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# Row214 C2-11a work record
Assignment sage-2794 at2026-10-22T16:33:20Z, Q220/mos-1301, issue#1715.
New isolated branch herb/row214 on aca16404c. The earlier197/215 worktrees
and their dirty/untracked historical packets are untouched. node_modules is
the required plain symlink to /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules.
Read C2-11a in both pinned briefs. The section is unchanged at51cc0445c;
Q222 changes C2-06's reply-limit settings, not wikilinks. The editor model,
entry, view, existing model/browser/provenance tests, build/toolchain and
vendored markdown parser/serializer were read. No third_party source changes.
## Static finding and authored work
model.mjs stores a canonical sig and the raw original block, and serialise
returns raw when the sig matches. The vendored text writer escapes brackets
(to_markdown.ts:433-437). It is therefore possible for no-edit round-trips
to pass while dirty-block output escapes a wikilink. This is a source-based
hypothesis, not a measured result. Both outcomes are in DESIGN.md.
Authored, unrun: the pinned-bundle measurement; ten fixture round-trips;
three browser regressions; inert wikilink schema/tokenizer/serializer. The
schema includes headings, and front matter remains raw. The serializer
validates its spelling before bypassing escaping. HTML/entity-like targets
stay text under the existing escaping rules. No clicking or resolution.
Local static git diff --check is clean. No Node, npm, compiler, browser,
measurement, test, Docker, HTTPS Git or push has run. The queue claim waits
for a gap because scripts/mosaic invokes Node. No candidate or pass claim.
Only design/path documents may be committed before the granted red/green
checks; product, tests and measurement remain uncommitted until validated.
## Next granted steps
1. Claim from canonical during a CLEAR/gap.
2. Run measure.mjs against aca16404c's pinned Git blobs; save JSON unchanged.
3. Run the structural/edit regression alone on the baseline bundle (red).
4. Install the already-pinned esbuild0.28.2 in this worktree's packages/webui
with npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund; no root install or lock edit.
5. Build with the existing editor/build.mjs, then the whole new test file and
existing editor, editor-browser and editor-provenance files, each singly.
6. Kill the serializer-removal mutant, restore, rebuild, focused green.
7. Commit only after the applicable checks, push only when Sage clears HTTPS
Git, send Filbert and Mos the candidate SHA/hash manifest directly, cc Sage.
8. After253 lands, new branch on its tip preserving all landed changes.
9. Filbert and Sage's whole webui and scripts gate finish the row.
All runs wait for explicit Sage CLEAR. Gander's row253 run5 owns the slot.
The whole suite gate and any unexpected failure use mos-0823's stop rule.
Proposed SESSIONS text for Sage's post-253 doc sweep (do not append here):
2026-10-22 | Herb (gpt-6.1-sol, f6cf4287) | row214 C2-11a editor wikilinks authoring | On herb/row214 at aca16404c, authored baseline round-trip measurement, designs for equal/unequal results, inert inline node and regression tests under sage-2794/Q220. Claim, runs and pushes held while253 owns the slot; measurement and test results unavailable.
## Filbert static design/path review accepted, R1 and R2 required
Review at2026-10-22T16:43:35Z read dee9f3d8d's packet only, no product or
runs. R1 is now in the plan: set MOSAIC_REQUIRE_EDITOR_BUILD=1 on focused
provenance and whole webui runs, grep ^# skip plus TAP/spec skip directives,
and name every skip. Missing/wrong pinned esbuild must fail, not skip.
R2: baseline no-edit roundTrips are expected to pass. They test retention
of raw bytes and are not red evidence for the node. Only the baseline
same-block structural/edit regression is expected red.
Two added fixtures cover a reference-definition collision and an atom
inside ordinary link text, taking the planned file to10 no-edit tests and
3 browser tests. The explicit & exclusion preserves the existing escaped
HTML/entity writer for dirty blocks; Q&A stays text and is a known limit.
Measurement VM setup matches loadEditor. Browser TMPDIR must use the short
non-/tmp scratch root. Sweep Node/Chromium after mutant/timeout and at clear.
All remain authored and unrun while253 owns the slot.
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# C2-11a: an inert editor wikilink node
Base: aca16404c. Owner: Herb. Reviewer: Filbert. Issue: #1715.
Authority: sage-2794, Q220/mos-1301. The assignment permits authoring the
node and tests before the measurement slot. Runs, claim and pushes wait
for Sage's CLEAR. After row253 lands, a new branch will carry the change
onto its landing with every landed hunk retained.
## Measurement before choosing the explanation
Run agents/herb/work/queue-214/measure.mjs only on a granted slot. It loads
aca16404c's editor.js and markdown-preview.js directly from local Git
objects. It verifies the editor bundle hash against that base's BUILD.json.
It cannot accidentally measure a candidate rebuild. Its JSON records the
full baseline SHA, bundle hash, timestamp, input, output and equality for
each fixture. The first five are the brief's plain, labelled, heading,
list and front-matter cases; extra cases cover a heading block, combined
heading/label, Unicode/spacing, adjacency and an inert embed. No result is
available yet. Static reasoning is not a measurement.
Outcome A, every baseline round-trip is equal: record that wikilinks do
not trigger Source fallback for the measured inputs. Do not claim that
bug exists. The source's raw/sig cache explains why an unchanged block can
keep its bytes even when its canonical serializer escapes brackets. Add
the node for structured wikilinks and dirty-block preservation, as the
brief requests. A baseline structural/edit regression must fail even if
all unchanged-file checks pass.
Outcome B, one or more differ: record the exact differing bytes and affected
contexts. Keep the existing Source fallback fail-closed. The node restores
the required spellings where the block is structured. Retain the same
no-edit and dirty-block regressions. If the mismatch comes from a separate
block, line-ending or front-matter defect, report it before widening scope.
## Representation and conversion
The schema gains one inline atom, wikilink, with a single source attribute.
Its source is the complete spelling, not reconstructed target/label parts.
It has no href, navigation, fetch or click behavior. A span with data-source
and a text child displays the spelling. Heading content includes the new
atom; paragraphs, quotes and lists already accept inline content.
One markdown-it inline rule runs before ordinary links, after escapes and
backticks. A sticky match reads a complete single-line [[...]] or ![[...]]
without copying every suffix or crossing state.posMax. The node writer
writes its validated spelling without bracket escaping, so editing adjacent
text cannot rewrite a wikilink. Front matter remains a raw block. No new
file-read, save, routing, documentPath or target-resolution behavior is added.
The accepted atom grammar excludes brackets within the body, line breaks,
angle brackets and ampersands. This is an editor representation boundary,
not a library resolver or a refusal to open such a file. Malformed,
HTML/entity-like and code syntax stays under the existing text/raw rules.
This preserves the existing escaping of HTML/entities when a block changes.
DOM paste accepts only that same grammar. Invalid attributes constructed
programmatically are flattened to one line and escaped by the text writer.
No input string is parsed as HTML and embeds never load an image.
## Acceptance and review
The measurement JSON goes in BUILD.md and the final manifest packet.
Ten fixture round-trips run with and without a final newline. A browser
test inspects real ProseMirror atom types and attributes, edits the same
block and reparses it, for each fixture. Two more browser tests cover
code/escape/malformed/hostile syntax and DOM/programmatic-attribute safety.
Tests use the existing fixture and Chromium harness and the shipped bundle.
They do not export new production APIs just for testing.
Before rebuilding, run only the structural regression against the baseline
bundle and observe it fail. Rebuild the candidate with the exact pinned
esbuild0.28.2 binary, run the whole new test file, existing editor tests,
editor browser tests and provenance test. Remove only the wikilink serializer
handler for one mutant; the dirty-block assertion must fail. Restore, rebuild
and rerun the focused regression. All execution needs Sage's CLEAR, including
installation, checks, builds, browser tests and the measurement.
The checked-in bundle and editor/BUILD.json must be regenerated by the
existing build script. No hand edits of generated JavaScript or provenance.
The current shared esbuild is0.28.1 and the local webui install is absent.
A granted npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund in packages/webui is
needed before building; the root node_modules remains its plain symlink.
No dependency or lockfile change is planned.
Final gate: Filbert approves the manifest, then the whole webui suite and
every scripts/test-*.sh on Sage's slot. Two failures stop a gate. A failure
outside this row is reported to Sage before any rerun. Source, generated
output, mode/hash manifest and raw granted logs identify the candidate.
