docs: roles design review fixes (#1873 )

Route merge, policy, hire, fire and credential decisions to the human and keep merge and policy cross-role only. A person-started hire is a decision record. Restructure the usability table by who acts, list template roles explicitly, add the arbiter threat row and slice tests.
docs: roles, rails and hire as a decision design (#1873 )
2026-11-10 15:00:43 -06:00 · 2026-11-10 14:50:04 -06:00 · 2026-11-10 20:43:00 +00:00 · 2026-11-10 20:43:00 +00:00
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+# Roles, rails and hiring
+
+Date: 2026-11-10. Lane org-roles-design, issue #1873. Status: proposed, doc
+only. Nothing here changes `AGENTS.md`, `roles/`, `contracts/`, rights policy
+or code. The slices in section 12 that touch role or rights policy land only
+with Jason's approval.
+
+Read with `docs/plans/2026-11-10_agent-levels-design.md` (levels, isolation,
+Phase A) and `docs/plans/2026-11-10_accounts-design.md` (rights, host trust
+boundary). This design replaces agent-levels section 7 and the A1 roles patch,
+which widened the chief's `hireable` list. That patch is withdrawn and nothing
+here extends it.
+
+Line numbers are against `origin/refactor` at `50be33355`.
+
+## 1. Rulings
+
+Jason, 2026-11-10:
+
+1. Who hires: the chief asks, a human approves. A hire is a decision, not a direct write.
+2. Which roles, verbatim: "Chief should be capable of hiring ANY role with any capacity. This will include custom roles invented by the user and the chief at any time."
+3. No cap on the number of hires.
+4. Timing: lands with A4.
+5. Templates, verbatim: "Mosaic Stack should ship role templates for the most common roles. These stay within the system as templates. Chief and user have the capability to import the roles from template and customize them as needed. New roles outside of the supplied templates must follow a set of rules from within the system to prevent an absolute destruction of the system's workings. We need a set of primitives available to the agent roles to allow for adherence. A new role constructed by chief and the user must plugin and follow the rules with the RBAC and other tools available. The agent will have an arbitrary set of tools specified by chief and/or the user. The agent will also have a personality and other traits specified by the user. The system must remain unopinionated upon the opinionated basal code provided. We provide the operational rails and allow an open system to build upon it."
+6. Ceiling: the approval is the ceiling. A hire may carry grants above the chief's own, but the decision lists those grants separately and flags them.
+7. Approver: a new grantable right `org.hire` (owner yes, member no) in the M1 rights table.
+8. Only the chief raises hires. No hire chains: a hired agent cannot hire.
+9. Rails, summarized (full text in the lead tracker; ask nothing, design from this): a base of inalienable rails the system needs to function, with everything else customizable on top. The smallest working system is user, assistant and chief; the chief staffs the rest from the user's plan. Start with the fewest agents, add agents as roles are needed, and keep configurations apart with organizations and projects. Full extensibility: modules and plugins, preconfigured systems for any use (software factory, writing workshop, video production, business, home, health), installed from GitHub, a zip or another source, and maybe a marketplace later. Flexibility comes from a set of primitives controlled by routing, agent configuration and plugins. Jason: "The Venn diagram for usability and security/rails needs to be understood."
+10. Credentials: the hire decision lists each credential and scope the agent needs; approving the decision binds them.
+11. Template updates: an imported role is a frozen copy. When the shipped template changes, the system offers a diff; it never changes the copy by itself.
+12. Personality: the chief may draft personality and traits inside the hire decision. After the hire only a human changes them.
+
+Also binding, Jason 2026-11-07: the system is modules joined by documented
+calls. Swapping or disabling one must not break core, and adding one must not
+need a core rewrite (`docs/plans/2026-11-07_organizations-owner-rulings.md:43-47`).
+
+## 2. Today
+
+- A role is `roles/<name>.json` plus its `.md` contract. Version 2 allows
+  only known keys, so an unknown field such as `personality` refuses
+  (`packages/organization/src/role.mjs:21,190`). Tools come from one closed
+  core list (`role.mjs:24-29`, `packages/organization/src/vocabulary.mjs:142`).
+  Actions come from `ACTIONS` (`vocabulary.mjs:11-65`); an unknown one
+  refuses, and so does one outside `ROUTED`, because those are hard waits the
+  human always decides (`role.mjs:42-43`, `vocabulary.mjs:109`).
+- The chief hires by writing directly. `instance.hire` checks that the caller
+  is the instance named in `launch.by` (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:6193`)
+  and holds `role.hire`, refuses kept names (`broker.mjs:6200`), then runs
+  `#hireable` (`broker.mjs:6291-6306`). That needs a version 2 definition whose
+  every action is on `HIRE_ALLOWED` (`vocabulary.mjs:114-121`, checked by
+  `unhireableAction` at `vocabulary.mjs:127`), named in the chief's own
+  `hireable` list, and not in `launch.noHire`.
+- The shipped chief's list is empty (`roles/chief-of-staff.json:13`), so the
+  chief can hire nothing today. Its contract says so
+  (`roles/chief-of-staff.md:17`).
+- Creative definitions are human-only. The writer refuses them for the chief
+  (`packages/organization/src/instance-settings.mjs:365-367`) and the role
+  check refuses them in a `hireable` list (`role.mjs:86-97`).
+- A hire writes `roles[name] = { definition, vars? }` and appends the name to
+  `launch.instances` (`instance-settings.mjs:354-391`). Its vars may set only
+  `model` and `limits.*` (`broker.mjs:216-221`). So `launch` refuses the new
+  instance with `no-route` until a human sets harness, model and thinking
+  (`packages/harness/src/bundle.mjs:96`, `roles/chief-of-staff.md:53-58`).
+- Fire revokes the instance's service credentials and delists it
+  (`instance-settings.mjs:396-414`).
+- Rights for people are a separate table: `RIGHTS`, the `ROLE_RIGHTS`
+  bundles and `canGrant` (`packages/organization/src/org-rights.mjs:6-17,21-26,122-129`).
+  It has no hire right yet.
+
+## 3. The rails
+
+A rail is a rule no role, template, plugin, approval or setting can change
+while the system runs. Only a reviewed commit changes one. Each row says where
+the code enforces it today and which slice closes the gap.
+
+| # | Rail | Enforced today | Gap, and the slice that closes it |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | Secrets never enter the repository, images, role files, decision text or the trail. A credential reaches an agent only through a human-approved binding, scoped and revocable. | Message and record bodies pass `credentials.assertClean` (`packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:833`, `broker.mjs:840,1313,2081`). Credential verbs are human-only (`broker.mjs:6144`). `credential.mint` decisions route to the human (`broker.mjs:2266-2268,2368`). Fire revokes (`instance-settings.mjs:396`). | Role definitions, personality text and hire decisions are not scanned. P1 runs the same check on every string in a composition and a hire decision. |
+| R2 | The trail and run records are write-once. | `events` and `decision_events` refuse update, delete and replace (`packages/bus/src/migrations/3b.sql:131-132,137-138,144,147`). | None. Hire, deny, expiry and binding entries use the same tables (A4). |
+| R3 | Fail closed: an unknown action, tool, right, plugin kind or role field refuses. | Role keys, actions and tools (`role.mjs:190,42,24-29`). Rights (`org-rights.mjs:122-129`). Plugin kinds (`packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs:147-148`). | Inline roles and plugin-declared tools and actions have no check yet. P1 and PL1. |
+| R4 | Hard waits stay with the human. A role can never hold an action outside `ROUTED`. | `vocabulary.mjs:109`, `role.mjs:43`. This covers `git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote`, `host.sudo`, `credential.mint`, `spend`, `deploy` and `data.delete` (`vocabulary.mjs:22,26,29,49,50,51,55`). | Added: the brief's list did not name it, and "any capacity" must not dissolve it. P1 keeps it for every composition. |
+| R5 | Human-only acts: approving a hire, fire or role change (`org.hire`), binding a credential, changing personality after hire, installing or enabling a plugin, changing a rail, and resolving a merge or policy decision. No agent approves its own request, and no agent approves a request that changes authority. | No agent resolves its own arbitrated raise: it goes to the human (`broker.mjs:7075`). Plugin enabling needs a human session (`broker.mjs:6008`). Hard waits always go to the human (R4). | Corrected. The brief's "no agent approves another agent's request" is false today. A cross-role raise goes to the domain arbiter, the chief by default, and an agent of that role resolves it (`broker.mjs:7074,7212-7215`, `packages/organization/src/org-template.json:5`). PRD 1.5 REQ-DEC-2 put `git.merge.protected` and `policy.change` on that path (`vocabulary.mjs:69-70,83,93`), and merge-gate holds merge cross-role (`roles/merge-gate.json:10`, `broker.mjs:5198-5201`). This design keeps agent arbitration only for one-off routed work that grants no lasting authority: task, review, record and message actions. A4 routes every decision whose action is `role.hire`, `role.fire`, `credential.mint`, `git.merge.protected` or `policy.change` to the human, whatever its class. That reverses part of REQ-DEC-2, so it needs Jason's approval. The dev tester may enable some plugin kinds (`broker.mjs:6013`); that stays dev-only. Personality has no field yet (T1). |
+| R6 | Every agent runs sandboxed as the instance uid, with only the tools its role names. A tool exists only if core or an installed, enabled plugin declares it. | bwrap with user, pid and ipc namespaces and a read-only root (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:76,176`). Tools are a closed core list (`vocabulary.mjs:142`) and the typed bus tools are fixed in core (`packages/harness/src/tools.mjs:96`). | Corrected: no plugin declares a tool today. PL1 adds plugin-declared tools. A sandbox escape holds the instance uid, which equals root for the instance (accounts design, "Host trust boundary"). |
+| R7 | Organizations are isolated. Cross-organization reads go only through the assistant's Console read broker. | Each organization has its own bus and every non-assistant agent's scope is one organization (agent-levels design section 4). | The read broker is not built. It is A6. Until then nothing reads across organizations. |
+| R8 | No grant beyond the granter, except through a flagged line in a human-approved decision. | People: `canGrant` subset (`org-rights.mjs:122-129`). Agents: a hire is bounded by `HIRE_ALLOWED` and the chief's list (`broker.mjs:6303-6305`). | A4 replaces that bound with the approval itself. The broker computes the flagged lines; the chief cannot omit them. |
+| R9 | No hire chains. Only the chief raises hires, and a hired agent cannot hire. | `role-not-chief` (`broker.mjs:6193`). `role.hire` is not on `HIRE_ALLOWED` (`vocabulary.mjs:114-121`). | Added from ruling 8. P1 refuses `role.hire` and `role.fire` in any hired composition, so the rail survives `HIRE_ALLOWED` going away. |
+| R10 | Plugin code runs with the host's authority, so installing one is an instance-level human act. | The loader reads only its own tree and takes no path from config (`packages/plugins/src/loader.mjs:1-5`). | Added: the loader says a module "runs with the host's authority" (`loader.mjs:5`). Install from GitHub or a zip has to keep that visible. No hash pin exists. PL1. |
+| R11 | System config is written only by bootstrap. | `scripts/bootstrap.sh:5`, AGENTS.md invariant 2. | None. Nothing in this design writes system config. |
+
+Dropped: none. Two items changed meaning. R5 now says "no agent approves its
+own request" and lists what always goes to a human, because the code routes
+cross-role work to an agent arbiter by design. R6 now says "core or a plugin"
+declares a tool, because core declares all of them today.
