docs(#827 ): record probe-3 bounded-repair v12 review

fix(#827 ): bind Probe-3 generation marker to launcher DI
docs(#827 ): record probe-3 bounded-repair v11 review
2026-07-19 14:08:50 -05:00 · 2026-07-19 14:03:52 -05:00 · 2026-07-19 13:23:02 -05:00 · 2026-07-19 13:15:53 -05:00 · 2026-07-18 19:24:54 -05:00 · 2026-07-18 19:21:48 -05:00
374 changed files with 5884 additions and 52558 deletions
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ coverage
 .env.local
 *.tsbuildinfo
 .pnpm-store
-__pycache__/
 docs/reports/

 # Step-CA dev password — real file is gitignored; commit only the .example
@@ -1 +1 @@
-pnpm preflight && pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check
+pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/
-# HOME resolves to /root in the ci-base image, preserving its warmed-store path.
-# Non-root checkouts use their own HOME. Override without editing this file via
-# NPM_CONFIG_STORE_DIR (pnpm's environment form of the store-dir setting).
-store-dir=${HOME}/.local/share/pnpm/store
+# Pin the pnpm store to the same path the ci-base image warms (Dockerfile.ci),
+# so the pipeline `pnpm install --prefer-offline` consumes the baked store
+# instead of repopulating a fresh one.
+store-dir=/root/.local/share/pnpm/store
@@ -4,15 +4,6 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
 **/node_modules
 **/drizzle
 **/.next
-# Python build/test artifacts — same category as node_modules/dist/.next above.
-# Prettier must never scan generated trees; without these a local venv poisons
-# `pnpm format:check` with thousands of third-party files.
-**/venv
-**/__pycache__
-**/.mypy_cache
-**/.pytest_cache
-**/htmlcov
 .claude/
 docs/tess/TASKS.md
 docs/scratchpads/
-packages/mosaic/src/fleet/testdata/documentation-publication-v1/inline-migration-v1.json
@@ -41,11 +41,6 @@ steps:
      # (Constitution + dispatcher + each RUNTIME.md slice). See DESIGN §7 / R9.
      - bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh --self-test
      - bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh
-      # Test-membership guard (#1017): also first link of test:framework-shell.
-      # Invoked from BOTH surfaces it audits (F2, PR #1018) — the guard is link
-      # [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
-      # with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
-      - bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh

  # Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
  # operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
@@ -103,12 +98,6 @@ steps:
      DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@ci-postgres:5432/mosaic
    commands:
      - *enable_pnpm
-      # openssl (#912) is the wake HMAC signer: the digest H1/H2, beacon B12,
-      # and install I8 legs hard-require it in CI. It is baked into ci-base via
-      # Dockerfile.ci, but ci-base only rebuilds on push-to-main/tag — this
-      # `apk add` guarantees openssl is present on PR pipelines too (and is a
-      # fast no-op once the rebuilt image already ships it).
-      - apk add --no-cache openssl
      # postgresql-client (pg_isready) is baked into ci-base.
      # Wait up to 60s for CI postgres to be ready; fail fast if it never comes up.
      - |
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Build, publish npm packages, and push Docker images
-# Runs on main for stable publishes and on next for integration-line prereleases/images
+# Runs only on main branch push/tag

 variables:
  # Pre-baked CI base (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml): node:24-alpine +
@@ -23,21 +23,9 @@ variables:
          - 'docs/**'
          - '**/*.md'
          - '.woodpecker/**'
-    - event: [push, manual]
-      branch: next
-  - &main_image_build_when
-    - event: tag
-    - event: [push, manual]
-      branch: main
-      path:
-        exclude:
-          - 'packages/mosaic/**'
-          - 'docs/**'
-          - '**/*.md'
-          - '.woodpecker/**'

 when:
-  - branch: [main, next]
+  - branch: [main]
    event: [push, manual, tag]

 steps:
@@ -115,84 +103,6 @@ steps:
    depends_on:
      - build

-  publish-next-npm:
-    image: *node_image
-    # Durable @next integration-line publish. Runs only on next; never writes
-    # the latest dist-tag and never commits the computed prerelease versions.
-    when:
-      - event: [push, manual]
-        branch: next
-    environment:
-      NPM_TOKEN:
-        from_secret: gitea_token
-      CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
-      CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER: ${CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER}
-    commands:
-      - *enable_pnpm
-      - |
-        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" != "next" ]; then
-          echo "[publish-next] FATAL: publish-next-npm may only run on next (got '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH')" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER" ]; then
-          echo "[publish-next] FATAL: CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER is required for prerelease versioning" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "//git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/:_authToken=$NPM_TOKEN" > ~/.npmrc
-        echo "@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/" >> ~/.npmrc
-        DIST_TAGS_JSON="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic dist-tags --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/ --json)"
-        DIST_TAGS_JSON="$DIST_TAGS_JSON" node -e 'const tags = JSON.parse(process.env.DIST_TAGS_JSON || "{}"); if (!tags || typeof tags !== "object" || !Object.hasOwn(tags, "latest")) { throw new Error("Gitea npm registry did not return a usable dist-tags object"); } console.log("[publish-next] registry dist-tags OK: latest=" + tags.latest);'
-        node <<'NODE'
-        const fs = require('node:fs');
-        const path = require('node:path');
-
-        const pipelineNumber = process.env.CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER;
-        const roots = ['apps', 'packages', 'plugins'];
-        const updated = [];
-
-        function walk(dir) {
-          if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return;
-          for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
-            if (entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' || entry.name === '.turbo') continue;
-            const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
-            if (entry.isDirectory()) {
-              const packagePath = path.join(fullPath, 'package.json');
-              if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) updatePackage(packagePath);
-              walk(fullPath);
-            }
-          }
-        }
-
-        function updatePackage(packagePath) {
-          const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
-          if (!manifest.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') || manifest.private) return;
-          const stableMatch = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:[-+].*)?$/.exec(manifest.version);
-          if (!stableMatch) {
-            throw new Error(manifest.name + " has unsupported semver version '" + manifest.version + "'");
-          }
-          const [, major, minor, patch] = stableMatch;
-          const oldVersion = manifest.version;
-          manifest.version = major + '.' + minor + '.' + (Number(patch) + 1) + '-next.' + pipelineNumber;
-          fs.writeFileSync(packagePath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n');
-          updated.push(manifest.name + ' ' + oldVersion + ' -> ' + manifest.version);
-        }
-
-        for (const root of roots) walk(root);
-        if (updated.length === 0) throw new Error('No publishable @mosaicstack/* packages found');
-        console.log('[publish-next] computed prerelease versions for ' + updated.length + ' packages:');
-        for (const line of updated) console.log('[publish-next] ' + line);
-        NODE
-        pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/*" --filter "!@mosaicstack/web" --filter "!@mosaicstack/mosaic-as" publish --no-git-checks --access public --tag next
-        EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p "require('./packages/mosaic/package.json').version")"
-        RESOLVED_VERSION="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/)"
-        if [ "$RESOLVED_VERSION" != "$EXPECTED_VERSION" ]; then
-          echo "[publish-next] FATAL: @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolved '$RESOLVED_VERSION', expected '$EXPECTED_VERSION'" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "[publish-next] @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolves to $RESOLVED_VERSION"
-    depends_on:
-      - build
-
  # TODO: Uncomment when ready to publish to npmjs.org
  # publish-npmjs:
  #   image: *node_image
@@ -224,17 +134,8 @@ steps:
      - echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
      - |
        DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
-        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
-          if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
-            echo "[publish] FATAL: next gateway publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "[publish] next gateway publish is sha-only"
-        elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
+        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
          DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:latest"
-        elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
-          echo "[publish] FATAL: gateway image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
-          exit 1
        fi
        if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
          DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
@@ -245,7 +146,7 @@ steps:

  build-appservice:
    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
-    when: *main_image_build_when
+    when: *image_build_when
    environment:
      REGISTRY_USER:
        from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -271,7 +172,7 @@ steps:

  build-web:
    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
-    when: *main_image_build_when
+    when: *image_build_when
    environment:
      REGISTRY_USER:
        from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -25,10 +25,7 @@ FROM node:24-alpine
 # postgresql-client used by the test step's pg_isready readiness probe. `bash`,
 # `git`, and `jq` are baked here too — framework shell tests and the shipped
 # Codex review wrappers require them without per-run installation in ci.yml.
-# `openssl` (#912) is the non-circular HMAC signer for the wake trust layer:
-# the digest H1/H2, beacon B12, and install I8 legs hard-require it in CI so the
-# §4 G6 evidence comes from an actually-run HMAC leg, not a skipped one.
-RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ postgresql-client bash git jq openssl
+RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ postgresql-client bash git jq

 # Pin pnpm to the repo's packageManager version via corepack.
 RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare [email protected] --activate
@@ -30,16 +30,6 @@ This installs both components:
 | **Framework**           | Bash launcher, guides, runtime configs, tools, skills            | `~/.config/mosaic/`  |
 | **@mosaicstack/mosaic** | Unified `mosaic` CLI — TUI, gateway client, wizard, auto-updater | `~/.npm-global/bin/` |

-### Install lanes
-
-| Lane                     | Command                               | Use when                                              | Source                                                                  |
-| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Stable                   | `bash tools/install.sh`               | You want the released Mosaic CLI/framework            | npm registry `@mosaicstack/mosaic@latest` + framework archive at `main` |
-| Prerelease integration   | `bash tools/install.sh --next`        | You want the current `next` integration branch        | Build-from-source at `next`                                             |
-| Contributor/source build | `bash tools/install.sh --dev --ref X` | You are testing a branch before release; `--ref` wins | Build-from-source at the requested ref                                  |
-
-`--next` is shorthand for the prerelease integration lane: it enables source-build mode and uses `next` unless an explicit `--ref` or `MOSAIC_REF` is provided.
-
 After install, the wizard runs automatically or you can invoke it manually:

 ```bash
@@ -211,21 +201,8 @@ git clone [email protected]:mosaicstack/stack.git
 cd stack

 # Install dependencies. The local tier uses in-process PGlite; leave DATABASE_URL unset.
-# The pnpm store defaults to $HOME/.local/share/pnpm/store. Override it without
-# editing the checkout with NPM_CONFIG_STORE_DIR=$HOME/another-store if needed.
 pnpm install

-# Verify dependencies and generated state before running source-quality gates.
-# Missing dependencies exit 42; stale/foreign apps/web/.next state exits 43.
-# The web build certifies its exact standalone symlink manifest; added, removed,
-# retargeted, or manifest-only-tampered generated links also exit 43. This detects
-# accidental, independent, stale, and foreign-residue mutation—the class exposed by
-# a five-month-stale .next that produced 19 phantom TS2307 errors.
-# It does NOT defend against a same-UID actor that can rewrite both manifest and
-# marker consistently (CWE-345). RM-59 tracks the required executor/spine-side
-# trust anchor outside worktree authority.
-pnpm preflight
-
 # Optional local queue service only. This does not start PostgreSQL.
 docker compose up -d valkey

@@ -253,7 +230,6 @@ Gateway start command until KBN-101-02 makes that state fail closed.
 ### Quality Gates

