fix(git): fail closed on YAML anchors in tea token fallback (#865 round 12)

The PyYAML-absent fallback's _strip_properties consumed a plain anchor
('&name') per-scalar, with no document-scoped registry of declared anchor
names. Real PyYAML's Composer rejects a duplicate anchor NAME declared
anywhere in the document (ComposerError, whole-document fail), but the
fallback would still emit the later token: fail-open (HIGH). Fix: reject
every '&'-anchor property unconditionally instead of building a hand-rolled
duplicate registry, which guarantees zero fail-open by construction at the
cost of a deliberate, endorsed over-reject on a single non-duplicated
anchor. The '!' non-specific-tag branch is unchanged ('! x' -> 'x' still
resolves).

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Active workstream is **W1 — Federation v1**. Workers should:
 | FCM-M3-002 | in-progress | Add isolated systemd/tmux lifecycle, drift, socket, unmanaged-session, crash, and rollback acceptance coverage                                                         | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates`   | FCM-M3-001                                     | 25K      | Canonical v2 named-socket + legacy-v1 default-server boundaries; fake adapters/temp fixtures only                                                                                                                  |
 | FCM-M4-001 | done        | Implement field-complete v1-to-v2 inventory/preview/migrator with alias, lifecycle, env-quarantine, and remote/connector disposition evidence                          | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-v1-v2-migrator`               | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M3-001                         | 35K      | PR #788; final head `d63bb0206a1d312ab8352ec1d3ca3631146b0baa`; tree `4da210da9a71b035130d4160a4a2e691bdfde2da`; squash `9745bc3f29c26b021a478b7ad03cfb494f6c9de3`; descendant-main pipeline 1855 terminal success |
 | FCM-M4-002 | not-started | Add reversible canary migration, rollback, stale-projection/orphan classification, and current-host 9-managed/3-unmanaged fixture coverage                             | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-migration-rollback-gates`     | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M3-002                         | 25K      | HOLD: never starts a previously stopped agent or kills an unproven unmanaged session; not authorized by FCM-M5-001                                                                                                 |
-| FCM-M5-001 | in-progress | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation                                                       | #758  | haiku         | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs`   | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K      | Sole owner: this FCM-M5-001 delivery on the recorded branch; must close every checklist item or record an approved deferral                                                                                        |
+| FCM-M5-001 | done        | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation                                                       | #758  | haiku         | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs`   | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K      | #789 content squash 627cf2bb; de-flake repair PR#851/#849 squash 77c9a826; completion proof wp1937 @aa999daf push/ci step 49632 recovery_runtime_unittest.py 3/3 OK (closes wp1932 step 49576 Errno111)            |
 | FCM-M5-002 | not-started | Package/update asset-drift checks, rolling local canary, independent validation certificate, and release evidence                                                      | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-config-release-gate`    | FCM-M3-002, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M5-001             | 30K      | HOLD: final #758 gate; quality, independent code/security review, validator certificate, merge-gate approval, and green CI remain out of M5-001                                                                    |
 
 ## Thin-core prompt diet (#528) — feat/contract-thin-core

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/README.md

@@ -4,6 +4,32 @@ These scripts provide host-aware GitHub and Gitea issue, pull-request, milestone
 
 ## Durable review provenance
 
-A successful provider write command—or a wrapper message based only on that command's exit code—is **not** durable review provenance. Review comments count as durable provenance only after the wrapper reads the created provider record back and verifies that it belongs to the intended repository and pull request and contains the exact submitted body (or verifies the provider-returned record ID).
+A successful provider write command—or a wrapper message based only on that command's exit code—is **not** durable review provenance. Review comments, approvals, and change requests count as durable provenance only after the wrapper reads the created provider record back and verifies that it was created by _this_ write.
 
-`pr-review.sh` therefore fails closed when a Gitea comment cannot be written, its created comment ID cannot be identified, or provider read-back does not match. It reports comment success only after that read-back verification passes.
+**The write is a direct Gitea REST `POST` that returns the created record's id.** Neither wrapper writes through `tea` — tea 0.11.1 can silently no-op while exiting 0 and cannot emit the id of a record it creates, so its exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write (#865). Instead:
+
+- Comments (`issue-comment.sh`, and the `comment` action of `pr-review.sh`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/comments`, requiring a `201` and parsing the created comment's `id` from the response body.
+- Reviews (`approve` / `request-changes`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/reviews` with the `event` (`APPROVED` / `REQUEST_CHANGES`), the review `body`, and `commit_id` pinned to the PR's current head, then parse the created review's `id`. The review body travels _in the review submit itself_ — there is no separate detached comment to reconcile (a Gitea `REQUEST_CHANGES` review requires a non-empty body, which the submit carries).
+
+**Verification keys on that exact provider-returned id.** The wrapper then `GET`s that one record directly — `GET /issues/comments/{id}` or `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews/{id}` — and requires that its `id` equals the created id, its **author login equals the acting identity** (resolved via `GET /api/v1/user` for the token in use), and, for comments, its body exactly matches what was submitted **and its returned web URL belongs to this exact provider and repository** (the `issue_url` / `pull_request_url` origin — scheme, host, and effective port — and full path, i.e. deployment prefix + exact `owner/repo` + kind + number, must match; a suffix/`endsWith` test would accept a look-alike host or a decoy path prefix, so the whole normalized URL is compared). The `comment` action of `pr-review.sh` additionally requires the returned resource be a **pull request** (a populated `pull_request_url`); a bare `issue_url` is rejected, so if issue `#N` exists but PR `#N` does not, an issue comment cannot be reported as a verified PR comment. (`issue-comment.sh` legitimately keeps the broader issue-or-PR acceptance.) For reviews, its state matches the requested action, its reviewed `commit_id` equals the PR head, **and its persisted body equals the submitted body** — an exact, presence- and type-checked equality (a missing/`null` persisted body no longer counts as an empty match), because Gitea can finalize/reuse a pending review id whose stored content was authored elsewhere, so the body is bound too. The write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use the **same** credential — the effective login's token, or the host credential when no login is named — so the write is verified against the identity that actually performed it.
+
+**A review's pinned head is re-checked after verification (current-head TOCTOU).** The `commit_id` is pinned to the PR head read _before_ the submit; between that read and the read-back the branch could advance (a force-push or a new commit), leaving a verified review attached to a now-superseded commit while the live tip carries unreviewed code. After the exact-id read-back succeeds, the wrapper re-reads the live PR head (`GET …/pulls/{n}`) and requires it still equals the submitted SHA; if the head advanced it fails closed (non-zero, no success line) rather than reporting a review that no longer covers the PR's current commit.
+
+**This closes the concurrency window rather than documenting it.** Because verification keys on the id the create returned, a no-op create yields no id and fails closed with no list-scan fallback, and a _concurrent_ record — even one written by the _same_ identity with an identical body/state — has a _different_ id and cannot be mistaken for this write. There is no residual same-identity window: the earlier boundary-and-author heuristic (accept any `id > pre-write-max` with a matching author) is replaced entirely by exact-id attribution.
+
+**Exact-id read-back is the sole authority.** Verification is a direct `GET` of the one record the create returned; there is no follow-up list enumeration. An earlier redundant pass that re-listed the record's page (`?limit=&page=1,2,…`) was removed: server-capped page sizes and list-pagination quirks made it a false-failure source (a durable, exact-id-verified record could be missed by a non-exhaustive enumeration), and it added nothing over the authoritative exact-id `GET`.
+
+## Credential handling
+
+The Gitea API token is **never passed on a curl command line.** An `Authorization: token <value>` argument would be visible to any local process that can read the process table (`ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`) for the lifetime of the request. Instead, every authenticated curl call writes the header into a private, mode-`0600` config file under `$TMPDIR` and passes it with `curl --config <file>` (`gitea_write_auth_config`), so only the file _path_ — never the token — appears in argv. Each such file is unlinked on every exit path (success and failure) by the caller's `RETURN` trap.
+
+## `tea` invocation notes (Gitea)
+
+- tea v0.11.1 has **no `comment` subcommand under `tea pr` or `tea issue`** — the `tea pr comment` / `tea issue comment` forms don't error, they silently fall through to a no-op and still exit 0, producing a false-success write (#865). tea's write subcommands (`tea comment`, `tea pr approve`/`reject`) also cannot report the id of the record they create, so their exit code cannot prove a durable write. These wrappers therefore do **not** write reviews or comments through `tea` at all; they use direct Gitea REST `POST`s that return the created record's id (see "Durable review provenance" above). `tea` is consulted only to enumerate the login list for host→login resolution.
+- Because the review body is carried in the `POST …/reviews` submit itself, there is no separate detached review comment, and the historical `tea pr approve`/`reject` trailing-positional-argument vs. nonexistent `--comment`/`-comment` flag hazard (#835) no longer applies to these wrappers — no review comment is ever passed to `tea`.
+
+### `--login` override
+
+Both `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` accept an optional `--login <name>` flag that overrides the automatically detected Gitea login for that single invocation. The override selects **which credential the REST write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use** — its token is resolved from the tea config for that login name (`get_gitea_token_for_login`), falling back to the repo host's credential when no login is named. The resolved login is **host- and port-bound**: the login's configured URL host **and effective port** (the scheme's default port — 80 for `http`, 443 for `https` — applies when a port is omitted, symmetrically on both sides) must match the repo remote's, so a login name shared across hosts (or an override configured for a different Gitea, including one on a different port of the same host) can never send one host's credential to another — a host or port mismatch fails closed rather than leaking a cross-host token. Resolving the acting identity and the read-back from the _same_ login that performs the write is essential: a write performed under an overridden login must be verified against that login's identity, not the host default's. Callers who need a different login than the host default should pass `--login <reviewer-login>`.
+
+As a durable successor to this mechanism, consider giving each reviewer/approver slot its own dedicated Gitea login credential, so that author≠reviewer holds at the credential level rather than relying on wrapper-level `--login` bookkeeping. This is a recommendation for future hardening, not something implemented by this flag.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -91,13 +91,19 @@ remote = urlparse(f"//{remote_host}")
 if configured.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or configured.hostname != remote.hostname:
     raise SystemExit(1)
 
-configured_port = configured.port
+# Normalize by scheme: an implicit (portless) HTTP(S) URL and its explicit
-remote_port = remote.port
+# default-port form (":80" for http, ":443" for https) name the same
-if remote_port is None:
+# provider endpoint. Apply that equivalence symmetrically -- whichever side
-    default_port = 80 if configured.scheme == "http" else 443
+# omits the port is treated as carrying the scheme's default port -- so
-    if configured_port not in {None, default_port}:
+# "configured implicit vs. remote explicit" and "configured explicit vs.
-        raise SystemExit(1)
+# remote implicit" both match. (The remote side here is always an HTTP(S)
-elif configured_port != remote_port:
+# authority; an SSH remote's transport port is stripped by get_remote_host
+# before reaching this comparison, since it identifies an unrelated
+# service on the same host, not the HTTP(S) provider port.)
+default_port = 80 if configured.scheme == "http" else 443
+normalized_configured = configured.port if configured.port is not None else default_port
+normalized_remote = remote.port if remote.port is not None else default_port
+if normalized_configured != normalized_remote:
     raise SystemExit(1)
 raise SystemExit(0)
 PY
@@ -432,7 +438,11 @@ get_remote_host() {
     fi
     if [[ "$remote_url" =~ ^ssh://([^/]+)/ ]]; then
         local host="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
-        echo "${host##*@}"
+        host="${host##*@}"
+        # Strip an SSH transport port (e.g. "git.example:2222"): it names the
+        # SSH daemon port, not the HTTP(S) provider API port, and must not
+        # feed gitea_url_matches_host's port comparison (#850).
+        echo "${host%%:*}"
         return 0
     fi
     if [[ "$remote_url" =~ ^git@([^:]+): ]]; then
@@ -553,6 +563,873 @@ get_gitea_token() {
     return 1
 }
 