+
+## 4. The primitives
+
+A role is a composition of these parts and nothing else.
+
+**Core set.** Shipped in `vocabulary.mjs`, versioned, changed only by reviewed
+commit:
+
+- `tools`: core built-ins and `web` (`vocabulary.mjs:142`).
+- `network`: one of `NETWORKS`.
+- `authority.withinRole` and `authority.crossRole`: actions from `ROUTED`
+  (`vocabulary.mjs:73-102`).
+- `credentials`: a known service with grantable scopes. Gitea `admin` and
+  `all` are never granted (`GITEA_SCOPE_CATEGORIES`).
+- `messaging.sendTo` and `messaging.receiveFrom`.
+- `skills`.
+- `instructions`: the contract text, today the `.md` file.
+- `personality`: new. Bounded text fields (summary, traits, voice), no
+  authority. Ruling 5 and ruling 12.
+
+**Plugin-declared set.** From an enabled plugin's manifest (section 7):
+tools, actions and credential services. A plugin action is always routed. A
+plugin cannot declare a hard wait, cannot reuse a core name, and every name
+carries the plugin's prefix (`<plugin>.<name>`).
+
+**The validator.** P1 adds `checkComposition(role, registry, chief)`. It
+replaces `HIRE_ALLOWED` and `unhireableAction` at hire time. It:
+
+1. refuses any unknown key, as `role.mjs:190` does;
+2. refuses any action, tool, network, service or scope the registry lacks,
+   where the registry is the core set plus the plugins enabled in that
+   organization;
+3. refuses any action outside `ROUTED` or a plugin's routed set (R4);
+4. refuses `role.hire` and `role.fire` (R9);
+5. allows `git.merge.protected` and `policy.change` only in `crossRole`, so
+   each use is its own decision that a human resolves (R5);
+6. refuses any string that fails `assertClean` (R1), and any field over its
+   length bound;
+7. returns the flagged lines: every action, tool, network, credential scope
+   and messaging target the chief's own resolved role does not hold (R8).
+
+The validator accepts every composition that passes. There is no allowlist of
+roles and no list of hireable definitions.
+
+**What "any role with any capacity" means.** The chief can propose any name,
+any mix of registered tools and routed actions, any credential scope a service
+grants, any personality, any number of agents. A human approves each one.
+
+**What it cannot mean.** A hired agent cannot hold a hard wait, hire, approve
+a human decision, read another organization, name a tool nothing declares,
+carry a secret in its text, or run outside the sandbox. A new capability that
+needs new enforcement, for example a new kind of external write, needs a
+plugin that declares and enforces it. A name with no code behind it gives an
+agent nothing.
+
+## 5. Templates and organization roles
+
+**Templates.** The shipped files in `roles/` become templates. They stay
+there, versioned by reviewed commit. A template's identity is its name plus
+the sha256 of its JSON and contract together, so no new field goes into
+`roles/`. Plugins may ship templates too (section 7).
+
+**Organization roles.** An organization's own definitions live in its file
+under a new `definitions` key, one entry per name:
+
+```json
+"definitions": {
+  "release-writer": {
+    "rev": 3,
+    "from": { "template": "coder", "sha256": "<64 hex>" },
+    "role": { "tools": ["read", "edit"], "authority": { "withinRole": ["record.write"] } },
+    "instructions": "...",
+    "personality": { "summary": "...", "traits": ["..."], "voice": "..." }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+An instance names `definition: "org:release-writer"` instead of a template
+name. Project agents use the organization's definitions. Root agents keep
+their own `definitions` in `<configDir>/agents.json`.
+
+- **Import** copies a template into `definitions` with `from` set. The copy is
+  frozen: nothing changes it except an approved change.
+- **Customize** edits the copy. **Invent** writes a definition with no `from`.
+  Both pass `checkComposition` before they are written.
+- **Who writes.** A human holding `org.hire` drafts or edits a definition in
+  the Console. A draft no agent uses does nothing. A change to a definition a
+  hired agent uses takes effect only through a change decision (section 6).
+  The chief proposes a definition only inside a decision.
+- **Template changes.** When a template's current hash differs from a copy's
+  `from.sha256`, the Console shows a diff and offers apply or keep. Apply is a
+  change decision (section 6). Nothing applies by itself (ruling 11).
+- **Versioning.** `rev` counts up on every write. Every hire and change
+  decision records the definition's `rev` and hash.
+- **A running agent.** Its sandbox, tools and contract are fixed at launch
+  from the bundle. A change that narrows authority takes effect at the broker
+  on the next call. Anything else takes effect at the next launch, and the
+  Console shows the agent as running an older `rev`.
+- **Creative templates** are templates like the others. They still get no
+  host grant (`broker.mjs:2415`).
+
+## 6. Hire as a decision
+
+One decision action covers hire, fire and change, at every level.
+
+**Fields.** The chief supplies:
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `op` | `hire`, `fire` or `change` |
+| `level` | `org`, `project` (with the project name) or `root` |
+| `name` | the agent's instance name, unused, not kept or retired |
+| `role` | `{ template, sha256 }`, `{ definition, rev }` or `{ inline }` |
+| `credentials` | each service and scope the agent needs |
+| `personality` | the chief's draft |
+| `route` | a proposed harness, model and thinking level |
+| `reason` | 1 to 500 characters |
+
+The broker adds, and the chief cannot set or edit:
+
+- `flagged`: the lines `checkComposition` returns above the chief's own role;
+- `credentialLines`: one line per service and scope;
+- `digest`: a hash over the whole decision, as the Console resolution path
+  already checks (`broker.mjs:7200-7204`);
+- `expiresAt`: seven days.
+
+**Raise.** Among agents, only the instance in `launch.by` may raise one, as
+today (`broker.mjs:6193`). The decision always routes to the human, whatever its
+class, so the arbiter path at `broker.mjs:7074` never applies. A hire needs no
+approval count and has no cap (ruling 3). Spend stays bounded by the
+organization's limits.
+
+**Approve.** A human whose membership in that organization holds `org.hire`
+approves in the Console, against the current digest. Two limits in the MVP:
+
+- a decision with any flagged line or any credential line needs the owner.
+  This mirrors `decide` stopping short of credential mints (accounts design,
+  section 3 "Rights"). A member with `org.hire` approves plain hires.
+- a root-level decision needs the instance owner, since the root file covers
+  every organization (agent-levels section 7).
+
+The human may change the route, narrow the role or drop credential lines
+before approving. Widening means a new decision.
+
+**What approval writes.** One writer call, with the human as actor and the
+decision id in the context:
+
+- org level: the organization writer, extended from `prepareHire`
+  (`instance-settings.mjs:354`). It writes the definition, the instance with
+  its route, and `launch.instances`;
+- project level: the A2 project-agent writer, behind the projects fence;
+- root level: the A2 root writer.
+
+Credential bindings then go through the existing human-only credential path
+(`broker.mjs:6144`). Until every binding succeeds, `launch` refuses the agent
+with `credential-unbound` and names the missing one, as A3 does for unbound
+copies. Because approval sets the route, launch no longer refuses `no-route`
+for an approved hire.
+
+**Deny, expire, withdraw.** Deny and expiry write nothing but the trail entry.
+The chief may withdraw its own decision (`broker.mjs:7205-7211`).
+
+**Fire and change** are the same decision with `op` set. Fire revokes and
+delists as today (`instance-settings.mjs:396`).
+
+**A person starting a hire.** A human holding `org.hire` may start a hire,
+fire or change in the Console. It is still a decision, with the same fields,
+broker-computed lines, digest and trail, raised and resolved in one step by
+that person. Flagged and credential lines still need the owner. I read ruling
+8 as limiting which agent raises hires, not as stopping a person from hiring.
+
+**Trail.** Raise, each resolution, the writer receipt and each binding are
+events in the write-once tables (R2).
+
+**What this replaces.** The direct `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` paths
+(`broker.mjs:6185-6280`) and the `hireable` check (`broker.mjs:6291-6306`) go
+away. The chief's `hire` tool (`packages/harness/src/tools.mjs:225-226`)
+raises the decision instead of writing. Agent-levels section 7 had three
+paths, one per level. Now there is one decision with a `level` field, so A4
+and A5 become one slice, with the root level waiting for A2's root writer.
+
+## 7. Plugins and modules
+
+**Today.** Plugin kinds are a closed core list (`kinds.mjs:4-5,22-105`). The
+loader reads only `packages/plugins/<kind>/<name>/index.mjs` in its own tree,
+checks symlinks, exports and interface version, and pins no hash
+(`loader.mjs:1-5,41-72`). A refused module keeps the kind's last good set
+(`loader.mjs:7-9`). Enabling is `plugins.set` under `org.setup`
+(`org-rights.mjs:74`), owner-only.
+
+**Manifest.** Each plugin gets a `plugin.json`: name, version, kinds,
+interface versions, a sha256 over its files, and what it declares: tools
+(name, description, argument schema, whether it runs in the sandbox or on the
+host), routed actions, credential services, and role templates.
+
+**Install.** Sources are a GitHub URL at a commit, a zip, or a local
+directory. The instance owner installs at the host with the expected hash.
+The install refuses a hash mismatch, a core name, a hard-wait action or an
+unknown kind. Installed plugins live read-only in an instance-level plugin
+root, listed with their hashes in a lock file. That reads a path outside the
+loader's own tree, which changes lead decision 143 (`loader.mjs:3-5`). Jason
+decides that in PL1.
+
+**Pin and load.** Every load checks the hash in the lock file. A mismatch
+refuses the plugin and logs it. The loader's existing refusal handling keeps
+core running.
+
+**Enable.** Per organization, by the owner, through `plugins.set`. Install is
+instance-wide because the code runs as the instance uid for every
+organization (R10).
+
+**A disabled or missing plugin.** Core keeps running. An agent whose role
+names the plugin's tools or actions refuses at launch with
+`plugin-disabled` and the plugin's name. A running agent's calls to those
+tools refuse with the same code. Nothing is fired or rewritten.
+
+**Preconfigured systems** such as a software factory or a writing workshop
+are plugins that ship templates, a system type and tools. Installing one hires
+nobody. The chief still raises a decision for each agent.
+
+**Marketplace.** Out of scope. The design must not preclude one, so the
+manifest keeps the source URL, version and hash, and reserves a `signature`
+field. The install screen already lists every tool that runs on the host.
+
+## 8. The minimal base
+
+A new organization already starts with the human, a chief and an assistant
+(`org-template.json:4,6`). That matches ruling 9. A6 later moves the
+assistant to the root level (agent-levels section 9).
+
+The chief reads the user's plan and raises one hire decision per agent it
+needs, each citing the plan in its reason. It starts with the fewest agents
+and adds one when a task needs a role nobody holds. Separate concerns go in
+separate organizations or projects.