## Static review follow-through (Filbert, 2026-10-22T16:43:35Z)
R1: the focused editor-provenance run and Sage's whole webui gate must set
MOSAIC_REQUIRE_EDITOR_BUILD=1. A missing, wrong-version or unpinned binary
then fails. Check every log for ^# skip, as well as TAP # SKIP directives
and the spec reporter's skipped-test lines; record each skipped name and
reason. A skipped rebuild is not proof of bundle reproducibility. The CSS
output must stay byte-identical and match BUILD.json.
R2: no-edit roundTrip checks are expected to pass on the baseline because
parse sets sig=canonical and an unchanged serialise returns lead+raw. Their
green result is compatibility evidence, never evidence that the atom was
needed or installed. The same-block edit/structural regression is the red
that proves the new node. The required measurement still runs and is kept.
N1: bus.js checks visual mode at949 on this base and also requires
MosaicMarkdown. The measurement uses the existing helper's bare-window VM
shape, markdown-preview.js first, then editor.js, both from pinned Git blobs.
N2: the exclusion of & and angle brackets is deliberate: the existing
text serializer escapes entities/HTML when it rewrites a block for another
renderer. An atom's verbatim writer must not bypass that rule, including
for pasted/programmatic values. This keeps those targets as ordinary text;
[[Q&A]] will still be escaped if its own block changes. It is a known
representation limit beyond the five brief cases, not a resolver change.
It is included among the text-only cases. Unedited bytes remain intact.
N3: the reference-definition fixture [[a]] with [a]: u deliberately becomes
one inert wikilink rather than a bracket around a reference link. Literal
spelling and the separate definition block remain intact.
N4: [x [[a]]](u) is an explicit fixture. The atom inherits the enclosing
ordinary link mark, whose existing target gate still applies. The atom
itself supplies no href or new click behavior; the fixture checks its
structure and spelling before/after a same-block edit.
N6: every granted browser/test process gets TMPDIR from
mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gXXX. Never /tmp. Sweep owned Chromium
and Node processes by cwd and the temp-root path after the mutant, after
any timeout, and before clearing the slot. Retain/report uncertain owners.
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# Row214 implementation manifest, draft before measurement
Pinned base: aca16404c. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md,
C2-11a. Also read at gosalyn/case2-06-idea-caps51cc0445c; that section is
unchanged. Q222's reply-limit settings belong to C2-06, not this row.
| Path | Change |
| --- | --- |
| packages/webui/editor/model.mjs | inert inline atom, heading content, tokenizer rule and serializer |
| packages/webui/tests/editor-wikilink.test.mjs | ten round-trips and three browser regressions |
| packages/webui/tests/helpers/wikilink-cases.mjs | exact fixtures shared with measurement |
| packages/webui/src/public/editor.js | generated by the pinned editor build, pending CLEAR |
| packages/webui/editor/BUILD.json | generated provenance, pending CLEAR |
| agents/herb/work/queue-214/measure.mjs | baseline Git-object measurement, authored and unrun |
| agents/herb/work/queue-214/DESIGN.md | both measurement outcomes, implementation and acceptance |
| agents/herb/work/queue-214/BUILD.md | rulings and receipts, pending runs |
| agents/herb/work/queue-214/MANIFEST.md | this reviewed path list |
editor.css is an unchanged build output; no source CSS is touched. No
entry/view, library, route, save, click, documentPath or dependency changes.
Generated changes do not exist yet. This is a design/path manifest, not a
frozen tested candidate. Candidate hashes and measurement results follow
only after the granted runs. Filbert reviews the plan before the build.
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# Row 258, E01: mail PRD addendum draft and schemas
Ludwig, 2026-10-22. Issue #1763. Assigned by sage-2802 under Q220. Reviewer: Della.
Base: aca16404c. Branch: ludwig/row258.
Sources: brief `docs/plans/2026-10-21_post-v1-row-briefs.md` (blob d7e5eaeea), "Brief: E01" and
"Gate: email rows". Email plan row E01 at origin/della/email-plan 179391055 (approved ludwig-0037).
Q2/Q222 terms (sage-2802): `mailboxScope` defaults to `[]`, changes are human-only, and the default-none
and refusal tests apply.
## Deliverable
| Path | What |
| --- | --- |
| `docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md` | REQ-MAIL-1 to 16, a draft. Each requirement names its rows. Two questions for Mos. |
| `packages/mail/schemas/*.schema.json` | source, data, access, service, content-key |
| `packages/mail/src/validate.mjs` | Closed-subset validator, binding, location, file and key-lifecycle checks |
| `packages/mail/tests/schema.test.mjs` | T1-T14, with T10b |
| `packages/mail/{package.json,README.md}` | Package manifest and notes |
Not changed: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md`, its requirements JSON and tests, `packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs`,
`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, roles, `scripts/stack-copy.sh` COPY_PATHS. No new dependency.
## Choices and tradeoffs
1. **Validator.** A copy of the `packages/project/src/validate.mjs` pattern: a closed keyword set
that throws on an unknown keyword. Added `integer`, `minimum`, `maximum`, `uniqueItems` and `default`.
No JSON Schema library, so there is no dependency review. Tradeoff: two small validators to keep apart.
A shared one is a later refactor, not this row.
2. **Defaults live in the schema** (`default` keyword), read by `defaults(kind)`. One definition per
default and range, as Q222 asks.
3. **Ranges (implementer choice, for the reviewer to challenge).** Defaults come from the plan.
| Setting | Default | Min | Max |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| pollSeconds | 60 | 15 | 3600 |
| sliceObservations | 50 | 1 | 500 |
| sliceBytes | 10 MiB | 64 KiB | 64 MiB |
| pendingDeliveries | 1,000 | 1 | 100,000 |
| retainedBytes | 100 MiB | 1 MiB | 10 GiB |
| parserInputBytes | 30 MiB | 1 MiB | 64 MiB |
| mimeDepth | 10 | 1 | 32 |
| mimeParts | 100 | 1 | 1,000 |
| normalizedTextBytes | 256 KiB | 4 KiB | 4 MiB |
| attachmentPartBytes | 10 MiB | 0 | 50 MiB |
| attachmentMessageBytes | 10 MiB | 0 | 100 MiB |
| staleScanIntervals | 3 | 2 | 20 |
| pageSize | 20 | 1 | 100 |
| bodyDraftDays | 30 | 1 | 3,650 |
| attachmentDays | 7 | 1 | 3,650 |
| metadataDays | 365 | 1 | 3,650 |
Cross-checks: part bytes ≤ message bytes; metadataDays ≥ both content durations (tombstones outlive
content, D4).
4. **Fixed false until later rows.** `persistContent` and `automaticPrune` are `const false`: the plan
says metadata only until retention authority exists (E13), and settings never grant `data.delete`.
`sourceMutations` has `maxItems: 0`: no mutation capability exists (Q3). E13 or a later reviewed row
widens these.
5. **Human-only.** Settings records require `changedBy.kind: "human"`. The schema can't tell a real human
from an agent proxy. The E02 writer proves that, as the plan's E02 row says.
6. **Incomplete scopes.** An enabled source needs an adapter. Unattended wake needs at least one exact
sender: wake on with an empty allowlist would be on in name only. Grants need at least one right and
one mailbox. Service scopes are `["mail.read"]` only.
7. **Secret values.** Unknown keys are refused. All string values are also checked against secret
shapes (private key header, JWT, common token prefixes, URL userinfo password, `password=` style).
Messages name the path, never the value. This is a backstop, not a scanner.
8. **Content-key record location.** The plan names the key path. The lifecycle record's own file is left
to E03. `checkKeyLocation` and `checkProtectedFile` apply to both.
9. **Key lifecycle.** active → retired → expired, or active → expired. `keyTransitionAllowed` is a pure
check on one state edge. It doesn't persist state, stop a restored backup rolling a record back, or
destroy key copies; E03 owns that proof (della-0023 N1). `keyUse` is none outside
[createdAt, expiresAt), whatever the state says.
10. **v1 compatibility.** T13 asserts that kinds.mjs names no mail, vocabulary.mjs has no `mail.access`,
and the approved PRD has no REQ-MAIL. E05 and the approved addendum update T13 when they land.
11. **Use helpers fail closed (della-0023 F1).** `effectiveMailboxes` and `keyUse` validate their
records first and read the clock only from a valid `Date`. An invalid record or clock, or a time
outside [issuedAt, expiresAt) or [createdAt, expiresAt), gives no read and no key use. Tradeoff: a
caller with a slightly malformed but otherwise usable grant gets nothing, not a partial read. E02
still owns principal, right, manual-mode and revoke enforcement.