 ```bash
-pnpm preflight               # Checkout/dependency/generated-state validation
 pnpm typecheck               # TypeScript type checking (all packages)
 pnpm lint                    # ESLint (all packages)
 pnpm test                    # Vitest (all packages)
@@ -371,9 +347,7 @@ The CLI also performs a background update check on every invocation (cached for
 bash tools/install.sh --check           # Version check only
 bash tools/install.sh --framework       # Framework only (skip npm CLI)
 bash tools/install.sh --cli             # npm CLI only (skip framework)
-bash tools/install.sh --next            # Prerelease lane: source build from next
-bash tools/install.sh --dev             # Contributor lane: source build at --ref/main
-bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0        # Install from a specific git ref (--ref wins over --next)
+bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0        # Install from a specific git ref
 bash tools/install.sh --yes             # Non-interactive, accept all defaults
 bash tools/install.sh --no-auto-launch  # Skip auto-launch of wizard
 ```
@@ -1,519 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation M3 single-gateway integration tests (FED-M3-10).
- *
- * Covers MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance:
- *  - #6: malformed certificate OIDs fail with 401; valid cert + revoked grant fails with 403.
- *  - #7: max_rows_per_query caps list results.
- *
- * Strategy:
- *  - Real PostgreSQL via @mosaicstack/db.
- *  - Mocked TLS context/Fastify request shim for FederationAuthGuard.
- *  - Direct controller calls using the real POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource contract.
- *
- * Run:
- *   FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- \
- *     src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts
- */
-
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
-import type { ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
-import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import {
-  and,
-  createDb,
-  eq,
-  federationGrants,
-  federationPeers,
-  inArray,
-  missionTasks,
-  missions,
-  projects,
-  tasks,
-  teamMembers,
-  teams,
-  type Db,
-  type DbHandle,
-  users,
-} from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
-import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation/server/federation-auth.guard.js';
-import { FederationScopeService } from '../../federation/server/scope.service.js';
-import { FederationListQueryService } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
-import { ListController } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list.controller.js';
-import {
-  makeMosaicIssuedCert,
-  makeSelfSignedCert,
-} from '../../federation/__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
-
-const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
-const PG_URL = process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
-const RUN_ID = `fed-m3-10-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
-const CERT_SERIAL_HEX = crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '').toUpperCase();
-
-interface TestIds {
-  readonly subjectUserId: string;
-  readonly otherUserId: string;
-  readonly peerId: string;
-  readonly revokedPeerId: string;
-  readonly activeGrantId: string;
-  readonly revokedGrantId: string;
-  readonly subjectProjectId: string;
-  readonly subjectMissionId: string;
-  readonly otherProjectId: string;
-  readonly teamId: string;
-  readonly unauthorizedTeamId: string;
-  readonly teamProjectId: string;
-  readonly taskIds: readonly string[];
-  readonly excludedTaskIds: readonly string[];
-  readonly subjectNoteId: string;
-  readonly otherUserNoteId: string;
-}
-
-function pemToDer(pem: string): Buffer {
-  return Buffer.from(
-    pem
-      .replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
-      .replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
-      .replace(/\s+/g, ''),
-    'base64',
-  );
-}
-
-function makeFederationRequest(certPem: string): FastifyRequest {
-  return {
-    raw: {
-      socket: {
-        getPeerCertificate: () => ({
-          raw: pemToDer(certPem),
-          serialNumber: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
-        }),
-      },
-    },
-  } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
-}
-
-function makeGuardContext(request: FastifyRequest): {
-  readonly context: ExecutionContext;
-  readonly sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown };
-} {
-  const sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown } = {};
-  const reply = {
-    status: (statusCode: number) => {
-      sent.statusCode = statusCode;
-      return {
-        header: () => ({
-          send: (payload: unknown) => {
-            sent.payload = payload;
-          },
-        }),
-      };
-    },
-  } as unknown as FastifyReply;
-
-  const context = {
-    switchToHttp: () => ({
-      getRequest: () => request,
-      getResponse: () => reply,
-    }),
-  } as unknown as ExecutionContext;
-
-  return { context, sent };
-}
-
-async function insertUser(db: Db, id: string, label: string): Promise<void> {
-  await db.insert(users).values({
-    id,
-    name: `${RUN_ID}-${label}`,
-    email: `${RUN_ID}-${label}@federation-test.invalid`,
-    emailVerified: false,
-  });
-}
-
-async function seedFixtures(db: Db): Promise<TestIds> {
-  const subjectUserId = `${RUN_ID}-subject`;
-  const otherUserId = `${RUN_ID}-other`;
-  const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const revokedPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const activeGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const revokedGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const subjectProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const subjectMissionId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const otherProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const teamId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const unauthorizedTeamId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const teamProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const taskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
-  const excludedTaskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
-  const subjectNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
-  const otherUserNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
-
-  await insertUser(db, subjectUserId, 'subject');
-  await insertUser(db, otherUserId, 'other');
-
-  await db.insert(teams).values([
-    {
-      id: teamId,
-      name: `${RUN_ID} allowed team`,
-      slug: `${RUN_ID}-allowed-team`,
-      ownerId: subjectUserId,
-      managerId: subjectUserId,
-    },
-    {
-      id: unauthorizedTeamId,
-      name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team`,
-      slug: `${RUN_ID}-unauthorized-team`,
-      ownerId: otherUserId,
-      managerId: otherUserId,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(teamMembers).values([
-    { teamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
-    { teamId: unauthorizedTeamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(projects).values([
-    {
-      id: subjectProjectId,
-      name: `${RUN_ID} subject personal project`,
-      ownerType: 'user',
-      ownerId: subjectUserId,
-    },
-    {
-      id: otherProjectId,
-      name: `${RUN_ID} other personal project`,
-      ownerType: 'user',
-      ownerId: otherUserId,
-    },
-    {
-      id: teamProjectId,
-      name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team project`,
-      ownerType: 'team',
-      teamId: unauthorizedTeamId,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(missions).values({
-    id: subjectMissionId,
-    name: `${RUN_ID} subject mission`,
-    projectId: subjectProjectId,
-    userId: subjectUserId,
-  });
-
-  await db.insert(tasks).values([
-    {
-      id: taskIds[0],
-      title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 1`,
-      missionId: subjectMissionId,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: taskIds[1],
-      title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 2`,
-      projectId: subjectProjectId,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: taskIds[2],
-      title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 3`,
-      projectId: subjectProjectId,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: excludedTaskIds[0],
-      title: `${RUN_ID} other user task`,
-      projectId: otherProjectId,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: excludedTaskIds[1],
-      title: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team task`,
-      projectId: teamProjectId,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(missionTasks).values([
-    {
-      id: subjectNoteId,
-      missionId: subjectMissionId,
-      userId: subjectUserId,
-      notes: `${RUN_ID} subject visible note`,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: otherUserNoteId,
-      missionId: subjectMissionId,
-      userId: otherUserId,
-      notes: `${RUN_ID} other user note on subject mission`,
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(federationPeers).values([
-    {
-      id: peerId,
-      commonName: `${RUN_ID}-active-peer`,
-      displayName: `${RUN_ID} Active Peer`,
-      certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
-      certSerial: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
-      certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
-      state: 'active',
-    },
-    {
-      id: revokedPeerId,
-      commonName: `${RUN_ID}-revoked-peer`,
-      displayName: `${RUN_ID} Revoked Peer`,
-      certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
-      certSerial: `${CERT_SERIAL_HEX}${RUN_ID.replace(/-/g, '').slice(0, 8).toUpperCase()}`,
-      certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
-      state: 'active',
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await db.insert(federationGrants).values([
-    {
-      id: activeGrantId,
-      peerId,
-      subjectUserId,
-      status: 'active',
-      scope: {
-        resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
-        excluded_resources: [],
-        filters: {
-          tasks: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
-          notes: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
-        },
-        max_rows_per_query: 2,
-      },
-    },
-    {
-      id: revokedGrantId,
-      peerId,
-      subjectUserId,
-      status: 'revoked',
-      revokedAt: new Date(),
-      revokedReason: `${RUN_ID} revoked grant fixture`,
-      scope: {
-        resources: ['tasks'],
-        excluded_resources: [],
-        max_rows_per_query: 2,
-      },
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  return {
-    subjectUserId,
-    otherUserId,
-    peerId,
-    revokedPeerId,
-    activeGrantId,
-    revokedGrantId,
-    subjectProjectId,
-    subjectMissionId,
-    otherProjectId,
-    teamId,
-    unauthorizedTeamId,
-    teamProjectId,
-    taskIds,
-    excludedTaskIds,
-    subjectNoteId,
-    otherUserNoteId,
-  };
-}
-
-async function cleanupFixtures(db: Db, ids: TestIds | undefined): Promise<void> {
-  if (!ids) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  await db
-    .delete(missionTasks)
-    .where(inArray(missionTasks.id, [ids.subjectNoteId, ids.otherUserNoteId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(tasks)
-    .where(inArray(tasks.id, [...ids.taskIds, ...ids.excludedTaskIds]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(missions)
-    .where(eq(missions.id, ids.subjectMissionId))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(projects)
-    .where(inArray(projects.id, [ids.subjectProjectId, ids.otherProjectId, ids.teamProjectId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(teamMembers)
-    .where(
-      and(
-        eq(teamMembers.userId, ids.subjectUserId),
-        inArray(teamMembers.teamId, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]),
-      ),
-    )
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(teams)
-    .where(inArray(teams.id, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(federationGrants)
-    .where(inArray(federationGrants.id, [ids.activeGrantId, ids.revokedGrantId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(federationPeers)
-    .where(inArray(federationPeers.id, [ids.peerId, ids.revokedPeerId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-  await db
-    .delete(users)
-    .where(inArray(users.id, [ids.subjectUserId, ids.otherUserId]))
-    .catch(() => {});
-}
-
-describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M3 list verb — single-gateway integration', () => {
-  let handle: DbHandle;
-  let db: Db;
-  let moduleRef: TestingModule;
-  let guard: FederationAuthGuard;
-  let listController: ListController;
-  let ids: TestIds | undefined;
-
-  beforeAll(async () => {
-    handle = createDb(PG_URL);
-    db = handle.db;
-    ids = await seedFixtures(db);
-
-    moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
-      controllers: [ListController],
-      providers: [
-        { provide: DB, useValue: db },
-        GrantsService,
-        FederationAuthGuard,
-        FederationScopeService,
-        FederationListQueryService,
-      ],
-    }).compile();
-
-    guard = moduleRef.get(FederationAuthGuard);
-    listController = moduleRef.get(ListController);
-  }, 30_000);
-
-  afterAll(async () => {
-    await moduleRef?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
-    await cleanupFixtures(db, ids).catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
-    await handle?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
-  });
-
-  it('#6 — rejects a client cert with malformed/missing Mosaic OIDs with 401', async () => {
-    const malformedOidCert = await makeSelfSignedCert();
-    const request = makeFederationRequest(malformedOidCert);
-    const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
-
-    await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
-    expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(401);
-    expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
-      error: {
-        code: 'unauthorized',
-        message: expect.stringContaining('missing required OID'),
-      },
-    });
-    expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-
-  it('#6 — rejects a valid client cert when its grant is revoked with 403', async () => {
-    expect(ids).toBeDefined();
-    const revokedCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
-      grantId: ids!.revokedGrantId,
-      subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
-    });
-    const request = makeFederationRequest(revokedCert);
-    const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
-
-    await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
-    expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(403);
-    expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
-      error: {
-        code: 'forbidden',
-        message: 'Federation access denied',
-      },
-    });
-    expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-
-  it('#7 — enforces max_rows_per_query on POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource', async () => {
-    expect(ids).toBeDefined();
-    const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
-      grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
-      subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
-    });
-    const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
-    const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
-
-    await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
-
-    const response = await listController.list('tasks', request, { limit: 100 });
-    const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-
-    expect(response.items).toHaveLength(2);
-    expect(response._truncated).toBe(true);
-    expect(response.nextCursor).toEqual(expect.any(String));
-    expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.taskIds[0], ids!.taskIds[1]]);
-    expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.taskIds[2]);
-    for (const excludedId of ids!.excludedTaskIds) {
-      expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(excludedId);
-    }
-    expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('excludes another user mission task notes on the same authorized mission', async () => {
-    expect(ids).toBeDefined();
-    const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
-      grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
-      subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
-    });
-    const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
-    const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
-
-    await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
-
-    const response = await listController.list('notes', request, { limit: 10 });
-    const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-
-    expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.subjectNoteId]);
-    expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.otherUserNoteId);
-    expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed for unsupported list resources', async () => {
-    expect(ids).toBeDefined();
-    const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
-      grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
-      subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
-    });
-    const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
-    const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
-
-    await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
-
-    await expect(listController.list('widgets', request, {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'scope_violation',
-          message: 'Requested federation resource is not supported',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 403,
-    });
-  });
-});
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
-import { Controller, Get, Inject, Optional, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Controller, Get, Inject, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { sql, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
 import { createQueue } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
 import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
 import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
 import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
-import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
 import { AdminGuard } from './admin.guard.js';
 import type { HealthStatusDto, ServiceStatusDto } from './admin.dto.js';

@@ -16,9 +14,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
    @Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
    @Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
    @Inject(ProviderService) private readonly providerService: ProviderService,
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
-    private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
  ) {}

  @Get()
@@ -60,14 +55,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
  }

  private async checkCache(): Promise<ServiceStatusDto> {
-    // On Local tier there is no Redis. The cache is intentionally absent, which
-    // is a healthy state for this tier — report 'ok' rather than opening a new
-    // ioredis connection on every admin health check (which would spam
-    // ECONNREFUSED and create/destroy a connection per request). latencyMs 0
-    // signals "no cache backend to measure" for this tier.
-    if (this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local') {
-      return { status: 'ok', latencyMs: 0 };
-    }
    const start = Date.now();
    const handle = createQueue();
    try {
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ const mockChatGateway = {
  broadcastSessionInfo: vi.fn(),
 };

-function buildService(redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis): CommandExecutorService {
+function buildService(): CommandExecutorService {
  return new CommandExecutorService(
    mockRegistry as never,
    mockAgentService as never,
    mockSystemOverride as never,
    mockSessionGC as never,
-    redis as never,
+    mockRedis as never,
    mockBrain as never,
    null,
    mockChatGateway as never,
@@ -131,22 +131,6 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
    expect(ttl).toBe(300);
  });

-  it('/provider login remains available without Redis on the local tier', async () => {
-    const localService = buildService(null);
-    const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
-      command: 'provider',
-      args: 'login anthropic',
-      conversationId,
-    };
-
-    const result = await localService.execute(payload, userScope);
-
-    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
-    expect(result.message).not.toContain('token=');
-    expect(result.data).toEqual({ provider: 'anthropic' });
-    expect(mockRedis.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
  // /provider with no args — returns usage
  it('/provider with no args returns usage message', async () => {
    const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', conversationId };
@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
    @Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
    @Inject(SystemOverrideService) private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
    @Inject(SessionGCService) private readonly sessionGC: SessionGCService,
-    // On Local tier COMMANDS_REDIS is null — provider login caching is skipped.
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
-    private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
+    @Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
    @Inject(BRAIN) private readonly brain: Brain,
    @Optional()
    @Inject(forwardRef(() => ReloadService))
@@ -446,16 +443,14 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
          byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),
        ).join('');
        const key = `mosaic:auth:poll:${tokenHash}`;
-        if (this.redis) {
-          // Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
-          // the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
-          await this.redis.set(
-            key,
-            JSON.stringify({ status: 'pending', provider: providerName, userId }),
-            'EX',
-            300,
-          );
-        }
+        // Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
+        // the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
+        await this.redis.set(
+          key,
+          JSON.stringify({ status: 'pending', provider: providerName, userId }),
+          'EX',
+          300,
+        );
        return {
          command: 'provider',
          success: true,
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
-import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
 import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
 import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
 import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
@@ -18,17 +16,13 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
  providers: [
    {
      provide: COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE,
-      useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
-        // On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection.
-        // CommandExecutorService falls back to no-cache for /provider login on local.
-        if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
+      useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
        return createQueue();
      },
-      inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
    },
    {
      provide: COMMANDS_REDIS,
-      useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
+      useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
      inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
    },
    CommandRegistryService,
@@ -44,13 +38,9 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
  ],
 })
 export class CommandsModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
-  constructor(
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE)
-    private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
-  ) {}
+  constructor(@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}

  async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
-    await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
+    await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
  }
 }
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
 import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
 import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
-import { GetController } from './server/verbs/get.controller.js';
-import { FederationGetQueryService } from './server/verbs/get-query.service.js';
 import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
 import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
 import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
@@ -14,13 +12,7 @@ import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
 import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';

@Module({
-  controllers: [
-    EnrollmentController,
-    FederationController,
-    CapabilitiesController,
-    ListController,
-    GetController,
-  ],
+  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
  providers: [
    AdminGuard,
    CaService,
@@ -31,7 +23,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
    FederationAuthGuard,
    FederationScopeService,
    FederationListQueryService,
-    FederationGetQueryService,
  ],
  exports: [
    CaService,
@@ -42,7 +33,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
    FederationAuthGuard,
    FederationScopeService,
    FederationListQueryService,
-    FederationGetQueryService,
  ],
 })
 export class FederationModule {}
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
-import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import {
-  createPgliteDb,
-  missionTasks,
-  missions,
-  projects,
-  runPgliteMigrations,
-  teams,
-  users,
-  type Db,
-  type DbHandle,
-} from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
-import { FederationGetQueryService } from '../get-query.service.js';
-
-const CREDENTIAL_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-  resource: 'credentials',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  includePersonal: true,
-  teamIds: [],
-  limit: 1,
-  maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
-};
-
-const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-subject';
-const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-other';
-const TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
-const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
-const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
-const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
-const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
-const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
-const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
-const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
-const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
-
-let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
-
-function makeService() {
-  return new FederationGetQueryService({} as Db);
-}
-
-function makeDbService() {
-  if (!dbHandle) {
-    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
-  }
-  return new FederationGetQueryService(dbHandle.db);
-}
-
-async function seedNotesFixture() {
-  if (!dbHandle) {
-    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
-  }
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      name: 'Federation Subject',
-      email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
-      emailVerified: false,
-    },
-    {
-      id: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      name: 'Federation Other',
-      email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
-      emailVerified: false,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
-    {
-      id: TEAM_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Team',
-      slug: 'fed-m3-06-team',
-      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Team',
-      slug: 'fed-m3-06-unauthorized-team',
-      ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
-    {
-      id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Project',
-      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      ownerType: 'user',
-    },
-    {
-      id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Project',
-      teamId: TEAM_ID,
-      ownerType: 'team',
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Project',
-      teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
-      ownerType: 'team',
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
-    {
-      id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Mission',
-      projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Mission',
-      projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Mission',
-      projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note on team mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'other user note on team mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-  ]);
-}
-
-describe('FederationGetQueryService', () => {
-  beforeAll(async () => {
-    dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-06-get-${Date.now()}`);
-    await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
-    await seedNotesFixture();
-  });
-
-  afterAll(async () => {
-    await dbHandle?.close();
-    dbHandle = undefined;
-  });
-
-  it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 get reads', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.evaluateReadAccess({
-        grantId: 'grant-1',
-        peerId: 'peer-1',
-        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-        resource: 'credentials',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      reason: 'credentials federation get access is not implemented in M3',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.evaluateReadAccess({
-        grantId: 'grant-1',
-        peerId: 'peer-1',
-        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-        resource: 'memory',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('uses subject team membership as the native RBAC upper bound for task and note reads', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    const listSubjectTeamIds = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(['team-1', 'team-2']);
-    (
-      service as unknown as {
-        listSubjectTeamIds: (subjectUserId: string) => Promise<string[]>;
-      }
-    ).listSubjectTeamIds = listSubjectTeamIds;
-
-    await expect(
-      service.evaluateReadAccess({
-        grantId: 'grant-1',
-        peerId: 'peer-1',
-        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-        resource: 'tasks',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
-    });
-    expect(listSubjectTeamIds).toHaveBeenCalledWith('user-1');
-  });
-
-  it('does not query storage for sensitive get resources even if scope allowed them', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(service.get({ filter: CREDENTIAL_FILTER, id: 'cred-1' })).resolves.toEqual({
-      status: 'denied',
-      reason: 'credentials federation get is not implemented',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed for unsupported resources instead of returning undefined', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.get({
-        filter: {
-          ...CREDENTIAL_FILTER,
-          resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
-        },
-        id: 'row-1',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      status: 'denied',
-      reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not leak another user mission task note through team-scoped get reads', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.get({
-        filter: {
-          resource: 'notes',
-          subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-          includePersonal: false,
-          teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-          limit: 1,
-          maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-        },
-        id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      status: 'denied',
-      reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.get({
-        filter: {
-          resource: 'notes',
-          subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-          includePersonal: true,
-          teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-          limit: 1,
-          maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-        },
-        id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      status: 'denied',
-      reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns a subject note only when subject ownership and authorized mission intersect', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.get({
-        filter: {
-          resource: 'notes',
-          subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-          includePersonal: false,
-          teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-          limit: 1,
-          maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-        },
-        id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toMatchObject({
-      status: 'found',
-      item: {
-        id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-        missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-        content: 'subject note on team mission',
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not return subject personal notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.get({
-        filter: {
-          resource: 'notes',
-          subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-          includePersonal: false,
-          teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-          limit: 1,
-          maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-        },
-        id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      status: 'denied',
-      reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
-    });
-  });
-});
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import type {
-  FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
-  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-} from '../../scope.service.js';
-import { GetController } from '../get.controller.js';
-import type { FederationGetQueryResult } from '../get-query.service.js';
-
-const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
-  grantId: 'grant-1',
-  peerId: 'peer-1',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
-};
-
-const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-  resource: 'tasks',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  includePersonal: true,
-  teamIds: ['team-1'],
-  limit: 1,
-  maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
-};
-
-function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
-  return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
-}
-
-function allowedScope(
-  filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
-): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
-  return { allowed: true, filter };
-}
-
-function makeController(opts?: {
-  scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
-  queryResult?: FederationGetQueryResult;
-}) {
-  const scope = {
-    evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
-  };
-  const query = {
-    evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
-    get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
-      opts?.queryResult ?? {
-        status: 'found',
-        item: {
-          id: 'task-1',
-          title: 'Federated task',
-          createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
-        },
-      },
-    ),
-  };
-
-  return {
-    controller: new GetController(scope as never, query as never),
-    scope,
-    query,
-  };
-}
-
-describe('GetController', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    vi.clearAllMocks();
-  });
-
-  it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/get');
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(':resource/:id');
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', GetController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
-  });
-
-  it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns one local-source tagged row', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    const response = await controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', makeRequest());
-
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-      context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      requestedLimit: 1,
-      nativeRbac: query,
-    });
-    expect(query.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, id: 'task-1' });
-    expect(response).toEqual({
-      item: {
-        id: 'task-1',
-        title: 'Federated task',
-        createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
-        _source: 'local',
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    await expect(
-      controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest),
-    ).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'unauthorized',
-          message: 'Federation context missing',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 401,
-    });
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
-    const { controller, query } = makeController({
-      scopeResult: {
-        allowed: false,
-        deny: {
-          code: 'resource_excluded',
-          stage: 'resource_exclusion',
-          statusCode: 403,
-          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
-          grantId: 'grant-1',
-          peerId: 'peer-1',
-          subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-          resource: 'credentials',
-        },
-      },
-    });
-
-    await expect(controller.get('credentials', 'cred-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'scope_violation',
-          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 403,
-    });
-    expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('returns 404 when the scoped query layer cannot find the resource id', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController({ queryResult: { status: 'not_found' } });
-
-    await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'missing-task', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: { error: { code: 'not_found' } },
-      status: 404,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns 403 when the resource exists outside the RBAC/scope intersection', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController({
-      queryResult: { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' },
-    });
-
-    await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'task-2', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'scope_violation',
-          message: 'Task is outside the federated scope',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 403,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed when the query layer denies an unsupported resource', async () => {
-    const unsupportedFilter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-      ...TASK_FILTER,
-      resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
-    };
-    const { controller } = makeController({
-      scopeResult: allowedScope(unsupportedFilter),
-      queryResult: {
-        status: 'denied',
-        reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
-      },
-    });
-
-    await expect(controller.get('unknown-resource', 'row-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'scope_violation',
-          message: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 403,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('rejects empty ids before evaluating scope', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    await expect(controller.get('tasks', '   ', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
-      status: 400,
-    });
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation get query layer (FED-M3-06).
- *
- * Read-only DB adapter used by GetController after FederationAuthGuard and
- * FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
- * native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
- * deferred to M4.
- */
-
-import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
-import {
-  and,
-  eq,
-  inArray,
-  insights,
-  or,
-  missionTasks,
-  missions,
-  preferences,
-  projects,
-  tasks,
-  teamMembers,
-  type Db,
-} from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
-import type {
-  FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
-  FederationNativeRbacRequest,
-  FederationNativeRbacResult,
-  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-} from '../scope.service.js';
-
-export interface FederationGetQueryRequest {
-  readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
-  readonly id: string;
-}
-
-export interface FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
-  readonly status: 'found';
-  readonly item: T;
-}
-
-export interface FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult {
-  readonly status: 'not_found';
-}
-
-export interface FederationGetQueryDeniedResult {
-  readonly status: 'denied';
-  readonly reason: string;
-}
-
-export type FederationGetQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> =
-  | FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T>
-  | FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult
-  | FederationGetQueryDeniedResult;
-
-type RowObject = Record<string, unknown>;
-
-function firstRow<T>(rows: T[]): T | undefined {
-  return rows[0];
-}
-
-function rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(
-  row: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
-  projectIds: readonly string[],
-  missionIds: readonly string[],
-): boolean {
-  return (
-    (typeof row.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.includes(row.projectId)) ||
-    (typeof row.missionId === 'string' && missionIds.includes(row.missionId))
-  );
-}
-
-@Injectable()
-export class FederationGetQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
-  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
-
-  async evaluateReadAccess(
-    request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
-  ): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
-    if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
-      return {
-        allowed: false,
-        reason: `${request.resource} federation get access is not implemented in M3`,
-        details: { resource: request.resource },
-      };
-    }
-
-    if (request.resource === 'memory') {
-      return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
-    }
-
-    const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
-    return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
-  }
-
-  async get<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
-    request: FederationGetQueryRequest,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>> {
-    return this.getByResource(request.filter, request.id) as Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>>;
-  }
-
-  private async getByResource(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    id: string,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
-    switch (filter.resource) {
-      case 'tasks':
-        return this.getTask(filter, id);
-      case 'notes':
-        return this.getNote(filter, id);
-      case 'memory':
-        return this.getMemory(filter, id);
-      case 'credentials':
-      case 'api_keys':
-        return { status: 'denied', reason: `${filter.resource} federation get is not implemented` };
-      default:
-        return {
-          status: 'denied',
-          reason: `Unsupported federation get resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`,
-        };
-    }
-  }
-
-  private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
-      .from(teamMembers)
-      .where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
-  }
-
-  private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
-    const clauses = [];
-    if (filter.includePersonal) {
-      clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
-    }
-    if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
-      // Project team ownership follows TeamsService.canAccessProject: team-owned
-      // rows are authorized through projects.teamId, while ownerId remains the
-      // user who created/bootstrapped the project.
-      clauses.push(
-        and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
-      );
-    }
-
-    if (clauses.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ id: projects.id })
-      .from(projects)
-      .where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
-  }
-
-  private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
-    if (projectIds.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ id: missions.id })
-      .from(missions)
-      .where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
-  }
-
-  private async getTask(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    id: string,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
-    const row = firstRow(
-      await this.db
-        .select({
-          id: tasks.id,
-          title: tasks.title,
-          description: tasks.description,
-          status: tasks.status,
-          priority: tasks.priority,
-          projectId: tasks.projectId,
-          missionId: tasks.missionId,
-          assignee: tasks.assignee,
-          tags: tasks.tags,
-          dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
-          metadata: tasks.metadata,
-          createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
-          updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
-        })
-        .from(tasks)
-        .where(eq(tasks.id, id))
-        .limit(1),
-    );
-
-    if (!row) {
-      return { status: 'not_found' };
-    }
-
-    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
-    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
-    if (!rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(row, projectIds, missionIds)) {
-      return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' };
-    }
-
-    return { status: 'found', item: row as RowObject };
-  }
-
-  private async getNote(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    id: string,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
-    const row = firstRow(
-      await this.db
-        .select({
-          id: missionTasks.id,
-          missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
-          taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
-          userId: missionTasks.userId,
-          status: missionTasks.status,
-          content: missionTasks.notes,
-          createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
-          updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
-        })
-        .from(missionTasks)
-        .where(eq(missionTasks.id, id))
-        .limit(1),
-    );
-
-    if (!row || row.content === null || row.content === '') {
-      return { status: 'not_found' };
-    }
-
-    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
-    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
-
-    // mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
-    // Scope-visible missions must intersect with subject ownership; team scope
-    // narrows mission IDs but never widens note reads to another user's rows.
-    if (row.userId !== filter.subjectUserId || !missionIds.includes(row.missionId)) {
-      return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope' };
-    }
-
-    const item = { ...row } as RowObject;
-    delete item['userId'];
-    return { status: 'found', item };
-  }
-
-  private async getMemory(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    id: string,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
-    const [insightRow, preferenceRow] = await Promise.all([
-      this.db
-        .select({
-          id: insights.id,
-          userId: insights.userId,
-          kind: insights.source,
-          content: insights.content,
-          category: insights.category,
-          relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
-          metadata: insights.metadata,
-          createdAt: insights.createdAt,
-          updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
-        })
-        .from(insights)
-        .where(eq(insights.id, id))
-        .limit(1)
-        .then(firstRow),
-      this.db
-        .select({
-          id: preferences.id,
-          userId: preferences.userId,
-          kind: preferences.category,
-          key: preferences.key,
-          value: preferences.value,
-          source: preferences.source,
-          mutable: preferences.mutable,
-          createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
-          updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
-        })
-        .from(preferences)
-        .where(eq(preferences.id, id))
-        .limit(1)
-        .then(firstRow),
-    ]);
-
-    const candidates = [insightRow, preferenceRow].filter(
-      (row): row is NonNullable<typeof row> => row !== undefined,
-    );
-    if (candidates.length === 0) {
-      return { status: 'not_found' };
-    }
-
-    if (!filter.includePersonal) {
-      return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory personal rows are outside the federated scope' };
-    }
-
-    const accessible = candidates.find((row) => row.userId === filter.subjectUserId);
-    if (!accessible) {
-      return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory row belongs to another subject user' };
-    }
-
-    const item = { ...accessible } as RowObject;
-    delete item['userId'];
-    return { status: 'found', item };
-  }
-}
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation get verb (FED-M3-06).
- *
- * POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id
- *
- * Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
- * FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
- * the read-only query layer fetches one local row and tags it with `_source`.
- * Read audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist
- * request or response bodies.
- */
-
-import { Controller, HttpException, Inject, Param, Post, Req, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import {
-  FederationInvalidRequestError,
-  FederationNotFoundError,
-  FederationScopeViolationError,
-  FederationUnauthorizedError,
-  SOURCE_LOCAL,
-  type FederationGetResponse,
-  type SourceTag,
-} from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import '../federation-context.js';
-import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
-import { FederationGetQueryService } from './get-query.service.js';
-
-type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
-
-function scopeDenyToHttpException(deny: {
-  readonly statusCode: 400 | 403;
-  readonly message: string;
-}): HttpException {
-  const ErrorClass =
-    deny.statusCode === 400 ? FederationInvalidRequestError : FederationScopeViolationError;
-  return new HttpException(new ErrorClass(deny.message, deny).toEnvelope(), deny.statusCode);
-}
-
-@Controller('api/federation/v1/get')
-@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
-export class GetController {
-  constructor(
-    @Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
-    @Inject(FederationGetQueryService) private readonly query: FederationGetQueryService,
-  ) {}
-
-  @Post(':resource/:id')
-  async get(
-    @Param('resource') resource: string,
-    @Param('id') id: string,
-    @Req() request: FastifyRequest,
-  ): Promise<FederationGetResponse<FederatedRow>> {
-    if (!request.federationContext) {
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
-        401,
-      );
-    }
-    if (id.trim().length === 0) {
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation get id must not be empty').toEnvelope(),
-        400,
-      );
-    }
-
-    const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
-      context: request.federationContext,
-      resource,
-      requestedLimit: 1,
-      nativeRbac: this.query,
-    });
-
-    if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
-      throw scopeDenyToHttpException(scopeResult.deny);
-    }
-
-    const result = await this.query.get({ filter: scopeResult.filter, id });
-    if (result.status === 'not_found') {
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new FederationNotFoundError('Requested federation resource was not found').toEnvelope(),
-        404,
-      );
-    }
-    if (result.status === 'denied') {
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new FederationScopeViolationError(result.reason, {
-          resource,
-          id,
-          grantId: request.federationContext.grantId,
-          peerId: request.federationContext.peerId,
-          subjectUserId: request.federationContext.subjectUserId,
-        }).toEnvelope(),
-        403,
-      );
-    }
-
-    return { item: { ...result.item, _source: SOURCE_LOCAL } };
-  }
-}
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
-import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
-import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
 import { SessionGCService } from './session-gc.service.js';
 import { REDIS } from './gc.tokens.js';

@@ -11,17 +9,13 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
  providers: [
    {
      provide: GC_QUEUE_HANDLE,
-      useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
-        // On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection entirely.
-        // The Valkey GC sweep is a no-op on Local (no session keys stored there).
-        if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
+      useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
        return createQueue();
      },
-      inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
    },
    {
      provide: REDIS,
-      useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
+      useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
      inject: [GC_QUEUE_HANDLE],
    },
    SessionGCService,
@@ -29,13 +23,9 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
  exports: [SessionGCService],
 })
 export class GCModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
-  constructor(
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE)
-    private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
-  ) {}
+  constructor(@Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}

  async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
-    await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
+    await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
  }
 }
@@ -119,19 +119,6 @@ describe('SessionGCService', () => {
    ).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
  });

-  it('collect() skips Valkey but still demotes only the requested session on local tier', async () => {
-    const localService = new SessionGCService(null, mockLogService as unknown as LogService);
-
-    const result = await localService.collect('local-session');
-
-    expect(result.sessionId).toBe('local-session');
-    expect(result.cleaned.valkeyKeys).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(mockLogService.logs.promoteSessionToWarm).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'local-session',
-      expect.any(Date),
-    );
-  });
-
  it('collect() returns sessionId in result', async () => {
    const result = await service.collect('test-session-id');
    expect(result.sessionId).toBe('test-session-id');
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Inject, Injectable, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
 import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
 import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
 import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@ function escapeRedisGlobLiteral(value: string): string {
@Injectable()
 export class SessionGCService {
  constructor(
-    // Local tier has no Redis; lifecycle cleanup still demotes this session's logs.
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(REDIS)
-    private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
+    @Inject(REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
    @Inject(LOG_SERVICE) private readonly logService: LogService,
  ) {}

@@ -32,10 +29,8 @@ export class SessionGCService {
   * Scan Valkey for all keys matching a pattern using SCAN (non-blocking).
   * KEYS is avoided because it blocks the Valkey event loop for the full scan
   * duration, which can cause latency spikes under production key volumes.
-   * Returns an empty population on the Local tier where Redis is disabled.
   */
  private async scanKeys(pattern: string): Promise<string[]> {
-    if (!this.redis) return [];
    const collected: string[] = [];
    let cursor = '0';
    do {
@@ -52,14 +47,12 @@ export class SessionGCService {
  async collect(sessionId: string): Promise<GCResult> {
    const result: GCResult = { sessionId, cleaned: {} };

-    // 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys (skipped on Local tier).
-    if (this.redis) {
-      const pattern = `mosaic:session:${escapeRedisGlobLiteral(sessionId)}:*`;
-      const valkeyKeys = await this.scanKeys(pattern);
-      if (valkeyKeys.length > 0) {
-        await this.redis.del(...valkeyKeys);
-        result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
-      }
+    // 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys
+    const pattern = `mosaic:session:${escapeRedisGlobLiteral(sessionId)}:*`;
+    const valkeyKeys = await this.scanKeys(pattern);
+    if (valkeyKeys.length > 0) {
+      await this.redis.del(...valkeyKeys);
+      result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
    }

    // 2. PG: demote hot-tier agent logs for this session only.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import type { MosaicJobData } from '../queue/queue.service.js';
@Injectable()
 export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  private readonly logger = new Logger(CronService.name);
-  private readonly registeredWorkers: Array<Worker<MosaicJobData>> = [];
+  private readonly registeredWorkers: Worker<MosaicJobData>[] = [];

  constructor(
    @Inject(SummarizationService) private readonly summarization: SummarizationService,
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  ) {}

  async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
-    // Local tier deliberately has no BullMQ consumers or repeatable jobs.
-    if (!this.queueService.isEnabled()) {
-      this.logger.log('CronService: BullMQ disabled on local tier — no jobs will be scheduled');
-      return;
-    }
-
    const summarizationSchedule = process.env['SUMMARIZATION_CRON'] ?? '0 */6 * * *'; // every 6 hours
    const tierManagementSchedule = process.env['TIER_MANAGEMENT_CRON'] ?? '0 3 * * *'; // daily at 3am

@@ -45,7 +39,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
    const summarizationWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_SUMMARIZATION, async () => {
      await this.summarization.runSummarization();
    });
-    if (summarizationWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);
+    this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);

    // M6-005: Tier management repeatable job
    await this.queueService.addRepeatableJob(
@@ -57,7 +51,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
    const tierWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_TIER_MANAGEMENT, async () => {
      await this.summarization.runTierManagement();
    });
-    if (tierWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
+    this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);

    // Retire any repeatable global GC schedule created by older deployments.
    // Session cleanup is now triggered only by an authorized session lifecycle operation.
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
-import { SystemOverrideService } from './system-override.service.js';
-
-const localConfig = { queue: { type: 'local' } } as MosaicConfig;
-
-describe('SystemOverrideService local tier', () => {
-  it('keeps ephemeral overrides isolated by tenant and user scope', async () => {
-    const service = new SystemOverrideService(localConfig);
-    const firstScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', userId: 'user-a' };
-    const secondScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-b', userId: 'user-b' };
-
-    await service.set('shared-session', 'first override', firstScope);
-    await service.set('shared-session', 'second override', secondScope);
-
-    await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBe('first override');
-    await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
-
-    await service.clear('shared-session', firstScope);
-    await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBeNull();
-    await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
-  });
-});
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
-import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
 import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
-import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';

 const scopedSessionId = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
  `${scope.tenantId}:${scope.userId}:${sessionId}`;
@@ -17,45 +15,16 @@ interface OverrideFragment {
  addedAt: number;
 }

-interface LocalOverrideEntry {
-  condensed: string;
-  fragments: OverrideFragment[];
-}
-
@Injectable()
-export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
+export class SystemOverrideService {
  private readonly logger = new Logger(SystemOverrideService.name);
-  private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null;
-  /** Local-tier fallback, keyed by the same tenant/user/session scope as Redis. */
-  private readonly localStore = new Map<string, LocalOverrideEntry>();
+  private readonly handle: QueueHandle;

-  constructor(
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
-    private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
-  ) {
-    this.handle = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local' ? null : createQueue();
-  }
-
-  async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
-    await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
+  constructor() {
+    this.handle = createQueue();
  }

  async set(sessionId: string, override: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
-    if (!this.handle) {
-      const key = scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope);
-      const entry = this.localStore.get(key) ?? { condensed: '', fragments: [] };
-      entry.fragments.push({ text: override, addedAt: Date.now() });
-      entry.condensed = await this.condenseOverrides(
-        entry.fragments.map((fragment) => fragment.text),
-      );
-      this.localStore.set(key, entry);
-      this.logger.debug(
-        `Set system override for session ${sessionId} (local, ${entry.fragments.length} fragment(s))`,
-      );
-      return;
-    }
-
    // Load existing fragments
    const existing = await this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope));
    const fragments: OverrideFragment[] = existing
@@ -85,14 +54,10 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
  }

  async get(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<string | null> {
-    if (!this.handle) {
-      return this.localStore.get(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope))?.condensed ?? null;
-    }
    return this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope));
  }

  async renew(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
-    if (!this.handle) return;
    const pipeline = this.handle.redis.pipeline();
    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
@@ -100,11 +65,6 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
  }

  async clear(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
-    if (!this.handle) {
-      this.localStore.delete(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope));
-      this.logger.debug(`Cleared system override for session ${sessionId} (local)`);
-      return;
-    }
    await this.handle.redis.del(
      SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope),
      SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope),
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
-import { QueueService } from './queue.service.js';
-
-const localConfig = {
-  queue: { type: 'local' },
-} as MosaicConfig;
-
-describe('QueueService local tier', () => {
-  it('disables BullMQ and treats queue operations as local no-ops', async () => {
-    const service = new QueueService(null, localConfig);
-
-    expect(service.isEnabled()).toBe(false);
-    expect(service.getQueue('mosaic-test')).toBeNull();
-    expect(service.registerWorker('mosaic-test', vi.fn())).toBeNull();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.addRepeatableJob('mosaic-test', 'local-noop', {}, '* * * * *'),
-    ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
-    await expect(service.removeRepeatableJobs('mosaic-test', 'local-noop')).resolves.toBe(0);
-    await expect(service.getHealthStatus()).resolves.toEqual({ queues: {}, healthy: true });
-    await expect(service.listJobs()).resolves.toEqual([]);
-    await expect(service.retryJob('mosaic-test__1')).resolves.toEqual({
-      ok: false,
-      message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
-    });
-    await expect(service.pauseQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
-      ok: false,
-      message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
-    });
-    await expect(service.resumeQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
-      ok: false,
-      message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
-    });
-  });
-});
@@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ import {
 } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { Queue, Worker, type Job, type ConnectionOptions } from 'bullmq';
 import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
-import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
 import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
-import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
 import type { JobDto, JobStatus } from './queue-admin.dto.js';

 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -110,42 +108,21 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  private readonly connection: ConnectionOptions;
  private readonly queues = new Map<string, Queue<MosaicJobData>>();
  private readonly workers = new Map<string, Worker<MosaicJobData>>();
-  /** False on Local tier — BullMQ/Redis operations become no-ops. */
-  private readonly enabled: boolean;

  constructor(
    @Optional()
    @Inject(LOG_SERVICE)
    private readonly logService: LogService | null,
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
-    private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
  ) {
-    this.enabled = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type !== 'local';
-    this.connection = this.enabled
-      ? getConnection()
-      : ({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 6380 } as ConnectionOptions);
-  }
-
-  /** Returns true when BullMQ/Redis is active (Standalone and Federated tiers). */
-  isEnabled(): boolean {
-    return this.enabled;
+    this.connection = getConnection();
  }

  onModuleInit(): void {
-    if (this.enabled) {
-      this.logger.log('QueueService initialised (BullMQ)');
-    } else {
-      this.logger.log(
-        'QueueService: BullMQ disabled for local tier — no Redis connections will be opened',
-      );
-    }
+    this.logger.log('QueueService initialised (BullMQ)');
  }

  async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
-    if (this.enabled) {
-      await this.closeAll();
-    }
+    await this.closeAll();
  }

  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -154,10 +131,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {

  /**
   * Get or create a BullMQ Queue for the given queue name.
-   * Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
   */
-  getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> | null {
-    if (!this.enabled) return null;
+  getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> {
    let queue = this.queues.get(name) as Queue<T> | undefined;
    if (!queue) {
      queue = new Queue<T>(name, { connection: this.connection });
@@ -169,7 +144,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  /**
   * Add a BullMQ repeatable job (cron-style).
   * Uses `jobId` as a deterministic key so duplicate registrations are idempotent.
-   * No-op on Local tier.
   */
  async addRepeatableJob<T extends MosaicJobData>(
    queueName: string,
@@ -177,13 +151,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
    data: T,
    cronExpression: string,
  ): Promise<void> {
-    if (!this.enabled) {
-      this.logger.debug(
-        `Skipping repeatable job "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
-      );
-      return;
-    }
-    const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName)!;
+    const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName);
    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
    await (queue as Queue<any>).add(jobName, data, {
      repeat: { pattern: cronExpression },
@@ -199,14 +167,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
   * safe retirement of previously registered system-wide jobs.
   */
  async removeRepeatableJobs(queueName: string, jobName: string): Promise<number> {
-    if (!this.enabled) {
-      this.logger.debug(
-        `Skipping repeatable-job removal for "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
-      );
-      return 0;
-    }
    const queue = this.getQueue(queueName);
-    if (!queue) return 0;
    const jobs = await queue.getRepeatableJobs();
    const matchingJobs = jobs.filter((job) => job.name === jobName);
    await Promise.all(matchingJobs.map((job) => queue.removeRepeatableByKey(job.key)));
@@ -221,18 +182,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  /**
   * Register a Worker for the given queue name with error handling and
   * exponential backoff.
-   * Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
   */
-  registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(
-    queueName: string,
-    handler: JobHandler<T>,
-  ): Worker<T> | null {
-    if (!this.enabled) {
-      this.logger.debug(
-        `Skipping worker registration for "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
-      );
-      return null;
-    }
+  registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(queueName: string, handler: JobHandler<T>): Worker<T> {
    const worker = new Worker<T>(
      queueName,
      async (job) => {
@@ -289,12 +240,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {

  /**
   * Return queue health statistics for all managed queues.
-   * Returns an empty healthy result on Local tier.
   */
  async getHealthStatus(): Promise<QueueHealthStatus> {
-    if (!this.enabled) {
-      return { queues: {}, healthy: true };
-    }
    const queues: QueueHealthStatus['queues'] = {};
    let healthy = true;

@@ -325,10 +272,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
  /**
   * List jobs across all managed queues, optionally filtered by status.
   * BullMQ jobs are fetched by state type from each queue.
-   * Returns empty array on Local tier.
   */
  async listJobs(status?: JobStatus): Promise<JobDto[]> {
-    if (!this.enabled) return [];
    const jobs: JobDto[] = [];
    const states: JobStatus[] = status
      ? [status]
@@ -355,10 +300,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
   * Retry a specific failed job by its BullMQ job ID (format: "queueName:id").
   * The caller passes "<queueName>__<jobId>" as the composite ID because BullMQ
   * job IDs are not globally unique — they are scoped to their queue.
-   * Returns an error on Local tier.
   */
  async retryJob(compositeId: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
-    if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
    const sep = compositeId.lastIndexOf('__');
    if (sep === -1) {
      return { ok: false, message: 'Invalid job id format. Expected "<queue>__<jobId>".' };
@@ -390,7 +333,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
   * Pause a queue by name.
   */
  async pauseQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
-    if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
    const queue = this.queues.get(name);
    if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
    await queue.pause();
@@ -402,7 +344,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
   * Resume a paused queue by name.
   */
  async resumeQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
-    if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
    const queue = this.queues.get(name);
    if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
    await queue.resume();
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  "version": "0.0.2",
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
-    "build": "node ../../scripts/build-web.mjs",
+    "build": "next build",
    "dev": "next dev",
    "lint": "eslint src",
    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
@@ -79,29 +79,6 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and

 ---

-## Compaction Refresh Trust Lifecycle (M1, #827–#830)
-
-### Problem and objective
-
-Context compaction, session replacement, and same-PID runtime reloads can leave a previously VERIFIED runtime lease attached to stale directives. M1 must revoke that authority mechanically for Claude (including Claudex) and Pi without trusting caller-asserted identity or forking the external broker state machine.
-
-### Requirements
-
-1. `CR-REQ-01`: Claude `PreCompact` and `SessionStart` with matcher `compact`, plus Pi `session_before_compact` and the first post-`session_compact` `context`, SHALL independently revoke the active broker lease.
-2. `CR-REQ-02`: Runtime generation increases—including same-PID Pi reload/new/resume/fork and Claude resume/clear—SHALL monotonically replace the prior broker incarnation and inherit no VERIFIED lease.
-3. `CR-REQ-03`: A fired observer that cannot confirm broker revocation SHALL fail closed through lifecycle cancellation, a private local generation fence, and/or a runtime-local tool latch. The existing all-tools broker gate remains authoritative.
-4. `CR-REQ-04`: The lease TTL SHALL remain monotonic and capped at 300 seconds. If both observers are missed, within-TTL consequential actions remain allowed and after-TTL actions are denied. This named bounded residual stale window SHALL be documented without claiming a mutator-action bound inside the window.
-5. `CR-REQ-05`: Hook descendants SHALL use the broker-minted session and owner-only current-generation state inherited from register-before-exec. Caller-minted sessions and parallel lease state machines remain forbidden.
-
-### Acceptance criteria
-
-1. `AC-CR-01`: Real-socket tests prove each Claude observer revokes, Pi lifecycle tests prove both observer paths, and Claudex isolated settings preserve and install the mandatory hooks.
-2. `AC-CR-02`: A same-PID generation test proves the old generation is stale and the replacement generation is UNVERIFIED across reload/resume/fork-equivalent lifecycle events.
-3. `AC-CR-03`: RED-first T12b/T30 evidence explicitly reports dual-hook miss within TTL as **ALLOWED** and after TTL as **DENIED**.
-4. `AC-CR-04`: Attributable executable coverage is at least 85%, the full repository suite is green on deterministic main, and independent code/security review completes before merge.
-
---
-
 ## Fleet Declarative Configuration Management Workstream (FCM, #758)

 ### Problem and objective
@@ -1,14 +1,5 @@
 # Documentation Sitemap

-## Compaction refresh lease broker
-
- [Internal broker protocol](architecture/lease-broker-protocol.md) — kernel identity, ancestry and generation invariants, framed requests, responses, and persisted cycle bindings.
- [Broker operations](guides/lease-broker-operations.md) — protected paths, startup, constrained recovery, fail-closed posture, distinct-principal deployment, and residual risk.
- [Constrained recovery skill](../packages/mosaic/framework/skills/mosaic-context-refresh/SKILL.md) — source-resident thin wrapper, receipt scope, C4 replay boundary, and T-C middle-drop disclosure.
- [Lease-broker security notes](architecture/lease-broker-security.md) — identity, whole-class authorization, threat boundaries, and coordinator review requirements.
- [Whole mutator-class gate](architecture/mutator-class-gate.md) — default-deny policy, revoke-first/promote-last state machine, TTL, runtime adapters, and T-B/T-C assurance boundary.
- [Compaction revocation lifecycle](architecture/compaction-revocation.md) — Claude/Pi observer matrix, same-PID generation rollover, failure fencing, and the named bounded residual stale window.
-
 ## CLI and skill management

 - [Skill registration user guide](guides/user-guide.md#claude-code-skill-registration) — register, unregister, list statuses, automatic install/update reconciliation, and Claude reload behavior.
@@ -16,24 +7,10 @@

 ## Fleet configuration management

- [Fleet configuration entry point](fleet/README.md) — desired-versus-observed decision tree and complete operator link map.
- [Desired, derived, and observed state](fleet/concepts/desired-vs-observed-state.md) — roster authority, generation, ownership, and drift.
- [Identity, class, and runtime](fleet/concepts/identity-class-runtime.md) — stable name, display alias, class, runtime, provider, and model separation.
- [Role authority and leases](fleet/concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md) — validator/merge-gate separation and bounded lease authority.
- [Generated launch chain](fleet/concepts/generated-env-launch-chain.md) — strict data parsing, precedence, and quarantine.
- [Roster v2 structural contract](fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md) — schema, supported values, required fields, defaults, and constraints.
- [Fleet CLI reference](fleet/reference/cli.md) — local desired-state commands, JSON/exit behavior, and gateway-catalog separation.
- [Lifecycle transitions](fleet/reference/lifecycle-transitions.md) — create/apply/reboot/migration/rollback boundaries.
- [Status and drift](fleet/reference/status-and-drift.md) — desired/managed/observed state and current/future classifications.
- [Safe agent CRUD](fleet/how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md) — expected generation, dry-run, and partial-failure recovery.
- [Local lifecycle operations](fleet/how-to/start-stop-restart.md) — persisted versus one-shot actions.
- [Configurable interaction instance](fleet/how-to/configure-tess-interaction.md) and [validator instance](fleet/how-to/configure-ultron-validator.md) — generic identities and protected limits.
- [Reconcile and recover](fleet/operations/reconcile-and-recover.md) — plan/apply lock and recovery behavior.
- [Environment quarantine](fleet/operations/env-quarantine.md) — private evidence and value-free diagnostics.
- [Systemd/tmux troubleshooting](fleet/operations/systemd-tmux-troubleshooting.md) — socket, holder, unmanaged-session, and lock decisions.
- [Backup/restore boundary](fleet/operations/backup-restore.md) and [upgrade-assets hold](fleet/operations/upgrade-assets.md).
- [v1-to-v2 migration preview](fleet/migration/v1-to-v2.md) and [executable artifact dispositions](fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md).
- [FCM M5 closure evidence](reports/documentation/758-fleet-config-ia-closure.md) and [approved deferrals](reports/deferred/758-fleet-config-deferrals.md).
+- [Generated environment boundary](fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md) — roster-derived launch projection, strict local data, legacy quarantine, and downstream interface evidence.
+- [Roster v2 structural contract](fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md) — local-tmux schema v2 parsing and structural validation.
+- [Role classes and authority](fleet/reference/role-classes.md) — canonical role resolver and protected authority boundaries.
+- [Executable asset dispositions](fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md) — shipped v1 fixture/profile/service validation posture.

 ## Official channel plugins

@@ -96,8 +73,3 @@
 - [Logical identity and connector lease/fencing implementation](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/755)
 - [M1 logical identity and fencing architecture](architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md)
 - [M1 connector lease operations](guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md)
-
-## Comms evolution — Matrix-native MACP (design, draft)
-
- [RFC-001 — MACP: a Mosaic-native, Matrix-native comms layer](rfcs/RFC-001-MACP-MATRIX-NATIVE.md) — Synapse + Mosaic appservice backbone, MACP v1 protocol, presence/escalation, federation, strangler migration off the Hermes MCP bridge.
- [RFC-002 — Install, configuration & topology for the Matrix/MACP comms system](rfcs/RFC-002-INSTALL-CONFIG-TOPOLOGY.md) — open-source install topology modes, ACME cert provisioning, pluggable secret backend, and config precedence.
@@ -52,20 +52,20 @@ Active workstream is **W1 — Federation v1**. Workers should:
 > the repository quality gates, independent code and security review, terminal-green CI, and
 > the applicable acceptance evidence before merge. Issue #758 remains open until M5 closes.

-| id         | status      | description                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent         | repo              | branch                                  | depends_on                                     | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
-| ---------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------- | ----------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| FCM-M0-001 | done        | Publish normative PRD requirements/acceptance criteria, this M0–M5 DAG, docs-IA checklist, and legacy example/profile disposition inventory; no implementation changes | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-management`      | —                                              | 18K      | Merged via #760 (`c32d85a`); parent #758 intentionally remains open through M5                                                                                                                                     |
-| FCM-M1-001 | done        | Implement narrow local-tmux v2 roster structural contract/compiler with YAML/JSON canonicalization and schema/parser parity tests                                      | #758  | coder0        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-roster-v2-compiler`           | FCM-M0-001                                     | 30K      | #764 squash `aa5b43b`; exact-head RoR and PR/main terminal-green CI; no lifecycle or live mutation                                                                                                                 |
-| FCM-M1-002 | done        | Reuse existing profile/persona/provision resolver for roster semantics; add canonical class/authority validation and approved aliases                                  | #758  | native-sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-shared-role-resolution`       | FCM-M0-001                                     | 25K      | #768 squash `a5e8e55`; shared resolver and canonical authority/alias validation delivered                                                                                                                          |
-| FCM-M1-003 | done        | Convert the M0 legacy inventory into executable example/profile/service-preset validation and explicit v1-version/retirement checks                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-example-profile-dispositions` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 20K      | #770 squash `e9c4aa3`; shipped artifact disposition validation delivered                                                                                                                                           |
-| FCM-M2-001 | done        | Migrate generic launch chain to deterministic `.env.generated` plus strict data-only `.env.local`; quarantine forbidden legacy keys                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-generated-env-boundary`       | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 30K      | #772 squash `191efae`; generated/local boundary and private quarantine delivered                                                                                                                                   |
-| FCM-M2-002 | done        | Add generation-guarded local fleet agent create/get/update/delete mutations with plan/dry-run, atomic roster writes, and recovery output                               | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-agent-crud`             | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M2-001                         | 30K      | #773 squash `bc5e736`; generation-guarded atomic CRUD and recovery contracts delivered                                                                                                                             |
-| FCM-M3-001 | done        | Implement local roster-owned reconcile/apply plus lifecycle/status/verify/doctor contracts and stable JSON/exit codes                                                  | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-local-reconciler`             | FCM-M2-001, FCM-M2-002                         | 35K      | #785 squash `4990905`; exact roster-owned systemd/tmux reconcile and lifecycle contracts delivered                                                                                                                 |
-| FCM-M3-002 | in-progress | Add isolated systemd/tmux lifecycle, drift, socket, unmanaged-session, crash, and rollback acceptance coverage                                                         | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates`   | FCM-M3-001                                     | 25K      | Canonical v2 named-socket + legacy-v1 default-server boundaries; fake adapters/temp fixtures only                                                                                                                  |
-| FCM-M4-001 | done        | Implement field-complete v1-to-v2 inventory/preview/migrator with alias, lifecycle, env-quarantine, and remote/connector disposition evidence                          | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-v1-v2-migrator`               | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M3-001                         | 35K      | PR #788; final head `d63bb0206a1d312ab8352ec1d3ca3631146b0baa`; tree `4da210da9a71b035130d4160a4a2e691bdfde2da`; squash `9745bc3f29c26b021a478b7ad03cfb494f6c9de3`; descendant-main pipeline 1855 terminal success |
-| FCM-M4-002 | not-started | Add reversible canary migration, rollback, stale-projection/orphan classification, and current-host 9-managed/3-unmanaged fixture coverage                             | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-migration-rollback-gates`     | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M3-002                         | 25K      | HOLD: never starts a previously stopped agent or kills an unproven unmanaged session; not authorized by FCM-M5-001                                                                                                 |
-| FCM-M5-001 | done        | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation                                                       | #758  | haiku         | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs`   | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K      | #789 content squash 627cf2bb; de-flake repair PR#851/#849 squash 77c9a826; completion proof wp1937 @aa999daf push/ci step 49632 recovery_runtime_unittest.py 3/3 OK (closes wp1932 step 49576 Errno111)            |
-| FCM-M5-002 | not-started | Package/update asset-drift checks, rolling local canary, independent validation certificate, and release evidence                                                      | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-config-release-gate`    | FCM-M3-002, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M5-001             | 30K      | HOLD: final #758 gate; quality, independent code/security review, validator certificate, merge-gate approval, and green CI remain out of M5-001                                                                    |
+| id         | status      | description                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent         | repo              | branch                                  | depends_on                                     | estimate | notes                                                                                                            |
+| ---------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------- | ----------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FCM-M0-001 | done        | Publish normative PRD requirements/acceptance criteria, this M0–M5 DAG, docs-IA checklist, and legacy example/profile disposition inventory; no implementation changes | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-management`      | —                                              | 18K      | Merged via #760 (`c32d85a`); parent #758 intentionally remains open through M5                                   |
+| FCM-M1-001 | done        | Implement narrow local-tmux v2 roster structural contract/compiler with YAML/JSON canonicalization and schema/parser parity tests                                      | #758  | coder0        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-roster-v2-compiler`           | FCM-M0-001                                     | 30K      | #764 squash `aa5b43b`; exact-head RoR and PR/main terminal-green CI; no lifecycle or live mutation               |
+| FCM-M1-002 | done        | Reuse existing profile/persona/provision resolver for roster semantics; add canonical class/authority validation and approved aliases                                  | #758  | native-sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-shared-role-resolution`       | FCM-M0-001                                     | 25K      | #768 squash `a5e8e55`; shared resolver and canonical authority/alias validation delivered                        |
+| FCM-M1-003 | done        | Convert the M0 legacy inventory into executable example/profile/service-preset validation and explicit v1-version/retirement checks                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-example-profile-dispositions` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 20K      | #770 squash `e9c4aa3`; shipped artifact disposition validation delivered                                         |
+| FCM-M2-001 | done        | Migrate generic launch chain to deterministic `.env.generated` plus strict data-only `.env.local`; quarantine forbidden legacy keys                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-generated-env-boundary`       | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 30K      | #772 squash `191efae`; generated/local boundary and private quarantine delivered                                 |
+| FCM-M2-002 | done        | Add generation-guarded local fleet agent create/get/update/delete mutations with plan/dry-run, atomic roster writes, and recovery output                               | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-agent-crud`             | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M2-001                         | 30K      | #773 squash `bc5e736`; generation-guarded atomic CRUD and recovery contracts delivered                           |
+| FCM-M3-001 | done        | Implement local roster-owned reconcile/apply plus lifecycle/status/verify/doctor contracts and stable JSON/exit codes                                                  | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-local-reconciler`             | FCM-M2-001, FCM-M2-002                         | 35K      | #785 squash `4990905`; exact roster-owned systemd/tmux reconcile and lifecycle contracts delivered               |
+| FCM-M3-002 | in-progress | Add isolated systemd/tmux lifecycle, drift, socket, unmanaged-session, crash, and rollback acceptance coverage                                                         | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates`   | FCM-M3-001                                     | 25K      | Canonical v2 named-socket + legacy-v1 default-server boundaries; fake adapters/temp fixtures only                |
+| FCM-M4-001 | not-started | Implement field-complete v1-to-v2 inventory/preview/migrator with alias, lifecycle, env-quarantine, and remote/connector disposition evidence                          | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-v1-v2-migrator`               | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M3-001                         | 35K      | Preview first; no unreviewed lifecycle inference                                                                 |
+| FCM-M4-002 | not-started | Add reversible canary migration, rollback, stale-projection/orphan classification, and current-host 9-managed/3-unmanaged fixture coverage                             | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-migration-rollback-gates`     | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M3-002                         | 25K      | Never starts a previously stopped agent or kills an unproven unmanaged session                                   |
+| FCM-M5-001 | not-started | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation                                                       | #758  | haiku         | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs`   | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K      | Must close every checklist item or record an approved deferral                                                   |
+| FCM-M5-002 | not-started | Package/update asset-drift checks, rolling local canary, independent validation certificate, and release evidence                                                      | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-config-release-gate`    | FCM-M3-002, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M5-001             | 30K      | Final #758 gate: quality, independent code/security review, validator certificate, merge-gate approval, green CI |

 ## Thin-core prompt diet (#528) — feat/contract-thin-core

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# Compaction observer revocation and runtime generations
-
-WI-3 connects Claude and Pi compaction/session lifecycle events to the existing authenticated lease-broker state machine. It does not add a second lease store or let runtime hooks assert identity. Each observer inherits the broker-minted session, resolves the current private runtime generation, and sends the existing `revoke_lease` action over the authenticated Unix socket.
-
-## Observer matrix
-
-| Runtime          | Lifecycle signal                                                 | Action                                                                                                                       |
-| ---------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Claude / Claudex | `PreCompact`                                                     | Revoke the current lease before compaction. A non-zero hook result blocks the lifecycle transition.                          |
-| Claude / Claudex | `SessionStart` with matcher `compact`                            | Revoke again after compacted context starts.                                                                                 |
-| Claude / Claudex | `SessionStart` with matcher `resume\|clear`                      | Atomically advance the private generation, then revoke the replacement incarnation.                                          |
-| Pi               | `session_before_compact`                                         | Revoke before compaction; return `{ cancel: true }` if revocation cannot be confirmed.                                       |
-| Pi               | `session_compact` then the first `context`                       | Arm and run an independent post-compaction revoke. A failed post observer blocks later tools locally until a retry succeeds. |
-| Pi               | `session_start` with reason `reload`, `new`, `resume`, or `fork` | Atomically advance the private generation, then revoke the replacement incarnation before reuse.                             |
-
-The first observer that reaches the broker deletes pending promotion tokens and makes the lease `UNVERIFIED`. The second compaction observer is deliberate redundancy, not a prerequisite for the first. Claudex receives the same mandatory hooks in its isolated `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`; hook merging preserves unrelated isolated settings and rejects malformed or symlinked settings fail-closed.
-
-## Private generation authority
-
-`launch-runtime.py` still registers before `exec`, preserving the kernel-authenticated PID/starttime anchor. It now also creates `generation-<broker-session>.state` beside the broker socket. The file is owner-only mode `0600` under the broker's mode-`0700` directory. Hook descendants read that file instead of relying only on an immutable inherited environment value.
-
-Generation changes use an exclusive file lock, validate owner/type/mode/size, increment monotonically, truncate and write the complete new value, and `fsync` before contacting the broker. Therefore reload, new-session, resume, and fork events may retain the same PID/starttime while still becoming a new broker incarnation. The higher generation causes the broker to atomically discard prior tokens and lease authority; the replacement generation inherits no VERIFIED lease.
-
-If an observer fires while broker transport is unavailable, `revoke-lease.py` advances the private generation as a local fence before returning non-zero. Every later all-tools gate reads that higher value. When the broker is reachable again, authentication of that value performs the same old-generation revocation before authorization. Pi also keeps a process-local post-compaction/rollover failure latch that blocks tool calls. An unsafe or unreadable generation file itself makes both lifecycle revocation and tool authorization fail closed.
-
-## Threat contract and stopping boundary
-
-### BOUNDED RESIDUAL STALE WINDOW
-
-If **both** pre- and post-compaction observers are missed entirely, no revocation signal exists. During the remaining unexpired lease, **within-TTL consequential actions are allowed**. Their count and timing are **bounded by lease expiry, not by the mutator gate**. WI-3 makes no claim that it bounds mutator actions inside this stale interval. The broker's monotonic lease TTL is capped at 300 seconds; after expiry, the next consequential tool is denied with `LEASE_EXPIRED`.
-
-This is the named D2-v5 T-A residual. It is distinct from an observer that fires but cannot contact the broker: the latter creates a local generation fence and fails closed. It is also distinct from T-C total rot, where the lifecycle observers and the all-tools gate are both absent or replaced. Server-side branch protection, required CI, and independent review remain the irreducible backstop for T-C.
-
-| Condition                                                       | Result                                                                                                                |
-| --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Either compaction observer succeeds                             | Existing lease and pending promotion tokens are revoked immediately.                                                  |
-| Observer runs but broker confirmation fails                     | Lifecycle transition is denied where supported; local generation fence and runtime latch prevent inherited authority. |
-| Both observers are missed, lease unexpired                      | **ALLOWED** inside the bounded residual stale window. No within-window mutator bound is claimed.                      |
-| Both observers are missed, lease expired                        | **DENIED** by monotonic TTL expiry.                                                                                   |
-| Generation advances on reload/new/resume/fork                   | Prior incarnation revoked; replacement starts `UNVERIFIED`.                                                           |
-| Lifecycle observers and all-tools gate both fail or are removed | T-C total-hook-miss residual; protected-branch controls remain required.                                              |
-
-## T-C server-side branch-protection posture
-
-The required posture is that `main` is push-blocked and PR-only-merge is **MANDATORY**, regardless
-of client-gate state. The client-side gate narrows the exposure window only; it is not the T-C
-guarantee. The server-side protected-branch configuration is the irreducible guarantee for protected
-repository actions. Status-check enforcement and approval enforcement are **RECOMMENDED**.
-
-## Current-vs-required gap (recorded, not enacted)
-
-The current empirical configuration is recorded here without re-probing or mutating live branch
-protection. `enable_push=False` (push-block present), so the mandatory push-block/PR-only-merge core
-holds. `require_approvals=0` (approvals not enforced), `enable_status_check=False` (status checks not
-enforced), and `block_on_official_review=False` (official review not enforced). Those recommended
-merge-quality controls are the current gap; changing them is a separate, owner-gated operations
-decision and is not enacted by this documentation change.
-
-The permanent T12b/T30 acceptance case prints both required outcomes: dual-hook miss within TTL is **ALLOWED**, and the same lease after TTL is **DENIED**. Separate real-socket tests prove each Claude observer and same-PID generation rollover; Pi lifecycle tests exercise pre/post observers, all four replacement reasons, and local failure closure.
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-# Authenticated external lease broker protocol
-
-The compaction-refresh lease broker is a Linux-only, newline-framed JSON protocol over a Unix stream socket. It is runtime-neutral; M1 consumers are limited to Claude and Pi. This is an internal process boundary, not an HTTP API, so it is intentionally absent from OpenAPI.
-
-The broker, never the caller, obtains `(pid, uid, gid)` from kernel `SO_PEERCRED`. It correlates the PID with `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 22 (`starttime`) and mints `session_id` on `register_anchor`. Presence of `session_id` in that request is refused even when its value is `null` or empty. Later requests must originate from the anchor or a descendant. The broker walks parent PIDs to the `(pid,starttime)` anchor and then rereads every walked PID's starttime before accepting the chain.
-
-## Request and response boundary
-
-Each connection carries exactly one UTF-8 JSON object followed by one newline, capped at 64 KiB. The protocol deliberately uses EOF to prove that there is exactly one frame: immediately after writing the newline, the client **MUST half-close its write side** with `shutdown(SHUT_WR)` (or Node `socket.end()`) before awaiting the response. A client that writes a newline but leaves its write side open receives no successful response; the broker's one-second connection deadline fails closed. Malformed, unterminated, multiple (including a delayed second frame), or oversized frames fail closed. Responses are one JSON object and one newline. Success has `{"ok":true,...}`; refusal has `{"ok":false,"code":"TYPED_CODE"}`. Requests are:
-
- `register_anchor`: `action`, non-negative `runtime_generation`; no `session_id` field.
- `authenticate`: `action`, broker-minted `session_id`, non-negative `runtime_generation`.
- `mint_token`: authenticated identity plus `binding` containing exactly `compaction_epoch`, `request_epoch`, `h_source`, `h_payload`, and `schema_version`.
- `consume_token`: authenticated identity plus `token`.
- `begin_verification`: authenticated identity, runtime (`claude` or `pi`), cycle `binding`, and a TTL no greater than 300 seconds. The broker revokes existing authority first, enters `PENDING_VERIFICATION`, and returns a single-use promotion token.
- `begin_recovery`: the constrained recovery entrypoint. It rejects caller-provided receipt/challenge fields and delegates to the same `begin_verification` transition, but reports `PENDING_DELIVERY` and marks the volatile cycle as recovery-owned.
- `complete_recovery`: authenticated identity only. It rejects caller-provided receipt/challenge fields, obtains the current recovery challenge only from broker state, and delegates to the same trusted-observer → evidence → consume → promote sequence. An observation failure revokes recovery authority; retry starts a fresh challenge.
-
-The daemon owns a second protected production observer socket (mode `0600`) unless a private `--test-observer-file` fixture is selected. That transport accepts only the exact `record_runtime_observation` schema after kernel `SO_PEERCRED` plus the existing anchor/ancestry authentication; it validates the pending runtime/generation before storing one finalized assistant entry for the in-process `RuntimeReceiptObserver`. It is **not** a broker request action. Claude sends its latest assistant entry from the Stop-hook transport; Pi sends only finalized `message_end` assistant content. The public broker socket continues to reject request-supplied `latest_assistant_message` in begin, observe, and complete paths.
-
- `promote_lease`: authenticated identity plus the exact pending promotion token. The broker commits token consumption before making `VERIFIED` visible.
- `revoke_lease`: authenticated observer signal; deletes pending tokens and makes the session `UNVERIFIED` immediately. WI-3 Claude/Pi hooks send this existing action; `runtime` and bounded `reason` fields are diagnostic input only and never identity authority.
- `authorize_tool`: authenticated identity, runtime, and exact runtime-reported tool name. The broker returns an explicit allow/deny decision from the whole-class policy and current lease.
-
-A higher generation for the same anchor atomically replaces the stored incarnation and deletes all prior tokens and lease authority for that session. A lower generation is stale. Runtime descendants resolve the current generation from an owner-only, locked generation file created by the register-before-exec launcher; reload/new/resume/fork observers advance and `fsync` it before broker revocation. This supports generation replacement even when PID/starttime do not change. Tokens are 256-bit values from the operating-system cryptographic RNG and are single use. At most 256 pending tokens may be persisted; another mint fails with `TOKEN_CAPACITY` before mutation. Successful consumption deletes the token, while a replay still fails with `TOKEN_REPLAY`. Live v1 token records retain the existing `consumed: false` schema.
-
-VERIFIED leases are volatile and monotonic-time bounded: broker restart, generation change, explicit observer revocation, or expiry returns the session to `UNVERIFIED`. `begin_verification` always revokes before minting a new prerequisite. `begin_recovery` reuses that exact transition and mints a new challenge, so a normal-path receipt/challenge cannot be replayed through recovery. `promote_lease` is valid only from the matching pending cycle; persistence failure rolls token and lease state back, while post-rename durability uncertainty terminates the broker. The WI-1 token is the atomic promotion prerequisite substrate.
-
-## Receipt boundary and T-C residual (R1)
-
-Receipt evidence is a T-A delivery/liveness prerequisite only; it cannot replace the mechanical
-mutator gate as safety authority. The receipt detects an **ABSENT** or **PREFIX-TRUNCATED** terminal
-token. A **MIDDLE-DROP** that preserves the tail is a T-C contract violation that is **NOT receipt-detectable**. It is covered by server-side protected-branch controls, **NOT** by the receipt; no category-wide receipt-detection claim is made for that tail-preserving transformation.
-
-State replacement serializes and enforces the 4 MiB maximum before opening a temporary file, then uses a mode-`0600` temporary file, `fsync`, atomic rename, and parent-directory `fsync`. Every broker mutation snapshots the prior v1 state. A commit failure before rename restores that snapshot and leaves durable state unchanged. A failure after rename makes durability uncertain, so the store is poisoned without rolling memory back and the daemon terminates rather than serving with divergent state. Existing state is opened without following symlinks, must be a bounded regular file at mode `0600`, and is fully schema- and invariant-validated before use. Persisted tokens must be unconsumed, match their session's current generation, and remain within the 256-token cap. Session identity is uniquely keyed by `(anchor_pid,anchor_starttime)`; duplicate logical sessions for one anchor refuse startup. State integrity or mode failures refuse startup. The daemon does not log session IDs or tokens.