+
+Every other shipped organization role becomes a template only: coder, pm,
+reviewer, security-reviewer, merge-gate, cto, the five chiefs (executive,
+financial, information, information security, marketing) and the six creative
+roles (companion, continuity, fact-checker, ideas, proofreader, research).
+`researcher.json` is a version 1 worker role (`roles/researcher.json:2`), which
+a hire refuses (`broker.mjs:6303`), and `conductor-policy.json` is not a role.
+Neither changes.
+
+## 9. Usability and security
+
+Read this first. It says who can change what.
+
+Everything in the first two columns is done by a person. No agent can do any
+of it.
+
+| A person changes it directly | It needs an approved decision | Only a reviewed code change |
+|---|---|---|
+| Organizations and projects (owner) | Hiring, firing or changing an agent's role (`org.hire`) | The rails in section 3 |
+| Drafting a role copy, or inventing a role from known parts. A draft does nothing until a decision uses it (`org.hire`) | Any agent power above the chief's own, shown flagged (owner approves) | The core list of tools and actions |
+| An agent's model, limits and route (`org.hire`) | Giving an agent a password, key or token (owner approves) | The shipped role templates |
+| An agent's personality and traits after hire | Applying a template update to your copy | The rights table, including `org.hire` |
+| Enabling a plugin in an organization (owner) | Each merge or policy change an agent asks for | Plugin kinds |
+| Installing a plugin on the instance (instance owner, at the host) | Adding an agent at the root level (instance owner) | System config, which only bootstrap writes |
+
+What never moves, whoever asks:
+
+- An agent cannot push to a protected branch, push to a remote, deploy, spend,
+  mint a credential, delete data or use sudo by itself. A person decides each
+  of those every time.
+- An agent cannot hire. Only the chief asks, and a person says yes.
+- An agent cannot merge into a protected branch or change policy unless a
+  person approves that one merge or change.
+- An agent cannot see another organization's work. The assistant's read
+  across organizations is planned (A6) and not built yet.
+- A plugin runs with the same power as the Mosaic service itself. Install
+  only code you trust.
+
+## 10. Threat model
+
+| Threat | What stops it | What is left |
+|---|---|---|
+| A prompt-injected chief proposes a hostile role | The broker computes the flagged and credential lines; the chief cannot hide them. Hard waits, hiring and unknown parts refuse (R4, R9, R3). A human approves against the digest. | A human can approve a hostile role. Flagged and credential lines need the owner. |
+| A custom role names an unknown tool | `checkComposition` refuses it at the decision and at the writer. Launch refuses it again (R3). | None. |
+| A plugin from an untrusted source | Instance owner only; hash pin; the install screen lists host-run tools. | Approved plugin code runs as the instance uid (R10). A pin does not make code safe. |
+| A credential scope wider than the task | Each scope is its own line; owner-only approval; the approver may drop lines; admin and all never granted. | The service's own scope granularity. |
+| An arbiter agent approves another agent's merge or policy change | A4 routes those decisions to the human whatever their class (R5). | Other routed work, such as task scope, still has an agent arbiter by design. |
+| Approval fatigue on flagged grants | Flagged lines shown apart from plain ones; credential and flagged decisions go to the owner; no batch approval; seven-day expiry. | A busy owner who approves without reading. A later slice could limit how many flagged decisions one approval screen holds. |
+| An imported template drifts from its source | The copy is frozen with its source hash. A changed template produces a diff offer, never a silent change. | An owner who keeps an old copy keeps its old behaviour. That is the ruling. |
+
+## 11. Invariant 7 amendment
+
+Proposed only. Jason approves it through a reviewed commit.
+
+Replace AGENTS.md invariant 7 (`AGENTS.md:45-47`) with:
+
+> 7. **Policy**: missions govern tasks; a task narrows, never widens. The
+>    rails, the core vocabulary of tools and actions, and the shipped role
+>    templates in `roles/` change only by reviewed commit. An organization's
+>    own roles are copies or compositions of known parts. One takes effect
+>    only through a decision a human with `org.hire` approves, which lists
+>    every grant above the chief's own as a flagged line. Only the chief
+>    raises hires, and a hired agent cannot hire.
+
+Touched role-model lines:
+
+- `AGENTS.md:107`: keep "policy/role expansion" as a protected act, and add
+  "an approved hire decision is that authority for the one agent it names".
+- `AGENTS.md:209`: change to "`roles/`: shipped role templates and the
+  conductor policy".
+
+## 12. Slices
+
+Phase A after A3, in order. A6 and A7 stay as agent-levels section 9 has
+them.
+
+**R1. The `org.hire` right.** Add `'org.hire': flag(true)` to `RIGHTS` and a
+verb entry for the hire resolution in `VERB_RIGHTS`. The owner bundle picks it
+up from `Object.keys(RIGHTS)` (`org-rights.mjs:22`); member, collaborator and
+approver do not get it. Rights policy, so Jason's approval
+(accounts design, `Grant needed` at line 1391). Tests: the owner has it; the
+three templates lack it; `canGrant` lets an owner grant it to a member; an
+unknown right still refuses.
+
+**P1. Primitives validator.** `checkComposition` and the registry, beside
+`role.mjs`. `HIRE_ALLOWED` stays until A4 switches over. It changes no role
+file but it defines authority policy, so Jason's approval. Tests: an unknown
+key, action, tool, service or scope refuses; each hard wait refuses;
+`role.hire` and `role.fire` refuse; a secret in instructions or personality
+refuses; `git.merge.protected` or `policy.change` in `withinRole` refuses;
+flagged lines match a hand-built expected set for coder against the
+shipped chief.
+
+**T1. Organization definitions and templates.** The `definitions` key,
+`org:` references, import, the human edit verbs under `org.hire`, the
+personality fields, the template hash and the diff read. Tests: import pins
+the hash; editing a template file changes no copy; the diff read shows the
+change; an `org:` reference to a missing definition refuses at launch; an
+agent cannot call the edit verbs.
+
+**A4. Hire as a decision, all levels.** The decision action, raise, Console
+approval, the writer calls, credential lines, expiry, fire and change, the
+Console path that raises and resolves in one step, human routing for
+`role.hire`, `role.fire`, `credential.mint`, `git.merge.protected` and
+`policy.change` decisions (R5), and removal of the direct path and
+`#hireable`. Org and project land first; root
+waits for A2's root writer. This edits `roles/chief-of-staff.json` and `.md`
+(drops `hireable`, rewords hire), the vocabulary and AGENTS.md invariant 7,
+and reverses part of PRD 1.5 REQ-DEC-2, so Jason's approval. Tests: a hired agent's raise refuses `role-not-chief`; a
+chief decision cannot carry its own `flagged`; a member with `org.hire`
+approving a credential or flagged decision refuses; a stale digest refuses;
+deny and expiry write nothing; approval writes the role, the route and the
+trail, and launch refuses `credential-unbound` until binding; fire revokes;
+the old `instance.hire` verb refuses; a cross-role `git.merge.protected` or
+`policy.change` decision routes to the human and an arbiter's resolve refuses
+`not-resolver`; a hire a person starts in the Console leaves a decision record
+with its flagged lines.
+
+**PL1. Plugin manifest, install and declared tools.** Manifest, pinned
+install root, lock file, the registry merge, and `plugin-disabled` refusals.
+Changes lead decision 143 and the loader's trust rule, so Jason's approval.
+Tests: a hash mismatch refuses and core keeps running; a manifest naming a
+core tool or a hard wait refuses; disabling a plugin makes its agents refuse
+at launch with its name; a running agent's call to a disabled tool refuses.
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+// Old path of packages/organization/src/accounts.mjs (rename design r2, stage B).
+export * from "../../organization/src/accounts.mjs";
@@ -1298,3 +1298,32 @@ shows selected, active and inactive ids. The owner replaces the selection with
 `mosaic project system-types-set PROJECT --types coding,montage --org ID`; an
 empty `--types ''` clears it. Disabled selections stay recorded but become
 inactive. Project settings changes are append-only and require human proof.
+
+## Accounts
+
+`mosaic accounts` administers the instance-level accounts store locally, as the
+effective uid owning the config directory. It requires a human shell, rejects `--tester`,
+and takes no business selector or bus connection. It has no organization rights
+verbs. Console sign-in, sessions and membership evaluation are later Phase M
+slices; these commands alone do not turn accounts mode on.
+
+```sh
+mosaic accounts init --name Operator
+mosaic accounts list --json
+mosaic accounts user add --name Pat --subject pocket:verified-subject --revision 1
+mosaic accounts user disable u-0123456789ab --revision 2
+mosaic accounts user enable u-0123456789ab --revision 3
+mosaic accounts user signout u-0123456789ab --revision 4
+mosaic accounts user remove u-0123456789ab --revision 5
+```
+
+Init creates one operator account containing every configured `console.sso`
+subject and refuses if accounts.json already exists. Add mints its id and defaults
+to instance role `user`; `--role operator` creates another operator. Writes require
+the file revision from list. Disable, enable and signout advance `authGen`, and
+the last active operator cannot be disabled or removed. Removal scans ownership
+while holding the registry then accounts locks, refuses if the account owns an
+organization (including archived organizations) or any registry entry lacks its
+owner metadata during creation, and removes its memberships in
+the same write. List reports rollback rows needing repair; its JSON omits invite
+bindings and hashes. Receipts record effective process uid and verb and omit subjects and secrets.
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// Phase M2: the local, instance-uid account administration exception. No org
+// rights commands and no bus transport: account init must work before orgs exist.