12. **Placement compares resolved paths too (della-0023 F2).** `checkSlotLocation` and
`checkKeyLocation` check the paths as written first, so planned paths that don't exist yet still
work. Then they resolve the nearest existing ancestor of the secret path and of each forbidden root,
and refuse containment. That catches a configDir linked into dataRoot and a root named through an
alias. `checkProtectedFile` now needs the file lexically under configDir, refuses a symbolic link
on configDir itself or any directory below it, and takes the forbidden roots for the same resolved
comparison. Symbolic links above configDir (a linked `/home`, say) stay allowed: they don't move
the secret relative to the roots, and the resolved comparison still covers them. Tradeoff: one
`realpath` per root on each check.
13. **Draft wording (mos-1313).** W1: rulings are cited as "DECISIONS Q…", plan questions as "email
plan Q…", and "Q4" is replaced by what it stands for. W2: retention says expiry stops serving an
item and removal waits for `data.delete`. W3: an invalid mail setting is refused when written and
holds its source with an alert when found at load; no fallback to the default. W4: the questions
section is gone; Mos's two answers are recorded in the status lines.
## Test plan (not run: Gander holds the slot, sage-2802)
`cd packages/mail && node --test tests/schema.test.mjs`. It writes only under `os.tmpdir()`, which the gate
sets to a `mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gXXXXXX` directory. No network and no `~/.mosaic-dev`.
Static checks done: schemas written by an uncommitted scratch script (the JSON files are the source),
JSON parses, every keyword is in the validator's closed set, every required key has a property, T13/T14 assertions checked against
the repository text with python3 -B, secret and wildcard patterns checked against every fixture and
sentinel. Node was not run.
Existing suites to run whole, because they scan every package's `src` or copy tracked package files:
- `packages/bus/tests/credential-store.test.mjs` (credential use sites)
- `packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs` (T24 kind lists and use sites)
- `packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs` (harness names outside plugins)
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` (fixture copies)
Mutants, named by Della (della-0023). Each must die on a semantic assertion in the whole
`schema.test.mjs`, run on a CLEAR slot. The wildcard tests stay.
| Mutant | Change | Must fail |
| --- | --- | --- |
| M1 | `mailboxScope` default nonempty | T1/T2 |
| M2 | allow an agent settings author | T3 |
| M3 | remove the source/business binding comparison | T8 |
| M4 | disable secret-shape rejection | T6 |
| M5 | omit the grant intersection | T2 |
| M6 | omit the forbidden-root exclusion | T10 (config under dataRoot) |
| M7 | allow mode 0640 | T11 |
| M8 | allow retired → active | T12 |
| M9 | bypass an enforced numeric lower or upper comparison in `visit` | T9 |
| M10 | omit the malformed-state/time guard | T2/T12 lifetime and malformed cases |
| M11 | omit the canonical or root-symlink guard | T10b/T11 |
## Round 2 (della-0023, mos-1313)
Round 1 was a8f0cf924, CHANGES (della-0023). Round 2 adds F1, F2 and N1 above, and Mos's W1-W4 on the
draft. New cases: T2 lifetime edges and malformed grant or clock, T12 lifetime edges and malformed key
or clock, T10b (configDir linked into dataRoot with a real 0600 key, a planned slot through the link,
a dataRoot alias), T11 (file outside configDir, unnormalized path, linked configDir, root alias).
Static checks only; Node not run (Gander holds the slot).
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# PRD addendum draft: mail intake and access
- Status: draft, not approved. Ludwig drafted it for email plan row E01
(Vikunja 460, issue #1763). Its wording goes to Mos first, then Jason.
It does not change `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md`. Once Jason approves it,
it lands there as a new PRD version, and only then does any requirement
here bind.
- Source: `docs/plans/2026-10-21_email-plan.md`, Della's revision
179391055, approved by Ludwig (ludwig-0037). DECISIONS Q217 settles
the mailbox (one agent mailbox on woltje.com at InMotion, which Jason
creates). DECISIONS Q222 settles personal mail (none for now) and the
settings rule: things are tunable, not hardcoded.
- Shape (mos-1313): once approved, this lands as one new PRD version with
a Mail section, in its own reviewed row. `mail.access` stays a hard
wait in that version.
- Scope: post-v1. None of it is needed for 2026-10-27.
- Q numbers: "DECISIONS Q…" is a ruling. "Email plan Q…" is a question
still open in the email plan.
## How to read this draft
Every limit, scope and time below is a setting with a default, unless
Jason fixed it himself. The default is the starting value, not a rule.
The schemas in `packages/mail/schemas/` hold each default and the range a
setting may take. Implementers and reviewers set that range. Widening it
needs a reviewed schema and test change. Only an authenticated human
changes a setting, through the audited CLI and later the Console. An
agent can't change one, not even to narrow it. For mail, an invalid
setting doesn't fall back to its default. A write with an invalid value
is refused. An invalid value found when the service loads holds that
source and raises an alert.
Each requirement lists the build rows that deliver it. The rows are in
the email plan's "Ordered build rows".
## Requirements
### Mail
- **REQ-MAIL-1.** The stack may run one mail service per instance. It is
off by default and opens no connection while off. A disabled source
makes no probe and no read. Each configured source has one leased
owner. Accounts stay separate by instance, business and source. One
service never means one shared credential or mailbox.
Rows: E01, E03, E14.
- **REQ-MAIL-2.** Each source has a mailbox scope, `mailboxScope`. It
defaults to none, which reads nothing, agent ingress included. A human
sets exact mailbox IDs. No wildcard is accepted. The scope is
rechecked before each scan and fetch. A mailbox removed from scope is
fenced before in-flight content returns. A read is the intersection of
the source scope, the provider's rights and the principal's current
grant. Widening a scope grants no agent anything. No personal mailbox
is enrolled until a later consent and grant (DECISIONS Q222).
Rows: E01, E02, E13.
- **REQ-MAIL-3.** A new plug-in kind, `mail-source`, carries providers
(REQ-PLUG-1). Its modules export `descriptor`, `scan`, `fetch` and
`health`. A module only reads: it never sends, deletes, labels, moves
or marks mail read. Microsoft 365 (Graph) and IMAP are the first
modules. POP3, Gmail API and JMAP wait for a named need. The kind
enters `packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs` with its first production
module. That waits for the approved PRD version, and for the source,
grant and route approvals in REQ-MAIL-4, 7 and 8.
Rows: E05, E06.
- **REQ-MAIL-4.** A source connects through its own service principal,
`mail-service`. This is a new approved extension, not an exception to
REQ-CRED-1. Its record names the business, source, provider, mailbox,
scopes (read only), slot path, rotation date, approval and revision.
The slot sits under
`<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/<business>/<source>/`, never in
the repository or dataRoot. Agents never see the credential. A missing,
expired or revoked slot fails closed. Authentication may retry once,
then stops and alerts.
Rows: E01, E02.
- **REQ-MAIL-5.** Intake keeps a durable record of what it saw. The
provider cursor and the new observations commit together. A message's
identity is its provider ID within business, source and account, never
Message-ID alone. Delivery uses a stable key and a receipt at the
recipient, so a crash causes no second task. First activation starts
from now and acts on no old mail. Importing history is a separate
approved window. Per-source quotas default to 1,000 pending deliveries
and 100 MiB of content. A full quota, a full disk or missing audit
storage holds intake and raises an alert.
Rows: E03.
- **REQ-MAIL-6.** Parsing is bounded. Defaults: 30 MiB input, depth 10,
100 parts, 256 KiB of normalized text. Bad or truncated mail is
quarantined, never dropped. Active content never runs. Attachments
start as metadata. An authorized fetch quarantines the bytes, by
default up to 10 MiB per part and per message. Extracting attachment
content stays Jason's choice (email plan Q8). If he chooses it, extraction runs
isolated with no network and a scanner.
Rows: E04, E16.
- **REQ-MAIL-7.** A route table maps trusted delivery evidence to a Stack
user or role instance. It lives in the organization file and changes
only through the human-approved write path. A route grants no read
right. No agent reroutes mail or widens its own route. Bcc, ambiguous
alias or forwarded mail goes to restricted review. Unknown addresses
create no agent.
Rows: E07, E08.
- **REQ-MAIL-8.** Agent access to mail needs a `mail.access` grant. It is
separate from `credential.mint`. The chief raises it, and the human
approves the exact principal, source, mailboxes, rights and expiry.
Metadata, body, attachment and draft are separate rights. Each read
rechecks the current grant. A revoke fences new reads and in-flight
reads before content returns. Manual mode asks the human for each use.
`mail.access` is a new vocabulary action, so it is a hard wait
(REQ-WAIT-3) until a PRD version Jason approves says otherwise
(REQ-WAIT-2).
Rows: E02, E09.