+# Stage the Gitea bearer credential for curl OUTSIDE the process argument vector.
+# Passing "-H 'Authorization: token <value>'" on the curl command line exposes
+# the token to anyone who can read the process table (ps / /proc/<pid>/cmdline)
+# for the lifetime of the request. Instead, write the header into a private
+# (mode 0600) curl config file and have callers pass it with `curl --config`, so
+# only the FILE PATH — never the token — appears in argv. Prints the temp file
+# path on success; the caller OWNS the file and MUST remove it on every exit
+# path (success and failure). $1 = bearer token. Callers must not log the token.
+gitea_write_auth_config() {
+    local token="$1" auth_file
+    auth_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-gitea-auth.XXXXXX") || return 1
+    # mktemp already creates the file with 0600; be explicit in case of an
+    # unusual umask so the credential is never briefly group/other readable.
+    chmod 600 "$auth_file" 2>/dev/null || true
+    # `header = "..."` is curl's config syntax for an extra request header. Only
+    # this filename reaches curl's argv; the token stays on disk, readable solely
+    # by this user, and is unlinked by the caller's trap after the request.
+    if ! printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$token" > "$auth_file"; then
+        rm -f "$auth_file"
+        return 1
+    fi
+    printf '%s' "$auth_file"
+}
+
+# Resolve the API token for a SPECIFIC tea login name from tea's own config
+# (the same store tea itself writes/reads for `--login <name>`). This is what
+# lets a REST write be performed AS the selected --login identity: tea keys its
+# per-login tokens by `name` in $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/tea/config.yml (default
+# ~/.config/tea/config.yml), exactly as the `tea` CLI resolves them, so a
+# --login override and its REST read-back bind to the SAME credential/identity.
+#
+# $2 (repo host) binds the selected credential to the TARGET host: a tea login
+# also records the `url` it authenticates against, and the matched login's URL
+# host MUST equal the repo host. This fails closed when an override login is
+# configured for a DIFFERENT host than the repo remote, so a login name shared
+# across hosts (or a mistargeted override) can never send one host's credential
+# to another host (cross-host credential leak). When $2 is empty the host bind
+# is skipped (host-agnostic lookup) — callers that write should always pass it.
+#
+# Prints the token on success; returns non-zero (no output) if the config, a
+# matching login token, or the host bind cannot be satisfied. Callers must not
+# log the result.
+get_gitea_token_for_login() {
+    local login_name="$1" repo_host="${2:-}" config_file
+    [[ -n "$login_name" ]] || return 1
+    config_file="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/tea/config.yml"
+    [[ -f "$config_file" ]] || return 1
+
+    LOGIN_NAME="$login_name" REPO_HOST="$repo_host" python3 - "$config_file" <<'PY'
+import datetime
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+wanted = os.environ["LOGIN_NAME"]
+repo_host = os.environ.get("REPO_HOST", "").strip().lower()
+config_path = sys.argv[1]
+
+
+# PyYAML 6.0.3 SafeLoader implicit resolver patterns (YAML 1.1). An UNQUOTED
+# plain scalar matching any of these is resolved by PyYAML to a NON-string type
+# (null->None, bool, int, float, timestamp->date/datetime); a quoted scalar is
+# ALWAYS a string. These mirror yaml/resolver.py so the PyYAML-absent fallback
+# types unquoted scalars exactly as PyYAML would (see _implicit_nonstring).
+_IMPLICIT_NULL = re.compile(r"^(?:~|null|Null|NULL|)$")
+_IMPLICIT_BOOL = re.compile(
+    r"^(?:yes|Yes|YES|no|No|NO|true|True|TRUE|false|False|FALSE"
+    r"|on|On|ON|off|Off|OFF)$"
+)
+_IMPLICIT_INT = re.compile(
+    r"^(?:[-+]?0b[0-1_]+"
+    r"|[-+]?0[0-7_]+"
+    r"|[-+]?(?:0|[1-9][0-9_]*)"
+    r"|[-+]?0x[0-9a-fA-F_]+"
+    r"|[-+]?[1-9][0-9_]*(?::[0-5]?[0-9])+)$"
+)
+# NOTE: the exponent group requires an EXPLICIT sign ([eE][-+][0-9]+), matching
+# PyYAML 6.0.3's resolver.py float regex exactly. An unsigned exponent (e.g.
+# "1.0e10", ".5e10", "4.e8") is NOT matched by PyYAML's implicit float resolver
+# -- PyYAML resolves those as plain strings -- so this pattern must not match
+# them either, or the fallback over-rejects a token PyYAML would emit verbatim.
+_IMPLICIT_FLOAT = re.compile(
+    r"^(?:[-+]?(?:[0-9][0-9_]*)\.[0-9_]*(?:[eE][-+][0-9]+)?"
+    r"|\.[0-9][0-9_]*(?:[eE][-+][0-9]+)?"
+    r"|[-+]?[0-9][0-9_]*(?::[0-5]?[0-9])+\.[0-9_]*"
+    r"|[-+]?\.(?:inf|Inf|INF)"
+    r"|\.(?:nan|NaN|NAN))$"
+)
+_IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP = re.compile(
+    r"^(?:[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]"
+    r"|[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]?-[0-9][0-9]?"
+    r"(?:[Tt]|[ \t]+)[0-9][0-9]?"
+    r":[0-9][0-9]:[0-9][0-9](?:\.[0-9]*)?"
+    r"(?:[ \t]*(?:Z|[-+][0-9][0-9]?(?::[0-9][0-9])?))?)$"
+)
+
+
+def _implicit_nonstring(text):
+    # True when an UNQUOTED plain scalar would be resolved by PyYAML's SafeLoader
+    # to a non-string type (null/bool/int/float/timestamp). Fuzzed against real
+    # PyYAML 6.0.3: it never returns False where PyYAML types the scalar as a
+    # non-string (i.e. never fail-open), and (post exponent-sign fix) no longer
+    # over-rejects unsigned-exponent spellings like "4.e8" or "1.0e10" -- those
+    # match PyYAML's own implicit float resolver exactly (explicit sign only),
+    # so PyYAML keeps them as strings and this function now agrees.
+    return bool(
+        _IMPLICIT_NULL.match(text)
+        or _IMPLICIT_BOOL.match(text)
+        or _IMPLICIT_INT.match(text)
+        or _IMPLICIT_FLOAT.match(text)
+        or _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP.match(text)
+    )
+
+
+# PyYAML 6.0.3 SafeConstructor timestamp regexp (yaml/constructor.py). The
+# constructor RE-parses a timestamp-tagged scalar with THIS pattern and then
+# builds a datetime.date/datetime, which raises ValueError for an out-of-range
+# calendar field (e.g. month 99, hour 25). _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP (the RESOLVER
+# pattern) is byte-identical to PyYAML's resolver, so anything it tags is also
+# tagged by PyYAML and re-matched here.
+_TIMESTAMP_CONSTRUCT = re.compile(
+    r"""^(?P<year>[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9])
+        -(?P<month>[0-9][0-9]?)
+        -(?P<day>[0-9][0-9]?)
+        (?:(?:[Tt]|[ \t]+)
+        (?P<hour>[0-9][0-9]?)
+        :(?P<minute>[0-9][0-9])
+        :(?P<second>[0-9][0-9])
+        (?:\.(?P<fraction>[0-9]*))?
+        (?:[ \t]*(?P<tz>Z|(?P<tz_sign>[-+])(?P<tz_hour>[0-9][0-9]?)
+        (?::(?P<tz_minute>[0-9][0-9]))?))?)?$""",
+    re.X,
+)
+
+
+def _int_constructible(text):
+    # Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_int and report whether it
+    # would succeed. A resolver-tagged int whose radix body is empty after
+    # underscore removal (e.g. "0b_", "0x_", "0x__") makes int(base) raise, so
+    # PyYAML fails the WHOLE document -> the fallback must fail closed too.
+    value = text.replace("_", "")
+    if value[:1] in ("+", "-"):
+        value = value[1:]
+    if value == "0":
+        return True
+    try:
+        if value.startswith("0b"):
+            int(value[2:], 2)
+        elif value.startswith("0x"):
+            int(value[2:], 16)
+        elif value[:1] == "0":
+            int(value, 8)
+        elif ":" in value:
+            [int(part) for part in value.split(":")]
+        else:
+            int(value)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _float_constructible(text):
+    # Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_float. Retained for the
+    # WHOLE-document invariant: _IMPLICIT_FLOAT now matches PyYAML's resolver
+    # pattern exactly (explicit-sign exponent only), and every scalar it tags
+    # is float()-constructible, so this never fails closed where PyYAML would
+    # emit a token.
+    value = text.replace("_", "").lower()
+    if value[:1] in ("+", "-"):
+        value = value[1:]
+    if value in (".inf", ".nan"):
+        return True
+    try:
+        if ":" in value:
+            [float(part) for part in value.split(":")]
+        else:
+            float(value)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _timestamp_constructible(text):
+    # Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_timestamp: build the same
+    # datetime.date/datetime and report whether it raises. Returns False for an
+    # out-of-range calendar field (month/day/hour/...), matching PyYAML's
+    # whole-document ValueError.
+    match = _TIMESTAMP_CONSTRUCT.match(text)
+    if not match:
+        return False
+    values = match.groupdict()
+    try:
+        year = int(values["year"])
+        month = int(values["month"])
+        day = int(values["day"])
+        if not values["hour"]:
+            datetime.date(year, month, day)
+            return True
+        hour = int(values["hour"])
+        minute = int(values["minute"])
+        second = int(values["second"])
+        fraction = 0
+        if values["fraction"]:
+            frac = values["fraction"][:6]
+            frac += "0" * (6 - len(frac))
+            fraction = int(frac)
+        tzinfo = None
+        if values["tz_sign"]:
+            tz_hour = int(values["tz_hour"])
+            tz_minute = int(values["tz_minute"] or 0)
+            delta = datetime.timedelta(hours=tz_hour, minutes=tz_minute)
+            if values["tz_sign"] == "-":
+                delta = -delta
+            tzinfo = datetime.timezone(delta)
+        elif values["tz"]:
+            tzinfo = datetime.timezone.utc
+        datetime.datetime(
+            year, month, day, hour, minute, second, fraction, tzinfo=tzinfo
+        )
+    except (ValueError, OverflowError):
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _constructible(text):
+    # WHOLE-DOCUMENT INVARIANT: the fallback resolves the SAME login token as
+    # PyYAML safe_load or fails closed -- never less conservative -- INCLUDING
+    # when PyYAML raises a CONSTRUCTOR error anywhere in the document. A plain
+    # scalar can match a typed implicit resolver (int/float/timestamp) yet NOT be
+    # constructible (e.g. 2023-99-99, 0b_, 0x_); PyYAML then raises on the whole
+    # load and yields no token, so the fallback MUST fail closed for the whole
+    # document too. This returns True only when PyYAML's constructor would build
+    # the scalar (null/bool token sets are always constructible), else False so
+    # the caller fails closed. `text` is assumed to satisfy _implicit_nonstring.
+    if _IMPLICIT_NULL.match(text) or _IMPLICIT_BOOL.match(text):
+        return True
+    if _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP.match(text):
+        return _timestamp_constructible(text)
+    if _IMPLICIT_INT.match(text):
+        return _int_constructible(text)
+    if _IMPLICIT_FLOAT.match(text):
+        return _float_constructible(text)
+    return True
+
+
+# PyYAML's Reader.check_printable scans the ENTIRE raw input stream (not just
+# scalar contents, and NOT scoped by quoting) for code points outside its
+# printable set and raises ReaderError -- a whole-document reject -- the instant
+# one is found, no matter where it sits (an unrelated field, a comment, inside or
+# outside quotes). To guarantee parity WITHOUT a hand-rolled subset (which missed
+# the C1 block and BMP noncharacters), this is PyYAML 6.0.3's EXACT Reader
+# printable definition, negated verbatim:
+#   Reader.NON_PRINTABLE =
+#     re.compile('[^\x09\x0A\x0D\x20-\x7E\x85\xA0-퟿-<2D>'
+#                '\U00010000-\U0010FFFF]')
+# i.e. PRINTABLE = {TAB(0x09), LF(0x0A), CR(0x0D), 0x20-0x7E, NEL(0x85),
+# 0xA0-0xD7FF, 0xE000-0xFFFD, 0x10000-0x10FFFF}; EVERYTHING else (all other C0
+# controls, DEL 0x7F, the entire C1 block 0x80-0x84/0x86-0x9F, the surrogate
+# range 0xD800-0xDFFF, and the BMP noncharacters 0xFFFE/0xFFFF) is non-printable
+# -> whole-document fail closed. Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3
+# in both directions: the C1 bytes and 0xFFFE/0xFFFF reject; NEL(0x85), 0xA0, and
+# astral code points (e.g. U+1F600) are accepted and resolve the token. The prior
+# C0/DEL/tab behavior is a strict subset of this. (A surrogate code point cannot
+# occur in valid UTF-8, so it also trips the UTF-8 decode on read and fails
+# closed; it is included here for exact definitional parity.)
+_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL = re.compile(
+    "[^\x09\x0a\x0d\x20-\x7e\x85\xa0-퟿-<2D>\U00010000-\U0010ffff]"
+)
+
+# Sentinel: "outside the supported subset -> fail closed". Distinct from a
+# genuine null (None), which is a valid resolved value.
+_FAIL = object()
+# Separators are SPACE-only: PyYAML rejects a tab used as key/value whitespace
+# (before or after the ':') with a scanner error, so a tab there must NOT be
+# treated as a benign separator. Space before the colon and one space after it
+# stay valid (PyYAML strips a plain key's trailing spaces); a tab in either
+# position makes the whole line fail to match -> the caller fails closed.
+_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^([A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*) *:(?:[ ](.*)|)$")
+_FLOW = set("[]{}*&!")
+
+
+class _Bail(Exception):
+    # Raised the instant the document leaves the narrow tea-config subset this
+    # recognizer can prove it resolves IDENTICALLY to PyYAML. Caught by
+    # _safe_parse, which then fails closed (returns _FAIL) rather than guess.
+    pass
+
+
+def _strip_properties(value):
+    # Consume a leading YAML node non-specific tag ('!' + space) and return the
+    # remaining node text for normal resolution. PyYAML's SafeLoader applies
+    # this TRANSPARENT property and then resolves the following node with its
+    # ordinary implicit typing, so (verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3)
+    # '! x' -> 'x', '! ' -> null, exactly as the bare node would resolve.
+    # Returns _FAIL for every form we do NOT reproduce identically, so the
+    # caller fails closed: a tag shorthand ('!x' -> ConstructorError), an
+    # explicit or verbatim tag ('!!str' / '!!int' / '!<...>' / '!foo') whose
+    # type coercion we do not emulate, a tab separator (PyYAML scanner error),
+    # a duplicate tag ('! ! x' -> ParserError).
+    #
+    # ANCHORS ('&name'): deliberately rejected in FULL, not just duplicates.
+    # Real PyYAML tracks anchor NAMES in a document-scoped composer registry
+    # and raises ComposerError ("found duplicate anchor") the instant the
+    # SAME anchor name is declared on a SECOND node anywhere in the document
+    # -- including on a totally unrelated node far from the token field. This
+    # line-oriented fallback has no such document-wide registry (and building
+    # one reliably, across every node shape this recognizer does not even
+    # parse, risks missing a scope and re-opening the fail-open). So instead
+    # of emulating the registry, every '&'-anchor property fails closed here,
+    # unconditionally. This is a conservative OVER-reject relative to PyYAML:
+    # a single, non-duplicated '&a x' is valid YAML that real PyYAML resolves
+    # to 'x', but we refuse it too. That is intentional and safe -- fail
+    # closed can only cost an emitted token PyYAML would have allowed, never
+    # emit one PyYAML would reject.
+    seen_tag = False
+    while value[:1] in ("!", "&"):
+        if value[0] == "!":
+            # Non-specific tag: '!' then AT LEAST ONE SPACE. A tab is a PyYAML
+            # scanner error; '!x' / '!!type' / '!<verbatim>' are typed/short tags.
+            if seen_tag or len(value) < 2 or value[1] != " ":
+                return _FAIL
+            seen_tag = True
+            value = value[1:].lstrip(" ")
+        else:  # anchor '&name' -- always fail closed, see comment above
+            return _FAIL
+    return value
+
+
+def _scalar(raw):
+    # Resolve a single flow scalar (quoted or plain) the way PyYAML would for
+    # tea's simple values, or _FAIL when it is outside the supported subset so
+    # the caller fails closed instead of guessing.
+    #
+    # A quoted scalar is ALWAYS a string (its contents returned verbatim); a '#'
+    # inside quotes is data. An UNQUOTED scalar ends at the first whitespace
+    # -preceded '#' (a YAML comment must be preceded by whitespace or line start,
+    # so "abc#def" stays literal while "abc  # note" becomes "abc"), and is then
+    # subject to PyYAML's implicit typing: forms like 12345 / null / ~ / yes /
+    # 3.14 / a timestamp resolve to a NON-string (int/None/bool/float/date), so
+    # they return None here (PyYAML's path rejects a non-str token via _accept).
+    # Strip SPACES only, never tabs: PyYAML raises a scanner error on a tab in a
+    # plain/leading/trailing scalar position, so a tab must be PRESERVED here to
+    # trip the fail-closed guard below rather than be silently normalized away.
+    value = raw.strip(" ")
+    if not value:
+        return None  # empty plain scalar -> null
+    if value[0] in ("'", '"'):
+        quote = value[0]
+        end = value.find(quote, 1)
+        if end == -1:
+            return _FAIL  # unterminated quote: PyYAML would error / continue
+        rest = value[end + 1:].strip(" ")
+        if rest and not rest.startswith("#"):
+            return _FAIL  # trailing junk after a quoted scalar
+        inner = value[1:end]
+        # Single-quote '' escaping and double-quote backslash escapes are NOT
+        # interpreted here; reject any scalar that uses them so we never diverge
+        # from PyYAML on escape handling.
+        if quote == "'" and "'" in inner:
+            return _FAIL
+        if quote == '"' and "\\" in inner:
+            return _FAIL
+        return inner
+    for i, ch in enumerate(value):
+        if ch == "#" and (i == 0 or value[i - 1] in (" ", "\t")):
+            value = value[:i]
+            break
+    value = value.strip(" ")  # spaces only; a tab must survive to fail closed
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    if value[0] in ("!", "&"):
+        # Leading node property (non-specific tag '! ' / plain anchor '&name '):
+        # PyYAML applies it to the FOLLOWING node and resolves THAT, so strip the
+        # transparent forms and re-resolve the remainder EXACTLY (implicit typing
+        # and all). _strip_properties returns _FAIL for the tag/anchor forms
+        # PyYAML rejects or type-coerces, which fail closed here.
+        remainder = _strip_properties(value)
+        if remainder is _FAIL:
+            return _FAIL
+        return _scalar(remainder)
+    if value[0] in _FLOW or value[0] in ("|", ">", "@", "`", '"', "'", "%", ","):
+        return _FAIL  # flow / block-scalar / reserved / directive / quote
+    # NOTE: "?" is deliberately NOT in the blanket-reject set above. Empirically
+    # verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3: "?x" (indicator immediately followed by
+    # a non-space) is a plain scalar string "?x" like "-x" and ":x" are -- only
+    # "?" alone or "? " (followed by space/EOL) opens a complex mapping key and
+    # is illegal in a value position. Blanket-rejecting every leading "?" would
+    # over-reject a token PyYAML accepts verbatim; the narrower check below
+    # (mirroring "-" and ":") handles exactly the illegal bare-indicator forms.
+    if value[0] in ("-", "?", ":") and (len(value) == 1 or value[1] in (" ", "\t")):
+        # A bare block indicator, not a plain scalar: '-'/'- ' opens a sequence
+        # entry, '?'/'? ' a complex mapping key, ':'/': ' a mapping value -- all
+        # illegal in a value position, where PyYAML raises a scanner error on the
+        # whole document. "-x"/"-1"/"?x"/":x" (indicator NOT followed by space)
+        # remain valid plain scalars and fall through. Fail closed on the bare
+        # indicator so the fallback never emits a token PyYAML would refuse.
+        return _FAIL
+    # NO blanket internal-indicator reject here. In BLOCK context (where a tea
+    # config value always sits) PyYAML treats ',[]{}' as ordinary plain-scalar
+    # content -- they are flow indicators ONLY inside a flow collection -- and
+    # treats '!&*|>#%@`' plus quotes as significant ONLY at the FIRST non-space
+    # character of a node (a leading one starts a tag/anchor/alias/block-scalar/
+    # comment/directive/reserved/quote), which the leading-char guard above
+    # (value[0] ...) already rejects. Verified empirically against real PyYAML
+    # 6.0.3: an INTERNAL '!' ',' '[' ']' '{' '}' '&' '*' '#'(not space-preceded)
+    # ':'(not space-followed) all resolve as a plain-string token. The only
+    # internal positions PyYAML treats as significant in block context are ' #'
+    # (whitespace-preceded '#' -> comment; stripped by the loop above) and ': '
+    # or a trailing ':' (-> mapping; rejected by the ": "/endswith(":") guard
+    # below). A blanket any(ch in _FLOW ...) scan over-rejected those internal
+    # indicators, dropping a token PyYAML emits verbatim; removing it restores
+    # parity while the position-specific guards keep the fail-open direction shut.
+    if "\t" in value:
+        # A tab anywhere in a plain scalar (leading, trailing, or embedded) is a
+        # PyYAML scanner error on the whole document -- it accepts tabs ONLY
+        # inside quoted scalars (handled above, returned verbatim). Fail closed
+        # so the fallback never emits a token PyYAML would refuse over a tab.
+        return _FAIL
+    if ": " in value or value.endswith(":"):
+        return _FAIL  # nested-mapping-in-scalar / ambiguous
+    if _implicit_nonstring(value):
+        # A plain scalar PyYAML would tag as a non-string (null/bool/int/float/
+        # timestamp). If PyYAML's CONSTRUCTOR would build it, the value is a
+        # non-string -> null-equivalent for a token field: return None and keep
+        # parsing (as before). But if it matches a typed implicit resolver yet is
+        # NOT constructible (e.g. 2023-99-99, 0b_, 0x_), PyYAML raises on the
+        # WHOLE document and yields no token, so the fallback MUST fail closed
+        # for the whole document too -> _FAIL (which the caller turns into _Bail).
+        if not _constructible(value):
+            return _FAIL
+        return None
+    return value
+
+
+class _Parser:
+    # A deliberately NARROW, conservative recognizer for the block-style YAML
+    # subset tea writes (mappings of scalar fields; a `logins:` block SEQUENCE of
+    # such mappings; optional shallow nested mappings for e.g. preferences). It
+    # reconstructs the SAME Python object PyYAML's SafeLoader would, but the
+    # instant it meets anything it cannot prove it handles identically -- a
+    # document marker (--- / ...), a block scalar (| / >), a flow collection, a
+    # duplicate mapping key, inconsistent indentation, an escape, or any line
+    # outside the grammar -- it raises _Bail so the whole resolution fails
+    # closed. This guarantees the module invariant (only ever MORE conservative
+    # than PyYAML, never less) at the DOCUMENT level, closing the structural
+    # fail-open classes (nested-logins shadow, block-scalar shadow, duplicate
+    # root key, malformed-after-valid, and extra-document) that a line scan that
+    # does not validate whole-document structure would miss.
+    def __init__(self, lines):
+        self.toks = []
+        for raw in lines:
+            if not raw.strip():
+                continue
+            lead = raw[: len(raw) - len(raw.lstrip(" \t"))]
+            if "\t" in lead:
+                raise _Bail()  # tab in indentation: PyYAML scanner error
+            indent = len(lead)
+            body = raw[indent:]
+            if body.lstrip().startswith("#"):
+                continue
+            if re.match(r"^(---|\.\.\.)(\s|$)", body) or body in ("---", "..."):
+                raise _Bail()  # document / end marker -> multi-doc -> fail closed
+            # rstrip SPACES only: a trailing tab is a PyYAML scanner error, so it
+            # must be kept on the token body to reach the fail-closed guards
+            # (rstrip() would swallow it and let a bad line resolve a token).
+            self.toks.append((indent, body.rstrip(" ")))
+        self.i = 0
+
+    def peek(self):
+        return self.toks[self.i] if self.i < len(self.toks) else None
+
+    def parse_document(self):
+        if not self.toks:
+            return None
+        node = self.parse_node(0)
+        if self.i != len(self.toks):
+            raise _Bail()  # trailing unconsumed content -> malformed
+        return node
+
+    def parse_node(self, min_indent):
+        tok = self.peek()
+        if tok is None:
+            return None
+        indent, body = tok
+        if indent < min_indent:
+            return None
+        if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
+            return self.parse_seq(indent)
+        return self.parse_map(indent)
+
+    def parse_map(self, indent):
+        result = {}
+        while True:
+            tok = self.peek()
+            if tok is None:
+                break
+            cur_indent, body = tok
+            if cur_indent < indent:
+                break
+            if cur_indent > indent:
+                raise _Bail()  # unexpected deeper line (bad indentation)
+            if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
+                raise _Bail()  # sequence item where a mapping entry was expected
+            m = _KEY_RE.match(body)
+            if not m:
+                raise _Bail()
+            key = m.group(1)
+            inline = m.group(2)
+            self.i += 1
+            if key in result:
+                raise _Bail()  # duplicate mapping key (PyYAML last-wins; we bail)
+            if inline is not None and inline.strip(" ") != "":
+                val = _scalar(inline)
+                if val is _FAIL:
+                    raise _Bail()
+                result[key] = val
+            else:
+                result[key] = self.parse_block_value(indent)
+        return result
+
+    def parse_block_value(self, key_indent):
+        # The value after a "key:" with no inline scalar. A block SEQUENCE may sit
+        # at the same indent as the key (YAML permits `- ` aligned with the key --
+        # tea's own on-disk shape) or deeper; a block MAPPING must be strictly
+        # deeper; otherwise the value is null.
+        nxt = self.peek()
+        if nxt is None:
+            return None
+        ni, nb = nxt
+        is_item = nb.startswith("-") and (len(nb) == 1 or nb[1] in (" ", "\t"))
+        if is_item and ni >= key_indent:
+            return self.parse_seq(ni)
+        if ni > key_indent:
+            return self.parse_node(ni)
+        return None
+
+    def parse_seq(self, indent):
+        result = []
+        while True:
+            tok = self.peek()
+            if tok is None:
+                break
+            cur_indent, body = tok
+            if cur_indent < indent:
+                break
+            if cur_indent > indent:
+                raise _Bail()
+            if not (body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t"))):
+                break  # a mapping entry at this indent ends the sequence
+            rest = body[1:].strip(" ")  # spaces only; a tab must survive to bail
+            self.i += 1
+            if rest == "":
+                nxt = self.peek()
+                if nxt is not None and nxt[0] > indent:
+                    result.append(self.parse_node(indent + 1))
+                else:
+                    result.append(None)
+                continue
+            km = _KEY_RE.match(rest)
+            if km:
+                # "- key: value" opens a mapping whose fields continue at the
+                # column where the content after the dash began.
+                field_indent = indent + (len(body) - len(body[1:].lstrip()))
+                result.append(self.parse_inline_map(field_indent, km))
+            else:
+                val = _scalar(rest)
+                if val is _FAIL:
+                    raise _Bail()
+                result.append(val)
+        return result
+
+    def parse_inline_map(self, field_indent, first_match):
+        result = {}
+        key = first_match.group(1)
+        inline = first_match.group(2)
+        if inline is not None and inline.strip(" ") != "":
+            val = _scalar(inline)
+            if val is _FAIL:
+                raise _Bail()
+            result[key] = val
+        else:
+            result[key] = self.parse_block_value(field_indent)
+        while True:
+            tok = self.peek()
+            if tok is None:
+                break
+            cur_indent, body = tok
+            if cur_indent != field_indent:
+                if cur_indent > field_indent:
+                    raise _Bail()
+                break
+            if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
+                raise _Bail()
+            m = _KEY_RE.match(body)
+            if not m:
+                raise _Bail()
+            k = m.group(1)
+            iv = m.group(2)
+            self.i += 1
+            if k in result:
+                raise _Bail()
+            if iv is not None and iv.strip(" ") != "":
+                v = _scalar(iv)
+                if v is _FAIL:
+                    raise _Bail()
+                result[k] = v
+            else:
+                result[k] = self.parse_block_value(field_indent)
+        return result
+
+
+def _safe_parse(lines):
+    # Return the parsed root object (dict/list/scalar/None) when the WHOLE
+    # document is inside the supported subset, else _FAIL (fail closed).
+    try:
+        return _Parser(lines).parse_document()
+    except _Bail:
+        return _FAIL
+    except Exception:
+        return _FAIL
+
+
+def _url_matches_repo_host(url):
+    # Mirror gitea_url_matches_host (detect-platform.sh): the login's recorded
+    # URL must name the SAME host AND the SAME effective port as the repo remote
+    # host, not merely the same hostname. A login configured for an explicit,
+    # non-default provider port (e.g. :9443) must NOT satisfy a portless (default
+    # -port) repo host, and a login on the matching port (e.g. :8443) must NOT be
+    # rejected. Ports are normalized by applying the login URL's scheme default
+    # (80 for http, else 443) to whichever side omits the port, symmetrically, so
+    # an implicit port and its explicit default-port form compare equal.
+    if not isinstance(url, str) or not url:
+        return False
+    configured = urlparse(url if "//" in url else f"//{url}")
+    remote = urlparse(f"//{repo_host}")
+    configured_host = configured.hostname
+    if not configured_host or configured_host.lower() != (remote.hostname or "").lower():
+        return False
+    default_port = 80 if configured.scheme == "http" else 443
+    configured_port = configured.port if configured.port is not None else default_port
+    remote_port = remote.port if remote.port is not None else default_port
+    return configured_port == remote_port
+
+
+def _accept(token, url):
+    # Enforce the host bind before surfacing a token. When a repo host is given,
+    # the login's recorded URL host AND port must match it; a login with no
+    # usable URL (or a mismatched host/port) is rejected (fail closed) so a
+    # cross-host (or cross-port) credential is never emitted.
+    if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+        return None
+    if repo_host:
+        if not _url_matches_repo_host(url):
+            return None
+    return token
+
+
+def _token_via_pyyaml():
+    # Preferred, fully general path when PyYAML is installed. Raises ImportError
+    # (caught by the caller) when the module is unavailable so the environment
+    # -robust fallback can take over instead of failing closed on every host
+    # that lacks PyYAML.
+    import yaml
+
+    with open(config_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        config = yaml.safe_load(handle)
+    logins = config.get("logins") if isinstance(config, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(logins, list):
+        return None
+    for login in logins:
+        if isinstance(login, dict) and str(login.get("name") or "") == wanted:
+            return _accept(login.get("token"), login.get("url"))
+    return None
+
+
+_BREAKS = "\r\n\x85

"
+_VALUE_OPEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s+)*[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*:$")
+_SEQ_OPEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s+)*-$")
+
+
+def _value_open_before(prefix):
+    # True when a quote appearing at the END of `prefix` (the current logical
+    # line so far) begins a flow SCALAR value -- the only position where a quote
+    # opens a quoted scalar whose embedded line breaks PyYAML folds instead of
+    # splitting. That is: the prefix is empty/all-indent (root or block scalar
+    # start), or ends with a mapping ': ' or a sequence '- ' indicator that is
+    # SPACE-separated from the quote. A quote glued to the previous char (e.g.
+    # 'key:"x') is NOT a value opener (PyYAML needs the space), and a quote mid
+    # -content is literal -- both fail this test, so their breaks split the line
+    # exactly as before (fail closed / plain-scalar behavior preserved).
+    stripped = prefix.rstrip(" ")
+    if stripped == "":
+        return True  # start of line (after any indentation) -> node value start
+    if prefix == stripped:
+        return False  # no space before the quote -> not a value opener
+    return bool(_VALUE_OPEN_RE.match(stripped) or _SEQ_OPEN_RE.match(stripped))
+
+
+def _fold_quoted_break_run(run):
+    # Reproduce PyYAML's flow-scalar folding (scan_flow_scalar_spaces +
+    # scan_flow_scalar_breaks) for the maximal ' \t' + line-break run inside a
+    # quoted scalar. A run with NO break is literal whitespace (verbatim). With a
+    # break: surrounding spaces/tabs are dropped; a single \n-class break
+    # (\n / \r / \r\n / \x85 NEL) folds to ONE space; 
 (LS) / 
 (PS)
+    # are kept verbatim; each ADDITIONAL break (a blank line) contributes its own
+    # break char (\n for the \n-class). Verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3 for
+    # both double- and single-quoted scalars (they fold identically here).
+    def _lb(s, j):
+        if s[j] == "\r" and j + 1 < len(s) and s[j + 1] == "\n":
+            return "\n", 2
+        if s[j] in "\r\n\x85":
+            return "\n", 1
+        return s[j], 1  # 
 / 
 preserved verbatim
+    n = len(run)
+    j = 0
+    while j < n and run[j] in " \t":
+        j += 1
+    if j >= n:
+        return run  # pure whitespace, no break -> literal content
+    line_break, adv = _lb(run, j)
+    j += adv
+    breaks = []
+    while True:
+        while j < n and run[j] in " \t":
+            j += 1
+        if j < n and run[j] in _BREAKS:
+            b, adv = _lb(run, j)
+            j += adv
+            breaks.append(b)
+        else:
+            break
+    out = ""
+    if line_break != "\n":
+        out += line_break
+    elif not breaks:
+        out += " "
+    return out + "".join(breaks)
+
+
+def _split_logical_lines(raw_text):
+    # Split like str.splitlines() EXCEPT a line break INSIDE a value-opening
+    # quoted scalar does NOT end the line: PyYAML keeps the quoted scalar together
+    # and folds the break (flow folding above), so we fold it and continue the
+    # same logical line. Only the break chars that survive the _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL
+    # gate reach here: \n, \r, \x85 (NEL), 
 (LS), 
 (PS). OUTSIDE
+    # quotes every one ends the line (matching PyYAML's block-level line breaks
+    # and str.splitlines), so a NEL/LS/PS used as the document's line-terminator
+    # style, and an UNQUOTED plain scalar carrying an embedded break, split and
+    # fail closed exactly as before. A quoted scalar left unterminated at EOF
+    # stays on the final line and fails closed in _scalar (PyYAML errors too).
+    out = []
+    cur = []
+    i = 0
+    n = len(raw_text)
+    quote = None
+    while i < n:
+        ch = raw_text[i]
+        if quote is None:
+            if ch in _BREAKS:
+                out.append("".join(cur))
+                cur = []
+                i += 2 if (ch == "\r" and i + 1 < n and raw_text[i + 1] == "\n") else 1
+                continue
+            if ch in ("'", '"') and _value_open_before("".join(cur)):
+                quote = ch
+                cur.append(ch)
+                i += 1
+                continue
+            cur.append(ch)
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        # inside a value-opening quoted scalar
+        if ch == quote:
+            cur.append(ch)
+            quote = None
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        if ch in " \t" or ch in _BREAKS:
+            j = i
+            has_break = False
+            while j < n and (raw_text[j] in " \t" or raw_text[j] in _BREAKS):
+                if raw_text[j] in _BREAKS:
+                    has_break = True
+                j += 1
+            run = raw_text[i:j]
+            if has_break:
+                # A continuation line beginning (at column 0, no indent) with a
+                # document marker is a PyYAML scanner error even inside a quoted
+                # scalar; when the run ends on a break the continuation content at
+                # j is at column 0, so guard it and fail closed. (An INDENTED
+                # '---' is literal content to PyYAML and folds normally.)
+                if run[-1] in _BREAKS and raw_text[j:j + 3] in ("---", "...") and (
+                    j + 3 >= n or raw_text[j + 3] in "\0 \t" + _BREAKS
+                ):
+                    raise _Bail()
+                cur.append(_fold_quoted_break_run(run))
+            else:
+                cur.append(run)
+            i = j
+            continue
+        cur.append(ch)
+        i += 1
+    if cur or not out:
+        out.append("".join(cur))
+    return out
+
+
+def _token_via_lines():
+    # Conservative fallback for hosts without PyYAML. It parses config.yml with a
+    # strict recognizer (_safe_parse) of the narrow block-style subset tea writes,
+    # which reconstructs the SAME object PyYAML would OR fails closed (_FAIL) on
+    # ANYTHING it cannot prove it resolves identically -- document markers, block
+    # scalars, flow collections, duplicate keys, inconsistent indentation, or any
+    # line outside the grammar. On a recognized document it then resolves the
+    # login EXACTLY as the PyYAML path does (root `logins` list -> first entry
+    # whose `name` equals the request -> host/port-bound token), so the fallback
+    # can only ever be MORE conservative than PyYAML, never less.
+    with open(config_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        raw_text = handle.read()
+
+    # Whole-document, position-independent reject: PyYAML's Reader rejects the
+    # ENTIRE document (ReaderError) if a NON-printable code point (per its exact
+    # printable definition -- see _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL: C0 controls, DEL, the C1
+    # block, surrogates, and 0xFFFE/0xFFFF) appears ANYWHERE in the raw stream --
+    # in a plain scalar, inside single- or double-quoted scalars, in a comment,
+    # or in a field this recognizer never even looks at. Checking the raw text
+    # (before line splitting, which would otherwise split on some of these same
+    # code points -- e.g. \x0b, \x0c, \x1c-\x1e -- and obscure them) mirrors that
+    # exactly: fail closed for the whole document. (NEL 0x85, LS 0x2028 and PS
+    # 0x2029 are PRINTABLE to PyYAML's Reader, so they are NOT in
+    # _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL; _split_logical_lines below reproduces PyYAML's line-break
+    # semantics for them -- a structural break outside quotes, a FOLDED break
+    # inside a quoted scalar -- rather than str.splitlines(), which would wrongly
+    # split them mid-quote and fail-close a token PyYAML resolves.)
+    if _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL.search(raw_text):
+        return None
+
+    lines = _split_logical_lines(raw_text)
+
+    config = _safe_parse(lines)
+    if config is _FAIL:
+        return None
+    logins = config.get("logins") if isinstance(config, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(logins, list):
+        return None
+    for login in logins:
+        if isinstance(login, dict) and str(login.get("name") or "") == wanted:
+            return _accept(login.get("token"), login.get("url"))
+    return None
+
+
+try:
+    try:
+        token = _token_via_pyyaml()
+    except ImportError:
+        token = _token_via_lines()
+except Exception:
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+if isinstance(token, str) and token:
+    print(token)
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+}
+
 # Resolve HTTPS basic auth credentials for a Gitea host from ~/.git-credentials.
 # Prints "username:password" for direct curl -u consumption. Callers must not log it.
 get_gitea_basic_auth() {