+import { basename, join } from 'node:path';
+import { configDir } from '../../organization/src/organization-config.mjs';
+import { accountsRepairs, assertAccountsOwner, loadAccounts, mintAccountId, withAccounts } from '../../organization/src/accounts.mjs';
+import { withRegistry, readRegistryLocked } from '../../organization/src/org-registry.mjs';
+import { readJsonFile, rejectUnknownKeys, requireString } from '../../organization/src/util.mjs';
+import { CliError } from './errors.mjs';
+import { refuseInsideAgent } from './transport.mjs';
+
+export const ACCOUNTS_USAGE = [
+  'mosaic accounts init [--name NAME]',
+  'mosaic accounts list [--json]',
+  'mosaic accounts user add --name NAME --subject PROVIDER:SUB [--role operator|user] --revision N',
+  'mosaic accounts user disable|enable|signout|remove ID --revision N',
+].join('\n');
+function parse(args) {
+  const words = [], values = {}, flags = new Set();
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const arg = args[i];
+    if (!arg.startsWith('--')) { words.push(arg); continue; }
+    if (flags.has(arg) || Object.hasOwn(values, arg)) throw new CliError(`duplicate ${arg}`, 4);
+    if (arg === '--tester') throw new CliError('refused: accounts takes the human shell, not --tester', 3);
+    if (arg === '--json') flags.add(arg);
+    else if (['--name', '--subject', '--role', '--revision'].includes(arg) && args[i + 1] && !args[i + 1].startsWith('--')) values[arg] = args[++i];
+    else throw new CliError(ACCOUNTS_USAGE, 4);
+  }
+  const verb = words[0] === 'user' ? `user.${words[1]}` : words[0];
+  const valid = ['init', 'list'].includes(verb) ? words.length === 1 : verb === 'user.add' ? words.length === 2 : ['user.disable', 'user.enable', 'user.signout', 'user.remove'].includes(verb) && words.length === 3;
+  if (!valid) throw new CliError(ACCOUNTS_USAGE, 4);
+  const allowed = verb === 'init' ? ['--name'] : verb === 'list' ? [] : verb === 'user.add' ? ['--name', '--subject', '--role', '--revision'] : ['--revision'];
+  if (Object.keys(values).some(k => !allowed.includes(k)) || (flags.size && verb !== 'list')) throw new CliError(ACCOUNTS_USAGE, 4);
+  const revision = verb === 'init' ? 0 : Number(values['--revision']);
+  if (verb !== 'list' && verb !== 'init' && (!/^[1-9][0-9]*$/.test(values['--revision'] ?? '') || !Number.isSafeInteger(revision))) throw new CliError('--revision requires the revision from accounts list', 4);
+  return { verb, values, flags, revision, id: words[2] };
+}
+function owns(user, owner, providers) {
+  return user.subjects.some(s => s.provider === owner.provider && s.sub === owner.sub && providers.find(p => p.id === s.provider)?.issuer === owner.iss);
+}
+function readOwner(root) {
+  const owner = readJsonFile(join(root, 'owner.json'), 'organization owner', st => {
+    if (st.uid !== process.geteuid() || (st.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) throw new CliError('refused: unsafe organization owner', 3);
+  });
+  rejectUnknownKeys(owner, ['provider', 'iss', 'sub'], 'organization owner');
+  for (const key of ['provider', 'iss', 'sub']) requireString(owner[key], `owner.${key}`, { max: 2048 });
+  return owner;
+}
+export async function accountsCommand(args, io, deps) {
+  refuseInsideAgent(io.env);
+  try {
+    const parsed = parse(args);
+    const dir = deps.configDir ?? configDir(io.env);
+    // This is deliberately before withRegistry as well as withAccounts.
+    assertAccountsOwner(dir, { uid: deps.uid ?? process.geteuid() });
+    const providers = deps.system.console?.sso?.providers ?? [];
+    const ctx = { configDir: dir, instance: deps.instance ?? basename(dir).replace(/^mosaic-/, ''), providers };
+    if (parsed.verb === 'list') {
+      const doc = loadAccounts(join(dir, 'accounts.json'), ctx);
+      const repairs = accountsRepairs(doc);
+      // Invites are not administered here. Never expose bindings or token hashes.
+      const listed = { ...doc, invites: doc.invites.map(({ tokenHash, bind, ...invite }) => invite), repairs };
+      io.stdout.write(parsed.flags.has('--json') ? JSON.stringify(listed, null, 2) + '\n' : [`accounts revision ${doc.revision}`, ...doc.users.map(u => `${u.id} ${u.name} ${u.instanceRole} ${u.state} authGen ${u.authGen}`), ...repairs.map(r => `${r.kind} ${r.org} needs repair: ${[r.unknownRole, ...r.unknownRights].filter(Boolean).join(', ')}`)].join('\n') + '\n');
+      return;
+    }
+    let added;
+    const mutate = doc => {
+      if (parsed.verb === 'init') {
+        const subjects = providers.flatMap(p => (p.subjects ?? []).map(s => ({ provider: p.id, sub: s.sub })));
+        if (!subjects.length) throw new CliError('refused: init requires console.sso subjects', 3);
+        added = { id: mintAccountId(), name: parsed.values['--name'] ?? 'Operator', subjects, instanceRole: 'operator', state: 'active', authGen: 1, created: new Date().toISOString() };
+        doc.users.push(added); return;
+      }
+      if (parsed.verb === 'user.add') {
+        const value = parsed.values['--subject'] ?? '', colon = value.indexOf(':');
+        if (!parsed.values['--name'] || colon < 1 || colon === value.length - 1) throw new CliError('user add needs --name and --subject PROVIDER:SUB', 4);
+        added = { id: mintAccountId(), name: parsed.values['--name'], subjects: [{ provider: value.slice(0, colon), sub: value.slice(colon + 1) }], instanceRole: parsed.values['--role'] ?? 'user', state: 'active', authGen: 1, created: new Date().toISOString() };
+        doc.users.push(added); return;
+      }
+      const u = doc.users.find(u => u.id === parsed.id);
+      if (!u) throw new CliError('refused: account not found', 2);
+      if (parsed.verb === 'user.remove') { doc.users = doc.users.filter(x => x !== u); doc.memberships = doc.memberships.filter(m => m.user !== u.id); }
+      else if (parsed.verb === 'user.signout') u.authGen++;
+      else { const state = parsed.verb === 'user.disable' ? 'disabled' : 'active'; if (u.state === state) throw new CliError('refused: account already has that state', 2); u.state = state; }
+    };
+    const opts = { revision: parsed.revision, verb: parsed.verb, init: parsed.verb === 'init' };
+    let result;
+    if (parsed.verb === 'user.remove') {
+      result = await withRegistry(ctx, registry => withAccounts(ctx, { ...opts, registry }, async doc => {
+        const user = doc.users.find(u => u.id === parsed.id);
+        if (!user) throw new CliError('refused: account not found', 2);
+        // Even disabled accounts keep ownership. A real create reserves before
+        // writing owner.json, so any missing owner must block removal too.
+        for (const entry of Object.values((await readRegistryLocked(registry)).orgs)) {
+          let owner;
+          try { owner = readOwner(entry.root); }
+          catch (e) { if (/not found/.test(e.message)) throw new CliError(`refused: org-create-in-progress: ${entry.id} has no owner metadata`, 3); throw e; }
+          if (owns(user, owner, providers)) throw new CliError(`refused: user-owns-org: ${entry.id}`, 3);
+        }
+        mutate(doc);
+      }), { write: false });
+    } else result = await withAccounts(ctx, opts, mutate);
+    io.stdout.write(`accounts ${parsed.verb.replace('.', ' ')}: ${added?.id ?? parsed.id ?? ''}, revision ${result.revision}\n`);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof CliError) throw e;
+    const error = new CliError(`refused: ${e.code ? e.code + ': ' : ''}${e.message}${e.committed ? '; accounts write committed; durability or receipt step failed; inspect before retrying' : ''}`, 3);
+    if (e.committed) error.committed = true;
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { hostsCommand, HOSTS_USAGE } from "./hosts.mjs";
 import { grantsCommand, GRANTS_USAGE } from "./grants.mjs";
 import { instancesCommand, orgInstancesCommand, ORG_INSTANCES_USAGE } from "./instances.mjs";
 import { accessCommand, accessContextFor } from "./access.mjs";
+import { accountsCommand, ACCOUNTS_USAGE } from "./accounts.mjs";
 import { createChannelCaller } from "../../plugins/src/channel.mjs";
 import { PluginError } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
 import { CliError, CliExit } from "./errors.mjs";
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ import { devCommand, DEV_USAGE, fixtureLaunchEnv, fixtureLauncherOptions } from
 import { runCommand, RUN_USAGE } from "./run-evidence.mjs";

 export const USAGE = `usage:
+  ${ACCOUNTS_USAGE}
  ${ORG_USAGE}
  ${USAGE_USAGE}
  ${LIMITS_USAGE}
@@ -745,6 +747,7 @@ export async function main(argv, io = { env: process.env, stdin: process.stdin,
      now: deps.now,
    });
  }
+  if (verb === 'accounts') return accountsCommand(rest, io, { system: deps.system ?? loadSystem({ env: io.env }), configDir: deps.accountsConfigDir });
  if (verb === "limits") return limitsCommand(rest,io,p=>callFor(p,io,deps));
  if (verb === "usage") return usageCommand(rest, io, p => callFor(p, io, deps));
  if (verb === "plugins") return pluginsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdtempSync, chmodSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { accountsCommand } from '../src/accounts.mjs';
+import { main } from '../src/cli.mjs';
+import { withRegistry, reserveOrg } from '../../organization/src/org-registry.mjs';
+const providers = [{ id: 'pocket', issuer: 'https://id.example', subjects: [{ sub: 'owner' }, { sub: 'other-owner' }] }, { id: 'second', issuer: 'https://second.example', subjects: [{ sub: 'owner' }] }];
+function setup(t) {
+ const configDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'a-')); chmodSync(configDir, 0o700); t.after(() => rmSync(configDir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+ const deps = { configDir, instance: 'test', system: { console: { sso: { providers } } } }; let output = '';
+ const io = { env: {}, stdout: { write: s => output += s }, stderr: { write: () => {} } };
+ return { configDir, deps, io, run: args => accountsCommand(args, io, deps), read: () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(configDir, 'accounts.json'))), output: () => output };
+}
+test('init makes exactly one operator from all configured subjects, then refuses rerun', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); const d = s.read(); assert.equal(d.users.length, 1); assert.equal(d.users[0].instanceRole, 'operator'); assert.equal(d.users[0].subjects.length, 3); assert.match(d.users[0].id, /^u-[0-9a-f]{12}$/); assert.equal(d.revision, 1);
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['init']), /already exists/); await s.run(['list', '--json']); assert.match(s.output(), /authGen/);
+ const r = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8')); assert.equal(r.uid, process.getuid()); assert.equal(r.verb, 'init'); assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(r).includes('other-owner'));
+});
+test('CLI add, disable, enable, signout and remove; last operator guard and stale revisions', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); const op = s.read().users[0].id;
+ await s.run(['user', 'add', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:pat:sub', '--revision', '1']); const id = s.read().users[1].id;
+ for (const [verb, revision, generation] of [['disable', 2, 2], ['enable', 3, 3], ['signout', 4, 4]]) { await s.run(['user', verb, id, '--revision', String(revision)]); assert.equal(s.read().users[1].authGen, generation); }
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'disable', op, '--revision', '5']), /active operator/);
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'signout', id, '--revision', '1']), /revision-conflict/);
+ await s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '5']); assert.equal(s.read().users.length, 1); assert.equal(s.read().revision, 6);
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8').trim().split('\n').length, 6);
+});
+test('host uid refusal happens before any lock, even on list or remove', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); for (const args of [['list'], ['init'], ['user', 'remove', 'u-000000000001', '--revision', '1']]) {
+ await assert.rejects(accountsCommand(args, s.io, { ...s.deps, uid: process.getuid() + 1 }), /uid/);
+ assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts.lock')), false); assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.configDir, 'org-runtime.lock')), false);
+ }
+});
+test('remove holds registry before accounts, refuses ownership of active or archived orgs, including a preceding create', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['user', 'add', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:pat', '--revision', '1']); const id = s.read().users[1].id;
+ const root = join(s.configDir, 'acme'); mkdirSync(root, { mode: 0o700 });
+ let release, entered; const ready = new Promise(r => entered = r), hold = new Promise(r => release = r);
+ const create = withRegistry(s.deps, async registry => { entered(); await hold; registry.orgs.acme = { id: 'acme', root, state: 'archived', revision: 1, created: '2026-11-10T00:00:00Z' }; writeFileSync(join(root, 'owner.json'), JSON.stringify({ provider: 'pocket', iss: 'https://id.example', sub: 'pat' }), { mode: 0o600 }); });
+ await ready; const removing = s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '2']); release(); await create; await assert.rejects(removing, /user-owns-org/); assert.equal(s.read().revision, 2);
+});
+test('remove drops memberships atomically, and malformed ownership metadata refuses', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['user', 'add', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:pat', '--revision', '1']); const d = s.read(), id = d.users[1].id;
+ d.memberships.push({ org: 'acme', incarnation: 'a'.repeat(32), user: id, role: 'member', rights: ['org.view'], scope: { projects: ['*'], instances: ['*'] }, rev: 1, by: d.users[0].id, added: '2026-11-10T00:00:00Z', via: 'invite:abc' }); writeFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts.json'), JSON.stringify(d));
+ await s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '2']); assert.deepEqual(s.read().memberships, []);
+ const root = join(s.configDir, 'broken'); mkdirSync(root, { mode: 0o700 });
+ await withRegistry(s.deps, async registry => { registry.orgs.broken = { id: 'broken', root, state: 'active', revision: 1, created: 'now' }; writeFileSync(join(root, 'owner.json'), '{}', { mode: 0o600 }); });
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'remove', s.read().users[0].id, '--revision', '3']), /owner/);
+});
+test('mosaic main wires accounts without a bus; tester, agent and unexpected args refuse', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await main(['accounts', 'init'], s.io, { system: s.deps.system, accountsConfigDir: s.configDir }); assert.equal(s.read().users.length, 1);
+ for (const args of [['list', '--tester'], ['list', '--subject', 'pocket:x'], ['user', 'add', 'chosen-id', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:x', '--revision', '1'], ['list', '--json', '--json']]) await assert.rejects(s.run(args));
+ await assert.rejects(accountsCommand(['list'], { ...s.io, env: { MOSAIC_RUN_ID: 'run' } }, s.deps), /human shell/);
+});
+
+
+test('review P2-2: real reservation wins before owner.json exists, and removal refuses', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['user', 'add', '--name', 'Pat', '--subject', 'pocket:pat', '--revision', '1']); const id = s.read().users[1].id;
+ const dataRoot = join(s.configDir, 'data'); mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 }); const ctx = { configDir: s.configDir, instance: 'test', dataRoot };
+ const org = await reserveOrg(ctx, 'acme'); assert.equal(existsSync(join(org.root, 'owner.json')), false);
+ await assert.rejects(s.run(['user', 'remove', id, '--revision', '2']), /org-create-in-progress/); assert.equal(s.read().users.length, 2); assert.equal(s.read().revision, 2);
+});
+
+
+test('host boundary and receipt use effective uid, not real uid (current design clarification)', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t), realUid = process.getuid, effectiveUid = process.geteuid();
+ process.getuid = () => effectiveUid + 1;
+ try { await s.run(['init']); await s.run(['list']); const receipt = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8')); assert.equal(receipt.uid, effectiveUid); }
+ finally { process.getuid = realUid; }
+});
@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ stay as the old names: each module there re-exports the module of the same name
 here (`src/business.mjs` re-exports `src/organization-config.mjs`), and its
 `src/cli.mjs` runs this package's `src/cli.mjs`. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-04_slice-1.md`,
 row S1. Design: `agents/darkwing/work/slice1-data-model-2026-10-04.md` and its
-addenda A and B. The package reads files and refuses on any problem. It
-never writes, and it never opens a token file.
