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ops-deploy-01 4dfbab868d test(#1394): pre-existing recover-token specs follow the new non-TTY path
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
The old specs mocked promptLine/promptSecret and relied on the prompt path
being taken unconditionally — which is precisely the behavior #1394 removes
(non-TTY must NOT sit on prompts). Under vitest stdin is non-TTY, so the
new code correctly routed to piped-stdin credentials and the specs hung on
the unmocked reader (4/7 timeouts). The specs now mock the
piped-credentials seam with the same fixed values and assert that seam (not
the prompts) was consulted; titles state the actual path. All 7 pass; suite
1667/1667 (remaining local failure is the known host pi-invariant, CI pins
pi 0.84.1).
2026-08-25 10:41:14 -05:00
ops-deploy-01 96eb0fb010 fix(#1394): recover-token headless — dual path (flag + piped stdin) with documented precedence
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
ensureSession credential resolution when sign-in is needed, in order:
1. explicit --email flag (highest)
2. non-TTY stdin: line 1 email, line 2 password (printf 'email\npassword\n' | …)
   — for headless callers without argv access
3. interactive prompt (TTY only)
Precedence documented on ensureSession and in --help; headless with NO
credentials exits 2 with guidance instead of hanging on prompts.
Password never read from argv (ps-visible); stdin line kept untrimmed.
New piped-credentials.ts module so the reader is testable against real
streams (4 stream specs) while token-ops specs mock the seam (5 specs).
2026-08-25 10:08:14 -05:00
16 changed files with 1045 additions and 1827 deletions
+4 -6
View File
@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@ when:
- event: push
branch: main
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is wired in publish.yml via the
# org-level Woodpecker secret `turbo_token` (events: push/tag/cron/manual/
# deployment — never pull_request). This PR pipeline deliberately gets no
# remote-cache credentials: an untrusted PR must not be able to write to (or
# poison) the shared cache. Without TURBO_* env vars turbo falls back to
# local cache only, which is the intended behavior here.
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
# repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).
# This avoids from_secret which is blocked on pull_request events.
# If the env vars aren't set, turbo falls back to local cache only.
steps:
install:
-14
View File
@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ steps:
# being empty) and on any incomplete verification.
verify:
image: *node_image
environment:
# Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
# secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
TURBO_TOKEN:
from_secret: turbo_token
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
# (a) Commit identity: the provider's claimed SHA must equal the actual
@@ -115,13 +108,6 @@ steps:
build:
image: *node_image
environment:
# Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
# secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
TURBO_TOKEN:
from_secret: turbo_token
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm build
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { type CanActivate, type ExecutionContext, type INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { TeamsController } from './teams.controller.js';
import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
const teamAlpha = { id: 'team-alpha', name: 'Alpha' };
const teamBeta = { id: 'team-beta', name: 'Beta' };
// user-1 is a member of team-alpha only; admin-1 has role admin.
