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Author SHA1 Message Date
jason.woltje cac7d0f67a row 273: T53 test 6 pins the usage line with --no-sso
The usage line gained --no-sso in the proof and sso bracket. T53 test 6
still matched the old bracket and failed the whole run on 978143bf4.
2026-10-21 21:32:11 -05:00
jason.woltje 978143bf42 row 273 notes: name the changed T57 item 3 assertion for review (sage-2321) 2026-10-21 20:34:59 -05:00
jason.woltje 6273b65e9d stack-release: a rollback that drops --sso drops --send; the --no-sso walk refuses an ok line with no activation (row 273, sage-2315)
B1: row 200's rollback to a Console without --sso kept the pointer's --send,
which F39 b forbids once --send can sit beside --sso. send_for_target drops it
whenever the run drops the pointer's --sso, and the plan and steps say so.
N1: an ok line with no activation refuses sso-off-flags instead of being
skipped.
2026-10-21 20:34:11 -05:00
jason.woltje 5b5fefc8bc stack-release tests: T58 adds sage-2305 cases a and b (row 273)
(a) --sso on, then two re-pins that carry it, then --no-sso gives back the
arrival's ExecStart byte for byte. (b) every set in the log holds --sso, so
--no-sso refuses sso-off-flags before any unit stops.
2026-10-21 20:24:57 -05:00
jason.woltje 3730567146 stack-release: --no-sso drops --send in one place, send_for_target (row 273) 2026-10-21 20:20:41 -05:00
jason.woltje 7dc538d90a stack-release: activate --send and --no-sso (row 273, #1778)
activate --send turns send on only when the run's Console flags hold
--sso, given or carried (F39 b), and puts it after --sso and before the
tester flags. activate --no-sso turns --sso off with the Console flags
from the set of the activation that turned it on, drops --send (F39 a)
and keeps the pointer's tester. Both are usage errors under --units
external. T58 covers the brief's T1-T4; the external test covers T5.
Design and the set-walk choice: agents/darkwing/work/queue-273/BUILD.md.
2026-10-21 20:19:48 -05:00
302 changed files with 618 additions and 30741 deletions
-74
View File
@@ -5220,78 +5220,4 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi
2026-10-21T22:30:20Z | Huey | T1 sessions design r3, scrooge-0007 R1, Vikunja 463 | Before: r2 e19e30df2 nested new session checkouts under the retained legacy instance workspace, allowing project-name collision or historical parent inspection to reach live siblings. After: exact path is dataRoot/session-workspaces/business/instance/session, outside the legacy root; canonicalized ancestor/descendant overlap refuses; T2 nesting mutant covers historical mount/inspection and a legacy project named sessions. All other r2 content retained as approved, revision label updated. Verification: old nested path absent, manual R1-only delta, whitespace and installed queue guard checked; no code/builds/suites/live changes/provider calls/credential reads.
2026-10-20 18:51:10 UTC | Row 191 #1689 design phase | Before: per-business launch revoke and per-binding Discord STOP leave task containers, active sessions and background work without one switch. Proposed per-data-root durable halt with human-only resume, generation-fenced starts, bounded concurrent termination, write-once stop receipts and existing event mirror; no schema migration. DESIGN.md inventories starter/continuation paths and container control-mount restriction. Sent to Dewey with Sage copied; implementation waits independent design approval. No tests, commits or live actions.
2026-10-20 18:57:51 UTC | Row 191 design revision | Dewey r1 changes: interim Console --send absence, reserved processing events and missing-state semantics required correction. DESIGN-r2.md now names CLI interim path, unavailable UI controls, trusted initialization and fail-closed missing leaf, container delete/replace mount tests, reservations and id-bound reconciliation. Small notes addressed including diagnostic seats and aliases. Recommended smaller Docker scope to Sage; design and scope approval pending, no code or test runs.
2026-10-20T19:50:56Z | Rocko | row 191 #1689 implementation stage: from independent brakes to shared root state, generation-fenced launcher and tracked stops, Discord/task guards and control HTTP/UI. Evidence is agents/rocko/work/queue-191/logs/ and PROGRESS.md. Fixture single files only so far; heavy verification and candidate not complete. Scope additions sage-1367 (one read-only CODE file) and sage-1392 (processing-only client socket timeout); no schema, proof baseline, live file/unit, commit or push change.
2026-10-20 22:58:45 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 rebase inspection candidate | Rebuilt uncommitted kill-switch tree from da230ca48 onto landed row 190 base 00d4cc1f6 under new branch rocko/row191-r2-00d4. Hand merges retained instance flags and SSO/sign-out changes; fixture tests exposed and fixed SSO signer compatibility and two unknown-runtime cleanup defects. Final touched singles 249/249 across 26 files; 15 overlapping Client reader files 102/102. Manifest a4f780c2 has 78 paths; packet 185 files verified with scan clear. Mutants and owner gate remain pending; no review-ready or activation claim, no commit/push/live action.
2026-10-21 23:39:21 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 inspection snapshot | Sage-2242 authorized a local inspection commit for Honker's row 194 S6. Created d52b4db1c on new rocko/row191-inspection-20261021, parent 00d4cc1f6, preserving the reviewed-design build and candidate a4f780c2 (78 paths). Static manifest/index/source scan and diff check verified; no tests run, no push credential or push attempt. Existing single-file evidence is historical, 249/249 and overlapping Client readers 102/102; suites/mutants/gate remain pending. Current code has verified runtime signalling and instance halt, but no dedicated per-run stop API yet; Honker and Sage notified of that seam directly. Snapshot is not review-ready or approved for live use.
2026-10-22 00:04:05 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 per-run stop inspection | Implemented agreed Honker-0079/0081 stopRun contract with verified per-signal identity, fixed 5s+2s, durable first-owner join and immutable result plus later-exit observations. Focused CLEAR sage-2250: final 9 files 62/62, no skipped, after correcting host guard placement and peer-discovery fixture timeout isolation; initial failures and failed teardown logs retained, only own failed group stopped. Slot returned with cwd sweep clear. Sage published f7bf7dfec; sage-2265 clean rebase creates 7aa18b0f6 on dcd8d4dda under new branch, explicit Rocko identity, all 79 manifest product blobs identical so 62/62 evidence carried. Direct S6 handoff sent to Honker and Sage. Wider suites, mutants, review and activation remain pending.
2026-10-22T00:18:12Z | Sage (Opus 5.5) | row 254 landing (#1759), library.sync human timeout | Before: the human transport gave library.sync the 5-second default, so a sync longer than that reported outcome-unknown, and six library-* codes reached the Console as 502. After: 331597709 lands Megavolt's candidate (7 paths, tree d49e4626f, manifest digest be63cfbe recomputed and matched). human-cli.mjs waits 130 s for library.sync, past the server's 120 s hold, and 5 s for other verbs. webui bus.mjs maps library-sync-busy, library-diverged and library-accept-stale to 409, library-accept-invalid to 400, and library-credential-missing and library-fetch-failed to 503. channel-proof re-pinned. Merged-tree gate on the landing commit: library 77/0, bus 628/0, webui 305/0 (1 skip), cli 749/0 (23:44:33-23:55:11Z). eb9672c91 adds the README request-timeout sentence (Dewey N1) and a DEFERRED entry for the four library codes still at 502 (Dewey N2, binds the Console library routes row). Overlap sweep before push: 268 rebased to r2 ecd9b35eb (README only, approval carried webby-0096), 194 rebased to b7. Done rev 3072, #1759 closed.
2026-10-22 00:24:34 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 full gate on c78f48946 | stopped on second integration failure per sage-2275; singles 269/269, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646; CLI interrupted with 26 observed failures; no further edits; cwd sweep empty and slot returned to Sage.
2026-10-22 00:48:20 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eb3abba12 full gate | stopped at Discord 190/192; 32 singles 304/304, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646, cli 761/761; two uninitialized Discord fixtures reported to Sage; no later run; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
2026-10-22 00:58:27 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2294 fixture fix | e6800380d on eb3abba12, two test files/four additions, assertions preserved; 338-entry static all-package sweep recorded; no tests; sent Sage for publication and Honker for dependent gate.
2026-10-22 01:30:04 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 e6800380d resume | binding15/15, recover5/5, Discord192/192; stopped WebUI314 passed/4 failed/1 esbuild skip; processing polling violates sign-out/manual redirect and bar changes layout; no fixes/retries, cwd sweep empty, slot returned.
2026-10-22 01:38:08 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2317 Console integration fix | 8e1f55c1d on e6800380d; shared sign-out/manual redirect/interval and desktop frame fixes, assertions retained, six browser cases, 73 mutant sites preflight; syntax only, no tests; sent Sage/Honker.
2026-10-22 02:06:38 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 rebase sage-2329 | eafcbd3e7 on ddfb29af7, new branch, dispatcher retains processing and access; CLI/readme auto-merges checked; 87-path fd0f2740 manifest and 73-site preflight; Sage2333 published, awaiting CLEAR; no tests.
2026-10-22 02:20:51 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eafcbd3e7 full gate | stopped singles313/6: six new browser cases count app freshness timer as processing timer; diagnosis sent Sage, no fix/retry; no suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
2026-10-22 02:23:13 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2345 timer fixture | 4db8b5778 on eafcbd3e7, one line attributes timer to processing.js; all assertions retained, no product change or tests; sent Sage and Honker; awaiting publication/CLEAR.
2026-10-22 02:25:29 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2349 record commit | 0f8235277 on 4db8b5778 adds packet BUILD.md cause record; product manifest remains ffb46fbd/87 paths; no amend, product change or tests; Sage/Honker notified.
2026-10-22 02:48:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 0f8235277 full gate second red | singles330/330, processing61/61, bus646/646, cli783/783, discord192/192; WebUI323/1/1 host esbuild skip; shell geometry1062vs1000; stopped/no retry, no later suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot returned, Sage escalates Mos.
2026-10-22 02:57:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 mos-1248 desktop layout restart | FF 5cd32f4c1 on 0f8235277: desktop grid allocates processing bar, existing shell assertions kept, visibility/no-scroll assertions added; 74 static mutant sites; candidate 2f93ef19; sent Webby/Sage for static review; no runs, awaiting review and CLEAR.
2026-10-22 03:11:09 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 static nav layout, mos-1249/1250 | FF da4334806 on 5cd32f4c1; controls first in nav, non-sticky per sage-2386/webby-0108; candidate-only placement assertion changed, landed shell assertions preserved; 77 mutants statically preflighted; manifest 245dceb1; Webby/Sage handoff sent, no runs, awaiting static look/publish/debug CLEAR.
2026-10-22 03:15:11 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 sage-2394 debug | da4334806 shell5/5 and processing-browser9/9, awk14/0/0; geometry heights reported with read-only distinction; cwd sweep[] and slot returned; full window awaits separate CLEAR.
2026-10-22 02:01:30 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 202 #1700 FED R5 landing | ddfb29af7 on 9c9732983: 6 manifest paths from a74cd9f87 (digests match CANDIDATE.sha256, patch-id 9d89077b equal); Duckworth APPROVE r5 rev 3026; C1 gate by Quackerjack on merge 3b86180b9: cli 771/771 skip 0 (run 2, run 1 red on gate TMPDIR length), 10 test-*.sh rc 0, M1-M13 killed; done rev 3108; landing note refused for length before the done move, so the record is the commit body and #1700 c30265; 191 and 194 rebased onto it (one scripts/mosaic case line)
2026-10-22 03:35:55 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 273 #1778 activate --send/--no-sso landing | 0bbf0f6d1 landed on 378a76b85, a rebase of cac7d0f67 (0042f713d) with all 6 range-diff pairs = and equal patch-ids; 4-path manifest e1031023 unchanged; Filbert APPROVE rev 3111 (c30308) carried merge-scoped under mos-1160, carry comment c30319 names 0bbf0f6d1. Gate on 0bbf0f6d1 by Darkwing: stack-release.test.mjs 218/218 skip 0, stack-release-external.test.mjs 25/25 skip 0, test-release.sh rc 0 (selftest 14/0, no skips), T58 controls c0 11/11 pass and c1 11/11 fail, M1-M7 killed. Rerun because row 202 changed scripts/mosaic, which stack-release.test.mjs copies. Red 1 was 978143bf4 (T53 test 6 usage pin). This doc commit adds the TOOLS.md usage line and F39 rules (Filbert N1).
2026-10-22 04:02:12 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 full window0fa7bf421 | touched35files336pass, packages2403pass/1esbuildskip, shells425selftests+156queue node pass; SR01–07killed, SR08timeout,69unrun; stopped/no retry;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],owned network removed,slot returned Sage; await Mos ruling.
2026-10-22 04:14:56 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 control/resume sage-2427 | control12/12;SR08separate timeoutkill;49resumed assertionkills thenKS43survived;total56assertionkills+1timeout,1survivor,19unrun;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos informed;no retry/edit.
2026-10-22 04:21:30 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS43+19 retarget run | KS43assertionkill thenKS44invalid mutation syntax;57assertionkills+1timeout,1invalid,18unrun;stopped,no edit/retry;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified.
2026-10-22 04:30:06 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS44+18 resume | 10assertionkills thenKS54timeout-without-control despite dependency assertion;total67assertionkills+1timeoutkill,1unqualifiedtimeout,8unrun;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified,no retry/edit.
2026-10-22 04:41:46 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | row191 #1689 builder complete/in-review | published0fa7bf421,manifest0bcbf337;35singles336pass,9packages2403pass/1knownskip,10shells425selftests+156queue nodepass;75assertionkills+2controlledtimeoutkills=77;88hashrestore,cwd sweep[],slotreturned;in-review rev3114,expected no-token failure3115(exit1);Sage/Dewey handoff,no live action.
2026-10-22 05:03:18 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | Vikunja502 processing test/runner hardening | brief+isolatedrocko-v502;expected wordingred→green,Node27/27,Python4/4,5/5assertionkills(includingSR08andKS54nohang),0skips/timeouts;sweep[],candidate5hashrestored,slotreturned05:01:29Z;candidate968d6ee3,runnerc5bdc764;packetready,no commit/push/liveaction.
2026-10-22 05:07:34 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | Vikunja502 committed/review handoff sage-2482 | newbranchrocko/vikunja502-ce6a-20261022,source8e3c6a79b+packet9bf4683c6 on ce6a96ad6;5paths no base drift,range-diff=,patch-id37135ebe unchanged;manifest968d6ee3,packet93889519 verifies39/39;focused runs carry;Sage publish/Dewey review handoff sent,no push/liveaction.
2026-10-22 05:10:00 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | serial landing 205 then 268 | 205: 3 commits, 4 paths, digest 858463b1, every scripts/test-*.sh green on ce6a96ad6, Duckworth N1-N4 carried (N1/N3 to 205b or R3, N2 to the 193b2 brief, N4 #1782 before any user thread goes live). 268 r4: c27207f6e on 205, 9 paths, digest caa0fa4e, patch-id 2942acc8 equal to r3. Overlap checks clean before both pushes. No live action; LIVE stays 86f95bb27.
2026-10-22 05:58:59 UTC | Rocko | row 279 #1784: before, deadline overshoot skipped final observation and returned unknown; after, one-line for (;;) retains final mapping and unchanged unreachable fallback. Regression red as specified; whole stop-run 13/13 and processing-control 62/62; M1 assertion kill, no skips, restored and swept. Source 1016b8584, packet cad927137; manifest 312ed511d8f1cff826ee2fd547de8368923130c7bfe06236d8e29d8655b80aaa. Pending Sage publication and Dewey review; no live action.
2026-10-22 06:15:54 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 279 #1784 landed (mos-1269) | Before: stopRun returned unknown for a live run when a sleep overshot the deadline. After: LANDED ceadad993 as a carry of cad927137 onto 343b6dd76 (range-diff 1:= 2:=, patch-ids 6d8ae7f4/e484c297 equal, Dewey carry c30410). Sage gate on cad927137: business 209/0/0, cli 794/0/0, discord processing + processing-stop 9/0/0. Correction: the first discord run wrote to a wrong out path and ran nothing; the rerun is the result. Overlap sweep clean (13, 257). Note rev 3144, done rev 3145. No live action; LIVE stays 86f95bb27.
2026-10-22 06:37:43 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 194 b16 third red (mos-1269/mos-1270) | Gate on ceadad993 + 9cdc47d04: business 228/0, cli 826/0 (T9a passes), control-board 124/0, bus 705/1 at grant-executor.test.mjs G13 (timed out 10044 ms); conversation, webui and scripts/test-*.sh never ran. runb8 green 436/0/0, 17/17 mutants. Correction to sage-2524 (mos-1270): the stuck wait is the first until at :733, the holding file after decision.resolve, so the executor never started the install and hosts.revoke at :734 never ran; it is not a revoke-path hang. Ruling: a diagnosis run, 30 base + 30 candidate alternating under cli load, no gate retry.
2026-10-22 07:51:04 UTC | Rocko | row 280 #1785: before, any TCP connect could accept a port our sshd failed to bind; after, attempt-local exact log proof plus liveness and connect, non-ephemeral picker, bounded scratch remote sleep cleanup. Both occupied regressions red on old acceptance; CRLF build failure captured and fixed under sage-2535. Committed source b765f5cb8, packet d6c924764, manifest27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5. Repeats07:29:03Z–07:48:38Z grant1230/1230,host780/780,CLI1588/1588; final M1/M2 four assertion kills,0skips/timeouts,sweepclear. Sage publishes/gates; Duckworth reviews.
2026-10-22 08:00:02 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 280 #1785 landed | before: the bus tests' scratch sshd helper returned a port on a connect alone, and 194 b16's gate hung at G13 (base hung too, honker-0127). After: b0fd28b6f on refactor, a ff from da5d3651d (b765f5cb8 + Rocko slim packet; full evidence d6c924764 on rocko/row280-da5d-20261022). Duckworth approve rev 3153 (manifest 27806c05). Sage gate bus 656/0/0, ge 41/0/0, hr 26/0/0 (c30431). Rocko repeat 2010/2010 under cli 1588/1588, no timeout; M1/M2 killed 4/4. Two build-time slips recorded in Rocko's packet: a runner root path (no test ran) and the CRLF sshd log line. Overlap 13/257 clean. Note rev 3154, done 3155, #1785 closed c30432, P19 511 comment 623. 194 b17 rebases on b0fd28b6f (sage-2542).
2026-10-22 08:38:11 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 194 #1692 landed | before: 194 b16 9cdc47d04 went red three times (stopRun deadline, then the bus test sshd port race), fixed by rows 279 and 280. After: fd6dd327c on refactor, a ff on e122aad8e. b18 is b17 3f451772d rebased after my doc and queue push blocked a ff (16 =, series patch-id 64303253f8e6, packages equal b17). Webby approve rev 3160 on manifest 29f131ab. Honker gate on fd6dd327c: runb8 503/0/0, mutants 17/17; 18 packages 3668/0, ten scripts rc=0, Docker up, env skips named. The secret scan hit three fake_*_token fixtures in bus tests (false positive). Note 3161, done 3162; #1692 closed c30435; P19 414 comment 625. LIVE still 86f95bb27.
2026-10-22 08:42:04 UTC | Honker (Claude Opus 5.5, ecd17786) | row 194 #1692 agent lifecycle build | before: no Console or CLI lifecycle for agents (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) and no per-agent hire/fire veto. After: 16 commits landed as fd6dd327c (b18, a rebase of b17 3f451772d on e122aad8e: 16 =, series patch-id 64303253f8e6, packages equal b17). Manifest 53 paths, digest 29f131ab. Final run on fd6dd327c: runb8 39 files whole 503/0/0, mutants 17/17 killed, restores matched; gate.sh merge onto e122aad8e, 18 packages 3668/0, ten scripts rc=0, Docker up, four env skips named (webui esbuild pin, queue render outside canonical root, test-task live provider x2); sweep clean. Corrections: b16 went red at G13; my diagnosis (60 runs, base hang on port 38927 sshd bind EADDRINUSE) placed it outside 194, fixed by row 280; the g13diag load kill missed its process group and overran about 8 minutes; one runb8 launch failed rc=126 on a lost exec bit before any test ran; the b17 runb8 was stopped unscored when refactor moved. In-review revs 3156/3157, Webby approve rev 3160.
2026-10-22 09:43:34 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 236 #1742 Gitea grant landing, and row 281 filing | 236 landed bd5f11ded at 09:37:31Z, a fast-forward on be2b008cc: 08840f3c1 rebased past 194 (commit 1 unions only, 2-7 =), e40b74beb for two stale out-of-manifest pins, bd5f11ded for a gitea-not-configured raise test. Dewey approve rev 3168 on manifest 0b00269b (34 paths). Megavolt gate under my slot: 2c bus 131, cli 224, route 28, docker 1; whole bus 765, business 228, cli 832, ten scripts rc=0; mutants 40/40; skips named, env only. Overlap with 13 and 257 clean. Note 3169, done 3170; #1742 closed c30451; P19 436 comment 639. Correction: the first whole run on ce74477e1 went red 762/764 on the two stale pins; that run is void. Follow-up per mos-1271: row 281 (#1786), a fire or delete revokes host and Gitea grants, Megavolt owns, Dewey reviews; brief docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md; DEFERRED entry points at it.
2026-10-22 10:30:51 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 274 #1779 FED R3 broker user principal landing | 274 landed 4c485c63b at 10:28:26Z, a fast-forward on 47a35bf43: six Morgana commits d20c92bf6..4c485c63b. r5 f58cfc361 moved covers, LEVELS and the all marker into business/src/vocabulary.mjs so the broker keeps its sandbox import closure (M16/M16b/M16c). r6 4c485c63b pins USER_VERBS as the ruled seven and widens the R3 off-list set. Dewey approve rev 3178 on manifest 00047b52 (13 paths), comment 30487. Morgana gate under my slot, 10:09-10:22Z: 23 touched files 0 fail, bus 787, harness 151, business 228, cli 832, seat 167, ten scripts rc=0, mutants 22/22; skips named, env only (test-queue 1, test-task 2). Overlap with 13 and 257 clean. Note 3179, done 3180; #1779 closed c30491; P19 414 comment 646. Corrections: the r5 gate on f58cfc361 went red (M3x/M6x survived the R3 off-list set), void; my gate comment 30490 said 24 touched files, the count is 23; the kit comment guessed human-required for the M3x wall, the run code is not-holder.
2026-10-22 10:57:34 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 256 #1761 the human deletes a creative instance, landing | before: row 194's deleteRefusal refused every END_PROTECTED definition for every actor, so nobody could delete a creative instance; the human could only delist one with launch: false. After: 256 landed f12441d4f, a fast-forward on 0165be266 (the 274 landing plus its docs and queue commits): four Honker commits b5f1e09d6..f12441d4f, patch-id b28e63746f8c. One protectedRefusal predicate serves delete and the listing's per-viewer endProtected; any non-human actor gets organization-creative-human-only, fire unchanged. Rebased twice (past 236, then past 274), each range-diff 4/4 =, carries checked by Webby (webby-0126, webby-0128). Webby APPROVE on manifest-r3 01eb75aa (10 paths), comment 30519, posted by Sage as jarvis because Webby has no token; review request c30518 (Sage, revs 3183/3184) after Honker's request failed (no token, revs 3181/3182). Gate by Honker under Sage's slot 10:33Z-10:52Z on merge tree ced6bf5f8: touched files 31/0/0, 18 packages 3757/0 (bus 788, business 231, cli 832, webui 335), ten scripts/test-*.sh rc=0, mutants M1, M2, M3, M4a, M4b killed with blob-checked restores. Skips, named and environment-only: webui editor rebuild byte check (esbuild 0.28.1 installed, pin 0.28.2), test-queue non-canonical root, test-task live provider x2. Overlap with in-review rows 13 and 257 clean. Order change sage-2594: 256 landed before 277 because 277's gate had not run. LIVE is still 86f95bb27. Queue note rev 3186, done rev 3187; #1761 closed c30520; P19 416 comment 649.
2026-10-22 11:19:28 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 277 #1782 the owner sees a thread agent's claims, landing | before: a thread run's role.claim wrote thread_claims only, and the agents verb read role_claims only, so the owner had no way to see a thread agent's claim (PRD :1083-1084). After: 277 landed 62f53b1e0, a fast-forward on 46dedf925 (the 256 landing plus its docs and queue commits): seven Morgana commits 1d5d00939..62f53b1e0, range patch-id 7f0533520bd2. A bus verb thread.claims serves human and reader sessions; mosaic agents adds thread lines without --tester or --json, --json keeps the agents array, the tester path makes one call, a refused thread.claims prints the role lines and the refusal code, and an error with no bus code still throws. Rebased onto 0165be266, then onto 46dedf925 after 256 landed first (sage-2594); both range-diffs all =, manifest e281aa2c unchanged (duckworth-0126). Duckworth APPROVE comment 30539, recorded rev 3192, posted by Sage as jarvis; review request c30538 (revs 3190/3191) after Morgana's request failed (no token, revs 3188/3189). Gate by Morgana under Sage's slot 11:01:23Z-11:13:56Z: 7 touched files 0 fail (thread-claims 5, message-filter 6, user-principal 22, format 4, tester 11, other-tree 4, host 43), bus 793, cli 836, harness 151, business 231, seat 167, ten scripts/test-*.sh rc=0, M1-M9 killed on committed bytes. Skips named, environment only: test-queue non-canonical root, test-task live provider x2. Overlap with in-review 13 and 257 clean. Duckworth N1 (M8 dies on a rethrown error) to DEFERRED; 0123 N3 per-session claims binds 264a r7. Note rev 3193, done rev 3194; #1782 closed c30540; P19 506 comment 652. Also landed as doc-only picks: Honker's 256 BUILD.md gate results (80620a3a0 as b83173305) and Megavolt's 236 BUILD.md runs (9c6e1a165 as 01ea1fb11). LIVE is still 86f95bb27.
-1
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@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
# runtime adapters.
COPY contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts
COPY src /opt/mosaic/src
COPY packages/processing-control/src/state.mjs packages/processing-control/src/entrypoint.mjs /opt/mosaic/processing-control/
COPY adapters /opt/mosaic/adapters
RUN chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts/* \
&& chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/src /opt/mosaic/src/*.sh \
-80
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@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
# Row 268 build notes (Gizmoduck)
Case 2 C2-01c, playground levels. Gitea #1773, Vikunja 464. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md,
"C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes" (blob a6ac627c8). The ruling is
agents/gosalyn/work/case2/DESIGN.md "Ruling after r11: playgrounds at three levels" (:49-88 at
db1e7732a), and it wins where the two differ. Reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Branch gizmoduck/row268
from refactor db1e7732a. Line numbers are on this branch unless a commit is named.
## mapping.mjs
- `kind` (:71). An entry with a `kind` key must say `"hybrid"` or `"draft"`. Before, a plain universe
with `kind` refused as an unknown key, and `kind: "draft"` did the same.
- A draft (:73-86) refuses `books` with its own message before the key check, so the cause reads
plainly. It takes `kind`, `name` and `playground`, needs one prefix or more, and comes back as
`{ kind: 'draft', name, books: [], playground }`, frozen with the rest.
- The prefix level check moved out of the per-entry loop to :127-140, after every entry is read,
because it needs every entry's books. It runs after the book-holds-book, prefix-holds-prefix and
listed-twice checks, so an overlap still reports as before. For each prefix and each book folder:
- equal to any book folder: `library-mapping-invalid` (brief, What ships, "or equal to a book folder");
- inside or holding another entry's book: `library-playground-other-universe`, and the message says
which, with the book and its entry;
- holding its own entry's book: `library-mapping-invalid`.
A prefix inside its own book is book level, and one that touches no book is universe level. A draft
has no books, so its prefixes are either outside every book or refused as another entry's.
- `sources` (:117-120) now refuses any entry with a `kind`, so a draft can't be a source either. The
message changed from "not a non-hybrid universe" to "not a plain universe". mapping.test.mjs:61 on
db1e7732a pinned the old words, and that line moves with it.
- `library-playground-outside-book` is gone from packages and docs/case2.
## scope.mjs
`classify` (:12-24) now runs two passes. The first finds a prefix in any entry, and the file is
`playground` with that entry's id and `book` set to the entry's book folder that holds the prefix, or
`null`. The second finds a book folder, and the file is `canon`. `place` (:26-32) works out `type` and
`folder` from the first folder under the prefix or the book, as before. The validator keeps prefixes
from overlapping, so the first pass finds at most one.
## Readers on this base
- reader.mjs:182 and :194 spread `classify`'s answer into each file record, so a universe-level or
draft file carries `book: null`. Nothing in the reader reads `book`.
- reader.mjs:206-209. R5 fires for a canon file linking into any playground. R6 fires when the target's
universe differs and isn't a source. A draft can't be a source, so a link into one gives R5 and R6.
A link into the file's own universe-level prefix gives R5 only. No code change was needed. The new
test covers both.
- survey.mjs:66 and mirror.mjs:246 read only `scope`. mirror.mjs:251 calls `readLibrary` and checks
only `path`.
- No other package calls this `classify` or reads `universes` (git grep over packages/*/src).
- C2-05a (row 216) and C2-06 (row 217) have no candidate branch on origin at the time of writing. I
check again before in-review.
## Tests
- mapping.test.mjs: the old outside-book test splits into the other-universe refusals (inside another
entry's book, holding one, a draft prefix inside a book), the mapping-invalid ones (equal to a book,
own or another's, and holding its own), universe level in a plain universe and in a hybrid with
`books: []`, and the draft shape (frozen with `books: []`, with `books`, with none or empty
prefixes, an extra key, and five bad `kind` values). The overlap test gains a cross-entry hold and a
cross-entry duplicate. The hybrid test gains a draft source. The caller-supplied `fail` test now
uses `Second World/Playground/` and sees the new code, since `Elsewhere/` is valid now.
- scope.test.mjs, new: one case per level (book, universe in a plain universe, universe in a hybrid,
draft), `.canvas` under each new prefix staying unmapped, prefixes first inside a book that holds a
prefix, and the reader case for R5 and R6, with `book: null` on the read records.
- business.test.mjs: `Elsewhere/Playground/` now loads, and `Second World/Playground/` refuses with
`library-playground-other-universe` through `validateBusinessDocument`.
## Docs
- packages/library/README.md: the universe keys, a line on the three levels, the refusal table and
the Scope section.
- docs/case2/SETUP-SHEET.md "Your playground": one line per level and the draft entry.
- docs/case2/SURVEY-RUN.md:114: the new code and message.
## Hash pins
`git grep -E '[0-9a-f]{64}'` over packages/*/tests finds no pin on any changed file.
## Runs
None yet. Every run waits for Sage's CLEAR.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
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@@ -1,707 +0,0 @@
# Row 194 design: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent veto
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` (blob a907109409ac). Gitea #1692. MVP T1 item 5 (mos-0974,
mos-0977, DECISIONS Q176). Owner Honker, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at 53bb59462.
Branch `honker/row194`.
Related designs read: row 190 `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190/DESIGN.md` (r2, after mos-0986), row 191
`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`. Row 193 is still in design. All line numbers below are at
53bb59462.
## Summary
- One verb family on the CLI, `mosaic business instance <verb> BUSINESS INSTANCE`, and one Console section.
Create and delete change the business file. Launch, terminate and regenerate act on runs.
- Every human verb goes through the bus with the human proof. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
launcher takes once and carries out under `serialize`. Launches go through the one `start()`, so
`--no-launch`, the limits, `launch.revoke` and row 191's switch all apply.
- The chief hires (adds and lists an instance) and fires (ends its runs and delists it). It never deletes.
`role.hire` and `role.fire` are new hard waits, so Jason resolves each one (Mos, mos-1017). The routed
form waits on a PRD 1.7 draft in this packet.
- A hire allowlist in code: the chief can hire only a definition whose every action is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`
(message, record, review request, assigned-task updates, and two actions that matter after row 199).
Launch, end, organization, naming, hire, verdict, merge and every later action stay out.
- The per-agent forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes: `launch.keep`
(instances the chief can't fire, replace or end) and `launch.noHire` (definitions the chief can't hire).
- The broker reloads a business from its file after each committed write. Create, delete, hire, fire and
veto changes then count without a bus restart. Hand edits still need one, except `bus.tester`.
- No bus schema change and no migration. Named for review: two new vocabulary actions (hard waits), the
role-file `hireable` key, `"hireable": []` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json`, and three business-file keys.
## What exists today (checked at 53bb59462)
| # | Fact | Where |
|---|---|---|
| E1 | Instances are keys of the business file's `roles`. `launch.instances` lists those the chief may launch. The list must be non-empty | `business.mjs:121-132` |
| E2 | The human adds an instance and changes its definition, vars and listing. No delete. Credentialed definitions are refused | `instance-settings.mjs:1-5, 22-31, 75-156` |
| E3 | The broker copies the businesses once at start and refuses a role it doesn't know | `broker.mjs:208, 446` |
| E4 | The chief launches over `launch.sock`. `fromSession` checks identity, then `check()` (which reloads the file), then `authorizeLaunch`, then `start()` | `launcher.mjs:232-327, 624-668` |
| E5 | The chief's `launch` tool takes an enum of the instances listed when its bundle was built | `harness/src/tools.mjs:116-119` |
| E6 | The chief ends a run with `role.revoke` plus a reason (`role.end`). Ending then launching again is already a replace | `broker.mjs:1601-1628`, `tools.mjs:167` |
| E7 | `mosaic stop RUN` is a same-uid SIGTERM. It has no bus call and no human proof | `cli.mjs:447-454`, `seat/src/session.mjs:249-270` |
| E8 | The Console stops only the assistant (`assistant.stop`) and writes instances through `instances.set` | `serve.mjs:282-289, 315-363, 535` |
| E9 | The launcher already starts runs for the human on its 2 s tick: threads with pending messages, and merge holders | `launcher.mjs:133, 487-597` |
| E10 | `launch.revoke` and `launch.restore` are human-only. A revoked business refuses `role.launch` | `broker.mjs:770-774, 2087-2095` |
| E11 | Only the assistant is END_PROTECTED. Coder, reviewer, pm and cto all declare gitea and vikunja credentials | `vocabulary.mjs:135`, `roles/*.json` |
The chief's veto today comes from the human-only membership in E2. The chief can only launch what the human
listed. It has no way to create an instance, and the human has no way to stop the chief ending a given
instance's runs.
## D1. The verbs
All of them are human verbs. Each is a broker verb behind `#human(s)` and then the D4 hook. Each logs its
actor. The CLI usage joins `INSTANCES_USAGE` (`cli/src/instances.mjs:9`).
| Verb | CLI | Bus verb | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| V1 create | `business instance add B I --definition DEF [--vars FILE] [--launch] --revision REV` | `instances.set` op `add` | as today, with no restart (D3) |
| V2 launch | `business instance launch B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.launch` | one run, through the launcher |
| V3 terminate | `business instance terminate B I [--reason TEXT]` | `instance.end` | ends every run of I and cancels I's open requests |
| V4 regenerate | `business instance regenerate B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.regenerate` | V3, then V2 once the run has exited |
| V5 delete | `business instance delete B I --revision REV [--wait SECONDS]` | `instances.set` op `delete` | a request. The launcher removes I from the business file and renames its workspace |
| V6 veto | `business veto B (keep\|unkeep) I` and `business veto B (nohire\|hire) DEF`, each `--revision REV` | `veto.set` | edits `launch.keep` and `launch.noHire` |
`mosaic business instances B` (read) gains, per instance: `running` (run ids from the bus claims), `kept`
and `retired`. The top level gains `noHire`. `mosaic stop RUN` stays as it is. It is the same-uid operator
tool, and V3 is the human verb.
### D1.1 Requests (V2, V4, V5)
The broker never starts a process or touches a workspace. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
launcher carries out, as E9 already does for the human's threads. A request has three states, open, taken
and closed, all recorded as `action.allowed` events with reserved action names:
| Event | Written by | Body |
|---|---|---|
| `lifecycle.launch`, `lifecycle.regenerate`, `lifecycle.delete` | the broker, at the verb | `{ request, via }`, subject I, actor the human or `tester`. A `human.input` event goes with it, as `launch.revoke` does |
| `lifecycle.taken` | host op `lifecycleTake` | `{ request }` |
| `lifecycle.done` | host op `lifecycleDone` | `{ request, run? , refusal? }` |
| `lifecycle.cancelled` | V3, for each open request of I | `{ request, by }` |
1. The launcher's new `lifecyclePass` runs on the same tick as `threadPass` and `landPass`. It lists open
requests with host op `lifecycleRequests`.
2. For each one, under `serialize`, it calls `lifecycleTake(request)`. That op runs in one store
transaction. It re-checks, in order: the request is still open (not taken, cancelled or closed), it is
less than 60 s old (else it closes as `request-expired`), the business isn't revoked (`launch_state`,
`launch-revoked`), I isn't retired, row 191's switch is off (`processing-halted`) for launch and
regenerate, and for a tester request `bus.tester` is true in the file (D4.1). Any failure closes the
request with that code. Otherwise it writes `lifecycle.taken` and answers go.
3. Only after go does the pass act: `check(I, { human: true })` then `start()` for a launch, the V5 steps
for a delete.
4. The pass then calls `lifecycleDone`. A taken request never runs again, whatever happens after the take.
If `lifecycleDone` throws, the request stays taken with no done event. The CLI reports that as
`outcome-unknown` with the request id, and the launcher log names the run.
5. The CLI polls a read verb, `instance.request`, until the request closes or `--wait` runs out (default
30 s). A timeout exits 3 with the request id. An untaken request can still be taken within its 60 s.
So the human's `launch.revoke` stops every untaken request, not only new ones (B4), and a bus restart
can't start a request older than 60 s.
### V2 launch
1. At the verb the broker checks that I exists, isn't a thread instance (`not-thread-launch`: threads start
on a message), isn't retired, and that the business isn't revoked and, with row 191, isn't halted. These
repeat at the take (D1.1 item 2).
2. After the take, `check(I, { human: true })` and `start({ instance: I, launchedBy })`, where
`launchedBy` is the business human or `tester`. `human: true` lets the human launch an instance that
isn't in `launch.instances`. The listing limits the chief, not the human. `launch.by` still goes through
the `pm: true` branch (`launcher.mjs:235`), as `--pm` does today. Every other step of `check()` and
`start()` is unchanged.
### V3 terminate
1. The broker revokes every claim I holds (`#claimEnd(s, h, 'revoke', null, reason, actor)`). A thread
instance has all its thread claims revoked, which is exactly `assistant.stop`.
2. In the same transaction it writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for every open (untaken) request of I, so no
launch the human asked for before the terminate starts after it (B5).
3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs. The launcher pass sends SIGTERM to each run's runner after
checking its start time, as the idle stop does (`launcher.mjs:526`). It also signals any run of I in the
launcher's registry that has spawned but not yet bound, which holds no claim yet. The existing exit
handler records the end, so the launch journal and `session.ended` are unchanged.
4. Nothing held, nothing open and nothing in the registry answers `not-held`.
5. Terminate is allowed while row 191's switch is on. It starts nothing.
A taken launch request is past cancelling. Its run reaches the registry under `serialize`, and the next
terminate ends it. The CLI's terminate output says so when a taken request exists.
There is no SIGKILL escalation in this row. A run that ignores SIGTERM keeps running. `mosaic stop` and the
limits are the operator's tools for it (N6).
### V4 regenerate
A fresh session with the same identity and role. It is V3 then V2 under one request. The pass takes the
request, waits for the old run's exit handler, then runs `check()` and `start()`. The workspace stays, as
it does across every launch today. The session is new because every non-thread launch gets a new run dir
(`seat/src/session.mjs:107`, newRun). If the old run hasn't exited by the request's 60 s mark, the request
closes as `regenerate-timeout`, nothing starts, and the old run is still running (N6).
A thread instance (the assistant) refuses `regenerate-thread`. Its context lives in the thread's session
directory, and clearing that is T1 item 7 (clear context). This row doesn't take it.
### V5 delete
`instances.set` gains op `delete`. At the verb the broker and the writer refuse, in this order:
| Refusal | When |
|---|---|
| `tester-refused` | the caller is the tester (B6) |
| `organization-definition-refused` | I is END_PROTECTED |
| `organization-instance-referenced` | I is `launch.by` or an arbiter. The message names the reference |
| `organization-instance-kept` | I is in `launch.keep`. The human runs `veto unkeep` first. Delete never clears a veto silently |
| `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` | I holds credentials or a tracker bot. That stays a hand edit until the credentials row (row 199) |
| `instance-running` | the broker sees a claim for I. The human terminates first |
| `instance-starting` | an open or taken request for I has no done event |
| BusinessError | I is the last name in `launch.instances` (E1). The message says so |
The checks pass with no write, and the broker records a `lifecycle.delete` request. After the take, the
launcher pass, under `serialize` so no `start()` of I runs alongside it:
1. Re-checks the registry for I (`instance-running`) and re-runs the writer's checks against the file as it
stands. The `--revision` the human gave must still match, else `revision-conflict`.
2. Commits the file through the organization writer. It removes `roles.I` and the references that exist
only for I: its `launch.instances` entry, its `launch.limits.tokens.instances` entry and its
per-instance model entry. It adds I to a new top-level list, `retired`. The build lists every place
`validateBusinessDocument` reads a role instance name and puts each one in one of the two groups (refuse
or remove). A reference the table doesn't name stops the build and goes back to Webby.
3. Renames `workspaces/<b>/I/` to `workspaces/<b>/.retired/I-<transaction>/`, mode 0700. No workspace is
no rename.
4. Calls `lifecycleDone` with the transaction.
The file goes first. Once it is committed, `check()` refuses I as unknown, so no launch can open the old
workspace even if step 3 fails. A failed rename closes the request with `workspace-rename-failed`, the
transaction and the path left behind. A second `delete` of a retired name skips steps 1 and 2 and retries
step 3 only. The file and evidence are already right, so this is the whole recovery.
What stays:
- Run evidence (`launches/<b>/<run>/`, `launches/<b>.jsonl`) and bus rows are untouched. They are
write-once.
- The workspace, under `.retired`. This row deletes no file. A prune with a receipt is a later act.
- `retired` stops a later create or hire from reusing the name. Decisions bind to the role instance and
outlive restarts (`broker.mjs:783-788`). A new `coder` would otherwise inherit an approval raised by the
old one. The tradeoff is a name that can't come back without a hand edit. I chose that over voiding
decisions, which would touch a second store.
### V6 veto
`veto.set` args: `{ revision, op: "keep" | "unkeep" | "nohire" | "hire", name }`. It goes through the
organization writer, so it is logged with actor and diff in `changes.jsonl`. `keep` needs a declared,
non-END_PROTECTED instance. `nohire` needs a name that matches the id pattern. A no-op answers
`organization-no-change`. It is human-only and isn't in `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS`.
## D2. Chief hire and fire
### D2.1 Authority (Mos, mos-1015 and mos-1017, through Sage, sage-1362 and sage-1365)
This row adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `ACTIONS` (`vocabulary.mjs:11`). Under PRD REQ-WAIT-3 a new
action is a hard wait until a PRD version says it isn't (`vocabulary.mjs:52-57`), so both ship as hard
waits. Jason resolves each one. There is no PRD change and no grant in a role file: `role.mjs:42` refuses
a withinRole that lists a hard wait, and REQ-WAIT-2 forbids it.
The flow in this row:
1. The chief raises a `role.hire` or `role.fire` decision whose body carries the arguments (business,
name, definition, vars, or name and reason). A hard wait goes to the human only. No arbiter resolves it.
2. Jason resolves it in the Console or the CLI.
3. The chief calls `instance.hire` or `instance.fire` citing the decision. The broker checks it with
`#consumeAuthority(s, 'role.hire', { decision, target })`, as the `role.revoke` decision branch does,
and the arguments must equal the decision body field by field (N1, webby-0010). For hire that is
`name`, `definition` and `vars` (vars compared with `canonicalJson`, absent equal to absent only). For
fire it is `name` and `reason`. A key in the call that the body lacks, or a body key the call lacks,
refuses `decision-mismatch`. Every check below runs again at this call, so a veto set after the resolve
still refuses.
The routed form, where the chief hires and fires without a decision each time, needs a PRD version that
moves both actions to `ROUTED`. My draft is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. It quotes
TARGET.md line 66 and carries Mos's bounds. Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console,
and Sage opens that decision. When it lands, a later commit adds the two actions to both `ROUTED` lists
(`vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:43-69`) and to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole. The broker then
takes the `reason` form instead of a decision. The verbs and every check below stay the same. This row
builds and tests the hard-wait form only. It writes the `hireable` key and its allowlist now (D2.3), because
both forms use them.
### D2.2 What the chief may do
| Act | Bus verb | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| launch | `launch` (host) | as today: listed instances only |
| end a run | `role.revoke` + reason | as today, and refused `instance-kept` when the target is kept (D2.4) |
| hire | `instance.hire { name, definition, vars?, decision }` | adds and lists an instance. Refusals below |
| fire | `instance.fire { name, reason, decision }` | ends I's runs, cancels I's open requests, and removes I from `launch.instances`. Refusals below |
Only the business's chief, the instance named by `launch.by`, may call either verb. Any other caller
refuses `role-not-chief`, even with a resolved decision, as `#classification` already limits
`role.launch`. The broker reads `hireable` from that chief's own role file. Both act only in the chief's
own business. Neither verb takes a business argument. The broker uses the
cap's business, and a decision raised in another business refuses `decision-mismatch`. Row 191's switch
refuses both while halted (D6). Every hire and fire writes `changes.jsonl` through the organization writer
with actor the chief's instance and run, and the decision id.
Hire refuses, in order:
1. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition holds an action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED` (D2.3), whatever
any list says.
2. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition isn't in the chief role file's `hireable` list, or is in
the business's `launch.noHire`.
3. `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED, `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` for a
credentialed definition (until the credentials row, row 199), `invalid-request` for version 1.
4. `organization-instance-retired` when the name is retired.
5. When the name exists: a fired instance (in `roles`, not listed) is listed again only if `definition`
equals its current one and `vars` is absent. Any other definition or vars refuses
`organization-instance-exists`, and so does a listed name. A re-hire never moves an instance's
decisions to a different role (B3).