+addenda A and B. Configuration readers refuse on any problem. Runtime
+organization and accounts stores provide explicit locked writes; this package
+never opens a token file.

 ```sh
 scripts/mosaic org config validate mosaic-stack
@@ -583,3 +584,44 @@ The optional `plugins.system-type` list enables installed system-type modules fo
 an organization. Missing means none. Unknown ids refuse validation. Changes
 are owner-only; project selections are separate bus settings and a selection
 whose type is disabled remains recorded as inactive.
+
+## Instance accounts (Phase M2)
+
+`src/accounts.mjs` validates `<configDir>/accounts.json` without a dependency or
+JSON schema engine, as `access.mjs` does. `checkAccounts(document, {providers})`
+and `loadAccounts(file, {providers})` return frozen documents. Providers are the
+configured `console.sso.providers` objects (including issuer). Reads refuse an
+unsafe config directory, unsafe file, unknown field or malformed row. Account
+ids may be organization humans. `accountsRepairs(document)` reports unknown
+roles and rights retained on read for rollback; these rows must grant nothing.
+M4 supplies the authorization evaluator; M2 alone grants no Console or bus access.
+
+`withAccounts(ctx, {revision, verb, actor?, registry?, init?}, mutate)` takes
+`accounts.lock`, reloads, checks the expected file revision, awaits `mutate` on a
+copy, maintains `authGen` and membership `rev`, validates and atomically replaces
+0600 bytes. Init publishes with a no-clobber hard link; replacements use rename.
+Both fsync the config directory before the receipt is appended. `ctx` contains `configDir`, `instance`, and `providers`. Init requires
+revision 0 and an absent file. Other writes require an existing valid file. Writes
+refuse unknown rights/roles on new or changed rows. Unchanged rollback rows pass
+through exactly, so they cannot block account revocation or another row's repair. Role templates are never evaluated as authority by this store.
+
+For a caller already holding accounts.lock,
+`withAccountsLock(ctx, handle => withAccountsLocked(handle, options, mutate))`
+reuses that live opaque handle. Never acquire an earlier lock from the callback.
+The config path must have no symlink ancestors, including the home directory.
+The order is lifecycle, registry, accounts. Registry-dependent writes pass the
+live document from `withRegistry`; `readRegistryLocked(registry, ctx?)` verifies
+the lock and rereads its persisted snapshot without relocking. A changed registry
+or an instance mismatch refuses before account publication. Callbacks cannot
+reuse a released handle, or run two writes at once through one handle.
+
+Each committed write appends and fsyncs one receipt under the accounts lock in
+`accounts-receipts.jsonl`: effective OS uid, actor id, verb, old/new file revisions, changed
+account ids with changed field names, and before/after membership rights, scope
+and revisions. No account
+name, subject, invite binding, hash, raw token or cookie enters the receipt. The
+store preflights the receipt destination before replacing accounts. As with
+other two-file journals, a crash or IO failure between replacement and receipt
+append can leave committed state without its receipt; an observed append failure
+has `committed: true` and must be inspected before retrying. It never rolls back
+committed authority silently or fabricates a success receipt.
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+// Phase M2 (#1873): instance accounts, independent of Console sessions and bus authority.
+import { constants, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
+import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname, join, parse, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { OrgError, readRegistryLocked } from './org-registry.mjs';
+import { readJsonFile, requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireString, requirePositiveInt, requireId, requireDistinctList, deepFreeze, canonicalJson } from './util.mjs';
+import { RIGHTS, ROLE_RIGHTS, normalizeRights } from './org-rights.mjs';
+
+const fail = (code, message = code) => { throw new OrgError(code, message); };
+const bad = message => fail('accounts-invalid', message);
+const USER_ID = /^u-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
+const HEX32 = /^[0-9a-f]{32}$/;
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
+const same = (a, b) => canonicalJson(a) === canonicalJson(b);
+const array = (x, at) => { if (!Array.isArray(x)) bad(`${at} must be an array`); return x; };
+const text = (x, at) => {
+  requireString(x, at, { max: 255 });
+  if (/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u061c\u200e\u200f\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\u2069]/.test(x)) bad(`${at} must not contain control or bidi formatting characters`);
+  return x;
+};
+const keys = (x, allowed, at) => { requireObject(x, at); rejectUnknownKeys(x, allowed, at); };
+const accountId = (x, at) => { if (typeof x !== 'string' || !USER_ID.test(x)) bad(`${at} must be u- plus 12 lowercase hex characters`); };
+function time(x, at) {
+  if (typeof x !== 'string' || !/^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\d(?:\.\d{1,3})?Z$/.test(x) || !Number.isFinite(Date.parse(x)) || new Date(x).toISOString().slice(0, 19) !== x.slice(0, 19)) bad(`${at} must be a real ISO time`);
+}
+function providerMap(context) {
+  const providers = new Map();
+  for (const p of array(context?.providers, 'accounts context.providers')) {
+    text(p.id, 'provider.id');
+    if (p.id === 'local-dev' || typeof p.issuer !== 'string' || !p.issuer.startsWith('https://')) bad('provider must have an https issuer and must not be local-dev');
+    try { if (new URL(p.issuer).protocol !== 'https:') bad('invalid issuer'); } catch { bad('invalid issuer'); }
+    if (providers.has(p.id)) bad('duplicate configured provider');
+    providers.set(p.id, p);
+  }
+  return providers;
+}
+function subject(s, at, providers) {
+  keys(s, ['provider', 'sub'], at);
+  if (s.provider === 'local-dev' || !providers.has(s.provider)) bad(`${at}.provider must be a configured provider, never local-dev`);
+  text(s.sub, `${at}.sub`);
+}
+function scope(s, at) {
+  keys(s, ['projects', 'instances', 'expires'], at);
+  for (const key of ['projects', 'instances']) {
+    const entries = requireDistinctList(s[key], `${at}.${key}`, x => {
+      if (x === '*') return;
+      if (key === 'projects') { if (typeof x !== 'string' || !UUID.test(x)) bad(`${at}.projects must contain UUIDs`); }
+      else requireId(x, `${at}.instances`);
+    }, { nonEmpty: true });
+    if (entries.includes('*') && entries.length !== 1) bad(`${at}.${key} must use "*" alone`);
+  }
+  if (s.expires !== undefined) time(s.expires, `${at}.expires`);
+}
+function rowRights(row, at) {
+  requireId(row.role, `${at}.role`);
+  if (row.role === 'owner') bad(`${at}.role is not grantable`);
+  const rights = requireDistinctList(row.rights, `${at}.rights`, r => {
+    text(r, `${at}.rights`);
+    if (r === 'owner' || (Object.hasOwn(RIGHTS, r) && !RIGHTS[r].grantable)) bad(`${at}.rights is not grantable`);
+    if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:\.[a-z][a-z0-9]*)*$/.test(r)) bad(`${at}.rights contains an invalid name`);
+  }, { nonEmpty: true });
+  if (!rights.includes('org.view') || !same(rights, [...rights].sort())) bad(`${at}.rights must be sorted and contain org.view`);
+  scope(row.scope, `${at}.scope`);
+  requireId(row.org, `${at}.org`);
+  if (typeof row.incarnation !== 'string' || !HEX32.test(row.incarnation)) bad(`${at}.incarnation must be 32 lowercase hex characters`);
+}
+
+// Pure whole-file validation. Unknown, well-formed rights/roles survive a rollback;
+// accountsRepairs exposes them without changing the persisted schema.
