Row 258 (E01, #1763) r2: della-0023 F1 (mail use helpers fail closed on malformed records or clock and outside the grant or key lifetime), F2 (secret placement compared after resolving links and root aliases; protected file under configDir with no linked configDir), N1 (key transition is a pure edge check; E03 owns anti-rollback); mos-1313 W1-W4 draft wording; mutants M1-M11 (Vikunja 460)

agents/ludwig/work/queue-258/BUILD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+# Row 258, E01: mail PRD addendum draft and schemas
+
+Ludwig, 2026-10-22. Issue #1763. Assigned by sage-2802 under Q220. Reviewer: Della.
+Base: aca16404c. Branch: ludwig/row258.
+
+Sources: brief `docs/plans/2026-10-21_post-v1-row-briefs.md` (blob d7e5eaeea), "Brief: E01" and
+"Gate: email rows". Email plan row E01 at origin/della/email-plan 179391055 (approved ludwig-0037).
+Q2/Q222 terms (sage-2802): `mailboxScope` defaults to `[]`, changes are human-only, and the default-none
+and refusal tests apply.
+
+## Deliverable
+
+| Path | What |
+| --- | --- |
+| `docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md` | REQ-MAIL-1 to 16, a draft. Each requirement names its rows. Two questions for Mos. |
+| `packages/mail/schemas/*.schema.json` | source, data, access, service, content-key |
+| `packages/mail/src/validate.mjs` | Closed-subset validator, binding, location, file and key-lifecycle checks |
+| `packages/mail/tests/schema.test.mjs` | T1-T14, with T10b |
+| `packages/mail/{package.json,README.md}` | Package manifest and notes |
+
+Not changed: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md`, its requirements JSON and tests, `packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs`,
+`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, roles, `scripts/stack-copy.sh` COPY_PATHS. No new dependency.
+
+## Choices and tradeoffs
+
+1. **Validator.** A copy of the `packages/project/src/validate.mjs` pattern: a closed keyword set
+   that throws on an unknown keyword. Added `integer`, `minimum`, `maximum`, `uniqueItems` and `default`.
+   No JSON Schema library, so there is no dependency review. Tradeoff: two small validators to keep apart.
+   A shared one is a later refactor, not this row.
+2. **Defaults live in the schema** (`default` keyword), read by `defaults(kind)`. One definition per
+   default and range, as Q222 asks.
+3. **Ranges (implementer choice, for the reviewer to challenge).** Defaults come from the plan.
+
+   | Setting | Default | Min | Max |
+   | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+   | pollSeconds | 60 | 15 | 3600 |
+   | sliceObservations | 50 | 1 | 500 |
+   | sliceBytes | 10 MiB | 64 KiB | 64 MiB |
+   | pendingDeliveries | 1,000 | 1 | 100,000 |
+   | retainedBytes | 100 MiB | 1 MiB | 10 GiB |
+   | parserInputBytes | 30 MiB | 1 MiB | 64 MiB |
+   | mimeDepth | 10 | 1 | 32 |
+   | mimeParts | 100 | 1 | 1,000 |
+   | normalizedTextBytes | 256 KiB | 4 KiB | 4 MiB |
+   | attachmentPartBytes | 10 MiB | 0 | 50 MiB |
+   | attachmentMessageBytes | 10 MiB | 0 | 100 MiB |
+   | staleScanIntervals | 3 | 2 | 20 |
+   | pageSize | 20 | 1 | 100 |
+   | bodyDraftDays | 30 | 1 | 3,650 |
+   | attachmentDays | 7 | 1 | 3,650 |
+   | metadataDays | 365 | 1 | 3,650 |
+
+   Cross-checks: part bytes ≤ message bytes; metadataDays ≥ both content durations (tombstones outlive
+   content, D4).
+4. **Fixed false until later rows.** `persistContent` and `automaticPrune` are `const false`: the plan
+   says metadata only until retention authority exists (E13), and settings never grant `data.delete`.
+   `sourceMutations` has `maxItems: 0`: no mutation capability exists (Q3). E13 or a later reviewed row
+   widens these.
+5. **Human-only.** Settings records require `changedBy.kind: "human"`. The schema can't tell a real human
+   from an agent proxy. The E02 writer proves that, as the plan's E02 row says.
+6. **Incomplete scopes.** An enabled source needs an adapter. Unattended wake needs at least one exact
+   sender: wake on with an empty allowlist would be on in name only. Grants need at least one right and
+   one mailbox. Service scopes are `["mail.read"]` only.
+7. **Secret values.** Unknown keys are refused. All string values are also checked against secret
+   shapes (private key header, JWT, common token prefixes, URL userinfo password, `password=` style).
+   Messages name the path, never the value. This is a backstop, not a scanner.
+8. **Content-key record location.** The plan names the key path. The lifecycle record's own file is left
+   to E03. `checkKeyLocation` and `checkProtectedFile` apply to both.
+9. **Key lifecycle.** active → retired → expired, or active → expired. `keyTransitionAllowed` is a pure
+   check on one state edge. It doesn't persist state, stop a restored backup rolling a record back, or
+   destroy key copies; E03 owns that proof (della-0023 N1). `keyUse` is none outside
+   [createdAt, expiresAt), whatever the state says.
