test(cli): json-redaction pins follow the label refusals

The review round changed the config-command relay and the org document refusal to name the file by label. cli/tests/json-redaction.test.mjs still required the host path in those two CLI refusals. They now require the label and the path's absence. The direct scripts/mosaic-config.mjs checks and the loadSystem check (PL1, deferred) still require the path.
fix(organization,cli): review round: raw fs and git errors, console entry, config, document and --vars refusals name labels
2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00 · 2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00 · 2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00 · 2026-11-11 00:30:10 -06:00 · 2026-11-11 00:30:10 -06:00 · 2026-11-11 00:11:13 -06:00
151 changed files with 5218 additions and 753 deletions
@@ -807,13 +807,52 @@ the port and the backup's `SHA256SUMS`. Then it makes
  Roles come from the target copy's `roles/`, as the live bus reads them.
 - `steps.log` holds the same PASS and FAIL lines the run prints, with times;
  `host.log`, `console.log` and, after a migration, `migrate.log` sit beside it.
+- When the live config has `console.sso` (M3, #1873), the scratch copy keeps
+  its provider ids, client ids, algorithms and subjects and moves the public
+  origin to `rehearsal.invalid`, a name that never resolves. For a stamped
+  target each issuer becomes `ORIGIN/ID/` at the rehearsal provider below;
+  otherwise it moves to `rehearsal.invalid` too. Each client secret slot is a 0600 file under `config/secrets/mosaic-stack/`
+  holding `rehearsal-placeholder-secret`; the live secret is never read.
+
+A stamped target copy (one with `.stack-build.json`) serves only with `--sso`,
+so its rehearsal needs the live instance's human-made SSO steps. Without a live
+`console.sso` it refuses `sso-not-prepared`; without the live `accounts.json`
+beside the config it refuses `accounts-not-initialized`. Both name the run-sheet
+step. Otherwise it copies the live `accounts.json` into `config/`, writes
+`data/.deployed` with the target copy's own `writeDeployment`, prints
+`PASS deployment`, and starts the Console with `--sso`.
+
+Before that, a stamped run starts a rehearsal provider and prints
+`PASS provider-start`. It is a node process on `127.0.0.1` port 0 that serves
+HTTPS with a certificate made for this run, under `provider/` (mode 0700). For
+each live provider id it serves discovery and a JWKS whose public key it made
+in memory for the first algorithm it can make from that provider's list. Its
+authorize and token routes answer 403 to any method and query: it issues no
+code and no token, and
+it reads no live secret. It logs each request to `provider/requests.log`,
+deletes its TLS key file once it has read it, and exits on SIGTERM or when
+the rehearsal's process is gone. `provider-start` fails when it exits early,
+writes no origin within the timeout, writes an origin that is not
+`https://127.0.0.1:PORT`, or leaves its key file. Only the scratch Console gets
+`NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` naming `provider/cert.pem`; the host does not.
+
+The scratch Console runs every startup check against that provider. The gate
+adds `sso-ready`: `/healthz` must report each provider `ready`. After the gate,
+`provider-discovery` requires a 200 discovery and JWKS request per provider and
+no authorize or token request. The end stops the provider with the Console and
+host and prints `provider-stopped`. The live `accounts.json` joins the end check
+`live-config-unchanged`. The rehearsal adds no subject and no account.

 A guard then loads the scratch config with the target's code and refuses
 with a named check: `data-root-live` when the scratch data root resolves to
 the live one, `sessions-live` when a `sessions.json` there names a running
 pid (the run never deletes the file), `data-root-scratch`, `notify-off`,
-`tracker-configured` when `bootConfig` still sets a tracker, and
-`credential-ref-live` for an env reference or a file outside `placeholders/`.
+`tracker-configured` when `bootConfig` still sets a tracker,
+`credential-ref-live` for an env reference or a file outside `placeholders/`,
+and `sso-isolated` when a `console.sso` origin is not on `rehearsal.invalid`,
+an issuer is not `ORIGIN/ID/` at the rehearsal provider (not on
+`rehearsal.invalid` for an unstamped target), or a slot is not its scratch
+placeholder.
 When the backup's schema differs from the target's, the run checks that the
 target refuses the store, migrates it, opens it, migrates it again as a
 no-op, and that the pointer's copy refuses the migrated store.
@@ -822,7 +861,8 @@ It starts `scripts/mosaic bus start BUSINESS --no-launch` and the Console's
 `serve --port N --business BUSINESS` from the target copy, without `--send`.
 The gate needs the host's `launches disabled` line, a live `bus status` host
 with this run's pid and a boot from this start, the Console's address line,
-`/healthz` 200, and both command lines on the target copy. Then it checks
+`/healthz` 200 (and `sso-ready` for a stamped target), and both command lines
+on the target copy. Then it checks
 that the host wrote no `sessions.json` and no `launches`, stops the Console
 and the host (SIGTERM, then SIGKILL and a FAIL after the timeout), checks that
 the host released `writer.lock`, and compares the backup and the live config
@@ -834,6 +874,21 @@ Usage exits 4. Nothing prunes rehearsal directories.
 starts no thread ticker, and leaves an earlier host's `sessions.json` and
 its runs alone. No unit passes it, and `--pm` with it is a usage error.

+An accounts instance runs system units (M3, #1873). Without `--units external`,
+`activate`, `rollback` and `pm-on` refuse `accounts-user-unit`, before
+anything stops and before `--plan` prints, when the target copy holds a
+`.stack-build.json` (a stamped copy), when `accounts.json` sits beside the
+config, when the config holds `console.sso`, or when `<dataRoot>/.deployed`
+exists. A config that cannot be read as JSON refuses as well. The message
+names the first sign found and says root renders the units with
+`case2-unit.sh`. For `activate` and `rollback` it adds that the run takes
+`--units external`. For `pm-on` it says the PM is a flag in root's bus unit.
+So a user-unit run never turns `--sso` on any more. The `--sso`, `sso-slot`
+and `--no-sso` text above describes the pointers that pre-M3 hosts left, and
+the Console's own start checks the slot (`readSlot` in
+`packages/webui/src/sso.mjs`). A rollback or `--no-sso` from such a pointer
+runs once `console.sso` is gone and no other sign is present.
+
 #### Root-owned units (`--units external`, row 232)

 On a host whose bus and Console are root's system units, the stack user runs
@@ -894,8 +949,9 @@ the target migrates the store and the run lacks `--migrate` (row 233). Under

 ```
 scripts/stack-upgrade.sh upgrade --instance dev --bundle FILE --sha SHA [--migrate] [--no-rehearsal]
-    [--rehearse-port N] [--timeout S]
-scripts/stack-upgrade.sh rollback --instance dev --to ID [--restore ACT [--events N]] [--timeout S]
+    [--rehearse-port N] [--next-args] [--timeout S]
+scripts/stack-upgrade.sh rollback --instance dev --to ID [--restore ACT [--events N]] [--next-args]
+    [--timeout S]
 ```

 Root runs it from a root-owned checkout of the reviewed commit, never from a
@@ -935,7 +991,13 @@ user's clone `<home>/src/mosaic-stack`:
   (`args-differ`), and
   `activate SHA BUSINESS --units external --plan --expect-from OLD` exits 0
   (`plan-refused`, which covers `open-activation`, `migrate-required` and
-   `pointer-differs`).
+   `pointer-differs`). Then the render checks (#1873 M3):
+   `case2-unit.sh --check` renders OLD from the args file and compares the
+   installed units with it, so a rollback could render them, then checks
+   SHA's render the same way. Either refusal is `render-refused`. A re-pin
+   that changes the serve flags fails the second check, because an
+   installed unit must equal the render but for the copy id (row 195); it
+   takes `--next-args`, below.
 4. The rehearsal, `rehearse SHA BUSINESS --backup last --port 7339`
   (`--rehearse-port`). Exit 0 goes on. Exit 3 means no backup in the log
   and goes on only with `--no-rehearsal`, logging `rehearsal-skipped`;
@@ -950,6 +1012,22 @@ user's clone `<home>/src/mosaic-stack`:
   still names the old one, and root moves the new file (the result line
   names it) into place by hand.

+`--next-args` changes the serve flags, as the SSO migration does
+(`docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` section 7). The run reads
+`/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args.next` as it reads the args file
+(`args-unreadable`). It must equal the args file before `--` but for
+`--copy`'s value (`next-args-differ`) and differ from it after `--`
+(`next-args-same`). The target's check is `case2-unit.sh --check-new`, a
+first install's checks from the next args, without the installed units'.
+After A3, root moves the installed unit files into a new 0700 directory
+`/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.replaced.XXXXXX` (step `units-aside`), so A4 renders
+as a first install. A failure from there moves them back unchanged
+(`units-back`), runs `daemon-reload` and starts the old units with no render.
+After A5 the old args file is copied into the replaced directory, the next
+args file is removed (step `next-args`), and the new args file, made from
+the next args, moves into place. The result line names the replaced
+directory. Nothing removes it.
+
 A failure in A2 or a stage that exits 3 starts the old units again and gates
 them (A2f). A later failure stops both units, runs `revert`, renders the old
 copy and runs `confirm --rollback OLD --cause A3|A4|A5`. `rollback` is the
@@ -386,10 +386,15 @@ then the bus, then the proxy, re-render all three onto the selected copy, and st
 then the Console. Recovery after a failed upgrade restores all three to the old copy. A missing or
 disagreeing proxy unit, or an installed proxy without `--proxy` in the args file, refuses before anything stops.

-For the `library` profile, the serve argv after `--` keeps the proxy-preview trio and required proof pair
-but omits `--send`. That Console is read-only until Case 2 gains real OIDC in #412; `case2-unit.sh`
-explicitly refuses `--send`. Proxy preview and proof-protected reads remain available. The `factory`
-profile and its private tester socket are unchanged.
+A stamped copy, which is every copy `stack-copy.sh` makes, signs in through SSO accounts in both profiles
+(M3, #1873; Jason's ruling 2026-11-10). After `--`, the `factory` profile takes `--sso --send` with its
+private tester socket. The `library` profile takes a bare `--sso`, still without `--send`, so its Console
+stays read-only. A stamped library copy refuses the proxy-preview trio (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`,
+`--allow-user`) and the proof pair (`--proof-header`, `--proof-file`): proxy-preview admission does not
+apply to a stamped copy. Only an unstamped library copy, which no host install makes, keeps the old
+proxy-preview argv and refuses `--sso`. Before writing anything, `case2-unit.sh` refuses a stamped copy
+that lacks `--sso` or any prerequisite and names each missing step. The migration below lists them in
+order.

 A library host installed before #385 has `--send` in two places, because the earlier `case2-unit.sh`
 required it: a `--send` line after `--` in the args file, and `--send` in the installed Console unit's
@@ -418,10 +423,83 @@ grep -n '^ExecStart=' /etc/systemd/system/mosaic-webui.service | grep -c -- ' --
  lead with the command's output. Removing only the args line does not help: the run then refuses
  `console-unit-legacy`.

-The Console stays read-only after the upgrade, until #412 (#385).
+The library Console stays read-only after the upgrade (#385). From M3 it signs in through SSO
+accounts, as the migration below sets up.

-Precheck line: none. `stack-upgrade.sh` refuses `args-unreadable` or `console-unit-legacy` on any of these
-rules, before it stops a unit.
+### Migrating a host to SSO accounts (M3, #1873)
+
+A host re-pinned onto an M3 copy migrates first, in this order. The order is the same for the `factory`
+(Case 1 and .53) and `library` (.54) profiles. Each step is a live step that needs Mos's go. Nothing in the
+stack picks or invents a subject: the subjects come from `console.sso`, which a human prepares, and
+`accounts.json` comes only from the human verb `mosaic accounts init`.
+
+1. Check or create `.deployed` through the installer. The stack's user's `case2-install.sh` (section 6)
+   writes `<dataRoot>/.deployed` naming the instance at its step 2. It never replaces an existing one, and
+   it refuses one that is invalid or names another instance. Check it read-only:
+   `stat -c '%U %a' <dataRoot>/.deployed` prints `mosaic 444`.
+2. Prepare SSO. A human adds `console.sso` to `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, with its
+   providers, their subjects and its client-secret slots, per
+   `docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md`. Jason places the client secrets (section 9).
+3. Run `mosaic accounts init --name <name>` as `mosaic`. This is a human verb, run from a human shell and
+   never by an agent. It creates the one operator account from the configured `console.sso` subjects and
+   refuses if `accounts.json` exists. It also refuses `accounts-unsafe` when any folder above the config
+   directory is not root's or `mosaic`'s, or is group or other writable without the sticky bit (#1919).
+   Check first, read-only: every line printed by
+   `p=/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev; while [ "$p" != / ]; do stat -c '%U %a %n' "$p"; p=$(dirname "$p"); done; stat -c '%U %a %n' /`
+   names `root` or `mosaic`, and its mode has no group or other write bit unless it starts with 1 (sticky).
+   The config directory itself is `mosaic`'s with no group or other write bit. A group-writable `.config`
+   refuses on purpose; fix the mode, never the check.
+4. Provision the dedicated uid. `mosaic` must keep section 1's shape: a non-login shell, the only member
+   of its primary group, and owner of its config directory and data root. An accounts instance never runs
+   under a human or development seat uid, and never under the `webui-service.sh` user units.
+5. Re-pin with `--next-args`. Leave `/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args` as it is. Write the new flags to
+   `/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args.next`, root's, mode 0640: the same lines before `--`, and after `--` the
+   serve flags with `--sso` added (`factory`: `--sso --send`). For `library`, also remove the
+   proxy-preview trio (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`) and the proof pair
+   (`--proof-header`, `--proof-file`). Then run
+   `stack-upgrade.sh upgrade --instance dev --bundle FILE --sha SHA --next-args`.
+
+   A plain re-pin refuses `render-refused` here, because an installed unit must equal the render but for
+   the copy id. With `--next-args`, before anything stops, the driver checks the installed copy against
+   `dev.args` and the target as a first install from `dev.args.next`. It refuses `next-args-differ` when
+   the files differ before `--` (other than `--copy`), and `next-args-same` when they do not differ after
+   it. After the stage it moves the installed unit files into a new 0700 directory
+   `/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.replaced.XXXXXX` and renders the target as a first install. A failure from
+   there moves them back unchanged and starts the old copy again. After `confirm` passes,
+   `dev.args.next` becomes `dev.args`, and the replaced directory keeps the old unit files and the old
+   `dev.args`. The result line names the directory. Nothing removes it; root removes it by hand once no
+   rollback needs it.
+
+   To roll back past the migration, put the replaced args back as the next args and roll back with
+   `--next-args`:
+
+   ```sh
+   install -m 0640 -o root -g root /etc/mosaic-stack/dev.replaced.XXXXXX/dev.args /etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args.next
+   stack-upgrade.sh rollback --instance dev --to <old copy id> --next-args
+   ```
+
+   For `library` this is the only rollback to a copy older than M3: `case2-unit.sh` refuses `--sso` for
+   an unstamped library copy (#416), so the old copy comes back with its old flags, proxy-preview
+   admission included, as before the migration. A `factory` rollback may instead keep `--sso --send`
+   with a plain `rollback`.
+
+If a step is missing, `case2-unit.sh` refuses before it writes a unit and prints the missing steps,
+numbered in this order, for example:
+
+```text
+case2-unit: refusing the units for <sha>: a stamped copy's Console starts only with SSO accounts; missing steps, in order:
+  1. check or create .deployed: mosaic runs case2-install.sh, whose deployment step writes <dataRoot>/.deployed
+  2. prepare SSO: console.sso in mosaic's system config /srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json, with its client secret slots
+  3. run `mosaic accounts init` as mosaic, a human verb: no /srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/accounts.json
+  4. add --sso to the serve flags, then re-pin
+```
+
+Without `console.sso`, the render does not check `accounts.json`, because its subjects name providers SSO
+has not configured yet. The next render after step 2 checks it. A rollback never removes accounts.json,
+its receipts or `.deployed` (`docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md`, section 7).
+
+Precheck line: none. `stack-upgrade.sh` refuses `args-unreadable`, `console-unit-legacy`, `render-refused`,
+`next-args-differ` or `next-args-same` on any of these rules, before it stops a unit.

 ## 8. Enrollment, once per host

@@ -450,7 +528,7 @@ file with `stat -c '%U %a %n' PATH`, never `cat`. `<business>` is the host's bus
 | Path | File | Mode | Owner | Profile | Precheck line |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/` | `claude-session.env`, one line `ZAI_API_KEY=...` | 0600 | mosaic | library | `<path> sets ZAI_API_KEY` |
-| `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/` | the Console's proof file, the path the args file's `--proof-file` names: one base64url line, at least 32 `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` characters, with one optional trailing LF (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:263-264`) | 0600 or 0400 | mosaic | library | none. Render checks metadata only and never opens the file (`scripts/case2-unit.sh:397-408`). Bad bytes refuse at Console start with exit 2 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:267`, `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:138-140`). Precheck line missing. |
+| `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/` | before M3 only, and an unstamped copy only: the Console's proof file, the path the args file's `--proof-file` names. A stamped copy refuses `--proof-file` (section 7). The file is one base64url line, at least 32 `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` characters, with one optional trailing LF (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:263-264`) | 0600 or 0400 | mosaic | library | none. Render checks metadata only and never opens the file (`scripts/case2-unit.sh:397-408`). Bad bytes refuse at Console start with exit 2 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:267`, `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:138-140`). Precheck line missing. |
 | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/<business>/` | `library-gitea` | 0600 | mosaic | library | After a unit start, wait for loopback `/healthz` with the bounded retry in section 10 before `case2-precheck.sh --business <business> --library-status`: `library-last-error library-credential-missing` until it's placed, then `library <project> last fetched ...` |
 | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/` | one file per service | 0600, dirs 0700 | mosaic | both | none. Filled only by `mosaic credentials issue`, or Approve after #436. Never by hand. |

@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ configured subject (`packages/cli/src/config.mjs:141`), and
  `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve` from that copy. Its flag set is
  `--port`, `--business`, `--board`, `--sso`, `--send` and the header
  preview set (`webui-service.sh:98`). It has no dev-owner flag.
-  `scripts/case2-unit.sh` renders Case 2 units the same way.
+  `scripts/case2-unit.sh` renders Case 2 units the same way. At BASE its
+  library profile takes the preview set and refuses `--sso`. Under the
+  owner ruling of 2026-11-10 a stamped library copy signs in through SSO
+  accounts instead (section 6, item 5).

 ### Organizations and who may read them

@@ -1231,7 +1234,13 @@ The executable boundary:
   this instance, and accounts.json loads. The Case 1 and Case 2 installers
   write `.deployed`.
 5. **The unit renderers have no dev flag.** `webui-service.sh` and
-   `case2-unit.sh` accept no dev flag today (`webui-service.sh:98`). M3 adds
+   `case2-unit.sh` accept no dev flag today (`webui-service.sh:98`). For a
+   stamped copy, `case2-unit.sh` renders either profile, factory or library,
+   only with `--sso`, `console.sso`, a loading accounts.json and a valid
+   `.deployed`, and refuses before any write, naming each missing step. A
+   stamped library unit refuses proxy-preview admission and its proof flags:
+   proxy-preview does not apply to a stamped copy. The dev and unstamped
+   paths keep the preview set. M3 adds
   a test that pins it.

 The instance boundary, which also covers a checkout started by mistake on a
@@ -1289,13 +1298,22 @@ business file.

 ### Rollback

-Rollback keeps OIDC. Nothing in it removes `--sso` or turns sign-in off.
+Rollback keeps OIDC. Nothing in it removes `--sso` or turns sign-in off,
+except the library rollback past the migration below.

 - The supported rollback is a pinned code and config rollback: install the
  earlier stack copy with the same unit flags, including `--sso`, through
-  `webui-service.sh install --copy <earlier id>`, as the unit script
-  already describes. Leave accounts.json, its receipts and `.deployed` in
+  `stack-upgrade.sh rollback --instance NAME --to <earlier id>` for the
+  dedicated system units. The accounts instance must not use the
+  `webui-service.sh` user-unit path. Leave accounts.json, its receipts and `.deployed` in
  place. BASE code ignores them, and the next roll-forward needs them.
+- A library host rolled back to a copy older than M3 is the exception.
+  `case2-unit.sh` refuses `--sso` for an unstamped library copy (#416), so
+  that rollback renders the old copy from the args file the migration
+  replaced, through `stack-upgrade.sh rollback ... --next-args`
+  (`docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` section 7). The old copy comes back with
+  its old flags, proxy-preview admission included, as before the migration.
+  accounts.json and `.deployed` stay in place.
 - Before the first accounts org exists, that rollback restores today's
  behavior completely. `console.sso` owners sign in as before, and FED R6
  users keep their root grants. Account-only users and pending invites stop
@@ -1450,6 +1468,9 @@ Acceptance tests, against a fake OIDC provider on port 0:
 - `--dev-local-owner` from a checkout refuses with accounts.json present,
  with `console.sso`, and with `.deployed`.
 - `webui-service.sh render` and `case2-unit.sh` refuse a dev flag.
+- For a stamped copy, `case2-unit.sh` renders a library or factory unit
+  only with `--sso` and the prerequisites, names each missing step before
+  any write, and refuses the proxy-preview and proof flags.
 - `case2-unit.sh` accepts the host run sheet's `mosaic` account fixture only
  when its shell is non-login, its primary group has no other members, and
  it owns the config directory and data root. Fixtures for a human login and
@@ -1666,6 +1687,8 @@ and draft 3 applies them. No question from draft 2 remains open.
 | May an invite bind to an email domain? | "agreed" | No domain binding. Section 4 binding, test in M6. |
 | May members read the board and write tasks? | "Similar to 1. grantable right via RBAC. Default owner R/W, member R" | The `board.read` and `task.write` rights. `member` holds `board.read` only. Section 3, slices M1, M5 and M7. |

+The library Console signs in through SSO accounts like every deployed Console; proxy-preview admission does not apply to a stamped copy.
+
 ### Choices made under the rulings

 These are decided in this draft, not open. Each one is a single reviewed
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+# Credential binding for agent copies
+
+Date: 2026-11-11 UTC. Lane `org-cred-bind-design`, issue #1873.
+Status: proposed, for Jason's approval before implementation. Doc only.
+Baseline: `6415e81ee75a6783b889b67b985f61825f9a074e` (`origin/refactor`).
+All current-code citations below refer to that commit. References to other
+designs describe proposed policy, not a claim that it is implemented.
+
+## 1. Outcome and boundaries
+
+An owner can approve a credential binding for one root or project agent copy
+inside one organization. A launch uses only that copy's own secret slot,
+with verified service permissions bounded by its frozen role and the
+organization's narrower approval. No agent can bind credentials for itself
+or another agent. Missing, stale or uncertain authority refuses launch and
+credential use. Copies in other organizations remain independent.
+
+This proposes a writer, schema and enforcement changes for later slices. It
+changes no code, right, role, contract, secret or running instance. Host and
+model credentials remain on their existing grant and proxy paths. There is
+no migration of named-agent credentials, no root-wide secret binding, no
+shared token pool, and no new plugin service in the first build.
+
+Owner direction requires each non-assistant agent's credentials to stay
+inside its organization even when its definition comes from root
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-09_unified-workspace-owner-direction.md:124-131`). A3
+explicitly deferred binding and its two-org thread-copy test
+(`/mnt/storage/scratch/mosaic-lead/reports/org-a3-build.md:52,216-217`).
+
+## 2. Current behavior, traced before the proposal
+
+| Step | Current behavior and evidence |
+| --- | --- |
+| Declare requirements | `checkCredentials` accepts each known service once and validates its scope shape. Gitea uses category levels; Vikunja uses route-group verbs; host has no scopes (`packages/organization/src/role.mjs:100-143`). `admin` and `all` are outside the grantable Gitea categories (`packages/organization/src/vocabulary.mjs:187-191`). |
+| Declare a named instance | `roles.<instance>.credentials` must reference exactly the role's services, except host grants and the chief's Gitea exception when no library exists. Vikunja also requires a unique bot identity (`packages/organization/src/organization-config.mjs:50-59,124-167`). |
+| Locate the slot | `parseCredentialRef` accepts exactly one of `store`, `file` or `env`. `{store:true}` derives the file from config directory, business, agent and service; it does not accept another agent's store path. Named agents can still use external file and environment references (`packages/organization/src/credentials.mjs:23-59`). This lane proposes only the store form for copies. |
+| Resolve launch inputs | `resolveInstance` takes the entry from the validated organization, intersects tools/network/actions with limits, then returns its non-host credential references and tracker metadata (`packages/organization/src/resolve.mjs:34-69,81-95`). These limits do not compute a credential scope intersection. |
+| Load secrets | Runtime indexes references by `business/role` and sets the store root to the agents secret directory (`packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:333-345,378-379`). `Credentials` loads those references into its private map (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:130-165`). It derives its store filename from business, agent and service (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:351-355`). File reads reject symlinks, wrong ownership/mode and repository/data-root placement (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:357-415`). |
+| Use secrets | `Credentials.useFor` derives business and role from the session, rather than a caller-supplied target. Missing tokens refuse `credential-unavailable`; Vikunja expiry refuses `credential-expired` (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:597-624`). The task adapter uses that session-bound path (`packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs:84-88`). |
+| Issue and revoke | The broker requires a human, with an explicit tester-verb exception; it checks that the agent exists and prevents delete while ordinary or thread claims remain (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:6212-6225`). The credential writer reads only `document.roles[agent].credentials`; issue writes a store reference, revoke drops memory/file before writing or recording the receipt (`packages/bus/src/credential-verbs.mjs:16-51`). |
+| Record writes | The organization writer takes the shared registry lock, then the organization's history `write.lock`, validates the revision and document, records a prepared change and publishes the file (`packages/organization/src/organization.mjs:143-159,175-220,278-340`; `packages/organization/src/org-registry.mjs:73-101`). Its `pathsOnly` option records changed field paths and presence without values (`organization.mjs:276-278,324-327`). |
+| Materialize copies | Root and project entries explicitly refuse `credentials`, `tracker`, `identity`, `publish`, `holder` and `hosts` (`packages/organization/src/agent-levels.mjs:18-41,53-59,105-115`). Copy names preserve root names or append project names. Collisions refuse both claimants; org instances shadow copies. Every required non-host service makes a copy `unbound` (`packages/organization/src/agent-copies.mjs:36-53,73-104`). An unbound copy never joins the role map and launch refuses `credential-unbound`, naming missing services (`agent-copies.mjs:223-245,279-287`; `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:361-375`). |
+| Guard launch races | Launch checks against a fresh organization revision, then final `request.admission` compares it again after async preparation (`packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:357-364,802-813`; `packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:636-661`). This revision covers organization bytes, not role file bytes. A3 records that limitation explicitly (`/mnt/storage/scratch/mosaic-lead/reports/org-a3-build.md:215`). |
+
+Important limit: validating a slot reference does not prove the remote
+token's permissions. For non-host/non-model services, `Credentials.#format`
+checks token syntax and length, not remote scopes
+(`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:448-451`). Existing Gitea minting has a
+fixed seat scope list, not a per-copy intersection
+(`packages/bus/src/gitea-grant.mjs:27-30,262-269`). Vikunja startup has
+specific negative permission probes, not a complete per-composition scope
+proof (`packages/tasks/src/startup.mjs:30-55`). The new build must close
+these gaps for copies; a JSON field that asserts scopes is insufficient.
+
+## 3. Choice and storage
+
+Considered three approaches:
+
+1. Add credentials to root/project definitions. Rejected: a root definition
+   would carry a per-org concern and invite cross-org reuse.
+2. Write synthetic copies into `roles`. Rejected: this conflicts with org
+   shadowing and turns a boot copy into a persistent named instance.
+3. Add an org-local binding overlay and reuse the existing per-agent store.
+   Recommended. It keeps copy definitions secret-free, preserves shadowing,
+   and gives bindings the same revision fence as other org settings.
+
+The authoritative metadata lives in the existing organization file,
+`<configDir>/businesses/<org>.json`, under a proposed top-level
+`copyBindings` key. It is not written into `agents.json` or `roles/`.
+An absent key means no bindings. The writer stores one record per concrete
+copy instance; the example below is illustrative schema, not current JSON:
+
+```json
+"copyBindings": {
+  "writer.site": {
+    "copyId": "<random 128-bit lowercase hex>",
+    "orgIncarnation": "<registry incarnation>",
+    "source": { "level": "project", "name": "writer", "project": "site" },
+    "definition": { "ref": "org:release-writer", "rev": 3, "sha256": "<digest>" },
+    "generation": 1,
+    "state": "bound",
+    "services": {
+      "gitea": {
+        "slot": "self",
+        "scopes": ["read:repository"],
+        "resources": { "projects": ["site"] },
+        "rotateBy": "2026-12-01",
+        "grantId": "<opaque service grant id>",
+        "grantGeneration": 1
+      }
+    },
+    "decision": "<authority decision id>"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+`slot: "self"` means exactly `(org, concrete instance, service)`. It is a
+selector for today's derived slot, not an arbitrary string slot name. The
+record contains no path, environment name, token, token fragment or token
+hash. Grant ids identify authorization records, never encode token bytes.
+Secret values stay exclusively in the existing private credential store
+and trusted service-call memory, never in metadata, evidence, bundles,
+decision text or errors. The symbolic paths in this design describe source
+architecture; runtime responses never emit resolved host paths.
+
+`source` includes the level and original name/project, so dotted-name
+collisions cannot silently attach an old binding. `copyId` is created on
+first approval and retired on fire, shadowing, source removal or replacement.
+`generation` increases for every binding change or revocation and never
+resets while that copyId exists. An unbound tombstone remains after unbind.
+A new copyId never adopts an old slot file. Name reuse requires verified
+old-slot cleanup and newly verified credentials before activation.
+
+For a root copy, source.project is null and its definition is the frozen
+root definition identity. For a project copy it names the org definition
+or template identity. A definition hash includes composition and contract;
+the applicable instruction/personality revision is pinned too. Import
+provenance (`from.sha256`) is not the customized definition's current hash.
+
+Vikunja metadata additionally contains the existing bot identity shape
+(`tracker: {bot, botId}`) at the copy record level. It must pass the same
+org-wide uniqueness check as named instances, including other copies.
+No service binding implicitly grants identity, publication, host enrollment
+or project access. Existing identity/publish requirements remain separate.
+
+### Writer and lock order
+
+Extend `organizationWriter` with dedicated trusted methods
+`applyCopyBindingDecision` and `revokeCopyBinding`; names are proposed API.
+Only the authenticated broker/Console owner path invokes these methods.
+Generic document writes and root/project writers must reject changes to
+`copyBindings`, even if a submitted document validates. An actor string,
+decision id or hash supplied by an agent is never authorization.
+
+Reuse the shared registry lock `<configDir>/org-runtime.lock`, then the
+organization lock `<configDir>/businesses/.history/<org>/write.lock`.
+Do not introduce a second competing metadata file or lock. Reuse the
+writer's revision conflict, prepared/committed receipt and paths-only
+evidence machinery. Under the locks, establish fresh active org incarnation,
+owner identity, expected document revision and decision digest. Perform
+the final checks in the publication critical section, not only in HTTP.
+
+Do not hold filesystem locks across remote service calls or waits for runs
+to stop. Before such work, persist a non-active pending operation with a
+unique id and expected generations. Reacquire the locks, re-read and compare
+all identities before publishing. A competing write invalidates preparation.
+Use the same operation id for idempotent recovery; a prepared or uncertain
+operation cannot produce a usable binding or resurrect the prior token.
+
+## 4. Authority, decisions and deployed ownership
+
+Use the existing grantable `org.hire` right as the authority-change entry
+right. It already exists, defaults to owner yes/member no, and maps
+`hire.resolve.console` to `org.hire`
+(`packages/organization/src/org-rights.mjs:6-26,67-69`). Do not add an
+`org.credentials` right that would imply delegable token-grant authority.
+
+The right is necessary but not sufficient: any decision containing a
+credential line requires the current owner of the target org, even if a
+member holds `org.hire` or `decide`. Map credential resolution to an
+explicit owner check as well as the right check, rechecked at commit.
+The owner-only credential read stays owner-only; `board.read` gets at most
+the existing copy's missing-service status, never a binding record.
+
+Bind and unbind are **authority-change decisions**, represented by the
+hire model's `op: "change"`, with a binding-specific payload. The
+decision names source, copyId (or new-copy proposal), org incarnation,
+definition revision/hash, before/after service scopes and resources, and
+expected binding generation. The broker computes credential lines and
+the whole-decision digest. Approval consumes the decision once. Dropping,
+narrowing or replacing a line invalidates the old digest and requires
+confirmation of the new digest; widening always raises a new decision.
+
+This reuses hire-as-a-decision instead of creating a second approval
+model. It follows the roles-and-rails design's credential ruling,
+owner restriction, digest, seven-day expiry, one-step human-originated
+decision, and post-approval binding steps
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_roles-and-rails-design.md:35,232-310`). The chief
+may propose a binding only through that decision path, never by naming a
+slot, supplying a token or calling the writer. Other agents cannot raise
+this authority-change subtype. No agent resolves it, including the chief,
+an arbiter, its subject, or a different copy of the same definition.
+
+This is an authority change under system rails R1, R5, R7 and R8 and the
+role's credential rail. Default autonomy is **in the loop**. As required by
+the existing design, credential bindings do not move to near or out of the
+loop at all without a new owner ruling
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_roles-and-rails-design.md:90-119,416-425,445-463`).
+Unbind uses the same human decision record, including a one-step
+owner-originated decision. Emergency **revoke** remains an owner-only
+immediate verb: it only removes use, must not wait for a chief proposal,
+and records the authority reduction. Revoke never issues a token or changes
+an unbound binding to bound.
+
+A root-level definition change still needs the instance owner. Binding one
+root copy inside org O needs O's owner and grants nothing in another org.
+Being an instance operator or root-business owner alone does not make a
+person O's owner. Accounts design separates these principals explicitly
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md:314-349`). No account-only session
+falls back to a human/root transport. All Console mutations retain Origin,
+session, fresh ownership and confirmation fences.
+
+The host remains the trust boundary. Host root and the instance uid can
+already change the instance and its secrets; this proposal does not claim
+protection from either, or from a sandbox escape to that uid. The deployed
+instance uid must remain separate from human/development seats
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md:887-936`).
+
+## 5. Permission calculation and proof
+
+For every service V, compute:
+
+`effective(V) = role-declared(V) intersect org-approved-binding(V)`.
+
+The binding is the org's per-copy narrowing. Omitted services are unbound,
+not permission to use another source. Unknown services/scopes refuse; they
+are never ignored. The requested scopes must already be a subset of the
+role. Do not silently trim a broader request and report that it succeeded.
+Resources also intersect the org's current admitted project set and the
+copy's union. A project copy may access its project only. A root copy may
+access only the approved projects that still admit it. An empty intersection
+allows no service operations and leaves a required service unbound.
+
+Scope comparison is semantic: Gitea read is narrower than write in the same
+category, categories are independent, and neither admin nor all is allowed.
+Vikunja compares each route-group/verb pair. Missing categories/groups mean
+no permission; there is no wildcard. All adapters must apply their service's
+registered semantics, never compare scope strings lexicographically.
+
+### At proposal, approval and bind
+
+1. Resolve the concrete copy from the target org's boot snapshot and current
+   project union. Refuse missing, shadowed, colliding, excluded or fired
+   copies. Never create `roles[copyName]` to make the operation succeed.
+2. Validate the role through the core composition validator and current
+   enabled registry. Read T1's definition revision/hash, or the frozen root
+   role identity. Verify org active state and incarnation. Compute all
+   credential lines from these inputs, not from chief-supplied summaries.
+3. Check every requested service/scope/resource against that definition and
+   org. Verify the resolver is the fresh org owner. The owner cannot override
+   a system rail or widen a binding past the approved role; changing the role
+   requires its own approved change first.
+4. Obtain a dedicated service credential for this exact org/copy/service.
+   Trusted service adapters must establish both token scopes and remote
+   identity resource grants. Prove the allowed projects/repos at the service,
+   not just a local `resources` list. A root-wide or cross-org bot account is
+   unacceptable even if its token is stored in a per-org directory.
+5. Accept a token only after trusted live introspection verifies its scopes,
+   service account, permitted resources and expiry against this operation,
+   or after a reviewed managed mint path produces and verifies that exact
+   bounded grant. An owner-entered assertion, copied grant id, token format,
+   or a few successful/negative probes are not proof of complete permissions.
+   If the service/version cannot prove the bound, refuse
+   `credential-scope-unverified`. Ship that refusal rather than an unsafe
+   compatibility mode. This is a required service-adapter build item.
+6. Stage the secret privately in the existing store with the binding inactive.
+   Recheck decision digest, definition hash, org incarnation, document
+   revision and slot generation after remote work. Only then commit the
+   metadata/receipt. A grant record binds the opaque grant id, copyId,
+   incarnation and generation to the issued slot. It stores no secret or
+   token-derived digest. Ambiguous crash recovery keeps use closed and
+   requires a new verified issue if exact provenance cannot be established.
+
+Gitea's existing fixed `SEAT_SCOPES` must not be reused for a read-only role.
+Vikunja needs a reviewed verifier for the complete route-group scope set
+and bot/project access. Until each adapter exists, that service's copy
+binding refuses. Do not claim the existing named-agent path provides this
+proof. Extending remote minting beyond its current approved envelope is a
+separate protected change, identified in slice CB2 below.
+
+### At launch, restart and every use
+
+The first build uses the existing restart model for **new references**.
+Approval may record a binding, but it is not usable until the org bus
+restarts and verifies it. Surface `restart-required`, not a successful
+launch. Today reference/bot changes already require restart
+(`packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:547-583`). Do not add live reference reload
+in the first slice. Revocations take effect immediately and never wait
+for this restart.
+
+On boot and every launch, re-resolve the effective role and binding,
+validate source/copyId/incarnation/generation, and obtain fresh trusted
+service scope/resource proof for the actual slot contents. If verification
+is unavailable, launch refuses. All required services must be bound and
+available. Bindings may be approved incrementally, but partial success
+cannot launch. A stale file alone never counts as a binding.
+
+Preserve A3's organization revision fence. Add a separate launch authority
+digest over frozen definition identity, copyId, org incarnation, binding
+generation and verified grant generation. Do not redefine the writer's
+document revision. Carry both into final admission and `bindLaunch`, and
+bind the admitted generations to the session. A pending revocation blocks
+admission, including the interval between final admission and spawn/bind.
+If a child was spawned before revocation won, deny its capability and stop
+it; it must perform no credential call. Do not release a launch fence on an
+uncertain outcome until that child is confirmed stopped.
+
+At every credential-bearing operation, check session org/instance, active
+incarnation, effective scopes/resources, binding/grant generation and slot
+liveness before any external request. Derive the slot from the session,
+never from request arguments or thread text. Raw tokens and credential file
+paths do not enter sandboxes. The trusted service adapter checks each
+method/resource as well as token permissions. Constrain outbound destinations
+to the approved service origin and reject redirects carrying authorization
+to another origin. Operation completion rechecks the generation before
+publishing its result. Unknown or stale state refuses closed.
+
+## 6. Lifecycle and running copies
+
+All transitions below close credential admission first, invalidate affected
+session generations, then stop **all** affected ordinary and thread runs.
+Serialize close versus new admission so a concurrent launch cannot escape
+the stop inventory. Abort cancellable service calls and wait for all held
+uses to settle before slot deletion or replacement. A completed external
+write cannot be undone; report that limit, never call local revoke a remote
+rollback. Existing non-host `Credentials.use` does not provide the host-key
+abort behavior, so generalizing the use fence is required, not assumed
+(`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:556-569,618-653`).
+
+| Event | Durable outcome and effect on a running copy | Next launch/use |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Unbind service | Owner-approved change bumps generation, records unbound tombstone, closes use, stops every run of that copy, revokes/removes its slot. Never retain a reusable token behind an inactive binding. | `credential-unbound`: `credentials.gitea needs an owner-approved binding.` |
+| Emergency revoke | Owner verb immediately closes use, bumps generation, stops all copy runs and performs local revoke. A managed remote grant is also revoked through its approved adapter. Keep tombstone; reissue needs a fresh decision and verification. | `credential-revoked`: `credentials.gitea was revoked; the owner must approve a new binding.` |
+| Slot removed or altered outside the writer | A slot liveness/identity check at use and launch refuses even if memory still holds the token. Mark binding unavailable, invalidate session use and stop its runs. Never fall back to cached memory, environment or another slot. Replacement is a newly verified issue. | `credential-unavailable`: `credentials.gitea is unavailable; the owner must verify the slot.` |
+| Expiry or upstream revocation | Local expiry checks and service authentication failure close the binding, invalidate use and stop runs. Rotation is a new verified slot generation and owner-approved change; no in-place replacement behind active uses. | `credential-expired`: `credentials.vikunja has expired; the owner must approve a replacement.` Upstream revoke uses `credential-revoked`. |
+| Role/definition changed | Any role identity/hash/revision mismatch closes use and stops affected copies. Do not inherit old credentials even for equal service names. A narrower role requires new bounded service proof; a wider role requires approval first and fresh binding. T1 blocks edits of an in-use definition until the change-decision path exists. | `credential-role-changed`: `credentials.gitea no longer matches the approved definition; the owner must review the binding.` |
+| Copy fired, source removed, excluded or shadowed | Close use, retire copyId, stop every run, revoke slots and delist the copy. Preserve run/trail evidence. A newly shadowing named instance must not load the old copy's file at the identical slot name. Require cleanup before it can use that name. | `copy-unavailable`: `copy is no longer active in this organization.` |
+| Copy-name collision | Refuse attaching either binding. If introduced while running, close affected use and stop both claimants. No first-wins fallback. | `copy-refused`: `copy identity is ambiguous; the owner must resolve the definition collision.` |
+| Organization archived | Close the org's admission, invalidate its running sessions and stop every org run before archive completes. Revoke all copy service slots and mark bindings unbound. Restore preserves definitions but requires fresh binding decisions. Never affect another org's runs or slots. | `org-archived`: `organization is archived.` After restore, `credential-unbound`. |
+| Organization deleted | Close all admission/use and stop every org run, revoke managed remote grants and local slots before the existing quarantine flow. Preserve evidence/tombstones in deletion evidence. A new org with the same id has a new incarnation and no inherited bindings. | `org-unavailable`: `organization is not active.` Recreated org starts unbound. |
+| Revoke/stop/cleanup uncertain | Persist a non-usable pending-revocation state and keep the affected copy or org fenced. Do not publish success or restore memory on write failure. Retry with the same operation id. Remote revocation uncertainty remains visible to the owner. | `credential-revoke-failed`: `credentials.gitea revocation is incomplete; the owner must retry cleanup.` |
+
+These archive/delete effects are proposed extensions. Current archive stops
+the bus and marks the registry archived; deletion quarantines org runtime,
+document/history and org secret trees, while its receipt says remote-side
+revocation is out of scope (`packages/organization/src/org-service.mjs:239-267,332,343-347`).
+The new build must explicitly test and add copy-run and copy-grant cleanup;
+it cannot infer it from a stopped bus.
+
+Refusal codes in this section are proposed public contracts where new.
+Use `human-required` with `Only the organization owner can approve credential
+binding.` for an agent/member mutation, `credential-not-yours` with
+`credentials.gitea must use this copy's own organization slot.` for a wrong
+slot, `credential-scope-exceeded` with `credentials.gitea.scopes exceeds the
+approved role.` for excess scopes, and `credential-scope-unverified` with
+`credentials.gitea permissions could not be verified.` for missing proof.
+`credential-binding-changed` says `credentials.gitea changed; read and approve
+again.` for stale generation; `organization-changed` retains the existing
+document-race code. Validation errors name field positions such as
+`copyBindings entry 1 services field`, not untrusted submitted keys.
+
+All new boundaries allow only registered service/field labels and fixed
+remediation text. Never interpolate a submitted value, resolved path, raw
+service error, URL, bot name, secret, token hash or token fragment into an
+error, receipt or trail. New metadata serializers use an allowlist and
+paths-only receipts. Scan human text with the existing secret scanner and
+fixed field-size limits; arbitrary unknown keys refuse with a fixed field
+label. Metadata holds only validated ids, known scope names and bounded
+dates/integers. The scope is every new copy-binding surface, consistent
+with the brief's #1916/#1920 requirement, without changing unrelated legacy
+diagnostics. Neither reviewer nor implementer needs live secrets to test it.
+
+## 7. Two organizations and identity reuse
+
+Example acceptance fixture: org A and org B both materialize root `writer`
+from the same creative template. A's binding selects `(A, writer, gitea)`;
+B's selects `(B, writer, gitea)`. Each uses a dedicated remote bot/token whose
+resources exclude the other org. B cannot select A's slot or reuse A's grant
+record. A path restriction alone would not prevent a token with both orgs'
+remote grants, so service proof must check those grants too.
+
+Enforce isolation at all of these independent boundaries:
+
+1. Console resolves the target org from the authorized route and fresh
+   ownership, not a body-supplied org or an instance-wide owner flag.
+2. The writer derives its org and slot from that context and binds the
+   metadata to the registry incarnation. A copied record from A has the
+   wrong incarnation in B and refuses before opening any slot.
+3. Copy source tuple, copyId and definition digest must match B's materialized
+   copy. A root definition carries no binding to propagate.
+4. Credential loader derives the slot, enforces private regular-file rules,
+   rejects alias/symlink/hardlink substitution for copy slots and verifies
+   remote grant ownership. Reject nlink other than one for these slots.
+5. Every use derives org/instance from the authenticated session and checks
+   the active binding generation. A thread, room or caller-supplied instance
+   cannot choose the key. Session and grant records cannot cross buses.
+6. Archive/delete touches only that incarnation's resources. A failed cleanup
+   never makes credentials valid for a later org or copy with the same name.
+
+Registry incarnation is a dependency of accounts design
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md:501-514`). The binding build must
+use that stable value; if the target baseline lacks it, land an explicitly
+approved incarnation slice first. Do not substitute timestamps, a pathname
+or an org id alone. The dedicated store layout remains unchanged.
+
+## 8. T1 dependency and implementation slices
+
+T1 is in flight. Its brief is
+`/mnt/storage/scratch/mosaic-lead/uidev/org-release/T1-BRIEF.md`. This design
+depends on its org-local definitions, `org:` resolver, revision/hash read,
+composition validation and in-use definition guard, as specified in
+roles-and-rails sections 4 and 5
+(`docs/plans/2026-11-10_roles-and-rails-design.md:157-170,186-228`). Do not
+patch T1's files in this lane. Project copies use those org definitions;
+root copies keep a frozen root identity. Supporting root-local customized
+definitions waits for that resolver to exist, rather than inventing another
+definition format here. A4 supplies the authority-change decision engine;
+this build extends it, rather than shipping a temporary direct bind verb.
+
+Every slice below is a later proposal requiring Jason's approval before
+work. Each ends with focused tests plus affected organization, business,
+bus, CLI and Console suites. No slice edits `roles/` or `contracts/`.
+
+| Slice and dependencies | Build and acceptance evidence | Protected changes needing approval |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| CB0: identity foundation, after T1/accounts | Reuse incarnation or add its approved missing support. Define copyId, source/hash pin and binding generation semantics. Pure resolver tests cover identical root copies across two orgs, project dotted-name collisions, org shadowing, removed/recreated org and source-name reuse. No secret read and no launch enabled. | Org schema; registry schema only if incarnation is absent. No new rights or role files. |
+| CB1: metadata and decisions, after CB0/A4 | Add `copyBindings`, guarded organization writer, owner-only credential subtype under `org.hire`, digest/expiry/single-consumption and paths-only receipts. Tests: owner binds/unbinds; member with org.hire/decide, chief, arbiter, subject agent, tester and reader all fail to resolve/write; agent may not call raw writer; only chief agent can propose; stale revision/digest/generation, expired approval, replay, wrong incarnation and generic write injection have no activation. Pending/partial binding never launches. | Organization and decision payload schema; `VERB_RIGHTS`/owner dispatch changes even though no new grantable right. Approval explicitly covers the reuse of org.hire with the owner restriction. |
+| CB2: verified service slots, after CB1 | Reuse self-only store and dedicated bot identity; add complete Gitea/Vikunja verification or exact bounded mint adapters. Tests use fake services for narrower/equal/broader scopes, read/write hierarchy, extra route verbs, unrelated repos/projects, reused foreign bot/grant, opaque/unverifiable token, wrong date, symlinks/hardlinks, stale file and token replacement. No request, path or token enters metadata/evidence; lost replies and crash points remain inactive. A live scratch-service acceptance must prove each service/version's permission verifier before that service enables copy launch. | Credential handling/security boundary; grant metadata schema and any remote mint/revoke envelope changes. No automatic reuse of existing fixed Gitea seat scopes. |
+| CB3: admission and use, after CB2 | Materialize only verified bound copies; new references visibly need restart. Check document revision plus separate authority digest at prepare, final admission and bindLaunch. Session-bound adapter checks every operation and slot liveness. Race tests mutate role hash, org bindings, token contents or admitted projects during async prepare and between admission/spawn/bind/use. Assert no admitted credential call, including an empty project manifest. Concurrent revoke denies new work; no cached-token fallback after unlink. | Launcher/broker credential enforcement boundary; session/launch authority fields and any store schema needed to persist fences. No live reference-reload policy. |
+| CB4: lifecycle and recovery, after CB3 | Test unbind, emergency revoke, slot removal, expiry, role change, fire, collision, shadowing, archive/restore, delete/recreate. Each closes admissions, invalidates ordinary and every thread run, aborts or drains uses, and denies later calls. Inject failures before/after metadata publication, secret staging, remote revoke, stop acknowledgement and receipt write; restart never resurrects authority. Include named-instance shadowing over a former copy's slot. Other org continues. | Credential/revocation and org lifecycle boundary; durable pending-operation schema. Existing deletion quarantine must not silently claim remote revoke. |
+| CB5: two-org thread acceptance and operator flow, after CB4 | Finish A3's deferred test with a shipped Gitea-requiring creative thread role in both orgs. Approve independent verified bindings; boot real buses and use fake harness/service, create one thread/session per org, launch both, write/read records, reopen each. Assert distinct session/run/trail/workspace and slot identities, no A record visible in B, no B request uses A's token, and B survives A revoke/archive/delete. Reject raw A binding/grant replay in B. Operator flow shows computed scope lines, confirmation, missing service, restart and remediation states, with sentinel redaction tests on every response/event/log. No screenshot gate for this doc lane. | Console mutation/decision flow; no further right or role changes. Any discovered schema delta returns to approval before build. |
+
+Existing regressions to retain include organization `credentials.test.mjs`,
+`role.test.mjs`, `agent-copies.test.mjs`, `instance-credential-transitions.test.mjs`,
+bus `credential-store.test.mjs`, `credential-verbs.test.mjs`,
+`agent-copies.test.mjs`, and CLI `thread-launch.test.mjs` and
+`launcher-final-race-probe.test.mjs`. Add meaningful new focused tests for
+the guarantees above; merely checking the proposed JSON shape is inadequate.
+
+Acceptance samples for this document are the seven brief requirements:
+storage/writer/locks in section 3; right/rail/decision in section 4;
+role ceiling and verification in section 5; lifecycle/code/text in section 6;
+two-org enforcement in section 7; tests/slices/protected changes in section 8;
+and at most three owner questions below. No visual samples apply.
+
+## 9. Questions for Jason, with recommendations
+
+1. Approve `org.hire` as the entry right while keeping every credential
+   binding/unbinding approval owner-only? Recommend yes: it matches the
+   existing hire decision model and does not grant members token authority.
+2. Approve the overlay schema and CB0-CB5 security changes, including complete
+   service scope/resource proof as a prerequisite and restart for new
+   references? Recommend yes. A service without a verifier stays refused;
+   implement Gitea first if its verifier is ready before Vikunja's.
+3. On archive/restore, discard copy credentials and require fresh bindings?
+   Recommend yes. It adds setup on restore, but avoids keeping dormant
+   usable grants and gives archive one clear revocation meaning.
+
+These are recommendations, not approvals. The Lead takes this design to
+Jason. No implementation or rollout is authorized by this document.
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { initializeControl, processingStatus } from '../../processing-control/sr
 import { NAME as HARNESS_NAME } from '../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs';
 import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';
 import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';
-import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITIONS, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl, credentialKind, validArgv, commandAllowed, HOST_ID, CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS, unhireableAction, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl, covers, grantScopeOf, grantInScope } from '../../organization/src/vocabulary.mjs';
+import { pluginName, ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITIONS, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl, credentialKind, validArgv, commandAllowed, HOST_ID, CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS, unhireableAction, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl, covers, grantScopeOf, grantInScope } from '../../organization/src/vocabulary.mjs';

