morgana: row 193 design r5 (sage-1373 item 1, mos-1023 item 2): one user sentence names decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files; governance pin checks each

agents/README.md

@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
 | Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
 | Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
+| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
+| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
 
 Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's

agents/duckworth/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Duckworth
+
+Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gosalyn/README.md

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Gosalyn
-
-Worker seat for Mosaic Stack, MVP track T2 (Case 2, the creative writing hub, Vikunja #416).
-
-- T3 thread: 7604438a-0ded-41c8-bd3f-26f57fdb5cd2
-- Model: Opus 5.5 (Claude Code, T3)
-- Launched by Mos (Jason's main agent, T3 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e), who briefs the seat
-- Repository lead and queue: Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079)
-- Branch: gosalyn/case2-design, pushed only by this seat, landed on refactor by Sage
-
-Work lives in `work/`. The Case 2 design is `work/case2/DESIGN.md`.

agents/honker/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Honker
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/launchpad/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Launchpad
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/morgana/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Morgana
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+# Row 193 design: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads
+
+Morgana (Opus 5.5), 2026-10-20. Revision 5: sage-1373 item 1 (mos-1023 item 2), the user sentence names every record the owner sees. Revision 4: duckworth-0011 B3 and N5. Revision 3: duckworth-0008 B1, B2 and N1-N4, sage-1368. Revision 2: sage-1354 (5.7 private from the owner, 193b split) and gizmoduck-0018 (coverage and the R4 predicate in FED r4.1). Gitea #1691, queue row 193, brief `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md`
+(blob f7472d1e47b1). Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: `refactor` at 53bb59462.
+
+Read for this design: COMMON.md (53bb59462), the brief, Gizmoduck's federation design r4.4 (b67bc6de9 on
+gizmoduck/federation-design, cited as FED; r3.1 a2840a6be was read first), Duckworth's federation reviews (b402197ff, 03a663cd7,
+45cbe5896 on duckworth/reviews), Sage's Q175 SSO design (`agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`), the row 192
+and row 196 briefs, Darkwing's row 190 packet (uncommitted, sha256 5493c9df3ec0...), and the bus, business,
+cli and webui code at the lines cited. Messages: morgana-0001 to 0003, sage-1338, gizmoduck-0009,
+gander-0002 and gander-0005.
+
+## 1. Summary
+
+- Three human roles: **owner**, **collaborator**, **viewer**. The owner is the business file's one `human`,
+  as today. Collaborators and viewers are access.json users, the same store federation uses (FED 3.5).
+  Their role is the `level` of a grant, so a role is per project and instance, not per person.
+- Every human principal is minted by one bus verifier, owned by row 196 (Gander). Row 193 states what it
+  needs from that verifier (section 6) and adds no second mechanism.
+- Threads stay private to their owner by default. A thread owner may share a thread, read-only, with a
+  named user, with the owner, or with everyone granted on it. Shares live in a new append-only bus table,
+  `thread_shares`. This is a deviation from brief point 4, agreed by Sage (sage-1338), for Duckworth to rule
+  on (section 5.1).
+- A share never widens a grant. It counts only while the reader's live grant covers the thread's project
+  and instance, and while the thread's owner still has coverage. Revocation, expiry and unsharing take
+  effect on the next request.
+- Existing businesses keep working unchanged: every existing thread is already owned by the business
+  human, and an instance without access.json has exactly one human, the owner.
+- The build splits so the part without a schema change can land first. `thread_shares` needs schema 3j and
+  a `--migrate` window with Jason.
+
+## 2. What exists today (measured at 53bb59462)
+
+- One `human` per business (`packages/business/src/business.mjs:160`). `bindHuman` refuses any other name
+  (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538`).
+- The owner's CLI proof is path-bound (#225): `verifyHuman` checks uid, start time, nonce
+  (`MOSAIC_BUS_CLI_NONCE`), `argv[1]` equal to the tree's `human-cli.mjs`, then walks parents and refuses
+  agent markers, launch records and agent binaries (`packages/bus/src/human.mjs:64-96`).
+  `authenticateHuman` binds the proof to `businesses[business].human` (`packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:175-182`).
+- Threads: `threads(seq,id,at,business,project,instance,owner,name)`, append-only
+  (`packages/bus/schema.sql:247`, triggers at :310-312). `#owner(s)` returns `tester` or `s.human`
+  (broker.mjs:364-366). `#thread` refuses a non-owner with `thread-not-owned` (:357-362).
+- Thread verbs are gated `if (!s.tester) this.#human(s)`: `project.list` (:2318), `thread.create` (:2325),
+  `thread.list` (:2351, owner filter), `thread.open` (:2365), `thread.send` (:2374, writes `human.input`
+  for the human only), `thread.messages` (:2401).
+- Board reads are business-wide and human or reader only: `inbox`, `agents`, `tasks`, `trail` (:2143-2167),
+  `decisions` (:2174), `credentials` (:2195), `messages` (:2217, `to_role='human'`), `replies` (:2422).
+  `trail` and `replies` return any message in the business by id (:2679-2700, :2422-2432).
+- The Console reads threads by polling the same verbs (`packages/webui/src/chat.mjs:22-26`). It has no
+  stream, so a refusal on the next poll ends access.
+- The launcher restarts a thread with pending messages as the business human
+  (`packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:533-542`).
+
+## 3. The human model (brief point 1)
+
+### 3.1 Who the humans are
+
+| Human | Where it is declared | How many | Identity |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| owner | business file `human` (unchanged) | exactly one per business | the business human's name |
+| user (collaborator or viewer) | access.json `users[]` with `home: "local"` (or a peer id under federation) | any number | `user:<id>` |
+| tester | not a human; row 177 test principal | one | `tester` |
+
+The owner stays outside access.json (FED 9 Q2). A business has no second owner and no admin level. Adding
+one is out of scope; section 9 lists it as a follow-up for Jason.
+
+### 3.2 How a sign-in or a call becomes exactly one human
+
+| Entry | Becomes | Checked by |
+|---|---|---|
+| Console SSO session whose `(provider, sub)` is in `console.sso.providers[].subjects` (row 192) | the owner | the Console after OIDC checks, then the bus verifier (row 196) |
+| Console SSO session whose `(provider, sub)` is a `users[].subjects` entry in access.json with a live grant | that one user | same |
+| Console SSO session matching neither | nobody: refused | the Console, and the bus refuses any later claim |
+| CLI call through `human-cli.mjs` that passes the human proof | the owner | the bus (`verifyHuman`) |
+| Any other process, including an agent | nobody | the bus |
+
+Why each is exactly one:
+
+- The R1 loader refuses a `(provider, sub)` pair that appears twice in access.json or also in
+  `console.sso.subjects` (FED 3.5). So one subject maps to at most one human.
+- A user id can't be `human`, `tester` or any business's human (FED 3.5). So a user can't be named as the
+  owner.
+- A terminal maps only to the owner. The only identity the bus can verify for a local process is the
+  instance's OS user, and that is the owner's. A user has no CLI path in row 193. This follows Mos's B1 rule
+  (mos-0985): the principal comes from what the bus verifies, never the process's own claim.
+- The bus never reads a user name from a request body as identity. The verifier returns the principal
+  (section 6).
+
+## 4. Human roles (brief point 2)
+
+### 4.1 The three roles
+
+- **owner**: everything the business human does today. Only the owner restructures the organization
+  (business file writer, project and role changes) and only the owner manages users and grants.
+- **collaborator**: FED 3.5's level, unchanged. Creates threads in granted projects on granted instances,
+  sends into and opens its own threads, and in row 193 also shares its own threads.
+- **viewer**: new. Reads threads shared with it, within its grant. It creates, opens and sends nothing, so
+  it never drives an instance. FED 3.5 notes that a collaborator's message drives the instance with the
+  owner's role authority (F10). A viewer has none of that.
+
+The word "collaborator" stays, so FED's tests and help text need no rename. The brief's example "member" is
+this level.
+
+A role is the `level` on a grant, and a grant is per business, project set and instance set. A user may
+hold a collaborator grant on one project and a viewer grant on another. Every check asks "does a live
+grant of a level that allows this verb cover this project and instance". A user has no single role.
+
+### 4.2 R1 widening
+
+FED R1 refuses any level but `collaborator`, because the 10-27 slice ships only that (FED 9 Q2).
+Row 193 widens R1's level check to `collaborator` or `viewer`, with its own test that each is accepted and
+anything else refuses. Nothing else in the access file changes. If R1 has not landed when row 193 builds,
+this one-line widening goes into the row 193a candidate chained on R1's candidate (Q177).
+
+### 4.3 Bus verbs per role
+
+Every verb not in a user's column fails `access-refused` before its own checks, as FED 3.5 requires for
+collaborators. That covers every owner verb, every board read, `message.*`, `decision.*`, project files,
+`spec.read`, `assistant.stop`, `launch.*`, `name.set`, `usage.*` and `access.reload`.
+
+| Verb | owner | collaborator | viewer |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `project.list` | all | projects covered by any live grant | projects covered by any live grant |
+| `thread.create` | yes | collaborator grant covers project and instance | refused |
+| `thread.list` | own threads | own threads still covered | own threads still covered (from an earlier collaborator grant) |
+| `thread.list {shared: true}` (new) | threads shared with the owner | threads shared with me and readable (5.4) | same |
+| `thread.open` | own | own, collaborator grant still covers | refused |
+| `thread.send` | own | own, collaborator grant still covers, no `human.input` | refused |
+| `thread.messages` | own, or shared with the owner | own (any level still covering), or shared and readable | same as collaborator |
+| `thread.share`, `thread.unshare` (new) | own threads | own threads, collaborator grant still covers | refused |
+| `thread.shares` (new) | own threads | own threads | refused |
+| `names` | all | instances covered by any live grant | instances covered by any live grant |
+| every other verb | as today | refused | refused |
+
+Notes:
+
+- `thread.list` keeps its response shape exactly. Shared threads come only from `thread.list {shared: true}`,
+  whose rows add `owner`. The Console and existing tests read the plain list unchanged.
+- A viewer can still read its own threads when a collaborator grant is lowered to viewer, but can't send
+  or open them. This is the downgrade path.
+- The tester keeps its row 177 verbs. It can't share or be shared with: `thread.share`, `thread.unshare`
+  and `thread.shares` fail `tester-refused`, and a share target is never `tester`. Agent testers (Q173) test
+  sharing through the bus suites, not the live 7333 listener.
+- `reader` sessions (Console read caps, broker.mjs:1303) are the owner's board view and stay owner-only.
+  A user never gets a reader session.
+
+### 4.4 Console per role
+
+- owner: as today, plus a share control on each own thread and a "Shared with me" list.
+- collaborator: the chat view only, for granted projects (FED R6's granted-user sign-in), plus share
+  controls on its own threads and "Shared with me". No board.
+- viewer: "Shared with me" and its own old threads, read-only. No composer, no open, no share control.
+- The Console hides controls a role can't use, but the bus check is authoritative. A Console bug can't
+  widen a grant (FED 3.6). Each role gets a webui test with the UI check removed (mutant) that the bus still
+  refuses.
+
+### 4.5 Who manages humans and roles
+
+Only the owner, through `mosaic access` (FED R5), which checks the human proof and refuses tester and agent
+callers. Row 193 needs from R5:
+
+- `mosaic access user add <id> --home local --subject <provider>:<sub>` and `user remove <id>`;
+- `--level viewer` on `grant`;
+- the receipt line in `<dataRoot>/state/access-log.jsonl` and the `access.reload` call, as FED R5 has.
+
+If R5 has no `user` verbs when row 193 builds, row 193c adds them on R5's candidate. The Console gets no
+user or grant writes in row 193: a write from the Console would need a new owner verb that writes
+access.json from the bus, and access.json is a config file only the owner's CLI writes. A read-only users
+page for the owner is a follow-up (section 9).
+
+The owner keeps every restructuring power (TARGET Case 1). Users can't touch the business file, projects,
+roles or access.json.
+
+## 5. Private and shared threads (brief point 3)
+
+### 5.1 Deviation from brief point 4, agreed by Sage (sage-1338)
+
+Brief point 4 says access.json is the one store. Users, roles and grants live there. Per-thread shares do
+not, for three reasons (morgana-0002):
+
+- F1. Thread ids are bus-generated UUIDs. A hand-typed share with a typo would fail the loader, and the
+  loader refuses the whole file on any failure, which revokes every user.
+- F2. Only the owner writes access.json. A collaborator could never share its own thread.
+- F3. Threads are append-only bus rows, and a share is a runtime act by a principal that wants a trail.
+
+So shares go in an append-only bus table, gated by the grant. Sage agreed (sage-1338). Gizmoduck had no
+objection (gizmoduck-0009) and recorded it as FED 9 Q2. Duckworth rules on it in this review.
+
+### 5.2 Schema 3j
+
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE thread_shares (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  thread TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES threads(id),
+  op TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('share','unshare')),
+  target TEXT NOT NULL,
+  by TEXT NOT NULL
+) STRICT;
+CREATE INDEX thread_shares_thread ON thread_shares (thread, target, seq);
+-- no_update, no_delete and no_replace triggers, as thread_opens has (schema.sql:319-321).
+```
+
+- `target` is an owner string: `user:<id>`, the business human's name, or `*`. A share whose target is a
+  name that is no longer the business's `human` (after a rename) is void: rule 1 in 5.4 compares against
+  the current owner string, so it matches nobody (Duckworth N4).
+- `by` is the sharer's owner string, which is always the thread's owner.
+- A share's state is its latest row per `(thread, target)` (Duckworth N12, REVIEW-r3.md:74-76). Shares
+  are not assumed to only grow.
+- No existing row changes. Existing threads are already owned by the business human (`#owner` at
+  broker.mjs:364-366), so they are the owner's and private. The brief's "all become the current human's"
+  is already true.
+
+The migration `3i-3j.sql` creates the table, index and triggers. `thread_shares` joins every table list that
+holds timed append-only tables: `timedTables` in store.mjs (:60-74), the broker's clock list
+(broker.mjs:223-235), the restore guard's counted tables (row 181) and `COUNTED` in
+`scripts/stack-release.sh:315`. The schema digest for 3j is pinned as the other versions are.
+
+### 5.3 Verbs
+
+- `thread.share {thread, to}`: the caller must own the thread (`thread-not-owned`). For a user, a
+  collaborator grant must still cover the thread. `to` is `user:<id>`, the business human's name or `*`.
+  A `user:<id>` target must have a live grant, of any level, covering the thread's project and instance,
+  else `share-not-covered`. Sharing with yourself fails `invalid-request`. A share that is already in force
+  fails `share-exists`. Writes one `share` row.
+- `thread.unshare {thread, to}`: the caller must own the thread. The share must be in force, else
+  `share-not-found`. Writes one `unshare` row. Unsharing the owner's or `*` shares works the same way.
+- `thread.shares {thread}`: the caller must own the thread. Returns the shares in force, latest row each.
+- Both writes go through `refuse()` on failure, so each refusal records `action.refused` with `by` set
+  (FED 3.6 item 6).
+
+### 5.4 The read check, one function
+
+`#readable(s, t)` decides whether a session may read thread `t` it doesn't own. True only when all hold:
+
+1. a share for `t` is in force whose target is the caller's owner string, or `*`;
+2. the caller is the owner, or the caller has a live grant of any level covering `t.project` and
+   `t.instance`;
+3. if `t.owner` is a user, that user still has a live grant covering `t` (a revoked owner hides the