Hire's `vars` may hold only the keys the chief can already set on an instance through `organization.set`
(the model key, `broker.mjs:1266-1269`) and narrowing `limits.*` keys. Anything else, such as `harness`
or a route, refuses `invalid-request`. The human sets those (N3).
Fire refuses `instance-kept` for a kept instance, `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED,
`organization-instance-referenced` for `launch.by`, and a BusinessError for the last listed instance. A
fired instance stays in `roles`. The chief never deletes. Delete stays a human act because it retires the
name.
Fire ends the fired instance's processes, not only its claims (F4, Megavolt through sage-1374). Every run
gets the shared model token at start: `ENV_ALLOW` (`packages/seat/src/session.mjs:83-94`) passes
`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` and the other provider variables into the sandbox. A revoke
can't take that token back, so a fired agent whose process lives on still holds it.
The delist is a business file commit through the organization writer, and the revoke and events are store
rows. No transaction covers both (webby-0011 B2), so fire runs in a fixed order, store side first:
A. One store transaction: steps 1 to 3 below, plus `fire.stopped` with the decision id. The decision isn't
consumed yet.
B. The delist through the organization writer (`launch.instances` loses I, logged in `changes.jsonl`).
C. One store write consuming the decision and recording `fire.done`.
If B or C fails, fire answers the step's code and the decision stays unconsumed. A second fire citing the
same decision runs again. A finds nothing to revoke, cancel or stop, and that isn't a refusal for fire
(unlike V3's `not-held`). B finds I already delisted and counts as done. C consumes. So a fire is safe to
repeat until it's consumed. The other order would leave a delisted agent with a live process and its model
token when the store step fails, which is the case F4 exists to stop. A halt between A and B doesn't stop
B or C, because neither starts anything. A second fire while halted refuses (D6), and the halt's own stop
covers the runs.
Steps 1 to 3 are V3's, with one change:
1. It revokes every claim the instance holds.
2. It writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for each of the instance's open requests.
3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs and `kill: true`. The launcher pass stops each runner, spawned
but unbound registry runs included, with escalation (sage-1380 item 1):
- SIGTERM after the identity check.
- After the grace, SIGKILL to any runner still alive, after the same identity check again, and
`lifecycle.end.killed` with the run and pid.
- A runner still alive after SIGKILL and the observe wait gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. The Console's
Agents section shows it to the human.
A runner whose identity no longer matches is never signalled. Every check, the recheck after the
grace included, uses the identity (start ticks plus boot id), never a bare pid, so a reused pid never
counts as the fired run (webby-0011 N2).
Fire's answer lists the runs it is stopping. The delist stops any new chief launch (`launch` takes listed
instances only). A human launch request already taken is past cancelling, as in V3. The human made it, the
fire answer names it, and the human's terminate ends its run.
The stop is row 191's per-run stop, not a second one, so the two can't fight (sage-1380 item 1). Row 191's
design r2 (`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`, "Stop policy and completion") sends SIGTERM, waits
5 s, sends SIGKILL to verified groups and namespaces, and observes for 2 s. Its identity check is start
ticks plus boot id, which replaces the start-time check at `launcher.mjs:526`. Fire calls that routine for
one instance's runs and uses its constants, so the grace is row 191's 5 s, not the 10 s in r3. The order:
- Fire is refused while halted (D6), so a halt sweep never meets a fire that started after it.
- A halt that comes during a fire's stop finds those runs already stopping. Each run has one stop receipt
(row 191's), and the first stop owns it. The halt sweep joins it instead of sending a second SIGTERM or
restarting the deadline, and counts the run in its remaining or quiescent totals.
- The record says which stop owned it: reason `fire` with the decision, or row 191's `kill-switch` with
its generation.
V3 terminate is unchanged. It still sends SIGTERM only (N6). Only fire escalates, because only a fired
agent must lose the token at once. If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its
candidate (Q177), as D6 already says.
### D2.3 The hire allowlist (B2, sage-1365 item 4, webby-0010 B1)
r2 and r3 had a deny list, `HIRE_FLOOR`. Webby's B1 showed it missed routed actions (`git.merge.protected`,
which `roles/merge-gate.json` holds with no credentials, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`,
`prd.approve`), and that any action added later would be hireable by default. That isn't fail-closed. r4
replaces it with an allowlist.
A definition is hireable only if every action in its withinRole and crossRole is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`:
| Allowed action | Held today by |
|---|---|
| `message.send`, `record.write` | every v2 role file |
| `review.request`, `task.update.assigned` | coder, cto, pm, reviewer |
| `task.scope.change`, `git.push.working` | coder, cto, pm (credentialed, so they matter only after row 199) |
Everything else in `ACTIONS` fails, including the actions of the old floor (`role.launch`, `role.end`,
`role.revoke`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `role.hire`, `role.fire`) and those
B1 named. An action added to `ACTIONS` later fails until a reviewed commit adds it here.
`git.push.remote` (row 199, routed to coder by PRD 1.7) isn't on the list. A coder holding it stays
unhireable until a reviewed commit adds it, after the credentials bound is lifted.
Against today's role files: chief-of-staff, cto, merge-gate, pm, reviewer and security-reviewer fail.
Assistant, researcher, coder and the five C-suite files pass the allowlist. Assistant is END_PROTECTED and
coder is credentialed, so D2.2 item 3 refuses them. The C-suite files hold only `message.send` and
`record.write`, so hiring one gives no authority beyond its name. `hireable` still has to list it.
The list is a constant in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, `HIRE_ALLOWED`. It is checked twice:
- At load. `role.mjs` validates the chief role file's `hireable` list: distinct definition names, each
present in `rolesDir`, version 2, and every action on `HIRE_ALLOWED`. A list naming one that isn't refuses
the role file (`hireable names <def>, which holds <action>`). The check reads only the named file's authority lists,
never its `hireable`, so a list can't recurse. `hireable` is an optional key on any role file. This is a
role schema change, named for review.
- At hire, in the broker, against the definition as loaded then. A role file edited after load is caught
here.
`hireable` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json` stays empty in this row (`[]`, Q4, sage-1374). Naming the first
role kind is a separate policy commit in `roles/`, made after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision, as
AGENTS.md invariant 7 requires. With an empty list the chief can hire nothing, even with Jason's resolve,
until that commit. The row's tests use scratch role files whose `hireable` names a kind.
### D2.4 The per-agent forbid and the veto (sage-1365 item 3)
TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids
per agent". The forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes:
- `launch.keep`: instance names. The chief can't fire, replace or end a kept instance. The broker refuses
`instance-kept` for every chief act aimed at it except launch:
- `instance.fire`, even with a resolved `role.fire` decision. Mos's limit is that Jason's veto applies
to every hire and fire, so the human unkeeps before a fire.
- a hire of that name.
- `role.revoke` in the reason branch (`broker.mjs:1607-1613`). End then launch is a replace (E6).
- an `organization.set` write of that instance's model key (B7). A model change is a replace at the next
launch.
The `role.revoke` decision branch (`broker.mjs:1614-1615`) still ends a kept run. It ends a run, it
doesn't fire or replace, and it cites a decision the human resolved (Webby's Q2 ruling). The human's V3
and the limits also still end a kept run.
- `launch.noHire`: definition names the chief can't hire into this business (D2.2 item 2).
Why the chief can't change the forbid:
- Only `veto.set` writes the lists. It is human-only (`#human(s)` then the D4 hook) and refuses the tester.
- `organization.set`, the chief's one write verb, reaches only `ORGANIZATION_KEYS` (`broker.mjs:145`),
which exclude `launch` and `retired`.
- `instances.set` is human or tester only (`broker.mjs:1248-1298`).
- Hire and fire carry no field that writes either list.
T18 tests each of those paths from a chief session and checks the business file bytes are unchanged.
END_PROTECTED instances can't be kept (N7). That is intended: Q169 lets the chief end the assistant's
runs, and the assistant's own stop is `assistant.stop`. Default, per "unless user forbids": nothing is
kept and nothing is on `noHire`.
### D2.5 Where it lives and how the broker enforces it
The forbid lives in the business file, under `launch`, beside the membership it limits:
`launch.keep: [instance]`, `launch.noHire: [definition]`, and top-level `retired: [instance]`. `hireable`
lives in the chief's role file, because it bounds the role, not one business.
`checkLaunch` (`business.mjs:118`) gains the two keys. Each list is distinct. `keep` names declared,
non-protected instances. `noHire` entries need only the id pattern (N2). A stale deny entry is harmless,
and a reviewed commit that removes a role file must not stop every business that lists it. `retired`
names none of `roles`. This is the business-file schema change for review. Old files without the keys load
unchanged. An old bus loader rejects a file that has them (`rejectUnknownKeys`), so a rollback past this
row needs the keys removed first. The activation plan has to say so (R4).
The broker enforces from its live copy of the business, which D3 keeps current. The checks sit in the
`role.revoke` reason branch, in `organization.set`'s model write and in the two chief verbs, before any
write.
## D3. Live changes
Today the broker's `#businesses` is fixed at start (E3), and `instances.set` answers `restart: true` for
add and redefine.
1. `Broker.reloadBusiness(id, document)` swaps in one business's validated document. It is synchronous, so
no request sees half of it. It refuses an unknown id and a document whose `human` changed (that is row
193's ground).
2. The runtime's organization callback (`runtime.mjs:121-133`) calls it in one place, after every verb
that commits a write, whatever the verb (N1). Today that is `limits.set`, `instances.set`, `routes.set`
and `plugins.set`, and after this row `veto.set`, `instance.hire`, `instance.fire` and the launcher's
delete through the same writer. It loads from the file through the loader `bootConfig` uses
(`cli/src/config.mjs:88-105`), so the broker holds exactly what a restart would give it. Then
`limits.refresh(id)` runs, as `plugins.set` does now.
3. Other startup consumers of `businesses` in `startBroker` (`runtime.mjs:75-81`): credential references,
usage, the web services and the tasks adapter's bots. A create or hire adds no credentials, no tracker
bot and no web grant, because credentialed definitions are refused. The build checks each consumer
against that claim. Any change that would need one of them still answers `restart: true` and doesn't
reload.
4. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running`. A live cap must not change
authority under its run. This is new: today the change waits for the restart. Existing tests that pin
`restart: true` change with it (N4): `business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs`,
`bus/tests/instances-verb.test.mjs`, `cli/tests/instances.test.mjs:76-94` (the `RESTART_NEEDED` text and
the restart line) and `webui/tests/instances.test.mjs:25, 71, 74, 140-145`. The build names each
changed assertion in its manifest.
5. The chief's `launch` tool (E5) takes `instance` as a string with the id pattern instead of the start-time
enum. Its description says the host refuses an unlisted instance. `check()` already refuses one
(`launcher.mjs:235`). Without this, the chief can't launch its own hire until its session restarts.
`tools.mjs` may carry hash pins in tests. The build greps for them (R5).
6. Hand edits of the business file still need a restart. Nothing watches the file. The one exception is
`bus.tester` (D4.1), read from the file at each tester call.
After this, `restart` is false for create, delete, hire, fire and veto changes, and true only under item 3.
## D4. RBAC until row 193
Every human verb above calls `#human(s)` and then one hook, `#mayHuman(s, verb, target)`. Until row 193
lands, the hook passes for the business's one `human`, which is the owner. The verbs are listed once, in
an exported `LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS` (`instance.launch`, `instance.end`, `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set`,
and `instances.set` ops `add`, `change`, `delete`), so row 193 maps each verb to the human roles that may
use it. Row 193 replaces the hook body and nothing else.
### D4.1 The tester (Sage, sage-1355)
What the tester may do after this row:
| Verb | Tester |
|---|---|
| `instance.launch`, `instance.end` | yes, new |
| `instances.set` ops `add`, `change` | yes, as today (row 175, `broker.mjs:103`, `serve.mjs:537`) |
| `instances.set` op `delete` | no, `tester-refused` in the broker (B6) |
| `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set` | no, `tester-refused` |
The tester's cap is bound to one business, and only when that business sets `bus.tester` to true
(`broker.mjs:542-546`). That stays Jason's switch, and no bus verb writes it. Two checks run on each tester
lifecycle call, before any effect, and again at the take (D1.1):
1. The request's business is the cap's business. Any other refuses `tester-refused`.
2. `bus.tester` is exactly true in the business file as it stands, read through `settings.current(id)` as
`harnessOn` does (`runtime.mjs:136-142`), not from the broker's copy (B8). An unreadable file refuses
`tester-off`. So a hand edit turning testing off counts at the next tester call, without a restart.
The request and done events record actor `tester`. The tester's Q173 tests of the Agents section then cover
launch and terminate on a scratch business, and the rest through fixtures.
## D5. One stack instance
Row 190 carries the stack instance as the config `MOSAIC_CONFIG` names. These verbs take no instance name.
The CLI reaches the broker socket under that config's `dataRoot`. The broker acts on its own businesses,
launcher and data root. A business id that exists in two stack instances is two separate businesses. A test
runs two scratch roots with the same business id and shows a launch, a terminate and a delete in one leave
the other byte-identical (T11).
## D6. The kill switch
- Launch and regenerate end in `start()`, which row 191 gates (its D3 inventory, `launcher.mjs:329-457`).
The new pass adds no second start path.
- The broker refuses `instance.launch` and `instance.regenerate` with `processing-halted` while the switch
is on (V2 step 1), and the take checks again (D1.1), so no request is waiting when a human resumes.
- `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` are agent work verbs, so row 191's default refuses them while halted.
The build adds them to row 191's work table, not its read list. A hire Jason resolved before a halt
still refuses while halted, and the chief calls it again after the resume.
- Terminate, create, delete and veto start nothing and stay allowed.
- If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its candidate (Q177). The two halted
checks are written against its reader and tested with its fixture.
## D7. The Console
A new Settings section, "Agents", in its own `agents.js` file. Settings itself isn't rewritten. It lists
each instance with definition, listed, kept, retired and running runs, and flags a run with a
`lifecycle.end.alive` event as "still running after fire" (D2.2). It has these actions:
- Create (definition select, from `definitions`), Delete (with a confirm naming what stays: the evidence
and the workspace under `.retired`).
- Launch, Terminate (with an optional reason), Regenerate (with a confirm).
- Keep and Unkeep per instance, and a No-hire toggle per definition.
The routes are `POST /api/instances` (op `delete` joins `add` and `change`), `POST /api/agent/launch`,
`/api/agent/terminate`, `/api/agent/regenerate` and `POST /api/veto`. Each uses `instanceSend`'s boundary:
signed-in user, exact Origin, same-origin Fetch Metadata, JSON within 16 KiB, strict keys, one bus call
through the human transport, and `outcome-unknown` on an unexpected answer. Launch and regenerate show the
request, then poll `GET /api/agent/request?id=` until it closes.
`agents.js` joins the static file list (`serve.mjs:28`) and `index.html` (N5).
When `/api/config` says `send` is false, every action button shows as unavailable with the text "Agent
actions are unavailable here. Use mosaic business instance from the instance CLI." This is the live state
until Q175 phase 2. Every write test uses a fixture server and fixture writers, as rows 165 and 191 do. No
route gets a `--send` exception.
## D8. Tests
Every test uses scratch roots under `TMPDIR` and the existing fixtures (`business/tests/helpers.mjs`,
`cli/tests/helpers.mjs`, `webui/tests/tester-fixture.mjs`). None touches `~/.mosaic-dev`,
`~/.config/mosaic-dev`, a live unit or a slot file.
| Test | Shows | File |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | V1 create on a running bus: a launch of the new instance binds with no restart, and the answer says `restart: false` | cli `instances.test.mjs` |
| T2 | V2: a human launch of an unlisted instance runs. `launch.by` goes through the `pm` branch (N8). A thread instance, a retired one and a revoked business refuse at the verb. A request older than 60 s never launches. A refused `check()` closes the request with its code | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` (new) |
| T2a | Take: a `launch.revoke` between the request and the pass closes it `launch-revoked` with no process. A `lifecycleDone` that throws once leaves the request taken, and the next tick starts nothing. A taken request is never taken twice | same |
| T3 | V2 with `--no-launch` and with each limit refusal: no process, request closed with the code | same |
| T4 | V3: claims revoked, runner SIGTERMed after the start-time check, one end record. A mismatched start time sends no signal. An open request is cancelled and never starts. A spawned, unbound run in the registry is signalled | same |
| T5 | V4: the new run starts only after the old exit, with a new run dir and the same workspace. A run that ignores SIGTERM closes the request `regenerate-timeout` with nothing started. The assistant refuses `regenerate-thread` | same |
| T6 | V5: each refusal in the V5 table, in order, including `instance-starting` with an open request. A clean delete leaves the evidence bytes unchanged, commits the file before the rename, adds `retired`, and a create or hire of the same name refuses. A failed rename closes `workspace-rename-failed`, `check()` refuses the name, and a second delete renames only | business `instance-settings.test.mjs` and cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` |
| T7 | V6: each op, the no-op refusal, an unknown `noHire` name accepted, and a `changes.jsonl` entry with actor `human` | business |
| T8 | Chief hire (hard-wait form): no decision refuses. A decision raised by the chief goes to the human only, no arbiter. After the resolve, the hire adds and lists the instance, logs actor and decision, and the same chief session launches it (D3 item 5). Arguments that differ from the decision body refuse. A non-chief caller with a resolved decision refuses `role-not-chief`. Outside `hireable`, in `noHire`, credentialed, END_PROTECTED, retired, and extra vars each refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
| T8a | Re-hire (B3): a fired name with the same definition and no vars is listed again. Another definition or vars refuses `organization-instance-exists` | same |
| T8b | Hire allowlist (D2.3): one case per action in `ACTIONS` that is neither on `HIRE_ALLOWED` nor a hard wait (`role.mjs` already refuses those), looped from the lists, not typed by hand. A fixture definition, clean when the chief's role file loads and listed in `hireable`, is rewritten to hold that action before the hire. The hire refuses `definition-not-hireable`. A definition holding one allowed and one refused action refuses. One holding only allowed actions hires. A pin test fixes `HIRE_ALLOWED` to the six actions | same |
| T8c | Allowlist at load: a role file whose `hireable` names a definition holding each refused action refuses at `loadRole`, one case per action, looped the same way. The mixed case refuses. A clean list loads. A missing, version 1 or duplicate name refuses | business `role.test.mjs` |
| T9 | Chief fire: runs end, open requests cancelled, delisted, still in `roles`. Kept (even with a resolved decision), END_PROTECTED, `launch.by` and last-listed refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
| T9a | Fire ends processes (F4, sage-1380 item 1): with a bound run and a spawned but unbound registry run of I, both fixture runners holding a stand-in model variable, fire answers both runs. After the launcher pass, neither runner pid is alive and I holds no claim. A fixture runner that ignores SIGTERM gets SIGKILL after the grace, is gone, and has `lifecycle.end.killed` with its run and pid. A stand-in whose kill is stubbed to fail gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. A runner whose identity changed before the SIGTERM, or between SIGTERM and SIGKILL, gets no signal. V3 terminate of a SIGTERM-ignoring runner sends no SIGKILL | cli `launcher.test.mjs` |
| T9b | Fire and row 191's halt: a halt during a fire's stop sends no second SIGTERM, keeps the fire's deadline, writes one stop receipt with reason `fire` and the decision, and counts the run in its totals. A fire while halted refuses (D6) | cli `launcher.test.mjs`, on row 191's fixture |
| T9c | Fire order (webby-0011 B2): the organization writer stubbed to fail after A commits. Fire answers the writer's code, I's claims are revoked and its runs stopped, I is still listed, and the decision is unconsumed. A second fire citing the same decision delists I and consumes it. A third fire refuses `decision-consumed`. With C stubbed to fail, the second fire finds I delisted and only consumes | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
| T10 | Keep: chief `role.revoke` with a reason, fire, hire of that name and an `organization.set` model write aimed at a kept instance each refuse `instance-kept`. A `role.revoke` citing a human-resolved decision ends the kept run (Q2). The human's V3 works | same |
| T11 | Two scratch stack instances with the same business id: V2, V3 and V5 in A leave B's root and config byte-identical. A chief of business A can't hire into business B on the same bus | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs`, bus |
| T12 | Agent and reader sessions refuse every human verb before any effect. The tester gets exactly the D4.1 table, including `tester-refused` for `instances.set` op `delete` (B6). The D4 hook is called with the verb | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
| T12a | Tester launch and terminate work on the cap's business with `bus.tester` true, record actor `tester`, and refuse `tester-refused` for a second business on the same bus. A file edit setting `bus.tester` to false, with no restart, refuses the next call and the take `tester-off`. An unreadable file refuses `tester-off` | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
| T13 | `organization.set` with `launch`, `retired`, `keep` or `noHire` keys refuses | bus |
| T14 | Live reload: after each committed verb, `plugins.set` and `routes.set` included, the broker answers from the new document. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running` | bus |
| T15 | Kill switch (with row 191's fixture): launch and regenerate refuse `processing-halted` at the verb and at the take, hire and fire refuse, terminate works | bus and cli |
| T16 | Console: each route's boundary refusals, a fixture write per action, `outcome-unknown` on a bad shape, unavailable buttons when `send` is false, request polling, and `agents.js` served from the static list | webui `agents.test.mjs` (new) |
| T17 | Business file: the new keys validate, each bad entry refuses, and a file without them loads byte for byte as before | business `business.test.mjs` |
| T18 | The forbid can't be changed by the chief (D2.4): from a chief session, `veto.set`, `organization.set` with each list key, `instances.set`, and hire and fire with extra fields all refuse, and the business file bytes are unchanged | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
### Mutants
Each one must fail at least one test. They run against the candidate, and the file is restored and its
sha256 checked after each one.
| # | Change | Killer |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | `instance.launch` skips `#human` | T12 |
| M2 | the pass calls `check()` without `human: true` | T2 |
| M3 | the take accepts a request older than 60 s | T2 |
| M4 | the take skips the `launch_state` check | T2a |
| M5 | terminate signals without the start-time check | T4 |
| M6 | regenerate starts before the old exit | T5 |
| M7 | delete skips the running check | T6 |
| M8 | delete skips `retired` | T6 |
| M9 | delete clears `keep` instead of refusing | T6 |
| M10 | delete removes the workspace instead of renaming it | T6 |
| M11 | the `keep` check is removed from the `role.revoke` reason branch | T10 |
| M12 | `noHire` is not read by hire | T8 |
| M13 | fire deletes the instance from `roles` | T9 |
| M14 | `reloadBusiness` isn't called after `instances.set` | T1, T14 |
| M15 | the tool enum is kept | T8 |
| M16 | the halted check is dropped from `instance.launch` | T15 |
| M17 | the Console route skips the Origin check | T16 |
| M18 | `veto.set` joins `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS` | T12 |
| M19 | the tester's business scope check is dropped | T12a |
| M20 | the tester's `bus.tester` file read is dropped | T12a |
| M21 | hire skips the role file's `hireable` list | T8 |
| M22 | the take doesn't write `lifecycle.taken`, so a request can be taken twice | T2a |
| M23 | terminate doesn't cancel open requests | T4 |
| M24 | delete skips the `instance-starting` check | T6 |
| M25 | delete renames before it commits the file | T6 |
| M26 | the tester's `instances.set` op `delete` refusal is dropped | T12 |
| M27 | the `keep` check is dropped from `organization.set`'s model write | T10 |
| M28 | the `keep` check is added to the `role.revoke` decision branch | T10 |
| M29 | a re-hire accepts a different definition | T8a |
| M30 to M36 | the broker's hire check accepts one action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED`, one mutant per action: `role.launch`, `role.end`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `git.merge.protected`, `decision.resolve.technical` | T8b |
| M37 to M43 | the same seven, accepted by the load check in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
| M44 | fire skips `instance-kept` when a decision is cited | T9 |
| M45 | `instance.hire` skips the `launch.by` caller check | T8 |
| M46 | `veto.set` skips `#human` | T18 |
| M47 | the broker's hire check needs some action on `HIRE_ALLOWED` instead of every action | T8b |
| M48 | the same in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
| M49 | fire revokes the claims but writes no `lifecycle.end`, so no runner is signalled | T9a |
| M50 | fire's signal skips spawned but unbound registry runs | T9a |
| M51 | fire's stop drops the SIGKILL escalation | T9a |
| M52 | SIGKILL is sent without the second identity check | T9a |
| M53 | a killed runner gets no `lifecycle.end.killed` | T9a |
| M54 | V3 terminate escalates to SIGKILL as fire does | T9a |
| M55 | the halt sweep sends its own SIGTERM and restarts the deadline on a run fire is stopping | T9b |
| M56 | fire delists before the store step | T9c |
| M57 | fire consumes the decision in step A | T9c |
| M58 | a second fire with nothing to revoke refuses `not-held` | T9c |
## Scope and boundaries
- In the row: the verbs and passes above in `business` (vocabulary, role validation, instance-settings,
business validation), `bus` (broker verbs, reload, runtime callback), `cli` (instances command, launcher
pass, host ops), `harness` (the launch tool's schema, and the hire and fire tools), `webui` (routes and
the Agents section), the tests, the package READMEs and the PRD draft in this packet. `docs/TOOLS.md`
text goes to Sage.
- Named for review:
- Vocabulary: `role.hire` and `role.fire` join `ACTIONS` as hard waits, under REQ-WAIT-3. The commit
message names them as hard waits, as REQ-WAIT-3 requires.
- Role schema: the optional `hireable` key, validated in `role.mjs` (D2.3).
- Role file: `roles/chief-of-staff.json` gains `"hireable": []`. No authority change.
- Business file schema: `launch.keep`, `launch.noHire`, `retired` (D2.5).
- Not in the row: the routed form (after PRD 1.7), filling `hireable`, credentialed hires and deletes (row
199), clear context for the assistant (T1 item 7), human roles (row 193), SIGKILL escalation, and any
live activation or Console start.
## Risks
- R1. Case 1's working roles (coder, reviewer, pm, cto) all declare credentials (E11), and pm, cto and
reviewer fail the hire allowlist anyway. Neither the human verb nor the chief can create or delete credentialed
roles until the credentials row (row 199). That is the largest gap against Case 1, and it isn't this
row's to close.
- R2. The human proof is path-bound and same-uid (P19 333). Any same-uid process that runs the tree's
`human-cli.mjs` can launch and delete. Row 190b's separate uid and row 193 narrow it. This row adds no
check of its own.
- R3. The 60 s request window means a slow `check()` (checkouts) can still start a run up to that point
after the CLI gave up. The CLI says so on timeout.
- R4. Rollback past this row needs `keep`, `noHire` and `retired` removed from each business file, and
`hireable` from the role file, or the old loaders refuse them. The activation plan states this.
- R5. `tools.mjs`, `serve.mjs`, `broker.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs` and `role.mjs` may carry sha256 pins in
other packages' tests. The build greps the tests for every changed path plus a 64-hex value before
in-review, without a `head`.
- R6. With `hireable` empty, the chief can hire nothing until the policy commit in `roles/` that follows
the `prd.approve` resolve names a kind (Q4). Case 1's "as needed" waits on that commit and on PRD 1.7.
- R7. Fire's SIGKILL closes the SIGTERM-ignoring case (sage-1380). A runner still alive after SIGKILL
(an unkillable process, or a stop whose identity check fails) keeps the shared model token until the
human acts on `lifecycle.end.alive`. Only a per-agent model token (row 199 Q-M4, a later proxy row)
would let a fire revoke the token itself.
## Questions and rulings
- Q1, ruled by Mos (mos-1015, mos-1017, through sage-1365): `role.hire` and `role.fire` ship as hard
waits Jason resolves. The routed form needs PRD 1.7, drafted in `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. D2.1.
- Q2, ruled by Webby (webby-0003): keep blocks the chief's `role.revoke` reason branch, not its decision
branch. D2.4.
- Q3, ruled by Sage (sage-1355): launch and terminate are tester verbs scoped to the tester's own
business, behind `bus.tester`. D4.1.
- Q4, ruled by Sage (sage-1374): `hireable` stays empty in this row. Naming the first role kind is a
separate policy commit in `roles/` after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision. Tests use scratch role
files that name a kind. D2.3.
## r2 changes against webby-0003
| Finding | Where |
|---|---|
| B1 | D2.1: hard waits under REQ-WAIT-3, no role grant. The routed form is PRD 1.7 (packet draft) |
| B2 | D2.3: the floor from sage-1365 item 4, checked at load and at hire, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43 (an allowlist since r4) |
| B3 | D2.2 hire item 5: a re-hire keeps the definition, T8a, M29 |
| B4 | D1.1: one `lifecycleTake` transaction re-checks and writes `lifecycle.taken`, T2a, M4, M22 |
| B5 | V3 cancels open requests and signals unbound runs. V5 refuses `instance-starting`, runs under `serialize`, commits the file before the rename, and states the recovery. T4, T6, M23 to M25 |
| B6 | V5 table and D4.1: the tester's delete refuses, T12, M26 |
| B7 | D2.4: keep covers `organization.set`'s model write, T10, M27 |
| B8 | D4.1: `bus.tester` is read from the file at each call and at the take, T12a, M20 |
| Q2 | D2.4, T10, M28 |
| N1 | D3 item 2: one reload after every committed write |
| N2 | D2.5: `noHire` takes any id-pattern name |
| N3 | D2.2: hire's vars limited to the model key and narrowing `limits.*` |
| N4 | D3 item 4 names the tests that change |
| N5 | D7 and T16: `agents.js` joins `serve.mjs:28` and `index.html` |
| N6 | V3 and V4: no SIGKILL, `regenerate-timeout` |
| N7 | D2.4: intended, Q169 |
| N8 | V2 item 2 and T2 |
## r3 changes against sage-1374, sage-1377 and Megavolt's F4
| Item | Where |
|---|---|
| Q4 ruled: `hireable` stays empty, the first kind is a later policy commit in `roles/` | D2.3, R6, Questions |
| `instance.name` joins the floor (Webby B2, mos-1023 item 6) | D2.3 table, T8b, T8c, M47, M48 |
| F4: fire ends the fired agent's processes, since `ENV_ALLOW` gives every run the shared model token | D2.2, D7, T9a, M49 to M51, R7 |
| `git.push.remote` routed to coder only (mos-1028 item 3, row 199 r3) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`, REQ-LAND-2 and the REQ-WAIT-3 append |
## r4 changes against webby-0010, sage-1380 and megavolt-0008
| Item | Where |
|---|---|
| webby-0010 B1: the deny-list floor becomes the allowlist `HIRE_ALLOWED`, so merge-gate, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`, `prd.approve` and any later action are refused | D2.3, Summary, R1, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43, M47, M48, PRD REQ-COS-3 bound |
| webby-0010 N1: field-by-field compare of the call against the decision body, extra or missing keys refuse | D2.1 item 3 |
| webby-0010 N2: the model write is in REQ-COS-3's text | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
| sage-1380 item 1: fire escalates to SIGKILL through row 191's per-run stop, and the order against a halt is fixed | D2.2, T9a, T9b, M51 to M55, R7 |
| sage-1380 item 2 and megavolt-0008: REQ-LAND-2 binds one commit oid, and Megavolt's three text changes against row 199 r4 (e1aa6216c) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
| webby-0011 B1: same as webby-0010 B1, M47 and M48 now allowlist mutants | D2.3 |
| webby-0011 B2: fire runs store side first, then the delist, then the consume, safe to repeat | D2.2 order A to C, T9c, M56 to M58 |
| webby-0011 N1: the remote-owner host check at each push | sent to Megavolt for row 199 |
| webby-0011 N2: identity, not bare pid, at every check | D2.2 step 3 |
| Q4: Webby's view matches Sage's ruling (empty) | no change |
@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
# PRD 1.8 draft: trusted actions within role guardrails, the manual mode, and grants the chief of staff
# requests and the user approves
Draft by Honker for Vikunja #434, under Mos's assignment mos-1117 (through Sage, sage-1525). Not approved.
It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision. Sage opens that decision and sends
Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 008746b6e, plus the version 1.7 text Jason
approved (PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md r2, 9ba31b5b3, decision d52febb5, mos-1089). Where 1.7 is not yet written into
the PRD file, this draft's anchors name 1.7's sections.
Revision 2 makes Mos's edits a to f (mos-1124, through Sage, sage-1534) and fixes Duckworth's B1 and B2
with notes N1 to N6 (duckworth-0057) on r1 at 3c30f1036. Revision 3 fixes Duckworth's C1 and takes
notes N1 and N2 (duckworth-0058) on r2 at 60f5ca8fa, with Gizmoduck's enrollment wording
(gizmoduck-0067). Revision 4 makes Mos's rulings on duckworth-0057 (mos-1129, through Sage, sage-1538)
on r3 at d16ccdb91: only an Approve creates a grant, one decision for a grant that makes an account, and
the arbiter route for `host.sudo`. Revision 5 fixes two stale notes from Duckworth's r4 check
(duckworth-0061 N1), with no change to the requirement text. Revision 6 makes Mos's wording for those
notes and adds two items for Jason at approval (mos-1138, through Sage, sage-1548), again with no change
to the requirement text.
For Jason at approval: "The main agent or chief of staff" in Q10 is read as one role under two names,
the chief of staff. So only the chief raises a grant request, and your assistant passes your own request
to the chief. That reading is Mos's (mos-1124). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-1
changes before the text goes into the PRD.
Also for Jason at approval:
- Only an Approve creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. An agent
that runs as the same OS user as the stack can still write the stack's own store. That is the B7
residual (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54), and this version doesn't close it.
- Who decides a root command on another host changes. Once `host.sudo` is routed, a raise for it that
cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, as version 1.7 set for
`git.push.remote`, not to you. The grant and its allowlist still limit the command. In manual mode the
decision comes to you (REQ-TRUST-2).
- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". "Mos" is read as your assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), limited to
grants in its own organization, and the tester may revoke only on a dev instance. That reading is Mos's
(mos-1124 d, mos-1132). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-4 changes before the text
goes into the PRD.
- The broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of
command is the messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check (REQ-GRANT-1).
## What it changes
Today an agent acts without a raise only on actions its role file grants within-role, and the role
files grant few. Every other use of a tool or command waits on a decision. Row 210 builds `host.sudo` as a
hard wait, so Jason would decide each command run on another machine. Grants themselves are hand work:
Jason makes every token and key from a runbook (REQ-CRED-1).
Jason's ruling Q188 turns this around. Roles set what each agent may do, and by default agents do it at
will within their sandbox and guardrails. A per-use raise happens only in a manual mode. No agent creates
a grant. The chief of staff brings a grant request to the user's inbox, the user clicks Approve or Deny, and
protected stack code does every step of making the grant. The user's own tokens are entered once in the
WebUI and never reach an agent.
This version adds:
1. Trusted actions within role guardrails as the default mode (REQ-TRUST-1).
2. Manual mode, a list of actions that each need a decision per use: who sets it, where it lives and what
it changes (REQ-TRUST-2).
3. Grant requests, raised only by the chief of staff through the chain of command (REQ-GRANT-1).
4. Approve and the protected grant code, with three grant methods: machine key, Gitea and GitHub
(REQ-GRANT-2).
5. The user's tokens, entered in the WebUI and used only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
6. Row 210's REQ-CRED-4, generalized from `host.sudo` to every role-listed action that uses a grant
(REQ-CRED-4).
7. Instant revoke (REQ-GRANT-4).
The hard waits stay with the user (Mos, mos-1117): spending money, deleting data, new external accounts,
messages outside the fleet and the rest of REQ-WAIT-1. Approving a grant is the user resolving one of
those hard waits, `credential.mint`. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's own Gitea user
(Q190), is the same one decision: its method says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account
name before Approve. So no hard wait moves to an agent.
When this version lands, reviewed commits:
1. add the manual-mode list to the organization file schema, written only on the human's path
(REQ-TRUST-2), and make the broker classify a listed action as needing a decision for each use, before
any other routing.
2. add the grant request: a decision the chief of staff raises with action `credential.mint`, naming the
agent, the method and target, the exact rights and, when the method makes an account, the account
name (REQ-GRANT-1). The broker refuses a `credential.mint` raise from any other role. An
`account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as it does in version 1.7, such as a PM's
sign-up for a service.
3. add the grant code that runs on a resolved Approve, one method at a time, and the grant record it
writes (REQ-GRANT-2, Vikunja #435 and #436).
4. add the user's token store, written from the WebUI (or the CLI until the Console knows the signed-in
human) and read only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
5. move `host.sudo` into both `ROUTED` lists, as row 199 does for `git.push.remote`, and route it under
REQ-CRED-4, with the arbiter route version 1.7 set for `git.push.remote`. Which definitions list it
within-role is a separate reviewed role commit in `roles/`.
6. update the role contracts that list the hard waits: `roles/chief-of-staff.md:75` raises grant
requests with the REQ-GRANT-1 fields, and `roles/pm.md:55` asks the chief of staff for a grant instead
of raising `credential.mint` itself (line numbers on origin/refactor). Other roles that list the hard
waits get the same line as the PM. A role's messaging list carries the chain of command.
## Text for the PRD
Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
> Version 1.8 records Jason's ruling Q188 of 2026-10-20: trusted actions within role guardrails by
> default, a manual mode for per-use raises, and grants the chief of staff requests and the user
> approves, approved by Jason in decision <prd.approve decision id>.
Source, two new bullets above "Version 1.7 source":
> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q188 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answers to Q8 and Q10, in part.
> Q8: "I would rather grant the grant right to an agent that runs with strict guardrails. That agent
> presents the final authorization for the user. Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically.
> I see this as: User configures their PATs, API tokens, authorizations within the WebUI. The agent
> presents the request for grant with X rights for another agent. The user reviews, then clicks
> Approve/Deny. Click of Approve fires off protected mechanical methods to handle the grants on Github,
> Gitea, .... services as needed. The tooling would need to exist and must be guarded." And "Disallowing
> the agents to create grants autonomously is a necessary evil for better security. Requiring the user
> to manually perform the steps is a no-fly." Q10: "Agents should have tools and command access based on
> roles. Those roles dictate the allowed tools and commands. The use of a tool or command should not be
> raised to the user unless the system is configured with a manual mode that requires user
> interaction. By default I want to have the agents capable of running commands and tools at will
> within their sandbox/guardrails. This allows autonomous actions by agents within their lanes. Perhaps
> a "Trusted actions within approved guardrails" methodology." And "The main agent or chief of staff
> would be responsible for surfacing the request to the user's inbox for approval. Not all agents are
> capable or authorized to request directly. It must follow the chain of command properly." He agreed
> with Mos's Q10 points 3 to 6: protected stack code does every step on Approve, his tokens are entered
> in the WebUI and agents never see them, a command on the approved list runs without a click and any
> other is refused, and he, Mos or the tester can revoke a grant at once.
> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q190 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answer "Q12: O1": each agent seat
> gets its own account on his Gitea, created through the Q188 approval path once the Gitea grants exist.
Under "Decisions", after REQ-DEC-6, a new section:
> ### Trusted actions
>
> Added in version 1.8 (Q188).
>
> - **REQ-TRUST-1.** Agents act within their role guardrails without asking. The default mode is
> "trusted actions within approved guardrails". An action a role file grants within-role is done at
> will, inside the agent's sandbox, its tool limit and its grants, and is logged. It raises nothing to
> the user. An action the file doesn't grant within-role still routes by REQ-DEC-2, and a hard wait
> still goes to the user (REQ-WAIT-1). Only a reviewed role change adds an action to a role file, and
> REQ-WAIT-2 still keeps every hard wait out of every role file.
> - **REQ-TRUST-2.** The user can put chosen actions in manual mode. The organization file holds the list
> of actions in manual mode, empty by default. While an action is on the list, every use of it by any
> role becomes a decision for that use, raised to the user, and the action waits until the user
> resolves it. A decision denied, or not resolved, refuses the action. Each decision is used once. For a
> command on another host, the decision names the host, the command and its input. Actions not on the
> list are unchanged. Only the user changes the list, through the WebUI or the CLI. The chief of
> staff's organization writes (REQ-ROLE-3) can't change it, and no agent can. Every change is logged
> with who made it. A change applies to the next use, and a run already in progress keeps no
> exemption.
Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-3 (version 1.7):
> Added in version 1.8 (Q188):
>
> - **REQ-CRED-4.** An action a role definition lists within-role, and that uses a grant, runs without a
> decision for each use only when all of these hold:
> - the definition declares the credential kind the action uses;
> - a grant names that agent, and that host or service;
> - for a command, the command matches the grant's allowlist. A grant lists exact argv prefixes. A
> wildcard grant is refused;
> - the agent's key or token for that grant is issued and not revoked.
>
> A command off the allowlist is refused, and adding one takes a new grant request (REQ-GRANT-1). An
> action whose definition doesn't list it within-role still needs a decision for each use. Only a
> reviewed role change adds an action to a definition. `host.sudo` routes under this requirement.
> - **REQ-GRANT-1.** No agent creates or writes a grant. A grant request follows the chain of command,
> and only the chief of staff raises it to the user's inbox. Any other role that needs a grant for
> itself or for an agent it directs asks the chief of staff, through its chain: a worker role through its
> PM, the PM and the CTO directly. The assistant passes the user's own request to the chief of staff
> (REQ-ASSIST-1). The request names the agent, the grant method and its target, the exact rights, and a
> rotate-by or expiry date. The chief raises one only for an agent whose reviewed role definition
> allows that kind of credential, and the broker refuses any other. A grant can't name a wildcard, a
> shell or an empty command. The request is a decision with the action `credential.mint`, so it goes
> to the user as a hard wait (REQ-WAIT-1). A grant whose method makes an account, such as a seat's own
> Gitea user (Q190), is the same one decision: the method in the grant says it makes an account, the
> request names the account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user's one
> resolution covers the account and its credential, so the hard-waits list doesn't change. An
> `account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as version 1.7 has it. The broker checks
> only that the chief of staff raised the request. The chain of command before that is in the
> messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check.
> - **REQ-GRANT-2.** The user approves or denies each grant request in the inbox. Approve is the only thing
> that creates a grant, and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. No agent
> creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. Row 210's hand-written
> grants stay a test path until Vikunja #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. On Approve,
> protected stack code does every step, not an agent and not the user: it records the grant, makes the
> key or token, installs it on the machine or creates it on the service, and logs each step. On Deny
> nothing is made, and the denial is logged. The grant methods are:
> - machine key: a key for one agent on one enrolled host, with the command allowlist of REQ-CRED-4. A
> host's identity comes from the host side when the user approves its enrollment, never from a first
> connection. A host user with sudo receives a grant only after the user approved that user by name;
> - Gitea: a token for one agent, and for an agent seat its own Gitea user (Q190), with an expiry. The
> all scope and the admin scope are never granted;
> - GitHub: a grant for one agent.
>
> The Gitea and GitHub rights units come in a later design that Jason approves.
>
> The approval binds the exact rights the user saw and the target or its enrolled identity. A change to
> the agent, its definition, the target, the target's identity or the rights after the raise voids it. An
> approval is used once. A grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side, so it
> is never used. What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as
> for a revoke (REQ-GRANT-4). A new grant needs a new approval, never an automatic retry. The grant
> code runs only on a request the user resolved. A request resolved by an arbiter, the tester or any
> agent makes nothing. A `credential.mint` decision raised before version 1.8, or without the fields of
> REQ-GRANT-1, makes nothing when it is approved. Until the Console
> knows the signed-in human (Vikunja #412), Approve is `mosaic decide` in the CLI (REQ-DEC-3).
> - **REQ-GRANT-3.** The user enters their own personal access tokens and API tokens in the WebUI, or the
> CLI. Only the grant code reads them, to make grants. No agent ever sees a token value or a key's
> private half. Values appear in no event, log, message, prompt or agent file, and no agent can read
> them back (REQ-VAR-2). Until the Console knows the signed-in human, they are entered through the
> CLI.
> - **REQ-GRANT-4.** A grant can be revoked at once by the user, by the assistant for a grant in its own
> organization, or by the tester on a dev instance (Q173). A revoke needs no decision and no new trust.
> It takes effect at once on the stack's side, without waiting on the network, so the next use is
> refused. Removing the key or token at the host or service follows. Until that removal is done it stays
> visible as pending. A revoke while the grant is being made stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
> Every revoke is logged with who made it.
REQ-CRED-1, appended:
> Since version 1.8, a token or key for a grant is made by the grant code on the user's Approve
> (REQ-GRANT-2), not by hand. Tokens that exist stay as they are.
REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
> `host.sudo` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-CRED-4 since version 1.8.
Under "Risks and open questions", a new bullet:
> - Trusted mode lets an agent run its allowed commands at will. On another host, an allowed command that
> writes a file as root or starts a shell can plant a key, and the seat sandbox doesn't confine the
> network, so root can outlive the grant and a revoke. The allowlist narrows this. A seat sandbox with
> its own network namespace closes it. Until then the host's own audit log is the check after the fact
> (row 210 design section 6).
## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
- REQ-TRUST-1 restates what REQ-DEC-2 already does for within-role actions ("routine and within-role
decisions are logged") and names it as the default mode. It grants nothing new by itself. What widens
is the role files, one reviewed commit at a time.
- The hard waits stay with the user (mos-1117). REQ-GRANT-1 makes the grant request a `credential.mint`
decision, already a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-1, so Approve is the user resolving it. REQ-WAIT-2 stands:
no role file grants `credential.mint`. The grant code acts on the user's resolution, not on a role
grant. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's Gitea user under Q190, is the same one
`credential.mint` decision. So 1.8 doesn't change the hard-waits list (mos-1124 a, mos-1129 N4).
- Manual mode: Sage asked who sets it, where it lives and what it changes. Mos accepted these choices
(mos-1124 b), and Jason can change them: a list of actions in the organization file, empty by
default, changed only by the user, outside the chief's organization writes. A list rather than one
switch follows Gizmoduck's #436 draft section 7 (gizmoduck/machine-grant-design f6b6a04b6), so Jason
can make host commands manual without making every action manual. Listing every within-role action
gives the whole-organization manual mode. Row 210's per-call `host.run` decision, bound to host, argv
and stdin and spent once, is this mode's decision for a host command (Q188, Mos's reading).