 // Kept closed while S1 lands; its vocabulary is the integration authority.
 export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ function checkBusiness(name, b) {
    if (!object(a) || !Array.isArray(a.withinRole) || !Array.isArray(a.crossRole))
      fail('invalid-authority');
    const all = [...a.withinRole, ...a.crossRole];
-    if (new Set(all).size !== all.length || all.some((v) => !ACTIONS.includes(v) || GATED.has(v)))
+    if (new Set(all).size !== all.length || all.some((v) => (!ACTIONS.includes(v) && !pluginName(v)) || GATED.has(v)))
      fail('invalid-authority');
  }
  if (!Object.hasOwn(b.roles, b.arbiters.technical) || !Object.hasOwn(b.roles, b.arbiters.delivery))
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ export class Broker {
  #builtin;
  #builtinBinding;
  #organization;
+  #pluginService;
  #credentialVerbs;
  #proxyInit;
  #proxyPage;
@@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ export class Broker {
  #processing;
  #taskTracker;
  // credentialStatus is the runtime's metadata-only Credentials.status(); the broker never gets use().
-  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, library = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null, proxyInit = null, proxyPage = null, hostGrant = null, hostKeys = null, processing = null, testerOn = null, grantScope = null, roleFile = null, giteaGrant = null, giteaKeys = null, access = null, accessStamp = null, compactions = null, requestLifecycle = null, requirementsHost = null, workspaceRead = null, taskTracker = null }) {
+  constructor({ store, businesses, pluginService = null, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, library = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null, proxyInit = null, proxyPage = null, hostGrant = null, hostKeys = null, processing = null, testerOn = null, grantScope = null, roleFile = null, giteaGrant = null, giteaKeys = null, access = null, accessStamp = null, compactions = null, requestLifecycle = null, requirementsHost = null, workspaceRead = null, taskTracker = null }) {
    if (!object(businesses) || !Object.keys(businesses).length) fail('invalid-business');
    // Row 194 b15 (sage-2501): the function-argument checks come before anything reads the store.
    if (harnessOn !== null && typeof harnessOn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('harnessOn must be a function');
@@ -678,6 +679,7 @@ export class Broker {
    this.#secretCheck = secretCheck;
    this.#credentialStatus = credentialStatus;
    this.#organization = organization;
+    this.#pluginService = pluginService;
    // Row 199: the runtime's credential lifecycle (credential-verbs.mjs); it holds the store, not the broker.
    this.#credentialVerbs = credentialVerbs;
    this.#proxyInit = proxyInit;
@@ -2151,6 +2153,13 @@ export class Broker {
  }
  bindLaunch(record) {
    const { key, session, old, body } = this.#launchProof(record);
+    const launchRole=this.#business(record.business).roles[record.role];
+    const pluginCapability=[...(launchRole.tools ?? []),...(launchRole.authority?.withinRole ?? []),...(launchRole.authority?.crossRole ?? []),...Object.keys(launchRole.credentials ?? {})].find(pluginName);
+    if(pluginCapability) {
+      if(!this.#pluginService)throw new BusError('plugin-disabled',pluginName(pluginCapability));
+      try { this.#pluginService.check(record.business,record.role); }
+      catch(e) { throw new BusError(e.code === 'plugin-disabled' ? e.code : 'invalid-request', e.code === 'plugin-disabled' ? e.plugin : undefined); }
+    }
    if (!old) this.#processingWork();
    if (!old && !this.#harnessOn(record.business, record.harness)) fail('invalid-harness');
    if (!old && record.thread !== undefined && this.#archived(record.business, this.#threadRow(session, record.thread).project)) fail('project-archived');
@@ -4668,7 +4677,14 @@ export class Broker {
    fail('role-end-refused');
  }
  #classification(s, action, target = null) {
-    if (!ACTIONS.includes(action)) fail('unknown-action');
+    if (!ACTIONS.includes(action)) {
+      const name=pluginName(action);
+      const held=this.#business(s.business).roles[s.role]?.authority;
+      if(!name || ![...(held?.withinRole ?? []),...(held?.crossRole ?? [])].includes(action))fail('unknown-action');
+      if(!this.#pluginService)throw new BusError('plugin-disabled',name);
+      let checked;try {checked=this.#pluginService.check(s.business,s.role);}catch{throw new BusError('plugin-disabled',name);}
+      if(!checked.view.registry.actions.includes(action))throw new BusError('plugin-disabled',name);
+    }
    if (
      this.#hardWait(s, action, target) ||
      (action === 'role.launch' && this.#business(s.business).launch?.by !== s.role)
@@ -5915,6 +5931,15 @@ export class Broker {
        }).catch(error => { throw this.#refused(s, new BusError(/^proxy-[a-z-]+$/.test(error.code ?? '') ? error.code : 'proxy-init-failed'), request); });
      }
      this.#secretCheck(args);
+      if (request.verb === 'plugin.tool') {
+        if(s.human || s.reader || s.tester || s.user || s.console)fail('agent-required');
+        keys(args,['tool','arguments'],['tool','arguments']);
+        this.#store.transaction(()=>this.#agent(s));
+        if(!this.#pluginService)throw new BusError('plugin-disabled',pluginName(args.tool) ?? undefined);
+        return this.#pluginService.call(s.business,s.role,args.tool,args.arguments).then(result=>{
+          this.#secretCheck(result);return result;
+        }).catch(e=>{throw this.#refused(s,new BusError(['plugin-disabled','invalid-request','not-authorized'].includes(e.code)?e.code:'adapter-failed',e.code==='plugin-disabled'?e.plugin:undefined),{verb:'plugin.tool'});});
+      }
      if (request.verb === 'processing.halt' || request.verb === 'processing.resume')
        return this.#requestProcessing(s, request.verb, structuredClone(args));
      if (request.verb === 'processing.status') {
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ class Failure extends Error {
 // lineages, each the current, retiring and earlier ids of one agent. A daily key quota follows
 // the lineage that holds its id, so it outlives rotation and re-issue. Both run only while a
 // daily key quota is set and a check is switched on. Without keyLineages they refuse.
-export function createLimits({ store, read, log, makeLoader = createLoader, keyForSubject = () => null,
+export function createLimits({ store, read, pluginDataRoot = null, log, makeLoader = createLoader, keyForSubject = () => null,
  keyLineages = () => { throw new Failure('proxy-key-refused'); } }) {
  if (typeof read !== 'function' || typeof log !== 'function') throw new TypeError('createLimits needs read and log');
  const loaders = new Map();
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export function createLimits({ store, read, log, makeLoader = createLoader, keyF
    return validLineages(value) ? value : null;
  }
  const loaderFor = business => {
-    if (!loaders.has(business)) loaders.set(business, makeLoader({ log }));
+    if (!loaders.has(business)) loaders.set(business, makeLoader({ log, dataRoot:pluginDataRoot }));
    return loaders.get(business);
  };

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { createLoader } from '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';
 const validId = s => typeof s === 'string' && /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/.test(s);
 const validModel = s => typeof s === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/-]{0,199}$/.test(s);
 const disabled = () => ({ status: 'disabled', observedAt: null, models: [], notices: [] });
-export function createModelCatalogue({ client, settings, now = Date.now, makeLoader = createLoader, proxyLock = null }) {
+export function createModelCatalogue({ client, settings, pluginDataRoot = null, now = Date.now, makeLoader = createLoader, proxyLock = null }) {
  const cache = new Map(), flights = new Map(); let generation = 0, writing = 0;
  function invalidate() { generation++; cache.clear(); }
  function begin() { writing++; invalidate(); }
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export function createModelCatalogue({ client, settings, now = Date.now, makeLoa
    try {
      if (off(id)) return disabled();
      const names = [...settings(id)['model-provider']];
-      const loader = makeLoader({ log: () => {} });
+      const loader = makeLoader({ log: () => {}, dataRoot:pluginDataRoot });
      const result = await loader.load({ 'model-provider': names });
      if (result.refused.length || loader.snapshot('model-provider').length !== names.length) throw Error();
      const c = client(); if (!c) throw Error();
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ export function busOrganization(business, resolved) {
    out.roles[role].network = r.limits.network;
    out.roles[role].authority = structuredClone(r.limits.authority);
    // REQ-HARN-2: "web" in the resolved tool limit is the grant for the broker's web verbs.
+    out.roles[role].tools = [...(r.limits.tools ?? [])];
    out.roles[role].web = (r.limits.tools ?? []).includes('web');
    // Row 210 (#1707, design D5): resolveInstance leaves host.<id> keys out of the session's
    // credentials. The bus child uses them, so they come back here from the business entry.
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ const KINDS = ['input', 'output', 'cacheWrite', 'cacheRead'];
 const ID = /^[a-f0-9]{12}$/;
 const plain = n => n <= BigInt(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) ? Number(n) : String(n);
 // makeLoader is the plug-in loader's factory; a test wraps it to see what a module is handed.
-export function createProxyUsage({ store, read, client, records, log, now = Date.now, makeLoader = createLoader, enableDrain = false }) {
-  const loader = makeLoader({ log });
+export function createProxyUsage({ store, read, pluginDataRoot = null, client, records, log, now = Date.now, makeLoader = createLoader, enableDrain = false }) {
+  const loader = makeLoader({ log, dataRoot:pluginDataRoot });
  let due = 0, previous = '', pending = null, closed = false;
  const states = new Map();
  // #778: per enabled business, the batches taken off the proxy queue and then not written, since
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ const group = (codes, rail, nextStep) => {
    entries.push([code, guidance]);
  }
 };
+group("plugin-disabled", "R3/R6/R10: installed, pinned and enabled plugin capabilities", "Ask the instance owner to verify the installed plugin and the organization owner to enable it. A replacement of an already loaded package needs a host restart; then relaunch the agent.");
+group("plugin-restart-required", "R3/R10: one imported package pin per host process", "Ask the instance owner to restart the host after replacing an already loaded package, then retry through the supported path.");
 group(
  "access-refused access-revoked share-exists share-not-covered share-not-found tester-dev-only tester-off tester-refused tester-required tester-target-not-running thread-not-allowed thread-not-owned",
  "R7: caller access and scoped session boundary",
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { pluginService } from '../../plugins/src/tools.mjs';
+import { readPluginLock } from '../../plugins/src/pinned.mjs';
 import { createRequirementsHost } from '../../tasks/src/builtin.mjs';
 import { createRequirementCatalog } from './requirement-catalog.mjs';
 import { readPrdMaterial } from '../../project/src/prd.mjs';
@@ -71,10 +73,10 @@ export const ACCESS_SWEEP_MS = 30_000;
 // web.fetch still works. A plug-in that refuses to load is logged and leaves search off; it never
 // stops the broker. Under harness-builtin the harness serves web itself, so the broker gets no
 // service and refuses the web verbs.
-export async function webServices(businesses, { log = (e) => process.stderr.write(`plugins: ${JSON.stringify(e)}\n`), deps } = {}) {
+export async function webServices(businesses, { log = (e) => process.stderr.write(`plugins: ${JSON.stringify(e)}\n`), deps, dataRoot = null } = {}) {
  const services = new Map();
  for (const [name, b] of Object.entries(businesses)) {
-    const loader = createLoader({ log });
+    const loader = createLoader({ log, dataRoot });
    await loader.load(b.plugins ?? {});
    const [source] = loader.modules('search-source');
    // "harness-builtin" is served by the harness itself, not the broker: no broker web verbs.
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ export async function webServices(businesses, { log = (e) => process.stderr.writ
 // checks a write runs, which are synchronous. A module that doesn't load, or answers anything but a
 // list of names, answers null, which refuses the write. The tree is pinned, so a module changes only
 // with a re-pin, and a re-pin restarts the bus.
-export async function harnessLevels({ log = (e) => process.stderr.write(`plugins: ${JSON.stringify(e)}\n`) } = {}) {
+export async function harnessLevels({ log = (e) => process.stderr.write(`plugins: ${JSON.stringify(e)}\n`), dataRoot = null } = {}) {
  const levels = new Map();
  let names = [];
  try {
@@ -98,8 +100,12 @@ export async function harnessLevels({ log = (e) => process.stderr.write(`plugins
  } catch (e) {
    log({ event: 'harness-levels-unread', message: e.message });
  }
+  if (dataRoot !== null) {
+    try { names = [...new Set([...names,...Object.keys(readPluginLock(dataRoot).plugins).filter(name=>hasModule('harness',name,dataRoot))])]; }
+    catch { log({event:'harness-levels-unread',message:'installed harness discovery refused'}); }
+  }
  for (const name of names) {
-    const loader = createLoader({ log });
+    const loader = createLoader({ log, dataRoot });
    if ((await loader.load({ harness: [name] })).refused.length) continue;
    try {
      const list = loader.modules('harness')[0].levels();
@@ -291,7 +297,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
  if (copies !== null && (typeof copies !== 'object' || Array.isArray(copies) || typeof copies.org !== 'string'
      || !Object.hasOwn(businesses ?? {}, copies.org) || copies.copies === null || typeof copies.copies !== 'object' || Array.isArray(copies.copies)))
    throw new BusError('invalid-host-request');
-  const loadOrg = id => loadWithCopies(id, { dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, snapshot: copies?.org === id ? copies : null });
+  const loadOrg = id => loadWithCopies(id, { dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, snapshot: copies?.org === id ? copies : null });
  if (!Array.isArray(consoleOwners) || consoleOwners.length > 512 || consoleOwners.some((o) => o === null || typeof o !== 'object' || Array.isArray(o) ||
      Object.keys(o).length !== 3 || ['provider', 'iss', 'sub'].some((k) => typeof o[k] !== 'string' || !o[k] || o[k].length > 512)))
    throw new BusError('invalid-host-request');
@@ -406,20 +412,20 @@ export async function startBroker({