+   thread, sage-1338);
+4. `t.owner` is not `tester`.
+
+`#thread(s, id)` keeps its owner check for `thread.open`, `thread.send`, `thread.share`, `thread.unshare`
+and `thread.shares`. A new `#threadRead(s, id)` admits the owner or `#readable`, and serves only
+`thread.messages`. A sharee fails `thread-not-owned` on every write verb.
+
+### 5.5 Every read path and its filter
+
+| Read path | Today | After row 193 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `thread.list` | `owner=?` | unchanged for the owner; for users also each row's thread still covered |
+| `thread.list {shared: true}` | none | rows where `#readable` holds |
+| `thread.messages` | `#thread` | `#threadRead` |
+| `thread.open`, `thread.send` | `#thread` | `#thread`, plus a collaborator grant for users |
+| `project.list`, `names` | business-wide | per FED 3.5 for users, unchanged for the owner |
+| `trail`, `replies` | human, reader or tester; any message by id | users refused (`access-refused`); for the others, messages in other users' unshared threads hidden (5.7) |
+| `messages`, `inbox`, `agents`, `tasks`, `decisions`, `credentials` | human or reader | users refused (`access-refused`); owner unchanged. A user-thread run can't send to the human (`user-thread-human`, FED 3.6), so `messages` holds none of a user's thread |
+| `message.receive` by a run | its own thread (:1933) | unchanged: runs read their own thread, never a share |
+| `threadsState` (launcher) | all threads | adds `revoked` per 5.6 |
+
+### 5.6 Revocation, expiry and unsharing
+
+Gizmoduck asked that a grant loss end access to threads shared with that user (gizmoduck-0009 point 2).
+
+- A sharee holds no claim and no run. Its access is only reads, and every read runs `#readable` against the
+  access state the broker already refreshes on each request (mtime, size, inode), on its 30 s timer, and on
+  `access.reload` (FED 3.7). So a removed, expired or invalid grant ends share reads on the next request,
+  with nothing to tear down. The Console polls, so a revoked sharee's next poll fails.
+- An unshare row ends access on the next request in the same way.
+- A user who loses coverage of their own thread also loses its shares: rule 3 in 5.4.
+
+The downgrade case. With viewer, "no live grant covers" would be wrong for runs: a viewer grant covers the
+thread but must not let a run continue. FED puts this in R4: `revoked`, claim end and the launch check call
+`covers` with level `collaborator`, so a downgrade to viewer ends the run within one launcher tick. FED r4.4
+(b67bc6de9, mos-1020) chains R4 after row 193's viewer level (193a) and keeps the level-loss test and its
+mutant in R4. Row 193 carries neither (Duckworth N3), so the mutant has one owner.
+
+### 5.7 What "private" means, stated plainly
+
+Sage ruled (sage-1354): a user's thread is private from the owner on the bus too. Jason's words are "private
+agent sessions per user", and in Case 2 the owner of Melanie's hub is not the user whose thread it is.
+Duckworth's B1 asked where the line sits, since a user-thread run acts with the owner's role authority (F10).
+I took Duckworth's option (a): **the user's messages are private, and the run's governance is not.** The
+run spends the owner's authority, so its decisions, task writes and claims are the owner's to see and
+answer. Filtering them too (option b) would need a thread link on `decisions`, more schema, and would hide
+from the owner what is done in the owner's name.
+
+Every read an owner or reader session has, and its side of the line:
+
+| Read | Shows | Side |
+|---|---|---|
+| `thread.list`, `thread.messages`, `thread.open` | own threads only, plus shares to the owner from 193b2 | private: other users' threads never appear |
+| `trail` | events, messages, decisions and deliveries by subject | messages filtered (below); decision rows and their events stay visible |
+| `replies` | messages replying to an id | filtered (below) |
+| `messages`, `message.receive`, `message.read` | messages `to_role='human'` (broker.mjs:1931-1936, :1953) | private by construction: a user-thread run can't send to the human (`user-thread-human`, FED 3.6 item 7) |
+| `inbox` | open decisions routed to the human | governance, visible |
+| `decisions {list: roles \| recent}` | decision rows with question, options and recommendation | governance, visible |
+| `agents` | role claims and each held role's state | governance, visible |
+| `tasks`, `state` | tracker tasks and launch state | governance, visible |
+| `credentials`, `usage` | credential state, usage records | governance, visible; neither holds message text |
+| `project.files`, `project.file` | project files, including records a run writes with `record.write` (broker.mjs:1395-1407, :1441-1450) | governance, visible |
+| `project.list`, `names` | projects and instance names | business-wide for the owner, visible |
+
+So a decision a user-thread run raises shows in the owner's `inbox` or `decisions`, with the free text the
+run wrote. Its role claims show in `agents`, its task writes in `tasks`, and a record it writes in
+`project.file`. Any of these can quote the user, and 5.7 doesn't call them private. The users' help text
+(R5) and the Console's share and thread pages say so in one sentence, which FED R6 reuses (mos-1023 item 2,
+duckworth-0012 N21):
+
+> The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files,
+> but not your messages.
+
+The gated-raise route. A user-thread run's uncited gated raise or hard wait routes to the human (broker.mjs:1677-1680).
+FED r4.5 (acd5f1f42, B9) settled this with no guard: the tester guard at :1683 (`tester-thread-human`) is not
+copied, and the decision reaches the owner's inbox and no other (sage-1368, mos-1021, mos-1022). FED R3 tests it.
+Row 193 adds nothing here.
+
+The message filter. A message is hidden from a session when it is in a thread (`message_threads`) whose owner
+is a `user:<id>` other than the caller, and `#readable(s, t)` is false. Threads owned by the business human or
+by `tester` are not affected, so row 177's behaviour is unchanged.
+
+- `trail`: drops hidden messages, their `deliveries` rows, and `events` rows whose `subject` is a hidden
+  message id. A `subject` that is itself a hidden message returns `message-not-found`, as an unknown id does,
+  so the reply doesn't confirm the id exists.
+- `replies {id}`: a hidden `id` fails `message-not-found`, and hidden messages are dropped from the result.
+- It applies to every session that can call these verbs: the owner, reader sessions and the tester.
+- It lands in 193b1, with no schema (Duckworth B2). Before 193b2 there are no shares, so `#readable` is false
+  for anyone but the thread's owner and b1 hides every message in another user's thread. 193b2 adds only the
+  share exception. So no build order can put a user thread live without the filter.
+
+What it does not do. The owner holds the store as the instance's OS user and can read it with sqlite. That is
+the same-uid limit in section 6, not a bus path. An owner audit verb, explicit and logged, is a follow-up row
+only if Jason asks for one (sage-1354).
+
+## 6. The bus human boundary (brief point 5)
+
+Row 196 (Gander, #1694, brief `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md` at 96f243faf) owns P19 333 and the
+verifier. Row 193 cites it and designs no boundary of its own (sage-1338: one mechanism).
+
+Agreed with Gander (gander-0002, morgana-0003, gander-0005):
+
+- One bus verifier, `verifyPrincipal(request, connection) -> {kind, business, id}`, kind `owner`, `user` or
+  `tester`. It mints one transient principal per request. It returns no role. The broker reads the level
+  from the live grant on every request, so a grant change acts without a new principal.
+- Gander recommends FED 3.6's shape for users (path-bound `user-cli.mjs`, direct parent the bus tree's
+  `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve`) plus kernel peer PID binding, and weighs bus-side ID-token
+  verification as the larger alternative.
+- Correction from Gander, accepted: the tester proof doesn't run the full agent walk, because agents bind
+  tester by design (Q173). Managed runs still fail it. The tester listener moves from TCP 7333 to a private
+  Unix socket, with `bus.tester` unchanged (agreed by Sage with Gander).
+
+What row 193 needs from row 196:
+
+- H1. Owner on the CLI keeps today's proof. Owner in the Console is a `console.sso.subjects` entry.
+- H2. A user principal comes only from an OIDC sign-in, through a path the bus verifies. No CLI path for
+  users.
+- H3. The user binding fails closed on no live grant, an unknown subject, a subject also in
+  `console.sso.subjects`, or a missing or invalid access.json. A broken access.json never stops the owner.
+- H4. Agent processes never get an owner or user principal.
+- H5. Revocation ends a bound user within 30 s and at once on `access.reload`, from the same access state
+  row 193's share check reads.
+
+The same-uid limit. Within one instance, a non-agent process on the instance's uid can claim the owner, and
+can start its own Console copy and claim any granted user (FED 3.6). An unsandboxed same-uid agent that
+detaches from its ancestry can do the same. The walk doesn't stop that, and Gander's design won't claim it
+does (gander-0005). Several humans don't make this worse: a user principal is no stronger than the owner
+principal that the same process could already take. Users themselves are not on the uid. They reach the
+bus only through the Console, so the limit is about local processes, not other humans.
+
+Does row 190 narrow it? Row 190 runs several instances under one uid, so no. Row 190b puts an instance (the
+hub) under its own Linux user (mos-0986). That narrows reach across instances: another instance's uid fails
+the uid check (human.mjs:67) and can't read the hub's store or access.json. It does not narrow reach within
+one instance. Private threads are private from other humans using the bus, not from processes running as
+the instance's uid.
+
+## 7. Migration and rollback (brief point 6)
+
+- No access.json: the business has exactly its owner, every verb behaves as today, and the share verbs
+  work for the owner only (target `*` or none). A broken access.json revokes users and leaves the owner.
+- Existing threads: already owned by the business human. Nothing is rewritten.
+- Schema: 3i to 3j adds `thread_shares` only. A re-pin past a schema bump needs a `--migrate` window with
+  Jason, and row 185's backup before activate covers it.
+- Rollback before any share is written: activate the previous copy with the store restored from the
+  pre-activate backup. A 3i copy refuses a 3j store, as it does for every bump.
+- Rollback after shares are written: the same restore loses shares made since the window. Grants are in
+  access.json and survive. Users re-share. Row 181's restore guard counts `thread_shares`, so the loss is
+  shown, not silent.
+- To keep that window small, the build splits (section 9): 193a, 193b1, 193c and 193d have no schema
+  change and can go live in any window. 193b2 carries 3j.
+
+## 8. Tests and mutants
+
+Bus, each in `packages/bus/tests/` (193b1: viewer, mixed grants, board reads, the 5.7 message filter and governance pin; 193b2: shares, the share exception to the filter, migration):
+
+- Viewer: each allowed verb works, every other verb refuses `access-refused`, including `thread.create`,
+  `thread.open`, `thread.send` and `thread.share`.
+- Mixed grants: collaborator on project A and viewer on B. Create in A works, create in B refuses.
+- Downgrade: not here. FED R4 owns the level-loss test and its mutant (r4.4, mos-1020, N3).
+- Shares: owner shares with `user:<id>`, the user reads `thread.messages` and gets `thread-not-owned` on
+  `thread.send` and `thread.open`. Share with `*` reaches every covered user and the owner. Share with a user
+  whose grant doesn't cover the project or instance refuses `share-not-covered`.
+- A share never widens: the target's grant drops the project, the next read refuses.
+- Revoke, expiry and an invalid file each end share reads on the next request. The 30 s timer and
+  `access.reload` paths each have a case.
+- A revoked thread owner hides the thread from sharees.
+- Unshare ends access. Share, unshare, share again leaves it shared (latest row wins).
+- Non-owner `thread.share`, `thread.unshare`, `thread.shares` refuse. Tester refuses on all three.
+- `thread.list` plain shape unchanged. `thread.list {shared: true}` returns only readable threads.
+- Board reads refuse users and viewers.
+- Governance pin (B1, sage-1368): a user-thread run raises a decision; it shows in the owner's
+  `decisions recent` with its question text, and `inbox` lists it when routed to the human; the run's
+  role claim shows in the owner's `agents`, its task write in `tasks`, and its `record.write` in
+  `project.file` (B3, sage-1373); the user's message bodies stay hidden from the owner's `trail` and
+  `replies`. The test names each item of the 5.7 user sentence, so the sentence and the pin match.
+- `trail`, for the owner, a reader session and the tester (193b1): a user's thread message as `subject`
+  fails `message-not-found`; a decision trail that reaches such a message omits it, its deliveries and its
+  events. Once the thread is shared with the owner, the owner's trail shows it.
+- `replies`, same three sessions (193b1): a hidden `id` fails `message-not-found`; hidden replies are dropped. The
+  owner's own and the tester's threads are unchanged.
+- Migration: a 3i store with threads migrates to 3j, row counts unchanged, `thread_shares` empty and
+  append-only (update, delete, replace each abort). Restore-guard and `COUNTED` include it.
+
+Business (193a): R1 accepts `viewer`, refuses any other new level.
+
+CLI (193c): `mosaic access user add/remove` and `grant --level viewer` refuse tester and agent callers,
+write a receipt line and call `access.reload`.
+
+Webui (193d): a viewer has no composer or share control. With each UI check removed, the bus still refuses.
+
+Mutants, each must be killed:
+
+1. `#readable` rule 1 dropped (any covered user reads any thread).
+2. Rule 2 dropped (a share widens the grant).
+3. Rule 3 dropped (a revoked owner's thread stays visible).
+4. Latest-row lookup replaced by "any share row" (unshare ignored).
+5. (Moved to FED R4, N3: the level-loss mutant is R4's.)
+6. Viewer allowed `thread.send`.
+7. `#threadRead` used for `thread.send` (sharee writes).
+8. `share-not-covered` check removed.
+9. `thread.share` owner check removed (sharee re-shares).
+10. A user allowed `trail`.
+11. The `trail` filter removed (the owner reads a user's unshared message by id).
+12. The `replies` filter removed (the owner reads replies in a user's unshared thread).
+
+## 9. Build rows and order
+
+| Row | Work | Chains on | Schema |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 193a | R1 level check widened to viewer | FED R1 candidate | none |
+| 193b1 | Bus: viewer verb list, per-grant level checks, users refused on board reads, the 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter with `#readable` as owner-only | FED R3, R4 candidates, row 196 verifier | none |
+| 193b2 | Bus: `thread_shares`, share verbs, the share rules of `#readable`, `#threadRead`, the 5.5 share filters | 193b1 candidate | 3j |
+| 193c | `mosaic access` user verbs and `--level viewer`, if R5 lacks them | FED R5 candidate | none |
+| 193d | Console: shared list, share controls, viewer read-only | FED R6, row 192 candidates, 193b2 for share controls | none |
+
+Sage ruled the split (sage-1354): 193b1 has no schema change and can go live first. 193b2 carries 3j, and
+Sage takes its migrate window to Mos when 193b2 is near. The 5.7 message filter is in 193b1 (Duckworth B2,
+sage-1368), so it is live before any user thread can be, whatever order FED R8 and 193b2 land in. 193b2 adds
+only the share exception. FED R4 chains on 193a (viewer level), and 193b1 chains on R4.
+
+Coverage, settled in FED r4.1 (73677b87d, gizmoduck-0018, still under Duckworth's review). A grant's
+`projects` is `["*"]` or bus project UUIDs (`projects.id`, broker.mjs:2306; `threads.project` references it).
+R1 exports one pure `covers(grant, {business, project, instance}, now, {level})`. Row 193 uses only that
+function and adds no second one (Sage confirmed, sage-1354):
+
+- share reads (5.4 rules 2 and 3) and `share-not-covered`: `covers(g, thread, now, {})`, any level;
+- `thread.create`, `thread.open`, `thread.send`, `thread.share`: `covers(g, thread, now, {level: 'collaborator'})`;
+- `project.list` and `names` for users: any level, as FED 3.5.
+
+`covers` needs no further argument for row 193. If r4.1 changes in review, 193b1 follows it.
+
+Follow-ups, not in this row:
+
+- A read-only users and grants page for the owner in the Console.
+- A second owner or admin level, if Jason wants one.
+- An explicit, logged owner audit verb for user threads, only if Jason asks for one (sage-1354).
+
+## 10. Gate
+
+Per the brief: Duckworth approves this design, then the manifest. The bus, business, cli and webui suites and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh` pass on Sage's gate, and the section 8 mutants are killed. No test touches the live
+directories. No product code before Duckworth approves.

agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,8 +1,42 @@
 # Q175 design: the Console verifies SSO itself (Vikunja #412)
 
-Author Sage, 2026-10-20. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at refactor
-4ca8d6e94. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345 and 353). #385 stays open until the
-Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
+Author Sage, 2026-10-20, r3. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at
+refactor 4ca8d6e94 unless a line says otherwise. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345
+and 353). #385 stays open until the Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
+
+## Changes from r2 (Filbert's r2 review, CHANGES)
+
+- C1: the `console` key goes into the shared loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, which today refuses any
+  unknown top-level key (:113). Section 4 names the blast radius. Jason step 4 moves inside the phase 2
+  window, after the pin and before the Console starts. The phase 2 rollback removes `console` first. A
+  test-config.sh case covers it (test 25). Mos confirms the sequence before phase 1 (section 5).
+- C2: under `--sso` the page treats a 401 `sign-in required` as signed out and links to
+  `/auth/login?return=<path>` (section 5 phase 1, test 24).
+- Notes: tests 7 and 15 are built so that only the record rule refuses; test 9a is an alg test; Q-B's two
+  classes are defined, and test 23 adds a 200 HTML page; the phase 2 scratch Console uses a scratch config,
+  a dummy slot, no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
+- r3 fix (Filbert r3 approve): D1, the loader checks the slot reference's shape only, and the file checks
+  run in the Console's `--sso` start; D2, the slot resolves from the config dir, and the scratch Console has
+  a scratch dataRoot and an unreachable issuer (section 5).
+- Q-E: settled as Filbert ruled. The `subject-unknown` line keeps iss and sub, JSON-escaped and capped
+  (section 1, tests 10 and 19).
+
+## Changes from r1 (Filbert's r1 review, CHANGES)
+
+- B1: the provider config moves to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` (section 4). Mos agreed (mos-0973). The
+  Console prints provider ids, issuers and subject counts at start. The rehearse-strip follow-up is dropped.
+- B2: one return-path rule, `new URL(ret, publicOrigin).origin === publicOrigin` (section 1 step 7), with
+  tests for `/\evil.example` and `/%09/evil.example`.
+- B3: refusals log a fixed code and the provider id, never the error or its cause (section 1).
+- B4: login records are capped at 32 (section 1 step 1), with a test.
+- B5: test 9 splits into a forged payload under a real kid and a kid missing from the JWKS, and a try/catch
+  mutant joins the list. Test 2 no longer claims the signature mutant (section 9).
+- B6: the phase 2 forged-header check runs on a scratch Console, or Mos or Jason runs it on live (section 5).
+- Rulings: Q-B start degraded (section 4), Q-C only the public Host on 7332 (section 3), Q-D keep 1 h idle
+  but polls don't count as activity (section 3).
+- Section 6: `startServer` throws on `tester && sso`, and `human` joins `tester` as a refused subject label.
+- The missing tests and nits N1-N5 are in sections 1, 3, 7 and 9.
+- Section 8: the human-cli statement stays as written (mos-0972). The recommendation is now Mos's ruling.
 
 ## The ruling this implements
 
@@ -22,7 +56,9 @@ trust with verification" and confirmed five points (mos-0970):
 ## What exists today
 
 The live Console runs from copies/490e2771d3d0 with `--public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header
-X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`.
+X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`. Row 189 (#1687, P19 #413) adds
+`stack-release.sh activate --no-send`, and Mos's ruling mos-0972 takes `--send` off the live Console until
+phase 2.
 
 - `previewOptions` (packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:205) builds `{ host, header, user }`.
 - A request is `named` when its Host equals the public name (:493). A named request passes sign-in when it
@@ -45,41 +81,73 @@ New module `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs`, used only by the human listener (7332).
 
 | Route | Method | What it does |
 |---|---|---|
-| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. |
+| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. A provider whose discovery hasn't succeeded gets 503 (section 4). |
 | `/auth/callback` | GET | Finish the flow, create the session, 303 to the saved return path. |
 | `/auth/logout` | POST | Same-origin checks, delete the session, 303 to the provider's `end_session_endpoint`. |
 | `/auth/signed-out` | GET | Static "signed out" page with a sign-in link. |
 
+Every URL the Console hands a provider is built from the configured `publicOrigin`: `redirect_uri` is
+`publicOrigin + '/auth/callback'` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` is `publicOrigin + '/auth/signed-out'`. No
+code path reads the request's Host to build them (N2).
+
 The flow per provider:
 
 1. Start. Generate a state, a nonce and a PKCE verifier (`generateRandomState`, `generateRandomNonce`,
    `generateRandomCodeVerifier`), and a challenge with `calculatePKCECodeChallenge` (S256 only). Put them, the
-   provider id and the return path in a server-side login record keyed by a random id. Set
-   `__Host-mosaic_login` to that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`,
-   `scope=openid profile email`, `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
+   provider id, the return path and an expiry 10 minutes out in a server-side login record keyed by a random
+   id. The store holds at most 32 login records; a new one evicts the oldest (B4). Set `__Host-mosaic_login` to
+   that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`, `scope=openid profile email`,
+   `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
 2. Callback. Read exactly one `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie, then take and delete its record (single use, so a
    replayed callback finds nothing). Expire the cookie in the response. The provider comes from the record,
-   never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers.
+   never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers. Two tabs signing in at once each set the
+   cookie, so the later one wins and the earlier tab's callback finds no record and gets the 403 page with a
+   sign-in link (N5). That costs one retry and keeps one cookie per browser.
 3. `validateAuthResponse(as, client, url, record.state)` checks state, refuses an error response, and checks
    the `iss` parameter when the provider advertises RFC 9207.
-4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)`, then
-   `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })`.
-   That checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and nonce, and checks `alg` against
-   `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`.
+4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)` returns a
+   `Response`. Keep that object. `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce:
+   record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })` checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and
+   nonce, and checks `alg` against `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`. That field gets the provider's whole
+   `algs` array, which the library's `checkSigningAlgorithm` accepts, so a provider listing RS256 and ES256
+   takes either and nothing else (N1). Test 16 pins this.
 5. Signature. oauth4webapi does not verify the signature of an ID token that came straight from the token
    endpoint over TLS (OIDC Core 3.1.3.7 allows that, and the library docs for
    `validateApplicationLevelSignature` say so). Point 2 asks for the JWKS check, so the callback always calls
-   `validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` after step 4. It fetches the JWKS from the discovered
-   `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kid` and `alg`, and refuses HS* outright.
-6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's configured `algs`, the token's
-   `iss` equals the configured issuer exactly, and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list. Anything
-   else is a 403 that logs `refused sign-in iss=... sub=...` (never a token, code or cookie).
-7. Create the session (section 3) and 303 to the return path. The return path must start with one `/` and
-   is otherwise replaced with `/`.
+   `validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` with the same `Response` object from step 4. It fetches
+   the JWKS from the discovered `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kty`, `kid`, `alg` and `use`, and refuses HS*
+   outright. On a `kid` it doesn't have, it refetches the JWKS once if the cache is at least 60 s old, which
+   covers key rotation (test 18). The call is not wrapped in a catch that continues; its throw ends the
+   callback.
+6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's `algs`, the token's `iss` equals
+   the configured issuer as a raw string compare, with no URL normalising (N3; the library's discovery check
+   compares normalised hrefs, so this one is stricter), and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list.
+7. Create the session (section 3), then 303 to the return path. The rule (B2): resolve
+   `u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin)`, and use `u.pathname + u.search` only when
+   `u.origin === publicOrigin`; otherwise use `/`. A missing or unparsable `ret` gives `/`.
 