- Gizmoduck's draft proposes REQ-CRED-5 (section 8) for the machine grant. Its content is in REQ-GRANT-1
to REQ-GRANT-4 here, generalized to all three methods, so 1.8 has no REQ-CRED-5. Their bounds in
gizmoduck-0062 items 4a to 4g are in the text: the chief raises only for an allowed definition, the
approval binds the rights shown, it is used once with no automatic retry, no value is ever seen, revoke
is at once on the stack's side with the host or service removal visible until done, every grant has a
rotate-by or expiry date, and the host identity comes from the host side. Duckworth has reviewed their
design r1 to r4 (duckworth-0056 and duckworth-0060), so a later change there may need a change here.
- B1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side.
What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as for a revoke.
- B2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): Mos chose Duckworth's second option. Only an Approve creates a grant,
and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. A grant written by hand makes
nothing. Jason's Q188 gives the reason: "Disallowing the agents to create grants autonomously is a
necessary evil for better security" and "Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically." Row
210's hand-written grants stay a test path until #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. r2
and r3 had a hand path in the business file, and r4 takes it out, with r3's load check on hand grants
(duckworth-0058 N1) and the note that a revoke never rewrites the user's file (duckworth-0058 N2).
The same-uid write to the stack's own store stays the B7 residual, and the top of this draft names it
for Jason.
- C1 (duckworth-0058, sage-1538): `account.create` is the hard wait for any new external account, not
only a grant (REQ-WAIT-1, `vocabulary.mjs:43-46`, `roles/pm.md:55`). It stays as version 1.7 has it.
Only `credential.mint` is chief-only, and a grant that makes an account is a `credential.mint`
decision (N4), so a PM's sign-up for a service routes as before.
- Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 (eb4c756a1, gizmoduck-0067): enrollment is a request the user approves
and the stack runs (mos-1120), and a host user with sudo is enrolled by name, the user's Approve
covering that user (mos-1125). REQ-GRANT-2's machine key says both. Their design r3 and r4 (1c5705d6d
section 6) give revoke to the user, the assistant in its own organization and the tester on a dev
instance, as REQ-GRANT-4 does (mos-1124 d).
- N1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the approval binds the target or its enrolled identity.
- N2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a revoke during creation stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
- N3 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): landing step 6 lists the role contract updates (`roles/pm.md:55`,
`roles/chief-of-staff.md:75`). A `credential.mint` decision raised before 1.8, or one without the
grant fields, makes nothing when it is approved.
- N4 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a decision carries one action (`a.action`, broker.mjs:1678 on
origin/refactor). A grant that makes an account is one `credential.mint` decision: the method in the
grant says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user clicks
once, and there is no separate `account.create` action for it. Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 reads it
the same way.
- N5 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): `host.sudo` keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for
`git.push.remote`. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for
its domain (broker.mjs:1677-1678 on origin/refactor), and the grant and its allowlist still limit the
command. In manual mode the decision goes to the user. The top of this draft names this for Jason as a
change in who decides a root command on another host.
- N6 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request.
The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and the role contracts (step 6 of "When this
version lands"). REQ-GRANT-1 says so.
- Approving a grant doesn't by itself let a command run without a click. That needs REQ-CRED-4 and
`host.sudo` in the routed lists, step 5 of "When this version lands" (gizmoduck-0062 item 4i).
- Which roles may request: Q188 says "Not all agents are capable or authorized to request directly. It
must follow the chain of command properly." The text makes the chief of staff the only role that raises,
the PM and the CTO ask it directly, and worker roles ask through their PM. Jason's words also name "the
main agent", but REQ-ASSIST-1 keeps the assistant out of directing agents, so it passes the user's
request to the chief rather than raising one. Mos accepted this (mos-1124 c) and reads "the main agent
or chief of staff" as one role under two names. That reading is Mos's, so the top of this draft puts it
to Jason at approval.
- REQ-CRED-4 keeps row 210's conditions (origin/gizmoduck/row210-on-199-r2,
agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-210/DESIGN.md:376-392): the definition declares the kind, the grant names the
agent, an exact argv-prefix allowlist with wildcards refused, the key issued, and only a reviewed role
change adds the action. Row 210 put the grant in a hand-edited business file, which stays a test path until
#436a. Under 1.8 the grant is what Approve records, so "the business file grants that agent that host"
becomes "a grant names that agent and that host".
- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". Mos is Jason's assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), so the text says the
assistant, limited to grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance (Q173).
Mos accepted this with those limits (mos-1124 d).
- Approve in the Console needs the Console to know the signed-in human (Q175 phase 2, #412). Until then
Approve is `mosaic decide`, which REQ-DEC-3 already allows (mos-1124 e). This draft doesn't take
REQ-WEB-2, which stays with the Console decide buttons amendment (Vikunja 19/266). That amendment, or a
later version, moves Approve into the Console.
- Roles already use a scoped Gitea token (`<read|write>:<category>`, all and admin never granted,
`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:105-106` on origin/refactor). It is a likely Gitea unit, not a settled
one. Only the machine key is designed so far. Gitea and GitHub are a later #436 draft, and minting a Gitea
token needs an admin credential the user enters, which is a design of its own (Gizmoduck's draft section
11). GitHub's rights unit isn't settled. So the text leaves both units to a later design Jason approves
(mos-1124 f), and keeps only the bounds: an expiry, and never the all or admin scope. The PRD names outcomes
and checks, not the grant code's steps, as REQ-CRED-3 does.
- Jason expects the inbox Approve and the Gitea and GitHub grants by 10-27 (Q188 point 6). That is a
delivery date, so it is in the source and not in the requirement text.
- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
paragraph never edited in place except to append.
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# Row 256 (#1761) build notes (append only)
## 2026-10-22 b1 (Honker)
Design d2 8c50481d2 was accepted by Webby (webby-0123). The code is on honker/row256 from be2b008cc.
### Correction to the design: the non-creative END_PROTECTED definition is `assistant`
- DESIGN.md (d1 and d2) says "the chief of staff" for the END_PROTECTED definition that isn't creative,
following the brief's wording. In the code that definition is `assistant`:
- `THREAD_DEFINITION = "assistant"` (vocabulary.mjs:203).
- `END_PROTECTED = THREAD_DEFINITIONS = [assistant, ...CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS]`.
- The `chief-of-staff` definition (the `chief` instance) isn't END_PROTECTED. Its delete refuses
`organization-instance-referenced`, because it is launch.by, and that is unchanged.
- So T3 and M2 use an `assistant` instance. The code is the same either way: protectedRefusal refuses
every END_PROTECTED definition that isn't creative.
- DESIGN.md isn't edited after approval; this note is the record.
### Persona file on delete (brief item 4)
- `<configDir>/personas/<business>/<instance>.md` is left in place. Nothing removes it, so there is no
new open and no O_NOFOLLOW test.
- Nothing reads it once the entry is gone. bundle.mjs reads it only for a launched creative instance,
and the name is retired, so `add` refuses it (instance-settings.mjs, organization-instance-retired)
and no later instance picks up the old persona.
- The human removes the file by hand if they want it gone.
### What changed
- packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs:
- New `protectedRefusal(document, instance, actor)`.
- `deleteRefusal(..., actor)`, `planDelete(..., actor)` and `checkDelete(..., actor)` take the
actor, and set op delete passes its actor.
- `read(business, actor)`. Its `endProtected` is `protectedRefusal(...) !== null`.
- commit's and fire's returned listings read with the writer's actor.
- The comment at :28-31 is rewritten.
- packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs: `instances` and `instances.check` pass the actor. There is no broker
change.
- packages/webui/src/public/agents.js: comment only.
- docs/plans/DEFERRED.md: a closing line on the creative-delete entry.
- Tests:
- business instance-settings.test: T1-T3 and T5 in one test, T4 in its own test, and the row 213
test's `endProtected` for the human's add is now `false`.
- business lifecycle-settings.test: checkDelete with the actor; fire unchanged.
- bus creative.test: T6 on the real runtime.
- webui agents-browser.test: T7/T8. The comment on the existing assertion is reworded.
### Mutants for the gate (exact-once replacements, runb8 shape)
- M1 (instance-settings.mjs): ` if (actor === document.human) return null;` becomes ` return null;`.
The kill is instance-settings.test "row 256 T1-T3".
- M2 (instance-settings.mjs): move the human check ahead of the creative one. Replace
` if (!CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(definition)) return { code: "organization-definition-refused" };\n if (actor === document.human) return null;`
with
` if (actor === document.human) return null;\n if (!CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(definition)) return { code: "organization-definition-refused" };`.
The kill is "row 256 T1-T3" (T3).
- M3 (instance-settings.mjs): ` endProtected: protectedRefusal(document, name, actor) !== null,` becomes
` endProtected: END_PROTECTED.includes(entry.definition),`. The kills are "row 256 T1-T3" (T5) and
bus creative.test T6.
- M4a (runtime.mjs): `instances.checkDelete(id,args.instance,actor)` becomes
`instances.checkDelete(id,args.instance)`. The kill is creative.test "row 256 T6".
- M4b (instance-settings.mjs): `planDelete(old, instance, actor), { revision` becomes
`planDelete(old, instance), { revision`. The kills are "row 256 T1-T3" (T1) and creative.test T6.
### Tests not run
None of these have run. They wait for Sage's CLEAR, after the rebase onto 236.
## 2026-10-22 b2 (Honker): Webby's N1 (webby-0124)
- Two comments said the chief of staff where they mean the assistant. Both now name the assistant:
- instance-settings.mjs:30, "The assistant is refused for every actor, the human included."
- agents.js:46, "true for the assistant and on the tester's."
- Comment-only. The mutant strings above are unchanged and still occur once.
## 2026-10-22 gate results (Honker, doc-only after landing)
This entry was added after landing. It records the gate on f12441d4f, which was the candidate, with manifest-r3
01eb75aa9d51367337f4eda855ad5271c5e22b14650aa5a2130333d275a7ab90.
### Rebases
- r2 1e761962a onto 236's landing bd5f11ded, and r3 f12441d4f onto 274's landing 0165be266. In both
range-diffs, every commit is `=` and nothing conflicted.
- The landing patch-id, from `git diff BASE TIP | git patch-id --stable`, is
b28e63746f8c1bda1c49c021447c61f2df6ea0d0 on both bases.
- Before that, Sage granted an early slot on 1e761962a (sage-2567), limited to steps 1-2. It was an early
signal, not gate evidence: 31/0/0, and M1-M4b were all killed.
### Full gate (Sage's slot, sage-2586, 10:33Z to 10:50Z)
- The gate tested a merge of the candidate onto origin/refactor 0165be266, tree ced6bf5f8, which matches the
candidate's own tree. The DEFERRED.md fallback did not fire.
- Touched test files, each run whole: instance-settings, lifecycle-settings, bus creative, and webui
agents-browser. 31 pass, 0 fail, 0 skip.
- Mutants: M1, M2, M3 (on instance-settings and on creative), M4a, and M4b (on instance-settings and on
creative). All were killed by the assertions listed above. Every restore matched the original blob.
- Package suites, all 18 at rc=0, 3757 pass, 0 fail:
| Package | Pass |
| --- | --- |
| business | 231 |
| bus | 788 |
| cli | 832 |
| control-board | 124 |
| conversation | 183 |
| discord | 192 |
| harness | 151 |
| ledger | 89 |
| library | 83 |
| mosaic | 69 |
| plugins | 111 |
| processing-control | 62 |
| project | 41 |
| queue | 156 |
| runs | 43 |
| seat | 167 |
| tasks | 100 |
| webui | 335 |
- scripts/test-*.sh, all 10 at rc=0:
| Script | Pass |
| --- | --- |
| auth | 15 |
| conductor | 17 |
| config | 31 |
| discord | 81 |
| extension-package | 18 |
| foundation | 44 |
| land-work | 86 |
| queue | 28 |
| release | 14 |
| task | 91 |
- Skips: 4, none on a touched path.
- The webui editor rebuild byte check, because esbuild 0.28.1 is installed and the check needs 0.28.2.
- test-queue verify and render --check, because the gate worktree is not the canonical root.
- test-task live provider cases, counted twice. Row 244 makes no provider call in the gate.
- Leftovers: none.
- Evidence is under /mnt/storage/scratch/honker-t/r256/: run-20261022T103355Z, gate-20261022T103414Z,
and console-r3.txt.
### Review and landing
- Webby approved manifest round 1 in webby-0129 (REVIEW-r3.md, 00502a740). The approval was recorded at
rev 3185, comment c30519.
- Sage landed f12441d4f as a fast-forward at 10:57Z. #1761 is closed with comment c30520.
-186
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# Row 256 (#1761) design: the human deletes a creative instance
Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-21_creative-delete-human.md (REQ-COS-3). Base be2b008cc (row 194 landed as
fd6dd327c). Builder Honker, reviewer Webby. Draft 2, 2026-10-22: Webby's d1 review (webby-0122, notes
171480e6e) R1, Q1, Q2 and N1-N2 applied; the changes are listed at the end.
## What changes
### 1. One predicate in instance-settings.mjs
Today `deleteRefusal(document, rolesDir, instance)` refuses every END_PROTECTED definition with
`organization-definition-refused`, and read()'s `endProtected` field is the same check
(`END_PROTECTED.includes(definition)`).
New, in `packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs`:
```js
// Row 256 (#1761, REQ-COS-3): the protected-definition part of a delete. A creative instance is
// the human's to delete; any other actor is refused. A non-creative END_PROTECTED definition (the
// chief of staff) is refused for every actor, the human included.
function protectedRefusal(document, definition, actor) {
if (!END_PROTECTED.includes(definition)) return null;
if (!CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(definition)) return { code: "organization-definition-refused" };
return actor === document.human ? null : { code: "organization-creative-human-only" };
}
export function deleteRefusal(document, rolesDir, instance, actor) {
...unknown-instance unchanged...
const refusal = protectedRefusal(document, entry.definition, actor);
if (refusal) return refusal;
...references, kept, credentials unchanged...
}
```
- A creative definition with `actor === document.human` goes on to the remaining checks:
references, then kept, then credentials.
- The code and message match `creativeHumanOnly` in launch-settings.mjs:13.
- The code is `organization-creative-human-only`.
- It is raised as a plain refusal code here, as deleteRefusal's other codes are.
- I don't call `creativeHumanOnly` itself, because it throws and deleteRefusal returns.
- `actor` undefined, null, "tester", or a role actor (`<definition>.<instance>`) never equals
`document.human`, so those actors are refused.
- validateBusinessDocument runs `requireId(document.human)` (business.mjs:239), so an undefined
actor can't match an undefined human.
### 2. The actor reaches every delete path
| Path | Today | Change |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `planDelete(document, instance)` | no actor | `planDelete(document, instance, actor)` |
| `set(business, args, actor)` op delete (:207) | has the actor, doesn't pass it | passes it to planDelete |
| `checkDelete(business, instance)` | no actor | `checkDelete(business, instance, actor)` |
| runtime.mjs:283 `instances.check` | `checkDelete(id, args.instance)` | `checkDelete(id, args.instance, actor)` |
- The broker's verb check `#deleteRequest` already passes `s.human` to `instances.check` (broker.mjs:2843).
- The launcher pass `lifecycleDelete` already passes the request's `r.by`, which is
`#owner(s)` at record time, to `instances.set op delete`.
- So the broker gets no logic change. Only the deferred comment at :2825 is touched, if it names
the old rule.
- The CLI (`mosaic instances delete`) and the Console both reach the same bus verb with the human's
session.
- The tester is refused `tester-refused` at the verb, before any of this (broker.mjs:2595,
serve.mjs:394).
- That is unchanged.
### 3. The listing: `endProtected` becomes the per-viewer delete check
- `read(business)` becomes `read(business, actor)`, and runtime.mjs passes the actor.
- The broker already passes `"tester"` for a tester session and `s.human` otherwise (broker.mjs:2627).
- Each instance's `endProtected` becomes `protectedRefusal(document, def, actor) !== null`.
- This is the same server predicate the delete runs, per the brief.
- The human's read shows `endProtected: false` for a creative instance.
- The tester's read, and any role read, show `true`.
- The chief of staff shows `true` for everyone.
- The listing that a write returns is read with the writer's actor.
- This covers `commit`'s `{ ...read(business), ... }` at :405 and fire's at :338.
- So the human's add of bean returns `endProtected: false`, and the existing :288 assertion
changes from `true` to `false` for "jason".
- I keep the field name, so the listing gains no key and the deepEqual shapes in
instance-settings.test, lifecycle-settings.test and agents-browser.test keep their keys.
- Only the value for a creative entry read by the human changes.
- The cost is a name that now means "delete refused for its protected definition, for this
viewer".
- The read() comment says so.
- A rename (for example `deletable`) touches every listing fixture; I'd rather not, but I'll take
Webby's call.
- agents.js:46 is unchanged in logic: `if (!e.endProtected)` offers Delete.
- Its comment changes to name row 256.
- Delete stays inside the existing `!c.isTester` branch, so the tester page offers none whatever
the field says.
- The tester has two guards: the server's `true`, and the page's tester branch.
### 4. Fire is unchanged
- `fireChecks` / `checkFire` / `instance.fire` / `role.fire` keep refusing END_PROTECTED for
every actor.
- protectedRefusal is not called from fire.
- A test pins that the human's fire of a creative instance still refuses.
### 5. Persona file
- `<configDir>/personas/<business>/<instance>.md` is left in place on delete.
- That is the brief's smallest choice.
- The delete commits the business file and renames the workspace under `.retired`, as today.
- The persona file isn't under either path, and nothing reads it once the entry is gone.
- bundle.mjs reads it only for a launched creative instance.
- Retired names are never reused (row 194 D1), so a later hire can't pick up the old persona.
- This goes in BUILD.md, plus a DEFERRED line if Sage wants a cleanup later.
- No new file open, so no O_NOFOLLOW test.
### 6. DEFERRED.md
The "Creative instances: the human can't delete one" entry (DEFERRED.md:387) gets a closing line:
> Closed by row 256 (#1761) for delete. Fire still refuses, by REQ-COS-3.
The entry says "the row covers fire and delete together". The brief keeps fire unchanged, so the
closing line says the fire half is closed by ruling, not by code.
## Tests
| File | Test |
| --- | --- |
| business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs | T1: the human deletes a creative instance (bean); the file loses the entry. |
| | T2: the same delete by a role actor (`chief-of-staff.chief`), by "tester" and by no actor refuses `organization-creative-human-only`, and the file is unchanged. |
| | T3: the human's delete of the chief of staff refuses `organization-definition-refused`. |
| | T4 (R1): with bean the only name in launch.instances, the human's delete of bean gets the last-listed BusinessError from deletedDocument (:64-66), not the creative code, so it passes protectedRefusal and reaches the later checks. A creative instance can't be in launch.keep, launch.by or the arbiters (business.mjs:208, :181-183, :251-255), so those aren't used. |
| | T5: read(business, human) shows `endProtected: false` for bean; read(business, "tester") and read(business) with no actor show `true`; the chief of staff shows `true` for every actor. |
| | The existing :283-292 test is updated where it pinned the old refusal. |
| business/tests/lifecycle-settings.test.mjs | checkDelete with the human passes for a creative instance and with another actor refuses. |
| | The fire of a creative instance by the human still refuses (fire unchanged). |
| bus/tests/creative.test.mjs (Q2: its runtime() is a real startBroker with the business writer) | T6: the human's `instances.set op delete` on bean records a lifecycle.delete request. |
| | Taking it and running the launcher pass commits the delete (the r.by path). |
| | The chief is refused `human-required` (broker.mjs:2585) and the tester `tester-refused` (:2595), both at the verb. |
| | The human's `instances` read has `endProtected: false` for bean; the tester's has `true`. |
| webui/tests/agents-browser.test.mjs | T7: the human page with bean at `endProtected: false` offers Delete for bean. |
| | T8: the tester page with the same listing offers no Delete. |
| | The existing sage-2164 assertion moves to the tester-shaped listing (bean `endProtected: true`). |
- The browser tests stub `/api/instances`, so they pin the page's use of the field.
- The server side of "never on the tester listener" is T5/T6.
- No test touches live paths: fixtures under mktemp in /mnt/storage/scratch, as today.
## Mutants (all must be killed)
- M1: protectedRefusal's creative branch returns `null` for every actor, so a non-human deletes a
creative instance. Killed by T2 only (N1): through the bus no non-human actor reaches the delete,
since the chief and the tester are refused at the verb.
- M2: protectedRefusal checks the human before the creative check, so
`actor === document.human ? null : ...` for every END_PROTECTED definition. The human then
deletes the chief of staff. Killed by T3.
- M3: read() keeps the old `END_PROTECTED.includes`, so the listing isn't the per-viewer predicate.
Killed by T5.
- M4 (N2): the actor isn't threaded: runtime.mjs:283 calls `checkDelete(id, args.instance)`
without it. Killed by T6, the human's real-writer delete. A second variant, set op delete not
passing the actor to planDelete, is killed by T1 and by T6's launcher pass.
## Boundaries kept
- No change to M10 add/change, role.hire, fire, veto or launch.keep.
- No schema change and no migration.
- No new verb.
- No change to the tester gate.
## Gate (on Sage's CLEAR)
- Touched test files, each whole.
- The business, bus, cli and webui suites.
- Every scripts/test-*.sh.
- The four mutants above (M4 in both variants), each on a green base, restored and blob-checked (the runb8 shape).
## Comments rewritten (Q1)
- `endProtected` keeps its name: agents.js:46 is its only reader, and it means "don't offer Delete".
- instance-settings.mjs:28-31 loses "no one deletes one yet". It says the human deletes a creative
instance and any other actor is refused, and that the listing's endProtected is protectedRefusal
for the reader.
- agents.js:45 says the same, naming row 256.
## Changes from draft 1 (webby-0122)
- R1: T4 uses the last-listed refusal instead of launch.keep, which the validator refuses for a
creative instance.
- Q1: keep the name; comments rewritten; T5 pins read(business) with no actor as true.
- Q2: the bus test goes in creative.test.mjs.
- N1: M1 is killed by T2 only; T6 pins the chief's `human-required`.
- N2: M4 added for the threading.
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# Row 236 build notes: #436b Gitea grant path (#1742, schema 3j-3k)
Builder Megavolt, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Draft; the results sections are filled in after the
runs on Sage's gate.
## Sources
- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`, "Brief: #436b Gitea grant path, build (schema 3j-3k)",
blob 9259ba2a1.
- Design: `agents/megavolt/work/436b/DESIGN.md` r5 at 1be535aca (sha256 68df02cd…f4), unedited. Scope:
sections 2 to 7, and section 9's X-G1 to X-G15 and mutants. Section 10 (GitHub half) is out of scope.
- Build carry: `agents/megavolt/work/436b/BUILD-CARRY.md` at 3330c901b (N9, N10).
- Schema label 3j-3k per sage-2237. If 264a or 206 lands first, this rebases onto a new branch name and reruns
the whole bus suite, the schema.test counts and the T46 lists.
- Rebases: onto 86f95bb27 after row 273 (sage-2403, no conflicts), then onto 0fa7bf421 after row 191
(sage-2452, sage-2457). The 191 rebase took three unions in commit 1, 191's `processing` first and then the
grant options: the Broker constructor (broker.mjs:317), the runtime's Broker options (runtime.mjs:173) and
the cli case line in `scripts/mosaic` (191's `halt|resume|processing|` plus `grants`).
## What changed
- `packages/bus/src/gitea-grant.mjs` (new): the grant body check, the admin slot (set, rotate, remove), the
admin and seat API calls, the start-time scan (`giteaStart`, `openGiteaGrants`, `tokenUnknown`).
- `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`: the gitea executor (steps 0 to 8), settle, restart reconcile, revoke and fire,
sweep, status, and the `grants.*` verbs.
- `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`: `held` pairs at start; the register and claim paths the executor uses.
- `packages/bus/src/migrations/3j-3k.sql`, `schema.sql`, `store.mjs`: `gitea_users` and `gitea_grants`, new
tables only.
- `packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs`, `server.mjs`, `human-cli.mjs`: wiring of the start scan and the verbs.
- `packages/cli/src/grants.mjs` (new), `cli.mjs`, `scripts/mosaic`: `mosaic grants`.
- Tests: `gitea-grant.test.mjs`, `gitea-migration.test.mjs`, `gitea-grant-docker.test.mjs` (X-G3),
`fake-gitea-api.mjs`, `fixtures/schema-3j.sql` (02da6a2ae's schema.sql), `cli/tests/grants.test.mjs`, and the
pin updates in the migration tests, `schema.test.mjs`, `channel-proof.test.mjs` and `stack-release.test.mjs`
(T46).
- READMEs of bus and cli.
## Choices and assumptions
Each is a reading of the design where it left room. Dewey may rule otherwise.
1. Admin rotation is due once today is past `rotateBy` (the date itself is still good).
2. A seat-token rotation moves the record at step 8, after the old token's delete (step 7).
3. A step 7 failure leaves the grant applied, with the old id in `serviceLeft` and the notice "The previous
token X is still live".
4. A failure after the commit step's rename returns `settle-pending`; the next start settles it.
5. tester-cli keeps its 5 s timeout; the grant verbs answer at once and the executor runs after.
6. A revoke of a token-unknown agent takes both ids from that decision's last commit step.
7. A user adopted at restart is upserted in the same transaction as its `grant.failed interrupted`.
8. `#giteaUnlink` (first-grant commit undo) uses a temporary reference dated `9999-12-31`, so it is never due
while it lives.
9. X-G12's org-team case: the fake models team membership as collaborator reach on the repository, which is
what `/user/repos` shows (F11, F12).
10. X-G15's look-alikes are stored under `action.refused` and under a non-grant kind, since the 3j trigger
refuses the human's NULL pair on `action.allowed`. The trigger cases of X-G13 (session, NULL pair,
`grant.host.enrolled`) are in `grant-migration.test.mjs`.
11. Step 6 faults: a pre-rename failure is injected by making `gitea.tmp` a directory; a step 8 store fault by
a TEMP trigger on `gitea_grants`.
12. The credentials-verb revoke close is tracked, so `giteaIdle()` waits for it.
13. `openGiteaGrants` gives `agent: null` for a spend with no step yet, so `status.running` can show a null
agent; the CLI prints it empty.
14. N9: a restart ignores a settle-pending commit with a `grant.revoked` after it and ends it `revoked` with
no message (notify false). A 404 on a delete by id counts as done.
15. N10: `serviceLeft` is a list in every body and answer.
16. A restart claims the agent's key for each open grant it undoes. One executor runs per agent
(grant-busy), so a killed child leaves at most one open grant per agent. If a store ever held two, the
second's claim fails and the undo runs with no admin: its token is left and named in `serviceLeft`,
never deleted unclaimed.
17. X-G7 changes the binding with a fixture decision whose hash differs (row 234's G9 pattern), since the
broker keeps its own copy of the business. The admin url check takes row 199's `parseGiteaUrl`, which
accepts the origin with or without a trailing slash.
18. r2, Dewey B1 (dewey-0781): step 8 and both settle branches (forward, back) check for a `grant.revoked`
of the agent after the decision's raise, in the same transaction as their write. A revoke that came
while step 7's or the settle's delete awaited took the record and both tokens, so the grant ends
`revoked` with the human's notice, as a revoke of a running executor ends it (X-G11), and no record is
written back. N9's restart case stays silent: a restart never settles a revoked rotation.
19. r2, Dewey B2: a sweep retry of `tokens` or `login` checks the user's id first, as the revoke close does,
against the `gitea_users` row (it survives a fire). A 404 skips with `gitea-user-gone`, a 200 with
another id with `gitea-user-foreign`, any other status leaves the entry. Skips go in `grant.swept` and
the sweep answer as `skipped: [{agent, user, id, reason}]`; a skipped entry is not left, so the next
sweep does not retry it.
20. r3, Dewey N5 (dewey-0783): the settle's 401 branch and its grant-token-unknown branch take the same
revoke check. A revoke during the whoami ends the grant `revoked`, not `grant-lost`, and the
token-unknown branch neither holds the agent again nor writes `grant-token-unknown`, so no start
names a file the revoke unlinked.
21. sage-2453, ruling (a) on megavolt-0123: 191's `#processingGate` refuses every agent verb off its read list
while processing is halted. `grants.status` is a read like `hosts.status`, and the kill-switch plan
(`docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md`:16) says "Reads and the human's own verbs, including the clear,
still work", so it joins the list. This touches row 191's list (one entry). An agent's `grants.revoke`
stays refused while halted, as `hosts.revoke` does.
## Named for DEFERRED (r2, Dewey N1-N4)
None is a small local change, so none is in r2. sage-2388: all four DEFERRED; N3 and N4 get a bus README
sentence each in r3 (a left admin token is deleted by hand at Gitea; a running executor keeps the admin
api it started with).
- N1: an admin rotate cut between the mint and the slot write leaves a token at Gitea that no event names.
A `grant.admin rotate-begin {oldName}` before the mint would close it; that is a new event shape.
- N2: `adminTokenLeft` is `unknown` when `/api/v1/token` gives no name. Which 1.27 F-fact shows the name
needs a check against the container, not a code change.
- N3: admin set or remove records `adminTokenLeft: null`, so a left token drops out of status. Carrying it
forward lets `rotate --finish` delete by name under a slot of another account or url; refusing remove
while one is left blocks the human's remove when Gitea is down. Either needs a ruling.
- N4: rotate or remove while a gitea claim is held. Refusing it blocks the human's remove during a run;
the running executor keeps the api it began with. Needs a ruling or a line in the README.
## Q188
No test creates a grant except through fixtures or the human's yes on a scratch store. No test reaches
git.mosaicstack.dev, tasks.woltje.com or any provider. Unit tests use the fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1; X-G3 uses a
throwaway gitea/gitea:1.27.1 container from the local image (never pulled), removed after. Every token is a
fake or a scratch-container token; values are compared with `assert.ok`, never printed.
## Runs
Sage's CLEAR (sage-2554), 10-22 09:00-09:28Z, one slot script that stops at the first red. Logs are in
`scratch/megavolt-r236/logs/` (`slot-2c.txt`, `slot-gate.txt`, `slot-mutants.txt`, `slot-all.txt`).
- Section 2c files whole, in the seat worktree, TMPDIR under `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp`:
- bus (gitea-grant, the migration tests, schema, channel-proof, chief-of-staff, grant-host,
project-runtime): 131 pass, 0 fail, 0 skipped;
- cli (grants, stack-release): 224 pass;
- route (grants, access): 28 pass;
- docker (gitea-grant-docker): 1 pass.
- The whole gate, in a detached worktree at bd5f11ded:
- `packages/bus/tests/*.test.mjs` 765 pass, `packages/business/tests/` 228 pass,
`packages/cli/tests/*.test.mjs` 832 pass, each 0 fail and 0 skipped;
- every `scripts/test-*.sh` rc=0: auth, conductor, config, discord, extension-package, foundation,
land-work, queue (156 pass), release, task.
- Named skips: test-queue line 34 (queue verify and render --check, because the gate worktree isn't the
queue's canonical root), and test-task lines 87 and 93 (live provider cases, row 244: no provider call in
the gate).
- The gate worktree was clean after the run. GATE_PASSED at 09:23:11Z.
## Mutants
(section 9's list, each with the test that kills it; filled in after the runs)
Result, at bd5f11ded after the gate (`r236-mutants.sh`): the base (gitea-grant, gitea-migration,
grant-migration, schema; cli grants) was green, then all 40 killed and none survived: M1-M37, N9a, N9b and M38.
Each mutant's restore left the worktree clean. SLOT_GREEN at 09:28:50Z.
A static pass over the 39 mutants (all apply, problems=0) found five with no test to kill them. Four tests
were added before any mutant run:
- M8, M9 (user or mint step written after its call) and M16 (grant.result written before its call): "X-G6
and X-G8: the user and mint steps are written before their calls, and each result after its call". It
reads the store from the fake while user-create and token-create are at Gitea, and checks every result's
status.
- M29 (fork parent not checked): "X-G4: a fork by the seat user of another repository than the project
refuses fork-foreign".
- M28 (memory and file revoked after the Gitea delete): "X-G11: a revoke unloads memory and removes the file
before its Gitea delete", which holds the DELETE open and reads the file and state.
- M37 (evidence without its kind filter): "X-G15: a look-alike spend under another kind with the grant writer
pair is not an open grant".
r2 tests, each red on 8bf442be9 by reading:
- B1: "X-G11: a revoke during a rotation step 7 ends it revoked, and step 8 writes no record back" and
"X-G11: a revoke while a sweep settles a rotation, forward or back, ends it revoked with no record".
On 8bf442be9 step 8 and the settle write the record and `grant.applied` (forward) or `grant.failed
interrupted settled:back` after the revoke deleted it.
- B2: "X-G14: a sweep retries a fire only for the user it fired: a remade or gone user is skipped and
named". On 8bf442be9 the retry fires the remade user (token list, delete, PATCH) and has no `skipped`.
- N5 (r3, sage-2388): "X-G11: a revoke during a settle whoami that finds a foreign token ends it revoked, not
held" and "X-G11: a revoke during a settle whoami that gets a 401 ends it revoked, not lost". On 77dd43c9e
they end `grant-token-unknown` (the agent back in tokenUnknown) and `grant-lost`.
- Choice 21 (sage-2453): "kill switch (plan :16): while halted the chief still reads grants.status, and an
agent grants.revoke refuses". M38 drops `'grants.status'` from the read list; the chief's status then
refuses `processing-halted` and the test fails.
-808
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@@ -1,808 +0,0 @@
# Row 281 build notes: a fire or a delete revokes the instance's grants (#1786)
Builder Megavolt, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Design draft d6 for Dewey's approval. No code until it is
approved. The results sections are filled in after the runs on Sage's gate.
History: d1 dfebd16cc. d2 c746ce378 added Sage's Q1/Q2 rulings (sage-2573). d3 36c2d98b8 added the
approved-before-fire tests (sage-2574). d4 answers Dewey's CHANGES on d3 (dewey-0823):
- B1: the set takes every grant decision with no outcome, and a raise refuses a fired or firing agent.
- B2: step G runs detached from the verb, so neither caller waits on the network.
- B3: one step G per agent, with named refusals for everything that could race it.
- N1-N3 are folded in.
d5 adds sage-2575: two requests per granted delete, with its five conditions. It also adds a `job` id to every
answer, event and message, and tests T3, T3b and T3c with mutants M16-M18.
d6 answers Dewey's CHANGES on d5 (dewey-0825):
- C1: the job's step C records authority without the chief's claim (`#authorityFor`, as a landing's record
does), processing-halted doesn't hold the job, and a step B or C failure records `fire.failed {job, step,
code}` with its own message. Tests T11 and T12, mutants M19 and M20.
- N4: boot closes a job a restart interrupted, with one message. Test T13, mutant M21.
- N5: section 7 names the refusals the manual verbs gain.
- N6: the set counts Q1 leftover lines, in fire step 3 and in the delete text.
## Sources
- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md`, "Brief: no grant outlives its instance" (sage-2568,
mos-1271, Vikunja 524).
- Code read at 47a35bf43: `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`, `runtime.mjs`, `credentials.mjs`, `host-grant.mjs`,
`gitea-grant.mjs`, `packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs`, `tools/host/mosaic-keys-write`.
- Row 256's delete (honker/row256-r2 at 1e761962a, not landed) changes only the delete's checks. Its write still
goes through `lifecycleDelete` and the same `revoke()`, so this design covers it unchanged.
- Row 235 r6 section 6 (host revoke) and #436b r5 section 6 (Gitea revoke and the fire steps).
## 1. Why: what happens today (read from the code, to be pinned by a test before the change)
In short: today a delete of a granted instance unlinks the key files but leaves both grant records, the host
lines and the Gitea token live, and a fire refuses `credential-revoke-failed` (sage-2573 asked for this here
and on #1786). The details:
- **Fire.** `revoke()` (runtime.mjs:151) revokes only the roles entry's `credentials` services, then lists the
agent's store directory and refuses `credential-revoke-failed` if any file is left. A host grant's key is
`<store>/<business>/<agent>/host.<id>` (host-grant.mjs:102), and a Gitea grant's token is `.../gitea`
(gitea-grant.mjs:379). Neither is a roles-entry service, so a fire of an instance with a grant refuses at
step B with "host.<id> still in the store". It doesn't leak, but it can't finish until a human runs
`mosaic hosts revoke` or `mosaic grants revoke` by hand. If the business file also names `gitea` as a
roles-entry credential, `credentials.revoke(instance, 'gitea')` unlinks the granted token file with no
`gitea_grants` change and no Gitea call.
- **Delete.** `credentials.remove(instance)` (credentials.mjs:400) revokes every registered reference,
`host.<id>` and `gitea` included, and unlinks the directory. The `host_grants` and `gitea_grants` records
stay, the host line stays on each host, and the Gitea token, user and login stay live. This is the leak.
The next start then finds a grant record whose key file is gone. What the start does with that isn't read
yet. The T1 test below pins it.
- **An open grant decision.** A fire delists the instance but keeps its roles entry. An approved host or Gitea
grant decision for that agent that hasn't run yet still passes `#hostDefinition` and `#giteaRole`, so it can
still apply after the fire. A delete removes the roles entry, so its executor refuses `unknown-role` or
`gitea-not-declared`.
- **A raise after the fire** (dewey-0823 B1). `#raiseGrant` (broker.mjs:1529) checks only that the caller is
the chief, and the grant bindings check only the roles entry. So the chief can raise a new grant for a fired
agent, and if the human approves it, it applies.
## 2. Where the grant revokes sit (D1, rewritten in d4 for B2)
d3 awaited step G inside the verb. Dewey's B2 showed that neither caller can wait that long:
- **Delete.** The launcher's `host.op` waits `REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10000` (cli/src/host.mjs:31). On a timeout,
`breakChannel` stops the whole bus host. One SSH remove can take 30 s (host-grant.mjs:231, :311), and each
Gitea call 15 s (`CALL_MS`, gitea-grant.mjs:38).
- **Fire.** server.mjs answers a verb that isn't on its async list synchronously (:154), and the async list
gives 120 s (:150). The chief's runner client times out at 30 s (harness/src/runner.mjs:449). Two hosts
plus the Gitea calls can pass both limits.
So step G never runs inside a verb. The fire and the delete both use the same answer-at-once job, for the same
timeout reason (sage-2575 condition 5). Both verbs stay synchronous and answer at once. Step G runs as tracked
broker work after the answer, as row 236's grant executors do (`#track`, `setImmediate`). No caller waits on
the network, so `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `cli/src/host.mjs` and the launcher don't change.
Each job gets an id, `job` (a UUID), when it starts. The verb's answer, the job's start event, its end event
and every inbox message about it carry that id. The human and the chief can then match a later outcome to
the request that started it.
### The fire
1. `write('instance.fireCheck')`, as today.
2. Step A, as today, with one addition. In the same transaction, after `fire.stopped`, the grant set is read
(section 3). Reading it there means a grant raise either committed before step A, and is in the set, or
comes after `fire.stopped` and refuses (section 3d).
3. If the set is empty, steps B and C run synchronously, exactly as today. A fire with no grant answers
today's result with today's events (T7). The set counts everything step G would touch (d6, N6): grant
rows, open decisions, the agent's Gitea leftovers (section 5) and its Q1 leftover host lines (section 5).
Any of them makes the set non-empty and goes to the job.
4. Otherwise the verb takes the agent's step G lock (section 3e), records `fire.revoking {job, grants}` in
step A's transaction, starts the job, and answers at once:
`{...stopped, job, revoking: ['host:<id>' | 'gitea', ...], done: false}`. There's no `transaction`, since
step B hasn't run.
5. The job runs step G, then step B (`write('instance.fire')`) and step C (`#recordAuthority`, below, then
`fire.done {job, grants}`). It releases the lock when it ends, whichever way it ends, `fire.failed`
included.
What the chief sees meanwhile: the instance is "firing". That's an existing state (`#firing`, broker.mjs:645):
`fire.stopped` with no later `fire.done`. Starts already refuse `instance-firing`.
- A repeat fire while the job runs refuses `fire-in-progress`, a new code.
- A repeat after the job finishes takes the delisted path (webby-0094 N1) and answers done.
- A repeat after a refused step G runs step G again (section 5).
The human sees the outcome either way: `fire.done` names the job and the grants, and a refusal sends the
inbox message in section 4.
**Steps B and C in the job (d6, C1).** d4 left "step C without the chief's run" as a build-time check, and
Dewey checked it: it fails.
- `#consumeAuthority` calls `#checkAuthority` (broker.mjs:2852). That runs `#processingWork()` and
`#agent(s)`, and `#agent` refuses `not-holder` once the chief's run no longer holds its claim (:749).
- After the verb answers, the job can take a minute or more. If the chief's run ends meanwhile, step C would
throw after step B had delisted. The instance would be left delisted with no `fire.done`.
So the verb does the full check, and the job only records:
- The verb runs `#checkAuthority(s, action, authority)`, as today, before step A. The chief holds its claim
then.
- The job's step C runs `#authorityFor(s, action, authority)`, the check without the holder test. It then
runs the `#spent` check and the `action.allowed` event, as `#consumeAuthority` does. That's the shape a
landing's record already uses (`recordPublish`, broker.mjs:3174, row 137): the run that asked held its
claim when it asked, and may have ended since. It's one small private method, `#recordAuthority`, shared
with nothing else.
- The job keeps a copy of the session fields `#authorityFor` and `#event` read (business, role, thread,
run). It doesn't keep the live session object.
- `processing-halted` doesn't hold the job. A halt stops agent work. Step G only removes access, and steps
B and C finish a decision the chief made while processing ran. Holding them would leave a delisted or
half-revoked instance "firing" for the length of the halt. The verb itself still refuses during a halt,
through `#checkAuthority`, as today.
**A step B or C failure in the job** gets its own record, not `grant.revoke.refused`, since every grant in the
set was revoked by then:
- It records `fire.failed {job, step: 'B' | 'C', code}`. `code` is the thrown code, for example the writer's
`credential-revoke-failed`, or `decision-consumed`.
- It sends an inbox message:
> Fire of <agent>: job <job> revoked its grants (<list>) but stopped at step <B|C> (<code>). The instance
> is still firing. Run the fire again once <code> is cleared.
- The instance stays firing. A repeat fire finds an empty set and takes today's path for that state, with the
chief's own claim: B and C after a step B failure (T12), the delisted path (webby-0094 N1) after a step C
failure.
`grant.revoke.refused` with reason `internal` stays only for an unexpected throw inside step G.
### The delete (sage-2575)
`lifecycleDelete` (broker.mjs:3293) stays synchronous. After its running and starting checks, it reads the
grant set.
- **No grant.** An empty set: `instances.set delete`, one request, exactly as today (condition 4, T3c).
- **The first request.** For a non-empty set, it takes the lock and records `grants.revoking {job, agent,
verb: 'lifecycle.delete', grants}`. It starts the job and refuses `grants-revoking` at once. The launcher
closes the request with that code, well inside its 10 s.
The launcher can carry only the code, so the broker also sends the human an inbox message (condition 1):
> Delete of <agent> is waiting on its grants. Revoking started (job <job>) for: host:<id>, ..., gitea.
> Raise the delete again when the inbox says the revoke is done.
- **A delete raised while the job runs.** It refuses `grants-revoking` again and starts no second job
(condition 2, the 3e lock). No second message goes out either: the first one still applies.
- **The job ends.** The human gets one inbox message (condition 3).
- If it completed, the message names each grant revoked, with any `grantsLeft` (section 5), then "Raise the
delete again." It records `grants.revoked.done {job, agent, verb, grants, grantsLeft}`.
- If it refused, the message names the grant, the reason and how to clear it by hand, as section 4
describes. It records `grant.revoke.refused {job, ...}`.
- **The delete raised after a completed job** finds an empty set and goes as today.
- **The delete raised after a refused job** doesn't complete over a live grant. Its set is non-empty, since
the refused grant's record is still there. It refuses `grant-revoke-failed`, naming the earlier job's
reason in a message:
> Delete of <agent> refused: job <job> couldn't revoke <grant> (<reason>). Retrying now as job <new>. Raise
> the delete again when the inbox says it's done, or clear <grant> by hand first.
It starts a new job for what's left. The broker knows the last job refused because the agent's latest job
end event is a `grant.revoke.refused` with verb `lifecycle.delete`, and no `grants.revoked.done` came after
it. A delete after the human cleared the grant by hand doesn't find an empty set if a manual revoke left a
line (Q1). The leftover line makes the set non-empty, so that delete starts a job for the line removal
and refuses `grants-revoking` (d6, N6, and T3b's second case). If nothing is left, the set is empty and the
delete goes on.
The tradeoff (ruled by sage-2575): deleting a granted instance now always takes two requests. That keeps the
cli and the host channel out of row 281, and a delete of an instance with a grant is rare. Holding the
launcher's request open past its 10 s would need a host channel change and a strand path, and polling would
widen the row into the launcher for a one-time wait.
While a delete's step G runs, the instance is still listed and not firing, so it could be started. That's
harmless: its grants are being revoked, and the repeat delete refuses `instance-running` as today. No new
start check.
### Why not in `beforeWrite` or `revoke()`
Both are synchronous and run inside the organization writer, after its checks. A host `remove` is SSH and a
Gitea revoke is HTTP, so they can't run there. The business package also has no reach into the broker's grant
tables, and shouldn't get any.
### Why after step A
A fire is the decision to stop the agent. If step G came first, a host that can't be reached would keep the
fired agent running. After step A, a refused step G leaves the same state as a failed step B today: the
instance is "firing" (stopped, still listed) until a repeat. Row 194 already handles that state. The repeat
fire's delisted path (webby-0094 N1) also runs step G, since the set is read before step B on both paths.
## 3. Step G: what it revokes, and how
The set, for (business, agent), is read in one store transaction: step A's for a fire, the delete's checks
for a delete (section 2). It holds:
- each `host_grants` row of the agent;
- each host named by an open host grant decision for the agent;
- the Gitea grant if the agent has a `gitea_grants` row, a `gitea_users` row, or an open Gitea grant decision.
An open decision (d4, B1) is any grant decision raised for the agent with no outcome yet. That is: not denied,
not expired, no `grant.applied` or `grant.failed`, and no `grant.revoked` of the same (agent, host), or of the
agent's Gitea, recorded after its raise. A raised decision the human hasn't decided is open. d3 required
"approved", which left that one out.
An empty set means no step G and no new records. A fire of an instance with no grant is then exactly today's
fire, with no new events (brief tests, fourth bullet).