+export function checkAccounts(document, context) {
+  const providers = providerMap(context);
+  keys(document, ['accountsVersion', 'revision', 'users', 'memberships', 'invites'], 'accounts file');
+  if (document.accountsVersion !== 1) bad('accountsVersion must be 1');
+  requirePositiveInt(document.revision, 'revision');
+  const users = new Set(), subjects = new Set(); let operators = 0;
+  array(document.users, 'users').forEach((u, i) => {
+    const at = `users[${i}]`;
+    keys(u, ['id', 'subjects', 'name', 'instanceRole', 'state', 'authGen', 'created'], at);
+    accountId(u.id, `${at}.id`); if (users.has(u.id)) bad('duplicate account id'); users.add(u.id);
+    text(u.name, `${at}.name`);
+    if (!['operator', 'user'].includes(u.instanceRole)) bad(`${at}.instanceRole must be operator or user`);
+    if (!['active', 'disabled'].includes(u.state)) bad(`${at}.state must be active or disabled`);
+    requirePositiveInt(u.authGen, `${at}.authGen`); time(u.created, `${at}.created`);
+    if (u.instanceRole === 'operator' && u.state === 'active') operators++;
+    array(u.subjects, `${at}.subjects`).forEach((s, j) => {
+      subject(s, `${at}.subjects[${j}]`, providers); const key = JSON.stringify([s.provider, s.sub]);
+      if (subjects.has(key)) bad('subject appears more than once in the file'); subjects.add(key);
+    });
+    if (!u.subjects.length) bad(`${at}.subjects must not be empty`);
+  });
+  if (!operators) bad('at least one active operator must exist');
+  const memberships = new Set();
+  array(document.memberships, 'memberships').forEach((m, i) => {
+    const at = `memberships[${i}]`;
+    keys(m, ['org', 'incarnation', 'user', 'role', 'rights', 'scope', 'rev', 'added', 'by', 'via'], at);
+    rowRights(m, at); accountId(m.user, `${at}.user`); if (!users.has(m.user)) bad(`${at}.user must name an account`);
+    accountId(m.by, `${at}.by`); text(m.via, `${at}.via`); time(m.added, `${at}.added`); requirePositiveInt(m.rev, `${at}.rev`);
+    const key = JSON.stringify([m.org, m.incarnation, m.user]); if (memberships.has(key)) bad('duplicate membership'); memberships.add(key);
+  });
+  const invites = new Set(), hashes = new Set();
+  array(document.invites, 'invites').forEach((invite, i) => {
+    const at = `invites[${i}]`;
+    keys(invite, ['id', 'org', 'incarnation', 'role', 'rights', 'scope', 'bind', 'tokenHash', 'by', 'created', 'expires', 'state', 'user', 'used'], at);
+    rowRights(invite, at); text(invite.id, `${at}.id`); if (!UUID.test(invite.id)) bad(`${at}.id must be a UUID`);
+    if (invites.has(invite.id)) bad('duplicate invite id'); invites.add(invite.id);
+    if (typeof invite.tokenHash !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(invite.tokenHash) || hashes.has(invite.tokenHash)) bad(`${at}.tokenHash must be a unique sha256 hex hash`); hashes.add(invite.tokenHash);
+    accountId(invite.by, `${at}.by`); time(invite.created, `${at}.created`); time(invite.expires, `${at}.expires`);
+    if (Date.parse(invite.expires) <= Date.parse(invite.created)) bad(`${at}.expires must follow created`);
+    const ttl = Date.parse(invite.expires) - Date.parse(invite.created);
+    if (ttl < 3600000 || ttl > 168 * 3600000) bad(`${at} validity must be between 1 and 168 hours`);
+    if (!['open', 'used', 'revoked', 'declined', 'expired'].includes(invite.state)) bad(`${at}.state is invalid`);
+    requireObject(invite.bind, `${at}.bind`);
+    if (Object.hasOwn(invite.bind, 'email')) { keys(invite.bind, ['email'], `${at}.bind`); text(invite.bind.email, `${at}.bind.email`); if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(invite.bind.email)) bad(`${at}.bind.email must be one address`); }
+    else subject(invite.bind, `${at}.bind`, providers);
+    if (invite.state === 'used') { accountId(invite.user, `${at}.user`); time(invite.used, `${at}.used`); }
+    else if (invite.user !== undefined || invite.used !== undefined) bad(`${at} unused invite has usage fields`);
+  });
+  return deepFreeze(structuredClone(document));
+}
+export function accountsRepairs(doc) {
+  const result = [];
+  for (const [kind, rows] of [['membership', doc.memberships], ['invite', doc.invites]]) for (const row of rows) {
+    const unknownRole = Object.hasOwn(ROLE_RIGHTS, row.role) ? undefined : row.role;
+    const unknownRights = row.rights.filter(r => !Object.hasOwn(RIGHTS, r));
+    if (unknownRole || unknownRights.length) result.push({ kind, org: row.org, ...(kind === 'membership' ? { user: row.user } : { id: row.id }), ...(unknownRole ? { unknownRole } : {}), unknownRights });
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+// Check the host boundary before any read or lock. Every ancestor must be a real
+// directory; configDir itself belongs to this uid and is not publicly writable.
+export function assertAccountsOwner(configDir, { uid = process.geteuid() } = {}) {
+  if (typeof configDir !== 'string' || resolve(configDir) !== configDir) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config directory must be an absolute normalized path');
+  let current = parse(configDir).root;
+  for (const part of configDir.slice(current.length).split('/').filter(Boolean)) {
+    current = join(current, part); const st = lstatSync(current);
+    if (!st.isDirectory() || st.isSymbolicLink()) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config path contains a symlink or non-directory');
+  }
+  const st = lstatSync(configDir);
+  if (st.uid !== uid) fail('accounts-unsafe', `config directory must belong to uid ${uid}: ${configDir}`);
+  if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'config directory must not be writable by group or other');
+}
+export function loadAccounts(file, context, { uid = process.geteuid() } = {}) {
+  assertAccountsOwner(dirname(file), { uid });
+  const doc = readJsonFile(file, 'accounts file', st => {
+    if (st.uid !== uid) fail('accounts-unsafe', `accounts file must belong to uid ${uid}: ${file}`);
+    if (st.mode & 0o022) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'accounts file must not be writable by group or other');
+  });
+  return checkAccounts(doc, context);
+}
+export const mintAccountId = () => `u-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`;
+const heldAccounts = new WeakMap();
+
+// Low-level helper for callers already holding the earlier lifecycle/registry
+// locks. A handle is valid only within this callback and serializes all writes.
+export async function withAccountsLock(ctx, fn) {
+  assertAccountsOwner(ctx.configDir);
+  const lock = join(ctx.configDir, 'accounts.lock'); let fd;
+  for (let n = 0; n < 200; n++) {
+    try { fd = await fs.open(lock, 'wx', 0o600); break; }
+    catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw e; await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 10)); }
+  }
+  if (!fd) fail('accounts-locked', 'accounts lock is held; inspect it before retrying');
+  const handle = Object.freeze({}); heldAccounts.set(handle, { ctx, writing: false });
+  try { return await fn(handle); }
+  finally { heldAccounts.delete(handle); await fd.close(); await fs.unlink(lock); }
+}
+export async function withAccounts(ctx, options, fn) {
+  if (options.registry) await readRegistryLocked(options.registry, ctx);
+  return withAccountsLock(ctx, handle => withAccountsLocked(handle, options, fn));
+}
+const VERBS = new Set(['init', 'user.add', 'user.disable', 'user.enable', 'user.signout', 'user.remove', 'user.update', 'membership.add', 'membership.rights', 'membership.remove', 'membership.leave', 'invite.create', 'invite.accept', 'invite.decline', 'invite.revoke', 'org.delete', 'orphans.sweep']);
+function generations(next, before, verb) {
+  for (const u of next.users) {
+    const old = before?.users.find(x => x.id === u.id);
+    if (!old) { u.authGen = 1; continue; }
+    const changed = u.state !== old.state || u.instanceRole !== old.instanceRole || !same(u.subjects, old.subjects);
+    if (changed) u.authGen = old.authGen + 1;
+    else if (u.authGen !== old.authGen && !(verb === 'user.signout' && u.authGen === old.authGen + 1)) bad('authGen may only advance one generation for signout or an authentication change');
+    if (u.created !== old.created) bad('account created time is immutable');
+  }
+  for (const m of next.memberships) {
+    const old = before?.memberships.find(x => x.org === m.org && x.incarnation === m.incarnation && x.user === m.user);
+    // A rollback row grants nothing, but must not block unrelated account
+    // revocation or the repair of another row. Preserve unchanged rows exactly.
+    if (old && same(m, old)) continue;
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(ROLE_RIGHTS, m.role) || m.role === 'owner') fail('unknown-role', 'unknown or ungrantable membership role');
+    m.rights = [...normalizeRights(m.rights)];
+    m.rev = old ? old.rev + (!same(old.rights, m.rights) || !same(old.scope, m.scope) ? 1 : 0) : 1;
+  }
+  for (const i of next.invites) {
+    const old = before?.invites.find(x => x.id === i.id);
+    if (old && same(i, old)) continue;
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(ROLE_RIGHTS, i.role) || i.role === 'owner') fail('unknown-role', 'unknown or ungrantable invite role');
+    i.rights = [...normalizeRights(i.rights)];
+  }
+}
+// Receipt construction has no free-form text: no names, subjects, bindings,
+// tokens, hashes, caller-supplied objects, or cookies can enter the log.
+function receipt(before, after, { verb, actor }, at) {
+  if (!VERBS.has(verb)) bad('unsupported receipt verb');
+  if (actor !== undefined && actor !== 'human') accountId(actor, 'receipt actor');
+  const membership = m => ({ org: m.org, incarnation: m.incarnation, user: m.user, role: Object.hasOwn(ROLE_RIGHTS, m.role) ? m.role : 'unknown', rights: m.rights, scope: m.scope, rev: m.rev });
+  return { at, uid: process.geteuid(), actor: actor ?? 'human', verb, revisionBefore: before?.revision ?? 0, revisionAfter: after.revision,
+    users: after.users.filter(u => !before || !same(u, before.users.find(x => x.id === u.id))).map(u => u.id),
+    userChanges: after.users.flatMap(u => {
+      const old = before?.users.find(x => x.id === u.id);
+      const changed = ['subjects', 'name', 'instanceRole', 'state', 'authGen', 'created'].filter(key => !old || !same(u[key], old[key]));
+      return changed.length ? [{ id: u.id, changed }] : [];
+    }),
+    removedUsers: (before?.users ?? []).filter(u => !after.users.some(x => x.id === u.id)).map(u => u.id),
+    memberships: { before: (before?.memberships ?? []).map(membership), after: after.memberships.map(membership) } };
+}
+async function syncDirectory(dir) {
+  const fd = await fs.open(dir, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
+  try { await fd.sync(); } finally { await fd.close(); }
+}
+
+// Re-read under the lock, compare expected revision, validate and atomically
+// replace 0600 bytes, then append and fsync exactly one receipt while still held.
+// A post-rename receipt failure reports committed=true: retrying is not safe.