let currentUser: { id: string; role?: string } = { id: 'user-1' };
const teamsServiceMock = {
findAll: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta])),
findAllForUser: vi.fn((userId: string) =>
Promise.resolve(userId === 'user-1' ? [teamAlpha] : []),
),
findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta].find((t) => t.id === id))),
listMembers: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }])),
isMember: vi.fn((teamId: string, userId: string) =>
Promise.resolve(teamId === 'team-alpha' && userId === 'user-1'),
),
};
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context
.switchToHttp()
.getRequest<{ user?: { id: string; role?: string } }>();
requestContext.user = currentUser;
return true;
},
};
describe('teams endpoints are scoped to membership', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [TeamsController],
providers: [{ provide: TeamsService, useValue: teamsServiceMock }],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
beforeEach(() => {
currentUser = { id: 'user-1' };
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it('GET /api/teams returns only the teams the user belongs to', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha]);
expect(teamsServiceMock.findAll).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/teams returns every team for an admin', async () => {
currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha, teamBeta]);
expect(teamsServiceMock.findAllForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 403 for a non-member', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta');
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 404 for a missing team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-missing');
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns the team for a member', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual(teamAlpha);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members returns 403 for a non-member and members for a member', async () => {
const denied = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members');
expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
expect(teamsServiceMock.listMembers).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const allowed = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members');
expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
expect(allowed.body).toEqual([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }]);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId allows a self-lookup on any team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-1');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: false });
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId denies looking up another user on a foreign team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-2');
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
});
it('an admin can look up any membership', async () => {
currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members/user-1');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: true });
});
});
+7 -45
View File
@@ -1,68 +1,30 @@
import {
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
Get,
NotFoundException,
Param,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Controller, Get, Param, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
type RequestUser = { id: string; role?: string };
@Controller('api/teams')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class TeamsController {
constructor(private readonly teams: TeamsService) {}
@Get()
async list(@CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
if (user.role === 'admin') {
return this.teams.findAll();
}
return this.teams.findAllForUser(user.id);
async list() {
return this.teams.findAll();
}
@Get(':teamId')
async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
return this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
return this.teams.findById(teamId);
}
@Get(':teamId/members')
async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
return this.teams.listMembers(teamId);
}
@Get(':teamId/members/:userId')
async checkMembership(
@Param('teamId') teamId: string,
@Param('userId') userId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: RequestUser,
) {
// A user may always ask about their own membership; anything else is
// team-scoped like the other routes.
if (userId !== user.id) {
await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
}
async checkMembership(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @Param('userId') userId: string) {
const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, userId);
return { isMember };
}
/**
* Team-scoped access: admins see any team; everyone else only teams they
* are a member of. NotFoundException when the team does not exist and
* ForbiddenException when the user lacks access (same convention as the
* projects controller).
*/
private async getAccessibleTeam(teamId: string, user: RequestUser) {
const team = await this.teams.findById(teamId);
if (!team) throw new NotFoundException('Team not found');
if (user.role === 'admin') return team;
const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, user.id);
if (!isMember) throw new ForbiddenException('Not a member of this team');
return team;
}
}
+1 -16
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { eq, and, inArray, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { eq, and, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
@Injectable()
@@ -56,21 +56,6 @@ export class TeamsService {
return this.db.select().from(teams);
}
/**
* List only the teams the user is a member of.
*/
async findAllForUser(userId: string) {
const memberRows = await this.db
.select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
.from(teamMembers)
.where(eq(teamMembers.userId, userId));
const teamIds = memberRows.map((r) => r.teamId);
if (teamIds.length === 0) return [];
return this.db.select().from(teams).where(inArray(teams.id, teamIds));
}
/**
* Find a team by ID.
*/
+1014 -242
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-77
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@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
---
kind: spec
status: active
---
# Mosaic Stack Roadmap
Companion to [docs/PRD.md](./PRD.md). Governed by the D11 rule: **every planned
phase appears here from day one, even as a placeholder** — nothing exists only
in heads. A phase marked _placeholder_ is a commitment to design it, not a
design; scoping one requires its own PRD section or requirements doc plus
review.
Phases are product phases. The in-flight platform workstreams (KBN-100/101
kanban SOT implementation, FCM #758, FCOM #766, TESS, RI #1275, and the other
Part II contracts in the PRD) run as parallel tracks under their own issues
and are prerequisites where noted.
| Phase | Scope | Status |
| ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------- |
| P0 | Current state on `next`: read-only dashboard, chat, auth/SSO login, admin tabs | shipped, evolving |
| P1 | **v1 slice** (PRD Part I §9) | next up |
| P2 | Connectors + comms + wizard expansion | placeholder |
| P3 | Full onboarding profile + M365 | placeholder |
| P4 | Enterprise mode + one-way conversion | placeholder |
| P5 | Federation | placeholder (deliberately undesigned, D3) |
## P0 — current state
What exists on `next` today: web dashboard (login/register/SSO, chat,
read-only projects/tasks, settings, admin user/system-health tabs), the
Gateway, the CLI-first framework tooling, and the fleet control plane. The
webUI audit (USC estate, webui-audit lane) measures the gap between this and
P1.