### 3a. A host grant: the host line first (D2)
hosts.revoke goes local first: the record drops, the key leaves memory and its file, and only then is
`remove <user> <tag>` sent. If the host can't be reached, the revoke closes with `hostLineLeft` and the
record is already gone. The brief says a fire may not drop a grant record while its key could still be on the
host. So the fire's host revoke reverses one step and keeps the rest the same:
1. Abort an executor in flight for (agent, host), with no record change (`hostKeys.abortClaim`, as the
`credential-unknown` branch of `#revokeHost` already does).
2. `remove <user> <tag>` through the installer, pinned to the host record's keys. `mosaic-keys-write` says
"a missing tag changes nothing", so this is safe to repeat and safe for a host named only by an open
decision. If the host record is gone, or the remove doesn't exit 0, step G refuses for this host
(section 4). Nothing local has changed for this grant: the record, the key file and the memory copy stay.
3. hosts.revoke's step 1 transaction, unchanged: the `host_grants` row goes and `grant.revoked {revoke, agent,
host, tag, hostLine: 'pending', granted, reason, by}` is recorded, plus `fire: true` (or `delete: true`)
so the human can tell it from a manual revoke.
4. hosts.revoke's step 2, unchanged: `hostKeys.revoke`, so the key leaves memory and its file goes.
5. `grant.revoke.closed {hostLine: 'removed'}` with no second remove. Step 2 already did it.
This is one shared method, `#revokeHostGrant(business, agent, host, reason, by, { lineFirst })`.
hosts.revoke calls it with `lineFirst: false` and its behavior and records don't change (brief item 4). The
fire and the delete call it with `lineFirst: true`.
The tradeoff: hosts.revoke goes local first so that "the part that matters can't wait on the network" (r6
section 6). For a fire, step A has already stopped the agent's runs, and a refused fire keeps the instance
"firing". So waiting on the host costs nothing in exposure, and the record never lies about the host.
### 3b. The Gitea grant (D3)
The Gitea revoke stays grants.revoke's steps with `fire: true`, which is what `credentials delete` already
runs (#436b section 6). Step 1 takes the token out of memory and unlinks the file. Step 2 is
`#giteaRevokeLocal(..., fire: true)`. Step 3 is `#giteaCloseRevoke`: every token deleted and
`prohibit_login: true`. The fire awaits step 3 instead of leaving it to `setImmediate`.
The Gitea side can't go remote first the way a host does. The record has to drop and `grant.revoked` has to
name the tokens before the DELETE calls, or a restart in between would find a live record whose tokens are
gone (section 5's reconcile). Two changes keep the fire closed:
- **Preflight.** Before step 1, `#giteaAdminChecked` runs. If the admin token can't be read or checked,
step G refuses with nothing changed.
- **Left means not done.** If `grant.revoke.closed` lists anything in `serviceLeft`, step G refuses. The
token ids stay in the evidence, which is exactly what `mosaic grants sweep gitea` retries, so nothing
forgets them. The record is gone, but no key of this stack's is still usable: the file and memory copy are
gone, and only the Gitea side is left. That is the case the brief's host rule guards against, and it is
kept visible here, not hidden.
**A Gitea executor in flight** (d3 T6c, and B3 seen from the executor's side). Step G's Gitea part goes in
this order:
1. Record `grant.revoked {granted: false}` for each open Gitea decision (3c).
2. Await this agent's tracked Gitea executors and remote undos, if any are running. Each one ends `revoked` at
its next `#giteaRevokedSince` check, or it committed `applied` before step 1.
3. Read the `gitea_grants` row again and run the steps above.
`#giteaCloseRevoke` with `fire: true` lists the user's tokens and deletes every one. The list comes after
step 2, so it includes any token an in-flight executor created. `#giteaRuns` is a single Set today. It
becomes keyed by (business, agent) so step G can await one agent's executors alone.
### 3c. Open decisions
A host named only by an open decision has no record. Step 3a still runs `remove` (a no-op) and records
`grant.revoked {granted: false}`, as hosts.revoke does for a revoke with no record (N4). The executor's
`#revokedSince` then ends that decision `revoked`. The Gitea side is the same through
`#giteaRevokedSince`.
This is the case where a decision is approved before the fire and executed after it (sage-2574). Both checks
look for a `grant.revoked` of the agent recorded after the decision was raised (broker.mjs:1156 and :1678 at
47a35bf43). A fire's `grant.revoked` is always later than the approval, so the executor ends the decision
whenever it runs. The fired agent keeps its roles entry, so `#hostDefinition` and `#giteaRole` still pass, and
this check is the only thing that stops the decision. T6 and T6b test it. A delete also removes the roles
entry, so the executor refuses there as well.
The same holds for a decision raised but not yet approved (B1). It's in the set, so it gets its
`grant.revoked {granted: false}`. If the human approves it later, its executor ends `revoked` (T6d). The
decision stays approvable in the inbox. Approving it does nothing but end it, which `grant.failed` reports as
it does for any revoked grant.
### 3d. A raise for a fired agent (d4, B1)
`#hostGrantBinding` and `#giteaGrantBinding` both run inside the raise transaction (broker.mjs:1539 and
:1548; the host raise's keyscan is awaited before that transaction). Both gain one check. The raise refuses
`instance-fired` if the agent is:
- firing (`#firing`);
- fired, by the writer's own rule (instance-settings.mjs, hire): a roles entry, not in `launch.instances`,
and not `launch.by`.
A rehire lists the name again, so a rehired agent can be granted again.
Because the check is in the transaction that records the decision, there's no gap. A raise that commits
before step A's transaction is in the set. One that commits after it refuses. A raise for an agent whose
delete's step G is running refuses `grant-revoke-running` (3e).
No executor recheck is added. A raise can't commit after `fire.stopped`, and every decision raised before it
is in the set and gets its `grant.revoked`.
### 3e. One step G per agent (d4, B3)
The broker keeps `#revoking`, a map from (business, agent) to the verb whose step G is running. The verb sets
it synchronously, in the same turn as the set read, before it answers. The job clears it in a `finally`.
While it's set:
| Caller | Answer |
|---|---|
| `instance.fire` | refuses `fire-in-progress` |
| `lifecycleDelete` | refuses `grants-revoking`, no second job |
| `hosts.revoke` / `grants.revoke` for the agent | refuse `grant-revoke-running` |
| grant raise for the agent | refuses `grant-revoke-running` |
| `grants.sweep` | skips this agent's entries and names it as `running` in its result |
Two fires started together (the chief retrying after a client timeout): the first takes the lock before it
answers, and the second refuses. The map is in memory. After a broker restart the job is gone and so is the
lock. The instance is still firing, or the delete still has a non-empty set, and the repeat starts a fresh
step G (section 5).
A manual revoke can't race step G, since it refuses while the lock is held. Step G's transactions still
check what they read: a `host_grants` row already gone at 3a step 3 records `grant.revoked {granted: false}`
and goes on, as hosts.revoke does today for a revoke with no record.
## 4. A refusal (D4)
Step G stops at the first grant that can't be revoked. Grants already revoked in this step G stay revoked and
recorded, and the rest stay as they were. The job doesn't run step B: the organization file is unchanged, and
the credentials are unrevoked, since `revoke()` never ran. A fire stays "firing". A delete's request was
already closed with `grants-revoking` (section 2).
The verb has already answered, so the refusal is a record, not a thrown code:
- One grant-evidence event, `grant.revoke.refused {job, agent, grant: 'host:<id>' | 'gitea', reason, verb:
'instance.fire' | 'lifecycle.delete', by}`.
- `reason` is one of `host-unknown`, `host-remove-failed`, `gitea-admin-unavailable` and `gitea-left:<ids>`.
- `grant-revoke-failed` is the code in the event and in the inbox message.
A message lands in the human's inbox, as `grant.failed` does today (broker.mjs:1139). It names the instance,
the grant and the reason, with the manual way out beside the retry (N2):
> Fire of <agent> stopped: its grant on <host> couldn't be revoked (<reason>). Run the fire again once <host>
> is reachable. If <host> won't come back, run `mosaic hosts revoke <agent> <host>` first: the grant record
> goes, the line is named as left, and the next fire completes and names that line (section 5).
The delete's message has the same shape, with "raise the delete again". For Gitea, the way out is
`mosaic grants sweep gitea` once Gitea is back.
A job that throws something unexpected inside step G records `grant.revoke.refused` with reason `internal`,
sends the same message, and releases the lock. There's no unhandled rejection. A failure at step B or C is
`fire.failed` (section 2).
**A restart mid-job (d6, N4).** The lock and the job are in memory, so a restart ends them with no end
record. A fire would stay "firing" until the chief happened to repeat it. A delete's request is already
closed, so no one would hear anything. Boot closes that gap:
- A job is a start record (`fire.revoking` or `grants.revoking`) whose `job` has no end record. The end
records are `fire.done`, `fire.failed`, `grants.revoked.done`, `grant.revoke.refused` and the new
`grants.job.interrupted`.
- When the broker starts, for each such job of each business, it records `grants.job.interrupted {job,
agent, verb}` and sends the human one inbox message:
> <Fire|Delete> of <agent>: job <job> was interrupted by a bus restart. Some grants may be revoked. Run the
> fire again, or raise the delete again. The repeat goes on from what's left.
- Recording the end record in the same transaction as the message means a second boot finds nothing to
send.
- Boot reads only events, with no network call, so it adds nothing to the start time beyond one query.
## 5. A repeat fire (D5)
A repeat runs the whole fire again: the checks, step A (nothing left to stop), the set read, then step G, B
and C in the job. A repeat while the job runs refuses `fire-in-progress` (3e). A repeat delete works the same
way through the human's new request.
- A host grant already revoked has no row and no open decision, so it isn't in the set. It's done.
- A host grant that refused still has its row, so it's retried from 3a step 1.
- Gitea (d4, N1): if the agent has entries in `#giteaLeft` or `#giteaOpenRevokes`, step G retries only those.
It calls `#giteaCloseRevoke` for each, as `#sweepGitea` does per entry. It doesn't run the business-wide
sweep, which would retry every agent's entries and settle every open rotation under the chief's name. Any
entry still left for this agent refuses `gitea-left`. An entry left by an earlier manual
`mosaic grants revoke` of the same agent blocks the fire the same way. That's intended: no grant outlives
its instance, whichever verb started its revoke. These entries count toward a non-empty set (section 2,
fire step 3), so they go to the job and never run inside the verb.
- A host line left by an earlier manual `hosts.revoke` doesn't block the fire (Q1 below). These are the
agent's `grant.revoke.closed` records with `hostLineLeft` and no later line removal for that tag. For each
one whose host record still exists, step G sends `remove <user> <tag>` once. On success it records
`grant.revoke.closed {revoke: <the old revoke id>, hostLine: 'removed', fire: true}`, so a later fire doesn't
find it again. On failure it records nothing new and the fire goes on. The host and the tag go in
`grantsLeft` (section 6). These leftover lines also make the set non-empty, so the retry runs in the job,
inside B2's answer (dewey-0823 accepted the single retry on that condition).
## Rulings
- **Q1 (sage-2573):** a leftover line doesn't block the fire. If the host is reachable, the fire tries the
removal once, because a fired agent's key line still on a host is the exact risk this row closes. If that
try fails, the fire doesn't refuse. It names the host and the leftover line in the result and in the event
the human sees. The human accepted that residue when their manual `hosts.revoke` left it, so it shouldn't
stop a fire forever on a dead host. Dewey may push back on the retry if it widens step G more than it's
worth.
- **Q2 (sage-2573):** a delete refused at step G closes its request through the launcher's normal refusal
path, and the human raises it again. A request left taken would strand, which is the shape DEFERRED already
records for the >64-stops done. Conditions: the refusal names the instance, the grant and the reason (the
`grant.revoke.refused` event, section 4). The repeat delete skips grants already revoked, as the repeat fire
does. T3b tests both.
- **Q2 extended (sage-2575):** every delete of a granted instance takes two requests. The first starts the
revoke job and refuses `grants-revoking`, and the human raises the delete again when the inbox says it's
done. This keeps the cli and the host channel out of the row, and such a delete is rare. Conditions, each
with a test:
1. The first refusal tells the human what happened and what's next: the named grants, and to raise the
delete again when the inbox says done. A bare code isn't enough (T3).
2. A delete raised while the job runs refuses `grants-revoking` again and starts no second job (T3, T9).
3. The job's end message names each grant revoked. If one failed, it names the grant, the reason and the
manual way out (`mosaic hosts revoke` or `mosaic grants revoke`). The next delete then refuses with that
reason and doesn't complete over a live grant (T3b).
4. A delete of an instance with no grant completes in one request, exactly as today (T3c).
5. Section 2 says the fire uses the same answer-at-once job, and the fire's result and event name the job
(T2).
## 6. The result and the event (D6)
- **A fire with a non-empty set** answers at once with `job`, `revoking` and `done: false`, and records
`fire.revoking {job, grants}` (section 2).
- **The job's outcome** is recorded, not returned. `fire.done` (step C) carries `job` and `grants: [{grant:
'host:<id>' | 'gitea', revoke, granted}]`, plus `grantsLeft` for any leftover from section 5's last bullet.
So the event the human sees names them.
- **A delete's job** records `grants.revoking {job, ...}` at the start and `grants.revoked.done {job, agent,
verb: 'lifecycle.delete', grants, grantsLeft}` at the end. It sends the inbox messages in section 2.
- **A fire with an empty set** carries none of these keys, so its shape is exactly today's.
## 7. What doesn't change (brief item 4)
- `hosts.revoke`, `grants.revoke` and `grants.sweep`: same callers and the same records. Their refusals stay
the same (`tester-dev-only` included) with one addition from section 3e (d6, N5): while a step G job holds
the agent's lock, `hosts.revoke` and `grants.revoke` for that agent refuse `grant-revoke-running`, and
`grants.sweep` skips the agent and names it as `running`. hosts.revoke's own order stays local first.
- No new verb, no Console route, no CLI change, no schema change. Every new record is an `events` row in the
existing grant-evidence shape.
- `revoke()` in runtime.mjs and the organization writer don't change.
- `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `cli/src/host.mjs` and `cli/src/launcher.mjs` don't change. Both verbs stay
synchronous. The launcher already closes a request with whatever code `lifecycleDelete` refuses.
- New codes: `fire-in-progress`, `grants-revoking`, `grant-revoke-running`, `instance-fired`, and
`grant-revoke-failed` in events and messages. New event types: `fire.revoking`, `grants.revoking`,
`grants.revoked.done`, `grant.revoke.refused`, `fire.failed` and `grants.job.interrupted`.
- The broker's start gains one events query for interrupted jobs (section 4, N4). `lifecycleDone` checks a refusal against `LIFECYCLE_CODE =
/^[a-z-]{1,64}$/` (broker.mjs:149), and `grants-revoking` matches it.
## 8. Tests (each in the owning package, whole files)
The bus tests use the fake installer and the fake Gitea from rows 235 and 236. They wait on the job with a new
trusted test API, `grantsIdle()`, which resolves once every step G job and Gitea executor has ended. It's the
same shape as `giteaIdle()`. Unless a test says otherwise, every fire or delete below is awaited that way.
- T1 (pins section 1 before the change): a fire of an instance with a host grant refuses
`credential-revoke-failed` today. A delete leaves the `host_grants` row. Then: what the next start does with
a record whose key file is gone.
- T2: a fire with a host grant on two hosts and a Gitea grant. The verb answers with a `job` id, `revoking`
with all three, and `done: false`, and `fire.revoking` carries the same job (sage-2575, condition 5). After
the job:
- all three are revoked, each with `grant.revoked` and `grant.revoke.closed` as the manual verbs record
them, plus `fire: true`;
- the line is gone on both fake hosts, every token is deleted, and login is prohibited at the fake Gitea;
- `fire.done` names all three;
- that agent's `host.run` and Gitea use both refuse.
- T3 (sage-2575, conditions 1-3): the same grants through the delete (`lifecycleTake` then
`lifecycleDelete`).
- The first delete refuses `grants-revoking` and starts the job. The human's inbox gets the start message
naming the job and all three grants, and saying to raise the delete again when it's done.
- A delete raised while the job is held refuses `grants-revoking`, starts no second job and sends no second
message.
- After the job, the end message names the job and each grant revoked.
- A third request completes as today.
- T3b (Q2, sage-2575 condition 3): a delete whose job refuses (host B unreachable).
- The end message and `grant.revoke.refused` name the instance, `host:B`, the reason and
`mosaic hosts revoke`.
- The file and the instance are unchanged.
- The next delete refuses `grant-revoke-failed`, not `grants-revoking`. Its message names the earlier job's
reason and the new job, and the instance is not deleted.
- With B back, that retry job revokes only B and Gitea, skipping host A, and the delete after it completes.
- A second case clears B by hand with `hosts.revoke` before the next delete. That delete starts a job only
for Gitea and the leftover line.
- T3c (sage-2575 condition 4): a delete of an instance with no grant completes in one request. Same result,
same events counted, no inbox message.
- T4: host B unreachable in a fire. The job records `grant.revoke.refused` naming the agent, `host:B` and
`host-remove-failed`, and the inbox message names `mosaic hosts revoke` (N2). Afterwards:
- the file is unchanged and the instance is still firing;
- host A is revoked and recorded, and host B's row and key file are still there;
- the Gitea grant is untouched, since it comes after B in the order;
- the credentials are unrevoked.
A repeat with B reachable completes and revokes only B and Gitea.
- T4b (Q1): an earlier manual `hosts.revoke` left a line on host C. A fire with C reachable removes it and
records the close. With C unreachable, the fire completes and names C and the tag in `grantsLeft` and in
`fire.done`.
- T5: Gitea's admin token can't be checked. The job refuses with the Gitea grant intact.
- T5b: a token DELETE fails. The job refuses `gitea-left`. A repeat with Gitea back retries only this agent's
entries and completes. Another agent's left entry is still left afterwards (N1).
- T6 (sage-2574): a host grant decision approved before the fire, executed after it. The fire records
`grant.revoked {granted: false}` for (agent, host). The executor runs after `fire.done` and ends the decision
`revoked`: no `host_grants` row, no key file, no `add` sent to the host.
- T6b (sage-2574): the same for a Gitea grant decision. The executor ends it `revoked` before any Gitea call:
no `gitea_grants` row, no token file, and the fake Gitea saw no token create.
- T6c: a host or Gitea executor already in flight when step G starts.
- The host side aborts its claim (3a step 1) and ends `revoked`.
- The Gitea side: step G awaits the executor (3b), and then the fake Gitea holds no token for the user. That
includes one the executor created mid-flight.
- T6d (B1): a host decision and a Gitea decision, raised before the fire and still undecided. The fire puts
both in the set. The human approves both after `fire.done`, and both executors end `revoked`, with nothing
applied.
- T6e (B1): a host raise and a Gitea raise refuse `instance-fired`:
- while the instance is firing;
- after `fire.done`.
After a rehire of the same name, a raise goes through. While a delete's job runs, a raise refuses
`grant-revoke-running`.
- T7: an instance with no grant fires exactly as today, synchronously. Same result keys, no `revoking`, and
the same events, counted.
- T8: hosts.revoke and grants.revoke keep their records, their order and their tester refusals.
- T9 (B3): with the job held on a remove:
- a second fire refuses `fire-in-progress`;
- a delete of the same agent refuses `grants-revoking` and starts no second job;
- `hosts.revoke` and `grants.revoke` for the agent refuse `grant-revoke-running`;
- `grants.sweep` names the agent as `running`.
After a release, one set of `grant.revoked` records exists per grant.
- T10 (B2): the fake installer holds a remove and the fake Gitea holds a DELETE, neither answering until
released.
- `instance.fire` and `lifecycleDelete` both answer before either is released. The test checks this with a
timer, not a wall-clock bound.
- Meanwhile the broker answers another verb from another session.
- After release, the jobs complete.
- A cli test drives the launcher's delete pass against a bus whose remove is held. The pass closes the
request `grants-revoking` and the host channel stays up.
- T11 (d6, C1): a fire whose job is held on a remove. While it's held, the chief's run ends and its claim is
released, and processing is halted. After the release, the job completes: `fire.done` is recorded with the
job, the consumed `action.allowed` event is there, a second use of the same authority refuses
`decision-consumed`, and the instance is out of the file. No `fire.failed` and no `grant.revoke.refused`.
- T12 (d6, C1): a fire with a grant whose step B refuses in the job. The test uses T1's setup, where
`revoke()` refuses `credential-revoke-failed`. After the job:
- `fire.failed` carries the job, step `B` and `credential-revoke-failed`, and the inbox message names the
job, the revoked grants, the step and the code;
- there's no `grant.revoke.refused` and no `fire.done`;
- the instance is still firing and still in the file.
With the cause cleared, a repeat fire finds an empty set, runs B and C synchronously and completes.
- T13 (d6, N4): a fire and a delete, each with its job held, then the broker is closed and a new one opened
on the same data root. The new broker records `grants.job.interrupted` for both jobs and sends two inbox
messages, one saying to fire again and one to raise the delete again. A third broker on the same root sends
nothing more. A job that ended before the restart gets no interrupted record.
Files (N3). Every file listed runs whole in the manifest round, touched or not:
- New: `packages/bus/tests/fire-revokes-grants.test.mjs` holds T2-T13.
- Changed:
- `grant-host.test.mjs` and `gitea-grant.test.mjs`: T1's pins, and the T8 regressions next to their
existing cases;
- `packages/cli/tests/lifecycle.test.mjs`: the T10 launcher pass;
- `fake-gitea-api.mjs` and `host-fixtures.mjs`, if T10's holds need a hook there.
- Run whole because they call `instance.fire` or `lifecycleDelete` at 47a35bf43:
- bus: `chief-of-staff`, `lifecycle-revoke`, `lifecycle-verbs`, `reload`;
- cli: `lifecycle`, `instances`;
- harness: `tools`.
- Also run: `grant-executor.test.mjs` (the executors' `#giteaRuns` change) and `gitea-grant-docker.test.mjs`
(brief gate).
- `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `host.mjs` and `launcher.mjs` are unchanged, so no test changes there for this
row.
## 9. Mutants
- M1: step G skips the host revokes. Killed by T2.
- M2: step G skips the Gitea revoke. Killed by T2.
- M3: a refused grant revoke is ignored and the job goes on to step B. Killed by T4.
- M4: `lifecycleDelete` skips step G. Killed by T3.
- M5: the fire's host revoke goes local first (`lineFirst: false`). Killed by T4, because B's row is gone.
- M6: a Gitea revoke with something in `serviceLeft` counts as done. Killed by T5b.
- M7: open decisions left out of the set. Killed by T6 and T6b.
- M8: step G skips the leftover-line retry. Killed by T4b.
- M9: a failed leftover-line retry refuses the fire. Killed by T4b.
- M10: the set takes only approved decisions (d3's rule). Killed by T6d.
- M11: the raise bindings skip the fired check. Killed by T6e.
- M12: no `#revoking` lock. Killed by T9.
- M13: the verb awaits the job before it answers. Killed by T10.
- M14: step G's Gitea part doesn't await the in-flight executor. Killed by T6c.
- M15: step G's Gitea retry runs the business-wide `#sweepGitea`. Killed by T5b.
- M16: the delete's first refusal sends no start message. Killed by T3.
- M17: a delete after a refused job refuses `grants-revoking` instead of `grant-revoke-failed`. Killed by T3b.
- M18: a delete of an instance with no grant goes through the job. Killed by T3c.
- M19: the job's step C uses `#consumeAuthority`, with the holder and processing checks. Killed by T11.
- M20: a step B or C failure in the job is recorded as `grant.revoke.refused internal`. Killed by T12.
- M21: boot skips the interrupted-job check. Killed by T13.
## 10. Order and rebase
Built from 47a35bf43 for this read. The code goes on whatever refactor is when the build starts. Rows 274, 256
and 194's follow-ups touch the broker and instance-settings, so expect a rebase and a whole rerun. The row lands
before the .53 Case 1 install hires an instance with a grant. It doesn't hold the dragon-lin re-pin.
## Build notes
Dewey approved d6 (dewey-0829, 10:11Z 10-22) with two build-time items. Both are test details, so there's no
new draft:
- N7, T12's setup. T1's setup makes `revoke()` refuse because the grant's `host.<id>` file is still in the
store. Step G's `hostKeys.revoke` removes that file before step B, so it can't be T12's cause. T12 uses a
step B refusal that survives step G, for example a stray file in the agent's store directory or a roles-entry
credential whose revoke fails. The test asserts it reaches `fire.failed` with step `B`.
- N8, `decision-consumed` in T11. A chief's fire is within-role: `#checkAuthority` returns `{ class }` with no
decision, and the lifecycle verbs take none (broker.mjs:3712). `#spent` never applies to a fire. T11 drops the
second-use `decision-consumed` assertion. Instead, a repeat fire after `fire.done` takes the delisted path and
answers done. Section 2's `decision-consumed` example for `fire.failed` can't occur, so the build uses only
codes that can.
Choices made in the code (b1, broker.mjs only so far). None changes an approved section; each fills in a
detail the design left open. Dewey, flag any you read differently.
- Record writers. `writeGrantEvent` takes only `grant.*` actions. So `fire.revoking`, `fire.done`, `fire.failed`
and `grants.job.interrupted` are not grant evidence. `fire.*` goes through `#event` under the chief's session
(the job keeps a copy, `sc`). `grants.revoking`, `grants.revoked.done` and `grants.job.interrupted` go under
the bus session `{ role: null, run: null }`, subject the agent. `grant.revoke.refused` is grant evidence, as
section 4 has it.
- A fired Gitea user. The `gitea_users` row survives a fire (#436b section 6), so on its own the row would
never let a fired agent's set empty. The user counts as pending until a later Gitea `grant.revoked` with
`fire: true` and a non-null `user` names the agent, and counts again after a new grant step (a rehire).
- Open Gitea decisions (3c) end with a `grant.revoked` that has `user: null`, `tokens: []`, `fire: false` and
`decisions: [ids]`, plus an immediate close with `serviceLeft: []`. `#giteaRevokedSince` then ends them. Since
`user` is null, the pair never counts as the user's fire.
- Leftover lines (section 5, Q1). A line is in the set as `line:<host>` when its tag is in `#hostLinesLeft`, its
host isn't one the agent holds a grant on, and no `fire.done` or `grants.revoked.done` for the agent since the
line was last named left lists it in `grantsLeft`. A line removed in step G gets `grant.revoke.closed` with
the old revoke id, `hostLine: 'removed'` and the flag. `#hostLinesLeft` now clears a tag on a later close
with `hostLine: 'removed'` and `fire` or `delete` set, so the line also leaves `hosts sweep`'s list. The
removed lines appear in `grants` as `{ grant: 'line:<host>', revoke, tag }`.
- 3a's wait for host executors. `#runHostGrant` marks itself in `#hostRuns` from its claim to its release. Step
G's host part runs `abortClaim`, waits for every mark on (agent, host), and sends the remove. If a new mark
appeared during the remove, it runs again, up to five rounds, and then refuses `host-remove-failed`. From the
last check to the step 1 commit there's no await.
- `hosts sweep gitea` (3e) skips the open revokes, settles and left entries of every agent a job holds, and
keeps those entries in `left`. Its answer has `running: [agents]` only when there's at least one. The retry
of one left entry is now `#giteaRetry`, which the sweep and step G share. The behavior is unchanged.
- Step G's Gitea retries record a sweep-shaped pair for the agent: `grant.sweep { agent, job }`, then the
closes and retries, then `grant.swept` whose `left` keeps every other agent's entries. The pair is written
first, so a serviceLeft from a close between the two can't drop out of `#giteaLeft`.
- `#giteaRuns` is now a Map from each promise to its `business/agent` key, or null for business-wide work.
Step G waits for its own agent's keys and the null ones. `#track` adds `.catch` to its `finally` chain, so a
rejected executor can't leave an unhandled rejection behind.
- A delete repeat after a refusal. `grant-revoke-failed` is returned only when the agent's last delete job end
was a `grant.revoke.refused` whose grant is still in the set. If that grant was cleared by hand and only a
leftover line remains, the repeat answers `grants-revoking`.
- The delete job's reason, in `grant.revoked`, is `lifecycle.delete <request>`.
- Step G's messages go to the human's inbox alone (no decision, so no raising role to thread to), through the
same insert and route as `#grantNotice`.
- `#recordAuthority` is `#consumeAuthority` less `#checkAuthority`'s holder and processing checks, for a
fire's step C (C1).
Choices made in the tests (b2). Each changes where a test sits or how it checks, not what it checks:
- T1 is in `lifecycle-revoke.test.mjs`, not `grant-host.test.mjs` and `gitea-grant.test.mjs`. T1 pins the
runtime's `revoke()` (step B's credential check) and the start sweep, and only `lifecycle-revoke` builds a
broker through `startBroker` with the real credential store. Its `setup` takes a new `seed` hook that writes
a host record and grant before the start.
- T8 is in `grant-executor.test.mjs` for `hosts.revoke`, where G12, G13, G26 and G27 already are, and in
`gitea-grant.test.mjs` for `grants.revoke`. G12 already pins the host verb's two records, their bodies and
their order, and G26 its role refusals, so T8 adds what no test had: `tester-dev-only` once `bus.tester` is
off, and that a verb revoke writes no `fire.*` or `grants.*` record.
- T2-T13 use a fake installer and a fake organization in `fire-revokes-grants.test.mjs`. The organization's
`instance.fire` delists and reloads the business, as the writer does, and can throw a set error, which is
how T12 gets its step B cause (N7): a `credential-revoke-failed` that survives step G.
- "A fired agent's `host.run` and Gitea use refuse" is checked through the state those uses read: no
`host_grants` row, no key file, a revoked credential, and no Gitea token for the user.
- T10's cli case runs the real runtime and launcher. The seeded grant is on a TEST-NET host
(192.0.2.10), so the job's remove fails or waits. The first request closes `grants-revoking` either way, and
the case waits on `grantsIdle()` before close.
- The mutants are `scratch/megavolt-r281/r281-mutants.sh`, one sed each on `broker.mjs`, run against
`fire-revokes-grants.test.mjs`. M13's verbs are synchronous, so its mutant makes the fire return the job's
promise, and the call waits for the job. That's what the verb awaiting its job would look like.
Rebase onto 46dedf925, after row 256 (sage-2597). It's on branch `megavolt/row281-b`, and
`megavolt/row281` stays where it is. `git range-diff 0165be266..bd0bb96ae origin/refactor..HEAD` gives `=` for
all nine commits, and no path changes on both sides. Row 256 threads the actor through `planDelete`,
`checkDelete` and `instances.check`, and adds `protectedRefusal`. That doesn't change what a delete calls in
this row:
- At the verb, `instances.set` op delete already ran `instances.check` with `s.human` before 256. A
creative instance's delete by anyone but the human now refuses there, before any request exists, so no
step G job starts for it.
- In the pass, step G runs in `lifecycleDelete` before `#organization('instances.set')`, and the actor
is still `r.by`. `planDelete` there can still refuse after step G has revoked. Before 256 a references or
last-listed refusal could do the same thing, so the order is unchanged. A delete the verb accepted only
meets a new refusal in the pass if the file changed between the two.
- `read(business, actor)` changes only the listing's `endProtected`. The broker and these tests don't read it.
The T10 cli case deletes `sec-1` (security-reviewer), which isn't END_PROTECTED.
Rebase onto 980cec88c, after row 277 (sage-2605). It's on branch `megavolt/row281-c`.
`git range-diff 46dedf925..7454be493 980cec88c..c174f37ac` gives `=` for all ten commits. Row 277's
`thread.claims` change to `broker.mjs` doesn't touch step G or any line the mutants change:
`scratch/megavolt-r281/anchors.sh` counts each M1-M21 sed anchor in the rebased `broker.mjs`, and all 28
counts are 1. The mutants script runs it after a green base and stops if a count isn't 1.
b3, after the first base run on c174f37ac (11:24:47Z) came back red. These tests had never run before: b2
was written under git and docs only. bus: 120 tests, 116 pass, 4 fail. cli lifecycle: 24 tests, 23 pass,
1 fail. Every older test in those files passed. No mutant ran. Each failure is a test fault, and b3 changes
no code:
- T4b, `fire-revokes-grants`: **test changed**. The test read `manual.revoke`, but the `hosts.revoke`
answer has never carried `revoke`: `#revokeHost` drops it, so the verb's answer keeps its pre-281 shape.
The fire's close names the manual revoke, as section 3a says. The test now takes that id from the
manual's `grant.revoked` event.
- T5b, `fire-revokes-grants`: **test changed**. The job refused `gitea-left:9,tokens`, and the test
expected `gitea-left:<digits>`. Section 4 sets the reason as `gitea-left:<ids>`, the ids left at Gitea.
For a fire, a close's `serviceLeft` is the N10 list from before 281: each token id whose DELETE failed,
then `tokens` or `login` for a fire step that failed (`#giteaCloseRevoke`). With the DELETE failing,
`#giteaFire`'s token list never clears, so `tokens` is a real entry left at Gitea. It belongs in the
reason. The test now expects `gitea-left:<id>,tokens`.
- T6b, `fire-revokes-grants`: **test changed**. After the fire, the executor made 4 Gitea calls where the
test expected none. They are step 0's admin checks C1 to C4: version, self, token scopes and the repo
check, all GET. Step 1's `#giteaRevokedSince` then ends the decision `revoked` before any write. Section
3c of d6 names that step 1 check as the only thing that stops the decision. T6b's line in section 8 says
"before any Gitea call", but the evidence it lists is no row, no token file and no token create. That
phrase was wrong, because step 0 always runs first. The approved text stays as it is, and this note is
the correction. The test now checks that every call after the fire is a GET and that no token create
happened. Moving the revoked check ahead of step 0 would change the executor for every revoke, not just
step G's, and the design doesn't ask for that.
- T8, `gitea-grant`: **test changed**. The human revoke's events between `grant.revoked` and
`grant.revoke.closed` include its 5 `grant.call`/`grant.result` pairs (`#giteaLog` logs both around every
Gitea call). T8 checks that a human revoke writes no job records, not that it makes no calls. It now
leaves the call log out before comparing.
- T10, cli `lifecycle`: **test changed** (sage-2615 asked about this one). The `credential-file` came from
`startBroker`, not from the delete and not from Gitea. The seeded host grant gives `sec-1` a `host.web1`
store reference. `Credentials` checks the store root (`<config dir>/secrets/agents`) with `privateDir` at
start, and the fixture had no store root. That check is row 199's, and it is right to fail closed. The
test now makes the store root at 0700 under `dirname(p.f.config)`, as the bus host fixtures do, never
under the real config. sage-2575's condition still holds. This business has no Gitea grant, so
`#grantSet` adds no `gitea` entry (`#giteaPending` and `#giteaUnfired` read only the store), and step G
never reaches `#stepGGitea`. A delete with no Gitea grant reads no Gitea credential file.
### b4a: the M1 hang's cause (mos-1273, sage-2636)
The first M1-M21 run on 06ee5ed6b hung on M1. All 22 tests ended in about 80 s (16 fail, 5 pass, 1
cancelled), but the file's process stayed alive until the harness killed it at 1762 s. This is a test fault,
and no code changed.
- Cause: T6c holds `web1:add`, and the fake `install` loops in `pause()` on `sleep(5)` while the key is
held. Only the fire's abort signal can end that loop, and M1 removes the host revoke that sends the
abort. In M1's log, T6c fails at its `until` on line 683, before it deletes the key on line 691. So the loop keeps a
timer alive forever. That reading comes from the log and the file. The rerun checks it: before M1-M21 it runs M1
once without `--test-force-exit`, and that run must exit by itself inside 180 s.
- Fix: setup's `t.after` clears `held` and `failing` before it closes the store, so any held loop ends
with its test. The base is unchanged because every passing test already releases its keys.
- Sage's second candidate, the Gitea `gate` in T6c and T10, isn't a live handle. The fake server's
`t.after` closes all its connections, and a parked promise with no timer doesn't keep node alive. Both
tests now also release the gate in `t.after` (`go()` only, not `off()`: a second `off()` would splice
index -1 and remove another rule).
- The runner's 180 s timeout with `--test-force-exit` (sage-2633) still caps any future hang.
### b4: T6b pins the four reads (dewey-0839, sage-2627)
- T6b: **test changed**, stricter. `slice(calls).every(GET)` also passed with zero calls. It now
deep-equals the exact list in order: `GET /api/v1/version`, `GET /api/v1/user`, `GET /api/v1/token`,
`GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1&page=1` (step 0's C1 to C4, `gitea-grant.mjs` adminChecks). It also fails
if step 1 stops ending the run and step 2's reads go out. The title says "before any Gitea write".
## Runs
(after the gate)
## Mutants
Run on b4a 3f29375a8 (base 6af85df4b), 12:16:18Z to 12:20:15Z, 10-22, slot sage-2643; runner
`r281-mutants.sh` (scratch). Base first, plain `node --test`, each file whole: bus fire-revokes-grants,
lifecycle-revoke, grant-executor and gitea-grant 120/120, 0 skipped; cli lifecycle 24/24, 0 skipped. The
worktree was clean after the base, and all 28 sed anchors matched once in `broker.mjs`.
The M1 exit check (mos-1273) applied M1 and ran fire-revokes-grants without `--test-force-exit`. It exited by
itself, rc 1, with 16 fails, in 63 s. The first run on 06ee5ed6b hung there until it was killed at 1762 s
(b4a above).
Each mutant ran fire-revokes-grants.test.mjs whole under `timeout -k 10 180 node --test --test-force-exit`
(sage-2633). Every one ran all 21 tests, with no load error and no timeout.
| Mutant | Change | Verdict | rc | Fails of 21 | Time | Section 9 names | Failing tests (from the log) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | skip-host-revokes | KILLED | 1 | 16 | 63 s | T2 | T2 T3 T3b×2 T4 T4b×2 T6 T6c T6d T6e T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 |
| M2 | skip-gitea-revoke | KILLED | 1 | 12 | 12 s | T2 | T2 T3 T3b×2 T4 T5 T5b T6b T6c T6d T9 T10 |
| M3 | refusal-goes-on | KILLED | 1 | 3 | 3 s | T4 | T4 T5 T5b |
| M4 | delete-skips-step-g | KILLED | 1 | 6 | 3 s | T3 | T3 T3b×2 T6e T10 T13 |
| M5 | host-local-first | KILLED | 1 | 4 | 3 s | T4 | T2 T3b×2 T4 |
| M6 | service-left-done | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 3 s | T5b | T5b |
| M7 | set-no-open-decisions | KILLED | 1 | 4 | 3 s | T6, T6b | T6 T6b T6c T6d |
| M8 | skip-line-retry | KILLED | 1 | 3 | 4 s | T4b | T3b T4b×2 |
| M9 | line-retry-refuses | KILLED | 1 | 2 | 3 s | T4b | T3b T4b |
| M10 | approved-only | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 3 s | T6d | T6d |
| M11 | raise-no-fired-check | KILLED | 1 | 3 | 3 s | T6e | T4 T6e T12 |
| M12 | no-lock | KILLED | 1 | 3 | 3 s | T9 | T3 T6e T9 |
| M13 | verb-awaits-job | KILLED | 1 | 14 | 3 s | T10 | T2 T4 T4b×2 T5 T5b T6 T6b T6c T6d T10 T11 T12 T13 |
| M14 | no-executor-wait | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 3 s | T6c | T6c |
| M15 | business-wide-sweep | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 4 s | T5b | T5b |
| M16 | no-start-message | KILLED | 1 | 2 | 3 s | T3 | T3 T3b |
| M17 | repeat-grants-revoking | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 3 s | T3b | T3b |
| M18 | empty-set-job | KILLED | 1 | 4 | 4 s | T3c | T3 T3b×2 T3c |
| M19 | step-c-consume | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 4 s | T11 | T11 |
| M20 | bc-as-internal | KILLED | 1 | 2 | 3 s | T12 | T6e T12 |
| M21 | no-interrupted-check | KILLED | 1 | 1 | 4 s | T13 | T13 |
Every mutant fails the test section 9 names for it; none was killed only by a different test. "T3b×2" and "T4b×2" are the two tests that share each id. The failing-test ids are taken from each log's "failing tests" list (dewey-0841).
21 killed, 0 survived. b4 makes one T6b assertion stricter after this run, and fire-revokes-grants is
rerun whole on b4 (Runs).
-229
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@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
# FED R3 (#414): the broker's user principal
Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-22_federation-r3.md (f0d0b31e9). Design: FED r4.11 (b93f098f0), sections 3.5, 3.6 and
the R3 row of section 7. Base: row 205a's candidate 67640f892. If 205a changes in review, R3 rebases onto a new
branch name. No schema change. Nothing has run yet: every test run waits for Sage's CLEAR.
## Changes
`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`:
- `USER_VERBS` is the collaborator list: `project.list`, `thread.create`, `thread.list`, `thread.open`,
`thread.send`, `thread.messages`, `names`. The grant level is `collaborator`, through R1's `covers`.
- The Broker takes `access`, a function that returns the checked access document (the runtime passes R1's
`loadAccess`). `#userGrants` calls it once per user request. A throw, null or no document gives no grants.
- `bindUser({business, user})` (3.6 item 1). The keys must be exactly those two. A user id that fails
`ID_PATTERN` or is `human`, `tester`, `user` or the business human fails `access-refused`, whatever the file
says. No live collaborator grant fails `access-revoked`. The session is
`{business, user, role: null, run: null, human: false}`.
- `request()`: for a user, a verb off `USER_VERBS` fails `access-refused` before any argument check. Then the
grants are read; none fails `access-revoked`. The view the verb sees carries them as `grants`.
`requestTask`, `requestWeb` and `requestHost` fail a user `access-refused` first.
- Filters: `project.list` keeps granted projects. `thread.list` keeps the user's own threads its grants still
cover. `names` keeps granted instances. `thread.create` checks the project and the thread instance against
the grants before the project lookup, so an ungranted id and an unknown id both refuse `access-refused`.
`thread.open`, `thread.send` and `thread.messages` refuse a thread the grants no longer cover.
- `#owner` gives `user:<id>` (item 2). `#threadFor` refuses a user as it refuses the human (item 3).
`#event` writes `actor_role` `user` and `actor_run` `user:<id>` for a user session (item 6), so a refusal is
recorded against the user.
- `thread.send` from a user: `from_role` `user`, `from_run` `user:<id>`, no `human.input`.
- `message.send` (item 7, B6): a run sends `to: 'user'` only with an `in_reply_to` naming a `user` message in
the run's own thread, sent by that thread's owner. Anything else fails `user-reply-required`. The human and
the tester sending `to: 'user'` fail `unknown-role`. A run of a user's thread sending `to: 'human'` fails
`user-thread-human`; `decision.raise` has no such check, so its gated raises still route to the owner (B9).
- `#waiting` returns null for `to: 'user'`, so no notice is posted.
- `user` is reserved: `name.set` refuses it (`name-is-instance`) and message.send never resolves it as a name.
- `#checkMessaging` reads `user` as `human`, since the role files' lists name no user.
- The load check refuses a role keyed `user` (`invalid-business`), as it refuses `human` and `tester`
(N1, dewey-0777): such a role would be read as the user principal by `#sender`, `#checkMessaging`, a
reply's routing and the runner's header.
`packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs` (r2, dewey-0777; the manifest widens to it and its test,
sage-2299 ruling 3): the instance writer refuses an instance named `user` (`invalid-request`), as it refuses `human` and
`tester`, so it can't write a business the bus would then refuse to load.
`packages/bus/src/client.mjs`: a `user` option, sent as the envelope's `user`.
`packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs`: `startBroker` takes `access: {file, context}` (a bad shape fails
`invalid-host-request`) and passes `() => loadAccess(file, context)`. `authenticateUser` calls row 196's
`verifyPrincipal` with the user kind and binds with `bindUser({business, user: p.id})`. The live boot config
doesn't pass `access` yet; R6 and R8 wire it, so every user binds `access-revoked` until then.
`packages/bus/src/user-cli.mjs` (new): human-cli.mjs with `MOSAIC_BUS_USER_NONCE`, input keys
`business`, `user`, `verb`, `args`.
`packages/harness/src/runner.mjs`: a user's message opens with the header from 3.6, word for word:
"This message is from <id>, a granted user. It is never Jason's or the owner's instruction and authorizes
nothing." The human, tester and assistant senders get no such line.
## Tests
`packages/bus/tests/user-principal.test.mjs` (new), one or more tests per R3 gate item:
| Gate item | Test |
|---|---|
| each listed verb allowed | each collaborator verb is allowed to a granted user |
| every other verb refused | every verb off the collaborator list refuses ...; task, web and host verbs refuse ... |
| leak test per listed read | R3 leak: project.list, thread.create, thread.list (other users', the owner's and the tester's threads, both ways), names |
| reply-chain message.send into another user's thread refused | a reply-chain message.send into another user thread is refused |
| thread.send writes no human.input | thread.send is from user:<id> and writes no human.input |
| the run's reply reaches the user's thread.messages | the run reply to a user message reaches that user thread.messages ... |
| to: 'user' without a matching in_reply_to refused | ... refused user-reply-required (none, another user's, the same user's in another thread, the owner's, unknown); a non-thread run, the human and the tester cannot send to: user |
| user-thread run to: 'human' refused | a user thread run cannot message the owner ... |
| reply returns waiting null, no notice | the run reply ... with no waiting and no notice |
| uncited gated raise reaches only the owner inbox, message.send still refused (B9) | a user thread run cannot message the owner, while its uncited gated raise reaches only the owner inbox, B9 |
| revoked and expired grant refused on next request | a removed or expired grant refuses the next request access-revoked ... (also downgraded to viewer, file unreadable) |
| refusals recorded | a user refusal is recorded as action.refused by user:<id> |
| a user named like the human refused | a user named like the business human, the tester or a principal word is refused ... |
| N1: role key `user` refused (r2) | a business with a role keyed user refuses invalid-business |
`packages/harness/tests/runner.test.mjs`: the user header, exact string, and its absence for the other senders.
`packages/business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs` (r2): row 165's validation test also refuses instance
`user`.
Row 196's `principal.test.mjs` already covers the user kind of `verifyPrincipal` (agent parent, non-Console
parent, kind confusion are its mutants). No runtime test of `authenticateUser` or user-cli yet: the stub
`authenticateUser` path needs a real Console parent, which is R6's harness.