- **REQ-MAIL-9.** Every harness gets the same mail tools through the
broker: list, get, thread, attachment, acknowledge, create a local
draft and health. A list page defaults to 20 items. Acknowledge
changes Stack state only. A draft is a local unsent record. There is
no send tool and no reroute tool.
Rows: E09.
- **REQ-MAIL-10.** Mail content is untrusted. Tool results carry
`untrusted: true`. A sender can't approve a decision, change policy,
mint a grant or pose as the human. Mail never wakes an agent by
default (`unattendedWake` is off, and its sender allowlist is empty).
A human may turn it on for a route. Then a wake also needs aligned
DMARC, a current grant and admission by the system manager
(DECISIONS Q198).
The woken work runs in a fresh restricted profile, and anything it
starts keeps `source: mail`.
Rows: E10.
- **REQ-MAIL-11.** A mail-triggered decision goes through the stack's one
decision module (DECISIONS Q207). Its input is metadata only, inside a closed
schema. The mail service never calls a model itself. Without a model,
deterministic intake keeps working and model work is held.
Rows: E11.
- **REQ-MAIL-12.** Mail health reports real progress: last scan, last
cursor commit, lag, backlog and credential state. A live process alone
is not healthy. Outages pause only the affected source. Recovery
follows the system manager's protected mode and its recovery latch
(DECISIONS Q198). A health check sends no mail and calls no model.
Rows: E12.
- **REQ-MAIL-13.** Mail data lives under `<dataRoot>/mail/<business>/`
and never enters git or an image. By default the stack keeps metadata
only. Content keys sit under
`<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/<business>/`, outside
dataRoot and its backups, mode 600, with no symbolic link. Retention
defaults: bodies and drafts 30 days, attachments 7 days, metadata 365
days. When an item's time runs out, the stack stops serving it. A
retention setting never authorizes deletion: removing the item waits
for `data.delete` or a retention authority Jason approves later. A
restored backup must not bring back expired content or redeliver old
work.
Rows: E01, E03, E13.
- **REQ-MAIL-14.** The mail service never sends. No SMTP, Graph send,
forward, auto-reply or emailed digest. The email specialist reads and
drafts, never sends (R21). A future sender needs its own plan and
`message.external` approval.
Rows: E05, E06, E09, E14.
- **REQ-MAIL-15.** Every mail limit, scope and retention time is a
setting. The schema holds its default and range. Only a human changes
it. A change is versioned and audited with who made it. An invalid
value is refused when written, and holds its source with an alert when
found at load. Settings never
override grants, hard waits or the system manager's contract.
Rows: E01, E04, E13.
- **REQ-MAIL-16.** A live pilot is separate. It needs Jason's mailbox,
the approved PRD version, the source, grant and route approvals in
REQ-MAIL-4, 7 and 8, and a reviewed re-pin. It sends no test mail, and it
is judged on evidence for each message, not counts.
Rows: E15.
-59
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# Mail records — schemas only (email plan row E01)
Post-v1. This package holds the record schemas for mail intake and access,
and a validator. Nothing here opens a connection, reads a secret or
registers a plug-in kind. Core `mail-source` registration waits for the
approved PRD version and the source, grant and route approvals. The addendum draft is
`docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md`; it binds nothing until Jason approves it.
| Schema | Record |
| --- | --- |
| `schemas/source.schema.json` | Per-source settings: enabled, adapter, `mailboxScope`, wake, limits |
| `schemas/data.schema.json` | Per-business content and retention settings |
| `schemas/access.schema.json` | A `mail.access` grant to one agent or user |
| `schemas/service.schema.json` | A source's service principal and its slot path |
| `schemas/content-key.schema.json` | A content key's location and lifecycle |
## Settings (DECISIONS Q222)
Every limit, scope and retention time is a setting. Its default and its
range sit in the schema, so they have one definition. `defaults(kind)`
reads them. Implementers and reviewers set the range; widening it is a
reviewed schema and test change. A settings record carries
`changedBy.kind: "human"`, and the validator refuses any other author.
Defaults are off and empty: `sourceEnabled: false`, `mailboxScope: []`,
`sourceMutations: []`, `accessMode: "manual"`, `unattendedWake: false`,
`wakeSenderAllowlist: []`, `persistContent: false` and
`automaticPrune: false`. `persistContent` and `automaticPrune` are fixed
false until retention authority exists (E13).
## Checks
- `validateRecord(kind, value)` returns a list of problems. It refuses
unknown keys, wildcards, secret-shaped values, values outside the
schema range and incomplete scopes. A refusal never echoes the value.
- `checkBinding({source, service, access})` refuses records that name a
different business, source or provider, and a grant past the source's
mailbox scope.
- `effectiveMailboxes(...)` intersects the source scope, the provider's
mailboxes and the grant, from `issuedAt` up to `expiresAt`. The
defaults read nothing. An invalid record or clock reads nothing.
Principal, right, manual-mode and revoke checks belong to E02.
- `checkSlotLocation` and `checkKeyLocation` keep provider slots and
content keys under `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/`, outside
dataRoot, the repository and any backup root. They compare the paths
as written and again after resolving symbolic links, so a linked
configDir or an aliased root can't hide a secret inside a forbidden root.
- `checkProtectedFile` wants a regular file under configDir, owned, mode
600, with no symbolic link from configDir itself down to the file. Given
the forbidden roots, it compares resolved paths against them too.
- `keyUse` gives active keys encrypt and decrypt, retired keys decrypt
only, and expired keys nothing. An invalid record or clock, or a time
outside `createdAt` to `expiresAt`, gives nothing.
- `keyTransitionAllowed` checks one state edge: active to retired or
expired, retired to expired. It is a pure predicate. It doesn't persist
state, stop a restored backup from rolling a record back, or destroy
key copies. E03 owns that proof.
Tests: `node --test tests/*.test.mjs` from this directory.
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "@mosaic/mail",
"version": "0.1.0",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"license": "UNLICENSED",
"exports": "./src/validate.mjs",
"scripts": {
"test": "node --test tests/*.test.mjs"
}
}
-103
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@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "mosaic:mail:1:access",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"recordVersion",
"kind",
"business",
"source",
"principal",
"rights",
"mailboxes",
"mode",
"approvalId",
"issuedAt",
"expiresAt",
"revision"
],
"properties": {
"recordVersion": {
"const": 1
},
"kind": {
"const": "mail-access"
},
"business": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"source": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"principal": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"id"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"agent",
"user"
]
},
"id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
}
}
},
"rights": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 4,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"enum": [
"metadata",
"body",
"attachment",
"draft"
]
}
},
"mailboxes": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 100,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
}
},
"mode": {
"enum": [
"manual",
"grant"
]
},
"approvalId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
},
"issuedAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"expiresAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"revision": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 2147483647
}
}
}
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "mosaic:mail:1:content-key",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"recordVersion",
"kind",
"business",
"keyId",
"path",
"state",
"createdAt",
"expiresAt",
"revision"
],
"properties": {
"recordVersion": {
"const": 1
},
"kind": {
"const": "mail-content-key"
},
"business": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"keyId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"path": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^/[^\\u0000]{0,4095}$"
},
"state": {
"enum": [
"active",
"retired",
"expired"
]
},
"createdAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"expiresAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"revision": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 2147483647
}
}
}
-83
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{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "mosaic:mail:1:data",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"recordVersion",
"kind",
"business",
"persistContent",
"bodyDraftDays",
"attachmentDays",
"metadataDays",
"automaticPrune",
"revision",
"changedBy",
"changedAt"
],
"properties": {
"recordVersion": {
"const": 1
},
"kind": {
"const": "mail-data-settings"
},
"business": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"persistContent": {
"const": false,
"default": false
},
"bodyDraftDays": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 3650,
"default": 30
},
"attachmentDays": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 3650,
"default": 7
},
"metadataDays": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 3650,
"default": 365
},
"automaticPrune": {
"const": false,
"default": false
},
"revision": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 2147483647
},
"changedBy": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"id"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "human"
},
"id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
}
}
},
"changedAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
}
}
}
-73
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@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "mosaic:mail:1:service",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"recordVersion",
"kind",
"business",
"source",
"provider",
"mailbox",
"scopes",
"slotPath",
"rotateBy",
"approvalId",
"revision"
],
"properties": {
"recordVersion": {
"const": 1
},
"kind": {
"const": "mail-service"
},
"business": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"source": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"provider": {
"enum": [
"m365",
"imap"
]
},
"mailbox": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
},
"scopes": {
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 1,
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"enum": [
"mail.read"
]
}
},
"slotPath": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^/[^\\u0000]{0,4095}$"
},
"rotateBy": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
},
"approvalId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