    // vikunja:19/305: the plug-in switch through the same human-only path as the limits: the verbs
    // plugins and plugins.set, logged in changes.jsonl with the actor, a missing module refused.
-    const plugins=organization?pluginSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,exists:hasModule}):null;
-    const levels=organization?await harnessLevels():()=>null;
+    const plugins=organization?pluginSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot,exists:(kind,name)=>hasModule(kind,name,instanceRoot ?? dataRoot)}):null;
+    const levels=organization?await harnessLevels({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot}):()=>null;
    // Row 333 R4 (#1831): the writer's key lineage lookup, ids only, from this bus's own credential
    // records. A daily key quota moved within one agent's lineage keeps its since and its count.
    const keyLineage=(business,keyId)=>modelKeyLineage(credentials.status(),business,keyId);
    const settings=organization?launchSettings({...organization,sessions:()=>readSessions(dataRoot),levels,keyLineage}):null;
-    modelCatalogues = modelCatalogue ?? (settings ? createModelCatalogue({ client: () => modelProxyClient, settings: id => settings.current(id).plugins ?? {}, proxyLock }) : null);
+    modelCatalogues = modelCatalogue ?? (settings ? createModelCatalogue({ pluginDataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, client: () => modelProxyClient, settings: id => settings.current(id).plugins ?? {}, proxyLock }) : null);
    // Resolve legacy table entries with the enabled modules' declarations. A
    // missing or ambiguous mapping never becomes an available route.
    async function catalogueFor(id, options = {}) {
      const snapshot = settings.writer.read(id);
      const current = settings.current(id);
      const names = current.plugins?.['model-provider'] ?? [];
-      const loader = makeProviderLoader({log:()=>{}});
+      const loader = makeProviderLoader({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot,log:()=>{}});
      const loaded = await loader.load({'model-provider': names});
      const catalogue = await modelCatalogues.read(id, options);
      if (loaded.refused.length || settings.writer.read(id).revision !== snapshot.revision) return {...catalogue, status:'unavailable', legacy:{}};
@@ -479,16 +485,16 @@ export async function startBroker({
      return { revoked: services, outsideStore: how === 'fire' ? outside : [] };
    }
    // Row 165 (#1662): the human adds and changes role instances through instances and instances.set.
-    const proxyOrganization = modelKeys ? modelOrganization({ modelKeys, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) }) : null;
+    const proxyOrganization = modelKeys ? modelOrganization({ modelKeys, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot }) }) : null;
    const instances=organization?instanceSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,system:organization.system,levels,revoke,
      ...(proxyOrganization ? { writer: proxyOrganization.writer, revoke: proxyOrganization.revoke(revoke) } : {})}):null;
    const usageLog = entry => process.stderr.write(`usage: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n`);
    const keyForRun = (business, run) => modelRuns.get(business + ':' + run)?.keyId ?? null;
    // Row 333 R3 (#1831): the usage view marks key quotas that match no hired agent; limits answers.
    let orphanedKeys = () => null;
-    const usage = await createUsage({ store, dataRoot, businesses, log: usageLog, keyForRun,
+    const usage = await createUsage({ store, dataRoot, pluginDataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, businesses, log: usageLog, keyForRun,
      proxyView: business => proxyUsage?.view(business) ?? null, keyOrphans: business => orphanedKeys(business) });
-    proxyUsage = createProxyUsage({ store, log: usageLog, client: async () => {
+    proxyUsage = createProxyUsage({ store, pluginDataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, log: usageLog, client: async () => {
      if (!modelKeys) return null;
      await modelKeys.verifyIdentity();
      return modelProxyClient;
@@ -498,7 +504,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
    // Row 125 (#1619, REQ-LIMIT-3, REQ-LIMIT-4): the limit checks read the organization file at
    // each ask, so a limit, a reset or a switched-on check takes effect without a restart.
    const limitLog = entry => process.stderr.write(`limits: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n`);
-    const limits = createLimits({ store, read: id => settings ? settings.current(id) : businesses[id], log: limitLog,
+    const limits = createLimits({ store, pluginDataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, read: id => settings ? settings.current(id) : businesses[id], log: limitLog,
      keyForSubject: (business, subject) => modelUsageKey(credentials.status(), modelRuns, business, subject),
      keyLineages: business => modelKeyLineages(credentials.status(), business) });
    orphanedKeys = business => limits.orphanedKeys(business);
@@ -591,7 +597,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
    // receipt-backed addition under the organization lock: the file must still be this business plus that entry,
    // with the credentials, bots, libraries, roles and prior mappings the bus booted with. Anything else leaves
    // the product pending. Both readiness records must exist before even the broker's reload begins.
-    const writer = organization ? organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) : null;
+    const writer = organization ? organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot }) : null;
    const known = new Map(Object.entries(businesses).map(([id, b]) => [id, canonicalJson(b.projects ?? {})]));
    function activateManagedProject({ business: id, project, receipt, organization_revision }) {
      if (!writer || !booted.has(id) || !Object.hasOwn(businesses, id)) throw new BusError('unknown-business');
@@ -692,6 +698,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
      trackerOf.set(id, named ?? ((trackers ? tracked : tasks !== null) ? 'vikunja' : 'store'));
    }
    broker = new Broker({
+      pluginService: pluginService({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot,read:id=>organization ? loadOrg(id) : businesses[id]}),
      taskTracker: (id) => trackerOf.get(id),
      workspaceRead: state => requestWorkspace({ dataRoot, state, events: store.all("SELECT kind,actor_role,subject,body FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind IN ('task.created','task.assigned','session.launched') ORDER BY seq LIMIT 10001", state.business) }),
      requirementsHost,
@@ -760,7 +767,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
        // configured reads as unreadable, so requireCitation is true), and thread.messages' `last`.
        guard: (context, body, options) => libraryModule.guardReply({ ...context, dataRoot }, body, options),
        replyLimits: id => libraryModule.resolveReplyLimits(organization
-          ? organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }).readRaw(id) : { readable: false }),
+          ? organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot }).readRaw(id) : { readable: false }),
        last: (context, paths) => libraryModule.lastCommits({ ...context, dataRoot }, paths),
        GuardError: libraryModule.GuardError,
      },
@@ -791,7 +798,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
          known.set(id, canonicalJson(next.projects));
          return getProjectRemote(writer, id, args.project);
        }
-        if (verb === 'system-types.installed') return installedSystemTypes();
+        if (verb === 'system-types.installed') return installedSystemTypes({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot});
        if (verb === 'system-types.current') return settings.current(id).plugins?.['system-type'] ?? [];
        if(verb==='limits')return withTokens(id,settings.read(id));
        if(verb==='plugins')return {...plugins.read(id), available:{harness:levels.names ?? []}};
@@ -832,7 +839,10 @@ export async function startBroker({
          });
          result=settings.setRoutes(id,args,actor);
        }
-        else if(verb==='plugins.set'){result=plugins.set(id,args,actor);modelCatalogues?.invalidate();}
+        else if(verb==='plugins.set') {
+          if(actor==='tester' && Object.entries(args.plugins ?? {}).some(([kind,value])=>(Array.isArray(value)?value:[value]).some(name=>name!==null && !hasModule(kind,name)))) throw new BusError('human-required');
+          result=plugins.set(id,args,actor);modelCatalogues?.invalidate();
+        }
        // Row 194 (#1692, V6): the human's keep and noHire lists, through the instance writer.
        else if(verb==='veto.set')result=instances.veto(id,args,actor);
        // Row 298: the human's grant scope, through the instance writer.
@@ -868,7 +878,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
        return settings;
      } : null,
      credentialVerbs: organization
-        ? credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) })
+        ? credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir, dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot }) })
        : null,
      // Row 65: a new launch binds only on a harness its business switches on, read from the file
      // as it stands now; an unreadable file switches none on.
@@ -941,7 +951,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
      let factory = null;
      if (name === 'vikunja' && tasks) factory = tasks;
      else if (name !== 'vikunja' || [...Object.values(businesses)].some((b) => b?.plugins?.['task-tracker'] === 'vikunja')) {
-        const loader = createLoader({ log: pluginLog });
+        const loader = createLoader({ dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, log: pluginLog });
        const { refused } = await loader.load({ 'task-tracker': name });
        const [module] = loader.modules('task-tracker');
        if (!refused.length && module) factory = module.adapter({ trackers: trackers ?? {} });
@@ -963,7 +973,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
        return one.handle(cap, verb, args);
      };
    }
-    const web = await webServices(businesses);
+    const web = await webServices(businesses,{dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot});
    // Row 210 (#1707, design D7 step 6): clear what a killed bus child left, before anyone can call.
    if (runRoot) sweepRunDir(runRoot);
    // Row 234 (r6 X3): end the enrollments a killed bus child left, before anyone can call.
@@ -1216,13 +1226,13 @@ export async function startBroker({
        if (vars[prefix + 'model'] !== modelKey || vars[prefix + 'harness'] !== harness) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
        const entry = current.launch?.models?.[modelKey];
        if (!entry || canonicalJson(entry) !== canonicalJson(expected ?? null) || entry.provider !== provider || entry.model !== model) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
-        const harnessLoader = createLoader({log:()=>{}});
+        const harnessLoader = createLoader({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot,log:()=>{}});
        if ((await harnessLoader.load({harness:[harness]})).refused.length) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
        const countsAccount = harnessLoader.modules('harness')[0].countsAccount();
        if (typeof countsAccount !== 'boolean' || account !== (countsAccount ? current.launch?.account?.name ?? null : null)) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
        const names = current.plugins?.['model-provider'];
        if (!Array.isArray(names) || !names.length || (entry.module && !names.includes(entry.module))) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
-        const loader = makeProviderLoader({log:()=>{}}), loaded = await loader.load({'model-provider':entry.module ? [entry.module] : names});
+        const loader = makeProviderLoader({dataRoot:instanceRoot ?? dataRoot,log:()=>{}}), loaded = await loader.load({'model-provider':entry.module ? [entry.module] : names});
        if (loaded.refused.length) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
        const selected = selectModelProvider(loader.snapshot('model-provider'), entry);
        if (!selected) return refused('model-provider-unavailable');
@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ export function turnRecords(store, business) {
    };
  });
 }
-export async function createUsage({ store, businesses, log, keyForRun = () => null, proxyView = () => null, keyOrphans = () => null }) {
+export async function createUsage({ store, businesses, pluginDataRoot = null, log, keyForRun = () => null, proxyView = () => null, keyOrphans = () => null }) {
  const loaders = new Map();
  for (const [id, b] of Object.entries(businesses)) {
-    const loader = createLoader({ log });
+    const loader = createLoader({ log, dataRoot:pluginDataRoot });
    await loader.load(b.plugins ?? {});
    loaders.set(id, loader);
  }
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ test('Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure: only the listed imports, n
    // Row 236 (#1742, #436b) reads giteaName and parseGiteaUrl for the Gitea grant path.
    // FED R3 r5 (row 274, #414) reads covers, a user's grant check, from it.
    // Row 219 reads THREAD_DEFINITIONS from the same vocabulary for creative thread admission.
-    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITIONS, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl, credentialKind, validArgv, commandAllowed, HOST_ID, CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS, unhireableAction, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl, covers, grantScopeOf, grantInScope } from '../../organization/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
+    "import { pluginName, ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITIONS, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl, credentialKind, validArgv, commandAllowed, HOST_ID, CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS, unhireableAction, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl, covers, grantScopeOf, grantInScope } from '../../organization/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
  ]);
  assert.doesNotMatch(source, /\bimport\s*\(/);
  assert.doesNotMatch(readFileSync(new URL('../src/proxy-page-vocabulary.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8'), /\bimport\b/);
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+// Old path of packages/organization/src/config-dir-trust.mjs (rename design r2, stage B).
+export * from "../../organization/src/config-dir-trust.mjs";
@@ -1304,8 +1304,10 @@ inactive. Project settings changes are append-only and require human proof.
 `mosaic accounts` administers the instance-level accounts store locally, as the
 effective uid owning the config directory. It requires a human shell, rejects `--tester`,
 and takes no business selector or bus connection. It has no organization rights
-verbs. Console sign-in, sessions and membership evaluation are later Phase M
-slices; these commands alone do not turn accounts mode on.
+verbs. Console OIDC sign-in re-reads these accounts on every request. A disabled
+account or changed authentication generation loses account authority immediately;
+a legacy access.json root grant is checked independently. Organization membership
+evaluation follows in later Phase M slices.

 ```sh
 mosaic accounts init --name Operator
@@ -1327,3 +1329,11 @@ organization (including archived organizations) or any registry entry lacks its
 owner metadata during creation, and removes its memberships in
 the same write. List reports rollback rows needing repair; its JSON omits invite
 bindings and hashes. Receipts record effective process uid and verb and omit subjects and secrets.
+
+Managed accounts instances use the system units from `scripts/case2-unit.sh`.
+The selected uid must use a non-login shell, be the only member of its primary
+group, and own its config directory and data root. The shared Case 1/Case 2
+installer writes `<dataRoot>/.deployed` as mode 0444 naming the instance.
+`webui-service.sh` refuses accounts and deployed instances because its user
+manager runs under a human or development seat uid. The receipt uid identifies
+the invoking process; it does not attribute a human or resist tampering by that uid.
@@ -154,11 +154,13 @@ function pidAlive(pid) {
  }
 }

+// Names the lock by label: its path sits beside the access file in the config
+// directory, and a refusal never quotes a host path (PR #1916).
 function lockRefusal(lock) {
  const pid = lockPid(lock);
  if (pid !== null && pidAlive(pid)) return BUSY;
-  if (pid === null) return `refused: lock ${lock} is unreadable or not a pid; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again`;
-  return `refused: lock ${lock} is left by pid ${pid}, which is not running; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again`;
+  if (pid === null) return `refused: access file lock is unreadable or not a pid; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again`;
+  return `refused: access file lock is left by pid ${pid}, which is not running; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again`;
 }

 function takeLock(lock, fs) {
@@ -37,8 +37,10 @@ function parse(args) {
 function owns(user, owner, providers) {
  return user.subjects.some(s => s.provider === owner.provider && s.sub === owner.sub && providers.find(p => p.id === s.provider)?.issuer === owner.iss);
 }
-function readOwner(root) {
-  const owner = readJsonFile(join(root, 'owner.json'), 'organization owner', st => {
+// The registry checked `id` against the id pattern, so the label may name it; the
+// root is a host path and never reaches a refusal (PR #1916).
+function readOwner(root, id) {
+  const owner = readJsonFile(join(root, 'owner.json'), `organization owner of ${id}`, st => {
    if (st.uid !== process.geteuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) throw new CliError('refused: unsafe organization owner', 3);
  });
  rejectUnknownKeys(owner, ['provider', 'iss', 'sub'], 'organization owner');
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ export async function accountsCommand(args, io, deps) {
        // writing owner.json, so any missing owner must block removal too.
        for (const entry of Object.values((await readRegistryLocked(registry)).orgs)) {
          let owner;
-          try { owner = readOwner(entry.root); }
+          try { owner = readOwner(entry.root, entry.id); }
          catch (e) { if (/not found/.test(e.message)) throw new CliError(`refused: org-create-in-progress: ${entry.id} has no owner metadata`, 3); throw e; }
          if (owns(user, owner, providers)) throw new CliError(`refused: user-owns-org: ${entry.id}`, 3);
        }
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 // host (src/host.mjs) the systemd unit mosaic-bus@<business> runs; with
 // --pm it also launches the business's PM (src/launcher.mjs).

+import { assertBuildStart, assertDevInstance } from './deployment.mjs';
 import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { basename, join } from "node:path";
 import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ import { interviewCommand, INTERVIEW_USAGE, northStarCommand, NORTH_STAR_USAGE }
 import { resolveThread, threadCommand, threadMembers, threadsCommand, THREAD_TALK_USAGE, THREAD_USAGE, THREADS_USAGE } from "./thread.mjs";
 import { sessionCommand, SESSION_USAGE } from "./session.mjs";
 import { limitsCommand, LIMITS_USAGE } from "./limits.mjs";
+import { pluginInstallCommand } from "./plugin-install.mjs";
 import { pluginsCommand, PLUGINS_USAGE } from "./plugins.mjs";
 import { proxyCommand } from "./model-proxy.mjs";
 import { credentialsCommand, CREDENTIALS_USAGE } from "./credentials.mjs";
@@ -219,7 +221,7 @@ function callFor(parsed, io, deps) {
 // Only the converted project/thread surface uses a channel. Management stays on callFor.
 function channelCallFor(parsed, io, deps) {
  const call = callFor(parsed, io, deps);
-  const channel = createChannelCaller({ name: "cli", call,
+  const channel = createChannelCaller({ name: "cli", call, dataRoot:(deps.system ?? loadSystem({env:io.env})).dataRoot,
    log: entry => io.stderr.write(`mosaic: channel module refused (${entry.code})\n`),
  });
  return Object.assign(async (verb, args = {}) => {
@@ -614,8 +616,10 @@ async function bus(rest, io, deps) {
    const parsed = parse(args, { flags: ["--pm", "--no-launch", "--dev-local-owner", "--detach", "--internal-host"] });
    if (parsed.positional.length !== 1) throw usage("bus start takes one organization");
    if (parsed.flags.has("--no-launch") && parsed.flags.has("--pm")) throw usage("bus start takes --pm or --no-launch, not both");
+    assertBuildStart({ devOwner: parsed.flags.has("--dev-local-owner") });
    if (parsed.flags.has("--dev-local-owner")) devOwnerInstance(io.env);
    const ctx = organizationContext(io, deps);
+    if (parsed.flags.has("--dev-local-owner")) assertDevInstance(ctx.system, io.env);
    const businessId = parsed.positional[0];
    if (!parsed.flags.has("--internal-host")) {
      const receipt = await busStart(ctx, businessId, { detach: parsed.flags.has("--detach"), devLocalOwner: parsed.flags.has("--dev-local-owner"), pm: parsed.flags.has("--pm"), noLaunch: parsed.flags.has("--no-launch") });
@@ -756,6 +760,10 @@ export async function main(argv, io = { env: process.env, stdin: process.stdin,
  if (verb === 'accounts') return accountsCommand(rest, io, { system: deps.system ?? loadSystem({ env: io.env }), configDir: deps.accountsConfigDir });
  if (verb === "limits") return limitsCommand(rest,io,p=>callFor(p,io,deps));
  if (verb === "usage") return usageCommand(rest, io, p => callFor(p, io, deps));
+  if (verb === "plugins" && ["install","list","remove"].includes(rest[0])) {
+    refuseInsideAgent(io.env);
+    return pluginInstallCommand(rest,io,{system:deps.system ?? loadSystem({env:io.env}),dir:deps.accountsConfigDir});
+  }
  if (verb === "plugins") return pluginsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
  // Row 199 (#1697): issue and rotate read the token on stdin.
  if (verb === "proxy") return proxyCommand(rest, io, { system: () => deps.system ?? loadSystem({ env: io.env }), callFor: p => callFor(p, io, deps), prompt: deps.promptProxyKey });
@@ -153,10 +153,10 @@ export const consoleOwners = (sso) =>
 // snapshot is plain data that the broker and the launcher re-apply to every later read of the
 // organization file, so a root file change takes effect at the next boot only. A root file that
 // refuses hides the root level (design section 6): no root copy, and the organization still boots.
-export function copiesAtBoot({ businessId, env = process.env, warn = () => {} }) {
+export function copiesAtBoot({ businessId, env = process.env, warn = () => {}, dataRoot = null }) {
  const dir = configDir(env), roles = rolesDir(env);
-  loadBusiness(businessId, { dir, rolesDir: roles });
-  const { document } = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir: roles }).read(businessId);
+  loadBusiness(businessId, { dir, rolesDir: roles, dataRoot });
+  const { document } = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir: roles, dataRoot }).read(businessId);
  let root = null;
  try { root = loadRootAgents(dir, { rolesDir: roles }); }
  catch (error) {
@@ -164,13 +164,13 @@ export function copiesAtBoot({ businessId, env = process.env, warn = () => {} })
    warn(`root agent file refused, so ${businessId} runs no root copies until it is fixed and the bus restarts: ${error.message}`);
  }
  const snapshot = materializeCopies({ orgId: businessId, doc: document, root, rolesDir: roles });
-  return { snapshot, business: withCopies(document, businessFilePath(businessId, dir), { rolesDir: roles, snapshot }) };
+  return { snapshot, business: withCopies(document, businessFilePath(businessId, dir), { rolesDir: roles, snapshot, dataRoot }) };
 }

 export function bootConfig({ system, businessId, orgRoot = system.dataRoot, env = process.env, warn = () => {} }) {
  return business(() => {
    const vars = systemVars(system);
-    const { snapshot, business: b } = copiesAtBoot({ businessId, env, warn });
+    const { snapshot, business: b } = copiesAtBoot({ businessId, env, warn, dataRoot:system.dataRoot });
    const resolved = {};
    for (const instance of Object.keys(b.roles)) resolved[instance] = resolveInstance({ system: vars, business: b, instance });
    const config = {
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// M3: executable and instance boundaries. Presence is checked with lstat, so
+// broken links and unreadable metadata never turn a deployed path into dev.
+import { constants, lstatSync, openSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, fchmodSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+const configDir = (env = process.env) => dirname(resolve(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG || join(homedir(), '.config/mosaic-dev/config.json')));
+
+const CODE_ROOT = resolve(import.meta.dirname, '../../..');
+export function present(file) {
+  try { lstatSync(file); return true; } catch (e) { if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return false; throw e; }
+}
+function metadata(file, label, check) {
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
+    const st = fstatSync(fd);
+    if (!st.isFile() || st.size > 4096 || !check(st)) throw new Error('metadata refused');
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync(fd, 'utf8'));
+  } catch { throw new Error(`${label} is missing or invalid`); }
+  finally { if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd); }
+}
+export function buildStamp(root = CODE_ROOT) {
+  const file = join(root, '.stack-build.json');
+  if (!present(file)) return null;
+  const doc = metadata(file, 'build stamp', st => !(st.mode & 0o222));
+  if (!doc || Object.keys(doc).length !== 1 || !/^[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(doc.commit) || doc.commit !== basename(root)) throw new Error('build stamp does not name this copy commit');
+  return doc;
+}
+export function assertBuildStart({ serve = false, sso = false, devOwner = false, devBind = null, devNames = [] } = {}) {
+  const stamp = buildStamp();
+  if (stamp && (devOwner || devBind !== null || devNames.length)) throw new Error('stamped build refuses dev-local-owner and LAN flags');
+  if (stamp && serve && !sso) throw new Error('stamped build serve requires --sso');
+  return stamp;
+}
+export function assertDevInstance(system, env = process.env) {
+  if (present(join(configDir(env), 'accounts.json'))) throw new Error('--dev-local-owner refuses accounts.json');
+  if (system.console?.sso) throw new Error('--dev-local-owner refuses console.sso');
+  if (present(join(system.dataRoot, '.deployed'))) throw new Error('--dev-local-owner refuses .deployed');
+}
+const instanceName = dir => /^mosaic-([a-z][a-z0-9]{1,15})$/.exec(basename(dir))?.[1] ?? 'dev';
+export function assertDeployed(system, dir = configDir()) {
+  const doc = metadata(join(system.dataRoot, '.deployed'), '.deployed', st => (st.mode & 0o777) === 0o444 && st.uid === process.geteuid());
+  if (!doc || Object.keys(doc).length !== 1 || doc.instance !== instanceName(dir)) throw new Error('.deployed does not name this instance');
+}
+// Both managed host cases install through case2-install.sh. Existing metadata
+// must validate; an install never replaces it or follows a destination link.
+export function writeDeployment(system, dir = configDir()) {
+  // Default-instance bootstrap creates the config before its data directory.
+  mkdirSync(system.dataRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const root = lstatSync(system.dataRoot);
+  if (!root.isDirectory() || root.uid !== process.geteuid() || (root.mode & 0o022)) throw new Error('.deployed data root must be an owned directory without public write');
+  const file = join(system.dataRoot, '.deployed');
+  if (present(file)) {
+    const doc = metadata(file, '.deployed', st => (st.mode & 0o777) === 0o444 && st.uid === process.geteuid());
+    if (!doc || Object.keys(doc).length !== 1 || doc.instance !== instanceName(dir)) throw new Error('.deployed does not name this instance');
+    return;
+  }
+  const fd = openSync(file, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o444);
+  try { writeFileSync(fd, JSON.stringify({ instance: instanceName(dir) }) + '\n'); fchmodSync(fd, 0o444); } finally { closeSync(fd); }
+}
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ function noCredentials(env) {
 function ownedPrivate(path, directory) {
  const st = lstatSync(path);
  if (st.isSymbolicLink() || (directory ? !st.isDirectory() : !st.isFile()) || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077))
-    throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', `${path} is not a private ${directory ? 'directory' : 'file'} of this user`);
+    throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', `${directory ? 'dev-fixture directory' : 'fixture file'} is not a private ${directory ? 'directory' : 'file'} of this user`);
 }

 // The recorded fixture, or null when there is none. Anything malformed refuses.
@@ -56,19 +56,19 @@ export function readFixture(dataRoot) {
  catch (e) { if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null; throw e; }
  let fd;
  try { fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW); }
-  catch (e) { if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null; throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', `${file} can't be opened (${e.code})`); }
+  catch (e) { if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null; throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', `fixture.json can't be opened (${e.code})`); }
  let doc;
  try {
    const st = fstatSync(fd);
-    if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', `${file} is not a private file of this user`);
+    if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) throw refuse('fixture-state-unsafe', 'fixture.json is not a private file of this user');
    doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync(fd, 'utf8'));
-  } catch (e) { if (e instanceof CliError) throw e; throw refuse('fixture-state-invalid', `${file} is not JSON`); }
+  } catch (e) { if (e instanceof CliError) throw e; throw refuse('fixture-state-invalid', 'fixture.json is not JSON'); }
  finally { closeSync(fd); }
  const m = LOOPBACK.exec(doc?.endpoint ?? '');
-  if (!m) throw refuse('fixture-endpoint-not-loopback', `${file} names an endpoint that is not http://127.0.0.1:<port>`);
+  if (!m) throw refuse('fixture-endpoint-not-loopback', 'fixture.json names an endpoint that is not http://127.0.0.1:<port>');
  if (doc.fixtureVersion !== 1 || doc.model !== 'deterministic' || Number(m[1]) !== doc.port || !Number.isSafeInteger(doc.pid) || doc.pid < 2
    || typeof doc.instance !== 'string' || JSON.stringify(doc.entry) !== JSON.stringify(FIXTURE_ENTRY))
-    throw refuse('fixture-state-invalid', `${file} is not a fixture record`);
+    throw refuse('fixture-state-invalid', 'fixture.json is not a fixture record');
  return doc;
 }

@@ -79,12 +79,13 @@ import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, createReadStream, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
 import { createServer } from "node:net";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { basename, join } from "node:path";
 import { GIT_GRACE_MS, GIT_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
 import { gitSocketPath } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
 import { gateEnv, isMosaicStack, rootHits, runGate } from "../../seat/src/landing.mjs";
 import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, publish, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
 import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
+import { ID_PATTERN } from "../../organization/src/vocabulary.mjs";
 import { withProcessing } from '../../processing-control/src/effects.mjs';

 const HEADER_MAX = 4096;
@@ -385,7 +386,7 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
      if (!p) throw new Refusal("unknown-project");
      mkdirSync(logs, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
      prepared = await prepareLand({ ...where, root: p.root, taskRef: task_ref, commit: facts.commit, dir: logs, name: id, rootHits, message: (m) => landMessage(facts, m) });
-      if (!(await gate.classify(p.root, env))) throw new Refusal("gate-missing", `${p.root} isn't a mosaic-stack checkout with node_modules`);
+      if (!(await gate.classify(p.root, env))) throw new Refusal("gate-missing", `project ${facts.project} isn't a mosaic-stack checkout with node_modules`);
      symlinkSync(join(p.root, "node_modules"), join(prepared.worktree, "node_modules"));
    } catch (e) {
      if (prepared) await dropLand({ ...where, worktree: prepared.worktree }).catch((x) => log(`git socket: ${id}: ${x.message}`));
@@ -398,7 +399,9 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
        const r = await gate.run({ worktree: prepared.worktree, logs, env: gateEnv(env), signal: AbortSignal.any([slot.abort.signal, scope.signal]) });
        scope.guard();
        if (r.aborted || slot.abort.signal.aborted) throw new Refusal("host-closing", "the host closed during the gate; nothing moved");
-        if (!r.ok) throw new Refusal("gate-failed", `${r.step} failed, see ${r.log}`);
+        // The detail reaches the role, so the log is named inside the bus host directory, never by
+        // host path (PR #1916); its file name only when it passes the id pattern.
+        if (!r.ok) throw new Refusal("gate-failed", `${r.step} failed, see land/${id}${ID_PATTERN.test(basename(r.log ?? "")) ? `/${basename(r.log)}` : ""} in the bus host directory`);
        await finishLand({ ...where, land: prepared, record: (m) => op({ op: "recordLand", ticket, land: { ...m, reviewed, base, patch_id } }) });
      } finally {
        await dropLand({ ...where, worktree: prepared.worktree }).catch((x) => log(`git socket: ${id}: ${x.message}`));
@@ -503,7 +506,7 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env

  async function listen() {
    if (existsSync(path)) {
-      if (!lstatSync(path).isSocket()) throw new CliError(`${path} exists and isn't a socket`, 3);
+      if (!lstatSync(path).isSocket()) throw new CliError("git socket path exists and isn't a socket", 3);
      rmSync(path);
    }
    server = createServer((socket) => {
@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ function readState(file, found = () => {}) {
    state = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
  } catch (e) {
    if (e.code === "ENOENT") return null;
-    throw new CliError(`bus host state is unreadable: ${file}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError("bus host state is unreadable", 3);
  }
  if (!state || !Number.isSafeInteger(state.pid) || typeof state.startTime !== "string" || typeof state.business !== "string") {
-    throw new CliError(`bus host state is malformed: ${file}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError("bus host state is malformed", 3);
  }
  return { ...state, live: startTimeOf(state.pid) === state.startTime };
 }
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ export function claimHostLock(dataRoot, state, { found = () => {}, between = ()
      const prior = readState(file, found);
      if (!prior) continue;
      if (prior.live) throw new CliError(`a bus host already runs for ${prior.business} (pid ${prior.pid})`, 3);
-      if (refuseStale) throw new CliError(`stale bus host lock: ${file}`, 3);
+      if (refuseStale) throw new CliError("stale bus host lock", 3);
      between();
      try {
        renameSync(file, aside);
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ export function claimHostLock(dataRoot, state, { found = () => {}, between = ()
      }
      rmSync(aside, { force: true });
    }
-    throw new CliError(`${file} kept changing; no bus host started`, 3);
+    throw new CliError("bus host lock kept changing; no bus host started", 3);
  } finally {
    rmSync(tmp, { force: true });
  }
@@ -120,7 +120,9 @@ function setArgs(parsed) {
    try {
      args.vars = JSON.parse(readFileSync(values["--vars"], "utf8"));
    } catch (error) {
-      throw new CliError(`--vars ${values["--vars"]}: ${error.message}`, 4);
+      // Name the flag and the error kind, never the file's path or bytes (PR #1916).
+      const code = typeof error?.code === "string" && /^E[A-Z0-9]+$/.test(error.code) ? error.code : "unreadable";
+      throw new CliError(`--vars file: ${error instanceof SyntaxError ? "not valid JSON" : code}`, 4);
    }
  }
  if (launch !== undefined) args.launch = launch;
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ export function createLauncher({
  }
  // Row 64 (#1557): where a role's skills are read from; scripts/skill.sh activate fills it.
  const skillsDir = join(system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, "skills-enabled");
-  const loadOrg = () => loadWithCopies(host.business, { dir: configDir(env), rolesDir: rolesDir(env), snapshot: copies?.org === host.business ? copies : null });
+  const loadOrg = () => loadWithCopies(host.business, { dir: configDir(env), rolesDir: rolesDir(env), dataRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, snapshot: copies?.org === host.business ? copies : null });
  let b = loadOrg();
  const vars = systemVars(system);

@@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ export function createLauncher({
    const admissionGeneration = admission().generation;
    let businessRevision;
    try {
-      const snapshot = organizationWriter({dir:configDir(env),rolesDir:rolesDir(env)}).read(host.business);
+      const snapshot = organizationWriter({dir:configDir(env),rolesDir:rolesDir(env),dataRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot}).read(host.business);
      businessRevision = snapshot.revision;
-      b = withCopies(snapshot.document, businessFilePath(host.business, configDir(env)), {rolesDir:rolesDir(env), snapshot: copies?.org === host.business ? copies : null});
+      b = withCopies(snapshot.document, businessFilePath(host.business, configDir(env)), {rolesDir:rolesDir(env), dataRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, snapshot: copies?.org === host.business ? copies : null});
    } catch(e){throw new Refusal("organization-refused",e.message);}
    if (!b.launch) throw new Refusal("launch-not-configured", `business ${b.id} has no launch block`);
    // #1873 A3: an unbound or refused copy never launches. The message names the copy, its project
@@ -382,16 +382,16 @@ export function createLauncher({
      throw new Refusal("legacy-run-live", `a run of ${instance} with no session is still live`);
    let resolved;
    try {
-      resolved = resolveInstance({ system: vars, business: b, instance });
+      resolved = resolveInstance({ system: vars, business: b, instance, enforcePlugins:true, pluginRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot });
    } catch (e) {
-      throw new Refusal("unsupported-harness", e.message);
+      throw new Refusal(e.code === "plugin-disabled" ? "plugin-disabled" : "unsupported-harness", e.code === "plugin-disabled" ? e.plugin : e.message);
    }
    // Resolve the business's current provider modules with a fresh loader; a refused
    // load never inherits a previous business's authority.
    const providerNames = b.plugins?.['model-provider'] ?? [];
    const providerModules = new Map();
    if (providerNames.length) {
-      const loader = makeLoader({ log: entry => record({ ...entry, instance }) });
+      const loader = makeLoader({ dataRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, log: entry => record({ ...entry, instance }) });
      const loaded = await loader.load({ 'model-provider': providerNames });
      if (loaded.refused.length) throw new Refusal('model-provider-unavailable', 'model provider module refused');
      for (const { name, module } of loader.snapshot('model-provider')) providerModules.set(name, module);
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ export function createLauncher({
    }
    // One harness through a fresh loader, so a refusal never leaves an earlier load's module in use.
    const harnessOf = async (m) => {
-      const loader = makeLoader({ log: (entry) => record({ ...entry, instance }) });
+      const loader = makeLoader({ dataRoot:system.instanceRoot ?? dataRoot, log: (entry) => record({ ...entry, instance }) });
      const { refused } = await loader.load({ harness: [m.harness] });
      if (refused.length) throw new Refusal("harness-refused", `harness ${m.harness}: ${refused.map((r) => `${r.code}: ${r.message}`).join("; ")}`);
      const module = loader.modules("harness")[0];
@@ -162,28 +162,28 @@ export function openJournal(file, { log = () => {}, now = () => new Date() } = {
    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
  } catch (e) {
    // A dangling link in place of the directory fails mkdir with ENOENT.
-    if (e.code === "ENOENT" && lstatSync(dir, { throwIfNoEntry: false })?.isSymbolicLink()) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must not be a symlink: ${dir}`, 3);
-    if ([...UNWRITABLE, "ENOTDIR"].includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory cannot be created (${e.code}): ${dir}`, 3);
+    if (e.code === "ENOENT" && lstatSync(dir, { throwIfNoEntry: false })?.isSymbolicLink()) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must not be a symlink`, 3);
+    if ([...UNWRITABLE, "ENOTDIR"].includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory cannot be created (${e.code})`, 3);
    if (e.code !== "EEXIST") throw e;
  }
  const ds = lstatSync(dir);
-  if (ds.isSymbolicLink()) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must not be a symlink: ${dir}`, 3);
+  if (ds.isSymbolicLink()) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must not be a symlink`, 3);
  if (!ds.isDirectory() || ds.uid !== process.getuid() || (ds.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
-    throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must be mode 0700 and owned by this user: ${dir}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError(`notify journal directory must be mode 0700 and owned by this user`, 3);
  }
  try {
    accessSync(dir, constants.W_OK | constants.X_OK);
  } catch (e) {
-    if (UNWRITABLE.includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory is not writable (${e.code}): ${dir}`, 3);
+    if (UNWRITABLE.includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal directory is not writable (${e.code})`, 3);
    throw e;
  }
  let fd;
  try {
    fd = openSync(file, O_RDWR | O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
  } catch (e) {
-    if (e.code === "ELOOP") throw new CliError(`notify journal must not be a symlink: ${file}`, 3);
-    if (UNWRITABLE.includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal is not writable (${e.code}): ${file}`, 3);
-    if (e.code === "EISDIR") throw new CliError(`notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user: ${file}`, 3);
+    if (e.code === "ELOOP") throw new CliError(`notify journal must not be a symlink`, 3);
+    if (UNWRITABLE.includes(e.code)) throw new CliError(`notify journal is not writable (${e.code})`, 3);
+    if (e.code === "EISDIR") throw new CliError(`notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user`, 3);
    throw e;
  }
  const sent = new Set();
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ export function openJournal(file, { log = () => {}, now = () => new Date() } = {
  try {
    const st = fstatSync(fd);
    if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) {
-      throw new CliError(`notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user: ${file}`, 3);
+      throw new CliError(`notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user`, 3);
    }
    const bytes = readFileSync(fd);
    const end = bytes.lastIndexOf(0x0a) + 1;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ export function openJournal(file, { log = () => {}, now = () => new Date() } = {
        r = null;
      }
      const bad = r === null ? "json" : badField(r);
-      if (bad) throw new CliError(`notify journal line ${i + 1} is malformed (${bad}): ${file}`, 3);
+      if (bad) throw new CliError(`notify journal line ${i + 1} is malformed (${bad})`, 3);
      count(r);
    });
    if (end < bytes.length) {
@@ -6,27 +6,28 @@ import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
 // The notifier's private config: `<dataRoot>/notify/<business>/notify.json`,
 // 0600, `{"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": "<discord binding>" | null}`.
 // Missing refuses, so a host never starts without someone deciding whether
-// it DMs; null runs the host without a notifier.
+// it DMs; null runs the host without a notifier. Refusals name the business
+// and the path under the data root, never the host path (PR #1916).
 export function readNotifyConfig(dataRoot, business) {
  const file = join(dataRoot, "notify", business, "notify.json");
  let st;
  try {
    st = lstatSync(file);
  } catch {
-    throw new CliError(`no notifier config at ${file}; write {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": "<discord binding>"} there, mode 0600, or "binding": null to run without DMs`, 3);
+    throw new CliError(`no notifier config for ${business}: write {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": "<discord binding>"} to notify/${business}/notify.json under the data root, mode 0600, or "binding": null to run without DMs`, 3);
  }
  if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) {
-    throw new CliError(`notifier config must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user: ${file}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError(`notifier config for ${business} must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user`, 3);
  }
  let doc;
  try {
    doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
  } catch {
-    throw new CliError(`notifier config is not JSON: ${file}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError(`notifier config for ${business} is not JSON`, 3);
  }
  const keys = doc && typeof doc === "object" && !Array.isArray(doc) ? Object.keys(doc).sort().join(",") : "";
  if (keys !== "binding,notifyVersion" || doc.notifyVersion !== 1 || (doc.binding !== null && !(typeof doc.binding === "string" && BINDING_NAME.test(doc.binding)))) {
-    throw new CliError(`notifier config must be exactly {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": <binding name> | null}: ${file}`, 3);
+    throw new CliError(`notifier config for ${business} must be exactly {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": <binding name> | null}`, 3);
  }
  return doc.binding;
 }
@@ -138,7 +138,9 @@ export async function busStart(ctx, id, { detach = false, devLocalOwner = false,
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));
  }
  if (!exited) { child.kill('SIGTERM'); await done; }
-  throw new CliError(`bus failed to start; see ${join(org.paths.hostDir, 'host.log')}`, 3);
+  // Name the log by its place in the organization's runtime directory, never by host path (PR #1916);
+  // resolveOrg admitted `id` only after the registry's id check.
+  throw new CliError(`bus failed to start; see bus-host/host.log in the runtime directory of organization ${id}`, 3);
 }
 export async function busRestart(ctx, id) {
  const org = await target(ctx, id);
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { processState } from '../../seat/src/process-state.mjs';
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
 import { request as httpRequest } from 'node:http';
 import { constants, closeSync, fstatSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, rmSync, renameSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { basename, join } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { listOrgs, resolveOrg } from '../../organization/src/org-registry.mjs';
 import { cmdlineOf, startTimeOf } from './host.mjs';
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ async function launch(ctx, args, lan, detach) {
      }
      await sleep(50);
    }
-    fail(`console failed to start; see ${log}`);
+    // The log is named under the data root, never by host path (PR #1916).
+    fail(`console failed to start; see console/${basename(log)} under the data root`);
  } catch (e) {
    if (child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) { child.kill('SIGTERM'); await done; }
    throw e;
@@ -193,11 +194,8 @@ export async function consoleStop(ctx, { warn = s => process.stderr.write(s) } =
    const argv = cmdlineOf(s.pid);
    if (!argv || !argv.length) fail('console process identity is uncertain');
    const i = argv.indexOf(WEBUI);
-    if (i < 0 || argv[i + 1] !== 'serve') {
-      const serve = argv.indexOf('serve');
-      const entry = serve > 0 ? ` ${argv[serve - 1]}` : '';
-      fail(`console was started from another path${entry}; stop it there`);
-    }
+    // The other entry script is a host path, so the refusal never names it (PR #1916).
+    if (i < 0 || argv[i + 1] !== 'serve') fail('console was started from another checkout; stop it there');
    process.kill(s.pid, 'SIGTERM');
    const deadline = Date.now() + 20000;
    while (Date.now() < deadline) {
@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ import { consoleBusRestart } from './org-console.mjs';
 import { refuseInsideAgent } from './transport.mjs';
 export const ORG_USAGE = 'mosaic org system-types installed | system-types enabled ID | lock show|clear ID | reload ID | archive ID --if-revision N [--json] | restore ID --if-revision N [--json] | delete ID --confirm ID [--if-revision N] [--json] | template render ID [--fixture local] --output FILE | validate FILE | create ID --from FILE | show ID [--json] | list [--json] | update ID --from FILE --if-revision N | queue init ID (--local-only --accept-local-loss-risk | --remote URL) | queue show ID [--json] | project repo init ID PROJECT (--local-only --accept-local-loss-risk | --remote URL) | project repo show ID PROJECT [--json] | config validate ID | config resolve ID INSTANCE [--project ID]';
 function parse(args) { const pos = [], values = {}, flags = new Set(); for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) { const a = args[i]; if (['--json', '--local-only', '--accept-local-loss-risk'].includes(a)) { if (flags.has(a)) throw new CliError(`duplicate ${a}`, 4); flags.add(a); } else if (['--fixture', '--output', '--from', '--if-revision', '--remote', '--confirm'].includes(a)) { if (values[a] !== undefined || !args[i+1] || args[i+1].startsWith('--')) throw new CliError(`${a} needs one value`, 4); values[a] = args[++i]; } else if (a.startsWith('--')) throw new CliError(`unknown option ${a}`, 4); else pos.push(a); } return { pos, values, flags }; }
-async function document(file) { try { return JSON.parse(await readFile(file, 'utf8')); } catch (e) { throw new CliError(`cannot read document ${file}: ${e instanceof SyntaxError ? 'not valid JSON' : e.message}`, 2); } }
+// A refusal names the document by label and the error by its code, never by host path or bytes (PR #1916).
+const errorCode = e => typeof e?.code === 'string' && /^E[A-Z0-9]+$/.test(e.code) ? e.code : 'unreadable';
+async function document(file) { try { return JSON.parse(await readFile(file, 'utf8')); } catch (e) { throw new CliError(`cannot read organization document: ${e instanceof SyntaxError ? 'not valid JSON' : errorCode(e)}`, 2); } }
 export async function orgCommand(args, io, deps = {}) {
 try {
  const p = parse(args); const words = p.pos; let result; let accepted = [];
@@ -41,5 +43,11 @@ export async function orgCommand(args, io, deps = {}) {
   else throw new CliError(ORG_USAGE, 4);
  } else throw new CliError(ORG_USAGE, 4);
  io.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + '\n');
- } catch (e) { if (e instanceof CliError) throw e; throw new CliError(`${e.code ? e.code + ': ' : ''}${e.message}`, 2); }
+ } catch (e) {
+  if (e instanceof CliError) throw e;
+  // A raw Node filesystem error ("CODE: description, syscall 'path'") is named by its operation
+  // and code, never by the host path in its message (PR #1916).
+  const message = typeof e?.syscall === 'string' && typeof e.code === 'string' && e.message.startsWith(`${e.code}:`) ? `cannot ${e.syscall} (${errorCode(e)})` : e.message;
+  throw new CliError(`${e.code ? e.code + ': ' : ''}${message}`, 2);
+ }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Instance-level shell verbs. Intentionally separate from pluginsCommand's bus transport.
+import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { CliError } from './errors.mjs';
+import { refuseInsideAgent } from './transport.mjs';
+import { configDir } from '../../organization/src/organization-config.mjs';
+import { assertAccountsOwner } from '../../organization/src/accounts.mjs';
+import { withRegistry } from '../../organization/src/org-registry.mjs';
+import { readJsonFile } from '../../organization/src/util.mjs';
+import { installPlugin, removePlugin } from '../../plugins/src/install.mjs';
+import { readPluginLock } from '../../plugins/src/pinned.mjs';
+
+export async function pluginInstallCommand(args,io,{system,dir=configDir(io.env)}) {
+  refuseInsideAgent(io.env);
+  try {
+    assertAccountsOwner(dir);
+    const [verb,value,...rest]=args;
+    if(!['install','list','remove'].includes(verb))throw new CliError('mosaic plugins install SOURCE --sha256 HASH [--commit FULL_SHA] | list | remove NAME',4);
+    const opts={};
+    if(verb==='install') {
+      for(let i=0;i<rest.length;i+=2){if(!['--sha256','--commit'].includes(rest[i]) || !rest[i+1] || Object.hasOwn(opts,rest[i]))throw new CliError('invalid plugin install options',4);opts[rest[i]]=rest[i+1];}
+      if(!value || !opts['--sha256'])throw new CliError('install requires SOURCE and --sha256 HASH',4);
+    }else if(rest.length || (verb==='list'?value!==undefined:!value))throw new CliError('invalid plugin management arguments',4);
+    let result;
+    if(verb==='list') result=readPluginLock(system.dataRoot);
+    else if(verb==='install')result=installPlugin({dataRoot:system.dataRoot,source:value,commit:opts['--commit'],expectedHash:opts['--sha256'],print:line=>io.stdout.write(line+'\n')});
+    else result=await withRegistry({configDir:dir,instance:system.instance ?? dir.split('/').pop().replace(/^mosaic-/, '')},()=>{
+      // All organization files, including archived organizations, must be readable. The registry
+      // lock prevents a simultaneous create from disappearing from this check.
+      let files=[];try{files=readdirSync(join(dir,'businesses'));}catch(e){if(e.code!=='ENOENT')throw e;}
+      return removePlugin({dataRoot:system.dataRoot,name:value,enabled:name=>files.filter(n=>n.endsWith('.json')).some(n=>{
+        const doc=readJsonFile(join(dir,'businesses',n),'organization file');
+        return Object.values(doc.plugins ?? {}).flat().includes(name);
+      })});
+    },{write:false});
+    io.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result,null,2)+'\n');
+  }catch(e){if(e instanceof CliError)throw e;throw new CliError(`plugin management refused: ${/^[a-z-]+$/.test(e.code ?? '')?e.code:'plugin-refused'}`,3);}
+}
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { orgSelector } from "./org-selector.mjs";

-export const PLUGINS_USAGE = "mosaic plugins [--business ID] [--json] [--tester] | set --file PATCH [--business ID] [--tester]";
+export const PLUGINS_USAGE = "mosaic plugins [--business ID] [--json] [--tester] | set --file PATCH [--business ID] [--tester] | install SOURCE --sha256 HASH [--commit FULL_SHA] | list | remove NAME";

 function parse(args) {
  const out = { positional: [], flags: new Set(), values: {} };
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ const inside = (root, path) => { const r = relative(root, path); return r !== ''
 export function threadRecords(file, thread) {
  const log = fileEvidence(file);
  if (!log.ok && log.problem === 'missing') return { file, missing: true, launches: [], ends: [], malformed: 0 };
-  if (!log.ok) throw new CliError(`run-evidence-refused: launch log ${file}: ${log.problem}`, 3);
+  if (!log.ok) throw new CliError(`run-evidence-refused: launch log: ${log.problem}`, 3);
  const launches = [], ends = []; let malformed = 0;
  log.bytes.toString('utf8').split('\n').forEach((line, i) => {
    if (!line) return;
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ export async function runCommand(rest, io, deps = {}) {
    lines.push(verify ? `verified: ${verified ? 'yes' : 'no'}` : 'not verified (pass --verify)');
    io.stdout.write(`${lines.join('\n')}\n`);
  }
-  if (runs.length === 0) throw new CliError(`no launch for thread ${thread.label} in ${log.file}`, 2);
+  if (runs.length === 0) throw new CliError(`no launch for thread ${thread.label} in the launch log`, 2);
  if (verify && !verified) throw new CliError('run evidence failed verification', 1);
  return report;
 }
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ test("a lock left by a dead pid refuses, names the pid, and is not reclaimed", a
  const dead = spawnSync(process.execPath, ["-e", ""]);
  writeFileSync(`${s.file}.lock`, `${dead.pid}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
  const before = readFileSync(s.file, "utf8");
-  await refusal(run([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], s.deps), new RegExp(`${s.file}\\.lock is left by pid ${dead.pid}, which is not running`));
+  await refusal(run([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], s.deps), new RegExp(`^refused: access file lock is left by pid ${dead.pid}, which is not running`));
  assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, "utf8"), before);
  assert.equal(readFileSync(`${s.file}.lock`, "utf8"), `${dead.pid}\n`);
  assert.equal(s.receipts(), "");
@@ -165,13 +165,14 @@ test("a failed rename leaves the old bytes, removes the temp file, and writes no
  assert.equal(s.receipts(), "");
 });

-test("a group-writable access file refuses with exit 3, names the file, and changes nothing", async (t) => {
+test("a group-writable access file refuses with exit 3, names the file by label, never by path, and changes nothing", async (t) => {
  const s = setup(t);
  chmodSync(s.file, 0o664);
  const before = readFileSync(s.file, "utf8");
  const err = await refusal(run([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], s.deps), /must not be writable by group or other/);
  assert.equal(err.exitCode, 3);
-  assert.match(err.message, new RegExp(s.file.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")));
+  assert.equal(err.message, "refused: access file must not be writable by group or other (mode 664)");
+  assert.ok(!err.message.includes(s.file), err.message);
  assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, "utf8"), before);
  assert.equal(s.receipts(), "");
  assert.equal(existsSync(`${s.file}.lock`), false);
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { mkdtempSync, chmodSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { mkdtempSync, chmodSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
 import { accountsCommand } from '../src/accounts.mjs';
@@ -69,3 +69,48 @@ test('host boundary and receipt use effective uid, not real uid (current design
 try { await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['list']); const receipt = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8')); assert.equal(receipt.uid, effectiveUid); }
 finally { process.getuid = realUid; }
 });
+
+// The uid identifies this process, not the human who invoked it. The instance
+// uid can rewrite its receipt; this is neither human attribution nor tamper evidence.
+test('M3 CLI integration refuses foreign effective uid before any account mutation, and receipts identify the process', async t => {
+ const { spawnSync } = await import('node:child_process'); const { fixture } = await import('./helpers.mjs');
+ const root=mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(),'ai-')); t.after(()=>rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true})); const f=fixture(root);
+ const config=JSON.parse(readFileSync(f.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG)); config.console={sso:{publicOrigin:'https://console.test',providers:[{id:'pocket',issuer:'https://id.test',clientId:'test',clientSecret:{slot:'pocket'},algs:['RS256'],subjects:[{sub:'owner',name:'Owner'}]}]}};
+ writeFileSync(f.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG,JSON.stringify(config));
+ const prelude=join(root,'uid.mjs'); const cli=new URL('../src/cli.mjs',import.meta.url).pathname;
+ const run=args=>spawnSync(process.execPath,['--import',prelude,cli,'accounts',...args],{env:{...process.env,...f.env},encoding:'utf8',timeout:10000});
+ writeFileSync(prelude,`process.geteuid=()=>${process.geteuid()+1};`); const refused=run(['init']); assert.equal(refused.status,3,refused.stderr); assert.match(refused.stderr,/accounts-unsafe: (a config directory ancestor|config directory) must belong to (root or )?uid \d+/);
+ for(const name of ['accounts.json','accounts.lock','accounts-receipts.jsonl']) assert.equal(existsSync(join(root,'config',name)),false);
+ // Different real uid, same effective uid: the effective identity is recorded.
+ writeFileSync(prelude,`process.getuid=()=>${process.geteuid()+2};`); const ok=run(['init']); assert.equal(ok.status,0,ok.stderr);
+ const receipt=JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root,'config/accounts-receipts.jsonl'),'utf8')); assert.equal(receipt.uid,process.geteuid());
+});
+
+// org-acct-anchor (#1873): `mosaic accounts init` refuses under an ancestor another user could
+// rename, before any lock or write, and the refusal names the rule, never the path.
+test('org-acct-anchor: init, list and remove refuse a 0777 ancestor before any lock; 1777 passes', async t => {
+ const top = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'a-')); t.after(() => { chmodSync(top, 0o700); rmSync(top, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+ const parent = join(top, 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234'), configDir = join(parent, 'cfg'); mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+ let output = ''; const io = { env: {}, stdout: { write: s => output += s }, stderr: { write: () => {} } };
+ const deps = { configDir, instance: 'test', system: { console: { sso: { providers } } } };
+ chmodSync(parent, 0o777);
+ for (const args of [['init'], ['list'], ['user', 'remove', 'u-000000000001', '--revision', '1']]) {
+  await assert.rejects(accountsCommand(args, io, deps), e => e.exitCode === 3 && /^refused: accounts-unsafe: a config directory ancestor must belong to root or uid \d+ and not be writable by others without the sticky bit$/.test(e.message) && !e.message.includes('sk-test') && !e.message.includes('/'));
+  for (const name of ['accounts.json', 'accounts.lock', 'accounts-receipts.jsonl', 'org-runtime.lock']) assert.equal(existsSync(join(configDir, name)), false, name);
+ }
+ chmodSync(parent, 0o1777);
+ await accountsCommand(['init'], io, deps); assert.match(output, /accounts init: u-[0-9a-f]{12}, revision 1/);
+});
+// PR #1916 (org-redact5): an unreadable owner file is named by the registry's checked
+// id, never by the organization root's host path.
+test('remove: an invalid or linked owner file is named by the org id, never by host path', async t => {
+ const SENTINEL = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['user', 'add', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:pat', '--revision', '1']); const id = s.read().users[1].id;
+ const root = join(s.configDir, SENTINEL, 'broken'); mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+ await withRegistry(s.deps, async registry => { registry.orgs.broken = { id: 'broken', root, state: 'active', revision: 1, created: 'now' }; writeFileSync(join(root, 'owner.json'), '{not json', { mode: 0o600 }); });
+ const clean = (pattern) => e => { assert.equal(e.exitCode, 3); assert.match(e.message, pattern); assert.ok(!e.message.includes(SENTINEL) && !e.message.includes(root), e.message); return true; };
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '2']), clean(/^refused: .*organization owner of broken is not valid JSON$/));
+ rmSync(join(root, 'owner.json')); writeFileSync(join(root, 'real.json'), '{}', { mode: 0o600 }); symlinkSync(join(root, 'real.json'), join(root, 'owner.json'));
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '2']), clean(/^refused: .*organization owner of broken must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file$/));
+ assert.equal(s.read().users.length, 2, 'nothing was removed');
+});
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ test("an unknown key and a JSON syntax error each leave the bus down with the re
    assert.equal(s.business, "acme");
    assert.equal(s.file, file);
    assert.match(s.reason, reason);
-    assert.ok(s.reason.includes(file) || /surprise/.test(s.reason));
+    // The reason names the file by label, never by host path (PR #1916); the path stays in `file`.
+    assert.ok(!s.reason.includes(file), s.reason);
+    assert.ok(/surprise/.test(s.reason) || /business file acme\.json is not valid JSON/.test(s.reason), s.reason);
    // `bus status` shows it, in text and in JSON.
    const out = run(f, "bus", "status", "acme", "--json");
    assert.equal(out.status, 0, out.stderr);
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ const LEGACY = '# row276-legacy-begin';
 // Stable even when a mutant removes the outer timeout from this command.
 const LAUNCH = '    LC_ALL=C ';
 const WAIT = '    wait "$child" 2>/dev/null || rc=$?\n';
+// org-base-reds: the root pair above also spans supervisor start-up and clean_session, a scan of
+// every host /proc entry whose cost grows with the host's process count. The timer pair brackets
+// only the inner timer: from just before the supervisor starts its sleep to the start of finish().
+const SUPERVISOR = '# row253-supervisor-begin\n';
+const SUPERVISOR_END = '# row253-supervisor-end\n';
+const TIMER = '"$sleep_bin" "$seconds" & timer=$!\n';
+const FINISH = 'finish() {\n    local rc="$?"\n';

 export const P10_OBSERVERS = Object.freeze({
  begin: `    # row299-observer-begin-start
@@ -20,6 +27,26 @@ export const P10_OBSERVERS = Object.freeze({
          printf 'end %s\\n' "$row299_up" >> "$ROW299_TIMING_FILE"; } 2>/dev/null || :
    fi
    # row299-observer-end-end
+`,
+  // Supervisor-side pair. Only the P10 peer's arguments carry the peer-credential option name.
+  // The pattern is split so this block never adds that literal to the supervisor text: the fake
+  // sudo stalls any command whose arguments contain it, and the supervisor text is an argument of
+  // every capture. finish() has no arguments of its own, so its stamp follows exactly one begin
+  // and is written at most once.
+  timerBegin: `# row299-timer-begin-start
+if [ -n "\${ROW299_TIMER_FILE-}" ] && [[ "$*" == *SO_PEER*CRED* ]]; then
+    { read -r row299_up row299_spare < /proc/uptime &&
+      printf 'begin %s\\n' "$row299_up" >> "$ROW299_TIMER_FILE"; } 2>/dev/null || :
+fi
+# row299-timer-begin-end
+`,
+  timerEnd: `    # row299-timer-end-start
+    if [ -n "\${ROW299_TIMER_FILE-}" ]; then
+        { read -r row299_up row299_spare < /proc/uptime &&
+          [[ "$(< "$ROW299_TIMER_FILE")" == begin* && "$(< "$ROW299_TIMER_FILE")" != *end* ]] &&