## Audit of `s.human` and `s.tester` branches
A user reaches only the seven `USER_VERBS` through `request()`. Task, web and host requests refuse it first.
The user cap is transient: the server binds it per request and releases it, and never returns it to a client,
so the cap-taking launcher and git ops (`authorize`, `checkPush`, `recordPush`, `checkLand`, `reviewFetch`,
`recordEvent`, `recordTask`) can't receive one.
| Branch | For a user |
|---|---|
| `#agent`, `#human` | `#human` refuses a user (`human-required`); every listed verb skips it with `!s.user`. `#agent` is reached only from `names` for a non-human, non-tester, non-user session. |
| `#threadFor` | refuses a user (item 3). Not reachable: message.send and the review verbs are off the list. An equivalent mutant; the line stays. |
| `#testerOwns`, `#testerThread` | `s.tester` false and `s.user` sessions have no thread: not taken. |
| `#owner`, `#sender`, `#event` | changed: `user:<id>`, `user`, actor columns. |
| `#userThread` | new; false for a user session itself. |
| `endLaunch` session sweep | matches `s.run === record.run`; a user's run is null and a record's run is an identifier: never matches. |
| `identity` | returns `{business, role: null, run: null, human: null}`. server.mjs reads only `business`, for the web service, and requestWeb then refuses. |
| `recordTask` | its cap check would pass a user, but only `requestTask`'s handler and the git ops call it with a cap: not reachable. |
| `request()` creative raise, usage, limitStop, organization verbs, hosts, project, library, credentials, reader and tester gates | after the user gate: not reachable. |
| `#hostsCaller`, `#requestCredential`, `#limitStop`, `#dispatch` role checks, `#claimEnd`, `#checkBlock` | reached only from verbs off the list: not reachable. |
| `message.send`, `message.receive`, `message.read`, `messages`, `replies`, `trail`, `decisions`, `credentials`, `state`, `usage`, `decision.withdraw`, `assistant.stop`, `name.set`, `project.create`, `role.claim` | off the list: not reachable. |
| `project.list`, `thread.create`, `thread.list`, `thread.open`, `thread.send`, `thread.messages`, `names` | changed as above. |
## Mutants (each must fail its named test, in user-principal.test.mjs unless named)
| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | the grant read skipped: no `access-revoked` after the per-request read | a removed or expired grant refuses the next request access-revoked ... |
| M2a | project.list filter dropped | R3 leak: project.list shows granted projects only |
| M2b | thread.list filter dropped | R3 leak: thread.list shows ... never others |
| M2c | names filter dropped | R3 leak: names shows granted instances only |
| M2d | `#grantedThread` check dropped | R3 leak: thread.list shows ... never others |
| M2e | thread.create grant check dropped | R3 leak: thread.create needs the project and the thread instance granted ... |
| M3x | `message.send` added to `USER_VERBS` (list mutant) | every verb off the collaborator list refuses ... |
| M4 | the reply-to check dropped | a reply to: user without a matching in_reply_to is refused user-reply-required |
| M5 | the business human dropped from bindUser's reserved list | a user named like the business human ... |
| M6x | `trail` and `replies` added to `USER_VERBS` (second list mutant) | every verb off the collaborator list refuses ... |
| M7 | user-thread-human check dropped | a user thread run cannot message the owner ..., B9 |
| M8 | `to === 'user'` dropped from `#waiting` | the run reply to a user message reaches ... with no waiting and no notice |
| M9 | thread.send writes `human.input` for a user | thread.send is from user:<id> and writes no human.input |
| M10 | the load check accepts a role keyed `user` | a business with a role keyed user refuses invalid-business |
| M11 | instance-settings accepts instance `user` | instance-settings.test.mjs: row 165 refuses each validation failure ... |
Rulings from Dewey's early look (dewey-0777), confirmed by Sage (sage-2299 rulings 1 and 2), on the two
mutants the design and brief name:
1. "#threadFor's user refusal removed" is an equivalent mutant. No user request reaches `#threadFor`: its
only callers are message.send and `#reviewMessage` (review.request and review.verdict), all off the list.
The line stays as defence in depth. M3x stays as a list mutant. The kit also runs the reply-chain test
under M3x as the two-walls evidence: with the access-refused assertion turned into a log line, it records
the code alice's send gets (expected `human-required`, from `#human`, since a user has no run) and still
asserts bob's thread holds one message.
2. The brief's "drops the 193b1a filter for user sessions" line is void (sage-2299 ruling 2): a user can't
call trail or replies, so no filtered read reaches a user. M6x is a second list mutant, not a stand-in.
## Notes
- N1: fixed in r2 (dewey-0777). The broker's load check and the instance writer refuse `user`, one test each
(M10, M11). The instance-settings change stays in R3 and the manifest widens to it and its test (sage-2299
ruling 3). Sage checked the live business config: no role or instance is named `user`, so a re-pin
carrying R3 loads (ruling 4; Sage checks again before that re-pin).
- N2: server.mjs answers a `user` envelope with no `authenticateUser` as `human-required`, the existing
default for a non-tester kind. The runtime always passes `authenticateUser`, so only a bare test server sees it.
## r4 (sage-2486, sage-2557): on row 194's landing
Row 194 landed as fd6dd327c. r4 rebases R3 onto it and adds four changes. Sage ruled on each.
- Halt (sage-2486): processing halt is the kill switch, so it refuses a granted user's writes
(thread.create, thread.open, thread.send) with `processing-halted`. The reads on #processingGate's list,
thread.messages among them, still answer. The kill-switch plan (:14-16) needs this, and Dewey agreed. Test:
"R3 r4: while halted, a granted user's thread.send refuses processing-halted and thread.messages still
answers". setup() takes a `processing` stand-in for it, as lifecycle-verbs T15 does.
- S1 (sage-2557): row 194's hire takes an instance name. Its two checks refused only `human` and `tester`, so
a chief could hire `user` and get past N1's load-check refusal. Both now refuse `user` with the code they
already give (`invalid-request`): broker #hireFireArgs, and the writer's hire() in instance-settings.mjs. One
test each: user-principal "R3 r4: the chief's hire refuses an instance named user ..." (with `helper` as a
control that passes the name check), and a hire loop in instance-settings' "row 165 refuses each
validation failure ..." that checks the file's bytes stay unchanged.
- S2 (sage-2557, sage-2501): the `access` TypeError check moves up beside harnessOn, testerOn and roleFile,
before the store is read or initializeControl runs. Test: "R3 r4: a non-function access throws before
the store is read" (null store, T8b style).
- Merge: the three 194 conflicts in broker.mjs are unions. R3's `user` role refusal moves into 194's
checkBusiness(). instance-settings takes 194's add/change/delete op list with R3's `user` refusal.
Mutants M12-M15 kill each of the changes above: M12 the broker hire, M13 the writer hire, M14 the access
check moved below the store read, M15 thread.send added to the halt-exempt list. The kit has 19 mutants plus
the M3x two-walls run. All 19 anchors match exactly once on the r4 tree.
## r5 (sage-2566): covers moves into the vocabulary
r4 was rebased onto row 236's landing, bd5f11ded, as 1920b926f. Sage ruled (b) in sage-2566, with Dewey's support
(dewey-0820), and r5 goes on refactor 47a35bf43. Checking that rebase found a fault in R3 itself.
The broker imported `covers` from business/src/access.mjs. That broke the pin in project-runtime.test.mjs
("Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure ..."), and it would have broken the runner: the session
sandbox mounts only seat/src/sandbox.mjs RUNNER_FILES, and access.mjs, which imports errors, business and
util, isn't one of them. R3 had never been run, so nobody had seen this.
- `covers`, `LEVELS` and the all marker (now `GRANT_ALL`) move into business/src/vocabulary.mjs. That file
is already in RUNNER_FILES and still imports nothing, the same reason row 194 put `unhireableAction`
there. access.mjs imports them back and re-exports `LEVELS` and `covers`, so index.mjs, the cli and the
access tests don't change.
- The broker takes `covers` from its vocabulary import. The pin test adds it to that line, with a comment.
- RUNNER_FILES is unchanged.
- M16 puts the access.mjs import back, and three tests must fail on it: the project-runtime pin; seat
sandbox.test.mjs "RUNNER_FILES is exactly what the runner and the harness sources it starts import"
(M16b), which walks the real import graph from the runner; and the confined-session test there (M16c),
which starts the runner under bwrap with only the RUNNER_FILES mounts, so it proves the closure by loading
it. M16c is skipped where bwrap can't run, and the gate log names any skip. The kit has 22 mutant runs plus
the M3x two-walls run, and every anchor matches exactly once.
- The manifest widens to vocabulary.mjs, access.mjs and project-runtime.test.mjs. Tests that import
either module use named exports only; none deepEquals an export list or pins a hash (sage-2566 item 4).
The kit runs project-runtime, access, access-levels and seat sandbox whole, plus the seat suite, and adds the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh`
(mos-1200).
## r6 (sage-2576): the list test pins the collaborator list
The r5 gate on f58cfc361 stopped red at 10:05:09Z: M3x and M6x survived (morgana-0108). The test "every
verb off the collaborator list ..." deleted the broker's own USER_VERBS from its off-list set, so a verb a
mutant added to the list left the checked set as well. The broker's allowlist at the user gate is right.
- The test now deepEquals USER_VERBS against the ruled seven verbs, written out, before the delete loop.
M3x and M6x fail on that line.
- The off-list set adds GRANTS_VERBS, LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS, WEB_VERBS and HOST_VERBS (sage-2576 item 2).
The user gate refuses each of them `access-refused` before any other check. If one doesn't, that is a
finding for Sage, not a test fix.
- Test only. Only user-principal.test.mjs's blob changes in the manifest. The gate reruns whole on the r6 tip.
## Gate
The kit is /mnt/storage/scratch/morgana-r3 (`slot-r3.sh`, `mutate.py`, `busy.sh`), run as
`bash busy.sh && CAND=<sha> bash slot-r3.sh` on Sage's CLEAR. It runs these files whole: user-principal,
principal, human, tester, tester-threads, tester-writes, threads, names, messaging, messages, decisions,
decision-route, broker, transport, peer-transport, process, message-filter, harness runner and business
instance-settings, project-runtime, business access and access-levels, and seat sandbox. Then the bus, harness, business, cli and seat suites, then the 22 mutant runs (r5), each on its named
test and restored after each, then the M3x two-walls run. It uses
umask 022 and TMPDIR from `mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gr3XXXX`, refuses unless HEAD is the
candidate and the tree is clean, and stops after two unexpected failures (mos-0823).
The kit runs every `scripts/test-*.sh` after the suites and counts each script's `^skip` lines (r5). Every run is slot work (sage-2280,
sage-2299 ruling 5); the brief's "single test files run freely" line is stale.
Static check: `node --check` on every changed source and test file, run from `/`. All parse. All fifteen
mutant anchors match exactly once.
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# Row 205a (193b1a, #1703): the trail and replies message filter
Design: DESIGN.md d2 in this directory, with rulings in section 7 (sage-2288). Base: refactor 02da6a2ae. No schema
change. Nothing has run yet: every test run waits for Sage's CLEAR.
## Changes
`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`:
- `#hiddenMessage(s, id)`: the message's thread (`message_threads` joined to `threads`) is owned by a `user:`
other than `#owner(s)`, and `#readable(s, t)` is false. A message with no thread, or in the business human's
or the tester's thread, is never hidden. A reader session owns nothing, so every user thread is hidden from it.
The tester reads through its reader view, and `#owner` still gives `tester`.
- `#readable(s, t)` returns false. Rule 1 (a share in force) can't hold before 193b2's schema 3j, so nobody
reads another's thread. 193b2 adds the share rule and rules 2-4 here.
- `#trail`: a hidden subject returns `[]` before anything is read, exactly as an unknown id does (ruling 3).
After the rows are collected, it drops hidden `messages` rows, `deliveries` rows of a hidden message, and
`events` rows whose subject is a hidden message. Decisions, decision events, task snapshots, run events and
claims stay.
- `replies`: a hidden id fails `message-not-found`, as an unknown id does. Hidden replies are left out in SQL
(`NOT EXISTS` a thread whose owner starts with `user:` and isn't the caller), so the `REPLIES` limit counts
only visible rows.
- The SQL clause doesn't call `#readable`. That is exact while `#readable` is false. 193b2 must add the share
exception to the clause and to `#readable` together.
`packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs` (new). It writes a `user:alice` thread and its messages
straight to the store, as R3's `thread.send` and the run's `to: 'user'` reply will write them, because nothing
makes a user session before R3.
- `trail` on a hidden id equals `trail` on an unknown id, byte for byte, for the owner, a reader and the tester.
- `replies` on a hidden id equals `replies` on an unknown id (code and message), for all three.
- `trail` on a user-thread run's decision shows the decision and the owner's message, and drops the user
thread message, its delivery and its event.
- `replies` with `REPLIES` hidden replies ahead of a visible one returns the visible one.
- Messages in the business human's and the tester's threads stay visible on both verbs (row 177 control).
- The governance pin, one assertion per item in the user sentence: inbox entry, claim, task, project file and
the closed decision in `decisions {list: 'recent'}` show to the owner. `trail` and `replies` hide the user
message, and the decision's trail carries no user body.
## Mutants (each must fail its named test in message-filter.test.mjs)
| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: the owner sees decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not the user messages |
| M11 | the trail drop loop iterates nothing | trail on a decision keeps the decision and drops the user thread messages, their deliveries and their events |
| M12 | the replies `NOT EXISTS` clause removed | replies leaves out other users thread messages and still fills a page |
| M13 | trail fails `message-not-found` for a hidden subject | trail on a hidden message id answers exactly as on an unknown id, for the owner, a reader and the tester |
| M14 | replies returns `[]` for a hidden id | replies on a hidden message id answers exactly as on an unknown id, for the owner, a reader and the tester |
## Gate
The kit is /mnt/storage/scratch/morgana-r205 (`slot205.sh`, `mutate.py`, `busy.sh`), run as
`bash busy.sh && CAND=<sha> bash slot205.sh` on Sage's CLEAR. It runs these files whole:
- message-filter;
- the bus files that call trail or replies: replies, tester, tester-threads, tester-writes, broker, decisions,
decision-close, end-launch and task-read.
Then it runs the bus suite, then M1 and M11-M14, each on its named test and restored after each. It uses umask
022 and TMPDIR from `mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/g205XXXX`. It refuses unless HEAD is the candidate
and the tree is clean, and it stops at the first unexpected failure (sage-2371).
Sage's gate adds every `scripts/test-*.sh`. The webui tests that read trail or replies run there.
Static check: `node --check` on broker.mjs and the new test, run from `/`. Both parse. All five mutant anchors
match exactly once.
## r2 (after the 742cba805 slot, failure 1 of the window, sage-2428)
slot205 on 742cba805 stopped red in message-filter, 4 pass and 2 fail. Both fixes are in the test only.
broker.mjs is unchanged (sage-2430).
- "trail on a decision ..." (:124, its event shows). `#trail` reaches events on a decision trail by
`subject` = the decision or `body.$.decision` = the decision. `put()` wrote every event body as `{}`, so the
shown message's event was out of reach. That also made the "no hidden event" check (:127) vacuous: the hidden
event was never collected, so dropping it proved nothing. Fix: `put()` writes `{decision}` as the event body
when the message has a decision. Both events are now collected; the filter keeps one and drops the other.
- Governance pin, claims item (:175). A thread run's `role.claim` writes `thread_claims` only and returns
(broker.mjs:2682). `agents` (:3309) reads `role_claims` only. No owner verb shows a thread claim. The gap
predates 205. Ruling sage-2430, option (a): the pin checks through `threadsState` (the launcher view) that
the claim is recorded with holder `assistant-run` and isn't filtered. `agents` is unchanged in 205.
Follow-up: Sage adds a row for an owner-visible thread-claim read. Like the filter, it lands before any
user thread goes live, since PRD :1084 and the FED R6 sentence promise that the owner sees claims.
M1 still fails the pin: with `#readable` true, `trail` on the user message returns rows instead of `[]`.
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# Row 205 (193b1, #1703): viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
Owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage (sage-2280). Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md`,
"Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter" (blob a73e1bba0, rev 3088). Design:
row 193 DESIGN.md r5 (e2d161e2e, Duckworth approved), sections 4.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7, 8 and 9. Base: refactor
02da6a2ae. Draft 2: Sage's rulings (sage-2288) are in section 7. Sections 1-6 are d1 as sent (morgana-0063).
## 1. The dependency gap
The brief chains 193b1 on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. Only row 196 exists (7247d80c7). On 02da6a2ae:
- R3 and R4 aren't filed. The FED brief (`docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md`:12-13) files R3 "after
R1 and row 196" and R4 after R3, R5 and 193a. No `*/fed-r3` branch is on origin.
- Row 196's `verifyPrincipal` returns the `user` kind, and server.mjs accepts the `user` envelope, but
runtime.mjs wires only `authenticateHuman` and `authenticateTester`. The broker has no `bindUser`, no
`s.user`, no per-request grant read and no collaborator verb list. FED 3.6 and row R3 own all of these.
- So nothing makes a user session today, and no thread is owned by `user:<id>` except through a direct
store write.
193b1 has two halves that depend on R3 in different ways.
| Item | Needs a user session (R3) | Testable on 02da6a2ae |
|---|---|---|
| Viewer verb list (4.3) | yes: it extends R3's collaborator list | no |
| Per-grant level checks via `covers(..., {level})` | yes: R3's grant read | no |
| Board reads refused to users (5.5) | yes | no |
| `trail` and `replies` filter (5.7) | no: it filters owner, reader and tester sessions | yes, with seeded `user:<id>` threads |
| `#readable` owner-only | no | yes |
| Governance pin test (owner side) | no: the owner reads decisions, inbox, agents, tasks and `project.file` | yes, with a seeded user-thread run |
| Mutants 6 (viewer `thread.send`), 10 (user allowed `trail`) | yes | no |
| Mutants 11, 12 (trail, replies filter removed) | no | yes |
| Mutants 1, 3 (`#readable` rules 1 and 3 dropped) | see 4 | see 4 |
## 2. Recommendation: split 205 into 205a now and 205b after R3
- **205a, the message filter.** `trail` and `replies` hide messages in other users' threads from the owner,
reader sessions and the tester, with `#readable` owner-only. Plus the owner-side governance pin test and
mutants 11 and 12. No R3 dependency, no schema change.
- **205b, viewer verbs and board refusals.** Built on R3's candidate, as Q177 chains a row on its parent's
candidate. The viewer list, the level checks, users refused on board reads, the user-session half of the
pin test, mutants 6 and 10.
Why split. The filter is the item the boundary orders first: "No user thread goes live before 193b1's
message filter has landed" (mos-1021 B2, FED R8). Landing it before R3 means R3 and every later row can't
create a user thread that the owner can read on `trail`. Waiting for R3 holds the filter behind a row that
isn't filed. The other option, building all of 193b1 against R3's named interface as 193a did with R1,
doesn't work here: 193a only called R1's exported `covers`, while 193b1 would have to write `bindUser`, the
grant read and the collaborator list itself, which is R3's scope and owner.
Tradeoff: two rows and two reviews in place of one, and 205b rebases onto R3. The split is a brief change,
so it's Sage's to rule.
## 3. 205a design
### 3.1 The hidden-message check
One broker method, `#hiddenMessage(s, id)`:
```
SELECT t.owner FROM message_threads mt JOIN threads t ON t.id = mt.thread
WHERE mt.message = ? AND t.business = ?
```
A message is hidden when that owner starts with `user:`, isn't `#owner(s)`, and `#readable(s, t)` is false.
A message with no thread row, or in a thread owned by the business human or `tester`, is never hidden, so
row 177's behaviour is unchanged. A reader session has no `#owner`, so every user thread's messages are
hidden from it.
`#readable(s, t)` in 205a returns false. Before 193b2's schema 3j there is no `thread_shares` table, so rule 1
(a share in force) can't hold, and the function is false for anyone but the thread's owner (5.7: "b1 hides
every message in another user's thread"). It is written as its own method so 193b2 adds the share rule and
rules 2-4 in one place.
### 3.2 `trail`
- If `subject` is a hidden message id, return `[]`. Design 5.7 says `message-not-found`, "as an unknown id
does", but `trail` on an unknown id returns `[]` today (it has no not-found check). A different code for a
hidden id would confirm the id exists, which is what 5.7 wants to prevent, so I follow its reason over its
code. Question 3.
- After `#trail` collects its rows, drop: `messages` rows that are hidden, `deliveries` rows whose `message`
is hidden, and `events` rows whose `subject` is a hidden message id. This covers each way `#trail` reaches
a message: by id, by `decision`, and through `task.created` → `human.input` → `body.message`.
- Decision rows, decision events, task snapshots, run events and role claims stay. 5.7 puts them on the
governance side.
### 3.3 `replies`
A hidden `id` fails `message-not-found`, and hidden messages are dropped from the result. The `LIMIT`
applies before the filter today; the filter moves into the SQL (`AND NOT EXISTS` a thread owned by another
`user:`) so a page of hidden replies doesn't return short. For 205a that SQL form is exact because
`#readable` is false; 193b2 adds the share exception to the same clause.
### 3.4 Tests (packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs, new)
Fixtures seed a project, a thread owned by `user:alice` with messages in `message_threads`, a delivery and an
event on one of them, and a decision raised by that thread's run that cites the message. Sessions: the
business human, a reader session and the tester.
- `trail` on a hidden message id: `[]` for all three sessions, the same as an unknown id.
- `trail` on the decision: the decision row and its events show; the user's message, its delivery and its
events don't.
- `trail` on a human-owned thread's message: unchanged (row 177 control).
- `replies` on a hidden id: `message-not-found`. `replies` on a visible id with hidden and visible replies:
only the visible ones, and a full page when hidden replies come first.
- Governance pin, owner side: for the user-thread run, `decisions {list: 'recent'}`, `inbox`, `agents`,
`tasks` and `project.file` each show its item, and `trail` and `replies` hide the user's message body.
Each item in the user sentence is one named assertion.
### 3.5 Mutants
| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
|---|---|---|
| 11 | the `trail` filter removed | trail on the decision hides the user's message, delivery and events |
| 12 | the `replies` filter removed | replies hides other users' thread messages |
| 11b | the hidden-subject early return removed | trail on a hidden message id returns [] |
| 1 | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: trail and replies hide the user body |
## 4. Mutants 1 and 3
Design section 8 lists mutants 1 (rule 1 dropped) and 3 (rule 3 dropped) for b1. With no shares table,
rule 1 is always false, so `#readable` is false whatever rules 2-4 say. Dropping rule 3 changes nothing a
test can see until 193b2 adds shares, and rules 2 and 3 need R3's grant read. So:
- Mutant 1 in 205a is "`#readable` returns true", killed by the pin test above.
- Mutant 3 moves to 193b2, where rule 1 can hold and rule 3 decides.
This is a second brief change for Sage to rule on.
## 5. Gate (Sage's slot, on CLEAR only)
The brief's gate: Duckworth approves the manifest; the bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` green on
Sage's gate; the mutants killed. The new test file whole, the touched existing files whole, then the bus
suite, then each mutant on its named test with a restore check. umask 022, TMPDIR from
`mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gXXXXXX`. No test touches the live data root, config, units, slot
files, any live access.json or `~/.mosaic`.
## 6. Questions for Sage
1. Split 205 into 205a (filter, now) and 205b (viewer verbs and board refusals, after R3's candidate)?
2. Mutant 1 as "`#readable` returns true" in 205a, and mutant 3 moved to 193b2?
3. A hidden `trail` subject returns `[]`, the same as an unknown id, in place of 5.7's `message-not-found`
(3.2)? `replies` already fails `message-not-found` on an unknown id, so there the code stays.
## 7. Rulings (sage-2288, re morgana-0063)
1. **Split approved.** 205a is built now: the 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter over owner, reader and tester
sessions, `#readable` owner-only, the owner-side governance pin test, and mutants 11 and 12. 205b comes
after R3's candidate and R4: viewer verbs, `covers` level checks, board reads refused to users, the
user-side pin, and mutants 6 and 10. 205a's base is origin/refactor 02da6a2ae or later. R3 builds on
205a's candidate and extends the filter to user sessions, so the filter isn't written twice.
2. **Mutant 1** in 205a is "`#readable` returns true", killed by the pin test. **Mutant 3** moves to 193b2
(row 206). Sage changes the brief to match.
3. **Hidden equals unknown.** A hidden `trail` subject returns `[]`, exactly as an unknown id does. `replies`
keeps `message-not-found` for both. The point of 5.7 is that a caller can't tell hidden from unknown.
So 205a adds:
- one test per verb comparing the hidden response with the unknown-id response byte for byte
(`JSON.stringify` of the result, or of the error's code and message), for each of the three sessions;
- a mutant M13 that makes the hidden path distinguishable: `trail` fails `message-not-found` for a
hidden subject. The `trail` equality test must kill it. M14 does the same for `replies`: a hidden id
returns `[]` instead of failing. The `replies` equality test must kill it.
### 7.1 205a mutant table (replaces 3.5)
| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
|---|---|---|
| M1 (design 1) | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: the owner sees decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not the user's messages |
| M11 (design 11) | the `trail` filter of hidden rows removed | trail on the decision hides the user's message, its delivery and its events |
| M12 (design 12) | the `replies` filter removed | replies drops other users' thread messages and still fills a page |
| M13 | `trail` fails `message-not-found` for a hidden subject | trail on a hidden id answers exactly as on an unknown id |
| M14 | `replies` returns `[]` for a hidden id | replies on a hidden id answers exactly as on an unknown id |
Queue: Sage re-pins 205 to the split brief and adds 205b and the R3 row at the next gap. I claim after
that. No run before Sage's CLEAR.
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# #1782: the owner sees a thread agent's claims (design r1)
Morgana, 2026-10-22, for Duckworth. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-22_owner-thread-claims.md (Sage, for
mos-1262). The brief wasn't committed and had no queue row when this was written, so the folder is named
for the brief. It moves to queue-<row> once the row exists. Base: refactor c27207f6e (205 landed at
ce6a96ad6, then 268). No code yet.
## What the code does now
- A thread run's `role.claim` writes `thread_claims` only and returns (broker.mjs:2682 at ce6a96ad6).
- `agents` (broker.mjs:3409) reads `role_claims` only:
- human and reader sessions get `#agentState(c)` per held role;
- role and tester sessions get the raw rows.
- A held thread claim is the thread's latest `thread_claims` row with op `claim`. `#threadHolders`
(:483) and `#threadRows` (:624) already compute it that way, with `c.seq = max(seq)` per thread.
- `threads.name` is the name a user wrote. `threads.instance` is the role instance from the business
file, which the operator writes, not the user.
## The problem with the brief's shape
The brief adds thread rows to the human and reader `agents` result, after the role rows. Every consumer
of that result assumes one row per role:
| Consumer | What it reads | What a thread row would do |
|---|---|---|
| Console Agents view, webui bus.js:474 | `c.role` in a "Held roles" table, `claims.length` as its count | blank role cell, wrong count |
| Console board held table, bus.js:447 and :462 `held-count` | same | same |
| Console composer, bus.js:298 | `c.role`, filtered with `typeof r === 'string'` | dropped safely |
| CLI TUI agents view, screens.mjs:280 and :284, app.mjs:288 and :433 | `c.role` as title and column | blank title |
| CLI `mosaic agents`, format.mjs:54 | `c.role` | `undefined` in the line (brief item 4 covers this one) |
So the shape as briefed also needs the Console (webui) and the TUI changed in this row, or the live
Agents view breaks on the next re-pin. The brief's manifest names only format.mjs.
## Proposed shape: a separate owner verb
The brief allows this ("for example a separate owner verb, it goes in BUILD.md to Duckworth before
code").
**D1. New verb `thread.claims`**, human and reader sessions only. Every other session refuses with
`human-required`, the code `decisions` uses at :3426. No arguments (`keys(a, [], [])`). The result, in
thread creation order:
```js
[{ thread, instance, holder_run, harness, at }]
```
- One row per thread whose latest `thread_claims` op is `claim`.
- `at` is that claim row's time.
- It doesn't return `name`, message content or `address`. `address` matches the brief's four fields;
it can be added if Duckworth wants it next to the role rows.
- `instance` is beyond the brief's four. It names which assistant holds the thread, and the operator
writes it, not the user.
SQL, the `#threadHolders` join without the instance and owner filter:
```sql
SELECT t.id AS thread, t.instance, c.holder_run, c.harness, c.at FROM threads t
JOIN thread_claims c ON c.seq=(SELECT max(seq) FROM thread_claims WHERE thread=t.id)
WHERE t.business=? AND c.op='claim' ORDER BY t.seq
```
**D2. `agents` doesn't change** for any session. That is stronger than brief item 2 (role sessions
only), and it means the Console, TUI and composer need no change in this row.
**D3. Reader allow-list.** `thread.claims` goes in the reader list at :2370. The processing gate (:402)
already exempts human and reader sessions, so a halt doesn't hide claims. No TESTER_VERBS or USER_VERBS
entry is added (see D6).
**D4. CLI `mosaic agents`** (cli.mjs:314) calls `agents` and then `thread.claims`. `formatAgents(list,
threads = [])` prints the role lines unchanged, then for each held thread claim:
```
thread <thread> <instance> <holder_run> <harness> since <at>
```
Each line starts with `thread `, so a reader can tell the two kinds apart (brief item 1). Role output
with no thread claims is byte-equal to today, including "agents: no role is claimed". When there are no
roles but there are thread claims, the empty-roles line is still printed, then the thread lines.
**D5. The governance pin.** message-filter.test.mjs, the "claims" item: `threadsState` becomes
`call(owner, 'thread.claims')`, which must include `{ thread: U, holder_run: 'assistant-run' }`. The
comment that names this row goes away (brief item 5).
**D6. What this row leaves out**, so as not to widen beyond owner and reader sessions (mos-1202):
- tester sessions;
- FED R3 user principals, who own threads under R3, so their own claims are an R6 question;
- a Console section;
- the TUI.
## Questions for Duckworth and Sage
- **Q1.** Do you accept D1 over the briefed mixed list? If you'd rather have the mixed list, the
manifest grows to webui bus.js, screens.mjs and app.mjs, plus their tests (bus-browser,
webui bus.test and the TUI tests).
- **Q2.** Should the Console show thread claims before a user thread goes live? PRD :1083-1084 promises
visibility to the owner, and a Console user won't run `mosaic agents`. My recommendation: a follow-up
row bound like this one (it lands before any user thread goes live), so this row stays small for
10-27. The alternative is a "Thread claims" section in the Console Agents view in this row.
## Tests (under D1)
All new tests go in packages/bus/tests/agents.test.mjs unless named otherwise. Each one runs on a store
with one held role claim and one thread run.
- **T1.** Human `thread.claims` lists the held thread claim (thread, instance, holder_run, harness,
at). Reader gets the same result.
- **T2.** After release, the thread is gone. After a re-claim followed by a revoke, it's gone again.
The thread has an earlier `claim` row, so a first-op reading would still list it.
- **T3.** A role session's `thread.claims` refuses `human-required`.
- **T4.** `agents` is deepEqual to a copy taken before the thread run claimed, for the role, human
and reader sessions on the same store.
- **T5.** `JSON.stringify` of the `thread.claims` result has neither the thread's name nor the body of
a message sent in that thread.
- **T6.** packages/cli/tests/format.test.mjs: a mixed list renders the role lines exactly as today,
then `thread …` lines. The empty-roles case with threads is covered too.
- **T7.** packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs: the moved pin (D5).
## Mutants (each killed by a named test)
| Mutant | Change | Killed by |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | `thread.claims` returns `[]` | T1, T7 |
| M2 | the held check uses `min(seq)` (first op) | T2 |
| M3 | the human/reader check is dropped, so a role session gets thread rows | T3 |
| M4 | `agents` for human appends the thread rows | T4 |
| M5 | the SELECT adds `t.name` | T5 |
| M6 | formatAgents drops the thread lines | T6 |
## Manifest (expected)
- packages/bus/src/broker.mjs
- packages/bus/README.md (a paragraph for `thread.claims`, next to `agents`)
- packages/bus/tests/agents.test.mjs
- packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs
- packages/cli/src/cli.mjs
- packages/cli/src/format.mjs
- packages/cli/tests/format.test.mjs
- this BUILD.md
Verb-list pins checked at c27207f6e:
- tester-writes.test.mjs:19 pins `TESTER_VERBS` exactly. D6 adds nothing to it, so the pin holds.
- No test pins the reader list at :2370.
- `thread.messages` appears in tester-threads, threads and webui chat as calls, not as a verb set.
Before the in-review move, I'll rerun the same grep for `thread.claims` and for any new verb-set pin.
Gate (brief): Duckworth approves the manifest. On Sage's gate, the touched test files run whole, the
bus and cli suites are green, every scripts/test-*.sh is green, and M1-M6 are killed.
## r2 (duckworth-0118: D1 approved with C1-C3)
Q1: Duckworth accepts D1. Q2: Duckworth is fine with a follow-up row under the same bind; Sage rules on
it. Duckworth's note is agents/duckworth/work/row1782/DESIGN-r1.md on duckworth/reviews 13fb9abc5.
**C1. `--tester` makes one call.** callFor binds the tester when `--tester` is given (cli.mjs:192).
D6 keeps `thread.claims` off TESTER_VERBS, so a second call there would refuse tester-refused and exit
3. tester.test.mjs:128 pins exactly one spawn, `agents`. So cli.mjs calls `thread.claims` only when
`--tester` is absent. A tester's `mosaic agents` is unchanged.
- T8 (packages/cli/tests/format.test.mjs or the CLI test that drives main() with a stand-in transport;
the exact file is picked at build): `agents --tester` makes one call, `agents`; human `agents` makes
two, `agents` then `thread.claims`.
- Gate adds tester.test.mjs and other-tree.test.mjs, each run whole.
- M7: thread.claims is called on the tester path too. T8 and tester.test.mjs:128 kill it.
**C2. `--json` shape.** `mosaic agents --json` prints the `agents` array unchanged, as `inbox --json`
prints decisions only (cli.mjs:308). Only the text output adds the `thread …` lines. The machine read of
thread claims is the bus verb, and the bus README paragraph documents `thread.claims` as such. A grep at
c27207f6e found no consumer of `mosaic agents --json` in packages/*/tests or scripts. T6 pins both: the
text output is mixed, and the `--json` output deepEquals the `agents` result alone.
**C3. Where the pin moves.** Under D1 the governance pin moves to the owner's `thread.claims` call, not
to `agents`. That is brief item 5 read under D1: the brief named `agents` because it put thread rows
there.
Notes taken:
- N1: T4's before/after equality covers the tester session too.
- N2: T3 adds a tester: `thread.claims` refuses tester-refused.
- N3: FED R3 user principals must not get other users' thread claims. This row gives them none
(no USER_VERBS entry). The rule carries with 205 N1/N3 to 205b/R3.
- N4: the :403 processing-gate list is in the verb-set grep. Human and reader sessions return before
that list (:402), so `thread.claims` needs no entry there, and no test pins the list (grep at
c27207f6e). The :2370 reader list is the one list that gains the verb.
Mutants are now M1-M7. Building starts once Sage creates the row.
## r3: build (sage-2486, on 23c3d6218)
Changes from the design, each a placement choice:
- **Bus tests file.** T1-T5 go in a new file, packages/bus/tests/thread-claims.test.mjs, not
agents.test.mjs. agents.test.mjs's businesses have no `assistant` instance, so a thread run would
need a new fixture there. The new file copies message-filter.test.mjs's setup (chief plus an
`assistant` thread instance, human, reader and tester sessions). Its threads are owned by the
business human (`jason`), so the human's `assistant.stop` reaches the run for T2's revoke.
- **T3** covers the chief's role session and the thread run itself (both `human-required`) and the
tester (`tester-refused`, N2).
- **T4** covers human, reader, tester and chief sessions (N1).
- **T5** writes the thread's message to the store, as message-filter.test.mjs's put() does. The run's
own message.send would also pass through the messaging graph, which T5 doesn't test.
- **T6/T8 split.** format.test.mjs holds T6's text cases: mixed, empty roles with threads, and no
threads argument. The `--json` pin needs main(), so it sits with T8 in tester.test.mjs, whose
setup has both stand-in transports. That test also pins the call order: tester `["agents"]`; human
`["agents", "thread.claims"]`; human `--json` adds only `agents`. Its JSON deepEquals the broker's
own `agents` result.
- **T7.** The message-filter.test.mjs pin now reads `holder_run` from the owner's `thread.claims`.
The old pin read `holder` from `threadsState`.
Manifest (actual):
- packages/bus/src/broker.mjs
- packages/bus/README.md (a "Thread claims" paragraph at the end of "Agent state")
- packages/bus/tests/thread-claims.test.mjs (new)
- packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs
- packages/cli/src/cli.mjs
- packages/cli/src/format.mjs
- packages/cli/tests/format.test.mjs
- packages/cli/tests/tester.test.mjs
- agents/morgana/work/queue-277/BUILD.md
Mutants: M1 (T1, T7), M2 (T2), M3 (T3), M4 (T1, T4), M5 (T5), M6 (T6), M7 (T8). Gate: the touched test
files run whole, plus other-tree.test.mjs. Then the bus and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh.
Nothing runs before Sage's CLEAR.
Early look (sage-2504, 05:27Z), on c050bb90b: thread-claims.test.mjs failed 5/5. The test's `call`
helper took any string as a session name, but a run's capability is a string too, so the run's calls
went out unauthenticated. T1 also compared null-prototype store rows strictly. Both are test bugs, and
the fix is r2 of the build. On r2, thread-claims 5/5, cli tester 9/9, other-tree 4/4 pass, 0 skipped.
## r3: Duckworth notes N1/N2 (duckworth-0119, ruled sage-2505), for the post-194 rebase round
- **N1.** A human `mosaic agents` no longer fails as a whole when `thread.claims` is refused.
cli.mjs prints the role lines, then `thread claims: refused <code>`, and exits 0. The choice of
exit 0 follows D1: `agents` stays as it was, and it exited 0 before this row. Only an error with a
bus code is caught (the same `^[a-z-]{1,64}$` shape `markRead` checks); any other error still
throws. Pinned by a new test in cli tester.test.mjs: a stand-in transport refuses thread.claims
with `processing-halted`, the role row prints, then the refusal line. This matches row 278 item 4
for the Console. M8 (the catch drops the refusal line, or rethrows) is killed by that test.
- **N2.** packages/cli/README.md: the usage line gains `[--tester]`, and a bullet describes the
`thread` lines, the refusal line, `--json` and `--tester`. host.test.mjs:855 reads this README
for a unit file name, which is still there. host.test.mjs joins the gate's whole-file runs.
Manifest adds packages/cli/README.md (10 paths). Nothing here has run yet. It runs whole after the
rebase onto 194, on Sage's CLEAR.
## r4: rebase onto 0165be266 and Duckworth's delta notes (sage-2587, duckworth-0123)
- **Rebase.** Commits 1-6 are cherry-picked onto refactor 0165be266, which has 194, 236 and 274
landed, on morgana/row277-0165. The range-diff is `=` for all six and the patch-ids are unchanged.
Four files auto-merged around upstream lines: bus README, broker.mjs, cli README and cli.mjs.
- **N1 (duckworth-0123).** The N1 catch's rethrow branch had no test, so a mutant that takes every
error as a refusal (it would print `refused undefined`) survived. A new cli tester.test.mjs test
throws from thread.claims with no code, then with `ECONNRESET`. Each rejects main with the same
error and prints nothing. M9 (the code check dropped) is killed by that test.
- **N2 (duckworth-0123), accepted.** Since 274, the owner's and a reader's thread.claims can include
user threads (id, instance, holder run, harness, time; no name, no messages). That is the design
join approved in duckworth-0118, with no owner filter, and owner-visible run governance under
sage-1368 B1.
- **N3 (duckworth-0123), for later.** When 264a and 277 meet, thread.claims's latest row per thread
goes per session, and thread-claims.test.mjs needs the default session. It is checked in whichever
round lands second.
Gate (sage-2590): the touched test files plus user-principal, other-tree and host whole; the bus,
cli, harness, business and seat suites; every scripts/test-*.sh; M1-M9. The kit prints HEAD and the
manifest check first. Nothing runs before Sage's CLEAR.
-127
View File
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
# Row 202 BUILD: FED R5, `mosaic access list|grant|revoke`
Quackerjack, 2026-10-20. Plan: `PLAN.md` (commit 2d0aa2937). Manifest: `MANIFEST.md` in this directory.
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md`, "Brief: FED R5". Reviewer Duckworth. Gate owner Sage.
Review record: round 2 approved as duckworth-0041 (commit 2a1d17da7) on 48a3fb96e; viewer carry c204bef73 after it.
## What was built
- `packages/cli/src/access.mjs`: the three verbs, the human proof, the context (`accessContextFor`), the
atomic write, the lock and the receipt.
- `packages/cli/src/cli.mjs`: routes `access` to `accessCommand`.
- `scripts/mosaic`: sends `access` to the CLI.
- `packages/cli/README.md`: the verbs, the human proof, the lock, the `instances` limit, the removal order,
and the limits on peers and subjects.
- `packages/cli/tests/access.test.mjs`: 21 tests (round 2; 18 in round 1). Single file, green on this branch.
R1 (`packages/business/src/access.mjs`) is merged in unchanged at 80fe31071, the Duckworth-approved
candidate. 44e36fc4c, the next commit on that branch, only removes a stray pyc file.
## The lock file (not in PLAN.md; added at Sage's request)
- Path: `<configDir>/access.json.lock`, the access file's path plus `.lock`. Mode 0600.
- Created with `O_EXCL` (`wx`). The holder writes its pid and a newline into it, then holds it for the
read, the check, the temp write and the rename. It is removed in a `finally`.
- A second writer that finds the lock reads the pid. If the pid is alive (or the pid is reused by a live
process), it refuses with `refused: ... being written by another command; try again` (exit 3). Nothing
is written.
- A lock whose pid is gone (`kill(pid, 0)` returns ESRCH) also refuses, and nothing reclaims it. The
refusal names the path and the pid. A human checks that no write is running and removes the file. This
is the crash case: the holder died mid-write, and a human clears it.
- An empty lock, or one that is not a pid, refuses. Its holder may still be between create and write. A
holder that died in that gap leaves an empty lock; a human removes it.
Reclaim was removed at Sage's ruling (sage-1429, 10-20). It was the one design with a race, so the
race below is gone, not accepted.
Former limit, now removed: reclaim race. The old design let a writer take a stale lock by unlinking it
and retaking it. The case that lost: writers A and B both read the same dead pid N. A unlinks the lock
and takes it. B then unlinks A's live lock and takes its own. Both read the same revision, both write
it, and the second rename silently replaces the first. The revision check did not catch it, because both
had read the old revision before either wrote.
Known limits, stated plainly:
1. A dead holder's lock blocks every write until a human removes it. That is the fail-closed price of
no reclaim. The refusal says which pid and which path.
2. A reused pid reads as alive, so a stale lock refuses. The fix is to remove the file by hand.
3. The lock is per access file. It does not cover the bus's own reads.
4. Crash-safety of the write path: the temp file is removed on any failure before or at the rename. The
directory is not fsynced after the rename, so a power loss right after a rename can lose the rename.
The bytes are never mixed.
Tests for the lock (all in `access.test.mjs`):
- "a live holder's lock refuses and leaves the file and the lock alone": pid = this process.
- "an empty or unreadable lock refuses": empty file, and `not-a-pid`.
- "a lock left by a dead pid refuses, names the pid, and is not reclaimed": a child that has exited. The
file, the lock and the receipt are unchanged.
- "the lock is mode 0600 while held and removed after a refused write".
Tests for the write path and the refusals (added in this round):
- "a failed rename leaves the old bytes, removes the temp file, and writes no receipt": the fs seam
(`deps.fs`) makes `renameSync` throw. Checks the old bytes, no `.access-*.tmp`, no lock, no receipt.
- "a group-writable access file refuses with exit 3, names the file, and changes nothing": a 0664 file.
Exit 3, the file path in the message, nothing written.
- "an agent or tester caller is refused before the context or the access file is read": `contextFor`
throws if called, and the file is 0664. The refusal must come first.
## The human proof, and the bus behavior behind test 10
The proof is one `project.list` call through `humanTransport`. The bus gates it with `#human`
(`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`, the `project.list` case at :2319, and `#human` at :377). The call is in
one function, `proveHuman` in `access.mjs`, for R4 to swap.
Test 10 runs the real `human-cli.mjs` on a scratch bus from agent ancestry (`CLAUDECODE=1` in the child's
env). The bus refuses. The client reports `outcome-unknown`, not `human-required`, because the bus closes
the socket on a failed proof and `packages/bus/src/client.mjs:32-33` maps a closed socket to
`outcome-unknown`. Exit 1 (`busExit`). The test pins that code and asserts the access file and the
receipt are unchanged.
This is a bus behavior outside R5. It is not changed here. Gizmoduck and Gander own the verifier (row 196).
Until it changes, a human who hits the agent refusal sees `outcome-unknown`.
## Context
`accessContextFor(system, env)`:
- `providers`: `system.console.sso.providers[].id`. Row 192's shape (packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs on
row 192's candidate).
- `ssoSubjects`: each provider's `subjects[].sub`, paired with the provider id. Gizmoduck's design says
`console.sso.subjects`; Sage ruled that is shorthand for this (erratum).
- `peers`: `[]` until row 203 adds the federation key. A grant that names a peer home refuses.
- `businesses`: `loadBusiness` for each `<configDir>/businesses/*.json`; `human` and the role names as
`instances`. A business file that fails to load fails the command.
No `console` key gives empty providers and subjects, so every grant naming a subject refuses. The
`checkConsole` check from row 192 is not on this branch yet. R5 rebases onto row 192's landing, and then
reads `console` through `checkConsole`.