+10. **v1 compatibility.** T13 asserts that kinds.mjs names no mail, vocabulary.mjs has no `mail.access`,
+    and the approved PRD has no REQ-MAIL. E05 and the approved addendum update T13 when they land.
+
+11. **Use helpers fail closed (della-0023 F1).** `effectiveMailboxes` and `keyUse` validate their
+    records first and read the clock only from a valid `Date`. An invalid record or clock, or a time
+    outside [issuedAt, expiresAt) or [createdAt, expiresAt), gives no read and no key use. Tradeoff: a
+    caller with a slightly malformed but otherwise usable grant gets nothing, not a partial read. E02
+    still owns principal, right, manual-mode and revoke enforcement.
+12. **Placement compares resolved paths too (della-0023 F2).** `checkSlotLocation` and
+    `checkKeyLocation` check the paths as written first, so planned paths that don't exist yet still
+    work. Then they resolve the nearest existing ancestor of the secret path and of each forbidden root,
+    and refuse containment. That catches a configDir linked into dataRoot and a root named through an
+    alias. `checkProtectedFile` now needs the file lexically under configDir, refuses a symbolic link
+    on configDir itself or any directory below it, and takes the forbidden roots for the same resolved
+    comparison. Symbolic links above configDir (a linked `/home`, say) stay allowed: they don't move
+    the secret relative to the roots, and the resolved comparison still covers them. Tradeoff: one
+    `realpath` per root on each check.
+13. **Draft wording (mos-1313).** W1: rulings are cited as "DECISIONS Q…", plan questions as "email
+    plan Q…", and "Q4" is replaced by what it stands for. W2: retention says expiry stops serving an
+    item and removal waits for `data.delete`. W3: an invalid mail setting is refused when written and
+    holds its source with an alert when found at load; no fallback to the default. W4: the questions
+    section is gone; Mos's two answers are recorded in the status lines.
+
+## Test plan (not run: Gander holds the slot, sage-2802)
+
+`cd packages/mail && node --test tests/schema.test.mjs`. It writes only under `os.tmpdir()`, which the gate
+sets to a `mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gXXXXXX` directory. No network and no `~/.mosaic-dev`.
+
+Static checks done: schemas written by an uncommitted scratch script (the JSON files are the source),
+JSON parses, every keyword is in the validator's closed set, every required key has a property, T13/T14 assertions checked against
+the repository text with python3 -B, secret and wildcard patterns checked against every fixture and
+sentinel. Node was not run.
+
+Existing suites to run whole, because they scan every package's `src` or copy tracked package files:
+- `packages/bus/tests/credential-store.test.mjs` (credential use sites)
+- `packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs` (T24 kind lists and use sites)
+- `packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs` (harness names outside plugins)
+- `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` (fixture copies)
+
+Mutants, named by Della (della-0023). Each must die on a semantic assertion in the whole
+`schema.test.mjs`, run on a CLEAR slot. The wildcard tests stay.
+
+| Mutant | Change | Must fail |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| M1 | `mailboxScope` default nonempty | T1/T2 |
+| M2 | allow an agent settings author | T3 |
+| M3 | remove the source/business binding comparison | T8 |
+| M4 | disable secret-shape rejection | T6 |
+| M5 | omit the grant intersection | T2 |
+| M6 | omit the forbidden-root exclusion | T10 (config under dataRoot) |
+| M7 | allow mode 0640 | T11 |
+| M8 | allow retired → active | T12 |
+| M9 | bypass an enforced numeric lower or upper comparison in `visit` | T9 |
+| M10 | omit the malformed-state/time guard | T2/T12 lifetime and malformed cases |
+| M11 | omit the canonical or root-symlink guard | T10b/T11 |
+
+## Round 2 (della-0023, mos-1313)
+
+Round 1 was a8f0cf924, CHANGES (della-0023). Round 2 adds F1, F2 and N1 above, and Mos's W1-W4 on the
+draft. New cases: T2 lifetime edges and malformed grant or clock, T12 lifetime edges and malformed key
+or clock, T10b (configDir linked into dataRoot with a real 0600 key, a planned slot through the link,
+a dataRoot alias), T11 (file outside configDir, unnormalized path, linked configDir, root alias).
+Static checks only; Node not run (Gander holds the slot).

docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# PRD addendum draft: mail intake and access
+
+- Status: draft, not approved. Ludwig drafted it for email plan row E01
+  (Vikunja 460, issue #1763). Its wording goes to Mos first, then Jason.
+  It does not change `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md`. Once Jason approves it,
+  it lands there as a new PRD version, and only then does any requirement
+  here bind.
+- Source: `docs/plans/2026-10-21_email-plan.md`, Della's revision
+  179391055, approved by Ludwig (ludwig-0037). DECISIONS Q217 settles
+  the mailbox (one agent mailbox on woltje.com at InMotion, which Jason
+  creates). DECISIONS Q222 settles personal mail (none for now) and the
+  settings rule: things are tunable, not hardcoded.
+- Shape (mos-1313): once approved, this lands as one new PRD version with
+  a Mail section, in its own reviewed row. `mail.access` stays a hard
+  wait in that version.