 Every refusal in steps 2-6 ends at a 403 page saying sign-in failed, with a link back to `/auth/login`. No
 step falls back to a header.
 
+Logging (B3). A refusal logs one line: a fixed code from a closed list (`login-record-missing`,
+`state-mismatch`, `auth-error-response`, `grant-failed`, `id-token-invalid`, `signature-invalid`,
+`alg-refused`, `issuer-mismatch`, `subject-unknown`, `discovery-failed`, `jwks-failed`) and the provider id.
+It never logs the exception, its message or its `cause`. oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims
+in `cause`, so even a message can leak. The one extra field is on `subject-unknown`: it logs `iss` and `sub`,
+because Jason step 3 reads his `sub` from that line (Q-E, Filbert's ruling). Authentik's default subject mode
+is a hashed user id that its admin view doesn't show, so the line is the practical source. Neither value is a
+credential. Three conditions hold:
+
+- Only a token that passed steps 3-6 up to the subject check reaches this line. Every earlier refusal logs
+  its own code and the provider id only.
+- Both values are written with `JSON.stringify` and each is cut to 255 characters first. Any account at the
+  provider can get a signed token, so a `sub` may hold a newline, and an unescaped one would let a sign-in
+  forge a log line.
+- Test 10 uses a `sub` holding `\n` and a fake `refused sign-in` suffix and asserts one escaped line.
+
+Test 19 asserts that no log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id.
+It exempts only the `iss` and `sub` fields of the `subject-unknown` line.
+
 ### 2. Library: oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly
 
 Mos's steer (mos-0971) was to prefer oauth4webapi over hand-rolled verification on `node:crypto` unless I
@@ -103,34 +171,78 @@ entry. Root is right because `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-31` copies only the root
 webui's first runtime dependency. The root dependency rule (exact pins, never unversioned) applies to it.
 Upgrades are reviewed commits.
 
-### 3. Sessions, cookies and logout
+### 3. Sessions, cookies, Host and logout
 
-- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256, so a heap dump doesn't hold usable ids.
-- Cookie `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/`, no Domain, no Max-Age (a
-  browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over https on
-  this exact host.
-- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires at
-  10 minutes server-side.
+- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256 and holds no raw id, so a heap dump
+  doesn't hold usable ids. Test 20 checks that the store's keys and values never contain the cookie value.
+- Cookie, exactly: `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax`, no Domain, no
+  Max-Age (a browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over
+  https on this exact host. Test 21 asserts the whole Set-Cookie value, and a mutant drops `HttpOnly`.
+- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, the same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires
+  at 10 minutes server-side.
 - Lax, not Strict, because the callback is a top-level navigation from the provider's site, and a Strict
   cookie set there would be missing on the redirect to `/`. Lax still keeps the session off cross-site POSTs.
   The write routes keep their exact `Origin` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` checks (:171, :250, :297, :340,
   :387, :425), so cross-site writes are refused twice.
-- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side. The store is in memory with a cap of 64 sessions
-  (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one human and keeps
-  sessions off disk.
+- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side (Q-D, Filbert's ruling). The store is in memory with a
+  cap of 64 sessions (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one
+  human and keeps sessions off disk.
+- Activity (Q-D). Only a page load (a GET outside `/api/`) or a write (a POST) refreshes `seen`. The page's
+  background reads don't: `refresh` re-reads the board every 10 s (packages/webui/src/public/app.js:346) and
+  the 5 s timer at :301 redraws the age label. Without this rule an open tab would never go idle. Test 13
+  covers it.
 - The session holds `{ provider, iss, sub, name, idToken, created, seen }`. `name` is the subject entry's
   label. It goes where `preview.user` goes today (send logs, settings, seat routes), so the downstream writer
   shape stays as it is. `idToken` is kept only as the logout hint and never leaves the server.
+- Host (Q-C, Filbert's ruling). Under `--sso`, 7332 serves only requests whose Host is the public host.
+  Any other Host, loopback included, gets 403 `public Host required`, except `GET /healthz`. The loopback read
+  path at :509-512 is gone under `--sso`. Today's readers of 127.0.0.1:7332 and where they go:
+  - `scripts/webui-service.sh status` (:406), the stack-release gate (scripts/stack-release.sh:484) and the
+    rehearse gate (:1369) read only `/healthz`, which stays open on loopback.
+  - The webui README (:83) describes the loopback path. It changes in phase 1.
+  - Agent reads of the board go to the tester listener on 7333, which already serves reads. I found no other
+    code that reads 7332 on loopback. A person opening http://127.0.0.1:7332 in a local browser gets the 403
+    and uses the public URL instead.
+  Test 22 covers a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write, and `/healthz` passing.
 - Every request on 7332 except `/healthz` and `/auth/*` needs a valid session. Without one, `/api/*` gets
   401 JSON and other GETs get a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`.
 - Logout: `POST /auth/logout` with the same-origin checks. It deletes the session, expires the cookie, and
-  303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
+  303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=<publicOrigin>/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
   If the provider has no `end_session_endpoint`, it goes straight to `/auth/signed-out`.
 - Limit: signing out at the provider does not end a Console session until idle or absolute expiry. Back-channel
   logout is a follow-up, not phase 1.
 
 ### 4. Provider config: shape and location
 
+Location (B1, Filbert's ruling, Mos agreed in mos-0973): a `console.sso` key in
+`~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. The reason is who can write it. The business file is writable by agents
+through `organizationWriter` (the tester verbs and the chief's `organization.set`), so a provider entry there
+could be changed by the agents the Console is meant to keep out. config.json is user-authored and never
+auto-written: `scripts/bootstrap.sh` creates it and nothing overwrites it. Adding the key is a Jason step
+(section 10).
+
+The loader (C1). Every tool reads config.json through one loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs. Its `validate`
+refuses any top-level key other than `configVersion`, `environment`, `dataRoot` and `execution` with
+`unsupported configuration key` (:113). The business, seat, cli, discord, bootstrap, land-work, stack-copy and
+conductor-apply code all use it. So phase 1 changes the shared loader, not a Console-only reader:
+
+- mosaic-config.mjs accepts an optional `console` key, and the strict `console.sso` shape validator (the
+  config checks below, except the slot file checks) runs inside the loader. The fail-closed canon holds for
+  every reader. The loader checks shape only and never touches a slot file: `clientSecret` must be
+  `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}`. The file checks and the read run only in the
+  Console's `--sso` start (D1), so a missing slot or a 0640 slot stops the Console, not the stack.
+- The blast radius is the whole stack. A typo in `console.sso` makes every tool refuse the config, not just
+  the Console. That's the price of one loader, and the reason step 4 writes the key inside a window with a
+  backup first.
+- The other direction breaks too. A copy older than phase 1 refuses a config that has the key. If the key
+  went in before the phase 2 pin, the live copy (490e2771d3d0 or later) would refuse its own config on the
+  next read, and the bus, seats and host would stop. After phase 2, a rollback to a pre-phase-1 copy fails
+  the same way until the key is removed. This is the same trap as the plug-in kind before a rollback.
+- Files without the key still load, on old and new copies.
+
+Test 25 in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads, a malformed one fails with
+the bad key path named, and a config without `console` loads.
+
 No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
 
 ```json
@@ -151,38 +263,54 @@ No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
 }
 ```
 
-Location: a new optional `console` key in the business file (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/<id>.json`). The
-Console already serves one business (`--business`), the identities map to that business's human, and Q173
-lets agents edit the test business with a backup first. Adding the key means adding `console` to `TOP_KEYS`
-(packages/business/src/business.mjs:21) with a strict validator. It's additive, and existing files without
-it still load. The alternative is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, which is user-authored and never
-auto-written. That fits a deployment setting well, but it puts per-business identity in system config.
-**Filbert, rule on this one.**
+At start, `--sso` prints one line per provider: its id, its issuer and the number of subjects. No client id
+value beyond that, no secret, no `sub`.
 
-The slot is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, read at start. The Console refuses to start if
-the file isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode bits, or
-resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or put in a refusal message.
+The slot is `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, where `configDir` is the directory of the config file
+the loader read (`MOSAIC_CONFIG`, default `~/.config/mosaic-dev`), so a scratch config gets a scratch slot
+(D2). The Console's `--sso` start reads it. The Console refuses to start if
+the file is a symlink, isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode
+bits (0640 refuses as well as 0644), or resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or
+put in a refusal message.
 
-`stack-release.sh rehearse` copies a backup onto a scratch root. A rehearsed Console must not use the live
-redirect URI, so rehearse strips `console.sso` from the scratch business file and the rehearsed Console runs
-without SSO (tester listener only). That's a row 163 follow-up, named in the build brief.
+`stack-release.sh rehearse` starts its Console with `serve --port N --business B` and no `--sso`, so a
+rehearsed Console never reads `console.sso` and never uses the live redirect URI. No rehearse change is
+needed; r1's follow-up is dropped.
 
-Startup checks for each provider, all fail-closed (the Console doesn't start, and the message names the
-provider and the check):
+Config checks, run at start without the network. Any failure refuses the start, and the message names the
+provider and the check:
 
-- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment. Discovery returns that issuer exactly.
-- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`, and `algs` holds only
-  asymmetric algs from the library's list. mosaic-preview advertises HS256 only, so the Console refuses it at
-  start.
+- `publicOrigin` is an https origin with no path, query or fragment.
+- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
+- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment.
+- `algs` is non-empty and holds only asymmetric algs from the library's list. `HS256`, any `HS*` and `none`
+  refuse.
+- `subjects` is non-empty, each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters, and no `name` is `tester` or `human`.
+- `clientSecret` is `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}` (shape only, in the loader).
+- In the Console's `--sso` start only, the slot file passes the file checks above.
+
+Discovery checks, run per provider when its discovery succeeds:
+
+- Discovery returns `issuer` exactly.
+- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`. mosaic-preview advertises HS256
+  only, so it fails here.
 - `code_challenge_methods_supported` includes `S256`.
 - `jwks_uri` returns at least one key usable for one of `algs`. The empty mosaic-preview JWKS fails here too.
-- `subjects` is non-empty, and each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters.
-- `client.id_token_signed_response_alg` is set to `algs[0]`, so the library enforces it per token.
-- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
 
-Starting while the provider is unreachable refuses the start. A Console with no working sign-in serves
-nothing, so refusing loudly costs nothing, and the unit restarts it. The tradeoff is that an IdP outage
-keeps the Console down until the IdP is back. With every route behind a session, it would be unusable anyway.
+Unreachable provider (Q-B, Filbert's ruling). Config errors still refuse the start. Each fetch of the
+discovery document or the JWKS lands in one of two classes:
+
+- Unreachable: a network error, a timeout, a status other than 200, or a body that doesn't parse as JSON. An
+  Authentik maintenance page served as 200 HTML is unreachable, not refused, so it can't block a restart.
+- Refused: a JSON document that fails the issuer, alg, S256 or JWKS check.
+
+An unreachable provider doesn't stop the Console. It starts, that provider's `/auth/login` gets 503
+`sign-in unavailable`, and a retry runs with backoff (5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes). `/healthz` stays
+200 and adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable" | "refused" }`, so the gates still pass and an operator
+can see the state. A refused provider at start refuses the start, because it's a configuration problem. On a
+later retry it stays disabled with the `discovery-failed` code until a restart. Sessions already made keep
+working while a provider is unreachable, since a session check needs no network. Test 23 covers the degraded
+start, a 200 HTML page, and the recovery.
 