## Mutant list (one per refusal; run on Sage's go, before review)
| # | Mutant | Expected kill |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | remove the `refuseInsideAgent` call | "an agent caller is refused before the bus is asked" |
| M2 | remove the `--tester` check | "--tester is refused on every verb" |
| M3 | the proof's error is swallowed | "a bus that refuses the human proof blocks the write" |
| M4 | the revision compare is removed | "a stale revision refuses with revision-conflict" |
| M5 | `takeLock` unlinks a dead-pid lock and retakes it (the reclaim this round removed) | "a lock left by a dead pid refuses, names the pid, and is not reclaimed" |
| M6 | `pidAlive` always returns true (a dead pid reads as live) | "a lock left by a dead pid refuses, names the pid, and is not reclaimed" |
| M11 | `writeAtomic` writes straight to access.json, no temp file or rename | "a failed rename leaves the old bytes, removes the temp file, and writes no receipt" |
| M12 | the BusinessError catch in `accessCommand` is removed | "a group-writable access file refuses with exit 3, names the file, and changes nothing" |
| M13 | `contextFor()` is called before the agent and tester refusals | "an agent or tester caller is refused before the context or the access file is read" |
| M7 | `checkAccess` is skipped before the write | "a grant naming an unknown instance is refused before any write" |
| M8 | the receipt append is removed | "grant writes ... a receipt line" |
| M9 | a project name is written as given (no lookup) | "a project name resolves to its id" |
| M10 | the lock is not taken | "a live holder's lock refuses" |
Round 2 closed the direct-write gap: `writeAtomic` takes the fs calls through `deps.fs` (default: the real
`node:fs` functions), and a rename that throws is tested (M11 is the direct-write mutant). Not yet run:
the mutant batch, the cli suite and `scripts/test-*.sh`. All wait on Sage's slot.
Round 2 also changed the file's refusal path: a `BusinessError` from `loadAccess` or `loadBusiness` now
exits 3 with the file path and key path on stderr, no stack trace (Duckworth B1, Sage sage-1437).
## Not done in this row
- `--peers` and the federation key: row 203.
- `access.reload`: row R4.
- Gizmoduck's `console.sso.subjects` name: erratum, the flattened shape is used.
- The suite (`packages/cli` and every `scripts/test-*.sh`) and the mutant batch: on Sage's gate.
@@ -1,814 +0,0 @@
# Row 191 stopRun inspection round
Design: ../DESIGN-r2.md, approved by Dewey in 29473; scope sage-2244;
per-run contract ../STOP-RUN-CONTRACT.md, honker-0079/0081. Not review-ready:
full package/shell/Docker gate and acceptance/guard mutants remain pending.
Current commit 7aa18b0f6e1a09188fb602853ebb02815b642ac9, new branch
rocko/row191-stoprun-dcd8-20261022, parent dcd8d4dda. Worktree
/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r191-r3. Earlier inspection f7bf7dfec is preserved.
All 79 manifest paths have identical blobs at f7bf7dfec and 7aa18b0f6;
rebase-product-diff.stat is empty, rebase-product-check.txt names the check.
The manifest SHA-256 stays
9971ac5fe56d0d36eb914ecaf2c282e14ab3cd29860fd27b268ec0baadaf0e52.
Rocko author and committer identity were selected explicitly. No attribution
lines, force-push or branch deletion. Sage publishes through jarvis.
## Changes Dewey must review: two focused-run fixes
1. packages/bus/src/broker.mjs, requestHost: the new processingWork guard was
initially inserted into the inner refusal logger's try block. That let the
original request reach validation, then prevented its refusal being logged
while halted, returning storage-unavailable. Move it to the main admission
try, before keys/credentials/authority/effects. The refusal logger retains
its existing unconditional audit behavior. The new host-admission test now
expects processing-halted and proves neither executor method was called.
Initial evidence: ../logs/stoprun-focused-packages_bus_tests_processing.test.mjs.log.
2. packages/bus/tests/processing.test.mjs, real socket await test: row 196's
asynchronous kernel-peer subprocess now precedes dispatch. The old 5 ms
server deadline could fire during that subprocess, before the processing
await branch extends it. This test already stubs authenticateHuman; give it
a deterministic peerReader too, with read and close, and assert exactly two
proof reads for halt/resume. Keep the 5 ms ordinary timeout and 30 ms halt
delay. Production peer discovery, proof/transport and timeout behavior are
unchanged. The test still fails if the async branch timeout is removed.
The first fixture retry omitted close(); its teardown failed and left its
own server running. Only that verified test group 2831504 was killed. Both
unsuccessful logs remain. Corrected evidence:
../logs/stoprun-focused-bus-processing-fixed-2.log (14/14).
These are diagnosed code/fixture mistakes, not declared flakes. No failed log
was removed and no existing security assertion was weakened.
## Focused evidence, sage-2250
Ran singly on 41b0cf755 because none of row 254's seven paths overlaps ours.
Sage-2265 carries this evidence to dcd8d4dda after the empty 79-path diff.
Scripted busy check exited 0 before the first file. Every test runner used its
own process group, 180 s timeout, scratch TMPDIR
/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r191-tmp and DOCKER_HOST=unix:///nonexistent.sock.
There was no Docker, browser, package suite, shell suite or mutant run.
| File | Final passed | Failed | Skipped |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control/tests/coordinator.test.mjs | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control/tests/containers.test.mjs | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control/tests/effects.test.mjs | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control/tests/task.test.mjs | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| bus/tests/processing.test.mjs | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| bus/tests/processing-runtime.test.mjs | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Script sum | 62 | 0 | 0 |
All final runners exited 0. The batch stopped at the initial bus failure,
then that file was diagnosed/rerun before the final two files. Counts are from
focused-run-table-final.json and include only each final successful file log.
Earlier bus failures are reported above, not silently included as green.
Approximate run span 23:59Z–00:00:41Z; start second was not recorded.
Cwd-scoped node/chromium sweep was empty at 00:00:41Z; slot returned to Sage.
## stopRun implementation
The export resolves host-owned run identity even without a bound bus claim.
It checks boot/start/group identity immediately before each signal, preserves
verified member anchors, waits 5 s before KILL and observes for 2 s. Signals
are acknowledgements only, never invented. Root/business/run cache joins the
same Promise. Atomic hard-link publication plus durable exclusive claim
coordinates other host processes. First owner/reason/deadline/result persists;
completed retries never re-escalate or overwrite that result. Halt links its
generation to the first fire receipt without relabelling the runtime's stop
cause. A later verified exit is separate immutable observation evidence.
The seam writes no bus events. Honker maps killed/alive to lifecycle events.
No global unit, live config, binding, token, slot file or live store touched.
No schema migration. First activation still requires stopping old processing
before trusted initialization and aligning the copy/image/read-only mount in
Mos's window. Existing result.json evidence remains write-once.
## Integration and outstanding work
The 12 latest-base conflict resolutions are listed in STATUS.md. New landed
host execution, publish and library sync paths are now wrapped in processing
scopes; host credential cancellation composes with its existing revocation
signal. This changes only files already owned by 191. Those wider integrations
still need the full owning-file/package gate and mutant evidence.
Fifteen proposed per-run mutants preflight exact once in stoprun-mutants.json;
none has been applied or run. The broader kill-switch acceptance/guard table
and executable mutant runner are still being completed. No kill count or
review-ready claim is made. Ask Sage for the later CLEAR when the packet is
complete, as sage-2259/2262 requires.
### Gate preparation after the focused slot
The published product implementation is unchanged. Three uncommitted test-file
strengthenings are saved in post-inspection-tests.patch: effects.test.mjs adds a
4-second bounded abort expectation for the watcher mutant; Discord's early
start fence is also checked before a malformed journal can be read; WebUI's
body limit now uses oversized valid JSON, and a direct-handler test isolates
its own origin/site guards from serve's outer fence. These edits are unrun and
are not included in the published 9971ac5f manifest. They must pass before a
new candidate is cut. Thus 62/62 is prior focused evidence, not a claim for
these changed test bytes.
The complete proposed table has 70 exact-once sites in all-mutants.json,
including expected killing test names. Static preflight is clean; no mutant
has been applied. run-mutants.py validates preflight, uses new process groups,
tracks only its own verified descendant identities, kills those groups on
timeout, checks named TAP failures, and restores all source bytes in finally.
A timeout or wrong-test failure is not counted as a valid kill. The table and
runner are prepared evidence, not a kill result. The requested nine-package,
ten-shell, seventy-mutant gate is in gate-plan.json; Sage CLEAR is pending.
## Published test-strengthening commit and full gate (sage-2269/2271)
81889b58d57889b12a584aa225e1ac26e90e5700 is one fast-forward commit on
7aa18b0f6, same branch rocko/row191-stoprun-dcd8-20261022. It commits the
three test changes saved in post-inspection-tests.patch; that patch remains
historical evidence, not an uncommitted candidate. Product implementation is
unchanged. Earlier manifest 9971ac5f belongs to 7aa18b0f6; candidate.txt now
names the manifest for 81889b58d. Sage published this tip before granting CLEAR.
The full gate checks HEAD equality and clean product bytes before its first
file. Changed test files run singly, then nine packages, all ten shell suites,
then seventy mutants. Each step gates on its exit status and retains its full
log. run-gate.sh uses pipefail and an EXIT trap for the label-verified Compose
network rocko-r191-gate_default, project rocko-r191-gate. TMPDIR is
/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/rocko-r191-gate. Docker is available only for test-task
and test-release; other steps use unix:///nonexistent.sock. Live provider calls
are disabled. No daemon, socket, volume or live configuration changes.
Gate start: 2026-10-22T00:18:00Z. Results remain pending until gate-results.json
and mutant-results.json provide actual exit statuses and counts.
### First full-gate stop and fixture correction (sage-2274)
The 81889b58d run stopped at its first failure, 00:18:00Z–00:19:21Z.
27 files completed: 268 passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped. Packages, shells and
mutants did not start. Full logs/results are in gate-attempt-81889/.
The tester refusal test's fixture requested tester:true over TCP, which row
196 now refuses before route handling. This is a stale fixture, not a flake.
The correction uses the existing startTesterSocket helper, a private fixture
root, socketPath requests, TESTER_ORIGIN and no human identity header. Every
assertion remains; the request now reaches the intended processing refusal
rather than failing listener setup or the outer identity fence. A grep of all
changed test files found no other tester:true TCP setup. The cwd node/chromium
sweep returned []; no Docker test workload ran. Commit c78f48946 is a single
fast-forward test-only fix on 81889b58d, authorized by sage-2274. The complete
gate restarts from its first single file only after Sage publishes this tip.
Sage-2275 published c78f48946 and granted full restart. Second attempt begins
2026-10-22T00:21:03Z; any further failure stops before additional edits.
Candidate manifest b49fd493dc75ef2484ffc255213dc8eeaaaa348dee416c8d26d1c2bab8e20067.
### Second attempt stopped; no further changes (sage-2275)
Run 00:21:03Z–00:23:50Z on published c78f48946: all 27 changed singles
269/269, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646. The CLI package emitted 26
failed subtests before its verified own runner group 3119310 was stopped.
Its result is interrupted, not a complete package count. Six gate-lane image
checks refuse because scripts/testing/lane-image.mjs pins the old four COPY
lines and 191 adds processing-control to Containerfile. Twenty launch-account,
launch-limit-checks, launch-limits and launch-routes cases hit
processing-uninitialized on fixture roots with no explicit control init.
No edits, retries, later packages, shells, Docker test workloads or mutants
followed this second failure. Parent runner exited; cwd node/chromium sweep
returned [] at 00:23:50Z. Slot returned to Sage at 00:24:05Z with the exact
failures and a request for scope on image-manifest and fixture initialization.
This is an integration failure, not a declared flake or a passing gate.
## Image-input manifest and launcher fixture scope (sage-2278, sage-2282)
Commit eb3abba12 is one fast-forward commit on c78f48946. This is an image-input
manifest change: scripts/testing/lane-image.mjs now pins the exact Containerfile
COPY of packages/processing-control/src/state.mjs and entrypoint.mjs and hashes
both named source paths, without a wildcard. Its only two changed lines add
those inputs. Without them, a lane could reuse a stale image after a reader or
entrypoint change. The image test fixtures copy both files and each has its
own receipt-invalidating test. Mutant KS56 drops state.mjs from the hash list;
its named killer is the state.mjs receipt-invalidating test. Static preflight
is 71 sites / 0 errors. No new run result is claimed before CLEAR.
The launch-account, launch-limit-checks, launch-limits and launch-routes fixtures
now explicitly call initializeControl(f.dataRoot) before constructing their
launchers. Existing assertion lines are byte-identical. A new launch-limit-checks
test leaves initialization off and asserts processing-uninitialized, no
mayLaunch/authorizeLaunch, and no registered session. A live root gets control
initialized by the bus broker. The re-pin order is bus start before any seat
launch; a launcher started before that refuses. This supplements the existing
window precondition to stop old processing before the first trusted init.
Sage-2282 supersedes the test-only image ruling: lane-image.mjs is a product
blob, so mos-1200 carries no earlier results. The complete plan restarts from
the first single file, all nine packages, all ten shells and all 71 mutants
only after publication and Sage CLEAR. Earlier attempts remain in their
separate gate-attempt directories; neither is a passing full gate.
Sage-2283 published eb3abba12. Current 85-path candidate manifest is
01a2b33651414c9b0cb094d2108f9e39c48a41b79974dcc16bdec374f8371091.
The gate prints HEAD and this digest, verifies every manifest blob before its
first test, and carries no old results. Awaiting CLEAR after Gander 253.
## Full restart on eb3abba12 stopped at Discord (sage-2286)
Verified HEAD and all 85 manifest blobs before tests. Run span:
2026-10-22T00:34:50Z–00:47:33Z. No old result carried.
| Step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 32 changed test files singly | 304 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control | 61 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| bus | 646 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| cli | 761 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| discord | 190 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
Singles sum independently confirmed by awk over all 32 TAP logs. Discord's
binding.test.mjs:201 STOP check and recover.test.mjs:145 ready recovery check
both get processing-uninitialized before the expected behavior. Those older
fixture roots do not explicitly initialize control. The gate stopped at this
step; no subsequent package, shell suite, Docker test workload or mutant ran.
Docker availability was checked read-only (29.7.2); no daemon/volume changes.
The EXIT trap completed. Cwd node/chromium sweep returned [] at 00:47:49Z,
source tree remains clean, and the slot was handed back at 00:47:58Z.
No test or product edits or retries followed this failure; Sage has the table
and the fixture-initialization recommendation. This is not a green full gate.
## Discord fixture init and all-package static sweep (sage-2294)
Commit e6800380dc0765ce3f1477044e2ce4f773ebb43c is test-only and fast-forwards eb3abba12.
Only binding.test.mjs and recover.test.mjs change: one initializeControl import
and one initializeControl(dep.dataRoot) call in each affected CLI fixture.
Every original assertion line is retained. Product blobs are unchanged.
FIXTURE-SWEEP.md and fixture-sweep.json enumerate 338 source call-site hits,
with the two fixes and the already-initialized chains, plus the screens for
rootless optional contexts and read-only/usage CLI calls. The generator reads
repository source only and invokes no fixture. Deliberate missing/deleted/
corrupt-state refusal tests remain negative; no shared helper masks them.
Current manifest be36af8f0855f57336e6a33283aa0a8e94297f338b1f8180936cbccf1119c60a, 87 paths. Sage-2294 carries only unchanged
processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646, CLI 761/761 and unchanged singles from
gate-attempt-eb3/. The resume must run both touched files wholly, whole Discord,
then the never-run WebUI/tasks/seat/project/library packages, every shell suite
and all 71 mutants. No result is claimed for the new test bytes before CLEAR.
The live initialization order remains bus start before any seat or Discord
start; no fixture change initializes or repairs a live root.
## Resume on e6800380d stopped at WebUI (sage-2311)
Start 2026-10-22T01:27:40Z; failed-step exit 01:28:45Z. Startup verified HEAD,
manifest be36af8f and all 87 blobs, and read-only Docker availability (29.7.2).
| New step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| binding.test.mjs whole | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| recover.test.mjs whole | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Discord whole | 192 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| WebUI whole | 314 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
Carried unchanged under sage-2294: 32 singles 304/304, processing-control 61/61,
bus 646/646 and CLI 761/761, from gate-attempt-eb3/. These are explicitly carried
results, not fresh runs on e6800380d.
Four WebUI failures are retained in gate-logs/package-webui.log:
- board-held.test.mjs:91: processing's config/state GETs omit redirect:manual.
- board-held.test.mjs:194 and send-browser.test.mjs:58: processing's independent
hash/focus/interval refresh continues to read after the shell signs out.
- shell.test.mjs:104: the added control bar makes the short desktop page 1095px
high at a 1000px viewport. Its new height is not accounted for by the existing
frame/sidebar/footer layout.
Static diagnosis: processing.js ignores the existing body.signed-out state and
mosaic-signed-out event that app.js and bus.js already share. Its GETs also lack
manual redirect handling. processing.css adds an external bar while shell.css's
frame minimum and sidebar heights still subtract only bar-h and foot-h. These
are product integration defects; no assertions were weakened and no fix was
made after the failed step. Sage received the table and recommendations.
One TAP skip: the editor rebuild requires exactly esbuild 0.28.2; installed
shared node_modules has 0.28.1. Full skip line is in tap-skips.json. No shell
suite ran, so there are no ^skip shell lines (skip-lines.txt remains empty).
No tasks/seat/project/library suite, shell Docker workload or mutant ran after
WebUI failed. Parent runner exited, EXIT cleanup completed, cwd node/chromium
sweep returned [] at 01:29:00Z, source tree is clean, and slot returned to Sage.
No retries or source edits were made. This is not a passing gate.
## Console shared sign-out and bounded desktop layout (sage-2317)
Commit 8e1f55c1db6a096e227b5114cd13a7142493b112, fast-forward on e6800380d, changes only the
processing assets and their owning two tests. Current 87-path manifest:
d3b014e6a0e9e547a29ae780eb27b1c0e57cc7b0e73dc49954abbff623929f41.
All three processing fetch sites use redirect:manual. responseBody dispatches
the existing mosaic-signed-out event for an opaque redirect, or its signIn
variant for exactly 401/sign-in required. No independent sign-out state is
added: refresh/action guards read body.signed-out. The existing event cancels
the interval, invalidates pending reads, clears stale state and disables
writes. In-flight answers cannot restore state after sign-out. Initial work
waits for DOMContentLoaded because this deferred asset precedes app.js in the
HTML and needs its shared sign-out listener registered first. app.js/bus.js
and their proof baselines remain untouched.
The CSS keeps the control bar in normal document flow. On desktop, the frame
flexes into the remaining viewport rather than imposing another full-height
minimum below the bar. Fixed navigation retains the shell's command/footer
bounds and existing responsive column widths. Mobile retains natural flow.
No short-page, sidebar or footer assertion is changed; rendering remains to
be verified on the next authorized gate, not claimed from static checks.
The VM fixture models the existing body class, document events and DOM ready;
its original assertion lines are unchanged. Six new browser cases cover config,
state and POST opaque redirects and sign-in-required replies, manual redirect
requests, interval cancellation and no subsequent fetch from forced refreshes
or clicks. KS57 removes manual redirect from the config GET; KS58 removes the
refresh signed-out guard. Both name the config-redirect browser case as their
killer. Static preflight: 73 exact-once sites / 0 errors. Syntax checks pass;
no owning test or mutant has run on this commit.
A product blob changes, so sage-2317/mos-1200 carries nothing. The next CLEAR
runs all changed files singly, all nine package suites, all ten shell suites
with Docker available and all 73 mutants. The editor rebuild's esbuild0.28.1
vs pinned0.28.2 skip remains host drift and is reported separately. Earlier
failed attempts remain immutable in gate-attempt-* directories.
## Rebase onto row 202 (sage-2329)
New branch rocko/row191-stoprun-ddfb-20261022, tip eafcbd3e7d6ef6e259fb59d87a7b0857b42337aa,
base ddfb29af7. The prior published branch is preserved; no force-push, delete
or old-name reuse. Six Rocko commits rebased, with one manual conflict in
scripts/mosaic's human CLI case: prepend halt|resume|processing and retain
row 202's appended access. packages/cli/src/cli.mjs auto-merges retain the
access import/branch and all three processing commands. CLI README retains
both the Access and Instance processing switch sections.
The full old/new tip diff has 15 paths (base plans/queue/logs, row 202's new
access files and its three shared CLI paths), 2327 insertions/32 deletions.
Within row 191's owned paths only CLI README, cli.mjs and scripts/mosaic differ,
with the row 202 additions. rebase-ddfb-log.txt, rebase-ddfb-tip-diff.stat,
rebase-ddfb-owned-diff.stat and rebase-ddfb-range-diff.txt retain exact evidence.
Manifest fd0f2740b1cccadaaad8c613640fdddb0497cdab33ec2c0fd11debf3cae6c4ee, 87 candidate paths. The package command lists were
regenerated from this base; CLI includes access.test.mjs. All 73 mutant sites
must preflight again. No tests ran, no result carries, and the complete gate
waits for publication and Sage CLEAR after Megavolt's debug run.
Sage-2333 published eafcbd3e7. Their per-file patch-id comparison matches
the prior six-commit range except the exactly ruled scripts/mosaic dispatch
line; binary/secrets/attribution checks pass. Gate remains unrun pending CLEAR.
## eafcbd3e7 full gate stopped on timer fixture attribution (sage-2339)
Run 2026-10-22T02:18:04Z–02:19:25Z. HEAD, 87 blobs and fd0f2740 manifest
verified. Short mktemp TMPDIR /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gxbC; named Compose
project rocko-r191-gate. Nothing carried. 32 changed files completed:
313 passed, 6 failed, 0 skipped. All six new processing-browser sign-out
cases stop at their common precondition, processingTimers length2 vs1.
The original two browser cases pass. Their recorder attributes every 5000ms
interval to processing, but app.js:307 already arms its own freshness timer.
The intended processing interval is at processing.js:87. These new cases have
not yet exercised sign-out or killed KS57/KS58, so no behavior proof is claimed.
The gate stopped at this first red step. No package, shell, Docker workload
or mutant ran; the esbuild rebuild was not reached. Runner exited, EXIT cleanup
completed and cwd node/chromium sweep returned [] at 02:19:34Z. No source edit
or retry followed the failure. Sage received the exact failure and a proposed
test-only caller-attribution filter with the assertions unchanged. This is a
fixture error, not a passing gate or a declared flake.
## Timer recorder attribution correction (sage-2345)
Commit 4db8b57785895bc62f5f015468a69515da7fc77f, fast-forward on eafcbd3e7, is a one-line
test-only correction in processing-browser.test.mjs. Cause: app.js:307's
freshness interval is also 5000ms, and the recorder incorrectly counted it as
a processing interval. The recorder now requires the processing.js caller
stack. Every assertion remains byte-identical, including exactly one timer
before sign-out and zero after it. A second 5000ms interval from processing.js
would still be counted and fail the exactly-one assertion. No product byte
changes, and no test or mutant ran for this correction.
Manifest ffb46fbdb875f97ff2eb7a7bed8bf6d5c4df53b8a63c738ffcde5fc5f6b7f6ad, 87 paths. Full restart after publication and CLEAR,
with nothing carried. Sage-2345 counts the timer-fixture red as the first in
this 191 window; any second red stops and is escalated to Mos. Previous logs
are retained in gate-attempt-eaf/.
## Full gate on 0f8235277: second red (sage-2351)
Candidate: 0f8235277e1fc21588edb6f2931d66c8e154a400 on ddfb29af7.
Manifest: ffb46fbdb875f97ff2eb7a7bed8bf6d5c4df53b8a63c738ffcde5fc5f6b7f6ad.
No prior result carried. Start 2026-10-22T02:33:41Z; failed-step exit
2026-10-22T02:46:17Z. Fresh TMPDIR /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/giNF.
Compose project rocko-r191-gate, trapped ownership-checked network cleanup.
| Step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 34 changed test files singly | 330 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| processing-control | 61 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| bus | 646 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| cli (including access) | 783 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| discord | 192 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| webui | 323 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| tasks, seat, project, library | not run | — | — | — |
| all ten scripts/test-*.sh | not run | — | — | — |
| all 73 mutants | not run | — | — | — |
Singles sum independently confirmed with awk over all 34 TAP logs.
The sole failure is shell.test.mjs:380 in the full shell-browser test:
scrollHeight 1062 vs innerHeight 1000. Full evidence is
gate-logs/package-webui.log (not ok 271, line 1626).
All prior manual-redirect/sign-out failures and eight processing-browser cases
pass, but the desktop short-page geometry is still wrong. No passing layout
or full-gate claim is made.
Known host-drift TAP skip: editor rebuild requires exactly esbuild 0.28.2,
while shared node_modules has 0.28.1. Full line is in tap-skips.json. This skip
is not counted as a red. No shell suite ran, so skip-lines.txt has no ^skip
shell line. No Docker test workload or mutant started.
Stopped at the first failed step without retry or product edits, per sage-2351.
This is the second red in the 191 window and is with Sage for Mos escalation
under mos-0823. Parent runner exited; EXIT cleanup completed. Cwd-scoped node
and chromium sweep returned [] at 02:47:14Z, product worktree is clean, and the
slot was returned. No in-review move was made.
### mos-1248 / sage-2363: desktop viewport allocation (unrun static candidate)
The second red on 0f8235277 was shell.test.mjs:380 (1062 versus 1000).
The shell gives .frame a viewport-based minimum at packages/webui/src/public/shell.css:135;
processing.css:12-14 replaced that minimum but used a column flex body with only
min-height:100vh, so the new bar was not allocated a bounded share of the viewport.
The desktop body now uses explicit grid rows for the command bar, controls, optional
banner, frame and footer. The frame row is minmax(min-content,1fr): it takes the
remaining short-page space while long content may grow the document. No clipping,
overflow suppression, fixed body height, test viewport change or assertion removal.
The existing shell.test.mjs:380 equality stays byte-identical. Added assertions
check actual processing-bar visibility, positive height, viewport placement and
no document scroll at 1440x1000; the existing 1440x420 long-page checks remain.
KS59 reverts processing.css to 0f8235277's bytes and must fail that same shell
browser test. Total: 74 planned mutants. No test or mutant has run on this fix.
Webby must statically review this delta before Sage opens the full no-carry gate.
### Correction after Webby B1 (webby-0104, 2026-10-22 03:00Z)
The cause stated in the mos-1248/sage-2363 note above is withdrawn.
processing.css loads after shell.css and already overrides the frame minimum.
With the tree fixed and inspector hidden, the remaining floor is the Board's
main content. The grid min-content row preserves that floor, so 5cd32f4c1
is not an accepted layout fix. Its static review is CHANGES at Webby's
REVIEW-layout.md, commit e2e7c60e5. No run established a new layout measurement.
Next step requires a granted fixture probe for main/control heights and an
owner layout ruling; no further product change or gate is authorized yet.
Existing shell assertions remain unchanged.
### Static nav placement: mos-1249/mos-1250, sage-2383/2385/2386, webby-0106/0108
Fast-forward on 5cd32f4c1; the rejected grid is removed. The unchanged labeled
region is now the first child of nav.tree, before its Console h2. The banner
stays at its original body location with every id, role, label and shipped
string unchanged. No processing.js change and no runtime reparenting.
At >=760 the tree is the same fixed box, with the same width breakpoints and
ordinary overflow:auto. The controls are non-shrinking and non-sticky; they
scroll with overflowing nav links (sage-2386 withdraws persistent visibility).
Below760 the region takes a full flex line before Console/Projects. Its mobile
location changes from before .frame to first in the static nav; the banner
therefore precedes it in a halted mobile view. Banner behavior itself is unchanged.
Specificity (0,3,0) resets .btn margin/order and .small margin/basis, leaving
the shell rules unchanged. No content is shortened and no overflow is hidden.
Correct height arithmetic (Webby B1): page=max(innerHeight,86+C), where C is
main content height. Controls consume space within the existing nav box, not
another body row. The old failing layout was max(innerHeight,86+barHeight+C).
The halted banner remains a body row; Sage tracks that separately.
Candidate-test design change at processing-ui.test.mjs:67 under mos-1250.
Old assertion:
```js
assert.ok(html.indexOf('id="processing-controls"') < html.indexOf('<div class="frame">'));
```
New assertion text:
```js
const controlsAt = html.indexOf('id="processing-controls"');
const mainAt = html.indexOf('<main id="main"'), inspectorAt = html.indexOf('<aside class="inspector"');
assert.ok(controlsAt >= 0 && controlsAt < mainAt, 'controls are outside and before #main');
assert.ok(!(inspectorAt < controlsAt && controlsAt < html.indexOf('</aside>', inspectorAt)),
'controls are outside aside.inspector');
```
Reason: the bar moves into the frame's first column under mos-1249 while
remaining outside route-specific #main and aside.inspector. This is a change
to our unlanded candidate assertion, not a landed assertion.
All existing shell assertions stay unchanged. Added bar-inside-tree assertion
and diagnostic height output. New processing browser coverage checks 400px
Stop order=0, visibility, focus and position above Projects; also on-load
visibility/focus at1440x1000,1440x420,800x420. Debug logs report controls/tree
heights at those desktop sizes and main height; Sage judges controls over half
the 334px nav at1440x420 before the window. No run yet.
Mutant delta: KS59 now reverts the complete layout (HTML and CSS together);
KS60 hides the controls; KS61 moves them into #main; KS62 drops the (0,3,0)
button reset. Total77. Every new site has its named killing test.
### sage-2394 debug on published da4334806 (2026-10-22)
03:14:37Z–03:14:53Z: shell.test.mjs whole 5/5, processing-browser.test.mjs
whole 9/9, 0 failures/skips. awk sum14/0/0. Original shell short-page and
long-page assertions pass unchanged. Logs/results and empty cwd sweep are in
debug-da4334806/. Slot clear sent Sage/Webby03:15:11Z after sweep.
Controls/tree/main heights: read-only shell1440x1000 212.5/914/914; writable
processing fixture1440x1000 127/914/914;1440x420 127/334/907.734375;800x420
127/334/1131.65625. Stop visible/order0/focusable/aboveProjects at400x1000.
Writable127 is below half the334 nav. The read-only212.5 height at1000 was
flagged for Sage's usability call; that state was not measured at420, so no
claim is made that all states use less than half the short nav.
No mutants or full gate run under this debug grant. Await separate CLEAR.
### R6 accepted: sage-2399 / webby-0111 (2026-10-22 03:16Z)
Sage accepts the short-nav usability tradeoff. Writable controls occupy38%
of the334px nav at1440x420. The read-only recovery note makes that about64%,
inferred from the measured212.5px height at the same width. The region is
non-sticky and scrolls away; Projects was already below the fold at that size
before191. Webby confirmed the debug TAP and has no window blocker. Sage
tracks the read-only note length with the halt-banner follow-up; no change
to this row.
Do not rebase or run now. Row273 lands first. On Sage's landing message,
rebase the candidate including the two latest layout commits onto the new
refactor under a new branch name (mos-1086), then provide range-diff,
patch-ids and the refreshed88-product-path manifest. The full no-carry
window requires a separate Sage CLEAR on that published tip.
### Rebase after row273: sage-2402 (2026-10-22 03:42Z)
New branch rocko/row191-stoprun-86f9-20261022, tip
0fa7bf421fc153a226b5f06ed484e089e48e23ba, on86f95bb27. All10 commits
rebase cleanly and range-diff pairs each with '='; no conflict resolution.
All88 per-file patch-ids match the old candidate. Whole product diff stable
patch-id before/after:0846823aefe165363601a6c68134ad46cc701c73.
87 product blobs are identical; only docs/TOOLS.md changes because the new
base carries row273's --send/--no-sso usage and three explanatory F39 lines.
191's TOOLS hunks stay unchanged. New88-path manifestSHA256:
0bcbf337433f6d46d809ee1dcaf8a5a8503160403d273cf73d6dac64adef3c02.
Range-diff, per-path patch-ids and TOOLS comparison are rebase-86f9-* files.
Static77-site exact-once preflight has0errors. No tests run, nothing carried
into the required full window; await Sage publication and separate CLEAR.
### Full no-carry window on0fa7bf421: stopped at SR08 (sage-2407/2418)
03:44:56Z–04:01:29Z. All35touched files passed336/0/0; nine packages
passed2403/0 with1known editor/esbuild skip. Every shell exited0:425selftests
plus156queue node tests passed; the canonical-root queue check and two
explicit live-provider exclusions are saved in skip-lines.txt. See
GATE-RESULTS.md for per-suite counts and mutant table.
SR01–SR07 killed. SR08 timed out at90seconds without named assertion failure
(TAP header only); runner restored all88candidate blobs and stopped. The69
later mutants did not run. SR08 is not counted as killed. Cwd sweep[] and
owned network cleanup completed; slot clear sent Sage04:02:12Z.
Saved mutation, timeout policy lines64–89 and shell/skip table sent Sage in
response to sage-2418. No source edit or retry; no in-review move. Await
Mos ruling and explicit Sage CLEAR before any control/replay/resume.
### SR08 timeout policy: mos-1259 / sage-2423 (2026-10-22 04:07Z)
Cause confirmed by Mos: runtimes.mjs:333 loops on now() <= deadline, while
stop-run.test.mjs:106-108 gives the second host a fixed fake clock with real
sleep. Removing the join branch enters the stop loop without advancing that
clock. Original SR08 log contains TAP header only; original timeout record
stays immutable. Mos permits separate classification as killed-by-timeout
only after the unmutated same whole test file passes the same90second
harness in this resumed run. **Control result: not run; awaiting CLEAR.**
No assertion kill is claimed for SR08.
Runner review requested from Dewey, Sage copied. SHA256 of run-mutants.py:
fe0d360f86d86ab2df967da5338479c593c27c88d06eb38a1389d99a08489369. Diff:runner-mos1259.diff; baseline:
run-mutants.before-mos1259.py. Shared execution harness uses90seconds, own
process groups, verified descendant cleanup and restored source bytes. A
control must pass every test with exit0, no not-ok/skip/cancel/fail. Its record
binds invocation id, candidate HEAD/manifest and test hash; all88candidate
blobs verified before and after control, and before each mutation. The
approved historical SR08 classification and69-site SR09+resume use separate
files so the original seven kills and timeout evidence remain intact.
Assertion kills and timeout kills have separate counters. No control for the
same file in this invocation means a timeout stops; survivors and invalid
failures stop too. Every timeout gets a cause/control record before review.
No product/test change, no control/mutant execution. Wait for independent
runner approval and Sage CLEAR. Green suites carry only on unchanged0fa7bf421
and manifest0bcbf337. Test clock fix is deferred to Vikunja502 as Mos ruled.
### Independent runner approval: dewey-0789 (2026-10-22 04:11:20Z)
Dewey APPROVES the frozen fe0d360f86d86ab2df967da5338479c593c27c88d06eb38a1389d99a08489369
runner, static only. Use only the proposed --control-file stop-run.test.mjs
--adjudicate-timeout SR08 --resume-from SR09 invocation. A positional-id or
full run would overwrite the original evidence and is not this resume.
Report the complete tally as7 prior assertion kills (old status killed),
plus SR08 separately adjudicated by timeout after control passes, plus69
resumed sites. The summary file counts only this invocation. No control or
resume result exists yet; Sage CLEAR remains required.
Classification change: the reviewed runner recognizes indented not-ok lines
with ^\s* rather than only top-level lines. Controls therefore reject nested
failures too, and mutant assertion kills still require the named pattern in
a failing test name. SR01–SR07 evidence was classified by the original runner.
Historical SR08 has no HEAD field. Its binding to0fa7bf421 relies on the saved
commit.txt/log timestamps and the new candidate HEAD+88blob check, not a
retroactively invented HEAD field in the old result. Preserve this provenance
in the adjudication report. Any newly detected timeout needs a concrete cause
before review; the generic placeholder is not accepted review evidence.
### Control and resume: sage-2427, stopped on KS43
Control/resume began04:13:44Z; last saved mutant result2026-10-22T04:14:08Z; process
absence confirmed04:14:56Z and slot returned to Sage. Whole unmutated
stop-run.test.mjs control passed12/12, exit0, no not-ok, no skips/cancels,
in0.459seconds. The reviewed runner adjudicated original SR08 separately
as killed-by-timeout under mos-1259. The immutable original SR08 row/log
stay unchanged; adjudication binds the control, exact cause, current HEAD
and manifest. Historical HEAD provenance remains as Dewey N4 described.
Resume stopped at KS43, not retried. It removes the inner processingHTTP
origin check and its selected outer-route test passed1/1(exit0). Saved
evidence:resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap and resume-mutant-results.json.
Tally:7prior assertion kills +49resumed assertion kills =56assertion kills;
1historical timeout kill;1survivor(KS43);19unrun. No new timeouts or placeholder
causes. All88candidate blobs restored and resume cwd sweep[]; no product or
test change. No in-review move. Sage and Mos notified directly.
Static diagnosis only: KS43 selects processing.test.mjs:52's outer-server
fence test. The unchanged direct-handler test at:95 already isolates this
origin guard from serve's outer refusal. Its pattern was not selected. Sent
recommendation to Sage/Mos to correct only the mutant's named killer after
their ruling, then run KS43+19remaining. No metadata edit or rerun authorized
yet; no claim the direct-handler test kills it until the run proves it.
### KS43 metadata retarget: mos-1261 (2026-10-22 04:16:41Z)
Original pattern `processing write fences refuse` selected processing.test:52.
KS43 survived with1passing test and no writer call, preserved in
resume-mutant-results.json and resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap. The serve-level
test cannot isolate the handler guard: outer fences and later refusal can
mask its removal. No product defect or new kill is claimed from static read.
New pattern: `processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer`,
the existing direct processingHTTP test at:95-107 with valid user/site/content
headers, asserted403 and no writer call. Only KS43's pattern changed in the
77-site table; product/test/mutation bytes unchanged. Generator mirrors it.
TableSHA256:5dbc8308c995e1974d6da63b3daa967896d822154eab38a8bb96154be667edf5. Diff:mutant-table-mos1261.diff,
baseline:all-mutants.before-mos1261.json. Dewey must independently review
this metadata diff before the next run. Static audit of all19unrun sites:
mutant-pattern-audit-mos1261.md; no other serve-level/direct-handler mismatch
with an existing direct test warrants retargeting. KS44 body-bound case has
no direct-handler counterpart; its oversized whitespace+{} case is valid
JSON without the bound, so it retains the existing pattern.
Carry56assertion kills+1timeout kill and green suites only on unchanged
0fa7bf421. Next approved scope is KS43+19sites after review and Sage CLEAR.
No run authorized by this metadata change.
### Retarget review APPROVE and C1 archive: dewey-0791 (2026-10-22 04:19:55Z)
Dewey approves table5dbc8308 and the19-site audit, conditional on preserving
the first resume evidence before any next run. Archive:mos-1261-archive/,
full per-file inventory:mos-1261-archive/sha256-manifest.txt.
- `resume-mutant-results.json` SHA256 `f5725ef26cdb488441285081fadaa9ce4a3e7d390ab2a1c6d04acfd27f105fc6`
- `resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap` SHA256 `c778ee33edb667f795ab560a328fd5c1c04ef6acf99d7b79c364f6302cf29864`
- `unmutated-control.json` SHA256 `ee9ddcd69d24276165abe1185f159a2737157fcae8fd37f731768e9324b765e5`
- `SR08-timeout-adjudication.json` SHA256 `214a04696d3329ef67bf10578daf4d251599816fd246bc31abecae1a6230e1e0`
The50-row result, all first-resume logs and control/adjudication records
were copied byte-for-byte. Original paths remain untouched too. A separate
retarget-mos1261/ directory holds byte-identical approved runnerfe0d360f,
reviewed table5dbc8308 and identical candidate/commit files. The proposed
--resume-from KS43 invocation there selects20sites and writes its own logs
and results without overwriting either original or archive. No control flag
is needed for these tests; any timeout without a same-file control stops.
Final tally will combine7old assertionkills +49first-resume assertionkills +
SR08separate timeout adjudication +20retarget results. Still no run; awaiting
Sage CLEAR. Product/test bytes remain unchanged.
### KS43 retarget run: sage-2436, stopped on KS44 invalid mutation
Run began04:21:06Z; KS43 is killed by the named direct-handler assertion.
KS44 then fails import with SyntaxError Unexpected token catch at
processing-http.mjs:40. The failing TAP name is the test file, not the
selected test, so runner records invalid-failure and stops without a kill.
Evidence remains in retarget-mos1261/console.log,resume-mutant-results.json
and resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap,KS44.tap. No original evidence overwritten.
Cause: our KS44 mutation uses `// no body bound` to replace an inline
`if (size > 1024) throw Error();` in a one-line for-await body. The comment
swallows the remaining chunks.push and closing brace. This is malformed
mutation metadata, not an observed product failure. No metadata correction
or retry yet. Proposed to Sage/Mos: replace only the new text with `void 0;`,
then independent review and a new CLEAR for KS44+18 on unchanged candidate.
Current tally57assertionkills (7+49+1),1SR08timeoutkill,1invalid(KS44),18unrun.
Cwd sweep[] and all88candidate hashes restored04:21:30Z; slot returned and
Sage/Mos notified. No in-review move. Wait for ruling before any edit or run.
### KS44 syntax metadata correction: mos-1264 (2026-10-22 04:22:16Z)
Only KS44.new changes from `// no body bound` to `void 0;`. Old site,
test and pattern stay unchanged. The invalid import result remains in
retarget-mos1261/resume-mutant-results.json and resume-mutant-logs/KS44.tap.
TableSHA256:85d9a7b13ad510e840f258d892afbfce393cefbc4006e1f808605b83adc84570. Diff:mutant-table-mos1264.diff;
baseline:all-mutants.before-mos1264.json. Generator mirrors the one field.
Authorized syntax-class preflight applied KS44–KS62 individually in scratch,
ran node --check on each JavaScript file, and restored before advancing.
All15JS checks passed; no other replacement fix was needed. KS59–KS62
change only HTML/CSS and are explicitly asset-only/not-applicable for the
Node parser; Mos/Sage informed, no false JS syntax pass claimed. All19
mutations restored and88candidate hashes match. Per-site logs/results and
restoration record:syntax-mos1264/. No behavioral test or assertion-mutant
run occurred. Dewey must review table diff and syntax results before next
Sage CLEAR for KS44+18. Carry57assertionkills+1timeoutkill only on unchanged
0fa7bf421. No product or test change.
### dewey-0795 approval: syntaxfixed-mos1264 staged (unrun)
Dewey APPROVES table85d9a7b1 and syntax preflight, static only. Conditions
met:syntaxfixed-mos1264/ holds byte copies of runnerfe0d360f, table85d9a7b1,
commit.txt,candidate.txt,candidate-manifest.sha256. Full SHA256 and byte-cmp
list is syntaxfixed-mos1264/byte-copy-check.txt. Invocation after Sage CLEAR:
python3 syntaxfixed-mos1264/run-mutants.py --resume-from KS44 (19sites).
All previous invalid/survivor evidence stays untouched in its original dirs.
No behavioral run occurred during preparation.
### Final19 resume stopped at KS54: sage-2444 (2026-10-22)
Run began04:27:45Z; KS44–KS53 are10named assertion kills. KS54 then timed out
at90.073seconds. Its log contains the expected dependency-list assertion:
"the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one" at
bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs:263. The mutation drops processing from runtime.mjs
tasks factory deps. The test opens runtime then asserts before close at:265;
a failing assertion skips the close and leaves Node alive. No same-file
control ran in this invocation, so this is timeout-without-control, not a
kill. No assertion or timeout kill is claimed for KS54.
Raw resume result's generic cause sentence says a control passed, which is
incorrect: its control:null and timeout-without-control status establish the
opposite. The raw evidence remains unchanged; the concrete cause and
correction are in syntaxfixed-mos1264/KS54-timeout-report.json. This explicit
report replaces the placeholder as explanation without altering the log.
Current tally67assertionkills(7+49+1+10),1adjudicatedSR08timeoutkill,
1unqualifiedKS54timeout,8unrun. All88candidate blobs restored; cwd sweep[]
and slot returned04:30:06Z to Sage, Mos directly copied as instructed. No
retry, product/test edit or in-review move. Sage's disclosed syntaxcheck
caused no busy refusal or foreign-node report. Await owner ruling/CLEAR.
### Final controls/mutants GREEN: mos-1267, sage-2448, dewey-0798
On unchanged0fa7bf421, whole-file tasks control9/9 passed in0.815s; KS54
rerun killed-by-timeout with the exact dependency not-ok at tasks.test:263.
KS55–KS62 are8assertionkills. Final run04:35:32Z–04:37:17Z, cwd sweep[] and
88hashrestore04:37:48Z; slot returned to Sage and direct handoff to Dewey/Mos.
Final77-site tally:75assertionkills(7+49+1+10+8),2separate timeoutkills
(SR08adjudication,KS54control+rerun). final-mutant-results.json consolidates
latest accepted evidence by id; no prior record or log overwritten.
GATE-RESULTS.md is the final per-suite/mutant table; prior narrative saved
as GATE-RESULTS-before-final.md.
KS54 raw placeholder result saved as resume-mutant-results.raw.json before
filling concrete cause in its review result. Same-invocation control id
1792643732624962173; prior syntaxfixed eleven-row result file remains exact
0ede036954ff77c21f29e1a744b21d1d9b18eb75736f78ecd1cf4ae559358911.
Dewey independently read logs/control/restoration and confirmed tally in
dewey-0798, explicitly not yet a manifest verdict. N6test cleanup stays
deferred under mos-1267/Vikunja502; no candidate byte changes permitted.
### Claimant review handoff
Queue move rocko-191-review-r1 entered in-review at revision3114, round1
on#1689, manifest0bcbf337. Revision3115 records the expected missing-token
request failure; command exit1. Receipt:in-review-receipt.txt. Sage posts
the request as jarvis; Dewey owns the manifest verdict. Candidate source
remains published0fa7bf421 with88product paths, base86f95bb27. No live
action, push, source change or further gate authorized by this handoff.
-56
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# Row279: stopRun deadline final observation
Scope: sage-2512, mos-1269; brief docs/plans/2026-10-22_stoprun-deadline.md.
Base f40f2e770. Reviewer Dewey; gate owner Sage. V502 stays separate.
## Cause and smallest change
The loop's precondition now()<=deadline can skip the existing final status
read when a sleep wakes beyond deadline. Use for(;;) so the existing
now()>=deadline branch is the only time exit. Change that loop header only;
all record/identity/ended exits and result mapping remain byte-identical.