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-comment.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,26 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # issue-comment.sh - Add a comment to an issue on GitHub or Gitea
-# Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment>
+# Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment> [--login <name>]
+#
+# tea v0.11.1 defines no `comment` subcommand under `tea issue` (or `tea pr`);
+# the non-existent `tea issue comment ...` form does not error — tea silently
+# no-ops and still exits 0, so a caller trusting the exit code believes a
+# comment was posted when it was not (#865). tea 0.11.1 also cannot reliably
+# emit the id of a record it created, so an exit code is the ONLY signal it
+# offers — and that signal is untrustworthy. This script therefore does not
+# write via tea at all: it POSTs the comment through the Gitea REST API (which
+# returns the created comment object, including its id), then GETs that exact
+# id back and fails closed unless it matches. Keying verification to the
+# provider-returned created id means a concurrent comment cannot masquerade as
+# this write and a no-op create simply yields no id to verify.
+#
+# --login override: the default login is resolved from the local `tea` login
+# list for this repo's host (get_gitea_login). Pass --login <name> to override
+# it for this invocation only. The REST write, the /user identity read, and the
+# read-back are ALL performed with the token of the EFFECTIVE login (the
+# override when given), so the write and its verification bind to the same
+# identity — a --login override is never written under one credential and
+# verified under a different default one.
 
 set -e
 
@@ -10,6 +30,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 # Parse arguments
 ISSUE_NUMBER=""
 COMMENT=""
+LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     case $1 in
@@ -21,12 +42,17 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             COMMENT="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -l|--login)
+            LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            echo "Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment>"
+            echo "Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment> [--login <name>]"
             echo ""
             echo "Options:"
             echo "  -i, --issue    Issue number (required)"
             echo "  -c, --comment  Comment text (required)"
+            echo "  -l, --login    Override the detected Gitea tea login for this call"
             echo "  -h, --help     Show this help"
             exit 0
             ;;
@@ -49,20 +75,273 @@ fi
 
 detect_platform >/dev/null
 
+# Resolve and cache the Gitea REST endpoint + token for the current remote,
+# bound to a SPECIFIC login identity ($1). Populates GITEA_API_ROOT (…/api/v1),
+# GITEA_API_BASE (…/api/v1/repos/<slug>), and GITEA_API_TOKEN.
+#
+# The token is resolved for the EFFECTIVE login (the --login override when
+# given, otherwise the detected default) so that the single credential used for
+# the write ALSO drives the /user identity read and the read-back — write token
+# and read-back token are the same identity by construction (this is the
+# credential-ordering fix: a --login override is no longer written under one
+# credential and verified under a different default one). Falls back to the
+# host-scoped credential ONLY when NO --login override was supplied (the
+# best-effort default path). When $2 is "explicit" the login came from a
+# caller-supplied --login: that exact login's token MUST resolve, and we FAIL
+# CLOSED rather than silently downgrading the write to the host default
+# identity — otherwise a caller relying on a dedicated per-role credential would
+# be told the write succeeded as requested while it was attributed to the shared
+# default. Returns non-zero (clear stderr) on any resolution failure.
+gitea_resolve_api_for_login() {
+    local effective_login="$1" override_explicit="${2:-}" host configured_url repo
+
+    host=$(get_remote_host)
+    if [[ -n "$override_explicit" ]]; then
+        GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") || {
+            echo "Error: could not resolve a host-matched Gitea token for --login '$effective_login' on host '$host'; refusing to fall back to the host default identity or a cross-host credential (comment write/read-back)" >&2
+            return 1
+        }
+    else
+        GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") \
+            || GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
+            echo "Error: Gitea token not found for login '$effective_login' (comment write/read-back)" >&2
+            return 1
+        }
+    fi
+    configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
+        echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for comment read-back verification" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
+        echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    GITEA_API_ROOT="${configured_url%/}/api/v1"
+    GITEA_API_BASE="$GITEA_API_ROOT/repos/$repo"
+    # The provider WEB base (scheme + host + effective port + any deployment path
+    # prefix) that Gitea uses to build a comment's html issue_url/pull_request_url.
+    # Read-back verification pins the returned URL's origin + path prefix to THIS,
+    # not just a repo/issue suffix.
+    GITEA_WEB_BASE="${configured_url%/}"
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Resolve the login of the identity the API token authenticates as (GET
+# /user). Used to attribute a read-back record to THIS invocation's writer so
+# a concurrent write from a DIFFERENT identity cannot satisfy verification.
+# Prints the login on success.
+gitea_authenticated_login() {
+    local response_file auth_config status
+
+    response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-whoami.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$response_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for identity read" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$response_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_ROOT/user"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    python3 - "$response_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        user = json.load(response)
+    login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(login, str) or not login:
+        raise ValueError("missing authenticated login")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not resolve authenticated Gitea identity: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(login)
+PY
+}
+
+# Post a comment to a Gitea issue via the supported REST API and verify it
+# durably against a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id — never trust an exit code
+# (#865 defect class: tea's non-existent `tea issue comment` no-ops yet exits
+# 0). The write is a direct POST that returns the created comment object, so we
+# learn the exact id of THIS write; we then GET that exact id and require
+# id == created id AND author == acting identity AND exact body AND that it
+# belongs to this issue. Because verification is keyed to the id the create
+# returned, a concurrent comment (even same identity, same body) CANNOT
+# masquerade as this write, and a suppressed/no-op write yields no created id
+# and fails closed — there is no fallback list scan that a concurrent record
+# could satisfy. Prints the created comment id on success.
+#
+# Args: $1 = issue number, $2 = comment body, $3 = acting identity login.
+gitea_create_comment_verified() {
+    local issue_number="$1" comment_body="$2" acting_login="$3"
+    local payload write_file readback_file auth_config write_status readback_status created_id
+
+    payload=$(COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" python3 -c '
+import json
+import os
+
+print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
+')
+    write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-write.XXXXXX")
+    readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-getid.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for comment write" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        -X POST \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+        -d "$payload" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/$issue_number/comments"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment write transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment write failed with HTTP $write_status (#865: no durable comment created)" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        comment = json.load(response)
+    created_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
+        raise ValueError("create response carried no positive comment id")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea comment: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(created_id)
+PY
+) || return 1
+
+    if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/comments/$created_id"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" \
+        ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG="${GITEA_API_BASE##*/repos/}" \
+        EXPECTED_NUMBER="$issue_number" EXPECTED_WEB_BASE="$GITEA_WEB_BASE" \
+        python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+
+def _origin_and_path(url):
+    # Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
+    # defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
+    # port and its explicit default form compare equal.
+    parsed = urlparse(url or "")
+    scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
+    port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
+    return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
+
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        comment = json.load(response)
+    if not isinstance(comment, dict):
+        raise ValueError("response is not a comment object")
+    expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID"])
+    expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY"]
+    acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
+    slug = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG"]
+    number = os.environ["EXPECTED_NUMBER"]
+    web_base = os.environ["EXPECTED_WEB_BASE"]
+    # Gitea populates WEB (html) URLs here, not API paths. A plain issue comment
+    # carries issue_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/issues/<n> (pull_request_url
+    # empty); a comment posted to a PR's conversation carries
+    # pull_request_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/<n> (issue_url empty).
+    # Pin the returned URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+port) and its FULL path to this
+    # provider + repo + kind + number — an endswith/suffix test would accept a
+    # look-alike host (evil.example/deceptive/<slug>/issues/N) or a same-host
+    # decoy prefix (/other/<slug>/issues/N), so compare the whole thing.
+    base_origin, base_path = _origin_and_path(web_base)
+    expected_issue_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/issues/{number}"
+    expected_pr_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/pulls/{number}"
+
+    def _belongs(url, expected_path):
+        if not url:
+            return False
+        origin, path = _origin_and_path(url)
+        return origin == base_origin and path == expected_path
+
+    if comment.get("id") != expected_id:
+        raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
+    if (comment.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
+        raise ValueError("created comment is not authored by the acting identity")
+    if comment.get("body") != expected_body:
+        raise ValueError("created comment body does not match")
+    if not (
+        _belongs(comment.get("issue_url"), expected_issue_path)
+        or _belongs(comment.get("pull_request_url"), expected_pr_path)
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("created comment does not belong to this issue on this provider/repo")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: Gitea comment persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+
+    echo "$created_id"
+    return 0
+}
+
 if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
     echo "Added comment to GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
-    # Build the invocation as an argv array (not unquoted $(get_gitea_repo_args)
+    # Resolve the login this comment should be attributed to: the --login
-    # word-splitting) so the comment body — including Markdown backticks, $(...),
+    # override when given, otherwise the detected default for this repo's host.
-    # and quotes — is passed verbatim and never re-split or shell-evaluated.
+    # A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this repo host's login only
-    REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug)
+    # as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login token, and
-    GITEA_LOGIN_NAME=$(get_gitea_login) || {
+    # gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host credential
-        echo "Error: could not resolve a Gitea login for this repo; cannot comment on issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER." >&2
+    # (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named, so the default credential
+    # still resolves even when the host tea has no matching login entry.
+    EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
+    [[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login 2>/dev/null || true)
+
+    # Bind the REST endpoint + token to the effective login, then derive the
+    # acting identity from that SAME credential (GET /user). The write below and
+    # its read-back both use this credential, so the write is verified against
+    # the identity that actually performed it. Passing "explicit" when --login
+    # was supplied forbids the host-default fallback: an unresolvable explicit
+    # override fails closed instead of writing under the default identity.
+    gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
+    ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
+
+    comment_id=$(gitea_create_comment_verified "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN") || {
+        echo "Error: could not create and verify a comment on Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
         exit 1
     }
-    tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" --repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME"
+    echo "Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
-    echo "Added comment to Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform"
     exit 1

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-review.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-review.sh - Review a pull request on GitHub or Gitea
-# Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>]
+# Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>] [--login <name>]
+#
+# Gitea reviews and comments are written through the supported REST API, not
+# `tea`: tea 0.11.1 cannot emit the id of a record it creates and can silently
+# no-op while exiting 0 (#865 defect class), so an exit code is the only — and
+# untrustworthy — signal it offers. approve/request-changes POST to
+# /pulls/{n}/reviews (returns the created review with its id); the `comment`
+# action POSTs to /issues/{n}/comments (returns the created comment with its
+# id). Each write is then verified by GETting that exact returned id, so a
+# concurrent record cannot masquerade as this write and a no-op fails closed.
+#
+# --login override: the default login is resolved from the local tea login list
+# for this repo's host (get_gitea_login_for_host). Pass --login <name> to
+# override it for this invocation only. The REST write, the /user identity read,
+# and every read-back are ALL performed with the token of the EFFECTIVE login,
+# so the write and its verification bind to the same identity.
 
 set -e
 
@@ -12,6 +27,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 PR_NUMBER=""
 ACTION=""
 COMMENT=""
+LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     case $1 in
@@ -27,13 +43,18 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             COMMENT="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -l|--login)
+            LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>]"
+            echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>] [--login <name>]"
             echo ""
             echo "Options:"
             echo "  -n, --number   PR number (required)"
             echo "  -a, --action   Review action: approve, request-changes, comment (required)"
             echo "  -c, --comment  Review comment (required for request-changes)"
+            echo "  -l, --login    Override the detected Gitea tea login (approve/request-changes only)"
             echo "  -h, --help     Show this help"
             exit 0
             ;;
@@ -56,6 +77,448 @@ fi
 
 detect_platform >/dev/null
 
+# Post a comment to a Gitea PR (PR comments ARE issue comments) via the
+# supported REST API and verify it against a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id. The
+# write is a direct POST that returns the created comment object, so we learn
+# the exact id of THIS write; we GET that exact id and require id == created id
+# AND author == acting identity AND exact body AND that it belongs to this PR.
+# Keying to the returned id means no concurrent comment (even same identity /
+# body) can masquerade as this write, and a no-op create yields no id and fails
+# closed. Requires GITEA_API_BASE / GITEA_API_TOKEN to be resolved first (via
+# gitea_resolve_api_for_login). Prints the created comment id on success.
+#
+# Args: $1 = PR number, $2 = comment body, $3 = acting identity login.
+gitea_create_comment_verified() {
+    local pr_number="$1" comment_body="$2" acting_login="$3"
+    local payload write_file readback_file auth_config write_status readback_status created_id
+
+    payload=$(COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" python3 -c '
+import json
+import os
+
+print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
+')
+    write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-write.XXXXXX")
+    readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-getid.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for comment write" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        -X POST \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+        -d "$payload" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/$pr_number/comments"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment write transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment write failed with HTTP $write_status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        comment = json.load(response)
+    created_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
+        raise ValueError("create response carried no positive comment id")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea comment: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(created_id)
+PY
+) || return 1
+
+    if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/comments/$created_id"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" \
+        ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG="${GITEA_API_BASE##*/repos/}" \
+        EXPECTED_NUMBER="$pr_number" EXPECTED_WEB_BASE="$GITEA_WEB_BASE" \
+        python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+
+def _origin_and_path(url):
+    # Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
+    # defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
+    # port and its explicit default form compare equal.
+    parsed = urlparse(url or "")
+    scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
+    port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
+    return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
+
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        comment = json.load(response)
+    if not isinstance(comment, dict):
+        raise ValueError("response is not a comment object")
+    expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID"])
+    expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY"]
+    acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
+    slug = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG"]
+    number = os.environ["EXPECTED_NUMBER"]
+    web_base = os.environ["EXPECTED_WEB_BASE"]
+    # Gitea populates WEB (html) URLs here, not API paths. A PR-conversation
+    # comment carries pull_request_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/<n> (with
+    # issue_url empty), while a plain issue comment carries
+    # issue_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/issues/<n> (with pull_request_url empty).
+    # This is the pr-review `comment` action, so the comment MUST land on a pull
+    # request: require pull_request_url. A plain issue_url is REJECTED — if issue
+    # #N exists but PR #N does not, POST /issues/N/comments creates an issue
+    # comment, and accepting that issue_url would let the wrapper falsely report a
+    # verified PR comment (issue-comment.sh legitimately keeps the broader
+    # issue-or-PR acceptance; a PR review does not).
+    # Pin the returned URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+port) and its FULL path to this
+    # provider + repo + kind + number — an endswith/suffix test would accept a
+    # look-alike host (evil.example/deceptive/<slug>/pulls/N) or a same-host
+    # decoy prefix (/other/<slug>/pulls/N), so compare the whole thing.
+    base_origin, base_path = _origin_and_path(web_base)
+    expected_pr_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/pulls/{number}"
+
+    def _belongs(url, expected_path):
+        if not url:
+            return False
+        origin, path = _origin_and_path(url)
+        return origin == base_origin and path == expected_path
+
+    if comment.get("id") != expected_id:
+        raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
+    if (comment.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
+        raise ValueError("created comment is not authored by the acting identity")
+    if comment.get("body") != expected_body:
+        raise ValueError("created comment body does not match")
+    if not _belongs(comment.get("pull_request_url"), expected_pr_path):
+        raise ValueError("claimed PR comment did not land on a pull request (kind=pulls) on this provider/repo")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: Gitea comment persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+
+    echo "$created_id"
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Resolve and cache the Gitea REST endpoint + token for the current remote,
+# bound to a SPECIFIC login identity ($1). Populates GITEA_API_ROOT (…/api/v1),
+# GITEA_API_BASE (…/api/v1/repos/<slug>), and GITEA_API_TOKEN.
+#
+# The token is resolved for the EFFECTIVE login (the --login override when
+# given, otherwise the detected default), so the one credential used to submit
+# the review/comment ALSO drives the /user identity read and every read-back —
+# write token and read-back token are the same identity by construction. This
+# is the credential-ordering fix: a --login override is no longer submitted
+# under one credential and verified under a different default one. Falls back to
+# the host-scoped credential ONLY when NO --login override was supplied (the
+# best-effort default path). When $2 is "explicit" the login came from a
+# caller-supplied --login: that exact login's token MUST resolve, and we FAIL
+# CLOSED rather than silently downgrading the review/comment to the host default
+# identity. Returns non-zero (clear stderr) on any resolution failure.
+gitea_resolve_api_for_login() {
+    local effective_login="$1" override_explicit="${2:-}" host configured_url repo
+
+    host=$(get_remote_host)
+    if [[ -n "$override_explicit" ]]; then
+        GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") || {
+            echo "Error: could not resolve a host-matched Gitea token for --login '$effective_login' on host '$host'; refusing to fall back to the host default identity or a cross-host credential (review write/read-back)" >&2
+            return 1
+        }
+    else
+        GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") \
+            || GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
+            echo "Error: Gitea token not found for login '$effective_login' (review write/read-back)" >&2
+            return 1
+        }
+    fi
+    configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
+        echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for review read-back verification" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
+        echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    GITEA_API_ROOT="${configured_url%/}/api/v1"
+    GITEA_API_BASE="$GITEA_API_ROOT/repos/$repo"
+    # The provider WEB base (scheme + host + effective port + any deployment path
+    # prefix) that Gitea uses to build a comment's html issue_url/pull_request_url.
+    # Read-back verification pins the returned URL's origin + path prefix to THIS,
+    # not just a repo/PR suffix.
+    GITEA_WEB_BASE="${configured_url%/}"
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Resolve the login of the identity the API token authenticates as (GET
+# /user). Used to attribute a read-back review to THIS action's reviewer so a
+# concurrent review from a DIFFERENT identity cannot satisfy verification.
+# Prints the login on success.
+gitea_authenticated_login() {
+    local response_file auth_config status
+
+    response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-whoami.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$response_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for identity read" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$response_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_ROOT/user"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    python3 - "$response_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        user = json.load(response)
+    login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(login, str) or not login:
+        raise ValueError("missing authenticated login")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not resolve authenticated Gitea identity: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(login)
+PY
+}
+
+# GET /pulls/{n} into a caller-owned response file and print its head commit
+# SHA. This core sets NO RETURN trap and reuses a caller-provided auth config +
+# response file, so it is safe to call from INSIDE another trapped function
+# (the post-verify re-read below) without clobbering that function's cleanup
+# trap. $1 = PR number, $2 = response file, $3 = curl auth config file.
+gitea_read_pr_head_into() {
+    local pr_number="$1" pr_file="$2" auth_config="$3" status
+
+    if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$pr_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea PR head read transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea PR head read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    python3 - "$pr_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        pr = json.load(response)
+    head_sha = pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") if isinstance(pr, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(head_sha, str) or not head_sha:
+        raise ValueError("missing PR head sha")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, AttributeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not resolve PR head commit: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(head_sha)
+PY
+}
+
+# Resolve the PR's current head commit SHA (GET /pulls/{n}). The review is
+# submitted against — and later verified as pinned to — this exact commit, so a
+# stale review left over from an earlier push cannot be mistaken for this one.
+# Prints the head SHA on success.
+gitea_pr_head_sha() {
+    local pr_number="$1" pr_file auth_config
+
+    pr_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-head.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$pr_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for PR head read" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$pr_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    gitea_read_pr_head_into "$pr_number" "$pr_file" "$auth_config"
+}
+
+# Submit a review to a Gitea PR via the supported REST API and verify it against
+# a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id. tea 0.11.1's `pr approve`/`reject` cannot emit
+# the id of the review it created and can silently no-op while exiting 0 (#865
+# defect class), so this does NOT shell out to tea: it POSTs to
+# /pulls/{n}/reviews with the event (APPROVED / REQUEST_CHANGES), the PR head
+# commit_id, and the review body, which returns the created review object
+# including its id. It then GETs that exact review id and requires
+# id == created id AND author == acting identity AND state == expected AND
+# commit_id == PR head. Keying to the returned id means no concurrent review
+# (even same identity/state/head) can masquerade as this one, and a no-op
+# submit yields no id and fails closed. Prints the created review id on success.
+#
+# Args: $1 = PR number, $2 = event (APPROVED|REQUEST_CHANGES),
+#       $3 = review body (may be empty for APPROVED), $4 = acting login,
+#       $5 = PR head sha.
+gitea_submit_review_verified() {
+    local pr_number="$1" event="$2" review_body="$3" acting_login="$4" head_sha="$5"
+    local payload write_file readback_file recheck_file auth_config
+    local write_status readback_status created_id live_head
+
+    payload=$(REVIEW_EVENT="$event" REVIEW_BODY="$review_body" REVIEW_COMMIT="$head_sha" python3 -c '
+import json
+import os
+
+print(json.dumps({
+    "event": os.environ["REVIEW_EVENT"],
+    "body": os.environ["REVIEW_BODY"],
+    "commit_id": os.environ["REVIEW_COMMIT"],
+}))
+')
+    write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-submit.XXXXXX")
+    readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-getid.XXXXXX")
+    recheck_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-recheck.XXXXXX")
+    auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
+        rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$recheck_file"
+        echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for review submit" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$recheck_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
+
+    if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        -X POST \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+        -d "$payload" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number/reviews"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea review submit transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    # Gitea returns 200 (occasionally 201) with the created review object.
+    if [[ "$write_status" != "200" && "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea review submit failed with HTTP $write_status (#865: no durable review created)" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        review = json.load(response)
+    created_id = review.get("id") if isinstance(review, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
+        raise ValueError("submit response carried no positive review id")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea review: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+print(created_id)
+PY
+) || return 1
+
+    if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
+        --config "$auth_config" \
+        "$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number/reviews/$created_id"); then
+        echo "Error: Gitea review read-back transport failed" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea review read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    EXPECTED_REVIEW_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_STATE="$event" ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" \
+        EXPECTED_HEAD_SHA="$head_sha" EXPECTED_REVIEW_BODY="$review_body" \
+        python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+try:
+    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
+        review = json.load(response)
+    if not isinstance(review, dict):
+        raise ValueError("response is not a review object")
+    expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_REVIEW_ID"])
+    expected_state = os.environ["EXPECTED_STATE"]
+    acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
+    expected_head = os.environ["EXPECTED_HEAD_SHA"]
+    expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_REVIEW_BODY"]
+    if review.get("id") != expected_id:
+        raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
+    if (review.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
+        raise ValueError("created review is not authored by the acting identity")
+    if review.get("state") != expected_state:
+        raise ValueError("created review is not in the expected state")
+    if review.get("commit_id") != expected_head:
+        raise ValueError("created review is not pinned to the PR head commit")
+    # Bind to the exact submitted body. On Gitea v1.25.4 SubmitReview may
+    # finalize/reuse a pending review id whose Content was authored elsewhere;
+    # the exact GET exposes the persisted body, so a mismatch (a reused/foreign
+    # review carrying different Content) fails closed even when id/author/state/
+    # head all line up. Require presence + string TYPE + exact equality rather
+    # than `(body or "")`: the old coalesce treated a missing/null persisted body
+    # as equal to an empty submitted one, so a non-empty submitted body that
+    # persisted as null (a suppressed/lost body) would have passed. When a
+    # non-empty body was submitted the persisted value MUST be that exact string;
+    # when an empty body was submitted the persisted value must be empty or
+    # absent (a non-empty persisted body is likewise a divergence — vice-versa).
+    persisted_body = review.get("body")
+    if expected_body == "":
+        if persisted_body not in (None, ""):
+            raise ValueError("created review carries a body but none was submitted")
+    elif not isinstance(persisted_body, str) or persisted_body != expected_body:
+        raise ValueError("created review body does not match the submitted body")
+except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
+    print(f"Error: Gitea review persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+
+    # Current-head TOCTOU close-out: the review verified above is pinned to
+    # head_sha, but that head was read BEFORE the submit. Between then and now
+    # the PR branch may have advanced (a force-push or a new commit), which would
+    # leave this verified review attached to a now-superseded commit while the
+    # live tip carries unreviewed code — yet the wrapper would still report
+    # success. Re-read the LIVE PR head and require it STILL equals the submitted
+    # SHA; if it advanced, fail closed (nonzero, no created id emitted, no
+    # success line). This reuses the submit-scoped auth config + recheck file so
+    # it neither leaks the token to argv nor clobbers this function's cleanup.
+    live_head=$(gitea_read_pr_head_into "$pr_number" "$recheck_file" "$auth_config") || {
+        echo "Error: could not re-read Gitea PR head after review verification" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    if [[ "$live_head" != "$head_sha" ]]; then
+        echo "Error: Gitea PR head advanced from $head_sha to $live_head between review submit and verification; refusing to report a review pinned to a superseded commit (#865 current-head TOCTOU)" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    echo "$created_id"
+    return 0
+}
+
 if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     case $ACTION in
         approve)
@@ -86,124 +549,76 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     case $ACTION in
         approve)
-            repo=$(get_repo_slug)
             host=$(get_remote_host)
-            login=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host")
+            # A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
-            tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$repo" --login "$login" ${COMMENT:+--comment "$COMMENT"}
+            # only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
-            echo "Approved Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
+            # token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
+            # credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
+            # tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
+            # the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
+            # then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
+            EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
+            [[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
+            # Bind the REST endpoint + token to the effective login, then derive
+            # the acting identity from that SAME credential so the review submit
+            # and its read-back verify against the identity that performed them.
+            gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
+            ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
+            head_sha=$(gitea_pr_head_sha "$PR_NUMBER") || exit 1
+            # The review body (if any) travels with the review itself in the REST
+            # submit — the created review record carries it — so there is no
+            # separate detached comment to reconcile.
+            review_id=$(gitea_submit_review_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "APPROVED" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN" "$head_sha") || {
+                echo "Error: could not submit and verify an APPROVED review on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
+                exit 1
+            }
+            echo "Approved and verified Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (review ID $review_id)"
             ;;
         request-changes)
             if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
                 echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
                 exit 1
             fi
-            repo=$(get_repo_slug)
             host=$(get_remote_host)
-            login=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host")
+            # A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
-            tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$repo" --login "$login" --comment "$COMMENT"
+            # only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
-            echo "Requested changes on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
+            # token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
+            # credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
+            # tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
+            # the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
+            # then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
+            EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
+            [[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
+            gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
+            ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
+            head_sha=$(gitea_pr_head_sha "$PR_NUMBER") || exit 1
+            review_id=$(gitea_submit_review_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "REQUEST_CHANGES" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN" "$head_sha") || {
+                echo "Error: could not submit and verify a REQUEST_CHANGES review on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
+                exit 1
+            }
+            echo "Requested changes and verified on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (review ID $review_id)"
             ;;
         comment)
             if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
                 echo "Error: Comment required"
                 exit 1
             fi
-
             host=$(get_remote_host)
-            token=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
+            # A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
-                echo "Error: Gitea token not found for comment persistence" >&2
+            # only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
+            # token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
+            # credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
+            # tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
+            # the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
+            # then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
+            EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
+            [[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
+            gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
+            ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
+            comment_id=$(gitea_create_comment_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN") || {
+                echo "Error: could not create and verify a comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
                 exit 1
             }
-            configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
-                echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for comment persistence" >&2
-                exit 1
-            }
-            repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
-                echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
-                exit 1
-            }
-            api_base="${configured_url%/}/api/v1/repos/$repo"
-            payload=$(COMMENT_BODY="$COMMENT" python3 -c '
-import json
-import os
-
-print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
-')
-            write_response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-write.XXXXXX")
-            readback_response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-readback.XXXXXX")
-            trap 'rm -f "$write_response_file" "$readback_response_file"' EXIT
-
-            if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-                -X POST \
-                -H "Authorization: token $token" \
-                -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-                -d "$payload" \
-                "$api_base/issues/$PR_NUMBER/comments"); then
-                echo "Error: Gitea comment write transport failed" >&2
-                exit 1
-            fi
-            if [[ "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
-                echo "Error: Gitea comment write failed with HTTP $write_status" >&2
-                exit 1
-            fi
-
-            comment_id=$(python3 - "$write_response_file" <<'PY'
-import json
-import sys
-
-try:
-    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
-        comment = json.load(response)
-    comment_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
-    if not isinstance(comment_id, int) or comment_id <= 0:
-        raise ValueError("missing positive comment id")
-except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
-    print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea comment: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-print(comment_id)
-PY
-)
-
-            if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-                -H "Authorization: token $token" \
-                "$api_base/issues/comments/$comment_id"); then
-                echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back transport failed" >&2
-                exit 1
-            fi
-            if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
-                echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
-                exit 1
-            fi
-
-            EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$comment_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$COMMENT" EXPECTED_REPO="$repo" EXPECTED_PR_NUMBER="$PR_NUMBER" \
-                python3 - "$readback_response_file" <<'PY'
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from urllib.parse import urlparse
-
-try:
-    with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
-        comment = json.load(response)
-    if not isinstance(comment, dict):
-        raise ValueError("response is not a comment object")
-    expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID"])
-    expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY"]
-    expected_repo = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO"]
-    expected_pr = os.environ["EXPECTED_PR_NUMBER"]
-    issue_path = urlparse(comment.get("issue_url", "")).path.rstrip("/")
-    expected_suffix = f"/repos/{expected_repo}/issues/{expected_pr}"
-    if comment.get("id") != expected_id:
-        raise ValueError("comment id mismatch")
-    if comment.get("body") != expected_body:
-        raise ValueError("comment body mismatch")
-    if not issue_path.endswith(expected_suffix):
-        raise ValueError("repository or PR mismatch")
-except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
-    print(f"Error: Gitea comment persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-PY
-
             echo "Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
             ;;
         *)