 Several providers: Pocket ID, WorkOS and other compliant OPs use the same entry shape. The login page lists
 them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session records which provider made it.
@@ -190,13 +318,48 @@ them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session re
 ### 5. Retiring `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` and the proof header
 
 1. **Phase 1 (code row).** Add `--sso` to `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`. It reads `console.sso` from
-   the business file. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
+   config.json. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
    `--sso`, `named` means "has a session", and `writer` comes from the session. `--send` needs `--sso` or the
-   old preview set. Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
+   old preview set. Phase 1 also carries the loader change and its test-config.sh case (section 4, test 25).
+   Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
+
+   The page (C2). Today app.js signs out only on `res.type === 'opaqueredirect'` (packages/webui/src/public/
+   app.js:111 and :305), which is the outpost's redirect. Under `--sso` the Console answers an `/api/*`
+   request without a session with 401 `sign-in required`, so the page would show an error on every 10 s
+   refresh and never offer a way back. Phase 1 makes both fetch paths treat a 401 whose body has
+   `error: 'sign-in required'` as signed out, and the signed-out notice links to
+   `/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`. Other 401s stay errors. The opaqueredirect branch stays
+   until phase 3, because the preview flags still run behind the outpost until then. Test 24 covers it.
+
+   Before phase 1 starts, Mos confirms the config.json sequence in phase 2 (C1).
 2. **Phase 2 (Jason-gated window).** Re-pin to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
-   instead of the preview flags, after the Jason steps below. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). Acceptance:
-   Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message, signs out, and a forged-header request with no
-   cookie gets 401.
+   instead of the preview flags, after Jason steps 1 to 3. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). The order
+   inside the window:
+   1. Back up the store, the pointer, the unit and config.json.
+   2. Pin the phase 1 copy with the Console stopped. The copy's loader accepts a config with or without
+      `console`, so the bus and seats keep reading the old config.
+   3. Straggler check (Mos's C1 condition, mos-0977): list every running process, unit and timer that
+      still runs from the old copy and reads config.json. Each one is restarted on the new copy or shown
+      not to re-read config. The old loader refuses the key, so a straggler would fail on its next read.
+      Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
+   4. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
+      for that one key. The new loader reads it back (`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` validate) before anything
+      starts.
+   5. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
+   Acceptance: Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message and signs out. The forged-header
+   check (a request with `X-authentik-username` and no cookie gets 401) runs either on a scratch Console or
+   on live by Mos or Jason (B6). No agent sends the auth header to the live 7332 (section 8). The scratch
+   Console runs from the same copy as `serve --sso --port <scratch port>`, with `MOSAIC_CONFIG` pointing at a
+   scratch config in a scratch dir. That config has a scratch `dataRoot`, and any business it serves comes
+   from the scratch config dir; neither points at live. Its dummy client secret sits in the scratch slot
+   (`<scratch configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`). Its issuer is an unreachable loopback host, not
+   Authentik, so the scratch Console sends nothing outbound (D2, mos-0971). It comes up in the degraded
+   state (Q-B), and the 401 check needs no sign-in. It has no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
+
+   Rollback for phase 2: remove the `console` key from config.json first (restore the step 1 backup), then
+   roll the pointer back. An older copy's loader refuses a config holding the key (section 4), so the other
+   order stops the bus and seats. The window plan lists that order, and the STATE check after a rollback
+   reads config.json for the key's absence.
 3. **Phase 3 (code row).** Remove `previewOptions`, `proofOptions` and their tests. `cli.mjs` and
    `webui-service.sh` refuse the old flags with `--auth-header was retired by Q175; use --sso`. Close #385
    with the phase 2 STATE and the phase 3 commit.
@@ -211,13 +374,15 @@ The tester listener exists so agents can test as the tester and never as Jason (
 - It never mounts `/auth/*` (404), never reads a cookie, and refuses any request carrying `Authorization` or a
   `__Host-mosaic_session` / `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie (403 `tester listener takes no sign-in`). The same
   goes for `X-authentik-jwt` and the old auth and proof header names.
+- `startServer` throws when its options hold both `tester` and `sso`, so the SSO module can't be mounted on
+  the tester listener by a wiring mistake. A unit test calls it with both.
 - Its writer stays the fixed `{ tester: true, user: 'tester' }`, and it allows only the row 175 writes, as
   today. No session or header can change it.
 - Its bus calls stay on `TESTER_CLI`. The bus checks the tester proof and refuses human verbs from it, and the
   broker refuses a business whose human is `tester` and any role named `tester`. So nothing that reaches 7333
   can become the human.
 - 7332 keeps refusing `x-mosaic-tester` for every Host (:485).
-- `subjects` validation refuses an entry named `tester`.
+- `subjects` validation refuses a `name` of `tester` or `human`.
 
 ### 7. Point 5, the proxy-forwarded token
 
@@ -225,7 +390,9 @@ Not in phase 1. Point 5 makes it optional and the code flow covers the ruling. I
 
 - Verify with jose (MIT, exact pin), against the JWKS from the configured issuer's own discovery. Never use
   the `X-authentik-meta-jwks` header, because it arrives with the request and the forger controls it.
-- Use the same alg allow list, iss, aud (the proxy provider's client id), exp and subject list.
+- Use the same alg allow list, iss, exp and subject list. `aud` is the proxy provider's client id, and the
+  config check refuses it if it equals any code-flow `clientId`, so an ID token issued to the Console can't be
+  replayed as a proxy token or the other way round (N4).
 - The mosaic-preview provider signs with HS256 and has an empty JWKS, so its `X-authentik-jwt` fails every
   check until Jason gives it an RSA or EC key (Jason step 1).
 
@@ -237,9 +404,11 @@ Today, with `--send` live, any same-uid process on dragon-lin can connect to 127
 strips client copies of the header, so a remote forger needs local code execution first. Users on other uids
 can reach the loopback port too (P19 333).
 
-Recommendation: Mos restarts the Console without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path stops
-carrying writes, and only Jason's sends through the Console stop. That's a Mos call (Console start belongs to
-Jason or Mos). Until then, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332. The tests use fixture servers.
+Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path
+stops carrying writes, and Jason sends piece 1 with `mosaic talk pm` instead. Row 189 (`stack-release.sh
+activate --no-send`, #1687) makes that change through the pointer so the unit and stack-active.json stay in
+step; the restart follows its landing. Until phase 2, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332.
+The tests use fixture servers.
 
 To be clear about the limit: SSO protects Console ingress. It doesn't protect the bus's human boundary. The
 human proof is path-bound (#225), so a same-uid process can already run the tree's `human-cli.mjs` and act
@@ -249,11 +418,11 @@ as the human without touching the Console. Q175 doesn't change that. P19 333 own
 
 All tests run against a fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. It's a loopback https
 server with a self-signed cert. Each test passes the library a `customFetch` that trusts only that cert, so
-production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a
-JWKS, and authorization, token and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an
-HMAC secret for the forgeries). No test reaches a real provider. Each refusal test asserts the status, that no
-`__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was never called. Each test also passes once
-unmutated, as the control.
+production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a JWKS, and authorization, token
+and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an HMAC secret for the
+forgeries). It can serve two issuers at once and rotate its keys. No test reaches a real provider. Each
+refusal test asserts the status, that no `__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was
+never called. Each test also passes once unmutated, as the control.
 
 Refusals Mos named:
 
@@ -261,35 +430,87 @@ Refusals Mos named:
    Fetch Metadata, and no cookie: 401 on `/api/bus/message`, `/api/settings` and `/api/config`, and a 303 to
    login on `/`.
 2. HS256 ID token. The fake OP signs the ID token with HS256, using the client secret as the key (the classic
-   confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback.
-3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused.
-4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's clock tolerance):
-   refused.
+   confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback. The library's alg check refuses it
+   before any signature check, so this test proves the alg rule, not the signature check. Test 9 covers that.
+3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused. Also an `aud`
+   array holding our client id and another, with no `azp`: refused.
+4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's 30 s clock
+   tolerance): refused.
 
 More refusals:
 
 5. Wrong `iss`, both a different issuer and a trailing-slash variant.
 6. Nonce mismatch or missing nonce.
 7. State mismatch, a missing login cookie, a replayed callback (record already taken), an expired login record,
-   and two login cookies.
+   and two login cookies. For the replay, the fake OP is set to accept the same code twice, so the second
+   callback reaches the record lookup and only the take-and-delete rule refuses it.
 8. A provider that demands no PKCE. The token request must carry `code_verifier`, and the fake OP refuses a
    wrong one.
-9. `alg: none`, and an RS256 token signed by a key not in the JWKS.
-10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one log line with iss and sub only.
-11. Startup refusals: HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch,
-    a slot with mode 0644, and `--sso` together with `--auth-header`.
+9. The signature check (B5), three cases: (a) `alg: none`; (b) an RS256 token whose header names a real kid in
+   the JWKS, with a changed payload and the original signature; (c) an RS256 token signed by a key whose kid
+   isn't in the JWKS, even after the refetch. (a) is refused by the alg check in step 4, so it's an alg test
+   like test 2. Only (b) and (c) reach step 5, and (b) is the case only the signature check catches.
+10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one `subject-unknown` log line with the provider id,
+    iss and sub only.
+11. Start refusals: `algs` holding `HS256` or `none`, HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty
+    JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a subject named `tester` or `human`, `--sso` together with
+    `--auth-header`, and slot files that are a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640, or under the repo. The owner
+    check has no test: making a file owned by another uid needs root, which the suite doesn't have. The
+    review reads that branch instead.
 12. Tester port: a valid session cookie (taken from a 7332 sign-in), `Authorization: Bearer <valid id token>`,
-    and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404.
+    and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404. `startServer` with `tester` and `sso`
+    throws.
 13. Session: idle expiry, absolute expiry, a logout followed by reuse of the old cookie, and logout without
-    same-origin (refused, session kept).
-14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example` and `return=https://evil.example` both land on `/`.
+    same-origin (refused, session kept). Background `/api/` GETs every 10 s for over an hour don't keep the
+    session alive; a page load does.
+14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example`, `return=https://evil.example`, `return=/\evil.example` and
+    `return=/%09/evil.example` all land on `/`, and `return=/board?x=1` lands there.
+15. Provider mix-up. Two providers, A and B. A login started for A whose callback carries B's `iss` and a
+    code from B is refused, and a `provider=` query on the callback is ignored. B's code is issued against
+    A-record's PKCE challenge, so the verifier matches and only the record rule (the callback belongs to A)
+    refuses it.
+16. Several algs: a provider with `algs: ["RS256", "ES256"]` takes a token signed with either, and refuses
+    PS256 even when the JWKS holds a usable PS256 key.
+17. Login record cap: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first login's callback finds no record.
+18. JWKS rotation: the fake OP rotates to a new key with a new kid. A sign-in after the rotation succeeds
+    through the one refetch, and a token under the removed kid is refused.
+19. Logs: across every test in this file, captured log lines hold none of the tokens, codes, states, nonces,
+    verifiers, the client secret or a session id that the test produced.
+20. The session store holds no raw session id (keys are sha256 values, and no value holds the cookie).
+21. Set-Cookie: the exact session and login cookie strings, including the expiry of the login cookie at
+    callback.
+22. Host: under `--sso`, a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write each get 403; `/healthz` on
+    loopback gets 200.
+23. Degraded start: the fake OP is down at start; the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, `/healthz` reports
+    `unreachable`; the OP comes up and the next retry makes sign-in work. A discovery URL that answers 200
+    with an HTML page also counts as `unreachable` and the Console starts. A provider that answers with
+    HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
+24. Signed-out page (C2). A page test in the board-held.test.mjs style stubs fetch to answer 401
+    `{ error: 'sign-in required' }`: the page shows the signed-out notice, its link is
+    `/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`, and the refresh stops. A 401 with another error stays an
+    error. The existing opaqueredirect case still signs out.
+25. Loader (C1), in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads; a malformed one (an HS
+    alg, a missing `slot` field, a slot name outside the pattern, an unknown key under `console`) fails and
+    names the bad key path, and no case reads a slot file (the file cases stay in test 11); a config without
+    `console` loads.
 