+- Scope: post-v1. None of it is needed for 2026-10-27.
+- Q numbers: "DECISIONS Q…" is a ruling. "Email plan Q…" is a question
+  still open in the email plan.
+
+## How to read this draft
+
+Every limit, scope and time below is a setting with a default, unless
+Jason fixed it himself. The default is the starting value, not a rule.
+The schemas in `packages/mail/schemas/` hold each default and the range a
+setting may take. Implementers and reviewers set that range. Widening it
+needs a reviewed schema and test change. Only an authenticated human
+changes a setting, through the audited CLI and later the Console. An
+agent can't change one, not even to narrow it. For mail, an invalid
+setting doesn't fall back to its default. A write with an invalid value
+is refused. An invalid value found when the service loads holds that
+source and raises an alert.
+
+Each requirement lists the build rows that deliver it. The rows are in
+the email plan's "Ordered build rows".
+
+## Requirements
+
+### Mail
+
+- **REQ-MAIL-1.** The stack may run one mail service per instance. It is
+  off by default and opens no connection while off. A disabled source
+  makes no probe and no read. Each configured source has one leased
+  owner. Accounts stay separate by instance, business and source. One
+  service never means one shared credential or mailbox.
+  Rows: E01, E03, E14.
+- **REQ-MAIL-2.** Each source has a mailbox scope, `mailboxScope`. It
+  defaults to none, which reads nothing, agent ingress included. A human
+  sets exact mailbox IDs. No wildcard is accepted. The scope is
+  rechecked before each scan and fetch. A mailbox removed from scope is
+  fenced before in-flight content returns. A read is the intersection of
+  the source scope, the provider's rights and the principal's current
+  grant. Widening a scope grants no agent anything. No personal mailbox
+  is enrolled until a later consent and grant (DECISIONS Q222).
+  Rows: E01, E02, E13.
+- **REQ-MAIL-3.** A new plug-in kind, `mail-source`, carries providers
+  (REQ-PLUG-1). Its modules export `descriptor`, `scan`, `fetch` and
+  `health`. A module only reads: it never sends, deletes, labels, moves
+  or marks mail read. Microsoft 365 (Graph) and IMAP are the first
+  modules. POP3, Gmail API and JMAP wait for a named need. The kind
+  enters `packages/plugins/src/kinds.mjs` with its first production
+  module. That waits for the approved PRD version, and for the source,
+  grant and route approvals in REQ-MAIL-4, 7 and 8.
+  Rows: E05, E06.
+- **REQ-MAIL-4.** A source connects through its own service principal,
+  `mail-service`. This is a new approved extension, not an exception to
+  REQ-CRED-1. Its record names the business, source, provider, mailbox,
+  scopes (read only), slot path, rotation date, approval and revision.
+  The slot sits under
+  `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/<business>/<source>/`, never in
+  the repository or dataRoot. Agents never see the credential. A missing,
+  expired or revoked slot fails closed. Authentication may retry once,
+  then stops and alerts.
+  Rows: E01, E02.
+- **REQ-MAIL-5.** Intake keeps a durable record of what it saw. The
+  provider cursor and the new observations commit together. A message's
+  identity is its provider ID within business, source and account, never
+  Message-ID alone. Delivery uses a stable key and a receipt at the
+  recipient, so a crash causes no second task. First activation starts
+  from now and acts on no old mail. Importing history is a separate
+  approved window. Per-source quotas default to 1,000 pending deliveries
+  and 100 MiB of content. A full quota, a full disk or missing audit
+  storage holds intake and raises an alert.
+  Rows: E03.
+- **REQ-MAIL-6.** Parsing is bounded. Defaults: 30 MiB input, depth 10,
+  100 parts, 256 KiB of normalized text. Bad or truncated mail is
+  quarantined, never dropped. Active content never runs. Attachments
+  start as metadata. An authorized fetch quarantines the bytes, by
+  default up to 10 MiB per part and per message. Extracting attachment
+  content stays Jason's choice (email plan Q8). If he chooses it, extraction runs
+  isolated with no network and a scanner.
+  Rows: E04, E16.
+- **REQ-MAIL-7.** A route table maps trusted delivery evidence to a Stack
+  user or role instance. It lives in the organization file and changes
+  only through the human-approved write path. A route grants no read
+  right. No agent reroutes mail or widens its own route. Bcc, ambiguous
+  alias or forwarded mail goes to restricted review. Unknown addresses
+  create no agent.
+  Rows: E07, E08.
+- **REQ-MAIL-8.** Agent access to mail needs a `mail.access` grant. It is
+  separate from `credential.mint`. The chief raises it, and the human
+  approves the exact principal, source, mailboxes, rights and expiry.
+  Metadata, body, attachment and draft are separate rights. Each read
+  rechecks the current grant. A revoke fences new reads and in-flight
+  reads before content returns. Manual mode asks the human for each use.
+  `mail.access` is a new vocabulary action, so it is a hard wait
+  (REQ-WAIT-3) until a PRD version Jason approves says otherwise
+  (REQ-WAIT-2).
+  Rows: E02, E09.