The old trailing fallback remains unreachable in the fixed loop. M1 restores
only the old header and thereby restores the complete old fall-through path.
## Regression and evidence plan
Add one test to stop-run.test.mjs, preserving existing tests. Its fake sleep
advances requested duration plus1ms, so the last sleep crosses the deadline.
Its signal stub records TERM/KILL and returns success without killing the
always-live fixture process. Expect both signals, time>7000ms and alive.
The old loop should fail only the alive assertion with unknown.
Ask Sage CLEAR before any run, including the expected regression red. Then
apply the one-line fix, run the touched whole file and processing-control
package as granted, and kill M1 with that same named regression. Busy check,
short scratch TMPDIR,deadDocker,owned process groups,timeouts,restore,sweep.
No live state,units,store,provider,browser,Docker or V502 changes.
Packet includes base,patch,candidate hashes,regression/gate/mutant logs and
exact source-diff check. Commit candidate and packet on the new branch only
after authorized checks. No token is available; Sage publishes as jarvis.
The business/CLI suites remain Sage's landing gate unless separately granted.
## Authorized run and result
Claim rev 3138, op rocko-279-start-r1. Sage granted this exact sequence in
sage-2516 (2026-10-22T05:55:21Z). Runs: 05:56:03Z to 05:58:03Z.
| Step | Pass | Fail | Skip | Result |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- |
| Regression on unfixed base | 0 | 1 | 0 | Expected assertion: unknown versus alive |
| stop-run.test.mjs whole | 13 | 0 | 0 | Green |
| processing-control package whole | 62 | 0 | 0 | Green |
| M1 old loop | 0 | 1 | 0 | Killed by the named regression, unknown versus alive |
M1's killer is `a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run
after both signals`. It exits 1 with that assertion, never a syntax error or
timeout. Logs and results.json retain the intentional failures separately.
Green runs total 75 passes (the whole-file tests are also part of the package).
No skips. All commands used a short scratch TMPDIR, a dead Docker socket and
fixture-only configuration. Each node command ran in its own process group
with a 120-second timeout. No timeout occurred. Final cwd sweep: empty.
The source restoration and exact one-line product scope are checked in
source-scope-check.json. The trailing unknown return stays unchanged and is
unreachable after the fix. Business and CLI suites remain Sage's owner gate.
Slot returned to Sage at 05:58:03Z. No live action or V502 change.
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
f40f2e770e0d8be394f1ef53b404045fd6a49c0e
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs b/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
index 05e439c1a..a11cb8e52 100644
--- a/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+++ b/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ async function ownStop(args, key, options) {
};
const termEnd = started + grace, deadline = termEnd + observe;
let termTried = false, killTried = false;
- while (now() <= deadline) {
+ for (;;) {
try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }
catch {
const present = readdirSync(directory(root, 'runtimes')).includes(record.id + '.json');
diff --git a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
index ed69bc111..5277ea7fe 100644
--- a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
@@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ test('failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and nev
assert.equal(f.sleeps.reduce((a,b)=>a+b,0), 7000);
assert.deepEqual(await stopRun(f.args, f.options), result);
});
+test('a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals', async t => {
+ const f = setup(t); let time = 0;
+ f.options.now = () => time;
+ f.options.sleep = async ms => { time += ms + 1; };
+ f.options.signal = (_r, sig) => { f.signals.push(sig); return true; };
+ const result = await stopRun(f.args, f.options);
+ assert.ok(time > 7000, 'the last sleep wakes past the complete stop deadline');
+ assert.deepEqual(f.signals, ['SIGTERM', 'SIGKILL']);
+ assert.equal(result.outcome, 'alive');
+ assert.deepEqual(result.signals, ['SIGTERM', 'SIGKILL']);
+});
test('missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal', async t => {
const f = setup(t);
for (const args of [{ ...f.args, run: 'missing' }, { ...f.args, business: 'other' }]) {
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
7145420aa354180689a5c84423928fc60c8123476dcfed3364c9cf4542f8c7ea packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
7ce7a99363b987f8525f8992fd57940f4305597e870c6162fc158962f2101ff6 packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1016b85846c60dc159d49373f99ca36794a51fd9
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1016b85846c60dc159d49373f99ca36794a51fd9
-32
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@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
not ok 1 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
---
duration_ms: 40.278473
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:64:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
Expected values to be strictly equal:
'unknown' !== 'alive'
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected: 'alive'
actual: 'unknown'
operator: 'strictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:72:10)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 89.021437
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: container admission publishes its generated name and root/runtime labels before dispatch
ok 1 - container admission publishes its generated name and root/runtime labels before dispatch
---
duration_ms: 9.883733
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: container sweep sends TERM then KILL only after verifying exact id and both labels
ok 2 - container sweep sends TERM then KILL only after verifying exact id and both labels
---
duration_ms: 66.167157
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: foreign labels and a replaced container id stay unknown and are never signalled
ok 3 - foreign labels and a replaced container id stay unknown and are never signalled
---
duration_ms: 5.105671
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: an unverified missing container remains unknown rather than claiming a pending start ended
ok 4 - an unverified missing container remains unknown rather than claiming a pending start ended
---
duration_ms: 15.538468
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a removed --rm container is settled only by its trusted owner completion receipt
ok 5 - a removed --rm container is settled only by its trusted owner completion receipt
---
duration_ms: 28.897791
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: after signalling a verified container, successful empty Docker listing proves --rm removed that id
ok 6 - after signalling a verified container, successful empty Docker listing proves --rm removed that id
---
duration_ms: 24.215826
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt publishes before awaiting stops, resume refuses pending, and only clear permits new work
ok 7 - halt publishes before awaiting stops, resume refuses pending, and only clear permits new work
---
duration_ms: 161.569582
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a new coordinator replays a persisted halt and an unresolved start keeps clear refused
ok 8 - a new coordinator replays a persisted halt and an unresolved start keeps clear refused
---
duration_ms: 1102.680874
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a new halt generation never inherits a previous quiescent status before its sweep
ok 9 - a new halt generation never inherits a previous quiescent status before its sweep
---
duration_ms: 4.450121
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt aborts an active local request and prevents a subsequent effect after halt/resume
ok 10 - halt aborts an active local request and prevents a subsequent effect after halt/resume
---
duration_ms: 35.831508
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing scopes isolate roots and cancel only the registered child group
ok 11 - processing scopes isolate roots and cancel only the registered child group
---
duration_ms: 59.946603
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halted scopes never invoke their body and unscoped human work has no processing context
ok 12 - halted scopes never invoke their body and unscoped human work has no processing context
---
duration_ms: 3.067699
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: host git is stopped promptly by the active scope rather than waiting for its long deadline
ok 13 - host git is stopped promptly by the active scope rather than waiting for its long deadline
---
duration_ms: 151.711241
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a child leader exiting does not erase an unverified surviving group receipt
ok 14 - a child leader exiting does not erase an unverified surviving group receipt
---
duration_ms: 117.914283
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the actual nested read-only control mount refuses unlink, replacement and parent removal
ok 15 - the actual nested read-only control mount refuses unlink, replacement and parent removal
---
duration_ms: 14.941666
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the image entrypoint refuses halted and stale generations using the shared reader
ok 16 - the image entrypoint refuses halted and stale generations using the shared reader
---
duration_ms: 89.020485
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt terminates a tracked stand-in and leaves honest write-once stop evidence
ok 17 - halt terminates a tracked stand-in and leaves honest write-once stop evidence
---
duration_ms: 95.55672
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a TERM-resistant workload is killed after the bounded wait
ok 18 - a TERM-resistant workload is killed after the bounded wait
---
duration_ms: 146.00258
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: wrong start ticks or boot identity cannot signal a live replacement
ok 19 - wrong start ticks or boot identity cannot signal a live replacement
---
duration_ms: 65.844444
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a pending start cannot be reported quiescent and a second root is never signalled
ok 20 - a pending start cannot be reported quiescent and a second root is never signalled
---
duration_ms: 93.749051
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: escalation still kills the tracked group after its leader exits
ok 21 - escalation still kills the tracked group after its leader exits
---
duration_ms: 192.463864
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: session TERM targets its verified runner before forcing the outer namespace
ok 22 - session TERM targets its verified runner before forcing the outer namespace
---
duration_ms: 100.923976
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: new runtime and stop directories sync their containing directories
ok 23 - new runtime and stop directories sync their containing directories
---
duration_ms: 42.560646
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a vanished group leader with unverified surviving members stays unknown, never quiescent
ok 24 - a vanished group leader with unverified surviving members stays unknown, never quiescent
---
duration_ms: 130.848284
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: persisted member identity anchors a group after the leader exited before the sweep
ok 25 - persisted member identity anchors a group after the leader exited before the sweep
---
duration_ms: 124.574935
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: an unconfirmed secondary brake does not leave a verified workload running or claim success
ok 26 - an unconfirmed secondary brake does not leave a verified workload running or claim success
---
duration_ms: 75.057063
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt persists across readers and resume needs the current generation
ok 27 - halt persists across readers and resume needs the current generation
---
duration_ms: 9.437871
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: first initialization is explicit; missing state after control exists fails closed and halt repairs it
ok 28 - first initialization is explicit; missing state after control exists fails closed and halt repairs it
---
duration_ms: 5.039685
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses invalid JSON instead of enabling work
ok 29 - refuses invalid JSON instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 1.867281
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses unknown keys instead of enabling work
ok 30 - refuses unknown keys instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.65956
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses bad timestamp instead of enabling work
ok 31 - refuses bad timestamp instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.144084
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses nonboolean state instead of enabling work
ok 32 - refuses nonboolean state instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.039112
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses bad generation instead of enabling work
ok 33 - refuses bad generation instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.085806
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses loose mode instead of enabling work
ok 34 - refuses loose mode instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.34307
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: refuses oversized file instead of enabling work
ok 35 - refuses oversized file instead of enabling work
---
duration_ms: 2.916273
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a symlink leaf never follows its target; human halt replaces only the leaf
ok 36 - a symlink leaf never follows its target; human halt replaces only the leaf
---
duration_ms: 4.530858
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: unsafe parent and interrupted initialization never get repaired as off
ok 37 - unsafe parent and interrupted initialization never get repaired as off
---
duration_ms: 0.385291
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: repeated halt is a no-op and a different root keeps running
ok 38 - repeated halt is a no-op and a different root keeps running
---
duration_ms: 7.00566
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: transition rejects nonstring identity before publishing state
ok 39 - transition rejects nonstring identity before publishing state
---
duration_ms: 3.121939
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: bootstrap syncs the containing root as well as the state and control directory
ok 40 - bootstrap syncs the containing root as well as the state and control directory
---
duration_ms: 36.144072
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: state ownership and bounded read guards refuse before trusting a document
ok 41 - state ownership and bounded read guards refuse before trusting a document
---
duration_ms: 101.892703
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: canonical root aliases address one switch and never create independent control state
ok 42 - canonical root aliases address one switch and never create independent control state
---
duration_ms: 4.179236
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
ok 43 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
---
duration_ms: 38.851257
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
ok 44 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
---
duration_ms: 27.976805
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
ok 45 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
---
duration_ms: 15.642865
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
ok 46 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
---
duration_ms: 32.602087
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
ok 47 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
---
duration_ms: 31.045314
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
ok 48 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
---
duration_ms: 10.113655
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
ok 49 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
---
duration_ms: 30.224351
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
ok 50 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
---
duration_ms: 99.128156
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
ok 51 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
---
duration_ms: 22.649789
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
ok 52 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
---
duration_ms: 55.85559
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
ok 53 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
---
duration_ms: 45.6493
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
ok 54 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
---
duration_ms: 8.507771
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
ok 55 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
---
duration_ms: 6.500324
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: task halt keeps the true Docker exit status, writes kill-switch once and leaves snapshots unchanged
ok 56 - task halt keeps the true Docker exit status, writes kill-switch once and leaves snapshots unchanged
---
duration_ms: 201.141886
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt refuses direct task launch before Docker or a run record; clear allows a fresh normal result
ok 57 - halt refuses direct task launch before Docker or a run record; clear allows a fresh normal result
---
duration_ms: 167.652567
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt refuses hello.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
ok 58 - halt refuses hello.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
---
duration_ms: 122.654442
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt refuses verify.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
ok 59 - halt refuses verify.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
---
duration_ms: 122.064969
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt refuses agent.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
ok 60 - halt refuses agent.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
---
duration_ms: 120.632718
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (task)
ok 61 - a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (task)
---
duration_ms: 93.3117
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (container-cli)
ok 62 - a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (container-cli)
---
duration_ms: 97.234461
type: 'test'
...
1..62
# tests 62
# suites 0
# pass 62
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 1323.026518
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
not ok 1 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
---
duration_ms: 53.588908
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:64:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
Expected values to be strictly equal:
'unknown' !== 'alive'
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected: 'alive'
actual: 'unknown'
operator: 'strictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:72:10)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 100.649138
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
ok 1 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
---
duration_ms: 36.122553
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
ok 2 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
---
duration_ms: 24.270208
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
ok 3 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
---
duration_ms: 13.289288
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
ok 4 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
---
duration_ms: 27.743499
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
ok 5 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
---
duration_ms: 26.252224
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
ok 6 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
---
duration_ms: 9.103416
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
ok 7 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
---
duration_ms: 25.918671
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
ok 8 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
---
duration_ms: 99.095272
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
ok 9 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
---
duration_ms: 23.700708
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
ok 10 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
---
duration_ms: 55.938599
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
ok 11 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
---
duration_ms: 42.386018
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
ok 12 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
---
duration_ms: 7.168469
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
ok 13 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
---
duration_ms: 6.715559
type: 'test'
...
1..13
# tests 13
# suites 0
# pass 13
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 445.396108
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"id":"M1","file":"packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs","old":" for (;;) {\n try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","new":" while (now() <= deadline) {\n try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","test":"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs","pattern":"a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals","required":"named assertion kill, never syntax or timeout"}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
6d33d35302499d66036145976f8f777a4c438c6b3f5c7b613fcfa5651c49faab BUILD.md
8521af77deed1d3b2c722f30b776159eb373df407a2a698ee116ef4174125f01 base.txt
74efdcea480e6c089f586b7330591b66164a3aa338fb1e1a60b74f6b7b9f3b0a build.patch
312ed511d8f1cff826ee2fd547de8368923130c7bfe06236d8e29d8655b80aaa candidate-manifest.sha256
960c366a732e4dc20133bf490d842cc42a345fefad1432ca6eba6dbd0058f337 candidate.txt
3099049a5acd051207fb5631b7bb6362dd84c246191009a44eca1ba696d27d73 changed-paths.txt
960c366a732e4dc20133bf490d842cc42a345fefad1432ca6eba6dbd0058f337 commit.txt
98a4da4e1c62f7e4ed5f50adc16cf99462a5e012e9736e658441e8eda3db894c logs/M1.log
7f878c13be43640f501b72d36e8d9e0c8d844bc5451f969154cd75d8fab0ee42 logs/processing-control-whole.log
62f83e511ad860d0f7da42d87e063eb691a95f29a0806b88784912374d2e7c47 logs/regression-red.log
4de8028674472cc75f61dc78cac624c336c8db785580a189e0b705584f80d636 logs/stop-run-whole.log
7669ce9f04189f659dbc23dae6b635d5ffac354e03d00fbae10e6fadc7e98791 mutant-plan.json
84f1080a9689374f7000197119074e53b459641cd709745f95eb0ebe37b5ef2f reader-search.txt
dd6b2ea95782154e1c9839bae7a6d76a60566762a2374901ae64b22f9a7f54f7 results.json
b9408890f30a72451d9171d8ceec40eb4f4f671811b30ba74f50f178e0eb8350 run-step.py
b8140e3919a5d342eb92c1cd34b13bbb62d6419c6a5a01a9cb4870e9a94c64ed scan-result.json
9e5c2e8cd2b59ac4559b0d67348a2a98e59b44a71eec7359018ea7a84d7a4082 skips.txt
43d77fe5bffa916f444a77bacda5b4ddbe78035b6ca7631378056c3158aa3253 source-scope-check.json
37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570 sweep.json
74b3eae937fdcc92cf2b0dd15fb67f4f6addd4a046f74e934febc565e4b5d2ed tmpdir.txt
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
packages/processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs:9:const api = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs').catch(e => { if (e.code === 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND') return {}; throw e; });
packages/processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs:139: new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href, new URL('../src/state.mjs', import.meta.url).href, root], { encoding: 'utf8' });
packages/processing-control/tests/effects.test.mjs:60: const { listRuntimes } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
packages/processing-control/tests/coordinator.test.mjs:9:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, processIdentity, unregisterRuntime } from '../src/runtimes.mjs';
packages/processing-control/tests/containers.test.mjs:62: const { updateRuntime } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
packages/processing-control/tests/task.test.mjs:12: const runtimes = new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href;
packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:7:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, runtime, stopRun, sweepRuntimes, readStops } from '../src/runtimes.mjs';
packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:104: const f = setup(t), source = new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href;
packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:148: const { processIdentity } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
packages/bus/tests/processing-runtime.test.mjs:10:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, processIdentity } from '../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs';
packages/discord/tests/processing-stop.test.mjs:35: const { registerRuntime, updateRuntime } = await import('../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs');
packages/discord/tests/processing.test.mjs:68: const { listRuntimes, sweepRuntimes, processIdentity } = await import('../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs');
-62
View File
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
[
{
"step": "regression-red",
"start": "2026-10-22T05:56:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:56:03Z",
"exit": 1,
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"skipped": 0
},
"failing": [
"a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals"
],
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/regression-red.log"
},
{
"step": "stop-run-whole",
"start": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
"exit": 0,
"counts": {
"tests": 13,
"pass": 13,
"fail": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"failing": [],
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/stop-run-whole.log"
},
{
"step": "processing-control-whole",
"start": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:57:49Z",
"exit": 0,
"counts": {
"tests": 62,
"pass": 62,
"fail": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"failing": [],
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/processing-control-whole.log"
},
{
"step": "M1",
"start": "2026-10-22T05:58:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:58:03Z",
"exit": 1,
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"skipped": 0
},
"failing": [
"a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals"
],
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/M1.log"
}
]
-15
View File
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess,signal,os,json,time,sys,re
root=Path('/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279');p=root/'agents/rocko/work/queue-279';logs=p/'logs';logs.mkdir(exist_ok=True);name=sys.argv[1];command=sys.argv[2:]
start=time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ',time.gmtime());log=logs/(name+'.log')
with log.open('w') as out:
child=subprocess.Popen(command,cwd=root,env=os.environ,stdout=out,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,start_new_session=True)
try:rc=child.wait(timeout=120)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
os.killpg(child.pid,signal.SIGKILL);child.wait();rc=124
text=log.read_text();counts={k:int(v) for k,v in re.findall(r'^# (tests|pass|fail|skipped) (\d+)\s*$',text,re.M)};failing=re.findall(r'^not ok \d+ - (.*)$',text,re.M)
row=dict(step=name,start=start,end=time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ',time.gmtime()),exit=rc,counts=counts,failing=failing,log=str(log));result=p/'results.json';rows=json.loads(result.read_text()) if result.exists() else [];rows.append(row);result.write_text(json.dumps(rows,indent=2)+'\n');print(json.dumps(row));print(text[-3200:])
if name in ['regression-red','M1']:
ok=rc==1 and failing==['a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals'] and "actual: 'unknown'" in text and "expected: 'alive'" in text
print('EXPECTED_UNKNOWN_VS_ALIVE',ok);raise SystemExit(0 if ok else 1)
raise SystemExit(rc)
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
{
"secret_matches": [],
"binary_files": []
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
None. All four TAP records report skipped 0.
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
{
"base": "f40f2e770e0d8be394f1ef53b404045fd6a49c0e",
"only_product_change": "while (now() <= deadline) -> for (;;)",
"other_product_bytes_unchanged": true,
"trailing_unknown_fallback": "unchanged; unreachable"
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
[]
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gwxq
-222
View File
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
# Slim packet and full-evidence location
This packet keeps the build note, candidate manifest and patch, summaries,
per-run counts/durations/exit statuses, mutant definitions and cleanup
records. Raw TAP logs, per-attempt config/log trees, diagnostic byte dumps,
runner scripts and transient TMPDIR notes remain only in the full packet.
References below to those files resolve at the full evidence commit.
Full evidence is retained permanently at commit
`d6c924764d387ea320365c4bb160b4b57ed8d635` on
`origin/rocko/row280-da5d-20261022`, under
`agents/rocko/work/queue-280/`. Its 3,531-entry inventory SHA256 is
`7d155092cb6edb547dbb7c8ba2fbabb1dd74f966c5c20965ef4fe6af2e7121b8`.
The full branch is retained; this slim packet does not replace its evidence.
The inventory in this directory describes only this slim packet.
Sage-2541 requested this doc-only follow-up on b765f5cb8 after the green
owner gate: bus 656/0/0, grant-executor 41/0/0, host-run 26/0/0 (#1785 c30431).
No source or test byte changes and no additional test run.
## Portability limit and carry notes
Duckworth N2: M2's demonstrated kill holds only while the host's ephemeral
range has lo <= 32768 <= hi. On another range, the picker test still checks
the outside-range property, but the old-picker mutant may not be killed by
a fixed sample. The evidence here applies to this host's 32768-60999 range.
For the next row touching scratch-sshd.mjs, carry these non-blocking notes:
- N3: add one helper comment line naming MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE.
- N4: remove the double blank lines in both owning test files.
These are follow-ups, not changes to the tested candidate in this packet.
---
# Row 280: scratch sshd owns its port
Design before code; Sage assignment sage-2530, mos-1270. Base
`da5d3651d75bff113b27d91abefc824c077dabbe`. Claim rev 3148,
`rocko-280-start-r1`. Reviewer Duckworth; gate owner Sage.
## Proposed change
Both helpers currently return on `listening(port)` alone
(grant-executor.test.mjs:86 and host-run.test.mjs:91). A foreign listener
can satisfy that probe while our daemon fails its bind. Move only their
common launch/retry/readiness loop and port selection into a shared test
helper, `packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs`; retain their distinct key,
authorized-key and command-stub setup in their existing files.
For each of the existing five attempts, write a fresh, attempt-specific
sshd log, start the child, and accept only after all three checks hold:
a successful loopback connect, the exact `Server listening on 127.0.0.1
port N.` line from this attempt's log, and the child's exitCode/signalCode
still null after the asynchronous connect. No previous attempt's log can
prove a later attempt. Early exit or failed bind advances to a fresh pick;
kill and await an unsuccessful child before retry. Exhaustion keeps the
existing `scratch sshd did not start` error, never a skip. Register cleanup
for the successful child as well.
Read and validate `/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`. Select uniformly
from eligible ports 1024 through 65535 outside the inclusive range, refusing
invalid input or an empty eligible set. No fixed 32768 assumption. Expose a
first-attempt port override only to the regression, then use the normal picker.
In each owning file, a regression opens a plain TCP listener, supplies that
occupied port for attempt one, and asserts the helper rejects it and returns
a different port. The helper's log/liveness proof still governs that returned
port. Register TCP listener cleanup before awaiting startup.
Add a deterministic picker assertion using injected random samples spanning
[0,1); every selected port must be unprivileged and outside the actual proc
range. M2 restores the old picker. If the actual host range makes M2 escape
this assertion, record it and ask Duckworth to adjudicate as the brief allows.
## X5 closure
DEFERRED.md:311-321 binds the `sleep 30` after the grant in G22/X5.
Use the fixture's existing fake-command PATH: a `sleep` stub delegates every
other argument to /usr/bin/sleep, but for 30 waits in short intervals only
while its scratch directory exists. The existing `sleep 30` argv, grant,
sudo-log assertion and revoke assertions stay unchanged. Remote cleanup no
longer leaves a 30-second child after the fixture directory is removed.
Append a closing line to the DEFERRED entry; do not rewrite its history.
## Evidence and slot request plan
No run before Sage CLEAR. First run the new occupied-port regressions red
against the old acceptance, then green after the helper change. Run both
whole files, M1 (old connect-only acceptance) and M2 (old random picker),
with each killing test named. Do not classify a timeout or syntax error as
an assertion kill. Save process-group timeout output and restore hashes.
After the whole-file durations are known, refine the repeat estimate.
Provisional estimate: allow 60-90 minutes for both 30-run whole-file repeats
under continuous CLI-suite load, with per-run counts and elapsed time saved.
The load and repeats are intentional concurrency within one granted slot;
all other commands stay sequential. Both files must complete all 30 without
timeout, and the CLI load must remain green. Any unexpected red stops for
Sage/Mos. Use a fresh short scratch TMPDIR, dead Docker socket, no live
configuration, no Docker or browser, and kill owned process groups on timeout.
Sweep owned node and sshd/stub processes and restore candidate hashes before
returning the slot. Sage runs the whole bus suite in the owner gate.
Owned paths: the two existing test files, the shared test helper,
`docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, and this packet. No product change, no live action.
## Phase 1 runner setup correction
The initial red-grant invocation at 07:22:02Z ran no test: packet runner
parents[5] selected the scratch parent instead of the worktree. The invalid
record and log stay unchanged. Sage-2534 approved parents[4], a git-root
and test-file existence preflight, and a fresh CLEAR. No source or test
byte changed for this correction; it is not a test red.
## Accepted design conditions and first test stop
Sage-2533 and duckworth-0120 approved the design. C1 samples are
[0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]; M2 uses rand(), never Math.random().
C2 checks attempt-zero's config names the occupied port and its log has no
listening proof for that port. C3's 30/60-second stub delegates other
arguments to absolute /usr/bin/sleep, so hold-add/remove's 0.05 sleeps do
not recurse. The same stub covers host-run's remote long sleeps (N1).
Attempt logs are sshd-N.log; exhaustion names the final log (N2).
After sage-2534's runner correction, both old-acceptance regression runs
failed exactly on returned port equaling the occupied listener port.
The first green regression then failed: no accepted sshd after five
attempts (07:22:56Z–07:23:09Z, 12.193 s), while the picker assertion passed.
The exact log comparison may be rejecting line framing, but this is only a
hypothesis: fixture cleanup removed the raw attempt logs. Stopped without
retry and requested diagnostic CLEAR to capture the logs before cleanup.
No later whole-file run or mutant was executed. Slot returned 07:23:34Z;
own cwd node/sshd sweep is empty. This evidence is not a passing gate.
## Confirmed log framing and correction
Sage-2535 granted a diagnostic rerun and the conditional CR-only correction.
The saved diagnostic TAP and diagnostic-bytes.json prove the occupied-port
bind refusal, then four listening lines with trailing hex 0d before newline.
Only the comparison changed: the exact expected line, optionally followed
by one CR, is accepted. No trim or substring match is used. The temporary
dump is removed. Both focused files pass 2/2 after this correction.
The earlier diagnostic red is retained as build evidence, not hidden.
## Phase 1 complete
Whole grant-executor: 41/41 in 20.673 s; whole host-run: 26/26 in
14.367 s. Focused regressions: 2/2 in each file. No skips or timeouts.
M1 and M2 are each assertion-killed by the named regression in both files
(4/4 executions, two distinct mutant sites). M2 deterministically hits
32768 at injected sample 0.6384. Source restored. Post-run pgrep finds no
process naming the fixture TMPDIR; cwd node/sshd sweep is empty, proving
the long-sleep stub cleanup requested in C3. Logs retain the prior invalid
runner invocation and the diagnosed CRLF build failure separately.
## Repeat preparation (sage-2536)
Before the repeat commit, the shared helper adds optional fixture evidence
output via MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE. It saves each attempted config/log before
accepting or abandoning that attempt, so test cleanup cannot erase the
startup evidence. The repeat runner assigns a packet directory per run.
No acceptance, picker, stub or existing assertion changes for this capture.
The repeated full files verify this final committed helper.
Repeat source commit: b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be. Four-path manifest SHA256: 27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5.
All four blobs are rechecked before and after each run. No candidate
bytes may change after this point.
## Final committed-byte evidence
Sage-2536 granted the repeat on committed bytes, with no changes carried
through the run. Source commit b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be;
manifest 27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5.
Repeat window: 2026-10-22T07:29:03Z to 07:48:38Z. Both whole files ran
sequentially under continuous CLI-suite load, with full output, exit status,
counts and durations retained per run in repeat-results.json/repeat-logs/.
Each run checks HEAD and all four hashes before and after. The load is the
actual complete CLI glob, not a substitute stress loop. Sage received the
required 15-minute report at 07:44:01Z.
| Repeat file | Whole runs | Pass | Fail | Skip | Timeout |
| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| grant-executor.test.mjs | 30 | 1230 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| host-run.test.mjs | 30 | 780 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CLI load, two whole cycles | 2 | 1588 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Repeat assertions total 2010/2010; load assertions 1588/1588. The in-progress
second CLI load was allowed to finish whole before stopping. No skips.
Each repeat has a 180 s process-group timeout; each load a 900 s timeout.
Neither bound fired. Attempt config/log evidence was saved before cleanup
under attempt-logs/<run>/<fixture>/; these are generated fixture paths only.
grant-executor: seconds min 20.611, median 20.811, max 26.419.
host-run: seconds min 14.207, median 14.408, max 14.609.
cli-load: seconds min 587.109, median 587.409, max 587.709.
Sage-2537 granted final M1/M2 replays after the complete CLI load exited,
because the optional attempt-log capture was added before the repeat commit.
07:48:56Z–07:48:57Z: four focused executions, all assertion kills:
| Mutant | Named killer, in both owning files | Result |
| --- | --- | --- |
| M1: connect-only acceptance | row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd | Both fail returned-port inequality |
| M2: 20000 + Math.floor(rand() * 20000) | row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range | Both fail at sample 0.6384, port 32768 |
No timeout or syntax failure is counted as a kill. Phase-1 runner, table and
logs remain separately recorded; final replays use the exact b765 helper.
Restored-hashes.json records 4/4 with no drift. Final-sweep.json records no
node, chromium or sshd under owned cwd paths and no process naming either
owned TMPDIR. This also supplies C3's post-test long-sleep cleanup evidence.
Slot returned at 07:49:17Z. No source byte changed during the repeat; the
final mutations were restored under sage-2537. No live file, unit or config
was touched. The whole bus suite remains Sage's owner gate.
Existing assertions/refusals remain unchanged (289 grant lines, 125 host
lines); assertion-preservation.json records the static check. The reader
search found only the intended shared-helper imports and no outside reader
of either owning file. Duckworth also confirmed no owning-file hash pin.
The two extra blank-line pairs are acknowledged style nits, left unchanged
after the committed repeat (sage-2537).
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs": {
"existing_assertion_refusal_lines": 289,
"all_preserved": true
},
"packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs": {
"existing_assertion_refusal_lines": 125,
"all_preserved": true
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
da5d3651d75bff113b27d91abefc824c077dabbe
-333
View File
@@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md b/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
index 197a29ecb..7945a6829 100644
--- a/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
+++ b/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
@@ -319,6 +319,10 @@ at every gate. Started 2026-09-12 during the control board MVP.
waits 30 s before it calls a lone `sleep 30` a leak. The row 197
lanes scan only at lane end, about 15 minutes after pkg-bus, so they
can't see it (mos-1169). (2026-10-21)
+ Closing note, row 280 (2026-10-22): both scratch sshd fixtures install a
+ bounded 30/60-second sleep stub that exits when its test directory is gone;
+ other sleep arguments exec /usr/bin/sleep unchanged. Evidence is recorded
+ in agents/rocko/work/queue-280/BUILD.md.
- **Row 66 live checks: the unslop notice on a live managed session, both harnesses.**
(mos-1186, Vikunja #454.) Row 66's gate asked for one landing session per
diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
index 1992f1525..b27d91dc4 100644
--- a/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
// reaches another host.
import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
import { appendFileSync, chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostExecutor, runHost } from '../src/host-run.mjs';
import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
import { grantDecision, hostRecord } from './host-fixtures.mjs';
+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
const USER = userInfo().username;
const AT = '2026-10-21T00:00:00.000Z';
@@ -35,12 +37,7 @@ const DEFINITIONS = {
pm: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [] },
ops: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [{ service: 'host' }] },
};
-const listening = (port) =>
- new Promise((resolve) => {
- const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
- s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
- s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
- });
+
async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
const end = Date.now() + ms;
while (!fn()) {
@@ -54,12 +51,13 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
// Both also stop when the test dir is gone, since a held stub on the sshd side outlives its test (#1750).
// wrap.sh logs every request. The sudo stub logs its arguments to sudo.log and runs the command as the
// test's user.
-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
keygen(join(dir, 'installer'));
writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'installer.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+ installSleepStub(dir);
const stub = (name, body) => writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', name), `#!/bin/sh\nD='${dir}'\n${body}\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
stub('list', '[ -e "$D/fail-list" ] && exit 1\n[ -e "$D/granted" ] && grep " mosaic-[0-9a-f]*$" "$D/granted"\nexit 0');
stub(
@@ -76,26 +74,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
`#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" >> '${dir}/requests.log'\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`,
{ mode: 0o755 },
);
- for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
- const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
- writeFileSync(
- join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
- [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`,
- `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
- `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
- );
- const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
- t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
- const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
- while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
- if (await listening(port)) return port;
- await sleep(30);
- }
- daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
- }
- throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+ return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+ 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+ `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+ 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+ `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+ ], options);
}
+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+ const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+ t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+ const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+ await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+ server.once('error', reject);
+ server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+ });
+ t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+ const occupied = server.address().port;
+ const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+ assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+ assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+ assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+ readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+ const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+ for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+ const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+ assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+ assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+ }
+});
+
async function setup(t, opts = {}) {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'g235x-'));
t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
index 6f5949b5c..f7eebd45e 100644
--- a/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
-import { connect, createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostGrant } from '../src/host-grant.mjs';
import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
const REPO = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url));
const USER = userInfo().username;
@@ -50,22 +52,18 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 5000) {
}
return true;
}
-const listening = (port) =>
- new Promise((resolve) => {
- const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
- s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
- s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
- });
+
// A scratch sshd. ForceCommand puts the fake sudo first on PATH and hands the command to /bin/sh, so
// the remote side parses the command line the way a real host's POSIX shell does.
-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
keygen(join(dir, 'otherhost'));
keygen(join(dir, 'user'));
writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'user.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+ installSleepStub(dir);
writeFileSync(
join(dir, 'fake', 'sudo'),
`#!/bin/sh\n'${process.execPath}' -e 'require("fs").appendFileSync(process.argv[1], JSON.stringify(process.argv.slice(2)) + "\\n")' '${dir}/argv.json' "$@"\nshift 2\nexec "$@"\n`,
@@ -75,26 +73,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', 'fail255'), '#!/bin/sh\necho "Host key verification failed." >&2\nexit 255\n', { mode: 0o755 });
writeFileSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), `#!/bin/sh\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`);
chmodSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), 0o755);
- for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
- const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
- writeFileSync(
- join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
- [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`,
- `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
- `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
- );
- const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
- t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
- const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
- while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
- if (await listening(port)) return port;
- await sleep(30);
- }
- daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
- }
- throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+ return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+ 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+ `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+ 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+ `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+ ], options);
}
+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+ const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+ t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+ const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+ await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+ server.once('error', reject);
+ server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+ });
+ t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+ const occupied = server.address().port;
+ const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+ assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+ assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+ assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+ readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+ const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+ for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+ const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+ assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+ assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+ }
+});
+
const GRANT = [['true'], ['false'], ['echo'], ['sleep'], ['head'], ['cat'], ['systemctl', 'status']];
async function hostFixture(t, { commands = GRANT, reviewerHosts, wrongHostKey = false, coderWeb2 = false } = {}) {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'h210-'));
diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2dde26de3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Row 280: fixture-only sshd startup. A TCP connect alone does not prove ownership.
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { basename, join } from 'node:path';
+
+export const ephemeralRange = () => {
+ const text = readFileSync('/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range', 'utf8').trim();
+ if (!/^\d+\s+\d+$/.test(text)) throw Error('invalid ephemeral port range');
+ const range = text.split(/\s+/).map(Number);
+ if (range[0] < 1 || range[1] > 65535 || range[0] > range[1]) throw Error('invalid ephemeral port range');
+ return range;
+};
+
+export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {
+ const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+ const below = Math.max(0, Math.min(lo, 65536) - 1024);
+ const above = Math.max(0, 65535 - Math.max(hi, 1023));
+ const sample = rand();
+ if (!below && !above) throw Error('no scratch sshd port available');
+ if (!(sample >= 0 && sample < 1)) throw Error('invalid random sample');
+ const offset = Math.floor(sample * (below + above));
+ return offset < below ? 1024 + offset : Math.max(hi + 1, 1024) + offset - below;
+}
+
+const sleep = ms => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+const listening = port => new Promise(resolve => {
+ const socket = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
+ const done = result => { socket.destroy(); resolve(result); };
+ socket.setTimeout(200, () => done(false));
+ socket.on('connect', () => done(true));
+ socket.on('error', () => done(false));
+});
+const stop = async daemon => {
+ if (daemon.pid === undefined || daemon.exitCode !== null || daemon.signalCode !== null) return;
+ const exited = once(daemon, 'exit');
+ daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
+ await exited;
+};
+
+export async function startScratchSshd(t, dir, config, { firstPort } = {}) {
+ let lastLog;
+ for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
+ const port = attempt === 0 && firstPort !== undefined ? firstPort : pickPort();
+ const configFile = join(dir, `sshd-${attempt}.conf`);
+ lastLog = join(dir, `sshd-${attempt}.log`);
+ writeFileSync(configFile, [`Port ${port}`, ...config, ''].join('\n'));
+ writeFileSync(lastLog, '');
+ const daemon = spawn('/usr/bin/sshd', ['-D', '-f', configFile, '-E', lastLog], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+ t.after(() => stop(daemon));
+ const saveLog = () => {
+ if (!process.env.MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE) return;
+ const evidence = join(process.env.MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE, basename(dir));
+ mkdirSync(evidence, { recursive: true });
+ writeFileSync(join(evidence, basename(lastLog)), readFileSync(lastLog));
+ writeFileSync(join(evidence, basename(configFile)), readFileSync(configFile));
+ };
+ let spawnError;
+ daemon.on('error', error => { spawnError = error; });
+ const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
+ while (Date.now() < deadline && !spawnError && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null) {
+ if (await listening(port) && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null &&
+ readFileSync(lastLog, 'utf8').split('\n').some(line =>
+ (line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.` ||
+ line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.\r`))) { saveLog(); return port; }
+ await sleep(30);
+ }
+ await stop(daemon);
+ saveLog();
+ }
+ throw Error(`scratch sshd did not start: ${lastLog}`);
+}
+
+// Long remote sleeps remain in flight for their original duration, but cannot outlive the fixture.
+export function installSleepStub(dir) {
+ const script = `const fs = require("node:fs");
+const end = Date.now() + Number(process.argv[2]) * 1000;
+const timer = setInterval(() => {
+ if (!fs.existsSync(process.argv[1]) || Date.now() >= end) { clearInterval(timer); }
+}, 50);`;
+ writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', 'sleep'), `#!/bin/sh
+case "$#:$1" in
+ 1:30|1:60) exec '${process.execPath}' -e '${script}' '${dir}' "$1" ;;
+ *) exec /usr/bin/sleep "$@" ;;
+esac
+`, { mode: 0o755 });
+}
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
1cb0971e745745e3db329c7c75f36197664d7bf0687def33c0819134f121975f packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
140ec358fff212b747412691e3cb5952844c13c7fe43d3ff1013d24f0df886d2 packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
3b647e59f09e7fc43b41d072e46c3cea5ed7641d5d4a95c5b39c240f73cdb75e packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
94c21723cd42f551bbd6249d5133cbfaa12ac25efef5a72bf525998ac3c52100 docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"cwd_processes": [],
"pgrep_checks": [
{
"tmpdir": "/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gInD",
"exit": 1,
"matches": []
},
{
"tmpdir": "/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gVtU",
"exit": 1,
"matches": []
}
]
}
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
{
"helper_sha256": "3b647e59f09e7fc43b41d072e46c3cea5ed7641d5d4a95c5b39c240f73cdb75e",
"restored": true
}
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
[
{
"id": "M1",
"old": " if (await listening(port) && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null &&\n readFileSync(lastLog, 'utf8').split('\\n').some(line =>\n (line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.` ||\n line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.\\r`))) { saveLog(); return port; }",
"new": " if (await listening(port)) return port;",
"pattern": "row 280: an occupied TCP port"
},
{
"id": "M2",
"old": "export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {\n const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();\n const below = Math.max(0, Math.min(lo, 65536) - 1024);\n const above = Math.max(0, 65535 - Math.max(hi, 1023));\n const sample = rand();\n if (!below && !above) throw Error('no scratch sshd port available');\n if (!(sample >= 0 && sample < 1)) throw Error('invalid random sample');\n const offset = Math.floor(sample * (below + above));\n return offset < below ? 1024 + offset : Math.max(hi + 1, 1024) + offset - below;\n}\n",
"new": "export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {\n return 20000 + Math.floor(rand() * 20000);\n}\n",
"pattern": "row 280: every injected picker sample"
}
]
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
d5d82d7cb679332e7d90ed26220cd7d3170931d2e8aa2ccdfc35ceea12147c11 BUILD.md
0e8f1e76f8c13d7de5cbea1ae8b8c2f178ca5aa0283ac0dbd00bffcd4c39bea5 assertion-preservation.json
052e9e79aa3c9ba1b6f8dedc7af00440e104d308ed9451a076e872c903704c7d base.txt
5898d3c45b4274a9cbf117018811f2b6206987e3849e97ce171c3aaa42d314da build.patch
27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5 candidate-manifest.sha256
634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08 candidate.txt
84f2091c0eb1b55c34b4462775160b5f808a6843e68b3e4cb54e1f7a2421eaf3 changed-paths.txt
634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08 commit.txt
eb9f55fd5de0ec370742702f15d737fb91e35542dbda727d43502adce92903a9 final-sweep.json
f9a578b95bd6f9e07dc231002a28ea9c3ae14fe2e269f3fbca50c4fc97ba61e0 mutant-restore.json
72cfbf942b4437720d6b92ddef0bc138d27bd6ecef1f1da0b32a2b0250b3cd61 mutants.json
b435b731ea4ccff12f90e1b53023cbc54bf65c08ad0f7feaf8a810088156a0b6 post-phase1-pgrep.txt
9f8458487a1c5146230e70d40428b6fb218c93f378fd1a8e8607fab80c446b2c reader-search.txt
634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08 repeat-commit.txt
42e240961767b817fb5f1d183bc949074b3b90c72335d65c3e0278a3db4294ea repeat-results.json
e26b6ecefd1a6db69fbaaa38c4f08abe0ad69035ecaa8e2e29f5da2961e5da15 repeat-summary.json
3e1903ee103b0a9ef8febeb4d2073848aca0e42fd4ecd1c586381f2ab7404be2 restored-hashes.json
f38eaa23861b8acb1738ed082f25a0e6661d976b87da140993373de41bc4053d results.json
76c5c03767ca34bc38a7f69c14fbf1c06e8ebcc93120bc577a44e2271f6fdb16 scan-result.json
e7f560ce5fc957432ddcad231897a5decd33be06f1201926adabb62d3c218c83 skips.txt
37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570 sweep-phase1.json
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
No process names the owned fixture TMPDIR.
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
Search: packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
(none)
Search: grant-executor.test.mjs
(none)
Search: packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
(none)
Search: host-run.test.mjs
(none)
Search: packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
(none)
Search: scratch-sshd.mjs
packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs:22:import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs:22:import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
Search: docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/genesis-render.md:35:| 30 | Open gaps from the MVP work | unassigned | — | parked | — | Jason reopens (jason) | `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md` § Open | Fixed only when a gate needs them |
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:25:Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
Search: DEFERRED.md
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/genesis-render.md:35:| 30 | Open gaps from the MVP work | unassigned | — | parked | — | Jason reopens (jason) | `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md` § Open | Fixed only when a gate needs them |
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:25:Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:83:| Open gaps from the MVP work | Fixed only when a gate needs them | DEFERRED.md, "Open" |
packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:92:- 2026-09-13 — created; rows 1 to 8 taken from CURRENT.md, DEFERRED.md and the plan page.
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"head": "b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be",
"manifest_sha256": "27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:29:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:48:38Z",
"failed": false,
"repeat_runs": 60,
"load_runs": 2,
"counts": {
"repeat": {
"tests": 2010,
"pass": 2010,
"fail": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"cancelled": 0
},
"cli-load": {
"tests": 1588,
"pass": 1588,
"fail": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"cancelled": 0
}
}
}
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
{
"paths": 4,
"drift": []
}
-368
View File
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
[
{
"step": "red-grant",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:22:02Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:22:02Z",
"seconds": 0.029,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "red-grant-actual",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:22:42Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
"seconds": 0.111,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
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},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "red-host-actual",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
"seconds": 0.143,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
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},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
"packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "green-grant-regressions",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:22:56Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:23:09Z",
"seconds": 12.193,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
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},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280:",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "diagnostic-log-bytes",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:24:22Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:24:34Z",
"seconds": 12.196,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
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},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
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]
},
{
"step": "green-grant-regressions-crlf",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
"seconds": 0.178,
"exit": 0,
"timeout": false,
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},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280:",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "green-host-regressions-crlf",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
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]
},
{
"step": "grant-whole",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:25:24Z",
"seconds": 20.673,
"exit": 0,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
"tests": 41,
"pass": 41,
"fail": 0,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "host-whole",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:25:24Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:25:38Z",
"seconds": 14.367,
"exit": 0,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
"tests": 26,
"pass": 26,
"fail": 0,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "M1-grant-executor",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
"seconds": 0.113,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
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"fail": 1,
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},
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"--test",
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"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
"step": "M1-host-run",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
"seconds": 0.146,
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"counts": {
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"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
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"--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
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]
},
{
"step": "M2-grant-executor",
"start": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
"seconds": 0.095,
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"counts": {
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},
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"--test",
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"--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
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"start": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
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},
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"--test-reporter=tap",
"--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
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]
},
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]
},
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]
},
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"--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
"packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
]
},
{
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"--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
"packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
]
}
]
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
{
"binary_files": [],
"secret_matches": []
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
None. All 60 repeat files and both complete CLI load cycles report skipped 0.