},
"revision": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 2147483647
}
}
}
-222
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@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "mosaic:mail:1:source",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"recordVersion",
"kind",
"business",
"source",
"provider",
"sourceEnabled",
"sourceAdapter",
"mailboxScope",
"sourceMutations",
"accessMode",
"unattendedWake",
"wakeSenderAllowlist",
"limits",
"revision",
"changedBy",
"changedAt"
],
"properties": {
"recordVersion": {
"const": 1
},
"kind": {
"const": "mail-source-settings"
},
"business": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"source": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
},
"provider": {
"enum": [
"m365",
"imap"
]
},
"sourceEnabled": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": false
},
"sourceAdapter": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
],
"pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$",
"default": null
},
"mailboxScope": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 100,
"uniqueItems": true,
"default": [],
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
}
},
"sourceMutations": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 0,
"default": [],
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"accessMode": {
"enum": [
"manual",
"grant"
],
"default": "manual"
},
"unattendedWake": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": false
},
"wakeSenderAllowlist": {
"type": "array",
"maxItems": 100,
"uniqueItems": true,
"default": [],
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._+-]{0,63}@[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,252}$"
}
},
"limits": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"pollSeconds",
"sliceObservations",
"sliceBytes",
"pendingDeliveries",
"retainedBytes",
"parserInputBytes",
"mimeDepth",
"mimeParts",
"normalizedTextBytes",
"attachmentPartBytes",
"attachmentMessageBytes",
"staleScanIntervals",
"pageSize"
],
"properties": {
"pollSeconds": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 15,
"maximum": 3600,
"default": 60
},
"sliceObservations": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 500,
"default": 50
},
"sliceBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 65536,
"maximum": 67108864,
"default": 10485760
},
"pendingDeliveries": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 100000,
"default": 1000
},
"retainedBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1048576,
"maximum": 10737418240,
"default": 104857600
},
"parserInputBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1048576,
"maximum": 67108864,
"default": 31457280
},
"mimeDepth": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 32,
"default": 10
},
"mimeParts": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 1000,
"default": 100
},
"normalizedTextBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 4096,
"maximum": 4194304,
"default": 262144
},
"attachmentPartBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0,
"maximum": 52428800,
"default": 10485760
},
"attachmentMessageBytes": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0,
"maximum": 104857600,
"default": 10485760
},
"staleScanIntervals": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 2,
"maximum": 20,
"default": 3
},
"pageSize": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 100,
"default": 20
}
}
},
"revision": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"maximum": 2147483647
},
"changedBy": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": [
"kind",
"id"
],
"properties": {
"kind": {
"const": "human"
},
"id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
}
}
},
"changedAt": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
}
}
}
-237
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@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
import { lstatSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
// Mail record schemas (email plan row E01). Nothing here reads a secret, opens a connection or
// registers a plug-in kind: core mail-source registration waits for the approved PRD version and the
// source, grant and route approvals.
export const KINDS = Object.freeze(['source', 'data', 'access', 'service', 'content-key']);
const KEYWORDS = new Set(['$schema', '$id', 'type', 'const', 'enum', 'properties', 'required',
'additionalProperties', 'items', 'minItems', 'maxItems', 'uniqueItems', 'minLength', 'maxLength',
'minimum', 'maximum', 'pattern', 'format', 'default']);
const schemas = Object.fromEntries(KINDS.map(kind => [kind,
JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL(`../schemas/${kind}.schema.json`, import.meta.url), 'utf8')),
]));
// Package-owned schemas use this deliberately small closed subset. Never silently ignore a new constraint.
function known(schema) {
for (const key of Object.keys(schema)) if (!KEYWORDS.has(key)) throw Error(`unsupported schema keyword: ${key}`);
for (const child of Object.values(schema.properties ?? {})) known(child);
if (schema.items) known(schema.items);
}
for (const schema of Object.values(schemas)) known(schema);
const isObject = value => value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
function visit(schema, value, path, problems) {
const bad = text => problems.push(`${path}: ${text}`);
if (Object.hasOwn(schema, 'const') && value !== schema.const) bad(`must equal ${JSON.stringify(schema.const)}`);
if (schema.enum && !schema.enum.includes(value)) bad(`must be one of ${schema.enum.join(', ')}`);
const types = schema.type ? [schema.type].flat() : [];
const matches = type => type === 'null' ? value === null : type === 'object' ? isObject(value)
: type === 'array' ? Array.isArray(value) : type === 'integer' ? Number.isSafeInteger(value)
: typeof value === type;
if (types.length && !types.some(matches)) { bad(`must be ${types.join(' or ')}`); return; }
if (typeof value === 'number') {
if (schema.minimum !== undefined && value < schema.minimum) bad(`below the schema bound ${schema.minimum}`);
if (schema.maximum !== undefined && value > schema.maximum) bad(`above the schema bound ${schema.maximum}`);
}
if (typeof value === 'string') {
if (schema.minLength !== undefined && value.length < schema.minLength) bad('too short');
if (schema.maxLength !== undefined && value.length > schema.maxLength) bad('too long');
if (schema.pattern && !new RegExp(schema.pattern).test(value)) bad('invalid format');
if (schema.format === 'date-time' && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(value)) ||
new Date(value).toISOString() !== value || value.length !== 24)) bad('invalid canonical UTC date-time');
if (value.includes('\0')) bad('NUL is forbidden');
}
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (schema.minItems !== undefined && value.length < schema.minItems) bad('too few items');
if (schema.maxItems !== undefined && value.length > schema.maxItems) bad('too many items');
if (schema.uniqueItems && new Set(value.map(item => JSON.stringify(item))).size !== value.length) bad('duplicate items');
if (schema.items) value.forEach((item, index) => visit(schema.items, item, `${path}[${index}]`, problems));
}
if (isObject(value)) {
for (const key of schema.required ?? []) if (!Object.hasOwn(value, key)) bad(`missing ${key}`);
for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
if (Object.hasOwn(schema.properties ?? {}, key)) visit(schema.properties[key], child, `${path}.${key}`, problems);
else if (schema.additionalProperties === false) bad(`unknown key ${key}`);
}
}
}
// Wildcards are refused by every pattern; this names the reason plainly. Scopes are exact IDs only.
const WILDCARD = /[*?%]/;
// Shapes of secret values. A record names a protected slot path, never a credential (invariant 3).
const SECRET_SHAPES = [
/-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/,
/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\./,
/\b(?:gh[pousr]_|glpat-|xox[abprs]-|sk-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/,
/:\/\/[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s@]+@/,
/\b(?:password|passwd|secret|token|apikey|api_key|client_secret)\s*[=:]/i,
];
export const looksSecret = text => SECRET_SHAPES.some(shape => shape.test(text));
function strings(value, path, out) {
if (typeof value === 'string') out.push([path, value]);
else if (Array.isArray(value)) value.forEach((item, index) => strings(item, `${path}[${index}]`, out));
else if (isObject(value)) for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) strings(child, `${path}.${key}`, out);
return out;
}
export function validateRecord(kind, value) {
if (!Object.hasOwn(schemas, kind)) return [`unknown record kind: ${kind}`];
const problems = [];
visit(schemas[kind], value, kind, problems);
for (const [path, text] of strings(value, kind, [])) {
if (looksSecret(text)) problems.push(`${path}: looks like a secret value; name a protected slot instead`);
else if (WILDCARD.test(text)) problems.push(`${path}: wildcard not allowed; scopes name exact IDs`);
}
if (problems.length) return problems;
if (kind === 'source') {
if (value.sourceEnabled && value.sourceAdapter === null)
problems.push('source.sourceAdapter: an enabled source needs an enrolled adapter');
if (value.unattendedWake && value.wakeSenderAllowlist.length === 0)
problems.push('source.wakeSenderAllowlist: unattended wake needs at least one exact sender');
if (value.limits.attachmentPartBytes > value.limits.attachmentMessageBytes)
problems.push('source.limits: attachmentPartBytes exceeds attachmentMessageBytes');
}
if (kind === 'data' && value.metadataDays < Math.max(value.bodyDraftDays, value.attachmentDays))
problems.push('data.metadataDays: metadata and tombstones must outlive content');
if (kind === 'access' && Date.parse(value.expiresAt) <= Date.parse(value.issuedAt))
problems.push('access.expiresAt: must be after issuedAt');
if (kind === 'content-key' && Date.parse(value.expiresAt) <= Date.parse(value.createdAt))
problems.push('content-key.expiresAt: must be after createdAt');
return problems;
}
// Defaults come from the schema, so a default and its bounds have one definition (Q222).
function defaultsOf(schema) {
if (Object.hasOwn(schema, 'default')) return structuredClone(schema.default);
if (schema.type !== 'object') return undefined;
const out = {};
for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(schema.properties ?? {})) {
const value = defaultsOf(child);
if (value !== undefined) out[key] = value;
}
return Object.keys(out).length ? out : undefined;
}
export function defaults(kind) {
if (kind !== 'source' && kind !== 'data') throw Error(`no settings defaults for ${kind}`);
return defaultsOf(schemas[kind]);
}
export const schemaBounds = (kind, key) => {
const node = key.split('.').reduce((schema, part) => schema?.properties?.[part], schemas[kind]);
if (!node || node.minimum === undefined) throw Error(`no bounds for ${kind}.${key}`);
return { minimum: node.minimum, maximum: node.maximum, default: node.default };
};
// Records that name one another must agree, and a grant never reaches past the source's mailbox scope.