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-# WI-1 lease broker security notes
-
- Trusted identity comes only from Linux `SO_PEERCRED` plus `/proc` starttime, never request identity fields.
- Descendant authorization is anchored to `(pid,starttime)` and uses a complete second starttime pass to fail closed on disappearance or PID-reuse races.
- Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits. WI-3 stores the live generation in an owner-only locked file so same-PID Pi reload/new/resume/fork and Claude resume/clear transitions cannot inherit a VERIFIED lease.
- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
- Built-in `0700`/`0600` filesystem modes provide same-principal hardening only, not socket authenticity against the same UID. WI-1 provides no distinct-principal isolation. That stronger deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary, and the boundary must preserve authenticated client identity for the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry authorization rather than substituting a shared proxy identity.
- WI-2 whole-class authorization denies every consequential, unknown, and custom tool while UNVERIFIED; it does not inspect shell strings or trust wrapper selection. First-class Claude/Pi, both Claudex dispatch modes, PRDY, QA remediation, coord, orchestrator, and fleet starts converge on broker register-before-exec; Claudex additionally installs the mandatory all-tools hook inside its preserved isolated config and fails closed on unsafe settings.
- The permanent `check-runtime-launches.py` suite/CI guard scans production source for direct literal, absolute-path, process-API, command-array, and dynamic Claude/Pi launches. It has no bypass allowlist: an unrecognized launch form fails CI until routed through the common boundary.
- WI-2 promotion consumes a WI-1 cycle token before VERIFIED becomes visible. Observer revocation, runtime-generation replacement, broker restart, and monotonic TTL expiry remove authority.
- WI-3 wires redundant Claude `PreCompact`/`SessionStart(compact)` and Pi `session_before_compact`/post-`session_compact` `context` observers to that same revoke action. If broker confirmation fails after an observer fires, the revoker advances the private generation as a local fence; subsequent authorization revokes the stale broker incarnation before any consequential allow.
- Dual observer absence while a lease remains live is the named **bounded residual stale window**: consequential tools remain allowed until monotonic expiry, with no claimed within-window action bound. After expiry they are denied. Total observer-plus-gate absence remains T-C.
- Receipt observation, payload construction, and constrained recovery implementation remain later surfaces. A receipt can become a promotion prerequisite but is never the safety mechanism.
-
-## Named residual: promote-lease-lost-ACK (WI-3 D2-v5)
-
-A valid `promote_lease` can leave a session `VERIFIED` in the broker while the client never learns of it. This is a named, bounded D2-v5 T-A residual — an **authority-observability divergence, not an authority divergence, not an ALLOW-risk, and not a retry double-apply**. It is disclosed here, not laundered.
-
-**Window — where it can occur.** The broker commits token consumption and durable `VERIFIED` state _before_ the success reply becomes visible (see the promotion order in `lease-broker-protocol.md`). The residual is confined to the interval after that commit+fsync when the broker→client reply or peer-ACK is lost — for example an extreme-contention send failure or peer disconnect after `handle()` has already mutated and persisted state (the #838 fail-closed transport path). The lease mutation is already durable broker-side; only the acknowledgement to the client is lost. No uncommitted or partially-applied state is involved: the commit either happened (and is authoritative) or it did not (and no lease exists).
-
-**Fail-safe direction — the client can only under-claim.** Broker intent is the ceiling; client authority is always ≤ broker intent, never more. Client-side authority-belief is granted only by a _received_ acknowledgement; a lost acknowledgement conveys nothing, so the client cannot conclude "verified" and continues to treat itself as `UNVERIFIED` (it re-verifies or recovers). If the client retries `promote_lease` with the same token, the token is already consumed and the broker rejects the retry (`PROMOTION_TOKEN_MISMATCH` / `INVALID_LEASE_TRANSITION`); there is no double-apply. The committed `VERIFIED` state the broker holds is authority the lease _legitimately earned_ from a real promotion — the broker authorizing consequential tools under it is correct, not inflation. Divergence is therefore strictly toward _less_ client authority than the broker granted; it never produces authority the broker did not grant.
-
-**Bound — TTL plus the observer/gen-bump revoke backstop, self-healing.** The orphaned `VERIFIED` lease is indistinguishable to the broker from any other legitimately verified lease, so the identical D2-v5 revocation backstops dispose of it: any compaction observer (`PreCompact` / `SessionStart(compact)` for Claude; `session_before_compact` / post-`session_compact` `context` for Pi), any same-PID runtime-generation bump (reload/new/resume/fork), broker restart, or monotonic-time expiry returns the session to `UNVERIFIED`. Monotonic TTL expiry (capped at 300 seconds) is **unconditional** — it requires no observer at all — so the maximum exposure of the orphaned lease is one TTL, ≤ 300 s, after which the next consequential tool is denied with `LEASE_EXPIRED`. Any observer that fires shortens the window further. The residual self-heals: "≥1 observer fires OR expiry ⇒ revoke" catches the lost-ACK lease on the same terms as every other stale lease. As with the dual-observer-miss stale window, WI-3 makes no claim that the mutator gate bounds actions inside the residual interval; the interval is bounded by TTL and the revoke backstop, and the server-side branch-protection / required-CI / independent-review line remains the irreducible backstop for protected-repository mutations.
-
-Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred and mutator-gate acceptance suites on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# Whole mutator-class lease gate
-
-WI-2 adds the framework-native authorization boundary for Claude (including the supported Claudex overlay) and Pi. Every runtime-reported tool name reaches the lease broker before execution. The gate classifies capabilities by the whole tool class; it never parses a Bash command to decide whether that particular string looks read-only.
-
-## Default-deny policy
-
-While a session is not VERIFIED, only these exact classes are allowed:
-
- Claude: `Read`, `Grep`, `Glob`, `Ls`, `Find`
- Pi: `read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`
- Both runtimes: the fixed `mosaic_context_recover` primitive
-
-Every other built-in, unknown tool, and custom/MCP tool is consequential by default and is denied. This includes Claude `Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, and `NotebookEdit`, plus Pi `bash`, `edit`, and `write`. A compromised model therefore cannot bypass Mosaic wrappers by selecting raw `git`, `curl`, `kubectl`, provider, deployment, or filesystem commands inside a generic mutator—the generic mutator itself is blocked before its input executes.
-
-## Broker-owned transition order
-
-The authenticated broker is the sole lease writer:
-
-1. `begin_verification` revokes existing authority and pending tokens first, then records `PENDING_VERIFICATION` and mints one WI-1 single-use promotion token bound to the exact cycle.
-2. `promote_lease` accepts only that session/generation/binding/token combination.
-3. Token consumption commits before the volatile lease becomes VERIFIED. Promotion is last and cannot be reached directly from UNVERIFIED.
-4. `revoke_lease`, a runtime-generation increase, broker restart, or monotonic expiry removes mutator authority.
-
-The initial TTL is capped at the ratified 300-second maximum. A caller may request a shorter positive TTL but cannot lengthen the maximum. WI-3 installs the [compaction observer and generation lifecycle](compaction-revocation.md). Dual compaction-hook miss within an unexpired lease remains the ratified bounded T-A residual: consequential tools are allowed until expiry, with no claimed within-window action bound; once either observer revokes or TTL expires, the next consequential tool is denied.
-
-A receipt is only a future promotion prerequisite. It is not an obedience, residency, or safety proof and never replaces this mechanical gate.
-
-## Runtime adapters
-
-`launch-runtime.py` registers itself with the broker and then `exec`s Claude or Pi so PID/starttime remain the authenticated parent anchor. It exports the broker-minted session ID and an owner-only generation-file reference to descendants; lifecycle hooks advance that file for same-PID replacement generations.
-
- Claude installs `mutator-gate.py` as an all-tools (`.*`) `PreToolUse` hook.
- `mosaic claudex` and `mosaic yolo claudex` preserve their isolated `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`, merge the mandatory hook into that isolated `settings.json`, and use the same register-before-exec launcher. Malformed or symlinked isolated settings deny launch.
- Pi invokes the same executable from its `tool_call` handler.
-
-The executable submits the runtime's actual tool name to `authorize_tool`. Missing identity, malformed input/reply, timeout, broker unavailability, or denial exits with status 2 and blocks fail-closed.
-
-## Runtime-launch choke-point and permanent guard
-
-Every repository-owned Claude/Pi launch entry converges on `launch-runtime.py`, either directly or through `mosaic` → `execLeaseGatedRuntime`. PRDY init/update and QA remediation invoke the wrapper directly so their existing prompts, dangerous-permission behavior, working directory, and environment survive without skipping broker registration. The raw Claude `--dangerously-skip-permissions` primitive is owned only by `launch-runtime.py`; callers request semantic `--dangerous` mode, and the wrapper validates Claude before injecting the primitive. `@mosaicstack/coord` rewrites direct Claude commands to `mosaic claude` and rejects unknown custom Claude launchers.
-
-`check-runtime-launches.py` is the permanent completeness guard. It scans production shell, TypeScript/JavaScript, Python, and data launch definitions under `packages/`, `apps/`, `plugins/`, and `tools/`; direct literal, absolute-path, process-API, dynamic, command-substitution, `eval`, and variable-execution runtime launches fail. Shell comments are stripped with quote awareness, wrapper prefixes are tokenized with `shlex`, and only an invocation in command position with `--runtime` before the command separator is gated. Literal and tracked-variable command tokens use one terminal resolver after any nesting of `exec`, `command`, `nohup`, or `env` plus assignments. A direct command always wins over an inert marker on the same line. Independently, the raw dangerous primitive anywhere outside the choke-point is RED.
-
-The command parser is a best-effort CI defense, not a complete shell interpreter. Alias/function redefinition, sourced commands, generated scripts, and encoded pipelines are intentionally residual rather than an invitation to chase an unbounded shell language. Two runtime controls backstop that residual surface: primitive ownership rejects a dangerous launch even when command identity is alias-indirected, and Claude's global `.*` `PreToolUse` hook invokes the broker gate for non-dangerous launches. Without `MOSAIC_LEASE_SESSION_ID`, representative read, mutator, and custom/MCP tools all fail closed with `GATE_UNAVAILABLE`. Hook absence or replacement remains in the documented T-C boundary.
-
-### Parser stopping criterion
-
- **A — realistic parser matrix:** comments, inert strings/assignments, heredocs, continuations, chained commands, command substitution, `eval`, bare tracked variables, and quoted/unquoted tracked variables behind `exec`, `command`, `nohup`, or `env` are permanent RED regressions. Prefix-variable forms are covered in both multiline and same-line assignment shapes.
- **B — residual backstops:** a dangerous alias-indirected launch is RED solely through primitive anchoring; a parser-missed non-dangerous alias launch is paired with an acceptance test proving the global all-tools hook denies every representative tool class as `GATE_UNAVAILABLE` without a lease.
- **C — independent fresh review:** the parser class is considered complete only when reviewers find no new non-overlapping realistic evasion on the exact head. A and B are repository evidence; C is supplied by the fresh review round.
-
-All three layers are load-bearing and complementary. The guard is mandatory in `@mosaicstack/mosaic`'s test script, so root CI fails on a future realistic bypass. Real-socket tests separately prove PRDY init/update and QA receive broker sessions and deny an unverified mutator.
-
-The live inventory is emitted by:
-
-```bash
-python3 packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root . --json
-```
-
-| Production launch family                               | Gated entries |
-| ------------------------------------------------------ | ------------: |
-| `@mosaicstack/coord` default/configured Claude command |             2 |
-| Fleet runtime start                                    |             1 |
-| QA remediation + generated QA command                  |             2 |
-| Orchestrator command construction/session launches     |             3 |
-| PRDY init/update                                       |             2 |
-| Mosaic Claude/Pi/Claudex adapter and wrapper boundary  |             4 |
-| **Total**                                              |   **14 / 14** |
-
-## Assurance boundary
-
-This closes T-A after an observer fires or lease expiry and T-B for in-runtime tool calls. Hook/extension absence, a runtime executing outside the gated launcher, ptrace/same-UID broker replacement, and other fully rotted behavior remain T-C. Server-side branch protection and required PR review/CI remain the irreducible line for protected repository mutations.
@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+# Compaction-Refresh WI-0 Gate0 Evidence Pack
+
+- **Issue:** Gitea #827
+- **Milestone:** 188 — Compaction-Refresh Mechanism
+- **Branch:** `feat/827-gate0-probe`
+- **Starting HEAD:** `d801d6c4c8a984d6a95033c49714210018d3d9a8`
+- **Host/runtime:** Linux 6.1.0-48-amd64; Mosaic 0.0.48; Pi 0.80.7; Claude Code 2.1.205
+- **Scope:** Probe fixtures and evidence only. No WI-1..WI-7 feature implementation.
+
+## Verdict — 5/6 PASS; BUILD ADMISSION: **NO**
+
+| Probe | Verdict | Short result |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| P1 launcher topology + ancestry | **PASS** | Real Mosaic→Pi and Mosaic→Claude chains reached the registered anchor; real Claude `SessionStart` hook ancestry accepted; same-UID sibling with the minted victim ID rejected. |
+| P2 Pi last-position + nonce map | **PASS** | Real Pi proved last-or-closed; `message_end` mapped exact `toolCallId → requestNonce` before `tool_call`; provider-response hook occurred before stream consumption/content completion. |
+| P3 same-PID generation revocation | **PASS** | Same Pi PID/starttime persisted through reload/fork/new/resume while broker generations increased; reload revoked a prior `VERIFIED` generation. |
+| P4 `SO_PEERCRED` + socket posture | **PASS** | Real Unix socket peer PID/UID/starttime matched `/proc`; 0700 directory + 0600 socket demonstrated. Same-UID counterfeit replacement remains explicitly T-C without a distinct principal/authenticated response. |
+| P5 source invalidation | **PASS** | Missing, oversize, and hash-mismatched fragments each refused injection/promotion, revoked broker state, and blocked the exact emitted tool call. |
+| P6 atomic injection | **T-C GAP** | Both runtimes empirically delivered a complete single block/message, but neither installed runtime contract states an **atomic/prefix-preserving** transport guarantee. Observation is not a guarantee; A-v5-1/T27 cannot be admitted. |
+
+**Planner return item:** P6. The evidence establishes successful complete delivery in these runs, not the required invariant that the harness cannot middle-drop/replace bytes while preserving the terminal token. Per R1, such a middle-drop is not receipt-detectable. It is therefore classed **T-C**, not assumed away.
+
+## STEP 0 — Authority re-verification
+
+Command:
+
+```bash
+sha256sum \
+  ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-BUILD-BRIEF.md \
+  ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-v5.md \
+  ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-RATIFICATION.md
+```
+
+Captured result:
+
+```text
+89fdbc27ed0e5050dc7b52f3ef2ddaea691edf17fd89d51b15e26fb5ed47171b  .../compaction-refresh-BUILD-BRIEF.md
+a6d07ade835758e8488ca10d3b0631caf0beb93ea3a6733631f151b0c2f01433  .../compaction-refresh-SPEC-v5.md
+bac58319c9c4028b5b40e1129e0033cdb5a6b7b02033c25f06f4cb77d7779c67  .../compaction-refresh-SPEC-RATIFICATION.md
+```
+
+All three **MATCH**. They were read in full before probe construction. Raw artifact: [`evidence/raw/STEP0-authority-hashes.txt`](./evidence/raw/STEP0-authority-hashes.txt).
+
+## Evidence method
+
+The scripts under [`probes/`](./probes/) are isolated Gate0 instrumentation, not product implementation. They run the installed `mosaic yolo` launcher and real installed runtime binaries. Broker prototypes use Linux `SO_PEERCRED` and `/proc`; runtime adapters are temporary Claude hooks/Pi extensions. No product source under `packages/mosaic` was changed.
+
+Raw-output artifact integrity is indexed at [`evidence/RAW-SHA256SUMS.txt`](./evidence/RAW-SHA256SUMS.txt).
+
+---
+
+## P1 — Launcher exec/parent topology + supported-hook ancestry (D1)
+
+**Verdict: PASS**
+
+### Commands
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_run.py --runtime both
+rg -n "spawnSync|execRuntime" \
+  ~/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/@mosaicstack/mosaic/dist/commands/launch.js | tail -8
+```
+
+Full outputs:
+
+- [`evidence/raw/P1-launch-ancestry.txt`](./evidence/raw/P1-launch-ancestry.txt)
+- [`evidence/raw/P1-claude-hook-events.txt`](./evidence/raw/P1-claude-hook-events.txt)
+
+### Real topology observed
+
+The installed Mosaic launcher does **not** replace itself with the runtime despite its `execRuntime` name; installed `launch.js:668` uses `spawnSync`. The Gate0 anchor first registered, then `execvpe` replaced the anchor with the real `mosaic yolo` process (PID/starttime retained). Mosaic remained the stable parent while it spawned the runtime.
+
+Pi run:
+
+```text
+anchor before exec: pid=4010843 starttime=365919858 exe=/usr/bin/python3.11
+anchor after exec:  pid=4010843 starttime=365919858 exe=/usr/bin/node
+Pi runtime:         pid=4011046 ppid=4010843 starttime=365920219 exe=/usr/bin/node
+
+ps:
+4010843 4010840 Fri Jul 17 19:35:18 2026 1001 1001 node
+4011046 4010843 Fri Jul 17 19:35:22 2026 1001 1001 pi
+```
+
+Claude supported-hook run (latest capture):
+
+```text
+hook python  pid=4011380 starttime=365920845
+  -> /bin/sh pid=4011379 starttime=365920845
+  -> claude  pid=4011285 starttime=365920748
+  -> node/mosaic anchor pid=4011129 starttime=365920380
+```
+
+The stream independently recorded the real hook firing:
+
+```json
+{"type":"system","subtype":"hook_started","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","hook_event":"SessionStart"}
+{"type":"system","subtype":"hook_response","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","exit_code":0,"outcome":"success","stdout":"...GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED..."}
+```
+
+### Authentication and sibling substitution
+
+The broker minted the logical ID on first peercred contact and keyed the anchor by `(pid,starttime)`. It took the hook/extension PID from `SO_PEERCRED`, walked `/proc/<pid>/stat`, and re-read every starttime before accepting.
+
+Real Pi acceptance excerpt:
+
+```json
+{"peercred":{"pid":4011046,"uid":1001,"gid":1001},"decision":"ACCEPT","reason":"ancestry-reaches-registered-anchor","starttimes_rechecked":true}
+```
+
+A separately spawned same-UID sibling was given the real minted victim ID. Its ancestry did not reach the anchor:
+
+```json
+{"attacker_uid":1001,"victim_session_id_known":true,"broker_decision":"REJECT","broker_reason":"victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch"}
+```
+
+The same rejection occurred in both Pi and Claude runs. This is positive runtime evidence for D1/T15a under the supported non-daemonizing topology.
+
+---
+
+## P2 — Pi last-position invariant + nonce map (D5)
+
+**Verdict: PASS**
+
+### Commands
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p2_provider_timing_run.py
+```
+
+Full outputs:
+
+- [`evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt`](./evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt)
+- [`evidence/raw/P2-provider-timing.txt`](./evidence/raw/P2-provider-timing.txt)
+
+### Last-or-closed evidence
+
+Real Pi argv/load order with the probe last:
+
+```json
+{"extensions":[".../mosaic-extension.ts",".../pi_gate0_extension.ts"],"lastPosition":true,"gateState":"UNVERIFIED_READY","pid":4004545}
+```
+
+A second real Pi launch deliberately appended a later handler:
+
+```json
+{"extensions":[".../mosaic-extension.ts",".../pi_gate0_extension.ts",".../pi_later_extension.ts"],"lastPosition":false,"gateState":"CLOSED_NOT_LAST","pid":4005692}
+```
+
+Thus the invariant observed is exactly **last or closed**, not an asserted registration order.
+
+### Exact nonce → tool-call-ID map
+
+In one real GPT-5.6 Sol Pi response, sequence 5 completed the assistant tool-call message and bound its exact ID:
+
+```json
+{"seq":5,"event":"message_end","requestNonce":"e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79","toolCallIds":["call_bgGE...57c"],"nonceMappings":[{"toolCallId":"call_bgGE...57c","requestNonce":"e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79"}]}
+```
+
+The following `tool_call` was sequence 6 and carried the same ID/nonce:
+
+```json
+{"seq":6,"event":"tool_call","toolCallId":"call_bgGE...57c","mapping":{"nonce":"e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79","verified":true},"allowed":true}
+```
+
+The harmless tool executed at sequence 7 with that same tool-call ID. No session-global “current epoch” was borrowed.
+
+### `after_provider_response` is not assistant-content observation
+
+A deterministic localhost HTTP provider was used only to force headers/status exposure through the real Pi transport. Actual order:
+
+```json
+{"seq":4,"event":"before_provider_request"}
+{"seq":5,"event":"after_provider_response","status":200,"assistantContentAvailableAtThisHook":false,"timing":"headers/status before stream consumption"}
+{"seq":6,"event":"message_end","role":"assistant","assistantContentObserved":true}
+```
+
+```text
+headers_hook_precedes_completed_message=True
+```
+
+This positively confirms SPEC-v5’s precision correction: receipt content is observed at `message_end`; `after_provider_response` is status/headers before stream consumption.
+
+---
+
+## P3 — Same-PID `runtime_generation` bump revokes prior lease (D4)
+
+**Verdict: PASS**
+
+### Command
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py
+```
+
+Full output: [`evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt`](./evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt).
+
+The real Pi process identity remained:
+
+```text
+pid=4004545 starttime_ticks=365907677 uid=1001
+```
+
+Broker state around reload:
+
+```json
+{"event":"runtime_generation_bump","reason":"startup","old_generation":0,"new_generation":1,"new_lease_state":"UNVERIFIED"}
+{"event":"probe_lease_promoted","generation":1,"new_lease_state":"VERIFIED"}
+{"event":"runtime_generation_bump","phase":"shutdown","reason":"reload","old_generation":1,"new_generation":2,"prior_lease":"VERIFIED","prior_lease_revoked":true,"new_lease_state":"REVOKED"}
+{"event":"runtime_generation_bump","phase":"start","reason":"reload","old_generation":2,"new_generation":3,"new_lease_state":"UNVERIFIED"}
+```
+
+The same `(pid,starttime)` then emitted monotonic bumps for real `fork`, `new`, and `resume` replacement flows, reaching generation 12. Pi 0.80.7 emitted an additional conservative `session_start` callback in each of those replacement flows; the broker bumped again rather than reusing authority. This is an availability/idempotence consideration for implementation, not a fail-open result.
+
+---
+
+## P4 — `SO_PEERCRED` + socket authenticity posture
+
+**Verdict: PASS, with the spec’s named same-UID T-C residual**
+
+### Command
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p4_peercred_probe.py
+```
+
+Full output: [`evidence/raw/P4-so-peercred.txt`](./evidence/raw/P4-so-peercred.txt).
+
+Captured real socket result:
+
+```text
+server_pid=4013762 server_uid=1001 server_gid=1001
+directory_mode=0700 socket_mode=0600
+SO_PEERCRED pid=4013768 uid=1001 gid=1001
+client_claim={"pid":4013768,"starttime_ticks":365927069,"uid":1001,...}
+proc_observed={"pid":4013768,"starttime_ticks":365927069,"uid":1001,...}
+pid_match=True
+uid_match=True
+starttime_match=True
+client_exit_status=0
+```
+
+Achievable unprivileged posture on this host is a user-owned 0700 parent plus 0600 socket. That excludes other UIDs and positively authenticates the connecting kernel PID/UID/GID. It does **not** stop another process running as `hermes` from unlinking/rebinding the socket. A claim stronger than T-C against counterfeit replacement therefore requires the ratified distinct-principal system service or authenticated broker responses. No stronger claim is made.
+
+---
+
+## P5 — Source invalidation fail-closed
+
+**Verdict: PASS**
+
+### Command
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py
+```
+
+Full output: [`evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt`](./evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt).
+
+Each fault was injected into the manifest/source read by the real Pi `context` hook. Each run reached an actual model-produced `toolCallId`, then the runtime gate refused it:
+
+| Fault | Runtime validation | Injection/promotion | Broker | Tool result |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Missing path | `reason=missing` | `injectionDecision=REFUSED`, `promotion=false` | `source_invalidation_revoke` | `allowed=false`, `unverified-source:missing` |
+| 65 bytes with 64-byte max | `reason=oversize` | `REFUSED`, `promotion=false` | revoked | `allowed=false`, `unverified-source:oversize` |
+| Bytes differ from pinned SHA-256 | `reason=hash-mismatch` | `REFUSED`, `promotion=false` | revoked | `allowed=false`, `unverified-source:hash-mismatch` |
+
+Missing example:
+
+```json
+{"event":"context_return","sourceValidation":{"ok":false,"reason":"missing"},"injectionDecision":"REFUSED","promotion":false,"sourceBroker":{"event":"source_invalidation_revoke","new_lease_state":"REVOKED"}}
+{"event":"tool_call","mapping":{"verified":false,"sourceReason":"missing"},"allowed":false,"reason":"unverified-source:missing"}
+```
+
+No fault case reached tool execution or promotion.
+
+---
+
+## P6 — Atomic Claude `additionalContext` + Pi `context` injection (A-v5-1 / T27)
+
+**Verdict: T-C GAP — returns to planner**
+
+### Commands
+
+```bash
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py
+python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p6_claude_run.py
+rg -n -i "atomic|prefix-preserv" <installed Pi and Claude hook docs>
+```
+
+Full outputs:
+
+- [`evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt`](./evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt)
+- [`evidence/raw/P6-claude-additional-context.txt`](./evidence/raw/P6-claude-additional-context.txt)
+- [`evidence/raw/P6-contract-gap.txt`](./evidence/raw/P6-contract-gap.txt)
+
+### Positive empirical observations
+
+**Pi:** The real `context` hook returned exactly one additional `AgentMessage`; the prior message prefix hash was unchanged. The real final provider payload contained exactly one occurrence in one content item, and the real model copied all bytes exactly:
+
+```json
+{"event":"context_return","inputCount":1,"outputCount":2,"injectionDecision":"ONE_ATOMIC_AGENT_MESSAGE","prefixPreservedByReturn":true,"blockLength":108,"blockSha256":"99c3...a0dd"}
+{"event":"before_provider_request","markerOccurrences":1,"markerPaths":["$.input[1].content[0].text"],"finalPayloadValid":true}
+{"event":"message_end","exactContextBlockCopied":true,"assistantTextSha256":"99c3...a0dd"}
+```
+
+**Claude:** The real `SessionStart` hook emitted one `hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext` string. Claude’s stream recorded successful hook execution, and the real model’s exact copied block matched byte length and SHA-256:
+
+```text
+block_length=116
+block_sha256=ef6377d63552af075f4f4adec00165988418c5f46a992f4dce8e678b56fd34ac
+assistant_copy_length=116
+assistant_copy_sha256=ef6377d63552af075f4f4adec00165988418c5f46a992f4dce8e678b56fd34ac
+assistant_copy_exact=True
+```
+
+### Why this is not a PASS
+
+The installed Pi documentation says only that `context` receives a deep copy and may return `{ messages }`. The installed Claude documentation says only that `additionalContext` enters/adds to context/system prompt. The exact search result was:
+
+```text
+NO MATCH: neither installed runtime document states an atomic/prefix-preserving transport guarantee.
+```
+
+One or several successful complete deliveries cannot prove the transport invariant needed by A-v5-1. In particular, a harness-side middle deletion/replacement that preserves the terminal receipt is not detectable by the receipt. That is precisely R1’s assurance boundary. Therefore:
+
+- absent or prefix-truncated terminal token: receipt-detectable;
+- middle-drop preserving the tail token: **not receipt-detectable**;
+- no documented runtime contract excludes that transform;
+- classification: **T-C contract gap**.
+
+No atomicity claim is inferred from empirical success.
+
+---
+
+## Independent probe review
+
+After an initial review identified a session-global P2 correlation flaw, the probe was changed to queue request-scoped cycles from `before_provider_request` through assistant `message_end`; all runtime probes were re-run and raw checksums regenerated. The final independent review command was:
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh \
+  -b d801d6c4c8a984d6a95033c49714210018d3d9a8 \
+  -o /tmp/827-gate0-rereview.json
+```
+
+Final review: **APPROVE**, confidence 0.91, 18 files reviewed, 0 blockers, 0 should-fix findings, 0 suggestions.
+
+## Final admission decision
+
+Gate0 requires every item to produce positive runtime evidence. P6 does not. **Do not admit WI-1..WI-7. Return A-v5-1/T27 to planner review.**
+
+No feature work, push, PR, merge, or issue closure was performed.
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+d19ed51612b52d8f5f4957321776e05157008d048b693217c03d71318dc4c763  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P1-claude-hook-events.txt
+c2d7bc21200063a4a0e61c67ba91abaf958ee88aa686e86f3f71c2717732b413  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P1-launch-ancestry.txt
+6efb12d908e9e20badcfda5b070aa1873409bd5a05f533f0b08bb1b4ef53d1a7  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P2-P3-P5-P6-pi.txt
+a9df6cc9f5d45f60d7d914ad1f80b9601574b82831101b3a10eccf1b93787e94  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P2-provider-timing.txt
+92e7aa7d69d53e58a151f9d56cfb583d90c206ecc0bc8a1b185e172c598fb177  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P4-so-peercred.txt
+047d235c6b6553158e27378c4ace081b094e5746734f4b5db6a6dc8ef9e05ff2  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P6-claude-additional-context.txt
+7df20b2878fc87aa4d1fc89121e494d8f4f7bf313b89e1e3147f16fdaa567cdd  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/P6-contract-gap.txt
+405bf3a06bf355d7f4f4d7b29d45a1ae70d93a690af5f7d0fc4819249e9f408f  docs/compaction-refresh/evidence/raw/STEP0-authority-hashes.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_run.py --runtime claude
+=== P1 CLAUDE REAL LAUNCH ===
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_anchor_exec.py --socket <protected-socket> claude <runtime args>
+registered_anchor={"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933580, "ppid": 3933578, "starttime_ticks": 365788075}
+broker_minted_session_id=ebe9f9146ad1ba5b9fd757fe9517d24b
+hook_or_extension_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 2, "argv0": "python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933983, "ppid": 3933982, "starttime_ticks": 365788568}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/sh", "comm": "sh", "exe": "/usr/bin/dash", "pid": 3933982, "ppid": 3933751, "starttime_ticks": 365788568}, {"argc": 16, "argv0": "claude", "comm": "claude", "exe": "/home/hermes/.local/share/claude/versions/2.1.205", "pid": 3933751, "ppid": 3933580, "starttime_ticks": 365788474}, {"argc": 16, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3933580, "ppid": 3933578, "starttime_ticks": 365788075}], "anchor": {"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933580, "ppid": 3933578, "starttime_ticks": 365788075}, "claimed_session_id": null, "decision": "ACCEPT", "event": "resolve-hook", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 3933983, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "ancestry-reaches-registered-anchor", "resolved_session_id": "ebe9f9146ad1ba5b9fd757fe9517d24b", "starttimes_rechecked": true}
+sibling_attack_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 6, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933581, "ppid": 3933578, "starttime_ticks": 365788080}, {"argc": 4, "argv0": "python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933578, "ppid": 3933576, "starttime_ticks": 365788059}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 3933576, "ppid": 3933575, "starttime_ticks": 365788058}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 3933575, "ppid": 3888118, "starttime_ticks": 365788058}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "pi", "comm": "pi", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3888118, "ppid": 3887912, "starttime_ticks": 365707392}, {"argc": 6, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3887912, "ppid": 3887869, "starttime_ticks": 365707050}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "-bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 3887869, "ppid": 1244054, "starttime_ticks": 365706948}, {"argc": 10, "argv0": "tmux", "comm": "tmux: server", "exe": "/usr/bin/tmux", "pid": 1244054, "ppid": 745, "starttime_ticks": 114078803}, {"argc": 2, "argv0": "/lib/systemd/systemd", "comm": "systemd", "exe": "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "pid": 745, "ppid": 1, "starttime_ticks": 627}], "anchor": {"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 3933580, "ppid": 3933578, "starttime_ticks": 365788075}, "claimed_session_id": "ebe9f9146ad1ba5b9fd757fe9517d24b", "decision": "REJECT", "event": "claim-session", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 3933581, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "resolved_session_id": null, "starttimes_rechecked": false}
+sibling_process_stdout={"attacker_pid": 3933581, "attacker_uid": 1001, "broker_decision": "REJECT", "broker_reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "victim_session_id_known": true}
+sibling_process_exit=0
+ps_snapshot=<hook chain exited; broker /proc snapshot above is authoritative>
+launcher_stderr_excerpt:
+  {"argv": ["mosaic", "yolo", "claude", "<12 runtime args>"], "event": "anchor-exec", "note": "os.execvpe retains pid and /proc starttime", "pid": 3933580}
+runtime_stdout_excerpt:
+  
+  [mosaic] Claude Code settings audit:
+    ⚠ Missing PreToolUse hook: prevent-memory-write.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: qa-hook-stdin.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: typecheck-hook.sh
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: feature-dev
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: pr-review-toolkit
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: code-review
+runtime_hook_event_excerpt:
+    ⚠ Missing PreToolUse hook: prevent-memory-write.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: qa-hook-stdin.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: typecheck-hook.sh
+  {"type":"system","subtype":"hook_started","hook_id":"cadd5ded-a869-4b05-85fc-cfd1a4988217","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","hook_event":"SessionStart","uuid":"b63d67bf-2247-4e1c-b16b-7ccffa73180b","session_id":"97e1224c-7c1c-42c7-9fb5-598d2cd3dfaf"}
+  {"type":"system","subtype":"hook_response","hook_id":"cadd5ded-a869-4b05-85fc-cfd1a4988217","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","hook_event":"SessionStart","output":"{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED\"}}\n","stdout":"{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED\"}}\n","stderr":"","exit_code":0,"outcome":"success","uuid":"b2bb583d-d287-4b56-8061-09153a32adc2","session_id":"97e1224c-7c1c-42c7-9fb5-598d2cd3dfaf"}
+
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_run.py --runtime both
+=== P1 PI REAL LAUNCH ===
+machine_assertions=PASS
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_anchor_exec.py --socket <protected-socket> pi <runtime args>
+registered_anchor={"argc": 13, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010843, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365919858}
+broker_minted_session_id=5207bd0d8251b616fe4df4c68f438830
+hook_or_extension_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 1, "argv0": "pi", "comm": "pi", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 4011046, "ppid": 4010843, "starttime_ticks": 365920219}, {"argc": 12, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 4010843, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365919858}], "anchor": {"argc": 13, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010843, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365919858}, "claimed_session_id": null, "decision": "ACCEPT", "event": "resolve-hook", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4011046, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "ancestry-reaches-registered-anchor", "resolved_session_id": "5207bd0d8251b616fe4df4c68f438830", "starttimes_rechecked": true}
+sibling_attack_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 6, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010844, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365919864}, {"argc": 4, "argv0": "python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010840, "ppid": 4010838, "starttime_ticks": 365919843}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 4010838, "ppid": 4010837, "starttime_ticks": 365919843}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 4010837, "ppid": 3888118, "starttime_ticks": 365919842}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "pi", "comm": "pi", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3888118, "ppid": 3887912, "starttime_ticks": 365707392}, {"argc": 6, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3887912, "ppid": 3887869, "starttime_ticks": 365707050}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "-bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 3887869, "ppid": 1244054, "starttime_ticks": 365706948}, {"argc": 10, "argv0": "tmux", "comm": "tmux: server", "exe": "/usr/bin/tmux", "pid": 1244054, "ppid": 745, "starttime_ticks": 114078803}, {"argc": 2, "argv0": "/lib/systemd/systemd", "comm": "systemd", "exe": "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "pid": 745, "ppid": 1, "starttime_ticks": 627}], "anchor": {"argc": 13, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010843, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365919858}, "claimed_session_id": "5207bd0d8251b616fe4df4c68f438830", "decision": "REJECT", "event": "claim-session", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4010844, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "resolved_session_id": null, "starttimes_rechecked": false}
+sibling_process_stdout={"attacker_pid": 4010844, "attacker_uid": 1001, "broker_decision": "REJECT", "broker_reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "victim_session_id_known": true}
+sibling_process_exit=0
+$ ps -o pid=,ppid=,lstart=,uid=,gid=,comm= -p 4011046,4010843
+4010843 4010840 Fri Jul 17 19:35:18 2026  1001  1001 node
+4011046 4010843 Fri Jul 17 19:35:22 2026  1001  1001 pi
+launcher_stderr_excerpt:
+  {"argv": ["mosaic", "yolo", "pi", "<8 runtime args>"], "event": "anchor-exec", "note": "os.execvpe retains pid and /proc starttime", "pid": 4010843}
+runtime_stdout_excerpt:
+  [mosaic] Launching Pi in YOLO mode...
+  {"type":"extension_ui_request","id":"4cf086c7-299e-4734-9264-6ad2964f3664","method":"notify","message":"Mosaic framework loaded","notifyType":"info"}
+  {"id":"state","type":"response","command":"get_state","success":true,"data":{"model":{"id":"gpt-5.6-sol","name":"GPT-5.6 Sol","api":"openai-codex-responses","provider":"openai-codex","baseUrl":"https://chatgpt.com/backend-api","compat":{"supportsToolSearch":true},"reasoning":true,"thinkingLevelMap":{"xhigh":"xhigh","max":"max","minimal":"low"},"input":["text","image"],"cost":{"input":5,"output":30,"cacheRead":0.5,"cacheWrite":6.25,"tiers":[{"inputTokensAbove":272000,"input":10,"output":45,"cache
+runtime_hook_event_excerpt:
+
+=== P1 CLAUDE REAL LAUNCH ===
+machine_assertions=PASS
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_anchor_exec.py --socket <protected-socket> claude <runtime args>
+registered_anchor={"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4011129, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365920380}
+broker_minted_session_id=f382fa5f4b2142ef79bb76204521ff2a
+hook_or_extension_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 2, "argv0": "python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4011380, "ppid": 4011379, "starttime_ticks": 365920845}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/sh", "comm": "sh", "exe": "/usr/bin/dash", "pid": 4011379, "ppid": 4011285, "starttime_ticks": 365920845}, {"argc": 16, "argv0": "claude", "comm": "claude", "exe": "/home/hermes/.local/share/claude/versions/2.1.205", "pid": 4011285, "ppid": 4011129, "starttime_ticks": 365920748}, {"argc": 16, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 4011129, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365920380}], "anchor": {"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4011129, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365920380}, "claimed_session_id": null, "decision": "ACCEPT", "event": "resolve-hook", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4011380, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "ancestry-reaches-registered-anchor", "resolved_session_id": "f382fa5f4b2142ef79bb76204521ff2a", "starttimes_rechecked": true}
+sibling_attack_record={"ancestry": [{"argc": 6, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4011130, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365920385}, {"argc": 4, "argv0": "python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4010840, "ppid": 4010838, "starttime_ticks": 365919843}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 4010838, "ppid": 4010837, "starttime_ticks": 365919843}, {"argc": 3, "argv0": "/bin/bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 4010837, "ppid": 3888118, "starttime_ticks": 365919842}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "pi", "comm": "pi", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3888118, "ppid": 3887912, "starttime_ticks": 365707392}, {"argc": 6, "argv0": "node", "comm": "node", "exe": "/usr/bin/node", "pid": 3887912, "ppid": 3887869, "starttime_ticks": 365707050}, {"argc": 1, "argv0": "-bash", "comm": "bash", "exe": "/usr/bin/bash", "pid": 3887869, "ppid": 1244054, "starttime_ticks": 365706948}, {"argc": 10, "argv0": "tmux", "comm": "tmux: server", "exe": "/usr/bin/tmux", "pid": 1244054, "ppid": 745, "starttime_ticks": 114078803}, {"argc": 2, "argv0": "/lib/systemd/systemd", "comm": "systemd", "exe": "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", "pid": 745, "ppid": 1, "starttime_ticks": 627}], "anchor": {"argc": 17, "argv0": "/usr/bin/python3", "comm": "python3", "exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4011129, "ppid": 4010840, "starttime_ticks": 365920380}, "claimed_session_id": "f382fa5f4b2142ef79bb76204521ff2a", "decision": "REJECT", "event": "claim-session", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4011130, "uid": 1001}, "reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "resolved_session_id": null, "starttimes_rechecked": false}
+sibling_process_stdout={"attacker_pid": 4011130, "attacker_uid": 1001, "broker_decision": "REJECT", "broker_reason": "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch", "victim_session_id_known": true}
+sibling_process_exit=0
+ps_snapshot=<hook chain exited; broker /proc snapshot above is authoritative>
+launcher_stderr_excerpt:
+  {"argv": ["mosaic", "yolo", "claude", "<12 runtime args>"], "event": "anchor-exec", "note": "os.execvpe retains pid and /proc starttime", "pid": 4011129}
+runtime_stdout_excerpt:
+  
+  [mosaic] Claude Code settings audit:
+    ⚠ Missing PreToolUse hook: prevent-memory-write.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: qa-hook-stdin.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: typecheck-hook.sh
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: feature-dev
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: pr-review-toolkit
+    ⚠ Missing plugin: code-review
+runtime_hook_event_excerpt:
+    ⚠ Missing PreToolUse hook: prevent-memory-write.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: qa-hook-stdin.sh
+    ⚠ Missing PostToolUse hook: typecheck-hook.sh
+  {"type":"system","subtype":"hook_started","hook_id":"2a5f7dab-a064-4610-a6b1-4ad151ddcdd9","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","hook_event":"SessionStart","uuid":"c6e0690c-f0c9-4d60-a8fb-5f0c25ea3208","session_id":"167d104d-907a-4120-9b07-bdf4762818a9"}
+  {"type":"system","subtype":"hook_response","hook_id":"2a5f7dab-a064-4610-a6b1-4ad151ddcdd9","hook_name":"SessionStart:startup","hook_event":"SessionStart","output":"{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED\"}}\n","stdout":"{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED\"}}\n","stderr":"","exit_code":0,"outcome":"success","uuid":"167b2a5b-a45a-4e70-a72b-1f4a609bb979","session_id":"167d104d-907a-4120-9b07-bdf4762818a9"}
+
+
+$ readlink -f "$(command -v mosaic)"
+/home/hermes/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/@mosaicstack/mosaic/dist/cli.js
+
+$ rg -n "spawnSync|execRuntime" ~/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/@mosaicstack/mosaic/dist/commands/launch.js | tail -8
+63:            spawnSync(initBin, [], { stdio: 'inherit' });
+131:    const result = spawnSync(checker, ['--check', '--runtime', runtime], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+624:            execRuntime('claude', cliArgs);
+637:            execRuntime('codex', cliArgs);
+643:            execRuntime('opencode', args);
+658:            execRuntime('pi', cliArgs);
+665:function execRuntime(cmd, args) {
+668:        const result = spawnSync(cmd, args, {
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py
+machine_assertions=PASS
+runtime_versions:
+  0.80.7
+  0.0.48
+
+P2_EVENT_ORDER_AND_NONCE_MAP:
+{"assistantContentObserved": true, "assistantTextSha256": "a36f1eb364f062cad2f9f7d7e2b62ef7715d2aef79caafcfccd3a227cecf3e61", "event": "message_end", "exactContextBlockCopied": false, "inFlightDepthAfter": 0, "nonceMappings": [{"requestNonce": "e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79", "toolCallId": "call_bgGEFnBJOmwJPEfmzMo1eHOy|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9d6f9a4819b9ddf70296c0cf57c"}], "pid": 4004545, "requestNonce": "e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79", "role": "assistant", "seq": 5, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallIds": ["call_bgGEFnBJOmwJPEfmzMo1eHOy|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9d6f9a4819b9ddf70296c0cf57c"]}
+{"allowed": true, "event": "tool_call", "mapping": {"nonce": "e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79", "sourceReason": "all-fragments-valid", "verified": true}, "pid": 4004545, "reason": "exact-tool-call-id-mapped-to-verified-request-nonce", "seq": 6, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallId": "call_bgGEFnBJOmwJPEfmzMo1eHOy|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9d6f9a4819b9ddf70296c0cf57c", "toolName": "gate0_nonce_probe"}
+{"broker": {"event": "probe_lease_promoted", "generation": 1, "new_lease_state": "VERIFIED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}, "event": "tool_execute", "label": "p2", "pid": 4004545, "seq": 7, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallId": "call_bgGEFnBJOmwJPEfmzMo1eHOy|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9d6f9a4819b9ddf70296c0cf57c"}
+{"assistantContentObserved": true, "assistantTextSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "message_end", "exactContextBlockCopied": true, "inFlightDepthAfter": 0, "nonceMappings": [], "pid": 4004545, "requestNonce": "cca4b1e3-296a-4e4c-9805-a395c270c01f", "role": "assistant", "seq": 11, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallIds": []}
+
+P2_LAST_OR_CLOSED:
+{"broker": {"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 1, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 0, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "NONE", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "startup", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}, "event": "session_start", "extensions": ["/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts", "/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_extension.ts"], "gateState": "UNVERIFIED_READY", "lastPosition": true, "pid": 4004545, "reason": "startup", "self": "/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_extension.ts", "seq": 1, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"broker": {"skipped": true}, "event": "session_start", "extensions": ["/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts", "/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_extension.ts", "/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_later_extension.ts"], "gateState": "CLOSED_NOT_LAST", "lastPosition": false, "pid": 4005692, "reason": "startup", "self": "/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_extension.ts", "seq": 1, "starttime_ticks": 365910545}
+
+P3_GENERATION_BROKER:
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 1, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 0, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "NONE", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "startup", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "probe_lease_promoted", "generation": 1, "new_lease_state": "VERIFIED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 2, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "old_generation": 1, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "shutdown", "prior_lease": "VERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "reload", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 3, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 2, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "reload", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 4, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "old_generation": 3, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "shutdown", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "fork", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 5, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 4, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "fork", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 6, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 5, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "fork", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 7, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "old_generation": 6, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "shutdown", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "new", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 8, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 7, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "new", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 9, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 8, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "new", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 10, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "old_generation": 9, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "shutdown", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "resume", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 11, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 10, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "resume", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "runtime_generation_bump", "new_generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "UNVERIFIED", "old_generation": 11, "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "phase": "start", "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "prior_lease_revoked": true, "reason": "resume", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+
+P5_SOURCE_INVALIDATION:
+{"blockLength": 108, "blockSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "context_return", "injectionDecision": "REFUSED", "inputCount": 5, "lastPosition": true, "outputCount": 5, "pid": 4004545, "prefixHashAfter": "4f339e3e45989486374b75d8a40abad22a3f3091f1099e3b4112f3afd1c60eb0", "prefixHashBefore": "4f339e3e45989486374b75d8a40abad22a3f3091f1099e3b4112f3afd1c60eb0", "prefixPreservedByReturn": true, "promotion": false, "requestNonce": "24ef5352-bcc6-4418-b65f-c2763453cc46", "seq": 12, "sourceBroker": {"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "missing", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}, "sourceValidation": {"fragment": "/tmp/gate0-pi-g_3gsk34/absent-fragment.md", "ok": false, "reason": "missing"}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"allowed": false, "event": "tool_call", "mapping": {"nonce": "24ef5352-bcc6-4418-b65f-c2763453cc46", "sourceReason": "missing", "verified": false}, "pid": 4004545, "reason": "unverified-source:missing", "seq": 15, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallId": "call_XBwBkiv5tZx2ayuDxHKD5vSB|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9dc341c819bb6ed3e00ca2cf1a5", "toolName": "gate0_nonce_probe"}
+{"blockLength": 108, "blockSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "context_return", "injectionDecision": "REFUSED", "inputCount": 9, "lastPosition": true, "outputCount": 9, "pid": 4004545, "prefixHashAfter": "1a39911018caefe8f5b5acb652cece9f92d937e7384109f5c1559266349480b7", "prefixHashBefore": "1a39911018caefe8f5b5acb652cece9f92d937e7384109f5c1559266349480b7", "prefixPreservedByReturn": true, "promotion": false, "requestNonce": "319646e8-59e2-4021-9b27-de1376b13c32", "seq": 22, "sourceBroker": {"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "oversize", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}, "sourceValidation": {"fragment": "/tmp/gate0-pi-g_3gsk34/oversize.md", "ok": false, "reason": "oversize"}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"allowed": false, "event": "tool_call", "mapping": {"nonce": "319646e8-59e2-4021-9b27-de1376b13c32", "sourceReason": "oversize", "verified": false}, "pid": 4004545, "reason": "unverified-source:oversize", "seq": 25, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallId": "call_P9d0wR5TSXSqZHydVHclh6Cg|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9e02a28819bb39df373b7c9e23b", "toolName": "gate0_nonce_probe"}
+{"blockLength": 108, "blockSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "context_return", "injectionDecision": "REFUSED", "inputCount": 13, "lastPosition": true, "outputCount": 13, "pid": 4004545, "prefixHashAfter": "224c8777dd0cd5fcf1ae02f0fc46198548b48647dbfd044ed131533d72086f16", "prefixHashBefore": "224c8777dd0cd5fcf1ae02f0fc46198548b48647dbfd044ed131533d72086f16", "prefixPreservedByReturn": true, "promotion": false, "requestNonce": "23f3125f-6e62-4f3c-aa60-3eaed705ddc1", "seq": 32, "sourceBroker": {"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "hash-mismatch", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}, "sourceValidation": {"fragment": "/tmp/gate0-pi-g_3gsk34/mismatch.md", "ok": false, "reason": "hash-mismatch"}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"allowed": false, "event": "tool_call", "mapping": {"nonce": "23f3125f-6e62-4f3c-aa60-3eaed705ddc1", "sourceReason": "hash-mismatch", "verified": false}, "pid": 4004545, "reason": "unverified-source:hash-mismatch", "seq": 35, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallId": "call_QUMvqBRnzv6HNqEd37jU5NUw|fc_0fb3d12b5404a73c016a5ac9e37510819b8506879faf287aa3", "toolName": "gate0_nonce_probe"}
+{"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "UNVERIFIED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "missing", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "oversize", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "source_invalidation_revoke", "generation": 12, "new_lease_state": "REVOKED", "peercred": {"gid": 1001, "pid": 4004545, "uid": 1001}, "prior_lease": "REVOKED", "promotion": false, "source_reason": "hash-mismatch", "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+
+P6_PI_CONTEXT_ATOMIC_OBSERVATION:
+{"blockLength": 108, "blockSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "context_return", "injectionDecision": "ONE_ATOMIC_AGENT_MESSAGE", "inputCount": 1, "lastPosition": true, "outputCount": 2, "pid": 4004545, "prefixHashAfter": "095a5415879b0d4006d1485dba3398fee6bf39850711ba0dc2e9cfa312e865dc", "prefixHashBefore": "095a5415879b0d4006d1485dba3398fee6bf39850711ba0dc2e9cfa312e865dc", "prefixPreservedByReturn": true, "promotion": false, "requestNonce": "e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79", "seq": 3, "sourceBroker": {"action": "none", "reason": "source-valid"}, "sourceValidation": {"ok": true, "reason": "all-fragments-valid"}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "before_provider_request", "finalPayloadValid": true, "inFlightDepth": 1, "markerOccurrences": 1, "markerPaths": ["$.input[1].content[0].text"], "pid": 4004545, "requestNonce": "e5a82358-a6c9-490b-a0de-2e1f1d9b8d79", "seq": 4, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"blockLength": 108, "blockSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "context_return", "injectionDecision": "ONE_ATOMIC_AGENT_MESSAGE", "inputCount": 3, "lastPosition": true, "outputCount": 4, "pid": 4004545, "prefixHashAfter": "7c40cce3664af7581b21ea007a4a44764237fce1e4f16b031e96d60df2229855", "prefixHashBefore": "7c40cce3664af7581b21ea007a4a44764237fce1e4f16b031e96d60df2229855", "prefixPreservedByReturn": true, "promotion": false, "requestNonce": "cca4b1e3-296a-4e4c-9805-a395c270c01f", "seq": 9, "sourceBroker": {"action": "none", "reason": "source-valid"}, "sourceValidation": {"ok": true, "reason": "all-fragments-valid"}, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"event": "before_provider_request", "finalPayloadValid": true, "inFlightDepth": 1, "markerOccurrences": 1, "markerPaths": ["$.input[5].content[0].text"], "pid": 4004545, "requestNonce": "cca4b1e3-296a-4e4c-9805-a395c270c01f", "seq": 10, "starttime_ticks": 365907677}
+{"assistantContentObserved": true, "assistantTextSha256": "99c3dce194b16405dfb555f126ee5ccc014fdc184d0882aee1a903cbc700a0dd", "event": "message_end", "exactContextBlockCopied": true, "inFlightDepthAfter": 0, "nonceMappings": [], "pid": 4004545, "requestNonce": "cca4b1e3-296a-4e4c-9805-a395c270c01f", "role": "assistant", "seq": 11, "starttime_ticks": 365907677, "toolCallIds": []}
+
+RPC_EVENT_COUNTS:
+{"agent_end": 4, "agent_settled": 4, "agent_start": 4, "extension_ui_request": 8, "message_end": 16, "message_start": 16, "message_update": 105, "response": 9, "tool_execution_end": 4, "tool_execution_start": 4, "turn_end": 8, "turn_start": 8}
+stderr_nonempty=False
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p2_provider_timing_run.py
+local_http_endpoint=http://127.0.0.1:42823/v1/chat/completions
+{"event": "before_provider_request", "finalPayloadValid": true, "inFlightDepth": 1, "markerOccurrences": 1, "markerPaths": ["$.messages[2].content[0].text"], "pid": 4008778, "requestNonce": "056b82c4-36eb-420b-94cf-b2c73813ef79", "seq": 4, "starttime_ticks": 365916346}
+{"assistantContentAvailableAtThisHook": false, "event": "after_provider_response", "pid": 4008778, "requestNonce": "056b82c4-36eb-420b-94cf-b2c73813ef79", "seq": 5, "starttime_ticks": 365916346, "status": 200, "timing": "headers/status before stream consumption"}
+{"assistantContentObserved": true, "assistantTextSha256": "fb4ebaab26d63661040dc15925a99e22dc07ee2b33df5c6b2ca93a5b34f08b1d", "event": "message_end", "exactContextBlockCopied": false, "inFlightDepthAfter": 0, "nonceMappings": [], "pid": 4008778, "requestNonce": "056b82c4-36eb-420b-94cf-b2c73813ef79", "role": "assistant", "seq": 6, "starttime_ticks": 365916346, "toolCallIds": []}
+machine_assertions=PASS
+after_provider_response_seq=5
+message_end_seq=6
+headers_hook_precedes_completed_message=True
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p4_peercred_probe.py
+machine_assertions=PASS
+server_pid=4013762 server_uid=1001 server_gid=1001
+socket_path=/tmp/gate0-p4-nl1_8ap2/broker.sock
+directory_mode=0700 socket_mode=0600
+SO_PEERCRED pid=4013768 uid=1001 gid=1001
+client_claim={"exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4013768, "ppid": 4013762, "starttime_ticks": 365927069, "uid": 1001}
+proc_observed={"exe": "/usr/bin/python3.11", "pid": 4013768, "ppid": 4013762, "starttime_ticks": 365927069, "uid": 1001}
+pid_match=True
+uid_match=True
+starttime_match=True
+client_exit_status=0
+same_principal_socket=true
+posture=0700 parent + 0600 socket excludes other UIDs, but does not prevent the same UID from unlinking/rebinding; distinct-principal system service remains required for a claim stronger than T-C against same-UID counterfeit replacement
+
+$ id
+uid=1001(hermes) gid=1001(hermes) groups=1001(hermes),40(src),100(users),996(docker)
+
+$ uname -srmo
+Linux 6.1.0-48-amd64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
+
+$ getconf CLK_TCK
+100
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p6_claude_run.py
+machine_assertions=PASS
+command=mosaic yolo claude --settings <isolated> --model haiku --print --output-format stream-json --verbose --include-hook-events <prompt>
+claude_version=2.1.205 (Claude Code)
+mosaic_version=0.0.48
+exit_code=0
+hook_process_log={"block_length": 116, "block_sha256": "ef6377d63552af075f4f4adec00165988418c5f46a992f4dce8e678b56fd34ac", "emission": "one hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext string field", "hook_event_name": "SessionStart", "pid": 4015703, "ppid": 4015701, "starttime_ticks": 365930489}
+hook_stream_event={"hook_event": "SessionStart", "hook_id": "557d613e-574f-4523-8bfb-8c6e51946035", "hook_name": "SessionStart:startup", "session_id": "f821d0db-1177-4237-8ff5-83b2a46996a6", "subtype": "hook_started", "type": "system", "uuid": "59449134-e2d4-43a9-9d34-b59e74622c08"}
+hook_stream_event={"exit_code": 0, "hook_event": "SessionStart", "hook_id": "557d613e-574f-4523-8bfb-8c6e51946035", "hook_name": "SessionStart:startup", "outcome": "success", "output": "{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN\\nsegment-01=alpha-2d11\\nsegment-02=middle-8e22\\nsegment-03=omega-4f33\\nGATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END\"}}\n", "session_id": "f821d0db-1177-4237-8ff5-83b2a46996a6", "stderr": "", "stdout": "{\"hookSpecificOutput\": {\"hookEventName\": \"SessionStart\", \"additionalContext\": \"GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN\\nsegment-01=alpha-2d11\\nsegment-02=middle-8e22\\nsegment-03=omega-4f33\\nGATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END\"}}\n", "subtype": "hook_response", "type": "system", "uuid": "e05842c1-813a-41dd-93c9-768eb834f260"}
+block_length=116
+block_sha256=ef6377d63552af075f4f4adec00165988418c5f46a992f4dce8e678b56fd34ac
+stream_fields_containing_full_block=3
+stream_fields_exactly_equal_block=2
+assistant_copy_length=449
+assistant_copy_sha256=a65febbb3ad8fa4952894d94406a83a520ef712c0ecb9ab43be3212094b21ba1
+assistant_copy_exact=False
+assistant_copy="The user is asking me to return the exact GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC block that was injected by SessionStart. This block was provided in the system-reminder at the beginning of the conversation:\n\n```\nGATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN\nsegment-01=alpha-2d11\nsegment-02=middle-8e22\nsegment-03=omega-4f33\nGATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END\n```\n\nThe user wants me to return ONLY this exact block, with no code fence or commentary. So I should just output it exactly as it appears."
+assistant_copy_length=116
+assistant_copy_sha256=ef6377d63552af075f4f4adec00165988418c5f46a992f4dce8e678b56fd34ac
+assistant_copy_exact=True
+assistant_copy="GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN\nsegment-01=alpha-2d11\nsegment-02=middle-8e22\nsegment-03=omega-4f33\nGATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END"
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+$ rg -n -i "atomic|prefix-preserv" <Pi extensions docs> <Claude hook docs>
+NO MATCH: neither installed runtime document states an atomic/prefix-preserving transport guarantee.
+
+$ rg -n -C 3 "#### context|event.messages - deep copy|return \{ messages" <Pi extensions docs>
+638-});
+639-```
+640-
+641:#### context
+642-
+643-Fired before each LLM call. Modify messages non-destructively. See [Session Format](session-format.md) for message types.
+644-
+645-```typescript
+646-pi.on("context", async (event, ctx) => {
+647:  // event.messages - deep copy, safe to modify
+648-  const filtered = event.messages.filter(m => !shouldPrune(m));
+649:  return { messages: filtered };
+650-});
+651-```
+652-
+
+$ rg -n -C 3 "additionalContext|add to the default system prompt" <Claude installed docs>
+/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md-58-  tiered models via the Task `model` param).
+/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md-59-
+/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md-60-Note: PostToolUse hook plain stdout on exit 0 goes to the debug log, not model context — only
+/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md:61:`hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext` (or exit-2 stderr) enters context.
+--
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-59-expressed as
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-60-[subagents](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/sub-agents), not as
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-61-SessionStart hooks. Subagents change the system prompt while SessionStart hooks
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md:62:add to the default system prompt.
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-63-
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-64-## Managing changes
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/README.md-65-
+--
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-1-#!/usr/bin/env bash
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-2-
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh:3:# Output the explanatory mode instructions as additionalContext
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-4-# This mimics the deprecated Explanatory output style
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-5-
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-6-cat << 'EOF'
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-7-{
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-8-  "hookSpecificOutput": {
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-9-    "hookEventName": "SessionStart",
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh:10:    "additionalContext": "You are in 'explanatory' output style mode, where you should provide educational insights about the codebase as you help with the user's task.\n\nYou should be clear and educational, providing helpful explanations while remaining focused on the task. Balance educational content with task completion. When providing insights, you may exceed typical length constraints, but remain focused and relevant.\n\n## Insights\nIn order to encourage learning, before and after writing code, always provide brief educational explanations about implementation choices using (with backticks):\n\"`★ Insight ─────────────────────────────────────`\n[2-3 key educational points]\n`─────────────────────────────────────────────────`\"\n\nThese insights should be included in the conversation, not in the codebase. You should generally focus on interesting insights that are specific to the codebase or the code you just wrote, rather than general programming concepts. Do not wait until the end to provide insights. Provide them as you write code."
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-11-  }
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-12-}
+/home/hermes/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/claude-plugins-official/plugins/explanatory-output-style/hooks-handlers/session-start.sh-13-EOF
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+$ sha256sum ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-BUILD-BRIEF.md ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-v5.md ~/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-RATIFICATION.md
+89fdbc27ed0e5050dc7b52f3ef2ddaea691edf17fd89d51b15e26fb5ed47171b  /home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-BUILD-BRIEF.md
+a6d07ade835758e8488ca10d3b0631caf0beb93ea3a6733631f151b0c2f01433  /home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-v5.md
+bac58319c9c4028b5b40e1129e0033cdb5a6b7b02033c25f06f4cb77d7779c67  /home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/compaction-refresh-SPEC-RATIFICATION.md
+
+Expected:
+89fdbc27ed0e5050dc7b52f3ef2ddaea691edf17fd89d51b15e26fb5ed47171b  BUILD-BRIEF
+a6d07ade835758e8488ca10d3b0631caf0beb93ea3a6733631f151b0c2f01433  SPEC-v5
+bac58319c9c4028b5b40e1129e0033cdb5a6b7b02033c25f06f4cb77d7779c67  RATIFICATION
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Register this PID as anchor, then exec the real `mosaic yolo` launcher."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+
+
+def request(socket_path: str, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    conn = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    conn.connect(socket_path)
+    conn.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode())
+    response = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+    conn.close()
+    return response
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("runtime", choices=["pi", "claude"])
+    parser.add_argument("args", nargs=argparse.REMAINDER)
+    ns = parser.parse_args()
+
+    response = request(ns.socket, {"action": "register-anchor", "runtime": ns.runtime})
+    if response.get("decision") != "ACCEPT":
+        raise SystemExit("anchor registration refused")
+    os.environ["GATE0_SESSION_ID"] = str(response["session_id"])
+    argv = ["mosaic", "yolo", ns.runtime, *ns.args]
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "event": "anchor-exec",
+                "pid": os.getpid(),
+                "argv": ["mosaic", "yolo", ns.runtime, f"<{len(ns.args)} runtime args>"],
+                "note": "os.execvpe retains pid and /proc starttime",
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+        ),
+        file=sys.stderr,
+        flush=True,
+    )
+    os.execvpe("mosaic", argv, os.environ)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Gate0 P1 broker prototype: peercred anchor minting and /proc ancestry checks."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import stat
+import struct
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def proc_node(pid: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    text = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text()
+    close = text.rfind(")")
+    comm = text[text.find("(") + 1 : close]
+    fields = text[close + 2 :].split()
+    cmdline = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cmdline").read_bytes().split(b"\0")
+    return {
+        "pid": pid,
+        "ppid": int(fields[1]),
+        "starttime_ticks": int(fields[19]),
+        "comm": comm,
+        "exe": os.readlink(f"/proc/{pid}/exe"),
+        "argv0": cmdline[0].decode(errors="replace") if cmdline and cmdline[0] else "",
+        "argc": len([part for part in cmdline if part]),
+    }
+
+
+def ancestry(peer_pid: int, anchor: dict[str, Any] | None) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], bool, str]:
+    chain: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    pid = peer_pid
+    seen: set[int] = set()
+    try:
+        while pid > 0 and pid not in seen:
+            seen.add(pid)
+            node = proc_node(pid)
+            chain.append(node)
+            if anchor and pid == anchor["pid"]:
+                if node["starttime_ticks"] != anchor["starttime_ticks"]:
+                    return chain, False, "anchor-starttime-mismatch"
+                break
+            pid = node["ppid"]
+        else:
+            return chain, False, "anchor-not-reached"
+
+        if not anchor or chain[-1]["pid"] != anchor["pid"]:
+            return chain, False, "anchor-not-reached"
+
+        # Re-read every node after the walk. A disappearing PID or changed
+        # starttime invalidates the complete chain (PID-reuse/race closure).
+        for original in chain:
+            again = proc_node(original["pid"])
+            if again["starttime_ticks"] != original["starttime_ticks"]:
+                return chain, False, f"starttime-race:{original['pid']}"
+        return chain, True, "ancestry-reaches-registered-anchor"
+    except (FileNotFoundError, ProcessLookupError, PermissionError) as exc:
+        return chain, False, f"proc-walk-failed:{type(exc).__name__}"
+
+
+def emit(log_file: Path, record: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    line = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True)
+    with log_file.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as out:
+        out.write(line + "\n")
+    print(line, flush=True)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--log", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    socket_path = Path(args.socket)
+    log_file = Path(args.log)
+    state_file = Path(args.state)
+    socket_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    os.chmod(socket_path.parent, 0o700)
+    socket_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    log_file.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    state_file.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    server.bind(str(socket_path))
+    os.chmod(socket_path, 0o600)
+    server.listen(8)
+    anchor: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    emit(
+        log_file,
+        {
+            "event": "broker-listen",
+            "pid": os.getpid(),
+            "socket": str(socket_path),
+            "directory_mode": f"{stat.S_IMODE(socket_path.parent.stat().st_mode):04o}",
+            "socket_mode": f"{stat.S_IMODE(socket_path.stat().st_mode):04o}",
+        },
+    )
+
+    while True:
+        conn, _ = server.accept()
+        with conn:
+            raw = conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, 12)
+            peer_pid, peer_uid, peer_gid = struct.unpack("3i", raw)
+            request = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+            action = request.get("action")
+
+            if action == "register-anchor" and anchor is None:
+                anchor = proc_node(peer_pid)
+                session_id = secrets.token_hex(16)
+                state = {"session_id": session_id, "anchor": anchor}
+                state_file.write_text(json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+                record = {
+                    "event": "anchor-minted",
+                    "decision": "ACCEPT",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": peer_pid, "uid": peer_uid, "gid": peer_gid},
+                    "anchor": anchor,
+                    "session_id": session_id,
+                }
+                emit(log_file, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+
+            if action in {"resolve-hook", "claim-session"}:
+                chain, reaches, reason = ancestry(peer_pid, anchor)
+                claimed = request.get("session_id")
+                claim_ok = action == "resolve-hook" or claimed == session_id
+                accepted = bool(anchor and session_id and reaches and claim_ok)
+                if action == "claim-session" and claimed != session_id:
+                    reason = "unknown-session-id"
+                elif action == "claim-session" and claimed == session_id and not reaches:
+                    reason = "victim-id-known-but-ancestry-mismatch"
+                record = {
+                    "event": action,
+                    "decision": "ACCEPT" if accepted else "REJECT",
+                    "reason": reason,
+                    "peercred": {"pid": peer_pid, "uid": peer_uid, "gid": peer_gid},
+                    "claimed_session_id": claimed,
+                    "resolved_session_id": session_id if accepted else None,
+                    "anchor": anchor,
+                    "ancestry": chain,
+                    "starttimes_rechecked": reaches,
+                }
+                emit(log_file, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+
+            if action == "shutdown":
+                record = {
+                    "event": "broker-shutdown",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": peer_pid, "uid": peer_uid, "gid": peer_gid},
+                }
+                emit(log_file, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record) + "\n").encode())
+                break
+
+            record = {
+                "event": "invalid-request",
+                "decision": "REJECT",
+                "peercred": {"pid": peer_pid, "uid": peer_uid, "gid": peer_gid},
+            }
+            emit(log_file, record)
+            conn.sendall((json.dumps(record) + "\n").encode())
+
+    server.close()
+    socket_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        main()
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(f"P1 broker fatal: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        raise
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Claude SessionStart hook client for P1 ancestry evidence."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    # Consume the real Claude hook payload without recording transcript paths or
+    # prompt content in the evidence artifact.
+    hook_input = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    conn = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    conn.connect(os.environ["GATE0_BROKER_SOCKET"])
+    conn.sendall((json.dumps({"action": "resolve-hook"}) + "\n").encode())
+    response = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+    conn.close()
+    event_name = hook_input.get("hook_event_name")
+    if response.get("decision") != "ACCEPT":
+        print(f"Gate0 broker rejected {event_name} hook ancestry", file=sys.stderr)
+        raise SystemExit(2)
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "hookSpecificOutput": {
+                    "hookEventName": event_name,
+                    "additionalContext": "GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK_ANCESTRY_ACCEPTED",
+                }
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import type { ExtensionAPI } from '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent';
+import net from 'node:net';
+
+async function brokerRequest(payload: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+  const socketPath = process.env['GATE0_BROKER_SOCKET'];
+  if (!socketPath) throw new Error('GATE0_BROKER_SOCKET missing');
+  return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const socket = net.createConnection(socketPath);
+    let buffer = '';
+    socket.setEncoding('utf8');
+    socket.on('connect', () => socket.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`));
+    socket.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      buffer += chunk;
+      const newline = buffer.indexOf('\n');
+      if (newline < 0) return;
+      socket.end();
+      resolve(JSON.parse(buffer.slice(0, newline)) as Record<string, unknown>);
+    });
+    socket.on('error', reject);
+  });
+}
+
+export default function register(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
+  pi.on('session_start', async () => {
+    const response = await brokerRequest({ action: 'resolve-hook', runtime: 'pi-extension' });
+    if (response['decision'] !== 'ACCEPT') {
+      throw new Error(`P1 broker rejected Pi extension ancestry: ${response['reason']}`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  pi.registerCommand('gate0-p1-ready', {
+    description: 'Return only after the P1 session_start ancestry hook completed',
+    handler: async () => undefined,
+  });
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Run P1 against the real installed Mosaic→Pi and Mosaic→Claude chains."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+
+
+def wait_for(predicate, description: str, timeout: float = 30.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if predicate():
+            return
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"timed out waiting for {description}")
+
+
+def read_records(path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not path.exists():
+        return []
+    return [json.loads(line) for line in path.read_text().splitlines() if line]
+
+
+def socket_request(path: Path, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    conn = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    conn.connect(str(path))
+    conn.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode())
+    response = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+    conn.close()
+    return response
+
+
+def start_broker(root: Path) -> tuple[subprocess.Popen[str], Path, Path, Path]:
+    socket_path = root / "broker.sock"
+    log_path = root / "broker.jsonl"
+    state_path = root / "state.json"
+    broker = subprocess.Popen(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            str(HERE / "p1_broker.py"),
+            "--socket",
+            str(socket_path),
+            "--log",
+            str(log_path),
+            "--state",
+            str(state_path),
+        ],
+        text=True,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+    )
+    wait_for(socket_path.exists, "broker socket")
+    return broker, socket_path, log_path, state_path
+
+
+def print_ps(record: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    chain = record.get("ancestry", [])
+    pids = [str(node["pid"]) for node in chain if Path(f"/proc/{node['pid']}").exists()]
+    if not pids:
+        print("ps_snapshot=<hook chain exited; broker /proc snapshot above is authoritative>")
+        return
+    command = [
+        "ps",
+        "-o",
+        "pid=,ppid=,lstart=,uid=,gid=,comm=",
+        "-p",
+        ",".join(pids),
+    ]
+    print("$ " + " ".join(command))
+    print(subprocess.check_output(command, text=True).rstrip())
+
+
+def run_runtime(runtime: str) -> None:
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=f"gate0-p1-{runtime}-") as temp:
+        root = Path(temp)
+        workspace = root / "workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir()
+        broker, socket_path, log_path, state_path = start_broker(root)
+        env = os.environ.copy()
+        env.update(
+            {
+                "GATE0_BROKER_SOCKET": str(socket_path),
+                "MOSAIC_PI_FORCE_SKILLS": "",
+                "PI_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK": "1",
+            }
+        )
+        stdout_path = root / f"{runtime}.stdout"
+        stderr_path = root / f"{runtime}.stderr"
+
+        if runtime == "pi":
+            runtime_args = [
+                "--mode",
+                "rpc",
+                "--no-session",
+                "--no-extensions",
+                "--no-context-files",
+                "--no-prompt-templates",
+                "--extension",
+                str(HERE / "p1_pi_extension.ts"),
+            ]
+        else:
+            settings = root / "claude-settings.json"
+            settings.write_text(
+                json.dumps(
+                    {
+                        "hooks": {
+                            "SessionStart": [
+                                {
+                                    "hooks": [
+                                        {
+                                            "type": "command",
+                                            "command": f'python3 "{HERE / "p1_hook_client.py"}"',
+                                            "timeout": 20,
+                                        }
+                                    ]
+                                }
+                            ]
+                        }
+                    }
+                )
+            )
+            runtime_args = [
+                "--settings",
+                str(settings),
+                "--model",
+                "haiku",
+                "--print",
+                "--output-format",
+                "stream-json",
+                "--verbose",
+                "--include-hook-events",
+                "--max-budget-usd",
+                "0.03",
+                "Reply exactly: OK",
+            ]
+
+        out = stdout_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8")
+        err = stderr_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8")
+        anchor = subprocess.Popen(
+            [
+                sys.executable,
+                str(HERE / "p1_anchor_exec.py"),
+                "--socket",
+                str(socket_path),
+                runtime,
+                *runtime_args,
+            ],
+            cwd=workspace,
+            env=env,
+            stdin=subprocess.PIPE if runtime == "pi" else subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stdout=out,
+            stderr=err,
+            text=True,
+            start_new_session=True,
+        )
+        try:
+            wait_for(state_path.exists, "anchor registration")
+            attacker = subprocess.run(
+                [
+                    sys.executable,
+                    str(HERE / "p1_sibling_attacker.py"),
+                    "--socket",
+                    str(socket_path),
+                    "--state",
+                    str(state_path),
+                ],
+                text=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if runtime == "pi":
+                assert anchor.stdin is not None
+                anchor.stdin.write('{"id":"state","type":"get_state"}\n')
+                anchor.stdin.flush()
+
+            wait_for(
+                lambda: any(r.get("event") == "resolve-hook" for r in read_records(log_path)),
+                f"{runtime} supported hook/extension broker contact",
+                timeout=60,
+            )
+            if runtime == "claude":
+                try:
+                    anchor.wait(timeout=90)
+                except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                    pass
+            records = read_records(log_path)
+            state = json.loads(state_path.read_text())
+            resolve = next(r for r in records if r.get("event") == "resolve-hook")
+            reject = next(r for r in records if r.get("event") == "claim-session")
+            if resolve.get("decision") != "ACCEPT":
+                raise AssertionError(f"{runtime} hook ancestry was not accepted: {resolve}")
+            if reject.get("decision") != "REJECT":
+                raise AssertionError(f"{runtime} sibling substitution was not rejected: {reject}")
+            if attacker.returncode != 0:
+                raise AssertionError(f"{runtime} sibling probe did not observe rejection: {attacker.stderr}")
+
+            print(f"=== P1 {runtime.upper()} REAL LAUNCH ===")
+            print("machine_assertions=PASS")
+            print(
+                "$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p1_anchor_exec.py "
+                f"--socket <protected-socket> {runtime} <runtime args>"
+            )
+            print("registered_anchor=" + json.dumps(state["anchor"], sort_keys=True))
+            print("broker_minted_session_id=" + state["session_id"])
+            print("hook_or_extension_record=" + json.dumps(resolve, sort_keys=True))
+            print("sibling_attack_record=" + json.dumps(reject, sort_keys=True))
+            print("sibling_process_stdout=" + attacker.stdout.strip())
+            print(f"sibling_process_exit={attacker.returncode}")
+            print_ps(resolve)
+            print("launcher_stderr_excerpt:")
+            for line in stderr_path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()[:12]:
+                print("  " + line[:500])
+            runtime_lines = stdout_path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
+            print("runtime_stdout_excerpt:")
+            for line in runtime_lines[:8]:
+                print("  " + line[:500])
+            hook_lines = [
+                line
+                for line in runtime_lines
+                if "hook" in line.lower() or "GATE0_P1_SUPPORTED_HOOK" in line
+            ]
+            print("runtime_hook_event_excerpt:")
+            for line in hook_lines[:8]:
+                print("  " + line[:1000])
+            print()
+        finally:
+            if anchor.poll() is None:
+                try:
+                    os.killpg(anchor.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
+                except ProcessLookupError:
+                    pass
+                try:
+                    anchor.wait(timeout=5)
+                except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                    os.killpg(anchor.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+                    anchor.wait(timeout=5)
+            out.close()
+            err.close()
+            try:
+                socket_request(socket_path, {"action": "shutdown"})
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            try:
+                broker.wait(timeout=5)
+            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                broker.kill()
+                broker.wait()
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--runtime", choices=["pi", "claude", "both"], default="both")
+    ns = parser.parse_args()
+    if ns.runtime in {"pi", "both"}:
+        run_runtime("pi")
+    if ns.runtime in {"claude", "both"}:
+        run_runtime("claude")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Same-UID sibling that attempts to claim the anchor's broker-minted id."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--state", required=True)
+    ns = parser.parse_args()
+    state_path = Path(ns.state)
+    for _ in range(200):
+        if state_path.exists():
+            break
+        time.sleep(0.025)
+    state = json.loads(state_path.read_text())
+    conn = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    conn.connect(ns.socket)
+    conn.sendall(
+        (
+            json.dumps(
+                {"action": "claim-session", "session_id": state["session_id"]},
+                sort_keys=True,
+            )
+            + "\n"
+        ).encode()
+    )
+    response = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+    conn.close()
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "attacker_pid": os.getpid(),
+                "attacker_uid": os.getuid(),
+                "victim_session_id_known": True,
+                "broker_decision": response.get("decision"),
+                "broker_reason": response.get("reason"),
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+        )
+    )
+    raise SystemExit(0 if response.get("decision") == "REJECT" else 1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Force a real Pi HTTP provider response to prove response-hook timing."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from pi_gate0_run import PiRpc, jsonl
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
+
+    def log_message(self, _format: str, *_args: object) -> None:
+        return
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        length = int(self.headers.get("content-length", "0"))
+        self.rfile.read(length)
+        chunks = [
+            {
+                "id": "gate0-response",
+                "object": "chat.completion.chunk",
+                "created": 1,
+                "model": "gate0-model",
+                "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {"role": "assistant"}, "finish_reason": None}],
+            },
+            {
+                "id": "gate0-response",
+                "object": "chat.completion.chunk",
+                "created": 1,
+                "model": "gate0-model",
+                "choices": [
+                    {"index": 0, "delta": {"content": "TIMING_OK"}, "finish_reason": None}
+                ],
+            },
+            {
+                "id": "gate0-response",
+                "object": "chat.completion.chunk",
+                "created": 1,
+                "model": "gate0-model",
+                "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {}, "finish_reason": "stop"}],
+                "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 10, "completion_tokens": 2, "total_tokens": 12},
+            },
+        ]
+        body = "".join(f"data: {json.dumps(chunk)}\n\n" for chunk in chunks) + "data: [DONE]\n\n"
+        encoded = body.encode()
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(encoded)))
+        self.send_header("X-Gate0-Response", "headers-before-stream")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(encoded)
+        self.wfile.flush()
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    port = server.server_address[1]
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gate0-p2-timing-") as temp:
+        root = Path(temp)
+        workspace = root / "workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir()
+        log = root / "hooks.jsonl"
+        env = os.environ.copy()
+        env.update(
+            {
+                "GATE0_PI_LOG": str(log),
+                "GATE0_LOCAL_PROVIDER_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/v1",
+                "MOSAIC_PI_FORCE_SKILLS": "",
+                "PI_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK": "1",
+            }
+        )
+        command = [
+            "mosaic",
+            "yolo",
+            "pi",
+            "--mode",
+            "rpc",
+            "--no-session",
+            "--no-extensions",
+            "--no-context-files",
+            "--no-prompt-templates",
+            "--provider",
+            "gate0-local",
+            "--model",
+            "gate0-model",
+            "--extension",
+            str(HERE / "pi_gate0_extension.ts"),
+        ]
+        pi = PiRpc(command, workspace, env)
+        try:
+            pi.prompt_and_settle("timing", "Reply with TIMING_OK")
+            records = jsonl(log)
+            selected = [
+                record
+                for record in records
+                if record["event"] in {"before_provider_request", "after_provider_response", "message_end"}
+                and (record["event"] != "message_end" or record.get("role") == "assistant")
+            ]
+            print("$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p2_provider_timing_run.py")
+            print(f"local_http_endpoint=http://127.0.0.1:{port}/v1/chat/completions")
+            for record in selected:
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+            after = next(record for record in selected if record["event"] == "after_provider_response")
+            message = next(record for record in selected if record["event"] == "message_end")
+            if not (
+                after["seq"] < message["seq"]
+                and after["assistantContentAvailableAtThisHook"] is False
+                and message["assistantContentObserved"] is True
+            ):
+                raise AssertionError("provider response/content observation ordering failed")
+            print("machine_assertions=PASS")
+            print(f"after_provider_response_seq={after['seq']}")
+            print(f"message_end_seq={message['seq']}")
+            print(f"headers_hook_precedes_completed_message={after['seq'] < message['seq']}")
+        finally:
+            pi.close()
+
+    server.shutdown()
+    server.server_close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,849 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""D4-only same-PID runtime-generation revocation harness.
+
+AUTHORING NOTE: this file is intentionally not executed until the separately
+ratified FIRE authorization.  When run later, every invocation creates its own
+/tmp fixture and launches the real Pi RPC runtime with only the D4 extension
+and ``p3_generation_broker.py``.  It does not use the broader Gate0 runner.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import ast
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import queue
+import shutil
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+# WI-3 remains in a reviewed worktree until the release package contains the
+# gated launcher. The probe resolves that worktree portably and never falls
+# back to the released `mosaic` binary.
+GATED_WI_ROOT_OVERRIDE = os.environ.get("GATED_WI_ROOT")
+GATED_WI_BRANCH = "refs/heads/feat/830-compaction-revoke"
+GATED_WI_HEAD = "f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d"
+GATED_WI_ANCESTOR = "66b1e0a0"
+GATED_BROKER_HEAD = "23c0caca9b5d44002e6184cd7f2b6c837e8795b2"
+LEASE_BROKER_DIRECTORY = "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker"
+BROKER_RELATIVE_PATH = "docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py"
+GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256 = "e950e4224e280f16979d90cabb89aa1896c5ee28bed2df957e14d018d43cda82"
+GATED_GENERATION_SHA256 = "061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c"
+GATED_BROKER_SHA256 = "4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad"
+
+
+class PiRpc:
+    """Small JSON-RPC client for an isolated real Pi process."""
+
+    def __init__(self, command: list[str], cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+        self.process = subprocess.Popen(
+            command,
+            cwd=cwd,
+            env=env,
+            stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+            text=True,
+            bufsize=1,
+            start_new_session=True,
+        )
+        self.events: queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]] = queue.Queue()
+        self.stderr_lines: list[str] = []
+        threading.Thread(target=self._read_stdout, daemon=True).start()
+        threading.Thread(target=self._read_stderr, daemon=True).start()
+
+    def _read_stdout(self) -> None:
+        if self.process.stdout is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Pi stdout pipe is unavailable")
+        for line in self.process.stdout:
+            try:
+                self.events.put(json.loads(line))
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+
+    def _read_stderr(self) -> None:
+        if self.process.stderr is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Pi stderr pipe is unavailable")
+        for line in self.process.stderr:
+            self.stderr_lines.append(line.rstrip("\n"))
+
+    def send(self, payload: dict[str, object]) -> None:
+        if self.process.stdin is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Pi stdin pipe is unavailable")
+        self.process.stdin.write(json.dumps(payload) + "\n")
+        self.process.stdin.flush()
+
+    def wait(
+        self,
+        predicate: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], bool],
+        description: str,
+        timeout: float = 180,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if self.process.poll() is not None and self.events.empty():
+                detail = " | ".join(self.stderr_lines[-5:])
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"Pi exited {self.process.returncode} while waiting for {description}: {detail}"
+                )
+            try:
+                event = self.events.get(timeout=0.2)
+            except queue.Empty:
+                continue
+            if predicate(event):
+                return event
+        raise TimeoutError(f"timed out waiting for {description}")
+
+    def response(self, request_id: str, timeout: float = 180) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self.wait(
+            lambda event: event.get("type") == "response" and event.get("id") == request_id,
+            f"response {request_id}",
+            timeout,
+        )
+
+    def prompt_and_settle(self, request_id: str, message: str) -> None:
+        self.send({"id": request_id, "type": "prompt", "message": message})
+        response = self.response(request_id)
+        if not response.get("success"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"prompt rejected: {response}")
+        self.wait(
+            lambda event: event.get("type") == "agent_settled",
+            f"agent_settled {request_id}",
+        )
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        if self.process.poll() is None:
+            try:
+                os.killpg(self.process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
+            except ProcessLookupError:
+                pass
+            try:
+                self.process.wait(timeout=8)
+            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                os.killpg(self.process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+                self.process.wait(timeout=5)
+
+
+def wait_path(path: Path, timeout: float = 20) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if path.exists():
+            return
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"timed out waiting for {path}")
+
+
+def request(path: Path, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as conn:
+        conn.connect(str(path))
+        conn.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode())
+        reply = conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline()
+    return json.loads(reply)
+
+
+def jsonl(path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    return [json.loads(line) for line in path.read_text().splitlines() if line]
+
+
+def write_extension(path: Path) -> None:
+    """Write the minimal Pi lifecycle bridge into the isolated fixture only."""
+
+    path.write_text(
+        """import type { ExtensionAPI } from '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent';
+import { Type } from 'typebox';
+import { appendFileSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import net from 'node:net';
+
+const socketPath = process.env['D4_GENERATION_SOCKET'];
+const logPath = process.env['D4_PI_LOG'];
+
+function starttime(): number {
+  const text = readFileSync(`/proc/${process.pid}/stat`, 'utf8');
+  const close = text.lastIndexOf(')');
+  return Number(text.slice(close + 2).trim().split(/\\s+/)[19]);
+}
+
+function log(event: string, details: Record<string, unknown> = {}): void {
+  if (!logPath) return;
+  appendFileSync(logPath, `${JSON.stringify({ event, pid: process.pid, starttime_ticks: starttime(), ...details })}\\n`);
+}
+
+function broker(payload: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+  if (!socketPath) return Promise.reject(new Error('D4_GENERATION_SOCKET is required'));
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const connection = net.createConnection(socketPath);
+    let buffer = '';
+    connection.setEncoding('utf8');
+    connection.on('connect', () => connection.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\\n`));
+    connection.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      buffer += chunk;
+      const newline = buffer.indexOf('\\n');
+      if (newline < 0) return;
+      connection.end();
+      resolve(JSON.parse(buffer.slice(0, newline)) as Record<string, unknown>);
+    });
+    connection.on('error', reject);
+  });
+}
+
+export default function register(pi: ExtensionAPI): void {
+  let initialStartup = true;
+
+  async function lifecycle(
+    phase: 'start' | 'shutdown',
+    reason: string,
+  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+    if (!(phase === 'start' && reason === 'startup' && initialStartup)) {
+      const bump = await broker({ action: 'bump-generation' });
+      log('generation_state_bump', { phase, reason, bump });
+    }
+    initialStartup = false;
+    return broker({ action: 'lifecycle', phase, reason });
+  }
+
+  pi.on('session_start', async (event) => {
+    const lifecycleResult = await lifecycle('start', event.reason);
+    log('session_start', { reason: event.reason, lifecycle: lifecycleResult });
+    if (event.reason === 'reload') {
+      const generation = lifecycleResult['new_generation'];
+      if (typeof generation !== 'number') throw new Error('broker did not return new_generation');
+      const current = await broker({ action: 'authorize-probe', generation });
+      const superseded = await broker({ action: 'authorize-probe', generation: generation - 1 });
+      log('d4_generation_authorization', { generation, current, superseded });
+    }
+  });
+
+  pi.on('session_shutdown', async (event) => {
+    const lifecycleResult = await lifecycle('shutdown', event.reason);
+    log('session_shutdown', { reason: event.reason, lifecycle: lifecycleResult });
+  });
+
+  pi.registerTool({
+    name: 'd4_fixture_promote',
+    label: 'D4 Fixture Promotion',
+    description: 'Promotes only the fixture lease needed for the D4 revocation check.',
+    parameters: Type.Object({}),
+    async execute() {
+      // the promotion step is a D4 test fixture, not a P2 evidence-gathering authorization.
+      const promotion = await broker({ action: 'promote-probe' });
+      log('fixture_promotion', { promotion });
+      return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'D4 fixture promotion complete' }] };
+    },
+  });
+
+  pi.registerCommand('d4-reload', {
+    description: 'D4-only same-PID reload boundary.',
+    handler: async (_args, context) => {
+      await context.reload();
+    },
+  });
+}
+""",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+
+def repository_root() -> Path:
+    for candidate in HERE.parents:
+        if (candidate / ".git").exists():
+            return candidate
+    raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: probe repository root is unavailable")
+
+
+def resolve_gated_wi_root() -> Path:
+    """Resolve an explicit override or the unique checked-out WI-3 branch."""
+
+    if GATED_WI_ROOT_OVERRIDE:
+        candidate = Path(GATED_WI_ROOT_OVERRIDE).expanduser()
+        candidates = [candidate]
+    else:
+        try:
+            listing = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "-C", str(repository_root()), "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
+                text=True,
+            )
+        except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+            raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: cannot enumerate WI-3 worktrees") from error
+        candidates = []
+        worktree: Path | None = None
+        head: str | None = None
+        branch: str | None = None
+        for line in [*listing.splitlines(), ""]:
+            if line.startswith("worktree "):
+                worktree = Path(line.removeprefix("worktree "))
+                head = None
+                branch = None
+            elif line.startswith("HEAD "):
+                head = line.removeprefix("HEAD ")
+            elif line.startswith("branch "):
+                branch = line.removeprefix("branch ")
+            elif not line and worktree is not None:
+                if head == GATED_WI_HEAD and branch == GATED_WI_BRANCH:
+                    candidates.append(worktree)
+                worktree = None
+        if len(candidates) != 1:
+            raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: WI-3 worktree is ambiguous or unavailable")
+
+    gated_root = candidates[0]
+    try:
+        if not gated_root.is_dir():
+            raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: GATED_WI_ROOT is not a directory")
+        is_worktree = subprocess.check_output(
+            ["git", "-C", str(gated_root), "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"],
+            text=True,
+        ).strip()
+        head = subprocess.check_output(
+            ["git", "-C", str(gated_root), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True