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh

@@ -312,4 +312,901 @@ if [[ "$override_wins" != "mosaicstack" ]]; then
 fi
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote set-url origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# #865 Blocker 1 & 2: get_gitea_token_for_login must resolve the SAME token as
+# PyYAML would (or fail closed identically) even when PyYAML is ABSENT, and must
+# bind the credential to the repo host's scheme + host + EFFECTIVE PORT — not the
+# hostname alone. These fixtures probe the ImportError-dispatched line-parser
+# fallback under FORCED PyYAML absence with adversarial YAML shapes, asserting it
+# NEVER misattributes a token from a nested sub-map or a mis-indented line, strips
+# inline comments like PyYAML, fails closed where PyYAML errors, and rejects a
+# port mismatch while accepting an exact / default-port match. When PyYAML is
+# available the same fixtures also assert the PyYAML path agrees (equivalence).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FIXTURE_XDG="$WORK_DIR/tokenfix"
+NOYAML_DIR="$WORK_DIR/noyaml"
+mkdir -p "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea" "$NOYAML_DIR"
+# A shadow `yaml` module that raises ImportError, forcing the fallback path.
+printf 'raise ImportError("forced-absent for #865 fallback regression")\n' > "$NOYAML_DIR/yaml.py"
+if python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then HAVE_PYYAML=true; else HAVE_PYYAML=false; fi
+# Confirm the shim really does force ImportError, so the fallback is exercised.
+if python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    if PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "FAIL: PyYAML-absence shim did not force ImportError (fallback not exercised)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+fi
+
+write_fixture() { printf '%s' "$1" > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"; }
+
+# Resolve a token via the FORCED-fallback path (PyYAML shimmed to ImportError).
+token_fallback() {
+    (
+        cd "$REPO_DIR"
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
+            source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
+            get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
+        ' _ "$1" "$2"
+    ) 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# Resolve a token via the normal path (uses PyYAML when installed).
+token_pyyaml() {
+    (
+        cd "$REPO_DIR"
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
+            source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
+            get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
+        ' _ "$1" "$2"
+    ) 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+assert_token() {
+    local desc="$1" expected="$2" login="$3" host="$4" got
+    got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
+    if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected [$expected] got [$got]" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
+        got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
+        if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
+            echo "FAIL pyyaml [$desc]: expected [$expected] got [$got]" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+# 1. Plain, well-formed entry resolves its token.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+'
+assert_token "plain scalar" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+
+# 2. A token nested inside a deeper SUB-MAP must NOT attach to the entry — PyYAML
+#    resolves the entry's own token to None here, so the fallback must too.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    extra:
+      token: TOK_NESTED_ATTACKER
+  - name: other
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_OTHER
+'
+assert_token "nested sub-map token is not attributed" "" primary git.example
+assert_token "sibling entry still resolves its own token" "TOK_OTHER" other git.example
+
+# 3. A MIS-INDENTED token line (deeper than the entry's fields) must not attach;
+#    PyYAML errors on this shape, so both fail closed.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+      token: TOK_MISINDENT
+'
+assert_token "mis-indented token fails closed" "" primary git.example
+
+# 4. A trailing inline comment on a scalar is stripped, exactly as PyYAML does.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_INLINE  # trailing note
+'
+assert_token "inline comment stripped" "TOK_INLINE" primary git.example
+
+# 5. A PyYAML-fail-closed case: tab indentation. PyYAML raises a scanner error;
+#    the fallback resolves no token. Both fail closed identically.
+write_fixture "$(printf 'logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n\ttoken: TOK_TAB\n')"
+assert_token "tab-indent fails closed like PyYAML" "" primary git.example
+
+# 6. Host binding is scheme + host + EFFECTIVE PORT, not hostname alone.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: ported
+    url: https://git.example:8443
+    token: TOK_PORTED
+'
+assert_token "explicit port exact match accepted" "TOK_PORTED" ported git.example:8443
+assert_token "portless repo host rejects :8443 login" "" ported git.example
+assert_token "wrong explicit port rejected" "" ported git.example:9443
+
+# 7. An implicit (portless) login URL equals the scheme's explicit default port.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: defported
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_DEFPORT
+'
+assert_token "implicit https vs explicit :443 match" "TOK_DEFPORT" defported git.example:443
+assert_token "implicit https vs :8443 rejected" "" defported git.example:8443
+
+# 8. An UNQUOTED token whose raw text PyYAML's implicit resolver types as a
+#    NON-string (int / null / bool / float) must fail closed: PyYAML yields a
+#    non-str value that _accept rejects, so the fallback must NOT surface the
+#    stringified scalar as a credential. Each raw form fails closed IDENTICALLY
+#    to PyYAML (a prior residual emitted "12345"/"null"/"true"/etc. here).
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed() {
+    local desc="$1" raw="$2"
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${raw}
+"
+    assert_token "$desc" "" primary git.example
+}
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted int token fails closed" "12345"
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted null token fails closed" "null"
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted tilde-null token fails closed" "~"
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted yes(bool) token fails closed" "yes"
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted true(bool) token fails closed" "true"
+assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted float token fails closed" "3.14"
+
+# 9. A QUOTED scalar is ALWAYS a string, even when its contents look like a
+#    non-string implicit form. The quotes force str typing in PyYAML, so the
+#    fallback must accept the literal (quote-stripped) contents as the token.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: "12345"
+'
+assert_token "double-quoted digit token is a literal string" "12345" primary git.example
+write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: 'abc'
+"
+assert_token "single-quoted token is a literal string" "abc" primary git.example
+
+# assert_fallback_fails_closed: the forced-fallback path MUST resolve no token
+# (fail closed). Used for STRUCTURAL cases where PyYAML would resolve a DIFFERENT
+# token (e.g. duplicate-key last-wins) — the fallback must never surface the
+# wrong/stale token, so it fails closed instead; when PyYAML is present we also
+# confirm it really does resolve a (divergent) token, proving the fallback is the
+# strictly-more-conservative side and the case is a genuine fail-open guard.
+assert_fallback_fails_closed() {
+    local desc="$1" login="$2" host="$3" got
+    got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
+    if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected fail-closed, got a token" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
+        got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
+        if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
+            echo "FAIL [$desc]: expected PyYAML to resolve a divergent token" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+# 10. tea's REAL on-disk shape: the `logins:` block SEQUENCE items sit at the
+#     SAME indentation as the key (dash at column 0), with extra scalar fields.
+#     The recognizer must resolve this exactly like PyYAML (regression guard so
+#     the stricter whole-document recognizer does not fail closed on real input).
+write_fixture 'logins:
+- name: primary
+  url: https://git.example
+  token: TOK_REAL
+  default: false
+  ssh_host: ""
+- name: other
+  url: https://other.example
+  token: TOK_REAL_OTHER
+preferences:
+  editor: false
+  flags: null
+'
+assert_token "tea dash-at-column-0 real shape resolves" "TOK_REAL" primary git.example
+assert_token "tea real shape sibling resolves own token" "TOK_REAL_OTHER" other other.example
+
+# 11. NESTED-SHADOW: a nested `logins:` (NOT at root scope) must not be mistaken
+#     for the real root logins. The recognizer parses whole-document structure,
+#     so it selects the ROOT logins token exactly as PyYAML does — never the
+#     nested attacker token. (A prior line scan matched the FIRST logins at ANY
+#     indent and returned ATTACKER.)
+write_fixture 'outer:
+  logins:
+    - name: primary
+      url: https://git.example
+      token: ATTACKER_NESTED
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ROOT_TOK
+'
+assert_token "nested logins shadow selects ROOT token" "ROOT_TOK" primary git.example
+
+# 12. BLOCK-SCALAR-SHADOW: text inside a YAML literal/folded block ( | or > ) is
+#     an OPAQUE scalar to PyYAML (so `logins` is a string, not a list) and must
+#     not be scanned as live logins entries. Both fail closed.
+write_fixture 'logins: |
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ATTACKER_BLOCK
+'
+assert_token "block-scalar logins value fails closed" "" primary git.example
+# A folded/literal block scalar anywhere is outside the recognizer's subset, so
+# the fallback fails closed (conservative) even though PyYAML can still resolve
+# the real root token past the opaque scalar. Fail-closed is the safe side.
+write_fixture 'note: >
+  logins:
+    - name: primary
+      token: ATTACKER_FOLDED
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ROOT_OK
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "folded block scalar present fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# 13. DUPLICATE-ROOT / DUPLICATE-FIELD: a duplicated `logins:` root key (PyYAML
+#     last-wins) or a duplicated field within a login must fail closed rather
+#     than take the FIRST (stale) value. PyYAML resolves the LAST; the fallback
+#     refuses to guess.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: FIRST_DUP
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: LAST_DUP
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "duplicate root logins key fails closed" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: FIRST_FIELD
+    token: SECOND_FIELD
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "duplicate token field fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# 14. MALFORMED-AFTER-VALID: a syntax error LATER in the file makes PyYAML reject
+#     the WHOLE document; the recognizer must too (not emit the earlier token).
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+broken: a: b: c
+'
+assert_token "malformed line after valid login fails closed" "" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+broken: [unclosed
+'
+assert_token "unclosed flow after valid login fails closed" "" primary git.example
+
+# 15. EXTRA-DOCUMENT: a multi-document file (--- separator, or ... end marker)
+#     makes PyYAML safe_load reject multi-document input; the recognizer fails
+#     closed on ANY document marker rather than emit the first doc's token.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+---
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: SECOND_DOC
+'
+assert_token "second document (--- separator) fails closed" "" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+...
+trailing: 1
+'
+assert_token "end marker then more content fails closed" "" primary git.example
+
+# 16. CONSTRUCTOR-VALIDITY / INVALID-INDICATOR: a plain scalar can match a typed
+#     implicit resolver (int/float/timestamp) yet be NON-constructible, or begin
+#     with an indicator a plain scalar may not start with. PyYAML then RAISES on
+#     the WHOLE document (constructor error / scanner error) and yields NO token,
+#     so the fallback must ALSO fail closed for the whole document -- even though
+#     the (unrelated) malformed key sits alongside an otherwise-valid logins
+#     block whose token is itself well-formed. A prior residual proved STRUCTURE
+#     and implicit TYPE but not constructor validity, so it ignored the malformed
+#     key and still emitted the valid login token (fail-open in the dangerous
+#     direction). assert_both_fail_closed asserts fallback == PyYAML == no token.
+assert_both_fail_closed() {
+    local desc="$1" login="$2" host="$3" got
+    got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
+    if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected fail-closed, got a token" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
+        got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
+        if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
+            echo "FAIL pyyaml [$desc]: expected PyYAML to also fail closed (raise/no token), got a token" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+    fi
+}
+
+# write_bad_key_fixture: an unrelated root key carrying $1 as its plain scalar,
+# followed by an otherwise-valid logins block whose token is well-formed.
+write_bad_key_fixture() {
+    write_fixture "bad: $1
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+"
+}
+
+# Non-constructible TIMESTAMP-tagged scalars: match the resolver, but the
+# calendar field is out of range so PyYAML's datetime construction raises.
+write_bad_key_fixture '2023-99-99'          # month 99 / day 99 invalid
+assert_both_fail_closed "bad-date 2023-99-99 fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '2023-13-01'          # month 13 invalid
+assert_both_fail_closed "bad-month 2023-13-01 fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15T25:00:00' # hour 25 invalid
+assert_both_fail_closed "bad-hour timestamp fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
+
+# Non-constructible INT-tagged scalars: match the int resolver, but the radix
+# body is empty after underscore removal so int(base) raises.
+write_bad_key_fixture '0b_'
+assert_both_fail_closed "empty-binary 0b_ fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '0x_'
+assert_both_fail_closed "empty-hex 0x_ fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '0x__'
+assert_both_fail_closed "empty-hex 0x__ (multi-underscore) fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# Invalid plain-scalar INDICATOR forms: a plain scalar may not begin with '%'
+# (directive) or ',' (flow) -- PyYAML raises a scanner/parser error on the whole
+# document, so the fallback fails closed on the leading indicator.
+write_bad_key_fixture '%broken'
+assert_both_fail_closed "leading-%% directive indicator fails closed" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture ',bad'
+assert_both_fail_closed "leading-comma flow indicator fails closed" primary git.example
+# Bare block indicators in a value position ('-'/'- ', '?'/'? ', ':'/': '):
+# PyYAML raises a scanner error on the whole document, so the fallback must fail
+# closed rather than accept the indicator as a plain-scalar string.
+write_bad_key_fixture '-'
+assert_both_fail_closed "bare dash (seq indicator) fails closed" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '- x'
+assert_both_fail_closed "dash-space (seq entry) fails closed" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '? key'
+assert_both_fail_closed "question-space (complex key) fails closed" primary git.example
+# ...but an indicator NOT followed by whitespace is a valid plain scalar string,
+# so the token still resolves (no over-broad fail-close).
+write_bad_key_fixture '-x'
+assert_token "dash-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture ':x'
+assert_token "colon-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+
+# NOT over-broad: a genuinely CONSTRUCTIBLE typed scalar (or a look-alike PyYAML
+# keeps as a plain string) leaves the document valid, so BOTH still resolve the
+# login token -- the fix must not fail closed on these.
+write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15'
+assert_token "valid date unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15 10:00:00'
+assert_token "valid datetime unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+# '0o_' is NOT matched by PyYAML's int resolver (YAML 1.1 octal is 0[0-7]+, not
+# 0o...), so PyYAML keeps it a STRING and resolves the token; the fallback must
+# agree (no spurious fail-close).
+write_bad_key_fixture '0o_'
+assert_token "0o_ is a plain string in PyYAML, token still resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+# '4.e8' matches the fallback's (superset) float pattern but PyYAML keeps it a
+# string; either way it is constructible, so the token still resolves in both.
+write_bad_key_fixture '4.e8'
+assert_token "4.e8 float look-alike still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+# A valid radix int as an unrelated key must not fail closed.
+write_bad_key_fixture '0x1f'
+assert_token "valid hex int unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+
+# 17. TAB / SCANNER PARITY: PyYAML raises a ScannerError on a tab used anywhere
+#     outside a quoted scalar -- leading, trailing, or embedded in a plain value,
+#     immediately after a key colon, before a key colon, or as indentation -- and
+#     yields NO token, accepting tabs ONLY inside single/double-quoted scalars
+#     (where the tab is preserved as string content). A prior fallback swallowed
+#     those tabs (via .strip()/.rstrip() normalization and [ \t] key separators)
+#     and still emitted the login token -- a fail-open in the dangerous direction.
+#     The recognizer now fails CLOSED for the whole document on any tab PyYAML
+#     rejects, while preserving the tabs PyYAML keeps (inside quotes). All tab
+#     positions were verified empirically against PyYAML 6.0.3 (ScannerError for
+#     each rejected position; string-preserved for quoted inner tabs).
+TAB=$'\t'
+# Fail-close: a tab in a plain value position (trailing / leading / embedded).
+write_bad_key_fixture "l4o${TAB}"
+assert_both_fail_closed "trailing tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture "${TAB}9"
+assert_both_fail_closed "leading tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture "a${TAB}b"
+assert_both_fail_closed "embedded tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
+# Fail-close: a tab immediately after the key colon (no separating space).
+write_fixture "bad:${TAB}9
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+"
+assert_both_fail_closed "tab immediately after key colon fails closed" primary git.example
+# Fail-close: a tab used as indentation (before a sequence dash).
+write_fixture "logins:
+${TAB}- name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN
+"
+assert_both_fail_closed "tab used as indentation fails closed" primary git.example
+# Fail-close: a tab trailing a sequence-mapping field value.
+write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_PLAIN${TAB}
+"
+assert_both_fail_closed "tab trailing a seq field value fails closed" primary git.example
+# NOT over-broad: a tab strictly INSIDE a quoted scalar is valid YAML (PyYAML
+# keeps it as string content), so the document parses and the login token still
+# resolves in BOTH paths -- double-quoted and single-quoted.
+write_bad_key_fixture "\"a${TAB}b\""
+assert_token "tab inside a double-quoted value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+write_bad_key_fixture "'a${TAB}b'"
+assert_token "tab inside a single-quoted value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+# ...and a quoted token value carrying an inner tab resolves to the exact string
+# (tab preserved), identical to PyYAML's construction.
+write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: \"T${TAB}OK\"
+"
+assert_token "quoted token with inner tab resolves verbatim" "T${TAB}OK" primary git.example
+
+# 18. CONTROL-CHARACTER FAIL-CLOSE (#865 round-9 blocker 1): PyYAML's Reader
+#     scans the ENTIRE raw document stream (not merely scalar contents, and NOT
+#     scoped by quoting) for bytes outside its printable set and raises
+#     ReaderError -- a WHOLE-DOCUMENT reject -- the instant one is found,
+#     regardless of where it sits: an unrelated field's plain scalar, inside a
+#     double- or single-quoted scalar, or a comment. Verified empirically against
+#     real installed PyYAML 6.0.3 (see detect-platform.sh's _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL
+#     comment): every C0 control byte {0x00-0x08, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0E-0x1F} plus DEL
+#     (0x7F) rejects in ALL THREE contexts (plain / double-quoted / single-quoted);
+#     only TAB(0x09), LF(0x0A), CR(0x0D) are accepted among the low byte range
+#     (TAB has its own narrower, position-aware coverage in section 17 above; LF/CR
+#     are line separators). A prior fallback ONLY guarded tabs and emitted the
+#     login token from documents PyYAML rejects over an UNRELATED field's control
+#     byte -- a dangerous fail-open (credential emission from a document PyYAML
+#     refuses). write_control_char_fixture writes the raw byte directly via
+#     printf's octal escape (never through a bash string/variable, which cannot
+#     hold an embedded NUL) so 0x00 is exercised faithfully alongside the rest.
+write_control_char_fixture() {
+    local octal="$1" quote="${2:-}"
+    {
+        if [[ -n "$quote" ]]; then
+            printf 'bad: %sx' "$quote"
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2059 # deliberate: $octal supplies printf's
+            # own \NNN octal escape so the raw control byte reaches the file
+            # directly, never passing through a bash string (which truncates
+            # at an embedded NUL and so cannot represent byte 0x00 otherwise).
+            printf "\\${octal}"
+            printf 'y%s\n' "$quote"
+        else
+            printf 'bad: x'
+            # shellcheck disable=SC2059 # deliberate: $octal supplies printf's
+            # own \NNN octal escape so the raw control byte reaches the file
+            # directly, never passing through a bash string (which truncates
+            # at an embedded NUL and so cannot represent byte 0x00 otherwise).
+            printf "\\${octal}"
+            printf 'y\n'
+        fi
+        printf 'logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n    token: TOK_PLAIN\n'
+    } > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"
+}
+
+# Plain (unquoted) unrelated-field placement: the full empirically-confirmed
+# forbidden C0/DEL set.
+for octal in 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 010 013 014 \
+             016 017 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 \
+             030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 177; do
+    write_control_char_fixture "$octal"
+    assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal in unrelated plain field fails closed" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Inside-quote variants (double and single) for the six bytes called out
+# explicitly in the round-9 blocker report: 0x00,0x01,0x07,0x0e,0x1f,0x7f.
+for octal in 000 001 007 016 037 177; do
+    write_control_char_fixture "$octal" '"'
+    assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal inside double-quoted unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
+    write_control_char_fixture "$octal" "'"
+    assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal inside single-quoted unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Same forbidden byte inside a comment line -- PyYAML's Reader check is
+# stream-wide, so it rejects here too, not merely inside live scalar content.
+{
+    printf '# note'
+    printf '\007'
+    printf 'here\nlogins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n    token: TOK_PLAIN\n'
+} > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"
+assert_both_fail_closed "control byte in a comment line fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# NOT over-broad: TAB/LF/CR remain accepted where PyYAML already accepts them
+# (covered by section 17's tab fixtures and the ordinary newline-delimited
+# fixtures used throughout this file), so no additional assertion is needed
+# here beyond confirming the forbidden-control guard does not fire on them.
+
+# 19. UNSIGNED-EXPONENT FLOAT OVER-REJECTION (#865 round-9 blocker 2): PyYAML
+#     6.0.3's implicit float resolver requires an EXPLICIT SIGN on the exponent
+#     ([eE][-+][0-9]+); an unsigned exponent is NOT matched, so PyYAML resolves
+#     the scalar as a plain STRING, not a float. A prior fallback's float
+#     recognizer accepted an OPTIONAL sign ([eE][-+]?[0-9]+), over-matching these
+#     spellings as floats and dropping the token PyYAML would emit verbatim
+#     (over-rejection). Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3.
+for form in '1.0e10' '+1.0e10' '-1.0e10' '1.0E10' '.5e10' '4.e8'; do
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${form}
+"
+    assert_token "unsigned-exponent form '$form' is a PyYAML string, token resolves" "$form" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Parity guard: a genuine SIGNED-exponent float is still typed as a non-string
+# float by PyYAML and must still fail closed (not regress into over-acceptance).
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: 1.0e+10
+'
+assert_token "signed-exponent genuine float still fails closed" "" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: 1.0e-10
+'
+assert_token "signed-exponent (negative) genuine float still fails closed" "" primary git.example
+
+# 20. RESIDUAL OVER-REJECTION found via round-9 differential fuzzing (folded into
+#     this round, not split off): a plain scalar starting with "?" NOT followed by
+#     whitespace (e.g. "?x") is a valid PyYAML string -- only a bare "?" or "? "
+#     (question mark followed by space/EOL) opens a complex mapping key and is
+#     illegal in a value position. A prior blanket-reject set treated EVERY
+#     leading "?" as illegal, over-rejecting a token PyYAML accepts verbatim.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ?x
+'
+assert_token "question-mark-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "?x" primary git.example
+
+# 21. PRINTABLE-BOUNDARY FAIL-CLOSE (#865 round-10 blocker 1): the round-9 guard
+#     used a hand-rolled C0/DEL subset that MISSED code points PyYAML's Reader
+#     also rejects -- the C1 block (U+0080-0084, U+0086-009F) and the BMP
+#     noncharacters U+FFFE/U+FFFF -- so the fallback still emitted the token from
+#     documents PyYAML rejects whole (fail-open). The guard now uses PyYAML
+#     6.0.3's EXACT Reader.NON_PRINTABLE character class (see detect-platform.sh
+#     _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL). Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3:
+#     PRINTABLE = {0x09,0x0A,0x0D, 0x20-0x7E, 0x85(NEL), 0xA0-0xD7FF,
+#     0xE000-0xFFFD, 0x10000-0x10FFFF}; everything else fails the whole document
+#     closed. write_codepoint_fixture emits a chosen Unicode code point's real
+#     UTF-8 bytes (via python3, since bash strings cannot faithfully carry many
+#     of these) into a selectable position, then the login block follows.
+write_codepoint_fixture() {
+    # $1 = hex code point (e.g. 0x80); $2 = position: field|comment|token|nelterm
+    CP_HEX="$1" CP_POS="$2" python3 - "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
+import sys
+cp = int(__import__("os").environ["CP_HEX"], 16)
+pos = __import__("os").environ["CP_POS"]
+ch = chr(cp)
+head = "logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n    token: TOK_PLAIN\n"
+if pos == "field":
+    doc = head + "other: x" + ch + "y\n"
+elif pos == "comment":
+    doc = head + "# note x" + ch + "y here\n"
+elif pos == "token":
+    doc = "logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n    token: T" + ch + "K\n"
+elif pos == "nelterm":
+    # NEL (U+0085) used as the line terminator throughout: PyYAML treats it as a
+    # line break (printable, NOT a ReaderError) and resolves the token; the
+    # fallback's _split_logical_lines splits on NEL identically OUTSIDE a quote
+    # -> parity, token resolves. (Round 23 covers NEL/LS/PS INSIDE a quote, where
+    # PyYAML folds rather than breaks and a naive splitlines() would over-split.)
+    doc = ("logins:" + ch + "  - name: primary" + ch
+           + "    url: https://git.example" + ch + "    token: TOK_NEL" + ch)
+else:
+    raise SystemExit("bad pos")
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+    f.write(doc)
+PY
+}
+
+# C1-block + BMP-noncharacter code points fail the WHOLE document closed in an
+# unrelated field and in a comment, exactly as PyYAML's ReaderError does.
+for cphex in 0x80 0x81 0x84 0x86 0x9f 0xfffe 0xffff; do
+    write_codepoint_fixture "$cphex" field
+    assert_both_fail_closed "code point $cphex in unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
+    write_codepoint_fixture "$cphex" comment
+    assert_both_fail_closed "code point $cphex in a comment fails closed" primary git.example
+done
+
+# NOT over-broad: printable code points PyYAML ACCEPTS must still resolve the
+# token in BOTH paths -- NEL(0x85) as a line separator, U+00A0 (NBSP) inside a
+# value, and an astral code point (U+1F600) inside the token value.
+write_codepoint_fixture 0x85 nelterm
+assert_token "NEL (U+0085) line-terminator resolves token" "TOK_NEL" primary git.example
+write_codepoint_fixture 0xa0 field
+assert_token "U+00A0 in unrelated value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
+write_codepoint_fixture 0x1f600 token
+assert_token "astral U+1F600 inside token resolves verbatim" "$(printf 'T\360\237\230\200K')" primary git.example
+
+# 22. INTERNAL-INDICATOR OVER-REJECTION (#865 round-10 blocker 2): the round-9
+#     recognizer blanket-rejected any plain scalar CONTAINING a flow indicator
+#     ([]{}*&!), but in BLOCK context PyYAML treats ',[]{}' as ordinary content
+#     and treats '!&*#...' as significant ONLY at the FIRST non-space char. So an
+#     INTERNAL indicator is legal plain-string content and PyYAML emits the token
+#     verbatim; the fallback dropped it (over-rejection). Verified empirically
+#     against real PyYAML 6.0.3. The fix removes the blanket internal scan while
+#     the leading-char guard and the ' #'/': '/trailing-':' guards keep the
+#     fail-OPEN direction shut.
+for tv in 'a!b' 'a,b' 'a[b' 'a]b' 'a{b' 'a}b' 'a&b' 'a*b' 'a[b]c' 'a{b}c' 'a,b,c' 'a#b' 'a:b'; do
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${tv}
+"
+    assert_token "internal-indicator token '$tv' resolves verbatim" "$tv" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Fail-OPEN direction stays shut: a LEADING indicator, a ' #' comment tail, an
+# internal ': ' (colon-space) inline map, and a trailing ':' each make PyYAML
+# resolve NO usable string token (tag/flow/anchor reject or None, comment strip,
+# or a mapping), so BOTH must fail closed. (Leading tag/anchor/flow are the
+# documented, round-9-approved structural fail-closed class; kept intact here.)
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: !x
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "leading '!' tag token fails closed" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: [a]
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "leading '[' flow-seq token fails closed" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: a # trailing comment
+'
+# ' #' comment tail: PyYAML strips the comment -> token is the string 'a', which
+# still resolves. This is the NOT-over-broad boundary partner of the guard.
+assert_token "space-hash comment tail strips to plain token" "a" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: a: b
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "internal colon-space (inline map) token fails closed" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ab:
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "trailing colon (map indicator) token fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# 23. EMBEDDED LINE-BREAK INSIDE A QUOTED SCALAR (#865 round-11 blocker A): the
+#     round-10 fallback split the raw document with str.splitlines(), which breaks
+#     at NEL(U+0085), LS(U+2028) and PS(U+2029) -- code points that are PRINTABLE
+#     to PyYAML's Reader. Inside a flow (quoted) scalar PyYAML does NOT break at
+#     these: it LINE-FOLDS a double/single-quoted scalar (NEL/LF/CR -> a single
+#     space; LS/PS -> the char verbatim), so it resolves ONE token, while
+#     splitlines() cut the value mid-quote and failed the whole document closed
+#     (over-rejection). The fallback now uses _split_logical_lines, which
+#     reproduces PyYAML's flow-folding. Verified empirically vs real PyYAML 6.0.3.
+#     write_break_fixture emits a chosen break code point in a selectable context.
+write_break_fixture() {
+    # $1 = hex code point of the break; $2 = context: dq|sq|plain|comment|dq2
+    CP_HEX="$1" Q_STYLE="$2" python3 - "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
+import sys, os
+cp = int(os.environ["CP_HEX"], 16)
+q = os.environ["Q_STYLE"]