// (The access schema already limits a grant's principal to an agent or a user, never the service.)
export function checkBinding({ source, service, access }) {
const problems = [];
const same = (label, a, b) => { for (const key of ['business', 'source']) if (a[key] !== b[key]) problems.push(`${label}: ${key} mismatch`); };
if (service) {
same('service', service, source);
if (service.provider !== source.provider) problems.push('service: provider mismatch');
}
if (access) {
same('access', access, source);
const scope = new Set(source.mailboxScope);
for (const mailbox of access.mailboxes) if (!scope.has(mailbox)) problems.push(`access: mailbox ${mailbox} outside the source scope`);
}
return problems;
}
const instant = now => (now instanceof Date && Number.isFinite(now.getTime()) ? now.getTime() : NaN);
// What a principal may read: the source scope, the provider's mailboxes and the grant, intersected.
// A disabled source, the default empty scope, a missing, invalid, not-yet-issued or expired grant, or an
// invalid clock reads nothing. Authenticated principal, right, manual-mode and revoke checks belong to E02.
export function effectiveMailboxes({ source, providerMailboxes = [], access = null, now = new Date() }) {
if (!access || validateRecord('source', source).length || validateRecord('access', access).length) return [];
if (!source.sourceEnabled || !Array.isArray(providerMailboxes)) return [];
const at = instant(now);
if (!(at >= Date.parse(access.issuedAt) && at < Date.parse(access.expiresAt))) return [];
if (access.business !== source.business || access.source !== source.source) return [];
const provider = new Set(providerMailboxes);
const granted = new Set(access.mailboxes);
return source.mailboxScope.filter(mailbox => provider.has(mailbox) && granted.has(mailbox));
}
function inside(root, path) {
const rel = relative(root, path);
return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && rel !== '..' && !isAbsolute(rel));
}
// The path with every existing part resolved, so a symbolic link or alias can't hide where it lands.
// Parts that don't exist yet (a planned slot) are kept as written under their nearest existing ancestor.
function canonical(path) {
const rest = [];
for (let at = path; ; at = dirname(at)) {
try { return join(realpathSync(at), ...rest.reverse()); } catch (error) {
if (error.code !== 'ENOENT' || at === dirname(at)) return null;
rest.push(basename(at));
}
}
}
// Lexical checks first, for planned paths. Then the same forbidden roots compared after resolution, so
// a configDir that links into dataRoot, the repository or a backup root is refused too.
function forbidden(label, path, { dataRoot, repoRoot, backupRoots = [] }) {
const problems = [];
const roots = [['dataRoot', dataRoot], ['the repository', repoRoot], ...backupRoots.map(root => ['a backup root', root])]
.filter(([, root]) => root);
for (const [name, root] of roots) if (inside(root, path)) problems.push(`${label}: inside ${name}; mail secrets live outside it`);
if (problems.length) return problems;
const real = canonical(path);
if (real === null) return [`${label}: path can't be resolved`];
for (const [name, root] of roots) {
const realRoot = canonical(root);
if (realRoot === null || inside(realRoot, real)) problems.push(`${label}: resolves inside ${name}; mail secrets live outside it`);
}
return problems;
}
function placed(label, path, expectedDir, roots) {
if (!isAbsolute(path) || normalize(path) !== path) return [`${label}: must be a normalized absolute path`];
const problems = !inside(expectedDir, path) || path === expectedDir ? [`${label}: must sit under ${expectedDir}`] : [];
return [...problems, ...forbidden(label, path, roots)];
}
// A source service's provider credential slot (plan D9).
export const slotDir = ({ configDir, business, source }) => join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail', business, source);
export const checkSlotLocation = (service, roots) =>
placed('service.slotPath', service.slotPath, slotDir({ ...roots, ...service }), roots);
// A content key, outside dataRoot and its backup set, apart from provider slots (plan D7).
export const keyPath = ({ configDir, business, keyId }) => join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', business, keyId);
export function checkKeyLocation(record, roots) {
const problems = placed('content-key.path', record.path, join(roots.configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', record.business), roots);
if (!problems.length && record.path !== keyPath({ ...roots, ...record })) problems.push(`content-key.path: must be ${keyPath({ ...roots, ...record })}`);
return problems;
}
// A protected file: inside configDir, owned, mode 600, regular, with no symbolic link from configDir
// itself down to the file, and not resolving into a forbidden root.
export function checkProtectedFile(path, { configDir, uid = process.getuid(), ...roots }) {
if (!isAbsolute(path) || normalize(path) !== path || !isAbsolute(configDir) || normalize(configDir) !== configDir)
return [`${path}: must be a normalized absolute path`];
if (!inside(configDir, path) || path === configDir) return [`${path}: must sit under ${configDir}`];
let stat;
try { stat = lstatSync(path); } catch { return [`${path}: not found`]; }
if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) return [`${path}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`];
for (let at = dirname(path); ; at = dirname(at)) {
let dir;
try { dir = lstatSync(at); } catch { return [`${path}: path can't be resolved`]; }
if (dir.isSymbolicLink()) return [`${path}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${at}`];
if (at === configDir) break;
}
const problems = [];
if (stat.uid !== uid) problems.push(`${path}: owned by uid ${stat.uid}, not ${uid}`);
if ((stat.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) problems.push(`${path}: mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}; use 600`);
return [...problems, ...forbidden(path, path, roots)];
}
// Key lifecycle states: active keys encrypt and decrypt, retired keys only decrypt, expired keys do
// neither. keyTransitionAllowed is a pure check on one state edge. It doesn't persist state, stop a
// restored backup from rolling a record back, or destroy key copies; E03 owns that proof.
const KEY_STEPS = { active: ['retired', 'expired'], retired: ['expired'], expired: [] };
export const keyTransitionAllowed = (from, to) => Object.hasOwn(KEY_STEPS, from) && KEY_STEPS[from].includes(to);
// The use a record allows now. An invalid record or clock, or a time outside [createdAt, expiresAt), is none.
export function keyUse(record, now = new Date()) {
if (validateRecord('content-key', record).length) return 'none';
const at = instant(now);
if (!(at >= Date.parse(record.createdAt) && at < Date.parse(record.expiresAt))) return 'none';
return record.state === 'active' ? 'encrypt-decrypt' : record.state === 'retired' ? 'decrypt' : 'none';
}
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@@ -1,337 +0,0 @@
import { test } from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import {
checkBinding, checkKeyLocation, checkProtectedFile, checkSlotLocation, defaults, effectiveMailboxes, keyPath,
keyTransitionAllowed, keyUse, schemaBounds, slotDir, validateRecord,
} from '../src/validate.mjs';
// Synthetic records only. No credential, mailbox or provider is real, and nothing here opens a connection.