+          printf 'end %s\\n' "$row299_up" >> "$ROW299_TIMER_FILE"; } 2>/dev/null || :
+    fi
+    # row299-timer-end-end
 `,
 });

@@ -40,7 +67,15 @@ export function instrumentP10Probe(source) {
  uniqueIndex(capture, WAIT);
  capture = capture.replace(LAUNCH, P10_OBSERVERS.begin + LAUNCH);
  capture = capture.replace(WAIT, WAIT + P10_OBSERVERS.end);
-  return source.slice(0, start) + capture + source.slice(end);
+  source = source.slice(0, start) + capture + source.slice(end);
+  const from = uniqueIndex(source, SUPERVISOR), to = uniqueIndex(source, SUPERVISOR_END);
+  if (to <= from) throw new Error('P10 observer supervisor scope is reversed');
+  let supervisor = source.slice(from, to);
+  uniqueIndex(supervisor, TIMER);
+  uniqueIndex(supervisor, FINISH);
+  supervisor = supervisor.replace(TIMER, P10_OBSERVERS.timerBegin + TIMER);
+  supervisor = supervisor.replace(FINISH, FINISH + P10_OBSERVERS.timerEnd);
+  return source.slice(0, from) + supervisor + source.slice(to);
 }

 export function removeP10Observers(source) {
@@ -378,6 +378,9 @@ test('row299 P10 timing copy preserves shipped bytes and isolates observer varia
  assert.deepEqual([...block.matchAll(/\b([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=/g)],[],'no other assignments in observer blocks');
  assert.doesNotMatch(block,/\$ROOT|\$\{ROOT/,'fixture root cannot supply the clock');
 }
+ // The fake sudo keys its faults on these argument markers; observers must not add or remove any.
+ for(const marker of['SO_PEERCRED','MOSAIC_TESTER_SOCKET_V1','MOSAIC_LEGACY_STATUS'])
+  assert.equal(copy.split(marker).length,source.split(marker).length,`observers keep the ${marker} count`);
 const changedTimer=source.replace('tester_capture 2 4 128','tester_capture 1 4 128');
 assert.equal(removeP10Observers(instrumentP10Probe(changedTimer)),changedTimer,'copy keeps current timer mutants');
 });
@@ -402,6 +405,34 @@ capture`;
 assert.match(read(clock),/^begin [0-9]+\.[0-9]{2}\nend [0-9]+\.[0-9]{2}\n$/);
 });

+test('row299 P10 timer observers keep supervisor status and record one P10 pair',t=>{
+ const dir=tmp(t,'p10-timer-'),clock=join(dir,'clock'),trapFile=join(dir,'trap');
+ put(clock,'',0o600);
+ // Same shape as TESTER_SUPERVISOR: positional arguments are the setsid command, finish() has none.
+ const program=`set +m
+finish() {
+    local rc="$?"
+${P10_OBSERVERS.timerEnd}    printf trap > "$ROW299_TRAP_FILE"
+    exit "$rc"
+}
+trap finish EXIT
+${P10_OBSERVERS.timerBegin}printf stdout-without-newline
+printf stderr-without-newline >&2
+exit 81`;
+ const supervise=(...args)=>spawnSync('/bin/bash',['-c',program,'--',...args],{encoding:'utf8',env:{...process.env,ROW299_TIMER_FILE:clock,ROW299_TRAP_FILE:trapFile}});
+ let r=supervise('node','-e','query');
+ assert.equal(r.status,81);assert.equal(read(clock),'','a supervisor without the P10 peer records nothing');
+ r=supervise('python','-c','getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)');
+ assert.equal(r.status,81);
+ assert.equal(r.stdout,'stdout-without-newline');
+ assert.equal(r.stderr,'stderr-without-newline');
+ assert.equal(read(trapFile),'trap');
+ assert.match(read(clock),/^begin [0-9]+\.[0-9]{2}\nend [0-9]+\.[0-9]{2}\n$/);
+ const pair=read(clock);
+ r=supervise('node','-e','later');
+ assert.equal(r.status,81);assert.equal(read(clock),pair,'a later supervisor cannot add a second end');
+});
+
 test('row299 P10 observer records are complete and ordered',()=>{
 assert.equal(readProbeSeconds('begin 100.01\nend 102.03\n'),2.02);
 const invalid={
@@ -433,23 +464,33 @@ for(const fault of ['inner','outer','overflow'])test(`row253 C4 P10 ${fault} rea
  if(fault==='inner')put(join(h.hc,'peer-hang'),'');
  if(fault==='outer'){put(join(h.hc,'stall-probe'),'');put(join(h.hc,'stall-output'),'200 997 997\n');}
  if(fault==='overflow'){put(join(h.hc,'peer-output'),'200 997 997\n'+'X'.repeat(256));put(join(h.hc,'peer-status'),'0');}
-  let observedScript=SCRIPT,timingFile;
+  let observedScript=SCRIPT,timingFile,timerFile;
  if(fault==='inner'||fault==='outer'){
   observedScript=join(h.dir,'case1-p10-observed.sh');timingFile=join(h.hc,'probe-uptime');
   put(timingFile,'',0o600);put(observedScript,instrumentP10Probe(read(SCRIPT)),0o700);
+   // The outer fault stalls before the supervisor starts, so only the inner fault has a timer pair.
+   if(fault==='inner'){timerFile=join(h.hc,'timer-uptime');put(timerFile,'',0o600);}
   put(join(h.dir,'selector.sh'),read(join(REPO,'scripts','selector.sh')),0o644);
   assert.equal(removeP10Observers(read(observedScript)),read(SCRIPT),'observer reversal equals a fresh shipped script read');
  }
  const stop=fixtureGuard(t,files,7000,timingFile);
-  const start=performance.now(),r=run(h,timingFile?{ROW299_TIMING_FILE:timingFile}:{},undefined,observedScript),seconds=(performance.now()-start)/1000;capture();
+  const observe={...(timingFile?{ROW299_TIMING_FILE:timingFile}:{}),...(timerFile?{ROW299_TIMER_FILE:timerFile}:{})};
+  const start=performance.now(),r=run(h,observe,undefined,observedScript),seconds=(performance.now()-start)/1000;capture();
  assert.equal(r.status,0,r.out+r.err);
  const reason=fault==='inner'?'inner-timeout':fault==='outer'?'outer-timeout':'output-limit';
  assert.match(r.out,new RegExp('P10 tester-socket-squat unnamed boundary=failed reason=probe-'+reason+' '));
  assert.doesNotMatch(r.out,/boundary=observed/);
-  let probeSeconds=seconds;
+  let probeSeconds=seconds,timerSeconds;
  if(timingFile)assert.doesNotThrow(()=>{probeSeconds=readProbeSeconds(read(timingFile));},'P10 observer pair is required');
-  if(fault==='inner'||fault==='outer')t.diagnostic(JSON.stringify({fault,mode,baselineSeconds,faultSeconds:seconds,probeSeconds}));
-  if(fault==='inner')assert.ok(probeSeconds>=1.25&&probeSeconds<2.75,`${mode}: direct probe ${probeSeconds}s; baseline ${baselineSeconds}s is diagnostic only`);
+  if(timerFile)assert.doesNotThrow(()=>{timerSeconds=readProbeSeconds(read(timerFile));},'P10 timer observer pair is required');
+  if(fault==='inner'||fault==='outer')t.diagnostic(JSON.stringify({fault,mode,baselineSeconds,faultSeconds:seconds,probeSeconds,timerSeconds}));
+  // org-base-reds: the band applies to the inner timer itself. The root pair adds supervisor start-up and
+  // clean_session's whole-host /proc scan, which grows with the host's process count, so it must contain
+  // the timer pair but has no band of its own; probe-inner-timeout above already places it before the outer bound.
+  if(fault==='inner'){
+   assert.ok(timerSeconds>=1.25&&timerSeconds<2.75,`${mode}: inner timer ${timerSeconds}s (root probe ${probeSeconds}s); baseline ${baselineSeconds}s is diagnostic only`);
+   assert.ok(probeSeconds>=timerSeconds,`${mode}: root probe ${probeSeconds}s must contain the inner timer ${timerSeconds}s`);
+  }
  if(fault==='outer'){
   assert.ok(probeSeconds>=3.25&&probeSeconds<4.75,`${mode}: direct probe ${probeSeconds}s; baseline ${baselineSeconds}s is diagnostic only`);
   if(mode==='hop')assert.ok(recordedLivePids(files[0]).length>0,'stalled supervisor is R3 residual');
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ test("the library install writes the business file, personas and slot dir, makes
  const x = world(t);
  const r = install(x);
  assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out);
+  assert.equal(mode(join(x.dataRoot, '.deployed')), 0o444);
+  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(x.dataRoot, '.deployed'), 'utf8')), { instance: 'dev' });
  assert.equal(mode(x.business), 0o600);
  const doc = JSON.parse(readFileSync(x.business, "utf8"));
  for (const [instance, name] of [["bean", "Bean"], ["chet", "Chet"]]) {
@@ -494,6 +496,9 @@ function dependencyFreeClone(t) {
  for (const file of ["case2-install.sh", "case2-persona-import.mjs", "selector.sh"]) {
    cpSync(join(REPO, "scripts", file), join(clone, "scripts", file));
  }
+  mkdirSync(join(clone, 'packages/cli/src'), { recursive: true });
+  cpSync(join(REPO, 'packages/cli/src/deployment.mjs'), join(clone, 'packages/cli/src/deployment.mjs'));
+  writeJson(x.config, { dataRoot: x.dataRoot });
  // Isolate the persona step; bootstrap and business validation are covered above.
  script(join(clone, "scripts", "bootstrap.sh"), "exit 0");
  script(join(clone, "scripts", "mosaic"), "exit 0");
@@ -565,3 +570,14 @@ test('row334 install Next tells root to select proxy only when configured', t =>
  assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out);
  assert.match(r.out, /Next: root runs case2-unit.sh[^\n]+add --proxy when the config has a proxy section/);
 });
+
+test('M3 install Next names the SSO, accounts-init and dedicated-uid steps before root re-pins with --sso', t => {
+  const x = world(t), r = install(x);
+  assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out);
+  const done = r.out.split('\n').findIndex(l => l.startsWith('case2-install: done. .deployed names this instance'));
+  assert.ok(done >= 0, r.out);
+  assert.match(r.out.split('\n')[done], /in order \(run sheet section 7\): prepare console\.sso and its client secret slots in .+; a human runs `mosaic accounts init` as [^;]+; [^ ]+ stays a dedicated uid with a non-login shell, the only member of its primary group\.$/);
+  assert.match(r.out.split('\n')[done + 1], /^case2-install: Next: root runs case2-unit\.sh --copy [0-9a-f]{40} --business \S+ with --sso in the serve flags \(factory: --sso --send;/);
+  // The installer names the human step; it never runs it.
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(x.configDir, 'accounts.json')), false);
+});
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ function hub(t, { uid = UID } = {}) {
  const bin = join(root, "bin");
  const log = join(root, "systemctl.log");
  script(join(bin, "getent"), `case "$1" in
-  passwd) [ "$2" = mosaic ] && echo "mosaic:x:${uid}:${GID}::${home}:/bin/bash" ;;
+  passwd) { [ -z "$2" ] || [ "$2" = mosaic ]; } && echo "mosaic:x:${uid}:${GID}::${home}:/usr/sbin/nologin" ;;
  group) [ "$2" = "${GID}" ] && echo "mosaic:x:${GID}:" ;;
  *) exit 2 ;;
 esac`);
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ test("the unit takes --org or --business on either side of --, renders --busines
 test("the unit refuses a bad selector in either scope, and an outer and serve pair that differ, before writing a unit", (t) => {
  const h = hub(t);
  const serve = ["--port", "443", "--business", "acme"];
-  const usage = "usage: case2-unit.sh --user NAME --home DIR --business ID --copy ID --node PATH [--profile factory|library] [--proxy] [--pm] [--claude PATH] -- SERVE FLAGS\n";
+  const usage = "usage: case2-unit.sh [--check|--check-new] --user NAME --home DIR --business ID --copy ID --node PATH [--profile factory|library] [--proxy] [--pm] [--claude PATH] -- SERVE FLAGS\n";
  const head = ["--user", "mosaic", "--home", h.home, "--copy", COPY_A, "--node", USR_NODE, "--profile", "factory"];
  for (const [label, argv, code, err] of [
    ["outer unequal, old first", [...head, "--business", "acme", "--org", "beta", "--", ...serve], 4, "case2-unit: --business acme and --org beta conflict\n"],
@@ -415,6 +415,8 @@ test("the read-only library profile explicitly refuses --send before writing a u
 test("PATH starts with the --node directory, for a node outside the default list and for /usr/bin/node", (t) => {
  const h = hub(t);
  const node = outsideNode();
+  // This metadata-only test uses a root-owned executable as a path stand-in.
+  writeFileSync(join(h.root, 'query-output'), JSON.stringify({ dataRoot: h.dataRoot, socket: true })); writeFileSync(join(h.root, 'query-status'), '0');
  assert.equal(unit(h, { node }).code, 0);
  for (const f of [busFile(h), webuiFile(h)]) assert.deepEqual(lines(read(f), "Environment"), [`PATH=${dirname(node)}:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin`]);
  assert.match(lines(read(webuiFile(h)), "ExecStart")[0], new RegExp(`^${node} `));
@@ -550,6 +552,7 @@ test("a --node that is relative, not root-owned or under <home> refuses", (t) =>
 test("a re-install with a different --node or different serve flags refuses", (t) => {
  const h = hub(t);
  assert.equal(unit(h).code, 0);
+  writeFileSync(join(h.root, 'query-output'), JSON.stringify({ dataRoot: h.dataRoot, socket: true })); writeFileSync(join(h.root, 'query-status'), '0');
  // A new node moves PATH too, so the installed unit fails its own Environment= check first.
  refuses(unit(h, { node: outsideNode() }), /installed .*: the Environment= lines must be exactly/);
  const flags = libraryFlags(h).map((f) => (f === "melanie" ? "someone" : f));
@@ -705,7 +708,9 @@ test("#415 factory --sso refuses before any unit write when the stack user's con
  noUnits(h);
 });

-test("#416 library still refuses --sso, alone and with --send, before writing a unit", (t) => {
+// M3 (#1873; Jason's ruling 2026-11-10): only an unstamped library copy keeps proxy preview. The
+// stamped copies below sign in through SSO accounts.
+test("#416 an unstamped library copy still refuses --sso, alone and with --send, before writing a unit", (t) => {
  const h = hub(t);
  ssoConfig(h);
  refuses(unit(h, { flags: [...libraryFlags(h), "--sso"] }), /refusing --sso: the Console signs people in through the proxy/);
@@ -713,6 +718,233 @@ test("#416 library still refuses --sso, alone and with --send, before writing a
  noUnits(h);
 });

+// ---- M3 (#1873): stamped copies ----
+// A stamped copy (stack-copy.sh's read-only .stack-build.json) serves only with --sso, console.sso,
+// an accounts.json that loads and a .deployed naming the default instance. The render asks the
+// stack user's copy through the bounded sudo query, with the copy's real deployment.mjs and
+// organization accounts.mjs, and refuses before any write, naming every missing step in order.
+// No real host, config or credential: the issuer is on .invalid and nothing connects to it.
+const ISSUER = "https://idp.invalid/a";
+const STAMP_ACCOUNTS = { accountsVersion: 1, revision: 1, users: [{ id: "u-000000000001", subjects: [{ provider: "a", sub: "owner" }], name: "Owner", instanceRole: "operator", state: "active", authGen: 1, created: "2026-11-10T00:00:00Z" }], memberships: [], invites: [] };
+const accountsFile = (h) => join(h.home, ".config", "mosaic-dev", "accounts.json");
+const deployedFile = (h) => join(h.dataRoot, ".deployed");
+function stamp(h, id = COPY_A) {
+  const dir = copyDir(h, id);
+  cpSync(join(REPO, "packages/cli/src/deployment.mjs"), join(dir, "packages/cli/src/deployment.mjs"));
+  for (const pkg of ["organization", "seat"]) symlinkSync(join(REPO, "packages", pkg), join(dir, "packages", pkg));
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, ".stack-build.json"), JSON.stringify({ commit: id }) + "\n");
+  chmodSync(join(dir, ".stack-build.json"), 0o444);
+}
+const stampSso = (h) => writeJson(h.query, { dataRoot: h.dataRoot, console: { sso: { publicOrigin: "https://console.invalid", providers: [{ id: "a", issuer: ISSUER }] } } });
+function stampAccounts(h, doc = STAMP_ACCOUNTS) {
+  writeFileSync(accountsFile(h), JSON.stringify(doc));
+  chmodSync(accountsFile(h), 0o600);
+}
+function stampDeployed(h, instance = "dev") {
+  writeFileSync(deployedFile(h), JSON.stringify({ instance }) + "\n");
+  chmodSync(deployedFile(h), 0o444);
+}
+function stamped(t, { sso = true, accounts = true, deployed = true } = {}) {
+  const h = hub(t);
+  stamp(h);
+  if (sso) stampSso(h);
+  if (accounts) stampAccounts(h);
+  if (deployed) stampDeployed(h);
+  return h;
+}
+const STAMP_LIBRARY = ["--port", "443", "--business", "acme", "--sso"];
+const STAMP_FACTORY = ["--port", "443", "--business", "acme", "--tester-socket", "--sso", "--send"];
+const STEP = {
+  deployed: (h) => `check or create .deployed: mosaic runs case2-install.sh, whose deployment step writes ${h.dataRoot}/.deployed`,
+  deployedBad: (h) => `check .deployed: ${h.dataRoot}/.deployed is invalid or names another instance; case2-install.sh's deployment step reports why and never replaces it`,
+  sso: (h) => `prepare SSO: console.sso in mosaic's system config ${h.home}/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json, with its client secret slots`,
+  accounts: (h) => `run \`mosaic accounts init\` as mosaic, a human verb: no ${accountsFile(h)}`,
+  accountsBad: (h) => `fix ${accountsFile(h)}: it does not load (its owner or mode, an active operator, or a subject console.sso does not name); a human fixes it with the accounts verbs`,
+  library: () => "add --sso to the serve flags, then re-pin",
+  factory: () => "add --sso --send to the serve flags, then re-pin",
+};
+// The exact refusal: one header line, then the steps numbered in the run sheet's order.
+function refusesSteps(h, r, steps) {
+  assert.equal(r.code, 1, `expected a refusal, got ${r.code}: ${r.out}${r.err}`);
+  const want = [`case2-unit: refusing the units for ${COPY_A}: a stamped copy's Console starts only with SSO accounts; missing steps, in order:`, ...steps.map((s, i) => `  ${i + 1}. ${s(h)}`)].join("\n") + "\n";
+  assert.equal(r.err, want);
+}
+// Nothing the render must not write: no unit, no systemctl, and none of the prerequisites.
+function wroteNothing(h, { accounts = false, deployed = false } = {}) {
+  noUnits(h);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(accountsFile(h)), accounts, "the render never writes accounts.json");
+  assert.equal(existsSync(deployedFile(h)), deployed, "the render never writes .deployed");
+}
+
+test("M3 a stamped library unit renders only with --sso and the prerequisites, and runs the Console without proxy preview", (t) => {
+  const h = stamped(t);
+  const r = unit(h, { flags: STAMP_LIBRARY });
+  assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out + r.err);
+  const webui = read(webuiFile(h));
+  assert.deepEqual(lines(webui, "ExecStart"), [`${USR_NODE} ${copyDir(h)}/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve --port 443 --business acme --sso`]);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(webui.split("\n").filter((l) => !l.startsWith("#")).join("\n"), /--public-host|--auth-header|--allow-user|--proof-header|--proof-file|--send/);
+  assert.deepEqual(lines(read(busFile(h)), "ExecStart"), [`${copyDir(h)}/scripts/mosaic bus start %i`]);
+  // The prerequisites were asked as the stack user, through the copy's own modules.
+  const sudo = read(h.sudoLog);
+  assert.match(sudo, new RegExp(`^-u mosaic -H env -i HOME=${h.home} PATH=`, "m"));
+  assert.match(sudo, /a\.loadAccounts\(.*d\.assertDeployed\(s,dir\)/);
+  assert.ok(sudo.includes(`${copyDir(h)}/packages/organization/src/accounts.mjs`));
+  assert.match(r.out, /enabled and started mosaic-bus@acme\.service, then mosaic-webui\.service\n$/);
+  // The render read them and left each as it was.
+  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(read(accountsFile(h))), STAMP_ACCOUNTS);
+  assert.equal(statSync(deployedFile(h)).mode & 0o777, 0o444);
+});
+
+test("M3 a stamped library unit refuses proxy-preview admission, its proof and --send, before any write", (t) => {
+  const h = stamped(t);
+  for (const [flag, value] of [["--public-host", "books.example"], ["--auth-header", "X-Auth-User"], ["--allow-user", "melanie"], ["--proof-header", "X-Proxy-Proof"], ["--proof-file", h.proof]]) {
+    const r = unit(h, { flags: [...STAMP_LIBRARY, flag, value] });
+    assert.equal(r.code, 1, flag);
+    assert.equal(r.err, `case2-unit: refusing ${flag}: ${COPY_A} is a stamped copy, and proxy-preview admission and its proof do not apply to a stamped copy; its Console signs in through SSO accounts with --sso\n`);
+  }
+  // The whole old preview set refuses at its first flag, with or without --sso.
+  refuses(unit(h, { flags: libraryFlags(h) }), /refusing --public-host: .* is a stamped copy, and proxy-preview admission and its proof do not apply/);
+  refuses(unit(h, { flags: [...STAMP_LIBRARY, "--send"] }), /the library profile is read-only; refusing --send \(a stamped library Console signs in with --sso and stays read-only\)/);
+  wroteNothing(h, { accounts: true, deployed: true });
+  assert.equal(existsSync(h.sudoLog), false, "a flag refusal comes before any query");
+});
+
+test("M3 a stamped library unit without its prerequisites refuses before any write and names every missing step in order", (t) => {
+  const none = stamped(t, { sso: false, accounts: false, deployed: false });
+  refusesSteps(none, unit(none, { flags: ["--port", "443", "--business", "acme"] }), [STEP.deployed, STEP.sso, STEP.accounts, STEP.library]);
+  wroteNothing(none);
+  refusesSteps(none, unit(none, { flags: STAMP_LIBRARY }), [STEP.deployed, STEP.sso, STEP.accounts]);
+  wroteNothing(none);
+  // Each prerequisite alone.
+  for (const [name, opts, steps] of [
+    ["no .deployed", { deployed: false }, [STEP.deployed]],
+    ["no console.sso", { sso: false }, [STEP.sso]],
+    ["no accounts.json", { accounts: false }, [STEP.accounts]],
+  ]) {
+    const h = stamped(t, opts);
+    refusesSteps(h, unit(h, { flags: STAMP_LIBRARY }), steps);
+    wroteNothing(h, { accounts: opts.accounts !== false, deployed: opts.deployed !== false });
+  }
+  const flagless = stamped(t);
+  refusesSteps(flagless, unit(flagless, { flags: ["--port", "443", "--business", "acme"] }), [STEP.library]);
+  wroteNothing(flagless, { accounts: true, deployed: true });
+});
+
+test("M3 a stamped copy refuses an invalid .deployed or accounts.json with the step that names it", (t) => {
+  const cases = [
+    [".deployed names another instance", (h) => { rmSync(deployedFile(h)); stampDeployed(h, "other"); }, [STEP.deployedBad]],
+    [".deployed writable", (h) => chmodSync(deployedFile(h), 0o644), [STEP.deployedBad]],
+    [".deployed broken link", (h) => { rmSync(deployedFile(h)); symlinkSync(join(h.root, "missing"), deployedFile(h)); }, [STEP.deployedBad]],
+    ["accounts without an active operator", (h) => stampAccounts(h, { ...STAMP_ACCOUNTS, users: [{ ...STAMP_ACCOUNTS.users[0], state: "disabled" }] }), [STEP.accountsBad]],
+    ["accounts subject on an unconfigured provider", (h) => stampAccounts(h, { ...STAMP_ACCOUNTS, users: [{ ...STAMP_ACCOUNTS.users[0], subjects: [{ provider: "b", sub: "owner" }] }] }), [STEP.accountsBad]],
+    ["accounts writable by group", (h) => chmodSync(accountsFile(h), 0o620), [STEP.accountsBad]],
+    ["accounts broken link", (h) => { rmSync(accountsFile(h)); symlinkSync(join(h.root, "missing"), accountsFile(h)); }, [STEP.accountsBad]],
+  ];
+  for (const [name, change, steps] of cases) {
+    for (const [profile, flags] of [["library", STAMP_LIBRARY], ["factory", STAMP_FACTORY]]) {
+      const h = stamped(t);
+      change(h);
+      refusesSteps(h, unit(h, { profile, flags }), steps);
+      noUnits(h);
+    }
+  }
+});
+
+test("M3 a stamped factory or Case 1 unit renders only with --sso --send and the prerequisites, and names each missing step", (t) => {
+  const h = stamped(t);
+  const r = unit(h, { profile: "factory", flags: STAMP_FACTORY });
+  assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out + r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(lines(read(webuiFile(h)), "ExecStart"), [`${USR_NODE} ${copyDir(h)}/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve ${STAMP_FACTORY.join(" ")}`]);
+  const none = stamped(t, { sso: false, accounts: false, deployed: false });
+  refusesSteps(none, unit(none, { profile: "factory" }), [STEP.deployed, STEP.sso, STEP.accounts, STEP.factory]);
+  wroteNothing(none);
+  refusesSteps(none, unit(none, { profile: "factory", flags: STAMP_FACTORY }), [STEP.deployed, STEP.sso, STEP.accounts]);
+  wroteNothing(none);
+  // A stamped copy without the flag pair names it as the last step, with the prerequisites present.
+  const flagless = stamped(t);
+  refusesSteps(flagless, unit(flagless, { profile: "factory" }), [STEP.factory]);
+  refusesSteps(flagless, unit(flagless, { profile: "factory", flags: [...factoryFlags(), "--send"] }), [STEP.factory]);
+  wroteNothing(flagless, { accounts: true, deployed: true });
+  // The pair stays a pair: --sso alone still refuses, as for an unstamped copy.
+  refuses(unit(flagless, { profile: "factory", flags: [...factoryFlags(), "--sso"] }), /refusing --sso without --send in the factory profile/);
+  noUnits(flagless);
+});
+
+test("M3 a stamped copy's query refuses on noise or a failed query, before any write", (t) => {
+  // The copy's accounts module stands in for the stack user's code: noise on stdout, a failed exit.
+  for (const [body, pattern] of [
+    ['console.log("forged");export const loadAccounts=()=>{};', /stamped copy query has invalid facts/],
+    ["process.exit(1);export const loadAccounts=()=>{};", /stamped copy query inner-command/],
+  ]) {
+    const h = stamped(t);
+    const org = join(copyDir(h), "packages/organization");
+    rmSync(org);
+    mkdirSync(join(org, "src"), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(org, "src/accounts.mjs"), body);
+    refuses(unit(h, { flags: STAMP_LIBRARY }), pattern);
+    noUnits(h);
+  }
+});
+
+// #1873 M3: stack-upgrade.sh checks each render before it stops anything. --check runs a render's
+// checks, the installed units' included, and writes nothing; --check-new skips only the installed
+// units' checks, for --next-args, which moves them aside before its render.
+const checkArgv = (h, { mode = "--check", profile = "library", copy = COPY_A, flags } = {}) =>
+  [mode, "--user", "mosaic", "--home", h.home, "--business", "acme", "--copy", copy, "--node", USR_NODE, "--profile", profile, "--",
+    ...(flags ?? (profile === "factory" ? factoryFlags() : libraryFlags(h)))];
+const unitsNow = (h) => [busFile(h), webuiFile(h)].map((f) => (existsSync(f) ? read(f) : null));
+const logNow = (h) => (existsSync(h.log) ? read(h.log) : "");
+
+test("#1873 --check passes on a matching install and on a first install, refuses an edited unit, and never writes or calls systemctl", (t) => {
+  const h = hub(t);
+  const empty = unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h) });
+  assert.equal(empty.code, 0, empty.out + empty.err);
+  assert.equal(empty.out, `case2-unit: check passed: the units for copy ${COPY_A} render, and the installed ones match them; nothing was written\n`);
+  noUnits(h);
+  assert.equal(unit(h).code, 0);
+  const units = unitsNow(h), log = logNow(h);
+  for (const copy of [COPY_A, COPY_B]) {
+    const r = unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { copy }) });
+    assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out + r.err);
+    assert.deepEqual(unitsNow(h), units, copy);
+    assert.equal(logNow(h), log, `${copy}: no systemctl call`);
+  }
+  // The installed-unit match stays: an edit, or other serve flags, refuses as the render would.
+  writeFileSync(busFile(h), units[0].replace(/^Description=.*$/m, "Description=edited"));
+  refuses(unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { copy: COPY_B }) }), /differs from the render in more than the copy id/);
+  writeFileSync(busFile(h), units[0]);
+  const flags = libraryFlags(h).map((f) => (f === "melanie" ? "someone" : f));
+  refuses(unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { copy: COPY_B, flags }) }), /installed .*: ExecStart= must be exactly once/);
+  assert.deepEqual(unitsNow(h), units);
+  assert.equal(logNow(h), log);
+});
+
+for (const profile of ["library", "factory"]) {
+  test(`#1873 an installed pre-M3 ${profile} unit: --check and the render refuse a stamped copy's SSO flags, and --check-new passes with the prerequisites, writing nothing`, (t) => {
+    const h = hub(t);
+    assert.equal(unit(h, { profile }).code, 0);
+    stamp(h, COPY_B);
+    stampSso(h);
+    stampAccounts(h);
+    stampDeployed(h);
+    const flags = profile === "factory" ? STAMP_FACTORY : STAMP_LIBRARY;
+    const units = unitsNow(h), log = logNow(h);
+    refuses(unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { profile, copy: COPY_B, flags }) }), /installed .*: ExecStart= must be exactly once/);
+    refuses(unit(h, { profile, copy: COPY_B, flags }), /installed .*: ExecStart= must be exactly once/);
+    const r = unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { mode: "--check-new", profile, copy: COPY_B, flags }) });
+    assert.equal(r.code, 0, r.out + r.err);
+    assert.equal(r.out, `case2-unit: check passed: the units for copy ${COPY_B} render as a first install; the installed ones were not compared; nothing was written\n`);
+    // --check-new still runs the stamped copy's checks: the old flags, or a missing prerequisite, refuse.
+    refuses(unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { mode: "--check-new", profile, copy: COPY_B }) }), /a stamped copy's Console starts only with SSO accounts|is a stamped copy, and proxy-preview admission/);
+    rmSync(accountsFile(h));
+    refuses(unit(h, { argv: checkArgv(h, { mode: "--check-new", profile, copy: COPY_B, flags }) }), /run `mosaic accounts init` as mosaic, a human verb/);
+    assert.deepEqual(unitsNow(h), units);
+    assert.equal(logNow(h), log, "no systemctl call");
+    assert.equal(existsSync(accountsFile(h)), false, "the check never writes accounts.json");
+    assert.equal(statSync(deployedFile(h)).mode & 0o777, 0o444);
+  });
+}
+
 test("row253 factory refuses retired TCP and a value after the socket marker", (t) => {
  const h = hub(t);
  refuses(unit(h, { profile: "factory", flags: ['--port','443','--business','acme','--tester-port','7333'] }), /case2-unit.sh retires tester TCP; use --tester-socket/);
@@ -1320,3 +1552,26 @@ test('row334 proxy installed path rejects symlink and non-regular file', t => {
  mkdirSync(proxyFile(h));
  refuses(proxyUnit(h), /is not a regular file/);
 });
+
+// M3: the managed uid is a dedicated non-login service identity. These are
+// database fixtures only: no real passwd/group or instance directories change.
+test('M3 dedicated host account: login shells, other primary/group members and wrong directory owners refuse', t => {
+ for (const [kind, shell, extraPasswd, members] of [
+  ['human login','/bin/bash','',''], ['interactive seat','/usr/bin/zsh','',''],
+  ['another primary member','/usr/sbin/nologin',`human:x:${UID+1}:${GID}::/fictional:/bin/bash`,''],
+  ['supplementary primary-group member','/usr/sbin/nologin','','human'],
+ ]) {
+  const h = hub(t);
+  script(join(h.bin,'getent'), `case "$1" in
+ passwd) echo 'mosaic:x:${UID}:${GID}::${h.home}:${shell}'; [ -n "$2" ] || echo '${extraPasswd}';;
+ group) echo 'mosaic:x:${GID}:${members}';;
+ esac`);
+  const r = unit(h); assert.notEqual(r.code,0,kind); assert.match(r.err,/non-login|sole.member/,kind); assert.equal(existsSync(webuiFile(h)),false);
+ }
+ const h = hub(t); for (const flag of ['--dev-local-owner','--dev-insecure-bind','--dev-allow-host']) { const r = unit(h, { flags: [...libraryFlags(h), flag, '127.0.0.1'] }); assert.notEqual(r.code,0); assert.match(r.err,/dev-local-owner|serve flag/); }
+});
+test('M3 host config and data directories belong to the selected uid and both units use it', t => {
+ const h = hub(t); const ok = unit(h); assert.equal(ok.code,0,ok.err);
+ for (const file of [busFile(h),webuiFile(h)]) { assert.deepEqual(lines(read(file),'User'),['mosaic']); assert.deepEqual(lines(read(file),'Group'),['mosaic']); }
+ const wrong = hub(t,{uid:UID+1}); const r = unit(wrong); assert.notEqual(r.code,0); assert.match(r.err,/owned by.*uid|directory.*owner/);
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// M3 executable boundary: copies and instances are fixtures only, no live ports.
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { cpSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, chmodSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { fixture } from './helpers.mjs';
+const REPO = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url));
+const SHA = 'a'.repeat(40);
+function setup(t) {
+ const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'db-')); t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+ const copy = join(root, SHA); mkdirSync(copy);
+ for (const dir of ['packages', 'scripts', 'roles', 'adapters']) cpSync(join(REPO, dir), join(copy, dir), { recursive: true, filter: p => !p.split('/').some(x => ['tests', 'node_modules'].includes(x)) });
+ writeFileSync(join(copy, 'package.json'), '{"type":"module"}');
+ const stamp = join(copy, '.stack-build.json'); writeFileSync(stamp, JSON.stringify({ commit: SHA }), { mode: 0o444 }); chmodSync(stamp, 0o444);
+ const f = fixture(join(root, 'instance')); const home = join(root, 'home'); const dir = join(home, '.config/mosaic-test'); mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+ const config = join(dir, 'config.json'); cpSync(f.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG, config);
+ writeFileSync(join(f.dataRoot, 'instance.json'), JSON.stringify({ instanceVersion: 1, name: 'test' }));
+ const env = { ...process.env, HOME: home, MOSAIC_CONFIG: config };
+ const run = (args, from = copy) => spawnSync(process.execPath, [join(from, args[0]), ...args.slice(1)], { env, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5000 });
+ return { root, copy, stamp, f, env, config, dir, run };
+}
+const serve = flags => ['packages/webui/src/cli.mjs', 'serve', '--port', '0', ...flags];
+test('stamped serve refuses dev owner, LAN flags, missing --sso and missing .deployed before listening', t => {
+ const s = setup(t);
+ for (const flags of [['--dev-local-owner'], ['--dev-insecure-bind','0.0.0.0'], ['--dev-allow-host','test.example'], []]) {
+  const r = s.run(serve(flags)); assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /stamped build/); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stdout, /Mosaic Console:/);
+ }
+ const r = s.run(serve(['--sso'])); assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /\.deployed/);
+ const bus = s.run(['packages/cli/src/cli.mjs','bus','start','acme','--dev-local-owner']); assert.notEqual(bus.status, 0); assert.match(bus.stderr, /stamped build/);
+});
+test('writable, linked, malformed, wrong-commit and directory stamps refuse every start', t => {
+ const s = setup(t);
+ for (const kind of ['writable','symlink','wrong','malformed','directory']) {
+  rmSync(s.stamp, { force: true, recursive: true });
+  if (kind === 'symlink') { const other = join(s.root, 'stamp'); writeFileSync(other, JSON.stringify({ commit: SHA }), { mode: 0o444 }); symlinkSync(other, s.stamp); }
+  else if (kind === 'directory') mkdirSync(s.stamp);
+  else { writeFileSync(s.stamp, kind === 'malformed' ? '{' : JSON.stringify({ commit: kind === 'wrong' ? 'b'.repeat(40) : SHA })); chmodSync(s.stamp, kind === 'writable' ? 0o644 : 0o444); }
+  for (const args of [serve([]), serve(['--sso']), ['packages/cli/src/cli.mjs','bus','start','acme']]) { const r = s.run(args); assert.notEqual(r.status, 0, kind); assert.match(r.stderr, /build stamp/, `${kind}: ${r.stderr}`); }
+ }
+});
+test('stamped serve requires 0444 metadata naming its instance and a loadable accounts file', t => {
+ const s = setup(t), file = join(s.f.dataRoot, '.deployed');
+ for (const [mode, instance] of [[0o644,'test'], [0o444,'other']]) {
+  writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ instance })); chmodSync(file, mode);
+  const r = s.run(serve(['--sso'])); assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /\.deployed/);
+ }
+ chmodSync(file, 0o644); writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ instance: 'test' })); chmodSync(file, 0o444);
+ const r = s.run(serve(['--sso'])); assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /accounts/);
+});
+test('checkout dev owner refuses accounts, SSO or deployment presence, including dangling links', t => {
+ const s = setup(t);
+ for (const name of ['accounts.json', '.deployed']) {
+  const file = join(name === 'accounts.json' ? s.dir : s.f.dataRoot, name); symlinkSync(join(s.root, 'missing'), file);
+  for (const args of [serve(['--dev-local-owner']), ['packages/cli/src/cli.mjs','bus','start','acme','--dev-local-owner']]) { const r = s.run(args, REPO); assert.notEqual(r.status, 0); assert.match(r.stderr, /dev-local-owner.*refuses/); }
+  rmSync(file);
+ }
+ const config = JSON.parse((awaitRead(s.config))); config.console = { sso: { publicOrigin: 'https://console.test', providers: [{ id:'pocket', issuer:'https://id.test',clientId:'test',clientSecret:{slot:'test'},algs:['RS256'],subjects:[{sub:'owner',name:'Owner'}] }] } };
+ writeFileSync(s.config, JSON.stringify(config));
+ for (const args of [serve(['--dev-local-owner']), ['packages/cli/src/cli.mjs','bus','start','acme','--dev-local-owner']]) { const r = s.run(args, REPO); assert.notEqual(r.status, 0); assert.match(r.stderr, /dev-local-owner.*refuses.*console.sso/); }
+});
+import { readFileSync as awaitRead } from 'node:fs';
+
+test('deployment writer preserves matching metadata and refuses linked or foreign destinations', t => {
+ const s = setup(t), system = { dataRoot: s.f.dataRoot }, file = join(s.f.dataRoot, '.deployed');
+ rmSync(system.dataRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ writeDeployment(system, s.dir); assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(awaitRead(file)), { instance: 'test' });
+ assert.equal(statSync(system.dataRoot).mode & 0o777, 0o700);
+ assert.equal(statSync(file).mode & 0o777, 0o444); const inode = statSync(file).ino; writeDeployment(system, s.dir); assert.equal(statSync(file).ino, inode);
+ rmSync(file); symlinkSync(join(s.root, 'absent'), file); assert.throws(() => writeDeployment(system, s.dir), /\.deployed/); rmSync(file);
+ writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ instance: 'other' }), { mode: 0o444 }); assert.throws(() => writeDeployment(system, s.dir), /\.deployed/);
+});
+import { statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { writeDeployment } from '../src/deployment.mjs';
+
+test('valid stamped accounts Console starts with --sso and answers health on its own port zero', async t => {
+ const { spawn } = await import('node:child_process');
+ const { once } = await import('node:events');
+ const { fakeOidc } = await import('../../webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs');
+ const s = setup(t), op = await fakeOidc(); t.after(() => op.close()); const iss = op.issuer('a');
+ symlinkSync(join(REPO, 'node_modules'), join(s.copy, 'node_modules'));
+ const config = JSON.parse(awaitRead(s.config)); config.console = { sso: { publicOrigin: 'https://console.test', providers: [{ id:'a',issuer:iss.issuer,clientId:iss.clientId,clientSecret:{slot:'a'},algs:['RS256'],subjects:[{sub:'owner',name:'Owner'}] }] } };
+ writeFileSync(s.config, JSON.stringify(config)); mkdirSync(join(s.dir, 'secrets/mosaic-stack'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+ writeFileSync(join(s.dir, 'secrets/mosaic-stack/a'), iss.clientSecret, { mode: 0o600 });
+ writeFileSync(join(s.dir, 'accounts.json'), JSON.stringify({ accountsVersion:1,revision:1,users:[{id:'u-000000000001',subjects:[{provider:'a',sub:'owner'}],name:'Owner',instanceRole:'operator',state:'active',authGen:1,created:'2026-11-10T00:00:00Z'}], memberships:[],invites:[] }), { mode: 0o600 });
+ writeDeployment({ dataRoot: s.f.dataRoot }, s.dir); const ca = join(s.root, 'ca.pem'); writeFileSync(ca, op.cert);
+ const child = spawn(process.execPath, [join(s.copy,'packages/webui/src/cli.mjs'), 'serve','--port','0','--sso','--board','http://127.0.0.1:9'], { env: { ...s.env, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: ca } });
+ let out = '', err = ''; child.stderr.on('data', c => err += c);
+ t.after(async () => { if (child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) { const done = once(child, 'close'); child.kill(); await done; } });
+ await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('start timeout: '+err)), 10000); child.stdout.on('data', c => { out += c; if(out.includes('Ctrl-C')) {clearTimeout(timer);resolve();} }); child.on('exit', () => {clearTimeout(timer);reject(new Error(err));}); });
+ const port = Number(out.match(/127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)\//)[1]); assert.ok(port); assert.equal((await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/healthz`)).status, 200);
+});
@@ -804,13 +804,27 @@ test("land: a failed gate is refused gate-failed with its step, told to the role
  assert.equal(ticket, TICKET);
  assert.equal(a.code, "gate-failed");
  assert.equal(a.notify, true);
-  assert.match(a.detail, /^pkg-bus failed, see \/.*\/bus-host\/land\/land-[0-9a-f]{12}\/pkg-bus\.log$/);
+  assert.match(a.detail, /^pkg-bus failed, see land\/land-[0-9a-f]{12}\/pkg-bus\.log in the bus host directory$/);
  assert.equal(w.git("rev-parse", "refs/heads/main"), w.main);
  assert.equal(w.git("cat-file", "-t", r.commit), "commit", "the squash was made, and only main didn't move");
  assert.deepEqual(w.of("recordLand"), []);
  assert.equal(w.trees(), 0);
 });

+// PR #1916 (org-redact5): the detail reaches the role, so it never carries the log's host
+// path; a log file name outside the id pattern is dropped too.
+test("land: a failed gate's detail names the land directory, never the log's host path", async (t) => {
+  const SENTINEL = "sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234";
+  let log = null;
+  const w = await landSetup(t, { gate: { run: async ({ logs }) => ({ ok: false, step: "pkg-bus", log: (log = join(logs, SENTINEL, `${SENTINEL}.log`)) }) } });
+  await w.land();
+  await w.ended();
+  const [[, a]] = w.of("landRefused");
+  assert.equal(a.code, "gate-failed");
+  assert.match(a.detail, /^pkg-bus failed, see land\/land-[0-9a-f]{12} in the bus host directory$/);
+  assert.ok(!a.detail.includes(SENTINEL) && !a.detail.includes(log) && !a.detail.includes(w.f.dataRoot), a.detail);
+});
+
 test("land: a record the broker refuses moves main back, and the landing is refused with the broker's code", async (t) => {
  const w = await landSetup(t);
  w.state.recordFails = "decision-consumed";
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ test("a host.lock that goes between the check and the read is tried again; one t
  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(hostDir(dataRoot)), ["host.lock"]);

  writeFileSync(hostLock(dataRoot), "{not json", { mode: 0o600 });
-  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, mine), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `bus host state is unreadable: ${hostLock(dataRoot)}`);
+  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, mine), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === "bus host state is unreadable");
  assert.equal(readFileSync(hostLock(dataRoot), "utf8"), "{not json");
  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(hostDir(dataRoot)), ["host.lock"]);
 });
@@ -749,8 +749,14 @@ test("a stale organization writer lock refuses start and status without removing
 });

 test("organization bus start refuses without a notifier config", async t => {
+  // PR #1916 (org-redact5): the refusal names the log inside the organization's
+  // runtime directory, never by host path. (A sentinel directory in the root would
+  // push the bus socket path past the socket length limit, so the check is on the
+  // fixture's own roots.)
  const f = await orgFixture(t, { notify: false });
-  await assert.rejects(busStart(f.ctx, "acme", { detach: true }), /failed to start/i);
+  await assert.rejects(busStart(f.ctx, "acme", { detach: true }), (e) => e.exitCode === 3
+    && e.message === "bus failed to start; see bus-host/host.log in the runtime directory of organization acme"
+    && !e.message.includes(f.dataRoot) && !e.message.includes(f.instanceRoot));
  assert.match(readFileSync(join(f.dataRoot, "bus-host", "host.log"), "utf8"), /no notifier config/);
  assert.equal(existsSync(join(f.dataRoot, "bus", "writer.lock")), false);
 });
@@ -21,10 +21,15 @@ function fixture(t) {
  };
  return { root, file, env, run, boot };
 }
-function redacted(result, file, status) {
+// label: the CLI refusal names the file by this label and never by host path (PR #1916).
+// Without it, the refusal comes from scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, which still names the file.
+function redacted(result, file, status, label) {
  assert.equal(result.status, status, result.stderr);
  assert.equal(result.stdout, '');
-  assert.ok(result.stderr.includes(file), result.stderr);
+  if (label) {
+    assert.ok(!result.stderr.includes(file), result.stderr);
+    assert.ok(result.stderr.includes(label), result.stderr);
+  } else assert.ok(result.stderr.includes(file), result.stderr);
  assert.match(result.stderr, /not valid JSON/);
  assert.doesNotMatch(result.stderr, /sk-test|Unexpected token/);
 }
@@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ test('system config parse refusal and CLI relay omit parser bytes', t => {
    assert.doesNotMatch(error.message, /sk-test|Unexpected token/);
    return true;
  });
-  redacted(f.run(cli, 'org', 'config', 'validate', 'alpha'), f.file, 3);
+  redacted(f.run(cli, 'org', 'config', 'validate', 'alpha'), f.file, 3, 'configuration is not valid JSON; expected readable JSON: the system config MOSAIC_CONFIG names');
 });

 test('named instance marker parse refusal omits parser bytes', t => {
@@ -55,5 +60,5 @@ for (const operation of ['validate', 'create', 'update']) test(`org ${operation}
  const file = join(f.root, 'alpha.json'); writeFileSync(file, secret);
  const args = operation === 'validate' ? ['validate', file]
    : [operation, 'alpha', '--from', file, ...(operation === 'update' ? ['--if-revision', '1'] : [])];
-  redacted(f.run(cli, 'org', ...args), file, 2);
+  redacted(f.run(cli, 'org', ...args), file, 2, 'mosaic: cannot read organization document: not valid JSON\n');
 });
@@ -46,30 +46,32 @@ for (const [field, edit] of configCases) test(`config ${field} omits the configu
 test('config-command refuses system config without relaying stderr file values', t => {
 const root = scratch(t), f = fixture(root), d = JSON.parse(readFileSync(f.config, 'utf8')); d.execution.model = secret + '\n'; writeFileSync(f.config, JSON.stringify(d));
 let err = ''; const status = runConfigCommand(['validate', 'acme'], { env: f.env, stdout: { write() {} }, stderr: { write(s) { err += s; } } });
- assert.equal(status, 3); assert.match(err, /system config problem \(mosaic-config exit 2\)/); assert.ok(err.includes(f.config), err); assert.doesNotMatch(err, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/); assert.match(err, /execution.model/); assert.match(err, /expected a 1-200 character name/);
+ assert.equal(status, 3); assert.match(err, /system config problem \(mosaic-config exit 2\)/); assert.ok(!err.includes(f.config), err); assert.match(err, /the system config MOSAIC_CONFIG names/); assert.doesNotMatch(err, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/); assert.match(err, /execution.model/); assert.match(err, /expected a 1-200 character name/);
 });
 test('project id mismatch omits the file value in config-command', t => {
 const root = scratch(t), f = fixture(root), file = join(f.doc.projects.stack.root, '.mosaic', 'project.json');
 mkdirSync(join(f.doc.projects.stack.root, '.mosaic'));
 writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ projectVersion: 1, id: secret.toLowerCase() }));
 let err = ''; const status = runConfigCommand(['validate', 'acme'], { env: f.env, stdout: { write() {} }, stderr: { write(s) { err += s; } } });
- assert.equal(status, 2); assert.ok(err.includes(file), err); assert.match(err, /id/); assert.doesNotMatch(err, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
+ assert.equal(status, 2); assert.ok(!err.includes(file), err); assert.match(err, /project file of project stack has id that does not match the declared project key/); assert.doesNotMatch(err, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
 });
 for (const [field, edit] of [
 ['dataRoot', d => { d.dataRoot = `/x/${secret}/../y`; }],
 ['federation.peers[0].id', d => { d.federation = { self: secret.toLowerCase(), peers: [{ id: secret.toLowerCase(), origin: 'https://peer.example', label: 'Peer' }] }; }],
-]) test(`config ${field} repeated/canonical value is omitted`, t => {
+]) test(`config ${field} repeated/canonical value ${field.endsWith(".id") ? "names the checked id" : "is omitted"}`, t => {
 const root = scratch(t), f = fixture(root), d = JSON.parse(readFileSync(f.config, 'utf8')); edit(d); writeFileSync(f.config, JSON.stringify(d));
 const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [join(repo, 'scripts/mosaic-config.mjs'), 'validate'], { encoding: 'utf8', env: { ...f.env, PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: process.env.HOME, TMPDIR: process.env.TMPDIR } });
- assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.ok(r.stderr.includes(field), r.stderr); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
+ assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.ok(r.stderr.includes(field), r.stderr);
+ if (field.endsWith(".id")) assert.ok(r.stderr.includes(secret.toLowerCase()), r.stderr);
+ else assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
 });
-for (const mission of [false, true]) test(`duplicate ${mission ? 'mission' : 'task'} tool omits the validated value`, t => {
+for (const mission of [false, true]) test(`duplicate ${mission ? 'mission' : 'task'} tool names the validated value`, t => {
 const root = scratch(t), d = task();
 if (mission) { d.mission = 'mission.json'; writeFileSync(join(root, d.mission), JSON.stringify({ missionVersion: 1, id: 'valid', objective: 'hello', capabilities: { tools: ['read', 'read'] } })); }
 else d.capabilities = { tools: ['read', 'read'] };
 const file = join(root, 'task.json'); writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(d));
 const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [join(repo, 'scripts/mosaic-task.mjs'), 'validate', file], { encoding: 'utf8', env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: process.env.HOME, TMPDIR: process.env.TMPDIR } });
- assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /duplicate tool in/); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /read/);
+ assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /duplicate tool in/); assert.match(r.stderr, /read/);
 });
 for (const childStderr of [secret, `mosaic-config: execution.model must match ${secret}`]) test(`config-command does not relay arbitrary child stderr${childStderr.startsWith('mosaic-config:') ? ' after a known field' : ''}`, t => {
 const root = scratch(t), file = join(root, 'config.json');
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ cp.spawnSync = () => ({ status: 2, stderr: ${JSON.stringify(childStderr)}, stdou
 const { runConfigCommand } = await import(${JSON.stringify(new URL('../../organization/src/config-command.mjs', import.meta.url).href)});
 process.exitCode = runConfigCommand(['validate', 'acme'], { env: { MOSAIC_CONFIG: ${JSON.stringify(file)} } });`;
 const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['--input-type=module', '-e', code], { encoding: 'utf8', env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: process.env.HOME, TMPDIR: process.env.TMPDIR } });
- assert.equal(r.status, 3, r.stderr); assert.ok(r.stderr.includes(file), r.stderr); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
+ assert.equal(r.status, 3, r.stderr); assert.ok(!r.stderr.includes(file), r.stderr); assert.match(r.stderr, /: the system config MOSAIC_CONFIG names\n$/); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
 });

 import { bootConfig, loadSystem } from '../src/config.mjs';
@@ -89,3 +91,12 @@ test('CLI boot project id mismatch omits the configured value and keeps exit 3',
 writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ projectVersion: 1, id: secret.toLowerCase() }));
 assert.throws(() => bootConfig({ system: loadSystem({ env: f.env }), businessId: 'acme', env: f.env }), safe(file, CliError, { exitCode: 3 }, secret.toLowerCase()));
 });
+
+for (const mission of [false, true]) test(`duplicate ${mission ? 'mission' : 'task'} tool rejects an unknown value before naming it`, t => {
+ const root = scratch(t), d = task();
+ if (mission) { d.mission = 'mission.json'; writeFileSync(join(root, d.mission), JSON.stringify({ missionVersion: 1, id: 'valid', objective: 'hello', capabilities: { tools: [secret, secret] } })); }
+ else d.capabilities = { tools: [secret, secret] };
+ const file = join(root, 'task.json'); writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(d));
+ const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [join(repo, 'scripts/mosaic-task.mjs'), 'validate', file], { encoding: 'utf8', env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: process.env.HOME, TMPDIR: process.env.TMPDIR } });
+ assert.equal(r.status, 2); assert.match(r.stderr, /unsupported.*tool/); assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/);
+});
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ test("the journal: a line with a wrong type refuses with exit 3 and names the fi
  for (const [field, r] of bad) {
    const text = `${JSON.stringify(dm)}\n${JSON.stringify(r)}\n`;
    writeFileSync(file, text);
-    assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal line 2 is malformed (${field}): ${file}`, `${field}: ${JSON.stringify(r)}`);
+    assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal line 2 is malformed (${field})` && !e.message.includes(file), `${field}: ${JSON.stringify(r)}`);
    assert.equal(readFileSync(file, "utf8"), text, "a refusal changes nothing");
  }
  const good = [dm, digest, { ...dm, outcome: "refused", messageId: null, status: 403 }, { ...dm, outcome: "gave-up", messageId: null }, { ...digest, outcome: "unknown", messageId: null }];
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ test("the journal: a symlinked directory refuses and says it is a link", (t) =>
  const file = journalPath(root, "demo");
  mkdirSync(dirname(dirname(file)), { mode: 0o700 });
  symlinkSync(real, dirname(file));
-  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory must not be a symlink: ${dirname(file)}`);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory must not be a symlink` && !e.message.includes(dirname(file)));
  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(real), [], "nothing was created through the link");
 });

@@ -386,13 +386,13 @@ test("the journal: a dangling directory link, a parent that is a file and a jour
  const dangling = journalPath(root, "demo");
  mkdirSync(dirname(dirname(dangling)), { mode: 0o700 });
  symlinkSync(join(root, "missing"), dirname(dangling));
-  assert.throws(() => openJournal(dangling), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory must not be a symlink: ${dirname(dangling)}`);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(dangling), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory must not be a symlink` && !e.message.includes(dirname(dangling)));
  const under = join(root, "plain", "notify", "demo", "sent.jsonl");
  writeFileSync(join(root, "plain"), "");
-  assert.throws(() => openJournal(under), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory cannot be created (ENOTDIR): ${dirname(under)}`);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(under), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory cannot be created (ENOTDIR)` && !e.message.includes(dirname(under)));
  const asDir = journalPath(root, "acme");
  mkdirSync(asDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  assert.throws(() => openJournal(asDir), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user: ${asDir}`);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(asDir), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user` && !e.message.includes(asDir));
 });

 test("the journal: an append after the file was swapped for a symlink refuses and writes nothing through it", (t) => {
@@ -414,18 +414,18 @@ test("the journal: a directory it cannot write or create refuses with exit 3 and
  // Modes are restored in finally: tmp()'s cleanup runs first among the after hooks.
  chmodSync(dirname(file), 0o500);
  try {
-    assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory is not writable (EACCES): ${dirname(file)}`);
+    assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory is not writable (EACCES)` && !e.message.includes(dirname(file)));
  } finally {
    chmodSync(dirname(file), 0o700);
  }
  openJournal(file);
  chmodSync(file, 0o400);
-  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal is not writable (EACCES): ${file}`);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal is not writable (EACCES)` && !e.message.includes(file));
  const parent = join(root, "notify");
  const other = journalPath(root, "acme");
  chmodSync(parent, 0o500);
  try {
-    assert.throws(() => openJournal(other), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory cannot be created (EACCES): ${dirname(other)}`);
+    assert.throws(() => openJournal(other), (e) => e.exitCode === 3 && e.message === `notify journal directory cannot be created (EACCES)` && !e.message.includes(dirname(other)));
  } finally {
    chmodSync(parent, 0o700);
  }
@@ -40,8 +40,10 @@ test('console stop quarantines dead and wrong-process states without signaling',
 });

 test('live console from another entry path remains recorded and is not signalled', { timeout: 30000 }, async t => {
-  const f = await fixture(), dir = join(f.ctx.dataRoot, 'console'), alias = join(f.root, 'console.mjs');
-  mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  // The other entry sits under the sentinel directory: the refusal must name neither (PR #1916).
+  const SENTINEL = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+  const f = await fixture(), dir = join(f.ctx.dataRoot, 'console'), alias = join(f.root, SENTINEL, 'console.mjs');
+  mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 }); mkdirSync(join(f.root, SENTINEL), { mode: 0o700 });
  symlinkSync(new URL('../../webui/src/cli.mjs', import.meta.url).pathname, alias);
  const child = spawn(process.execPath, [alias, 'serve', '--port', '0'], { env: humanEnv({ HOME: f.root, MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(f.ctx.configDir, 'config.json') }), stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
  t.after(async () => { if (child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) { const ended = once(child, 'exit'); child.kill('SIGTERM'); await ended; } });
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ test('live console from another entry path remains recorded and is not signalled
  const record = { pid: child.pid, startTime: startTimeOf(child.pid), url };
  json(join(dir, 'console.json'), record);
  await assert.rejects(consoleStart(f.ctx), /console state exists/);
-  await assert.rejects(consoleStop(f.ctx), e => /another path/.test(e.message) && e.message.includes(alias));
+  await assert.rejects(consoleStop(f.ctx), e => { assert.equal(e.exitCode, 3); assert.equal(e.message, 'console was started from another checkout; stop it there'); assert.ok(!e.message.includes(SENTINEL) && !e.message.includes(alias), e.message); return true; });
  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(dir, 'console.json'), 'utf8')), record);
  assert.equal(startTimeOf(child.pid), record.startTime);
  assert.equal(readdirSync(dir).filter(x => x.startsWith('console.json.stale-')).length, 0);
@@ -38,10 +38,12 @@ const IMPORT=new RegExp([
 `${DYNAMIC.source}\\s*['"](\\.{1,2}\\/[^'"]+)['"]\\s*\\)`,
 ].join('|'),'g');
 const DYNAMIC_LITERAL=/^import\s*\(\s*(['"])[^'"\n]*\1\s*\)/;
-// The plug-in loader's one computed import, allowed only in that file and only in this exact form. It loads
+// The plug-in loader's computed imports, allowed only in that file and these exact forms. Core loads
 // packages/plugins/<kind>/<name>/index.mjs after checking that path, and a real copy ships all of
 // packages/plugins, so a fixture that never loads a plug-in needs nothing more from it.
-const LOADER_FILE='packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs',LOADER_IMPORT=/^import\(pathToFileURL\(expected\)\.href\)/;
+// PL1 adds the checked instance package entry with its verified hash as a cache key. Installed
+// bytes belong to the instance, not to a release fixture's import closure.
+const LOADER_FILE='packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs',LOADER_IMPORT=/^import\(pathToFileURL\(expected\)\.href\)|^import\(pathToFileURL\(entry\)\.href \+ '\?pin=' \+ checked\.manifest\.sha256\)/;
 const REGEX_AFTER='(,=:[!&|?{};+-*%<>~^';
 const inert=(literals,index)=>literals.some(([from,to])=>index>=from&&index<to);
 const sources=(dir)=>readdirSync(dir,{withFileTypes:true}).flatMap((e)=>e.isDirectory()?sources(join(dir,e.name)):e.name.endsWith('.mjs')?[join(dir,e.name)]:[]);
@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ test('the loader exception holds only for the loader file and its exact computed
 assert.throws(()=>organizationImportedFiles(tree({[`${ORG}a.mjs`]:"import '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';\n",'repo/packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs':"await import(x);\n"})),/not a plain string literal/);
 });

+test('PL1 pinned import exception holds only for the checked loader entry and exact hash cache key',()=>{
+ const computed="await import(pathToFileURL(entry).href + '?pin=' + checked.manifest.sha256);\n";
+ const at=(file,text=computed)=>tree({[`${ORG}a.mjs`]:`import '../../plugins/src/${file}';\n`,[`repo/packages/plugins/src/${file}`]:text});
+ assert.deepEqual(organizationImportedFiles(at('loader.mjs')),['packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs']);
+ assert.throws(()=>organizationImportedFiles(at('other.mjs')),/not a plain string literal/);
+ for(const changed of [computed.replace('entry','arbitrary'),computed.replace('?pin=','?unchecked='),computed.replace('checked.manifest.sha256','input')])assert.throws(()=>organizationImportedFiles(at('loader.mjs',changed)),/not a plain string literal/);
+});
+
 test('every static form and a literal dynamic import is found, and the imports of what it finds in turn', ()=>{
 const repo=withOrg([
  "import x from '../../other/src/from.mjs';",
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+// PR #1916 redaction (org-redact5): a CLI refusal names the file by its label,
+// never by host path. Every fixture here sits under a directory named for the
+// sentinel, so a refusal that quoted the path would carry it.
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { createServer } from "node:net";
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+import { gitSocketPath } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
+import { withLock } from "../src/access.mjs";
+import { fixtureFile, readFixture } from "../src/dev-fixture.mjs";
+import { createGitSocket } from "../src/git-socket.mjs";
+import { consoleStart, consoleStop } from "../src/org-console.mjs";
+import { claimHostLock, hostLock } from "../src/host.mjs";
+import { journalPath, openJournal } from "../src/notifier.mjs";
+import { readNotifyConfig } from "../src/notify-config.mjs";
+import { orgCommand } from "../src/org.mjs";
+import { instancesCommand } from "../src/instances.mjs";
+import { FIXTURE_ENTRY } from "../../plugins/model-provider/fixture/index.mjs";
+
+const SENTINEL = "sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234";
+const ROOT_SKIP = process.getuid() === 0 && "root ignores the modes";
+
+function under(t) {
+  const top = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "redact-"));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(top, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const root = join(top, SENTINEL);
+  mkdirSync(root, { mode: 0o700 });
+  return root;
+}
+
+// The refusal is exactly `message` (a string) or matches it (a RegExp), with exit
+// code `exitCode`, and carries neither the sentinel nor any of `paths`.
+function refusal(message, { exitCode = 3, paths = [], code } = {}) {
+  return (error) => {
+    assert.equal(error.name, "CliError");
+    assert.equal(error.exitCode, exitCode);
+    if (code !== undefined) assert.equal(error.code, code);
+    if (message instanceof RegExp) assert.match(error.message, message);
+    else assert.equal(error.message, message);
+    assert.ok(!error.message.includes(SENTINEL), error.message);
+    for (const path of paths) assert.ok(!error.message.includes(path), error.message);
+    return true;
+  };
+}
+
+// --- access.json lock ---
+
+test("access lock: an unreadable lock is named by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), "access.json");
+  writeFileSync(`${file}.lock`, "not-a-pid\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+  assert.throws(() => withLock(file, () => assert.fail("must refuse")),
+    refusal("refused: access file lock is unreadable or not a pid; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again", { paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test("access lock: a lock left by a dead pid is named by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), "access.json");
+  const dead = spawnSync(process.execPath, ["-e", ""]);
+  writeFileSync(`${file}.lock`, `${dead.pid}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+  assert.throws(() => withLock(file, () => assert.fail("must refuse")),
+    refusal(`refused: access file lock is left by pid ${dead.pid}, which is not running; if no write is running, remove it by hand and try again`, { paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+// --- bus host lock ---
+
+const MINE = { pid: process.pid, startTime: "1", business: "acme", startedAt: "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z" };
+const STALE = { pid: 999999999, startTime: "1", business: "acme", startedAt: "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z" };
+
+function hostRoot(t, lock) {
+  const dataRoot = join(under(t), "data");
+  mkdirSync(join(dirname(hostLock(dataRoot))), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  if (lock !== undefined) writeFileSync(hostLock(dataRoot), lock, { mode: 0o600 });
+  return dataRoot;
+}
+
+test("host lock: an unreadable host.lock refuses by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = hostRoot(t, "{not json");
+  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, MINE), refusal("bus host state is unreadable", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("host lock: a malformed host.lock refuses by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = hostRoot(t, JSON.stringify({ pid: "x" }));
+  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, MINE), refusal("bus host state is malformed", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("host lock: a stale host.lock refused on request is named by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = hostRoot(t, JSON.stringify(STALE));
+  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, MINE, { refuseStale: true }), refusal("stale bus host lock", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("host lock: a lock that keeps changing is named by label, never by host path", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = hostRoot(t, JSON.stringify(STALE));
+  let n = 0;
+  const race = () => writeFileSync(hostLock(dataRoot), JSON.stringify({ ...STALE, startedAt: `2026-11-09T00:00:${String(++n % 60).padStart(2, "0")}.000Z` }), { mode: 0o600 });
+  assert.throws(() => claimHostLock(dataRoot, MINE, { between: race }), refusal("bus host lock kept changing; no bus host started", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+// --- notify journal ---
+
+test("notify journal: a directory link, dangling or not, is refused by label", (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const dangling = journalPath(root, "demo");
+  mkdirSync(dirname(dirname(dangling)), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  symlinkSync(join(root, "missing"), dirname(dangling));
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(dangling), refusal("notify journal directory must not be a symlink", { paths: [dangling] }));