## P1 — v1 slice (D11)
1. Standalone onboarding wizard: system/company name, component choices,
initial user, initial estate + project, seeded examples, re-runnable.
2. Hierarchy core: company → estate → project → workspace → kanban, read-only
task bubble-up (kanban SOT Amendment A1 is the schema contract).
3. Basic RBAC on the hierarchy.
4. Minimal agent enrollment: one harness, API key, name/persona.
Prerequisites: KBN-100/101 schema foundation; the D8 tool inventory and
webUI→tool mapping (any missing tool is built first, D12).
## P2 — connectors + comms + wizard expansion (placeholder)
Email and drive connectors (Gmail/IMAP, Google Drive/OneDrive/Dropbox) with
granular agentic-access consent; comms integrations (Matrix/Discord/Slack)
including agent auto-enroll. Wizard gains the corresponding tabs (D4), plus
the D4 capabilities deferred out of P1's minimal slice: expanded agent
enrollment (OAuth login, multi-account, model choice with recommendation,
account assignment, comms auto-enroll) and the Standalone SSO/OIDC
configuration tab.
## P3 — full onboarding profile + M365 (placeholder)
Complete user onboarding profile (communication-style capture, optional
voice-matching interview) under the D14 custody rule; M365 connectors,
available to both deployment modes as ordinary connectors (same consent model
as the P2 connector class). The Enterprise install flow's M365 prominence
(D4) arrives with the Enterprise phase, P4.
## P4 — Enterprise mode + conversion (placeholder)
Enterprise install flow (org chart, RBAC focus, immediate OIDC, SSO
prominent); per-user brains with architectural isolation (D14); Vault
required; the one-way Standalone → Enterprise conversion (D3).
## P5 — federation (placeholder)
Connecting deployments: system-level config, assigned users, rights and
data-access control, trusts with boundaries, strict data access, exfiltration
monitoring. Explicitly not designed yet (D3); nothing in earlier phases may
foreclose it. Requires its own PRD + threat model before any scoping.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-84
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@@ -372,87 +372,3 @@ The P0P3 canon does not authorize:
## 7. Global release evidence
P0P3 may close only when requirements traceability maps every requirement above to automated and situational evidence, including cross-workspace denials, DB/Valkey fault injection, concurrent leases, stale fencing, generated-file immutability, UI conflict/reconnect behavior, migration reconciliation, independent review, mandatory SecReview, and final Certifier evidence.
## 8. Amendment A1 — hierarchy parentage and RBAC chain above workspaces
**Status:** amendment to the ratified canon, added by reviewed PR under
decision D13 (operator ruling, 2026-08-25; decision owner Jason). It adds
parent structure ABOVE workspaces. Sections 17, every invariant in §3, and
every REQ above remain binding verbatim, with exactly one express modification:
the narrow portfolio-analytics carve-out stated in §8.2.4. Nothing else below
this line is weakened.
### 8.1 What is added
1. A platform hierarchy exists above workspaces:
**company/organization → estate → platform-project → workspace**. Each
workspace belongs to exactly one platform-project, each platform-project to
exactly one estate, each estate to exactly one company.
2. **Record class.** Hierarchy records (company, estate, platform-project,
their parentage edges, and hierarchy-level access grants) are a new,
explicitly named record class: **tenancy/authorization structure records**.
They are not business or orchestration records, so §3 invariant 10 and
REQ-TEN-001 do not apply to them and are not weakened by them — those two
requirements bind business/orchestration rows exactly as before.
Constraints on the new class:
- Hierarchy tables MUST NOT carry task, plan, or any other
business/orchestration payload — parentage, naming, and grant data only.
- A hierarchy record can never be the subject of work: it cannot be
claimed, ordered, gated, or referenced as a dependency by any
business/orchestration row.
- Hierarchy mutations flow through the same sole-writable-SOT, fail-closed,
audited mutation path as everything else (§8.2.3).
3. The hierarchy serves exactly two runtime functions, plus audited
maintenance of its own structure:
- **RBAC evaluation:** access grants are declared per company, estate, or
platform-project and evaluate down the chain to workspace-scoped
authorization. Tenant context continues to be derived from authenticated
authority (REQ-TEN-001); the chain adds where grants can be declared,
not a bypass of workspace authorization.