const HUMAN = { kind: 'human', id: 'jason' };
const AT = '2026-10-22T16:00:00.000Z';
const source = (over = {}) => ({
recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-source-settings', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress', provider: 'imap',
...defaults('source'), revision: 1, changedBy: HUMAN, changedAt: AT, ...over,
});
const data = (over = {}) => ({
recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-data-settings', business: 'acme', ...defaults('data'),
revision: 1, changedBy: HUMAN, changedAt: AT, ...over,
});
const access = (over = {}) => ({
recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-access', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress',
principal: { kind: 'agent', id: 'mail-specialist' }, rights: ['metadata', 'body'],
mailboxes: ['[email protected]'], mode: 'manual', approvalId: 'decision-1',
issuedAt: AT, expiresAt: '2026-10-29T16:00:00.000Z', revision: 1, ...over,
});
const CONFIG = '/home/op/.config/mosaic-acme';
const ROOTS = { configDir: CONFIG, dataRoot: '/home/op/.mosaic-acme', repoRoot: '/src/stack', backupRoots: ['/backup/mosaic'] };
const service = (over = {}) => ({
recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-service', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress', provider: 'imap',
mailbox: '[email protected]', scopes: ['mail.read'],
slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress/imap`, rotateBy: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
approvalId: 'decision-2', revision: 1, ...over,
});
const contentKey = (over = {}) => ({
recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-content-key', business: 'acme', keyId: 'k1',
path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/k1`, state: 'active',
createdAt: AT, expiresAt: '2027-10-22T16:00:00.000Z', revision: 1, ...over,
});
const refused = (kind, value, text) => {
const problems = validateRecord(kind, value);
assert.ok(problems.some(problem => problem.includes(text)), `${kind} should be refused with "${text}": ${JSON.stringify(problems)}`);
};
test('T1 the defaults are off, empty and valid, and every record kind validates', () => {
const settings = defaults('source');
assert.equal(settings.sourceEnabled, false);
assert.deepEqual(settings.mailboxScope, []);
assert.deepEqual(settings.sourceMutations, []);
assert.equal(settings.sourceAdapter, null);
assert.equal(settings.accessMode, 'manual');
assert.equal(settings.unattendedWake, false);
assert.deepEqual(settings.wakeSenderAllowlist, []);
assert.deepEqual(settings.limits, {
pollSeconds: 60, sliceObservations: 50, sliceBytes: 10485760, pendingDeliveries: 1000, retainedBytes: 104857600,
parserInputBytes: 31457280, mimeDepth: 10, mimeParts: 100, normalizedTextBytes: 262144,
attachmentPartBytes: 10485760, attachmentMessageBytes: 10485760, staleScanIntervals: 3, pageSize: 20,
});
assert.deepEqual(defaults('data'), { persistContent: false, bodyDraftDays: 30, attachmentDays: 7, metadataDays: 365, automaticPrune: false });
for (const [kind, value] of [['source', source()], ['data', data()], ['access', access()], ['service', service()], ['content-key', contentKey()]])
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord(kind, value), [], kind);
assert.throws(() => defaults('access'), /no settings defaults/);
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('mailbox', {}), ['unknown record kind: mailbox']);
});
test('T2 the default scope reads nothing, and a read is the intersection of scope, provider and grant', () => {
const grant = access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] });
const providerMailboxes = ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'];
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: source(), providerMailboxes, access: grant }), []);
const enabled = source({ sourceEnabled: true, sourceAdapter: 'imap' });
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: enabled, providerMailboxes, access: grant }), [], 'enabled with the default empty scope');
const scoped = source({ sourceEnabled: true, sourceAdapter: 'imap', mailboxScope: ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'] });
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), ['[email protected]']);
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: null }), [], 'no grant');
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes: [], access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'provider denies');
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date('2026-10-29T16:00:00.000Z') }), [], 'expired grant');
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: access({ source: 'other' }), now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'grant for another source');
assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: { ...scoped, sourceEnabled: false }, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'disabled');
// Lifetime edges: the grant reads from issuedAt up to, not including, expiresAt.
const read = (over = {}) => effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT), ...over });
assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date('2026-10-22T15:59:59.999Z') }), [], 'before issuedAt');
assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date('2026-10-29T15:59:59.999Z') }), ['[email protected]'], 'the last instant before expiresAt');
// Malformed records or clock fail closed.
assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date(Number.NaN) }), [], 'invalid clock');
assert.deepEqual(read({ now: AT }), [], 'a clock that is not a Date');
assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ expiresAt: 'not-a-date' }) }), [], 'invalid expiresAt');
assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ issuedAt: 'not-a-date' }) }), [], 'invalid issuedAt');
assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ issuedAt: '2026-10-23T16:00:00.000Z' }) }), [], 'issued in the future');
const { mailboxes, ...noMailboxes } = grant;
assert.deepEqual(read({ access: noMailboxes }), [], 'grant without mailboxes');
assert.deepEqual(read({ source: { ...scoped, mailboxScope: ['*'] } }), [], 'invalid source');
assert.deepEqual(read({ providerMailboxes: '[email protected]' }), [], 'provider list that is not an array');
});
test('T3 only a human changes settings', () => {
for (const kind of ['source', 'data']) {
const make = kind === 'source' ? source : data;
refused(kind, make({ changedBy: { kind: 'agent', id: 'mail-specialist' } }), 'changedBy.kind: must equal "human"');
refused(kind, make({ changedBy: { kind: 'system', id: 'mail' } }), 'changedBy.kind: must equal "human"');
const { changedBy, ...unsigned } = make();
refused(kind, unsigned, 'missing changedBy');
}
});
test('T4 unknown fields are refused at every level', () => {
refused('source', source({ secretRef: 'x' }), 'unknown key secretRef');
refused('source', source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, unlimited: 1 } }), 'unknown key unlimited');
refused('data', data({ purgeNow: true }), 'unknown key purgeNow');
refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'agent', id: 'a', asHuman: true } }), 'unknown key asHuman');
refused('service', service({ password: 'x' }), 'unknown key password');
refused('content-key', contentKey({ material: 'x' }), 'unknown key material');
});
test('T5 wildcards are refused in scopes, grants, allowlists and principals', () => {
refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['*'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['%'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
refused('source', source({ wakeSenderAllowlist: ['*@example.test'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
refused('access', access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'agent', id: '*' } }), 'wildcard not allowed');
refused('service', service({ mailbox: '*' }), 'wildcard not allowed');
});
test('T6 secret values are refused wherever they appear', () => {
const sentinels = [
'-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----', 'eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJzZW50aW5lbCJ9.x',
'ghp_SENTINELSENTINEL', 'imaps://user:[email protected]', 'password=SENTINEL', 'client_secret: SENTINEL',
];
for (const sentinel of sentinels) {
refused('service', service({ slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress/${sentinel}` }), 'looks like a secret value');
refused('service', service({ approvalId: sentinel }), 'looks like a secret value');
refused('access', access({ approvalId: sentinel }), 'looks like a secret value');
}
const problems = validateRecord('service', service({ approvalId: 'password=SENTINEL' }));
assert.ok(!problems.join('\n').includes('SENTINEL'), 'a refusal never echoes the value');
});
test('T7 incomplete scopes are refused', () => {
refused('access', access({ rights: [] }), 'access.rights: too few items');
refused('access', access({ mailboxes: [] }), 'access.mailboxes: too few items');
refused('access', access({ rights: ['metadata', 'send'] }), 'must be one of');
refused('access', access({ rights: ['body', 'body'] }), 'duplicate items');
refused('access', access({ expiresAt: AT }), 'must be after issuedAt');
refused('service', service({ scopes: [] }), 'service.scopes: too few items');
refused('service', service({ scopes: ['mail.send'] }), 'must be one of');
refused('source', source({ sourceEnabled: true }), 'an enabled source needs an enrolled adapter');
refused('source', source({ unattendedWake: true }), 'unattended wake needs at least one exact sender');
refused('source', source({ sourceMutations: ['mark-read'] }), 'too many items');
refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'] }), 'duplicate items');
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', source({ unattendedWake: true, wakeSenderAllowlist: ['[email protected]'] })), []);
});
test('T8 mismatched principal and source are refused', () => {
const scoped = source({ mailboxScope: ['[email protected]'] });
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service(), access: access() }), []);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ source: 'other' }) }), ['service: source mismatch']);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ business: 'beta' }) }), ['service: business mismatch']);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ provider: 'm365' }) }), ['service: provider mismatch']);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, access: access({ business: 'beta' }) }), ['access: business mismatch']);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, access: access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] }) }),
['access: mailbox [email protected] outside the source scope']);
assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: source(), access: access() }), ['access: mailbox [email protected] outside the source scope'],
'the default empty scope admits no grant');
refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'service', id: 'mail' } }), 'must be one of agent, user');
assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(service({ slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/other/imap` }), ROOTS),
[`service.slotPath: must sit under ${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress`]);
});
test('T9 settings take changed values inside the schema bounds and refuse values outside them', () => {
for (const key of ['pollSeconds', 'parserInputBytes', 'mimeDepth', 'mimeParts', 'normalizedTextBytes', 'pageSize']) {
const { minimum, maximum } = schemaBounds('source', `limits.${key}`);
const at = value => source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, [key]: value } });
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', at(minimum)), [], `${key} at its minimum`);
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', at(maximum)), [], `${key} at its maximum`);
refused('source', at(minimum - 1), 'below the schema bound');
refused('source', at(maximum + 1), 'above the schema bound');
refused('source', at(minimum + 0.5), 'must be integer');
}
assert.equal(schemaBounds('source', 'limits.pageSize').maximum, 100);
refused('source', source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, attachmentPartBytes: 20971520 } }), 'attachmentPartBytes exceeds attachmentMessageBytes');
assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('data', data({ bodyDraftDays: 90, metadataDays: 400 })), []);
refused('data', data({ metadataDays: 10 }), 'metadata and tombstones must outlive content');
refused('data', data({ persistContent: true }), 'persistContent: must equal false');
refused('data', data({ automaticPrune: true }), 'automaticPrune: must equal false');
});
test('T10 slot and key locations stay outside dataRoot, the repository and backups', () => {
assert.equal(slotDir({ configDir: CONFIG, business: 'acme', source: 'ingress' }), `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress`);
assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(service(), ROOTS), []);
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), ROOTS), []);
const nested = { ...ROOTS, dataRoot: CONFIG };
assert.ok(checkSlotLocation(service(), nested).some(problem => problem.includes('inside dataRoot')));
assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), nested).some(problem => problem.includes('inside dataRoot')));
assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), { ...ROOTS, backupRoots: ['/home/op/.config'] }).some(problem => problem.includes('inside a backup root')));
assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), { ...ROOTS, repoRoot: CONFIG }).some(problem => problem.includes('inside the repository')));
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: '/home/op/.mosaic-acme/mail/acme/k1' }), ROOTS),
[`content-key.path: must sit under ${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme`, 'content-key.path: inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/k2` }), ROOTS),
[`content-key.path: must be ${keyPath({ configDir: CONFIG, business: 'acme', keyId: 'k1' })}`]);
assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/k1` }), ROOTS)[0].includes('must sit under'), 'apart from provider slots');
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/../acme/k1` }), ROOTS),
['content-key.path: must be a normalized absolute path']);
});
test('T10b a symbolic link or alias can\'t move a slot or key into a forbidden root', () => {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mail-place-'));
try {
const dataRoot = join(root, 'data');
const roots = { dataRoot, repoRoot: join(root, 'repo'), backupRoots: [join(root, 'backup')] };
// configDir is a symbolic link into dataRoot, with a real 0600 key behind it.