+- **REQ-MAIL-9.** Every harness gets the same mail tools through the
+  broker: list, get, thread, attachment, acknowledge, create a local
+  draft and health. A list page defaults to 20 items. Acknowledge
+  changes Stack state only. A draft is a local unsent record. There is
+  no send tool and no reroute tool.
+  Rows: E09.
+- **REQ-MAIL-10.** Mail content is untrusted. Tool results carry
+  `untrusted: true`. A sender can't approve a decision, change policy,
+  mint a grant or pose as the human. Mail never wakes an agent by
+  default (`unattendedWake` is off, and its sender allowlist is empty).
+  A human may turn it on for a route. Then a wake also needs aligned
+  DMARC, a current grant and admission by the system manager
+  (DECISIONS Q198).
+  The woken work runs in a fresh restricted profile, and anything it
+  starts keeps `source: mail`.
+  Rows: E10.
+- **REQ-MAIL-11.** A mail-triggered decision goes through the stack's one
+  decision module (DECISIONS Q207). Its input is metadata only, inside a closed
+  schema. The mail service never calls a model itself. Without a model,
+  deterministic intake keeps working and model work is held.
+  Rows: E11.
+- **REQ-MAIL-12.** Mail health reports real progress: last scan, last
+  cursor commit, lag, backlog and credential state. A live process alone
+  is not healthy. Outages pause only the affected source. Recovery
+  follows the system manager's protected mode and its recovery latch
+  (DECISIONS Q198). A health check sends no mail and calls no model.
+  Rows: E12.
+- **REQ-MAIL-13.** Mail data lives under `<dataRoot>/mail/<business>/`
+  and never enters git or an image. By default the stack keeps metadata
+  only. Content keys sit under
+  `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/<business>/`, outside
+  dataRoot and its backups, mode 600, with no symbolic link. Retention
+  defaults: bodies and drafts 30 days, attachments 7 days, metadata 365
+  days. When an item's time runs out, the stack stops serving it. A
+  retention setting never authorizes deletion: removing the item waits
+  for `data.delete` or a retention authority Jason approves later. A
+  restored backup must not bring back expired content or redeliver old
+  work.
+  Rows: E01, E03, E13.
+- **REQ-MAIL-14.** The mail service never sends. No SMTP, Graph send,
+  forward, auto-reply or emailed digest. The email specialist reads and
+  drafts, never sends (R21). A future sender needs its own plan and
+  `message.external` approval.
+  Rows: E05, E06, E09, E14.
+- **REQ-MAIL-15.** Every mail limit, scope and retention time is a
+  setting. The schema holds its default and range. Only a human changes
+  it. A change is versioned and audited with who made it. An invalid
+  value is refused when written, and holds its source with an alert when
+  found at load. Settings never
+  override grants, hard waits or the system manager's contract.
+  Rows: E01, E04, E13.
+- **REQ-MAIL-16.** A live pilot is separate. It needs Jason's mailbox,
+  the approved PRD version, the source, grant and route approvals in
+  REQ-MAIL-4, 7 and 8, and a reviewed re-pin. It sends no test mail, and it
+  is judged on evidence for each message, not counts.
+  Rows: E15.

packages/mail/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Mail records — schemas only (email plan row E01)
+
+Post-v1. This package holds the record schemas for mail intake and access,
+and a validator. Nothing here opens a connection, reads a secret or
+registers a plug-in kind. Core `mail-source` registration waits for the
+approved PRD version and the source, grant and route approvals. The addendum draft is
+`docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md`; it binds nothing until Jason approves it.
+
+| Schema | Record |
+| --- | --- |
+| `schemas/source.schema.json` | Per-source settings: enabled, adapter, `mailboxScope`, wake, limits |
+| `schemas/data.schema.json` | Per-business content and retention settings |
+| `schemas/access.schema.json` | A `mail.access` grant to one agent or user |
+| `schemas/service.schema.json` | A source's service principal and its slot path |
+| `schemas/content-key.schema.json` | A content key's location and lifecycle |
+
+## Settings (DECISIONS Q222)
+
+Every limit, scope and retention time is a setting. Its default and its
+range sit in the schema, so they have one definition. `defaults(kind)`
+reads them. Implementers and reviewers set the range; widening it is a
+reviewed schema and test change. A settings record carries
+`changedBy.kind: "human"`, and the validator refuses any other author.
+
+Defaults are off and empty: `sourceEnabled: false`, `mailboxScope: []`,
+`sourceMutations: []`, `accessMode: "manual"`, `unattendedWake: false`,
+`wakeSenderAllowlist: []`, `persistContent: false` and
+`automaticPrune: false`. `persistContent` and `automaticPrune` are fixed
+false until retention authority exists (E13).
+
+## Checks
+
+- `validateRecord(kind, value)` returns a list of problems. It refuses
+  unknown keys, wildcards, secret-shaped values, values outside the
+  schema range and incomplete scopes. A refusal never echoes the value.
+- `checkBinding({source, service, access})` refuses records that name a
+  different business, source or provider, and a grant past the source's
+  mailbox scope.