+  const real = join(root, "real");
+  mkdirSync(real, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const linked = journalPath(root, "acme");
+  symlinkSync(real, dirname(linked));
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(linked), refusal("notify journal directory must not be a symlink", { paths: [linked] }));
+});
+
+test("notify journal: a parent that is a file is refused by its error code", (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  writeFileSync(join(root, "plain"), "");
+  const file = join(root, "plain", "notify", "demo", "sent.jsonl");
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal directory cannot be created (ENOTDIR)", { paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test("notify journal: a directory of the wrong mode is refused by label", (t) => {
+  const file = journalPath(under(t), "demo");
+  mkdirSync(dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o755 });
+  chmodSync(dirname(file), 0o755);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal directory must be mode 0700 and owned by this user", { paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test("notify journal: a directory it cannot write or create is refused by its error code", { skip: ROOT_SKIP }, (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const file = journalPath(root, "demo");
+  mkdirSync(dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  chmodSync(dirname(file), 0o500);
+  try {
+    assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal directory is not writable (EACCES)", { paths: [file] }));
+  } finally {
+    chmodSync(dirname(file), 0o700);
+  }
+  const parent = dirname(dirname(file));
+  const other = journalPath(root, "acme");
+  chmodSync(parent, 0o500);
+  try {
+    assert.throws(() => openJournal(other), refusal("notify journal directory cannot be created (EACCES)", { paths: [other] }));
+  } finally {
+    chmodSync(parent, 0o700);
+  }
+});
+
+test("notify journal: a journal link, an unwritable journal and a directory journal are refused by label", { skip: ROOT_SKIP }, (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const file = journalPath(root, "demo");
+  mkdirSync(dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  writeFileSync(join(root, "elsewhere.jsonl"), "", { mode: 0o600 });
+  symlinkSync(join(root, "elsewhere.jsonl"), file);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal must not be a symlink", { paths: [file] }));
+  rmSync(file);
+  writeFileSync(file, "", { mode: 0o400 });
+  chmodSync(file, 0o400);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal is not writable (EACCES)", { paths: [file] }));
+  const asDir = journalPath(root, "acme");
+  mkdirSync(asDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(asDir), refusal("notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user", { paths: [asDir] }));
+});
+
+test("notify journal: a journal of the wrong mode and a malformed line are refused by label", (t) => {
+  const file = journalPath(under(t), "demo");
+  mkdirSync(dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  writeFileSync(file, "", { mode: 0o644 });
+  chmodSync(file, 0o644);
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user", { paths: [file] }));
+  chmodSync(file, 0o600);
+  writeFileSync(file, "not json\n");
+  assert.throws(() => openJournal(file), refusal("notify journal line 1 is malformed (json)", { paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+// --- notifier config ---
+
+function notifyRoot(t, text, mode = 0o600) {
+  const dataRoot = join(under(t), "data");
+  const dir = join(dataRoot, "notify", "acme");
+  mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  if (text !== undefined) {
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "notify.json"), text, { mode });
+    chmodSync(join(dir, "notify.json"), mode);
+  }
+  return dataRoot;
+}
+
+test("notifier config: a missing file names the business and its place under the data root", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = notifyRoot(t);
+  assert.throws(() => readNotifyConfig(dataRoot, "acme"),
+    refusal('no notifier config for acme: write {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": "<discord binding>"} to notify/acme/notify.json under the data root, mode 0600, or "binding": null to run without DMs', { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("notifier config: a file of the wrong mode names the business only", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = notifyRoot(t, JSON.stringify({ notifyVersion: 1, binding: null }), 0o644);
+  assert.throws(() => readNotifyConfig(dataRoot, "acme"), refusal("notifier config for acme must be a regular file, mode 0600, owned by this user", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("notifier config: a file that is not JSON names the business only", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = notifyRoot(t, "{not json");
+  assert.throws(() => readNotifyConfig(dataRoot, "acme"), refusal("notifier config for acme is not JSON", { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("notifier config: a file of the wrong shape names the business only", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = notifyRoot(t, JSON.stringify({ notifyVersion: 1, binding: null, extra: 1 }));
+  assert.throws(() => readNotifyConfig(dataRoot, "acme"), refusal('notifier config for acme must be exactly {"notifyVersion": 1, "binding": <binding name> | null}', { paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+// --- dev fixture ---
+
+const RECORD = { fixtureVersion: 1, model: "deterministic", endpoint: "http://127.0.0.1:45678", port: 45678, pid: 999999, instance: "fxtest", entry: FIXTURE_ENTRY };
+
+function fixtureRoot(t, { record = RECORD, text = JSON.stringify(record), dirMode = 0o700, fileMode = 0o600 } = {}) {
+  const dataRoot = join(under(t), "data");
+  const file = fixtureFile(dataRoot);
+  mkdirSync(dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: dirMode });
+  chmodSync(dirname(file), dirMode);
+  if (text !== null) {
+    writeFileSync(file, text, { mode: fileMode });
+    chmodSync(file, fileMode);
+  }
+  return dataRoot;
+}
+
+test("dev fixture: a shared fixture directory is refused by label", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { dirMode: 0o755 });
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-state-unsafe: dev-fixture directory is not a private directory of this user", { code: "fixture-state-unsafe", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("dev fixture: a linked fixture file is refused by label and error code", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { text: null });
+  writeFileSync(join(dataRoot, "elsewhere.json"), JSON.stringify(RECORD), { mode: 0o600 });
+  symlinkSync(join(dataRoot, "elsewhere.json"), fixtureFile(dataRoot));
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-state-unsafe: fixture.json can't be opened (ELOOP)", { code: "fixture-state-unsafe", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("dev fixture: a shared fixture file is refused by label", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { fileMode: 0o644 });
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-state-unsafe: fixture.json is not a private file of this user", { code: "fixture-state-unsafe", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("dev fixture: a fixture file that is not JSON is refused by label", (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { text: "not json" });
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-state-invalid: fixture.json is not JSON", { code: "fixture-state-invalid", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+test("dev fixture: a non-loopback endpoint and a record of the wrong shape are refused by label", (t) => {
+  let dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { record: { ...RECORD, endpoint: "http://0.0.0.0:45678" } });
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-endpoint-not-loopback: fixture.json names an endpoint that is not http://127.0.0.1:<port>", { code: "fixture-endpoint-not-loopback", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+  dataRoot = fixtureRoot(t, { record: { ...RECORD, port: 1 } });
+  assert.throws(() => readFixture(dataRoot), refusal("fixture-state-invalid: fixture.json is not a fixture record", { code: "fixture-state-invalid", paths: [dataRoot] }));
+});
+
+// --- git socket ---
+
+test("git socket: a path that exists and is not a socket is refused by label", async (t) => {
+  const dataRoot = join(under(t), "data");
+  const path = gitSocketPath(dataRoot);
+  mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  writeFileSync(path, "", { mode: 0o600 });
+  const sock = createGitSocket({ host: {}, business: { id: "acme", projects: {} }, dataRoot, env: {}, log: () => {} });
+  await assert.rejects(sock.listen(), refusal("git socket path exists and isn't a socket", { paths: [dataRoot, path] }));
+});
+
+// --- console launch ---
+
+// The Console is given a port this test holds, so its listen fails and it exits at
+// startup. Should it start anyway, it is stopped before the tree goes.
+test("console: a Console that exits at startup is named by its log under the data root, never by host path", { timeout: 60000 }, async (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const ctx = { configDir: join(root, "config"), dataRoot: join(root, "data"), instance: "redact", env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: root } };
+  for (const dir of [ctx.configDir, ctx.dataRoot]) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const held = createServer();
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => held.once("error", reject).listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
+  try {
+    await assert.rejects(consoleStart(ctx, { detach: true, port: String(held.address().port), warn: () => {} }),
+      refusal(/^console failed to start; see console\/console-[0-9]+-[0-9]+\.log under the data root$/, { paths: [ctx.dataRoot] }));
+  } finally {
+    await consoleStop(ctx, { warn: () => {} }).catch(() => {});
+    await new Promise((resolve) => held.close(resolve));
+  }
+});
+
+// --- review round (org-redact5 Sol P2 #3): documents, --vars and raw fs errors ---
+
+const quietIo = () => ({ stdout: { write: () => true }, stderr: { write: () => true } });
+
+test("org validate: a missing or invalid document is refused by kind, never by host path or bytes", async (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), missing = join(root, "missing.json"), bad = join(root, "bad.json");
+  writeFileSync(bad, `{"${SENTINEL}": `, { mode: 0o600 });
+  await assert.rejects(orgCommand(["validate", missing], quietIo()), refusal("cannot read organization document: ENOENT", { exitCode: 2, paths: [missing, root] }));
+  await assert.rejects(orgCommand(["validate", bad], quietIo()), refusal("cannot read organization document: not valid JSON", { exitCode: 2, paths: [bad, root] }));
+});
+
+test("org template render: a raw filesystem error is named by operation and code, never by host path", async (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), output = join(root, "alpha.json");
+  writeFileSync(output, "{}\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+  await assert.rejects(orgCommand(["template", "render", "alpha", "--output", output], quietIo()),
+    refusal("EEXIST: cannot open (EEXIST)", { exitCode: 2, paths: [output, root] }));
+});
+
+test("instance set: a missing or invalid --vars file is refused by flag and kind, never by host path or bytes", async (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), missing = join(root, "vars.json"), bad = join(root, "bad.json");
+  writeFileSync(bad, `{"${SENTINEL}": `, { mode: 0o600 });
+  const rev = "a".repeat(64);
+  const callFor = () => assert.fail("must refuse before any call");
+  await assert.rejects(instancesCommand(["instance", "set", "acme", "coder", "--vars", missing, "--revision", rev], quietIo(), callFor),
+    refusal("--vars file: ENOENT", { exitCode: 4, paths: [missing, root] }));
+  await assert.rejects(instancesCommand(["instance", "set", "acme", "coder", "--vars", bad, "--revision", rev], quietIo(), callFor),
+    refusal("--vars file: not valid JSON", { exitCode: 4, paths: [bad, root] }));
+});
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ test("rename r2 B2: a draft file named like an installed ID: org validate reads
  rmSync(join(cwd, "acme"));
  const noDraft = spawn(MOSAIC, ["org", "validate", "acme"], env, cwd);
  assert.equal(noDraft.status, 2);
-  assert.match(noDraft.stderr, /^mosaic: cannot read document acme: /);
+  assert.equal(noDraft.stderr, "mosaic: cannot read organization document: ENOENT\n");
  writeJson(join(cwd, "acme"), await templateRender("acme", { fixture: "local" }));
  rmSync(join(root, "config", "businesses", "acme.json"));
  const noInstalled = spawn(MOSAIC, ["org", "config", "validate", "acme"], env, cwd);
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { ownerAccounts } from '../../webui/tests/helpers/owner-accounts.mjs';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import { fork } from 'node:child_process';
 import { once } from 'node:events';
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ export async function lifecycleFixture(t) {
  const issuer = op.issuer('fixture');
  sso = await createSso({ publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: [{ id: 'fixture', issuer: issuer.issuer, clientId: issuer.clientId,
    clientSecret: { slot: 'fixture' }, algs: ['RS256'], subjects: [{ sub: 'owner', name: 'jason' }] }] },
-    { secrets: new Map([['fixture', issuer.clientSecret]]), fetch: op.fetch, log: () => {} });
+    { accounts: ownerAccounts({ providers: [{ id: 'fixture', subjects: [{ sub: 'owner', name: 'jason' }] }] }), secrets: new Map([['fixture', issuer.clientSecret]]), fetch: op.fetch, log: () => {} });
  const transport = async (verb, args, ctx) => {
    try { return await rpc('console', { verb, args, subject: ctx.subject }); }
    catch (e) { appendFileSync(join(root, 'console-errors.jsonl'), JSON.stringify({ verb, code: e.code, detail: e.detail })+'\n'); throw new BusReadError(e.code ?? 'outcome-unknown', 503); }
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ const OTHER = '11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555';
 let n = 0;

 // An instance with org alpha and one finished run for THREAD.
-async function world({ run = 'r0123456789ab' } = {}) {
+async function world({ run = 'r0123456789ab', under = HOME } = {}) {
  const name = `ev${++n}`;
  const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME, MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(HOME, '.config', `mosaic-${name}`, 'config.json') };
  mkdirSync(dirname(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  const dataRoot = join(HOME, `data-${name}`); mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const dataRoot = join(under, `data-${name}`); mkdirSync(dataRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
  const org = await reserveOrg({ configDir: dirname(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG), dataRoot, instance: name, principal: DEV_OWNER }, 'alpha');
  const runDir = join(runsDir(org.root, 'alpha'), run);
  mkdirSync(join(runDir, 'bundle'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
@@ -132,6 +132,27 @@ test('no launch for the thread, an unknown org and a usage error', async () => {
  await assert.rejects(runCommand(['evidence', 'alpha', '--thread', THREAD], io({ PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME }), { system: { dataRoot: w.dataRoot } }), e => e.exitCode === 3 && e.code === 'run-evidence-instance-refused');
 });

+// PR #1916 (org-redact5): a refusal names the launch log by label, never by host path.
+const SENTINEL = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+const noPath = (e, w) => !e.message.includes(SENTINEL) && !e.message.includes(w.dataRoot) && !e.message.includes(w.log);
+
+test('a launch log of the wrong mode refuses by label, never by host path', async () => {
+  const w = await world({ under: join(HOME, SENTINEL) });
+  chmodSync(w.log, 0o644);
+  const r = await evidence(w, ['--thread', THREAD, '--json']);
+  assert.equal(r.error?.exitCode, 3);
+  assert.equal(r.error.message, 'run-evidence-refused: launch log: mode 644, expected 600');
+  assert.ok(noPath(r.error, w), r.error.message);
+});
+
+test('no launch for the thread names the launch log by label, never by host path', async () => {
+  const w = await world({ under: join(HOME, SENTINEL) });
+  const r = await evidence(w, ['--thread', '99999999-2222-4333-8444-555555555555', '--json']);
+  assert.equal(r.error?.exitCode, 2);
+  assert.equal(r.error.message, 'no launch for thread 99999999-2222-4333-8444-555555555555 in the launch log');
+  assert.ok(noPath(r.error, w), r.error.message);
+});
+
 test('a thread name resolves through the bus with the org as business', async () => {
  const w = await world();
  const seen = [];
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import {createOwnedRunner} from './fixtures/owned-child.mjs';
 import {pathToFileURL} from 'node:url';
 import {fixture,notifyConfig,BUSINESSES} from './helpers.mjs';
 import {reserveOrg,activateOrg} from '../../business/src/org-registry.mjs';
+import {writeDeployment} from '../src/deployment.mjs';
+import {fakeOidc} from '../../webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs';
 const ROOT=fileURLToPath(new URL('../../..',import.meta.url)).replace(/\/$/,'');
 const git=(cwd,...args)=>execFileSync('git',['-c','user.name=fixture','-c','user.email=fixture@invalid','-c','commit.gpgsign=false','-c','core.hooksPath=/dev/null','-C',cwd,...args],{encoding:'utf8'}).trim();
 export function setup(t, realPin=false){
@@ -58,6 +60,7 @@ test('a copy carries every file the harness modules read from it',async t=>{
 test('shared copy: npm ci, pushed reachability, readonly/existing copy, webui delegation',async t=>{
 const s=setup(t),r=(await s.run('stack-copy.sh',['copy',s.id,'--copies',s.copies]));assert.equal(r.status,0,r.stderr);
 const copy=join(s.copies,s.id);assert.equal(statSync(copy).mode&0o777,0o555);
+ assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(copy,'.stack-build.json'),'utf8')), {commit:s.id}); assert.equal(statSync(join(copy,'.stack-build.json')).mode&0o222,0);
 for(const f of ['scripts/mosaic','adapters/pi/adapter.sh','packages/queue/src/cli.mjs','package.json','package-lock.json','packages/tasks/requirements.json','packages/project/src/index.mjs','packages/library/src/index.mjs','packages/project/schemas/project.schema.json','packages/project/templates/north-star.md','packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs','packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs','packages/processing-control/src/state.mjs','packages/processing-control/src/containers.mjs','packages/processing-control/src/effects.mjs'])assert.ok(existsSync(join(copy,f)),f);
 const npm=join(s.bin,'npm');writeFileSync(npm,'#!/bin/sh\nexit 99\n');chmodSync(npm,0o755);
 const existing=(await s.run('webui-service.sh',['copy',s.id,'--copies',s.copies]));assert.equal(existing.status,0);assert.equal(existing.stdout,`exists: ${copy}\n`);unlinkSync(npm);
@@ -139,7 +142,7 @@ async function childResult(command,args,env,input){
 const timer=setTimeout(()=>p.kill('SIGKILL'),15000);
 try{const [status]=await once(p,'close');return {status,stdout,stderr};}finally{clearTimeout(timer)}
 }
-test('real pinned install loads bus and Console; same-copy mosaic talk passes proof, other trees refuse', {timeout:180000},async t=>{
+test('real pinned install loads bus and Console; the Console starts only with --sso and its deployed prerequisites; same-copy mosaic talk passes proof, other trees refuse', {timeout:180000},async t=>{
 const s=setup(t,true);
 const copied=(await s.run('stack-copy.sh',['copy',s.id,'--copies',s.copies]));assert.equal(copied.status,0,copied.stderr);
 const root=join(s.copies,s.id),url=f=>pathToFileURL(join(root,f)).href;
@@ -156,7 +159,24 @@ test('real pinned install loads bus and Console; same-copy mosaic talk passes pr
 host.stdout.on('data',c=>hostOut+=c);host.stderr.on('data',c=>hostErr+=c);
 try{await until(()=>hostOut.includes('\"org\":\"acme\"')||host.exitCode!==null);assert.match(hostOut,/\"org\":\"acme\"/,hostErr);}
 finally{if(host.exitCode===null&&host.signalCode===null){const done=once(host,'close');const stop=spawnSync(join(root,'scripts/mosaic'),['bus','stop','acme'],{env,encoding:'utf8'});assert.equal(stop.status,0,stop.stderr);await done;}}
- const web=spawn(process.execPath,[join(root,'packages/webui/src/cli.mjs'),'serve','--port','0','--business','acme','--board','http://127.0.0.1:9'],{env,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});let webOut='',webErr='';
+ // The copy is stamped (M3): its Console starts only with --sso, console.sso and its slot, .deployed and accounts.json.
+ const serveArgs=sso=>[join(root,'packages/webui/src/cli.mjs'),'serve','--port','0','--business','acme','--board','http://127.0.0.1:9',...(sso?['--sso']:[])];
+ const op=await fakeOidc();t.after(()=>op.close());const iss=op.issuer('a');
+ const ca=join(s.root,'ca.pem');writeFileSync(ca,op.cert);const webEnv={...env,NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS:ca};
+ const startRefused=async(sso,why)=>{const r=await childResult(process.execPath,serveArgs(sso),webEnv,'');assert.equal(r.status,2,r.stderr);assert.match(r.stderr,why);assert.doesNotMatch(r.stdout,/Mosaic Console:/);};
+ await startRefused(false,/stamped build serve requires --sso/);
+ await startRefused(true,/\.deployed is missing or invalid/);
+ writeDeployment({dataRoot:f.dataRoot},configDir);
+ await startRefused(true,/accounts file not found/);
+ writeFileSync(join(configDir,'accounts.json'),JSON.stringify({accountsVersion:1,revision:1,users:[{id:'u-000000000001',subjects:[{provider:'a',sub:'owner'}],name:'Owner',instanceRole:'operator',state:'active',authGen:1,created:'2026-11-10T00:00:00Z'}],memberships:[],invites:[]}),{mode:0o600});
+ await startRefused(true,/must be a configured provider/);
+ const config=JSON.parse(readFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG,'utf8'));
+ config.console={sso:{publicOrigin:'https://console.test',providers:[{id:'a',issuer:iss.issuer,clientId:iss.clientId,clientSecret:{slot:'a'},algs:['RS256'],subjects:[{sub:'owner',name:'Owner'}]}]}};
+ writeFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG,JSON.stringify(config));
+ await startRefused(true,/client secret slot is missing/);
+ mkdirSync(join(configDir,'secrets','mosaic-stack'),{recursive:true,mode:0o700});
+ const slot=join(configDir,'secrets','mosaic-stack','a');writeFileSync(slot,iss.clientSecret,{mode:0o600});chmodSync(slot,0o600);
+ const web=spawn(process.execPath,serveArgs(true),{env:webEnv,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});let webOut='',webErr='';
 web.stdout.on('data',c=>webOut+=c);web.stderr.on('data',c=>webErr+=c);
 try{await until(()=>/Mosaic Console: http:/.test(webOut)||web.exitCode!==null);const port=webOut.match(/127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)/)?.[1];assert.ok(port,webErr);assert.equal((await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/healthz`)).status,200);}
 finally{if(web.exitCode===null&&web.signalCode===null){const done=once(web,'close');web.kill();await done;}}
@@ -1555,51 +1555,110 @@ function setEdit(set,name,from,to,sums=true){
 if(sums){const s=join(set,'SHA256SUMS');chmodSync(s,0o600);writeFileSync(s,readFileSync(s,'utf8').replace(new RegExp(`^[0-9a-f]{64}(  \\./${name.replace(/[.@]/g,'\\$&')})$`,'m'),`${sha(f)}$1`))}
 }

+// M3 (#1873): console.sso marks an accounts instance, which runs system units, so a user-unit run
+// with it refuses accounts-user-unit before anything stops. An --sso pointer now comes two ways:
+// - a pre-M3 host's user-unit run. LEGACY is the fixture repo with the M3 base's stack-release.sh,
+//   webui-service.sh and stack-copy.sh, so legacy(e) builds the state such a host left behind;
+// - the system path: root stops the units, stack-release stages with --units external, root
+//   installs the units and starts them, and confirm pins the pointer to root's Console flags.
+const M3_BASE='c3c192677defa518eabeb324aac82f0757e398c3';
+const LEGACY=join(base,'legacy-repo');
+cpSync(repo,LEGACY,{recursive:true});
+for(const f of ['scripts/stack-release.sh','scripts/webui-service.sh','scripts/stack-copy.sh'])writeFileSync(join(LEGACY,f),execFileSync('git',['-C',ROOT,'show',`${M3_BASE}:${f}`]),{mode:0o755});
+const legacy=(e)=>({...e,sr:join(LEGACY,'scripts','stack-release.sh')});
+const X=(e)=>({...e,flags:[...e.flags,'--units','external']});
+const AUU=(e,op)=>`${e.cfg} holds console.sso; an accounts instance runs system units, so root renders them with case2-unit.sh and the ${op} runs with --units external`;
+// Root's part. rootUp installs the bus unit for COPY and writes the Console unit case2-unit.sh
+// renders for COPY with FLAGS (webui-service.sh refuses an accounts instance), then starts both.
+const rootDown=(e)=>{sysctl(e,'stop',e.con);sysctl(e,'stop',e.bus)};
+function rootUp(e,copy,flags){
+ execFileSync('bash',[join(repo,'scripts','bus-service.sh'),'install',...e.flags,'--copy',copy,'--copies',COPIES,'--claude',e.claude],{env:e.env,stdio:'ignore'});
+ const f=join(e.units,e.con),s=readFileSync(f,'utf8'),node=/^ExecStart=(\S+) /m.exec(s)[1],dir=join(COPIES,copy);
+ writeFileSync(f,s.replace(/^WorkingDirectory=.*$/m,`WorkingDirectory=${dir}`).replace(/^Documentation=.*$/m,`Documentation=file://${dir}/packages/webui/README.md`)
+  .replace(/^ExecStart=.*$/m,`ExecStart=${node} ${dir}/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve --checkout ${repo} ${flags.join(' ')}`));
+ execFileSync(join(SBIN,'systemctl'),['--user','start',e.bus],{env:{...e.env,SD_CLOCK_OFFSET:'0'}});sysctl(e,'start',e.con);
+}
+// One system-path run: OP (activate TO, or rollback --to TO) planned and staged from the pointer's
+// copy, root's units for TO with FLAGS, confirm. The plan, the staged set and both log lines are this
+// script's output; the unit flags are root's render (case2-unit.test.mjs pins that render), so the
+// pointer pinning them is confirm's read of root's unit, not a conversion of this script's.
+async function viaSystem(e,op,to,flags,...more){
+ const x=X(e),from=pointer(e).copy,p0=readFileSync(e.pointer,'utf8'),w0=sha(join(e.bin,e.wrapper));
+ const args=op==='activate'?['activate',to,'acme']:['rollback','acme','--to',to],inst=e.flags.length?`${e.flags.join(' ')} `:'';
+ rootDown(e);
+ const con0=sha(join(e.units,e.con));
+ const out=await planOnly(x,0,...args,...more),plan=out.join('\n');
+ assert.deepEqual([out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('plan: ')),out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('from: ')),out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('to: '))],[`plan: ${op} for acme`,`from: ${from}`,`to: ${to}`],plan);
+ assert.ok(out.includes(`units: external; root installs the units for ${to} and starts them, then confirm gates them`),plan);
+ assert.ok(out.includes(`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} ${inst}--copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`),plan);
+ // Root renders the units, so the plan names no unit, Console flag or refusal of this script's.
+ assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>/^(bus|pm|proof|send|sso|Console):|^(drop|refuses) /.test(l)),[],plan);
+ let r=await prun(x,...args,...more);assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+ const st=logLines(e).at(-1),act=st.activation,rs=setOf(e,act);
+ assert.deepEqual([st.op,st.from,st.to,st.result,st.units],[op,from,to,'started','external']);
+ assert.equal(r.out.split('\n').at(-2),`stack-release: ${op} staged ${to} for acme as ${act}; root installs and starts the units, then runs confirm ${to} acme --units external`);
+ // Staged, not live: the pointer stays; the set holds the pointer, the wrapper and the Console unit root stopped.
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(e.pointer,'utf8'),p0);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(rs,'AWAITING-UNITS'),'utf8'),`${to}\n`);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(rs,'pointer'),'utf8'),p0);assert.equal(sha(join(rs,'wrapper')),w0);
+ assert.ok(readFileSync(join(rs,'UNITS.sha256'),'utf8').includes(`${con0}  ${join(e.units,e.con)}\n`));
+ assert.ok(readFileSync(join(e.bin,e.wrapper),'utf8').includes(join(COPIES,to)),'the wrapper names the target copy');
+ rootUp(e,to,flags);
+ r=await prun(x,'confirm',to,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+ assert.equal(r.out.split('\n').at(-2),`stack-release: ${op} ok: ${to} is live for acme`);
+ const l=logLines(e).at(-1);assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result,l.units,l.activation],[op,from,to,'ok','external',act]);
+ assert.ok(!existsSync(join(rs,'AWAITING-UNITS')));
+ assert.deepEqual([pointer(e).copy,pointer(e).console],[to,flags]);
+ return act;
+}
+
+// --plan with an accounts sign: exit 3 with the refusal alone; nothing written, started or stopped, and no log line.
+async function planRefused(e,args,code,msg){
+ const before=fp(e),data=tree(e.data),n=calls(e).length,logs=logLines(e).length;
+ const r=await prun(e,...args,'--plan');assert.equal(r.code,3,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(r.out,'');
+ assert.equal(r.err,`stack-release: refusing ${code}: ${msg}\n`);
+ assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(tree(e.data),data);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
+}
+// The user-unit run and its --plan both refuse accounts-user-unit, before anything stops.
+async function auu(e,args,op,msg=AUU(e,op)){await refused(e,args,'accounts-user-unit',msg);await planRefused(e,args,'accounts-user-unit',msg)}
+const rootStart=(e)=>{execFileSync(join(SBIN,'systemctl'),['--user','start',e.bus],{env:{...e.env,SD_CLOCK_OFFSET:'0'}});sysctl(e,'start',e.con)};
+const shown=(e,act,show=SHOW)=>readFileSync(join(setOf(e,act),show),'utf8');
+
 test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollback to a Console without --sso',async(t)=>{
- await t.test('item 1: a pre-SSO activation drops legacy send; --sso then drops preview and proof before the tester port',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('item 1 (M3): a pre-SSO activation drops legacy send; with console.sso a user-unit --sso refuses accounts-user-unit, and the system path pins root\'s --sso Console',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']),f=await proofFile(e),pre=noSend(base);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--tester-port','7333',...pair(f));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f),'--tester-port','7333']);
  await ssoConfig(e);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'activate');
+  // Root renders the stamped Console with --sso and no preview or proof flags (case2-unit.test.mjs pins that render).
  const want=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--tester-port','7333'];
-  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');
-  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --sso drops header x-console-proof','send: off',
-   `sso: on; drops ${DROPS}; carries --port ${e.port} --business acme --tester-port 7333`]);
-  assert.equal(out[out.findIndex((l)=>l.startsWith('sso:'))+1],`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${C1} --copies ${COPIES} ${want.join(' ')}`);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  const act=await viaSystem(e,'activate',C1,want);
  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,C1);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  const steps=stepText(e);
-  assert.ok(steps.includes(`Z drop --proof-header x-console-proof --proof-file ${f}; --sso was given\n`),steps);
-  assert.ok(steps.includes(`Z turn on --sso; drop ${DROPS}\n`),steps);
+  // The activation's set holds the proxy-preview Console it replaced, pair and tester port included.
+  assert.ok(shown(e,act).includes(` ${[...pre,...pair(f),'--tester-port','7333'].join(' ')}`),shown(e,act));
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('item 1: --sso may re-pin the live copy once; later activates carry it; --no-send still drops --send',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');
-  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['proof: off','send: off',`sso: on; drops ${DROPS}; carries --port ${e.port} --business acme`]);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  const l=logLines(e).at(-1);assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result],['activate',C1,C1,'ok']);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso']);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/proof/);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'already-active',`${C1} is the pointer's copy`);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme'],'already-active',`${C1} is the pointer's copy`);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send']);
-  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C,'acme');assert.deepEqual(ssoLines(out),['sso: carried']);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C,'acme','--migrate');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  // Carried, not turned on: no stamped step names sso (the install output's serve line still shows --sso).
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send']);assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/^\S+Z .*sso/m);
-  assert.match(stepText(e),/^serve: .* --sso --send$/m);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso']);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+ await t.test('item 1 (M3): while console.sso is set every user-unit activate refuses accounts-user-unit; the system path carries root\'s --sso --send Console to another copy',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);await ssoConfig(e);
+  for(const args of [['activate',C1,'acme'],['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],['activate',C1,'acme','--send'],['activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--no-send'],['activate',C,'acme','--migrate']])await auu(e,args,'activate');
+  const sso=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send'];
+  await viaSystem(e,'activate',C1,sso);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,sso);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-send'],'activate');
+  await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
+  const act=await viaSystem(e,'activate',C,sso,'--migrate');
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,C);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,sso);
+  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${sso.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
+  assert.match(shown(e,act),/ --sso --send /);
+  let r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  // Root's unit without --send: the pointer pins what root rendered.
  const g=await mk(t);await seedPreview(g,undefined,['--send']);await ssoConfig(g);
-  r=await prun(g,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await viaSystem(g,'activate',C1,['--port',g.port,'--business','acme','--sso']);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(g).console,['--port',g.port,'--business','acme','--sso']);
-  assert.ok(stepText(g).includes('Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n'));
+  r=await prun(g,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
 });
 await t.test('item 1: --sso with a pair or --no-proof, or on any verb but activate, is a usage error',async(t)=>{
@@ -1613,53 +1672,49 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac
  assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('item 2: a target without --sso, a missing or bad console.sso, and each slot problem refuse before any stop',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e,{slot:false});
-  const slot=slotPath(e),put=(mode=0o600,text='x\n')=>{rmSync(slot,{force:true,recursive:true});writeFileSync(slot,text,{mode});chmodSync(slot,mode)};
-  put();
+ await t.test('item 2 (M3): without console.sso, a target without --sso and the missing key refuse before any stop; with console.sso, valid or not and whatever its slot, the user-unit run refuses accounts-user-unit first',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);
  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--sso'],'sso-target',`${B}'s Console does not support --sso`);
-  setKey(e,undefined);
  // N4: from another copy, the refusal names the re-pin without --sso as the first step.
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'sso-config',`${C1}'s Console would refuse its --sso start: there is no console.sso in the system config; activate ${C1} without --sso first, then write console.sso, then run activate ${C1} --sso`);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'sso-config',`${C1}'s Console would refuse its --sso start: there is no console.sso in the system config`);
-  setKey(e,{sso:{...SSO_KEY.sso,providers:[{...SSO_KEY.sso.providers[0],algs:['RS256']}]}});
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--plan');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-config',`${C}'s Console would refuse its --sso start: console.sso.providers[0].algs[0] must be one of ${ALGS.filter((a)=>a!=='RS256').join(', ')}; HS* and none are refused`);
-  setKey(e,SSO_KEY);
-  const bad=(why)=>`console.sso provider a client secret slot ${slot} ${why}`;
-  rmSync(slot);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad('is missing'));
-  const elsewhere=join(e.root,'elsewhere');writeFileSync(elsewhere,'x\n',{mode:0o600});symlinkSync(elsewhere,slot);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad('is a symbolic link'));
-  rmSync(slot);mkdirSync(slot,{mode:0o700});
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad('is not a regular file'));
-  for(const mode of [0o644,0o640,0o604]){put(mode);await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad(`has mode ${mode.toString(8)}, which gives group or other permission bits`))}
-  put(0o600,'');
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad('is empty'));
-  // The slot directory resolving into the repository: the file is no link, but its real path is.
-  const inRepo=mkdtempSync(join(repo,'t57-slot-'));t.after(()=>rmSync(inRepo,{recursive:true,force:true}));
-  writeFileSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),'x\n',{mode:0o600});chmodSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),0o600);
-  const secrets=dirname(slot);rmSync(secrets,{recursive:true});symlinkSync(inRepo,secrets);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',bad('is inside the repository or the copies'));
  // --plan lists the sso refusal with the rest and writes nothing.
  const out=await planOnly(e,3,'activate',C,'acme','--sso','--tester-port','80');
-  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('refuses ')),[`refuses tester-port-invalid: --tester-port 80 is not a whole port from 1024 to 65535 other than 7332 and the Console's --port ${e.port}`,`refuses sso-slot: ${bad('is inside the repository or the copies')}`]);
-  rmSync(secrets);mkdirSync(secrets,{mode:0o700});put();
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C,'acme','--sso','--migrate');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('refuses ')),[`refuses tester-port-invalid: --tester-port 80 is not a whole port from 1024 to 65535 other than 7332 and the Console's --port ${e.port}`,`refuses sso-config: ${C}'s Console would refuse its --sso start: there is no console.sso in the system config; activate ${C} without --sso first, then write console.sso, then run activate ${C} --sso`]);
+  // With console.sso the slot is the Console start's check (packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs, readSlot);
+  // no slot state and no bad key gets a user-unit run past accounts-user-unit.
+  await ssoConfig(e,{slot:false});
+  const slot=slotPath(e),secrets=dirname(slot),put=(mode=0o600,text='x\n')=>{rmSync(slot,{force:true,recursive:true});writeFileSync(slot,text,{mode});chmodSync(slot,mode)};
+  const inRepo=mkdtempSync(join(repo,'t57-slot-'));t.after(()=>rmSync(inRepo,{recursive:true,force:true}));
+  writeFileSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),'x\n',{mode:0o600});chmodSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),0o600);
+  const elsewhere=join(e.root,'elsewhere');writeFileSync(elsewhere,'x\n',{mode:0o600});
+  const states=[()=>{},()=>symlinkSync(elsewhere,slot),()=>{rmSync(slot);mkdirSync(slot,{mode:0o700})},()=>put(0o644),()=>put(0o640),()=>put(0o604),()=>put(0o600,''),
+   ()=>{rmSync(secrets,{recursive:true});symlinkSync(inRepo,secrets)},()=>{rmSync(secrets);mkdirSync(secrets,{mode:0o700});put()}];
+  // A bad tester port is a usage error outside --plan (row 180), so that case runs --plan only:
+  // accounts-user-unit stops the plan before it lists tester-port-invalid.
+  for(const s of states){s();for(const args of [['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],['activate',B,'acme','--sso']])await auu(e,args,'activate');await planRefused(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso','--tester-port','80'],'accounts-user-unit',AUU(e,'activate'))}
+  setKey(e,{sso:{...SSO_KEY.sso,providers:[{...SSO_KEY.sso.providers[0],algs:['RS256']}]}});
+  await auu(e,['activate',C,'acme','--sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C,'acme','--migrate');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('item 3: a config whose console key the target loader refuses stops an activate or a rollback before any stop, naming the first step',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e);
+ await t.test('item 3 (M3): a config whose console key the target loader refuses stops an external activate or rollback before any stop, naming the first step; a user-unit run refuses accounts-user-unit first',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  const why='mosaic-config: unsupported configuration key: "console"';
-  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,B,'activate',why));
-  await refused(e,['rollback','acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,B,'rollback',why));
-  const out=await planOnly(e,3,'rollback','acme');
+  await ssoConfig(e);
+  await auu(e,['activate',B,'acme'],'activate');await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
+  // Root stopped the units; the staged run checks the config before it writes anything.
+  rootDown(e);
+  const x=X(e),why='mosaic-config: unsupported configuration key: "console"';
+  await refused(x,['activate',B,'acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,B,'activate',why));
+  await refused(x,['rollback','acme','--to',B],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,B,'rollback',why));
+  const out=await planOnly(x,3,'rollback','acme','--to',B);
  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('refuses ')),[`refuses config-console-key: ${KEY_MSG(e,B,'rollback',why)}`]);
  setKey(e,{sso:{...SSO_KEY.sso,providers:[{...SSO_KEY.sso.providers[0],algs:['RS256']}]}});
-  await refused(e,['activate',C,'acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,C,'activate',`mosaic-config: console.sso.providers[0].algs[0] must be one of ${ALGS.filter((a)=>a!=='RS256').join(', ')}; HS* and none are refused`));
-  setKey(e,undefined);
+  await refused(x,['activate',C,'acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,C,'activate',`mosaic-config: console.sso.providers[0].algs[0] must be one of ${ALGS.filter((a)=>a!=='RS256').join(', ')}; HS* and none are refused`));
+  setKey(e,undefined);rootStart(e);
  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
@@ -1676,17 +1731,17 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac
  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('item 3: a rollback from --sso to a Console without it takes the flags from the set of the activation onto the copy, past a same-copy re-pin (sage-1389)',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']);await ssoConfig(e);
+ await t.test('item 3 (M3): from a pre-M3 --sso pointer the user-unit rollback refuses accounts-user-unit; without console.sso it takes the flags from the set of the activation onto the copy, past a same-copy re-pin (sage-1389)',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const set=arrivalSet(e,C1);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  // A pre-M3 host turned --sso on in place, then re-pinned twice.
+  await ssoConfig(e);
+  for(const f of ['--sso','--send','--no-send']){r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme',f);assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err)}
  // The latest set holds the --sso Console; the arrival set holds B's.
-  assert.match(readFileSync(join(setOf(e,pointer(e).activation),SHOW),'utf8'),/ --sso /);
+  assert.match(shown(e,pointer(e).activation),/ --sso /);
  assert.doesNotMatch(readFileSync(join(set,SHOW),'utf8'),/ --sso /);
-  await refused(e,['rollback','acme'],'config-console-key',KEY_MSG(e,B,'rollback','mosaic-config: unsupported configuration key: "console"'));
+  await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
  setKey(e,undefined);
  const want=[...noSend(base.slice(0,-2)),'--tester-port','7333'];
  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'rollback','acme');
@@ -1701,15 +1756,17 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac
  const g=await mk(t),gbase=await seedPreview(g,undefined,['--send']),f=await proofFile(g);
  r=await prun(g,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(f));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  await ssoConfig(g);
-  r=await prun(g,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(legacy(g),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await auu(g,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
  setKey(g,undefined);
  r=await prun(g,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(g).console,[...noSend(gbase),...pair(f)]);
  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
 });
- await t.test('item 3: a rollback set that is missing, fails its sums, holds no argv or already ran --sso refuses sso-rollback-flags',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('item 3 (M3): from a pre-M3 --sso pointer, a rollback set that is missing, fails its sums, holds no argv or already ran --sso refuses sso-rollback-flags',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
  setKey(e,undefined);
  const set=arrivalSet(e,C1),show=join(set,SHOW),text=readFileSync(show,'utf8');
  setEdit(set,SHOW,' --public-host ',' --sso --public-host ');
@@ -1731,17 +1788,18 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac
  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('round 2 (webby-0028 N1): run through a symlinked repository path, a slot or a proof file inside the repository still refuses',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('round 2 (webby-0028 N1, M3): run through a symlinked repository path, a proof file inside the repository still refuses, and console.sso with a slot inside the repository refuses accounts-user-unit',async(t)=>{
  const link=join(base,'repo-link.200');if(!existsSync(link))symlinkSync(repo,link);
  const e=await mk(t);e.sr=join(link,'scripts','stack-release.sh');await seedPreview(e);
  const f=await proofFile(e,'proof.200',0o600,mkdtempSync(join(repo,'t57-proof-')));t.after(()=>rmSync(dirname(f),{recursive:true,force:true}));
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme',...pair(f)],'proof-file-invalid',`--proof-file ${f} is inside the repository or the copies`);
-  await ssoConfig(e,{slot:false});
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await ssoConfig(e,{slot:false});
  const inRepo=mkdtempSync(join(repo,'t57-slot-'));t.after(()=>rmSync(inRepo,{recursive:true,force:true}));
  writeFileSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),'x\n',{mode:0o600});chmodSync(join(inRepo,SLOT),0o600);
  const secrets=dirname(slotPath(e));rmSync(secrets,{recursive:true});symlinkSync(inRepo,secrets);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',`console.sso provider a client secret slot ${slotPath(e)} is inside the repository or the copies`);
+  // The Console's start refuses the slot (sso.test.mjs: inside the repository or a stack copy).
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'activate');
  await noLeak(e);
 });
 await t.test('round 2 (webby-0028 N2): a config.json that does not parse stops the run before anything is read or stopped',async(t)=>{
@@ -1758,24 +1816,21 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac
  const r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('round 3 (sage-1556): a named instance turns --sso on with its own config, slot and Console unit, and rolls back from its own set',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('round 3 (sage-1556, M3): a named instance refuses a user-unit --sso with its own config, turns --sso on through the system path on its own Console unit, and rolls back from its own set',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t),a=await named(e,'alpha');await seed(a);
  const show=`show-${a.con}.txt`,unit=()=>readFileSync(join(a.units,a.con),'utf8').split('\n').find((l)=>l.startsWith('ExecStart='));
  assert.ok(slotPath(a).startsWith(join(a.env.HOME,'.config','mosaic-alpha','secrets','mosaic-stack')+'/'),slotPath(a));
-  await ssoConfig(a,{slot:false});
-  await refused(a,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'sso-slot',`console.sso provider a client secret slot ${slotPath(a)} is missing`);
-  await proofFile(a,SLOT,0o600,dirname(slotPath(a)));
+  await ssoConfig(a);
+  await auu(a,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso'],'activate');
  const want=['--port',a.port,'--business','acme','--sso'];
-  const out=await planOnly(a,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');
-  assert.equal(out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('Console: ')),`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --instance alpha --copy ${C1} --copies ${COPIES} ${want.join(' ')}`);
-  let r=await prun(a,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  const act=await viaSystem(a,'activate',C1,want);
  assert.equal(pointer(a).copy,C1);assert.deepEqual(pointer(a).console,want);
  assert.ok(unit().endsWith(` ${want.join(' ')}`),unit());
  assert.ok(readFileSync(join(a.units,a.con),'utf8').includes(`\nEnvironment=MOSAIC_CONFIG=${a.cfg}\n`));
  assert.ok(!existsSync(join(e.units,CON)),'the default Console unit was written');
-  r=await prun(a,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  let r=await prun(a,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
  setKey(a,undefined);
-  const set=arrivalSet(a,C1);assert.ok(existsSync(join(set,show)),show);
+  const set=setOf(a,act);assert.equal(arrivalSet(a,C1),set);assert.ok(existsSync(join(set,show)),show);
  assert.deepEqual(ssoLines(await planOnly(a,0,'rollback','acme')),[`sso: dropped; ${B}'s Console does not support --sso, so the rollback takes the Console flags from ${set}/${show}, with --tester-port as the pointer has it`]);
  r=await prun(a,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.equal(pointer(a).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(a).console,want.slice(0,-1));
@@ -1794,44 +1849,35 @@ test('T57 row 200: activate --sso, its refusals before any stop, and the rollbac

 // Row 273 (#1778, mos-1246 F39): activate --send turns send on only beside --sso, given or carried, and
 // activate --no-sso turns --sso off with the Console flags from the set of the activation that turned
-// it on, dropping --send. The tester follows the pointer.
+// it on, dropping --send. The tester follows the pointer. M3 (#1873): with console.sso these are
+// accounts-user-unit refusals; a pre-M3 --sso pointer comes from legacy(e), and --no-sso runs once
+// console.sso is gone.
 const SEND_MSG="--send needs --sso in the run's Console flags, given or carried; under forward auth any same-uid process could send (F39)";
 const NOT_ON_MSG="the pointer's Console flags hold no --sso, so --no-sso has nothing to turn off";
 const OFF_MSG=(why)=>`the Console flags from before --sso cannot be read: ${why}`;
 const OFF_PLAN=(set,restores)=>`sso: off; Console flags from ${set}/${SHOW}; restores ${restores}`;
 const NOTE=(to)=>`note: ${to} is the pointer's copy; the run re-pins it and only the Console flags change`;
 test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
- await t.test('T1: --sso --send turns send on after --sso and before the tester port, and the plan says so',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T1 (M3): a user-unit --sso --send refuses accounts-user-unit; the system path pins root\'s --sso --send before the tester port',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--tester-port','7333']);await ssoConfig(e);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send'],'activate');
  const want=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send','--tester-port','7333'];
-  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');
-  assert.deepEqual([...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['send: on; --send was given',`sso: on; drops ${DROPS}; carries --port ${e.port} --business acme --send --tester-port 7333`]);
-  assert.equal(out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('Console: ')),`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${C1} --copies ${COPIES} ${want.join(' ')}`);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await viaSystem(e,'activate',C1,want);
  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,C1);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
-  const steps=stepText(e);
-  assert.ok(steps.includes('Z turn on --send; --send was given\n'),steps);assert.ok(steps.includes(`Z turn on --sso; drop ${DROPS}\n`),steps);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  // The same copy with send on again is already active.
-  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--send'],'already-active',`${C1} is the pointer's copy`);
+  const r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--send'],'activate');
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T1: --send beside a carried --sso re-pins the live copy once, and the plan names the carried --sso',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T1 (M3): beside a pre-M3 carried --sso, a user-unit --send refuses accounts-user-unit; the system path carries root\'s --sso --send to another copy',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso']);
-  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');
-  assert.deepEqual([...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['send: on; --send was given','sso: carried']);
-  assert.ok(out.includes(NOTE(C1)),out.join('\n'));
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  const l=logLines(e).at(-1);assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result],['activate',C1,C1,'ok']);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--send'],'activate');
+  await auu(e,['activate',C,'acme','--send','--migrate'],'activate');
  const want=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send'];
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
-  assert.ok(stepText(e).includes('Z turn on --send; --send was given\n'));assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/^\S+Z .*sso/m);
-  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--send'],'already-active',`${C1} is the pointer's copy`);
-  // Another copy carries both.
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C,'acme','--send')),['send: carried']);
+  await viaSystem(e,'activate',C,want,'--migrate');
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,C);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
@@ -1848,11 +1894,12 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
  await refused(g,['activate',B,'acme','--send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
 });
- await t.test('T2 (sage-2315 B1): a rollback from an --sso --send pointer to a Console without --sso ends with neither flag',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T2 (sage-2315 B1, M3): from a pre-M3 --sso --send pointer the user-unit rollback refuses accounts-user-unit; without console.sso the rollback to a Console without --sso ends with neither flag',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send']);
  const set=arrivalSet(e,C1);
+  await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback');
  setKey(e,undefined);
  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'rollback','acme');
  assert.deepEqual([...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['send: dropped; the run drops --sso, and --send needs it (F39)',ROLLBACK_PLAN(set)]);
@@ -1866,7 +1913,7 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
 });
 await t.test('T2 and T4: --send with --no-send, --no-sso with --sso, --send, a pair or --no-proof, and either flag on another verb, is a usage error',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);await ssoConfig(e);const f=await proofFile(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const usageText=(await prun(e,'--help')).err,n=calls(e).length,logs=logLines(e).length,before=fp(e);
  for(const args of [['activate',C1,'acme','--send','--no-send'],['activate',C1,'acme','--no-send','--send','--plan'],['activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--send','--no-send'],
   ['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso','--sso'],['activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--no-sso','--plan'],['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso','--send'],
@@ -1879,15 +1926,18 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
  assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T3: --no-sso on the same copy returns the unit and the pointer to the flags from before --sso, without --send',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']);await ssoConfig(e);
+ await t.test('T3 (M3): --no-sso refuses accounts-user-unit while console.sso is set; without it, on the same copy it returns the unit and the pointer to the flags from before --sso, without --send',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const pre=conExec(e),want=noSend(base);
  assert.ok(pre.endsWith(` ${want.join(' ')}`),pre);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await ssoConfig(e);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const set=setOf(e,pointer(e).activation);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send','--tester-port','7333']);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso');
  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['proof: off','send: dropped; --no-sso drops --send (F39)',OFF_PLAN(set,want.slice(0,-2).join(' '))]);
  assert.ok(out.includes(NOTE(C1)),out.join('\n'));
@@ -1904,14 +1954,16 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'sso-not-on',NOT_ON_MSG);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T3: the set walk passes later re-pins that ran with --sso, and the tester follows the pointer',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T3 (M3): from pre-M3 re-pins, the set walk passes later re-pins that ran with --sso, and the tester follows the pointer',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']);await ssoConfig(e);
  // The activation that turns --sso on also moves the tester to 7334, so the set and the pointer differ.
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--tester-port','7334');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--tester-port','7334');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const set=setOf(e,pointer(e).activation);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.match(readFileSync(join(setOf(e,pointer(e).activation),SHOW),'utf8'),/ --sso /);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.match(shown(e,pointer(e).activation),/ --sso /);
  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--tester-port','7334']);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
  const restores=base.slice(0,-3),want=[...restores,'--tester-port','7334'];
  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso');
  assert.deepEqual([...sendLines(out),...ssoLines(out)],['send: off; --no-sso was given and the pointer holds no --send',OFF_PLAN(set,restores.join(' '))]);
@@ -1921,17 +1973,20 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T3 (sage-2305 a): after --sso, two later re-pins that carry it, then --no-sso restores the flags from before --sso byte for byte',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--tester-port','7333']);await ssoConfig(e);
+ await t.test('T3 (sage-2305 a, M3): after a pre-M3 --sso and two re-pins that carry it, --no-sso without console.sso restores the flags from before --sso byte for byte',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--tester-port','7333']);
  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const pre=conExec(e);assert.ok(pre.endsWith(` ${base.join(' ')}`),pre);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await ssoConfig(e);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const set=setOf(e,pointer(e).activation);
  // Two same-copy re-pins carry --sso, so the two newest sets both hold a Console with it.
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const acts=logLines(e).filter((l)=>l.result==='ok'&&l.op==='activate').map((l)=>l.activation).slice(-2);
-  for(const a of acts)assert.match(readFileSync(join(setOf(e,a),SHOW),'utf8'),/ --sso /);
+  for(const a of acts)assert.match(shown(e,a),/ --sso /);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
  const out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso');
  assert.deepEqual(ssoLines(out),[OFF_PLAN(set,base.slice(0,-2).join(' '))]);
  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
@@ -1939,27 +1994,31 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T4 (sage-2305 b): a log in which every set holds a Console with --sso refuses before any unit stops',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T4 (sage-2305 b, M3): a log in which every set holds a Console with --sso refuses before any unit stops',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
  const first=setOf(e,pointer(e).activation);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.match(readFileSync(join(setOf(e,pointer(e).activation),SHOW),'utf8'),/ --sso /);
+  r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.match(shown(e,pointer(e).activation),/ --sso /);
  // The set of the activation that turned --sso on now claims its Console ran with it too, sums intact.
  setEdit(first,SHOW,' --public-host ',' --sso --public-host ');
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
  const why=OFF_MSG(`the Console in ${join(first,SHOW)} already ran with --sso, and the log names no earlier activation`);
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'sso-off-flags',why);
  assert.deepEqual((await planOnly(e,3,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso')).filter((l)=>l.startsWith('refuses ')),[`refuses sso-off-flags: ${why}`]);
  await noLeak(e);
 });
- await t.test('T4: --no-sso refuses before any stop on a pointer without --sso, a tampered or missing set, a set that ran with --sso, an ok line with no activation, and a log with no set',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('T4 (M3): --no-sso refuses before any stop on a pointer without --sso, a tampered or missing set, a set that ran with --sso, an ok line with no activation, and a log with no set',async(t)=>{
  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-sso'],'sso-not-on',NOT_ON_MSG);
  await refused(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'sso-not-on',NOT_ON_MSG);
  assert.deepEqual((await planOnly(e,3,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso')).filter((l)=>l.startsWith('refuses ')),[`refuses sso-not-on: ${NOT_ON_MSG}`]);
-  // One set, from the activation that turned --sso on.
+  // One set, from the pre-M3 activation that turned --sso on.
  await ssoConfig(e);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  let r=await prun(legacy(e),'activate',C1,'acme','--sso');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--no-sso'],'activate');
+  setKey(e,undefined);
  const set=setOf(e,pointer(e).activation),show=join(set,SHOW),text=readFileSync(show,'utf8');
  // An ok line with no activation stops the walk (sage-2315 N1); skipping it would reach the set above.
  const logText=readFileSync(e.log,'utf8');
@@ -1985,6 +2044,62 @@ test('T58 row 273: activate --send and --no-sso',async(t)=>{
 });
 });

+// M3 (#1873) item 2: each accounts sign refuses a user-unit activate, rollback or pm-on before
+// anything stops; without them the user path runs, and with them the system path runs.
+const AUU_TAIL=(op)=>`; an accounts instance runs system units, so root renders them with case2-unit.sh and the ${op} runs with --units external`;
+test('M3 accounts-user-unit: each accounts sign refuses a user-unit run before any stop; the user path without them and the system path with them both run',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('a stamped target, accounts.json, console.sso and .deployed each refuse activate and rollback, run and --plan',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  const accounts=join(dirname(e.cfg),'accounts.json'),deployed=join(e.data,'.deployed');
+  const stamp=(copy)=>{const d=join(COPIES,copy),f=join(d,'.stack-build.json'),m=statSync(d).mode&0o777;chmodSync(d,0o755);writeFileSync(f,'{}\n');chmodSync(d,m);
+   return ()=>{chmodSync(d,0o755);rmSync(f);chmodSync(d,m)}};
+  const signs=[
+   [()=>stamp(C),()=>stamp(B),`${join(COPIES,C)} is a stamped copy`,`${join(COPIES,B)} is a stamped copy`],
+   [()=>{writeFileSync(accounts,'{}\n',{mode:0o600});return ()=>rmSync(accounts)},null,`${accounts} is present`],
+   [()=>{setKey(e,SSO_KEY);return ()=>setKey(e,undefined)},null,`${e.cfg} holds console.sso`],
+   [()=>{writeFileSync(deployed,'{}\n');return ()=>rmSync(deployed)},null,`${deployed} is present`],
+  ];
+  for(const [on,onRb,why,whyRb] of signs){
+   let off=on();t.after(()=>{try{off()}catch{}});
+   await auu(e,['activate',C,'acme','--migrate'],'activate',why+AUU_TAIL('activate'));
+   if(onRb){off();off=onRb()}
+   await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback',(whyRb??why)+AUU_TAIL('rollback'));
+   off();
+  }
+  // No sign left: the user path runs both ways.
+  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,C1);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('pm-on on an accounts instance refuses before it captures or stops anything; without the sign it runs',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await pending(e);biz(e,HARNESS);
+  const accounts=join(dirname(e.cfg),'accounts.json');writeFileSync(accounts,'{}\n',{mode:0o600});
+  // The harness is set, so only the accounts sign stands between pm-on and the user bus unit.
+  await refused(e,['pm-on','acme'],'accounts-user-unit',`${accounts} is present; an accounts instance runs system units, so root renders them with case2-unit.sh, and the PM is a flag in root's bus unit`);
+  rmSync(accounts);
+  const r=await run(e,'pm-on','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.ok(r.out.endsWith(`stack-release: pm-on ok: the PM is live on ${C1} for acme\n`),r.out);
+ });
+ await t.test('with accounts.json and .deployed the system path activates, confirms and rolls back, and the user path still refuses',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e);