+export async function withAccountsLocked(handle, options, fn) {
+  const held = heldAccounts.get(handle);
+  if (!held || held.writing) fail('accounts-locked', 'a live, unused accounts lock handle is required');
+  held.writing = true;
+  const { ctx } = held; const file = join(ctx.configDir, 'accounts.json');
+  let temp, receiptFd, committed = false;
+  try {
+    if (options.registry) await readRegistryLocked(options.registry, ctx);
+    assertAccountsOwner(ctx.configDir);
+    let before;
+    if (options.init) {
+      try { await fs.lstat(file); fail('accounts-exists', 'accounts.json already exists'); } catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') throw e; }
+      if (options.revision !== 0) fail('revision-conflict');
+    } else before = loadAccounts(file, ctx);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.revision) || options.revision !== (before?.revision ?? 0)) fail('revision-conflict', `revision-conflict: accounts revision is ${before?.revision ?? 0}`);
+    const next = before ? structuredClone(before) : { accountsVersion: 1, revision: 0, users: [], memberships: [], invites: [] };
+    await fn(next);
+    generations(next, before, options.verb); next.revision = (before?.revision ?? 0) + 1;
+    const checked = checkAccounts(next, ctx);
+    const line = receipt(before, checked, options, new Date().toISOString());
+    // Refuse unsafe receipt destinations before publishing the account change.
+    receiptFd = await fs.open(join(ctx.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_APPEND | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK, 0o600);
+    const st = await receiptFd.stat();
+    if (!st.isFile() || st.uid !== process.geteuid() || (st.mode & 0o022) || st.nlink !== 1) fail('accounts-unsafe', 'unsafe accounts receipt file');
+    temp = join(ctx.configDir, `.accounts-${randomBytes(12).toString('hex')}`);
+    const fd = await fs.open(temp, 'wx', 0o600);
+    try { await fd.writeFile(JSON.stringify(checked, null, 2) + '\n'); await fd.sync(); } finally { await fd.close(); }
+    await options.beforeReplace?.();
+    if (options.registry) await readRegistryLocked(options.registry, ctx);
+    // Defend against a non-cooperating writer even though cooperative writers
+    // already serialize through accounts.lock.
+    if (before) { if (!same(loadAccounts(file, ctx), before)) fail('revision-conflict', 'accounts changed before replace'); }
+    // Init must never replace a target, including one created by a writer that
+    // ignores accounts.lock. link publishes the complete inode or fails EEXIST.
+    if (before) await fs.rename(temp, file);
+    else await fs.link(temp, file);
+    committed = true;
+    if (!before) await fs.unlink(temp);
+    await (options.syncDirectory ?? syncDirectory)(ctx.configDir);
+    await receiptFd.writeFile(JSON.stringify(line) + '\n'); await receiptFd.sync();
+    return checked;
+  } catch (e) { if (committed) e.committed = true; throw e; }
+  finally { if (temp) await fs.rm(temp, { force: true }); if (receiptFd) await receiptFd.close(); held.writing = false; }
+}
@@ -36,14 +36,29 @@ export async function readRegistry({ configDir }) {
  return validateRegistry(doc, file);
 }
 export async function listOrgs(ctx) { const doc = await readRegistry(ctx); return doc ? Object.values(doc.orgs) : []; }
+const heldRegistries = new WeakMap();
+// Only a live withRegistry document may be reused by a later accounts-lock
+// holder. Recheck the persisted snapshot without reacquiring this lock.
+export async function readRegistryLocked(registry, ctx) {
+  const held = heldRegistries.get(registry);
+  if (!held) fail('org-locked', 'a live registry lock document is required');
+  if (ctx && (ctx.configDir !== held.ctx.configDir || ctx.instance !== held.ctx.instance)) fail('org-mismatch', 'registry lock belongs to another instance');
+  const current = await readRegistry(held.ctx);
+  if (JSON.stringify(current) !== held.persisted) fail('registry-changed', 'registry-changed before accounts replace');
+  return validateRegistry(registry, join(held.ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.json'));
+}
 export async function withRegistry(ctx, fn, { write = true } = {}) {
  await safeDir(ctx.configDir); await privateDir(ctx.configDir); const lock = join(ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.lock'); let fd;
  for (let n = 0; n < 200; n++) { try { fd = await fs.open(lock, 'wx', 0o600); break; } catch (e) { if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw e; await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 10)); } }
  if (!fd) fail('org-locked', 'registry lock is held', lock);
  try {
-    const registry = await readRegistry(ctx) ?? { version: 1, instance: ctx.instance, orgs: {} };
+    const persisted = await readRegistry(ctx);
+    const registry = persisted ?? { version: 1, instance: ctx.instance, orgs: {} };
    if (registry.instance !== ctx.instance) fail('org-mismatch', 'registry instance mismatch');
-    const result = await fn(registry);
+    heldRegistries.set(registry, { ctx, persisted: JSON.stringify(persisted) });
+    let result;
+    try { result = await fn(registry); }
+    finally { heldRegistries.delete(registry); }
    if (write) {
      const file = join(ctx.configDir, 'org-runtime.json'); const temp = join(ctx.configDir, `.org-runtime-${randomBytes(12).toString('hex')}`);
      try { await fs.writeFile(temp, JSON.stringify(registry, null, 2) + '\n', { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' }); await fs.rename(temp, file); } finally { await fs.rm(temp, { force: true }); }
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, existsSync, readdirSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { checkAccounts, loadAccounts, accountsRepairs, withAccounts, withAccountsLock, withAccountsLocked } from '../src/accounts.mjs';
+import { templateRender } from '../src/org-service.mjs';
+import { loadBusiness } from '../src/organization-config.mjs';
+import { REPO_ROLES } from './helpers.mjs';
+import { withRegistry, readRegistryLocked } from '../src/org-registry.mjs';
+
+export const OP = 'u-000000000001', USER = 'u-000000000002';
+export const context = { providers: [{ id: 'pocket', issuer: 'https://id.example', subjects: [{ sub: 'owner' }] }] };
+export const user = (id = OP, sub = 'owner', instanceRole = 'operator') => ({ id, subjects: [{ provider: 'pocket', sub }], name: 'Person', instanceRole, state: 'active', authGen: 1, created: '2026-11-10T00:00:00Z' });
+export const member = () => ({ org: 'acme', incarnation: 'a'.repeat(32), user: USER, role: 'member', rights: ['board.read', 'org.view', 'thread.read'], scope: { projects: ['*'], instances: ['*'] }, rev: 1, added: '2026-11-10T00:00:00Z', by: OP, via: 'invite:abc' });
+export const document = () => ({ accountsVersion: 1, revision: 1, users: [user(), user(USER, 'member', 'user')], memberships: [], invites: [] });
+function setup(t, doc = document()) {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'a-')); chmodSync(dir, 0o700); t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const file = join(dir, 'accounts.json'); writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(doc), { mode: 0o600 });
+  return { configDir: dir, instance: 'test', ...context, file };
+}
+const write = (ctx, revision, fn, rest = {}) => withAccounts(ctx, { revision, verb: 'user.signout', ...rest }, fn);
+
+test('loader refuses every malformed document as a whole, including nested unknown keys', t => {
+  const cases = [d => d.accountsVersion = 2, d => d.revision = 0, d => d.cookie = 'secret', d => d.users[0].id = 'human', d => d.users[0].authGen = 0, d => d.users[0].authGen = 1.5, d => d.users[0].instanceRole = 'owner', d => d.users[0].state = 'disabled', d => d.users[0].subjects[0].provider = 'local-dev', d => d.users[0].subjects[0].provider = 'missing', d => d.users[1].subjects = d.users[0].subjects, d => d.users[0].subjects[0].iss = 'https://evil', d => d.users[0].created = '2026-02-30T00:00:00Z', d => d.memberships.push({}), d => { const m = member(); m.rights.push('org.setup'); d.memberships.push(m); }, d => { const m = member(); m.rights.reverse(); d.memberships.push(m); }, d => { const m = member(); m.scope.instances = ['*', 'coder']; d.memberships.push(m); }, d => { const m = member(); m.user = 'u-000000000003'; d.memberships.push(m); }];
+  for (const mutate of cases) { const d = document(); mutate(d); assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(d, context), undefined, mutate.toString()); }
+  assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(document(), { providers: [{ id: 'pocket', issuer: 'local-dev' }] }));
+  const s = setup(t); assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s, { uid: process.getuid() + 1 }), /uid/);
+  for (const mode of [0o620, 0o602]) { chmodSync(s.file, mode); assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s), /writable/); }
+  chmodSync(s.file, 0o600); const target = join(s.configDir, 'real'); writeFileSync(target, JSON.stringify(document()), { mode: 0o600 }); unlinkSync(s.file); symlinkSync(target, s.file); assert.throws(() => loadAccounts(s.file, s), /symbolic/);
+});
+
+test('unknown role and right load as repair rows; account may be a business human', () => {
+  const d = document(); const m = member(); m.role = 'future'; m.rights.push('zz.future'); d.memberships.push(m);
+  const loaded = checkAccounts(d, { ...context, businesses: { acme: { human: OP } } });
+  assert.equal(loaded.users[0].id, OP); assert.ok(Object.isFrozen(loaded.users[0]));
+  assert.deepEqual(accountsRepairs(loaded), [{ kind: 'membership', org: 'acme', user: USER, unknownRole: 'future', unknownRights: ['zz.future'] }]);
+});
+
+test('writes refuse stale revision, unknown role/right and reserved rights without a receipt', async t => {
+  const s = setup(t); const before = readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8');
+  await assert.rejects(write(s, 9, () => {}), /revision-conflict/);
+  for (const change of [m => m.role = 'future', m => m.rights.push('zz.future'), m => m.rights.push('org.setup')]) {
+    await assert.rejects(write(s, 1, d => { const m = member(); change(m); d.memberships.push(m); }));
+  }
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), before); assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl')), false);
+});
+
+test('rights/scope revisions and security generations are maintained by the writer', async t => {
+  const d = document(); d.memberships.push(member()); const s = setup(t, d);
+  let rev = 1;
+  for (const change of [u => u.state = 'disabled', u => u.state = 'active', u => u.instanceRole = 'operator', u => u.subjects[0].sub = 'new-sub']) {
+    const result = await write(s, rev++, next => change(next.users[1])); assert.equal(result.users[1].authGen, rev);
+  }
+  let result = await write(s, rev++, next => next.users[1].authGen++); assert.equal(result.users[1].authGen, rev);
+  result = await write(s, rev++, next => next.memberships[0].rights.push('task.write')); assert.equal(result.memberships[0].rev, 2);
+  result = await write(s, rev++, next => next.memberships[0].scope.instances = ['coder']); assert.equal(result.memberships[0].rev, 3);
+  assert.equal(result.users[1].authGen, 6);
+  const lines = readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8').trim().split('\n').map(JSON.parse);
+  assert.equal(lines.length, 7); for (const r of lines) { assert.equal(r.uid, process.getuid()); assert.equal(r.verb, 'user.signout'); }
+  assert.equal(statSync(s.file).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
+});
+
+test('concurrent writes serialize and the later stale write changes nothing', async t => {
+  const s = setup(t); let release, entered; const ready = new Promise(r => entered = r); const wait = new Promise(r => release = r);
+  const first = write(s, 1, async d => { entered(); await wait; d.users[1].authGen++; }); await ready;
+  const second = write(s, 1, d => { d.users[1].authGen++; }); release();
+  const results = await Promise.allSettled([first, second]); assert.equal(results[0].status, 'fulfilled'); assert.equal(results[1].status, 'rejected'); assert.match(results[1].reason.message, /revision-conflict/);
+  assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).revision, 2);
+});
+