+- `effectiveMailboxes(...)` intersects the source scope, the provider's
+  mailboxes and the grant, from `issuedAt` up to `expiresAt`. The
+  defaults read nothing. An invalid record or clock reads nothing.
+  Principal, right, manual-mode and revoke checks belong to E02.
+- `checkSlotLocation` and `checkKeyLocation` keep provider slots and
+  content keys under `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/`, outside
+  dataRoot, the repository and any backup root. They compare the paths
+  as written and again after resolving symbolic links, so a linked
+  configDir or an aliased root can't hide a secret inside a forbidden root.
+- `checkProtectedFile` wants a regular file under configDir, owned, mode
+  600, with no symbolic link from configDir itself down to the file. Given
+  the forbidden roots, it compares resolved paths against them too.
+- `keyUse` gives active keys encrypt and decrypt, retired keys decrypt
+  only, and expired keys nothing. An invalid record or clock, or a time
+  outside `createdAt` to `expiresAt`, gives nothing.
+- `keyTransitionAllowed` checks one state edge: active to retired or
+  expired, retired to expired. It is a pure predicate. It doesn't persist
+  state, stop a restored backup from rolling a record back, or destroy
+  key copies. E03 owns that proof.
+
+Tests: `node --test tests/*.test.mjs` from this directory.

packages/mail/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "name": "@mosaic/mail",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "type": "module",
+  "license": "UNLICENSED",
+  "exports": "./src/validate.mjs",
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "node --test tests/*.test.mjs"
+  }
+}

packages/mail/schemas/access.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "mosaic:mail:1:access",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "recordVersion",
+    "kind",
+    "business",
+    "source",
+    "principal",
+    "rights",
+    "mailboxes",
+    "mode",
+    "approvalId",
+    "issuedAt",
+    "expiresAt",
+    "revision"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "recordVersion": {
+      "const": 1
+    },
+    "kind": {
+      "const": "mail-access"
+    },
+    "business": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "source": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "principal": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "kind",
+        "id"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "kind": {
+          "enum": [
+            "agent",
+            "user"
+          ]
+        },
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "rights": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 4,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {
+        "enum": [
+          "metadata",
+          "body",
+          "attachment",
+          "draft"
+        ]
+      }
+    },
+    "mailboxes": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 100,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
+      }
+    },
+    "mode": {
+      "enum": [
+        "manual",
+        "grant"
+      ]
+    },
+    "approvalId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
+    },
+    "issuedAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "expiresAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "revision": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 2147483647
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/mail/schemas/content-key.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "mosaic:mail:1:content-key",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "recordVersion",
+    "kind",
+    "business",
+    "keyId",
+    "path",
+    "state",
+    "createdAt",
+    "expiresAt",
+    "revision"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "recordVersion": {
+      "const": 1
+    },
+    "kind": {
+      "const": "mail-content-key"
+    },
+    "business": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "keyId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "path": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^/[^\\u0000]{0,4095}$"
+    },
+    "state": {
+      "enum": [
+        "active",
+        "retired",
+        "expired"
+      ]
+    },
+    "createdAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "expiresAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "revision": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 2147483647
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/mail/schemas/data.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "mosaic:mail:1:data",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "recordVersion",
+    "kind",
+    "business",
+    "persistContent",
+    "bodyDraftDays",
+    "attachmentDays",
+    "metadataDays",
+    "automaticPrune",
+    "revision",
+    "changedBy",
+    "changedAt"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "recordVersion": {
+      "const": 1
+    },
+    "kind": {
+      "const": "mail-data-settings"
+    },
+    "business": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "persistContent": {
+      "const": false,
+      "default": false
+    },
+    "bodyDraftDays": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 3650,
+      "default": 30
+    },
+    "attachmentDays": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 3650,
+      "default": 7
+    },
+    "metadataDays": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 3650,
+      "default": 365
+    },
+    "automaticPrune": {
+      "const": false,
+      "default": false
+    },
+    "revision": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 2147483647
+    },
+    "changedBy": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "kind",
+        "id"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "kind": {
+          "const": "human"
+        },
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "changedAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/mail/schemas/service.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "mosaic:mail:1:service",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "recordVersion",
+    "kind",
+    "business",
+    "source",
+    "provider",
+    "mailbox",
+    "scopes",
+    "slotPath",
+    "rotateBy",
+    "approvalId",
+    "revision"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "recordVersion": {
+      "const": 1
+    },
+    "kind": {
+      "const": "mail-service"
+    },
+    "business": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "source": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "provider": {
+      "enum": [
+        "m365",
+        "imap"
+      ]
+    },
+    "mailbox": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
+    },
+    "scopes": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "maxItems": 1,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "items": {
+        "enum": [
+          "mail.read"
+        ]
+      }
+    },
+    "slotPath": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^/[^\\u0000]{0,4095}$"
+    },
+    "rotateBy": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "approvalId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$"
+    },
+    "revision": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 2147483647
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/mail/schemas/source.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "mosaic:mail:1:source",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "recordVersion",
+    "kind",
+    "business",
+    "source",
+    "provider",
+    "sourceEnabled",
+    "sourceAdapter",
+    "mailboxScope",
+    "sourceMutations",
+    "accessMode",
+    "unattendedWake",
+    "wakeSenderAllowlist",
+    "limits",
+    "revision",
+    "changedBy",
+    "changedAt"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "recordVersion": {
+      "const": 1
+    },
+    "kind": {
+      "const": "mail-source-settings"
+    },
+    "business": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "source": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+    },
+    "provider": {