- **Read-only roll-ups:** task and status visualization bubbles up the
hierarchy as aggregation over workspaces the reader is authorized on.
- **Chain maintenance (not a third runtime function):** re-parenting an
asset — moving a workspace to another platform-project, a
platform-project to another estate, and so on ("assets are transferable
subject to the structure", PRD Part I §4) — is an audited edit of the
hierarchy records themselves under §8.3. It never modifies
business/orchestration rows and never crosses a workspace boundary for
them; the workspace's contents move with the workspace untouched.
4. Naming: this amendment says **platform-project** for the hierarchy level
above workspaces, because §5 REQ-PLAN-001 already defines `projects` as
planning entities INSIDE a workspace. The two are different objects. Final
terminology (rename of one or the other) is an implementation-PR decision
under this amendment's review; the schema MUST NOT merge them.
### 8.2 What is explicitly unchanged
1. `workspace_id` remains the hard mechanical isolation unit (§2 D2,
REQ-TEN-001). Hierarchy tables carry parentage; they do not create
cross-workspace relationships between business/orchestration rows, which
remain rejected (§3 invariant 10).
2. Roll-up is **never a write**: no aggregation path may mutate, claim, order,
or gate work in any workspace. Bubble-up views are generated projections in
the sense of §3 invariant 5 — non-authoritative and never import sources.
3. Fail-closed mutation health (§3 invariants 34), sole writable PostgreSQL
SOT, fencing, audit, and the Coordinator/Certifier authority rules are
untouched.
4. No §6 non-goal is authorized, with one express, narrow carve-out that this
amendment makes to the "portfolio analytics" non-goal: the read-only
roll-up of §8.1 — per-workspace task counts and statuses aggregated up the
parent chain, over workspaces the reader is authorized on — is in scope.
Everything beyond that boundary (metrics, trends, forecasting, scoring,
dashboards computed across workspaces, any derived analytic that is not a
direct count/status aggregation) remains a non-goal. This is an explicit
narrowing by amendment, not a claim that §6 is unchanged; every other §6
non-goal is untouched.
### 8.3 Acceptance (binding on the implementing PRs)
- Schema tests prove each workspace resolves to exactly one
platform-project/estate/company chain and that chain edits are audited.
- Authorization tests prove a grant at each hierarchy level yields exactly the
workspace permissions the chain implies, and that revocation up the chain
propagates.
- Negative tests prove roll-up endpoints cannot mutate state and that a
reader sees aggregates only over workspaces they are authorized on
(no cross-tenant existence oracles).
+2 -7
View File
@@ -203,14 +203,9 @@ export function registerGatewayCommand(program: Command): void {
gw.command('uninstall')
.description('Uninstall the gateway daemon and optionally remove data')
.option(
'-y, --yes',
'Headless: skip the confirmation prompt (required when stdin is not a TTY)',
)
.option('--remove-data', 'Also remove all gateway data (never implied by --yes)')
.action(async (cmdOpts: { yes?: boolean; removeData?: boolean }) => {
.action(async () => {
const { runUninstall } = await import('./gateway/uninstall.js');
await runUninstall(cmdOpts);
await runUninstall();
});
// ─── doctor ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -95,17 +95,11 @@ export async function runInstall(opts: InstallOpts): Promise<void> {
// fatal (#1392): an install that reports success over an empty/partial
// database is the exact T63 failure this command must never reproduce.
let verifyResult: VerifyResult | undefined;
let verificationThrew = false;
try {
const { runPostInstallVerification } = await import('./verify.js');
verifyResult = await runPostInstallVerification(configResult.host, configResult.port);
} catch (err) {
// Health/token/bootstrap courtesy failures are non-fatal, but a THROWN
// schema verification must not let install report success either (N2,
// rev-code-02 review 285): mark it and treat as fatal below.
verificationThrew = true;
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
prompter.warn(`Post-install verification errored: ${msg}`);
} catch {
// Non-fatal — verification is a courtesy
}
if (verifyResult && verifyResult.schemaMigrated === false) {
prompter.warn(
@@ -113,12 +107,6 @@ export async function runInstall(opts: InstallOpts): Promise<void> {
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (verificationThrew) {
prompter.warn(
'Gateway install ABORTED: post-install verification errored (see above); refusing to report success on an unverified database.',
);
process.exit(1);
}
} catch (err) {
// Stages normally return structured results for expected failures.