+  writeFileSync(join(dirname(e.cfg),'accounts.json'),'{}\n',{mode:0o600});writeFileSync(join(e.data,'.deployed'),'{}\n');
+  await ssoConfig(e);
+  const sso=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--send'];
+  await viaSystem(e,'activate',C1,sso);
+  assert.deepEqual([pointer(e).copy,pointer(e).console],[C1,sso]);
+  let r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  // B's loader refuses the console key, so a rollback onto it drops console.sso first; the other signs stay.
+  setKey(e,undefined);
+  await auu(e,['rollback','acme'],'rollback',`${join(dirname(e.cfg),'accounts.json')} is present`+AUU_TAIL('rollback'));
+  await viaSystem(e,'rollback',B,base);
+  assert.deepEqual([pointer(e).copy,pointer(e).console],[B,base]);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+});
+
 // --- rehearse (D2, row 163; the brief's "Stack rehearsal on a scratch root") ---
 // Copies of their own in RCOPIES: the real scripts/mosaic, config loader, business loader, roles and
 // mosaic-config.mjs, with stand-ins for the bus host (cli.mjs), the Console, the Store and
@@ -2009,6 +2124,7 @@ function rHost(){
 }
 if(a[0]!=='bus'||a[1]!=='start'||!a.slice(3).every((f)=>flags.includes(f))){console.error(`fixture host: ${a.join(' ')}`);process.exit(4)}
 fs.appendFileSync(path.join(home,'host-args.log'),`${a.join(' ')}\n`);
+ fs.appendFileSync(path.join(home,'host-ca.log'),`${process.env.NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS??'none'}\n`);
 if(fault(`host-fails-${id}`)){console.error('fixture host: refused');process.exit(1)}
 const b=a[2],off=a.includes('--no-launch'),lock=path.join(data,'bus','writer.lock'),at=new Date().toISOString();
 fs.writeFileSync(lock,String(process.pid),{flag:'wx'});
@@ -2029,14 +2145,39 @@ function rHost(){
 }

 // The Console: serve on the given loopback port; /healthz answers 200 unless healthz-<copy> is set.
-function rConsole(){
+// M3 (#1873): under --sso it runs its copy's real createSso on the scratch console.sso, with the
+// scratch slot placeholders, as the real Console does, and /healthz carries sso.health(). Faults:
+// console-hold waits for $HOME/release before it starts; console-no-sso reports every provider
+// ready without asking any; console-asks-token POSTs to provider a's token endpoint, then asks its
+// authorize endpoint with a query, once each.
+async function rConsole(){
 const fs=process.getBuiltinModule('node:fs'),path=process.getBuiltinModule('node:path'),http=process.getBuiltinModule('node:http');
 const id=path.basename(path.resolve(import.meta.dirname,'..','..','..')),home=process.env.HOME,a=process.argv.slice(2);
 const fault=(n)=>fs.existsSync(path.join(home,'faults',n));
+ const c=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(process.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG,'utf8'));
 fs.appendFileSync(path.join(home,'console-args.log'),`${a.join(' ')}\n`);
- fs.appendFileSync(path.join(home,'console-context.jsonl'),JSON.stringify({argv:a,dataRoot:JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(process.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG,'utf8')).dataRoot})+'\n');
+ fs.appendFileSync(path.join(home,'console-context.jsonl'),JSON.stringify({argv:a,dataRoot:c.dataRoot,ca:process.env.NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS??null})+'\n');
 if(a[0]!=='serve'){console.error('fixture Console: refused');process.exit(1)}
- const s=http.createServer((q,r)=>{r.writeHead(q.url==='/healthz'&&!fault(`healthz-${id}`)?200:500);r.end()});
+ while(fault('console-hold')&&!fs.existsSync(path.join(home,'release')))await new Promise((r)=>setTimeout(r,50));
+ let health=null;
+ if(a.includes('--sso')){
+  const ps=c.console.sso.providers;
+  if(fault('console-no-sso'))health=()=>Object.fromEntries(ps.map((p)=>[p.id,'ready']));
+  else{
+   const {createSso}=await import(path.join(import.meta.dirname,'sso.mjs'));
+   const secrets=new Map(ps.map((p)=>[p.id,fs.readFileSync(path.join(path.dirname(process.env.MOSAIC_CONFIG),'secrets','mosaic-stack',p.clientSecret.slot),'utf8')]));
+   let sso;try{sso=await createSso(c.console.sso,{secrets,log:()=>{}})}catch(err){console.error(`fixture Console: ${err.message}`);process.exit(2)}
+   health=()=>sso.health();
+  }
+  if(fault('console-asks-token')){
+   await fetch(`${ps[0].issuer}token`,{method:'POST',headers:{'content-type':'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},body:'grant_type=authorization_code&code=x'}).catch(()=>{});
+   await fetch(`${ps[0].issuer}authorize?client_id=rehearsal&response_type=code`).catch(()=>{});
+  }
+ }
+ const s=http.createServer((q,r)=>{
+  const ok=q.url==='/healthz'&&!fault(`healthz-${id}`);r.writeHead(ok?200:500,{'content-type':'application/json'});
+  r.end(ok&&health?JSON.stringify({ok:true,sso:health()}):'');
+ });
 s.listen(Number(a[a.indexOf('--port')+1]),'127.0.0.1',()=>console.log(`Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:${s.address().port}/\nBoard: fixture`));
 process.on('SIGTERM',()=>process.exit(0));
 }
@@ -2079,6 +2220,24 @@ for(const [id,v,froms] of [[B,'3g',['3f']],[C,'3h',['3f','3g']],[A,'3g',['3f']],
 for(const [f,text] of [['packages/cli/src/cli.mjs',id===A?'// fixture host from before row 163\nprocess.exit(1);\n':script(rHost)],['packages/webui/src/cli.mjs',script(rConsole)],['packages/bus/src/store.mjs',rStore(v,froms)],['packages/bus/src/migrate-schema.mjs',script(rMigrate)],['packages/bus/src/broker.mjs','export class BusError extends Error { constructor(code) { super(code); this.code = code; } }\nexport function requestArchived() { return false; }\n']]){mkdirSync(dirname(join(d,f)),{recursive:true});writeFileSync(join(d,f),text)}
 execFileSync('chmod',['-R','a-w',d]);
 }
+// M3 (#1873): SCOPIES holds B as a stamped copy: RCOPIES's B with a read-only .stack-build.json
+// naming its commit, the Console's sso-config.mjs the config loader needs for a console key, its
+// sso.mjs the stand-in Console runs, and the deployment.mjs whose writeDeployment the rehearsal runs.
+const SCOPIES=join(base,'scopies');mkdirSync(SCOPIES);
+{
+ const d=join(SCOPIES,B);cpSync(join(RCOPIES,B),d,{recursive:true});execFileSync('chmod',['-R','u+w',d]);
+ for(const p of ['packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs','packages/webui/src/sso.mjs','packages/cli/src/deployment.mjs'])cpSync(join(repo,p),join(d,p));
+ // sso.mjs imports oauth4webapi.
+ symlinkSync(join(ROOT,'node_modules'),join(d,'node_modules'));
+ writeFileSync(join(d,'.stack-build.json'),JSON.stringify({commit:B}),{mode:0o444});
+ execFileSync('chmod',['-R','a-w',d]);
+}
+// UCOPIES holds B unstamped but able to load a console key: SCOPIES's B without .stack-build.json.
+const UCOPIES=join(base,'ucopies');mkdirSync(UCOPIES);
+{
+ const d=join(UCOPIES,B);cpSync(join(SCOPIES,B),d,{recursive:true,verbatimSymlinks:true});execFileSync('chmod',['-R','u+w',d]);
+ rmSync(join(d,'.stack-build.json'));execFileSync('chmod',['-R','a-w',d]);
+}

 const TESTER='7499';
 // Vikunja #782: this leases a port, closes it and hands the number to `stack-release.sh rehearse`, which
@@ -2091,12 +2250,13 @@ const rfault=(e,name)=>{mkdirSync(rh(e,'faults'),{recursive:true});writeFileSync

 // A root for one rehearsal: a stopped live store at `store`, a pointer by hand on `copy` with the
 // Console on e.port and the tester listener on TESTER, and a backup as backup_store writes one.
-// A rehearsal's leftovers, found by their scratch MOSAIC_CONFIG, are killed after the test.
+// A rehearsal's leftovers, found by their scratch MOSAIC_CONFIG or a rehearsal path in their command
+// line (the rehearsal provider), are killed after the test.
 async function rmk(t,{copy=B,store='3g'}={}){
 const e=await mk(t);
 t.after(()=>{
  for(const pid of readdirSync('/proc').filter((n)=>/^\d+$/.test(n)))
-   try{if(readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/environ`,'utf8').includes(`MOSAIC_CONFIG=${e.data}/rehearsals/`))process.kill(Number(pid),'SIGKILL')}catch{}
+   try{if(readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/environ`,'utf8').includes(`MOSAIC_CONFIG=${e.data}/rehearsals/`)||readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/cmdline`,'utf8').includes(`${e.data}/rehearsals/`))process.kill(Number(pid),'SIGKILL')}catch{}
 });
 const db=new DatabaseSync(e.store);
 db.exec('PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL');
@@ -2121,7 +2281,7 @@ async function rmk(t,{copy=B,store='3g'}={}){
 const untouched=(e)=>JSON.stringify([...[e.store,e.cfg,e.biz,e.pointer].map((f)=>[f,sha(f)]),existsSync(e.log),...readdirSync(e.backup,{recursive:true}).sort().map((f)=>join(e.backup,f)).filter((f)=>statSync(f).isFile()).map((f)=>[f,sha(f)])]);

 async function rehearse(e,id,...args){
- const ch=spawn('bash',[e.sr??SR,'rehearse',id,'acme',...args,'--copies',RCOPIES,'--bin',e.bin],{env:e.env,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});
+ const ch=spawn('bash',[e.sr??SR,'rehearse',id,'acme',...args,'--copies',e.copies??RCOPIES,'--bin',e.bin],{env:e.env,stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});
 let out='',err='';ch.stdout.on('data',(d)=>{out+=d});ch.stderr.on('data',(d)=>{err+=d});
 e.during?.(ch);
 const timer=setTimeout(()=>ch.kill('SIGKILL'),120000);
@@ -2137,7 +2297,7 @@ function ownScript(e,from,to){
 const s=readFileSync(e.sr,'utf8');assert.ok(s.includes(from),`${e.sr} has no ${from}`);writeFileSync(e.sr,s.replace(from,()=>to));
 }
 const rDirs=(e)=>existsSync(join(e.data,'rehearsals'))?readdirSync(join(e.data,'rehearsals')):[];
-const PRE=['PASS copy','PASS port','PASS backup','PASS scratch-root','PASS data-root-live','PASS sessions-live','PASS data-root-scratch','PASS notify-off','PASS tracker-configured','PASS credential-ref-live'];
+const PRE=['PASS copy','PASS port','PASS backup','PASS scratch-root','PASS data-root-live','PASS sessions-live','PASS data-root-scratch','PASS notify-off','PASS tracker-configured','PASS credential-ref-live','PASS sso-isolated'];
 const POST=['PASS console-stopped','PASS host-stopped','PASS host-released-store','PASS backup-unchanged','PASS live-config-unchanged'];

 test('R1 rehearse passes on the same schema; the scratch root holds its files and the live files stay byte-identical',async(t)=>{
@@ -2374,6 +2534,229 @@ test('R15 a rehearsal stopped by TERM, INT or HUP fails signal and still stops t
 }
 });

+// --- M3 (#1873): rehearsing a stamped copy (the brief's item 1) ---
+// A stamped copy serves only with --sso, console.sso, accounts.json and a .deployed naming its
+// instance. The rehearsal gives its scratch Console all four: the live console.sso with its origin
+// on rehearsal.invalid and each issuer at the rehearsal's own provider, a placeholder per slot, a
+// copy of the live accounts.json, and a .deployed from the copy's writeDeployment. The live slot
+// has a read watch: it is never opened.
+const ACCOUNTS={accountsVersion:1,revision:1,users:[{id:'u-000000000001',subjects:[{provider:'a',sub:'subject-1'}],name:'Jason',instanceRole:'operator',state:'active',authGen:1,created:'2026-11-10T00:00:00Z'}],memberships:[],invites:[]};
+async function smk(t,{sso=true,accounts=true}={}){
+ const e=await rmk(t);e.copies=SCOPIES;
+ if(sso)await ssoConfig(e);
+ e.accounts=join(dirname(e.cfg),'accounts.json');
+ if(accounts)writeFileSync(e.accounts,JSON.stringify(ACCOUNTS),{mode:0o600});
+ return e;
+}
+const SPRE=[...PRE.slice(0,3),'PASS provider-start',PRE[3],'PASS deployment',...PRE.slice(4)];
+const SPOST=['PASS console-stopped','PASS host-stopped','PASS provider-stopped',...POST.slice(2)];
+// The rehearsal provider's origin and pid, from its provider-start line.
+const provOf=(out)=>{const m=/^PASS provider-start: pid (\d+) at (https:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:\d+): /m.exec(out);return m?{pid:Number(m[1]),origin:m[2]}:null};
+// A real stamped copy of this checkout, as deployment-boundary.test.mjs builds one.
+function stampedCopy(t){
+ const sha40='a'.repeat(40),root=mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(),'rs-'));t.after(()=>rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true}));
+ const copy=join(root,sha40);mkdirSync(copy);
+ for(const dir of ['packages','scripts','roles','adapters'])cpSync(join(ROOT,dir),join(copy,dir),{recursive:true,filter:(q)=>!q.split('/').some((x)=>['tests','node_modules'].includes(x))});
+ writeFileSync(join(copy,'package.json'),'{"type":"module"}');
+ writeFileSync(join(copy,'.stack-build.json'),JSON.stringify({commit:sha40}),{mode:0o444});chmodSync(join(copy,'.stack-build.json'),0o444);
+ symlinkSync(join(ROOT,'node_modules'),join(copy,'node_modules'));
+ return copy;
+}
+// Starts the copy's real Console on port 0 against the rehearsal's scratch config. Resolves with
+// {code,out,err} on exit, or with the bound port once it prints its address line.
+async function realServe(t,copy,e,dir,more={}){
+ const ch=spawn(process.execPath,[join(copy,'packages/webui/src/cli.mjs'),'serve','--port','0','--sso','--board','http://127.0.0.1:9'],{env:{HOME:e.env.HOME,PATH:e.env.PATH,TMPDIR:e.env.TMPDIR,MOSAIC_CONFIG:join(dir,'config','config.json'),...more},stdio:['ignore','pipe','pipe']});
+ t.after(async()=>{if(ch.exitCode===null&&ch.signalCode===null){const done=once(ch,'close');ch.kill('SIGKILL');await done}});
+ let out='',err='';ch.stderr.on('data',(d)=>{err+=d});
+ return new Promise((res)=>{
+  const timer=setTimeout(()=>{ch.kill('SIGKILL');res({code:'timeout',out,err})},20000);
+  ch.stdout.on('data',(d)=>{out+=d;const m=/Mosaic Console: http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)\//.exec(out);if(m&&out.includes('Ctrl-C')){clearTimeout(timer);res({port:Number(m[1]),out,err,ch})}});
+  ch.on('close',(code)=>{clearTimeout(timer);res({code,out,err})});
+ });
+}
+
+test('M3 R16 a stamped copy rehearses with --sso against its own provider, a scratch accounts copy and its own .deployed; the live files stay as they were',async(t)=>{
+ const st=(f)=>{const x=statSync(f);return [x.ino,x.size,x.mtimeMs,x.mode]};
+ const e=await smk(t),before=untouched(e),accounts=sha(e.accounts),slot=st(slotPath(e)),port=await freePort();
+ const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',port,'--timeout','10');
+ assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+ assert.deepEqual(r.names,[...SPRE,'PASS migration','PASS gate','PASS no-session','PASS provider-discovery',...SPOST]);
+ const R=r.dir,prov=provOf(r.out);assert.ok(prov,r.out);
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes(`PASS provider-start: pid ${prov.pid} at ${prov.origin}: discovery and a JWKS from keys made for this run, no code and no token; its certificate ${join(R,'provider','cert.pem')} is the trust the scratch Console alone gets\n`),r.out);
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes(`PASS deployment: ${B} is stamped: ${join(R,'data','.deployed')} from its writeDeployment, the live accounts.json copied to ${join(R,'config')}, the Console starts with --sso\n`),r.out);
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes(`PASS sso-isolated: 1 provider(s), each at the rehearsal provider ${prov.origin} with a placeholder secret\n`),r.out);
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes(`PASS gate: host-up, bus-status, console-up, healthz, sso-ready and copy-match on ${B}\n`),r.out);
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes(`PASS provider-discovery: the Console fetched each provider's discovery and JWKS from ${prov.origin} and asked for no code or token\n`),r.out);
+ // The Console started with --sso, only on the scratch config, and alone trusts the provider's
+ // certificate; the host gets no added trust.
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(rh(e,'console-args.log')),[`serve --port ${port} --business acme --sso`]);
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(rh(e,'console-context.jsonl')).map((l)=>JSON.parse(l).ca),[join(R,'provider','cert.pem')]);
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(rh(e,'host-ca.log')),['none']);
+ // The provider served discovery and the JWKS, got no other request, kept no TLS key and is gone.
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(join(R,'provider','requests.log')).sort(),['GET /a/.well-known/openid-configuration 200','GET /a/jwks 200']);
+ assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(R,'provider')).sort(),['cert.pem','origin','provider.log','requests.log']);
+ assert.equal(statSync(join(R,'provider')).mode&0o777,0o700);
+ assert.equal(existsSync(`/proc/${prov.pid}`),false,`provider pid ${prov.pid} is still there`);
+ // The scratch config: the live one with dataRoot, origin and issuer moved; provider id, client id,
+ // algorithms, slot name and subjects as they were. No subject is added.
+ const live=JSON.parse(readFileSync(e.cfg,'utf8')),sc=JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(R,'config','config.json'),'utf8'));
+ const want=structuredClone(live);want.dataRoot=join(R,'data');want.console.sso.publicOrigin='https://rehearsal.invalid';want.console.sso.providers[0].issuer=`${prov.origin}/a/`;
+ assert.deepEqual(sc,want);assert.deepEqual(sc.console.sso.providers[0].subjects,SSO_KEY.sso.providers[0].subjects);
+ // The slot is a scratch placeholder, 0600 in a 0700 directory.
+ const ph=join(R,'config','secrets','mosaic-stack',SLOT);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(ph,'utf8'),'rehearsal-placeholder-secret\n');assert.equal(statSync(ph).mode&0o777,0o600);
+ assert.equal(statSync(dirname(ph)).mode&0o777,0o700);assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(dirname(ph)),[SLOT]);
+ // accounts.json is the live file's bytes; .deployed names the instance the scratch config dir gives.
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(R,'config','accounts.json'),'utf8'),readFileSync(e.accounts,'utf8'));
+ const dep=join(R,'data','.deployed');
+ assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(readFileSync(dep,'utf8')),{instance:'dev'});assert.equal(statSync(dep).mode&0o777,0o444);
+ // The live store, config, business, pointer, backup, accounts and slot are as they were; the run
+ // never opened the live slot and its sentinel is nowhere under the data root.
+ assert.equal(untouched(e),before);assert.equal(sha(e.accounts),accounts);assert.deepEqual(st(slotPath(e)),slot);
+ assert.ok(readFileSync(join(R,'live.before'),'utf8').includes(e.accounts),'the end check sums the live accounts.json');
+ await noLeak(e);
+});
+
+test('M3 R17 the real stamped Console finds the rehearsal provider ready with the scratch prerequisites, starts degraded once it is gone, and refuses without .deployed or accounts.json',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await smk(t);rfault(e,'console-hold');
+ const copy=stampedCopy(t);
+ // While the stand-in Console holds, the rehearsal provider is up: the real Console of a stamped
+ // copy passes every startup check (stamp, --sso, .deployed, accounts, console.sso and its slot)
+ // and, trusting only the provider's certificate, finds provider a ready.
+ let during=null;
+ e.during=async()=>{
+  try{
+   for(let i=0;i<400&&!existsSync(rh(e,'console-args.log'));i++)await new Promise((r)=>setTimeout(r,50));
+   const dir=join(e.data,'rehearsals',rDirs(e)[0]);
+   const up=await realServe(t,copy,e,dir,{NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS:join(dir,'provider','cert.pem')});
+   during={up:up.port?await (await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${up.port}/healthz`)).json():null,why:`${up.code} ${up.out} ${up.err}`};
+   if(up.ch){const done=once(up.ch,'close');up.ch.kill('SIGTERM');await done}
+  }finally{writeFileSync(rh(e,'release'),'')}
+ };
+ const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','30');
+ assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+ assert.deepEqual(during?.up,{ok:true,sso:{a:'ready'}},during?.why);
+ // After the rehearsal its provider is gone: the same Console serves degraded and /healthz says so.
+ const up=await realServe(t,copy,e,r.dir);
+ assert.ok(up.port,`${up.code} ${up.out} ${up.err}`);
+ const h=await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${up.port}/healthz`);
+ assert.equal(h.status,200);assert.deepEqual(await h.json(),{ok:true,sso:{a:'unreachable'}});
+ const done=once(up.ch,'close');up.ch.kill('SIGTERM');await done;
+ // The same start without each prerequisite refuses before it listens.
+ const dep=join(r.dir,'data','.deployed'),acc=join(r.dir,'config','accounts.json'),keep=readFileSync(dep);
+ rmSync(dep);
+ let q=await realServe(t,copy,e,r.dir);assert.equal(q.code,2,q.out+q.err);assert.match(q.err,/\.deployed is missing or invalid/);assert.doesNotMatch(q.out,/Mosaic Console:/);
+ writeFileSync(dep,keep,{mode:0o444});rmSync(acc);
+ q=await realServe(t,copy,e,r.dir);assert.equal(q.code,2,q.out+q.err);assert.match(q.err,/accounts/);assert.doesNotMatch(q.out,/Mosaic Console:/);
+});
+
+test('M3 R18 a stamped copy refuses sso-not-prepared without a live console.sso and accounts-not-initialized without a live accounts.json, before any rehearsal directory',async(t)=>{
+ for(const [opts,code,msg] of [
+  [{sso:false},'sso-not-prepared',(e)=>`${B} is a stamped copy, which serves only with --sso, and ${e.cfg} has no console.sso; prepare SSO for this instance (run sheet) before re-pinning to it`],
+  [{accounts:false},'accounts-not-initialized',(e)=>`${B} is a stamped copy, which needs an accounts file, and there is no ${e.accounts}; a human runs mosaic accounts init (run sheet) before re-pinning to it`],
+ ]){
+  const e=await smk(t,opts),before=untouched(e);
+  const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','3');
+  assert.equal(r.code,1,code+r.out+r.err);
+  assert.ok(r.out.includes(`FAIL ${code}: ${msg(e)}\nREHEARSAL_FAIL\n`),r.out);
+  assert.deepEqual(r.names.filter((n)=>n.startsWith('FAIL')),[`FAIL ${code}`]);
+  assert.deepEqual(rDirs(e),[]);assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'host-args.log')),false);assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'console-args.log')),false);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(e.accounts),code!=='accounts-not-initialized');
+  assert.equal(untouched(e),before);
+ }
+ // An unstamped copy needs neither: B from RCOPIES rehearses without console.sso or accounts.json,
+ // and its Console gets no --sso.
+ const u=await rmk(t),port=await freePort();
+ const r=await rehearse(u,B,'--backup',u.act,'--port',port,'--timeout','10');
+ assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);assert.ok(!r.names.includes('PASS deployment'));
+ assert.ok(r.out.includes('PASS sso-isolated: no console.sso\n'),r.out);
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(rh(u,'console-args.log')),[`serve --port ${port} --business acme`]);
+ assert.equal(existsSync(join(r.dir,'data','.deployed')),false);
+});
+
+test('M3 R19 sso-isolated fails before the host starts when the scratch origin, an issuer or a slot is not the rehearsal\'s',async(t)=>{
+ // stamped: the issuer must be the rehearsal provider's; unstamped (no provider): on rehearsal.invalid.
+ for(const [stamped,from,to,why] of [
+  [true,'sso.publicOrigin="https://rehearsal.invalid";','','console.sso.publicOrigin is https://console.example.test, not https://rehearsal.invalid'],
+  [true,'p.issuer=`${op||','p.issuer=p.issuer||`${op||','console.sso provider a issuer is https://op.example.test/, not ORIGIN/a/ at the rehearsal provider'],
+  [false,'p.issuer=`${op||"https://rehearsal.invalid"}','p.issuer=`${op||"https://op.example.test"}','console.sso provider a issuer is https://op.example.test/a, not on rehearsal.invalid'],
+  [true,'"rehearsal-placeholder-secret\\n",{mode:0o600,flag:"wx"}','"other\\n",{mode:0o600,flag:"wx"}','console.sso provider a has no scratch placeholder secret'],
+ ]){
+  let e;if(stamped)e=await smk(t);else{e=await rmk(t);e.copies=UCOPIES;await ssoConfig(e)}
+  ownScript(e,from,to);
+  const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','3');
+  assert.equal(r.code,1,why+r.out+r.err);
+  const prov=provOf(r.out);assert.equal(!!prov,stamped,r.out);
+  assert.ok(r.out.includes(`FAIL sso-isolated: ${why.replace('ORIGIN',prov?.origin)}\n`),r.out);
+  assert.deepEqual(r.names.slice(stamped?-4:-3),['FAIL sso-isolated',...(stamped?['PASS provider-stopped']:[]),'PASS backup-unchanged','PASS live-config-unchanged']);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'host-args.log')),false);assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'console-args.log')),false);
+  if(prov)assert.equal(existsSync(`/proc/${prov.pid}`),false);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ }
+});
+
+test('M3 R20 the rehearsal provider\'s failure controls: no start, no trust, no discovery, a token request, a signal and a SIGKILL each fail and stop it',async(t)=>{
+ const ends=['PASS backup-unchanged','PASS live-config-unchanged'];
+ // The provider cannot start, leaves its TLS key, offers a non-loopback origin or never writes one:
+ // provider-start fails before the scratch build, and no host or Console starts.
+ for(const [from,to,why] of [
+  ['spawnSync("openssl"','spawnSync("openssl-missing-for-r20"','the rehearsal provider exited: rehearsal provider: cannot make the certificate: openssl exit ENOENT'],
+  ['finally{fs.rmSync(tls,{force:true})}','finally{}','the rehearsal provider left its TLS key at RDIR/provider/tls-key.pem'],
+  ['origin=`https://127.0.0.1:${','origin=`https://localhost:${','the rehearsal provider\'s origin https://localhost:PORT is not https on 127.0.0.1'],
+  ['fs.renameSync(path.join(dir,"origin.tmp"),path.join(dir,"origin"));','','the rehearsal provider wrote no origin within 3s'],
+ ]){
+  const e=await smk(t);ownScript(e,from,to);
+  const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','3');
+  assert.equal(r.code,1,why+r.out+r.err);assert.ok(r.dir,r.out+r.err);
+  const line=r.out.split('\n').find((l)=>l.startsWith('FAIL provider-start: '))??'';
+  const re=new RegExp(`^FAIL provider-start: ${why.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g,'\\$&').replace('RDIR',r.dir.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g,'\\$&')).replace('PORT','\\d+')}$`);
+  assert.match(line,re,r.out);
+  assert.deepEqual(r.names,[...PRE.slice(0,3),'FAIL provider-start',...(why.includes('exited')?[]:['PASS provider-stopped']),...ends],r.out);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(r.dir,'config')),false);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'host-args.log')),false);assert.equal(existsSync(rh(e,'console-args.log')),false);
+ }
+ // The Console cannot reach the provider (its discovery drops the connection, or the Console has
+ // no trust for its certificate): it starts degraded and the gate fails sso-ready.
+ for(const [from,to] of [
+  ['  send(200,{issuer,authorization_endpoint','  return q.socket.destroy();send(200,{issuer,authorization_endpoint'],
+  ['r_ca=(NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS="$R/provider/cert.pem")','r_ca=()'],
+ ]){
+  const e=await smk(t);ownScript(e,from,to);
+  const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','5');
+  assert.equal(r.code,1,from+r.out+r.err);
+  assert.ok(r.out.includes('FAIL sso-ready: provider a is unreachable, not ready\n'),r.out);
+  assert.deepEqual(r.names,[...SPRE,'PASS migration','FAIL sso-ready',...SPOST],r.out);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(`/proc/${provOf(r.out).pid}`),false);
+ }
+ // A Console that reports ready without asking the provider, or asks it for a token: the gate
+ // passes and provider-discovery fails.
+ for(const [f,why] of [
+  ['console-no-sso','no GET /a/.well-known/openid-configuration 200; no GET /a/jwks 200'],
+  ['console-asks-token','a request for POST /a/token 403; a request for GET /a/authorize?client_id=rehearsal&response_type=code 403'],
+ ]){
+  const e=await smk(t);rfault(e,f);
+  const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','10');
+  assert.equal(r.code,1,f+r.out+r.err);
+  assert.ok(r.out.includes(`FAIL provider-discovery: ${why}; see ${join(r.dir,'provider','requests.log')}\n`),r.out);
+  assert.deepEqual(r.names,[...SPRE,'PASS migration','PASS gate','PASS no-session','FAIL provider-discovery',...SPOST],r.out);
+ }
+ // A signal while the gate waits stops the Console, host and provider.
+ const e=await smk(t);rfault(e,`healthz-${B}`);
+ e.during=async(ch)=>{for(let i=0;i<200&&!existsSync(rh(e,'console-args.log'));i++)await new Promise((r)=>setTimeout(r,50));ch.kill('SIGTERM')};
+ const r=await rehearse(e,B,'--backup',e.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','30');
+ assert.equal(r.code,1,r.out+r.err);
+ assert.deepEqual(r.names,[...SPRE,'PASS migration','FAIL signal',...SPOST],r.out);
+ assert.equal(existsSync(`/proc/${provOf(r.out).pid}`),false);
+ // SIGKILL leaves no trap to run: the provider sees its parent gone and exits by itself.
+ const k=await smk(t);rfault(k,`healthz-${B}`);
+ k.during=async(ch)=>{for(let i=0;i<200&&!existsSync(rh(k,'console-args.log'));i++)await new Promise((r)=>setTimeout(r,50));ch.kill('SIGKILL')};
+ const rk=await rehearse(k,B,'--backup',k.act,'--port',await freePort(),'--timeout','30');
+ assert.equal(rk.code,null,rk.out+rk.err);
+ const pk=provOf(rk.out);assert.ok(pk,rk.out);
+ for(let i=0;i<60&&existsSync(`/proc/${pk.pid}`);i++)await new Promise((r)=>setTimeout(r,100));
+ assert.equal(existsSync(`/proc/${pk.pid}`),false,`provider pid ${pk.pid} outlived the killed rehearsal`);
+});
+
 // --- Row 233 (#1735): --backup last, the newest backup the log records (sage-1650, sage-1653) ---

 // The log's lines, as the runs write them, with only the fields from_log reads set.
@@ -2601,7 +2984,8 @@ test('row196 explicit socket conversion refuses inherited TCP before stop and ro
 assert.equal(r.code,3,r.out+r.err);assert.match(r.err,/tester-socket-path/);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(long,before),[]);
 });

-// Row196 merge guard: without --send, SSO insertion must still precede the socket flag.
+// Row196 merge guard, M3 (#1873): a user-unit --sso --tester-socket refuses accounts-user-unit; root's
+// unit for the copy carries --sso before the socket flag, and the pointer and status pin that order.
 test('row196 SSO socket conversion pins pointer and unit argv order without send',async t=>{
 const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,{copy:B});await ssoConfig(e);
 const file=join(COPIES,C1,'packages/webui/src/cli.mjs'),original=readFileSync(file,'utf8');
@@ -2611,8 +2995,9 @@ test('row196 SSO socket conversion pins pointer and unit argv order without send
 chmodSync(dirname(module),0o755);
 writeFileSync(module,'export const inspectInterpreter=()=>({path:"/usr/bin/python3",sha256:"fixture"});export const verifyInterpreterReceipt=()=>true;\n');chmodSync(module,0o444);chmodSync(dirname(module),0o555);
 t.after(()=>{chmodSync(dirname(module),0o755);rmSync(module);chmodSync(dirname(module),0o555);});
- const r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--tester-socket');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+ await auu(e,['activate',C1,'acme','--sso','--tester-socket'],'activate');
 const want=['--port',e.port,'--business','acme','--sso','--tester-socket'];
+ await viaSystem(e,'activate',C1,want);
 assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
 assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));
 assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send(?: |$)|--tester-port|--public-host|--proof-header/);
@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ function fakeSudo(K){

 // case2-unit.sh: logs its argv, then installs the copy's units as the fixture's user units (its
 // WorkingDirectory under the stack's copies) and starts the optional proxy, bus, then Console,
-// as case2-unit.sh does. The business is --business's value, or --org's when that is the spelling. faults/render-fails-<copy> exits 1 first; faults/render-probe-<copy> (one-shot) first runs
+// as case2-unit.sh does. The business is --business's value, or --org's when that is the spelling. A first
+// --check or --check-new (#1873) logs its argv and exits 1 under faults/check-fails-<copy>, else 0,
+// writing nothing. faults/render-fails-<copy> exits 1 first; faults/render-probe-<copy> (one-shot) first runs
 // probe.sh, a second driver, and records its exit and stderr.
 function fakeRender(K){
 const fs=process.getBuiltinModule('node:fs'),path=process.getBuiltinModule('node:path'),cp=process.getBuiltinModule('node:child_process');
 const a=process.argv.slice(2),sd=process.env.SD_STATE,f=(n)=>path.join(sd,'faults',n);
 fs.appendFileSync(path.join(sd,'render.log'),JSON.stringify(a)+'\n');
+ if(a[0]==='--check'||a[0]==='--check-new'){
+  const c=a[a.indexOf('--copy')+1];
+  if(fs.existsSync(f(`check-fails-${c}`))){console.error(`fixture render: ${a[0]} ${c} fails`);process.exit(1)}
+  process.exit(0);
+ }
 const cut=a.indexOf('--'),pre=a.slice(0,cut),serve=a.slice(cut+1),get=(k)=>pre[pre.indexOf(k)+1];
 const copy=get('--copy'),copies=path.join(get('--home'),'.local','share','mosaic-stack','copies');
 if(fs.existsSync(f(`render-probe-${copy}`))){
@@ -147,7 +154,7 @@ const arm=(e,key,text)=>writeFileSync(join(e.sd,'arm',key),text);

 // The step log: every line `<time> <step> rc=N ...` or the result line, root:root 0640 (here the
 // test user's), and nothing the stack's user printed. Returns the lines without the time.
-const STEP=/^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\dZ (start|fetch|ff|copy|hostcheck|units|plan|rehearse|rehearse-store|rehearsal-skipped|stop-console|stop-bus|stop-proxy|wait-down|stage|render|confirm|args|revert|render-old|confirm-rollback|gate|start-proxy|start-bus|start-console|stop-units) rc=\d+ |^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\dZ result exit=[0-35] [a-z-]+ /;
+const STEP=/^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\dZ (start|fetch|ff|copy|hostcheck|units|plan|rehearse|rehearse-store|rehearsal-skipped|render-old-check|render-check|stop-console|stop-bus|stop-proxy|wait-down|units-aside|units-back|daemon-reload|next-args|stage|render|confirm|args|revert|render-old|confirm-rollback|gate|start-proxy|start-bus|start-console|stop-units) rc=\d+ |^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\dZ result exit=[0-35] [a-z-]+ /;
 function slog(e){
 const l=lines(e.slog);
 for(const x of l){assert.match(x,STEP);assert.ok(!/stack-release:|fixture rehearse|PASS |FAIL |REHEARSAL/.test(x),x)}
@@ -165,7 +172,7 @@ const live=(e)=>[units(e)[e.bus].state,units(e)[e.con].state,units(e)[e.bus].wd.
 // Nothing the run did reached the args file: the same bytes and mode, and no temporary file left.
 const argsKept=(e)=>{assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),e.argsText);assert.equal(statSync(e.args).mode&0o777,0o640);assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(e.etc),['dev.args'])};
 const argsCopy=(e)=>{const l=readFileSync(e.args,'utf8').split('\n');return l[l.indexOf('--copy')+1]};
-const PRE=['start','fetch','ff','copy','hostcheck','units','plan','rehearse','rehearse-store'];
+const PRE=['start','fetch','ff','copy','hostcheck','units','plan','render-old-check','render-check','rehearse','rehearse-store'];
 const A2=['stop-console','stop-bus','wait-down','wait-down'];
 const R=[...A2,'revert','render-old','confirm-rollback'];

@@ -394,7 +401,7 @@ test('row 233: sequence 7: two upgrades and a rollback --to the previous copy wi
 const rb=await drive(e,C,'rollback','--instance','dev','--to',C1,'--restore',a2,...TO);assert.equal(rb.code,0,rb.all);
 assert.equal(rb.out.split('\n').at(-2),`stack-upgrade: rollback ok: ${C1} is live for acme`);
 // A rollback fetches, copies and rehearses nothing.
- assert.deepEqual(names(e).slice(n),['start','hostcheck','units','plan',...A2,'stage','render','confirm','args','result']);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e).slice(n),['start','hostcheck','units','plan','render-old-check','render-check',...A2,'stage','render','confirm','args','result']);
 const ra=lastAct(e),l3=final(e,ra);assert.deepEqual([l3.op,l3.result,l3.from,l3.to,l3.backup],['rollback','ok',C,C1,a2]);
 assert.deepEqual([pointer(e).copy,pointer(e).schema],[C1,'3g']);assert.equal(storeVersion(e.store,true),'3g');
 assert.equal(argsCopy(e),C1);assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',C1,C1]);
@@ -632,7 +639,9 @@ test('rename r2: an upgrade from an args file that spells both selectors --org k
 const after=e.argsText.replace(`--copy\n${B}\n`,`--copy\n${C1}\n`);assert.notEqual(after,e.argsText);
 assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),after);
 assert.equal(statSync(e.args).mode&0o777,0o640);assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(e.etc),['dev.args']);
- assert.deepEqual(lines(join(e.sd,'render.log')).map((x)=>JSON.parse(x)),[after.trimEnd().split('\n')]);
+ // #1873: before anything stops, --check renders the installed copy, then the target, from the same lines.
+ const al=after.trimEnd().split('\n');
+ assert.deepEqual(lines(join(e.sd,'render.log')).map((x)=>JSON.parse(x)),[['--check',...e.argsText.trimEnd().split('\n')],['--check',...al],al]);
 // The stack's user's steps get the business as a word, never a spelling.
 for(const k of ['activate-plan','rehearse','activate','confirm'])assert.ok(JSON.parse(lines(join(e.sd,'sudo.log')).find((x)=>JSON.parse(x).key===k)).cmd.includes('acme'),k);
 assert.ok(!lines(join(e.sd,'sudo.log')).some((x)=>JSON.parse(x).cmd.includes('--org')));
@@ -718,12 +727,25 @@ const baseCase2=()=>{
 // read. args(copy, extra) is a library args file's lines without --send; legacy() renders base's pair into dir.
 function case2Host(e,dir){
 const home=e.env.HOME,secrets=join(home,'.config','mosaic-dev','secrets');mkdirSync(secrets,{recursive:true,mode:0o700});
+ copyFileSync(e.cfg,join(home,'.config','mosaic-dev','config.json'));
 const proof=join(secrets,'proxy-proof');writeFileSync(proof,'made-up-proof\n');chmodSync(proof,0o600);
 const c2=join(e.root,'case2'),bin=join(c2,'bin'),log=join(c2,'systemctl.log');mkdirSync(bin,{recursive:true});mkdirSync(dir,{recursive:true});
 const uid=process.getuid(),gid=process.getgid();
- writeFileSync(join(bin,'getent'),`#!/bin/sh\ncase "$1 $2" in\n "passwd fixture") echo "fixture:x:${uid}:${gid}::${home}:/bin/bash" ;;\n "group ${gid}") echo "fixture:x:${gid}:" ;;\n *) exit 2 ;;\nesac\n`,{mode:0o755});
+ writeFileSync(join(bin,'getent'),`#!/bin/sh\ncase "$1 $2" in\n "passwd fixture"|"passwd ") echo "fixture:x:${uid}:${gid}::${home}:/usr/sbin/nologin" ;;\n "group ${gid}") echo "fixture:x:${gid}:" ;;\n *) exit 2 ;;\nesac\n`,{mode:0o755});
 writeFileSync(join(bin,'systemctl'),`#!/bin/sh\necho "$*" >> '${log}'\n[ "$1" != is-active ] || exit 3\n`,{mode:0o755});
- const env={CASE2_UNIT_DIR:dir,CASE2_GETENT:join(bin,'getent'),CASE2_SYSTEMCTL:join(bin,'systemctl')};
+ // M3: the current renderer queries the config under the selected uid for every
+ // profile. These copies deliberately stub the CLI; give that query its own
+ // fixture loader and sudo rather than invoking the machine's sudo.
+ for(const id of [B,C1,C]){
+  const d=join(COPIES,id),packages=join(d,'packages'),cli=join(packages,'cli'),src=join(cli,'src');
+  if(!existsSync(join(src,'config.mjs'))){
+   chmodSync(d,0o755);chmodSync(packages,0o755);mkdirSync(src,{recursive:true});
+   writeFileSync(join(src,'config.mjs'),`import fs from 'node:fs';import os from 'node:os';import path from 'node:path';export const loadSystem=()=>JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(),'.config/mosaic-dev/config.json'),'utf8'));`);
+   chmodSync(join(src,'config.mjs'),0o444);chmodSync(src,0o555);chmodSync(cli,0o555);chmodSync(packages,0o555);chmodSync(d,0o555);
+  }
+ }
+ writeFileSync(join(bin,'sudo'),'#!/bin/sh\n[ "$1" = -u ] && [ "$2" = fixture ] && [ "$3" = -H ] || exit 97\nshift 3\nexec "$@"\n',{mode:0o755});
+ const env={PATH:`${bin}:${e.env.PATH}`,CASE2_UNIT_DIR:dir,CASE2_GETENT:join(bin,'getent'),CASE2_SYSTEMCTL:join(bin,'systemctl')};
 const serve=['--port','443','--business','acme','--public-host','books.example','--auth-header','X-Auth-User','--allow-user','melanie','--proof-header','X-Proxy-Proof','--proof-file',proof];
 const args=(copy=B,extra=[])=>['--user','fixture','--home',home,'--business','acme','--copy',copy,'--node',RENDER_NODE,...extra,'--',...serve];
 const render=(script,a)=>{const r=spawnSync('bash',[script,...a],{env:{PATH:e.env.PATH,...env},encoding:'utf8'});return {code:r.status,out:r.stdout,err:r.stderr}};
@@ -829,3 +851,101 @@ test('row 233: usage exits 4 before any log or lock',async(t)=>{
 }
 assert.ok(!existsSync(dirname(e.slog)));assert.ok(!existsSync(e.run));
 });
+
+// --- #1873 M3: render checks before anything stops, and --next-args ---
+
+// The installed units' bytes, for the byte-for-byte checks across a moved-aside render.
+const unitBytes=(e)=>Object.fromEntries([e.tmpl,e.con].map((u)=>[u,readFileSync(join(e.units,u),'utf8')]));
+const renders=(e)=>lines(join(e.sd,'render.log')).map((l)=>JSON.parse(l));
+const copyOf=(a)=>a[a.indexOf('--copy')+1];
+// The next args: the args file's lines with the serve flags in another order, root's 0640.
+const nextText=(e)=>e.argsText.replace(`--\n--port\n${e.port}\n--business\nacme\n`,`--\n--business\nacme\n--port\n${e.port}\n`);
+const writeNext=(e,text=nextText(e),mode=0o640)=>{const f=join(e.etc,'dev.args.next');writeFileSync(f,text);chmodSync(f,mode);return f};
+const replacedDirs=(e)=>readdirSync(e.etc).filter((n)=>/^dev\.replaced\.[A-Za-z0-9]{6}$/.test(n)).sort();
+
+test('#1873: a target whose render check fails refuses render-refused, naming --next-args, before anything stops',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await useed(t);
+ fault(e,`check-fails-${C1}`);
+ const r=await upgrade(e,C1);assert.equal(r.code,3,r.all);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e),['start','fetch','ff','copy','hostcheck','units','plan','render-old-check','render-check','result']);
+ assert.match(result(e),new RegExp(`^result exit=3 render-refused case2-unit.sh --check refuses ${C1}'s units from .*dev\\.args; .*takes --next-args .*\\(nothing was stopped\\)$`));
+ assert.deepEqual(renders(e).map((a)=>[a[0],copyOf(a)]),[['--check',B],['--check',C1]]);
+ assert.ok(!existsSync(join(e.sd,'root-systemctl.log')));assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',B,B]);argsKept(e);
+});
+
+test('#1873: an installed copy whose render check fails refuses at render-old-check, before the target\'s check',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await useed(t);
+ fault(e,`check-fails-${B}`);
+ const r=await upgrade(e,C1);assert.equal(r.code,3,r.all);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e),['start','fetch','ff','copy','hostcheck','units','plan','render-old-check','result']);
+ assert.match(result(e),new RegExp(`^result exit=3 render-refused case2-unit.sh --check refuses ${B}'s units from .*dev\\.args, so a rollback could not render them`));
+ assert.deepEqual(renders(e).map((a)=>[a[0],copyOf(a)]),[['--check',B]]);
+ assert.ok(!existsSync(join(e.sd,'root-systemctl.log')));assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',B,B]);argsKept(e);
+});
+
+test('#1873: --next-args moves the old units aside, renders the new flags as a first install, keeps the old units and args, and rolls back the same way',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await useed(t);
+ const before=unitBytes(e),next=nextText(e);writeNext(e);
+ const r=await upgrade(e,C1,'--next-args');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.all);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e),[...PRE,...A2,'stage','units-aside','render','confirm','next-args','args','result']);
+ const [d]=replacedDirs(e);assert.ok(d,readdirSync(e.etc).join(' '));
+ assert.equal(result(e),`result exit=0 ok upgrade ok: ${C1} is live for acme; the replaced units and args file are in ${join(e.etc,d)}`);
+ assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(e.etc).sort(),['dev.args',d]);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),next.replace(`--copy\n${B}\n`,`--copy\n${C1}\n`));assert.equal(statSync(e.args).mode&0o777,0o640);
+ const rd=join(e.etc,d);assert.equal(statSync(rd).mode&0o777,0o700);
+ assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(rd).sort(),['dev.args',e.tmpl,e.con].sort());
+ for(const [u,text] of Object.entries(before))assert.equal(readFileSync(join(rd,u),'utf8'),text,u);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(rd,'dev.args'),'utf8'),e.argsText);assert.equal(statSync(join(rd,'dev.args')).mode&0o777,0o640);
+ const serve=(a)=>a.slice(a.indexOf('--')+1);
+ const rl=renders(e);assert.deepEqual(rl.map((a)=>[a[0],copyOf(a)]),[['--check',B],['--check-new',C1],['--user',C1]]);
+ assert.deepEqual(serve(rl[0]),['--port',String(e.port),'--business','acme']);
+ assert.deepEqual(serve(rl[1]),['--business','acme','--port',String(e.port)]);assert.deepEqual(serve(rl[2]),serve(rl[1]));
+ assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',C1,C1]);
+ // The run sheet's rollback: the replaced args file as the next args, then rollback --next-args.
+ copyFileSync(join(rd,'dev.args'),join(e.etc,'dev.args.next'));chmodSync(join(e.etc,'dev.args.next'),0o640);
+ const after=unitBytes(e),m=slog(e).length,n=renders(e).length;
+ const rb=await drive(e,C1,'rollback','--instance','dev','--to',B,'--next-args',...TO);assert.equal(rb.code,0,rb.all);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e).slice(m),['start','hostcheck','units','plan','render-old-check','render-check',...A2,'stage','units-aside','render','confirm','next-args','args','result']);
+ assert.deepEqual(renders(e).slice(n).map((a)=>[a[0],copyOf(a)]),[['--check',C1],['--check-new',B],['--user',B]]);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),e.argsText);assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',B,B]);
+ const d2=replacedDirs(e).find((x)=>x!==d);assert.ok(d2);assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(e.etc).sort(),['dev.args',d,d2].sort());
+ for(const [u,text] of Object.entries(after))assert.equal(readFileSync(join(e.etc,d2,u),'utf8'),text,u);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(e.etc,d2,'dev.args'),'utf8'),next.replace(`--copy\n${B}\n`,`--copy\n${C1}\n`));
+});
+
+test('#1873: a failed render under --next-args moves the old units back unchanged and restarts them, with no render of the old copy: exit 1',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await useed(t);
+ const before=unitBytes(e),next=nextText(e);writeNext(e);
+ fault(e,`render-fails-${C1}`);
+ const r=await upgrade(e,C1,'--next-args');assert.equal(r.code,1,r.all);
+ assert.deepEqual(names(e),[...PRE,...A2,'stage','units-aside','render',...A2,'revert','units-back','daemon-reload','start-bus','start-console','confirm-rollback','result']);
+ assert.match(result(e),new RegExp(`^result exit=1 failed A4 failed; rolled back to ${B}`));
+ assert.deepEqual(renders(e).map((a)=>[a[0],copyOf(a)]),[['--check',B],['--check-new',C1],['--user',C1]]);
+ for(const [u,text] of Object.entries(before))assert.equal(readFileSync(join(e.units,u),'utf8'),text,u);
+ assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(e.etc).sort(),['dev.args','dev.args.next']);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),e.argsText);assert.equal(readFileSync(join(e.etc,'dev.args.next'),'utf8'),next);
+ assert.equal(final(e,lastAct(e)).rollback,'ok');assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',B,B]);
+});
+
+test('#1873: the next args must be root\'s, equal before -- but for --copy, differ after it, and render as a first install',async(t)=>{
+ const e=await useed(t);
+ const tryNext=async(text,mode,code,why,at='plan')=>{
+  if(text===null)rmSync(join(e.etc,'dev.args.next'),{force:true});else writeNext(e,text,mode);
+  const n=existsSync(e.slog)?slog(e).length:0;
+  const r=await upgrade(e,C1,'--next-args');assert.equal(r.code,3,`${why}: ${r.all}`);
+  assert.match(slog(e).at(-1),new RegExp(`^result exit=3 ${code} `),why);
+  const ran=names(e).slice(n);assert.ok(!ran.some((x)=>/^(stop|stage|units-aside|render$|confirm)/.test(x)),`${why}: ${ran}`);
+  if(at)assert.equal(ran.at(-2),at,`${why}: ${ran}`);
+ };
+ await tryNext(null,0,'args-unreadable','no next file','start');
+ await tryNext(nextText(e),0o660,'args-unreadable','group write','start');
+ await tryNext(nextText(e).replace('--home\n','--pm\n--home\n'),0o640,'next-args-differ','a flag before --','start');
+ await tryNext(nextText(e).replace('--user\nfixture\n','--user\nother\n'),0o640,'next-args-differ','another user','start');
+ await tryNext(e.argsText,0o640,'next-args-same','the same lines','start');
+ await tryNext(e.argsText.replace(`--copy\n${B}\n`,`--copy\n${C}\n`),0o640,'next-args-same','only --copy differs','start');
+ fault(e,`check-fails-${C1}`);
+ await tryNext(nextText(e),0o640,'render-refused','the first-install check','render-check');
+ assert.match(result(e),new RegExp(`^result exit=3 render-refused case2-unit.sh --check-new refuses ${C1}'s units from .*dev\\.args\\.next`));
+ assert.ok(!existsSync(join(e.sd,'root-systemctl.log')));assert.deepEqual(live(e),['active','active',B,B]);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(e.args,'utf8'),e.argsText);assert.deepEqual(replacedDirs(e),[]);
+});
@@ -130,9 +130,13 @@ export function writeTurn(dir, id, record) {
  return path;
 }

+// A parse refusal names the turn by its id, never by host path (PR #1916); a
+// listed file's id is named only when it passes TURN_ID.
+const turnLabel = (id) => (TURN_ID.test(id) ? `turn record ${id}` : "turn record");
+
 export function readTurn(dir, id) {
  const path = turnPath(dir, id);
-  return parseJsonFileText(readFileSync(path, "utf8"), path, "turn record");
+  return parseJsonFileText(readFileSync(path, "utf8"), path, turnLabel(String(id)));
 }

 export function listTurns(dir) {
@@ -140,7 +144,7 @@ export function listTurns(dir) {
  if (!existsSync(turns)) return [];
  return readdirSync(turns)
    .filter((f) => f.endsWith(".json"))
-    .map((f) => parseJsonFileText(readFileSync(join(turns, f), "utf8"), join(turns, f), "turn record"));
+    .map((f) => parseJsonFileText(readFileSync(join(turns, f), "utf8"), join(turns, f), turnLabel(f.slice(0, -".json".length))));
 }

 // The daily ceiling counts admissions on the current UTC date. An admission
@@ -28,9 +28,10 @@ for (const [field, edit] of [
 });
 test('gateway url refusal omits its value', () => assert.throws(() => createGateway({ url: secret, token: 'fake' }), safe('url', DiscordError, { exitCode: 1 })));
 for (const mode of ['read', 'list']) test(`turn ${mode} parser omits file bytes and keeps SyntaxError`, t => {
- const root = scratch(t); mkdirSync(join(root, 'turns'));
+ const root = join(scratch(t), secret); mkdirSync(join(root, 'turns'), { recursive: true });
 const file = join(root, 'turns', 'turn-1.json'); writeFileSync(file, secret);
- assert.throws(() => mode === 'read' ? readTurn(root, 'turn-1') : listTurns(root), safe(file, SyntaxError));
+ // The refusal names the turn by its id, never by host path (PR #1916).
+ assert.throws(() => mode === 'read' ? readTurn(root, 'turn-1') : listTurns(root), safe('turn record turn-1 is not valid JSON', SyntaxError, {}, file));
 });

 for (const duplicate of [true, false]) test(`binding approver ${duplicate ? 'duplicate' : 'invalid'} name omits user values`, t => {
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export function webPlan(resolved, harness, builtinWeb) {
  }
  return { source, builtin: granted && source === "harness-builtin" };
 }
-export const builtinTools = (tools) => tools.filter((t) => t !== "web");
+export const builtinTools = (tools) => tools.filter((t) => t !== "web" && !t.includes("."));
 export const SOURCES = Object.freeze({
  piExtension: fileURLToPath(new URL("./pi-extension.mjs", import.meta.url)),
  claudeGate: fileURLToPath(new URL("./claude-gate.mjs", import.meta.url)),
@@ -363,11 +363,12 @@ export function toolServer({ path, tools, client, local }) {
      if (!tool) return answer({ ok: false, error: "unknown-tool" });
      const args = request.args && typeof request.args === "object" && !Array.isArray(request.args) ? request.args : {};
      try {
-        const result = Object.hasOwn(local, tool.verb) ? await local[tool.verb](args, { signal: controller.signal }) : await client.call(tool.verb, args);
+        const result = Object.hasOwn(local, tool.verb) ? await local[tool.verb](args, { signal: controller.signal }) : await client.call(tool.verb, tool.pluginTool ? {tool:tool.pluginTool,arguments:args} : args);
        answer({ ok: true, result });
      } catch (e) {
        answer({ ok: false, error: /^[a-z-]{1,64}$/.test(e.code ?? "") ? e.code : "tool-failed",
          ...refusalGuidance(e.code),
+          ...(e.code === "plugin-disabled" && /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,31}$/.test(e.reason ?? "") ? {plugin:e.reason} : {}),
          ...(typeof e.reason === "string" && request.tool === "advance_request" && tool.verb === "request.advance" && e.code === "request-evidence-required"
            ? { reason: e.reason.slice(0, 300) } : tool.verb === "record.write" && e.code === "project-record-invalid" && typeof e.reason === "string"
              ? { reason: e.reason.slice(0, 300) } : {}) });
@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ const MESSAGE_CLASSES = ["REQUEST", "ASSIGNMENT", "REVIEW-REQUEST", "REVIEW-RESU
 // "working.land" go to the host's git socket.
 export function typedTools({ resolved, arbiter = false, tracker = false, projects = [], webTyped = true, land = false, library = false }) {
  const held = new Set([...resolved.limits.authority.withinRole, ...resolved.limits.authority.crossRole]);
-  const tools = [];
+  const tools = (resolved.pluginTools ?? []).filter(t=>resolved.limits.tools.includes(t.name)).map(t=>({
+    name:t.name, verb:"plugin.tool", pluginTool:t.name, action:null, description:t.description, parameters:t.arguments,
+  }));
  const add = (name, verb, action, description, parameters) => tools.push({ name, verb, action, description, parameters });
  if (held.has("message.send")) {
    add("send_message", "message.send", "message.send", "Send a message to another role instance, or to \"human\". Your final answer to a message is sent back to its sender for you; use this for anything else. A reply to an answer gets no automatic answer; use class REQUEST to ask a follow-up.", obj({
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ function checkUser(user, at, ctx, humans, seenSubjects) {
  requireObject(user, at);
  rejectUnknownKeys(user, ["id", "home", "subjects"], at);
  requireId(user.id, `${at}.id`);
-  if (RESERVED_USERS.includes(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be a bus principal`);
-  if (humans.has(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be a business's human`);
+  if (RESERVED_USERS.includes(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be ${JSON.stringify(user.id)}, a bus principal`);
+  if (humans.has(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be a business's human (${JSON.stringify(user.id)})`);
  if (user.home !== LOCAL_HOME && !ctx.peers.has(user.home)) {
    refuse(`${at}.home must be a configured peer or ${JSON.stringify(LOCAL_HOME)}`);
  }
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ function checkScope(value, where, check) {
  const seen = new Set();
  list.forEach((entry, i) => {
    check(entry, `${where}[${i}]`);
-    if (seen.has(entry)) refuse(`duplicate entry in ${where}`);
+    if (seen.has(entry)) refuse(`duplicate entry in ${where}: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}`);
    seen.add(entry);
  });
 }
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ function checkGrant(grant, at, ctx, users, seenGrants) {
  requireObject(grant, at);
  rejectUnknownKeys(grant, ["id", "user", "business", "projects", "instances", "level", "expires"], at);
  requireId(grant.id, `${at}.id`);
-  if (seenGrants.has(grant.id)) refuse(`${at}.id is a duplicate grant id`);
+  if (seenGrants.has(grant.id)) refuse(`${at}.id is a duplicate grant id: ${grant.id}`);
  seenGrants.add(grant.id);
  if (typeof grant.user !== "string" || !users.has(grant.user)) refuse(`${at}.user must name a user in this file`);
  if (typeof grant.business !== "string" || !ctx.businesses.has(grant.business)) {
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ export function checkAccess(document, context) {
  const seenSubjects = new Set();
  requireArray(document.users, "users").forEach((user, i) => {
    checkUser(user, `users[${i}]`, ctx, humans, seenSubjects);
-    if (users.has(user.id)) refuse(`users[${i}].id is a duplicate user id`);
+    if (users.has(user.id)) refuse(`users[${i}].id is a duplicate user id: ${user.id}`);
    users.add(user.id);
  });
  const seenGrants = new Set();
@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ export function checkAccess(document, context) {
 // other, as the business file is.
 export function loadAccess(file, context, { uid = process.getuid() } = {}) {
  const document = readJsonFile(file, "access file", (stat) => {
-    if (stat.uid !== uid) refuse(`access file must belong to uid ${uid}: ${file}`);
-    if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) refuse(`access file must not be writable by group or other (mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}): ${file}`);
+    if (stat.uid !== uid) refuse(`access file must belong to uid ${uid}`);
+    if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) refuse(`access file must not be writable by group or other (mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)})`);
  });
  return checkAccess(document, context);
 }
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 // Phase M2 (#1873): instance accounts, independent of Console sessions and bus authority.
-import { constants, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { constants } from 'node:fs';
 import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { dirname, join, parse, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
 import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
 import { OrgError, readRegistryLocked } from './org-registry.mjs';
+import { assertTrustedConfigDir } from './config-dir-trust.mjs';
 import { readJsonFile, requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireString, requirePositiveInt, requireId, requireDistinctList, deepFreeze, canonicalJson } from './util.mjs';
 import { RIGHTS, ROLE_RIGHTS, normalizeRights } from './org-rights.mjs';

@@ -128,23 +129,16 @@ export function accountsRepairs(doc) {
  return result;
 }

-// Check the host boundary before any read or lock. Every ancestor must be a real
-// directory; configDir itself belongs to this uid and is not publicly writable.
+// Check the host boundary before any read or lock: every ancestor a real directory
+// that only root or this uid can change, and configDir this uid's and not publicly
+// writable (config-dir-trust.mjs). Refusals name the rule and uid, never the path.
 export function assertAccountsOwner(configDir, { uid = process.geteuid() } = {}) {
-  if (typeof configDir !== 'string' || resolve(configDir) !== configDir) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config directory must be an absolute normalized path');
-  let current = parse(configDir).root;
-  for (const part of configDir.slice(current.length).split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
-    current = join(current, part); const st = lstatSync(current);
-    if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink()) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config path contains a symlink or non-directory');
-  }
-  const st = lstatSync(configDir);
-  if (st.uid !== uid) fail('accounts-unsafe', `config directory must belong to uid ${uid}: ${configDir}`);
-  if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config directory must not be writable by group or other');
+  assertTrustedConfigDir(configDir, { uid, code: 'accounts-unsafe' });
 }
 export function loadAccounts(file, context, { uid = process.geteuid() } = {}) {
  assertAccountsOwner(dirname(file), { uid });
  const doc = readJsonFile(file, 'accounts file', st => {
-    if (st.uid !== uid) fail('accounts-unsafe', `accounts file must belong to uid ${uid}: ${file}`);
+    if (st.uid !== uid) fail('accounts-unsafe', `accounts file must belong to uid ${uid}`);
    if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'accounts file must not be writable by group or other');
  });
  return checkAccounts(doc, context);
@@ -188,11 +188,11 @@ function projectCopyRefusal(copy, document, levels) {
 // dropped: the file's own instance wins. Returns a frozen business whose `copies` key is the
 // snapshot's view, with each copy's state as it is in this document; a business with no copies and
 // no project agents is plain validateBusinessDocument.
-export function withCopies(document, file, { rolesDir, snapshot }) {
+export function withCopies(document, file, { rolesDir, snapshot, dataRoot = null }) {
  const copies = snapshot?.copies ?? {};
-  if (Object.keys(copies).length === 0 && !hasProjectAgents(document)) return validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir });
+  if (Object.keys(copies).length === 0 && !hasProjectAgents(document)) return validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
  // The document's own refusals come first, whole.
-  validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir });
+  validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
  const orgId = snapshot?.org ?? document.id;
  const levels = resolveAgentLevels({ orgId, doc: document, root: { agents: snapshot?.rootAgents ?? {} }, rolesDir });
  const unions = {};
@@ -234,25 +234,25 @@ export function withCopies(document, file, { rolesDir, snapshot }) {
    if (refused) { view[instance] = { ...view[instance], state: "refused", reason: refused }; continue; }
    const entry = entryOf(copy, copy.project === null && narrows[copy.name] ? narrowVars("root", copy.vars, narrows[copy.name]) : copy.vars);
    try {
-      validateBusinessDocument({ ...narrowed, roles: { ...roles, [instance]: entry } }, file, { rolesDir });
+      validateBusinessDocument({ ...narrowed, roles: { ...roles, [instance]: entry } }, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
      join[instance] = entry;
    } catch (error) {
      if (error?.name !== "BusinessError") throw error;
      view[instance] = { ...view[instance], state: "refused", reason: reasonOf(error, file, orgId, document, copy) };
    }
  }
-  const business = validateBusinessDocument({ ...narrowed, roles: { ...roles, ...join } }, file, { rolesDir });
+  const business = validateBusinessDocument({ ...narrowed, roles: { ...roles, ...join } }, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
  return deepFreeze({ ...business, ...(Object.keys(copies).length ? { copies: view } : {}), unions });
 }

 // The organization with its copies, as a bus or launcher loads it. The plain load keeps
 // loadBusiness's file checks; when there are copies or project agents, the document is read again
 // through the organization's own writer and validated with them, and only that second read is used.
-export function loadWithCopies(id, { dir, rolesDir, snapshot }) {
-  const plain = loadBusiness(id, { dir, rolesDir });
-  const { document } = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir }).read(id);
+export function loadWithCopies(id, { dir, rolesDir, snapshot, dataRoot = null }) {
+  const plain = loadBusiness(id, { dir, rolesDir, dataRoot });
+  const { document } = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, dataRoot }).read(id);
  if ((!snapshot || Object.keys(snapshot.copies ?? {}).length === 0) && !hasProjectAgents(document)) return plain;
-  return withCopies(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, snapshot });
+  return withCopies(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, snapshot, dataRoot });
 }

 // Why `instance` can't work in code project `project` of this business, as { code, message }, or
@@ -11,11 +11,12 @@
 // No refusal and no receipt carries a value from the file or the request: a var value can be a
 // secret typed into the wrong place. Messages name the file (agents.json) and the key, never a
 // host path.
-import { constants, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { constants } from 'node:fs';
 import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
-import { join, parse, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { OrgError } from './org-registry.mjs';
+import { assertTrustedConfigDir } from './config-dir-trust.mjs';
 import { ROOT_FILE, checkProjectAgents, checkRootAgents, loadRootAgents, projectUnion, rootAgentsPath } from './agent-levels.mjs';
 import { canonicalJson, isPlainObject } from './util.mjs';
 import { ID_PATTERN } from './vocabulary.mjs';
@@ -38,27 +39,9 @@ export function requireRootOwner(actor, owner) {
    fail('human-required', 'only the signed-in owner writes the root agent file');
 }

-// Every ancestor a real directory that only root or this uid can change: owned by one of them, and
-// group or other writable only with the sticky bit (as /tmp is), so no other user can rename or
-// replace configDir between these checks and the path-based lock, temp file and rename. configDir
-// itself is this uid's and not group or other writable.
-function assertConfigDir(configDir, uid) {
-  if (typeof configDir !== 'string' || resolve(configDir) !== configDir) fail('agents-unsafe', 'config directory must be an absolute normalized path');
-  let current = parse(configDir).root;
-  const trusted = st => (st.uid === 0 || st.uid === uid) && (!(st.mode & 0o022) || (st.mode & 0o1000));
-  try { if (!trusted(lstatSync(current))) fail('agents-unsafe', `a config directory ancestor must belong to root or uid ${uid} and not be writable by others without the sticky bit`); }
-  catch (error) { if (error instanceof OrgError) throw error; fail('agents-unsafe', 'config directory is missing'); }
-  for (const part of configDir.slice(current.length).split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
-    current = join(current, part);
-    let st;
-    try { st = lstatSync(current); } catch { fail('agents-unsafe', 'config directory is missing'); }
-    if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink()) fail('agents-unsafe', 'config path contains a symbolic link or non-directory');
-    if (current !== configDir && !trusted(st)) fail('agents-unsafe', `a config directory ancestor must belong to root or uid ${uid} and not be writable by others without the sticky bit`);
-  }
-  const st = lstatSync(configDir);
-  if (st.uid !== uid) fail('agents-unsafe', `config directory must belong to uid ${uid}`);
-  if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('agents-unsafe', 'config directory must not be writable by group or other');
-}
+// The shared config directory check (config-dir-trust.mjs): every ancestor root's or this uid's and
+// not writable by others without the sticky bit, configDir this uid's and not group or other writable.
+const assertConfigDir = (configDir, uid) => assertTrustedConfigDir(configDir, { uid, code: 'agents-unsafe' });

 // The reader's descriptor checks (loadRootAgents), plus one link: a regular file, no symbolic link,
 // this uid, no group or other write. Missing is an empty root level at ABSENT_REVISION.
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ export function loadRootAgents(configDir, { rolesDir } = {}) {
  } catch (error) {
    if (error?.name !== "BusinessError") throw error;
    if (error.exitCode === 4 && /not found/.test(error.message)) return deepFreeze({ state: "absent", agents: {}, assistant: null });
-    // The read's messages carry the host path; the Console shows this one, so it names the file only.
-    // Keep parse refusals file-only here too, without the host path.