+      "enum": [
+        "m365",
+        "imap"
+      ]
+    },
+    "sourceEnabled": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "default": false
+    },
+    "sourceAdapter": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ],
+      "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$",
+      "default": null
+    },
+    "mailboxScope": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "maxItems": 100,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "default": [],
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,253}$"
+      }
+    },
+    "sourceMutations": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "maxItems": 0,
+      "default": [],
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string"
+      }
+    },
+    "accessMode": {
+      "enum": [
+        "manual",
+        "grant"
+      ],
+      "default": "manual"
+    },
+    "unattendedWake": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "default": false
+    },
+    "wakeSenderAllowlist": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "maxItems": 100,
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "default": [],
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._+-]{0,63}@[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{0,252}$"
+      }
+    },
+    "limits": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "pollSeconds",
+        "sliceObservations",
+        "sliceBytes",
+        "pendingDeliveries",
+        "retainedBytes",
+        "parserInputBytes",
+        "mimeDepth",
+        "mimeParts",
+        "normalizedTextBytes",
+        "attachmentPartBytes",
+        "attachmentMessageBytes",
+        "staleScanIntervals",
+        "pageSize"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "pollSeconds": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 15,
+          "maximum": 3600,
+          "default": 60
+        },
+        "sliceObservations": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "maximum": 500,
+          "default": 50
+        },
+        "sliceBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 65536,
+          "maximum": 67108864,
+          "default": 10485760
+        },
+        "pendingDeliveries": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "maximum": 100000,
+          "default": 1000
+        },
+        "retainedBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1048576,
+          "maximum": 10737418240,
+          "default": 104857600
+        },
+        "parserInputBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1048576,
+          "maximum": 67108864,
+          "default": 31457280
+        },
+        "mimeDepth": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "maximum": 32,
+          "default": 10
+        },
+        "mimeParts": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "maximum": 1000,
+          "default": 100
+        },
+        "normalizedTextBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 4096,
+          "maximum": 4194304,
+          "default": 262144
+        },
+        "attachmentPartBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "maximum": 52428800,
+          "default": 10485760
+        },
+        "attachmentMessageBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "maximum": 104857600,
+          "default": 10485760
+        },
+        "staleScanIntervals": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 2,
+          "maximum": 20,
+          "default": 3
+        },
+        "pageSize": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "maximum": 100,
+          "default": 20
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "revision": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 2147483647
+    },
+    "changedBy": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "kind",
+        "id"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "kind": {
+          "const": "human"
+        },
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "changedAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/mail/src/validate.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+import { lstatSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
+
+// Mail record schemas (email plan row E01). Nothing here reads a secret, opens a connection or
+// registers a plug-in kind: core mail-source registration waits for the approved PRD version and the
+// source, grant and route approvals.
+export const KINDS = Object.freeze(['source', 'data', 'access', 'service', 'content-key']);
+const KEYWORDS = new Set(['$schema', '$id', 'type', 'const', 'enum', 'properties', 'required',
+  'additionalProperties', 'items', 'minItems', 'maxItems', 'uniqueItems', 'minLength', 'maxLength',
+  'minimum', 'maximum', 'pattern', 'format', 'default']);
+const schemas = Object.fromEntries(KINDS.map(kind => [kind,
+  JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL(`../schemas/${kind}.schema.json`, import.meta.url), 'utf8')),
+]));
+// Package-owned schemas use this deliberately small closed subset. Never silently ignore a new constraint.
+function known(schema) {
+  for (const key of Object.keys(schema)) if (!KEYWORDS.has(key)) throw Error(`unsupported schema keyword: ${key}`);
+  for (const child of Object.values(schema.properties ?? {})) known(child);
+  if (schema.items) known(schema.items);
+}
+for (const schema of Object.values(schemas)) known(schema);
+
+const isObject = value => value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
+function visit(schema, value, path, problems) {
+  const bad = text => problems.push(`${path}: ${text}`);
+  if (Object.hasOwn(schema, 'const') && value !== schema.const) bad(`must equal ${JSON.stringify(schema.const)}`);
+  if (schema.enum && !schema.enum.includes(value)) bad(`must be one of ${schema.enum.join(', ')}`);
+  const types = schema.type ? [schema.type].flat() : [];
+  const matches = type => type === 'null' ? value === null : type === 'object' ? isObject(value)
+    : type === 'array' ? Array.isArray(value) : type === 'integer' ? Number.isSafeInteger(value)
+      : typeof value === type;
+  if (types.length && !types.some(matches)) { bad(`must be ${types.join(' or ')}`); return; }
+  if (typeof value === 'number') {
+    if (schema.minimum !== undefined && value < schema.minimum) bad(`below the schema bound ${schema.minimum}`);
+    if (schema.maximum !== undefined && value > schema.maximum) bad(`above the schema bound ${schema.maximum}`);
+  }
+  if (typeof value === 'string') {
+    if (schema.minLength !== undefined && value.length < schema.minLength) bad('too short');
+    if (schema.maxLength !== undefined && value.length > schema.maxLength) bad('too long');
+    if (schema.pattern && !new RegExp(schema.pattern).test(value)) bad('invalid format');
+    if (schema.format === 'date-time' && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(value)) ||
+        new Date(value).toISOString() !== value || value.length !== 24)) bad('invalid canonical UTC date-time');
+    if (value.includes('\0')) bad('NUL is forbidden');
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    if (schema.minItems !== undefined && value.length < schema.minItems) bad('too few items');
+    if (schema.maxItems !== undefined && value.length > schema.maxItems) bad('too many items');
+    if (schema.uniqueItems && new Set(value.map(item => JSON.stringify(item))).size !== value.length) bad('duplicate items');
+    if (schema.items) value.forEach((item, index) => visit(schema.items, item, `${path}[${index}]`, problems));
+  }
+  if (isObject(value)) {
+    for (const key of schema.required ?? []) if (!Object.hasOwn(value, key)) bad(`missing ${key}`);
+    for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      if (Object.hasOwn(schema.properties ?? {}, key)) visit(schema.properties[key], child, `${path}.${key}`, problems);
+      else if (schema.additionalProperties === false) bad(`unknown key ${key}`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Wildcards are refused by every pattern; this names the reason plainly. Scopes are exact IDs only.