+ch = chr(cp)
+head = "logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n    token: "
+if q == "dq":
+    doc = head + '"tok' + ch + 'en"'
+elif q == "sq":
+    doc = head + "'tok" + ch + "en'"
+elif q == "plain":
+    doc = head + "tok" + ch + "en"
+elif q == "dq2":
+    # blank line inside a quoted scalar: PyYAML folds a two-break run to a literal
+    # newline, which the recognizer's key regex cannot carry -> endorsed
+    # fail-closed over-reject (see assert_fallback_fails_closed below).
+    doc = head + '"tok' + ch + ch + 'en"'
+elif q == "comment":
+    doc = ("logins:\n  - name: primary\n    url: https://git.example\n"
+           "    token: TOK_PLAIN\n# c" + ch + "x")
+else:
+    raise SystemExit("bad q")
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+    f.write(doc + "\n")
+PY
+}
+
+# NEL folds to a single space inside double- AND single-quoted scalars: the token
+# resolves identically in both paths (fallback no longer over-splits).
+write_break_fixture 0x85 dq
+assert_token "NEL inside double-quote folds to space, token resolves" "tok en" primary git.example
+write_break_fixture 0x85 sq
+assert_token "NEL inside single-quote folds to space, token resolves" "tok en" primary git.example
+# LS(U+2028)/PS(U+2029) are preserved VERBATIM by PyYAML's flow fold (they are
+# not \n-class breaks); the fallback must surface them byte-for-byte.
+write_break_fixture 0x2028 dq
+assert_token "LS inside double-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\250en')" primary git.example
+write_break_fixture 0x2028 sq
+assert_token "LS inside single-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\250en')" primary git.example
+write_break_fixture 0x2029 dq
+assert_token "PS inside double-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\251en')" primary git.example
+
+# Direction-sensitivity: the SAME code points UNQUOTED (a plain scalar) or in a
+# COMMENT make PyYAML raise a scanner error, so both paths must fail closed. The
+# fold rule applies ONLY inside a quoted scalar.
+write_break_fixture 0x85 plain
+assert_token "NEL in an unquoted plain scalar fails closed" "" primary git.example
+write_break_fixture 0x2028 plain
+assert_token "LS in an unquoted plain scalar fails closed" "" primary git.example
+write_break_fixture 0x85 comment
+assert_token "NEL in a comment fails closed" "" primary git.example
+
+# Endorsed fail-closed over-reject: a blank line inside a quoted scalar folds to a
+# literal newline that the recognizer cannot carry -- PyYAML resolves a
+# (newline-bearing) token, the fallback fails closed (strictly safer).
+write_break_fixture 0x85 dq2
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "blank-line-in-quote (NEL run) fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# 24. LEADING NON-SPECIFIC TAG / ANCHOR PROPERTY (#865 round-11 blocker B, revised
+#     in round 12): the round-10 recognizer blanket-rejected any scalar beginning
+#     with '!' or '&'. Round 11 taught it to strip a transparent NON-SPECIFIC tag
+#     ('! ' bang + SPACE) and a transparent plain ANCHOR ('&name ') so '! x' /
+#     '&a x' resolve the STRING 'x', matching PyYAML. Round 12 discovered that the
+#     anchor half of that was a HIGH fail-open: PyYAML's Composer tracks anchor
+#     NAMES in a document-scoped registry and raises ComposerError ("found
+#     duplicate anchor") the instant the SAME name is declared on a SECOND node
+#     ANYWHERE in the document (even an unrelated one) -- the fallback's
+#     per-scalar-only view has no such registry and would emit the later token.
+#     Round 12's fix: reject EVERY '&'-anchor property, unconditionally. The
+#     transparent NON-SPECIFIC TAG behavior ('! x' -> 'x') is unchanged and still
+#     verified below; only the anchor half now fails closed (deliberate
+#     conservative over-reject, verified safe both ways against real PyYAML 6.0.3).
+for pair in '! x=x' '! x y=x y' '! "q"=q' "! 'q'=q"; do
+    tv="${pair%%=*}"; want="${pair#*=}"
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${tv}
+"
+    assert_token "tag property token '$tv' resolves node string" "$want" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Fail-OPEN direction stays shut. '!x' (bang + NON-space) is a tag HANDLE ->
+# ConstructorError; '!foo x'/'* a'/'! !x' raise; a property over a NON-string node
+# ('! 123'/'! true'/'! null') types non-str -> no usable token. All fail closed in
+# BOTH paths.
+for tv in '!x' '!foo x' '* a' '! !x' '! 123' '! true' '! null' '&a &b x'; do
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${tv}
+"
+    assert_token "non-resolving property token '$tv' fails closed" "" primary git.example
+done
+
+# Round 12: a SINGLE, non-duplicated '&a x' is valid YAML that real PyYAML
+# resolves to the string 'x' (round-11 behavior, and still true of the oracle).
+# The fallback now rejects it anyway -- a deliberate, endorsed CONSERVATIVE
+# over-reject (see the round-12 comment block above): fail-closed can only cost
+# an emitted token PyYAML would have allowed, never emit one PyYAML rejects, and
+# a per-scalar recognizer cannot safely prove document-wide anchor-name
+# uniqueness. assert_fallback_fails_closed also confirms PyYAML really does
+# resolve a token here, proving this is a genuine (safe-direction) divergence
+# and not an accidental parity loss.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: &a x
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: single non-duplicated anchor '&a x' now fails closed (conservative over-reject; PyYAML resolves x)" primary git.example
+# Same over-reject for the combined tag+anchor forms round 11 used to resolve.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ! &b x
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: '! &b x' (tag+anchor) now fails closed (conservative over-reject)" primary git.example
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: &b ! x
+'
+assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: '&b ! x' (anchor+tag) now fails closed (conservative over-reject)" primary git.example
+
+# Endorsed fail-closed over-reject: an EXPLICIT tag ('!!str x', verbose
+# '!<tag:yaml.org,2002:str> x') forces a string PyYAML resolves, but the fallback
+# recognizes only the transparent non-specific tag and fails closed (safer).
+for tv in '!!str x' '!<tag:yaml.org,2002:str> x'; do
+    write_fixture "logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ${tv}
+"
+    assert_fallback_fails_closed "explicit-tag token '$tv' fails closed" primary git.example
+done
+
+# 25. #865 round 12 HIGH fail-open closure: DUPLICATE ANCHOR NAME across separate
+#     nodes. Real PyYAML's Composer tracks anchor names in a DOCUMENT-SCOPED
+#     registry and raises ComposerError ("found duplicate anchor ... first
+#     occurrence") the instant the SAME anchor name is declared a second time
+#     ANYWHERE in the document -- failing the WHOLE document closed, no token,
+#     regardless of how far the duplicate sits from the logins block. The round-11
+#     fallback tracked anchors only WITHIN a single scalar's `_strip_properties`
+#     call, so it had no visibility into a duplicate declared on an unrelated
+#     node and would still emit the (later) token: fail-open. The round-12 fix
+#     (reject every '&'-anchor property, unconditionally -- see section 24 above)
+#     closes this as a strict superset: since NO anchor is ever accepted, a
+#     duplicate anchor can never slip through. These cases exercise that
+#     document-wide duplicate-anchor invariant specifically (as opposed to
+#     section 24's single-anchor-on-the-token-field cases) and pair each fallback
+#     assertion with confirmation that real PyYAML also fails closed here (via
+#     ComposerError), proving this was a genuine fail-open, not a hypothetical.
+write_fixture 'first: &same one
+second: &same two
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_DUP_ROOT
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: duplicate anchor name on two unrelated root nodes fails closed" primary git.example
+
+write_fixture 'outer:
+  nested: &dup x
+dup_root: &dup y
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: TOK_DUP_NESTED
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: duplicate anchor name across a nested node and a root node fails closed" primary git.example
+
+write_fixture 'first: &dup one
+logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: &dup TOK_DUP_TOKEN_NODE
+'
+assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: anchor name declared earlier and repeated on the token-bearing node fails closed" primary git.example
+
+# Regression guard: the non-specific TAG half of section 24 ('! x' -> 'x') is
+# UNCHANGED by the round-12 anchor fix and must still resolve.
+write_fixture 'logins:
+  - name: primary
+    url: https://git.example
+    token: ! x
+'
+assert_token "round-12 regression: '! x' (tag, no anchor) still resolves 'x'" "x" primary git.example
+
 echo "Gitea login resolution regression harness passed"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression harness for issue-comment.sh's Gitea comment write + verification
+# (#865).
+#
+# The #865 defect class: tea 0.11.1's `tea issue comment ...` (a nonexistent
+# subcommand) silently no-ops yet exits 0, and tea cannot emit the id of a
+# record it created — so an exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write.
+# The wrapper therefore does NOT write via tea at all. It POSTs the comment to
+# the Gitea REST API (which returns the created comment object, including its
+# id), then GETs THAT EXACT id back and requires it to match on id, author
+# (acting identity), body, and issue. Because verification is keyed to the id
+# the create returned, no concurrent comment can masquerade as this write, and a
+# suppressed/no-op create yields no id and fails closed.
+#
+# This harness models a REAL server: the curl stub keeps persistent comment
+# state on disk, the POST actually CREATES and PERSISTS a record and returns its
+# id, and the read-back GET reads that same state. There is no independently
+# fabricated record for the wrapper to "find" — the only way verification
+# passes is if the POST genuinely created the record the read-back retrieves.
+# It proves the wrapper:
+#   1. never shells out to tea to write (no `tea comment` / `tea issue comment`);
+#   2. creates the comment via REST POST and learns the provider-returned id;
+#   3. verifies THAT EXACT id by direct GET, attributed to the acting identity;
+#   4. fails closed when the write is a no-op even though a concurrent
+#      SAME-IDENTITY comment with the same body already exists (the closed
+#      concurrency window — no fallback list scan can rescue a no-op);
+#   5. fails closed when the created record is not authored by the acting
+#      identity;
+#   6. treats the exact-id GET as the SOLE authority — it performs NO follow-up
+#      list enumeration (the stub exposes no comment-list endpoint, so any
+#      residual enumeration attempt would fail the run);
+#   7. with a RESOLVABLE --login override, performs the write, the /user identity
+#      lookup, and the read-back ALL under THAT login's token/identity — never
+#      the host default;
+#   8. with an UNRESOLVABLE --login override, FAILS CLOSED (nonzero, no write, no
+#      success line) instead of silently downgrading to the host default
+#      identity — the token seam maps each bearer token to the identity it
+#      authenticates as, so a misattributed write is caught;
+#   9. with a --login override whose tea config URL is a DIFFERENT host than the
+#      repo remote, FAILS CLOSED (host-bound token selection) rather than sending
+#      that other host's credential cross-host;
+#  10. leaves NO temp files behind (POST/GET bodies + metadata) on either the
+#      success or the failure path — nested function-scoped RETURN traps do not
+#      clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-comment-readback}"
+REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
+BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
+XDG_DIR="$WORK_DIR/xdg"
+TEA_LOG="$WORK_DIR/tea.log"
+CURL_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl.log"
+# Full curl argv per invocation — proves the bearer token never rides in argv.
+CURL_ARGV_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl-argv.log"
+AUTH_LOG="$WORK_DIR/auth.log"
+OUTPUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/output.log"
+CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
+STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
+# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
+# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
+TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
+
+cleanup() {
+    rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+
+ISSUE_NUMBER=7
+REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
+API_BASE="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack"
+API_ROOT="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1"
+BODY='durable "note" -- marker'
+ACTING_LOGIN="primary-reviewer"
+FOREIGN_LOGIN="other-writer"
+# A dedicated per-role --login override identity, with its own token stored in
+# tea's config (exactly the author-not-equal-reviewer hardening path).
+OVERRIDE_LOGIN="delegated-reviewer"
+DEFAULT_TOKEN="test-only-placeholder"
+OVERRIDE_TOKEN="override-token-placeholder"
+# A --login override whose tea config URL points at a DIFFERENT Gitea host than
+# the repo remote (git.mosaicstack.dev). Its token must NEVER be sent to the
+# repo host: host-bound selection must fail closed on the host mismatch.
+CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="foreign-host-reviewer"
+CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="cross-host-token-placeholder"
+
+# tea config: the override login has its own token here (as tea itself stores
+# per-login tokens). The default login name ("mosaicstack") is deliberately NOT
+# present, so the no-override default path resolves via the host credential
+# fallback while an explicit --login must resolve from this file or fail closed.
+# A second login is configured for a DIFFERENT host to exercise host-bound
+# rejection.
+mkdir -p "$XDG_DIR/tea"
+OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
+    CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
+    python3 - "$XDG_DIR/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
+import os
+import sys
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    handle.write("logins:\n")
+    handle.write(f"  - name: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_LOGIN']}\n")
+    handle.write("    url: https://git.mosaicstack.dev\n")
+    handle.write(f"    token: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_TOKEN']}\n")
+    handle.write(f"  - name: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_LOGIN']}\n")
+    handle.write("    url: https://git.uscllc.com\n")
+    handle.write(f"    token: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_TOKEN']}\n")
+PY
+
+CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL="https://git.mosaicstack.dev" python3 - "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as credentials:
+    json.dump({
+        "gitea": {
+            "mosaicstack": {
+                "url": os.environ["CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL"],
+                "token": "test-only-placeholder",
+            }
+        }
+    }, credentials)
+PY
+
+# tea stub: only ever answers the login list (used to resolve the default login
+# name). It must NEVER be asked to write a comment — the wrapper writes via REST.
+cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG"
+
+if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
+    printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "Unexpected tea command (wrapper must not write via tea): $*" >&2
+exit 92
+SH
+chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea"
+
+# curl stub: a small REST server backed by persistent on-disk comment state.
+#   GET  /user                 -> acting identity
+#   POST /issues/7/comments    -> CREATE + PERSIST, return created object
+#   GET  /issues/comments/{id} -> read the persisted record by exact id
+# There is deliberately NO comment-LIST endpoint: exact-id read-back is the sole
+# authority, so any residual list enumeration attempt hits the unexpected-request
+# guard and fails the test.
+cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Record the FULL argv exactly as spawned, before consumption. The bearer token
+# must NOT appear here — it is delivered via a curl --config file (#865 ITEM 3a),
+# so only the config file PATH may show up.
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG"
+
+output_file=""
+method="GET"
+url=""
+data=""
+auth_token=""
+config_file=""
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        -o) output_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        -H)
+            [[ "$2" == Authorization:* ]] && auth_token="${2##* }"
+            shift 2 ;;
+        -K|--config) config_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        -w) shift 2 ;;
+        -X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        -d|--data) data="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        -s|-S|-sS) shift ;;
+        http://*|https://*) url="$1"; shift ;;
+        *) shift ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+# Resolve the bearer token from the curl --config file (its real, secure source);
+# fall back to an -H header only for defense in depth. The config line is
+# `header = "Authorization: token <value>"`.
+if [[ -z "$auth_token" && -n "$config_file" && -f "$config_file" ]]; then
+    config_hdr="$(grep -i 'Authorization' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    if [[ "$config_hdr" == *"token "* ]]; then
+        auth_token="${config_hdr##*token }"
+        auth_token="${auth_token%\"}"
+    fi
+fi
+
+path="${url%%\?*}"
+query="${url#*\?}"
+[[ "$query" == "$url" ]] && query=""
+printf '%s %s\n' "$method" "$url" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG"
+
+# Map the presented bearer token to the identity it authenticates as — the same
+# derivation Gitea's own /user does. The wrapper's write, /user lookup, and
+# read-back must all carry the SAME token, so the acting identity recorded here
+# reveals which credential actually performed the request.
+acting_identity=""
+case "$auth_token" in
+    "$ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN" ;;
+    "$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN" ;;
+    "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" ;;
+esac
+printf '%s %s %s\n' "$method" "$path" "${acting_identity:-<unauthenticated>}" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG"
+
+write_response() {
+    local status="$1" body="$2"
+    [[ -n "$output_file" ]] || exit 96
+    printf '%s' "$body" > "$output_file"
+    printf '%s' "$status"
+}
+
+if [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT/user" ]]; then
+    [[ -n "$acting_identity" ]] || { write_response 401 '{"message":"unauthenticated"}'; exit 0; }
+    write_response 200 "$(ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN="$acting_identity" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+print(json.dumps({"login": os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN"]}))
+PY
+)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE/issues/7/comments" ]]; then
+    result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="${acting_identity:-$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN}" ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA="$data" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"]
+mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE"]
+acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN"]
+foreign = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN"]
+repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG"]
+body = json.loads(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA"]).get("body")
+
+with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    comments = json.load(handle)
+
+# no-op-concurrent: the wrapper's own write is SUPPRESSED (returns 200 with no
+# created object) even though a concurrent same-identity comment already exists
+# in state. Nothing is persisted; there is no created id to verify.
+if mode == "no-op-concurrent":
+    print("200")
+    print(json.dumps({}))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+
+author = foreign if mode == "author-mismatch" else acting
+new_id = (max((c["id"] for c in comments), default=0)) + 1
+# REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB (html) path, not an API path,
+# and a plain issue comment leaves pull_request_url empty. The URL-injection
+# modes persist a record whose id/author/body are all correct but whose
+# issue_url is forged, so ONLY the origin+path verification can catch them.
+issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
+if mode == "url-wrong-host":
+    issue_url = f"https://evil.example/{repo}/issues/7"
+elif mode == "url-wrong-owner":
+    issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/attacker/stack/issues/7"
+elif mode == "url-wrong-repo":
+    issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/other/issues/7"
+elif mode == "url-suffix-injection":
+    # Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/issues/7") test would ACCEPT this.
+    issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/deceptive/{repo}/issues/7"
+record = {
+    "id": new_id,
+    "body": body,
+    "user": {"login": author},
+    "issue_url": issue_url,
+    "pull_request_url": "",
+}
+comments.append(record)
+with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    json.dump(comments, handle)
+print("201")
+print(json.dumps(record))
+PY
+)
+    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then
+    result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"]
+wanted = int(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID"])
+with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    comments = json.load(handle)
+match = next((c for c in comments if c["id"] == wanted), None)
+if match is None:
+    print("404")
+    print(json.dumps({"message": "not found"}))
+else:
+    print("200")
+    print(json.dumps(match))
+PY
+)
+    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+else
+    echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2
+    exit 97
+fi
+SH
+chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/curl"
+
+# Seed persistent server state for a mode, then run the wrapper against it.
+seed_state() {
+    local mode="$1"
+    ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE="$mode" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY="$BODY" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING="$ACTING_LOGIN" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO="$REPO_SLUG" \
+        python3 - "$STATE_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE"]
+body = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY"]
+acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING"]
+repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO"]
+# REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB path, pull_request_url empty.
+issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
+
+
+def comment(cid, text, author):
+    return {
+        "id": cid,
+        "body": text,
+        "user": {"login": author},
+        "issue_url": issue_url,
+        "pull_request_url": "",
+    }
+
+
+if mode == "fresh-success":
+    # 50 pre-existing comments already exist; the comment this run creates
+    # becomes id 51, proving exact-id read-back works regardless of how many
+    # comments precede it (no list enumeration is involved).
+    comments = [comment(i, f"prior {i}", acting) for i in range(1, 51)]
+elif mode == "no-op-concurrent":
+    # A concurrent SAME-IDENTITY comment with the IDENTICAL body already exists.
+    # The wrapper's own write will be a no-op; it must still fail closed because
+    # no created id is returned — it must not scan and accept this record.
+    comments = [comment(55, body, acting)]
+else:  # author-mismatch
+    comments = []
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    json.dump(comments, handle)
+PY
+}
+
+run_comment() {
+    local mode="$1"
+    shift
+    : > "$TEA_LOG"
+    : > "$CURL_LOG"
+    : > "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"
+    : > "$AUTH_LOG"
+    : > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+    seed_state "$mode"
+    (
+        cd "$REPO_DIR"
+        PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
+        TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
+        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG="$CURL_LOG" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG="$CURL_ARGV_LOG" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG="$AUTH_LOG" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE="$STATE_FILE" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE="$mode" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="$ACTING_LOGIN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN="$FOREIGN_LOGIN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN="$DEFAULT_TOKEN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG="$REPO_SLUG" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE="$API_BASE" \
+        ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT="$API_ROOT" \
+        "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-comment.sh" -i "$ISSUE_NUMBER" -c "$BODY" "$@"
+    ) > "$OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1
+}
+
+# Assert the wrapper left no scratch temp files behind in TMPDIR (POST/GET
+# request bodies + metadata). Called after both success and failure paths so a
+# clobbered/leaked RETURN trap is caught on every exit route.
+assert_no_temp_leak() {
+    local context="$1" leaked
+    # Includes the curl auth-config files (mosaic-gitea-auth-*), which carry the
+    # bearer token and must be unlinked on every exit path.
+    leaked=$(find "$TMP_SCRATCH" -type f \( -name 'mosaic-issue-comment-*' -o -name 'mosaic-gitea-auth-*' \) 2>/dev/null || true)
+    if [[ -n "$leaked" ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL: issue-comment temp files leaked ($context):" >&2
+        printf '%s\n' "$leaked" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Assert the presented bearer token NEVER appeared in curl's argv (it must travel
+# via a curl --config file), and that --config auth was actually used. On the
+# expected path grep matches nothing, so no token value is ever printed.
+assert_token_not_in_argv() {
+    local context="$1"
+    if grep -qF -e "$DEFAULT_TOKEN" -e "$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" -e "$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
+        echo "FAIL: a Gitea bearer token leaked into curl argv ($context)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if ! grep -q -- '--config' "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
+        echo "FAIL: curl was not invoked with --config file auth ($context)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Case 1: a genuine REST create (id 51) is verified end to end via its exact
+# provider-returned id — no list enumeration is involved.
+run_comment fresh-success
+grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 51)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+# The write is a REST POST, never a tea comment.
+grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments$" "$CURL_LOG"
+if grep -Eq '^comment |^issue comment ' "$TEA_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper wrote a comment via tea instead of REST" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# Read-back is a DIRECT GET of the exact created id.
+grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51$" "$CURL_LOG"
+# Acting identity resolved via GET /user.
+grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user$" "$CURL_LOG"
+# No comment-list enumeration is performed — the exact-id GET is authoritative.
+if grep -Eq "^GET $API_BASE/issues/7/comments(\?|$)" "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper performed a redundant comment-list enumeration" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# Default path (no --login): the host credential fallback resolves, and the
+# write is performed AND self-verified under the host-default acting identity.
+grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51 $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+# Success path leaves no scratch temp files behind.
+assert_no_temp_leak "fresh-success"
+# ITEM 3a: the token drove the write/read-back chain but never appeared in curl
+# argv — it was passed via a curl --config file.
+assert_token_not_in_argv "fresh-success default-token"
+
+# Case 2: a no-op write with a concurrent SAME-IDENTITY, same-body comment
+# already present must FAIL CLOSED — the closed concurrency window.
+if run_comment no-op-concurrent; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper reported success when its write no-opped but a concurrent same-identity comment existed" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a concurrent record for a no-op write (window not closed)" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# It must NOT have fallen back to a list scan that could find the concurrent id.
+if grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/55$" "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper read back the concurrent comment id 55 (illegitimate fallback)" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 3: a created record NOT authored by the acting identity must FAIL CLOSED.
+if run_comment author-mismatch; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a created comment authored by a different identity" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: read-back did not enforce acting-identity authorship" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# Failure-after-read-back path must ALSO leave no scratch temp files behind
+# (proves the RETURN traps clean up on the error-return route, not just success).
+assert_no_temp_leak "author-mismatch"
+
+# Case 4: a RESOLVABLE --login override — the write, the /user identity lookup,
+# and the read-back must ALL be performed under THAT login's token/identity, not
+# the host default. The override login has id 1 (empty seed).
+run_comment override-success --login "$OVERRIDE_LOGIN"
+grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 1)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/1 $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+# The host-default identity must NOT have performed ANY request in this run.
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: an explicit --login override request was performed under the host default identity" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 5: an UNRESOLVABLE --login override (name absent from tea config) must
+# FAIL CLOSED — no silent downgrade to the host default identity: nonzero exit,
+# no success line, and NO write performed.
+if run_comment override-unresolvable --login "nonexistent-typo-login"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override did not fail closed" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override reported success" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override still performed a write" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# And it must not have silently fallen back to the host default identity.
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 6: a --login override that IS present in tea config but whose URL is a
+# DIFFERENT host than the repo remote must FAIL CLOSED (host-bound selection).
+# The cross-host token must NEVER be sent to the repo host, and no write occurs.
+if run_comment cross-host --login "$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override did not fail closed" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override reported success" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# The cross-host credential must not have performed ANY request against the repo
+# host — no request may be attributed to the cross-host identity.
+if grep -q " $CROSS_HOST_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host credential was sent to the repo host (cross-host leak)" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override still performed a write" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# It must not have silently downgraded to the host default identity either.
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host"
+
+# Cases 7-10 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
+# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url is forged. Verification pins the
+# URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix
+# + exact owner/repo + kind + number), so each forgery must FAIL CLOSED. A bare
+# endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and
+# prefix-injection variants.
+for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection; do
+    if run_comment "$bad_mode"; then
+        echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
+        cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+        echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) passed verification" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    assert_no_temp_leak "$bad_mode"
+done
+
+# Sanity: the exact same verification path still ACCEPTS a legitimate web-shaped
+# issue_url (already exercised by Case 1's fresh-success), so the tightened check
+# is not rejecting genuine writes.
+
+echo "issue-comment.sh REST create + exact-id read-back regression passed"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh

@@ -1,5 +1,38 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for durable Gitea PR review comments (#812).
+# Regression harness for pr-review.sh's Gitea review + comment writes (#865,
+# #812, #835).
+#
+# The #865 defect class: tea 0.11.1 can silently no-op while exiting 0 and
+# cannot emit the id of a record it creates, so its exit code is worthless as
+# proof of a durable write. The wrapper therefore does NOT write reviews or
+# comments via tea. approve/request-changes POST to /pulls/{n}/reviews (with the
+# event, the PR head commit_id, and the review body) and read the created review
+# back by its EXACT provider-returned id; the `comment` action POSTs to
+# /issues/{n}/comments and reads that created comment back by its exact id.
+# Because verification keys on the id the create returned, no concurrent record
+# can masquerade as this write and a no-op create fails closed. tea is only ever
+# consulted for the login list.
+#
+# The curl stub models a REAL server with persistent review/comment state on
+# disk: a POST actually CREATES and PERSISTS a record and returns its id, and
+# the read-back reads that same state. There is no independently fabricated
+# record for the wrapper to "find" — verification passes only when the POST
+# genuinely created the record the read-back retrieves.
+#
+# #865 Round-4: the curl stub also maps the presented bearer token to the
+# identity it authenticates as and logs it per request, so tests can prove
+# credential attribution. An explicit --login override must drive the entire
+# write→read-back chain under THAT login's token (resolvable case) or FAIL
+# CLOSED (unresolvable case) — never silently downgrade to the host-default
+# identity. The host-default best-effort fallback is reserved for the
+# no-override default path.
+#
+# #865 Round-5: the exact-id read-back is the SOLE authority — the wrapper does
+# NO follow-up list enumeration (the stub exposes no review/comment list
+# endpoint, so a residual enumeration would fail the run). A --login override is
+# host-bound: an override configured for a DIFFERENT host than the repo remote
+# FAILS CLOSED rather than leaking a cross-host credential. And every run leaves
+# no scratch temp files behind on any exit path (POST/GET bodies + metadata).
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -7,20 +40,70 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-review-gitea-comment}"
 REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
 BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
+XDG_DIR="$WORK_DIR/xdg"
+STATE_DIR="$WORK_DIR/state"
+REVIEWS_FILE="$STATE_DIR/reviews.json"
+COMMENTS_FILE="$STATE_DIR/comments.json"
+SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE="$STATE_DIR/review_payload.json"
+# Counts GET /pulls/{n} calls within a single run so a race mode can advance the
+# reported head between the pre-submit read and the post-verify re-read.
+HEAD_CALLS_FILE="$STATE_DIR/head_calls"
 TEA_LOG="$WORK_DIR/tea.log"
 CURL_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl.log"
+# Full curl argv per invocation — proves the bearer token never rides in argv.
+CURL_ARGV_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl-argv.log"
+AUTH_LOG="$WORK_DIR/auth.log"
 OUTPUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/output.log"
 CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
+# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
+# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
+TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
 
 cleanup() {
     rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT
 
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
+ACTING_LOGIN="review-bot"
+FOREIGN_LOGIN="other-writer"
+HEAD_SHA="HEADSHA_FEEDFACE"
+# A dedicated per-role --login override identity with its own token in tea's
+# config (the author-not-equal-reviewer hardening path).
+OVERRIDE_LOGIN="primary-reviewer"
+DEFAULT_TOKEN="test-only-placeholder"
+OVERRIDE_TOKEN="override-token-placeholder"
+# A --login override whose tea config URL points at a DIFFERENT Gitea host than
+# the repo remote (git.mosaicstack.dev). Host-bound selection must reject it
+# rather than send its token cross-host.
+CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="foreign-host-reviewer"
+CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="cross-host-token-placeholder"
+
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$STATE_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
 
+# tea config: the override login carries its own token here. The default login
+# name ("mosaicstack") is deliberately absent, so the no-override default path
+# resolves via the host credential fallback while an explicit --login must
+# resolve from this file or fail closed. A second login is configured for a
+# DIFFERENT host to exercise host-bound rejection.
+mkdir -p "$XDG_DIR/tea"
+OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
+    CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
+    python3 - "$XDG_DIR/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
+import os
+import sys
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    handle.write("logins:\n")
+    handle.write(f"  - name: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_LOGIN']}\n")
+    handle.write("    url: https://git.mosaicstack.dev\n")
+    handle.write(f"    token: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_TOKEN']}\n")
+    handle.write(f"  - name: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_LOGIN']}\n")
+    handle.write("    url: https://git.uscllc.com\n")
+    handle.write(f"    token: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_TOKEN']}\n")
+PY
+
 write_credentials() {
     local configured_url="$1"
     CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL="$configured_url" python3 - "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'PY'
@@ -40,6 +123,9 @@ with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as credentials:
 PY
 }
 
+# tea stub: only ever answers the login list. The wrapper must never write a
+# review or comment through tea (#865 defect class); any other tea invocation is
+# an error.
 cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 set -euo pipefail
@@ -47,73 +133,76 @@ set -euo pipefail
 printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$PR_REVIEW_TEA_LOG"
 
 if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
+    printf '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"%s"}]\n' "$PR_REVIEW_LOGIN_URL"
     exit 0
 fi
 
-case "${PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE:-}" in
+echo "Unexpected tea command (wrapper must not write via tea): $*" >&2
-    approve)
+exit 92
-        [[ "$*" == "pr approve 123 --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack" ]] || exit 90
-        ;;
-    request-changes)
-        [[ "$*" == "pr reject 123 --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --comment changes-required" ]] || exit 91
-        ;;
-    legacy-fallback|comment-success|http-success|prefix-success|subpath-success|port-success|scp-ssh-success|url-ssh-success|write-transport-failure|write-http-failure|readback-failure)
-        if [[ "$*" == pr\ comment* ]]; then
-            # tea v0.11.1 treats the nonexistent subcommand as `tea pr list` and exits 0.
-            printf '%s\n' 'INDEX TITLE STATE'
-            exit 0
-        fi
-        echo "Unexpected tea command: $*" >&2
-        exit 92
-        ;;
-    *)
-        exit 95
-        ;;
-esac
 SH
 chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea"
 
+# curl stub: a small REST server backed by persistent on-disk review/comment
+# state.
 cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 set -euo pipefail
 
+# Record the FULL argv exactly as spawned, BEFORE any consumption. The bearer
+# token must NOT appear here — it is delivered via a curl --config file, so only
+# the config file PATH may show up. (#865 ITEM 3a credential-in-argv exposure.)
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$PR_REVIEW_CURL_ARGV_LOG"
+
 output_file=""
 method="GET"
 payload=""
 url=""
+auth_token=""
+config_file=""
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     case "$1" in
-        -o)
+        -o) output_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-            output_file="$2"
+        -H)
-            shift 2
+            [[ "$2" == Authorization:* ]] && auth_token="${2##* }"
-            ;;
+            shift 2 ;;
-        -w|-H)
+        -K|--config) config_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-            shift 2
+        -w) shift 2 ;;
-            ;;
+        -X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-        -X)
+        -d|--data) payload="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-            method="$2"
+        -s|-S|-sS) shift ;;
-            shift 2
+        http://*|https://*) url="$1"; shift ;;
-            ;;
+        *) shift ;;
-        -d|--data)
-            payload="$2"
-            shift 2
-            ;;
-        -s|-S|-sS)
-            shift
-            ;;
-        http://*|https://*)
-            url="$1"
-            shift
-            ;;
-        *)
-            shift
-            ;;
     esac
 done
 
+# Resolve the bearer token from the curl --config file (its real, secure source);
+# only fall back to an -H header for defense in depth. The config line is
+# `header = "Authorization: token <value>"`.
+if [[ -z "$auth_token" && -n "$config_file" && -f "$config_file" ]]; then
+    config_hdr="$(grep -i 'Authorization' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    if [[ "$config_hdr" == *"token "* ]]; then
+        auth_token="${config_hdr##*token }"
+        auth_token="${auth_token%\"}"
+    fi
+fi
+
+path="${url%%\?*}"
+query="${url#*\?}"
+[[ "$query" == "$url" ]] && query=""
 printf '%s %s\n' "$method" "$url" >> "$PR_REVIEW_CURL_LOG"
 
+# Map the presented bearer token to the identity it authenticates as (as Gitea's
+# /user does). The write, /user lookup, and read-back must all carry the SAME
+# token, so the identity logged here reveals which credential performed each
+# request — proving an explicit --login override is honored, not downgraded.
+acting_identity=""
+case "$auth_token" in
+    "$PR_REVIEW_DEFAULT_TOKEN") acting_identity="$PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN" ;;
+    "$PR_REVIEW_OVERRIDE_TOKEN") acting_identity="$PR_REVIEW_OVERRIDE_LOGIN" ;;
+    "$PR_REVIEW_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN") acting_identity="$PR_REVIEW_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" ;;
+esac
+printf '%s %s %s\n' "$method" "$path" "${acting_identity:-<unauthenticated>}" >> "$PR_REVIEW_AUTH_LOG"
+
 write_response() {
     local status="$1" body="$2"
     [[ -n "$output_file" ]] || exit 96
@@ -121,116 +210,498 @@ write_response() {
     printf '%s' "$status"
 }
 