 Positive paths: an RS256 and an ES256 provider each complete sign-in and one send, and two providers configured
 together each work with their own subjects.
 
-Mutants for the gate: drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (test 2 or 9 must fail), drop the
-`subjects` check, accept HS* in `algs`, take the provider from the query, let the tester listener read
-cookies, and skip the login record delete.
+Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
+
+- drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (9b);
+- wrap that call in a try/catch that continues (9b);
+- drop the `subjects` check (10);
+- accept HS* in `algs` (11);
+- take the provider from the query (15);
+- let the tester listener read cookies (12);
+- skip the login record delete (7);
+- drop `HttpOnly` from the session cookie (21);
+- refresh `seen` on every request (13);
+- build `redirect_uri` from the request Host (a test with a different Host on `/auth/login` checks the
+  `redirect_uri` sent to the fake OP);
+- serve the loopback read path under `--sso` (22).
 
 ### 10. Jason-gated steps
 
@@ -300,16 +521,21 @@ cookies, and skip the login record delete.
    post-logout URI `https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out`, keep RS256, and give the client id. Put the
    client secret into slot `console-sso-authentik` (or say an agent may create the slot file from a value he
    puts in place, per the Q173 secrets rule). Agents never see the value.
-3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one refusal log line on his first
-   sign-in attempt.
-4. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
+3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one `subject-unknown` log line on his
+   first sign-in attempt.
+4. The `console.sso` entry in `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, inside the phase 2 window, after the pin
+   and before the Console starts (section 5). He writes it, or he gives an agent the go to write that one
+   key from the values in steps 2 and 3, with a backup of the file first. config.json is user-authored, so
+   this isn't covered by Q173. Writing it earlier stops every tool on the live copy, whose loader refuses
+   the key.
+5. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
    later, so the Console is the only gate, changes who can reach the Console from outside and is his call.
-5. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
+6. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
 
 ## Questions for review
 
-- Q-A: the config location, business file `console` key or config.json (section 4).
-- Q-B: refuse to start when the IdP is unreachable, or start and refuse sign-ins (section 4).
-- Q-C: should the loopback-Host read path on 7332 also go behind the session, as proposed? Public traffic
-  arrives from 127.0.0.1 too, and only Host keeps it off that path today.
-- Q-D: 8 h absolute and 1 h idle, or shorter.
+Q-A to Q-E are settled (Filbert r1 and r2, Mos mos-0973). One open point, for Mos:
+
+- The config.json sequence (C1): the key goes in only inside the phase 2 window, after the pin and before
+  the Console starts, with a backup first, and a rollback removes it before the pointer moves (section 5).
+  Mos confirms this before phase 1 starts.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/candidate-manifest.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md
+4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log
+ddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh
+5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md
+38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md
+fe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs
+16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh

agents/sage/work/t1-seats/COMMON.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Common start for Sage's MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977)
+
+You are a builder seat on Mosaic Stack, repository /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack, branch base `refactor`.
+Sage leads the project and is your coordinator (T3 thread 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079). Mos speaks
+for Jason (thread 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e). Human input reaches you only through Sage and Mos.
+
+## Read first, in this order
+
+1. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/USER.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, `CONSTITUTION.md` (who Jason is, the
+   system rules, the constitution).
+2. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/TARGET.md` (the MVP addendum) and `DECISIONS.md` Q176 to Q178.
+3. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md` and `PLAN.md`.
+   Everything under jason-master-restart is read only.
+4. The repository's `AGENTS.md`, then your brief (named in your first message) and the files it points to.
+
+## Your worktree
+
+T3 made your worktree from `refactor`. Work only there. Link node_modules from the canonical checkout right
+after you start (`ln -s /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules node_modules`), unless your brief adds a
+dependency. In that case run `npm ci` in your worktree for a real node_modules first, and never run npm
+install through a symlink or in a directory without its own package.json (npm walks up to home).
+
+## Rules that bind you
+
+- Message ids are `<seat>-NNNN`, starting at 0001. Run `date -u` right before every message and put the
+  stamp in it. End each turn with a clock timestamp.
+- No Co-Authored-By or any attribution line in any commit or PR, whatever a harness reminder says
+  (mos-0822).
+- Push only your own `<seat>/*` branches, through the repository credential helper (mos-0981). Never push
+  `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
+- You have no Gitea token. Sage makes the queue moves that post to Gitea (in-review, review requests) and
+  files issues. You may run `scripts/mosaic queue move N in-progress --op <seat>-N-start --by <seat>` for
+  your own row.
+- Never touch `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files or `~/.mosaic`. Never
+  start, stop or restart the live Console or bus. Never read or print a credential value.
+- Never read other seats' scratch directories. `agents/<seat>/work/` packets in the repository are fine.
+- Single test files run freely. The cli suite, any `scripts/test-*.sh` and any full package suite share
+  one slot: run `bash /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-busy-now.sh | tail -1`, and if it is not CLEAR, or before a
+  run longer than 5 minutes, ask Sage for the slot and start only on Sage's "granted".
+- Two failures in one gate run means stop and report.
+- Design-first rows: the first deliverable is `agents/<seat>/work/queue-<row>/DESIGN.md`, committed on your
+  branch. Send the reviewer and Sage its path, commit and sha256. No product code before approval.
+- Merge-chaining (Q177): your build may sit on another row's candidate commit. Your row keeps its own
+  review and gate, and the chain lands in order.
+- Fail closed. Never route around a refusal. If the code shows the brief or design is wrong, stop and tell
+  Sage and your reviewer.
+- Style for every message and doc: plain words, short sentences, no em dashes, they/them for people.
+- Sage registers your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md`. Do not edit it.

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/comment-337-412-r163-landed.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 163 (D2, #1660) round 2 approved. One comment on P19 337 (D2), per mos-0882 (every
+// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
+// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
+// Usage: node comment-337-r163-approved.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
+if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
+if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
+const PROJECT = 19;
+const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
+const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
+const POSTS = [
+  { id: 337, title: /^D2: stack rehearsal on a scratch root/, body: [
+    "Row 163 (Gitea #1660) landed and pushed. Landing commit 8ecc7a239 (Sage; Filbert approve 29447), queue revs 2235-2236 (landing note and done) in 9ae8c73ac, range 4ca8d6e94..9ae8c73ac on refactor. Patch-id b8d5f8a37c24 matches candidate c6f4f4c12596. #1660 is closed with comment 29450.",
+    "Sage gate passed at 18:16Z on eaa0f2666: cli 472/472 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. The pushed commit is a cherry-pick of eaa0f2666 onto 7f57419b3, which adds only the Q175 design doc, and no test reads that file. Mos dropped the Part B wait when Q175 replaced Part B (mos-0971).",
+    "Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. Rehearse and bus start --no-launch go live at the next re-pin, where the Q173 backup and STATE report apply.",
+  ] },
+  { id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
+    "Design r1 is committed: agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md in 7f57419b3 (blob 91e5b1b5e737), pushed in 9ae8c73ac. The Console becomes an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. It always calls validateApplicationLevelSignature, because the library skips the signature check on a token-endpoint ID token. Identity is an (iss, sub) pair, and only asymmetric algs are accepted.",
+    "Filbert's r1 review asks for changes in the doc before any code (B1-B6). B1 moves the provider config to config.json, because agents have write paths into the business file. B2 closes an open-redirect hole. B3 keeps the library's error causes out of logs. B4 caps login records. B5 fixes the signature mutant test. B6 removes a live forged-header probe from the phase 2 acceptance. Their rulings: Q-B start degraded when the IdP is unreachable, Q-C yes (7332 accepts only the public Host under --sso), Q-D keep idle expiry but don't refresh it on poll GETs. r2 follows.",
+    "Interim (mos-0972): the Console runs without --send until phase 2. stack-release.sh has no way to drop --send that keeps stack-active.json and the unit in step, so a small tool row comes first, through review.",
+  ] },
+];
+const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
+async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
+  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
+  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
+  return { status: r.status, json };
+}
+const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
+const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
+const save = () => {
+  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
+  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
+  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
+};
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
+  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
+}
+writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
+  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
+  rec.comments.push(e);
+  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
+  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
+  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
+  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
+  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
+  save();
+}
+save();
+process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
+if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/file-no-send-row.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// Sage, 2026-10-20: files the activate --no-send row (mos-0972, mos-0973) as one P19 task, owner Sage, no due date.
+// Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. No labels, assignees, due dates or bucket moves. Refuses if
+// the title exists. Prints no secret.
+// Usage: node file-no-send-row.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
+if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
+if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
+const PROJECT = 19;
+const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
+const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
+const T = {
+  title: "stack-release.sh activate --no-send: drop the Console's --send and keep the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972)",
+  description: ps(SIG, [
+    "Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without --send until Q175 phase 2 (P19 #412), because with --send live any same-uid process can forge X-authentik-username on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason.",
+    "stack-release.sh has no path that drops --send and keeps ~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json and the unit in step: console_for_target (:658-687) carries the pointer's flags, check_target (:247-249) allows a same-copy activate only for the proof pair, and adopt refuses once a pointer exists. A hand reinstall makes flags_drift refuse every later activate, pm-on and rollback.",
+    "The row adds activate --no-send, modeled on row 187's --no-proof. It drops --send from the pointer and the unit. A same-copy activate is allowed when the pointer holds --send. Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer as they do now. There is no re-enable flag. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md. Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh (mos-0973 go).",
+    "After landing: a same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 with --no-send under Q173, with the plan output sent to Mos first, a backup first and a STATE report after. Then row 66 lands.",
+  ]),
+};
+const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
+async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
+  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
+  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
+  return { status: r.status, json };
+}
+const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
+async function existing() {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
+    const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
+    if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
+    out.push(...list(r.json));
+    if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
+  }
+  throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
+}
+const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
+const save = () => {
+  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
+  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
+  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
+};
+if ((await existing()).some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
+writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
+const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
+rec.created = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
+if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`);
+else {
+  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
+  Object.assign(rec.created, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done, inverse: `mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/${r.json.id} with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's` });
+  if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push("create read-back differs");
+}
+save();
+console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/no-send-row-2026-10-20.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+ "at": "2026-10-20T18:21:15.323Z",
+ "project": 19,
+ "created": {
+  "status": 201,
+  "id": 413,
+  "readBack": 200,
+  "done": false,
+  "inverse": "mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/413 with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's"
+ },
+ "problems": []
+}