// Anything that reaches here is an unexpected runtime error — render a
@@ -153,29 +153,4 @@ describe('resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath', () => {
if (prevHome !== undefined) vi.stubEnv('HOME', prevHome);
}
});
it('gives MOSAIC_CONFIG NO authority (N1, review 285): env never overrides file resolution', async () => {
const { resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath } = await import('./schema-check.js');
const daemonDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'schema-check-env-'));
tmpDirs.push(daemonDir);
const daemonHome = join(daemonDir, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway');
mkdirSync(daemonHome, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(join(daemonHome, 'mosaic.config.json'), JSON.stringify(LOCAL_CFG));
// A stale env var pointing at a DIFFERENT file must be ignored entirely:
const decoyDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'schema-check-decoy-'));
tmpDirs.push(decoyDir);
const decoyPath = join(decoyDir, 'mosaic.config.json');
writeFileSync(decoyPath, JSON.stringify(STANDALONE_CFG));
const prevHome = process.env['HOME'];
vi.stubEnv('HOME', daemonDir);
vi.stubEnv('MOSAIC_CONFIG', decoyPath);
try {
const resolved = resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath();
expect(resolved).toBe(join(daemonHome, 'mosaic.config.json'));
expect(resolved).not.toBe(decoyPath);
} finally {
if (prevHome !== undefined) vi.stubEnv('HOME', prevHome);
}
});
});
@@ -53,11 +53,8 @@ export const SCHEMA_FAIL_REMEDIATION = [
*/
export function resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath(explicit?: string): string | undefined {
if (explicit) return resolve(explicit);
// NOTE: no env-var candidate, deliberately. apps/gateway/src/env.ts gives env
// NO config authority (a stale MOSAIC_CONFIG could verify a database the
// daemon never reads — rev-code-02 review 285, note N1). Resolution order
// mirrors the daemon's file priorities only.
const candidates = [
process.env['MOSAIC_CONFIG'],
join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', 'mosaic.config.json'), // daemon-written
resolve(process.cwd(), 'mosaic.config.json'),
join(homedir(), '.mosaic', 'mosaic.config.json'),
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
vi.mock('./daemon.js', () => ({
GATEWAY_HOME: '/tmp/u-test-gateway-home',
getDaemonPid: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(null),
readMeta: vi.fn(),
stopDaemon: vi.fn(),
uninstallGatewayPackage: vi.fn(),
}));
import { runUninstall } from './uninstall.js';
import { readMeta, uninstallGatewayPackage } from './daemon.js';
describe('gateway uninstall — #1390 headless semantics', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('non-TTY without --yes FAILS LOUD (exit 1, nothing touched)', async () => {
vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue({
version: '0.0.7',
installedAt: '',
entryPoint: '',
host: 'localhost',
port: 14242,
});
const exit = vi.spyOn(process, 'exit').mockImplementation((() => {
throw new Error('EXIT');
}) as never);
const err = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
await expect(runUninstall()).rejects.toThrow('EXIT');
expect(exit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1);
expect(err).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('stdin is not a TTY'));
expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
exit.mockRestore();
err.mockRestore();
});
it('--yes proceeds headlessly WITHOUT removing data (never implied)', async () => {
const meta = {
version: '0.0.7',
installedAt: '',
entryPoint: '',
host: 'localhost',
port: 14242,
};
vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue(meta);
const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runUninstall({ yes: true });
expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('Gateway data kept'));
log.mockRestore();
});
it('--yes --remove-data removes data headlessly', async () => {
vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue({
version: '0.0.7',
installedAt: '',
entryPoint: '',
host: 'localhost',
port: 14242,
});
mkdirSync('/tmp/u-test-gateway-home', { recursive: true }); // existsSync gate
const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runUninstall({ yes: true, removeData: true });
expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('Gateway data removed'));
log.mockRestore();
});
it('no meta → clean no-op even with --yes', async () => {
vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue(null);
const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runUninstall({ yes: true });
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Gateway is not installed.');
expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
log.mockRestore();
});
});
@@ -8,65 +8,30 @@ import {
uninstallGatewayPackage,
} from './daemon.js';
export interface UninstallOptions {
/** Skip the confirmation prompt (headless/scripted uninstall). */
yes?: boolean;
/** Also remove all gateway data at GATEWAY_HOME (never implied by --yes). */
removeData?: boolean;
}
export async function runUninstall(opts: UninstallOptions = {}): Promise<void> {
const nonInteractive = Boolean(opts.yes) || process.env['MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES'] === '1';
// Non-TTY without explicit consent must FAIL LOUD, not quietly do nothing:
// the pre-fix behavior (prompt on a closed stdin → default No → exit 0,
// gateway untouched) reported success-by-silence to every scripted caller
// (#1390). An explicit refusal beats a silent no-op.