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
[]
-128
View File
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
# Vikunja502: processing test and runner hardening
Briefed by Rocko before implementation, from sage-2460 and mos-1267/1268.
Parent row191 is landed at0fa7bf421. This follow-up changes tests and the
owned runner copy; it does not change the live stack or processing policy.
Queue next currently offers211; Sage's explicit502 assignment governs this
work. No211claim or unrelated row work.
## Outcome and bounds
Keep row191's product behavior unchanged while making its failure evidence
precise and bounded. Four accepted fixes only:
1. packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:106-108: the second
host must pair its real sleep with a real advancing clock. Override now
with Date.now alongside its existing real sleep. Retain all identity,
signal, ownership and receipt assertions. Replaying SR08 must produce a
named assertion failure and exit rather than hang until the harness kills it.
2. packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:52: replace coarse status>=400
with a case table of exact status/error outcomes and no writer call per
refusal. Keep valid same-origin requests as the baseline; isolate the
unnamed-host case from the unrelated outer-origin refusal. The existing
direct-handler origin/site test stays intact. Replay KS43 and KS44 against
their appropriate existing tests to prove the right guard is detected.
3. packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs:252-265: close the opened runtime in
finally around the dependency assertions. Keep each assertion and the
subsequent close-count check. Replaying KS54 must yield its named
dependency assertion and terminate without a90second hang.
4. Own-dir run-mutants.py: generic timeout causes must reflect the actual
same-invocation control record, including the no-control case. Start from
reviewed fe0d360f. Keep the old row191 runner and all historical outputs
immutable; deliver the corrected copy in this packet. Update the cause
call to receive its actual control. Add focused pure-function regression
checks for absent, failed and passing control wording. No policy change:
classification, controls,90second bound and cleanup remain as reviewed.
The original row191 evidence stays frozen. No live files, bus store, units,
provider calls, Docker, browser, credentials or activation action. No push,
force-push, branch deletion or attribution lines. Sage sweeps the pending
canonical191 BUILD.md/SESSIONS/BUILD-LOG edits; Rocko will not commit those.
## Build and acceptance evidence
New isolated worktree /mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502, new branch
rocko/vikunja502-20261022, baseline0fa7bf421; link node_modules immediately.
Use scratch TMPDIR and a dead Docker socket for every permitted run.
Write the runner wording regression checks before changing the helper.
Request Sage's slot before any test or mutant run. Proposed focused gate:
whole stop-run.test.mjs, processing.test.mjs and bus tasks.test.mjs singly;
runner wording regression file; replay SR08, KS43, KS44 and KS54 one at a
time with owned process groups and cleanup. The old SR08/KS54 red evidence
is retained, and the new replays must fail by named assertion and exit.
Run broader package suites only if Sage grants them. No carry from old tests
is claimed after these test changes. Grep readers/pins before final manifest.
Packet will contain base, patch, changed paths, candidate hashes, exact run
logs, mutant detections and the corrected runner hash/diff. Source-only
candidate paths are the three test files; runner files are separately hashed
packet deliverables. Sage resolves reviewer/gate ownership and landing.
## Current state
Initial brief state: no tests or mutant runs yet; subsequent results below record the authorized run.
## Sage scope approval and slot: sage-2471 (2026-10-22 04:55:20Z)
Scope above approved as written. Slot order is MVP205 gate,268r4,194,236;
Sage will fit502into a gap and sends explicit CLEAR. Nothing may run yet.
Prepared5-site table:SR08(clock),KS43(direct handler origin),KS44(bodybound),
KS54(runtime cleanup),V502-status(cross-site403→400). The last site proves
the exact status assertion catches a response that the old>=400 accepted.
Each old site statically matches exactly once in this worktree. No mutation
applied and no syntax/test command executed during this preparation.
A successful replay must be an assertion kill and exit, including SR08 and
KS54. Timeout kills do not satisfy this follow-up's fixture-hardening goal.
The new runner's root will point to rocko-v502 when its wording helper is
fixed after the first red. This is runner workspace configuration, not a
policy change. New packet files/evidence remain separate from landed191.
## Focused verification complete: sage-2475
Run04:59:34Z–05:00:52Z on0fa7bf421 in rocko-v502. Expected regression
red is a named assertion: old generic cause falsely claims a passed control.
After the minimal helper/context fix, that regression passes. Whole single
files:stop-run12/12,processingHTTP6/6,bustasks9/9;awk27pass/0fail/0skip.
All4Python regressions pass (missing,failed,passingcontrol and SR08cause).
No unexpected test failures. No ^skip or TAPSKIP lines.
Five mutants are assertion kills,0timeouts:SR08(5.211s),KS43(.161s),
KS44(.156s),KS54(.883s),V502-status(.162s). SR08 now pairs the parent clock
with its real sleep, and KS54 closes its runtime even when the deps assertion
throws; neither requires timeout adjudication. The wrong-status mutant
returns400instead403 and is rejected by the exact fence assertions.
All5candidate code/test hashes restored. Cwd node/chromium/Python sweep[];
slot returned Sage05:01:29Z. No suites,Docker,browser,live actions or provider
calls. The expected red/green run is distinguished from verification failures.
The candidate manifest binds3landed test files plus the corrected owned
runner and its Python regression source,5paths in total. This expands the
brief's initial source-only3path convention solely to bind the two already
in-scope runner deliverables to the same verified candidate. Other packet
files and historical baseline are inventory-hashed,not candidate paths.
RunnerSHA256:c5bdc764d1cfe11752db2df412c96baa4f366236777df1755bb337e9a943ddea.
Runner code changes:truthful control-aware cause, passing actual control to
the renderer, and workspace root set to this isolated worktree. Classification,
90second limit, group cleanup, restore and control policy unchanged.
Earlier row191runner/evidence remain untouched. No code commit,push,live
step or queue move. Sage owns review assignment and integration of502.
## Rebase and commits: sage-2482
No candidate path changed from0fa7bf421 toce6a96ad6. On new branch
rocko/vikunja502-ce6a-20261022, source candidate was committed then rebased
without conflict ontoce6a96ad6. All5blobs remain byte-identical, range-diff
pairs equal and stable patch-id matches. Focused runs carry by Sage's ruling;
no rerun. rebase-proof.json and rebase-range-diff.txt contain exact hashes.
commit.txt names the source candidate commit; the subsequent packet commit
adds evidence only,not candidate source changes. No pending canonical logs
or row191packet files are included. No push; Sage publishes and requests
Dewey review after checking the two-commit range.
-22
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# Vikunja502 focused results
|Check|Pass|Fail|Skip|
|---|---:|---:|---:|
|stop-run whole|12|0|0|
|processing HTTP whole|6|0|0|
|bus tasks whole|9|0|0|
|Python regressions|4|0|0|
Expected wording regression:1assertion red before fix, then green. No unexpected red.
|Mutant|Result|Seconds|Named failing test|
|---|---|---:|---|
|SR08|assertion-killed|5.211|a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals|
|KS43|assertion-killed|0.161|processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer|
|KS44|assertion-killed|0.156|processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer|
|KS54|assertion-killed|0.883|the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one|
|V502-status|assertion-killed|0.162|processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer|
5/5assertionkills,0timeoutkills. No skips. Candidate restored,process sweep[],slotreturned05:01:29Z.
No package suites,Docker,browser or live action under focused grant.
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
[
{
"id": "SR08",
"file": "packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs",
"old": "if (winner.id !== claim.id) {",
"new": "if (false) {",
"test": "packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs",
"pattern": "separate host joins durable first ownership",
"check": "cross-process exclusive first owner",
"status": "unrun"
},
{
"id": "KS43",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"old": "if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');",
"new": "// skip origin fence",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer",
"check": "same-origin browser write",
"status": "unrun"
},
{
"id": "KS44",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"old": "if (size > 1024) throw Error();",
"new": "void 0;",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing write fences refuse",
"check": "bounded control payload",
"status": "unrun"
},
{
"id": "KS54",
"file": "packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs",
"old": "adapter = await tasks({ broker, credentials, businesses, processing });",
"new": "adapter = await tasks({ broker, credentials, businesses });",
"test": "packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs",
"pattern": "",
"check": "production tracker injection",
"status": "unrun"
},
{
"id": "V502-status",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"old": "return refuse(403, 'cross-site')",
"new": "return refuse(400, 'cross-site')",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing write fences refuse",
"check": "exact refusal status rejects a wrong 400 that coarse >=400 accepted",
"status": "unrun"
}
]
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"old_base": "0fa7bf421",
"new_base": "ce6a96ad6",
"candidate_paths": [
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py",
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py",
"packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs",
"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs",
"packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs"
],
"changed": []
}
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ce6a96ad6153a0a7a689e6d9d0f625b55eb86b51
-312
View File
@@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py b/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8dce3064d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Run only with Sage's explicit slot grant. Mutations are exact-once and restored."""
+from pathlib import Path
+import argparse, hashlib, json, os, re, signal, subprocess, sys, time
+packet = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+root = Path('/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502')
+all_sites = json.loads((packet/'all-mutants.json').read_text())
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument('ids', nargs='*')
+parser.add_argument('--resume-from')
+parser.add_argument('--control-file')
+parser.add_argument('--adjudicate-timeout')
+args = parser.parse_args()
+sites = all_sites
+if args.resume_from:
+ ids = [s['id'] for s in all_sites]
+ if args.ids or args.resume_from not in ids: raise SystemExit('invalid resume selection')
+ sites = all_sites[ids.index(args.resume_from):]
+elif args.ids:
+ wanted = set(args.ids); sites = [s for s in all_sites if s['id'] in wanted]
+ if {s['id'] for s in sites} != wanted: raise SystemExit('unknown mutant id')
+if args.adjudicate_timeout and not args.control_file:
+ raise SystemExit('timeout adjudication requires an unmutated whole-file control')
+originals = {e['file']: (root/e['file']).read_bytes() for s in sites for e in [s, *s.get('extra_edits', [])]}
+for s in sites:
+ for e in [s, *s.get('extra_edits', [])]:
+ if originals[e['file']].decode().count(e['old']) != 1: raise SystemExit('preflight '+s['id'])
+logs = packet/('resume-mutant-logs' if args.resume_from else 'mutant-logs'); logs.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+result_file = packet/('resume-mutant-results.json' if args.resume_from else 'mutant-results.json')
+results = []
+controls = {}
+run_id = str(time.time_ns())
+
+def verify_candidate():
+ expected = (packet/'commit.txt').read_text().strip()
+ if subprocess.check_output(['git','rev-parse','HEAD'],cwd=root,text=True).strip()!=expected:
+ raise RuntimeError('candidate HEAD changed')
+ manifest = packet/'candidate-manifest.sha256'
+ digest = hashlib.sha256(manifest.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+ if digest!=(packet/'candidate.txt').read_text().strip(): raise RuntimeError('manifest digest changed')
+ for line in manifest.read_text().splitlines():
+ wanted,name = line.split(' ',1)
+ if hashlib.sha256((root/name).read_bytes()).hexdigest()!=wanted: raise RuntimeError('candidate drift '+name)
+ return {'head':expected,'manifest':digest}
+
+def stat(pid):
+ try:
+ raw = Path('/proc',str(pid),'stat').read_text(); fields = raw[raw.rfind(')')+2:].split()
+ return dict(ppid=int(fields[1]), group=int(fields[2]), start=fields[19], state=fields[0])
+ except (FileNotFoundError, PermissionError, ProcessLookupError): return None
+def capture(child, known):
+ current = {}
+ for p in Path('/proc').iterdir():
+ if p.name.isdecimal():
+ value=stat(int(p.name))
+ if value: current[int(p.name)]=value
+ changed=True
+ while changed:
+ changed=False
+ for pid,value in current.items():
+ if pid not in known and (pid==child or (value['ppid'] in known and current.get(value['ppid'],{}).get('start')==known[value['ppid']]['start'])): known[pid]=value;changed=True
+
+def cleanup(known):
+ groups={}
+ for pid,old in known.items():
+ cur=stat(pid)
+ if cur and cur['start']==old['start'] and cur['state']!='Z': groups.setdefault(cur['group'],[]).append(pid)
+ for group,anchors in groups.items():
+ # Every member here descends from this test runner, identified by start ticks.
+ if not any((cur:=stat(pid)) and cur['start']==known[pid]['start'] and cur['group']==group for pid in anchors):continue
+ try: os.killpg(group, signal.SIGKILL)
+ except ProcessLookupError: pass
+def execute(test, pattern, log):
+ child = None; known = {}; timedout = False; started = time.monotonic()
+ command = ['node','--test','--test-reporter=tap']
+ if pattern: command += ['--test-name-pattern='+re.escape(pattern)]
+ command += [test]
+ try:
+ with log.open('w') as out:
+ child = subprocess.Popen(command,cwd=root,stdout=out,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,start_new_session=True,
+ env={**os.environ,'TMPDIR':os.environ['TMPDIR'],'DOCKER_HOST':'unix:///nonexistent.sock',
+ 'MOSAIC_CONFIG':str(Path(os.environ['TMPDIR'])/'no-live-config.json')})
+ first = stat(child.pid)
+ if first: known[child.pid] = first
+ deadline = started+90
+ while child.poll() is None:
+ capture(child.pid,known)
+ if time.monotonic()>=deadline:
+ timedout = True; cleanup(known)
+ try: os.killpg(child.pid,signal.SIGKILL)
+ except ProcessLookupError: pass
+ break
+ time.sleep(.05)
+ rc = child.wait()
+ finally:
+ if child and child.poll() is None:
+ cleanup(known)
+ try: os.killpg(child.pid,signal.SIGKILL)
+ except ProcessLookupError: pass
+ child.wait()
+ cleanup(known)
+ text = log.read_text()
+ return {'exit':rc,'timeout':timedout,'seconds':time.monotonic()-started,'log':str(log),
+ 'failing':re.findall(r'^\s*not ok \d+ - (.*)$',text,re.M),
+ 'counts':{k:int(v) for k,v in re.findall(r'^# (tests|pass|fail|skipped|cancelled) (\d+)\s*$',text,re.M)}}
+
+def timeout_cause(site, control=None):
+ if site['id']=='SR08':
+ return ('runtimes.mjs:333 loops on now() <= deadline; stop-run.test.mjs:106-108 '
+ 'gives the second host a fixed fake clock with a real sleep. Removing the join '
+ 'branch enters the delivery loop without advancing that clock. Original log: TAP header only.')
+ if not control or control.get('passed') is not True:
+ return ('Mutated '+site['file']+' timed out after 90s; no passing same-file control '
+ 'exists in this invocation. Detection is not established. '
+ 'Detailed cause must be recorded before review.')
+ return ('Mutated '+site['file']+' timed out after 90s while the same whole test file '
+ 'passed unmutated in this invocation. Detailed cause must be recorded before review.')
+
+try:
+ binding = verify_candidate()
+ if args.control_file:
+ if args.control_file not in {s['test'] for s in all_sites}: raise SystemExit('unknown control file')
+ before = hashlib.sha256((root/args.control_file).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+ control = execute(args.control_file,'',logs/'unmutated-control.tap')
+ after = hashlib.sha256((root/args.control_file).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+ counts = control['counts']
+ passed = (control['exit']==0 and not control['timeout'] and not control['failing'] and before==after
+ and counts.get('tests',0)>0 and counts.get('pass')==counts.get('tests')
+ and counts.get('fail')==0 and counts.get('cancelled')==0 and counts.get('skipped')==0)
+ control.update(run_id=run_id,test=args.control_file,test_sha256=before,passed=passed,**binding)
+ (packet/'unmutated-control.json').write_text(json.dumps(control,indent=2)+'\n')
+ print('CONTROL',json.dumps(control),flush=True)
+ if not passed: raise SystemExit('control failed; stop for Mos, no mutation applied')
+ verify_candidate()
+ controls[args.control_file] = control
+ if args.adjudicate_timeout:
+ # This is the already-observed SR08 timeout, not a rerun or an assertion kill.
+ if args.adjudicate_timeout!='SR08': raise SystemExit('only SR08 historical adjudication approved')
+ prior = json.loads((packet/'mutant-results.json').read_text())
+ old = next((s for s in prior if s['id']=='SR08'),None)
+ site = next(s for s in all_sites if s['id']=='SR08')
+ if not old or old['status']!='timeout' or old['test']!=args.control_file or old['failing']:
+ raise SystemExit('historical timeout does not match approved control')
+ if Path(old['log']).read_text().strip()!='TAP version 13': raise SystemExit('historical timeout log changed')
+ adjudication = {**old,'status':'killed-by-timeout','cause':timeout_cause(site, controls[args.control_file]),'control':controls[args.control_file],
+ 'original_log_sha256':hashlib.sha256(Path(old['log']).read_bytes()).hexdigest()}
+ (packet/'SR08-timeout-adjudication.json').write_text(json.dumps(adjudication,indent=2)+'\n')
+ print('TIMEOUT_KILL SR08',adjudication['cause'],flush=True)
+ for i,s in enumerate(sites,1):
+ verify_candidate()
+ edits = [s, *s.get('extra_edits', [])]
+ for e in edits:
+ if (root/e['file']).read_bytes()!=originals[e['file']]: raise RuntimeError('source drift '+s['id'])
+ print(f'{i}/{len(sites)} {s["id"]}: {s["check"]}',flush=True)
+ try:
+ for e in edits:
+ (root/e['file']).write_bytes(originals[e['file']].decode().replace(e['old'],e['new'],1).encode())
+ observed = execute(s['test'],s['pattern'],logs/(s['id']+'.tap'))
+ finally:
+ for e in edits: (root/e['file']).write_bytes(originals[e['file']])
+ expected = not s['pattern'] or any(s['pattern'] in name for name in observed['failing'])
+ control = controls.get(s['test'])
+ if observed['timeout']:
+ status = 'killed-by-timeout' if control and control['passed'] and control['run_id']==run_id else 'timeout-without-control'
+ elif observed['exit']==0: status = 'survived'
+ elif observed['failing'] and expected: status = 'assertion-killed'
+ else: status = 'invalid-failure'
+ row = {**{k:s[k] for k in ['id','file','test','pattern','check']},**observed,'status':status}
+ if observed['timeout']: row.update(cause=timeout_cause(s, control),control=control)
+ results.append(row)
+ result_file.write_text(json.dumps(results,indent=2)+'\n')
+ print(status,flush=True)
+ if status not in ('assertion-killed','killed-by-timeout'): raise SystemExit(1)
+finally:
+ for name,data in originals.items(): (root/name).write_bytes(data)
+ if any((root/name).read_bytes()!=data for name,data in originals.items()): raise RuntimeError('restore failed')
+summary = {'assertion_kills':sum(s['status']=='assertion-killed' for s in results),
+ 'timeout_kills':sum(s['status']=='killed-by-timeout' for s in results),
+ 'historical_timeout_kills':int(bool(args.adjudicate_timeout)),'selected':len(sites),
+ 'run_id':run_id,'candidate':binding}
+(packet/'mutant-resume-summary.json').write_text(json.dumps(summary,indent=2)+'\n')
+print('MUTANT_SUMMARY',json.dumps(summary),flush=True)
diff --git a/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py b/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..444ec2c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""Exercise the actual pure cause renderer without executing the mutant driver."""
+import ast
+from pathlib import Path
+import unittest
+
+RUNNER = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / 'run-mutants.py'
+
+
+def cause_renderer():
+ tree = ast.parse(RUNNER.read_text())
+ function = next(n for n in tree.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef) and n.name == 'timeout_cause')
+ namespace = {}
+ exec(compile(ast.Module(body=[function], type_ignores=[]), str(RUNNER), 'exec'), namespace)
+ return namespace['timeout_cause']
+
+
+class TimeoutCause(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.cause = cause_renderer()
+ self.site = {'id': 'KS54', 'file': 'packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs'}
+
+ def test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass(self):
+ text = self.cause(self.site)
+ self.assertIn('no passing same-file control', text)
+ self.assertNotIn('passed unmutated', text)
+
+ def test_failed_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass(self):
+ text = self.cause(self.site, {'passed': False})
+ self.assertIn('no passing same-file control', text)
+ self.assertNotIn('passed unmutated', text)
+
+ def test_passing_control_can_state_its_observed_pass(self):
+ text = self.cause(self.site, {'passed': True})
+ self.assertIn('passed unmutated', text)
+ self.assertNotIn('no passing same-file control', text)
+
+ def test_known_sr08_cause_remains_specific_without_claiming_a_control(self):
+ text = self.cause({'id': 'SR08', 'file': 'packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs'})
+ self.assertIn('fixed fake clock', text)
+ self.assertNotIn('passed unmutated', text)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+ unittest.main()
diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
index 4c8aae9d6..081925299 100644
--- a/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
@@ -259,10 +259,13 @@ test('the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one', async (t)
return { handle: async () => ({ ok: 1 }), timeout: 1000, close: async () => closed++ };
},
});
- // Row 191: runtime injects cancellation alongside the existing factory dependencies.
- assert.deepEqual(given, ['broker', 'businesses', 'credentials', 'processing']);
- assert.equal(typeof processing.work, 'function');
- await runtime.close();
+ try {
+ // Row 191: runtime injects cancellation alongside the existing factory dependencies.
+ assert.deepEqual(given, ['broker', 'businesses', 'credentials', 'processing']);
+ assert.equal(typeof processing.work, 'function');
+ } finally {
+ await runtime.close();
+ }
assert.equal(closed, 5);
await assert.rejects(
startBroker({
diff --git a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
index ed69bc111..f54022251 100644
--- a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ test('a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals',
const messages = []; child.on('message', value => messages.push(value));
await once(child, 'message');
const joined = stopRun({ ...f.args, owner: { decision: 'second-host' } },
- { ...f.options, sleep: ms => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms)) });
+ { ...f.options, now: Date.now, sleep: ms => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms)) });
setTimeout(() => child.send('continue'), 30);
const result = await joined;
const exit = child.exitCode === null ? await once(child, 'exit') : [child.exitCode];
diff --git a/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs b/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
index e9874602c..14956867b 100644
--- a/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
@@ -52,15 +52,26 @@ test('Console halt and generation-bound resume use only the management writer an
test('processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer', async t => {
const f = await fixture(t);
const cases = [
- { headers: { ...POST.headers, origin: 'https://elsewhere' } },
- { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' } },
- { headers: { ...POST.headers, host: `127.0.0.1:${f.server.address().port}`, 'x-user': undefined } },
- { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'x-user': ['jason', 'jason'] } },
- { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'content-type': 'text/plain' } },
- { body: '{"human":"jason"}' }, { body: '[]' }, { body: 'null' }, { body: ' '.repeat(1025) + '{}' },
+ ['wrong origin', { headers: { ...POST.headers, origin: 'https://elsewhere' } }, 403, 'cross-origin request refused'],
+ ['cross-site', { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' } }, 403, 'cross-site'],
+ ['unnamed host', { headers: { ...POST.headers, host: `127.0.0.1:${f.server.address().port}`,
+ origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${f.server.address().port}`, 'x-user': undefined } }, 403, 'read-only'],
+ ['duplicate identity', { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'x-user': ['jason', 'jason'] } }, 401, 'sign-in required'],
+ ['content type', { headers: { ...POST.headers, 'content-type': 'text/plain' } }, 415, 'invalid-request'],
+ ['extra key', { body: '{"human":"jason"}' }, 400, 'invalid-request'],
+ ['array', { body: '[]' }, 400, 'invalid-request'],
+ ['null', { body: 'null' }, 400, 'invalid-request'],
+ ['body bound', { body: ' '.repeat(1025) + '{}' }, 400, 'invalid-request'],
];
- for (const c of cases) assert.ok((await http(f.server, '/api/processing/halt', { ...POST, ...c })).status >= 400);
- assert.equal((await http(f.server, '/api/processing/resume', POST)).status, 400);
+ for (const [name, changed, status, error] of cases) {
+ const response = await http(f.server, '/api/processing/halt', { ...POST, ...changed });
+ assert.equal(response.status, status, name);
+ assert.equal(response.value.error, error, name);
+ assert.deepEqual(f.calls, [], name + ' must refuse before the writer');
+ }
+ const missingGeneration = await http(f.server, '/api/processing/resume', POST);
+ assert.equal(missingGeneration.status, 400);
+ assert.equal(missingGeneration.value.error, 'invalid-request');
assert.deepEqual(f.calls, []);
});
test('tester cannot invoke either control writer and failures never echo backend text', async t => {
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
c5bdc764d1cfe11752db2df412c96baa4f366236777df1755bb337e9a943ddea agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
475ab651a60bc4721ba8bb193b3f05ff67d25afc068e80382174b98828ad085d agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
a17ef09d68a13181fb0d27fde9006bd14ecf340270e07d7c79f6b37025f773c8 packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
bbf88324b1adc9acbb91a49f08d3ae5edb1d65a233933bdb86bc96701b0a35d3 packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
28caf153da5d16949c5a3e1cedf8c91613e7230840d9df65d5dc4bdc95e72bf5 packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
968d6ee345766da838df68f491b5a77c9a25157034dc49e9d4a9b603e4ce7812
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
8e3c6a79bfa39e739bf728f949f51e9842ca0df9
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
[]
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
[
{
"step": "runner-red",
"command": [
"python3",
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py",
"TimeoutCause.test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T04:59:34Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T04:59:34Z",
"exit": 1,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/runner-red.log"
},
{
"step": "runner-green",
"command": [
"python3",
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py",
"TimeoutCause.test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:01Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:01Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/runner-green.log"
},
{
"step": "stop-run-whole",
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:01Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:01Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/stop-run-whole.log"
},
{
"step": "processing-http-whole",
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:02Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:02Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/processing-http-whole.log"
},
{
"step": "bus-tasks-whole",
"command": [
"node",
"--test",
"--test-reporter=tap",
"packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:02Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:03Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/bus-tasks-whole.log"
},
{
"step": "python-regressions",
"command": [
"python3",
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:03Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:03Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/python-regressions.log"
},
{
"step": "replays",
"command": [
"python3",
"agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py"
],
"start": "2026-10-22T05:00:45Z",
"end": "2026-10-22T05:00:52Z",
"exit": 0,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/replays.log"
}
]
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "focused scope completed under sage-2475; no further run authorized",
"scope": "sage-2471",
"worktree": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502",
"base": "0fa7bf421fc153a226b5f06ed484e089e48e23ba",
"red_command": [
"python3",
"/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py",
"TimeoutCause.test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass"
],
"green_command": [
"python3",
"/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py"
],
"single_files": [
"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs",
"packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs"
],
"replay_ids": [
"SR08",
"KS43",
"KS44",
"KS54",
"V502-status"
],
"replay_required_status": "assertion-killed for every site; no timeout kills accepted as fixture-hardening evidence",
"process_rules": "short scratch TMPDIR,deadDocker,one test file at a time,owned process groups,timeouts,restore and cwd sweep"
}
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
ok 1 - recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
---
duration_ms: 22.077964
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
ok 2 - read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
---
duration_ms: 9.65343
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a bad entry refuses the whole record
ok 3 - a bad entry refuses the whole record
---
duration_ms: 10.008621
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: taskView reads the projection for one business
ok 4 - taskView reads the projection for one business
---
duration_ms: 11.605317
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
ok 5 - requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
---
duration_ms: 21.879126
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
ok 6 - the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
---
duration_ms: 294.372769
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
ok 7 - without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
---
duration_ms: 39.665659
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
ok 8 - the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
---
duration_ms: 51.674609
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
ok 9 - the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
---
duration_ms: 248.929804
type: 'test'
...
1..9
# tests 9
# suites 0
# pass 9
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 819.657876
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: read-only Console can read processing state but neither human control writes without --send
ok 1 - read-only Console can read processing state but neither human control writes without --send
---
duration_ms: 17.100325
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: Console halt and generation-bound resume use only the management writer and keep partial stops honest
ok 2 - Console halt and generation-bound resume use only the management writer and keep partial stops honest
---
duration_ms: 3.741854
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
ok 3 - processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
---
duration_ms: 5.750951
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: tester cannot invoke either control writer and failures never echo backend text
ok 4 - tester cannot invoke either control writer and failures never echo backend text
---
duration_ms: 5.062465
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing writes use the existing SSO signer and still require --send and same-origin
ok 5 - processing writes use the existing SSO signer and still require --send and same-origin
---
duration_ms: 4.114043
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
ok 6 - processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
---
duration_ms: 0.618941
type: 'test'
...
1..6
# tests 6
# suites 0
# pass 6
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 134.607131
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
....
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ran 4 tests in 0.011s
OK
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
1/5 SR08: cross-process exclusive first owner
assertion-killed
2/5 KS43: same-origin browser write
assertion-killed
3/5 KS44: bounded control payload
assertion-killed
4/5 KS54: production tracker injection
assertion-killed
5/5 V502-status: exact refusal status rejects a wrong 400 that coarse >=400 accepted
assertion-killed
MUTANT_SUMMARY {"assertion_kills": 5, "timeout_kills": 0, "historical_timeout_kills": 0, "selected": 5, "run_id": "1792645245774744257", "candidate": {"head": "0fa7bf421fc153a226b5f06ed484e089e48e23ba", "manifest": "968d6ee345766da838df68f491b5a77c9a25157034dc49e9d4a9b603e4ce7812"}}
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ran 1 test in 0.004s
OK
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
F
======================================================================
FAIL: test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass (__main__.TimeoutCause.test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py", line 24, in test_missing_control_never_claims_an_unmutated_pass
self.assertIn('no passing same-file control', text)
AssertionError: 'no passing same-file control' not found in 'Mutated packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs timed out after 90s while the same whole test file passed unmutated in this invocation. Detailed cause must be recorded before review.'
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ran 1 test in 0.003s
FAILED (failures=1)
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
ok 1 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
---
duration_ms: 41.095674
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
ok 2 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
---
duration_ms: 32.241062
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
ok 3 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
---
duration_ms: 13.366003
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
ok 4 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
---
duration_ms: 29.310841
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
ok 5 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
---
duration_ms: 8.032376
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
ok 6 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
---
duration_ms: 26.551382
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
ok 7 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
---
duration_ms: 99.31242
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
ok 8 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
---
duration_ms: 24.064935
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
ok 9 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
---
duration_ms: 58.520012
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
ok 10 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
---
duration_ms: 44.780832
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
ok 11 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
---
duration_ms: 7.48526
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
ok 12 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
---
duration_ms: 6.177784
type: 'test'
...
1..12
# tests 12
# suites 0
# pass 12
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 446.315604
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
not ok 1 - processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
---
duration_ms: 4.161227
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:106:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
Expected values to be strictly equal:
503 !== 403
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected: 403
actual: 503
operator: 'strictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:118:12)
process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 113.430641
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
not ok 1 - processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
---
duration_ms: 22.664684
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:52:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
body bound
200 !== 400
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected: 400
actual: 200
operator: 'strictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:68:12)
process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 126.507861
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
ok 1 - recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
---
duration_ms: 23.452757
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
ok 2 - read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
---
duration_ms: 9.929636
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a bad entry refuses the whole record
ok 3 - a bad entry refuses the whole record
---
duration_ms: 9.894173
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: taskView reads the projection for one business
ok 4 - taskView reads the projection for one business
---
duration_ms: 11.839691
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
ok 5 - requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
---
duration_ms: 23.330397
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
ok 6 - the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
---
duration_ms: 297.537138
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
ok 7 - without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
---
duration_ms: 43.546083
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
not ok 8 - the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
---
duration_ms: 50.654664
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs:239:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
+ actual - expected
[
'broker',
'businesses',
'credentials',
- 'processing'
]
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected:
0: 'broker'
1: 'businesses'
2: 'credentials'
3: 'processing'
actual:
0: 'broker'
1: 'businesses'
2: 'credentials'
operator: 'deepStrictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs:264:12)
process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7)
...
# Subtest: the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
ok 9 - the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
---
duration_ms: 249.07671
type: 'test'
...
1..9
# tests 9
# suites 0
# pass 8
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 829.345079
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
not ok 1 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
---
duration_ms: 5083.453611
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:90:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
the second host sends no signal
+ actual - expected
+ [
+ 'SIGTERM',
+ 'SIGKILL'
+ ]
- []
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected:
actual:
0: 'SIGTERM'
1: 'SIGKILL'
operator: 'deepStrictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:113:10)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 5132.608875
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
not ok 1 - processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
---
duration_ms: 19.005372
type: 'test'
location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:52:1'
failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
error: |-
cross-site
400 !== 403
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
name: 'AssertionError'
expected: 403
actual: 400
operator: 'strictEqual'
stack: |-
TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs:68:12)
process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
...
1..1
# tests 1
# suites 0
# pass 0
# fail 1
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 130.795212
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
[
{
"id": "SR08",
"file": "packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs",
"test": "packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs",
"pattern": "separate host joins durable first ownership",
"check": "cross-process exclusive first owner",
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"seconds": 5.2106276580598205,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/SR08.tap",
"failing": [
"a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals"
],
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"status": "assertion-killed"
},
{
"id": "KS43",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer",
"check": "same-origin browser write",
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"seconds": 0.16104768705554307,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS43.tap",
"failing": [
"processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer"
],
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"status": "assertion-killed"
},
{
"id": "KS44",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing write fences refuse",
"check": "bounded control payload",
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"seconds": 0.15614235494285822,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS44.tap",
"failing": [
"processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer"
],
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"status": "assertion-killed"
},
{
"id": "KS54",
"file": "packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs",
"test": "packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs",
"pattern": "",
"check": "production tracker injection",
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"seconds": 0.8833191560115665,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS54.tap",
"failing": [
"the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one"
],
"counts": {
"tests": 9,
"pass": 8,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"status": "assertion-killed"
},
{
"id": "V502-status",
"file": "packages/webui/src/processing-http.mjs",
"test": "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs",
"pattern": "processing write fences refuse",
"check": "exact refusal status rejects a wrong 400 that coarse >=400 accepted",
"exit": 1,
"timeout": false,
"seconds": 0.16231847403105348,
"log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-v502/agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/V502-status.tap",
"failing": [
"processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer"
],
"counts": {
"tests": 1,
"pass": 0,
"fail": 1,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0
},
"status": "assertion-killed"
}
]
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
{
"assertion_kills": 5,
"timeout_kills": 0,
"historical_timeout_kills": 0,
"selected": 5,
"run_id": "1792645245774744257",
"candidate": {
"head": "0fa7bf421fc153a226b5f06ed484e089e48e23ba",
"manifest": "968d6ee345766da838df68f491b5a77c9a25157034dc49e9d4a9b603e4ce7812"
}
}
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
9dbbf20dc65be5306b1a4fb1259bfcf179bc748390f5b206ca42012f9c8ca078 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/BUILD.md
8a5e6ea781f413f838aa9f0f3b49364202600aac4d095c9a22b52e959d68de66 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/RESULTS.md
501bbda0c8c33f37857856345322a020af0f77e91d86860f1ac0d0244f708cd5 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/all-mutants.json
011d0877029723282896967d6fcd0c6f6c1eff532e5a841b43eda16189395e8f agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/base-drift-ce6a.json
d0c009ec9f9cad210038db986fc135c7aa358ab96a1c61c78dce4543333bc737 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/base.txt
d66e23404156a941f0d4f8d97a83c3de8ba2a243bedccf511462053254542ec9 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/build.patch
968d6ee345766da838df68f491b5a77c9a25157034dc49e9d4a9b603e4ce7812 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/candidate-manifest.sha256
62ebb87cb798e5c96fed4354399a5252861bf57621fd8bc21d552adfe3a28ab4 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/candidate.txt
ebaa1dd2a828fd591a625f1e9bfa7b853c3a1e886bd538fe2de4c26d4beab044 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/changed-paths.txt
edd003aa45d2b541012de68a8e7869c47c388e8270bc06adca804bf645c3ff86 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/commit.txt
37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/cwd-sweep.json
0e5426a7de4dc633a11c15ca9a22812c5ccb7300e1bf02a806c0556b866c7f79 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/focused-results.json
7a0d496a5b7babf07e04e31991b804759510b40d58f9573b0b78c5e91e4b3b18 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/gate-plan.json
0b91b9016d0da6dc94b496447c4624bac9eefa486d3eba9ea4e733987d13f753 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/bus-tasks-whole.log
4245c5f91bfa421c5f697841a93a679afc1d901762c72409830460efa4d6116b agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/processing-http-whole.log
d52cbb1058abf83e3acb402d1c2b8ee089749613d6075f5d973dd66c8ef09200 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/python-regressions.log
bbc1528eeeb64ce52b2532db1e0e798eded967fd66c805a030d35ef34d605ca9 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/replays.log
a626407facf1102b512cc38f00f6e7d889aa6280a5c03d1722ac6d1c4eb08dc5 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/runner-green.log
23ffbda3d00898ea85570996abad994c521b9500698b36bd8481622f5943e161 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/runner-red.log
7c52ba2561dd20f8bdc272647ac6a6cb6358a3005d0cf66ef38914e7d98a173d agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/logs/stop-run-whole.log
5e0bde2f8340fa3ae0660f08ac1eab29aae0f84856d72df6784b76e0c61110c4 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS43.tap
4d57c485599655d5f5c4b3e6d42f24d5dfd32553af3d4993a0b287d939b4be90 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS44.tap
5d91c5a8380f7d4f8a9bb8677561bc6edf0c9444eb780e502d5b1dc1fa9f1bcc agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/KS54.tap
f195652fa91e8b07c46128ac809b8ec458632f00bced4f64bf8846761ea91ba1 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/SR08.tap
ac40be01b48349b3b3545a92a16576951e1481513bea4aeb5526e66ca6ecbe6e agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/mutant-logs/V502-status.tap
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fe0d360f86d86ab2df967da5338479c593c27c88d06eb38a1389d99a08489369 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.baseline.py
c5bdc764d1cfe11752db2df412c96baa4f366236777df1755bb337e9a943ddea agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
708397d67087d30bbfacdd27d0dfd81055aa47d841cbcbc8281bc4bb98632f21 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/runner-change.diff
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041a6eed7c60eb2f6900974718ed8db85efb0178afe71ca5ce828f0e89588b96 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/scan-summary.json
37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/skips.json
475ab651a60bc4721ba8bb193b3f05ff67d25afc068e80382174b98828ad085d agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
9532b4498e2aa1ad91b37aa032a8305c338b6b9953728e2d88b5ae0071647097 agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tmpdir.txt
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
3b04790e28a2390a9b3c9cfad71ab63acc35e0ce
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# V502 rerun on 980cec88c
Sage-2609 authorized the clean picks; Dewey-0834 carries approval subject
to this new-base rerun. Source 407c8d7be, packet 04a86cf33; both patch-ids
match 8e3c6a79b and 9bf4683c6. No conflicts; stop-run auto-merged with row
279's landed overshoot regression. Original packet and inventory remain
historical, unchanged; this subpacket records current-base hashes/results.
Sage-2616 CLEAR supersedes sage-2614's wait. Run the three whole touched
Node files and Python check only, sequentially. No suites, mutants, Docker,
browser or live action. scripts/mosaic-task.mjs does not change, so the
DEFERRED N7 runs-suite trigger does not apply. A red stops without retry.
Short scratch TMPDIR, process-group timeout, pipefail and tee; final source
hash check and cwd sweep precede the slot return.
## Rerun result
2026-10-22T11:27:32Z–11:27:34Z on 04a86cf33: whole stop-run 13/13,
whole processing HTTP 6/6, whole bus tasks 9/9; Node total 28/28. Python
regressions 4/4. No skips, cancelled tests or timeouts. Commands used
pipefail and tee with a 120-second owned process-group deadline. All five
candidate hashes match before/after and cwd node/chromium sweep is empty.
The original five assertion-killed mutant results carry because both
approved patch-ids match; no mutant rerun or suite was taken in this CLEAR.
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
980cec88c276f3af6636c140c531d0e6008a0a20
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
c5bdc764d1cfe11752db2df412c96baa4f366236777df1755bb337e9a943ddea agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/run-mutants.py
475ab651a60bc4721ba8bb193b3f05ff67d25afc068e80382174b98828ad085d agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py
a17ef09d68a13181fb0d27fde9006bd14ecf340270e07d7c79f6b37025f773c8 packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs
a26e5c15daff43b946aed8235158eb4037a21eaa67e8241f74a75b42b456fc62 packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
28caf153da5d16949c5a3e1cedf8c91613e7230840d9df65d5dc4bdc95e72bf5 packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
04a86cf338930ffb4ef528fc4b81a5b7a2ebd237
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
[]
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
ok 1 - recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart
---
duration_ms: 22.535421
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
ok 2 - read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely
---
duration_ms: 10.077554
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a bad entry refuses the whole record
ok 3 - a bad entry refuses the whole record
---
duration_ms: 11.903011
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: taskView reads the projection for one business
ok 4 - taskView reads the projection for one business
---
duration_ms: 12.856767
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
ok 5 - requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals
---
duration_ms: 21.237027
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
ok 6 - the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous
---
duration_ms: 295.239472
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
ok 7 - without an adapter the server refuses every task verb
---
duration_ms: 39.741274
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
ok 8 - the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one
---
duration_ms: 48.57706
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
ok 9 - the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers
---
duration_ms: 229.152599
type: 'test'
...
1..9
# tests 9
# suites 0
# pass 9
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 793.825413
V502_STEP_META {"command": ["node", "--test", "--test-reporter=tap", "packages/bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs"], "start": "2026-10-22T11:27:33Z", "end": "2026-10-22T11:27:34Z", "exit": 0, "timeout": false}
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: read-only Console can read processing state but neither human control writes without --send
ok 1 - read-only Console can read processing state but neither human control writes without --send
---
duration_ms: 18.400047
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: Console halt and generation-bound resume use only the management writer and keep partial stops honest
ok 2 - Console halt and generation-bound resume use only the management writer and keep partial stops honest
---
duration_ms: 3.897097
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
ok 3 - processing write fences refuse cross-site, wrong origin, unnamed host, duplicate identity and bad payload before writer
---
duration_ms: 5.981101
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: tester cannot invoke either control writer and failures never echo backend text
ok 4 - tester cannot invoke either control writer and failures never echo backend text
---
duration_ms: 3.994511
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing writes use the existing SSO signer and still require --send and same-origin
ok 5 - processing writes use the existing SSO signer and still require --send and same-origin
---
duration_ms: 4.204597
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
ok 6 - processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer
---
duration_ms: 0.562412
type: 'test'
...
1..6
# tests 6
# suites 0
# pass 6
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 140.239653
V502_STEP_META {"command": ["node", "--test", "--test-reporter=tap", "packages/webui/tests/processing.test.mjs"], "start": "2026-10-22T11:27:33Z", "end": "2026-10-22T11:27:33Z", "exit": 0, "timeout": false}
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
....
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ran 4 tests in 0.011s
OK
V502_STEP_META {"command": ["python3", "agents/rocko/work/vikunja-502/tests/test_timeout_cause.py"], "start": "2026-10-22T11:27:34Z", "end": "2026-10-22T11:27:34Z", "exit": 0, "timeout": false}
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
TAP version 13
# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
ok 1 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
---
duration_ms: 33.307311
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
ok 2 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
---
duration_ms: 23.800235
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
ok 3 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
---
duration_ms: 13.579582
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
ok 4 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
---
duration_ms: 28.626285
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
ok 5 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
---
duration_ms: 25.884332
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
ok 6 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
---
duration_ms: 8.820752
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
ok 7 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
---
duration_ms: 25.62055
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
ok 8 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
---
duration_ms: 102.133976
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
ok 9 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
---
duration_ms: 23.157638
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
ok 10 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
---
duration_ms: 57.055196
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
ok 11 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
---
duration_ms: 42.230422
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
ok 12 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
---
duration_ms: 7.372218
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
ok 13 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
---
duration_ms: 6.951622
type: 'test'
...
1..13
# tests 13
# suites 0
# pass 13
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 445.400398
V502_STEP_META {"command": ["node", "--test", "--test-reporter=tap", "packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs"], "start": "2026-10-22T11:27:32Z", "end": "2026-10-22T11:27:33Z", "exit": 0, "timeout": false}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
0a8e6bc20b2ba835adef447093a653f2dff364c6ad040229d866660a63ba2a71 BUILD.md
ecec3a1a2e175702e6ed6370550e0d5c8efdbce87c0d9b4d7851301d33877f39 base.txt
5758d699f04ecc81f7fed2a1f14af035130cceb6f99847cd954d89b111802257 candidate-manifest.sha256
cd0fe73242c88babb31499654bc104d5b75c47fed37b8d0cf84979c7232af8d5 candidate.txt
37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570 cwd-sweep.json
dea8596ba0cde895238a9d8dce11d43e02604592a7e810e96e0e609f0eb97050 logs/bus-tasks-whole.log
bdfe555de3365f1067fd53839ae488177d23b0f1f1950688e7b0ded89df7e6ea logs/processing-http-whole.log
33ffbf98d5c5e910d1605868b4beeb6955d764ee092879a3cf3ea846641cbc63 logs/python-regressions.log
1b6f920baa4aa071f51b8820efb465dc6d514bf3d6b95f192b48020f235e0e74 logs/stop-run-whole.log
043f3cd860db3c9c6e5249ea33eb6fa2d8538365382d68ce2e4b2be780922ce8 range-diff.txt
c90b6a02dfaa0cb64e6fab5be9f655f030222770ed694e2042854566bca28d65 restored-hashes.json
07d020c6a1410acf45961589c37f6bfff1f7d5df5c7b273e11d856bfa37e84dc results.json
76c5c03767ca34bc38a7f69c14fbf1c06e8ebcc93120bc577a44e2271f6fdb16 scan-result.json
061e5c8904f40545d3552c1caa08ee961545b23d559b01ba4e95f4e7fac202e2 tmpdir.txt
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
1: 8e3c6a79b = 1: 407c8d7be test: harden processing failure diagnostics and cleanup
2: 9bf4683c6 = 2: 04a86cf33 docs: record Vikunja 502 focused verification and rebase evidence
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"paths": 5, "drift": []}

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