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/r163-landed-412-design-2026-10-20.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{
+ "at": "2026-10-20T18:19:36.544Z",
+ "comments": [
+  {
+   "task": 337,
+   "status": 201,
+   "id": 372,
+   "readBack": 200,
+   "found": true
+  },
+  {
+   "task": 412,
+   "status": 201,
+   "id": 373,
+   "readBack": 200,
+   "found": true
+  }
+ ],
+ "problems": []
+}

agents/webby/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Webby
+
+Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0981, thread 03086006). Reviews Case 2 designs and MVP T1 rows 192 and 194.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

docs/SESSIONS.md

@@ -1357,5 +1357,7 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-20T15:26:33Z | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 163 (#1660) r2 for Filbert's r1 changes (F1-F3, N1) | in-review r2, Filbert reviewer: candidate 2c090eefd on code 2a5f3a3a0, base 4f02486d5, manifest c6f4f4c12596; tests R14 R15 + R4/R9/R11 cases, read-only Registry #write() returns; gate passed, K34-K41 killed; Mos checked manifest (mos-0967); revs 2230 (Filbert) and 2231-2233 committed 92cc6011c c539995cf; request comment 29446; P19 337 comment 367; packet 7af166574; lands after B7
 2026-10-20T15:40:36Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 163 r2 review (D2 rehearse, candidate 2c090eefd, manifest c6f4f4c12596) | approve, comment 29447 rev 2234: 249/249 singles pass; my M1-M6 and N1 mutants all killed (R14, R9, R11, R4, R15, session test)
 2026-10-20T15:42:00Z | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 163 (#1660) r2 verdict intake | approved by Filbert (comment 29447, rev 2234 committed cd2b377bb); P19 337 comment 367 -> 368; candidate 2c090eefd manifest c6f4f4c12596 waits to land after B7, fresh gate if the base moves
-2026-10-20T18:48:55Z | Gosalyn (Opus 5.5, 7604438a) | T2 Case 2 design (#416), agents/gosalyn/work/case2/DESIGN.md on gosalyn/case2-design, static read at 5d019d876 | design r1 committed, review requested from Dewey, rows C2-01..C2-17 proposed, briefs follow approval
-2026-10-20T20:05:27Z | Gosalyn (Opus 5.5, 7604438a) | T2 Case 2 design (#416) r2-r8 and slice row briefs, gosalyn/case2-design | design r8 eab6e1a3a approved by Webby (webby-0026), step 1 hold lifted (mos-1074), 16 briefs in docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md sent to Sage for queue add, webby-0026 N1 folded into the C2-13 brief
+2026-10-20T18:19:06Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r1 (#412, DESIGN.md blob 91e5b1b5e737 at 7f57419b3), static read incl. oauth4webapi 3.8.8 | changes: B1 config in config.json not business file, B2 return-path backslash, B3 log redaction of library error causes, B4 login-record cap, B5 test 9 not 2 kills signature mutant, B6 phase 2 live forged-header probe; rulings Q-B start degraded, Q-C yes, Q-D 8h abs + idle ignores polls; step 5 reading confirmed; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
+2026-10-20T18:34:53Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r2 (DESIGN.md blob 3eb718b5e131 at 1a268249e), static | changes: C1 config.json console key fails old loaders (mosaic-config.mjs:113 rejects unknown keys; key add inside phase 2 window, rollback removes it, loader test), C2 app.js signs out only on opaqueredirect so 401 never shows sign-in; notes on tests 15/7/9a, Q-B 200-HTML classification, scratch Console flags; Q-E keep iss/sub escaped and capped; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
+2026-10-20T18:40:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r3 (DESIGN.md blob a152fd58e18e at 817e8f51b), static | approve on condition D1 (slot file checks stay out of shared loader, shape-only there) as a line edit; D2 notes: slot root from configDir, scratch dataRoot, name discovery GETs for Mos; C1/C2 and notes verified; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
+2026-10-20T18:41:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design D1/D2 check (DESIGN.md blob eba861f5d2bb at d55d86bb0), static git diff 817e8f51b..d55d86bb0 | ack: D1 and D2 match; design approved; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record

docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-0972 (Q175 interim, Vikunja #412). Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate owner
+Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit.
+
+This row builds the tool only. The live restart without `--send` is a separate step afterwards, a same-copy
+activate under Q173 with a backup first and a STATE report after. No test here touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the
+live units or a slot file. Every test uses the stand-in `systemctl`, units, stores and data root that
+`packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` already builds.
+
+## Why
+
+Mos ruled that the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2, because with `--send` live any same-uid
+process can forge `X-authentik-username` on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason (design section 8). On the pinned
+stack, the Console flags live in the pointer (`~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json`):
+
+- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:658-687) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
+  `--tester-port` and the row 187 proof pair can change.
+- `check_target` (:247-249) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
+- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:822).
+- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:640-651) refuse
+  `unit-flags-drift` on every later activate, pm-on and rollback.
+
+So the tool can't drop `--send` today. This row adds that one path.
+
+## The change
+
+1. `activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE`, so `install_stack` leaves it out of the
+   Console unit and `write_pointer` leaves it out of the pointer. Only `activate` takes it. It combines with
+   `--tester-port`, the proof pair and `--no-proof`.
+2. An activate with `--no-send` may name the pointer's copy when the pointer's Console flags hold `--send`. It
+   re-pins the live copy with only the Console flags changed, as row 187 does for the pair, including the
+   live-copy plan note and the backup of the stopped store. Without `--send` in the pointer, a same-copy
+   `--no-send` still refuses `already-active`.
+3. The steps log records `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
+   --send, so there is nothing to drop`.
+4. `--plan` prints one `send:` line for an activate or rollback: `send: dropped; --no-send was given`,
+   `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`, `send: carried` when the pointer's
+   `--send` goes on unchanged, or `send: off`.
+5. `rollback` and `pm-on` don't change: they carry the pointer's flags. So once `--no-send` has run, a rollback
+   to an earlier copy keeps send off. There is no flag to turn send back on. Q175 phase 2 changes the Console
+   flags in its own row.
+6. `docs/TOOLS.md` "Pinned stack update" gets `--no-send` in the usage block and one sentence.
+
+## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs)
+
+1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send` and `--tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
+   passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the preview flags and
+   `--tester-port 7333` in order. Status says `unit flags: match the pointer`. The steps log has the drop
+   line. The log line has from = to = B, and the stopped store was backed up.
+2. A plain same-copy activate still refuses `already-active`. So does a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is
+   gone.
+3. `--plan` prints the four `send:` lines in their cases, with the live-copy note on the same-copy run.
+4. After `--no-send`, a rollback to the earlier copy and `pm-on` both leave `--send` out of the pointer and
+   the unit.
+5. `--no-send` on `rollback`, `pm-on`, `status` or `adopt` is a usage error (exit 4).
+6. `--no-send` with the proof pair, and with `--no-proof`, on a pointer holding both: each drops what it
+   names and keeps the rest.
+
+## Mutants (each must fail at least one test)
+
+- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
+- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
+- M3: `--no-send` drops `--send` from the pointer but not from the unit (it writes the pointer from
+  `P_CONSOLE`).
+- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
+- M5: the arg parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
+
+## Gate
+
+Dewey approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the
+mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "User and main agent can create and spawn
+agents" and "User maintains ability to terminate, regenerate, or create agents via WebUI or CLI ad-hoc", #415
+Case 1 "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids per agent" and
+"User maintains ability to restructure organization at will"). Gitea #1692. T1 item 5. Owner Honker, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate
+owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/DESIGN.md`. Webby reviews it before any
+code.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md G8, G9, C1.5, C1.6, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- The chief launches only listed instances (`roles/chief-of-staff.json`, harness `tools.mjs` launch,
+  `broker.mjs:1968`). No user verb launches an arbitrary agent.
+- Terminate exists (`packages/cli/src/cli.mjs:447`, `instances.mjs:9-11`, webui `serve.mjs:288, 535`). There
+  is no regenerate, no delete and no Console launch.
+- Instance changes need a bus restart (`instance-settings.mjs:35,75`, `organization.mjs:83`). Add and change
+  only, no delete.
+- Human-only membership acts as a veto today, but there is no per-agent veto list.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The verbs: create (from a role and a name), launch, terminate, regenerate (a fresh session with the same
+   identity and role), and delete (with what happens to its sessions, workspace and run evidence, which
+   stays write-once). Each one is a human verb on the CLI and a Console action.
+2. Chief hire/fire. What the chief may do on its own, and the per-agent veto: the human marks an agent so
+   the chief can't fire or replace it, and marks roles the chief can't hire. Where the veto lives and how
+   the broker enforces it.
+3. Live changes. Which changes take effect without a bus restart, and how a running bus picks them up
+   safely.
+4. RBAC. Human roles come from row 193 (Morgana). Until it lands, these verbs are owner-only. The design
+   states the hook that row 193 fills.
+5. Per instance. Row 190 runs one instance per OS user. Lifecycle verbs act on their own instance only.
+6. The kill switch (row 191, Rocko) refuses every launch path. These new launch paths check it too.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
+- Role authority is declared in `roles/` and changes only by reviewed commits (AGENTS.md invariant 7). This
+  row adds verbs, not new role authority. Any role file change is called out for review.
+- The build may chain on rows 190, 191 and 193 candidates (Q177).
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, cli, business and webui suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 and mos-0977 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "RBAC enforcement" and #415
+Case 1 "Additional users can be configured for access" and "Shared and private agent sessions available per
+user; RBAC"). Gitea #1691. T1 item 3. Owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief
+commit.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md`. Duckworth reviews it before
+any code.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- One human per business: `packages/business/src/business.mjs:160`, and the broker's human check
+  (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538`).
+- Threads have an owner field only (`packages/bus/schema.sql:247`, `broker.mjs:353-360`). Nothing is private
+  or shared.
+- RBAC covers agents only (`role.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:769-799`, harness `gate.mjs`). Humans
+  have no roles.
+- The human proof is path-bound (#225, P19 333): any same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts
+  as the human. That limit is real and the design must say how several humans change it.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The human model. How a business lists several humans, how each is identified, and how a Console SSO
+   session (#412, row 192: each session names a provider subject mapped to a name) and a CLI call each
+   become exactly one of them. Starting rule (Mos, mos-0985, from Duckworth's federation review B1 at
+   b402197ff on origin duckworth/reviews): the bus takes a human principal only from something it verifies,
+   such as the Console's OIDC session under #412. A process's own claim of who it is never counts.
+2. Human roles. A small fixed set to start (for example owner, member, viewer), what each may do on the
+   bus and in the Console, and who may add or remove humans and change roles. Restructuring stays with
+   the owner (Case 1).
+3. Threads. Private threads (visible to their owner and the agents in them) and shared threads (visible to
+   named humans or all members). Schema change, migration of existing rows (all become the current human's),
+   and every read path that must filter.
+4. One user and grant store. Gizmoduck's federation design (thread 9312a896, design 6925f78f0 on
+   gizmoduck/federation-design) proposes `access.json` for grants. Mos's reading (mos-0977): one model for
+   local and federated humans, because two stores drift. Lead decision (Sage, 2026-10-20, to gizmoduck-0002):
+   row 193 takes Gizmoduck's human-authored `<configDir>/access.json` (federation DESIGN.md section 3.5) as
+   the one user and grant store, and extends it with local humans, roles and shared threads. Federation adds
+   only a `home` field. The design confirms this or brings a concrete reason against it to Sage and
+   Gizmoduck before the build. Federation's R1 (the access.json loader) then comes before this row's build.
+5. The bus human boundary. With several humans, the human verbs must know which human calls. State what a
+   same-uid process can still do (P19 333) and whether row 190's one-instance-per-OS-user direction narrows
+   it.
+6. Migration and rollback. Existing businesses keep working with their one human as owner.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Changing who can reach the Console from outside is Jason's. This row changes who is allowed once inside.
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
+- The build may chain on rows 190 and 192 candidates (Q177). Each row keeps its own review and gate.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business, cli and webui suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "Kill switch is available to
+stop all processing immediately"). Gitea #1689. T1 item 4. Owner Rocko, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor
+at the brief commit.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN.md`, which Dewey reviews before
+any code. Then the build follows the design, with tests and mutants.
+
+## The goal
+
+One human command and one Console button stop all processing at once and keep it stopped until the human
+clears it:
+
+- The bus takes no new work. Agent verbs that start or continue work refuse with a fixed code while the
+  switch is on. Reads and the human's own verbs, including the clear, still work.
+- Every running managed session and task run is stopped (SIGTERM, then SIGKILL after a bounded wait), and
+  each stop is recorded as an event.
+- Discord stops (its existing STOP file and `stop` verb) and can't restart while the switch is on.
+- New launches refuse: the launcher, chief hire, `run-task.sh`, and any other path that starts an agent.
+- The switch survives a bus restart and a host reboot (it lives in the data root, not in memory).
+- Turning it on and clearing it are human-only verbs, through the bus human proof, and each leaves one
+  event with who and when.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md G10, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+These are pieces, with no single switch over them. The design inventories every path that starts or
+continues work and says how each one checks the switch:
+
+- `launch.revoke` and `launch.restore` in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs` (around :2087), human-only.
+- The `mosaic launches off|on` verbs in `packages/cli/src/cli.mjs` (around :456-533) and
+  `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs` (around :769).
+- The Discord STOP file (`packages/discord/src/cli.mjs:18-27`).
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Where the switch state lives, its format, and how each process reads it (the broker checks on every
+   work verb; the launcher and Discord check before start). The race: a launch already past its check when
+   the switch goes on must still be stopped.
+2. The CLI verb names (for example `mosaic halt` and `mosaic resume`) and the Console button. The button
+   is a human write, so it goes through the same writer and same-origin checks as other Console writes, and
+   it works under the Q175 SSO session (#412) once phase 2 lands. Until then, test it with fixture servers
+   only.
+3. Per instance. Row 190 adds several instances per host. The switch is per instance, so it stops one
+   instance and never another. The design names how it finds the instance's data root. This row may build
+   on the row 190 candidate (Q177 merge-chaining).
+4. What a stopped run's record says, so run evidence stays write-once and honest.
+
+## Tests
+
+Each part of the goal gets a test: work verbs refuse, a running stand-in session and run are stopped,
+Discord refuses to start, every launch path refuses, the switch survives a restart, an agent can't set or
+clear it, and the clear lets work resume. Mutants: drop the check from one launch path, let an agent clear
+the switch, keep the switch in memory only, skip the SIGKILL after the wait. Each one must fail a test.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units, a real Discord bot or a slot file. Use the stand-in
+  units, scratch data roots and fixture servers the suites already build.
+- Rocko has no git credentials. Sage commits the candidate and runs the queue moves Rocko can't.
+
+## Gate
+
+Dewey approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite, the bus, discord and webui package suites and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176-Q178, Vikunja #414). Gitea #1688. T1 item 1. Owner
+Darkwing, reviewer Filbert, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. This row blocks both MVP
+cases: Case 1 (Jason's software factory) and Case 2 (Melanie's creative writing hub) run as two instances
+on one homelab host, beside the current mosaic-stack test instance.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190/DESIGN.md`. Filbert reviews it
+before any code, as Q175 did. Then the build follows the design, with tests and mutants.
+
+## The goal
+
+Two or more instances run side by side on dragon-lin. Each one has its own config file, data root (store,
+broker.sock, host.lock, state, runs, sessions, workspaces), businesses, bus unit, Console unit and port,
+tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. Nothing one
+instance does can read or change another's state. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
+config path, data root, unit names and ports stay as they are, and no re-pin is needed for it.
+
+## Known single-instance points (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+The design starts with a full inventory. Grep every script and package, not only these:
+
+- `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in`: `mosaic-bus@<business>` sets no `MOSAIC_CONFIG` and reads the
+  fixed `EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`.
+- `packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in` and `scripts/webui-service.sh`: one `mosaic-webui.service`.
+- `packages/discord/systemd/[email protected]` and `scripts/discord-service.sh`.
+- `scripts/stack-copy.sh:8` hardcodes `BUSINESS=mosaic-stack`, and `:95` reads `mosaic-webui.service`.
+- `scripts/stack-release.sh`: unit names, the Console port and the tester port default, `COPIES` (:28), the
+  pointer under `$DATA/state` (:1474), and `rehearse`.
+- `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`, `scripts/bootstrap.sh`, `scripts/reset.sh`, `scripts/land-work.sh`,
+  `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs`, `packages/business/src/{business,vars}.mjs`, and
+  `packages/conversation/src/guard.mjs` each name the default config path or data root.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Instance identity. How a name maps to its config file and how every tool picks the instance (an
+   `--instance NAME` flag, `MOSAIC_CONFIG`, or both), and what happens with neither (the current default,
+   unchanged). Name rules, and refusal of a name that collides.
+2. Config canon. AGENTS.md invariant 2 says `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is the sole system config,
+   created only by `scripts/bootstrap.sh`. Several instances mean several config files. The design proposes
+   the exact wording change and how bootstrap creates an instance config without overwriting one. Mos rules
+   on the canon change before the build.
+3. Unit names and templates. The bus, Console and Discord units per instance, how `MOSAIC_CONFIG` and the
+   Claude env file reach each unit, and how the current unit names stay valid for the default instance.
+4. Ports. Each instance's Console and tester ports, with a refusal when two instances claim the same port.
+5. Stack copies and the pointer. Whether copies are shared between instances (read-only trees, so sharing
+   may be fine) and how the pointer, activation log, backups and `flags_drift` stay per instance.
+   `stack-release.sh` and `stack-copy.sh` take the instance.
+6. Secrets. The per-instance Claude session env file and the secrets slot root, resolved from the instance's
+   config dir (the Q175 design resolves its slot the same way: `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`).
+7. Isolation proof. What the tests show: two instances started side by side on stand-in units and scratch
+   roots, each reads only its own config and data root, a command aimed at one never touches the other, and
+   the default instance's paths and unit names are byte-identical to today.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file. Use the stand-in
+  systemctl, units and scratch roots that `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` already builds.
+- Standing up a real second instance on dragon-lin is a later window under Q173, with a backup first and a
+  STATE report after. Exposing a new Console through the tunnel or Traefik changes who can reach it from
+  outside, so it waits for Jason. SSO (Q175, #412) comes first for any instance a second user can reach.
+- Merge-chaining (Q177): rows that need instances (human users, kill switch, lifecycle) may build on this
+  row's candidate. This row keeps its own review and gate.
+
+## Gate
+
+Filbert approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
+Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Q175 (Jason's ruling), mos-0971/0973/0977 and Vikunja #412. Gitea #1690. MVP T1 item 2. Owner
+Launchpad, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+The design is approved: `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` at d55d86bb0 (blob eba861f5d2bb), Filbert r3
+approve plus the D1/D2 ack, Mos C1 confirmation in mos-0977, whose straggler-check condition is in the phase 2 window at b416d2ede. Build phase 1 exactly as the design says. If
+the code shows the design is wrong somewhere, stop and tell Sage, Webby and Filbert before building around it.
+
+## Scope (phase 1 only, design section 5 item 1)
+
+- oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly (design section 2). No other new dependency.
+- The OIDC relying party in the Console: `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, `/auth/signed-out`,
+  the callback steps 1-7, our own checks on top of the library, and sessions, cookies and Host rules
+  (design sections 1 and 3).
+- The shared loader, `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`, accepts an optional `console` key and checks only its
+  shape. The slot file checks and the read run in the Console's `--sso` start, and the slot resolves from
+  the config dir (section 4, D1, D2).
+- The degraded start for an unreachable provider, and the unreachable/refused classes (Q-B, section 4).
+- `--sso` for `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`, with its refusals against the old flags.
+- The tester listener rules (section 6).
+- The page: both fetch paths in `packages/webui/src/public/app.js` (:111 and :305) treat a 401
+  `sign-in required` as signed out, and the notice links to `/auth/login?return=<path>` (C2).
+- Logging as the design says, including the Q-E `subject-unknown` line.
+
+Out of scope: the phase 2 window, the live config.json key, phase 3 removals, the proxy-forwarded token
+(section 7), and any change to the live Console.
+
+## Tests and mutants
+
+Design section 9: tests 1-25, the positive paths, and every listed mutant, each killed by its named test.
+All tests run against the fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. No test reaches a real
+provider or Authentik, and no test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a
+slot file. Test 25 goes in `scripts/test-config.sh`.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No request of any kind to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or the live 127.0.0.1:7332 (mos-0971,
+  design section 8).
+- No credential value is read, printed or logged.
+- `npm install` runs only inside the worktree that has its own package.json, never in a directory that would
+  walk up to home.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves the manifest. Filbert approved the design and answers design questions. The webui and cli suites, `scripts/test-config.sh` and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/QUEUE.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->
 