+test('locked helpers require live handles; registry dependency is rechecked before replace', async t => {
+  const s = setup(t); let held;
+  await assert.rejects(readRegistryLocked({}), /lock/);
+  await assert.rejects(withAccountsLocked({}, { revision: 1, verb: 'user.signout' }, () => {}), /lock/);
+  await withRegistry(s, async registry => {
+    assert.equal(await readRegistryLocked(registry), registry);
+    await withAccountsLock(s, async handle => { held = handle; await withAccountsLocked(handle, { revision: 1, verb: 'user.signout', registry }, d => d.users[1].authGen++); });
+  });
+  await assert.rejects(withAccountsLocked(held, { revision: 2, verb: 'user.signout' }, () => {}), /lock/);
+  const before = readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8');
+  await withRegistry(s, async registry => {
+    await assert.rejects(write(s, 2, d => { d.users[1].authGen++; writeFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'org-runtime.json'), JSON.stringify({ version: 1, instance: 'test', orgs: { changed: { id: 'changed', root: '/elsewhere', state: 'active', revision: 1, created: 'now' } } }), { mode: 0o600 }); }, { registry }), /registry-changed/);
+  }, { write: false });
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), before);
+});
+
+test('failure before replace leaves old bytes, no receipt line and no temporary file', async t => {
+  const s = setup(t); const before = readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8');
+  await assert.rejects(write(s, 1, d => d.users[1].authGen++, { beforeReplace: () => { throw new Error('injected failure'); } }), /injected failure/);
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), before); assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(s.configDir).filter(f => f.startsWith('.accounts-')), []); assert.equal(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'), '');
+});
+
+test('receipts never serialize subject secrets, tokens, cookies, names or arbitrary actor text', async t => {
+  const s = setup(t); const secret = 'subject-secret';
+  await write(s, 1, d => { d.users[1].subjects[0].sub = secret; d.users[1].name = 'cookie-secret'; }, { actor: OP });
+  const raw = readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'); assert.ok(!raw.includes(secret)); assert.ok(!raw.includes('cookie-secret'));
+  await assert.rejects(write(s, 2, () => {}, { verb: 'token-secret' }));
+  await assert.rejects(write(s, 2, () => {}, { actor: 'cookie-secret' }));
+});
+
+test('malformed membership rows refuse all of the file; reserved rights never load', () => {
+  const mutations = [m => m.role = 'owner', m => m.rev = 0, m => m.incarnation = 'old', m => m.rights = ['thread.read'], m => m.rights = ['org.view', 'org.view'], m => m.scope = { projects: [], instances: ['*'] }, m => m.scope.projects = ['not-a-uuid'], m => m.scope.expires = 'not-a-time', m => m.extra = true, m => m.by = 'human', m => m.via = '', m => m.added = 'bad'];
+  for (const mutate of mutations) { const d = document(), m = member(); mutate(m); d.memberships.push(m); assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(d, context), undefined, mutate.toString()); }
+  for (const right of ['members.manage', 'org.setup', 'org.lifecycle', 'request.write', 'owner']) { const d = document(), m = member(); m.rights = ['org.view', right].sort(); d.memberships.push(m); assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(d, context)); }
+});
+function invitation() {
+ const { user: ignored, rev, added, via, ...row } = member();
+ return { ...row, id: '11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555', bind: { email: '[email protected]' }, tokenHash: 'b'.repeat(64), created: '2026-11-10T00:00:00Z', expires: '2026-11-13T00:00:00Z', state: 'open' };
+}
+test('invite schema refuses raw secrets, domain/bearer bindings, malformed hashes and unknown fields', () => {
+ const d = document(); d.invites.push(invitation()); assert.equal(checkAccounts(d, context).invites.length, 1);
+ for (const mutate of [i => i.token = 'raw-token', i => i.cookie = 'raw-cookie', i => i.bind = { domain: 'example.com' }, i => i.bind = {}, i => i.bind = { email: '@example.com' }, i => i.bind.sub = 'extra-binding', i => i.tokenHash = 'raw-token', i => i.state = 'other', i => i.rights = ['org.setup', 'org.view'], i => i.scope.level = 'collaborator']) {
+  const next = structuredClone(d); mutate(next.invites[0]); assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(next, context));
+ }
+ d.invites[0].role = 'future'; d.invites[0].rights.push('zz.future'); assert.equal(accountsRepairs(checkAccounts(d, context))[0].kind, 'invite');
+});
+test('unsafe receipt destination refuses before publication and leaves its target intact', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t), target = join(s.configDir, 'target'); writeFileSync(target, 'untouched', { mode: 0o600 }); symlinkSync(target, join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'));
+ const before = readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'); await assert.rejects(write(s, 1, d => d.users[1].authGen++)); assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), before); assert.equal(readFileSync(target, 'utf8'), 'untouched');
+});
+test('account lock allows sequential writes and registry handles cannot cross instance boundaries', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t), other = setup(t);
+ await withAccountsLock(s, async handle => {
+   await withAccountsLocked(handle, { revision: 1, verb: 'user.signout' }, d => d.users[1].authGen++);
+   await withAccountsLocked(handle, { revision: 2, verb: 'user.signout' }, d => d.users[1].authGen++);
+ });
+ await withRegistry(other, async registry => { await assert.rejects(write(s, 3, () => {}, { registry }), /another instance/); });
+ assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).revision, 3);
+});
+test('invite token hashes and subject bindings never reach receipts', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); const invite = invitation(); invite.bind = { provider: 'pocket', sub: 'subject-secret' };
+ await write(s, 1, d => d.invites.push(invite), { verb: 'invite.create' });
+ const raw = readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'); assert.ok(!raw.includes(invite.tokenHash)); assert.ok(!raw.includes('subject-secret')); assert.equal(JSON.parse(raw).verb, 'invite.create');
+});
+
+test('a failed rename preserves published bytes and appends no receipt', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t), before = readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8');
+ await assert.rejects(write(s, 1, d => d.users[1].authGen++, { beforeReplace: () => { const temp = readdirSync(s.configDir).find(f => f.startsWith('.accounts-')); unlinkSync(join(s.configDir, temp)); } }), { code: 'ENOENT' });
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), before); assert.equal(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'), ''); assert.ok(!existsSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts.lock')));
+});
+
+
+test('review P2-1: rollback rows survive unrelated disable/signout but cannot be added or edited', async t => {
+ const d = document(), m = member(), invite = invitation(); m.role = 'future'; m.rights.push('zz.future'); invite.rights.push('zz.future'); d.memberships.push(m); d.invites.push(invite); const s = setup(t, d);
+ const disabled = await write(s, 1, next => next.users[1].state = 'disabled', { verb: 'user.disable' });
+ assert.deepEqual(disabled.memberships, d.memberships); assert.deepEqual(disabled.invites, d.invites);
+ const signedOut = await write(s, 2, next => next.users[0].authGen++); assert.deepEqual(signedOut.memberships, d.memberships); assert.equal(signedOut.users[0].authGen, 2);
+ await assert.rejects(write(s, 3, next => next.memberships[0].scope.instances = ['coder']), /unknown/);
+ await assert.rejects(write(s, 3, next => next.invites[0].state = 'revoked'), /unknown/);
+ const repaired = await write(s, 3, next => { next.memberships[0].role = 'member'; next.memberships[0].rights = ['org.view']; }); assert.equal(repaired.memberships[0].rev, 2); assert.deepEqual(repaired.invites, d.invites);
+});
+test('review P3-1: control and bidi characters refuse in names, subjects and provenance', () => {
+ for (const control of ['\x1b', '\x07', '\r', '\n', '\x7f', '\u0085', '\u202e', '\u2066']) for (const field of ['name', 'sub', 'via']) {
+  const d = document(); d.memberships.push(member()); if (field === 'via') d.memberships[0].via += control; else if (field === 'sub') d.users[1].subjects[0].sub += control; else d.users[1].name += control;
+  assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(d, context));
+ }
+});
+test('review P3-2: invite validity is between one and 168 hours inclusive', () => {
+ for (const hours of [0.5, 169, 87600]) { const d = document(), i = invitation(); i.expires = new Date(Date.parse(i.created) + hours * 3600000).toISOString(); d.invites.push(i); assert.throws(() => checkAccounts(d, context)); }
+ for (const hours of [1, 168]) { const d = document(), i = invitation(); i.expires = new Date(Date.parse(i.created) + hours * 3600000).toISOString(); d.invites.push(i); assert.equal(checkAccounts(d, context).invites.length, 1); }
+});
+test('review P3-3: receipts record actual changed field names even for a misleading verb', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); await write(s, 1, d => d.users[1].instanceRole = 'operator');
+ const r = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8')); assert.deepEqual(r.userChanges, [{ id: USER, changed: ['instanceRole', 'authGen'] }]);
+});
+test('review P3-4: directory durability failure reports committed state and appends no success receipt', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); let error;
+ try { await write(s, 1, d => d.users[1].authGen++, { syncDirectory: async () => { throw new Error('injected directory sync failure'); } }); } catch (e) { error = e; }
+ assert.match(error?.message ?? '', /injected directory sync failure/); assert.equal(error.committed, true); assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).revision, 2); assert.equal(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'), '');
+});
+test('review P3-5: init cannot clobber a file created after its last absence check', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t); unlinkSync(s.file); const intruder = 'concurrent file';
+ await assert.rejects(withAccounts(s, { revision: 0, verb: 'init', init: true, beforeReplace: () => writeFileSync(s.file, intruder, { mode: 0o600 }) }, d => d.users.push(user())), { code: 'EEXIST' });
+ assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, 'utf8'), intruder); assert.equal(readFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'accounts-receipts.jsonl'), 'utf8'), '');
+});
+test('review P3-6: a real business file and accounts file load with the same human id', async t => {
+ const s = setup(t), doc = await templateRender('acme'); doc.human = OP; mkdirSync(join(s.configDir, 'businesses')); writeFileSync(join(s.configDir, 'businesses', 'acme.json'), JSON.stringify(doc), { mode: 0o600 });
+ assert.equal(loadBusiness('acme', { dir: s.configDir, rolesDir: REPO_ROLES }).human, OP); assert.equal(loadAccounts(s.file, s).users[0].id, OP);
+});
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jason.woltje	f98f278fbb	docs: roles design review fixes (#1873 ) Route merge, policy, hire, fire and credential decisions to the human and keep merge and policy cross-role only. A person-started hire is a decision record. Restructure the usability table by who acts, list template roles explicitly, add the arbiter threat row and slice tests.	2026-11-10 15:00:43 -06:00
jason.woltje	c6e341e92e	docs: roles, rails and hire as a decision design (#1873 ) Roles become templates plus organization copies built from known parts. A hire is a decision the chief raises and a human with org.hire approves. Rails listed with their enforcement points. Proposal only: no change to AGENTS.md, roles/, contracts/ or code.	2026-11-10 14:50:04 -06:00
jason.woltje	50be333552	fix(organization): address accounts review and rollback edge cases (#1873 )	2026-11-10 20:43:00 +00:00
jason.woltje	3bb0f70acc	feat(organization): add locked instance accounts store and CLI (#1873 )	2026-11-10 20:43:00 +00:00