-    if (/ is not valid JSON /.test(error.message)) refuse(`root agent file is not valid JSON (${ROOT_FILE})`, error.exitCode);
+    // The Console shows this one, so it names the file only. The shared reader no longer quotes the
+    // host path; the replaceAll below stays as a second guard.
+    if (/ is not valid JSON$/.test(error.message)) refuse(`root agent file is not valid JSON (${ROOT_FILE})`, error.exitCode);
    refuse(error.message.replaceAll(file, ROOT_FILE), error.exitCode);
  }
  try { return deepFreeze({ state: "ok", ...checkRootAgents(document, { rolesDir }) }); }
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ const AUTHORITY_KEYS = Object.freeze(["withinRole", "crossRole"]);
 const MESSAGING_KEYS = Object.freeze(["sendTo", "receiveFrom"]);
 const PERSONALITY_KEYS = Object.freeze(["summary", "traits", "voice"]);
 const CREDENTIAL_KEYS = Object.freeze(["service", "scopes"]);
-const PLUGIN_KEYS = Object.freeze(["name", "tools", "actions", "services"]);
+const PLUGIN_KEYS = Object.freeze(["name", "tools", "actions", "services", "roleTemplates"]);
 const PLUGIN_SERVICE_KEYS = Object.freeze(["name", "scopes"]);

 // Step 6's length bounds, in characters or entries. The design gives none, so P1 sets them. The
@@ -137,7 +137,14 @@ function checkPlugin(plugin, i, core) {
  const names = [...tools, ...actions, ...services.map((s) => s.name.slice(name.length + 1))];
  const twice = names.find((n, j) => names.indexOf(n) !== j);
  if (twice !== undefined) refuse(`${where} declares ${JSON.stringify(full(twice))} twice`);
-  return { name, tools: tools.map(full), actions: actions.map(full), services };
+  if (plugin.roleTemplates !== undefined && !Array.isArray(plugin.roleTemplates)) refuse("invalid plugin role templates");
+  const roleTemplates=(plugin.roleTemplates ?? []).map(t=>{
+    if(!isPlain(t) || Object.keys(t).sort().join(",")!=="file,name" || typeof t.name!=="string" || !DECLARED_NAME.test(t.name) || coreName(t.name)
+      || typeof t.file!=="string" || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9._/-]+$/.test(t.file) || t.file.split("/").some(p=>!p || p==="." || p==="..")) refuse("invalid plugin role template");
+    return {name:full(t.name),file:t.file};
+  });
+  if(new Set(roleTemplates.map(t=>t.name)).size!==roleTemplates.length)refuse("duplicate plugin role template");
+  return { name, tools: tools.map(full), actions: actions.map(full), services, roleTemplates };
 }

 // The registry checkComposition reads: the core set plus each plugin's declared set. The plugin
@@ -162,6 +169,7 @@ export function buildRegistry({ plugins = [] } = {}) {
    routed: [...ROUTED, ...pluginActions],
    services,
    plugins: declared,
+    roleTemplates: declared.flatMap(p=>p.roleTemplates),
  });
  BUILT.add(registry);
  return registry;
@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ export function runConfigCommand(argv, { stdout = process.stdout, stderr = proce
        ? "configuration is not valid JSON; expected readable JSON: "
        : field ? `${field}: expected ${expected[field] ?? "a value satisfying the system configuration schema"}: `
          : "expected valid system configuration: ";
-      fail(3, `system config problem (mosaic-config exit ${proc.status}): ${detail}${env.MOSAIC_CONFIG || join(env.HOME || "~", ".config", "mosaic-dev", "config.json")}${proc.error?.code ? ` (${proc.error.code})` : ""}`);
+      // Name the config by where it came from, never by host path (PR #1916).
+      fail(3, `system config problem (mosaic-config exit ${proc.status}): ${detail}${env.MOSAIC_CONFIG ? "the system config MOSAIC_CONFIG names" : "the default system config"}${proc.error?.code ? ` (${proc.error.code})` : ""}`);
    }
    try {
      return JSON.parse(proc.stdout);
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ export function runConfigCommand(argv, { stdout = process.stdout, stderr = proce
        continue;
      }
      const project = loadProject(entry.root);
-      if (project.id !== id) fail(2, `project file ${file} has id that does not match the declared project key`);
+      if (project.id !== id) fail(2, `project file of project ${id} has id that does not match the declared project key`);
      for (const instance of Object.keys(organization.roles)) resolveInstance({ system, business: organization, project, instance });
      projects[id] = "valid";
    }
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// #1873: the config directory check shared by the accounts store (accounts.mjs) and the root agent
+// file's writer (agent-levels-write.mjs). Both open, lock, write and rename files by path under
+// configDir, so the path must stay this uid's from the check to the last write.
+//
+// Every ancestor is a real directory that only root or this uid can change: owned by one of them, and
+// group or other writable only with the sticky bit (as /tmp is). Otherwise another user could rename
+// configDir out from under the check and put their own file in its place. configDir itself belongs to
+// this uid and is not group or other writable.
+//
+// Each caller keeps its own refusal code. No message quotes a path: a refusal names the rule and the
+// uid only (the redaction rule, PR #1916).
+import { lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join, parse, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { OrgError } from './org-registry.mjs';
+
+export function assertTrustedConfigDir(configDir, { uid, code }) {
+  const fail = message => { throw new OrgError(code, message); };
+  if (typeof configDir !== 'string' || resolve(configDir) !== configDir) fail('config directory must be an absolute normalized path');
+  const ancestor = `a config directory ancestor must belong to root or uid ${uid} and not be writable by others without the sticky bit`;
+  const trusted = st => (st.uid === 0 || st.uid === uid) && (!(st.mode & 0o022) || (st.mode & 0o1000));
+  const stat = path => { try { return lstatSync(path); } catch { return fail('config directory is missing'); } };
+  let current = parse(configDir).root;
+  if (!trusted(stat(current))) fail(ancestor);
+  for (const part of configDir.slice(current.length).split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
+    current = join(current, part);
+    const st = stat(current);
+    if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink()) fail('config path contains a symbolic link or non-directory');
+    if (current !== configDir && !trusted(st)) fail(ancestor);
+  }
+  const st = stat(configDir);
+  if (st.uid !== uid) fail(`config directory must belong to uid ${uid}`);
+  if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('config directory must not be writable by group or other');
+}
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { credentialKind, isHostKind } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireDate } from "./util.mjs";

+import { pluginName } from "../../plugins/src/organization.mjs";
+
 const ENV_NAME = /^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,63}$/;
 export const DATE_KEY = Object.freeze({ gitea: "rotateBy", vikunja: "expires" });
 const WARN_DAYS = 7;
@@ -21,10 +23,10 @@ const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 // can't use the form. A `file` reference into the agents' store must be the
 // agent's own path (`credential-not-yours`).
 export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
-  if (!credentialKind(service)) refuse(`${where}: unknown credential service ${JSON.stringify(service)}`);
+  if (!credentialKind(service) && !pluginName(service)) refuse(`${where}: unknown credential service ${JSON.stringify(service)}`);
  requireObject(ref, where);
  // Row 210 (#1707, design D1): an ssh key doesn't expire, so host.<id> takes rotateBy as gitea does.
-  const dateKey = isHostKind(service) ? "rotateBy" : DATE_KEY[service];
+  const dateKey = isHostKind(service) ? "rotateBy" : (DATE_KEY[service] ?? "rotateBy");
  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", "store", dateKey], where);
  const hasFile = ref.file !== undefined;
  const hasEnv = ref.env !== undefined;
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ export function checkCommands(commands, where) {
      if (/[*?[]/.test(element)) refuse(`${at} must not hold *, ? or [; the match is literal`);
    }
    if (prefix[0].includes("/") && !prefix[0].startsWith("/")) refuse(`${at}[0] must be a bare name or an absolute path`);
-    if (refusedCommand(prefix[0])) refuse(`${at} starts with ${prefix[0]}, a shell, runner or interpreter, which would grant any command`);
+    // Name the command by its basename, which refusedCommand matched against a closed list or
+    // pattern, never by an absolute host path (PR #1916).
+    if (refusedCommand(prefix[0])) refuse(`${at} starts with ${prefix[0].split("/").pop()}, a shell, runner or interpreter, which would grant any command`);
    const key = JSON.stringify(prefix);
    if (seen.has(key)) refuse(`${at} repeats a prefix`);
    seen.add(key);
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ function createdCredentials(old, instance, definition, args) {
 // services) revokes the instance's credentials for a fire or a delete and throws
 // credential-revoke-failed when it can't. Null in a writer with no bus (the CLI's), which revokes
 // nothing. Row 239 (#1745): writer is the organization writer, injected only by tests.
-export function instanceSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, levels = () => null, revoke = null, writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir }) }) {
+export function instanceSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, levels = () => null, revoke = null, writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null }) }) {

  // The definitions in rolesDir and whether add and set accept each one.
  function definitions() {
@@ -168,18 +168,18 @@ const ROUTE_FIELDS = Object.freeze(["harness", "model", "thinking"]);
 // Without it, a write that adds a daily key quota refuses proxy-key-refused; no other write asks.
 export function launchSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, sessions = () => [], now = () => new Date().toISOString(), levels = () => null,
  keyLineage = () => { throw new OrganizationError("proxy-key-refused"); } }) {
-  const writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir });
+  const writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });

  // The validated business as the file stands now (row 125: the limit checks read it at each ask).
  function current(id) {
-    return validateBusinessDocument(writer.read(id).document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+    return validateBusinessDocument(writer.read(id).document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
  }

  // The file before a write, validated, for checkRoutes; null when it no longer validates, so every
  // route is checked.
  function before(id, document) {
    try {
-      return validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+      return validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
    } catch (e) {
      if (e.name === "BusinessError") return null;
      throw e;
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ export function launchSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, sessions = () => [], now

  function view(id) {
    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
-    const business = validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+    const business = validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
    if (!business.launch) throw new OrganizationError("launch-not-configured");
    const instances = Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(business.roles).map(instance => {
      const vars = resolveInstance({ business, system, instance }).vars;
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ export function launchSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, sessions = () => [], now
      if (next.roles[instance]?.definition !== entry.definition) throw new OrganizationError("organization-definition-refused");
    }
    // Check every instance's route before publishing the complete document.
-    const proposed = validateBusinessDocument(next, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+    const proposed = validateBusinessDocument(next, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
    checkRoutes({ proposed, old: before(id, old.document), levels, catalogue });
    const receipt = writer.write(id, next, { revision: args.revision, actor });
    return { ...view(id), transaction: receipt.transaction };
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ export function launchSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, sessions = () => [], now
  // doesn't set reads null; its launch refuses no-route.
  function routes(id) {
    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
-    const business = validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+    const business = validateBusinessDocument(document, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
    if (!business.launch) throw new OrganizationError("launch-not-configured");
    const harnesses = Array.isArray(business.plugins?.harness) ? [...business.plugins.harness] : [];
    const named = new Set(harnesses);
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ export function launchSettings({ dir, rolesDir, system, sessions = () => [], now
      next.roles[instance].vars = vars;
    }
    if (canonicalJson(next) === canonicalJson(old.document)) throw new OrganizationError("organization-no-change");
-    const proposed = validateBusinessDocument(next, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir });
+    const proposed = validateBusinessDocument(next, businessFilePath(id, dir), { rolesDir, dataRoot:system?.dataRoot ?? null });
    checkRoutes({ proposed, old: before(id, old.document), levels, catalogue });
    const receipt = writer.write(id, next, { revision: args.revision, actor });
    return { ...routes(id), transaction: receipt.transaction };
@@ -24,18 +24,20 @@ export function defaultRolesDir(env = process.env) {
 export function loadSeatSets({ dir = configDir(), rolesDir = defaultRolesDir() } = {}) {
  // lstat first: only nothing at the path is an absent directory. Anything else
  // there (a file, a dangling symlink, a directory) must list, or it throws.
+  // The refusal names the directory by label and the error by its code only:
+  // err.message quotes the host path (PR #1916).
  const businesses = join(dir, "businesses");
  try {
    lstatSync(businesses);
  } catch (err) {
    if (err.code === "ENOENT") return { librarySeats: new Set(), creativeSeats: new Set() };
-    throw new BusinessError(`cannot list businesses in ${dir}: ${err.message}`);
+    throw new BusinessError(`cannot list businesses in the config directory: ${err.code ?? "unreadable"}`);
  }
  let names;
  try {
    names = readdirSync(businesses).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".json"));
  } catch (err) {
-    throw new BusinessError(`cannot list businesses in ${dir}: ${err.message}`);
+    throw new BusinessError(`cannot list businesses in the config directory: ${err.code ?? "unreadable"}`);
  }
  const librarySeats = new Set();
  const creativeSeats = new Set();
@@ -228,3 +228,6 @@ export async function orgLock(ctx, id, { clear = false } = {}) {
    }
  }
 }
+
+// PL1: the organization primitive set, derived from enabled, verified manifests only.
+export { organizationPlugins as buildOrganizationRegistry } from "../../plugins/src/organization.mjs";
@@ -19,15 +19,22 @@ const encode = doc => JSON.stringify(doc, null, 2) + '\n';
 const projectPath = (root, project) => join(root, 'projects', project);
 function authorize(ctx) { if (!ctx || typeof ctx.instance !== 'string' || !/^[a-z][a-z0-9]{1,15}$/.test(ctx.instance) || ctx.instance === 'dev' || !same(ctx.principal, owner)) fail('org-forbidden', 'authenticated local development owner required'); }
 function checkId(id) { if (typeof id !== 'string' || !ID_PATTERN.test(id)) fail('org-invalid', 'invalid id'); }
-async function privateRead(file) { const fd = await fs.open(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK); try { const st = await fd.stat(); if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe file', file); return await fd.readFile('utf8'); } finally { await fd.close(); } }
+// A filesystem error names the operation, the file by label and the error code, never the
+// host path Node puts in its message (PR #1916). code, syscall and the other fields stay.
+const quieted = new WeakSet();
+function quiet(e, what) {
+  if (e && typeof e === 'object' && typeof e.syscall === 'string' && typeof e.code === 'string' && !quieted.has(e)) { e.message = `cannot ${e.syscall} ${what} (${e.code})`; quieted.add(e); }
+  return e;
+}
+async function privateRead(file, what = 'organization file') { let fd; try { fd = await fs.open(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK); } catch (e) { throw quiet(e, what); } try { const st = await fd.stat(); if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe file', file); return await fd.readFile('utf8'); } catch (e) { throw quiet(e, what); } finally { await fd.close(); } }
 async function atomic(file, content, exclusive = false) {
  const tmp = join(dirname(file), `.org-write-${randomBytes(12).toString('hex')}`);
-  try { await fs.writeFile(tmp, content, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' }); if (exclusive) await fs.link(tmp, file); else await fs.rename(tmp, file); } finally { await fs.rm(tmp, { force: true }); }
+  try { await fs.writeFile(tmp, content, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' }); if (exclusive) await fs.link(tmp, file); else await fs.rename(tmp, file); } catch (e) { throw quiet(e, 'organization file'); } finally { await fs.rm(tmp, { force: true }); }
 }
-async function ensurePrivateDir(path) { try { await fs.mkdir(path, { mode: 0o700 }); } catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw e; } const st = await fs.lstat(path); if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe directory', path); }
+async function ensurePrivateDir(path) { try { await fs.mkdir(path, { mode: 0o700 }); } catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw quiet(e, 'organization directory'); } const st = await fs.lstat(path).catch(e => { throw quiet(e, 'organization directory'); }); if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe directory', path); }
 async function receipt(root, op, org, principal, fields = {}) {
  const result = { op, org, at: new Date().toISOString(), subject: { ...principal }, ...fields };
-  const file = join(root, 'receipts.jsonl'); const fd = await fs.open(file, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_APPEND | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
+  const file = join(root, 'receipts.jsonl'); const fd = await fs.open(file, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_APPEND | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600).catch(e => { throw quiet(e, 'organization receipts'); });
  try { const st = await fd.stat(); if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe receipts', file); await fd.writeFile(JSON.stringify(result) + '\n'); } finally { await fd.close(); } return result;
 }
 async function receipts(root) {
@@ -129,11 +136,11 @@ async function readCurrentUnlocked(ctx, id, { includeArchived = false } = {}) {
  if (found.state === 'archived' && !includeArchived) fail('org-archived', 'organization is archived');
  if (found.state !== 'active' && !(includeArchived && found.state === 'archived')) fail('org-unavailable', 'organization is not active');
  const ownerFile = join(found.root, 'owner.json');
-  const principal = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(ownerFile), ownerFile, 'organization owner file'); if (!same(principal, ctx.principal)) fail('org-forbidden', 'organization owner required');
+  const principal = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(ownerFile, 'organization owner file'), ownerFile, 'organization owner file'); if (!same(principal, ctx.principal)) fail('org-forbidden', 'organization owner required');
  // From here the caller is the verified owner. A failure carries that proof so a list may
  // show this org as broken to its owner; earlier failures prove nothing and stay hidden.
  try {
-    const entry = (await readRegistry(ctx)).orgs[id]; const file = join(ctx.configDir, 'businesses', `${id}.json`); const raw = await privateRead(file);
+    const entry = (await readRegistry(ctx)).orgs[id]; const file = join(ctx.configDir, 'businesses', `${id}.json`); const raw = await privateRead(file, 'organization file');
    if (!entry.digest || entry.digest !== digest(raw)) fail('org-mismatch', 'organization document and registry disagree');
    const doc = parseJsonFileText(raw, file, 'organization file'); await checked(doc); return { ...found, revision: entry.revision, doc, principal };
  } catch (e) { if (e && typeof e === 'object') e.ownerVerified = true; throw e; }
@@ -171,13 +178,13 @@ export async function showOrg(ctx, id, opts = {}) { authorize(ctx); const { root
 export async function notificationShow(ctx, id) {
  authorize(ctx); const current = await readCurrent(ctx, id);
  for (const path of [join(current.root, 'notify'), join(current.root, 'notify', id)]) {
-    const st = await fs.lstat(path);
+    const st = await fs.lstat(path).catch(e => { throw quiet(e, 'notifier directory'); });
    if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077)) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe notifier directory');
  }
  const file = join(current.root, 'notify', id, 'notify.json');
-  const st = await fs.lstat(file);
+  const st = await fs.lstat(file).catch(e => { throw quiet(e, 'notifier configuration file'); });
  if (!st.isFile() || st.isSymbolicLink() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) fail('org-mismatch', 'unsafe notifier configuration');
-  const binding = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(file), file, 'notifier configuration file');
+  const binding = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(file, 'notifier configuration file'), file, 'notifier configuration file');
  if (!binding || Object.keys(binding).sort().join(',') !== 'binding,notifyVersion' || binding.notifyVersion !== 1 || !(binding.binding === null || typeof binding.binding === 'string' && BINDING_NAME.test(binding.binding))) fail('org-mismatch', 'invalid notifier configuration');
  const record = (await receipts(current.root)).find(r => r.op === 'org.create' && r.org === id && same(r.subject, current.principal));
  if (!record || record.notifications !== 'none') fail('org-mismatch', 'notification choice receipt unavailable');
@@ -198,7 +205,7 @@ function options({ mode, remote, acceptLocalLossRisk }) {
 }
 async function git(root, args) {
  const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH ?? '/usr/bin:/bin', HOME: '/nonexistent', GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM: '1', GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: '/dev/null', GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0', LC_ALL: 'C' };
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const p = spawn('git', ['-c', 'user.name=Mosaic Local', '-c', '[email protected]', '-c', 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null', '-C', root, ...args], { env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); let out = '', err = ''; p.stdout.on('data', d => out += d); p.stderr.on('data', d => err += d); p.on('error', reject); p.on('close', code => code === 0 ? resolve(out.trim()) : reject(new OrgError('org-git', `git failed: ${err.trim()}`))); });
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const p = spawn('git', ['-c', 'user.name=Mosaic Local', '-c', '[email protected]', '-c', 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null', '-C', root, ...args], { env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); let out = '', err = ''; p.stdout.on('data', d => out += d); p.stderr.on('data', d => err += d); p.on('error', reject); p.on('close', code => code === 0 ? resolve(out.trim()) : reject(new OrgError('org-git', `git ${args[0]} failed (exit ${code})`))); });
 }
 async function initGit(root) { await fs.mkdir(root, { mode: 0o700 }); await git(root, ['init', '--quiet', '--template=']); await git(root, ['commit', '--quiet', '--allow-empty', '-m', 'Genesis']); return git(root, ['rev-parse', 'HEAD']); }
 async function setup(ctx, id, project, opts) {
@@ -273,6 +280,8 @@ export async function restoreOrg(ctx, id, opts = {}) { return lifecycleChange(ct

 // Deletion keeps a durable marker in the registry and a receipt beside the
 // moved data. It never opens the contents of organization secret trees.
+// The deletion folder deleteOrg generates: `<id>-<ISO time with : and . as ->-<8 hex>`.
+const deletionFolderPattern = (id) => new RegExp(`^${id.replace(/[.]/g, '\\.')}-\\d{4}-\\d{2}-\\d{2}T\\d{2}-\\d{2}-\\d{2}-\\d{3}Z-[0-9a-f]{8}$`);
 async function deleteInspect(path, { secret = false } = {}) {
  let count = 0;
  async function visit(p) {
@@ -328,7 +337,7 @@ export async function deleteOrg(ctx, id, { confirm, ifRevision, busStop } = {})
    try {
      await deleteSafeRoot(ctx.dataRoot);
      await ensurePrivateDir(deleted); await ensurePrivateDir(destination);
-      try { result = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(receiptFile), receiptFile, 'deletion receipt file'); }
+      try { result = parseJsonFileText(await privateRead(receiptFile, 'deletion receipt file'), receiptFile, 'deletion receipt file'); }
      catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') throw e; result = { op: 'org.delete', org: id, actor: deletion.actor, time: deletion.time, revision: deletion.revision, destination, bus: null, moves: [], secrets: [], note: 'Purging deleted data and remote-side revocation are out of scope.' }; await atomic(receiptFile, encode(result), true); }
      if (result.org !== id || result.destination !== destination || result.revision !== deletion.revision || !Array.isArray(result.moves) || !Array.isArray(result.secrets)) fail('org-mismatch', 'invalid deletion receipt');
      if (!result.bus) {
@@ -380,9 +389,12 @@ export async function deleteOrg(ctx, id, { confirm, ifRevision, busStop } = {})
      });
      registryRemoved = true; result.registry = 'removed'; await atomic(receiptFile, encode(result)); return result;
    } catch (e) {
-      e.deleteStep = phase; if (result) e.deleteReceipt = result;
-      if (registryRemoved) { e.message += `; registry removal completed but the receipt could not be finalized at ${receiptFile}`; throw e; }
-      e.message += `; deletion remains in progress. Inspect ${destination}/receipt.json and rerun mosaic org delete ${id} --confirm ${id}`;
+      e.deleteStep = phase; if (result) e.deleteReceipt = result; quiet(e, `a file in the deletion ${phase} step`);
+      // Name the receipt under the data root, never by host path (PR #1916). The folder comes
+      // from the registry, so it is named only when it has the shape this function generates.
+      const at = deletionFolderPattern(id).test(deletion.folder) ? `deleted/${deletion.folder}/receipt.json under the data root` : 'the deletion receipt under the data root';
+      if (registryRemoved) { e.message += `; registry removal completed but the receipt could not be finalized at ${at}`; throw e; }
+      e.message += `; deletion remains in progress. Inspect ${at} and rerun mosaic org delete ${id} --confirm ${id}`;
      throw e;
    }
  });
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { loadRole } from "./role.mjs";
 import { END_PROTECTED } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { checkPlugins, checkUsageSettings } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
 import { hasModule } from "../../plugins/src/loader.mjs";
+import { readPluginLock } from "../../plugins/src/pinned.mjs";
 import { checkMapping } from "../../library/src/mapping.mjs";
 import { forkProblem, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl, HOST_SERVICE, CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { checkAppearance } from "./appearance.mjs";
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ function checkRetired(retired, roles, file) {

 // Validate a parsed business document read from `file`. `rolesDir` is where
 // role definitions live. Returns a frozen business with its definitions.
-export function validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
+export function validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot = null }) {
  requireObject(document, "business file");
  rejectUnknownKeys(document, TOP_KEYS, "business file");
  if (document.businessVersion !== 1) refuse(`business file "businessVersion" must be 1 (${file})`);
@@ -333,8 +334,13 @@ export function validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
  // here; whether each module loads is the loader's check, at load time.
  const plugins = document.plugins === undefined ? {}
    : structuredClone(checkPlugins(document.plugins, `${file} plugins`, { fail: (_code, message) => refuse(message) }));
+  let installedNames = new Set();
+  if (dataRoot !== null && plugins["system-type"]?.some(id=>!hasModule("system-type",id))) {
+    try { installedNames = new Set(Object.keys(readPluginLock(dataRoot).plugins)); }
+    catch { installedNames = null; } // the loader reports an unreadable lock; core still loads
+  }
  for (const id of plugins["system-type"] ?? []) {
-    if (!hasModule("system-type", id)) refuse(`${file} plugins.system-type names unknown module ${id}`);
+    if (!hasModule("system-type", id) && installedNames !== null && !installedNames.has(id)) refuse(`${file} plugins.system-type names unknown module ${id}`);
  }
  const usage = document.usage === undefined ? undefined : checkUsageSettings(document.usage);
  const appearance = checkAppearance(document.appearance, `${file} appearance`);
@@ -349,14 +355,14 @@ export function validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
 // Load businesses/<id>.json from the config directory. The file holds
 // authority, so it must belong to this user and not be writable by group
 // or other.
-export function loadOrganization(id, { dir = configDir(), rolesDir }) {
+export function loadOrganization(id, { dir = configDir(), rolesDir, dataRoot = null }) {
  if (!rolesDir) throw new Error("loadBusiness needs rolesDir");
  const file = organizationFilePath(id, dir);
-  const document = readJsonFile(file, "business file", (stat) => {
+  const document = readJsonFile(file, `business file ${id}.json`, (stat) => {
    if (stat.uid !== process.getuid()) refuse(`business file must belong to uid ${process.getuid()}: ${file}`);
    if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) refuse(`business file must not be writable by group or other (mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}): ${file}`);
  });
-  return validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir });
+  return validateOrganizationDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
 }

 // The old names (rename design r2, module map): the same functions, not copies.
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ export function setReplyLimits(writer, id, args, actor) {
  return writer.write(id, { ...document, replyLimits }, { revision: args.revision, actor });
 }

-export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
+export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, dataRoot = null, barrier = () => {} }) {
  const evidence = join(dir, "businesses", ".history");
  const logFile = id => join(evidence, id, "changes.jsonl");
  // Keep the writer's established busy refusal when the shared registry lock
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
    const file = businessFilePath(id, dir);
    const bytes = regular(file);
    const document = parseJsonFileText(bytes, file, "organization file");
-    validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir });
+    validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
    return { document, revision: sha256(bytes) };
  }

@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
        modelQuotaFence(old, document, actor);
        usageFence(old, document, actor);
        systemTypesFence(old, document, actor);
-        validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir });
+        validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
        const bytes = JSON.stringify(document, null, 2) + "\n";
        // Check and log exactly what lands on disk, for every setter: a value JSON
        // can't carry (a Date, a Map) serializes as something else (row 131, sage-0314).
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
        modelQuotaFence(old, written, actor);
        usageFence(old, written, actor);
        systemTypesFence(old, written, actor);
-        validateBusinessDocument(written, file, { rolesDir });
+        validateBusinessDocument(written, file, { rolesDir, dataRoot });
        if (beforeWrite) {
          beforeWrite();
          revoked = true;
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@
 // Writes go through the organization writer, which logs old and new names
 // like a limit change. A write is a patch per kind (see set()): kinds it doesn't name are kept. A refused write throws a code and logs nothing.
 import { organizationWriter, OrganizationError } from "./organization.mjs";
+import { verifiedPlugin } from "../../plugins/src/pinned.mjs";
+import { hasModule } from "../../plugins/src/loader.mjs";
 import { isPlainObject } from "./util.mjs";
 import { KINDS, PluginError, checkPlugins, checkUsageSettings } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";

 // `exists(kind, name)`, when given, refuses a name no module answers to (the host passes the
 // loader's hasModule). Without it the setter checks only the shape, as before.
-export function pluginSettings({ dir, rolesDir, exists = null }) {
-  const writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir });
+export function pluginSettings({ dir, rolesDir, exists = null, dataRoot = null }) {
+  const writer = organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, dataRoot });

  function read(id) {
    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
@@ -51,6 +53,10 @@ export function pluginSettings({ dir, rolesDir, exists = null }) {
    if (exists) {
      for (const [kind, setting] of Object.entries(sets)) {
        for (const name of Array.isArray(setting) ? setting : [setting]) {
+          if (dataRoot !== null && !hasModule(kind,name)) {
+            try { verifiedPlugin(dataRoot,name,kind); }
+            catch(e) { throw new OrganizationError(e.code === "missing-lock" ? "unknown-plugin" : "invalid-plugins", "installed plugin verification refused"); }
+          }
          if (!exists(kind, name)) throw new OrganizationError("unknown-plugin", `no ${kind} module named ${name} in this tree`);
        }
      }
@@ -10,20 +10,23 @@ export function projectFilePath(root) {
  return join(root, ".mosaic", "project.json");
 }

+// Refusals name the project file by label: its path is the project root from
+// the business file, a config value, so no refusal quotes it (PR #1916). An
+// instance name is quoted only after requireId passed it.
 export function validateProjectDocument(document, file) {
  requireObject(document, "project file");
  rejectUnknownKeys(document, ["projectVersion", "id", "vars", "roles"], "project file");
-  if (document.projectVersion !== 1) refuse(`project file "projectVersion" must be 1 (${file})`);
+  if (document.projectVersion !== 1) refuse(`project file "projectVersion" must be 1`);
  requireId(document.id, "project id");
-  const vars = checkVars(document.vars ?? {}, "project", `${file} vars`);
+  const vars = checkVars(document.vars ?? {}, "project", "project file vars");
  const roles = {};
  if (document.roles !== undefined) {
-    requireObject(document.roles, `${file} roles`);
+    requireObject(document.roles, "project file roles");
    for (const [instance, entry] of Object.entries(document.roles)) {
-      requireId(instance, `${file} role instance`);
-      requireObject(entry, `${file} roles.${instance}`);
-      rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["vars"], `${file} roles.${instance}`);
-      roles[instance] = { vars: checkVars(entry.vars ?? {}, "project", `${file} roles.${instance}.vars`) };
+      requireId(instance, "project file role instance");
+      requireObject(entry, `project file roles.${instance}`);
+      rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["vars"], `project file roles.${instance}`);
+      roles[instance] = { vars: checkVars(entry.vars ?? {}, "project", `project file roles.${instance}.vars`) };
    }
  }
  return deepFreeze({ projectVersion: 1, id: document.id, file, vars, roles });
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 // the record a launcher or the broker uses. Plain values: the most specific
 // layer wins. Limits: every layer narrows, nothing widens.

+import { organizationPlugins, assertPluginCapabilities } from "../../plugins/src/organization.mjs";
 import { ownRails } from "./rails.mjs";
 import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { ACTIONS, NETWORKS, isHostKind } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
@@ -31,11 +32,18 @@ function narrowerNetwork(a, b) {
 //   business  loadBusiness(...) output
 //   project   loadProject(...) output, or null
 //   instance  a role instance the business file declares
-export function resolveInstance({ system, business, project = null, instance }) {
+export function resolveInstance({ system, business, project = null, instance, enforcePlugins = false, pluginRoot = system?.dataRoot ?? null }) {
  const entry = Object.hasOwn(business.roles, instance) ? business.roles[instance] : null;
  if (!entry) refuse(`business ${business.id} declares no role instance ${JSON.stringify(instance)}`);
  const definition = business.definitions[entry.definition];

+  const pluginView = organizationPlugins(pluginRoot,business.plugins);
+  let disabledPlugin = null;
+  try { assertPluginCapabilities(definition,pluginView); } catch(e) {
+    if(enforcePlugins)throw e;
+    disabledPlugin=e.plugin;
+  }
+  const pluginTools = pluginView.manifests.flatMap(m=>m.tools).filter(t=>definition.tools.includes(t.name));
  const layers = [
    { layer: "system", source: "system", vars: system },
    { layer: "business", source: `business:${business.id}`, vars: business.vars },
@@ -79,6 +87,9 @@ export function resolveInstance({ system, business, project = null, instance })
  }

  const resolved = {
+    ...(pluginTools.length ? {pluginTools} : {}),
+    ...(pluginView.registry.plugins.length ? {pluginActions:pluginView.registry.plugins.flatMap(p=>p.actions)} : {}),
+    ...(disabledPlugin ? {disabledPlugin} : {}),
    business: business.id,
    project: projectId,
    instance,
@@ -112,7 +123,7 @@ export function resolveInstance({ system, business, project = null, instance })
 // Classify one action for a resolved instance: "within", "cross" or
 // "gated". An action outside the vocabulary refuses.
 export function classify(resolved, action) {
-  if (!ACTIONS.includes(action)) refuse(`unknown action: ${JSON.stringify(action)}`);
+  if (!ACTIONS.includes(action) && !resolved.pluginActions?.includes(action)) refuse(`unknown action: ${JSON.stringify(action)}`);
  if (resolved.limits.authority.withinRole.includes(action)) return "within";
  if (resolved.limits.authority.crossRole.includes(action)) return "cross";
  return "gated";
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import {
  requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireId, requireString, requireDistinctList, readJsonFile, deepFreeze,
 } from "./util.mjs";

+import { pluginName } from "../../plugins/src/organization.mjs";
+
 const CONTRACT_NAME = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,60}\.md$/;
 const V1_KEYS = ["roleVersion", "name", "tools", "network"];
 const V2_REQUIRED = ["roleVersion", "name", "title", "contract", "tools", "network", "authority", "credentials"];
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ const SKILL_NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/;
 function checkTools(tools) {
  if (!Array.isArray(tools) || tools.length === 0) refuse('role "tools" must be a non-empty array of tool names');
  return requireDistinctList(tools, "role tools", (tool) => {
-    if (!TOOLS.includes(tool)) refuse(`unsupported tool (supported: ${TOOLS.join(", ")})`);
+    if (!TOOLS.includes(tool) && !pluginName(tool)) refuse(`unsupported tool (supported: ${TOOLS.join(", ")})`);
  });
 }

@@ -39,12 +41,12 @@ function checkAuthority(authority) {
  const lists = {};
  for (const key of ["withinRole", "crossRole"]) {
    lists[key] = requireDistinctList(authority[key], `role authority.${key}`, (action) => {
-      if (!ACTIONS.includes(action)) refuse(`unknown action in authority.${key}; expected an action from the role vocabulary`);
-      if (GATED_ONLY.includes(action)) refuse(`authority.${key} lists an action which is always gated`);
+      if (!ACTIONS.includes(action) && !pluginName(action)) refuse(`unknown action in authority.${key}; expected an action from the role vocabulary`);
+      if (GATED_ONLY.includes(action)) refuse(`authority.${key} lists ${action}, which is always gated`);
    });
  }
  const both = lists.withinRole.filter((a) => lists.crossRole.includes(a));
-  if (both.length > 0) refuse(`action listed as both withinRole and crossRole`);
+  if (both.length > 0) refuse(`action listed as both withinRole and crossRole: ${both.join(", ")}`);
  return lists;
 }

@@ -87,13 +89,13 @@ function checkHireable(hireable, file) {
  const dir = dirname(file);
  return requireDistinctList(hireable, "role hireable", (name) => {
    requireId(name, "role hireable entry");
-    if (CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(name)) refuse(`hireable names a creative definition only the human adds`);
+    if (CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(name)) refuse(`hireable names ${name}, a creative definition only the human adds`);
    const path = join(dir, `${name}.json`);
    if (!existsSync(path)) refuse(`hireable names a definition which has no role file`);
-    const named = validateRoleDocument(readJsonFile(path, "role file"), path, { hireable: false });
+    const named = validateRoleDocument(readJsonFile(path, `role file ${name}.json`), path, { hireable: false });
    if (named.roleVersion !== 2) refuse(`hireable names a definition which is role version 1`);
    const outside = unhireableAction(named);
-    if (outside !== null) refuse(`hireable names a definition which holds an action outside the hireable ceiling`);
+    if (outside !== null) refuse(`hireable names ${name}, which holds ${outside} outside the hireable ceiling`);
  });
 }

@@ -106,7 +108,7 @@ function checkGiteaScopes(scopes) {
  }, { nonEmpty: true });
  const categories = list.map((s) => s.split(":")[1]);
  const twice = categories.filter((c, i) => categories.indexOf(c) !== i);
-  if (twice.length > 0) refuse(`gitea scopes name a category twice; a token holds one level per category`);
+  if (twice.length > 0) refuse(`gitea scopes name ${twice[0]} twice; a token holds one level per category`);
  return list;
 }

@@ -132,13 +134,15 @@ function checkCredentials(credentials) {
    // Row 210 (#1707, design D1): "host" takes no scopes; the business file names the hosts.
    const host = entry.service === HOST_SERVICE;
    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, host ? ["service"] : ["service", "scopes"], `role credentials[${i}]`);
-    if (!host && !SERVICES.includes(entry.service)) {
+    if (!host && !SERVICES.includes(entry.service) && !pluginName(entry.service)) {
      refuse(`role credentials[${i}].service must be one of: ${[...SERVICES, HOST_SERVICE].join(", ")}`);
    }
-    if (seen.has(entry.service)) refuse(`role credentials name a service twice`);
+    if (seen.has(entry.service)) refuse(`role credentials name ${entry.service} twice`);
    seen.add(entry.service);
    if (host) return { service: HOST_SERVICE };
-    const scopes = entry.service === "gitea" ? checkGiteaScopes(entry.scopes) : checkVikunjaScopes(entry.scopes);
+    const scopes = pluginName(entry.service) ? requireDistinctList(entry.scopes, "plugin credential scopes", s => {
+      if (typeof s !== "string" || !/^[a-z][a-z0-9_.:-]{0,63}$/.test(s)) refuse("invalid plugin credential scope");
+    }, {nonEmpty:true}) : entry.service === "gitea" ? checkGiteaScopes(entry.scopes) : checkVikunjaScopes(entry.scopes);
    return { service: entry.service, scopes };
  });
 }
@@ -167,12 +171,12 @@ function checkContract(contract, file) {
 // docs: its authority is withinRole CREATIVE_ACTIONS at most, and its one credential is gitea.
 function checkCreative(role) {
  const wider = role.tools.filter((tool) => !CREATIVE_TOOLS.includes(tool));
-  if (wider.length > 0) refuse(`creative role ${role.name} may not name tools outside the allowed set (allowed: ${CREATIVE_TOOLS.join(", ")})`);
+  if (wider.length > 0) refuse(`creative role ${role.name} may not name tools ${wider.join(", ")} (allowed: ${CREATIVE_TOOLS.join(", ")})`);
  if (role.authority.crossRole.length > 0 || role.authority.withinRole.some((a) => !CREATIVE_ACTIONS.includes(a))) {
    refuse(`creative role ${role.name} may hold only withinRole ${CREATIVE_ACTIONS.join(" and ")}`);
  }
  const services = role.credentials.map((c) => c.service).filter((service) => service !== CREATIVE_SERVICE);
-  if (services.length > 0) refuse(`creative role ${role.name} may hold only the ${CREATIVE_SERVICE} credential`);
+  if (services.length > 0) refuse(`creative role ${role.name} may hold only the ${CREATIVE_SERVICE} credential (got ${services.join(", ")})`);
  if (role.messaging === null) refuse(`creative role ${role.name} requires "messaging"`);
  for (const key of ["sendTo", "receiveFrom"]) {
    if (role.messaging[key].some((entry) => entry !== "human")) {
@@ -226,7 +230,7 @@ export function validateRoleDocument(document, file, options = {}) {
 }

 export function loadRoleFile(file) {
-  return validateRoleDocument(readJsonFile(file, "role file"), file);
+  return validateRoleDocument(readJsonFile(file, /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}\.json$/.test(basename(file)) ? `role file ${basename(file)}` : "role file"), file);
 }

 export function loadRole(rolesDir, name) {
@@ -60,11 +60,14 @@ export function requireDate(value, where) {

 // Parser diagnostics can quote file bytes. Keep the existing SyntaxError refusal,
 // but never attach the parser's message or cause to an error that callers can log.
+// The message names the file by its `what` label only: a refusal never quotes a
+// host path (PR #1916). `file` stays in the signature so callers don't change;
+// it is not used.
 export function parseJsonFileText(text, file, what = "file") {
  try {
    return JSON.parse(text);
  } catch {
-    throw new SyntaxError(`${what} is not valid JSON (${file})`);
+    throw new SyntaxError(`${what} is not valid JSON`);
  }
 }

@@ -72,19 +75,21 @@ export function parseJsonFileText(text, file, what = "file") {
 // Missing or not a regular file is 4; unparseable is 2. One descriptor,
 // opened without following a link, serves every check and the read.
 // `checkStat` sees that descriptor's stat before the read, so the file
-// can't be swapped between the check and the read.
+// can't be swapped between the check and the read. Every refusal names the
+// file by `what` and never by path; a caller whose label alone can't tell
+// two files apart adds a name that already passed a strict pattern.
 export function readJsonFile(file, what, checkStat) {
  let fd;
  try {
    fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
  } catch (error) {
-    if (error.code === "ENOENT") refuse(`${what} not found: ${file}`, 4);
-    refuse(`${what} must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file: ${file}`, 4);
+    if (error.code === "ENOENT") refuse(`${what} not found`, 4);
+    refuse(`${what} must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file`, 4);
  }
  let text;
  try {
    const stat = fstatSync(fd);
-    if (!stat.isFile()) refuse(`${what} must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file: ${file}`, 4);
+    if (!stat.isFile()) refuse(`${what} must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file`, 4);
    checkStat?.(stat);
    text = readFileSync(fd, "utf8");
  } finally {
@@ -93,7 +98,7 @@ export function readJsonFile(file, what, checkStat) {
  try {
    return parseJsonFileText(text, file, what);
  } catch {
-    refuse(`${what} is not valid JSON (${file})`);
+    refuse(`${what} is not valid JSON`);
  }
 }

@@ -374,3 +374,12 @@ export function grantInScope(scope, body) {
  }
  return false;
 }
+
+// PL1: a capability's plugin namespace, without loading files or code. Kept pure because the
+// runner's bus client imports the broker error type inside the existing sandbox binds.
+export function pluginName(capability) {
+  const core = [...ACTIONS,...TOOLS,...SERVICES,HOST_SERVICE];
+  if(typeof capability!=="string" || core.includes(capability) || !/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*\.[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*(?:\.[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*)*$/.test(capability))return null;
+  const name=capability.split(".")[0];
+  return [...core,...NETWORKS].some(n=>n.split(".")[0]===name) ? null : name;
+}
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ test("users: unknown keys and the id rule", () => {
 });

 test("users: human, tester and any business's human are refused", () => {
-  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[0].id = "human"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[0\]\.id must not be a bus principal/);
-  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[1].id = "tester"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[1\]\.id must not be a bus principal/);
+  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[0].id = "human"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[0\]\.id must not be "human", a bus principal/);
+  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[1].id = "tester"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[1\]\.id must not be "tester", a bus principal/);
  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[0].id = "melanie"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[0\]\.id must not be a business's human/);
  // The human of a business the grant doesn't name is refused too.
  refuses(() => checkAccess(mutated((d) => { d.users[1].id = "jason"; d.grants = []; }), context()), /users\[1\]\.id must not be a business's human/);
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, existsSync, readdirSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, existsSync, readdirSync, rmSync, statSync, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { checkAccounts, loadAccounts, accountsRepairs, withAccounts, withAccountsLock, withAccountsLocked } from '../src/accounts.mjs';
+import { checkAccounts, loadAccounts, accountsRepairs, assertAccountsOwner, withAccounts, withAccountsLock, withAccountsLocked } from '../src/accounts.mjs';
 import { templateRender } from '../src/org-service.mjs';
 import { loadBusiness } from '../src/organization-config.mjs';
 import { REPO_ROLES } from './helpers.mjs';
@@ -178,3 +178,75 @@ test('review P3-6: a real business file and accounts file load with the same hum
 const s = setup(t), doc = await templateRender('acme'); doc.human = OP; mkdirSync(join(s.configDir, 'businesses')); writeFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'businesses', 'acme.json'), JSON.stringify(doc), { mode: 0o600 });
 assert.equal(loadBusiness('acme', { dir: s.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }).human, OP); assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).users[0].id, OP);
 });
+
+// org-acct-anchor (#1873, A2 review P2-1): every ancestor of the config directory must belong to root
+// or this uid, and be writable by others only with the sticky bit. Otherwise another user could rename
+// the directory away and put their own accounts.json in its place. No refusal quotes the path.
+const SECRETISH = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+function nested(t) {
+  const top = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'a-')); t.after(() => { chmodSync(top, 0o700); rmSync(top, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+  const parent = join(top, SECRETISH), configDir = join(parent, 'cfg'); mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); chmodSync(parent, 0o700);
+  const accountsFile = join(configDir, 'accounts.json'); writeFileSync(accountsFile, JSON.stringify(document()), { mode: 0o600 });
+  return { top, parent, configDir, instance: 'test', ...context, file: accountsFile };
+}
+const unsafe = rule => e => e.code === 'accounts-unsafe' && rule.test(e.message) && !e.message.includes(SECRETISH) && !e.message.includes('/');
+const ANCESTOR = /ancestor must belong to root or uid \d+ and not be writable by others without the sticky bit/;
+
+test('org-acct-anchor: a 0777 ancestor refuses load, init and the lock; 1777 passes', async t => {
+  const s = nested(t), initDir = join(s.parent, 'new'); mkdirSync(initDir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const init = { ...s, configDir: initDir, file: join(initDir, 'accounts.json') };
+  for (const dir of [s.parent, s.top]) {
+    chmodSync(dir, 0o777);
+    try {
+      assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s), unsafe(ANCESTOR));
+      await assert.rejects(withAccounts(init, { revision: 0, verb: 'init', init: true }, d => d.users.push(user())), unsafe(ANCESTOR));
+      let entered = false;
+      await assert.rejects(withAccountsLock(s, async () => { entered = true; }), unsafe(ANCESTOR));
+      assert.equal(entered, false);
+      for (const c of [s, init]) for (const name of ['accounts.lock', 'accounts-receipts.jsonl']) assert.equal(existsSync(join(c.configDir, name)), false, name);
+      assert.equal(existsSync(init.file), false);
+      chmodSync(dir, 0o1777);
+      assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).revision, 1);
+      await withAccountsLock(s, async () => { entered = true; }); assert.equal(entered, true);
+      await withAccounts(init, { revision: 0, verb: 'init', init: true }, d => d.users.push(user()));
+      assert.equal(loadAccounts(init.file, init).revision, 1);
+      rmSync(init.file); rmSync(join(init.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'));
+    } finally { chmodSync(dir, 0o700); }
+  }
+  // A group-writable ancestor without the sticky bit refuses too.
+  chmodSync(s.parent, 0o770);
+  try { assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s), unsafe(ANCESTOR)); } finally { chmodSync(s.parent, 0o700); }
+});
+
+test('org-acct-anchor: an ancestor owned by another uid refuses; root-owned ancestors pass', t => {
+  const s = nested(t), other = process.geteuid() + 1;
+  // Simulated as the agent-levels tests do: as another uid, this uid's directories are foreign.
+  assert.throws(() => assertAccountsOwner(s.configDir, { uid: other }), unsafe(new RegExp(`ancestor must belong to root or uid ${other} `)));
+  assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s, { uid: other }), unsafe(ANCESTOR));
+  // The real ancestors above the scratch root include root-owned ones (at least /), which pass.
+  assert.equal(lstatSync('/').uid, 0);
+  assertAccountsOwner(s.configDir);
+  assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).revision, 1);
+});
+
+test('org-acct-anchor: a symlinked ancestor refuses, and leaf refusals name no path', async t => {
+  const s = nested(t), link = join(s.top, 'link'); symlinkSync(s.parent, link);
+  const via = { ...s, configDir: join(link, 'cfg'), file: join(link, 'cfg', 'accounts.json') };
+  assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(via.file, via), unsafe(/symbolic link or non-directory/));
+  await assert.rejects(withAccountsLock(via, async () => {}), unsafe(/symbolic link or non-directory/));
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts.lock')), false);
+  // The leaf checks are unchanged, but no longer quote the path.
+  const other = process.geteuid() + 1;
+  for (const mode of [0o720, 0o702]) {
+    chmodSync(s.configDir, mode);
+    try { assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s), unsafe(/^config directory must not be writable by group or other$/)); } finally { chmodSync(s.configDir, 0o700); }
+  }
+  // As another uid the ancestors refuse first; the leaf's uid rule is the same no-path form (source check below).
+  assert.throws(() => assertAccountsOwner(s.configDir, { uid: process.geteuid() + 1 }), e => !e.message.includes(SECRETISH) && !e.message.includes('/'));
+  const source = readFileSync(new URL('../src/config-dir-trust.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8') + readFileSync(new URL('../src/accounts.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.match(source, /`config directory must belong to uid \$\{uid\}`/);
+  assert.match(source, /`accounts file must belong to uid \$\{uid\}`/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(source, /must belong to uid \$\{uid\}: \$\{/);
+  assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(join(s.configDir, 'missing', 'accounts.json'), s), unsafe(/^config directory is missing$/));
+  assert.throws(() => assertAccountsOwner(`${s.configDir}/../cfg`), unsafe(/absolute normalized/));
+});
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ test("row 325: the old mosaic-stack project key refuses against those same proje
  const r = x.validate();
  assert.equal(r.status, 2, r.stdout + r.stderr);
  assert.equal(r.stdout, "");
-  assert.match(r.stderr, /has id that does not match the declared project key/);
-  assert.ok(r.stderr.includes(x.projectFile));
+  assert.match(r.stderr, /project file of project mosaic-stack has id that does not match the declared project key/);
+  // The refusal names the declared key, never the project root (PR #1916).
+  assert.ok(!r.stderr.includes(x.projectFile), r.stderr);
  assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /no project file/);
 });
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { test } from "node:test";
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { chmodSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { projectFilePath } from "../src/index.mjs";
 import { businessDoc, REPO, rolesCopy, systemConfig, tmp, tokenFile, writeJson } from "./helpers.mjs";
@@ -87,11 +87,24 @@ test("validate: project files", () => {
  assert.equal(run(s, "validate", "acme").code, 2);
 });

+// PR #1916 (org-redact5): the project root is a config value, so a mismatched
+// project file is named by its checked project key, never by path.
+test("validate: a project file with another id names the project key, not the project root", () => {
+  const sentinel = "sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234";
+  const s = setup((doc, root) => { doc.projects.stack.root = join(root, sentinel, "project"); mkdirSync(doc.projects.stack.root, { recursive: true }); });
+  writeJson(projectFilePath(s.doc.projects.stack.root), { projectVersion: 1, id: "other" });
+  const r = run(s, "validate", "acme");
+  assert.equal(r.code, 2);
+  assert.match(r.err, /project file of project stack has id that does not match the declared project key/);
+  assert.ok(!r.err.includes(sentinel), r.err);
+  assert.ok(!r.err.includes(s.doc.projects.stack.root), r.err);
+});
+
 test("validate: missing files and a broken system config", () => {
  const s = setup();
  const missing = run(s, "validate", "nobody");
  assert.equal(missing.code, 4);
-  assert.match(missing.err, /business file not found/);
+  assert.match(missing.err, /business file nobody\.json not found/);
  assert.equal(run(s, "validate", "Bad!").code, 2);

  const noConfig = { ...s, env: { ...s.env, MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(s.root, "absent", "config.json") } };
@@ -17,42 +17,46 @@ import { createOrg, deleteOrg, notificationShow, showOrg, templateRender } from

 const secret = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
 const malformed = secret;
+// PR #1916 redaction (org-redact5): the sentinel is also a path component, so a
+// refusal that quoted the host path would carry it.
 function fixture(t) {
-  const root = tmp();
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const top = tmp();
+  t.after(() => rmSync(top, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const root = join(top, secret);
+  mkdirSync(root, { mode: 0o700 });
  const ctx = { configDir: join(root, 'config'), dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), instance: 'test',
    principal: { provider: 'local-dev', iss: 'local-dev', sub: 'local-dev-owner' } };
  for (const dir of [ctx.configDir, ctx.dataRoot]) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
  return ctx;
 }
-function safe(file, { name = 'SyntaxError', code, exitCode, prefix } = {}) {
+// The refusal names the file by its label and never by path.
+function safe(file, { name = 'SyntaxError', code, exitCode, prefix, label, suffix = '' } = {}) {
  return error => {
    assert.equal(error.name, name);
    assert.equal(error.code, code);
    assert.equal(error.exitCode, exitCode);
-    assert.ok(error.message.includes(file), error.message);
-    assert.match(error.message, /not valid JSON/);
+    assert.ok(!error.message.includes(file), error.message);
+    assert.equal(error.message, `${prefix ?? ''}${label} is not valid JSON${suffix}`);
    assert.doesNotMatch(error.message, /sk-test|private|broken|Unexpected|position|line \d/);
    assert.ok(!error.stack.includes(secret));
    assert.equal(error.cause, undefined);
-    if (prefix) assert.ok(error.message.startsWith(prefix));
    return true;
  };
 }

-for (const [label, load, relative] of [
-  ['shared reader', file => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), 'config.json'],
-  ['organization loader', (_file, ctx) => loadBusiness('alpha', { dir: ctx.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), 'businesses/alpha.json'],
-  ['legacy business loader', (_file, ctx) => legacyLoadBusiness('alpha', { dir: ctx.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), 'businesses/alpha.json'],
-  ['project loader', (_file, ctx) => loadProject(ctx.configDir), '.mosaic/project.json'],
+for (const [label, load, relative, labelText] of [
+  ['shared reader', file => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), 'config.json', 'config file'],
+  ['organization loader', (_file, ctx) => loadBusiness('alpha', { dir: ctx.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), 'businesses/alpha.json', 'business file alpha.json'],
+  ['legacy business loader', (_file, ctx) => legacyLoadBusiness('alpha', { dir: ctx.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), 'businesses/alpha.json', 'business file alpha.json'],
+  ['project loader', (_file, ctx) => loadProject(ctx.configDir), '.mosaic/project.json', 'project file'],
 ]) test(`${label} names malformed JSON's file without quoting bytes`, t => {
  const ctx = fixture(t), file = writeJson(join(ctx.configDir, relative), malformed);
-  assert.throws(() => load(file, ctx), safe(file, { name: 'BusinessError', exitCode: 2 }));
+  assert.throws(() => load(file, ctx), safe(file, { name: 'BusinessError', exitCode: 2, label: labelText }));
 });

 test('root agents keep their existing file-only refusal', t => {
  const ctx = fixture(t); writeJson(join(ctx.configDir, 'agents.json'), malformed);
-  assert.throws(() => loadRootAgents(ctx.configDir, { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), safe('agents.json', { name: 'BusinessError', exitCode: 2 }));
+  assert.throws(() => loadRootAgents(ctx.configDir, { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), safe(join(ctx.configDir, 'agents.json'), { name: 'BusinessError', exitCode: 2, label: 'root agent file', suffix: ' (agents.json)' }));
 });

 for (const operation of ['read', 'write', 'recover', 'findAddition']) test(`organization writer ${operation} does not quote malformed file bytes`, async t => {
@@ -74,13 +78,13 @@ for (const operation of ['read', 'write', 'recover', 'findAddition']) test(`orga
  const invoke = () => operation === 'write'
    ? writer.write('alpha', current.document, { revision: current.revision, actor: ctx.principal.sub })
    : writer[operation]('alpha', {});
-  assert.throws(invoke, safe(file));
+  assert.throws(invoke, safe(file, { label: receipt ? 'organization receipt file' : 'organization file' }));
 });

 for (const operation of ['async', 'sync']) test(`${operation} registry read names the file without parser bytes`, async t => {
  const ctx = fixture(t), file = writeJson(join(ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.json'), malformed);
-  if (operation === 'async') await assert.rejects(readRegistry(ctx), safe(file, { name: 'OrgError', code: 'org-mismatch', prefix: 'invalid registry: ' }));
-  else assert.throws(() => withRegistryWriter(ctx.configDir, () => assert.fail('must refuse')), safe(file));
+  if (operation === 'async') await assert.rejects(readRegistry(ctx), safe(file, { name: 'OrgError', code: 'org-mismatch', prefix: 'invalid registry: ', label: 'metadata file' }));
+  else assert.throws(() => withRegistryWriter(ctx.configDir, () => assert.fail('must refuse')), safe(file, { label: 'registry file' }));
 });

 for (const kind of ['owner', 'organization', 'notifier', 'deletion receipt']) test(`service ${kind} refuses malformed JSON without file bytes`, async t => {
@@ -107,9 +111,11 @@ for (const kind of ['owner', 'organization', 'notifier', 'deletion receipt']) te
    registry.orgs.alpha.digest = createHash('sha256').update(malformed).digest('hex');
    writeJson(registryFile, registry);
  }
-  if (kind === 'notifier') await assert.rejects(notificationShow(ctx, 'alpha'), safe(file));
-  else if (kind === 'deletion receipt') await assert.rejects(deleteOrg(ctx, 'alpha', { confirm: 'alpha', ifRevision: 1, busStop: async () => assert.fail('must refuse first') }), safe(file));
-  else await assert.rejects(showOrg(ctx, 'alpha'), safe(file));
+  const label = { owner: 'organization owner file', organization: 'organization file', notifier: 'notifier configuration file', 'deletion receipt': 'deletion receipt file' }[kind];
+  if (kind === 'notifier') await assert.rejects(notificationShow(ctx, 'alpha'), safe(file, { label }));
+  else if (kind === 'deletion receipt') await assert.rejects(deleteOrg(ctx, 'alpha', { confirm: 'alpha', ifRevision: 1, busStop: async () => assert.fail('must refuse first') }),
+    safe(file, { label, suffix: '; deletion remains in progress. Inspect the deletion receipt under the data root and rerun mosaic org delete alpha --confirm alpha' }));
+  else await assert.rejects(showOrg(ctx, 'alpha'), safe(file, { label }));
 });

 // The packaged template is immutable at runtime; substitute only its read result
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ test('template reader refuses malformed JSON without quoting template bytes', as
  });
  syncBuiltinESMExports();
  try {
-    await assert.rejects(templateRender('alpha'), safe('org-template.json'));
+    await assert.rejects(templateRender('alpha'), safe('/org-template.json', { label: 'organization template file' }));
  } finally {
    t.mock.restoreAll();
    syncBuiltinESMExports();