+const WILDCARD = /[*?%]/;
+// Shapes of secret values. A record names a protected slot path, never a credential (invariant 3).
+const SECRET_SHAPES = [
+  /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/,
+  /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\./,
+  /\b(?:gh[pousr]_|glpat-|xox[abprs]-|sk-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/,
+  /:\/\/[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s@]+@/,
+  /\b(?:password|passwd|secret|token|apikey|api_key|client_secret)\s*[=:]/i,
+];
+export const looksSecret = text => SECRET_SHAPES.some(shape => shape.test(text));
+function strings(value, path, out) {
+  if (typeof value === 'string') out.push([path, value]);
+  else if (Array.isArray(value)) value.forEach((item, index) => strings(item, `${path}[${index}]`, out));
+  else if (isObject(value)) for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) strings(child, `${path}.${key}`, out);
+  return out;
+}
+
+export function validateRecord(kind, value) {
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(schemas, kind)) return [`unknown record kind: ${kind}`];
+  const problems = [];
+  visit(schemas[kind], value, kind, problems);
+  for (const [path, text] of strings(value, kind, [])) {
+    if (looksSecret(text)) problems.push(`${path}: looks like a secret value; name a protected slot instead`);
+    else if (WILDCARD.test(text)) problems.push(`${path}: wildcard not allowed; scopes name exact IDs`);
+  }
+  if (problems.length) return problems;
+  if (kind === 'source') {
+    if (value.sourceEnabled && value.sourceAdapter === null)
+      problems.push('source.sourceAdapter: an enabled source needs an enrolled adapter');
+    if (value.unattendedWake && value.wakeSenderAllowlist.length === 0)
+      problems.push('source.wakeSenderAllowlist: unattended wake needs at least one exact sender');
+    if (value.limits.attachmentPartBytes > value.limits.attachmentMessageBytes)
+      problems.push('source.limits: attachmentPartBytes exceeds attachmentMessageBytes');
+  }
+  if (kind === 'data' && value.metadataDays < Math.max(value.bodyDraftDays, value.attachmentDays))
+    problems.push('data.metadataDays: metadata and tombstones must outlive content');
+  if (kind === 'access' && Date.parse(value.expiresAt) <= Date.parse(value.issuedAt))
+    problems.push('access.expiresAt: must be after issuedAt');
+  if (kind === 'content-key' && Date.parse(value.expiresAt) <= Date.parse(value.createdAt))
+    problems.push('content-key.expiresAt: must be after createdAt');
+  return problems;
+}
+
+// Defaults come from the schema, so a default and its bounds have one definition (Q222).
+function defaultsOf(schema) {
+  if (Object.hasOwn(schema, 'default')) return structuredClone(schema.default);
+  if (schema.type !== 'object') return undefined;
+  const out = {};
+  for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(schema.properties ?? {})) {
+    const value = defaultsOf(child);
+    if (value !== undefined) out[key] = value;
+  }
+  return Object.keys(out).length ? out : undefined;
+}
+export function defaults(kind) {
+  if (kind !== 'source' && kind !== 'data') throw Error(`no settings defaults for ${kind}`);
+  return defaultsOf(schemas[kind]);
+}
+export const schemaBounds = (kind, key) => {
+  const node = key.split('.').reduce((schema, part) => schema?.properties?.[part], schemas[kind]);
+  if (!node || node.minimum === undefined) throw Error(`no bounds for ${kind}.${key}`);
+  return { minimum: node.minimum, maximum: node.maximum, default: node.default };
+};
+
+// Records that name one another must agree, and a grant never reaches past the source's mailbox scope.
+// (The access schema already limits a grant's principal to an agent or a user, never the service.)