mkdirSync(join(dataRoot, 'cfg'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const configDir = join(root, 'config');
symlinkSync(join(dataRoot, 'cfg'), configDir);
const dir = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme');
mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const file = join(dir, 'k1');
writeFileSync(file, 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
const key = contentKey({ path: file });
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(key, { ...roots, configDir }), ['content-key.path: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
// A planned slot that doesn't exist yet resolves through its nearest existing ancestor.
const slot = service({ slotPath: join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail', 'acme', 'ingress', 'imap') });
assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(slot, { ...roots, configDir }), ['service.slotPath: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
// A forbidden root named through an alias still covers the real configDir.
const realConfig = join(dataRoot, 'cfg');
const alias = join(root, 'alias');
symlinkSync(dataRoot, alias);
const realKey = contentKey({ path: join(realConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1') });
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(realKey, { ...roots, dataRoot: alias, configDir: realConfig }),
['content-key.path: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
// The same layout outside every forbidden root passes.
const safeConfig = join(root, 'safe');
mkdirSync(safeConfig, { mode: 0o700 });
const safeKey = contentKey({ path: join(safeConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1') });
assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(safeKey, { ...roots, configDir: safeConfig }), []);
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('T11 a protected file must be a regular owned 600 file with no symbolic link on its path', () => {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mail-schema-'));
try {
const configDir = join(root, 'config');
const dir = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme');
mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const file = join(dir, 'k1');
writeFileSync(file, 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }), []);
chmodSync(file, 0o640);
assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }).some(problem => problem.includes('mode 640')));
chmodSync(file, 0o400);
assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }).some(problem => problem.includes('mode 400')));
chmodSync(file, 0o600);
assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, uid: process.getuid() + 1 }).some(problem => problem.includes('owned by uid')));
const link = join(dir, 'k2');
symlinkSync(file, link);
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(link, { configDir }), [`${link}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`]);
const realDir = join(root, 'elsewhere');
mkdirSync(realDir, { mode: 0o700 });
writeFileSync(join(realDir, 'k3'), 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
symlinkSync(realDir, join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta'));
const viaLink = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta', 'k3');
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(viaLink, { configDir }),
[`${viaLink}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta')}`]);
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(join(dir, 'missing'), { configDir }), [`${join(dir, 'missing')}: not found`]);
mkdirSync(join(dir, 'k4'));
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(join(dir, 'k4'), { configDir }), [`${join(dir, 'k4')}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`]);
// The file must sit under configDir, lexically.
const outside = join(realDir, 'k3');
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(outside, { configDir }), [`${outside}: must sit under ${configDir}`]);
const dotted = `${configDir}/../elsewhere/k3`;
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(dotted, { configDir }), [`${dotted}: must be a normalized absolute path`]);
// A symbolic-link configDir is refused, even with a real 0600 file behind it.
const linkedConfig = join(root, 'linked-config');
symlinkSync(configDir, linkedConfig);
const viaConfig = join(linkedConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1');
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(viaConfig, { configDir: linkedConfig }), [`${viaConfig}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${linkedConfig}`]);
// A forbidden root named through an alias still covers the file.
const alias = join(root, 'alias');
symlinkSync(root, alias);
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, dataRoot: alias }), [`${file}: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it`]);
assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, dataRoot: join(root, 'data') }), []);
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('T12 the key lifecycle moves forward only, and an expired key gives no use', () => {
assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('active', 'retired'));
assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('active', 'expired'));
assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('retired', 'expired'));
for (const [from, to] of [['retired', 'active'], ['expired', 'active'], ['expired', 'retired'], ['active', 'active'], ['lost', 'active'], ['constructor', 'active']])
assert.equal(keyTransitionAllowed(from, to), false, `${from} -> ${to}`);
const now = new Date('2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), now), 'encrypt-decrypt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'retired' }), now), 'decrypt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'expired' }), now), 'none');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date('2027-10-22T16:00:00.000Z')), 'none', 'past expiresAt, whatever the state says');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'retired' }), new Date('2027-10-22T15:59:59.999Z')), 'decrypt', 'the last instant before expiresAt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date(AT)), 'encrypt-decrypt', 'from createdAt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date('2026-10-22T15:59:59.999Z')), 'none', 'before createdAt');
// Malformed records or clock fail closed.
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'escrowed' }), now), 'none', 'unknown state');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'constructor' }), now), 'none', 'prototype key as state');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ createdAt: 'not-a-date' }), now), 'none', 'invalid createdAt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ expiresAt: 'not-a-date' }), now), 'none', 'invalid expiresAt');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date(Number.NaN)), 'none', 'invalid clock');
assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'), 'none', 'a clock that is not a Date');
refused('content-key', contentKey({ state: 'escrowed' }), 'must be one of');
refused('content-key', contentKey({ expiresAt: AT }), 'must be after createdAt');
});
test('T13 the disabled schema leaves v1 unchanged: no mail kind, no mail action', () => {
const kinds = readFileSync(new URL('../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
const vocabulary = readFileSync(new URL('../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
assert.ok(!/mail/i.test(kinds), 'core mail-source registration waits for the approved PRD version and the source, grant and route approvals');
assert.ok(!/mail\.access/.test(vocabulary), 'mail.access waits for a Jason-approved PRD version');
const prd = readFileSync(new URL('../../../docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
assert.ok(!/REQ-MAIL-/.test(prd), 'the addendum is a draft until Jason approves it');
});
test('T14 every addendum requirement maps to build rows, and every row E01-E16 is covered', () => {
const draft = readFileSync(new URL('../../../docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
assert.match(draft, /^- Status: draft, not approved\./m);
const blocks = draft.split(/^- \*\*(?=REQ-MAIL-)/m).slice(1);
const ids = blocks.map(block => block.match(/^(REQ-MAIL-\d+)\.\*\*/)[1]);
assert.deepEqual(ids, Array.from({ length: ids.length }, (_, index) => `REQ-MAIL-${index + 1}`));
assert.equal((draft.match(/\*\*REQ-MAIL-/g) ?? []).length, ids.length);
const covered = new Set();
for (const [index, block] of blocks.entries()) {
const rows = block.match(/^ {2}Rows: (E\d\d(?:, E\d\d)*)\.$/m);
assert.ok(rows, `${ids[index]} names its rows`);
for (const row of rows[1].split(', ')) covered.add(row);
}
const all = Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, index) => `E${String(index + 1).padStart(2, '0')}`);
assert.deepEqual([...covered].sort(), all);
});