-case "${PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE:-}" in
+emit() {
-    legacy-fallback|write-transport-failure)
+    # Split a two-line "status\n<json body>" python result into the response.
+    local result="$1"
+    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+}
+
+mode="${PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE:-}"
+
+if [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_API_ROOT/user" ]]; then
+    [[ -n "$acting_identity" ]] || { write_response 401 '{"message":"unauthenticated"}'; exit 0; }
+    write_response 200 "$(PR_REVIEW_LOGIN="$acting_identity" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+print(json.dumps({"login": os.environ["PR_REVIEW_LOGIN"]}))
+PY
+)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE/pulls/123" ]]; then
+    write_response 200 "$(PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA="$PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+head = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA"]
+mode = os.environ.get("PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE", "")
+calls_path = os.environ.get("PR_REVIEW_HEAD_CALLS", "")
+# Count GET /pulls/{n} calls within this run: call 1 is the pre-submit head read
+# that pins the review; call 2+ is the post-verify re-read (current-head TOCTOU
+# close-out). In the race mode the branch "advances" after the pin.
+n = 1
+if calls_path:
+    try:
+        with open(calls_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            n = int(handle.read() or "0") + 1
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        n = 1
+    with open(calls_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write(str(n))
+if mode == "head-advanced-race" and n >= 2:
+    head = "HEADSHA_ADVANCED_DEADBEEF"
+print(json.dumps({"head": {"sha": head}}))
+PY
+)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE/pulls/123/reviews" ]]; then
+    printf '%s' "$payload" > "$PR_REVIEW_SUBMIT_PAYLOAD"
+    emit "$(PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN="${acting_identity:-$PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN}" PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD="$payload" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+state_path = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_REVIEWS"]
+mode = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE"]
+acting = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN"]
+foreign = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_FOREIGN_LOGIN"]
+submitted = json.loads(os.environ["PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD"])
+
+with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    reviews = json.load(handle)
+
+# no-op-concurrent-review: the wrapper's own submit is SUPPRESSED (200, no
+# created object) even though a concurrent same-identity, same-state review at
+# the same head already exists. Nothing is persisted; no created id to verify.
+if mode == "no-op-concurrent-review":
+    print("200")
+    print(json.dumps({}))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+
+# review-body-reuse (#865 Blocker 4): Gitea v1.25.4's SubmitReview can finalize
+# and REUSE a pending review id whose Content was authored earlier — NOT this
+# submit's body. id/author/state/head all line up with the request; only the
+# persisted body diverges, so only body verification catches it. The read-back
+# GET returns this same divergent-body record.
+if mode == "review-body-reuse":
+    new_id = (max((r["id"] for r in reviews), default=0)) + 1
+    record = {
+        "id": new_id,
+        "state": submitted.get("event"),
+        "commit_id": submitted.get("commit_id"),
+        "body": "leftover-pending-content-not-this-submit",
+        "user": {"login": acting},
+    }
+    reviews.append(record)
+    with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        json.dump(reviews, handle)
+    print("201")
+    print(json.dumps(record))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+
+# review-body-null (#865 ITEM 3b): a non-empty body was submitted but the
+# persisted review carries body == null. id/author/state/head all line up; only
+# strict presence + string-type body verification catches the lost body. The old
+# `(body or "")` coalesce would have treated null as an empty string and passed.
+if mode == "review-body-null":
+    new_id = (max((r["id"] for r in reviews), default=0)) + 1
+    record = {
+        "id": new_id,
+        "state": submitted.get("event"),
+        "commit_id": submitted.get("commit_id"),
+        "body": None,
+        "user": {"login": acting},
+    }
+    reviews.append(record)
+    with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        json.dump(reviews, handle)
+    print("201")
+    print(json.dumps(record))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+
+author = foreign if mode == "author-mismatch-review" else acting
+new_id = (max((r["id"] for r in reviews), default=0)) + 1
+record = {
+    "id": new_id,
+    "state": submitted.get("event"),
+    "commit_id": submitted.get("commit_id"),
+    "body": submitted.get("body"),
+    "user": {"login": author},
+}
+reviews.append(record)
+with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    json.dump(reviews, handle)
+print("201")
+print(json.dumps(record))
+PY
+)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE"/pulls/123/reviews/* ]]; then
+    emit "$(PR_REVIEW_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+state_path = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_REVIEWS"]
+wanted = int(os.environ["PR_REVIEW_GET_ID"])
+with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    reviews = json.load(handle)
+match = next((r for r in reviews if r["id"] == wanted), None)
+if match is None:
+    print("404")
+    print(json.dumps({"message": "not found"}))
+else:
+    print("200")
+    print(json.dumps(match))
+PY
+)"
+elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE/issues/123/comments" ]]; then
+    case "$mode" in
+        write-transport-failure)
             echo "simulated transport failure" >&2
             exit 7
             ;;
         write-http-failure)
             write_response 500 '{"message":"simulated rejection"}'
             ;;
-    comment-success|http-success|prefix-success|subpath-success|port-success|scp-ssh-success|url-ssh-success|readback-failure)
+        *)
-        if [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$url" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE/issues/123/comments" ]]; then
+            emit "$(PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD="$payload" PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE="$mode" python3 - <<'PY'
-            PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD="$payload" python3 - <<'PY'
 import json
 import os
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
-assert json.loads(os.environ["PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD"]) == {"body": os.environ["PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY"]}
+state_path = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_COMMENTS"]
-PY
+acting = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN"]
-            response=$(python3 - <<'PY'
+web_base = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_WEB_BASE"]
-import json
+mode = os.environ.get("PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE", "")
-import os
+body = json.loads(os.environ["PR_REVIEW_PAYLOAD"]).get("body")
-
+# REAL Gitea shape for a comment posted to a PR's conversation
-print(json.dumps({"id": 456, "body": os.environ["PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY"]}))
+# (/issues/{n}/comments on a PR): pull_request_url is the WEB pulls path and
-PY
+# issue_url is left empty. This is what the wrapper must tolerate — it must NOT
-)
+# require an API-shaped issue_url.
-            write_response 201 "$response"
+pr_url = f"{web_base}/pulls/123"
-        elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$url" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE/issues/comments/456" ]]; then
+# comment-plain-issue (#865 ITEM 2): #123 is a plain ISSUE, not a PR. POST
-            if [[ "$PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE" == "readback-failure" ]]; then
+# /issues/123/comments lands an issue comment whose issue_url is set and
-                body="different-body"
+# pull_request_url is empty. The pr-review `comment` action MUST reject this — it
-            else
+# claimed a PR comment, so a bare issue_url is not acceptable proof.
-                body="$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY"
+if mode == "comment-plain-issue":
-            fi
+    record = {
-            response=$(PR_REVIEW_BODY="$body" python3 - <<'PY'
-import json
-import os
-
-print(json.dumps({
         "id": 456,
-    "body": os.environ["PR_REVIEW_BODY"],
+        "body": body,
-    "issue_url": os.environ["PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE"] + "/issues/123",
+        "user": {"login": acting},
-}))
+        "issue_url": f"{web_base}/issues/123",
+        "pull_request_url": "",
+    }
+    with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        json.dump([record], handle)
+    print("201")
+    print(json.dumps(record))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+# URL-injection modes (#865 Blocker 3): id/author/body are all correct but the
+# provider-returned pull_request_url is forged, so ONLY origin+full-path
+# verification can catch them.
+_p = urlparse(web_base)
+_origin = f"{_p.scheme}://{_p.netloc}"
+_slug = _p.path  # /<owner>/<repo>
+if mode == "comment-url-wrong-host":
+    pr_url = f"https://evil.example{_slug}/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-owner":
+    pr_url = f"{_origin}/attacker/stack/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-repo":
+    pr_url = f"{_origin}/mosaicstack/other/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-suffix-injection":
+    # Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/pulls/123") test would ACCEPT it.
+    pr_url = f"{_origin}/deceptive{_slug}/pulls/123"
+record = {
+    "id": 456,
+    "body": body,
+    "user": {"login": acting},
+    "issue_url": "",
+    "pull_request_url": pr_url,
+}
+with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    json.dump([record], handle)
+print("201")
+print(json.dumps(record))
 PY
-)
+)"
-            write_response 200 "$response"
+            ;;
-        else
+    esac
+elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then
+    emit "$(PR_REVIEW_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+state_path = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_COMMENTS"]
+mode = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE"]
+wanted = int(os.environ["PR_REVIEW_GET_ID"])
+with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    comments = json.load(handle)
+match = next((c for c in comments if c["id"] == wanted), None)
+if match is None:
+    print("404")
+    print(json.dumps({"message": "not found"}))
+    raise SystemExit(0)
+if mode == "readback-failure":
+    # The server returns a DIFFERENT body than was created — a genuine
+    # provider-side mismatch the wrapper must reject.
+    match = dict(match, body="different-body")
+print("200")
+print(json.dumps(match))
+PY
+)"
+else
     echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2
     exit 97
-        fi
+fi
-        ;;
-    *)
-        exit 98
-        ;;
-esac
 SH
 chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/curl"
 
+# Seed persistent server state for a mode before the wrapper runs.
+seed_state() {
+    local mode="$1"
+    printf '[]' > "$COMMENTS_FILE"
+    rm -f "$SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE" "$HEAD_CALLS_FILE"
+    PR_REVIEW_SEED_MODE="$mode" PR_REVIEW_SEED_ACTING="$ACTING_LOGIN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_SEED_HEAD="$HEAD_SHA" python3 - "$REVIEWS_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+mode = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_SEED_MODE"]
+acting = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_SEED_ACTING"]
+head = os.environ["PR_REVIEW_SEED_HEAD"]
+
+
+def review(rid, state, commit, login):
+    return {"id": rid, "state": state, "commit_id": commit, "user": {"login": login}}
+
+
+if mode == "many-prior-approve":
+    # 50 pre-existing reviews already exist; the review this run submits becomes
+    # id 51, proving exact-id read-back works regardless of how many reviews
+    # precede it (no list enumeration is involved).
+    reviews = [review(i, "COMMENT", "oldsha0000", acting) for i in range(1, 51)]
+elif mode == "no-op-concurrent-review":
+    # A concurrent SAME-IDENTITY APPROVED review at the CURRENT head already
+    # exists. The wrapper's own submit will be a no-op; it must fail closed
+    # because no created id is returned — it must not scan and accept this one.
+    reviews = [review(77, "APPROVED", head, acting)]
+else:
+    reviews = [review(100, "COMMENT", "oldsha0000", acting)]
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+    json.dump(reviews, handle)
+PY
+}
+
 run_review() {
     local mode="$1" action="$2" comment="${3:-}"
     local configured_url="${4:-https://git.mosaicstack.dev}"
     local remote_url="${5:-https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git}"
     local expected_repo="${6:-mosaicstack/stack}"
+    local login_override="${7:-}"
     local expected_api_base="${configured_url%/}/api/v1/repos/$expected_repo"
+    local expected_api_root="${configured_url%/}/api/v1"
+    local expected_web_base="${configured_url%/}/$expected_repo"
     git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote set-url origin "$remote_url"
     write_credentials "$configured_url"
     : > "$TEA_LOG"
     : > "$CURL_LOG"
+    : > "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"
+    : > "$AUTH_LOG"
     : > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+    seed_state "$mode"
     (
         cd "$REPO_DIR"
         PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
+        TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
         MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
         PR_REVIEW_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \
+        PR_REVIEW_LOGIN_URL="${configured_url%/}" \
         PR_REVIEW_CURL_LOG="$CURL_LOG" \
+        PR_REVIEW_CURL_ARGV_LOG="$CURL_ARGV_LOG" \
+        PR_REVIEW_AUTH_LOG="$AUTH_LOG" \
+        PR_REVIEW_REVIEWS="$REVIEWS_FILE" \
+        PR_REVIEW_COMMENTS="$COMMENTS_FILE" \
+        PR_REVIEW_SUBMIT_PAYLOAD="$SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE" \
+        PR_REVIEW_HEAD_CALLS="$HEAD_CALLS_FILE" \
         PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE="$mode" \
         PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY="$comment" \
         PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_API_BASE="$expected_api_base" \
-        "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" -n 123 -a "$action" ${comment:+-c "$comment"}
+        PR_REVIEW_API_ROOT="$expected_api_root" \
+        PR_REVIEW_WEB_BASE="$expected_web_base" \
+        PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA="$HEAD_SHA" \
+        PR_REVIEW_ACTING_LOGIN="$ACTING_LOGIN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_FOREIGN_LOGIN="$FOREIGN_LOGIN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_DEFAULT_TOKEN="$DEFAULT_TOKEN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
+        PR_REVIEW_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
+        "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" -n 123 -a "$action" ${comment:+-c "$comment"} ${login_override:+--login "$login_override"}
     ) > "$OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1
 }
 
+# Assert the wrapper left no scratch temp files behind in TMPDIR (POST/GET
+# request bodies + metadata). Called after both success and failure paths so a
+# clobbered/leaked RETURN trap is caught on every exit route.
+assert_no_temp_leak() {
+    local context="$1" leaked
+    # Includes the curl auth-config files (mosaic-gitea-auth-*), which carry the
+    # bearer token and must be unlinked on every exit path.
+    leaked=$(find "$TMP_SCRATCH" -type f \( -name 'mosaic-pr-review-*' -o -name 'mosaic-gitea-auth-*' \) 2>/dev/null || true)
+    if [[ -n "$leaked" ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL: pr-review temp files leaked ($context):" >&2
+        printf '%s\n' "$leaked" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Assert the presented bearer token NEVER appeared in curl's argv (it must travel
+# via a curl --config file), and that --config auth was actually used. On the
+# expected path grep matches nothing, so no token value is ever printed.
+assert_token_not_in_argv() {
+    local context="$1"
+    if grep -qF -e "$DEFAULT_TOKEN" -e "$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" -e "$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
+        echo "FAIL: a Gitea bearer token leaked into curl argv ($context)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if ! grep -q -- '--config' "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
+        echo "FAIL: curl was not invoked with --config file auth ($context)" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+assert_no_tea_write() {
+    # tea must only ever be used for the login list, never to write.
+    if grep -qvE '^login list --output json$' "$TEA_LOG"; then
+        echo "FAIL: wrapper invoked tea for something other than the login list" >&2
+        cat "$TEA_LOG" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Case 1: a plain approve submits a review via REST and verifies it by its exact
+# provider-returned id (id 101), attributed to the acting identity, pinned to
+# the PR head, with no separate comment.
 run_review approve approve
-grep -q '^pr approve 123 --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack$' "$TEA_LOG"
+grep -q 'Approved and verified Gitea PR #123 (review ID 101)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
-grep -q 'Approved Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/user$' "$CURL_LOG"
+grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123$' "$CURL_LOG"
+grep -q '^POST https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews$' "$CURL_LOG"
+grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews/101$' "$CURL_LOG"
+# No review-list enumeration is performed — the exact-id GET is authoritative.
+if grep -Eq '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews(\?|$)' "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper performed a redundant review-list enumeration" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# No-override default path: the write, /user lookup, and read-back all resolve
+# via the host-default credential and authenticate as the acting identity.
+grep -q "^POST https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/user $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+assert_no_tea_write
+assert_no_temp_leak "approve"
+# ITEM 3a: the host-default token drove this whole chain, yet never appeared in
+# any curl argv — it was passed via a curl --config file.
+assert_token_not_in_argv "approve default-token"
+# The submitted review payload carries the event and the PR head commit_id.
+PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA="$HEAD_SHA" python3 - "$SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
 
-run_review request-changes request-changes changes-required
+payload = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
-grep -q '^pr reject 123 --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --comment changes-required$' "$TEA_LOG"
+assert payload["event"] == "APPROVED", payload
-grep -q 'Requested changes on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+assert payload["commit_id"] == os.environ["PR_REVIEW_HEAD_SHA"], payload
+PY
+# A plain approve (no body) must not POST a comment.
+if grep -q '/issues/123/comments' "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: plain approve unexpectedly posted a comment" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 
-if run_review legacy-fallback comment durable-body; then
+# Case 2: a submitted review NOT authored by the acting identity must FAIL
-    echo "The old nonexistent tea pr comment fallback returned success" >&2
+# CLOSED — the exact-id read-back enforces authorship.
+if run_review author-mismatch-review approve; then
+    echo "FAIL: approve accepted a review authored by a different identity" >&2
     cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
     exit 1
 fi
-if grep -q '^pr comment ' "$TEA_LOG"; then
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
-    echo "Wrapper invoked unsupported tea pr comment" >&2
+    echo "FAIL: read-back did not enforce acting-identity authorship" >&2
     exit 1
 fi
-if grep -q 'Added comment to Gitea PR' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+# Failure-after-read-back path must ALSO leave no scratch temp files behind.
-    echo "Wrapper reported success without durable persistence" >&2
+assert_no_temp_leak "author-mismatch-review"
+
+# Case 3: a no-op submit with a concurrent SAME-IDENTITY, same-state review at
+# the current head already present must FAIL CLOSED — the closed concurrency
+# window. The wrapper must not read back (or accept) the concurrent id 77.
+if run_review no-op-concurrent-review approve; then
+    echo "FAIL: approve reported success when its submit no-opped but a concurrent review existed" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: approve accepted a concurrent review for a no-op submit (window not closed)" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q '/pulls/123/reviews/77$' "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper read back the concurrent review id 77 (illegitimate fallback)" >&2
     exit 1
 fi
 
+# Case 4: a genuine matching review (id 51) created after 50 pre-existing reviews
+# is still verified by its EXACT provider-returned id — no list enumeration is
+# needed regardless of how many reviews precede it.
+run_review many-prior-approve approve
+grep -q 'Approved and verified Gitea PR #123 (review ID 51)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews/51$' "$CURL_LOG"
+if grep -Eq '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews(\?|$)' "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper performed a redundant review-list enumeration" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 5: an approve WITH a body carries that body in the review submit itself —
+# there is no separate detached comment POST.
+run_review approve approve approve-note
+grep -q 'Approved and verified Gitea PR #123 (review ID 101)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY="approve-note" python3 - "$SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+payload = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
+assert payload["body"] == os.environ["PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY"], payload
+PY
+if grep -q '/issues/123/comments' "$CURL_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: approve-with-body posted a separate comment instead of carrying the body on the review" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 6: request-changes requires a body and carries it on the REQUEST_CHANGES
+# review submit.
+run_review request-changes request-changes changes-required
+grep -q 'Requested changes and verified on Gitea PR #123 (review ID 101)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+grep -q '^POST https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews$' "$CURL_LOG"
+grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews/101$' "$CURL_LOG"
+PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY="changes-required" python3 - "$SUBMIT_PAYLOAD_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+payload = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8"))
+assert payload["event"] == "REQUEST_CHANGES", payload
+assert payload["body"] == os.environ["PR_REVIEW_EXPECTED_BODY"], payload
+PY
+assert_no_tea_write
+
+# Case 7: the `comment` action creates a comment via REST and verifies it by its
+# exact created id, attributed to the acting identity. This also exercises
+# owner/repo + base-URL resolution across clone-URL shapes.
 complex_body=$'durable "body"\n-- marker'
 run_review comment-success comment "$complex_body"
 grep -q '^POST https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues/123/comments$' "$CURL_LOG"
 grep -q '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues/comments/456$' "$CURL_LOG"
 grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
-if [[ -s "$TEA_LOG" ]]; then
+assert_no_tea_write
-    echo "REST comment path unexpectedly invoked tea" >&2
+assert_no_temp_leak "comment-success"
-    cat "$TEA_LOG" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
 
 run_review http-success comment durable-body http://git.mosaicstack.dev
 grep -q '^POST http://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues/123/comments$' "$CURL_LOG"
@@ -258,6 +729,17 @@ grep -q '^POST https://git.example/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/123/comments$'
 run_review url-ssh-success comment durable-body https://git.example ssh://git@git.example/owner/repo.git owner/repo
 grep -q '^POST https://git.example/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/123/comments$' "$CURL_LOG"
 
+# #850: an SSH remote's transport port must not be compared against the
+# configured HTTP(S) API URL's port.
+run_review ssh-transport-port-success comment durable-body https://git.example ssh://git@git.example:2222/owner/repo.git owner/repo
+grep -q '^POST https://git.example/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/123/comments$' "$CURL_LOG"
+
+# #850: an explicit default HTTP(S) port on the remote must equal an implicit
+# (portless) configured URL.
+run_review explicit-default-port-success comment durable-body https://git.example https://git.example:443/owner/repo.git owner/repo
+grep -q '^POST https://git.example/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/issues/123/comments$' "$CURL_LOG"
+
+# Comment write/read-back failure modes must all fail closed.
 if run_review write-transport-failure comment durable-body; then
     echo "Expected provider transport failure to return nonzero" >&2
     exit 1
@@ -275,4 +757,167 @@ if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-echo "pr-review.sh durable Gitea comment regression passed"
+# Case 8 (#865 Round-4): a RESOLVABLE explicit --login override must attribute
+# the entire write→read-back chain to THAT login's token/identity, never the
+# host-default identity. The override login carries its own token in the tea
+# config, so /user, the review POST, and the exact-id read-back all authenticate
+# as the override identity — and NOTHING is performed under the default identity.
+run_review override-success approve "" https://git.mosaicstack.dev \
+    https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git mosaicstack/stack "$OVERRIDE_LOGIN"
+grep -q 'Approved and verified Gitea PR #123 (review ID 101)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+grep -q "^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/user $OVERRIDE_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^POST https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews $OVERRIDE_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+grep -q "^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/reviews/101 $OVERRIDE_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: an explicit --login override was silently downgraded to the host-default identity" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_tea_write
+# ITEM 3a: the override token likewise never leaked into curl argv.
+assert_token_not_in_argv "override-success override-token"
+
+# Case 9 (#865 Round-4): an UNRESOLVABLE explicit --login override (a name absent
+# from the tea config) must FAIL CLOSED — nonzero exit, no success line, no review
+# POST, and above all NO request performed under the host-default identity. The
+# host-default best-effort fallback is reserved for the no-override path only.
+if run_review override-unresolvable approve "" https://git.mosaicstack.dev \
+    https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git mosaicstack/stack "nonexistent-typo-login"; then
+    echo "FAIL: an unresolvable --login override was not rejected (silently used the host default)" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override reported success" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q '/pulls/123/reviews ' "$AUTH_LOG" && grep -qE '^POST .*/pulls/123/reviews ' "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override performed a review POST" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override fell back to the host-default identity" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Case 10 (#865 Round-5): a --login override that IS present in tea config but
+# whose URL is a DIFFERENT host than the repo remote must FAIL CLOSED (host-bound
+# selection). The cross-host token must NEVER be sent to the repo host, and no
+# review POST occurs.
+if run_review cross-host approve "" https://git.mosaicstack.dev \
+    https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git mosaicstack/stack "$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override did not fail closed" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override reported success" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# The cross-host credential must not have performed ANY request against the repo
+# host — no request may be attributed to the cross-host identity.
+if grep -q " $CROSS_HOST_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host credential was sent to the repo host (cross-host leak)" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -qE '^POST .*/pulls/123/reviews ' "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override performed a review POST" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
+    echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override fell back to the host-default identity" >&2
+    cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host"
+
+# Case 11 (#865 Blocker 4): SubmitReview finalizes/reuses a pending review id
+# whose persisted body is NOT this submit's body. id/author/state/head all match
+# the request, so ONLY body verification can catch the divergence — it must FAIL
+# CLOSED. (Submit a non-empty body so the mismatch is meaningful.)
+if run_review review-body-reuse approve real-submitted-review-body; then
+    echo "FAIL: review with a reused/foreign body was accepted (body not verified)" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: read-back did not enforce the submitted review body" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-reuse"
+
+# Cases 12-15 (#865 Blocker 3): a PR comment whose id/author/body are all correct
+# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url is forged must FAIL CLOSED.
+# Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and FULL path
+# (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind + number); a bare endswith/suffix
+# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
+for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo comment-url-suffix-injection; do
+    if run_review "$bad_mode" comment durable-body; then
+        echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
+        cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+        echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) passed verification" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    assert_no_temp_leak "$bad_mode"
+done
+
+# Case 16 (#865 ITEM 1, current-head TOCTOU): the PR head advances between the
+# pre-submit head read (which pins the review) and the post-verify re-read. The
+# review is genuinely created and verified as pinned to the OLD head, but the
+# live tip has moved on, so the wrapper must FAIL CLOSED rather than report a
+# review that no longer covers the PR's current commit.
+if run_review head-advanced-race approve; then
+    echo "FAIL: approve reported success though the PR head advanced after submit" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: current-head TOCTOU close-out did not fail closed on an advanced head" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+# The head was re-read after the submit/verify (2nd GET /pulls/123).
+if [[ "$(grep -c '^GET https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123$' "$CURL_LOG")" -lt 2 ]]; then
+    echo "FAIL: wrapper did not re-read the PR head after review verification" >&2
+    cat "$CURL_LOG" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "head-advanced-race"
+
+# Case 17 (#865 ITEM 2): a claimed PR comment that actually lands as a plain
+# ISSUE comment (issue #123 exists, PR #123 does not — issue_url set,
+# pull_request_url empty) must FAIL CLOSED. The pr-review `comment` verifier
+# requires a pull_request_url (kind=pulls) and rejects a bare issue_url.
+if run_review comment-plain-issue comment durable-body; then
+    echo "FAIL: pr-review accepted a plain issue comment as a verified PR comment" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: a plain issue_url satisfied the PR comment verifier" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "comment-plain-issue"
+
+# Case 18 (#865 ITEM 3b): a non-empty review body submitted but persisted as null
+# must FAIL CLOSED. id/author/state/head all match; only strict presence +
+# string-type + exact body equality (not the old `(body or "")` coalesce) catches
+# the lost body.
+if run_review review-body-null approve real-submitted-review-body; then
+    echo "FAIL: review whose non-empty body persisted as null was accepted" >&2
+    cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q 'Approved and verified' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
+    echo "FAIL: a null persisted body passed strict review-body verification" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-null"
+
+echo "pr-review.sh REST review + comment create/read-back regression passed"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh

@@ -50,6 +50,21 @@ if ! [[ "$FILE_PATH" =~ \.(ts|tsx|js|jsx|mjs|cjs)$ ]]; then
     exit 0
 fi
 
+# Deps preflight (#856): this hook is the common gate-entry seam the delivery
+# cycle invokes on every Edit/Write/MultiEdit — it fires before any pnpm-based
+# gate (test/lint/typecheck/format:check) runs against the edited file. In a
+# freshly created git worktree (pnpm workspaces do NOT share node_modules
+# across worktrees), node_modules/.bin is empty until `pnpm install` has run,
+# so gate binaries (tsc/eslint/prettier/vitest) fail with a raw, illegible
+# `sh: 1: <tool>: not found` that is indistinguishable from a real failure.
+# Fail legibly here instead, before that raw error has a chance to surface.
+BIN_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/node_modules/.bin"
+if [ ! -d "$BIN_DIR" ] || [ -z "$(ls -A "$BIN_DIR" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+    echo "deps not installed — run pnpm install" >&2
+    echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] [ERROR] deps not installed — run pnpm install ($BIN_DIR is missing or empty)" >> "$LOG_FILE"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 # Call the main QA handler with extracted parameters
 if [ -f ~/.config/mosaic/tools/qa/qa-hook-handler.sh ]; then
     echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Calling QA handler for $FILE_PATH" >> "$LOG_FILE"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression harness for #856: worker git-worktrees under a fresh `git worktree
+# add` have no node_modules until `pnpm install` runs (pnpm workspaces do NOT
+# share node_modules across worktrees). Before the fix, the gate-entry seam
+# (qa-hook-stdin.sh, registered as the PostToolUse hook for every Edit/Write/
+# MultiEdit in runtime/claude/settings.json) silently let a raw
+# `sh: 1: <tool>: not found` surface from any downstream gate invocation —
+# indistinguishable from a real test/lint failure (false-red).
+#
+# Asserts:
+#   1. RED (documented): a completely fresh worktree with no node_modules/.bin
+#      at all produces the raw "not found" for a gate binary — this is the
+#      defect the fix prevents from reaching the operator un-annotated.
+#   2. With node_modules/.bin missing entirely, the seam exits nonzero with
+#      the legible sentinel "deps not installed — run pnpm install" instead
+#      of silently proceeding (exit 0) into a would-be raw not-found.
+#   3. With node_modules/.bin present but empty, same legible-sentinel
+#      behavior (covers `git worktree add` immediately followed by an
+#      as-yet-incomplete/interrupted install).
+#   4. Once node_modules/.bin is populated (post `pnpm install`), the seam
+#      proceeds normally (exit 0) — the preflight does not false-positive.
+#   5. Non-JS/TS files are unaffected (existing skip behavior preserved).
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+HOOK="$SCRIPT_DIR/qa-hook-stdin.sh"
+
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT
+
+fail=0
+
+fail_msg() {
+    echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
+    fail=1
+}
+
+run_hook() {
+    local file_path="$1"
+    printf '{"tool_name":"Edit","tool_input":{"file_path":"%s"}}' "$file_path" | "$HOOK"
+}
+
+make_fixture_repo() {
+    local dir="$1"
+    mkdir -p "$dir"
+    git -C "$dir" init -q .
+    git -C "$dir" -c user.email=fixture@test -c user.name=fixture commit -q --allow-empty -m init
+}
+
+# --- Scenario 1: RED — document the pre-fix raw not-found a gate hits when
+#     node_modules/.bin is entirely absent (this is what the preflight now
+#     intercepts before any gate command runs).
+RED_DIR="$TMP_DIR/red-fixture"
+make_fixture_repo "$RED_DIR"
+RED_OUTPUT=$(PATH="/usr/bin:/bin" sh -c 'tsc --noEmit' 2>&1) && RED_STATUS=0 || RED_STATUS=$?
+case "$RED_OUTPUT" in
+    *"not found"*) ;;
+    *) fail_msg "expected the raw un-preflighted invocation to demonstrate 'not found'; got: $RED_OUTPUT" ;;
+esac
+[[ "$RED_STATUS" -ne 0 ]] || fail_msg "expected raw invocation without deps installed to fail"
+
+# --- Scenario 2: node_modules/.bin missing entirely -> legible sentinel, nonzero.
+MISSING_DIR="$TMP_DIR/missing-bin"
+make_fixture_repo "$MISSING_DIR"
+echo "console.log(1)" > "$MISSING_DIR/x.ts"
+OUTPUT=$(cd "$MISSING_DIR" && run_hook "$MISSING_DIR/x.ts" 2>&1) && STATUS=0 || STATUS=$?
+[[ "$STATUS" -ne 0 ]] || fail_msg "missing node_modules/.bin: expected nonzero exit, got 0"
+case "$OUTPUT" in
+    *"deps not installed"*"pnpm install"*) ;;
+    *) fail_msg "missing node_modules/.bin: expected legible sentinel, got: $OUTPUT" ;;
+esac
+
+# --- Scenario 3: node_modules/.bin present but empty -> legible sentinel, nonzero.
+EMPTY_DIR="$TMP_DIR/empty-bin"
+make_fixture_repo "$EMPTY_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$EMPTY_DIR/node_modules/.bin"
+echo "console.log(1)" > "$EMPTY_DIR/x.ts"
+OUTPUT=$(cd "$EMPTY_DIR" && run_hook "$EMPTY_DIR/x.ts" 2>&1) && STATUS=0 || STATUS=$?
+[[ "$STATUS" -ne 0 ]] || fail_msg "empty node_modules/.bin: expected nonzero exit, got 0"
+case "$OUTPUT" in
+    *"deps not installed"*"pnpm install"*) ;;
+    *) fail_msg "empty node_modules/.bin: expected legible sentinel, got: $OUTPUT" ;;
+esac
+
+# --- Scenario 4: node_modules/.bin populated (post `pnpm install`) -> proceeds normally.
+OK_DIR="$TMP_DIR/installed-bin"
+make_fixture_repo "$OK_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$OK_DIR/node_modules/.bin"
+printf '#!/bin/sh\necho ok\n' > "$OK_DIR/node_modules/.bin/tsc"
+chmod +x "$OK_DIR/node_modules/.bin/tsc"
+echo "console.log(1)" > "$OK_DIR/x.ts"
+OUTPUT=$(cd "$OK_DIR" && run_hook "$OK_DIR/x.ts" 2>&1) && STATUS=0 || STATUS=$?
+[[ "$STATUS" -eq 0 ]] || fail_msg "populated node_modules/.bin: expected exit 0, got $STATUS ($OUTPUT)"
+case "$OUTPUT" in
+    *"deps not installed"*) fail_msg "populated node_modules/.bin: unexpected sentinel fired: $OUTPUT" ;;
+    *) ;;
+esac
+
+# --- Scenario 5: non-JS/TS files are unaffected by the preflight (still
+#     skipped before the deps check, regardless of node_modules state).
+NONJS_DIR="$TMP_DIR/nonjs"
+make_fixture_repo "$NONJS_DIR"
+echo "# doc" > "$NONJS_DIR/README.md"
+OUTPUT=$(cd "$NONJS_DIR" && run_hook "$NONJS_DIR/README.md" 2>&1) && STATUS=0 || STATUS=$?
+[[ "$STATUS" -eq 0 ]] || fail_msg "non-JS/TS file: expected exit 0 (skip), got $STATUS ($OUTPUT)"
+case "$OUTPUT" in
+    *"deps not installed"*) fail_msg "non-JS/TS file: preflight incorrectly fired: $OUTPUT" ;;
+    *) ;;
+esac
+
+if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
+    echo "deps-preflight regression passed (5/5 scenarios)"
+fi
+
+exit "$fail"

packages/mosaic/package.json

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "lint": "eslint src",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests && pnpm run test:framework-shell",
-    "test:framework-shell": "python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh"
+    "test:framework-shell": "python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@mosaicstack/brain": "workspace:*",

packages/mosaic/src/mutator-gate/mutator-gate.acceptance.spec.ts

@@ -661,13 +661,27 @@ describe('whole mutator-class lease gate', () => {
   test('observer revocation and monotonic TTL expiry deny the next mutator', async () => {
     const { socket } = await startBroker();
     const sessionId = await register(socket);
-    const pending = await beginVerification(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 1, 1);
-    await promote(socket, sessionId, pending.receipt_challenge!);
 
+    // Establish the lease with a normal (non-racing) TTL first and prove it
+    // authorizes. This "still valid" check is setup, not a TTL-expiry
+    // assertion, so it must not share a lease with a 1-second TTL: on a
+    // contended push-CI host, scheduling delay alone between promote() and
+    // this authorize() call can consume that entire 1-second margin and
+    // spuriously deny it (CI#1945). Using a generous TTL here removes that
+    // real-time race without touching lease-gate security semantics.
+    const pending = await beginVerification(socket, sessionId, 'claude');
+    await promote(socket, sessionId, pending.receipt_challenge!);
     expect(await authorize(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 'Bash')).toMatchObject({
       ok: true,
       decision: 'allow',
     });
+
+    // A dedicated, isolated short-TTL lease drives the deliberate monotonic
+    // expiry demonstration below. It is never used for anything but the
+    // wait-then-expire assertion, so there is no setup work racing its
+    // 1-second window.
+    const shortLived = await beginVerification(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 1, 1, 2);
+    await promote(socket, sessionId, shortLived.receipt_challenge!);
     await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1_100));
     expect(await authorize(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 'Bash')).toMatchObject({
       ok: false,
@@ -675,7 +689,7 @@ describe('whole mutator-class lease gate', () => {
       decision: 'deny',
     });
 
-    const refreshed = await beginVerification(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 1, 300, 2);
+    const refreshed = await beginVerification(socket, sessionId, 'claude', 1, 300, 3);
     await promote(socket, sessionId, refreshed.receipt_challenge!);
     expect(
       await request(socket, {

plugins/mosaic-framework/src/index.ts

@@ -217,12 +217,22 @@ git fetch origin
 mkdir -p ~/src/${projectName}-worktrees
 git worktree add ~/src/${projectName}-worktrees/<task-slug> -b <branch-name> origin/main
 cd ~/src/${projectName}-worktrees/<task-slug>
+pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline
 # ... all work happens here ...
 git push origin <branch-name>
 cd ~/src/${projectName} && git worktree remove ~/src/${projectName}-worktrees/<task-slug>
 \`\`\`
 
-Worktrees path: \`~/src/<repo>-worktrees/<task-slug>\` — NEVER use /tmp.`);
+Worktrees path: \`~/src/<repo>-worktrees/<task-slug>\` — NEVER use /tmp.
+
+\`pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline\` MUST run immediately after
+\`git worktree add\`/\`cd\`, BEFORE any gate (\`pnpm test\`/\`lint\`/\`typecheck\`/\`format:check\`)
+is invoked. pnpm workspaces do NOT share \`node_modules\` across separate git
+worktrees — a fresh worktree has an empty \`node_modules/.bin\`, so every gate
+binary (\`tsc\`/\`eslint\`/\`prettier\`/\`vitest\`) fails \`sh: 1: <tool>: not found\`
+until deps are installed. That failure is indistinguishable from a real
+test/lint failure — a false-red gate. Never skip this step and never reorder
+it after the first gate invocation.`);
 
   // 6. Completion gates
   sections.push(`# Completion Gates — ENFORCED

skills/glpi-create/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Skill: glpi-create — Open a New GLPI Ticket
+
+> Create a new GLPI helpdesk ticket. Mutates GLPI — confirm the details before running.
+
+## When to use
+
+- Logging a new incident or request that should live in the helpdesk queue.
+
+## Required information
+
+- **title** — short subject line.
+- **content** — description of the issue / request.
+
+## Optional
+
+- **priority** — `1`=VeryLow, `2`=Low, `3`=Medium (default), `4`=High, `5`=VeryHigh, `6`=Major.
+- **type** — `1`=Incident (default), `2`=Request.
+
+## Command
+
+Wraps the existing tooling:
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-create.sh \
+  -t "<title>" \
+  -c "<content>" \
+  [-p <priority>] \
+  [-y <type>] \
+  [-f json]
+```
+
+Example:
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-create.sh \
+  -t "Paint-area camera install" \
+  -c "Ordered 2 cameras for Paint and stock; schedule mounting + NVR config." \
+  -p 3 -y 2
+```
+
+## After creating
+
+- Note the returned **ticket ID** — you'll need it for **[[glpi-followup]]** and
+  **[[glpi-solve]]**.
+- If it should also be tracked as brain work, add a matching task (see the `add-task` skill).
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Confirm title/content/priority with the user before creating — a ticket is outward-facing.
+- Never echo GLPI tokens.

skills/glpi-followup/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Skill: glpi-followup — Add a Followup to a GLPI Ticket
+
+> Post a followup (comment / progress note / resolution writeup) to a GLPI ticket.
+> This documents work but does **not** change the ticket status — to close a ticket
+> out, follow with **[[glpi-solve]]** to set status to Solved.
+
+## When to use
+
+- Recording progress, a decision, or a root-cause/resolution note on a ticket.
+- The documentation step that usually precedes closing a ticket out (`glpi-solve`).
+
+## Critical quirk
+
+Use the **top-level `/ITILFollowup` endpoint**, NOT `/Ticket/<id>/ITILFollowup`. The
+sub-resource path returns permission errors even with a Super-Admin profile.
+
+## Procedure
+
+### 1. Session + creds
+
+```bash
+SESSION=$(~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/session-init.sh -q)
+source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials glpi
+```
+
+### 2. Post the followup
+
+```bash
+TICKET_ID=<id>
+CONTENT="<the followup text>"
+curl -sk -X POST "${GLPI_URL}/ITILFollowup" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" \
+  -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d "$(jq -n --argjson id "$TICKET_ID" --arg c "$CONTENT" \
+        '{input:{itemtype:"Ticket", items_id:$id, content:$c}}')"
+```
+
+Expect HTTP 201. Building the payload with `jq` keeps quotes/newlines in the content safe.
+
+### 3. Long or multi-paragraph content
+
+Write the note to a file first, then read it into the payload:
+
+```bash
+curl -sk -X POST "${GLPI_URL}/ITILFollowup" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d "$(jq -n --argjson id "$TICKET_ID" --rawfile c /path/to/note.md \
+        '{input:{itemtype:"Ticket", items_id:$id, content:$c}}')"
+```
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Never echo the GLPI app/user/session tokens.
+- A followup alone leaves the ticket open. If the work is done, run **[[glpi-solve]]** next.

skills/glpi-list/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Skill: glpi-list — Query GLPI Tickets
+
+> Quick lookups of GLPI helpdesk tickets by status or recency. Read-only.
+
+## When to use
+
+- "What tickets are open / pending?" · "Show recent tickets" · finding a ticket ID
+  before running **[[glpi-followup]]** or **[[glpi-solve]]**.
+
+## Command
+
+Wraps the existing tooling:
+
+```bash
+GLPI=~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi
+
+# Most recent tickets (default 50, newest first)
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh"
+
+# Filter by status: new | processing | pending | solved | closed
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh" -s pending
+
+# JSON output (for parsing / piping to jq) and a custom limit
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh" -s processing -f json -l 20
+```
+
+Status IDs: 1 New · 2/3 Processing · 4 Pending · 5 Solved · 6 Closed.
+
+## Details lookup for one ticket
+
+When you have an ID and want the full record:
+
+```bash
+SESSION=$(~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/session-init.sh -q)
+source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials glpi
+curl -sk "${GLPI_URL}/Ticket/<id>?expand_dropdowns=true" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  | jq '{id, name, status, date, date_mod}'
+
+# Followups on a ticket
+curl -sk "${GLPI_URL}/Ticket/<id>/ITILFollowup" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  | jq '.[] | {date, content}'
+```
+
+(Reading followups via the sub-resource is fine — only _creating_ them requires the
+top-level `/ITILFollowup` endpoint. See **[[glpi-followup]]**.)
+
+## Present to user
+
+Group by status, one line per ticket: `#<id> · <title> · <status> · <last-modified>`.
+Use neutral phrasing — no "OVERDUE"/"URGENT".
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Read-only. Never echo GLPI tokens.
+- To sync tickets into brain data instead, use `python tools/sync_glpi.py` (not this skill).

skills/glpi-solve/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Skill: glpi-solve — Close Out a GLPI Ticket
+
+> Properly close out a completed GLPI helpdesk ticket. Completing the work is not
+> enough — the ticket **status must be set to "Solved"**, which is what triggers
+> GLPI's config-driven auto-close. Posting a resolution followup documents the work
+> but does **not** change status, so a ticket left at Solved-less status stays open.
+
+## When to use
+
+- Any time work on a GLPI ticket is finished and it should be closed out.
+- After posting a root-cause / resolution writeup as an `/ITILFollowup`.
+- During a cleanup sweep of tickets that are done in reality but still open in GLPI.
+
+## The rule (from an operator, 2026-07-20)
+
+**"Solved" is the correct terminal state to set — not "Closed."** GLPI is configured
+to auto-close Solved tickets after its delay. If you only post a followup and never set
+status, the ticket sits open (this bit us on a real incident where resolution followups
+were posted but status was never advanced, leaving tickets open, which the operator had
+to mark Solved by hand).
+
+Close-out = **followup (optional but preferred) + set status to Solved.**
+
+## GLPI status IDs
+
+| ID    | Status                |                                              |
+| ----- | --------------------- | -------------------------------------------- |
+| 1     | New                   |                                              |
+| 2     | Processing (assigned) |                                              |
+| 3     | Processing (planned)  |                                              |
+| 4     | Pending / Waiting     |                                              |
+| **5** | **Solved**            | ← set this on close-out                      |
+| 6     | Closed                | ← happens automatically; do not set manually |
+
+## Procedure
+
+### 1. Get a session token
+
+```bash
+SESSION=$(~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/session-init.sh -q)
+source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials glpi
+```
+
+### 2. (Preferred) Post the resolution followup
+
+Use the **top-level `/ITILFollowup` endpoint** — the `/Ticket/<id>/ITILFollowup`
+sub-resource returns permission errors even as Super-Admin (known GLPI quirk).
+
+```bash
+TICKET_ID=<id>
+curl -sk -X POST "${GLPI_URL}/ITILFollowup" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" \
+  -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d "{\"input\":{\"itemtype\":\"Ticket\",\"items_id\":${TICKET_ID},\"content\":\"<resolution summary>\"}}"
+```
+
+### 3. Set status to Solved (the step that actually closes it out)
+
+```bash
+curl -sk -X PUT "${GLPI_URL}/Ticket/${TICKET_ID}" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" \
+  -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d "{\"input\":{\"id\":${TICKET_ID},\"status\":5}}"
+```
+
+Expect HTTP 200/201. GLPI will auto-close it later per its config — leave status at 5.
+
+### 4. Verify
+
+```bash
+curl -sk "${GLPI_URL}/Ticket/${TICKET_ID}?expand_dropdowns=true" \
+  -H "App-Token: $GLPI_APP_TOKEN" -H "Session-Token: $SESSION" \
+  | jq '{id, name, status}'
+```
+
+`status` should read `Solved` (or `5`).
+
+## Optional: sweep for done-but-open tickets
+
+List tickets still open (New/Processing/Pending) to spot ones whose work is actually
+finished but were never marked Solved:
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-list.sh -s processing -f table
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-list.sh -s pending    -f table
+```
+
+Review each; for any that are genuinely resolved, run steps 2–3.
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Read-only until you intend to close — confirm the ticket is actually done first.
+- Never echo the GLPI app/user/session tokens.
+- Set **Solved (5)**, never Closed (6) — auto-close owns that transition.

skills/glpi-sweep/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Skill: glpi-sweep — Find Done-But-Open Tickets
+
+> Read-only sweep for tickets that are finished in reality but still sitting open in
+> GLPI (never moved to Solved). Surfaces the exact miss an operator caught on 2026-07-20
+> (a real incident where an affected ticket had resolution followups posted but was left
+> open). For each one that's genuinely done, close it out with **[[glpi-solve]]**.
+
+## When to use
+
+- Periodic hygiene pass (e.g. before a weekly update or month-end).
+- After a burst of ticket work, to catch any you resolved-in-followup but never Solved.
+
+## Why this exists
+
+Posting an `/ITILFollowup` documents work but does **not** change status. Tickets only
+auto-close once set to **Solved (status 5)**. Anything left at New/Processing/Pending
+stays open indefinitely. This sweep finds those.
+
+## Procedure
+
+### 1. List still-open tickets by status
+
+```bash
+GLPI=~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh" -s new        -f table
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh" -s processing -f table
+"$GLPI/ticket-list.sh" -s pending    -f table
+```
+
+(GLPI status IDs: 1 New · 2/3 Processing · 4 Pending · 5 Solved · 6 Closed.)
+
+### 2. Triage
+
+For each open ticket, judge whether the underlying work is actually finished — check
+its latest followups and cross-reference brain tasks / recent work. Read-only here;
+change nothing yet.
+
+Reasonable "probably done" signals:
+
+- A resolution/root-cause followup already posted, but status never advanced.
+- The related brain task is `done`, or the fix shipped and was confirmed.
+- Requester confirmed resolution but the ticket was never Solved.
+
+### 3. Present the candidates
+
+List them for review before touching anything — never bulk-solve blindly:
+
+```
+Open tickets that look resolved:
+- #<id> "<title>" — <why it looks done> → glpi-solve?
+```
+
+### 4. Close out the confirmed ones
+
+For each ticket the user (or clear evidence) confirms is done, run **[[glpi-solve]]**
+(optionally **[[glpi-followup]]** first if a closing note is warranted).
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Read-only until a ticket is confirmed done — do not auto-solve on a guess.
+- Never echo GLPI tokens.
+- Set **Solved (5)**, never Closed (6) — GLPI auto-close owns that transition.