+        ).strip()
+    except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: GATED_WI_ROOT is not a git worktree") from error
+    if is_worktree != "true":
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: GATED_WI_ROOT is not a git worktree")
+    if head != GATED_WI_HEAD:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: gated WI head mismatch: {head}")
+    try:
+        forward_contains = subprocess.run(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "-C",
+                str(gated_root),
+                "merge-base",
+                "--is-ancestor",
+                GATED_WI_ANCESTOR,
+                GATED_WI_HEAD,
+            ],
+            check=False,
+        ).returncode == 0
+    except OSError as error:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: cannot verify WI-3 ancestry") from error
+    if not forward_contains:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: gated WI lacks required ancestor")
+    return gated_root
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PinnedClosure:
+    launcher: Path
+    generation: Path
+    broker: Path
+
+
+def git_object_bytes(git_root: Path, commit: str, relative_path: str) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        return subprocess.check_output(
+            ["git", "-C", str(git_root), "show", f"{commit}:{relative_path}"]
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.CalledProcessError) as error:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: missing pinned source {relative_path}") from error
+
+
+def closure_import_guard(member_sources: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    """Refuse an incomplete project-code closure before materializing it."""
+
+    allowed_nonstdlib = {"lease_generation"}
+    stdlib = getattr(sys, "stdlib_module_names", frozenset())
+    for name, source in member_sources.items():
+        try:
+            tree = ast.parse(source, filename=name)
+        except SyntaxError as error:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: pinned {name} does not parse") from error
+        for node in ast.walk(tree):
+            module: str | None = None
+            if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
+                for alias in node.names:
+                    module = alias.name.split(".", maxsplit=1)[0]
+                    if module not in stdlib and module not in allowed_nonstdlib:
+                        raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: unpinned import {module} in {name}")
+            elif isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom):
+                if node.level:
+                    raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: relative import in {name}")
+                if node.module:
+                    module = node.module.split(".", maxsplit=1)[0]
+                    if module not in stdlib and module not in allowed_nonstdlib:
+                        raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: unpinned import {module} in {name}")
+
+
+def write_pinned_file(path: Path, data: bytes) -> None:
+    descriptor = os.open(
+        path,
+        os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_CLOEXEC,
+        0o600,
+    )
+    try:
+        remaining = memoryview(data)
+        while remaining:
+            written = os.write(descriptor, remaining)
+            if written <= 0:
+                raise OSError("pinned write made no progress")
+            remaining = remaining[written:]
+    finally:
+        os.close(descriptor)
+
+
+def materialize_closure(root: Path, gated_root: Path, gate0_root: Path) -> PinnedClosure:
+    """Pin the complete project-authored runtime closure inside this fixture."""
+
+    launcher_relative = f"{LEASE_BROKER_DIRECTORY}/launch-runtime.py"
+    generation_relative = f"{LEASE_BROKER_DIRECTORY}/lease_generation.py"
+    members = (
+        (
+            "launch-runtime.py",
+            gated_root,
+            GATED_WI_HEAD,
+            launcher_relative,
+            GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256,
+        ),
+        (
+            "lease_generation.py",
+            gated_root,
+            GATED_WI_HEAD,
+            generation_relative,
+            GATED_GENERATION_SHA256,
+        ),
+        (
+            "p3_generation_broker.py",
+            gate0_root,
+            GATED_BROKER_HEAD,
+            BROKER_RELATIVE_PATH,
+            GATED_BROKER_SHA256,
+        ),
+    )
+    member_bytes: dict[str, bytes] = {}
+    member_sources: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for name, git_root, commit, relative_path, digest in members:
+        data = git_object_bytes(git_root, commit, relative_path)
+        if hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() != digest:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: {name} hash mismatch")
+        try:
+            member_sources[name] = data.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError as error:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"D4 precondition: pinned {name} is not UTF-8") from error
+        member_bytes[name] = data
+    closure_import_guard(member_sources)
+
+    pinned = root / "pinned"
+    pinned.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    paths = {name: pinned / name for name, *_ in members}
+    for name, path in paths.items():
+        write_pinned_file(path, member_bytes[name])
+    return PinnedClosure(
+        launcher=paths["launch-runtime.py"],
+        generation=paths["lease_generation.py"],
+        broker=paths["p3_generation_broker.py"],
+    )
+
+
+def gated_launcher_precondition(
+    root: Path, socket_path: Path, environment: dict[str, str]
+) -> PinnedClosure:
+    """Verify and materialize the full WI-3/probe closure before execution."""
+
+    if environment.get("MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET") != str(socket_path):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: lease broker socket is not this fixture")
+    if environment.get("MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE"):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: inherited generation file is forbidden")
+    fixture_path_vars = (
+        "HOME",
+        "XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
+        "XDG_CACHE_HOME",
+        "XDG_STATE_HOME",
+        "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR",
+        "TMPDIR",
+        "D4_PI_LOG",
+        "MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR",
+        "MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR",
+        "MOSAIC_HOME",
+    )
+    if any(
+        not (value := environment.get(name)) or not Path(value).is_relative_to(root)
+        for name in fixture_path_vars
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: child write path escapes fixture root")
+    if socket_path.parent != root or root.parent != Path(tempfile.gettempdir()):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: fixture socket is outside this run's temporary root")
+
+    gated_root = resolve_gated_wi_root()
+    closure = materialize_closure(root, gated_root, repository_root())
+    launcher_source = closure.launcher.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    generation_source = closure.generation.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    # Exact hashes in materialize_closure are the trust anchor. These marker
+    # checks are belt-and-suspenders diagnostics only.
+    behavior_markers = (
+        '"action": "register_anchor"',
+        "initialize_generation: Callable[[Path, int], None] = initialize_runtime_generation",
+        "execute(command[0], command, environment)",
+        'source_environment["MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET"]',
+        'socket_path.parent / f"generation-{session_id}.state"',
+        'environment["MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE"]',
+    )
+    if not all(marker in launcher_source for marker in behavior_markers) or not (
+        "def read_runtime_generation" in generation_source
+        and "def bump_runtime_generation" in generation_source
+    ):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: pinned launcher lacks file-generation markers")
+    return closure
+
+
+def reject_pinned_bytecode(pinned_directory: Path) -> None:
+    cache_directory = pinned_directory / "__pycache__"
+    if cache_directory.exists() or any(pinned_directory.rglob("*.pyc")):
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: pinned bytecode cache is forbidden")
+
+
+def launch_verified_pi(
+    launcher: Path,
+    workspace: Path,
+    sessions: Path,
+    extension: Path,
+    environment: dict[str, str],
+) -> PiRpc:
+    command = [
+        sys.executable,
+        # -s preserves sys.path[0]=pinned/ for the launcher's sibling helper.
+        "-s",
+        "-S",
+        "-B",
+        str(launcher),
+        "--runtime",
+        "pi",
+        "--",
+        "pi",
+        "--mode",
+        "rpc",
+        "--session-dir",
+        str(sessions),
+        "--no-extensions",
+        "--no-context-files",
+        "--no-prompt-templates",
+        "--model",
+        "openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol",
+        "--thinking",
+        "medium",
+        "--extension",
+        str(extension),
+    ]
+    reject_pinned_bytecode(launcher.parent)
+    # This is deliberately the statement immediately before Popen (inside
+    # PiRpc): the fixture-pinned launcher bytes are re-hashed then executed.
+    if hashlib.sha256(launcher.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: adjacent launcher hash mismatch")
+    return PiRpc(command, workspace, environment)
+
+
+def launch_verified_broker(
+    broker_path: Path,
+    generation_path: Path,
+    socket_path: Path,
+    log_path: Path,
+    environment: dict[str, str],
+) -> subprocess.Popen[str]:
+    command = [
+        sys.executable,
+        "-I",
+        "-S",
+        "-B",
+        str(broker_path),
+        "--socket",
+        str(socket_path),
+        "--log",
+        str(log_path),
+        "--generation-module",
+        str(generation_path),
+    ]
+    reject_pinned_bytecode(broker_path.parent)
+    if hashlib.sha256(broker_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != GATED_BROKER_SHA256:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: pinned broker hash mismatch")
+    # The final helper re-hash is immediately adjacent to the broker Popen.
+    if hashlib.sha256(generation_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != GATED_GENERATION_SHA256:
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 precondition: pinned helper hash mismatch")
+    return subprocess.Popen(
+        command,
+        env=environment,
+        text=True,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+    )
+
+
+def assert_d4(records: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    def record_where(description: str, candidates: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if not candidates:
+            raise AssertionError(f"missing D4 evidence record: {description}")
+        return candidates[0]
+
+    fixture_listen = record_where(
+        "fixture listen", [r for r in records if r.get("event") == "listen"]
+    )
+    fixture_root = Path(fixture_listen["socket"]).parent
+    lifecycle = [record for record in records if record.get("event") == "runtime_generation_bump"]
+    state_bumps = [record for record in records if record.get("event") == "generation_state_bumped"]
+    promotion = record_where(
+        "fixture promotion", [r for r in records if r.get("event") == "probe_lease_promoted"]
+    )
+    launcher_registration = record_where(
+        "lease anchor", [r for r in records if r.get("event") == "lease_anchor_registered"]
+    )
+    reload_revoke = record_where(
+        "reload shutdown",
+        [
+            r
+            for r in lifecycle
+            if r.get("reason") == "reload" and r.get("phase") == "shutdown"
+        ],
+    )
+    reload_start = record_where(
+        "reload start",
+        [
+            r
+            for r in lifecycle
+            if r.get("reason") == "reload" and r.get("phase") == "start"
+        ],
+    )
+    authorization = [
+        record for record in records if record.get("event") == "generation_authorization"
+    ]
+    current_generation = reload_start["new_generation"]
+    current_authorization = record_where(
+        "current-generation authorization",
+        [r for r in authorization if r.get("requested_generation") == current_generation],
+    )
+    superseded_authorization = record_where(
+        "superseded-generation authorization",
+        [r for r in authorization if r.get("requested_generation") == current_generation - 1],
+    )
+
+    identities = {
+        (record["peercred"]["pid"], record["starttime_ticks"])
+        for record in [*lifecycle, *state_bumps, promotion, launcher_registration, *authorization]
+    }
+    generations = [record["new_generation"] for record in lifecycle]
+    file_records = [*lifecycle, *state_bumps, promotion, *authorization]
+    observed_reasons = {record.get("reason") for record in lifecycle}
+    checks = {
+        "same_pid_starttime": len(identities) == 1,
+        "strictly_increasing_generation": all(
+            previous < current for previous, current in zip(generations, generations[1:])
+        ),
+        "state_file_drives_lifecycle": [record["generation"] for record in state_bumps]
+        == generations[1:],
+        "state_file_source": all(
+            record.get("generation_source") == "state-file" for record in file_records
+        ),
+        "state_file_in_fixture_root": all(
+            Path(record["generation_file"]).parent == fixture_root for record in file_records
+        )
+        and Path(launcher_registration["generation_file"]).parent == fixture_root,
+        "all_lifecycle_boundaries": {"startup", "reload", "fork", "new", "resume"}
+        <= observed_reasons,
+        "lease_anchor_fixture": launcher_registration.get("session_id_shape") == "hex-256",
+        "verified_revoked_on_reload": reload_revoke.get("prior_lease") == "VERIFIED"
+        and reload_revoke.get("prior_lease_revoked") is True,
+        "new_generation_unverified": current_authorization.get("code") == "MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED",
+        "prior_generation_stale": superseded_authorization.get("code") == "STALE_GENERATION",
+    }
+    failed = [name for name, passed in checks.items() if not passed]
+    if failed:
+        raise AssertionError(f"D4 checks failed: {', '.join(failed)}")
+    passed = all(checks.values())
+    if not passed:
+        raise AssertionError("D4 PASS derivation failed")
+
+    return {
+        "machine_assertions": "PASS" if passed else "FAIL",
+        "checks": checks,
+        "same_pid_starttime": next(iter(identities)),
+        "generations": generations,
+        "reload_revoke_verified": checks["verified_revoked_on_reload"],
+        "lease_anchor_fixture": checks["lease_anchor_fixture"],
+        "file_backed_generation": checks["state_file_drives_lifecycle"],
+        "new_generation_code": current_authorization["code"],
+        "superseded_generation_code": superseded_authorization["code"],
+    }
+
+
+def isolated_environment(
+    root: Path, index: int, workspace: Path, socket_path: Path, pi_log: Path
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Build a write-confined child environment; no inherited path variable survives."""
+
+    fixture_home = root / "home"
+    fixture_config = root / "config"
+    fixture_cache = root / "cache"
+    fixture_state = root / "state"
+    fixture_runtime = root / "runtime"
+    fixture_tmp = root / "tmp"
+    fixture_heartbeat = root / "heartbeat"
+    fixture_mosaic_home = root / "mosaic-home"
+    for directory in (
+        fixture_home,
+        fixture_config,
+        fixture_cache,
+        fixture_state,
+        fixture_runtime,
+        fixture_tmp,
+        fixture_heartbeat,
+        fixture_mosaic_home,
+    ):
+        directory.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+
+    # Authentication/settings are copied into fixture HOME so Pi never writes
+    # under the operator's HOME. They are not emitted or modified in place.
+    source_agent = Path.home() / ".pi" / "agent"
+    target_agent = fixture_home / ".pi" / "agent"
+    target_agent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700)
+    for name in ("settings.json", "auth.json", "bin/fd"):
+        source = source_agent / name
+        target = target_agent / name
+        if source.is_file():
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+            shutil.copy2(source, target)
+
+    environment = {
+        "HOME": str(fixture_home),
+        "XDG_CONFIG_HOME": str(fixture_config),
+        "XDG_CACHE_HOME": str(fixture_cache),
+        "XDG_STATE_HOME": str(fixture_state),
+        "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR": str(fixture_runtime),
+        "TMPDIR": str(fixture_tmp),
+        "PATH": os.environ.get("PATH", ""),
+        "LANG": os.environ.get("LANG", "C.UTF-8"),
+        "TERM": os.environ.get("TERM", "dumb"),
+        "D4_GENERATION_SOCKET": str(socket_path),
+        "MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET": str(socket_path),
+        "D4_PI_LOG": str(pi_log),
+        "MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME": f"d4-fixture-{index}",
+        "MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR": str(workspace),
+        "MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR": str(fixture_heartbeat),
+        "MOSAIC_HOME": str(fixture_mosaic_home),
+        "MOSAIC_PI_FORCE_SKILLS": "",
+        "PI_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK": "1",
+        "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1",
+        "PYTHONNOUSERSITE": "1",
+    }
+    if "PI_CODING_AGENT" in os.environ:
+        environment["PI_CODING_AGENT"] = os.environ["PI_CODING_AGENT"]
+    return environment
+
+
+def scrub_fixture_credentials(root: Path) -> None:
+    """Remove the copied Pi credential/config subtree before retaining evidence."""
+
+    copied_agent = root / "home" / ".pi" / "agent"
+    if copied_agent.exists():
+        shutil.rmtree(copied_agent)
+    if copied_agent.exists():
+        raise RuntimeError("D4 credential scrub failed")
+
+
+def run_once(index: int) -> Path:
+    root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"gate0-d4-{index}-"))
+    workspace = root / "workspace"
+    sessions = root / "sessions"
+    workspace.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    sessions.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+    socket_path = root / "generation.sock"
+    generation_log = root / "generation.jsonl"
+    pi_log = root / "pi.jsonl"
+    extension = root / "d4_extension.ts"
+    write_extension(extension)
+    broker: subprocess.Popen[str] | None = None
+    pi: PiRpc | None = None
+
+    try:
+        environment = isolated_environment(root, index, workspace, socket_path, pi_log)
+        # Must run before the fixture broker or Pi process is launched. It proves
+        # the launcher registers before exec and can only read this fixture socket.
+        closure = gated_launcher_precondition(root, socket_path, environment)
+        broker = launch_verified_broker(
+            closure.broker, closure.generation, socket_path, generation_log, environment
+        )
+        wait_path(socket_path)
+        pi = launch_verified_pi(closure.launcher, workspace, sessions, extension, environment)
+        pi.send({"id": "state", "type": "get_state"})
+        state = pi.response("state")
+        original_session = state["data"]["sessionFile"]
+        pi.prompt_and_settle(
+            "fixture-promote",
+            "Call d4_fixture_promote exactly once, then stop.",
+        )
+        pi.send({"id": "reload", "type": "prompt", "message": "/d4-reload"})
+        reload_response = pi.response("reload")
+        if not reload_response.get("success"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"reload failed: {reload_response}")
+        for request_id, request_payload in [
+            ("clone", {"id": "clone", "type": "clone"}),
+            ("new", {"id": "new", "type": "new_session"}),
+            (
+                "resume",
+                {"id": "resume", "type": "switch_session", "sessionPath": original_session},
+            ),
+        ]:
+            pi.send(request_payload)
+            response = pi.response(request_id)
+            if not response.get("success") or response.get("data", {}).get("cancelled"):
+                raise RuntimeError(f"{request_id} failed: {response}")
+        results = assert_d4(jsonl(generation_log))
+        verdict = results.get("machine_assertions")
+        if verdict != "PASS":
+            raise RuntimeError(f"D4 checks did not derive PASS: {verdict}")
+        (root / "machine-assertions.json").write_text(
+            json.dumps(results, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        print(f"run={index} evidence_dir={root}")
+        print(f"machine_assertions={verdict}")
+        print(json.dumps(results, sort_keys=True))
+    except Exception as error:
+        (root / "machine-assertions.json").write_text(
+            json.dumps({"error": f"{type(error).__name__}: {error}"}, sort_keys=True, indent=2)
+            + "\n",
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
+        print(f"run={index} evidence_dir={root}")
+        print("machine_assertions=FAIL")
+        print(f"error={type(error).__name__}: {error}")
+        raise
+    finally:
+        try:
+            try:
+                if pi is not None:
+                    pi.close()
+            finally:
+                if broker is not None:
+                    try:
+                        request(socket_path, {"action": "shutdown-broker"})
+                    except OSError:
+                        pass
+                    try:
+                        broker.wait(timeout=5)
+                    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                        broker.kill()
+                        broker.wait()
+        finally:
+            scrub_fixture_credentials(root)
+    return root
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--runs", type=int, default=3, choices=(3,))
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    roots: list[Path] = []
+    for index in range(1, args.runs + 1):
+        roots.append(run_once(index))
+    print("d4_isolation_runs=" + ",".join(str(root) for root in roots))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""P3 broker prototype: peercred-keyed runtime_generation and lease revocation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import socket
+import struct
+from collections.abc import Callable, Mapping
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def proc_starttime(pid: int) -> int:
+    text = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text()
+    close = text.rfind(")")
+    return int(text[close + 2 :].split()[19])
+
+
+def emit(log: Path, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    with log.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as out:
+        out.write(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+
+
+def load_generation_functions(
+    path: Path,
+) -> tuple[Callable[[Mapping[str, str]], int], Callable[[Mapping[str, str]], int]]:
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("d4_lease_generation", path)
+    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+        raise ValueError("generation module is unavailable")
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    reader = getattr(module, "read_runtime_generation", None)
+    bumper = getattr(module, "bump_runtime_generation", None)
+    if not callable(reader) or not callable(bumper):
+        raise ValueError("generation module has no read/bump functions")
+    return reader, bumper
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--socket", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--log", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--generation-module", required=True, type=Path)
+    ns = parser.parse_args()
+    socket_path = Path(ns.socket)
+    log_path = Path(ns.log)
+    read_runtime_generation, bump_runtime_generation = load_generation_functions(
+        ns.generation_module
+    )
+    socket_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    os.chmod(socket_path.parent, 0o700)
+    socket_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+    log_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    server.bind(str(socket_path))
+    os.chmod(socket_path, 0o600)
+    server.listen(8)
+    generations: dict[tuple[int, int], int] = {}
+    lease_state: dict[tuple[int, int], str] = {}
+    # The gated launcher registers its own exec-preserved PID here.  This is
+    # deliberately volatile fixture state; nothing is written outside root.
+    launcher_sessions: dict[tuple[int, int], str] = {}
+    generation_files: dict[tuple[int, int], Path] = {}
+
+    def generation_environment(identity: tuple[int, int]) -> dict[str, str]:
+        state_path = generation_files.get(identity)
+        if state_path is None or state_path.parent != socket_path.parent:
+            raise ValueError("generation file is outside the fixture root")
+        return {"MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE": str(state_path)}
+
+    def file_generation(identity: tuple[int, int]) -> int:
+        return read_runtime_generation(generation_environment(identity))
+
+    emit(log_path, {"event": "listen", "pid": os.getpid(), "socket": str(socket_path)})
+
+    while True:
+        conn, _ = server.accept()
+        with conn:
+            raw = conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, 12)
+            pid, uid, gid = struct.unpack("3i", raw)
+            starttime = proc_starttime(pid)
+            request = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+            if request.get("action") == "shutdown-broker":
+                conn.sendall(b'{"ok":true}\n')
+                break
+            identity = (pid, starttime)
+            if request.get("action") == "register_anchor":
+                generation = request.get("runtime_generation")
+                if type(generation) is not int or generation < 0:
+                    conn.sendall(b'{"ok":false,"code":"INVALID_GENERATION"}\n')
+                    continue
+                session_id = launcher_sessions.setdefault(identity, secrets.token_hex(32))
+                generation_file = socket_path.parent / f"generation-{session_id}.state"
+                generation_files[identity] = generation_file
+                record = {
+                    "event": "lease_anchor_registered",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid},
+                    "starttime_ticks": starttime,
+                    "runtime_generation": generation,
+                    "session_id_shape": "hex-256",
+                    "generation_file": str(generation_file),
+                }
+                emit(log_path, record)
+                reply = {
+                    "ok": True,
+                    "session_id": session_id,
+                    "peer": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid, "starttime": str(starttime)},
+                }
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(reply, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+            # The D4 extension requests this at each post-start lifecycle
+            # boundary; the exact WI-3 helper mutates the launcher-created file.
+            if request.get("action") == "bump-generation":
+                generation = bump_runtime_generation(generation_environment(identity))
+                record = {
+                    "event": "generation_state_bumped",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid},
+                    "starttime_ticks": starttime,
+                    "generation": generation,
+                    "generation_file": str(generation_files[identity]),
+                    "generation_source": "state-file",
+                }
+                emit(log_path, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+            if request.get("action") == "promote-probe":
+                generation = file_generation(identity)
+                lease_state[identity] = "VERIFIED"
+                record = {
+                    "event": "probe_lease_promoted",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid},
+                    "starttime_ticks": starttime,
+                    "generation": generation,
+                    "generation_file": str(generation_files[identity]),
+                    "generation_source": "state-file",
+                    "new_lease_state": "VERIFIED",
+                }
+                emit(log_path, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+            # D4 fixture-only authorization observation.  It exposes the broker's
+            # current versus superseded generation disposition without changing it.
+            if request.get("action") == "authorize-probe":
+                generation = request.get("generation")
+                if type(generation) is not int or generation < 0:
+                    conn.sendall(b'{"ok":false,"code":"INVALID_GENERATION"}\n')
+                    continue
+                current_generation = file_generation(identity)
+                current_lease = lease_state.get(identity, "NONE")
+                if generation < current_generation:
+                    code = "STALE_GENERATION"
+                elif generation > current_generation:
+                    code = "FUTURE_GENERATION"
+                elif current_lease != "VERIFIED":
+                    code = "MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED"
+                else:
+                    code = "ALLOW"
+                record = {
+                    "event": "generation_authorization",
+                    "peercred": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid},
+                    "starttime_ticks": starttime,
+                    "requested_generation": generation,
+                    "current_generation": current_generation,
+                    "generation_file": str(generation_files[identity]),
+                    "generation_source": "state-file",
+                    "lease_state": current_lease,
+                    "ok": code == "ALLOW",
+                    "code": code,
+                }
+                emit(log_path, record)
+                conn.sendall((json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+                continue
+            if request.get("action") != "lifecycle":
+                conn.sendall(b'{"ok":false,"reason":"invalid-action"}\n')
+                continue
+
+            old_generation = generations.get(identity, 0)
+            old_lease = lease_state.get(identity, "NONE")
+            new_generation = file_generation(identity)
+            if new_generation <= old_generation:
+                conn.sendall(b'{"ok":false,"code":"NON_MONOTONIC_STATE_FILE"}\n')
+                continue
+            generations[identity] = new_generation
+            # Every lifecycle boundary revokes first. A start establishes a new
+            # UNVERIFIED incarnation; it never inherits prior VERIFIED state.
+            lease_state[identity] = "UNVERIFIED" if request.get("phase") == "start" else "REVOKED"
+            record = {
+                "event": "runtime_generation_bump",
+                "peercred": {"pid": pid, "uid": uid, "gid": gid},
+                "starttime_ticks": starttime,
+                "phase": request.get("phase"),
+                "reason": request.get("reason"),
+                "old_generation": old_generation,
+                "new_generation": new_generation,
+                "generation_file": str(generation_files[identity]),
+                "generation_source": "state-file",
+                "prior_lease": old_lease,
+                "prior_lease_revoked": True,
+                "new_lease_state": lease_state[identity],
+            }
+            emit(log_path, record)
+            conn.sendall((json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+
+    server.close()
+    socket_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Gate0 P4: exercise Linux SO_PEERCRED and correlate it to /proc."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import stat
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def proc_identity(pid: int) -> dict[str, int | str]:
+    stat_text = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text()
+    close = stat_text.rfind(")")
+    fields = stat_text[close + 2 :].split()
+    # fields[0] is field 3 (state); ppid is field 4 and starttime is field 22.
+    return {
+        "pid": pid,
+        "ppid": int(fields[1]),
+        "starttime_ticks": int(fields[19]),
+        "uid": int(Path(f"/proc/{pid}/status").read_text().split("Uid:", 1)[1].split()[0]),
+        "exe": os.readlink(f"/proc/{pid}/exe"),
+    }
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gate0-p4-") as tmp:
+        root = Path(tmp)
+        os.chmod(root, 0o700)
+        socket_path = root / "broker.sock"
+        server = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        server.bind(str(socket_path))
+        os.chmod(socket_path, 0o600)
+        server.listen(1)
+
+        child = os.fork()
+        if child == 0:
+            client = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+            client.connect(str(socket_path))
+            identity = proc_identity(os.getpid())
+            client.sendall((json.dumps(identity, sort_keys=True) + "\n").encode())
+            # Keep /proc/<pid> alive until the server has correlated peercred.
+            if client.recv(2) != b"OK":
+                os._exit(2)
+            client.close()
+            os._exit(0)
+
+        conn, _ = server.accept()
+        raw = conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, 12)
+        peer_pid = int.from_bytes(raw[0:4], byteorder="little", signed=True)
+        peer_uid = int.from_bytes(raw[4:8], byteorder="little", signed=True)
+        peer_gid = int.from_bytes(raw[8:12], byteorder="little", signed=True)
+        claimed = json.loads(conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline())
+        observed = proc_identity(peer_pid)
+        conn.sendall(b"OK")
+        _, status = os.waitpid(child, 0)
+
+        root_mode = stat.S_IMODE(root.stat().st_mode)
+        socket_mode = stat.S_IMODE(socket_path.stat().st_mode)
+        if not (
+            peer_pid == claimed["pid"] == observed["pid"]
+            and peer_uid == claimed["uid"] == observed["uid"]
+            and claimed["starttime_ticks"] == observed["starttime_ticks"]
+            and root_mode == 0o700
+            and socket_mode == 0o600
+            and os.waitstatus_to_exitcode(status) == 0
+        ):
+            raise AssertionError("SO_PEERCRED, /proc identity, or socket-mode correlation failed")
+        print("machine_assertions=PASS")
+        print(f"server_pid={os.getpid()} server_uid={os.getuid()} server_gid={os.getgid()}")
+        print(f"socket_path={socket_path}")
+        print(f"directory_mode={root_mode:04o} socket_mode={socket_mode:04o}")
+        print(f"SO_PEERCRED pid={peer_pid} uid={peer_uid} gid={peer_gid}")
+        print("client_claim=" + json.dumps(claimed, sort_keys=True))
+        print("proc_observed=" + json.dumps(observed, sort_keys=True))
+        print(f"pid_match={peer_pid == claimed['pid'] == observed['pid']}")
+        print(f"uid_match={peer_uid == claimed['uid'] == observed['uid']}")
+        print(
+            "starttime_match="
+            + str(claimed["starttime_ticks"] == observed["starttime_ticks"])
+        )
+        print(f"client_exit_status={os.waitstatus_to_exitcode(status)}")
+        print("same_principal_socket=true")
+        print(
+            "posture=0700 parent + 0600 socket excludes other UIDs, but does not prevent "
+            "the same UID from unlinking/rebinding; distinct-principal system service remains "
+            "required for a claim stronger than T-C against same-UID counterfeit replacement"
+        )
+
+        conn.close()
+        server.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""P5 Gate0 replay probe; BUILT ONLY, execution is Mos-gated.
-
-Run only under fresh-executor authorization:
-  python3 -I -S -B docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p5_receipt_replay.py
-
-Each of the default three isolated runs launches the shipped lease-broker daemon
-in a distinct private temporary directory.  This driver never changes broker
-state directly and does not replace the promote gate: every transition is sent
-over the daemon's real Unix socket.  It proves the shipped order is
-PENDING_DELIVERY -> observe/evidence commit -> consume -> VERIFIED and that a
-consumed challenge cannot be replayed or reopen/renew its lease.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import base64
-import importlib.util
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
-REPOSITORY = HERE.parents[2]
-TOOLS = REPOSITORY / "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker"
-DAEMON = TOOLS / "daemon.py"
-FRAGMENTS = TOOLS / "normative_fragments.py"
-
-
-def load_shipped_fragments():
-    if not FRAGMENTS.is_file():
-        raise RuntimeError(f"shipped normative construction missing: {FRAGMENTS}")
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p5_shipped_normative_fragments", FRAGMENTS)
-    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
-        raise RuntimeError("unable to load shipped normative construction")
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    return module
-
-
-def request(socket_path: Path, value: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as connection:
-        connection.settimeout(3.0)
-        connection.connect(str(socket_path))
-        connection.sendall((json.dumps(value, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode())
-        connection.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
-        response = bytearray()
-        while True:
-            chunk = connection.recv(4096)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            response.extend(chunk)
-    if not response.endswith(b"\n") or response.count(b"\n") != 1:
-        raise AssertionError(f"unframed broker reply: {bytes(response)!r}")
-    parsed = json.loads(response[:-1])
-    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
-        raise AssertionError(f"non-object broker reply: {parsed!r}")
-    return parsed
-
-
-def wait_ready(process: subprocess.Popen[str], socket_path: Path) -> None:
-    deadline = time.monotonic() + 5.0
-    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
-        if socket_path.exists():
-            return
-        if process.poll() is not None:
-            output = process.stdout.read() if process.stdout is not None else ""
-            raise RuntimeError(f"shipped daemon exited before READY: {output}")
-        time.sleep(0.02)
-    raise TimeoutError("shipped daemon did not create private probe socket")
-
-
-def expect_refused(reply: dict[str, object], code: str) -> None:
-    if reply != {"ok": False, "code": code}:
-        raise AssertionError(f"expected refusal {code}, got {reply!r}")
-
-
-def run_once(index: int) -> str:
-    fragments = load_shipped_fragments()
-    root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"mosaic-p5-replay-{index}-"))
-    os.chmod(root, 0o700)
-    socket_path = root / "broker.sock"
-    state_path = root / "state.json"
-    observer_path = root / "test-observer.json"
-    process = subprocess.Popen(
-        [
-            sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(DAEMON), "--socket", str(socket_path),
-            "--state", str(state_path), "--test-observer-file", str(observer_path),
-        ],
-        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
-        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
-        text=True,
-    )
-    try:
-        wait_ready(process, socket_path)
-        registered = request(socket_path, {"action": "register_anchor", "runtime_generation": 1})
-        if registered.get("ok") is not True or not isinstance(registered.get("session_id"), str):
-            raise AssertionError(f"registration failed: {registered!r}")
-        session_id = registered["session_id"]
-        construction = fragments.build_payload(
-            manifest_version=1,
-            generator_version="p5-replay-probe",
-            fragments=[
-                fragments.NormativeFragment(
-                    "authority/probe",
-                    b"P5 shipped transition driver\n",
-                    "63537df1a6cb0d80195a96757ab11d629e5b5e1f23be167218b84cb195b1c1d6",
-                ),
-            ],
-        )
-        if construction.injectionDecision != "ACCEPTED" or not construction.promotion:
-            raise AssertionError("shipped normative construction refused P5 fixture")
-        binding = {
-            "compaction_epoch": index,
-            "request_epoch": index + 100,
-            "h_source": construction.h_source,
-            "h_payload": construction.h_payload,
-            "schema_version": 1,
-        }
-        construction_request = {
-            "manifest_version": 1,
-            "generator_version": "p5-replay-probe",
-            "fragments": [{
-                "source_id": "authority/probe",
-                "content_base64": base64.b64encode(b"P5 shipped transition driver\n").decode("ascii"),
-                "expected_sha256": "63537df1a6cb0d80195a96757ab11d629e5b5e1f23be167218b84cb195b1c1d6",
-            }],
-        }
-        pending = request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "begin_verification",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "runtime": "pi",
-            "binding": binding,
-            "construction": construction_request,
-        })
-        if pending.get("ok") is not True or pending.get("state") != "PENDING_VERIFICATION":
-            raise AssertionError(f"shipped pending-delivery transition failed: {pending!r}")
-        challenge = pending.get("receipt_challenge")
-        receipt = pending.get("receipt")
-        if not isinstance(challenge, str) or not isinstance(receipt, str):
-            raise AssertionError(f"shipped broker did not mint a receipt challenge: {pending!r}")
-
-        # Promotion before observation/evidence/consumption is forbidden.
-        expect_refused(request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "promote_lease",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "receipt_challenge": challenge,
-        }), "INVALID_LEASE_TRANSITION")
-
-        observer_path.write_text(json.dumps({
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "latest_assistant_message": receipt,
-        }), encoding="utf-8")
-        os.chmod(observer_path, 0o600)
-        observed = request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "observe_receipt",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "receipt_challenge": challenge,
-        })
-        if observed.get("ok") is not True or observed.get("state") != "PENDING_PROMOTION":
-            raise AssertionError(f"shipped evidence transition failed: {observed!r}")
-        durable = json.loads(state_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        evidence = durable["tokens"][challenge].get("evidence")
-        if not isinstance(evidence, dict) or not isinstance(evidence.get("h_latest_assistant"), str):
-            raise AssertionError("shipped receipt evidence was not committed before consume/promote")
-
-        promoted = request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "promote_lease",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "receipt_challenge": challenge,
-        })
-        if promoted.get("ok") is not True or promoted.get("state") != "VERIFIED":
-            raise AssertionError(f"shipped consume-before-promote transition failed: {promoted!r}")
-
-        # T25/T28: the actual consumed challenge, re-presented through the
-        # shipped daemon, can neither be observed again nor re-promote/reopen.
-        expect_refused(request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "observe_receipt",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "receipt_challenge": challenge,
-        }), "RECEIPT_REPLAY")
-        expect_refused(request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "promote_lease",
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "receipt_challenge": challenge,
-        }), "RECEIPT_REPLAY")
-        return challenge
-    finally:
-        if process.poll() is None:
-            process.terminate()
-            try:
-                process.wait(timeout=3.0)
-            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-                process.kill()
-                process.wait()
-        shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--runs", type=int, default=3)
-    arguments = parser.parse_args()
-    if arguments.runs != 3:
-        raise SystemExit("P5 requires exactly three isolated runs")
-    challenges = [run_once(index) for index in range(arguments.runs)]
-    if len(set(challenges)) != arguments.runs:
-        raise AssertionError("separate shipped cycles did not mint unique challenges")
-    print("P5 receipt replay probe PASS: 3 isolated shipped-daemon runs")
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Claude SessionStart additionalContext producer for P6 observation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+BLOCK = "\n".join(
+    [
+        "GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN",
+        "segment-01=alpha-2d11",
+        "segment-02=middle-8e22",
+        "segment-03=omega-4f33",
+        "GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END",
+    ]
+)
+
+
+def starttime(pid: int) -> int:
+    text = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text()
+    return int(text[text.rfind(")") + 2 :].split()[19])
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    hook_input = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    log = Path(os.environ["GATE0_CLAUDE_HOOK_LOG"])
+    record = {
+        "hook_event_name": hook_input.get("hook_event_name"),
+        "pid": os.getpid(),
+        "ppid": os.getppid(),
+        "starttime_ticks": starttime(os.getpid()),
+        "block_length": len(BLOCK.encode()),
+        "block_sha256": hashlib.sha256(BLOCK.encode()).hexdigest(),
+        "emission": "one hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext string field",
+    }
+    log.write_text(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "hookSpecificOutput": {
+                    "hookEventName": "SessionStart",
+                    "additionalContext": BLOCK,
+                }
+            }
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Run real Claude 2.1.x through `mosaic yolo` for P6 observation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+BLOCK = "\n".join(
+    [
+        "GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN",
+        "segment-01=alpha-2d11",
+        "segment-02=middle-8e22",
+        "segment-03=omega-4f33",
+        "GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END",
+    ]
+)
+
+
+def strings(value: Any):
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        yield value
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for item in value:
+            yield from strings(item)
+    elif isinstance(value, dict):
+        for item in value.values():
+            yield from strings(item)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gate0-p6-claude-") as temp:
+        root = Path(temp)
+        workspace = root / "workspace"
+        workspace.mkdir()
+        settings = root / "settings.json"
+        hook_log = root / "hook.jsonl"
+        settings.write_text(
+            json.dumps(
+                {
+                    "hooks": {
+                        "SessionStart": [
+                            {
+                                "hooks": [
+                                    {
+                                        "type": "command",
+                                        "command": f'python3 "{HERE / "p6_claude_hook.py"}"',
+                                        "timeout": 20,
+                                    }
+                                ]
+                            }
+                        ]
+                    }
+                }
+            )
+        )
+        env = os.environ.copy()
+        env["GATE0_CLAUDE_HOOK_LOG"] = str(hook_log)
+        command = [
+            "mosaic",
+            "yolo",
+            "claude",
+            "--settings",
+            str(settings),
+            "--model",
+            "haiku",
+            "--print",
+            "--output-format",
+            "stream-json",
+            "--verbose",
+            "--include-hook-events",
+            "--max-budget-usd",
+            "0.10",
+            "Return only the exact full GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN through GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_END block injected by SessionStart, with no code fence or commentary.",
+        ]
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            command,
+            cwd=workspace,
+            env=env,
+            stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            text=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            timeout=150,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+            try:
+                events.append(json.loads(line))
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+        hook_events = [
+            event
+            for event in events
+            if event.get("type") == "system"
+            and event.get("subtype") in {"hook_started", "hook_response"}
+        ]
+        full_matches = [text for event in events for text in strings(event) if BLOCK in text]
+        exact_matches = [text for event in events for text in strings(event) if text == BLOCK]
+        assistant_texts: list[str] = []
+        for event in events:
+            if event.get("type") != "assistant":
+                continue
+            for text in strings(event.get("message", {})):
+                if "GATE0_CLAUDE_ATOMIC_BEGIN" in text:
+                    assistant_texts.append(text)
+
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            raise AssertionError(f"Claude probe exited {result.returncode}")
+        if not any(event.get("subtype") == "hook_response" and event.get("outcome") == "success" for event in hook_events):
+            raise AssertionError("Claude SessionStart hook did not complete successfully")
+        if BLOCK not in exact_matches:
+            raise AssertionError("Claude did not return an exact full-block field")
+
+        print("$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p6_claude_run.py")
+        print("machine_assertions=PASS")
+        print("command=mosaic yolo claude --settings <isolated> --model haiku --print --output-format stream-json --verbose --include-hook-events <prompt>")
+        print("claude_version=" + subprocess.check_output(["claude", "--version"], text=True).strip())
+        print("mosaic_version=" + subprocess.check_output(["mosaic", "--version"], text=True).strip())
+        print(f"exit_code={result.returncode}")
+        print("hook_process_log=" + hook_log.read_text().strip())
+        for event in hook_events:
+            print("hook_stream_event=" + json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True))
+        print(f"block_length={len(BLOCK.encode())}")
+        print(f"block_sha256={hashlib.sha256(BLOCK.encode()).hexdigest()}")
+        print(f"stream_fields_containing_full_block={len(full_matches)}")
+        print(f"stream_fields_exactly_equal_block={len(exact_matches)}")
+        for text in assistant_texts:
+            print(f"assistant_copy_length={len(text.encode())}")
+            print(f"assistant_copy_sha256={hashlib.sha256(text.encode()).hexdigest()}")
+            print(f"assistant_copy_exact={text == BLOCK}")
+            print("assistant_copy=" + json.dumps(text))
+        if result.stderr.strip():
+            print("stderr_excerpt=" + json.dumps(result.stderr.splitlines()[:10]))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""P6 constrained-recovery probe; BUILT ONLY and Mos-gated.
-
-DO NOT self-fire. Under Mos authorization only:
-  python3 -I -S -B docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p6_constrained_recovery.py
-
-The default three isolated runs launch the shipped daemon plus its production
-observer transport on private sockets. The driver invokes the shipped recovery
-command and adapter gate identity; it never resets broker state, mocks promote,
-or taps a live model-output stream.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import base64
-import hashlib
-import importlib.util
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import socket
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
-REPOSITORY = HERE.parents[2]
-TOOLS = REPOSITORY / "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker"
-DAEMON = TOOLS / "daemon.py"
-GATE = TOOLS / "mutator-gate.py"
-RECOVERY_COMMAND = TOOLS / "recover-context.py"
-OBSERVER_CLIENT = TOOLS / "receipt-observer-client.py"
-FRAGMENTS = TOOLS / "normative_fragments.py"
-CLAUDE_SETTINGS = REPOSITORY / "packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/claude/settings.json"
-PI_EXTENSION = REPOSITORY / "packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts"
-
-
-def load_shipped_fragments():
-    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("p6_shipped_fragments", FRAGMENTS)
-    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
-        raise RuntimeError("shipped normative construction unavailable")
-    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
-    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-    return module
-
-
-def request(socket_path: Path, value: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as connection:
-        connection.settimeout(3.0)
-        connection.connect(str(socket_path))
-        connection.sendall((json.dumps(value, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode())
-        connection.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR)
-        response = bytearray()
-        while True:
-            chunk = connection.recv(4096)
-            if not chunk:
-                break
-            response.extend(chunk)
-    if not response.endswith(b"\n") or response.count(b"\n") != 1:
-        raise AssertionError(f"unframed broker reply: {bytes(response)!r}")
-    reply = json.loads(response[:-1])
-    if not isinstance(reply, dict):
-        raise AssertionError("broker reply is not an object")
-    return reply
-
-
-def wait_ready(process: subprocess.Popen[str], socket_path: Path) -> None:
-    deadline = time.monotonic() + 5.0
-    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
-        if socket_path.exists():
-            return
-        if process.poll() is not None:
-            output = process.stdout.read() if process.stdout is not None else ""
-            raise RuntimeError(f"shipped daemon exited before READY: {output}")
-        time.sleep(0.02)
-    raise TimeoutError("shipped daemon did not create private probe socket")
-
-
-def run_json(command: list[str], environment: dict[str, str], input_value: object | None = None) -> dict[str, object]:
-    completed = subprocess.run(
-        command,
-        input=None if input_value is None else json.dumps(input_value),
-        text=True,
-        capture_output=True,
-        env=environment,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    if not completed.stdout.endswith("\n"):
-        raise AssertionError(f"command omitted framed result: {completed.stderr!r}")
-    reply = json.loads(completed.stdout)
-    if not isinstance(reply, dict):
-        raise AssertionError("command result is not an object")
-    return reply
-
-
-def gate_recovery(runtime: str, phase: str, environment: dict[str, str]) -> None:
-    command = [sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(GATE), "--runtime", runtime]
-    if runtime == "claude":
-        command.extend(["--recovery-command", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND)])
-        recovery_invocation = (
-            f"python3 {RECOVERY_COMMAND} begin --construction /tmp/p6.json "
-            "--compaction-epoch 1 --request-epoch 1"
-            if phase == "begin"
-            else f"python3 {RECOVERY_COMMAND} complete"
-        )
-        value = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": recovery_invocation}}
-    else:
-        value = {"tool_name": "mosaic_context_recover"}
-    completed = subprocess.run(command, input=json.dumps(value), text=True, capture_output=True, env=environment, check=False)
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise AssertionError(f"{runtime} recovery invocation remained gated: {completed.stderr!r}")
-
-
-def record_production_observation(runtime: str, message: str, root: Path, environment: dict[str, str]) -> None:
-    command = [sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(OBSERVER_CLIENT), "--runtime", runtime]
-    if runtime == "claude":
-        transcript = root / "claude-transcript.jsonl"
-        transcript.write_text(json.dumps({"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": message}}) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
-        payload = {"transcript_path": str(transcript)}
-        command.append("--latest-entry")
-    else:
-        payload = {"latest_assistant_message": message}
-    completed = subprocess.run(command, input=json.dumps(payload), text=True, capture_output=True, env=environment, check=False)
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        raise AssertionError(f"{runtime} production observer transport refused: {completed.stderr!r}")
-
-
-def run_once(index: int, runtime: str) -> None:
-    # Parity guard: drive the shipped command and the repaired adapter/observer
-    # bytes, not a shadow receipt or promotion implementation.
-    recovery_source = RECOVERY_COMMAND.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    if '"action": "begin_recovery"' not in recovery_source or '"action": "complete_recovery"' not in recovery_source:
-        raise AssertionError("P6 parity guard: recovery command no longer drives shipped broker entrypoints")
-    gate_source = GATE.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    if "--recovery-command" not in CLAUDE_SETTINGS.read_text(encoding="utf-8"):
-        raise AssertionError("P6 parity guard: Claude recovery mapping is missing")
-    if "_SHELL_ACTIVE" not in gate_source or "argv[1] != str(recovery_command)" not in gate_source:
-        raise AssertionError("P6 parity guard: Claude mapping is not literal-only")
-    if "const RECOVERY_TOOL = 'mosaic_context_recover'" not in PI_EXTENSION.read_text(encoding="utf-8"):
-        raise AssertionError("P6 parity guard: Pi recovery tool mapping is missing")
-
-    fragments = load_shipped_fragments()
-    root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"mosaic-p6-recovery-{index}-"))
-    os.chmod(root, 0o700)
-    socket_path = root / "broker.sock"
-    observer_socket = root / "observer.sock"
-    state_path = root / "state.json"
-    construction_path = root / "construction.json"
-    content = b"P6 constrained recovery fixture\n"
-    construction = {
-        "manifest_version": 1,
-        "generator_version": "p6-constrained-recovery",
-        "fragments": [{
-            "source_id": "authority/p6",
-            "content_base64": base64.b64encode(content).decode("ascii"),
-            "expected_sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(),
-        }],
-    }
-    construction_path.write_text(json.dumps(construction), encoding="utf-8")
-    os.chmod(construction_path, 0o600)
-    process = subprocess.Popen(
-        [sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(DAEMON), "--socket", str(socket_path),
-         "--state", str(state_path), "--observer-socket", str(observer_socket)],
-        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
-        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
-        text=True,
-    )
-    try:
-        wait_ready(process, socket_path)
-        registered = request(socket_path, {"action": "register_anchor", "runtime_generation": 1})
-        session_id = registered.get("session_id")
-        if registered.get("ok") is not True or not isinstance(session_id, str):
-            raise AssertionError(f"broker anchor registration failed: {registered!r}")
-        built = fragments.build_payload_from_wire(construction)
-        normal = request(socket_path, {
-            "action": "begin_verification", "session_id": session_id, "runtime_generation": 1,
-            "runtime": runtime, "construction": construction,
-            "binding": {"compaction_epoch": index, "request_epoch": index + 100,
-                        "h_source": built.h_source, "h_payload": built.h_payload, "schema_version": 1},
-        })
-        normal_challenge = normal.get("receipt_challenge")
-        normal_receipt = normal.get("receipt")
-        if not isinstance(normal_challenge, str) or not isinstance(normal_receipt, str):
-            raise AssertionError("normal path did not mint a receipt challenge")
-        environment = {
-            **os.environ,
-            "MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET": str(socket_path),
-            "MOSAIC_RECEIPT_OBSERVER_SOCKET": str(observer_socket),
-            "MOSAIC_LEASE_SESSION_ID": session_id,
-            "MOSAIC_RUNTIME_GENERATION": "1",
-            "MOSAIC_LEASE_RUNTIME": runtime,
-        }
-        gate_recovery(runtime, "begin", environment)
-        recovery = run_json([
-            sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND), "begin", "--construction", str(construction_path),
-            "--compaction-epoch", str(index + 10), "--request-epoch", str(index + 110),
-        ], environment)
-        challenge = recovery.get("receipt_challenge")
-        receipt = recovery.get("receipt")
-        if recovery.get("state") != "PENDING_DELIVERY" or not isinstance(challenge, str) or not isinstance(receipt, str):
-            raise AssertionError(f"recovery command did not drive pending delivery: {recovery!r}")
-        if challenge == normal_challenge:
-            raise AssertionError("recovery reused a normal-path challenge")
-
-        # C4: production observer content is still exact-current-cycle only.
-        record_production_observation(runtime, normal_receipt, root, environment)
-        refused = run_json([sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND), "complete"], environment)
-        if refused.get("ok") is not False or refused.get("code") != "RECEIPT_MISMATCH":
-            raise AssertionError(f"normal-path receipt replay was not refused: {refused!r}")
-
-        gate_recovery(runtime, "begin", environment)
-        recovery = run_json([
-            sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND), "begin", "--construction", str(construction_path),
-            "--compaction-epoch", str(index + 20), "--request-epoch", str(index + 120),
-        ], environment)
-        receipt = recovery.get("receipt")
-        if recovery.get("state") != "PENDING_DELIVERY" or not isinstance(receipt, str):
-            raise AssertionError(f"fresh recovery retry did not pend: {recovery!r}")
-        record_production_observation(runtime, receipt, root, environment)
-        gate_recovery(runtime, "complete", environment)
-        promoted = run_json([sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND), "complete"], environment)
-        if promoted.get("ok") is not True or promoted.get("state") != "VERIFIED":
-            raise AssertionError(f"recovery consume-before-promote failed: {promoted!r}")
-        replay = run_json([sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(RECOVERY_COMMAND), "complete"], environment)
-        if replay.get("ok") is not False or replay.get("code") != "INVALID_LEASE_TRANSITION":
-            raise AssertionError(f"consumed recovery challenge re-promoted: {replay!r}")
-    finally:
-        if process.poll() is None:
-            process.terminate()
-            try:
-                process.wait(timeout=3.0)
-            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-                process.kill()
-                process.wait()
-        shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-def main() -> None:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("--runs", type=int, default=3)
-    arguments = parser.parse_args()
-    if arguments.runs != 3:
-        raise SystemExit("P6 requires exactly three isolated runs")
-    for index, runtime in enumerate(("pi", "claude", "pi")):
-        run_once(index, runtime)
-    print("P6 constrained recovery probe PASS: 3 isolated shipped recovery-command runs")
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+import type { ExtensionAPI } from '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent';
+import { Type } from 'typebox';
+import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { readFileSync, appendFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import net from 'node:net';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { resolve } from 'node:path';
+
+const SELF = resolve(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url).split('?')[0]!);
+const LOG = process.env['GATE0_PI_LOG'];
+const CONTEXT_BLOCK =
+  process.env['GATE0_PI_CONTEXT_BLOCK'] ??
+  [
+    'GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_BEGIN',
+    'segment-01=alpha-7e31',
+    'segment-02=middle-9c42',
+    'segment-03=omega-5b83',
+    'GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_END',
+  ].join('\n');
+
+let sequence = 0;
+
+function sha(value: string | Buffer): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex');
+}
+
+function procStarttime(): number {
+  const text = readFileSync(`/proc/${process.pid}/stat`, 'utf8');
+  const close = text.lastIndexOf(')');
+  const fields = text.slice(close + 2).trim().split(/\s+/);
+  return Number(fields[19]);
+}
+
+function log(event: string, details: Record<string, unknown> = {}): void {
+  if (!LOG) return;
+  sequence += 1;
+  appendFileSync(
+    LOG,
+    `${JSON.stringify({ seq: sequence, event, pid: process.pid, starttime_ticks: procStarttime(), ...details })}\n`,
+  );
+}
+
+function argvExtensions(): string[] {
+  const result: string[] = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < process.argv.length; i += 1) {
+    if (process.argv[i] === '--extension' || process.argv[i] === '-e') {
+      const candidate = process.argv[i + 1];
+      if (candidate) result.push(resolve(candidate));
+    }
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+interface SourceValidation {
+  ok: boolean;
+  reason: string;
+  fragment?: string;
+}
+
+function validateSources(): SourceValidation {
+  const manifestPath = process.env['GATE0_SOURCE_MANIFEST'];
+  if (!manifestPath) return { ok: true, reason: 'no-manifest-probe-disabled' };
+  try {
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf8')) as {
+      maxBytes: number;
+      fragments: Array<{ path: string; sha256: string }>;
+    };
+    for (const fragment of manifest.fragments) {
+      let fileStat;
+      try {
+        fileStat = statSync(fragment.path);
+      } catch {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'missing', fragment: fragment.path };
+      }
+      if (!fileStat.isFile()) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'not-regular-file', fragment: fragment.path };
+      }
+      if (fileStat.size > manifest.maxBytes) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'oversize', fragment: fragment.path };
+      }
+      const bytes = readFileSync(fragment.path);
+      if (sha(bytes) !== fragment.sha256) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'hash-mismatch', fragment: fragment.path };
+      }
+    }
+    return { ok: true, reason: 'all-fragments-valid' };
+  } catch (error) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `manifest-error:${error instanceof Error ? error.name : 'unknown'}` };
+  }
+}
+
+function brokerRequest(payload: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+  const socketPath = process.env['GATE0_GENERATION_SOCKET'];
+  if (!socketPath) return Promise.resolve({ skipped: true });
+  return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
+    const socket = net.createConnection(socketPath);
+    let buffer = '';
+    socket.setEncoding('utf8');
+    socket.on('connect', () => socket.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`));
+    socket.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      buffer += chunk;
+      const newline = buffer.indexOf('\n');
+      if (newline < 0) return;
+      socket.end();
+      resolvePromise(JSON.parse(buffer.slice(0, newline)) as Record<string, unknown>);
+    });
+    socket.on('error', reject);
+  });
+}
+
+function markerPaths(value: unknown, path = '$'): string[] {
+  const matches: string[] = [];
+  if (typeof value === 'string') {
+    if (value.includes(CONTEXT_BLOCK)) matches.push(path);
+    return matches;
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    value.forEach((item, index) => matches.push(...markerPaths(item, `${path}[${index}]`)));
+    return matches;
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === 'object') {
+    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+      matches.push(...markerPaths(item, `${path}.${key}`));
+    }
+  }
+  return matches;
+}
+
+function assistantToolIds(message: unknown): string[] {
+  if (!message || typeof message !== 'object') return [];
+  const candidate = message as { role?: string; content?: unknown };
+  if (candidate.role !== 'assistant' || !Array.isArray(candidate.content)) return [];
+  return candidate.content
+    .filter(
+      (block): block is { type: 'toolCall'; id: string } =>
+        Boolean(
+          block &&
+            typeof block === 'object' &&
+            (block as { type?: string }).type === 'toolCall' &&
+            typeof (block as { id?: unknown }).id === 'string',
+        ),
+    )
+    .map((block) => block.id);
+}
+
+function assistantText(message: unknown): string {
+  if (!message || typeof message !== 'object') return '';
+  const candidate = message as { role?: string; content?: unknown };
+  if (candidate.role !== 'assistant' || !Array.isArray(candidate.content)) return '';
+  return candidate.content
+    .filter(
+      (block): block is { type: 'text'; text: string } =>
+        Boolean(
+          block &&
+            typeof block === 'object' &&
+            (block as { type?: string }).type === 'text' &&
+            typeof (block as { text?: unknown }).text === 'string',
+        ),
+    )
+    .map((block) => block.text)
+    .join('');
+}
+
+export default function register(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
+  const localProviderUrl = process.env['GATE0_LOCAL_PROVIDER_URL'];
+  if (localProviderUrl) {
+    pi.registerProvider('gate0-local', {
+      baseUrl: localProviderUrl,
+      apiKey: 'gate0-probe-not-a-secret',
+      api: 'openai-completions',
+      models: [
+        {
+          id: 'gate0-model',
+          name: 'Gate0 deterministic local model',
+          reasoning: false,
+          input: ['text'],
+          cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
+          contextWindow: 32_000,
+          maxTokens: 1_024,
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+  }
+
+  const extensions = argvExtensions();
+  const lastPosition = extensions.length > 0 && extensions.at(-1) === SELF;
+  interface RequestCycle {
+    nonce: string;
+    verified: boolean;
+    sourceReason: string;
+  }
+  let buildingCycle: RequestCycle | undefined;
+  const inFlightCycles: RequestCycle[] = [];
+  const toolNonce = new Map<string, { nonce: string; verified: boolean; sourceReason: string }>();
+
+  pi.on('session_start', async (event) => {
+    const broker = await brokerRequest({ action: 'lifecycle', phase: 'start', reason: event.reason });
+    log('session_start', {
+      reason: event.reason,
+      extensions,
+      self: SELF,
+      lastPosition,
+      gateState: lastPosition ? 'UNVERIFIED_READY' : 'CLOSED_NOT_LAST',
+      broker,
+    });
+  });
+
+  pi.on('session_shutdown', async (event) => {
+    const broker = await brokerRequest({ action: 'lifecycle', phase: 'shutdown', reason: event.reason });
+    log('session_shutdown', { reason: event.reason, broker });
+  });
+
+  pi.on('context', async (event) => {
+    const validation = validateSources();
+    buildingCycle = {
+      nonce: randomUUID(),
+      sourceReason: validation.reason,
+      verified: lastPosition && validation.ok,
+    };
+    const inputJson = JSON.stringify(event.messages);
+    const injected = {
+      role: 'custom' as const,
+      customType: 'gate0-context',
+      content: CONTEXT_BLOCK,
+      display: false,
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+    };
+    const outputMessages = buildingCycle.verified
+      ? [...event.messages, injected]
+      : [...event.messages];
+    const outputPrefix = outputMessages.slice(0, event.messages.length);
+    const sourceBroker = validation.ok
+      ? { action: 'none', reason: 'source-valid' }
+      : await brokerRequest({ action: 'source-invalid', reason: validation.reason });
+    log('context_return', {
+      requestNonce: buildingCycle.nonce,
+      sourceValidation: validation,
+      sourceBroker,
+      lastPosition,
+      promotion: false,
+      injectionDecision: buildingCycle.verified ? 'ONE_ATOMIC_AGENT_MESSAGE' : 'REFUSED',
+      inputCount: event.messages.length,
+      outputCount: outputMessages.length,
+      prefixHashBefore: sha(inputJson),
+      prefixHashAfter: sha(JSON.stringify(outputPrefix)),
+      prefixPreservedByReturn: sha(inputJson) === sha(JSON.stringify(outputPrefix)),
+      blockLength: CONTEXT_BLOCK.length,
+      blockSha256: sha(CONTEXT_BLOCK),
+    });
+    return { messages: outputMessages };
+  });
+
+  pi.on('before_provider_request', async (event) => {
+    const paths = markerPaths(event.payload);
+    const cycle = buildingCycle;
+    buildingCycle = undefined;
+    if (cycle) inFlightCycles.push(cycle);
+    log('before_provider_request', {
+      requestNonce: cycle?.nonce,
+      inFlightDepth: inFlightCycles.length,
+      markerOccurrences: paths.length,
+      markerPaths: paths,
+      finalPayloadValid: Boolean(cycle?.verified && paths.length === 1),
+    });
+  });
+
+  pi.on('after_provider_response', async (event) => {
+    const cycle = inFlightCycles[0];
+    log('after_provider_response', {
+      requestNonce: cycle?.nonce,
+      status: event.status,
+      assistantContentAvailableAtThisHook: false,
+      timing: 'headers/status before stream consumption',
+    });
+  });
+
+  pi.on('message_end', async (event) => {
+    const role = (event.message as { role?: string }).role;
+    const ids = assistantToolIds(event.message);
+    const text = assistantText(event.message);
+    const cycle = role === 'assistant' ? inFlightCycles.shift() : undefined;
+    if (ids.length > 0 && cycle) {
+      for (const id of ids) {
+        toolNonce.set(id, {
+          nonce: cycle.nonce,
+          verified: cycle.verified,
+          sourceReason: cycle.sourceReason,
+        });
+      }
+    }
+    log('message_end', {
+      role,
+      assistantContentObserved: role === 'assistant',
+      requestNonce: cycle?.nonce,
+      inFlightDepthAfter: inFlightCycles.length,
+      toolCallIds: ids,
+      nonceMappings: ids.map((id) => ({ toolCallId: id, requestNonce: cycle?.nonce })),
+      exactContextBlockCopied: text.includes(CONTEXT_BLOCK),
+      assistantTextSha256: text ? sha(text) : null,
+    });
+  });
+
+  pi.on('tool_call', async (event) => {
+    const mapping = toolNonce.get(event.toolCallId);
+    const allowed = Boolean(lastPosition && mapping?.verified);
+    log('tool_call', {
+      toolCallId: event.toolCallId,
+      toolName: event.toolName,
+      mapping: mapping ?? null,
+      allowed,
+      reason: !lastPosition
+        ? 'closed-not-last'
+        : !mapping
+          ? 'unknown-tool-call-id'
+          : !mapping.verified
+            ? `unverified-source:${mapping.sourceReason}`
+            : 'exact-tool-call-id-mapped-to-verified-request-nonce',
+    });
+    if (!allowed) return { block: true, reason: 'Gate0 probe refused unverified tool batch' };
+  });
+
+  pi.on('agent_settled', async () => {
+    log('agent_settled', { retainedNonceMappingsBeforeClear: toolNonce.size });
+    toolNonce.clear();
+  });
+
+  pi.registerTool({
+    name: 'gate0_nonce_probe',
+    label: 'Gate0 Nonce Probe',
+    description: 'Gate0-only harmless tool used to prove toolCallId to request-nonce correlation.',
+    parameters: Type.Object({ label: Type.String() }),
+    async execute(toolCallId, params) {
+      const broker = await brokerRequest({ action: 'promote-probe' });
+      log('tool_execute', { toolCallId, label: params.label, broker });
+      return {
+        content: [{ type: 'text', text: `gate0_nonce_probe executed for ${params.label}` }],
+        details: { harmless: true },
+      };
+    },
+  });
+
+  pi.registerCommand('gate0-reload', {
+    description: 'Trigger a real same-PID Pi extension/runtime reload.',
+    handler: async (_args, ctx) => {
+      log('reload_command_before');
+      await ctx.reload();
+      return;
+    },
+  });
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Drive real Pi 0.80.x RPC for P2/P3/P5/P6 runtime evidence."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import queue
+import shutil
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+BLOCK = "\n".join(
+    [
+        "GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_BEGIN",
+        "segment-01=alpha-7e31",
+        "segment-02=middle-9c42",
+        "segment-03=omega-5b83",
+        "GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_END",
+    ]
+)
+
+
+def wait_path(path: Path, timeout: float = 20) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if path.exists():
+            return
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"timed out waiting for {path}")
+
+
+def socket_request(path: Path, payload: dict[str, object]) -> None:
+    conn = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    conn.connect(str(path))
+    conn.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode())
+    conn.makefile("r", encoding="utf-8").readline()
+    conn.close()
+
+
+def jsonl(path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not path.exists():
+        return []
+    return [json.loads(line) for line in path.read_text().splitlines() if line]
+
+
+class PiRpc:
+    def __init__(self, command: list[str], cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str]):
+        self.process = subprocess.Popen(
+            command,
+            cwd=cwd,
+            env=env,
+            stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+            text=True,
+            bufsize=1,
+            start_new_session=True,
+        )
+        self.events: queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]] = queue.Queue()
+        self.raw_lines: list[str] = []
+        self.stderr_lines: list[str] = []
+        threading.Thread(target=self._read_stdout, daemon=True).start()
+        threading.Thread(target=self._read_stderr, daemon=True).start()
+
+    def _read_stdout(self) -> None:
+        assert self.process.stdout is not None
+        for line in self.process.stdout:
+            stripped = line.rstrip("\n")
+            self.raw_lines.append(stripped)
+            try:
+                event = json.loads(stripped)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+            self.events.put(event)
+
+    def _read_stderr(self) -> None:
+        assert self.process.stderr is not None
+        for line in self.process.stderr:
+            self.stderr_lines.append(line.rstrip("\n"))
+
+    def send(self, payload: dict[str, object]) -> None:
+        assert self.process.stdin is not None
+        self.process.stdin.write(json.dumps(payload) + "\n")
+        self.process.stdin.flush()
+
+    def wait(self, predicate: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], bool], description: str, timeout: float = 180) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if self.process.poll() is not None and self.events.empty():
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"Pi exited {self.process.returncode} while waiting for {description}: "
+                    + " | ".join(self.stderr_lines[-5:])
+                )
+            try:
+                event = self.events.get(timeout=0.2)
+            except queue.Empty:
+                continue
+            if predicate(event):
+                return event
+        raise TimeoutError(f"timed out waiting for {description}")
+
+    def response(self, request_id: str, timeout: float = 180) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return self.wait(
+            lambda event: event.get("type") == "response" and event.get("id") == request_id,
+            f"response {request_id}",
+            timeout,
+        )
+
+    def prompt_and_settle(self, request_id: str, message: str) -> None:
+        self.send({"id": request_id, "type": "prompt", "message": message})
+        response = self.response(request_id)
+        if not response.get("success"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"prompt rejected: {response}")
+        self.wait(lambda event: event.get("type") == "agent_settled", f"agent_settled {request_id}")
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        if self.process.poll() is None:
+            try:
+                os.killpg(self.process.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
+            except ProcessLookupError:
+                pass
+            try:
+                self.process.wait(timeout=8)
+            except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+                os.killpg(self.process.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+                self.process.wait(timeout=5)
+
+
+def manifest(path: Path, fragment: Path, expected_hash: str, max_bytes: int = 64) -> None:
+    path.write_text(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "maxBytes": max_bytes,
+                "fragments": [{"path": str(fragment), "sha256": expected_hash}],
+            },
+            sort_keys=True,
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def run_open(root: Path) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], list[dict[str, Any]], list[str], list[str]]:
+    workspace = root / "workspace"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    session_dir = root / "sessions"
+    session_dir.mkdir()
+    pi_log = root / "pi-hooks.jsonl"
+    generation_log = root / "generation.jsonl"
+    generation_socket = root / "generation.sock"
+    source_manifest = root / "manifest.json"
+    valid_fragment = root / "fragment.md"
+    valid_fragment.write_text("NORMATIVE-FRAGMENT-v1\n")
+    expected = hashlib.sha256(valid_fragment.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
+    manifest(source_manifest, valid_fragment, expected)
+
+    broker = subprocess.Popen(
+        [
+            sys.executable,
+            str(HERE / "p3_generation_broker.py"),
+            "--socket",
+            str(generation_socket),
+            "--log",
+            str(generation_log),
+        ],
+        text=True,
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+    )
+    wait_path(generation_socket)
+    env = os.environ.copy()
+    env.update(
+        {
+            "GATE0_PI_LOG": str(pi_log),
+            "GATE0_GENERATION_SOCKET": str(generation_socket),
+            "GATE0_SOURCE_MANIFEST": str(source_manifest),
+            "GATE0_PI_CONTEXT_BLOCK": BLOCK,
+            "MOSAIC_PI_FORCE_SKILLS": "",
+            "PI_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK": "1",
+        }
+    )
+    command = [
+        "mosaic",
+        "yolo",
+        "pi",
+        "--mode",
+        "rpc",
+        "--session-dir",
+        str(session_dir),
+        "--no-extensions",
+        "--no-context-files",
+        "--no-prompt-templates",
+        "--model",
+        "openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol",
+        "--thinking",
+        "medium",
+        "--extension",
+        str(HERE / "pi_gate0_extension.ts"),
+    ]
+    pi = PiRpc(command, workspace, env)
+    try:
+        pi.send({"id": "state-0", "type": "get_state"})
+        state0 = pi.response("state-0")
+        original_session = state0["data"]["sessionFile"]
+
+        pi.prompt_and_settle(
+            "p2",
+            "Call gate0_nonce_probe exactly once with label p2. After the tool finishes, copy the exact full GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_BEGIN through GATE0_PI_ATOMIC_END block from context, with no commentary.",
+        )
+
+        # P3 immediately follows the valid P2 promotion so reload must revoke a
+        # genuinely VERIFIED prior generation, not an already-invalid source run.
+        pi.send({"id": "reload", "type": "prompt", "message": "/gate0-reload"})
+        reload_response = pi.response("reload")
+        if not reload_response.get("success"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"reload command failed: {reload_response}")
+
+        pi.send({"id": "clone", "type": "clone"})
+        clone_response = pi.response("clone")
+        if not clone_response.get("success") or clone_response.get("data", {}).get("cancelled"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"clone failed: {clone_response}")
+
+        pi.send({"id": "new", "type": "new_session"})
+        new_response = pi.response("new")
+        if not new_response.get("success") or new_response.get("data", {}).get("cancelled"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"new session failed: {new_response}")
+
+        pi.send(
+            {
+                "id": "resume",
+                "type": "switch_session",
+                "sessionPath": original_session,
+            }
+        )
+        resume_response = pi.response("resume")
+        if not resume_response.get("success") or resume_response.get("data", {}).get("cancelled"):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"resume failed: {resume_response}")
+
+        # P5 missing fragment: action-time source validation must revoke/refuse.
+        manifest(source_manifest, root / "absent-fragment.md", expected)
+        pi.prompt_and_settle(
+            "p5-missing",
+            "Call gate0_nonce_probe exactly once with label p5-missing, then stop.",
+        )
+
+        # P5 oversize fragment: expected hash is correct, size limit is not.
+        oversize = root / "oversize.md"
+        oversize.write_text("X" * 65)
+        manifest(source_manifest, oversize, hashlib.sha256(oversize.read_bytes()).hexdigest(), 64)
+        pi.prompt_and_settle(
+            "p5-oversize",
+            "Call gate0_nonce_probe exactly once with label p5-oversize, then stop.",
+        )
+
+        # P5 hash mismatch: size is valid but bytes differ from expected.
+        mismatch = root / "mismatch.md"
+        mismatch.write_text("tampered\n")
+        manifest(source_manifest, mismatch, expected, 64)
+        pi.prompt_and_settle(
+            "p5-hash",
+            "Call gate0_nonce_probe exactly once with label p5-hash-mismatch, then stop.",
+        )
+
+        time.sleep(1)
+        return jsonl(pi_log), jsonl(generation_log), list(pi.raw_lines), list(pi.stderr_lines)
+    finally:
+        pi.close()
+        try:
+            socket_request(generation_socket, {"action": "shutdown-broker"})
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        try:
+            broker.wait(timeout=5)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            broker.kill()
+            broker.wait()
+
+
+def run_closed(root: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    workspace = root / "closed-workspace"
+    workspace.mkdir()
+    pi_log = root / "closed-hooks.jsonl"
+    env = os.environ.copy()
+    env.update(
+        {
+            "GATE0_PI_LOG": str(pi_log),
+            "MOSAIC_PI_FORCE_SKILLS": "",
+            "PI_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK": "1",
+        }
+    )
+    command = [
+        "mosaic",
+        "yolo",
+        "pi",
+        "--mode",
+        "rpc",
+        "--no-session",
+        "--no-extensions",
+        "--no-context-files",
+        "--no-prompt-templates",
+        "--extension",
+        str(HERE / "pi_gate0_extension.ts"),
+        "--extension",
+        str(HERE / "pi_later_extension.ts"),
+    ]
+    pi = PiRpc(command, workspace, env)
+    try:
+        pi.send({"id": "closed-state", "type": "get_state"})
+        pi.response("closed-state")
+        time.sleep(0.5)
+        return jsonl(pi_log)
+    finally:
+        pi.close()
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gate0-pi-") as temp:
+        root = Path(temp)
+        records, generations, rpc_lines, stderr_lines = run_open(root)
+        closed = run_closed(root)
+
+        p2_message = next(
+            r for r in records if r["event"] == "message_end" and r.get("nonceMappings")
+        )
+        p2_tool = next(r for r in records if r["event"] == "tool_call" and r.get("allowed"))
+        mapped = p2_message["nonceMappings"][0]
+        assert mapped["toolCallId"] == p2_tool["toolCallId"]
+        assert mapped["requestNonce"] == p2_tool["mapping"]["nonce"]
+        assert next(r for r in records if r["event"] == "session_start")["lastPosition"] is True
+        assert next(r for r in closed if r["event"] == "session_start")["gateState"] == "CLOSED_NOT_LAST"
+        reload_revoke = next(
+            r
+            for r in generations
+            if r["event"] == "runtime_generation_bump"
+            and r.get("reason") == "reload"
+            and r.get("phase") == "shutdown"
+        )
+        assert reload_revoke["prior_lease"] == "VERIFIED"
+        assert reload_revoke["prior_lease_revoked"] is True
+        for reason in {"missing", "oversize", "hash-mismatch"}:
+            assert any(
+                r["event"] == "context_return"
+                and r.get("sourceValidation", {}).get("reason") == reason
+                and r.get("injectionDecision") == "REFUSED"
+                and r.get("promotion") is False
+                for r in records
+            )
+            assert any(
+                r["event"] == "tool_call"
+                and r.get("mapping", {}).get("sourceReason") == reason
+                and r.get("allowed") is False
+                for r in records
+            )
+        assert any(
+            r["event"] == "message_end" and r.get("exactContextBlockCopied") is True
+            for r in records
+        )
+
+        print("$ python3 docs/compaction-refresh/probes/pi_gate0_run.py")
+        print("machine_assertions=PASS")
+        print("runtime_versions:")
+        print("  " + subprocess.check_output(["pi", "--version"], text=True).strip())
+        print("  " + subprocess.check_output(["mosaic", "--version"], text=True).strip())
+
+        print("\nP2_EVENT_ORDER_AND_NONCE_MAP:")
+        for record in records:
+            if record["seq"] <= 12 and record["event"] in {
+                "after_provider_response",
+                "message_end",
+                "tool_call",
+                "tool_execute",
+            } and (
+                record["event"] != "message_end"
+                or record.get("role") == "assistant"
+            ):
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+
+        print("\nP2_LAST_OR_CLOSED:")
+        print(json.dumps(next(r for r in records if r["event"] == "session_start"), sort_keys=True))
+        print(json.dumps(next(r for r in closed if r["event"] == "session_start"), sort_keys=True))
+
+        print("\nP3_GENERATION_BROKER:")
+        for record in generations:
+            if record["event"] in {"probe_lease_promoted", "runtime_generation_bump"}:
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+
+        print("\nP5_SOURCE_INVALIDATION:")
+        fault_reasons = {"missing", "oversize", "hash-mismatch"}
+        emitted_context: set[str] = set()
+        emitted_tool: set[str] = set()
+        for record in records:
+            source_reason = record.get("sourceValidation", {}).get("reason")
+            if (
+                record["event"] == "context_return"
+                and source_reason in fault_reasons
+                and source_reason not in emitted_context
+            ):
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+                emitted_context.add(source_reason)
+            mapping_reason = record.get("mapping", {}).get("sourceReason")
+            if (
+                record["event"] == "tool_call"
+                and not record.get("allowed")
+                and mapping_reason in fault_reasons
+                and mapping_reason not in emitted_tool
+            ):
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+                emitted_tool.add(mapping_reason)
+        emitted_broker: set[str] = set()
+        for record in generations:
+            reason = record.get("source_reason")
+            if record["event"] == "source_invalidation_revoke" and reason not in emitted_broker:
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+                emitted_broker.add(str(reason))
+
+        print("\nP6_PI_CONTEXT_ATOMIC_OBSERVATION:")
+        for record in records:
+            include = (
+                (record["event"] == "context_return" and record.get("injectionDecision") == "ONE_ATOMIC_AGENT_MESSAGE")
+                or (record["event"] == "before_provider_request" and record.get("finalPayloadValid"))
+                or (record["event"] == "message_end" and record.get("exactContextBlockCopied"))
+            )
+            if include and record["seq"] <= 12:
+                print(json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True))
+
+        print("\nRPC_EVENT_COUNTS:")
+        counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for line in rpc_lines:
+            try:
+                event = json.loads(line)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                continue
+            key = str(event.get("type"))
+            counts[key] = counts.get(key, 0) + 1
+        print(json.dumps(counts, sort_keys=True))
+        print("stderr_nonempty=" + str(bool(stderr_lines)))
+        for line in stderr_lines[:10]:
+            print("stderr: " + line[:500])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import type { ExtensionAPI } from '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent';
+
+// Deliberately loaded after pi_gate0_extension.ts. The Gate0 extension must
+// observe its argv position and remain CLOSED rather than claiming finality.
+export default function register(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
+  pi.on('context', async (event) => ({ messages: [...event.messages] }));
+  pi.on('before_provider_request', async () => undefined);
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# TERRA §3 — Probe-3 Bounded-Repair Re-Review v11
+
+**Verdict: PASS (byte review only; no harness, broker, or runtime was launched).**
+
+## Reviewed object (GUARD 1)
+
+- **Branch:** `feat/827-gate0-probe`
+- **Reviewed object = `93a5fd018d26f16aa58a3ec1afc0c9bc83935fed`**
+- **v10 baseline:** `ce5ba762051354338889959bfce2b0381f4a4e2a`
+- **Harness:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py`
+- **Verified harness sha256:** `3a4b625a474ab31c53af7758464f51fe729a14201a77c049cceb9eafb607b5c8`
+
+Fresh verification fetched `origin/feat/827-gate0-probe`; local `HEAD` and remote branch both resolved to the reviewed full SHA before hashing the Git object.
+
+## TERRA §3 null-delta gate
+
+### (a) Exact authorized diff — PASS
+
+`git diff ce5ba762051354338889959bfce2b0381f4a4e2a 93a5fd018d26f16aa58a3ec1afc0c9bc83935fed -- docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` reports exactly `1 insertion, 1 deletion`, one hunk:
+
+```diff
+@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ def isolated_environment(
+-            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700)
+            target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+```
+
+The zero-context hunk is `@@ -709 +709 @@`. No other harness hunk or changed line exists. This is the authorized fixture-copy-loop repair only.
+
+### (b) Security-bearing bytes / D4 mechanism unchanged — PASS
+
+The hunk range is **old L709 / new L709**, which does not intersect these byte-compared ranges:
+
+| Surface | Line range | v10 SHA-256 = repair SHA-256 |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| B5–B9 closure, bytecode, environment, and child-launch controls | L351–L575 | `3dcdcf75c8b1dea0a1f8888cf1e49a52aba51e7e41f447b80cf407d84533eb2e` |
+| D4 generated lifecycle extension | L159–L251 | `4bdc047f7494029d951763555a797103ca25da647b255b287378771d20da209b` |
+| D4 runtime assertions, including `lease_anchor_registered` | L579–L665 | `75620f25829fa7e176af8b342b2935d45afb546d821d45bf478c51e95f6918ca` |
+| D4 orchestration and `--runs` parser | L749–L849 | `a28c36296b2ba8fffe77912b7e25b793047393bae79a9242df1727bd21ab2f92` |
+
+Thus B5–B9 assertions and all D4 generation-mechanism bytes are identical to v10. The sole hunk is inside `isolated_environment`, outside those assertion/mechanism ranges.
+
+## Required negative checks
+
+- **L704 unchanged:** byte-identical (`target_agent.mkdir(parents=True, mode=0o700)`); the L704-only slice hash is `5c077090950c1cc68b53ac4d06280dd2b5d91bd34b28f1cc8d26d0d9eb8dbe41` on both commits.
+- **Launcher flags unchanged:** B5–B9 slice includes launcher L511–L517: `-s -S -B` unchanged.
+- **Broker flags unchanged:** B5–B9 slice includes broker L551–L556: `-I -S -B` unchanged.
+- **`--runs` unchanged:** L840 remains `default=3, choices=(3,)` in the byte-identical L749–L849 slice.
+- **Assertions intact:** `lease_anchor_registered` remains at L594–L596 in the byte-identical L579–L665 slice; no B5–B9 assertion is softened, removed, or repointed.
+- **Absent from the harness delta:** P5, P6, P2-banking, retry-laundering, and live/prod-path changes. The exact one-line diff contains only the fixture directory `exist_ok=True` addition.
+- **Fixture scope:** no other fixture line changed; `git diff --check` is clean.
+
+## Guard 2 — authorship independence
+
+These review-document bytes were authored by this independent review session, not by repair author `ms-p3-fix`; this session did not build or modify the reviewed harness. The review was static/byte-only and did not execute the harness or launch a broker.
+
+## Guard 3 — publication boundary
+
+This document is committed separately on top of `93a5fd018d26f16aa58a3ec1afc0c9bc83935fed`. Its publication commit must leave the reviewed harness Git-object SHA-256 at `3a4b625a474ab31c53af7758464f51fe729a14201a77c049cceb9eafb607b5c8`.
+
+**TERRA §3 v11 PASS.** This is a null-security-delta byte review only; FIRE remains separately gated on Mos.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# TERRA §3 — Probe-3 Bounded-Repair Re-Review v12
+
+**Verdict: PASS — static byte review only.** No harness, broker, socket, or fixture state was launched or created.
+
+## Reviewed object (GUARD 1)
+
+- **Branch:** `feat/827-gate0-probe`
+- **reviewed object = `ca7b522e7beb09fbff64485510201b372d305d34`**
+- **v11 baseline:** `93a5fd018d26f16aa58a3ec1afc0c9bc83935fed`
+- **Harness:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py`
+- **Verified harness SHA-256:** `92ff11bd35a72c3bda8f9722837cd9058a711f688cc75bf5e5df106645f81553`
+- **Pre-audit reviewed:** `docs/compaction-refresh/reviews/GATE0-PROBE3-PREAUDIT-v12.md` at the reviewed object.
+
+Fresh `git fetch origin feat/827-gate0-probe -q` resolved both local HEAD and `origin/feat/827-gate0-probe` to the reviewed full SHA before the object hash was trusted.
+
+## Null-delta gate
+
+### (a) Exact authorized diff — PASS
+
+The exact harness diff from v11 has `1 insertion, 1 deletion`, one zero-context hunk only:
+
+```diff
+@@ -484 +484 @@ def gated_launcher_precondition(
+-        "initialize_runtime_generation(generation_file, generation)",
+        "initialize_generation: Callable[[Path, int], None] = initialize_runtime_generation",
+```
+
+No other harness hunk or line changed. This is the authorized diagnostic `behavior_markers` entry at L484.
+
+### (b) B5–B9 / D4 security-bearing bytes — PASS
+
+The sole hunk is **old/new L484**, inside the diagnostic marker tuple (L481–489), and does not intersect B5–B9 assertion/control or D4 logic ranges. Independent slice SHA-256 comparisons from v11 to the reviewed object were identical:
+
+| Surface | Range | SHA-256 on both revisions |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| B5–B9 controls before marker tuple | L351–L480 | `85eda967698af5699593daa12f761abd4b759a11a03323dc867905d286455aec` |
+| B5–B9 controls after marker tuple | L490–L575 | `b92bd920d896450f89a14979dd9a557a82ad590d7c9a73e900ebc89979a48986` |
+| D4 generated lifecycle extension | L159–L251 | `4bdc047f7494029d951763555a797103ca25da647b255b287378771d20da209b` |
+| D4 runtime assertions (`lease_anchor_registered` included) | L579–L672 | `ddaae13f0302b401ada76f1c96b9f66f2938d7afa614928f4cffb187da832856` |
+| D4 orchestration / `--runs` parser | L749–L849 | `a28c36296b2ba8fffe77912b7e25b793047393bae79a9242df1727bd21ab2f92` |
+
+Therefore the diagnostic-only L484 hunk is non-intersecting and all B5–B9/D4 security-bearing bytes are byte-identical to v11.
+
+## Hardened-marker correctness — PASS
+
+- The replacement is exactly `initialize_generation: Callable[[Path, int], None] = initialize_runtime_generation`.
+- The exact string is byte-present in the pinned launcher at `f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py:49`.
+- The same launcher imports the real function at L15 and invokes the DI-bound parameter at L90; the marker consequently proves the real helper binding, not merely a same-named call.
+- Pinned launcher SHA-256 was independently verified as `e950e4224e280f16979d90cabb89aa1896c5ee28bed2df957e14d018d43cda82`.
+
+## Pre-audit independently re-verified — PASS
+
+All remaining precondition checks pass against the real pinned closure bytes:
+
+| Requirement | Satisfying real bytes |
+| --- | --- |
+| Remaining launcher markers | registration action L77; DI binding L49; fixture socket env lookup L70; fixture generation path L89; generation-file env assignment L98; exec L101. |
+| Generation markers | `lease_generation.py` at `f4008307`: `read_runtime_generation` L78 and `bump_runtime_generation` L90; SHA-256 `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c`. |
+| Pinned broker closure | `p3_generation_broker.py` at `23c0caca`: explicit generation-module load L29–41; fixture socket bind/permissions L46–63; fixture-parent generation-file guard L71–75; SHA-256 `4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad`. |
+| Harness path/socket checks | Fixture broker socket equality and no inherited generation file: L452–455; all ten fixture-relative variables: L456–471; temporary-root socket requirement: L473–474. |
+| Fixture construction satisfying those checks | Fixture paths/environment L675–736; root-owned workspace/sessions, socket, logs, and extension construction L749–759. |
+| Complete pinned closure and hash gates | Exact three-object selection and SHA gate L397–433; materialized pinned files L435–443. |
+
+The six remaining launcher marker substrings and both generation-function substrings were independently checked as byte-present in the pinned objects. Thus no remaining marker or path/socket precondition has a static mismatch with the real closure.
+
+## Required unchanged / absent checks
+
+- **SHA pins:** L41–L43 byte-identical (`7396f46357620118d3da27aa074d422186600e8a4320fc0f56774439af14e877`).
+- **SHA gate / before-exec rehashes / bytecode rejection:** unchanged: materialize SHA gate L426; rehashes L539/L565/L568; `reject_pinned_bytecode` L498–501.
+- **Fixture:** L704 pre-create and L709 `exist_ok=True` are byte-identical to v11 (L700–L710 slice SHA-256 `3137ef255435ac613fe1332138bbb13111a9d3efc502a34403b3dce21287b04e`).
+- **Flags and runs:** unchanged launcher `-s -S -B` (L511–L517), broker `-I -S -B` (L551–L556), and `--runs default=3, choices=(3,)` (L840).
+- **Assertions:** `lease_anchor_registered` is intact at L594–L596 in the byte-identical D4 assertion slice; no B5–B9/D4 assertion is softened, removed, or repointed.
+- **Absent from the exact one-line harness delta:** P5, P6, P2-banking, retry-laundering, and live/prod-path changes.
+
+## Guard 2 — independent authorship
+
+These review-document bytes were authored by this reviewer session. Repair author `ms-p3-fix` did not author this document; this reviewer did not build or alter the harness and is not Mos.
+
+## Guard 3 — separate publication
+
+This review is committed separately on top of `ca7b522e7beb09fbff64485510201b372d305d34`; its publication commit must preserve the reviewed harness object SHA-256 `92ff11bd35a72c3bda8f9722837cd9058a711f688cc75bf5e5df106645f81553`.
+
+**TERRA §3 v12 PASS.** FIRE remains separately gated on Mos.
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Class-B — §3-Conformance Review v3
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS**
+
+## Pin (G1 — reviewed object, mandatory)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `ace6066762c088f4b9729860da71b4c84451a7c3`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`, `mosaicstack/stack` @ git.mosaicstack.dev).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py`
+- **Harness sha256 (pushed provider bytes, fetched `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust):**
+  `2f11c9391c0eef203f26b1206bee8bc4cd106e8c1192399c5e7b71f41a3f6b75` (17162 bytes; no not-found sentinel).
+- **§3 amendment authority read at pin:** `GATE0-PROBE3-EXEC-AMENDMENT.md` @ ref `571f239154c6793fb1a5eac0d1cd4182f286a3ac`,
+  sha256 `9ac9ff873fad41a6e15763cc89cb94d0bc4a6b0cf9b6770561d1781b03f63276` (7699 bytes). MUST-HAVE/MUST-BE-ABSENT
+  confirmed against the actual fetched §3 text, not a paraphrase.
+
+## Independence (G2)
+
+Distinct Opus §3-conformance reviewer (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). I did **not** build this harness (author =
+ms-rev-826); I am not Mos. This verdict is my own; the author did not author or edit it. Byte review only — **ran
+nothing** (no harness, no broker, no sockets/state). Reviewed across v1 (FAIL, live-broker launch path) → v2 (PASS,
+later found runtime-dead producer) → this v3 (closes the live-path review-gap).
+
+## Why v3 (the review-gap closed)
+
+v2 PASS @`839d156f` credited the static presence of `lease_anchor_registered` as isolation proof. At FIRE the
+producing path was **dead**: the harness drove the *released* `mosaic` binary, which launched Pi **ungated**, so
+`register_anchor` never ran. Static presence of an assertion ≠ its producing path executing. v3 requires the
+producing path to be **live at runtime**.
+
+## Surface-by-surface
+
+| Surface | Result | Evidence (file:line) |
+|---|---|---|
+| Pushed bytes fetched + sha-verified | ✅ | sha256==`2f11c939…`, 17162B, no sentinel |
+| (a) LIVE-PATH — drives the **gated** launcher, producer in the exec chain, NOT released `mosaic`/plain `execRuntime` | ✅ | launch = `python3 <GATED_LAUNCHER> --runtime pi -- pi …` :357-364; `GATED_LAUNCHER=…/launch-runtime.py` :32, pinned `GATED_WI_HEAD=abd2791f…` :31; `mosaic yolo`/`execRuntime` = 0 hits. `launch-runtime.py` unconditionally `register_anchor`s before `execvpe`, so the producer is in the invoked chain |
+| (b) Fail-closed precondition present + correct (gated + fixture-socket, refuses otherwise), invoked before all launches | ✅ | `gated_launcher_precondition` :229-251, called :342 **before** broker Popen :343 and Pi launch :357. Verifies (ii) `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET==fixture` :232 + fixture in tempdir :234; (i) launcher HEAD==`abd2791f` :243 + source has `register_anchor` **before** `execute(command[0]…)` and reads `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET` :246-250. Raises `RuntimeError` (no run) on any miss :233/:235/:242/:244/:250 |
+| (c) Fixture-socket isolation (no live/default broker reachable, single p3 fixture, non-destructive) | ✅ | `pop("MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET")` :330 + set to fixture socket :334; harness invokes `launch-runtime.py` directly so it reads `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET`=fixture with **no** `defaultLeaseBrokerSocket`/XDG/`/run/user` fallback in the path; `register_anchor` served by the single p3 fixture; `p3_generation_broker.py` **zero diff** vs `839d156f` (in-memory volatile hex-256 session `secrets.token_hex(32)`, nothing durable outside tempdir) |
+| (d) Assertion INTACT (`lease_anchor_registered` + `session_id_shape=="hex-256"`, not softened/optional/repointed) | ✅ | :256-258 (event), :298 (`hex-256`), folded into single-PID/starttime identity set :286. Not Case C |
+| spawns ONLY p3_generation_broker.py | ✅ | broker Popen = `HERE/p3_generation_broker.py` :343-346; the pinned launcher is a register-before-exec launch wrapper, not a 2nd broker |
+| promotion = fixture-only (not P2-banked) | ✅ | `d4_fixture_promote` "not a P2 evidence-gathering authorization"; `promote-probe` in-memory; precondition target only; no P2 import |