if (!nonInteractive && !process.stdin.isTTY) {
console.error(
'gateway uninstall: stdin is not a TTY and no --yes was given — refusing to ' +
'run an interactive uninstall headlessly (nothing was changed). ' +
'Use --yes (and --remove-data to also delete gateway data), or run from a terminal.',
);
process.exit(1);
}
const rl = nonInteractive
? null
: createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
export async function runUninstall(): Promise<void> {
const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
try {
await doUninstall(rl as NonNullable<typeof rl>, opts, nonInteractive);
await doUninstall(rl);
} finally {
rl?.close();
rl.close();
}
}
function prompt(
rl: NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof createInterface>>,
question: string,
): Promise<string> {
function prompt(rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>, question: string): Promise<string> {
return new Promise((resolve) => rl.question(question, resolve));
}
async function doUninstall(
rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>,
opts: UninstallOptions,
nonInteractive: boolean,
): Promise<void> {
async function doUninstall(rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>): Promise<void> {
const meta = readMeta();
if (!meta) {
console.log('Gateway is not installed.');
return;
}
if (nonInteractive) {
console.log(`Uninstalling Mosaic Gateway (--yes${opts.removeData ? ' --remove-data' : ''})...`);
} else {
const answer = await prompt(rl, 'Uninstall Mosaic Gateway? [y/N] ');
if (answer.toLowerCase() !== 'y') {
console.log('Aborted.');
return;
}
const answer = await prompt(rl, 'Uninstall Mosaic Gateway? [y/N] ');
if (answer.toLowerCase() !== 'y') {
console.log('Aborted.');
return;
}
// Stop if running
@@ -80,20 +45,13 @@ async function doUninstall(
}
}
// Remove config/data. Interactive: ask. Headless: only with the explicit
// flag — destructive recursion is never implied by --yes alone (#1390).
let removeData = Boolean(opts.removeData);
if (!nonInteractive) {
const answer = await prompt(rl, `Remove all gateway data at ${GATEWAY_HOME}? [y/N] `);
removeData = answer.toLowerCase() === 'y';
}
if (removeData) {
// Remove config/data
const removeData = await prompt(rl, `Remove all gateway data at ${GATEWAY_HOME}? [y/N] `);
if (removeData.toLowerCase() === 'y') {
if (existsSync(GATEWAY_HOME)) {
rmSync(GATEWAY_HOME, { recursive: true, force: true });
console.log('Gateway data removed.');
}
} else {
console.log(`Gateway data kept at ${GATEWAY_HOME}.`);
}
// Uninstall npm package
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ export async function runPostInstallVerification(
const { runMigrations, getMigrationStatus } = await import('@mosaicstack/db');
const result = await checkDatabaseSchema(
{ runMigrations, getMigrationStatus },
undefined, // resolver mirrors daemon file priorities; env has no config authority (N1)
process.env['MOSAIC_CONFIG'],
);
if (result.status === 'ok') {
ok(result.detail);