-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
 
 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
 | 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
+| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
+| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
+| 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->
 

docs/plans/queue.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
   "canonicalRoot": "/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack",
-  "revision": 2236,
+  "revision": 2247,
   "rows": [
     {
       "id": 1,
@@ -19820,6 +19820,153 @@
       "createdAt": "2026-10-20T10:31:30.403Z",
       "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T11:11:25.098Z",
       "updatedBy": "sage"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 189,
+      "piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
+      "owner": "sage",
+      "issues": [
+        1687
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1687
+      ],
+      "state": "in-review",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+        "blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
+      },
+      "after": [
+        {
+          "id": 163,
+          "when": "done"
+        }
+      ],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "dewey"
+      ],
+      "review": {
+        "rounds": [
+          {
+            "n": 1,
+            "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+            "by": "sage",
+            "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+            "issue": 1687,
+            "candidate": {
+              "kind": "manifest",
+              "digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
+              "text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
+            },
+            "request": "comment",
+            "attempts": [
+              {
+                "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+                "by": "sage",
+                "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+                "state": "posted",
+                "comment": 29457,
+                "transport": {
+                  "outcome": "posted",
+                  "status": 201,
+                  "comment": 29457,
+                  "detail": "created"
+                },
+                "resolutions": []
+              }
+            ],
+            "duplicateRisk": false,
+            "receipts": []
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "sage",
+        "op": "sage-189-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
+      "updatedBy": "sage"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 190,
+      "piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+      "owner": "darkwing",
+      "issues": [
+        1688
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1688
+      ],
+      "state": "in-progress",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+        "blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
+      },
+      "after": [],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "filbert"
+      ],
+      "review": null,
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "darkwing",
+        "op": "darkwing-190-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
+      "updatedBy": "darkwing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 191,
+      "piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+      "owner": "rocko",
+      "issues": [
+        1689
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1689
+      ],
+      "state": "in-progress",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+        "blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
+      },
+      "after": [],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "dewey"
+      ],
+      "review": null,
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "rocko",
+        "op": "rocko-191-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
+      "updatedBy": "rocko"
     }
   ],
   "log": [
@@ -78756,6 +78903,329 @@
         "receipt": "ok sage-163-done rev 2236 row 163 in-review→done round 2"
       },
       "viewSha": "e44815d32d46b91ee37d4c3c4701716956ba35d29c16c24c89020cce345bd61b"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2237,
+      "op": "sage-189-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
+        "gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md#Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+        "issues": [
+          1687
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "sage",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": [
+          {
+            "id": 163,
+            "when": "done"
+          }
+        ],
+        "reviewers": [
+          "dewey"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+          "blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-add rev 2237 row 189 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "70bf9967156881afecaba9ccf4edf8cbc63a344eb7c6407b3453c950781f34c5"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2238,
+      "op": "sage-189-briefed",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:22:01.437Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-briefed rev 2238 row 189 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "27ee8a26722d3eaf4c4b346e06ffdb853037aad2d1a7fe14f440cbe1bb9a2a27"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2239,
+      "op": "sage-189-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:22:18.476Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-start rev 2239 row 189 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "230578585341fcfc9429364332ca8b78988ffd669d3c1bb5e2e94a74d9916649"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2240,
+      "op": "sage-190-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+        "gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md#Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+        "issues": [
+          1688
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "darkwing",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": null,
+        "reviewers": [
+          "filbert"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+          "blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-190-add rev 2240 row 190 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "b4319dbd993254b58e4db8be18769b04322028903e325c0c8cadcfdec527929f"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2241,
+      "op": "sage-191-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+        "gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md#Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+        "issues": [
+          1689
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "rocko",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": null,
+        "reviewers": [
+          "dewey"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+          "blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-191-add rev 2241 row 191 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "2cdc7c37430226f1ea01ed9f3d60a2c12be16eddac38d18dc16f889c7b54b14e"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2242,
+      "op": "sage-190-brief",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 190,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:25.630Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-190-brief rev 2242 row 190 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "6203315b484302369ce5ea7d854082a6bca4a95f9793e14ec123f57381234c95"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2243,
+      "op": "sage-191-brief",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 191,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:43.042Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-191-brief rev 2243 row 191 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "9cc7dda5fa676258e864dedfdf2f4e3904c8723ba9c36474cff76757f52e5c07"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2244,
+      "op": "rocko-191-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 191,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "rocko",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok rocko-191-start rev 2244 row 191 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "cd2423e53ac82a667c737852bef6adfdafba82987f37cd090f5484b15b3a0e0c"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2245,
+      "op": "darkwing-190-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 190,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "darkwing",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok darkwing-190-start rev 2245 row 190 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "014db845fb2e380678ab1250f2cd3c0d7b192dc39909416515482c810440149b"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2246,
+      "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "in-review",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": "agents/sage/work/queue-189/candidate-manifest.sha256",
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "in-progress",
+        "to": "in-review",
+        "round": 1,
+        "issue": 1687,
+        "candidate": {
+          "kind": "manifest",
+          "digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
+          "text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1 rev 2246 row 189 in-progress→in-review round 1 on #1687; request sage-189-inreview-1 requesting"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "d8a3aa936a9a819329e86679d0bfcf658d773d0f7cfd29c10587c6447f78e968"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2247,
+      "op": "sage-189-inreview-1.outcome",
+      "verb": "review-outcome",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+        "outcome": "posted",
+        "status": 201,
+        "comment": 29457,
+        "detail": "created"
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "round": 1,
+        "attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+        "state": "posted",
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1.outcome rev 2247 row 189 round 1 request sage-189-inreview-1 posted comment 29457"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "6d7e91ae3cab0b76e5c5d791fb821b97c9da7db16389ff2d531d7b77d2a069f1"
     }
   ]
 }