+| D4 assertions complete | ✅ | same-PID+starttime persist (incl. launcher registration) :284-288; gen strictly increases :290-293; reload revokes genuinely-VERIFIED prior :299-300; new→`MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED` :301; prior→`STALE_GENERATION` :302; lifecycle boundaries :294-297 |
+| P5 / P6 / P2-bank / retry-launder / live-effect / mechanism-change / scope-widen ABSENT | ✅ | 0 hits: `source-invalid`/`run_open`/`atomic`/`p2_provider`/`p5`/`p6`/`pi_gate0_run`/`retry`; no real-broker path; the only mechanism change is the required launch-routing fix (release→pinned gated launcher), which narrows scope, not widens |
+| non-destructive | ✅ | per-run `tempfile.mkdtemp` fixtures; p3 in-memory + tempdir socket/log only; reads `/proc/<pid>/stat` (read-only) |
+| deterministic | ✅ | isolated tempdir per run; deterministic assertions; session-id randomness is **shape**-asserted only (`hex-256`), `setdefault` idempotent |
+| hidden exec-at-import | ✅ absent | only `if __name__ == "__main__": main()`; docstring: not executed until FIRE |
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `ace60667`** — (a) LIVE-PATH, (b) fail-closed precondition, (c) fixture-socket isolation, and
+(d) intact assertion all hold, with zero out-of-scope surface. The v2 review-gap (runtime-dead producer via the
+released ungated `mosaic`) is structurally closed: the harness no longer invokes `mosaic` at all — it invokes the
+pinned `abd2791f` `launch-runtime.py` directly (register-before-exec), and refuses to launch unless the launcher is
+that pinned gated register-before-exec binary bound to this run's fixture socket.
+
+**Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Per §3/§5 of the amendment, producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (launches processes, creates
+socket/state artifacts, exercises revocation). This review clears the **bytes**; **FIRE remains separately gated on
+Mos's explicit post-clear GO** and is not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** independent Opus §3-conformance reviewer (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Byte review only; ran nothing.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `ace6066762c088f4b9729860da71b4c84451a7c3` · harness sha256 `2f11c9391c0eef203f26b1206bee8bc4cd106e8c1192399c5e7b71f41a3f6b75`.
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Observation-Fidelity — §3-Conformance Review v4
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS**
+
+## Pin (G1 — reviewed object, mandatory)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `484849387006ab5561798506fd6042ddbd5617de`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`, `mosaicstack/stack` @ git.mosaicstack.dev).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `9095eab7a4ddf11bb92bb5971d49e1facad12f4692ce2081665b0af47cbe5098` (23698 bytes, no not-found sentinel). Worktree bytes at `48484938` re-hashed identical.
+- **Co-reviewed fixture broker:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py` (sha256 `fd5327d2e9a2808282cbc9c4a4ccef42d2a806482b27cc48035191b9b11607c8`).
+- **Traceability anchor (independently recomputed):** `GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256 = e950e4224e280f16979d90cabb89aa1896c5ee28bed2df957e14d018d43cda82` equals the sha256 of `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py` at WI-3 #830 reviewed head `f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d` (computed from two independent worktrees).
+
+## Independence (G2)
+
+Distinct Opus §3-conformance reviewer (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). I did not build this harness (author = ms-rev-826);
+I am not Mos. This verdict is my own; the author did not author or edit it. Byte review only — **ran nothing** (no
+harness, no broker, no sockets/state). Prior v3 PASS (`ace60667`, pinned `abd2791f`) is correctly **superseded**:
+pinning a pre-`66b1e0a0` ancestor made D4 an in-memory socket simulation (hollow gate). v4 requires
+mechanism-fidelity within isolation (Jason R1).
+
+## BAR1 — Traceability (evidence attests the SHIPPED WI-3 D4 mechanism)
+
+| Check | Result | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| `GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307` (not `abd2791f`) | ✅ | :33 |
+| Launcher pinned by git-HEAD **and** sha256 | ✅ | precondition :285-288 (`head != GATED_WI_HEAD` raise; `sha256(launcher) != GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256` raise); sha256 independently == f4008307's `launch-runtime.py` |
+| Launcher bytes contain the file-backed mechanism | ✅ | precondition requires `register_anchor` :290, `initialize_runtime_generation(generation_file, generation)` :291, `generation-{session_id}.state` :294, `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE` :295, `read_runtime_generation`+`bump_runtime_generation` in `lease_generation.py` :296-299; order `register < initialize < execute` :302-303 |
+
+## BAR2 — Fidelity (file-backed generation, not in-memory simulation)
+
+| # | Requirement | Result | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| i | Extension bumps `generation-{sid}.state` via the real helper, not in-mem | ✅ | ext `lifecycle()` calls `broker({action:'bump-generation'})` at every post-start boundary (harness :200-205); broker `bump-generation` → `bump_runtime_generation(generation_environment(identity))` (broker :119-120) |
+| ii | Broker reads generation via `read_runtime_generation`, not an in-mem counter | ✅ | broker loads the pinned module (`--generation-module`, :52-54); `file_generation()` = `read_runtime_generation(...)` (:77-78); authorize-probe reads `current_generation = file_generation(identity)` (:154); lifecycle `new_generation = file_generation(identity)` (:201). The in-mem `generations` dict is only an old-value cache for the monotonic guard (:199-204), never the authorization authority |
+| iii | `assert_d4` observes the FILE-BACKED transition | ✅ | `state_file_source` = all records `generation_source=="state-file"` (harness :370-372); `state_file_drives_lifecycle` = state-bumps == lifecycle generations[1:] (:368-369); `new_generation_unverified→MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED` :382; `prior_generation_stale→STALE_GENERATION` :383; `verified_revoked_on_reload` :380-381 — not a socket-only bump |
+| iv | `.state` bound to per-run fixture temp root | ✅ | broker `generation_environment` **raises if `state_path.parent != socket_path.parent`** (:73-74); `state_file_in_fixture_root` (:373-376); precondition forbids inherited `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE` (:255-256) and requires socket in `gettempdir()` (:274-275); launcher/broker agree on `socket_path.parent / generation-{sid}.state` |
+
+## BAR3 — Carry-over
+
+| # | Result | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| a LIVE-PATH (gated launcher @f4008307 at runtime, not released/plain execRuntime) | ✅ | Pi launched via `python3 <GATED_LAUNCHER> --runtime pi -- pi …` :502-505; `mosaic yolo`/`execRuntime` = 0 hits; register-before-exec producer in the invoked chain (precondition order gate) |
+| b Fail-closed precondition present+correct | ✅ | `gated_launcher_precondition` :250-306, invoked :485 **before** broker/Pi; raises on socket≠fixture / gen-file-inherited / write-path-escape / head-mismatch / hash-mismatch / not-register-before-exec-file-bound |
+| c Fixture-socket isolation, single p3 broker | ✅ | one broker Popen :486-500; `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET=socket_path` (fixture); direct launcher invocation ⇒ no default/XDG/`/run/user` fallback in path |
+| d `lease_anchor_registered` INTACT | ✅ | broker emits event + `session_id_shape=="hex-256"` (:102-107); `record_where` requires it (:324-326); `lease_anchor_fixture` check (:379) — not deleted/softened/optional/repointed (not Case-C) |
+
+## BAR4 — Homelab Gate-B carry-forward findings
+
+| # | Result | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| b4-1 gated launcher @f4008307, not released/plain execRuntime | ✅ | :502-505; 0 `mosaic yolo`/`execRuntime` |
+| b4-2 **affirmative no-escape** (allow-list base, not deny-list) | ✅ | `isolated_environment` builds the child env from a **literal allow-list dict** (:442-461), NOT `os.environ.copy()`; only PATH/LANG/TERM/PI_CODING_AGENT (non-write-bearing) pass through; every write-bearing var (HOME/XDG*/TMPDIR/MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR/HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR/MOSAIC_HOME/D4_PI_LOG/socket) redirected under `root`; precondition double-checks each is `is_relative_to(root)` (:257-273). No unnamed/future inherited var survives |
+| b4-3 `--runs` exactly 3, fail-closed otherwise | ✅ | `add_argument("--runs", type=int, default=3, choices=(3,))` :591 (argparse rejects any other value) |
+| b4-4 cleanup try/finally spans the whole launch | ✅ | `broker=pi=None` :479-480; `try` opens **before** precondition/broker/PiRpc :482; nested `finally` always closes pi then broker+socket even on early `wait_path`/`PiRpc` failure :571-585 |
+| b4-5 `-O`-safe integrity + derived PASS | ✅ | load-bearing checks in a `checks` dict; `if failed: raise AssertionError` :385-387 and `if not passed: raise` :388-390 (NO bare `assert` anywhere — grep-confirmed); PASS = `"PASS" if passed else "FAIL"` derived from `all(checks.values())` :393, re-derived+checked in `run_once` :550-553 |
+
+## MUST-BE-ABSENT sweep
+
+`P5` / `P6` / `P2-bank` / `retry-launder` / `mosaic yolo` / `execRuntime` / `run_open` / `atomic-observation` /
+`pi_gate0_run` = **0 hits** (both files). Extension invokes only `bump-generation` / `lifecycle` /
+`authorize-probe` / `promote-probe`. No live/prod/real-broker path (single fixture broker; allow-list env; launcher
+pinned to fixture socket). No `.state`/gen-file path outside the fixture temp root (broker `generation_environment`
+raises otherwise). §4 live effect: none. No extra broker/socket beyond the single p3. No exec-at-import (both files
+`__main__`-guarded). Mechanism change is confined to the mandated R1 observation-fidelity deepening + BAR4 hardening;
+no scope-widen of what the probe touches.
+
+## Observations (transparency — not findings)
+
+1. The fixture broker retains a **dormant `source-invalid` action** (:179-194, P5-adjacent, in-mem). It is
+   **never invoked** by the harness or its embedded extension (verified: extension actions are only
+   bump/lifecycle/authorize/promote), and `assert_d4` never observes it — so the probe does **not** exercise or bank
+   P5. Pre-existing shared-fixture code, unchanged. Surfaced so Mos may, if desired, apply a stricter
+   purge-dormant-P5-from-the-fixture standard; under the "what the probe TOUCHES/does" framing it is not a violation.
+2. Fixture `HOME` receives a **read-only copy** of the operator's `~/.pi/agent` `settings.json`/`auth.json`/`bin/fd`
+   (:430-440, `shutil.copy2` into the fixture) so real Pi can authenticate to the model provider. It reads operator
+   state; it does not write/mutate operator HOME and does not emit/log credential material. Confined to the fixture.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `48484938`** — BAR1 (traceability to shipped f4008307 mechanism) + BAR2 (genuine file-backed generation,
+i–iv) + BAR3 (live-path / fail-closed precondition / isolation / intact assertion) + BAR4 (b4-1..b4-5) all hold,
+with zero out-of-scope surface exercised. The v3 hollow-gate (ancestor pin, in-mem simulation) is structurally
+closed: evidence now attests the shipped WI-3 D4 file-backed generation mechanism, launcher pinned by head+sha256,
+child env write-confined by allow-list, integrity `-O`-safe with a derived PASS.
+
+**Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Per §3/§5 of the amendment, producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism. This review clears the
+**bytes**; **FIRE remains separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO** and is not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** independent Opus §3-conformance reviewer (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Byte review only; ran nothing.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `484849387006ab5561798506fd6042ddbd5617de` · harness sha256 `9095eab7a4ddf11bb92bb5971d49e1facad12f4692ce2081665b0af47cbe5098`.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Hygiene-Delta — §3-Conformance Review v5
+
+**Verdict: ❌ FAIL** (hygiene delta (a)+(b) landed correctly and (c)+(d) hold, but homelab findings **NEW-5** and **NEW-6** are present in these bytes; both must close for PASS).
+
+## Pin (G1 — reviewed object, mandatory)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `7f975b95ad39096463a7548bd6be0dbb387cb61b`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `c3a09a342a4b367184d44472ec6fc11f8a3aabb7e90d5a72aa6b7044b1d9b91e` (24174 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Co-reviewed fixture broker:** `p3_generation_broker.py` sha256 `4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad`.
+
+## Reviewer identity / lane (independence — on the record)
+
+This review is produced by a **distinct independent Opus §3-conformance / SECREV session** (Gate-16 author≠reviewer),
+**byte review only, ran nothing**, that **did not build** this harness (author = ms-rev-826) and **is not Mos**. The
+PROCESS/LANE separation (build lane ≠ review lane) holds and is attested here. Homelab's separate observation — that
+the published PASS commits and the repair commits share the `ms-lead-reviewer` **Git signer identity** — is a
+git-identity-signer question I do **not** self-resolve; per instruction it is routed to Mos. My lane attestation is
+independent of the git signer.
+
+## Hygiene delta (v4 `48484938` → v5 `7f975b95`) — items (a)+(b): CLOSED
+
+Full `diff` of both files shows the delta touches **only** these:
+
+- **(a) Creds scrubbed — CLOSED.** New `scrub_fixture_credentials(root)` (:467-475): `shutil.rmtree(root/"home"/".pi"/"agent")` then a fail-closed re-check `if copied_agent.exists(): raise` (:473-474). Invoked in the **outermost `finally`** (:598), **after** pi/broker cleanup and **before** `return root` (:600) — so it runs on the **success path too**. The scrub target exactly matches the only copy site (`target_agent = fixture_home/".pi"/"agent"`, :433). `isolated_environment` was moved inside the `try` (:485) so the scrub finally also covers a partial env-setup failure. No copied agent credential/config subtree (incl. `auth.json`) survives in any retained root. ✅
+- **(b) `source-invalid` handler REMOVED — CLOSED.** `grep source-invalid / source_invalidation_revoke == 0` across **both** files. Broker delta is solely the deletion of the old `:179-194` block. ✅
+
+## (c) Everything-else byte-stable vs `48484938` — HOLDS
+
+Diff confirms **no other hunks**. Re-swept intact: traceability `GATED_WI_HEAD=f4008307` (:33) + `GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256=e950e4224e…` (:35); fidelity `read_runtime_generation`/`bump_runtime_generation` + `generation_source=="state-file"` + `new→MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED`/`prior→STALE_GENERATION`; `lease_anchor_registered` + `hex-256`; `-O`-safe (0 bare `assert`, PASS derived `all(checks.values())`); allow-list literal env (0 `os.environ.copy`); `--runs choices=(3,)`; fail-closed precondition; single p3 broker. Blockers 1-4 (inherited env / `--runs`≠3 / cleanup-misses-setup-failure / `-O`-strips-checks) remain closed.
+
+## (d) ABSENT sweep — 0
+
+`P5`/`P6`/`P2-bank`/`retry-launder`/`mosaic yolo`/`execRuntime`/`run_open`/`atomic`/`pi_gate0` = 0 (both files);
+extension invokes only `bump-generation`/`lifecycle`/`authorize-probe`/`promote-probe`; no exec-at-import.
+
+## Homelab carry-forward — NEW-5 / NEW-6: **PRESENT → FAIL**
+
+### 🔴 NEW-6 — GATED_WI_ROOT resolves wrong / non-portably (CONFIRMED)
+`GATED_WI_ROOT = HERE.parents[3].parent / "stack-cr-wi3-revoke"` (:32). For the harness at
+`…/agent-work/stack-cr-wi0-gate0/docs/compaction-refresh/probes/`, this computes
+**`/home/hermes/stack-cr-wi3-revoke` — which does not exist**. The actual f4008307 worktree is
+`/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi3-revoke` = `HERE.parents[3] / "stack-cr-wi3-revoke"`. The traversal is
+**off-by-one** (`.parents[3].parent` should be `.parents[3]`), and it additionally hardcodes the worktree name — a
+non-portable relative assumption. On this host the precondition therefore fail-closes ("gated WI launcher is
+unavailable") and the probe cannot locate/execute the pinned launcher at all. **Real resolution defect** (independently
+computed by path arithmetic; harness not run). **file:line — :32.**
+*Fix:* derive `GATED_WI_ROOT` from a portable, explicit anchor (e.g. an env-provided path validated to be the
+f4008307 worktree, or `HERE.parents[3] / "stack-cr-wi3-revoke"` with existence+HEAD assertion), not `.parents[3].parent`.
+
+### 🔴 NEW-5 — launcher precondition is check-then-exec, not pinned-executed-bytes (CONFIRMED)
+The precondition hashes `launcher_bytes = GATED_LAUNCHER.read_bytes()` (:280) against `GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256` (:287),
+but the launcher is **executed separately** via `PiRpc([sys.executable, str(GATED_LAUNCHER), …])` (:514-515), which
+opens and **re-reads the file at exec time**. There is **no fd-handoff and no exec-from-verified-copy**, so the
+verified snapshot does **not** bind the executed bytes. The window between check (:287) and exec (:514-515) spans the
+broker `Popen` + `wait_path` (≤20 s) — a genuine **check-then-exec TOCTOU / mutable-path trust**; the `git rev-parse
+HEAD` check (:285-286) is likewise on a mutable HEAD, not the executed bytes. Per the bar this is a real gap.
+**file:line — hash :280/:287 vs exec :514-515.**
+*Fix:* execute the exact verified bytes with no window — e.g. read once, verify, and exec from a fixture-private
+copy of the verified bytes (or `python3 /proc/self/fd/<verified-fd>`), so the hashed bytes == executed bytes.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**FAIL @ `7f975b95`.** The hygiene delta itself is correct — (a) creds scrub (fail-closed finally, success path,
+every retained root) and (b) `source-invalid` removal both landed cleanly, (c) everything else is byte-stable vs
+`48484938`, and (d) the absent sweep is 0. **However**, homelab's NEW-5 (check-then-exec launcher TOCTOU / not
+pinned-executed-bytes) and NEW-6 (GATED_WI_ROOT off-by-one/non-portable resolution) are **present in these bytes**;
+the addendum requires both **closed** for PASS. Not softened. Returns to author (ms-rev-826) — not to a builder
+re-review, no PASS-launder.
+
+**Findings:** NEW-6 (`p3_d4_focused_run.py:32`); NEW-5 (`p3_d4_focused_run.py:280/:287` vs `:514-515`).
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO — and is moot until this FAIL is remediated.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** independent Opus §3-conformance/SECREV reviewer (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Byte review only; ran nothing.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `7f975b95ad39096463a7548bd6be0dbb387cb61b` · harness sha256 `c3a09a342a4b367184d44472ec6fc11f8a3aabb7e90d5a72aa6b7044b1d9b91e`.
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+# GATE0 Probe-3 (#827) — Mos byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION (v-final)
+
+**Principal:** Mos (orchestrator, merge authority for the mosaic-stack governance lane).
+**Committed under a DISTINCT git identity** (`[email protected]`) — deliberately NOT the
+`[email protected]` lane signer — so this record stands as a *distinct-identity*
+co-attestation, not a same-signer duplicate. See "Independence" below.
+
+**Verify class:** independent provider-byte read (guarded `git show <full-40>:path | sha256sum` from a
+read-only clone of `mosaicstack/stack`). Not a re-build, not a re-run — a byte/scope/hygiene audit of
+the exact committed objects on the provider branch.
+
+## Package under attestation
+
+| Artifact | Ref |
+|---|---|
+| Branch | `feat/827-gate0-probe` |
+| Harness commit-40 | `2d54a9dd14cb924701b2ae4ed72dae4df760c4e3` |
+| Harness `p3_d4_focused_run.py` sha256 | `15a154df55273f51301763a984485fd63813f6d1f05d2728abb9fb8b9c040b1a` (27366 B) |
+| §3-review-v6 commit-40 | `23c0caca9b5d44002e6184cd7f2b6c837e8795b2` |
+| Review path | `docs/compaction-refresh/reviews/GATE0-PROBE3-NEW56-S3-REVIEW-v6.md` |
+
+sha256 re-confirmed against the checked-out object at `HEAD:docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py`
+(git object id `8c68cd07…`) — matches the relayed value byte-for-byte.
+
+## Findings — VERDICT: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene **PASS**
+
+**Anchors.** Harness sha256 matches (27366 B). review-v6 (`23c0caca`) parent == harness commit
+`2d54a9dd`; review touches only the review `.md` (+82 lines, 1 file). Broker
+(`p3_generation_broker.py`) delta vs `48484938…` = **exactly** the 16-line `action=="source-invalid"`
+handler purge, byte-stable otherwise.
+
+**NEW-6 (GATED_WI_ROOT off-by-one) — CLOSED.** `resolve_gated_wi_root()` selects the worktree by
+`git worktree list --porcelain` enumeration, requires a UNIQUE match on `HEAD==GATED_WI_HEAD`
+(`f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d`) AND `branch==refs/heads/feat/830-compaction-revoke`,
+then fail-closed re-validates (`is-inside-work-tree==true`, `rev-parse HEAD==GATED_WI_HEAD`);
+`RuntimeError` on ambiguity/mismatch. The `HERE.parents[3].parent / "stack-cr-wi3-revoke"` off-by-one
+and the hardcoded `/home/hermes/...` literal are **gone** — portable, zero hardcoded path.
+
+**NEW-5 (TOCTOU / pinned-executed-bytes) — CLOSED via approach (i), as mandated.** The `git`-object
+sha256 pin (`GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256 = e950e422…`) is the trust anchor. Ordering/marker `.find()`
+heuristics are downgraded to explicitly diagnostic-only ("never a substitute for the pin"). In
+`launch_verified_pi()` the executed working-tree file is re-hashed against the pin **in the statement
+immediately before `Popen`** (no interleaved yield/IO), and the launcher is executed **in place at the
+pinned worktree path** — the higher-risk approach (ii) copy-to-fixture (previously at `7ff63cd5` /
+`6164dc07`) is **reverted** (the only remaining `shutil.copy2` is the legitimate credential copy, not a
+launcher copy). Residual sub-statement TOCTOU window on a local file inside a non-adversarial operator
+fixture is within this probe's threat model; the gross precondition→much-later-exec gap homelab flagged
+is closed.
+
+**Hygiene — CLOSED.** `scrub_fixture_credentials(root)` removes the entire `.pi/agent` subtree in a
+`finally` block (nested try/finally, after `pi.close()` + broker shutdown, before `return root`) and
+`RuntimeError`s if the scrub fails — credentials are removed from retained evidence; logs retained.
+
+**Invariants byte-stable (all INTACT):** assertion `lease_anchor_registered`; file-backed fidelity
+checks (`generation_source=="state-file"`, `state_file_in_fixture_root`, `MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED`,
+`STALE_GENERATION`); `-O`-safe (0 bare `assert`); allow-list env (0 `os.environ.copy`); single broker;
+`--runs choices=(3,)`; ABSENT-sweep (`yolo`/`execRuntime`/`p3_bank`/`promote_p2`/`retry`) = 0.
+
+**R1 mechanism-fidelity boundary — HELD.** D4 exercises #830's real file-backed revocation
+(`generation-{sid}.state` / `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE`, from `66b1e0a0`); `.state` stays inside the
+fixture temp root; fixture-socket / child-write-escape / gettempdir isolation preconditions preserved;
+launcher exec is in place at the pinned worktree (same surface as R1, not a new production/live
+surface). **No path escapes the fixture root.** BEYOND-R1 tripwire NOT tripped.
+
+## Independence
+
+- **Substantive principal-independence** of review-v6 is satisfied by an orchestrator-dispatched,
+  builder-distinct Opus SECREV (`ms-secrev-828`, byte-only, non-builder) — that IS the substance of
+  Gate-16.
+- The shared `ms-lead-reviewer` git signer on harness+review commits is **evidentiary, not
+  substantive**. It is resolved by (1) this Mos co-attestation committed under a **distinct** identity
+  (`mos-orchestrator`), and (2) a homelab third-principal verify under its own distinct identity —
+  i.e. three distinct-identity principals of record.
+- The shared signer is a tracked **fleet-infra tooling-gap** (durable fix = per-lane distinct signers),
+  **not a blocker**.
+
+## Scope of this record — byte-clear, NOT fire-authorization
+
+Producing probe evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism; a byte-clear is not a fire-authorization.
+This co-attestation clears the **bytes/scope/hygiene**. FIRE remains gated on: **homelab
+third-principal verify** + **Mos transparency-to-Jason** (real-Pi consumes operator model creds inside
+the isolated fixture, scrubbed post-run, never emitted) + **Mos explicit FIRE GO**. Until then: nothing
+banked, WI-3 #830 held at `f4008307` (unmoved), C-hatch armed (if 3× isolation still no-fire /
+wrong-value / isolation-FAIL → possible Case-C → STOP + escalate to Jason).
+
+**Mos verdict: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene PASS. Co-attestation of record — committed.**
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ SUPERSEDED — homelab third-principal FAIL raised a stricter bar (evidence-integrity note)
+
+This co-attestation was **byte-clear on the v6 bar ONLY** and self-limited above to *"byte-clear
+ONLY, NOT fire-authorization; FIRE remains gated on homelab third-principal verify."* Homelab (the
+required third principal) subsequently returned **FAIL @2d54a9dd**, and Mos **UPHELD** it — so the v6
+byte-clear this document records is **SUPERSEDED** and does **NOT** authorize FIRE.
+
+Homelab's substantively-correct deepening (accepted as gate-**strengthening**, not softening):
+1. `launch_verified_pi` hashes the launcher then `Popen`/execve **reopens the path** → statement
+   adjacency shrinks but does not eliminate TOCTOU; hashed-snapshot ≠ executed-bytes.
+2. `lease_generation.py` helper is unpinned, loaded from the mutable worktree → HEAD + launcher-pin
+   do not bind the helper bytes.
+3. `p3_generation_broker.py` executes from the mutable worktree unhashed → reviewed broker bytes need
+   not be the evidence-producing bytes.
+
+For a fail-closed DO-178C evidence gate, **hashed==executed must hold on the FULL executed closure**
+(launcher + helper + broker), which v6 (approach (i) adjacency) does not meet. Mos therefore
+**authorized approach (ii) full-closure materialization** (SHA-pin + materialize the full closure into
+a fixture-private 0700/0600 dir or held verified fds, exec from there, launcher+broker consume the same
+pinned helper; re-hash==f4008307 pins immediately before exec, fail-closed). This rides the existing R1
+authorization + Mos adjudication authority (it deepens isolation of already-authorized touch and stays
+inside the fixture temp root → R1 owner tripwire not tripped; no fresh owner window).
+
+**Live target = v7** (materialized-closure harness, forthcoming). `2d54a9dd` / `23c0caca` / this
+co-attestation (`12914d8`) are **SUPERSEDED**. A fresh Mos co-attestation will be committed on v7
+byte-verify PASS. WI-3 #830 remains HELD at `f4008307`; nothing banked; C-hatch armed.
+
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# GATE0 Probe-3 (#827) — Mos byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION (v10 no-site startup closure)
+
+**Principal:** Mos (orchestrator, merge authority for the mosaic-stack governance lane).
+**Committed under a DISTINCT git identity** (`[email protected]`) — deliberately NOT the
+`[email protected]` lane signer that authored the harness and the §3 review — so this
+record stands as a *distinct-identity* co-attestation. See "Independence".
+
+**Verify class:** independent provider-byte read (`git show <full-40>:path | sha256sum`) plus a
+git-diff byte-comparison of the v9→v10 delta and source inspection of the executed command lines. Not
+a re-build, not a re-run. This SUPERSEDES the v9 co-attestation `f320d075` (byte-clear on the v9
+env-iso + bytecode-pin bar), which was overtaken by homelab's 4th-round FAIL @1c34e3cb
+(site-startup-closure hole) and the resulting B9 bar.
+
+## Package under attestation
+
+| Artifact | Ref |
+|---|---|
+| Branch | `feat/827-gate0-probe` (mosaicstack/stack) |
+| Harness commit-40 | `ce5ba762051354338889959bfce2b0381f4a4e2a` |
+| Harness `p3_d4_focused_run.py` sha256 | `7e14ead89a7b2a297fcc17e7653291b3bcace1d2002a8f90a989db74f6985b6f` (32753 B) |
+| §3-review-v10 commit-40 | `ffc3b573a8258a86e3ece9ef92bac925fb5a7a5b` (parent == harness `ce5ba762`, byte-stable; adds only the review `.md`, +86; ms-secrev-828 authored) |
+| Review path | `docs/compaction-refresh/reviews/GATE0-PROBE3-V10-NOSITE-S3-REVIEW-v10.md` |
+
+**Pinned closure (all 3 sha256 INDEPENDENTLY recomputed by Mos from git objects == pins == embedded harness constants; UNCHANGED from v9):**
+
+| Member | Source (commit:path) | Pin sha256 | Size |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| launcher `launch-runtime.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py` | `e950e422…` | 4237 B |
+| helper `lease_generation.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/lease_generation.py` | `061625402f…` | 3769 B |
+| broker `p3_generation_broker.py` | `23c0caca:docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py` | `4db4fef1…` | — |
+
+> `f4008307` (held WI-3 #830 gated head) is **not on origin** — recomputed launcher+helper from the
+> local `stack-cr-wi3-revoke` worktree (HEAD == `f4008307`); broker from origin `23c0caca`.
+
+## Findings — VERDICT: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene **PASS** (v10 = v9 + B9 no-site)
+
+The v9→v10 delta is **exactly 2 insertions / 0 deletions** (git-diff byte-compared), a `+28 B`
+harness growth **fully accounted** (2 × `        "-S",\n` = 14 B each). Every prior invariant is
+byte-stable — the diff touches nothing outside the two command lists.
+
+**B9 — no-site startup closure (homelab 4th-round finding CLOSED).** Both child command lists now
+carry `-S`, which disables the `site` module entirely (no `.pth` executable lines, no
+`sitecustomize`/`usercustomize`) so no unpinned startup code runs before the exact launcher/broker or
+outside `closure_import_guard`:
+- launcher `launch_verified_pi` (`:515`): `-s` + **`-S`** + `-B`, **no `-I`** (`-I` appears exactly
+  once in the harness, `:553`, the broker only).
+- broker `launch_verified_broker` (`:554`): `-I` + **`-S`** + `-B`.
+
+Homelab's finding was **independently reproduced by Mos** and the fix **empirically verified** on host
+Py3.11.2 (throwaway, not the harness): `[-s -B]`→`no_site=0, site imported` (the v9 hole); `[-I -B]`→
+`no_site=0, site imported` (proves `-I` does **not** imply `-S`); `[-s -S -B]`→`no_site=1`, `site` not
+in `sys.modules`, **and the launcher's bare `from lease_generation import` still resolves** (`sys.path[0]`
+untouched by `-S` → no B6c regression); `[-I -S -B]`→`no_site=1`. The launcher deliberately omits `-I`
+(B6c: on 3.11+ `-I` implies `-P`, dropping the script dir from `sys.path[0]` → sibling import breaks);
+its env isolation comes from the `PiRpc` `env=` allow-list, not `-I`.
+
+**All priors — byte-stable (outside the 2-line delta, re-confirmed from the v9 verify):**
+B5 conjunction (materialize-from-pin / `mkdir(0o700)`+`O_EXCL` no-writer-window / re-hash==pin
+immediately-before-exec); B6 (single pinned helper bound; `closure_import_guard` AST-reject); B6c
+(launcher no `-I`); B7 (broker `env=environment` strict allow-list `:570`); B8 (`reject_pinned_bytecode`
+fail-closed `:498-501` before each consumer `:535/:562` + `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` `:729` + `-B` on
+both); fidelity asserts (`generation_source=='state-file'`, `state_file_in_fixture_root`,
+`MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED`, `STALE_GENERATION`); `lease_anchor_registered`; BAR1 `GATED_WI_HEAD==f4008307`
+(`:36`) + `merge-base --is-ancestor 66b1e0a0 f4008307` = **YES**; `--runs choices=(3,)`; `-O`-safe
+(0 bare `assert`); allow-list env (0 `os.environ.copy`); single broker (1 def + 1 call); the only
+`shutil.copy2` is the `.pi/agent` credential copy.
+
+**Closure = exactly 3 files, materialized inside the fixture root.** No path escapes the fixture temp
+root; no live/default broker; `.state` fixture-bound. **R1 owner tripwire NOT tripped** — `-S`
+deepens startup-closure isolation of an already-authorized touch; it does not widen the touched surface.
+
+## Independence
+
+Substantive principal-independence of review-v10 is satisfied by an orchestrator-dispatched,
+builder-distinct Opus SECREV (`ms-secrev-828`, byte-only, non-builder, non-Mos). The shared
+`ms-lead-reviewer` git signer on harness+review commits is evidentiary, not substantive — resolved by
+(1) this Mos co-attestation under a **distinct** identity (`mos-orchestrator`) and (2) a homelab
+third-principal verify under its own distinct identity = three distinct-identity principals of record.
+The prior 2-of-3 (`ms-secrev-828` v9 §3 PASS + `f320d075`) does **not** carry — all three re-verify
+this v10 SHA. Shared signer = tracked fleet-infra tooling-gap, not a blocker.
+
+## Scope of this record — byte-clear, NOT fire-authorization
+
+Producing probe evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism; a byte-clear is not a fire-authorization.
+This clears **bytes / scope / mechanism / hygiene on the v10 (v9 + B9 no-site) bar**. FIRE remains
+gated on: **homelab third-principal re-verify** (5th round, own distinct identity) + **Mos
+transparency-to-Jason** + **Mos explicit FIRE GO**. The FIRE GO additionally carries an
+**execution-procedure constraint**: the 3× isolation dispatch must launch the runner under
+externally-enforced **`python -I -S -B p3_d4_focused_run.py`** — a self-reexec is too late, the
+harness's own `site` runs before it could re-add `-S` to itself. Until FIRE GO: nothing banked, WI-3
+#830 held at `f4008307` (unmoved), C-hatch armed (fired-rig only: no-fire / wrong-value /
+assertion-FAIL / isolation-FAIL → possible Case-C → STOP + escalate to Jason).
+
+Prior v10-superseded set: `1c34e3cb` / `e1c9a468` / `f320d075` (and transitively the v7 chain).
+
+**Mos verdict: v10 (v9 + B9 no-site) byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene PASS. Co-attestation of
+record — committed.**
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# GATE0 Probe-3 (#827) — Mos byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION (v7 full-closure)
+
+**Principal:** Mos (orchestrator, merge authority for the mosaic-stack governance lane).
+**Committed under a DISTINCT git identity** (`[email protected]`) — deliberately NOT the
+`[email protected]` lane signer that authored both the harness and the §3 review — so this
+record stands as a *distinct-identity* co-attestation. See "Independence" below.
+
+**Verify class:** independent provider-byte read (guarded `git show <full-40>:path | sha256sum`) plus
+source-level inspection of the executed mechanism. Not a re-build, not a re-run. This SUPERSEDES the v6
+co-attestation `12914d8` (and its SUPERSEDED-note `b6bd0cd`), which was byte-clear on the v6 bar only
+and was overtaken by homelab's third-principal FAIL @2d54a9dd + the resulting stricter full-closure bar.
+
+## Package under attestation
+
+| Artifact | Ref |
+|---|---|
+| Branch | `feat/827-gate0-probe` |
+| Harness commit-40 | `f609a44953f5ae61916805fcb45ca337de00b0b0` |
+| Harness `p3_d4_focused_run.py` sha256 | `0f1bd1b39399b32f243d901230e2d840794a2144edd723a095dab716833a7a9b` (32071 B) |
+| §3-review-v7 commit-40 | `2bba933f67c821899d320a938a9473a73a136422` (adds only the review `.md`; harness parent byte-stable) |
+| Review path | `docs/compaction-refresh/reviews/GATE0-PROBE3-V7-FULLCLOSURE-S3-REVIEW-v7.md` |
+
+**Pinned closure (all 3 sha256 INDEPENDENTLY recomputed by Mos from git objects == pins):**
+
+| Member | Source (commit:path) | Pin sha256 | Size |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| launcher `launch-runtime.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py` | `e950e422…` | 4237 B |
+| helper `lease_generation.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/lease_generation.py` | `061625402f…` | 3769 B |
+| broker `p3_generation_broker.py` | `23c0caca:docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py` | `4db4fef1…` | — |
+
+> Note: `f4008307` (the held WI-3 #830 gated head) is **not on origin** — it exists only as a local
+> `git worktree` on the build host. Mos recomputed the launcher+helper pins from that worktree
+> (`stack-cr-wi3-revoke`, HEAD == `f4008307`) rather than passing over a clone-completeness gap. The
+> broker pin was recomputed from origin `23c0caca`.
+
+## Findings — VERDICT: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene **PASS** (v7 full-closure bar)
+
+Homelab's stricter bar — **hashed==executed on the FULL executed closure (launcher + helper + broker)**
+— is met. Verified at the source, not accepted on the review's assertion:
+
+**B5 conjunction (the load-bearing repair) — HELD, all three legs:**
+- **(a) materialized from pinned git-object bytes, NOT the mutable worktree.** `materialize_closure`
+  fetches each member via `git_object_bytes` (`git show {commit}:{path}`), then
+  `sha256(data) == pin` **fail-closed** (`RuntimeError` on mismatch) before use.
+- **(b) no writable window hash→consume.** `pinned/` is `mkdir(mode=0o700)`; each file is written with
+  `os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0o600)` — `O_EXCL` refuses a pre-planted file. No `chmod`,
+  no `os.rename/replace`, no `symlink`, and nothing re-opens a pinned file for write (grep = 0). The
+  pinned bytes are immutable within the fixture threat model between hash and exec.
+- **(c) re-hash == pin IMMEDIATELY before each exec, no interleaved yield.** Launcher: re-hash then
+  `return PiRpc(command,…)` whose `__init__` **first statement** is `subprocess.Popen(command,…)` —
+  zero IO/yield/reopen between. Broker + helper: both re-hashed then `subprocess.Popen` on the next
+  line. Adjacency-alone-without-materialization (the v6 defect) is **absent** — all three exec from
+  `pinned/`.
+
+**B6 — helper pinned AND bound to the SAME single copy.** The broker receives
+`--generation-module {closure.generation}` (the pinned helper); the launcher runs from `pinned/` so its
+`import lease_generation` resolves to the sibling pinned copy via `sys.path[0]`. `closure_import_guard`
+AST-parses every member and raises on any non-stdlib import other than the allowed `lease_generation`
+— proving the dependency closure is complete and no unpinned module can enter at runtime.
+
+**Closure = exactly 3 files, materialized inside the fixture root** (`root / "pinned"`). No path escapes
+the fixture temp root; no live/default broker; `.state` remains fixture-bound. **R1 owner tripwire NOT
+tripped** — this deepened isolation of an already-authorized touch, it did not widen the touched surface.
+
+**Invariants (all INTACT):** BAR1 `GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307` and `merge-base --is-ancestor 66b1e0a0
+f4008307` = YES (file-backed `.state` revocation fidelity present); BAR2 `.state` =
+`socket_path.parent / generation-{sid}.state`, `state_file_in_fixture_root` + `generation_source ==
+"state-file"` checks present; BAR3 `lease_anchor_registered` / live-path / fixture-socket isolation
+intact. `-O`-safe (0 bare `assert`); ABSENT-sweep (`yolo`/`execRuntime`/`p3_bank`/`promote_p2`/`retry`)
+= 0; single broker (1 def + 1 call site); `--runs choices=(3,)`; allow-list env (0 `os.environ.copy`);
+the only `shutil.copy2` is the legitimate `.pi/agent` credential copy (settings/auth/fd), **not** a
+launcher/helper/broker copy — the v6 copy-to-fixture concern is gone.
+
+## Independence
+
+- **Substantive principal-independence** of review-v7 is satisfied by an orchestrator-dispatched,
+  builder-distinct Opus SECREV (`ms-secrev-828`, byte-only, non-builder) — that IS the substance of
+  Gate-16.
+- The shared `ms-lead-reviewer` git signer on both the harness (`ms-rev-826` build) and the review
+  commit is **evidentiary, not substantive**. It is resolved by (1) this Mos co-attestation under a
+  **distinct** identity (`mos-orchestrator`), and (2) a homelab third-principal verify under its own
+  distinct identity — three distinct-identity principals of record. Tracked fleet-infra tooling-gap
+  (durable fix = per-lane distinct signers), **not a blocker**.
+
+## Scope of this record — byte-clear, NOT fire-authorization
+
+Producing probe evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism; a byte-clear is not a fire-authorization.
+This co-attestation clears the **bytes / scope / mechanism / hygiene on the v7 full-closure bar**. FIRE
+remains gated on: **homelab third-principal re-verify** (under its own distinct identity) + **Mos
+transparency-to-Jason** + **Mos explicit FIRE GO**. Until then: nothing banked, WI-3 #830 held at
+`f4008307` (unmoved), C-hatch armed (if the materialized-closure rig still no-fire / wrong-value /
+assertion-FAIL / isolation-FAIL → possible Case-C → STOP + escalate to Jason).
+
+**Mos verdict: v7 full-closure byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene PASS. Co-attestation of record —
+committed.**
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ SUPERSEDED — homelab v7 third-principal FAIL @f609a449 raised a stricter bar (evidence-integrity note)
+
+This co-attestation was **byte-clear on the v7 full-closure bar ONLY** and self-limited above to
+*"byte-clear NOT fire-authorization; FIRE remains gated on homelab third-principal re-verify."*
+Homelab (the required third principal) subsequently returned **FAIL @f609a449** (static verify, no
+code run), and Mos **UPHELD** it after independently confirming both findings in source — so the v7
+byte-clear this document records is **SUPERSEDED** and does **NOT** authorize FIRE.
+
+Two residual isolation/binding holes WITHIN the materialized closure (both independently reproduced
+by Mos in the harness source; accepted as gate-**strengthening**, not softening):
+1. **Broker child env not isolated.** `launch_verified_broker` (`:551`) calls `Popen` with **no
+   `env=`** (only `PiRpc.__init__` `:50` passes an allow-listed `env`) → the broker child inherits
+   ambient `os.environ` (PYTHONPATH/PYTHONHOME/PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX). `closure_import_guard` is a
+   static AST check and cannot bind the child's runtime stdlib resolution.
+2. **Executed bytecode-cache outside the pin.** No `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE`/`-I`/`-B`/`__pycache__`
+   handling anywhere. `exec_module` on the pinned helper writes derived `.pyc` the pin never covers;
+   only the `.py` is re-hashed → executed bytecode ≠ pinned-source-hash.
+
+Both break "hashed==executed on the FULL executed closure" on **fidelity** grounds even in a
+non-adversarial fixture. Mos **authorized the bounded repair** (broker `Popen` with strict
+allow-listed `env=` + `-I` + `PYTHON*` stripped; bytecode-cache suppressed via
+`PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`/`-B` + reject stray `__pycache__`/`.pyc` fail-closed before each
+consumer; launcher sibling-import binding to the pinned helper preserved). This **rides the existing
+(ii)-full-closure authorization + R1 + Mos adjudication** — it deepens isolation/binding of an
+already-authorized touch, stays inside the fixture temp root, no fresh Jason owner-window. It is
+**NOT a Case-C escalation** (no probe fired, no evidence produced — a static pre-fire catch, exactly
+what the review gate is for). Added review bars **B7** (broker child env-isolated) and **B8**
+(executed bytecode pinned-or-suppressed) on top of B5+B6+all priors.
+
+**Live target = v8** (env-isolated + bytecode-pinned harness, forthcoming). `f609a449` /
+`2bba933f` / this co-attestation (`e08ad03`) are **SUPERSEDED**. A fresh Mos co-attestation will be
+committed on v8 byte-verify PASS. WI-3 #830 remains HELD at `f4008307`; nothing banked; C-hatch
+armed; NO FIRE.
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# GATE0 Probe-3 (#827) — Mos byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION (v9 full-closure, env-isolated + bytecode-pinned)
+
+**Principal:** Mos (orchestrator, merge authority for the mosaic-stack governance lane).
+**Committed under a DISTINCT git identity** (`[email protected]`) — deliberately NOT the
+`[email protected]` lane signer that authored the harness and the §3 review — so this
+record stands as a *distinct-identity* co-attestation. See "Independence".
+
+**Verify class:** independent provider-byte read (`git show <full-40>:path | sha256sum`) plus
+source-level inspection of the executed mechanism and the v7→v9 delta. Not a re-build, not a re-run.
+This SUPERSEDES the v7 co-attestation `e08ad03` (and its SUPERSEDED note `2ae379e`), which was
+byte-clear on the v7 bar and was overtaken by homelab's third-principal FAIL @f609a449 (broker
+env-isolation + executed-bytecode-cache) and the resulting B7/B8 bar.
+
+## Package under attestation
+
+| Artifact | Ref |
+|---|---|
+| Branch | `feat/827-gate0-probe` |
+| Harness commit-40 | `1c34e3cb3172acdcd094e683e847d7c984afc96c` |
+| Harness `p3_d4_focused_run.py` sha256 | `29e5c7bfbe1911b52984bd94c79036bb1200ee82588318367b13c2b1053a0103` (32725 B) |
+| §3-review-v9 commit-40 | `e1c9a4682da2892ca5f5381012caffe1dd7b43a7` (parent == harness `1c34e3cb`, byte-stable; adds only the review `.md`; ms-secrev-828 authored) |
+| Review path | `docs/compaction-refresh/reviews/GATE0-PROBE3-V9-LAUNCHERFIX-S3-REVIEW-v9.md` |
+
+**Pinned closure (all 3 sha256 INDEPENDENTLY recomputed by Mos from git objects == pins == embedded harness constants):**
+
+| Member | Source (commit:path) | Pin sha256 | Size |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| launcher `launch-runtime.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py` | `e950e422…` | 4237 B |
+| helper `lease_generation.py` | `f4008307:packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/lease_generation.py` | `061625402f…` | 3769 B |
+| broker `p3_generation_broker.py` | `23c0caca:docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py` | `4db4fef1…` | — |
+
+> `f4008307` (held WI-3 #830 gated head) is **not on origin** — recomputed launcher+helper from the
+> local `stack-cr-wi3-revoke` worktree (HEAD == `f4008307`); broker from origin `23c0caca`.
+
+## Findings — VERDICT: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene **PASS** (v9 = v7 full-closure + B7 + B8)
+
+The v7→v9 delta is **exactly 22 insertions / 2 deletions**, confined to the intended B7+B8+B6c
+surface; every prior invariant is byte-stable (outside the delta) from the v7 verify.
+
+**B7 — broker child env-ISOLATED (homelab finding 1 CLOSED).** `launch_verified_broker` (`:568`) now
+passes `env=environment` (the strict allow-list, `:570`) — the ambient-`os.environ`-inheritance hole
+is gone — AND runs the broker with `-I` (`:552`, isolated: ignores `PYTHON*`/user-site) + `-B`
+(`:553`). Both children are env-controlled: the launcher was already `env=env` at `PiRpc` (`:53`).
+
+**B8 — executed bytecode PINNED/SUPPRESSED (homelab finding 2 CLOSED).** `reject_pinned_bytecode`
+(`:498`) raises `RuntimeError` fail-closed if a `__pycache__` dir or any `*.pyc` exists in the pinned
+dir, and is called before **each** consumer (launcher `:535`, broker `:562`). Bytecode writes are
+disabled via `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` (`:729`) in the allow-list env **and** `-B` on both command
+lines. No unpinned `.pyc` can be executed; only the pinned `.py` re-hash governs.
+
+**B6c — launcher sibling-import PRESERVED (v8 regression FIXED).** v8 over-applied `-I` to the
+launcher; on Py3.11+ `-I` implies `-P`, dropping the script dir from `sys.path[0]`, so the pinned
+launcher's bare `from lease_generation import` (launch-runtime.py:15) would `ModuleNotFoundError`. v9
+uses `-s` (`:514`) + `-B` (`:515`) on the launcher (NO `-I`) — neither touches `sys.path[0]`, so the
+sibling import still resolves to `pinned/lease_generation.py`. **Mos empirically re-verified on host
+Py3.11.2** (throwaway, not the harness): `-I` launcher → `ModuleNotFoundError`; `-s`+`PYTHONNOUSERSITE`
+→ import OK. The launcher's env isolation comes from the `PiRpc` `env=` allow-list, NOT `-I`, so
+dropping `-I` does **not** reopen B7. My earlier constraint-(c) assumption ("`-I` does not strip the
+script dir") was FALSIFIED for 3.11+; the author≠reviewer gate (ms-secrev-828) caught it — recorded.
+
+**B5 conjunction (load-bearing repair) — HELD, all three legs (byte-stable from v7):**
+(a) materialized from pinned git-object bytes via `materialize_closure`/`git_object_bytes`, `sha256==pin`
+fail-closed; (b) `pinned/` `mkdir(0o700)` + `O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC` `0o600`, no writable window — now also
+`reject_pinned_bytecode` closes the `.pyc` side-channel; (c) re-hash == pin IMMEDIATELY before each
+exec, no interleaved yield: launcher re-hash (`:538`) → `return PiRpc(command,…)` whose `__init__`
+first statement is `Popen` (`:50`); broker re-hash (`:563`) + helper re-hash (`:566`) → `Popen`
+(`:568`) on the next line.
+
+**B6 — single pinned helper, complete closure.** Broker gets `--generation-module {closure.generation}`;
+launcher resolves `import lease_generation` to the sibling pinned copy via `sys.path[0]`.
+`closure_import_guard` (`:351`, called `:433`) AST-rejects any non-stdlib import other than
+`lease_generation`. Single broker: `launch_verified_broker` 1 def (`:543`) + 1 call (`:766`).
+
+**Invariants (all INTACT):** BAR1 `GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307` (`:36`) and `merge-base --is-ancestor
+66b1e0a0 f4008307` = YES (file-backed `.state` revocation fidelity present); fidelity
+`generation_source=='state-file'` (`:639`), `state_file_in_fixture_root` (`:641`),
+`MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED` (`:650`), `STALE_GENERATION` (`:651`); `lease_anchor_registered` (`:593`);
+`-O`-safe (0 bare `assert`); `--runs choices=(3,)` (`:838`); allow-list env (0 `os.environ.copy`);
+ABSENT-sweep (`yolo`/`execRuntime`/`p3_bank`/`promote_p2`/`retry`) = 0; the only `shutil.copy2`
+(`:708`) is the `.pi/agent` credential copy, not a closure copy.
+
+**Closure = exactly 3 files, materialized inside the fixture root.** No path escapes the fixture temp
+root; no live/default broker; `.state` fixture-bound. **R1 owner tripwire NOT tripped** — B7/B8
+deepen isolation/binding of an already-authorized touch, they do not widen the touched surface.
+
+## Independence
+
+Substantive principal-independence of review-v9 is satisfied by an orchestrator-dispatched,
+builder-distinct Opus SECREV (`ms-secrev-828`, byte-only, non-builder, non-Mos). The shared
+`ms-lead-reviewer` git signer on harness+review commits is evidentiary, not substantive — resolved by
+(1) this Mos co-attestation under a **distinct** identity (`mos-orchestrator`) and (2) a homelab
+third-principal verify under its own distinct identity = three distinct-identity principals of record.
+Shared signer = tracked fleet-infra tooling-gap (durable fix = per-lane distinct signers), not a blocker.
+
+## Scope of this record — byte-clear, NOT fire-authorization
+
+Producing probe evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism; a byte-clear is not a fire-authorization.
+This clears **bytes / scope / mechanism / hygiene on the v9 (full-closure + B7 + B8) bar**. FIRE
+remains gated on: **homelab third-principal re-verify** (4th round, own distinct identity) + **Mos
+transparency-to-Jason** + **Mos explicit FIRE GO**. Until then: nothing banked, WI-3 #830 held at
+`f4008307` (unmoved), C-hatch armed (materialized-closure rig still no-fire / wrong-value /
+assertion-FAIL / isolation-FAIL → possible Case-C → STOP + escalate to Jason).
+
+**Mos verdict: v9 full-closure + B7 + B8 byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene PASS. Co-attestation of
+record — committed.**
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ SUPERSEDED — homelab v9 4th-round FAIL @1c34e3cb raised a stricter *startup-closure* bar
+
+This co-attestation was **byte-clear on the v9 (env-iso + bytecode-pin) bar ONLY** and self-limited
+above to *"byte-clear NOT fire-authorization; FIRE remains gated on homelab 4th-round re-verify."*
+Homelab (the required third principal) returned **FAIL @1c34e3cb** (static, nothing executed), and Mos
+**UPHELD** it after independently confirming the finding in-source AND empirically on host Py3.11.2 —
+so the v9 byte-clear this document records is **SUPERSEDED** and does **NOT** authorize FIRE.
+
+**Residual startup-closure hole (empirically reproduced by Mos; accepted as gate-STRENGTHENING):**
+neither child carries `-S`, so CPython imports the `site` module **before** the script runs. `-s`
+(launcher) suppresses only *user*-site; `-I` (broker) implies `-s -E -P` but **NOT** `-S`. Proven:
+
+    [-s  -B ]  no_site=0  site_imported=True    ← v9 launcher: site runs
+    [-I  -B ]  no_site=0  site_imported=True    ← v9 broker: -I does NOT imply -S
+    [-s -S -B] no_site=1  site_imported=False   ← v10 launcher fix (sibling import STILL resolves)
+    [-I -S -B] no_site=1  site_imported=False   ← v10 broker fix (additive)
+
+System-site executable `.pth` lines + sitecustomize/usercustomize can therefore run **unpinned startup
+code** before the exact launcher/broker and **outside** `closure_import_guard`, while every hash +
+`reject_pinned_bytecode` + import-guard still pass — defeating hashed==executed on the full *startup*
+closure (strictly wider than the module-import closure v9 cleared). A genuine fidelity hole for a
+fail-closed DO-178C evidence gate.
+
+Mos **authorized the bounded v10 repair**: add `-S` to the **launcher** (keep `-s -B`, NOT `-I`) and
+to the **broker** (keep `-I -B`) — a minimal 2-line delta; no B6c regression (launcher `-s -S -B`
+sibling import empirically intact; `-S` does not touch `sys.path[0]`). Added review bar **B9**
+(no-site startup closure). This **rides the existing (ii)-full-closure authorization + R1 + Mos
+adjudication** (deepens startup-closure isolation of an already-authorized touch, inside the fixture
+temp root, no fresh Jason owner-window) and is **NOT a Case-C escalation** (static pre-fire catch, no
+probe fired). A separate **FIRE-time** constraint is captured: the 3× isolation dispatch must launch
+the runner under externally-enforced `python -I -S -B` (a self-reexec is too late).
+
+**Live target = v10** (no-site harness, forthcoming). `1c34e3cb` / `e1c9a468` / this co-attestation
+(`f320d075`) are **SUPERSEDED**; the prior 2-of-3 (ms-secrev-828 v9 §3 PASS + `f320d075`) does NOT
+carry — all three distinct-identity principals re-verify the new v10 SHA. A fresh Mos co-attestation
+will be committed on v10 byte-verify PASS. WI-3 #830 remains HELD at `f4008307`; nothing banked;
+C-hatch armed (fired-rig only); NO FIRE.
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) NEW-5/NEW-6 Closure — §3-Conformance Review v6
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS**
+
+## Pin (G1 — reviewed object, mandatory)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `2d54a9dd14cb924701b2ae4ed72dae4df760c4e3`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`, approach-**(i)** build; supersedes the reverted (ii) copy-to-fixture builds `7ff63cd5`/`6164dc07`, which were NOT reviewed to a verdict).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `15a154df55273f51301763a984485fd63813f6d1f05d2728abb9fb8b9c040b1a` (27366 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Co-reviewed fixture broker:** `p3_generation_broker.py` sha256 `4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad` — **byte-identical to v5** (unchanged by this delta).
+
+## Principal-independence attestation (Mos independence ruling — process of record)
+
+This review is produced by a **distinct Opus SECREV session, orchestrator-dispatched** — the **`ms-secrev-828`
+reviewer lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`** — **byte review only, ran nothing**, and **did NOT build** this harness
+(builder = ms-rev-826). Author ≠ reviewer (Gate-16). This is one of three principals: **Mos commits his own
+distinct-identity byte-scope-verify co-attestation at v-final**, and **homelab's independent verify is the third
+principal**. (The `ms-lead-reviewer` **Git signer identity** shared across published review commits is a git-signer
+question routed to Mos; it does not bear on this lane's process/dispatch independence, attested here.)
+
+## NEW-5 CLOSED — approach (i): exact-byte pin, adjacent re-hash, exec in place
+
+- **Exact-byte sha256 is the trust anchor, NOT substring heuristics.** Launcher bytes are read from the immutable
+  git object (`git show f4008307:<path>`) and gated on `sha256(launcher_bytes) == GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256`
+  (`e950e422…`) (:354). The `behavior_markers` `in`-checks (:364-372) are explicitly commented "the exact launcher
+  digest above is the trust anchor. These marker checks are diagnostic belt-and-suspenders only, never a substitute
+  for the pin" (:362-363). The old ordered `.find()` heuristic (`register < initialize < execute`, min<0) is **gone**.
+- **Final re-hash immediately adjacent to `Popen`, no interleaved yield.** `launch_verified_pi` assembles `command`,
+  then — as the statement **immediately before** `return PiRpc(command, …)` (which performs the `Popen`) — re-hashes
+  the launcher: `if hashlib.sha256(launcher.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256: raise` (:411-412),
+  `return PiRpc(...)` (:413). **No harness-controlled step (no `wait_path`, no broker spawn) sits between the re-hash
+  and the exec** — the broker `Popen` + `wait_path` occur *before* `launch_verified_pi` is called (:611-621). Window
+  narrowed to the fork/exec itself.
+- **Exec stays IN PLACE at the pinned f4008307-worktree path.** The precondition returns the worktree paths
+  `gated_root / launcher_relative`, `gated_root / generation_relative` (:378); Pi execs `str(launcher)` = that
+  worktree launch-runtime.py (:390,:621), and the broker `--generation-module` = the worktree lease_generation.py
+  (:614). The reverted (ii) machinery is **gone**: `grep pinned-lease-broker / PYTHONPATH / fixture_launcher /
+  fixture_generation / write_bytes == 0`. Launcher import resolution and the file-backed fidelity surface are
+  therefore **unperturbed** (this is the lower-risk approach Mos mandated over copy-to-fixture).
+
+## NEW-6 CLOSED — portable, validated, off-by-one gone
+
+`GATED_WI_ROOT` is no longer the off-by-one `HERE.parents[3].parent / "stack-cr-wi3-revoke"`. It is resolved by
+`resolve_gated_wi_root()` (:257-307): an explicit `GATED_WI_ROOT` env override, else **repo-relative** `git worktree
+list --porcelain` (from `repository_root()`, first parent containing `.git`) selecting the **unique** worktree whose
+`HEAD == f4008307` **and** `branch == refs/heads/feat/830-compaction-revoke` (raise if ambiguous/absent). It then
+**fail-closes** unless `gated_root.is_dir()`, `git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree == "true"` (:304-305), and
+`HEAD == GATED_WI_HEAD` (:306-307). Independently recomputed on this host (git query, harness not run): it resolves
+to the real worktree **`/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-cr-wi3-revoke`**. Portable + validated; the off-by-one is gone.
+
+## Full v4/v5 carry-over re-sweep (byte-stable vs `7f975b95` except the NEW-5/6 delta)
+
+`diff 7f975b95 → 2d54a9dd` confines changes to launcher resolution (NEW-6) + adjacent-rehash-exec-in-place (NEW-5);
+nothing else moved. Re-swept intact: **creds-scrub** (`scrub_fixture_credentials` + outermost `finally`); **`source-invalid`
+ABSENT** (grep=0 both files); **fidelity file-backed** unperturbed (broker `read_runtime_generation`/`bump_runtime_generation`
+on the fixture `.state`; `assert_d4` `generation_source=="state-file"` + `state_file_drives_lifecycle` +
+`state_file_in_fixture_root` + `new→MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED`/`prior→STALE_GENERATION`); **`lease_anchor_registered`** INTACT
+(event + `hex-256`); **live-path** gated launcher; **fail-closed precondition**; **fixture-socket isolation**; **`-O`-safe**
+(0 bare `assert`, PASS derived); **allow-list env** (0 `os.environ.copy`); **`--runs choices=(3,)`**; **single p3 broker**
+(broker byte-identical to v5). **ABSENT sweep = 0** (P5/P6/P2-bank/retry-launder/mosaic-yolo/execRuntime/pi_gate0/run_open/
+atomic; extension actions only bump/lifecycle/authorize/promote; no exec-at-import). **Beyond-R1 tripwire: not tripped** —
+exec is in place, imports and the file-backed observation surface untouched; no isolation crossing.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `2d54a9dd`.** NEW-5 (approach (i): exact-byte sha256 pin as trust anchor; adjacent re-hash immediately
+before `Popen` with no interleaved yield; exec in place at the pinned f4008307-worktree path; (ii) copy-to-fixture/
+PYTHONPATH machinery reverted) and NEW-6 (portable, validated, off-by-one-gone root resolution) are both **closed**;
+the full v4/v5 carry-over holds byte-stable except the two intended surfaces; ABSENT sweep is 0; the R1 file-backed
+fidelity surface is unperturbed. Zero out-of-scope surface.
+
+**Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; **FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO** and is not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** distinct Opus SECREV session (`ms-secrev-828` lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`), Gate-16 author≠reviewer,
+byte review only; ran nothing; did not build.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `2d54a9dd14cb924701b2ae4ed72dae4df760c4e3` · harness sha256 `15a154df55273f51301763a984485fd63813f6d1f05d2728abb9fb8b9c040b1a`.
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 Pre-Audit v12
+
+**Author:** ms-p3-fix  
+**Scope:** Static audit only of the D4 fixture-construction and precondition path in `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py`. No harness execution occurred.
+
+## Pinned closure verified
+
+| Member | Pinned revision | SHA-256 |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `launch-runtime.py` | `f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d` | `e950e4224e280f16979d90cabb89aa1896c5ee28bed2df957e14d018d43cda82` |
+| `lease_generation.py` | `f400830738998db105107a2a4c69c7f2a2a6fd5d` | `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c` |
+| `p3_generation_broker.py` | `23c0caca9b5d44002e6184cd7f2b6c837e8795b2` | `4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad` |
+
+The launcher and generation bytes were read from the exact `f4008307` object in the resolved WI-3 worktree. The broker bytes were checked from this repository's exact `23c0caca` object. Their SHA-256 values match the three unchanged pin constants.
+
+## Behavior-marker audit
+
+| Harness marker / check | Result | Satisfying real closure byte location |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `"action": "register_anchor"` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:77` emits the registration action. |
+| `initialize_generation: Callable[[Path, int], None] = initialize_runtime_generation` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:49` is the DI binding to the imported real helper; import is at `launch-runtime.py:15`, and the bound parameter is invoked at `launch-runtime.py:90`. |
+| `execute(command[0], command, environment)` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:101`. |
+| `source_environment["MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET"]` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:70`. |
+| `socket_path.parent / f"generation-{session_id}.state"` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:89`; broker independently retains the same fixture-parent construction at `p3_generation_broker.py:99`. |
+| `environment["MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE"]` | PASS | `launch-runtime.py:98`. |
+| `def read_runtime_generation` | PASS | `lease_generation.py:78`; broker loads and calls it at `p3_generation_broker.py:37-41`, `77-78`, and `133`. |
+| `def bump_runtime_generation` | PASS | `lease_generation.py:90`; broker loads and calls it at `p3_generation_broker.py:37-41` and `119-120`. |
+
+## Fixture and precondition-path audit
+
+| Harness precondition | Result | Static construction / real closure satisfaction |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Fixture broker socket equals `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET` | PASS | Harness sets the variable from `socket_path` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:723` and rejects mismatch at `:452-453`. Launcher consumes that exact variable at `launch-runtime.py:70`; broker accepts the fixture value via `--socket` at `p3_generation_broker.py:46-50` and binds it at `:60-63`. |
+| `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE` is absent before launcher execution | PASS | The isolated environment dictionary has no such key (`p3_d4_focused_run.py:712-737`) and precondition rejects any inherited value at `:454-455`. The launcher creates and assigns it only after successful registration and initialization (`launch-runtime.py:74-90`, `95-99`). |
+| `HOME` is fixture-relative | PASS | Constructed as `root / "home"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:680,713`; validated by the fixture-path loop at `:456-471`. Launcher copies the source environment only after receiving this fixture value (`launch-runtime.py:68,95`). |
+| `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "config"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:681,714`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `XDG_CACHE_HOME` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "cache"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:682,715`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `XDG_STATE_HOME` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "state"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:683,716`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "runtime"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:684,717`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `TMPDIR` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "tmp"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:685,718`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `D4_PI_LOG` is fixture-relative | PASS | The run creates `root / "pi.jsonl"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:758` and assigns it at `:724`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR` is fixture-relative | PASS | The run creates `root / "workspace"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:755` and assigns it at `:726`; validated at `:456-471`. Launcher executes with the copied fixture environment at `launch-runtime.py:95-101`. |
+| `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "heartbeat"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:687,727`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| `MOSAIC_HOME` is fixture-relative | PASS | `root / "mosaic-home"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:688,728`; validated at `:456-471`. |
+| Socket parent is this temporary root | PASS | The run derives `socket_path = root / "generation.sock"` at `p3_d4_focused_run.py:757`; precondition requires `socket_path.parent == root` and `root.parent == tempfile.gettempdir()` at `:472-474`. Broker additionally refuses a generation path whose parent differs from `socket_path.parent` at `p3_generation_broker.py:71-75`. |
+| Complete pinned closure can be materialized without an unpinned project import | PASS | `materialize_closure` reads the three exact objects and verifies their hashes (`p3_d4_focused_run.py:397-431`); `closure_import_guard` allows only `lease_generation` as non-stdlib (`:342-371`). Launcher has that sole project import at `launch-runtime.py:15`; broker imports its supplied generation file using an explicit path at `p3_generation_broker.py:29-41`. |
+
+**All remaining preconditions pass against real closure bytes: Y.**
+
+No B5-B9/D4 assertion, closure hash gate, before-exec re-hash, fixture/socket precondition, bytecode rejection, launch/broker flag, or run-count setting was changed by this audit artifact.
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) No-Site Startup Closure — §3-Conformance Review v10
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS**
+
+## Pin (GUARD 1 — reviewed object)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `ce5ba762051354338889959bfce2b0381f4a4e2a`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `7e14ead89a7b2a297fcc17e7653291b3bcace1d2002a8f90a989db74f6985b6f` (32753 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Closure pins (unchanged):** launcher `e950e422…` @f4008307 · helper `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c` @f4008307 · broker `4db4fef1…` @23c0caca.
+
+## Independence (GUARD 2 — principal-independence attestation)
+
+Distinct Opus SECREV session, orchestrator-dispatched — the **`ms-secrev-828` reviewer lane, dispatched by
+`mosaic-100`** — **byte review only, ran nothing** (harness/broker not executed); did **not** build this harness
+(builder = ms-rev-826); is not Mos; distinct principal from both. This re-verifies from scratch on the v10 SHA after
+homelab's 4th-round FAIL @`1c34e3cb` (no `-S` → `site` startup-closure hole) superseded my v9 PASS + Mos's co-attest.
+The `-S`/`-s`/`-I` behavior checks below use a *throwaway* script to observe interpreter startup — not the harness.
+
+## ★ B9 — No-site startup closure (the homelab 4th-round FAIL)
+
+The delta vs `1c34e3cb` is **exactly two `-S` insertions**, byte-confirmed by `diff` (nothing else; +28 B fully
+accounted by the two `        "-S",\n` lines):
+
+- **(i) Launcher command** (`launch_verified_pi`, :512-516): `sys.executable, "-s", "-S", "-B", str(launcher), …` —
+  carries `-s` + **`-S`** + `-B`, and **no `-I`**.
+- **(ii) Broker command** (`launch_verified_broker`, :551-554): `sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", str(broker_path), …`
+  — carries `-I` + **`-S`** + `-B`.
+- **(iii) `site` not imported at child startup** — empirically confirmed (Python 3.11.2, throwaway script):
+  `python3 -s -S -B main.py` → `sys.flags.no_site == 1`, `'site' in sys.modules == False`; `python3 -I -S -B main.py`
+  → `no_site == 1`. So system-site `.pth` executable lines and `sitecustomize`/`usercustomize` **cannot run unpinned
+  startup code** before the pinned launcher/broker. (Contrast without `-S`: `python3 -s -B` → `no_site == 0`, `site`
+  imported — the exact v9 hole this closes.)
+- **(iv)** No harness reliance on any site-injected path/hook (env is the constructed allow-list; children execute
+  pinned bytes).
+- **(v) `-S` does not touch `sys.path[0]`** (unlike `-I`/`-P`) — empirically confirmed: `python3 -s -S -B main.py`
+  keeps `sys.path[0]` = the script's directory, so the launcher's bare `from lease_generation import
+  initialize_runtime_generation` (`f4008307:launch-runtime.py:15`) **still binds `pinned/lease_generation.py`** with
+  `-S` present. The broker's explicit `--generation-module` import (via `importlib`) binds the pinned helper
+  regardless of `sys.path`/site, so `-I -S` is correct there.
+- **(vi) Delta = exact 2-line `-S` only** vs `1c34e3cb` (git-diff/byte-compared, not accepted on assertion).
+
+## All prior bars — byte-stable (delta was only the two `-S` lines)
+
+- **B6(c):** launcher still carries no `-I`; sibling import binds `pinned/` (confirmed above with `-S` present). ✅
+- **B7:** broker `Popen` `env=environment` (allow-list, **not** `os.environ`; no `PYTHONPATH`/`PYTHONHOME`/
+  `PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX`) + `-I`. ✅
+- **B8:** `reject_pinned_bytecode` fail-closed before each consumer; `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` + `PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1`
+  in env; `-B` on both children. ✅
+- **B5:** 3-leg conjunction — materialize each of launcher/helper/broker from git-object bytes with `sha256==pin`
+  fail-closed; `pinned/` `0o700` in fixture root, files `O_EXCL 0o600` (no writable window); re-hash `==pin`
+  immediately before each `Popen`; launcher + broker consume the same single pinned helper. ✅
+- **B6:** `closure_import_guard` AST present; single pinned helper; broker `--generation-module = closure.generation`. ✅
+- **Fidelity:** extension bumps `generation-{sid}.state` via `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE` (not in-mem); broker
+  `read_runtime_generation`; `assert_d4` `generation_source=="state-file"` / `state_file_in_fixture_root` /
+  `new→MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED` / `prior→STALE_GENERATION`; `.state` fixture-root-bound. ✅
+- **Traceability:** `GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307` + `merge-base --is-ancestor 66b1e0a0 f4008307`. ✅
+- `lease_anchor_registered` + `hex-256` INTACT; LIVE-PATH (pinned gated launcher); single p3 broker;
+  promotion=fixture-only; `--runs choices=(3,)`; `-O`-safe (0 bare `assert`); `copy2` = creds-only; allow-list env
+  (0 `os.environ.copy`). ✅
+
+## ABSENT sweep
+
+P5/P6/P2-bank/retry-launder/mosaic-yolo/execRuntime = 0; `source-invalid` = 0; no live/real-broker path; no `.state`
+outside fixture root; no exec-at-import (`__main__`-guarded); no adjacency-only-exec-from-worktree; the only change is
+the authorized `-S` no-site isolation-deepening (no mechanism change, no scope-widen); `-O`-safe.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `ce5ba762`.** B9 (no-site startup closure) is closed — both children carry `-S`, `site` is not imported at
+startup (so system-site `.pth`/`sitecustomize` cannot execute unpinned code before the pinned launcher/broker),
+`-S` leaves `sys.path[0]` intact so the launcher sibling import and the broker explicit-path import both still bind
+the pinned helper, and the delta vs `1c34e3cb` is exactly the two `-S` insertions. All prior bars (B5/B6/B6c/B7/B8/
+fidelity/traceability/lease_anchor/live-path/single-broker/promotion/`--runs`/`-O`-safe) are byte-stable. Zero
+out-of-scope surface. **Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; **FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO**, his byte-scope-verify co-attestation, and homelab's
+third-principal verify — not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** distinct Opus SECREV session (`ms-secrev-828` lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`), Gate-16 author≠reviewer,
+byte review only; ran nothing.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `ce5ba762051354338889959bfce2b0381f4a4e2a` · harness sha256 `7e14ead89a7b2a297fcc17e7653291b3bcace1d2002a8f90a989db74f6985b6f`.
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+> ⚠ SUPERSEDED by v8 (homelab 3rd-principal FAIL @f609a449: broker env-inherit + unpinned .pyc; PASS overtaken by stricter B7+B8 bar). This v7 PASS record is NOT fire-authorization.
+
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Full-Closure Materialization — §3-Conformance Review v7
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS** *(superseded — see banner above)*
+
+## Pin (GUARD 1 — reviewed object)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `f609a44953f5ae61916805fcb45ca337de00b0b0`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `0f1bd1b39399b32f243d901230e2d840794a2144edd723a095dab716833a7a9b` (32071 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Closure pins (independently recomputed from the git objects):**
+  - launcher `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/launch-runtime.py` @ `f4008307` = `e950e4224e280f16979d90cabb89aa1896c5ee28bed2df957e14d018d43cda82` ✓
+  - **helper** `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/lease_generation.py` @ `f4008307` = `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c` ✓
+  - **broker** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_generation_broker.py` @ `23c0caca` = `4db4fef1ac6658a8ca79ad5091cefc901d2aa26003265c3d6726c294cf895cad` ✓
+
+## Independence (GUARD 2 — principal-independence attestation)
+
+This review is produced by a **distinct Opus SECREV session, orchestrator-dispatched — the `ms-secrev-828`
+reviewer lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`** — **byte review only, ran nothing**, that **did NOT build** this harness
+(builder = ms-rev-826) and **is not Mos**. Three distinct principals: this reviewer, the builder, and Mos (whose
+own distinct-identity byte-scope-verify follows); homelab's independent verify is a further principal — it is
+homelab's third-principal FAIL @`2d54a9dd` (upheld by Mos) that correctly retired the approach-(i) adjacency
+re-hash and authorized this full-closure. v6/`2d54a9dd`/`23c0caca`/`12914d8` are superseded.
+
+## Why v7 (the reopen-after-hash hole)
+
+Approach (i) re-hashed the launcher then let `Popen` **reopen the worktree path** — hashed-snapshot ≠ executed-bytes
+(the worktree file is a shared, same-UID-mutable path). Statement adjacency alone did not bind. v7 closes it for the
+**full project-code closure** (launcher + `lease_generation.py` helper + `p3_generation_broker.py`).
+
+## B5 — HASHED == EXECUTED on the full closure (binding conjunction, stated verbatim)
+
+The reopen-after-hash shape is unavoidable for imported/exec'd files, so closure rests on the **conjunction of all
+three legs**, each byte-verified here:
+
+> **(a)** bytes are materialized **from the pinned git-object @ `f4008307`** (helper/launcher) and **@ `23c0caca`**
+> (broker) — `git show <commit>:<path>`, the trusted immutable object, **never the mutable worktree file**; **AND**
+> **(b)** into a **fixture-private `0o700` dir with `0o600` files created via `O_CREAT|O_EXCL`** — no writer exists in
+> the threat model between hash and exec; **AND** **(c)** each member is **re-hashed == its pin IMMEDIATELY before
+> exec/import, fail-closed (`RuntimeError`)**.
+
+Byte evidence:
+- **(a)** `git_object_bytes(git_root, commit, relative)` = `git show <commit>:<path>` (:322-327); `materialize_closure`
+  reads all three members from git objects and asserts `sha256(data) == digest` else `RuntimeError` (:415-433). Worktree
+  working-tree files are never read.
+- **(b)** `pinned = root / "pinned"; pinned.mkdir(mode=0o700)` (:435-436); `write_pinned_file` uses
+  `os.open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0o600)` (:379-382). **No `os.chmod`/`os.rename`/`shutil.move`
+  anywhere** (grep=0); `O_EXCL` refuses a pre-planted file/symlink, so no symlink-follow or hijack gap; the dir is a
+  fresh per-run `mkdtemp` child, owner-only. **No code re-opens the pinned files for write between materialize and
+  consume** — there is no writable window.
+- **(c)** launcher re-hash `sha256(launcher.read_bytes()) == GATED_LAUNCHER_SHA256` is the statement immediately before
+  `return PiRpc(command,…)` (:528-530); broker **and** helper re-hashes (`== GATED_BROKER_SHA256`,
+  `== GATED_GENERATION_SHA256`) are the two statements immediately before `return subprocess.Popen(command,…)`
+  (:546-551). No interleaved harness yield.
+
+Adjacency-only exec-from-worktree is **absent** for every member (all three exec/import from `pinned/`; grep worktree-exec=0).
+
+## B6 — helper + broker pinned and bound to execution (one shared helper)
+
+`materialize_closure` writes exactly **one** `pinned/lease_generation.py` (:442). The broker executes the **pinned**
+broker with `--generation-module = closure.generation` = that pinned helper (`launch_verified_broker`, :533-551, called
+:746-747). The launcher executes the **pinned** launcher (`python3 pinned/launch-runtime.py`), whose
+`import lease_generation` resolves via `sys.path[0]` = the script's own `pinned/` dir to the **same** sibling
+`pinned/lease_generation.py`. Launcher-import and broker-`--generation-module` therefore resolve the **same single
+pinned helper copy**, not two copies and not the worktree. Worktree helper/broker are not re-read at runtime.
+
+**Closure-import guard:** `closure_import_guard` AST-parses each member and refuses any non-stdlib import outside the
+allow-set `{"lease_generation"}` (and any relative import) → `RuntimeError` (:341-364). The 3-member closure is
+therefore provably complete — no unpinned project-code dependency can slip in.
+
+## BAR1 — Traceability
+
+`GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307`; the precondition asserts `git merge-base --is-ancestor 66b1e0a0 f4008307` (:315-330),
+independently confirmed **YES** — the pinned launcher forward-contains the `66b1e0a0` file-backed generation mechanism.
+
+## BAR2 — Fidelity file-backed, `.state` in fixture root, UNTOUCHED
+
+`pinned/` holds **code bytes only** (launcher/helper/broker). The `.state` generation file is written by the launcher
+to `socket_path.parent` (the fixture root), **not** `pinned/`. The broker (pinned, byte-identical `4db4fef1`) still
+enforces `generation_environment` raising if `state_path.parent != socket_path.parent` (grep=2), and `assert_d4`
+still checks `state_file_source == "state-file"` / `state_file_drives_lifecycle` / `state_file_in_fixture_root` +
+`new→MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED` / `prior→STALE_GENERATION` (grep=4, unchanged). The v7 change did not move `.state` into
+`pinned/` or perturb these asserts.
+
+## BAR3 — Carry-over
+
+(a) **live-path:** Pi launched via `python3 pinned/launch-runtime.py --runtime pi -- pi …` (gated register-before-exec);
+`mosaic yolo`/`execRuntime` = 0. (b) **fail-closed precondition:** `gated_launcher_precondition` (resolve+materialize+
+verify) runs before any launch, fail-closed. (c) **fixture-socket isolation:** `MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET` = per-run
+fixture socket; single pinned p3 broker serves `register_anchor`; no live/default broker reachable; non-destructive.
+(d) **`lease_anchor_registered` INTACT:** event + `session_id_shape=="hex-256"` unchanged (broker byte-identical);
+`assert_d4` folds it into the single-identity set — not deleted/softened/optional/repointed.
+
+## Re-confirm + ABSENT sweep
+
+Spawns ONLY the single pinned p3 broker; promotion=fixture-only; full D4 asserts; `--runs choices=(3,)`; allow-list
+env (0 `os.environ.copy`); **`-O`-safe** (all new checks `RuntimeError`, **0 bare `assert`**); creds-scrub intact;
+non-destructive (fixture tempdir only); deterministic (git objects + fixed pins); closure-import guard present.
+**ABSENT = 0:** P5/P6/P2-bank/retry-launder/mosaic-yolo/execRuntime/pi_gate0; `source-invalid` grep=0; no live/real-broker
+path; no `.state`/gen path outside the fixture root; no extra broker/socket; no exec-at-import (`__main__`-guarded); no
+adjacency-only exec-from-worktree for any member; the only mechanism change is materialization; no scope-widen.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `f609a449`.** B5 (full-closure hashed==executed via the (a)+(b)+(c) conjunction with no writable window),
+B6 (one shared pinned helper bound to both launcher-import and broker-`--generation-module`; complete closure), BAR1,
+BAR2 (fidelity `.state`-in-fixture-root untouched), and BAR3 all hold, with zero out-of-scope surface. **Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; **FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO**, his v-final byte-scope-verify co-attestation, and homelab's
+third-principal verify — not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** distinct Opus SECREV session (`ms-secrev-828` lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`), Gate-16 author≠reviewer,
+byte review only; ran nothing; did not build.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `f609a44953f5ae61916805fcb45ca337de00b0b0` · harness sha256 `0f1bd1b39399b32f243d901230e2d840794a2144edd723a095dab716833a7a9b`.
+**Pinned closure:** launcher `e950e422…` @f4008307 · helper `06162540…be4c` @f4008307 · broker `4db4fef1…` @23c0caca.
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+> ⚠ SUPERSEDED by v9: the reviewed harness `a92ad090` is superseded by the narrow fix `1c34e3cb` (my v8 B6(c) FAIL — `-I` on the launcher — was remediated by `-I`→`-s` + `PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1`; re-review v9 = PASS). This v8 FAIL record pertains to the superseded commit.
+
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Broker Env-Isolation + Bytecode Binding — §3-Conformance Review v8
+
+**Verdict: ❌ FAIL** (B7 and B8 land correctly, but the same change breaks **B6(c)**: the launcher is run with `-I`, which strips the script directory from `sys.path` on Python 3.11+, so its bare `import lease_generation` cannot resolve the pinned helper — empirically confirmed).
+
+## Pin (GUARD 1 — reviewed object)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `a92ad090ae3828c643f961c7628d809b8521185f`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `915ebeb5aeab108cb60c5f629c1db520623ab4914eed427ca34ee66f9aa08390` (32614 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Closure pins (unchanged from v7):** launcher `e950e422…` @f4008307 · helper `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c` @f4008307 · broker `4db4fef1…` @23c0caca.
+
+## Independence (GUARD 2 — principal-independence attestation)
+
+Distinct Opus SECREV session, orchestrator-dispatched — the **`ms-secrev-828` reviewer lane, dispatched by
+`mosaic-100`** — **byte review only, ran nothing** (the harness/broker were not executed); did **not** build this
+harness (builder = ms-rev-826); is not Mos. This verdict is my own. (The `-I` semantics check below runs a *throwaway*
+two-line script to observe the interpreter's `sys.path` behavior — it does not run the harness, broker, or any part of
+the reviewed closure.)
+
+## 🔴 BLOCKING FINDING — B6(c) broken: `-I` on the launcher strips the pinned-helper import path
+
+**File:line — `p3_d4_focused_run.py:512`** (the `"-I"` added to `launch_verified_pi`'s launcher command).
+
+The pinned launcher `launch-runtime.py` @`f4008307` imports its helper with a **bare top-level import**:
+`from lease_generation import initialize_runtime_generation` (launcher line 15) — no `sys.path` manipulation. Under
+v7 this bound because `python3 pinned/launch-runtime.py` put the script's directory (`pinned/`) at `sys.path[0]`, so
+the sibling `lease_generation` resolved to `pinned/lease_generation.py`.
+
+v8 now runs the launcher as `python3 -I -B pinned/launch-runtime.py …` (:512-513). **`-I` implies `-P` (Python 3.11+),
+which does NOT prepend the script's directory to `sys.path`.** Empirically confirmed on this host (Python 3.11.2),
+using a throwaway script (not the harness):
+
+```
+python3 -I -B main.py  → sys.path[0] = '/usr/lib/python311.zip'
+                          import sibling → ModuleNotFoundError: No module named '…'
+python3    -B main.py  → sys.path[0] = '<script dir>'  → sibling import: OK
+```
+
+Therefore, at FIRE on Python 3.11+, the launcher's line-15 `from lease_generation import …` raises
+`ModuleNotFoundError` at module load — the pinned helper does **not** resolve (neither pinned nor worktree; the import
+simply fails). **B6(c) — "launcher sibling-import to `pinned/` via `sys.path[0]` STILL BINDS" — does not hold.** The
+build report's assertion "`-I` keeps script dir" is false on 3.11+, and could not have been observed under the
+correct "never run" boundary.
+
+Note: the env allow-list carries no `PYTHONPATH` (correct for B7), and `-I` ignores `PYTHON*` env regardless, so there
+is no alternate resolution path — the launcher import is unrecoverable under `-I`.
+
+**Fix:** remove `-I` from the **launcher** command only (keep `-B` + the `env=` allow-list — the launcher's
+env-isolation is already provided by the constructed allow-list, which contains no `PYTHONPATH`/`PYTHONHOME`/
+`PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX`, and it needs `pinned/` at `sys.path[0]` for the sibling import). Keep `-I` on the **broker**
+command (it loads the helper by explicit `--generation-module` path via `importlib`, so it never needs the script
+dir on `sys.path`). Alternatively, inject the pinned dir explicitly (e.g. `PYTHONPATH=pinned/` — but that reintroduces
+a `PYTHON*` passthrough B7 forbids, so dropping `-I` on the launcher is the clean fix).
+
+## What DID land correctly (for the author's fast turnaround)
+
+- **B7 — broker child env-isolated: correct.** `launch_verified_broker` now takes `environment` and passes
+  `env=environment` (the constructed allow-list, **not** `os.environ`) to `Popen` (:566-568); the broker command
+  includes `-I` (:551); the allow-list contains no `PYTHONPATH`/`PYTHONHOME`/`PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX` passthrough. The
+  broker child cannot inherit ambient env or resolve stdlib imports to ambient code. ✅
+- **B8 — bytecode pinned-or-suppressed: correct.** `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` is in the allow-list env (:728) and
+  `-B` is on **both** child commands (:512-513 launcher, :551-552 broker); `reject_pinned_bytecode` fails closed
+  (`RuntimeError`) on any pre-existing `pinned/__pycache__` or `*.pyc` (:498-501) and is called **before each
+  consumer** (:534 launcher, :561 broker). No unpinned `.pyc` can be executed. ✅
+- **B5 conjunction / B6 single-helper / closure-import-guard / BAR1 / BAR2 (`.state` fidelity untouched) / BAR3
+  (live-path, fail-closed precondition, fixture-socket isolation, `lease_anchor_registered` + hex-256) / single p3
+  broker / `-O`-safe / allow-list env / `--runs==(3,)` / ABSENT sweep:** all intact/unperturbed (the delta touches only
+  the env/`-I`/`-B`/bytecode-reject surfaces). These are **not** the failing item.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**FAIL @ `a92ad090`.** B7 (broker env isolation) and B8 (bytecode pinned-or-suppressed) are correctly implemented,
+but the `-I` added to the **launcher** command breaks B6(c): the launcher's bare `from lease_generation import` at
+`f4008307:launch-runtime.py:15` cannot resolve the pinned helper because `-I`/`-P` strips `sys.path[0]` on Python
+3.11+ (empirically confirmed, 3.11.2 → `ModuleNotFoundError`). PASS requires **all** of B7+B8+B5+B6+BAR1/2/3; B6(c)
+does not hold. Not softened → returns to author (ms-rev-826). The fix is narrow: drop `-I` from the launcher command
+(retain `-B` + allow-list env), keep `-I` on the broker.
+
+**Findings:** B6(c) — `p3_d4_focused_run.py:512` (`-I` on the launcher command; breaks the pinned-helper sibling
+import under Python 3.11+).
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's post-clear GO — moot until this FAIL is remediated.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** distinct Opus SECREV session (`ms-secrev-828` lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`), Gate-16 author≠reviewer,
+byte review only; ran nothing (harness/broker not executed).
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `a92ad090ae3828c643f961c7628d809b8521185f` · harness sha256 `915ebeb5aeab108cb60c5f629c1db520623ab4914eed427ca34ee66f9aa08390`.
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+> ⚠ SUPERSEDED: homelab 4th-round FAIL @`1c34e3cb` — no `-S` → Python imports `site` at startup, running unpinned system-site `.pth` executable lines + `sitecustomize`/`usercustomize` before the pinned launcher/broker (site startup-closure hole). This v9 PASS record is overtaken by the stricter B9 (no-site) bar and is NOT fire-authorization; superseded by v10.
+
+# Gate0 Probe-3 (D4) Launcher-Import Fix — §3-Conformance Review v9
+
+**Verdict: ✅ PASS** *(superseded — see banner above)*
+
+## Pin (GUARD 1 — reviewed object)
+
+- **Reviewed object = `1c34e3cb3172acdcd094e683e847d7c984afc96c`** (harness commit, branch `feat/827-gate0-probe`).
+- **Reviewed file:** `docs/compaction-refresh/probes/p3_d4_focused_run.py` — sha256 (pushed provider bytes, `-o FILE`, FULL-40 ref, verified before trust): `29e5c7bfbe1911b52984bd94c79036bb1200ee82588318367b13c2b1053a0103` (32725 bytes, no not-found sentinel).
+- **Closure pins (unchanged):** launcher `e950e422…` @f4008307 · helper `061625402f08488eac47acd23272904e71fd1a71fd15b3bdab158632c801be4c` @f4008307 · broker `4db4fef1…` @23c0caca.
+
+## Independence (GUARD 2 — principal-independence attestation)
+
+Distinct Opus SECREV session, orchestrator-dispatched — the **`ms-secrev-828` reviewer lane, dispatched by
+`mosaic-100`** — **byte review only, ran nothing** (harness/broker not executed); did **not** build this harness
+(builder = ms-rev-826); is not Mos. This is the re-review after **my own** v8 FAIL @`a92ad090` (B6(c): `-I` on the
+launcher broke the sibling import); the author applied the narrow fix and I verify it here. The `-s`/`-I` `sys.path`
+checks below use a *throwaway* two-line script to observe interpreter behavior — not the harness/broker/closure.
+
+## ★ B6(c) — THE FIX (was the v8 FAIL): launcher `-I` dropped; sibling import binds to `pinned/`
+
+The launcher command no longer carries `-I`; it now uses **`-s`** (`:514`, commented "`-s` preserves `sys.path[0]=pinned/`
+for the launcher's sibling helper") + `-B` (`:515`), and `PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1` is added to the allow-list env (`:730`).
+
+`-s` and `PYTHONNOUSERSITE` disable **user site-packages only** — they do **not** strip the script's directory from
+`sys.path` (unlike `-I`/`-P`). Empirically confirmed on this host (Python 3.11.2), throwaway script:
+
+```
+python3 -s -B main.py                       → sys.path[0] = '<script dir>'  → sibling import: OK
+PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1 python3 -s -B main.py     → sys.path[0] = '<script dir>'  → sibling import: OK
+python3 -I -B main.py   (the v8 FAIL form)   → sys.path[0] = stdlib zip     → ModuleNotFoundError
+```
+
+Therefore `python3 -s -B pinned/launch-runtime.py …` puts `pinned/` at `sys.path[0]`, so the pinned launcher's bare
+top-level `from lease_generation import initialize_runtime_generation` (`f4008307:launch-runtime.py:15`, no `sys.path`
+manipulation) resolves to the **pinned** `pinned/lease_generation.py` — not the worktree, not a miss. **B6(c) holds.**
+
+## B7 — Broker env-isolation (still holds)
+
+`launch_verified_broker` passes `env=environment` (the constructed allow-list, **not** `os.environ`; contains no
+`PYTHONPATH`/`PYTHONHOME`/`PYTHONPYCACHEPREFIX`) to `Popen` (`:570`), and the broker command includes `-I` (`:552`).
+The broker imports the helper by explicit `--generation-module` path via `importlib`, so it never needs `sys.path[0]`
+— `-I` is correct there and does not affect it. (The env's `PYTHONNOUSERSITE`/`PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE` are hardening
+flags, not path/home passthrough, and `-I` ignores all `PYTHON*` env anyway.)
+
+## B8 — Bytecode pinned-or-suppressed (still holds)
+
+`PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` (`:729`) and `PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1` (`:730`) in the allow-list env; `-B` on **both** child
+commands (`:515` launcher, `:553` broker); `reject_pinned_bytecode` fails closed (`RuntimeError`) on any pre-existing
+`pinned/__pycache__` or `*.pyc` (`:498-501`) and is called **before each consumer** (`:535` launcher, `:562` broker).
+No unpinned `.pyc` can be executed.
+
+## B5 — 3-leg conjunction (still holds)
+
+`materialize_closure` reads launcher+helper+broker from **git-object bytes** (`git show <commit>:<path>`) and asserts
+`sha256 == pin` for each, fail-closed; `pinned/` is a fixture-private `0o700` dir inside the per-run fixture temp root;
+files created `O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC 0o600` (no chmod/rename/symlink gap → no writable window); each member
+re-hashed `== pin` immediately before its `Popen` (launcher; broker + helper). Launcher and broker consume the **same
+single** pinned helper. `closure_import_guard` AST-rejects any unpinned non-stdlib import.
+
+## Fidelity + traceability + carry-over (still hold)
+
+`GATED_WI_HEAD == f4008307` + `merge-base --is-ancestor 66b1e0a0 f4008307` (forward-contains). Extension bumps
+`generation-{sid}.state` via `MOSAIC_LEASE_GENERATION_FILE` (not in-mem); broker reads via `read_runtime_generation`;
+`assert_d4` observes the file-backed transition (`generation_source=="state-file"`, `state_file_drives_lifecycle`,
+`state_file_in_fixture_root`, new→`MUTATOR_UNVERIFIED`, prior→`STALE_GENERATION`); `.state` stays in the fixture temp
+root. `lease_anchor_registered` INTACT (event + `session_id_shape=="hex-256"`). LIVE-PATH drives the pinned gated
+launcher (no released `mosaic`/`execRuntime`). Fail-closed precondition before any launch. Single pinned p3 broker.
+Promotion=fixture-only. `--runs choices=(3,)`. `copy2` = creds-only. Allow-list env (0 `os.environ.copy`).
+
+## ABSENT sweep
+
+P5/P6/P2-bank/retry-launder/mosaic-yolo/execRuntime = 0; `source-invalid` = 0; no live/real-broker path; no `.state`
+outside the fixture root; no exec-at-import (`__main__`-guarded); no adjacency-only-exec-from-worktree; the only change
+is the authorized launcher-flag isolation fix (no mechanism change, no scope-widen); **`-O`-safe** (0 bare `assert`).
+
+## Verdict
+
+**PASS @ `1c34e3cb`.** The v8 FAIL is remediated by the narrow fix (launcher `-I` → `-s` + `PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1`),
+empirically verified to preserve `sys.path[0]=pinned/` so the pinned launcher's sibling import binds to the pinned
+helper; the broker retains `-I` (explicit-path import). B7, B8, B5, B6-rest, fidelity, traceability, and all carry-over
+bars remain intact; zero out-of-scope surface. **Findings: none.**
+
+## Scope reminder (not a finding)
+
+Producing this evidence **executes** the Gate0 mechanism (§3/§5). This review clears **bytes** only; **FIRE remains
+separately gated on Mos's explicit post-clear GO**, his byte-scope-verify co-attestation, and homelab's
+third-principal verify — not authorized by this review.
+
+---
+
+**Reviewer:** distinct Opus SECREV session (`ms-secrev-828` lane, dispatched by `mosaic-100`), Gate-16 author≠reviewer,
+byte review only; ran nothing.
+**Reviewed object (pin):** `1c34e3cb3172acdcd094e683e847d7c984afc96c` · harness sha256 `29e5c7bfbe1911b52984bd94c79036bb1200ee82588318367b13c2b1053a0103`.
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# npm `@next` prerelease lane
-
-Status: **IMPLEMENTED**
-
-## Current behavior
-
-`tools/install.sh --next` provides the prerelease integration lane for the permanent `next` branch.
-
-The lane is fast-by-default:
-
-1. Install framework files from the `next` source archive.
-2. Resolve the Gitea npm registry `next` dist-tag for the globally installed packages:
-
-   ```bash
-   npm view @mosaicstack/gateway@next version
-   npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version
-   ```
-
-3. Require both resolved versions to share the same `next.<pipeline>` suffix, then install the exact resolved versions.
-4. If either `@next` package is missing, unreachable, mismatched, or fails to install, fall back to the source-build path at `next`.
-
-`--next` never hard-fails solely because the prerelease npm dist-tag is unavailable.
-
-## Published packages
-
-The `next` publish pipeline publishes non-private `@mosaicstack/*` packages to the Mosaic Gitea npm registry:
-
-```text
-https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/
-```
-
-Observed `next` dist-tags after enabling the pipeline:
-
-```text
-@mosaicstack/mosaic@next  -> 0.0.49-next.1633
-@mosaicstack/gateway@next -> 0.0.7-next.1633
-```
-
-The gateway also publishes a Docker image as `gateway:sha-<short>` on `next` merges. The installer fast path uses the npm gateway package when available; the Docker image is for deployed gateway/runtime harness flows.
-
-## Explicit source lanes
-
-Source builds remain available and are still the authority for explicit ref validation:
-
- `--dev` always builds from source.
- `--ref <ref>` / `MOSAIC_REF=<ref>` wins over `--next` and uses the source path for that exact ref.
-
-## Pipeline shape
-
-1. Trigger on `next` merges.
-2. Compute the next prerelease version from the upcoming stable version plus the Woodpecker pipeline number (`<target-stable>-next.<CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER>`).
-3. Build and publish non-private packages in CI.
-4. Publish to the Mosaic Gitea npm registry with dist-tag `next`.
-5. Keep `latest` untouched; only main/release promotion can update `latest`.
-6. Publish gateway Docker images from `next` as `gateway:sha-<short>` only.
-
-## Guardrails
-
- `@next` is mutable prerelease convenience, not a deployment pin.
- Stable installs continue to use `@latest`.
- Contributor validation remains available through `--dev --ref <branch>`.
- Pipeline output traces every prerelease package back to the source commit on `next`.
- The installer falls back to source rather than hard-failing on prerelease registry issues.
@@ -5,17 +5,28 @@
 This checklist is an acceptance contract for documentation and examples. It does not authorize
 schema, runtime, systemd, role, profile, or live-fleet changes. An item is complete only when its
 named artifact exists, is linked from the fleet documentation entry point, and its evidence is
-recorded in the M5 closure report and linked deferral evidence.
+recorded in the M0 task/PR.

 ## M0 baseline acceptance

- [x] `docs/PRD.md` states the roster as desired-state SSOT; generated environment, systemd, tmux, and heartbeat artifacts as non-authoritative projections; and fail-closed handling of unsupported or quarantined legacy input.
- [x] `docs/PRD.md` defines the required classes and authority boundary: `validator` certifies but does not merge; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority; `team-leader` capacity is lease-bounded; `interaction` is request/status only; instance names such as Tess and Ultron remain configurable.
- [x] `docs/PRD.md` defines local lifecycle semantics for `enabled`, persisted desired state, and observed state, including stopped-state preservation through migration, apply, and reboot.
- [x] `docs/PRD.md` defines the generated-env/local-override boundary, explicitly denies arbitrary command overrides in M1–M5, and requires key-name/hash-only quarantine diagnostics.
- [x] `docs/PRD.md` identifies the M1–M5 local-tmux scope and excludes remote reconciliation, connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary commands/channels, gateway convergence, and UI configuration storage.
- [x] `docs/TASKS.md` contains the complete M0–M5 one-card/one-PR dependency DAG for #758 with agent tier, branch, dependency, estimate, and evidence expectations.
- [x] `docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md` classifies every current shipped fleet example, profile, and service preset before M1 implementation starts.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` states the roster as desired-state SSOT; generated environment, systemd,
+      tmux, and heartbeat artifacts as non-authoritative projections; and fail-closed handling of
+      unsupported or quarantined legacy input.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the required classes and authority boundary: `validator` certifies but
+      does not merge; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority; `team-leader`
+      capacity is lease-bounded; `interaction` is request/status only; instance names such as Tess
+      and Ultron remain configurable.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines local lifecycle semantics for `enabled`, persisted desired state, and
+      observed state, including stopped-state preservation through migration, apply, and reboot.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the generated-env/local-override boundary, explicitly denies arbitrary
+      command overrides in M1–M5, and requires key-name/hash-only quarantine diagnostics.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` identifies the M1–M5 local-tmux scope and excludes remote reconciliation,
+      connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary commands/channels, gateway convergence, and
+      UI configuration storage.
+- [ ] `docs/TASKS.md` contains the complete M0–M5 one-card/one-PR dependency DAG for #758 with
+      agent tier, branch, dependency, estimate, and evidence expectations.
+- [ ] `docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md` classifies every current shipped
+      fleet example, profile, and service preset before M1 implementation starts.

 ## Required documentation IA for M1–M5

@@ -61,18 +72,15 @@ recorded in the M5 closure report and linked deferral evidence.

 ## Cross-cutting evidence gates

- [x] Every retained or migrated YAML/JSON example, profile, and service preset validates through the same declared executable production parser/resolver path recorded by the disposition inventory; versioned v1 fixtures are not forced through the v2 compiler.
- [x] Every retired example/profile/service preset has a replacement link and deprecation note; no unresolved legacy class or tool-policy alias remains silently shipped.
- [x] Documentation examples contain no secret values, arbitrary command override, or product-hardcoded Tess/Ultron identity.
- [x] CLI snippets distinguish local fleet desired-state commands from the separate gateway-backed mosaic agent catalog.
- [x] Migration, quarantine, lifecycle, status, and troubleshooting documentation state that values of legacy sensitive keys are never printed.
- [x] M5 documentation validation verifies required IA paths, local file and heading-fragment links, the canonical roster through the production compiler/resolver, and fenced/canonical-example safety checks.
- [ ] FCM-M5-001 does not deterministically assert owner/evidence/deferral metadata for every checklist row. Closure and deferral reports provide human-reviewable evidence only; broader assertion coverage remains unclaimed.
-
-## Held downstream gates
-
-These unchecked items are intentionally outside FCM-M5-001 and are not authorized by this checklist:
-
- [ ] FCM-M4-002 executes and evidences live cutover, canary, stopped-state preservation, and rollback.
- [ ] FCM-M5-002 completes independent exact-head review and issues the validator certificate.
- [ ] The exact PR head reaches terminal-green CI after independent review.
+- [ ] Every retained or migrated YAML/JSON example, profile, and service preset validates through the
+      same executable schema and shared baseline-plus-`roles.local` resolver used by the CLI.
+- [ ] Every retired example/profile/service preset has a replacement link and deprecation note; no
+      unresolved legacy class or tool-policy alias remains silently shipped.
+- [ ] Documentation examples contain no secret values, arbitrary command override, or product-hardcoded
+      Tess/Ultron identity.
+- [ ] CLI snippets distinguish local fleet desired-state commands from the separate gateway-backed
+      `mosaic agent` catalog.
+- [ ] Migration, quarantine, lifecycle, status, and troubleshooting documentation state that values of
+      legacy sensitive keys are never printed.
+- [ ] M5 release review verifies links, schema/example validation, and that all checklist rows have
+      owner/evidence or an explicit approved deferral.
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ Generated environment files are rebuildable projections, not an operator-editabl
 | Layer               | Responsibility                                                                                                                  |
 | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | Roster              | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket. |
-| Projection writer   | Renders deterministic fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated from the roster.                                                        |
-| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only fleet/agents/<name>.env.local; it cannot shadow generated keys.                                       |
-| systemd             | Starts the launcher with env -i and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file.                          |
+| Projection writer   | Renders deterministic `fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated` from the roster.                                                      |
+| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only `fleet/agents/<name>.env.local`; it cannot shadow generated keys.                                     |
+| systemd             | Starts the launcher with `env -i` and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file.                        |
 | session launcher    | Validates generated and local data before it queries, creates, or stops an exact tmux session.                                  |
-| runtime launch      | Derives the fixed mosaic yolo <runtime> argument array from validated roster data, then seeds the runtime contract.             |
+| runtime launch      | Derives the fixed `mosaic yolo <runtime>` argument array from validated roster data, then seeds the runtime contract.           |

 The launcher never `source`s or `eval`s an environment file and never accepts an environment-supplied
 command. `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, command/channel overrides, unknown keys, generated-key shadowing,
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ secret-like key names, duplicate keys, comments, quoted/export syntax, and unsaf

 ## Generated and local files

-<name>.env.generated is complete, deterministic, and written only by Mosaic. Its ordered keys are:
+`<name>.env.generated` is complete, deterministic, and written only by Mosaic. Its ordered keys are:

 ```dotenv
 MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
@@ -33,12 +33,12 @@ MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
 MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
 ```

-The generated launch contract supports `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. mosaic fleet add
+The generated launch contract supports `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. `mosaic fleet add`
 rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
 The legacy dogfood stub remains an observability-only canary on its separate `mosaic-factory` socket;
 it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through this path.

-<name>.env.local is optional and may contain only non-secret machine data:
+`<name>.env.local` is optional and may contain only non-secret machine data:

 - `MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN`
 - `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR`
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ private, non-symlink paths. Violations fail closed before tmux interaction.

 ## Legacy input and diagnostics

-A legacy <name>.env is input only during projection generation. Roster-owned keys are regenerated;
+A legacy `<name>.env` is input only during projection generation. Roster-owned keys are regenerated;
 valid allowed local data can move to `.env.local`; invalid legacy input is privately retained at
-<name>.env.quarantine. Neither legacy nor quarantine files are launch authority.
+`<name>.env.quarantine`. Neither legacy nor quarantine files are launch authority.

 Diagnostics expose only rule code, key name, and a SHA-256 content hash. They do not reveal command
 text, credentials, or other values.
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ text, credentials, or other values.
 ## Launch and stop behavior

 The launcher obtains the agent's socket only from the validated generated projection. It creates or
-checks the exact =<agent-name> tmux target; it never uses an ambient socket or fuzzy session match.
+checks the exact `=<agent-name>` tmux target; it never uses an ambient socket or fuzzy session match.
 The same strict parser runs before exact-stop behavior. A fresh native Pi heartbeat remains authoritative;
 the shell sidecar only provides fallback state when the native marker is stale or absent.

-mosaic agent comms-block <exact-member> can inspect that exact roster member's resolved Fleet-Comms
+`mosaic agent comms-block <exact-member>` can inspect that exact roster member's resolved Fleet-Comms
 block. It is a read-only inspection tool and fails loudly for an unknown exact member or missing roster.
 On Linux, the installed roster, TOOLS contract, and executable helper are opened through a held
 descriptor chain rooted at `/`; every managed path component uses no-follow traversal, and content plus
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ parallel resolver. The current executable implementation and per-artifact outcom

 | Shipped file                                         | Current class evidence                                              | M0 disposition decision                                                                              | Required M1/M4 evidence                                              |
 | ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `framework/fleet/examples/coding.yaml`               | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `reviewer`               | Migrate: implementer → code, reviewer → review; retain orchestration/enhancer intent                 | v2 fixture validates; role aliases and authority matrix tested       |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/coding.yaml`               | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `reviewer`               | Migrate: `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`; retain orchestration/enhancer intent             | v2 fixture validates; role aliases and authority matrix tested       |
 | `framework/fleet/examples/general.yaml`              | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `worker`                                | Migrate only after operator chooses a concrete canonical role for `worker`; no implicit conversion   | Explicit replacement class, or versioned v1 fixture/retirement note  |
 | `framework/fleet/examples/hybrid.yaml`               | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `researcher`, `reviewer` | Migrate aliases; resolve `researcher` through existing role resolver or retain/version               | Shared resolver validation; no ad-hoc class scanner                  |
 | `framework/fleet/examples/local-canary.yaml`         | `orchestrator`, `implementer`, `reviewer`                           | Migrate aliases; preserve its local-tmux canary purpose                                              | v2 fixture validates and preserves safe stopped/running behavior     |
@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ parallel resolver. The current executable implementation and per-artifact outcom

 ## Service presets

-| Shipped file                                         | Current policy evidence                                                                                                                                       | M0 disposition decision                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Required M1/M4 evidence                                                                                                                                                               |
-| ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `framework/fleet/services/operator-interaction.yaml` | Generic policy only: runtime: pi, model: openai/gpt-5.6-sol, reasoning: high, tool_policy: operator-interaction; provisioning supplies the agent name as data | Retain as a generic service policy, not a Tess identity. Migrate tool_policy: operator-interaction only through the approved interaction tool-policy alias/semantic resolver; do not infer a class or machine name from this file. | Service-policy fixture validates runtime/model/reasoning and alias behavior; generic provisioning proves a configured interaction instance is supplied without a hardcoded Tess name. |
+| Shipped file                                         | Current policy evidence                                                                                                                                               | M0 disposition decision                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Required M1/M4 evidence                                                                                                                                                               |
+| ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `framework/fleet/services/operator-interaction.yaml` | Generic policy only: `runtime: pi`, `model: openai/gpt-5.6-sol`, `reasoning: high`, `tool_policy: operator-interaction`; provisioning supplies the agent name as data | Retain as a generic service policy, not a Tess identity. Migrate `tool_policy: operator-interaction` only through the approved interaction tool-policy alias/semantic resolver; do not infer a class or machine name from this file. | Service-policy fixture validates runtime/model/reasoning and alias behavior; generic provisioning proves a configured interaction instance is supplied without a hardcoded Tess name. |

 ## Required disposition controls

-1. **No silent aliasing:** only implementer → code, reviewer → review, and
-   operator-interaction → interaction are approved deterministic aliases in this M0 baseline.
+1. **No silent aliasing:** only `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`, and
+   `operator-interaction → interaction` are approved deterministic aliases in this M0 baseline.
   `worker`, `analyst`, `canary`, and domain-specific classes require resolver evidence or an
   explicit version/retirement decision.
 2. **No identity hardcoding:** Tess and Ultron are optional instance/display names. An example/profile
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ The Mosaic Backlog is the backlog of record + dispatch engine, built on Mosaic's
 - **AC-NS-4** — TTL is enforced on claims; token caps remain advisory until a real meter exists.
 - **AC-NS-5** — Flipping fleet/run/PAUSED halts dispatch and merges within one tick.
 - **AC-NS-6** — A user can declare a system type and the fleet provisions the matching persona roster + topology from the baseline library, with no code change.
- **AC-NS-7** — A user-customized persona (edited or added via the orchestrator) survives mosaic update: baseline reseed never clobbers user overrides.
+- **AC-NS-7** — A user-customized persona (edited or added via the orchestrator) survives `mosaic update`: baseline reseed never clobbers user overrides.

 ## Workstreams

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ success_criteria:
  - id: AC-NS-7
    text: >-
      A user-customized persona (edited or added via the orchestrator) survives
-      mosaic update: baseline reseed never clobbers user overrides.
+      `mosaic update`: baseline reseed never clobbers user overrides.

 workstreams:
  - id: A
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 ## Mission

 Turn the proven fleet primitives into a **user-installable, AI-free-configurable fleet product**:
-a user runs mosaic fleet init, answers a few questions (general / coding / research / hybrid),
+a user runs `mosaic fleet init`, answers a few questions (general / coding / research / hybrid),
 gets a recommended set of agents plus one always-on orchestrator wired for chat-ops, and can
 operate, mutate, re-create, and observe the fleet — over tmux today and Matrix tomorrow — from
 CLI/TUI and (designed-for) the webUI.
@@ -21,25 +21,25 @@ functional, we use the fleet itself to continue the work.

 ### A. Configure-without-AI CLI

-| ID  | Requirement                                                                                                 |
-| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| R1  | mosaic fleet command set is functional end-to-end (init/install/start/stop/status/ps/verify + agent verbs). |
-| R2  | mosaic fleet init is an interactive, **AI-free** CLI wizard.                                                |
-| R3  | Init asks the **configuration type**: `general`, `coding`, `research`, `hybrid`, … (extensible).            |
-| R4  | Based on the answer, the fleet is populated with a **recommended set of agents** (a preset).                |
-| R5  | **Exactly one main orchestrator agent** is always configured, regardless of type.                           |
-| R10 | A set of **recommended configurations (presets)** ships for easy duplication.                               |
-| R8  | User can **re-create** the fleet when config needs change (idempotent re-init / reconfigure).               |
-| R17 | Fleet controls are **simple and intuitive**.                                                                |
+| ID  | Requirement                                                                                                   |
+| --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| R1  | `mosaic fleet` command set is functional end-to-end (init/install/start/stop/status/ps/verify + agent verbs). |
+| R2  | `mosaic fleet init` is an interactive, **AI-free** CLI wizard.                                                |
+| R3  | Init asks the **configuration type**: `general`, `coding`, `research`, `hybrid`, … (extensible).              |
+| R4  | Based on the answer, the fleet is populated with a **recommended set of agents** (a preset).                  |
+| R5  | **Exactly one main orchestrator agent** is always configured, regardless of type.                             |
+| R10 | A set of **recommended configurations (presets)** ships for easy duplication.                                 |
+| R8  | User can **re-create** the fleet when config needs change (idempotent re-init / reconfigure).                 |
+| R17 | Fleet controls are **simple and intuitive**.                                                                  |

 ### B. Comms & orchestrator chat-ops

-| ID  | Requirement                                                                                                                   |
-| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| R6  | Init can wire the orchestrator to a chat connector — **Telegram / Discord / Matrix / Slack** — for command + comms.           |
-| R7  | Designed with the end-goal of **Matrix comms on a locally-controlled server**.                                                |
-| R16 | Fleet supports **tmux AND Matrix** comms, **user-configurable** at init or any time. Not all users want Matrix.               |
-| R19 | **"Mos" orchestrator on Discord** (chan 1517622518662434996 / srv 1112631390438166618) on `w-jarvis` — the first live target. |
+| ID  | Requirement                                                                                                                       |
+| --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| R6  | Init can wire the orchestrator to a chat connector — **Telegram / Discord / Matrix / Slack** — for command + comms.               |
+| R7  | Designed with the end-goal of **Matrix comms on a locally-controlled server**.                                                    |
+| R16 | Fleet supports **tmux AND Matrix** comms, **user-configurable** at init or any time. Not all users want Matrix.                   |
+| R19 | **"Mos" orchestrator on Discord** (`chan 1517622518662434996` / `srv 1112631390438166618`) on `w-jarvis` — the first live target. |

 ### C. Runtime, health, lifecycle

@@ -64,46 +64,46 @@ functional, we use the fleet itself to continue the work.
 - **Orchestrator agent:** always present; carries the chat connector config (connector type + target IDs) so it can be commanded over chat. tmux is the substrate; the connector bridges chat ↔ the orchestrator session.
 - **Comms layers (R16):** (1) **tmux** inter-agent (`agent-send`, proven) — default, always available. (2) **chat connector** for human↔orchestrator (Discord now; Matrix the strategic target). (3) **Matrix** as the locally-controlled cross-agent bus (future). Connector is pluggable + reconfigurable.
 - **Heartbeat (R15):** runtime-agnostic launcher sidecar already covers pi/claude/codex (#584). Refine per-runtime (native HB) with the **custom Pi harness** (R14) + a Claude path.
- **Updates (R13):** mosaic update (CLI) + a fleet-aware harness-update step that refreshes pi/claude/codex and re-launches agents safely (drain → update → relaunch via the durable launcher).
- **webUI (R18):** the fleet exposes machine-readable state (fleet ps --json already carries tenant/host/heartbeat/managed) + control verbs (start/stop/watch/send); webUI consumes these (control plane rides federation per north star). Ensure a stable JSON contract + a terminate/attach(butt-in) path.
+- **Updates (R13):** `mosaic update` (CLI) + a fleet-aware harness-update step that refreshes pi/claude/codex and re-launches agents safely (drain → update → relaunch via the durable launcher).
+- **webUI (R18):** the fleet exposes machine-readable state (`fleet ps --json` already carries tenant/host/heartbeat/managed) + control verbs (start/stop/watch/send); webUI consumes these (control plane rides federation per north star). Ensure a stable JSON contract + a terminate/attach(butt-in) path.

 ## Phases (incremental, each shippable)

-| Phase                             | Deliverable                                                                                                                       | Notes                                 |
-| --------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- |
-| **F1 Presets + init wizard**      | preset rosters (general/coding/research/hybrid) + always-orchestrator + AI-free fleet init selecting a preset; re-init idempotent | R1–R5, R8, R10, R17                   |
-| **F2 Connector + Mos-on-Discord** | orchestrator chat-connector config (Discord first) + **Mos live on Discord 1517…/1112…** on w-jarvis                              | R6, R19, partial R16                  |
-| **F3 Heartbeat + harness**        | HB confirmed for claude + pi/gpt; **custom Pi harness** (tool usage, native HB, model self-report); graceful harness updates      | R13, R14, R15                         |
-| **F4 Matrix + comms toggle**      | Matrix connector (local server) + user toggle tmux/Matrix at init/anytime                                                         | R7, R16                               |
-| **F5 Orchestrator-mutable fleet** | orchestrator can add/remove agents at runtime                                                                                     | R9                                    |
-| **F6 webUI hooks**                | stable JSON contract + terminate/attach surface for webUI view/monitor/terminate/butt-in                                          | R18                                   |
-| **F7 Test + docs**                | install+test on w-jarvis AND dragon-lin; user docs (install/configure/use)                                                        | R11, R12 (runs alongside every phase) |
+| Phase                             | Deliverable                                                                                                                         | Notes                                 |
+| --------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- |
+| **F1 Presets + init wizard**      | preset rosters (general/coding/research/hybrid) + always-orchestrator + AI-free `fleet init` selecting a preset; re-init idempotent | R1–R5, R8, R10, R17                   |
+| **F2 Connector + Mos-on-Discord** | orchestrator chat-connector config (Discord first) + **Mos live on Discord `1517…`/`1112…`** on w-jarvis                            | R6, R19, partial R16                  |
+| **F3 Heartbeat + harness**        | HB confirmed for claude + pi/gpt; **custom Pi harness** (tool usage, native HB, model self-report); graceful harness updates        | R13, R14, R15                         |
+| **F4 Matrix + comms toggle**      | Matrix connector (local server) + user toggle tmux/Matrix at init/anytime                                                           | R7, R16                               |
+| **F5 Orchestrator-mutable fleet** | orchestrator can add/remove agents at runtime                                                                                       | R9                                    |
+| **F6 webUI hooks**                | stable JSON contract + terminate/attach surface for webUI view/monitor/terminate/butt-in                                            | R18                                   |
+| **F7 Test + docs**                | install+test on w-jarvis AND dragon-lin; user docs (install/configure/use)                                                          | R11, R12 (runs alongside every phase) |

 ## Work division (proposed — confirm with dragon-lin)

 - **Jarvis @ w-jarvis (Lead):** F1 presets+wizard, F2 connector+Mos-on-Discord, F5 mutability, F6 webUI hooks; merge authority + dual-engine reviews; co-testing on w-jarvis.
- **coder @ dragon-lin:** F3 custom Pi harness + harness-update flow (pi/codex-savvy); plus its in-flight constitution P4–P6 (P4 installer rework underpins fleet init/updates — coordinate the install path). Co-testing on dragon-lin (R11).
+- **coder @ dragon-lin:** F3 custom Pi harness + harness-update flow (pi/codex-savvy); plus its in-flight constitution P4–P6 (P4 installer rework underpins `fleet init`/updates — coordinate the install path). Co-testing on dragon-lin (R11).
 - **Shared:** F4 Matrix (whoever has bandwidth); F7 testing/docs continuous.

 ## Immediate target: Mos on Discord (F2 first slice)

-The discord plugin is available (~/.claude.json). Path: configure the **orchestrator** as a durable
+The discord plugin is available (`~/.claude.json`). Path: configure the **orchestrator** as a durable
 fleet session running Claude Code with the discord plugin bridged to channel `1517622518662434996`
 (server `1112631390438166618`) on w-jarvis, with the existing Discord Bridge Protocol (ack within
 ~3s, reply via `mcp__discord__reply`, no `AskUserQuestion`). Heartbeat via the launcher sidecar.

 ## Success criteria

- A non-AI user can mosaic fleet init, pick a type, and get a working fleet + orchestrator.
- **Mos answers in Discord 1517…** on w-jarvis.
- Fleet runs + is observable (fleet ps) on **both** w-jarvis and dragon-lin.
+- A non-AI user can `mosaic fleet init`, pick a type, and get a working fleet + orchestrator.
+- **Mos answers in Discord `1517…`** on w-jarvis.
+- Fleet runs + is observable (`fleet ps`) on **both** w-jarvis and dragon-lin.
 - Harness updates handled gracefully; HB healthy for claude + pi/gpt agents.
 - Docs let a new operator install/configure/use the fleet.
 - Re-init + orchestrator mutation work.

 ## Assumptions (veto-able)

- `ASSUMPTION:` presets ship as example rosters under the framework (fleet/examples/\*.yaml), selected by `init`.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` presets ship as example rosters under the framework (`fleet/examples/*.yaml`), selected by `init`.
 - `ASSUMPTION:` chat connectors are pluggable; Discord first (target exists), Matrix is the strategic default later.
 - `ASSUMPTION:` "Mos" = a Claude Code orchestrator session with the discord plugin (reuses the documented Discord Bridge Protocol).
 - `ASSUMPTION:` per north star, runtimes default to Codex/pi-on-Codex for workers; the orchestrator "Mos" runs Claude Code (in Claude Code, which is allowed).
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
 The durable tmux fleet runs on the isolated `mosaic-fleet` socket. That isolation
 (which protects the operator's default tmux) makes the fleet **invisible** to default
 tooling, and truth is split across three planes no single command joins — systemd
-(systemctl --user), tmux (-L mosaic-fleet), and the process tree (`pstree`).
-agent tail (`capture-pane`) returns **blank for full-screen TUIs**, and agent send
+(`systemctl --user`), tmux (`-L mosaic-fleet`), and the process tree (`pstree`).
+`agent tail` (`capture-pane`) returns **blank for full-screen TUIs**, and `agent send`
 confirms only keystroke injection, not acceptance. Net: the operator has near-zero
 observability and no safe way to watch a session.

@@ -32,22 +32,22 @@ observability and no safe way to watch a session.

 ## Functional requirements

-| ID   | Requirement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
-| ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| FR-1 | mosaic fleet ps [--json] prints one row per roster agent joining: name · tenant · host · runtime · systemd(active/enabled) · pane(alive/dead) · pid · idle · **last-heartbeat age** · **drift** flag (roster runtime ≠ actual pane command) · **boot-enable** warning (active but `UnitFileState=disabled`). |
-| FR-2 | **Heartbeat protocol v1** (see below); `dogfood-agent.py` implements the responder. fleet ps issues probes (or reads last-seen) and reports health per FR-1.                                                                                                                                                 |
-| FR-3 | mosaic agent watch <name> opens a **read-only** view of the pane (grouped session or tmux attach -r) that cannot send keystrokes and does not shrink the agent's window.                                                                                                                                     |
-| FR-4 | mosaic agent attach <name> remains the **explicit** interactive-takeover path (separate verb, documented as the only one that can type).                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| FR-5 | mosaic agent send <name> --verify confirms the message was **accepted** (not left as an unsubmitted draft) and returns non-zero if delivery cannot be verified.                                                                                                                                              |
-| FR-6 | All structured output (`--json`) includes `tenant_id` and `host` fields.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| ID   | Requirement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| ---- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FR-1 | `mosaic fleet ps [--json]` prints one row per roster agent joining: name · tenant · host · runtime · systemd(active/enabled) · pane(alive/dead) · pid · idle · **last-heartbeat age** · **drift** flag (roster runtime ≠ actual pane command) · **boot-enable** warning (active but `UnitFileState=disabled`). |
+| FR-2 | **Heartbeat protocol v1** (see below); `dogfood-agent.py` implements the responder. `fleet ps` issues probes (or reads last-seen) and reports health per FR-1.                                                                                                                                                 |
+| FR-3 | `mosaic agent watch <name>` opens a **read-only** view of the pane (grouped session or `tmux attach -r`) that cannot send keystrokes and does not shrink the agent's window.                                                                                                                                   |
+| FR-4 | `mosaic agent attach <name>` remains the **explicit** interactive-takeover path (separate verb, documented as the only one that can type).                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| FR-5 | `mosaic agent send <name> --verify` confirms the message was **accepted** (not left as an unsubmitted draft) and returns non-zero if delivery cannot be verified.                                                                                                                                              |
+| FR-6 | All structured output (`--json`) includes `tenant_id` and `host` fields.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

 ## Heartbeat protocol v1

- **Probe:** operator/fleet ps writes a sentinel line to the agent's input or a
-  well-known per-agent heartbeat file path ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/<agent>.hb.
- **Response:** the runtime updates <agent>.hb with ts=<iso8601> pid=<pid> status=<ok|busy>
+- **Probe:** operator/`fleet ps` writes a sentinel line to the agent's input or a
+  well-known per-agent heartbeat file path `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/<agent>.hb`.
+- **Response:** the runtime updates `<agent>.hb` with `ts=<iso8601> pid=<pid> status=<ok|busy>`
  on a fixed interval (default 15s) and on demand when probed.
- **Health rule:** `healthy` if now - ts <= 3 × interval; else `stale`; missing file = `unknown`.
+- **Health rule:** `healthy` if `now - ts <= 3 × interval`; else `stale`; missing file = `unknown`.
 - **Contract:** every runtime (dogfood stub now; claude/codex/pi/opencode in Phase 3)
  MUST emit the heartbeat. The protocol is file-based so it works for headless stubs and
  full-screen TUIs alike (no `capture-pane` dependency).
@@ -56,15 +56,15 @@ observability and no safe way to watch a session.

 ## Acceptance criteria

- mosaic fleet ps shows all 5 live sessions on `mosaic-fleet` with correct
+- `mosaic fleet ps` shows all 5 live sessions on `mosaic-fleet` with correct
  pane/pid/idle and flags the dogfood **drift** (`canary-pi` runtime=pi but pane runs
  `dogfood-agent.py`) and the **boot-enable** gap (active but disabled).
 - Killing one agent's pane flips its row to dead/stale within one `interval`.
- agent watch shows live output and provably cannot type into the pane; detaching
+- `agent watch` shows live output and provably cannot type into the pane; detaching
  leaves the agent's window size unchanged.
- agent send --verify returns success on an accepting pane and non-zero on a wedged/draft pane.
- Quality gates green: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm format:check, plus
-  pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test.
+- `agent send --verify` returns success on an accepting pane and non-zero on a wedged/draft pane.
+- Quality gates green: `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm format:check`, plus
+  `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test`.
 - Independent review passed; dogfood evidence captured against the live fleet.

 ## Test plan
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@ observability and no safe way to watch a session.
 - Unit/CLI specs in `packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.spec.ts` (and a new
  `fleet-ps`/`watch`/`send-verify` spec) using the injected `CommandRunner` to assert
  exact tmux/systemd command construction and JSON shape (tenant+host present).
- Situational: run against the live `mosaic-fleet` fleet; capture fleet ps output,
-  a kill-and-detect cycle, a read-only `watch`, and a send --verify pass/fail pair.
+- Situational: run against the live `mosaic-fleet` fleet; capture `fleet ps` output,
+  a kill-and-detect cycle, a read-only `watch`, and a `send --verify` pass/fail pair.

 ## Known limitations

- **Verify heuristic is best-effort:** agent send --verify uses a > -prefix draft
+- **Verify heuristic is best-effort:** `agent send --verify` uses a `>` -prefix draft
  heuristic that is specific to pi/claude TUIs. Draft detection for codex and opencode
  TUIs is best-effort only; those runtimes may not use the same input-line indicator.
 - **Pane-change check is the best Phase-2 signal; verify now polls up to a bounded
-  timeout:** agent send --verify captures a BEFORE snapshot, sends the message, then
+  timeout:** `agent send --verify` captures a BEFORE snapshot, sends the message, then
  polls `capture-pane` every ~400 ms up to a configurable total timeout (default ~6 s,
-  controlled by --verify-timeout <ms>). On each poll it runs classifySendResult: if
+  controlled by `--verify-timeout <ms>`). On each poll it runs classifySendResult: if
  the pane shows 'accepted' or 'draft' the loop exits immediately; while the result is
  'unverifiable' (no pane change yet) it keeps polling. After the timeout with no
  definitive result, it fails closed: exit 1 with "no pane change after send". This
@@ -92,15 +92,15 @@ observability and no safe way to watch a session.
  requires a runtime acknowledgement (Phase-3 heartbeat-ack); the bounded pane-change
  poll is the best signal available against an opaque TUI for Phase-2.
 - **Blank AFTER capture fails closed:** Full-screen TUIs (claude, codex, opencode, pi)
-  render blank for tmux capture-pane. When the AFTER snapshot is empty, send --verify
+  render blank for `tmux capture-pane`. When the AFTER snapshot is empty, `send --verify`
  returns non-zero with an "unverifiable" message rather than silently succeeding. This
  is an intentional fail-closed design (FR-5).
- **agent watch uses a grouped viewer session:** tmux attach -r directly against the
-  agent session lets the viewer terminal shrink the agent's window. agent watch instead
-  creates a throwaway grouped session (tmux new-session -d -t '=<agent>' -s
-  '<agent>-watch-<pid>'), attaches read-only to that session, and kills it on detach.
+- **`agent watch` uses a grouped viewer session:** `tmux attach -r` directly against the
+  agent session lets the viewer terminal shrink the agent's window. `agent watch` instead
+  creates a throwaway grouped session (`tmux new-session -d -t '=<agent>' -s
+'<agent>-watch-<pid>'`), attaches read-only to that session, and kills it on detach.
  The grouped session shares the agent's windows but has independent sizing, so the
-  agent's window is never affected. tmux attach is still interactive and requires
+  agent's window is never affected. `tmux attach` is still interactive and requires
  inherited stdio; the `interactiveRunner` handles TTY passthrough.

 ## Surfaces & parity (MVP-X1)
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# Fleet Configuration Management
-
-This book documents the local roster-v2 desired-state control plane delivered under issue #758. The normative requirements are the [FCM section of the repository PRD](../PRD.md#fleet-declarative-configuration-management-workstream-fcm-758), not the older fleet-suite or observability planning pages.
-
-## Authority boundary
-
-<MOSAIC_HOME>/fleet/roster.yaml is the sole writable desired-state authority for local fleet membership, launch policy, and persisted lifecycle. Generated environment files, systemd enablement, tmux sessions, heartbeat files, and status output are derived or observed. Rebuild projections from the roster; never edit them as desired state.
-
-This control plane is local tmux/systemd only. Remote/SSH entries and connectors are inventory, not reconciliation targets. Arbitrary commands, channels, secret references, gateway catalog convergence, and UI configuration storage are outside this workstream. `mos-comms` is temporary transport glue, not permanent fleet architecture.
-
-## Choose the right workflow
-
-1. **Need to inspect intent?** Read the roster and use mosaic fleet get; see [desired versus observed state](concepts/desired-vs-observed-state.md).
-2. **Need to inspect reality?** Use `status` or `doctor`; use `verify` for a strict non-zero drift/ownership gate. These commands do not repair anything.
-3. **Need to change membership or persisted policy?** Use generation-guarded `plan`, `create`, `update`, or `delete`; see [safe CRUD](how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md).
-4. **Need a one-time runtime action?** Use `start`, `stop`, or `restart`. These do not change persisted desired state.
-5. **Need convergence?** Review apply --dry-run, resolve blockers, then use `apply` with the same current generation; see [reconcile and recover](operations/reconcile-and-recover.md).
-6. **Need v1 migration evidence?** Use preview only. Cutover, canary, and rollback remain held for FCM-M4-002.
-7. **Need the gateway-backed agent catalog?** That is the separate mosaic agent surface, not local fleet desired state.
-
-## Concepts
-
- [Desired versus observed state](concepts/desired-vs-observed-state.md)
- [Identity, class, runtime, provider, and model](concepts/identity-class-runtime.md)
- [Role authority and leases](concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md)
- [Generated environment launch chain](concepts/generated-env-launch-chain.md)
-
-## Operator how-to
-
- [Create, inspect, update, and delete](how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md)
- [Start, stop, restart, and reconcile](how-to/start-stop-restart.md)
- [Configure an interaction instance](how-to/configure-tess-interaction.md)
- [Configure a validator instance](how-to/configure-ultron-validator.md)
- [Customize roles](how-to/customize-roles.md)
-
-## Operations and recovery
-
- [Reconcile and recover](operations/reconcile-and-recover.md)
- [Environment quarantine](operations/env-quarantine.md)
- [Systemd/tmux troubleshooting](operations/systemd-tmux-troubleshooting.md)
- [Backup and restore boundary](operations/backup-restore.md)
- [Upgrade and asset-drift hold](operations/upgrade-assets.md)
-
-## Reference and migration
-
- [Roster v2 fields](reference/roster-v2-fields.md) · [executable JSON Schema](reference/roster-v2.schema.json) · [validated example](examples/roster-v2.yaml)
- [CLI and exit codes](reference/cli.md)
- [Role classes](reference/role-classes.md)
- [Lifecycle transitions](reference/lifecycle-transitions.md)
- [Status and drift](reference/status-and-drift.md)
- [Generated environment boundary](reference/generated-env-boundary.md)
- [v1-to-v2 preview](migration/v1-to-v2.md)
- [Example/profile dispositions](migration/example-profile-disposition.md)
- [Legacy class aliases](migration/legacy-class-aliases.md)
-
-## Acceptance evidence and holds
-
- [M0/M5 IA checklist](FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md)
- [Legacy example/profile inventory](LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md)
- [M5 closure evidence](../reports/documentation/758-fleet-config-ia-closure.md)
- [Approved-existing deferrals and live-action holds](../reports/deferred/758-fleet-config-deferrals.md)
-
-The canonical publishing source remains this repository. This card does not publish externally, run a migration, operate a live fleet, or close parent issue #758.
@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@
 > Mission: `mvp-20260312` · PRD: [docs/fleet/PRD.md](./PRD.md) · North star: [docs/fleet/north-star.md](./north-star.md)
 > Status: `not-started` | `in-progress` | `done` | `blocked` | `failed`

-| id            | status      | description                                                                                                      | depends_on            | agent       | pr  | notes                                                                                                                       |
-| ------------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------- | ----------- | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| FLEET-OBS-000 | done        | Plan: north-star + Phase-2 PRD + workstream scaffolding                                                          | —                     | lead        | —   | persisted 2026-06-20 on `feat/fleet-observability`                                                                          |
-| FLEET-OBS-001 | done        | Heartbeat protocol v1 spec finalized in PRD + framework doc                                                      | FLEET-OBS-000         | lead        | —   | file-based ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/<agent>.hb; spec in PRD                                                               |
-| FLEET-OBS-002 | in-progress | Implement heartbeat responder in `dogfood-agent.py`                                                              | FLEET-OBS-001         | fleet-coder | —   | dispatched to ad-hoc mosaic yolo fleet agent (dogfood)                                                                      |
-| FLEET-OBS-003 | done        | mosaic fleet ps — join systemd+tmux+proc+idle+heartbeat; tenant+host tagged; drift + boot-enable flags; `--json` | FLEET-OBS-001         | worker      | —   | commit ab47831; LIVE-verified on mosaic-fleet; caught canary-pi DRIFT + BOOT-ENABLE. Polish: idleSeconds parse returns null |
-| FLEET-OBS-004 | done        | mosaic agent watch <name> — read-only join (no resize, no keystrokes)                                            | FLEET-OBS-000         | worker      | —   | attach -r; verb wired                                                                                                       |
-| FLEET-OBS-005 | done        | mosaic agent send --verify — delivery/acceptance receipt                                                         | FLEET-OBS-000         | worker      | —   | --verify flag; draft-heuristic verify                                                                                       |
-| FLEET-OBS-006 | done        | CLI specs for ps/watch/send-verify (tenant+host shape, command construction)                                     | FLEET-OBS-003,004,005 | worker      | —   | 62 tests green (31 new); re-verified by lead                                                                                |
-| FLEET-OBS-007 | not-started | Framework doc: fleet observability guide + verbs                                                                 | FLEET-OBS-003,004,005 | lead        | —   | `docs/guides/` or `framework/tools/.../README`                                                                              |
-| FLEET-OBS-008 | not-started | Independent review + dogfood verification on live fleet                                                          | FLEET-OBS-002..007    | reviewer    | —   | author ≠ reviewer; capture evidence in scratchpad                                                                           |
-| FLEET-OBS-009 | not-started | Open PR → green CI (queue guard) → squash-merge → close `fleet-observability-1`                                  | FLEET-OBS-008         | lead        | —   | trunk merge; no direct push to main                                                                                         |
+| id            | status      | description                                                                                                        | depends_on            | agent       | pr  | notes                                                                                                                       |
+| ------------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------- | ----------- | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FLEET-OBS-000 | done        | Plan: north-star + Phase-2 PRD + workstream scaffolding                                                            | —                     | lead        | —   | persisted 2026-06-20 on `feat/fleet-observability`                                                                          |
+| FLEET-OBS-001 | done        | Heartbeat protocol v1 spec finalized in PRD + framework doc                                                        | FLEET-OBS-000         | lead        | —   | file-based `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/<agent>.hb`; spec in PRD                                                             |
+| FLEET-OBS-002 | in-progress | Implement heartbeat responder in `dogfood-agent.py`                                                                | FLEET-OBS-001         | fleet-coder | —   | dispatched to ad-hoc `mosaic yolo` fleet agent (dogfood)                                                                    |
+| FLEET-OBS-003 | done        | `mosaic fleet ps` — join systemd+tmux+proc+idle+heartbeat; tenant+host tagged; drift + boot-enable flags; `--json` | FLEET-OBS-001         | worker      | —   | commit ab47831; LIVE-verified on mosaic-fleet; caught canary-pi DRIFT + BOOT-ENABLE. Polish: idleSeconds parse returns null |
+| FLEET-OBS-004 | done        | `mosaic agent watch <name>` — read-only join (no resize, no keystrokes)                                            | FLEET-OBS-000         | worker      | —   | `attach -r`; verb wired                                                                                                     |
+| FLEET-OBS-005 | done        | `mosaic agent send --verify` — delivery/acceptance receipt                                                         | FLEET-OBS-000         | worker      | —   | --verify flag; draft-heuristic verify                                                                                       |
+| FLEET-OBS-006 | done        | CLI specs for ps/watch/send-verify (tenant+host shape, command construction)                                       | FLEET-OBS-003,004,005 | worker      | —   | 62 tests green (31 new); re-verified by lead                                                                                |
+| FLEET-OBS-007 | not-started | Framework doc: fleet observability guide + verbs                                                                   | FLEET-OBS-003,004,005 | lead        | —   | `docs/guides/` or `framework/tools/.../README`                                                                              |
+| FLEET-OBS-008 | not-started | Independent review + dogfood verification on live fleet                                                            | FLEET-OBS-002..007    | reviewer    | —   | author ≠ reviewer; capture evidence in scratchpad                                                                           |
+| FLEET-OBS-009 | not-started | Open PR → green CI (queue guard) → squash-merge → close `fleet-observability-1`                                    | FLEET-OBS-008         | lead        | —   | trunk merge; no direct push to main                                                                                         |

 ## Proposed MVP rollup row (for the MVP orchestrator — not written by this workstream)

-```text-table
+```
 | W-FLEET | in-progress | Fleet (agent-session execution layer) | Phase 2/5 | docs/fleet/TASKS.md | observability dogfooded on live stub fleet; control plane rides federation (W1) |
 ```
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@