@@ -53,22 +53,29 @@ for (const [field, edit] of [
 assert.throws(() => validateRoleDocument(d, join(root, 'r.json')), safe(field, BusinessError, { exitCode: 2 }, secret.toLowerCase()));
 });
 // This branch is reachable only with already-validated service names; a sentinel service
-// is refused earlier. Pin the same no-value rule with an admissible service.
-test('creative service refusal omits the validated service list', t => {
+// is refused earlier. A known service is already displayed in the role's rails.
+test('creative service refusal names the validated service list', t => {
 const root = scratch(t); writeFileSync(join(root, 'companion.md'), '# R\n\n## Authority\n');
 const d = { ...role(), name: 'companion', contract: 'companion.md', messaging: { sendTo: ['human'], receiveFrom: ['human'] }, credentials: [{ service: 'vikunja', scopes: { tasks: ['read_one'] } }] };
- assert.throws(() => validateRoleDocument(d, join(root, 'companion.json')), safe('credential', BusinessError, { exitCode: 2 }, 'vikunja'));
+ assert.throws(() => validateRoleDocument(d, join(root, 'companion.json')), named('credential', 'vikunja'));
 });
 test('role duplicate skill omits the accepted list value', t => {
 const root = scratch(t); writeFileSync(join(root, 'r.md'), '# R\n\n## Authority\n');
 const d = { ...role(), skills: [secret, secret] };
 assert.throws(() => validateRoleDocument(d, join(root, 'r.json')), safe('role skills', BusinessError, { exitCode: 2 }));
 });
-for (const at of ['user', 'grant', 'scope', 'human']) test(`access ${at} duplicate/reserved refusal omits accepted ids`, () => {
+for (const at of ['user', 'grant', 'scope', 'human']) test(`access ${at} duplicate/reserved refusal names accepted ids`, () => {
 const value = secret.toLowerCase(), d = access(), ctx = structuredClone(context);
 if (at === 'user') { d.users[0].id = value; d.users.push({ ...structuredClone(d.users[0]), subjects: [{ provider: 'test', sub: 'second' }] }); }
 if (at === 'grant') { d.grants[0].id = value; d.grants.push(structuredClone(d.grants[0])); }
 if (at === 'scope') { ctx.businesses.acme.instances = [value]; d.grants[0].instances = [value, value]; }
 if (at === 'human') { ctx.businesses.acme.human = value; d.users[0].id = value; }
- assert.throws(() => checkAccess(d, ctx), safe(at === 'scope' ? 'instances' : '.id', BusinessError, { exitCode: 2 }, value));
+ assert.throws(() => checkAccess(d, ctx), named(at === 'scope' ? 'instances' : '.id', value));
 });
+
+function named(label, value) { return error => {
+ assert.ok(error instanceof BusinessError); assert.equal(error.exitCode, 2);
+ assert.ok(error.message.includes(label), error.message);
+ assert.ok(error.message.includes(value), error.message);
+ return true;
+}; }
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ test("REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1 launch.threadIdleSeconds: absent is the default,
 test("loadBusiness: file checks", () => {
  const root = tmp();
  const dir = join(root, "config");
-  refuses(() => loadBusiness("acme", { dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), /business file not found/, 4);
+  refuses(() => loadBusiness("acme", { dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), /business file acme\.json not found/, 4);

  const file = writeJson(join(dir, "businesses", "acme.json"), businessDoc(root));
  assert.equal(loadBusiness("acme", { dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }).file, file);
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+// PR #1916 redaction (org-redact5): a refusal names the file by its label, never
+// by host path. Every fixture here sits under a directory named for the sentinel,
+// so a refusal that quoted the path would carry it.
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { chmodSync, copyFileSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { REPO_ROLES, tmp, writeJson } from './helpers.mjs';
+import { parseJsonFileText, readJsonFile } from '../src/util.mjs';
+import { loadAccess } from '../src/access.mjs';
+import { validateProjectDocument } from '../src/project.mjs';
+import { loadSeatSets } from '../src/library-seats.mjs';
+import { loadRole, loadRoleFile } from '../src/role.mjs';
+import { loadBusiness } from '../src/organization-config.mjs';
+import { createOrg, deleteOrg, notificationShow, templateRender } from '../src/org-service.mjs';
+import { checkCommands } from '../src/hosts.mjs';
+import { BUSINESS_CONFIG, runConfigCommand } from '../src/config-command.mjs';
+
+const SENTINEL = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+
+function under(t) {
+  const top = tmp();
+  t.after(() => rmSync(top, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const root = join(top, SENTINEL);
+  mkdirSync(root, { mode: 0o700 });
+  return root;
+}
+
+// The refusal is exactly `message`, with its exit code, and carries neither the
+// sentinel nor any of `paths`.
+function refusal(message, { exitCode, name = 'BusinessError', paths = [] } = {}) {
+  return (error) => {
+    assert.equal(error.name, name);
+    if (exitCode !== undefined) assert.equal(error.exitCode, exitCode);
+    assert.equal(error.message, message);
+    assert.ok(!error.message.includes(SENTINEL), error.message);
+    for (const path of paths) assert.ok(!error.message.includes(path), error.message);
+    return true;
+  };
+}
+
+test('readJsonFile: a missing file is refused by label, exit 4', (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), 'config.json');
+  assert.throws(() => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), refusal('config file not found', { exitCode: 4, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('readJsonFile: a symbolic link is refused by label at open, exit 4', (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), file = join(root, 'config.json');
+  writeJson(join(root, 'real.json'), {});
+  symlinkSync(join(root, 'real.json'), file);
+  assert.throws(() => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), refusal('config file must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file', { exitCode: 4, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('readJsonFile: a directory is refused by label after the stat, exit 4', (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), 'config.json');
+  mkdirSync(file);
+  assert.throws(() => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), refusal('config file must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file', { exitCode: 4, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('readJsonFile: invalid JSON is refused by label, exit 2', (t) => {
+  const file = writeJson(join(under(t), 'config.json'), '{not json');
+  assert.throws(() => readJsonFile(file, 'config file'), refusal('config file is not valid JSON', { exitCode: 2, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('parseJsonFileText: the SyntaxError names the label only', (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), 'config.json');
+  assert.throws(() => parseJsonFileText('{not json', file, 'config file'), refusal('config file is not valid JSON', { name: 'SyntaxError', paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('loadAccess: an access file of another uid is refused without its path', (t) => {
+  const file = writeJson(join(under(t), 'access.json'), {});
+  const uid = process.getuid() + 1;
+  assert.throws(() => loadAccess(file, {}, { uid }), refusal(`access file must belong to uid ${uid}`, { exitCode: 2, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('loadAccess: a group-writable access file is refused without its path', (t) => {
+  const file = writeJson(join(under(t), 'access.json'), {}, 0o620);
+  assert.throws(() => loadAccess(file, {}), refusal('access file must not be writable by group or other (mode 620)', { exitCode: 2, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+for (const [what, document, message] of [
+  ['projectVersion', { projectVersion: 2, id: 'stack' }, 'project file "projectVersion" must be 1'],
+  ['vars', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', vars: [] }, 'project file vars must be a JSON object'],
+  ['roles', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', roles: [] }, 'project file roles must be a JSON object'],
+  ['role instance', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', roles: { 'Bad!': {} } }, 'project file role instance must match /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/'],
+  ['roles entry', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', roles: { coder: [] } }, 'project file roles.coder must be a JSON object'],
+  ['roles entry key', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', roles: { coder: { extra: 1 } } }, 'unsupported project file roles.coder key: "extra"'],
+  ['roles entry vars', { projectVersion: 1, id: 'stack', roles: { coder: { vars: [] } } }, 'project file roles.coder.vars must be a JSON object'],
+]) test(`validateProjectDocument: ${what} is refused by label, never by the project root`, (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), 'project', '.mosaic', 'project.json');
+  assert.throws(() => validateProjectDocument(document, file), refusal(message, { exitCode: 2, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('loadSeatSets: a config directory that is a file is refused by its error code', (t) => {
+  const dir = join(under(t), 'config');
+  writeFileSync(dir, '');
+  assert.throws(() => loadSeatSets({ dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), refusal('cannot list businesses in the config directory: ENOTDIR', { exitCode: 2, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('loadSeatSets: a businesses entry that does not list is refused by its error code', (t) => {
+  const dir = join(under(t), 'config');
+  mkdirSync(dir);
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'businesses'), '');
+  assert.throws(() => loadSeatSets({ dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), refusal('cannot list businesses in the config directory: ENOTDIR', { exitCode: 2, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('loadRole: a missing role file is named by its checked name', (t) => {
+  const dir = under(t);
+  assert.throws(() => loadRole(dir, 'coder'), refusal('role file coder.json not found', { exitCode: 4, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('loadRoleFile: a file name outside the id pattern is not quoted', (t) => {
+  const file = join(under(t), 'Not An Id.json');
+  assert.throws(() => loadRoleFile(file), refusal('role file not found', { exitCode: 4, paths: [file] }));
+});
+
+test('loadRoleFile: a hireable entry whose file is invalid JSON is named by its checked name', (t) => {
+  const dir = join(under(t), 'roles');
+  mkdirSync(dir);
+  const chief = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(REPO_ROLES, 'chief-of-staff.json'), 'utf8'));
+  writeJson(join(dir, 'chief-of-staff.json'), { ...chief, hireable: ['coder'] });
+  copyFileSync(join(REPO_ROLES, 'chief-of-staff.md'), join(dir, 'chief-of-staff.md'));
+  writeJson(join(dir, 'coder.json'), '{not json');
+  assert.throws(() => loadRole(dir, 'chief-of-staff'), refusal('role file coder.json is not valid JSON', { exitCode: 2, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('loadBusiness: a missing business file is named by its checked id', (t) => {
+  const dir = join(under(t), 'config');
+  assert.throws(() => loadBusiness('acme', { dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), refusal('business file acme.json not found', { exitCode: 4, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('loadBusiness: a symbolic link business file is named by its checked id', (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), dir = join(root, 'config');
+  writeJson(join(root, 'real.json'), {});
+  mkdirSync(join(dir, 'businesses'), { recursive: true });
+  symlinkSync(join(root, 'real.json'), join(dir, 'businesses', 'acme.json'));
+  assert.throws(() => loadBusiness('acme', { dir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }), refusal('business file acme.json must be a regular, non-symbolic-link file', { exitCode: 4, paths: [dir] }));
+});
+
+test('deleteOrg: a failed deletion names the generated receipt folder under the data root, never the host path', async (t) => {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const ctx = { configDir: join(root, 'config'), dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), instance: 'test',
+    principal: { provider: 'local-dev', iss: 'local-dev', sub: 'local-dev-owner' } };
+  for (const dir of [ctx.configDir, ctx.dataRoot]) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  await createOrg(ctx, 'alpha', await templateRender('alpha'));
+  const folder = 'alpha-2026-11-10T00-00-00-000Z-0123abcd';
+  const registryFile = join(ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.json');
+  const registry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(registryFile));
+  registry.orgs.alpha.state = 'deleting';
+  registry.orgs.alpha.deletion = { actor: ctx.principal, time: new Date().toISOString(), revision: 1, folder };
+  writeJson(registryFile, registry);
+  const destination = join(ctx.dataRoot, 'deleted', folder);
+  mkdirSync(destination, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  writeJson(join(destination, 'receipt.json'), '{not json');
+  chmodSync(join(destination, 'receipt.json'), 0o600);
+  await assert.rejects(deleteOrg(ctx, 'alpha', { confirm: 'alpha', ifRevision: 1, busStop: async () => assert.fail('must refuse first') }),
+    refusal(`deletion receipt file is not valid JSON; deletion remains in progress. Inspect deleted/${folder}/receipt.json under the data root and rerun mosaic org delete alpha --confirm alpha`,
+      { name: 'SyntaxError', paths: [ctx.dataRoot, destination] }));
+});
+
+// Review round (org-redact5 Sol P2 #1): a raw filesystem error from the organization
+// service names the operation, the file by label and the error code, never the host path.
+async function deletingOrg(t) {
+  const root = under(t);
+  const ctx = { configDir: join(root, 'config'), dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), instance: 'test',
+    principal: { provider: 'local-dev', iss: 'local-dev', sub: 'local-dev-owner' } };
+  for (const dir of [ctx.configDir, ctx.dataRoot]) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  await createOrg(ctx, 'alpha', await templateRender('alpha'));
+  return { root, ctx };
+}
+
+test('deleteOrg: a receipt that is a symbolic link is refused by label and error code, never by host path', async (t) => {
+  const { root, ctx } = await deletingOrg(t);
+  const folder = 'alpha-2026-11-10T00-00-00-000Z-0123abcd';
+  const registryFile = join(ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.json');
+  const registry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(registryFile));
+  registry.orgs.alpha.state = 'deleting';
+  registry.orgs.alpha.deletion = { actor: ctx.principal, time: new Date().toISOString(), revision: 1, folder };
+  writeJson(registryFile, registry);
+  const destination = join(ctx.dataRoot, 'deleted', folder);
+  mkdirSync(destination, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  writeJson(join(root, 'elsewhere.json'), {});
+  symlinkSync(join(root, 'elsewhere.json'), join(destination, 'receipt.json'));
+  await assert.rejects(deleteOrg(ctx, 'alpha', { confirm: 'alpha', ifRevision: 1, busStop: async () => assert.fail('must refuse first') }), (error) => {
+    assert.equal(error.code, 'ELOOP');
+    assert.equal(error.syscall, 'open');
+    assert.equal(error.deleteStep, 'prepare');
+    return refusal(`cannot open deletion receipt file (ELOOP); deletion remains in progress. Inspect deleted/${folder}/receipt.json under the data root and rerun mosaic org delete alpha --confirm alpha`,
+      { name: 'Error', paths: [ctx.dataRoot, destination, root] })(error);
+  });
+});
+
+test('notificationShow: a missing notifier directory is refused by label and error code, never by host path', async (t) => {
+  const { root, ctx } = await deletingOrg(t);
+  const notify = join(ctx.dataRoot, 'org-runtime', 'alpha', 'notify');
+  renameSync(notify, `${notify}.gone`);
+  await assert.rejects(notificationShow(ctx, 'alpha'), (error) => {
+    assert.equal(error.code, 'ENOENT');
+    return refusal('cannot lstat notifier directory (ENOENT)', { name: 'Error', paths: [ctx.dataRoot, notify, root] })(error);
+  });
+});
+
+// Sol P3 #4: a refused command given by absolute path is named by the basename refusedCommand matched.
+test('checkCommands: a refused interpreter by absolute path is named by its basename, never by host path', (t) => {
+  const bin = join(under(t), 'bin');
+  assert.throws(() => checkCommands([[join(bin, 'bash'), '-c']], 'grant.commands'),
+    refusal('grant.commands[0] starts with bash, a shell, runner or interpreter, which would grant any command', { exitCode: 2, paths: [bin] }));
+});
+
+// Sol P2 #3: the system config refusal names where the config came from, never its path.
+test('config validate: a missing system config is named by where it came from, never by host path', (t) => {
+  const root = under(t), config = join(root, 'config.json');
+  const err = { text: '' }, out = { text: '' };
+  const streams = { stdout: { write: (s) => { out.text += s; return true; } }, stderr: { write: (s) => { err.text += s; return true; } } };
+  assert.equal(runConfigCommand(['validate', 'acme'], { ...streams, env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: root, MOSAIC_CONFIG: config } }), 3);
+  assert.equal(out.text, '');
+  assert.match(err.text, new RegExp(`^${BUSINESS_CONFIG.prefix}: system config problem \\(mosaic-config exit [1-9][0-9]*\\): .*the system config MOSAIC_CONFIG names\n$`));
+  assert.ok(!err.text.includes(SENTINEL) && !err.text.includes(config), err.text);
+});
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ test("credentials: Gitea scopes", () => {
  refuses(() => gitea(["write:admin"]), /unsupported gitea scope/);
  refuses(() => gitea(["all"]), /unsupported gitea scope/);
  refuses(() => gitea(["sudo:repository"]), /unsupported gitea scope/);
-  refuses(() => gitea(["read:issue", "write:issue"]), /name a category twice/);
+  refuses(() => gitea(["read:issue", "write:issue"]), /name issue twice/);
  refuses(() => gitea([]), /must not be empty/);
 });

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ test("M1: a creative role file wider than read and answer is refused", () => {
  };
  assert.doesNotThrow(creative("ideas", { tools: ["read", "grep", "find", "ls", "web"] }));
  for (const tool of ["write", "edit", "bash"]) {
-    refuses(creative("ideas", { tools: ["read", tool] }), /^creative role ideas may not name tools outside the allowed set /);
+    refuses(creative("ideas", { tools: ["read", tool] }), /^creative role ideas may not name tools (?:write|edit|bash) \(allowed: /);
  }
  const gitea = [{ service: "gitea", scopes: ["read:user", "write:repository"] }];
  assert.doesNotThrow(creative("ideas", { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send", "library.write"], crossRole: [] }, credentials: gitea }));
@@ -268,9 +268,9 @@ test("M1: a creative role file wider than read and answer is refused", () => {
  refuses(creative("proofreader", { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send"], crossRole: ["library.write"] } }), only);
  // Row 285: library.write with any credential but gitea refuses.
  refuses(creative("ideas", { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send", "library.write"], crossRole: [] }, credentials: [...gitea, { service: "vikunja", scopes: { tasks: ["read_one"] } }] }),
-    /^creative role ideas may hold only the gitea credential$/);
+    /^creative role ideas may hold only the gitea credential \(got vikunja\)$/);
  refuses(creative("ideas", { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send", "library.write"], crossRole: [] }, credentials: [{ service: "host" }] }),
-    /^creative role ideas may hold only the gitea credential$/);
+    /^creative role ideas may hold only the gitea credential \(got host\)$/);
  refuses(creative("continuity", { messaging: undefined }), /^creative role continuity requires "messaging"$/);
  refuses(creative("research", { messaging: { sendTo: ["human", "pm"], receiveFrom: ["human"] } }), /^creative role research messaging.sendTo may name only human$/);
  refuses(creative("research", { messaging: { sendTo: ["human"], receiveFrom: ["assistant"] } }), /^creative role research messaging.receiveFrom may name only human$/);
@@ -307,14 +307,14 @@ test("hireable: a list naming a definition that holds any refused action refuses
  for (const action of REFUSED_FOR_HIRE) {
    for (const key of ["withinRole", "crossRole"]) {
      const dir = hireDir({ chief: { hireable: ["worker"] }, worker: { [key]: [action], ...(key === "crossRole" ? { withinRole: [] } : {}) } });
-      refuses(() => loadRole(dir, "chief"), /hireable names a definition which holds an action outside the hireable ceiling$/);
+      refuses(() => loadRole(dir, "chief"), /hireable names worker, which holds [a-z.]+ outside the hireable ceiling$/);
    }
  }
 });

 test("hireable: a mixed definition refuses, a clean list loads, and the named file's own hireable isn't read", () => {
  const mixed = hireDir({ chief: { hireable: ["worker"] }, worker: { withinRole: ["message.send", "role.launch"] } });
-  refuses(() => loadRole(mixed, "chief"), /hireable names a definition which holds an action outside the hireable ceiling/);
+  refuses(() => loadRole(mixed, "chief"), /hireable names worker, which holds [a-z.]+ outside the hireable ceiling/);
  const clean = hireDir({
    chief: { hireable: ["worker", "helper"] },
    worker: { withinRole: [...HIRE_ALLOWED] },
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ test("hireable: a missing, version 1, duplicate or badly named entry refuses, an
  refuses(() => loadRole(hireDir({ chief: { hireable: ["old"] }, old: 1 }), "chief"), /hireable names a definition which is role version 1/);
  // Row 213 (M10): a creative definition refuses by name, before its file is read.
  for (const name of CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS) {
-    refuses(() => loadRole(hireDir({ chief: { hireable: [name] } }), "chief"), /hireable names a creative definition only the human adds$/);
+    refuses(() => loadRole(hireDir({ chief: { hireable: [name] } }), "chief"), /hireable names [a-z-]+, a creative definition only the human adds$/);
  }
  refuses(() => loadRole(hireDir({ chief: { hireable: ["w", "w"] }, w: {} }), "chief"), /duplicate entry in role hireable/);
  refuses(() => loadRole(hireDir({ chief: { hireable: ["../w"] } }), "chief"), /role hireable entry/);
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { validateRoleDocument } from '../src/role.mjs';
+import { checkAccess } from '../src/access.mjs';
+import { BusinessError } from '../src/errors.mjs';
+
+const bad = 'sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234';
+const badId = `${bad.toLowerCase()} "`;
+function refusal(fn, names = [], omitted = bad, validation = null) {
+  assert.throws(fn, error => {
+    assert.ok(error instanceof BusinessError);
+    assert.equal(error.exitCode, 2);
+    for (const name of names) assert.ok(error.message.includes(name), error.message);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(error.message + error.stack, /sk-test|NOT-A-SECRET/i);
+    assert.ok(!error.message.includes(omitted), error.message);
+    if (validation !== null) assert.match(error.message, validation);
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+function role(t, edit = () => {}) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'names-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  writeFileSync(join(root, 'r.md'), '# R\n\n## Authority\n');
+  writeFileSync(join(root, 'companion.md'), '# R\n\n## Authority\n');
+  const doc = { roleVersion: 2, name: 'r', title: 'R', contract: 'r.md', tools: ['read'], network: 'none',
+    authority: { withinRole: [], crossRole: [] }, credentials: [] };
+  edit(doc, root);
+  return () => validateRoleDocument(doc, join(root, `${doc.name}.json`));
+}
+
+for (const key of ['withinRole', 'crossRole']) test(`gated ${key} names the known action; unknown action stays unnamed`, t => {
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.authority[key] = ['deploy']; }), ['authority.' + key, 'deploy']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.authority[key] = [bad]; }));
+});
+test('overlapping authority lists name every known action; invalid entries stop first', t => {
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.authority = { withinRole: ['message.send', 'record.write'], crossRole: ['message.send', 'record.write'] }; }), ['message.send', 'record.write']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.authority = { withinRole: [bad], crossRole: [bad] }; }));
+});
+for (const kind of ['creative', 'outside']) test(`hireable ${kind} names a known definition; invalid name stops first`, t => {
+  const edit = (d, root) => {
+    const name = kind === 'creative' ? 'companion' : 'helper';
+    d.hireable = [name];
+    if (kind === 'outside') writeFileSync(join(root, 'helper.json'), JSON.stringify({ ...d, name, hireable: [], authority: { withinRole: ['role.hire'], crossRole: [] } }));
+  };
+  refusal(role(t, edit), kind === 'creative' ? ['companion'] : ['helper', 'role.hire']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.hireable = [badId]; }), [], badId, /role hireable entry must match/);
+});
+test('hireable wider action rejects unknown action before naming it', t => {
+  refusal(role(t, (d, root) => {
+    d.hireable = ['helper'];
+    writeFileSync(join(root, 'helper.json'), JSON.stringify({ ...d, name: 'helper', hireable: [], authority: { withinRole: [bad], crossRole: [] } }));
+  }));
+});
+test('gitea category conflict names the checked category; invalid scope stops first', t => {
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.credentials = [{ service: 'gitea', scopes: ['read:issue', 'write:issue'] }]; }), ['issue']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.credentials = [{ service: 'gitea', scopes: [bad] }]; }));
+});
+test('duplicate credential names the checked service; invalid service stops first', t => {
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.credentials = [{ service: 'gitea', scopes: ['read:issue'] }, { service: 'gitea', scopes: ['read:issue'] }]; }), ['gitea']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { d.credentials = [{ service: bad }, { service: bad }]; }));
+});
+for (const field of ['tools', 'credentials']) test(`creative ${field} names the checked wider grant; invalid grant stops first`, t => {
+  const edit = d => { d.name = 'companion'; d.contract = 'companion.md'; d.messaging = { sendTo: ['human'], receiveFrom: ['human'] }; };
+  refusal(role(t, d => { edit(d); if (field === 'tools') d.tools.push('bash'); else d.credentials = [{ service: 'vikunja', scopes: { tasks: ['read_one'] } }]; }), [field === 'tools' ? 'bash' : 'vikunja']);
+  refusal(role(t, d => { edit(d); if (field === 'tools') d.tools = [bad]; else d.credentials = [{ service: bad }]; }));
+});
+
+const context = () => ({ providers: ['test'], peers: [], businesses: { acme: { human: 'jason', instances: ['coder'] } }, ssoSubjects: [] });
+const access = () => ({ accessVersion: 1, revision: 1,
+  users: [{ id: 'bean', home: 'local', subjects: [{ provider: 'test', sub: 'one' }] }],
+  grants: [{ id: 'grant', user: 'bean', business: 'acme', projects: ['*'], instances: ['coder'], level: 'viewer' }] });
+for (const kind of ['reserved', 'human', 'user', 'grant', 'project', 'instance']) test(`access ${kind} conflict names checked id; malformed replacement stops first`, () => {
+  function run(value) {
+    const d = access(), ctx = context();
+    if (kind === 'reserved' || kind === 'human') d.users[0].id = value;
+    if (kind === 'user') d.users.push({ ...structuredClone(d.users[0]), id: value, subjects: [{ provider: 'test', sub: 'two' }] });
+    if (kind === 'grant') { d.grants[0].id = value; d.grants.push(structuredClone(d.grants[0])); }
+    if (kind === 'project') d.grants[0].projects = [value, value];
+    if (kind === 'instance') d.grants[0].instances = [value, value];
+    return () => checkAccess(d, ctx);
+  }
+  const value = { reserved: 'human', human: 'jason', user: 'bean', grant: 'g-known-1', project: '11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555', instance: 'coder' }[kind];
+  refusal(run(value), [value]);
+  const validation = kind === 'project' ? /lowercase UUID/ : kind === 'instance' ? /declared instance/ : /\.id must match/;
+  refusal(run(badId), [], badId, validation);
+});
@@ -505,3 +505,92 @@ A harness declares `outputPolicy({ proxy })` as `adapter`, `non-newline-stdout`,
 from module directories, and malformed modules refuse discovery. An organization
 selects modules with `plugins.system-type`; an omitted list enables none. The
 initial five modules declare no toolsets yet.
+
+### Instance-installed packages (PL1, #1873)
+
+The instance owner may install trusted plugin code from the host shell:
+
+```
+mosaic plugins install ./package --sha256 <64 lowercase hex>
+mosaic plugins install ./package.zip --sha256 <64 lowercase hex>
+mosaic plugins install https://example.invalid/plugin.git --commit <40 lowercase hex> --sha256 <64 lowercase hex>
+mosaic plugins list
+mosaic plugins remove <name>
+```
+
+These commands read the selected system config's `dataRoot`, use
+`<dataRoot>/plugins/<name>`, and publish `<dataRoot>/plugins.lock.json`.
+They have no bus, Console, organization, tester, or agent installation path.
+Removal holds the organization registry lock and refuses if any organization
+file still enables the package. Disable it through the existing owner-only
+`plugins.set` before removal. The installer prints the names of all host tools
+before its first instance write. Plugin code runs as the instance uid; installing
+it is a trust decision, and a hash pin does not make code safe.
+
+Every package has this strict `plugin.json` shape (all fields required):
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "example",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "kinds": ["usage-source"],
+  "interfaceVersions": {"usage-source": 1},
+  "sha256": "<64 lowercase hex>",
+  "source": {"path": "./source", "version": "1.0.0"},
+  "signature": null,
+  "tools": [{
+    "name": "example.lookup",
+    "description": "Look up a local fixture",
+    "arguments": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": [], "additionalProperties": false},
+    "runs": "sandbox",
+    "entry": "tools/lookup.mjs"
+  }],
+  "actions": ["example.publish"],
+  "services": [{"name": "example.account", "scopes": ["read"]}],
+  "roleTemplates": [{"name": "example.writer", "file": "templates/writer.json"}]
+}
+```
+
+`source` takes exactly one of `path`/`url` and one of `version`/`commit`.
+Git installs record their actual full commit and URL in the lock. `signature`
+is reserved and must be null. Kinds and interface versions remain core policy;
+each kind has `<kind>/index.mjs` with the usual exports. Every declaration has
+the plugin namespace, and no declaration may reuse a core name or hard wait.
+Templates are recorded as data; installation imports no role and hires nobody.
+
+`pluginHash(directory)` in `src/pinned.mjs` computes the expected digest. Sort
+relative regular-file paths lexically and hash the UTF-8 frame
+`<path byte length>:<path>:<file byte length>:` followed by each file's bytes.
+For `plugin.json`, replace only the top-level `sha256` value with 64 zeroes.
+All other bytes, including whitespace and descriptions, are pinned. Symlinks,
+hard links, special files, unsafe archive paths and duplicate archive entries
+refuse. Files become 0444, directories 0555. Empty directories carry no code
+and are omitted from the digest.
+
+A declared tool exports `execute(arguments)` from its `entry` module. Argument
+schemas use the bounded, reference-free subset checked in `src/manifest.mjs`;
+unknown keywords refuse. Tool presence follows the resolved role, and the
+broker rechecks the current organization setting and hash on every call.
+Host tools run in the host process. Sandbox tools run in a fresh bubblewrap
+namespace with the pinned package and Node runtime, no home, config, workspace
+or network. They receive JSON on stdin and return JSON on stdout.
+
+The loader checks the complete package against the lock before every installed
+module import. A refusal logs static codes and the validated package name;
+core modules continue. A bad pin evicts previously loaded installed modules.
+Once a package path has been imported, the process latches its verified pin before
+the first import attempt (including failed attempts). Removing and reinstalling a
+different pin at that path refuses with `plugin-restart-required` until the host
+restarts. The latch is shared by loaders and host tools, so cached helper modules
+cannot run under a replacement pin. A fresh sandbox tool process has no old cache.
+
+Executable dependencies must be bundled in the package and imported by relative
+path (or an in-package file URL). A shared resolver guard refuses bare third-party
+lookups, executable data URLs and paths outside that package; Node built-ins remain
+available. This applies to static imports, dynamic imports and `createRequire`,
+including sandbox tools. It constrains module resolution, not R10 host authority:
+trusted host code can still use filesystem and other host APIs.
+
+A role referencing a missing or disabled plugin refuses at launch with
+`plugin-disabled` and the package name. Disabling never fires or rewrites an
+agent; its next plugin tool call refuses with that same code.
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ const report = entry => process.stderr.write(`channel: ${JSON.stringify({
  event: entry.event, kind: entry.kind, name: entry.name, code: entry.code, kept: entry.kept,
 })}\n`);

-export function createChannelCaller({ name, call, log = report }) {
+export function createChannelCaller({ name, call, log = report, dataRoot = null }) {
  if (typeof name !== "string" || !NAME.test(name)) throw new PluginError("bad-name", "invalid channel name");
  if (typeof call !== "function") throw new TypeError("channel needs a core caller");
-  const loader = createLoader({ log });
+  const loader = createLoader({ log, dataRoot });
  return async (verb, args = {}) => {
    const settings = await call("plugins", {});
    if (!record(settings) || !record(settings.plugins)) {
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// PL1: executable dependencies must be bundled inside the pinned package.
+// This constrains module resolution, not the host authority granted by R10.
+// Kept standalone so a sandbox tool can use this same guard in its fresh process.
+import { isBuiltin, registerHooks } from 'node:module';
+import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const roots = new Set();
+let registered = false;
+const inside = (root, path) => {
+  const rel = relative(root, path);
+  return rel !== '..' && !rel.startsWith('../') && !isAbsolute(rel);
+};
+const refused = () => { throw new Error('plugin import refused'); };
+export function guardPluginImports(directory) {
+  roots.add(resolve(directory));
+  if (registered) return;
+  registerHooks({resolve(specifier, context, nextResolve) {
+    let parent;
+    try { if (context.parentURL?.startsWith('file:')) parent = fileURLToPath(context.parentURL); }
+    catch { return refused(); }
+    const root = parent && [...roots].find(dir => inside(dir, parent));
+    if (!root || isBuiltin(specifier)) return nextResolve(specifier, context);
+    // Refuse bare lookups before Node searches unpinned ancestor node_modules.
+    if (!specifier.startsWith('./') && !specifier.startsWith('../') && !specifier.startsWith('/') && !specifier.startsWith('file:')) return refused();
+    try {
+      const candidate = new URL(specifier, context.parentURL);
+      if (candidate.protocol !== 'file:' || !inside(root, fileURLToPath(candidate))) return refused();
+      const result = nextResolve(specifier, context);
+      if (!result.url.startsWith('file:') || !inside(root, fileURLToPath(result.url))) return refused();
+      return result;
+    } catch { return refused(); }
+  }});
+  registered = true;
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// Instance-uid, host-only management. No broker verb or organization writer calls this module.
+import { chmodSync, closeSync, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, openSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { bad, HASH } from './manifest.mjs';
+import { KINDS } from './kinds.mjs';
+import { hashFiles, pluginFiles, pluginPaths, readPlugin, readPluginLock, safeDirectory } from './pinned.mjs';
+const run = (cmd,args,options={}) => {
+  const r=spawnSync(cmd,args,{encoding:'utf8',maxBuffer:40*1024*1024,timeout:120000,...options});
+  if(r.status!==0 || r.error) bad('source-refused'); return r.stdout;
+};
+// Validate the complete archive before creating a file. Never extract links, devices,
+// duplicate names, absolute paths, dot components, or an archive's permission bits.
+const EXTRACT = `import sys,zipfile,tarfile,os,stat,io
+kind,src,dst=sys.argv[1:]
+archive=zipfile.ZipFile(src) if kind=='zip' else tarfile.open(src)
+rows=[]; seen=set(); total=0
+for e in archive.infolist() if kind=='zip' else archive.getmembers():
+ n=e.filename if kind=='zip' else e.name
+ directory=e.is_dir() if kind=='zip' else e.isdir()
+ n=n.rstrip('/') if directory else n
+ if not n or n.startswith('/') or any(p in ('','..','.') for p in n.split('/')) or '\\\\' in n: raise ValueError('path')
+ if n in seen: raise ValueError('duplicate')
+ seen.add(n)
+ mode=e.external_attr>>16 if kind=='zip' else e.mode
+ if kind=='zip':
+  if stat.S_IFMT(mode) not in (0,stat.S_IFREG,stat.S_IFDIR): raise ValueError('type')
+ elif not (e.isfile() or e.isdir()): raise ValueError('type')
+ size=e.file_size if kind=='zip' else e.size
+ total+=size
+ if total>33554432 or len(seen)>2048: raise ValueError('size')
+ rows.append((e,n,directory))
+for e,n,directory in rows:
+ p=os.path.join(dst,n)
+ if directory: os.makedirs(p,exist_ok=True)
+ else:
+  os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(p),exist_ok=True)
+  with open(p,'xb') as out: out.write(archive.read(e) if kind=='zip' else archive.extractfile(e).read())
+`;
+function sourceFiles(source,commit,scratch) {
+  if(commit!==undefined) {
+    if(!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(commit) || typeof source!=='string' || source.startsWith('-') || /[\x00-\x1f]/.test(source)) bad('commit-required');
+    const repo=join(scratch,'repo'),archive=join(scratch,'source.tar'),out=join(scratch,'out'); mkdirSync(out);
+    run('git',['-c','core.hooksPath=/dev/null','clone','--no-checkout','--no-local','--',source,repo]);
+    const actual=run('git',['-C',repo,'rev-parse','--verify',`${commit}^{commit}`]).trim(); if(actual!==commit) bad('source-refused');
+    run('git',['-C',repo,'archive','--format=tar',`--output=${archive}`,commit]);
+    run('python3',['-c',EXTRACT,'tar',archive,out]); return pluginFiles(out);
+  }
+  if(typeof source!=='string' || /^(https?:|ssh:|git:|git@)/.test(source)) bad('commit-required');
+  const st=lstatSync(source); if(st.isSymbolicLink()) bad('unsafe-path');
+  if(st.isDirectory()) return pluginFiles(source);
+  if(!st.isFile() || !source.endsWith('.zip')) bad('source-refused');
+  const out=join(scratch,'out');mkdirSync(out);run('python3',['-c',EXTRACT,'zip',source,out]); return pluginFiles(out);
+}
+function writableRemove(dir) {
+  if(!existsSync(dir))return;
+  for(const [p] of pluginFiles(dir)) chmodSync(join(dir,p),0o600);
+  const dirs=new Set(['']);for(const [p] of pluginFiles(dir)) {let parts=p.split('/');parts.pop();while(parts.length){dirs.add(parts.join('/'));parts.pop();}}
+  for(const p of dirs)chmodSync(join(dir,p),0o700);
+  rmSync(dir,{recursive:true});
+}
+function withInstallLock(dataRoot,fn) {
+  safeDirectory(dataRoot);const st=lstatSync(dataRoot);if(st.uid!==process.getuid() || st.mode&0o022)bad("plugin-root");const paths=pluginPaths(dataRoot);let fd;
+  try {fd=openSync(paths.mutex,'wx',0o600);}catch{bad('plugin-locked');}
+  try{return fn(paths);}finally{closeSync(fd);unlinkSync(paths.mutex);}
+}
+function writeLock(lock,doc) {
+  const temp=`${lock}.new`; try {writeFileSync(temp,JSON.stringify(doc,null,2)+'\n',{flag:'wx',mode:0o600});renameSync(temp,lock);}finally{if(existsSync(temp))unlinkSync(temp);}
+}
+export function installPlugin({dataRoot,source,commit,expectedHash,print=()=>{}}) {
+  if(!HASH.test(expectedHash))bad('expected-hash-required');
+  const scratch=mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(),'pl1-'));
+  try {
+    const files=sourceFiles(source,commit,scratch),candidate=join(scratch,'candidate');mkdirSync(candidate);
+    for(const [p,bytes]of files){mkdirSync(join(candidate,p,'..'),{recursive:true});writeFileSync(join(candidate,p),bytes,{flag:'wx',mode:0o600});}
+    const {manifest}=readPlugin(candidate);
+    if(hashFiles(files)!==expectedHash || manifest.sha256!==expectedHash)bad('hash-mismatch',manifest.name);
+    for(const kind of Object.keys(KINDS)) if (existsSync(new URL(`../${kind}/${manifest.name}/index.mjs`,import.meta.url))) bad('core-name');
+    // This is before even the instance lock is created. Only validated names are printed.
+    for(const tool of manifest.tools.filter(t=>t.runs==='host'))print(`host tool: ${tool.name}`);
+    return withInstallLock(dataRoot,({root,lock})=>{
+      const doc=readPluginLock(dataRoot);if(Object.hasOwn(doc.plugins,manifest.name))bad('already-installed',manifest.name);
+      if(!existsSync(root))mkdirSync(root,{mode:0o700});safeDirectory(root);
+      const dest=join(root,manifest.name);if(existsSync(dest))bad('already-installed',manifest.name);
+      const stage=mkdtempSync(join(root,'.install-'));
+      try {
+        for(const[p,bytes]of files){mkdirSync(join(stage,p,'..'),{recursive:true,mode:0o755});writeFileSync(join(stage,p),bytes,{flag:'wx',mode:0o444});}
+        const dirs=new Set(['']);for(const[p]of files){let parts=p.split('/');parts.pop();while(parts.length){dirs.add(parts.join('/'));parts.pop();}}
+        for(const p of dirs)chmodSync(join(stage,p),0o555);
+        readPlugin(stage);renameSync(stage,dest);
+        doc.plugins[manifest.name]={version:manifest.version,source:commit === undefined ? manifest.source : {url:source,commit},sha256:expectedHash};
+        try{writeLock(lock,doc);}catch(e){writableRemove(dest);throw e;}
+        return {name:manifest.name,...doc.plugins[manifest.name]};
+      }finally{if(existsSync(stage))writableRemove(stage);}
+    });
+  }catch(e){if(e?.name==='PluginError')throw e;bad('install-refused');}finally{rmSync(scratch,{recursive:true,force:true});}
+}
+export function removePlugin({dataRoot,name,enabled}) {
+  if(typeof enabled!=='function')bad('organization-state-required');
+  return withInstallLock(dataRoot,({root,lock})=>{
+    const doc=readPluginLock(dataRoot);if(!Object.hasOwn(doc.plugins,name))bad('missing-lock');
+    if(enabled(name))bad('plugin-enabled',name);
+    // Remove the lock first: an interrupted removal can never leave unpinned code loadable.
+    delete doc.plugins[name];writeLock(lock,doc);writableRemove(join(root,name));return {removed:name};
+  });
+}
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
 // The plug-in loader (REQ-PLUG-1). It switches on the modules the
 // organization file's `plugins` object names, one key per kind, and loads
-// only packages/plugins/<kind>/<name>/index.mjs from the tree this file runs
-// from. It takes no path from config and loads nothing outside that tree
-// (lead decision 143). A loaded module runs with the host's authority.
+// core packages/plugins/<kind>/<name>/index.mjs from its own tree, plus
+// hash-pinned installed modules from <instance dataRoot>/plugins only. PL1
+// (#1873), owner-authorized amendment of lead decision 143. No arbitrary
+// config path is accepted. A loaded module runs with the host's authority.
 //
-// A refusal keeps the kind's last good modules and is logged. A kind refused
+// A core refusal keeps the kind's last good modules and is logged. A refused
+// installed plugin is omitted; valid core modules in its kind still load. A kind refused
 // on its first load has nothing switched on. `loaded()` reports what each
 // kind actually has switched on.
 import { lstatSync, readdirSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
 import { KINDS, NAME, PluginError, namesFor } from "./kinds.mjs";
+import { verifiedPlugin, readPluginLock, claimPluginImport } from "./pinned.mjs";

 const ROOT = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");

@@ -38,7 +41,8 @@ function component(path, directory) {
  }
 }

-async function loadModule(spec, name, barrier) {
+async function loadModule(spec, name, barrier, dataRoot = null) {
+  if (dataRoot !== null && !hasModule(spec.kind, name)) return loadPinnedModule(spec, name, barrier, dataRoot);
  const kindDir = join(ROOT, spec.kind);
  const nameDir = join(kindDir, name);
  const index = join(nameDir, "index.mjs");
@@ -74,7 +78,10 @@ async function loadModule(spec, name, barrier) {
 // True when packages/plugins/<kind>/<name>/index.mjs exists in this tree as a real file, with no
 // symlink on the way down. The setters use it to refuse a name no module answers to before it is
 // written; the loader's own checks still run at load.
-export function hasModule(kind, name) {
+export function hasModule(kind, name, dataRoot = null) {
+  if (dataRoot !== null && !hasModule(kind, name)) {
+    try { verifiedPlugin(dataRoot, name, kind); return true; } catch { return false; }
+  }
  try {
    if (!Object.hasOwn(KINDS, kind) || !NAME.test(name)) return false;
    for (const dir of [ROOT, join(ROOT, kind), join(ROOT, kind, name)]) component(dir, true);
@@ -113,7 +120,7 @@ export function discoverModules(kind) {
 // (loadModule, unchanged). One refused module is reported and never hides the others, and nothing
 // here changes what createLoader has switched on. Node caches an import by path, so a module
 // whose file changed is read again only after a restart; a removed directory is gone at once.
-export async function loadInstalled(kind, { barrier = () => {} } = {}) {
+export async function loadInstalled(kind, { barrier = () => {}, dataRoot = null } = {}) {
  if (!Object.hasOwn(KINDS, kind)) refuse("unknown-kind", `unknown kind ${JSON.stringify(kind)}`);
  const spec = KINDS[kind];
  const modules = [], refused = [];
@@ -129,9 +136,14 @@ export async function loadInstalled(kind, { barrier = () => {} } = {}) {
    return { modules, refused };
  }
  for (const name of found.invalid) report(name, new PluginError("bad-name", `${kind}/${name} doesn't match ${NAME}`, name));
+  if (dataRoot !== null) {
+    try { for (const name of Object.keys(readPluginLock(dataRoot).plugins)) {
+      try { if (verifiedPlugin(dataRoot, name).manifest.kinds.includes(kind) && !found.names.includes(name)) found.names.push(name); } catch(e) { report(name,e); }
+    } } catch(e) { report(null,e); }
+  }
  for (const name of found.names) {
    try {
-      modules.push(await loadModule(spec, name, barrier));
+      modules.push(await loadModule(spec, name, barrier, dataRoot));
    } catch (e) {
      report(name, e);
    }
@@ -139,7 +151,7 @@ export async function loadInstalled(kind, { barrier = () => {} } = {}) {
  return { modules, refused };
 }

-export function createLoader({ log, barrier = () => {} }) {
+export function createLoader({ log, barrier = () => {}, dataRoot = null }) {
  if (typeof log !== "function") throw new TypeError("createLoader needs a log callback");
  const current = new Map(Object.keys(KINDS).map(kind => [kind, Object.freeze([])]));
  let queue = Promise.resolve();
@@ -151,6 +163,14 @@ export function createLoader({ log, barrier = () => {} }) {
      event: "plugin-refused", kind, name: e.plugin ?? name, code: e.code, message: e.message,
      kept: kind === null ? loaded() : current.has(kind) ? current.get(kind).map(m => m.name) : [],
    };
+    if (dataRoot !== null) {
+      const affected=kind===null ? [...current.keys()] : current.has(kind) ? [kind] : [];
+      for(const checkedKind of affected)current.set(checkedKind, Object.freeze(current.get(checkedKind).filter(m => {
+        if (!m.installed) return true;
+        try { verifiedPlugin(dataRoot,m.name,checkedKind); return true; } catch { return false; }
+      })));
+      entry.kept = kind===null ? loaded() : current.has(kind) ? current.get(kind).map(m=>m.name) : [];
+    }
    log(entry);
    report.push(entry);
  }
@@ -180,9 +200,10 @@ export function createLoader({ log, barrier = () => {} }) {
      let ok = true;
      for (const name of names) {
        try {
-          next.push(await loadModule(spec, name, barrier));
+          next.push(await loadModule(spec, name, barrier, dataRoot));
        } catch (e) {
          refused(kind, name, e, report);
+          if (dataRoot !== null && !hasModule(kind,name)) continue;
          ok = false;
          break;
        }
@@ -219,3 +240,19 @@ export function createLoader({ log, barrier = () => {} }) {

 // Shared pure plug-in setting classification; no check implementation is loaded.
 export { isDailyModelQuota } from "./model-quota.mjs";
+
+// Verify before every import, including cache hits. Recheck after the test barrier and import.
+async function loadPinnedModule(spec, name, barrier, dataRoot) {
+  let checked = verifiedPlugin(dataRoot,name,spec.kind);
+  barrier("checked", {kind:spec.kind,name});
+  checked = verifiedPlugin(dataRoot,name,spec.kind);
+  const entry = join(checked.dir,spec.kind,"index.mjs");
+  claimPluginImport(checked);
+  let module;
+  try { module=await import(pathToFileURL(entry).href + '?pin=' + checked.manifest.sha256); }
+  catch { refuse("load-failed","installed plugin load refused",name); }
+  verifiedPlugin(dataRoot,name,spec.kind);
+  for(const key of spec.exports) if(typeof module[key]!=="function") refuse("missing-export","installed plugin export refused",name);
+  if(module.interfaceVersion!==spec.interfaceVersion) refuse("interface-version","installed plugin interface refused",name);
+  return Object.freeze({name,module,installed:true});
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// PL1 (#1873): strict, non-executing manifest validation. All errors are static;
+// neither a malformed field nor plugin free text is ever included in a refusal.
+import { KINDS, NAME, PluginError } from './kinds.mjs';
+import { buildRegistry } from '../../organization/src/composition.mjs';
+
+export const HASH = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
+const object = v => v !== null && typeof v === 'object' && !Array.isArray(v);
+export const bad = (code = 'invalid-manifest', name = null) => { throw new PluginError(code, `plugin refused: ${code}`, name); };
+const keys = (v, allowed, required = allowed) => {
+  if (!object(v) || Object.keys(v).some(k => !allowed.includes(k)) || required.some(k => !Object.hasOwn(v, k))) bad();
+};
+const text = (v, max = 2048) => { if (typeof v !== 'string' || !v.length || v.length > max || /[\x00-\x1f]/.test(v)) bad(); };
+export function pluginPath(v) {
+  if (typeof v !== 'string' || v.length > 200 || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9._/-]+$/.test(v) || v.split('/').some(p => !p || p === '.' || p === '..') || v.startsWith('/')) bad('unsafe-path');
+  return v;
+}
+// Deliberately bounded JSON Schema subset. No remote references, executable validators,
+// or unknown keywords. The same schema is enforced before dispatch, not just shown to a model.
+export function checkSchema(s, depth = 0) {
+  keys(s, ['type', 'description', 'properties', 'required', 'additionalProperties', 'items', 'enum', 'minLength', 'maxLength', 'minimum', 'maximum', 'minItems', 'maxItems'], ['type']);
+  if (depth > 12 || !['object', 'array', 'string', 'number', 'integer', 'boolean', 'null'].includes(s.type)) bad();
+  if (s.description !== undefined) text(s.description);
+  if (s.enum !== undefined && (!Array.isArray(s.enum) || !s.enum.length || s.enum.some(v => v !== null && !['string','number','boolean'].includes(typeof v)))) bad();
+  for (const k of ['minLength','maxLength','minItems','maxItems']) if (s[k] !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(s[k]) || s[k] < 0)) bad();
+  for (const k of ['minimum','maximum']) if (s[k] !== undefined && !Number.isFinite(s[k])) bad();
+  if (s.type === 'object') {
+    if (!object(s.properties) || s.additionalProperties !== false || !Array.isArray(s.required) || new Set(s.required).size !== s.required.length || s.required.some(k => typeof k !== 'string' || !Object.hasOwn(s.properties,k))) bad();
+    for (const [k,v] of Object.entries(s.properties)) { if (!/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$/.test(k)) bad(); checkSchema(v, depth+1); }
+  } else if (s.properties !== undefined || s.required !== undefined || s.additionalProperties !== undefined) bad();
+  if (s.type === 'array') checkSchema(s.items, depth+1);
+  else if (s.items !== undefined) bad();
+  return s;
+}
+export function validArguments(v, s) {
+  if (s.enum && !s.enum.some(x => x === v)) return false;
+  if (s.type === 'object') return object(v) && Object.keys(v).every(k => Object.hasOwn(s.properties,k) && validArguments(v[k],s.properties[k])) && s.required.every(k => Object.hasOwn(v,k));
+  if (s.type === 'array') return Array.isArray(v) && v.length >= (s.minItems ?? 0) && v.length <= (s.maxItems ?? 10000) && v.every(x => validArguments(x,s.items));
+  if (s.type === 'null') return v === null;
+  if (s.type === 'integer' ? !Number.isSafeInteger(v) : typeof v !== s.type) return false;
+  if (typeof v === 'string') return v.length >= (s.minLength ?? 0) && v.length <= (s.maxLength ?? 1000000);
+  if (typeof v === 'number') return Number.isFinite(v) && v >= (s.minimum ?? -Infinity) && v <= (s.maximum ?? Infinity);
+  return true;
+}
+export function declaredSet(m) {
+  const bare = n => n.slice(m.name.length + 1);
+  return { name:m.name, roleTemplates:m.roleTemplates.map(t=>({name:bare(t.name),file:t.file})), tools:m.tools.map(t => bare(t.name)), actions:m.actions.map(bare), services:m.services.map(s => ({name:bare(s.name),scopes:s.scopes})) };
+}
+export function checkManifest(m) {
+  keys(m, ['name','version','kinds','interfaceVersions','sha256','source','signature','tools','actions','services','roleTemplates']);
+  if (typeof m.name !== 'string' || !NAME.test(m.name) || m.name.length > 32) bad();
+  if (typeof m.version !== 'string' || !/^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(?:-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$/.test(m.version) || !HASH.test(m.sha256)) bad();
+  if (!Array.isArray(m.kinds) || !m.kinds.length || new Set(m.kinds).size !== m.kinds.length || m.kinds.some(k => !Object.hasOwn(KINDS,k))) bad('unknown-kind');
+  keys(m.interfaceVersions,m.kinds);
+  for (const k of m.kinds) if (m.interfaceVersions[k] !== KINDS[k].interfaceVersion) bad('interface-version');
+  keys(m.source,['url','path','commit','version'],[]);
+  if (Object.hasOwn(m.source,'url') === Object.hasOwn(m.source,'path') || Object.hasOwn(m.source,'commit') === Object.hasOwn(m.source,'version')) bad();
+  for (const v of Object.values(m.source)) text(v);
+  if (m.source.commit !== undefined && !/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(m.source.commit)) bad();
+  if (m.signature !== null) bad(); // reserved, never claims verification
+  for (const k of ['tools','actions','services','roleTemplates']) if (!Array.isArray(m[k]) || m[k].length > 128) bad();
+  const full = n => { if (typeof n !== 'string' || !n.startsWith(`${m.name}.`) || !/^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*(?:\.[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*)+$/.test(n) || n.length > 64) bad(); };
+  for (const t of m.tools) {
+    keys(t,['name','description','arguments','runs','entry']); full(t.name); text(t.description); checkSchema(t.arguments);
+    if (t.arguments.type !== 'object' || !['sandbox','host'].includes(t.runs)) bad(); pluginPath(t.entry);
+    if (!t.entry.endsWith('.mjs')) bad();
+  }
+  for (const a of m.actions) full(a);
+  for (const s of m.services) { keys(s,['name','scopes']); full(s.name); }
+  const seen = new Set([...m.tools.map(t=>t.name),...m.actions,...m.services.map(s=>s.name)]);
+  for (const r of m.roleTemplates) { keys(r,['name','file']); full(r.name); pluginPath(r.file); if (seen.has(r.name)) bad(); seen.add(r.name); }
+  try { buildRegistry({plugins:[declaredSet(m)]}); } catch { bad(); }
+  return structuredClone(m);
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jason.woltje	be698e602b	test(cli): json-redaction pins follow the label refusals The review round changed the config-command relay and the org document refusal to name the file by label. cli/tests/json-redaction.test.mjs still required the host path in those two CLI refusals. They now require the label and the path's absence. The direct scripts/mosaic-config.mjs checks and the loadSystem check (PL1, deferred) still require the path.	2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00
jason.woltje	d085b16136	fix(organization,cli): review round: raw fs and git errors, console entry, config, document and --vars refusals name labels Sol review (org-redact5, changes 6): - org-service: Node filesystem errors become "cannot <syscall> <label> (<CODE>)"; code, syscall, deleteStep and deleteReceipt stay. git failures name the verb and exit code, never git's stderr. - org-console: consoleStop names "another checkout", not the entry path. Exit 3. - config-command: the system config is named by where it came from. Exit 3. - cli org: documents and raw fs errors are named by kind and code. Exit 2. - instances: --vars file named by flag and kind. Exit 4. - hosts: a refused command is named by the basename refusedCommand matched. - role.mjs (T1): the change is back to the readJsonFile label only. Sentinel tests for each; pins in last-values, rename-b-commands, org-recovery.	2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00
jason.woltje	4c8bf9ca4e	fix(organization,cli): refusals name the file by label, never by host path PR #1916 rule: a refusal names the field or file, never a config value or a host path. readJsonFile's three refusals and parseJsonFileText now name the file by its `what` label only. Callers whose label alone is ambiguous add a name that already passed a strict pattern (business id, role name, org id, turn id, project key) or a fixed path under the data root. Exit codes, refusal codes and check order are unchanged. organization: util, access, project, config-command, library-seats, org-service deleteOrg receipt, agent-levels regex; T1 files role.mjs and organization-config.mjs change only the readJsonFile label. cli: access lock, accounts owner, host state/lock, notifier journal, notify-config, run-evidence, dev-fixture, git-socket, org-bus, org-console. discord: turn record label names the turn id. Sentinel tests (sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234 as a path component) cover each changed refusal and fail on BASE; old path pins updated.	2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00
jason.woltje	e588fb32cb	test(cli): band the P10 inner timer at the supervisor, not around cleanup (#1873 ) The row299 root-side pair (mos-1409) spans supervisor start-up and clean_session, which scans every /proc entry on the host. With about 1,850 processes that adds 0.6 to 1.6 s, so the unchanged inner probe read 2.5 to 3.9 s and failed the [1.25, 2.75) band, while the 1 s inner-timer mutant read 2.06 to 2.38 s and passed. Widening the bound alone would have kept that mutant alive. A second observer pair, also confined to the private test copy, brackets only the inner timer: begin just before the supervisor starts its sleep, end at the start of finish(). It writes only for the SO_PEERCRED peer and at most one pair. The unchanged band now applies to that interval (2.01 s on base, 1.00 s and 3.00 s for the 1 s and 3 s mutants, so both fail). The root pair remains required and must contain the timer pair; probe-inner-timeout already places it before the outer bound.	2026-11-11 00:30:10 -06:00
jason.woltje	e3577e9d31	fix(case2): give the case2 fixture host the request-host ops (#1873 ) test-case2.sh failed 8 of 21 steps on base from S3b on. Bisect names `f23a998ee` (#797, "close project archive admission races") as the first bad commit: it made every launch call request.admission and updated each in-process launcher fixture except scripts/case2/launch.mjs. The fixture host refused the op with invalid-host-request, so no launch started; the S6/S7 "unauthenticated" and S8/S10 reds followed from the missing launch capability, not from a separate session change. The fixture now spreads requestHostOps from packages/cli/tests, the shared map every other fixture uses, so it tracks the production protocol.	2026-11-11 00:30:10 -06:00
jason.woltje	99ce579e3c	fix(plugins): keep imports on the verified package pin (#1873 )	2026-11-11 00:11:13 -06:00
jason.woltje	b44b14c7df	feat(plugins): install pinned instance packages and declared tools (#1873 )	2026-11-11 00:11:13 -06:00
jason.woltje	85858938fc	docs: design credential bindings for agent copies	2026-11-10 23:52:29 -06:00
jason.woltje	6415e81ee7	docs(run-sheet): check config directory ancestors before accounts init (#1873 ) mosaic accounts init refuses accounts-unsafe since #1919 when a folder above the config directory is writable by another user. Step 3 now gives the read-only check.	2026-11-10 23:43:55 -06:00
jason.woltje	15225c5e1c	test(webui): verify applied light overrides and the U5 shot recipe (#1873 )	2026-11-10 23:40:06 -06:00
jason.woltje	cb9580f6fb	fix(webui): explain conflicts that reopen a read-only task (#1873 )	2026-11-10 23:40:06 -06:00
jason.woltje	c0e08f81ea	fix(webui): reopen Archive conflicts on the current task (#1873 )	2026-11-10 23:40:06 -06:00
jason.woltje	f7813339b5	test(refusals): detect escaped malformed identifiers (#1873 )	2026-11-10 23:16:26 -06:00
jason.woltje	3e82bc16c3	fix(refusals): restore validated identifiers already shown by the system (#1873 )	2026-11-10 23:16:26 -06:00
jason.woltje	57052c53dd	fix(organization): old-path re-export for config-dir-trust.mjs (#1873 ) rename-b-identity requires one packages/business/src shim per packages/organization/src module.	2026-11-10 22:26:46 -06:00
jason.woltje	930182b54a	fix(organization): accounts config directory checks every ancestor (#1873 ) assertAccountsOwner refused a symlink or non-directory on the config path, but checked owner and mode only on the leaf. An ancestor owned by another user, or writable by others without the sticky bit, let that user rename the directory away and put their own accounts.json in its place. Since M3 that file decides root authority on a deployed Console. One shared helper, config-dir-trust.mjs, now holds A2's rule: every ancestor belongs to root or this uid and is group or other writable only with the sticky bit; configDir itself is this uid's and not group or other writable. The accounts store (load, init, lock, locked write, mosaic accounts) and the root agent file's writer both call it, each with its own refusal code. A2's messages are unchanged. Accounts refusals no longer quote a path: the config directory and accounts file uid messages name the rule and the uid only (redaction rule, #1916). A missing config directory now refuses accounts-unsafe instead of a raw ENOENT.	2026-11-10 22:21:06 -06:00
jason.woltje	d0cfebe286	fix(cli): M3 re-check: provider denials answer 403; A2 test owner carries rootOwner (#1873 ) The rehearsal provider matches routes on the parsed pathname, so a query string no longer turns authorize or token into a 404. Authorize and token answer 403 to any method before the GET check, and only discovery and the JWKS answer 405 to another method. R20 now sends a POST to token and a GET to authorize with a query, and expects 403 for both. The upstream A2 agent-levels write test stubbed an owner session without rootOwner. M3 sets the hook's owner flag from rootOwner, as sso.mjs grants it, so the stub now carries rootOwner: true, as system-types-http does. No check changes.	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00
jason.woltje	9acc378555	fix(cli): M3 review round: re-pin migration, rehearsal provider (#1873 ) An installed unit must equal the render but for the copy id, so a re-pin that adds --sso refused render-refused. case2-unit gains --check (every render check, nothing written) and --check-new (a first install's checks). stack-upgrade runs both checks before anything stops, and --next-args reads root's <instance>.args.next: equal before -- but for --copy, different after it. After the stage it moves the installed unit files into a new <instance>.replaced.XXXXXX directory and renders a first install. A failure moves them back unchanged and restarts the old copy, and confirm swaps the args file. The run sheet gives the commands, the rollback past the migration included. A stamped rehearsal now starts an isolated provider on 127.0.0.1 port 0 with a certificate and keys made for the run. It serves discovery and a JWKS for the live provider ids and answers 403 to authorize and token. Only the scratch Console trusts its certificate. The gate requires each provider ready (sso-ready); provider-discovery requires discovery and JWKS fetches and no code or token request. The provider stops with the run, and by itself once the run's shell is gone. The system-path test helper asserts the log's from copy again. The pinned-copy sign-in requests are bounded, and cleanup waits for each Console to exit.	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00
jason.woltje	db822c5b9d	feat(cli): M3 reconciliation: accounts units, stamped renders, rehearsal (#1873 ) stack-release refuses a user-unit activate, rollback or pm-on when the instance shows any accounts sign (stamped target, accounts.json, console.sso, .deployed), before anything stops. Root renders the system units with case2-unit.sh, and the op runs with --units external. case2-unit renders a stamped copy's units only with --sso, console.sso, an accounts.json that loads and a valid .deployed, and names each missing step in run-sheet order before any write. Per Jason's ruling of 2026-11-10, a stamped library unit takes --sso and refuses proxy-preview admission and its proof. The unstamped and dev paths are unchanged. rehearse runs a stamped copy against rehearsal.invalid with scratch slot placeholders, a copy of the live accounts.json and the copy's own .deployed. It refuses sso-not-prepared and accounts-not-initialized before any rehearsal directory exists, and sso-isolated before the host starts. The tests that turned SSO on through the user unit now pin the refusal and reach the same end state through the system path. The copy tests start the Console on real scratch prerequisites and pin each refusal. The run sheet, TOOLS.md and the accounts design record the ruling and the migration order.	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00
jason.woltje	554bc5116d	feat(cli): require dedicated host uid for accounts system units (#1873 )	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00
jason.woltje	6db8fb2dce	feat(cli): enforce stamped-copy and deployed-instance boundaries (#1873 )	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00
jason.woltje	85122dd2bc	feat(webui): separate account sessions from root authority (#1873 )	2026-11-10 21:38:17 -06:00