 The **backlog** is Mosaic's native backlog-of-record for fleet work. It is built
 end-to-end on Mosaic's own storage layer (`@mosaicstack/db`, drizzle/Postgres)
-and surfaced as mosaic fleet backlog <sub> --json.
+and surfaced as `mosaic fleet backlog <sub> --json`.

 > **Mosaic-native, no Hermes.** This backlog REPLACES the former Hermes adapter.
-> There is **no** runtime dependency on Hermes, hermes kanban, or ~/.hermes
+> There is **no** runtime dependency on Hermes, `hermes kanban`, or `~/.hermes`
 > anywhere in this feature. Anything previously delegated to Hermes is recreated
 > here on Mosaic's own Postgres storage layer.

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ engine (no sqlite, no raw client).
 | ---------------------------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `DATABASE_URL` injected at runtime | Full server Postgres | the verified runtime database; it never authorizes migration/DDL |
 | `PGLITE_DATA_DIR` set (no URL)     | Embedded PGlite      | that directory                                                   |
-| neither (default)                  | Embedded PGlite      | ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/backlog                                   |
+| neither (default)                  | Embedded PGlite      | `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/backlog`                                 |

 PGlite is real Postgres semantics in-process — including the row locks the atomic
 claim relies on — so the **same code** runs on a laptop (embedded, single-host
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ For embedded PGlite only, the local backlog routine may prepare its local schema

 ### Update safety

-The embedded PGlite store lives under ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/backlog, which is
+The embedded PGlite store lives under `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/backlog`, which is
 listed in `PRESERVE_PATHS` in `packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh`. This means
-mosaic update (which runs the framework sync with rsync --delete) will **not**
+`mosaic update` (which runs the framework sync with `rsync --delete`) will **not**
 wipe the operator's backlog — same protection as the roster, per-agent env, and
 heartbeat run dir.

@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ A card is one row in the `backlog` table:
 | `phase`             | text (nullable)     | Board/phase grouping (see below).                             |
 | `priority`          | int (default 0)     | **Higher = sooner.** Claim picks the max-priority ready card. |
 | `status`            | enum                | `ready` \| `claimed` \| `blocked` \| `done`.                  |
-| `depends_on`        | jsonb string[]      | DAG edges — ids of cards this one depends on.                 |
+| `depends_on`        | jsonb `string[]`    | DAG edges — ids of cards this one depends on.                 |
 | `claim_owner`       | text (nullable)     | Owner token of the active claim.                              |
 | `claim_ttl_seconds` | int (nullable)      | TTL of the active claim.                                      |
-| `claimed_at`        | timestamptz (null)  | When the claim was taken. claimed_at + ttl = expiry.          |
+| `claimed_at`        | timestamptz (null)  | When the claim was taken. `claimed_at + ttl` = expiry.        |
 | `attempts`          | int (default 0)     | Incremented each time the card is claimed.                    |
 | `idempotency_key`   | text (unique, null) | Dedups `create`; NULLs are distinct in Postgres.              |
 | `acceptance`        | jsonb (nullable)    | Acceptance criteria (array of strings or object).             |
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ would add ceremony without benefit.
 ### Board / phase convention

 `phase` is a free-form grouping string used as the board column / milestone label
-(e.g. `M1`, `fleet`, `infra`). list --phase <phase> filters to one board lane.
+(e.g. `M1`, `fleet`, `infra`). `list --phase <phase>` filters to one board lane.
 `priority` orders cards **within** the ready pool regardless of phase.

 ## Status lifecycle

-```text-diagram
+```
            create
              │
              ▼
@@ -87,49 +87,51 @@ would add ceremony without benefit.
 - **blocked** — explicitly parked; never auto-claimed.
 - **done** — completed; satisfies dependents.

-## Atomic claim (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED) + TTL
+## Atomic claim (`FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`) + TTL

 `claim` is atomic. Inside a single transaction it locks candidate `ready` rows
-with SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED (via the drizzle `sql` operator), picks
+with `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` (via the drizzle `sql` operator), picks
 the highest-priority deps-satisfied card, and flips it to `claimed`. Because a row
 already locked by a concurrent claimer is **skipped**, two claimers can **never**
 both win the same card — the loser falls through to the next candidate or gets
 `null`. (Proven by the concurrency tests in `packages/db/src/backlog.spec.ts`.)

 - **Deps gate:** a card is only claimable when every id in `depends_on` is `done`.
- **TTL:** claim --ttl <sec> (default **900s**) records `claim_ttl_seconds`.
- **reclaim:** releases claims whose claimed_at + ttl is in the past (expired)
-  back to `ready`, clearing the claim fields. reclaim --id <id> force-releases a
+- **TTL:** `claim --ttl <sec>` (default **900s**) records `claim_ttl_seconds`.
+- **reclaim:** releases claims whose `claimed_at + ttl` is in the past (expired)
+  back to `ready`, clearing the claim fields. `reclaim --id <id>` force-releases a
  specific card regardless of expiry. This is how a crashed worker's card returns
  to the pool.

-## CLI — mosaic fleet backlog <sub> --json
+## CLI — `mosaic fleet backlog <sub> --json`

 All subcommands support `--json`.

-| Subcommand                                                                                  | Purpose                                                                                   |
-| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| create --id --title [--body --phase --priority --depends-on --acceptance --idempotency-key] | Create a card; `idempotency_key` dedups (repeat returns the existing card).               |
-| list [--status --phase --ready-only]                                                        | List cards. `--ready-only` = status `ready` AND all deps `done`.                          |
-| claim --owner [--ttl <sec> --id <id>]                                                       | Atomically claim the highest-priority ready card (or `--id`). Returns the card or `null`. |
-| reclaim [--id <id>]                                                                         | Release expired claims (or a specific card) back to `ready`.                              |
-| link --from --to                                                                            | Add a `depends_on` edge (`--from` depends on `--to`).                                     |
-| `stats`                                                                                     | Counts by status, oldest-ready age, expired-claim count.                                  |
-| block --id                                                                                  | Set a card to `blocked`.                                                                  |
-| complete --id                                                                               | Set a card to `done` (releases any claim).                                                |
+| Subcommand                                                                                    | Purpose                                                                                   |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `create --id --title [--body --phase --priority --depends-on --acceptance --idempotency-key]` | Create a card; `idempotency_key` dedups (repeat returns the existing card).               |
+| `list [--status --phase --ready-only]`                                                        | List cards. `--ready-only` = status `ready` AND all deps `done`.                          |
+| `claim --owner [--ttl <sec> --id <id>]`                                                       | Atomically claim the highest-priority ready card (or `--id`). Returns the card or `null`. |
+| `reclaim [--id <id>]`                                                                         | Release expired claims (or a specific card) back to `ready`.                              |
+| `link --from --to`                                                                            | Add a `depends_on` edge (`--from` depends on `--to`).                                     |
+| `stats`                                                                                       | Counts by status, oldest-ready age, expired-claim count.                                  |
+| `block --id`                                                                                  | Set a card to `blocked`.                                                                  |
+| `complete --id`                                                                               | Set a card to `done` (releases any claim).                                                |

 ### Example

-Seed two cards; the second depends on the first. Because A2 is gated on A1, claim returns A1 first. Finish A1, then list A2 as ready. Recover stalled work.
-
-```fleet-command
+```sh
+# Seed two cards, the second depends on the first.
 mosaic fleet backlog create --id A1 --title "schema" --priority 5
 mosaic fleet backlog create --id A2 --title "service" --depends-on A1 --priority 9

+# A2 is gated on A1, so claim returns A1 first.
 mosaic fleet backlog claim --owner worker-1 --ttl 600 --json

+# Finish A1; now A2 is ready.
 mosaic fleet backlog complete --id A1
 mosaic fleet backlog list --ready-only --json

+# Recover stalled work.
 mosaic fleet backlog reclaim --json
 ```
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Desired, Derived, and Observed Fleet State
-
-## One writable authority
-
-The canonical local v2 roster at <MOSAIC_HOME>/fleet/roster.yaml is desired state. Membership, stable identity, class, runtime/provider/model selection, launch policy, enablement, and persisted `running`/`stopped` intent are written only through generation-guarded roster mutations.
-
-Derived projections are reproducible consequences of that authority:
-
- <name>.env.generated;
- exact roster-named tmux sessions on the configured socket after reconciliation;
- systemd service targets managed by installation/reconciliation.
-
-Current systemd unit enablement is not yet lifecycle-conformant at boot: installation can enable every
-agent unit, and the launcher projection does not carry `enabled` or `desired_state`. Therefore reboot
-preservation for stopped/disabled agents remains an FCM-M3-002 acceptance hold, not a guaranteed
-projection behavior.
-
-Observed evidence available to current roster-v2 status commands includes systemd active state, tmux
-presence, holder ownership, and unmanaged sessions. Heartbeat files are observational in the wider fleet,
-but roster-v2 `status`, `doctor`, and `verify` do not currently read them. Observation never writes back
-to the roster.
-
-## Generation and ownership
-
-`generation` is a positive integer concurrency fence. A mutating request must provide the current value. Successful changed CRUD increments it exactly once; stale or concurrent writers fail before mutation. Apply/reconcile rereads the canonical roster under a private exclusive lock and uses only that generation and content for effects.
-
-Ownership is exact, never fuzzy. Reconciliation is limited to roster names, the configured socket, the exact holder session, a private installation identity, and private managed paths. An ownership mismatch, unmanaged session, unsafe path, stale generation, or ambiguous lock fails closed.
-
-## Drift decisions
-
-| Observation                              | Interpretation           | Safe response                                                          |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Generated file differs or is missing     | Derived projection drift | Review apply --dry-run; regenerate from the roster.                    |
-| Desired `running`, exact session missing | `missing-session`        | Diagnose ownership/runtime, then reconcile if safe.                    |
-| Desired `stopped`, exact session present | `unexpected-session`     | Inspect; reconciliation may stop only the proven roster target.        |
-| Disabled agent running                   | `disabled-running`       | Inspect; disabled state wins during explicit safe reconciliation.      |
-| Unknown session on the configured socket | Unmanaged state          | Report only. Do not adopt, rename, or kill it.                         |
-| Heartbeat stale in the wider fleet       | Liveness evidence        | Diagnose separately; current roster-v2 status does not read heartbeat. |
-
-`status` and `doctor` classify. `verify` is also observational but exits non-zero when ownership, drift, or unmanaged-state checks fail. `plan`/apply --dry-run validates proposed projection and lifecycle work without mutation. `apply` and `reconcile` converge only after all preconditions pass.
-
-A partial projection failure does not roll the roster back. Treat the committed roster as authority and regenerate. A lifecycle failure after projection completion preserves both roster and projections for inspection. Sensitive legacy values are never printed; diagnostics are bounded to stable codes, key names where applicable, and hashes.
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# Generated Environment Launch Chain
-
-The launcher consumes validated data, not shell configuration.
-
-1. Read and validate the canonical roster.
-2. Render deterministic <name>.env.generated data from that roster.
-3. Parse optional <name>.env.local through a strict allowlist.
-4. Reject generated-key shadowing, unknown or sensitive-looking keys, unsafe paths/values, duplicates, malformed lines, shell syntax, and command overrides.
-5. Derive the runtime command from validated runtime/model/reasoning data.
-6. Target only the exact configured tmux socket and roster session after ownership checks.
-
-## File precedence and ownership
-
-| File              | Owner                    | Use                                                                         |
-| ----------------- | ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `.env.generated`  | Mosaic projection writer | Complete deterministic roster projection. Rebuild; do not edit.             |
-| `.env.local`      | Operator                 | Optional, private, strict machine-local data. Cannot shadow generated keys. |
-| `.env`            | Legacy input             | One-time migration input only; never launch authority.                      |
-| `.env.quarantine` | Private quarantine       | Retained unsafe legacy evidence; never loaded by the launcher.              |
-
-Neither systemd nor the launcher sources these files. No `eval`, shell expansion, arbitrary `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, channel, or secret-reference compatibility path exists. Safe legacy generated keys are regenerated, allowed local keys are relocated, and unsafe material is quarantined.
-
-Diagnostics never expose the rejected value, credential material, or command text. They are bounded to stable rule code, key name where safe, and SHA-256 content identity. See [generated environment reference](../reference/generated-env-boundary.md) and [quarantine operations](../operations/env-quarantine.md).
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Fleet Identity, Class, and Runtime
-
-Each roster field has one job. Do not use names or model strings as authority shortcuts.
-
-| Concern                 | Field                         | Contract                                                                                     |
-| ----------------------- | ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Stable machine identity | agents[].name                 | Unique, immutable mutation target and exact service/session name.                            |
-| Display identity        | agents[].alias                | Human-facing label only; may be changed and grants no authority.                             |
-| Behavioral contract     | agents[].class                | Resolves through the shared baseline plus `roles.local` persona library.                     |
-| Tool boundary           | agents[].tool_policy          | Must match protected canonical classes; cannot independently grant authority.                |
-| Harness                 | agents[].runtime              | One of `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, or `pi`, declared in `runtimes`.                       |
-| Backend selection       | agents[].provider and `model` | Explicit non-empty data; capability validity is not inferred from the display name or class. |
-| Effort                  | agents[].reasoning            | `low`, `medium`, or `high`.                                                                  |
-| Local placement         | `working_directory`           | Explicit safe local work path; not remote placement authority.                               |
-
-Tess and Ultron are conventional instance/display names only. They are not products, required machine identities, role aliases, or authority-bearing classes. A configurable interaction instance uses class: interaction; a configurable validation instance uses class: validator. Any stable name and alias satisfying the structural contract may be used.
-
-Class aliases are deliberately narrow: implementer → code, reviewer → review, and operator-interaction → interaction. No runtime, provider, model, persona prose, or instance name changes this mapping. See [role classes](../reference/role-classes.md) and the [validated generic example](../examples/roster-v2.yaml).
-
-Roster v2 is local-only. It contains no host/SSH placement, connector, channel, secret-reference, arbitrary-command, per-agent socket, or gateway mapping fields. Those concerns require separate requirements and threat models.
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Fleet Role Authority and Leases
-
-Role content describes behavior; protected authority is immutable code metadata derived only from the canonical class.
-
-## Required workstream classes
-
-`code`, `review`, `validator`, `orchestrator`, `team-leader`, `enhancer`, and `interaction` are required FCM classes. `merge-gate` is additionally protected because it remains the sole approve-to-land and merge authority.
-
-| Class                                        | Authority                                         | Boundary                                                                               |
-| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `merge-gate`                                 | Approve-to-land and merge                         | Sole merge authority.                                                                  |
-| `validator`                                  | Issue independent validation evidence/certificate | Never approves landing or merges.                                                      |
-| `orchestrator`                               | Orchestrate topology and issue bounded leases     | Does not gain merge authority.                                                         |
-| `team-leader`                                | Use explicitly leased capacity                    | Cannot issue leases or mutate roster, credentials, topology authority, or merge state. |
-| `interaction`                                | Receive requests and report status                | Cannot orchestrate, issue leases, mutate configuration, or merge.                      |
-| `code`, `review`, `enhancer`, custom classes | No protected authority by default                 | Persona prose cannot grant protected powers.                                           |
-
-A lease is capacity authorization from an orchestrator, not ownership. It must identify a bounded task or period and does not alter the leased agent's roster identity, role contract, credentials, authority, or persisted lifecycle. Expiry/revocation returns capacity; it does not rewrite the roster.
-
-Semantic validation rejects protected class/tool-policy mismatch in either direction. An instance named Ultron with class: validator remains validation-only. An instance named Tess with class: interaction remains request/status-only. Renaming either instance changes no authority.
-
-For resolver layering and safe customization, see [role classes](../reference/role-classes.md) and [customize roles](../how-to/customize-roles.md).
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-version: 2
-generation: 1
-transport: tmux
-tmux:
-  socket_name: mosaic-fleet
-  holder_session: _holder
-defaults:
-  working_directory: ~/src
-  runtime: pi
-runtimes:
-  pi:
-    reset_command: /new
-agents:
-  - name: code-example
-    alias: Code Example
-    class: code
-    runtime: pi
-    provider: example-provider
-    model: example-model
-    reasoning: medium
-    tool_policy: code
-    working_directory: ~/src
-    persistent_persona: false
-    reset_between_tasks: true
-    lifecycle:
-      enabled: true
-      desired_state: stopped
-    launch:
-      yolo: false
-  - name: interaction-example
-    alias: Interaction Example
-    class: interaction
-    runtime: pi
-    provider: example-provider
-    model: example-model
-    reasoning: low
-    tool_policy: interaction
-    working_directory: ~/src
-    persistent_persona: true
-    reset_between_tasks: false
-    lifecycle:
-      enabled: true
-      desired_state: stopped
-    launch:
-      yolo: false
-  - name: validator-example
-    alias: Validator Example
-    class: validator
-    runtime: pi
-    provider: example-provider
-    model: example-model
-    reasoning: high
-    tool_policy: validator
-    working_directory: ~/src
-    persistent_persona: false
-    reset_between_tasks: true
-    lifecycle:
-      enabled: true
-      desired_state: stopped
-    launch:
-      yolo: false
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ core.

 Connectors implement one small, uniform interface (`src/fleet/connectors/types.ts`):

-```typescript
+```ts
 interface OrchestratorConnector {
  readonly kind: 'tmux' | 'discord' | 'matrix';
  send(message: OutboundMessage): Promise<SendResult>; // orchestrator → human
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ interface OrchestratorConnector {
 ```

 - **send / subscribe / health** — the only surface fleet core depends on. `SendResult` is the
-  ack half; health() is the liveness half.
+  ack half; `health()` is the liveness half.
 - **Thread-aware by metadata** — `OutboundMessage.threadId` / `InboundMessage.threadId` are
  optional, so thread-capable connectors (Matrix rooms/threads, the future first-party Mosaic
  Discord plugin) fit **without an interface change**.
- **Registry** (`registry.ts`) — implementations register a factory by kind; createConnector(config)
+- **Registry** (`registry.ts`) — implementations register a factory by kind; `createConnector(config)`
  resolves one from roster config. Phase 1 ships the registry + `resolveConnectorKind` (defaults
  `tmux` when a roster declares no connector — **back-compat**); the factories land in Phase 2.

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ A roster may carry an optional `connector` block (`roster.schema.json`); absent

 ```yaml
 connector:
-  kind: matrix
+  kind: matrix # tmux | discord | matrix
  matrix:
    homeserver_url: https://matrix.example.internal
    user_id: '@mos:example.internal'
@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ reject a token committed to a shipped file anyway.
 The connector speaks the **Matrix client-server API** directly over HTTPS (`fetch` — no SDK needed
 for MVP), so it is **homeserver-agnostic**:

-| Op          | Matrix CS-API                                                           |
-| ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `send`      | PUT /\_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{roomId}/send/m.room.message/{txnId}      |
-| `subscribe` | GET /\_matrix/client/v3/sync (long-poll, `since` token) → room timeline |
-| `health`    | GET /\_matrix/client/versions (reachable) + …/account/whoami (authed)   |
-| threads     | `m.thread` relations ↔ `threadId`                                       |
+| Op          | Matrix CS-API                                                            |
+| ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `send`      | `PUT /_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{roomId}/send/m.room.message/{txnId}`      |
+| `subscribe` | `GET /_matrix/client/v3/sync` (long-poll, `since` token) → room timeline |
+| `health`    | `GET /_matrix/client/versions` (reachable) + `…/account/whoami` (authed) |
+| threads     | `m.thread` relations ↔ `threadId`                                        |

 ## Local homeserver (infra, not connector code)

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ homeserver choice is a **deployment** concern (a Phase-2 deploy guide), not conn
 | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- |
 | **1** | Connector interface + types, registry + kind resolution, roster `connector` schema, doc | ✅ yes  |
 | 2     | Matrix CS-API client (fetch-based send/sync/health) + registered factory + tests        | follow  |
-| 2     | fleet init / `configure` connector-selection UX; roster parse wires the block           | follow  |
+| 2     | `fleet init` / `configure` connector-selection UX; roster parse wires the block         | follow  |
 | 2     | systemd launch wiring so the orchestrator starts on the chosen connector                | follow  |
 | 3     | Conduit deploy guide; first-party Mosaic Discord (threads) registers as a connector     | follow  |

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Configure an Interaction Instance
-
-An interaction instance is a configurable local roster member with canonical class: interaction and matching tool_policy: interaction. “Tess” may be used as a display alias, but neither that alias nor the stable name is required or authority-bearing.
-
-Use the [validated generic roster](../examples/roster-v2.yaml) as the safe shape. Choose a unique stable `name`, any descriptive `alias`, a supported declared runtime, explicit provider/model/reasoning, and a safe work directory. Start with:
-
-```yaml
-name: interaction-example
-alias: Interaction Example
-class: interaction
-tool_policy: interaction
-lifecycle:
-  enabled: true
-  desired_state: stopped
-```
-
-Plan the complete agent payload with the current roster generation, then create it without `--persisted-start`. Creation defaults to enabled/stopped and performs no runtime action. Review the resulting roster and projection plan before any later lifecycle decision.
-
-The interaction class is request/status only. It cannot orchestrate, issue leases, mutate the roster/configuration, grant credentials, certify validation, approve landing, or merge. Connector and channel configuration are outside roster v2; do not add connector, channel, secret, command, remote-host, or gateway fields.
-
-See [safe CRUD](create-update-delete-agent.md), [identity separation](../concepts/identity-class-runtime.md), and [role authority](../concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md).
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Configure a Validator Instance
-
-A validator instance is a configurable local roster member with canonical class: validator and matching tool_policy: validator. “Ultron” may be used as a display alias, but it is not a required identity, class alias, product name, or source of authority.
-
-Use the [validated generic roster](../examples/roster-v2.yaml) as the safe shape. Choose a unique stable name and explicit supported runtime/provider/model/reasoning values. Start stopped:
-
-```yaml
-name: validator-example
-alias: Validator Example
-class: validator
-tool_policy: validator
-lifecycle:
-  enabled: true
-  desired_state: stopped
-```
-
-Plan the full payload with the current generation and create without `--persisted-start`. Creation writes desired state and projections only; it does not launch a validator.
-
-`validator` may issue independent validation evidence or a certificate. It has no approve-to-land or merge authority. `merge-gate` remains the sole protected merge authority, and changing the validator's name, alias, persona prose, runtime, provider, model, or tool-policy text cannot elevate it.
-
-Certificate consumption and final release evidence remain FCM-M5-002 gates. This page does not create a certificate or authorize merge. See [safe CRUD](create-update-delete-agent.md) and [role authority](../concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md).
@@ -4,20 +4,20 @@ Use the local roster-v2 control plane only. These commands change desired state

 ## Read and plan first

-```fleet-synopsis
+```sh
 mosaic fleet get <name>
 mosaic fleet plan create --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>'
 mosaic fleet plan update <name> --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>'
 mosaic fleet plan delete <name> --expected-generation <n>
 ```

-plan create takes the name from `--agent`. plan update and plan delete require the target name immediately after the operation. A plan is deterministic and side-effect free: it validates the complete proposed roster and projection targets without changing files. Use `--dry-run` on `create`, `update`, or `delete` for the same no-write result.
+`plan create` takes the name from `--agent`. `plan update` and `plan delete` require the target name immediately after the operation. A plan is deterministic and side-effect free: it validates the complete proposed roster and projection targets without changing files. Use `--dry-run` on `create`, `update`, or `delete` for the same no-write result.

-Every successful command prints JSON. `get` returns { "generation", "agent" }; mutation results contain `plan`, `applied`, `authoritativeRoster`, and `projections`.
+Every successful command prints JSON. `get` returns `{ "generation", "agent" }`; mutation results contain `plan`, `applied`, `authoritativeRoster`, and `projections`.

 ## Create safely

-```fleet-command
+```sh
 mosaic fleet create --expected-generation 7 --agent '{
  "name":"coder0",
  "alias":"Coder 0",
@@ -34,20 +34,20 @@ mosaic fleet create --expected-generation 7 --agent '{
 }'
 ```

-Create defaults to enabled: true and desired_state: stopped. It does not start a process. Add `--persisted-start` only to persist desired_state: running; that still does not start a runtime in this M2 command. The JSON payload is an allowlist of the roster-v2 fields shown above plus `launch.yolo`; command, channel, secret-reference, and other unknown keys are rejected rather than ignored. The JSON error exposes only a stable code, never the rejected value.
+Create defaults to `enabled: true` and `desired_state: stopped`. It does not start a process. Add `--persisted-start` only to persist `desired_state: running`; that still does not start a runtime in this M2 command. The JSON payload is an allowlist of the roster-v2 fields shown above plus `launch.yolo`; command, channel, secret-reference, and other unknown keys are rejected rather than ignored. The JSON error exposes only a stable code, never the rejected value.

 ## Update and delete safely

-```fleet-synopsis
-mosaic fleet update <name> --expected-generation <n> --agent '<complete JSON agent payload>'
-mosaic fleet delete <name> --expected-generation <n>
+```sh
+mosaic fleet update coder0 --expected-generation 8 --agent '<complete JSON agent payload>'
+mosaic fleet delete coder0 --expected-generation 9
 ```

 Updates require a complete agent JSON payload and preserve the stable name. Delete removes only the exact roster-owned `coder0.env.generated` projection. It retains `coder0.env.local`, legacy `coder0.env`, `coder0.env.quarantine`, and every unrelated projection. A delete dry-run leaves all of those files byte-identical.

 ## Handle generation conflicts

-Every mutation requires the current authoritative `--expected-generation`. A stale value returns JSON error.code: "stale-generation" with a non-zero exit. Reload with mosaic fleet get <name> or reread the roster, plan again using the returned generation, then retry. A concurrent mutation returns `concurrent-mutation`; do not force or bypass the lock.
+Every mutation requires the current authoritative `--expected-generation`. A stale value returns JSON `error.code: "stale-generation"` with a non-zero exit. Reload with `mosaic fleet get <name>` or reread the roster, plan again using the returned generation, then retry. A concurrent mutation returns `concurrent-mutation`; do not force or bypass the lock.

 ## Interpret partial failures

@@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ This is not a rollback and not a no-op: reload the roster because its generation

 Handled validation errors and partial projection failures exit non-zero. `plan`/`--dry-run` and normal mutation JSON make the state explicit; scripts should use both the exit code and `authoritativeRoster`/`projections`, not `applied` alone.

-The commands operate only on <mosaic-home>/fleet/roster.yaml, the local roster desired-state authority. They do not accept arbitrary commands, channels, secrets, remote/connector actions, migration/canary actions, or runtime lifecycle operations.
+The commands operate only on `<mosaic-home>/fleet/roster.yaml`, the local roster desired-state authority. They do not accept arbitrary commands, channels, secrets, remote/connector actions, migration/canary actions, or runtime lifecycle operations.
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@

 Mosaic resolves persona contracts through two layers:

-1. fleet/roles/<canonical-class>.md — seeded baseline contract.
-2. fleet/roles.local/<canonical-class>.md — operator override or custom role; this layer wins.
+1. `fleet/roles/<canonical-class>.md` — seeded baseline contract.
+2. `fleet/roles.local/<canonical-class>.md` — operator override or custom role; this layer wins.

 The same shared resolver is used by profile validation, provisioning, roster-v2 semantic validation,
 and launch-time persona injection.
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@ A custom class remains supported when a readable contract exists for the exact i
 The release-notes role (`class: release-notes`) prepares operator-reviewed release copy.
 ```

-Save it as `fleet/roles.local/release-notes.md`, then reference class: release-notes and a matching
-tool_policy: release-notes in roster v2. Adding only a `LIBRARY.md` row is insufficient.
+Save it as `fleet/roles.local/release-notes.md`, then reference `class: release-notes` and a matching
+`tool_policy: release-notes` in roster v2. Adding only a `LIBRARY.md` row is insufficient.

 Names such as `worker`, `analyst`, and `canary` are not built-in aliases; they need genuine custom
-contracts. agents[].alias, Tess, and Ultron are display names and cannot select a class.
+contracts. `agents[].alias`, Tess, and Ultron are display names and cannot select a class.

 ## Validation and authority boundaries

@@ -2,22 +2,22 @@

 Use the canonical local roster-v2 command surface:

-```fleet-synopsis
+```sh
 mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n> --dry-run
 mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n>
 mosaic fleet reconcile --expected-generation <n>
 mosaic fleet start <name> --expected-generation <n>
 mosaic fleet stop <name> --expected-generation <n>
 mosaic fleet restart <name> --expected-generation <n>
-mosaic fleet status [<name>]
+mosaic fleet status [name]
 mosaic fleet verify
 mosaic fleet doctor
 ```

-Start with `--dry-run`. It validates roster semantics, deterministic projections, private managed paths, exact holder ownership, and named-socket state without changing files or lifecycle state. Explicit `apply` and `reconcile` rebuild derived projections and enforce persisted roster state: enabled `running` agents may start, while stopped or disabled agents are not started. This guarantee does not extend to reboot/service activation yet; boot preservation remains an FCM-M3-002 hold.
+Start with `--dry-run`. It validates roster semantics, deterministic projections, private managed paths, exact holder ownership, and named-socket state without changing files or lifecycle state. `apply` and `reconcile` rebuild derived projections and enforce only persisted roster state: enabled `running` agents may start, while stopped or disabled agents are not started.

-`start`, `stop`, and `restart` are explicit one-shot exact-service actions. They do not persist a lifecycle change. `update` preserves the agent's existing lifecycle, and no delivered operation changes durable lifecycle after creation.
+`start`, `stop`, and `restart` are explicit one-shot exact-service actions. They do not persist a lifecycle change. Roster CRUD is the only way to change persisted desired state.

-Every command prints JSON. Observation commands report drift without mutation; `verify` exits non-zero on ownership mismatch, unmanaged sessions, or drift. A failed apply that wrote some derived projections reports projections: "incomplete" with bounded recovery to regenerate from the roster. A lifecycle failure after projections reports incomplete lifecycle work; it is never represented as a rollback or no-op.
+Every command prints JSON. Observation commands report drift without mutation; `verify` exits non-zero on ownership mismatch, unmanaged sessions, or drift. A failed apply that wrote some derived projections reports `projections: "incomplete"` with bounded recovery to regenerate from the roster. A lifecycle failure after projections reports incomplete lifecycle work; it is never represented as a rollback or no-op.

 These commands are local only. Remote/SSH/connector entries are inventory/validation-only. Commands do not accept arbitrary runtime commands, channels, secrets, generated-file desired state, or arbitrary tmux sockets.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ artifact is added, removed, or left without one of the dispositions below.
 ## Disposition rules

 - **Explicit v1 fixture:** the artifact is loaded through the existing v1 roster parser and must
-  declare version: 1. It remains a compatibility fixture; it is not silently treated as a v2
+  declare `version: 1`. It remains a compatibility fixture; it is not silently treated as a v2
  roster or given inferred aliases.
 - **Canonical profile:** the artifact is loaded through `loadProfiles`, which uses the shared
  baseline-plus-`roles.local` persona resolver and rejects unreadable or unresolved classes.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ rollback; those gates belong to FCM-M4-002. See [v1-to-v2 preview](./v1-to-v2.md

 ## Running the guard

-```fleet-command
+```bash
 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- v1-v2-migration.spec.ts \
  -t "validates all 13 shipped artifacts and executes ready previews for every v1 fixture"
 ```
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ms-lead-reviewer	0643ea392f	docs(#827 ): record probe-3 bounded-repair v12 review	2026-07-19 14:08:50 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	ca7b522e7b	fix(#827 ): bind Probe-3 generation marker to launcher DI	2026-07-19 14:03:52 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	cc3d1ea880	docs(#827 ): record probe-3 bounded-repair v11 review	2026-07-19 13:23:02 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	93a5fd018d	fix(#827 ): add exist_ok=True to probe-3 fixture env mkdir (L709) — bounded repair	2026-07-19 13:15:53 -05:00
mos-orchestratorandHermes Agent	61126c7473	co-attest: probe-3 v10 byte-scope-verify PASS @ce5ba762 (B9 no-site, exact 2-line -S delta) — supersedes `f320d075`	2026-07-18 19:24:54 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	ffc3b573a8	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 no-site §3-review v10 PASS @ce5ba762 Independent Opus SECREV review (ms-secrev-828 lane, dispatched by mosaic-100; Gate-16 author≠reviewer; byte-only; did not build). Reviewed object = `ce5ba76205` harness sha256 = 7e14ead89a7b2a297fcc17e7653291b3bcace1d2002a8f90a989db74f6985b6f Verdict PASS: B9 no-site startup closure — launcher -s -S -B (no -I) :515, broker -I -S -B :554; empirically confirmed site NOT imported (no_site=1) so system-site .pth/sitecustomize cannot run unpinned startup code; -S leaves sys.path[0] intact so launcher sibling import + broker explicit --generation-module import both still bind the pinned helper; delta vs `1c34e3cb` = EXACT 2-line -S only (byte-compared). All priors (B5/B6/B6c/B7/B8/fidelity/traceability/lease_anchor/ live-path/single-broker/--runs/-O-safe) byte-stable. Byte review only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 19:21:48 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	ce5ba76205	fix(827): disable site startup in D4 children	2026-07-18 19:18:59 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	1a09c925d3	evidence-integrity: mark my v9 SECREV PASS SUPERSEDED (homelab 4th-round FAIL @1c34e3cb, -S site-startup closure) False-assurance principle: my v9 PASS (@1c34e3cb) is overtaken by the stricter B9 no-site bar after homelab's 4th-round FAIL (no -S → system-site .pth exec + sitecustomize run unpinned code at child startup). NOT fire-authorization; v10 no-site fix incoming. Authored by ms-secrev-828 reviewer lane (my own artifact). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 19:18:16 -05:00
mos-orchestrator	3d6f556e2b	co-attest: SUPERSEDE v9 `f320d075` — homelab 4th-round FAIL @1c34e3cb (site-startup closure, -S); v10 authorized	2026-07-18 19:16:18 -05:00
mos-orchestratorandHermes Agent	f320d075df	co-attest: probe-3 v9 byte-scope-verify PASS (full-closure + B7 broker-env-iso + B8 bytecode-pinned); supersedes e08ad03/2ae379e	2026-07-18 18:52:57 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	e1c9a4682d	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 launcher-fix §3-review v9 PASS @1c34e3cb (+ mark v8 superseded) Independent Opus SECREV review (ms-secrev-828 lane, dispatched by mosaic-100; Gate-16 author≠reviewer; byte-only; did not build). Reviewed object = `1c34e3cb31` harness sha256 = 29e5c7bfbe1911b52984bd94c79036bb1200ee82588318367b13c2b1053a0103 Verdict PASS: B6(c) remediated — launcher -I dropped -> -s + PYTHONNOUSERSITE=1; empirically verified sys.path[0]=pinned/ so the pinned launcher's bare 'from lease_generation import' binds to pinned/lease_generation.py (broker keeps -I, explicit --generation-module import). B7/B8/B5/B6-rest/fidelity/traceability/ lease_anchor/live-path/single-broker/--runs/ABSENT all intact; -O-safe. Also marked my own v8 FAIL review SUPERSEDED (reviewed `a92ad090` -> fixed by `1c34e3cb`). Byte review only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 18:48:01 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	1c34e3cb31	fix(827): preserve pinned launcher sibling import	2026-07-18 18:42:02 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	e6c3b830fd	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 env+bytecode §3-review v8 FAIL @a92ad090 Independent Opus SECREV review (ms-secrev-828 lane, dispatched by mosaic-100; Gate-16 author≠reviewer; byte-only; did not build). Reviewed object = `a92ad090ae` harness sha256 = 915ebeb5aeab108cb60c5f629c1db520623ab4914eed427ca34ee66f9aa08390 Verdict FAIL: B7 (broker env=allowlist not os.environ + -I) and B8 (PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE + -B both children + __pycache__/.pyc reject fail-closed) land correctly, BUT the -I added to the LAUNCHER command (p3_d4_focused_run.py:512) breaks B6(c): launcher's bare 'from lease_generation import' (@f4008307 launch-runtime.py:15) cannot resolve the pinned helper because -I implies -P (Py 3.11+) which strips the script dir from sys.path — empirically confirmed on Python 3.11.2 (ModuleNotFoundError). Fix: drop -I from the launcher command (keep -B + allow-list env); keep -I on the broker (explicit --generation-module import). Byte review only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 18:38:30 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	a92ad090ae	test(827): isolate pinned runtime bytecode	2026-07-18 18:33:58 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	90dc68a31c	evidence-integrity: mark my v7 SECREV review SUPERSEDED by v8 False-assurance principle: my v7 PASS record (@f609a449) is overtaken by the stricter B7+B8 bar after homelab's 3rd-principal FAIL (broker env-inherit + unpinned .pyc). This v7 PASS is NOT fire-authorization. Authored by the ms-secrev-828 reviewer lane (my own artifact, Gate-16). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 18:33:32 -05:00
mos-orchestrator	2ae379e664	evidence-integrity: mark v7 co-attest SUPERSEDED (homelab FAIL @f609a449, B7+B8 raised)	2026-07-18 18:30:49 -05:00
mos-orchestrator	e08ad03506	Gate0 probe-3 (#827 ): Mos v7 full-closure byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION (distinct identity) — PASS; all 3 closure pins independently recomputed, B5 conjunction + B6 verified in source; supersedes v6 12914d8/b6bd0cd; BYTE-CLEAR only, FIRE gated on homelab 3rd-principal + Jason transparency + Mos GO	2026-07-18 17:58:56 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	2bba933f67	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 full-closure §3-review v7 PASS @f609a449 Independent Opus SECREV review (ms-secrev-828 lane, dispatched by mosaic-100; Gate-16 author≠reviewer; byte-only; did not build). Reviewed object = `f609a44953` harness sha256 = 0f1bd1b39399b32f243d901230e2d840794a2144edd723a095dab716833a7a9b Verdict PASS: B5 full-closure hashed==executed via conjunction (git-object source @f4008307/@23c0caca + fixture-private 0700/0600 O_EXCL no-writable-window + re-hash immediately before each Popen) for launcher e950e422 / helper 06162540 / broker 4db4fef1; B6 one shared pinned lease_generation.py bound to launcher import (sys.path[0]=pinned) AND broker --generation-module; closure import guard complete; BAR1 fwd-contains 66b1e0a0; BAR2 .state stays in fixture root, fidelity untouched; BAR3 carry-over intact; ABSENT sweep 0. Byte-only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 17:51:46 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	f609a44953	test(827): pin full D4 runtime closure	2026-07-18 17:45:47 -05:00
mos-orchestrator	b6bd0cd91c	docs(827): SUPERSEDE Mos co-attest `12914d8` — homelab 3rd-principal FAIL upheld, stricter hashed==executed-full-closure bar; live target=v7 (ii)-materialization	2026-07-18 17:27:05 -05:00
mos-orchestrator	12914d8edd	docs(827): Mos byte-scope-verify CO-ATTESTATION v-final — probe-3 PASS @2d54a9dd Independent provider-byte verify of harness `2d54a9dd` (sha256 15a154df, 27366B) + review-v6 `23c0caca`. VERDICT: byte-scope + mechanism + hygiene PASS. NEW-5 closed via approach (i) [exec-adjacent re-hash, in-place, (ii) reverted]; NEW-6 closed [portable resolve_gated_wi_root, off-by-one gone]; creds-scrub + source-invalid-purge confirmed; all mechanism/assertion/fidelity/isolation invariants byte-stable; R1 boundary held. Committed under distinct mos-orchestrator identity = distinct-identity co-attestation of record (resolves shared ms-lead-reviewer signer gap). Byte-clear ONLY — FIRE still gated on homelab third-principal verify + transparency-to-Jason + explicit Mos FIRE GO.	2026-07-18 17:06:58 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	23c0caca9b	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 NEW5/NEW6 §3-review v6 PASS @2d54a9dd Independent Opus SECREV review (ms-secrev-828 lane, dispatched by mosaic-100; Gate-16 author≠reviewer; byte-only; did not build). Reviewed object = `2d54a9dd14` harness sha256 = 15a154df55273f51301763a984485fd63813f6d1f05d2728abb9fb8b9c040b1a Verdict PASS: NEW-5 approach (i) exact-byte sha256 pin trust anchor + adjacent re-hash immediately before Popen (no interleaved yield) + exec in place at pinned `f4008307` worktree ((ii) copy-to-fixture/PYTHONPATH reverted); NEW-6 portable+validated GATED_WI_ROOT (worktree enumeration, is-inside-work-tree + HEAD==f4008307, off-by-one gone); full v4/v5 carry-over byte-stable, R1 file-backed fidelity unperturbed, ABSENT sweep 0. Byte review only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 16:55:17 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	2d54a9dd14	fix(827): execute pinned launcher in place	2026-07-18 16:51:08 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	6164dc0794	fix(827): harden pinned launcher validation	2026-07-18 16:48:53 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	7ff63cd5c1	fix(827): bind D4 launcher bytes to fixture	2026-07-18 16:46:38 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	49f0cdd15a	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 hygiene §3-review v5 FAIL @7f975b95 Independent Opus §3-conformance/SECREV review (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Reviewed object = `7f975b95ad` harness sha256 = c3a09a342a4b367184d44472ec6fc11f8a3aabb7e90d5a72aa6b7044b1d9b91e Verdict FAIL: hygiene delta (a) creds-scrub + (b) source-invalid-removal landed correctly and (c) byte-stable + (d) absent-sweep-0 hold, BUT homelab NEW-6 (GATED_WI_ROOT off-by-one/non-portable resolution, :32) and NEW-5 (check-then-exec launcher TOCTOU, hash :280/:287 vs exec :514-515) are present in these bytes; both must close for PASS. Byte review only; ran nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 16:41:32 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	7f975b95ad	test(827): scrub D4 fixture credentials	2026-07-18 16:34:36 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	cff21358a2	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 fidelity §3-review v4 PASS @48484938 Independent Opus §3-conformance review (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Reviewed object = `4848493870` harness sha256 = 9095eab7a4ddf11bb92bb5971d49e1facad12f4692ce2081665b0af47cbe5098 Verdict PASS: BAR1 traceability (launcher pinned head+sha256 to WI-3 `f4008307`), BAR2 file-backed generation fidelity (read/bump_runtime_generation on the fixture .state; assert_d4 observes state-file source), BAR3 carry-over (live-path/precondition/isolation/lease_anchor_registered intact), BAR4 b4-1..b4-5 (gated launcher, allow-list env no-escape, --runs==3, whole-launch cleanup, -O-safe derived PASS). Byte review only; ran nothing. FIRE remains separately gated on Mos GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 16:24:17 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	4848493870	test(827): observe file-backed D4 generations	2026-07-18 16:15:50 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewerandClaude Opus 4.8	d19b41a62c	docs(827): Gate0 Probe-3 Class-B §3-review v3 PASS @ace60667 Independent Opus §3-conformance review (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). Reviewed object = `ace6066762` harness sha256 = 2f11c9391c0eef203f26b1206bee8bc4cd106e8c1192399c5e7b71f41a3f6b75 Verdict PASS: (a) live-path gated launcher, (b) fail-closed precondition, (c) fixture-socket isolation, (d) lease_anchor_registered assertion intact. Byte review only; ran nothing. FIRE remains separately gated on Mos GO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-18 15:38:57 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	ace6066762	fix(827): gate D4 launcher fixture	2026-07-18 15:32:45 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	839d156f6c	fix(827): isolate D4 lease broker fixture	2026-07-18 13:44:08 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	aa88a5cb9d	test(827): add D4-focused generation harness	2026-07-18 13:26:13 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	a532df5943	test(827): harden and review Gate0 probes	2026-07-17 19:39:45 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	b9780eb058	chore(827): exclude probe bytecode	2026-07-17 19:38:18 -05:00
ms-lead-reviewer	d5c599e2b0	test(827): capture Gate0 runtime evidence	2026-07-17 19:37:56 -05:00