+export function checkBinding({ source, service, access }) {
+  const problems = [];
+  const same = (label, a, b) => { for (const key of ['business', 'source']) if (a[key] !== b[key]) problems.push(`${label}: ${key} mismatch`); };
+  if (service) {
+    same('service', service, source);
+    if (service.provider !== source.provider) problems.push('service: provider mismatch');
+  }
+  if (access) {
+    same('access', access, source);
+    const scope = new Set(source.mailboxScope);
+    for (const mailbox of access.mailboxes) if (!scope.has(mailbox)) problems.push(`access: mailbox ${mailbox} outside the source scope`);
+  }
+  return problems;
+}
+
+const instant = now => (now instanceof Date && Number.isFinite(now.getTime()) ? now.getTime() : NaN);
+
+// What a principal may read: the source scope, the provider's mailboxes and the grant, intersected.
+// A disabled source, the default empty scope, a missing, invalid, not-yet-issued or expired grant, or an
+// invalid clock reads nothing. Authenticated principal, right, manual-mode and revoke checks belong to E02.
+export function effectiveMailboxes({ source, providerMailboxes = [], access = null, now = new Date() }) {
+  if (!access || validateRecord('source', source).length || validateRecord('access', access).length) return [];
+  if (!source.sourceEnabled || !Array.isArray(providerMailboxes)) return [];
+  const at = instant(now);
+  if (!(at >= Date.parse(access.issuedAt) && at < Date.parse(access.expiresAt))) return [];
+  if (access.business !== source.business || access.source !== source.source) return [];
+  const provider = new Set(providerMailboxes);
+  const granted = new Set(access.mailboxes);
+  return source.mailboxScope.filter(mailbox => provider.has(mailbox) && granted.has(mailbox));
+}
+
+function inside(root, path) {
+  const rel = relative(root, path);
+  return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && rel !== '..' && !isAbsolute(rel));
+}
+// The path with every existing part resolved, so a symbolic link or alias can't hide where it lands.
+// Parts that don't exist yet (a planned slot) are kept as written under their nearest existing ancestor.
+function canonical(path) {
+  const rest = [];
+  for (let at = path; ; at = dirname(at)) {
+    try { return join(realpathSync(at), ...rest.reverse()); } catch (error) {
+      if (error.code !== 'ENOENT' || at === dirname(at)) return null;
+      rest.push(basename(at));
+    }
+  }
+}
+// Lexical checks first, for planned paths. Then the same forbidden roots compared after resolution, so
+// a configDir that links into dataRoot, the repository or a backup root is refused too.
+function forbidden(label, path, { dataRoot, repoRoot, backupRoots = [] }) {
+  const problems = [];
+  const roots = [['dataRoot', dataRoot], ['the repository', repoRoot], ...backupRoots.map(root => ['a backup root', root])]
+    .filter(([, root]) => root);
+  for (const [name, root] of roots) if (inside(root, path)) problems.push(`${label}: inside ${name}; mail secrets live outside it`);
+  if (problems.length) return problems;
+  const real = canonical(path);
+  if (real === null) return [`${label}: path can't be resolved`];
+  for (const [name, root] of roots) {
+    const realRoot = canonical(root);
+    if (realRoot === null || inside(realRoot, real)) problems.push(`${label}: resolves inside ${name}; mail secrets live outside it`);
+  }
+  return problems;
+}
+function placed(label, path, expectedDir, roots) {
+  if (!isAbsolute(path) || normalize(path) !== path) return [`${label}: must be a normalized absolute path`];
+  const problems = !inside(expectedDir, path) || path === expectedDir ? [`${label}: must sit under ${expectedDir}`] : [];
+  return [...problems, ...forbidden(label, path, roots)];
+}
+// A source service's provider credential slot (plan D9).
+export const slotDir = ({ configDir, business, source }) => join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail', business, source);
+export const checkSlotLocation = (service, roots) =>
+  placed('service.slotPath', service.slotPath, slotDir({ ...roots, ...service }), roots);
+// A content key, outside dataRoot and its backup set, apart from provider slots (plan D7).
+export const keyPath = ({ configDir, business, keyId }) => join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', business, keyId);
+export function checkKeyLocation(record, roots) {
+  const problems = placed('content-key.path', record.path, join(roots.configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', record.business), roots);
+  if (!problems.length && record.path !== keyPath({ ...roots, ...record })) problems.push(`content-key.path: must be ${keyPath({ ...roots, ...record })}`);
+  return problems;
+}
+
+// A protected file: inside configDir, owned, mode 600, regular, with no symbolic link from configDir
+// itself down to the file, and not resolving into a forbidden root.
+export function checkProtectedFile(path, { configDir, uid = process.getuid(), ...roots }) {
+  if (!isAbsolute(path) || normalize(path) !== path || !isAbsolute(configDir) || normalize(configDir) !== configDir)
+    return [`${path}: must be a normalized absolute path`];
+  if (!inside(configDir, path) || path === configDir) return [`${path}: must sit under ${configDir}`];
+  let stat;
+  try { stat = lstatSync(path); } catch { return [`${path}: not found`]; }
+  if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) return [`${path}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`];
+  for (let at = dirname(path); ; at = dirname(at)) {
+    let dir;
+    try { dir = lstatSync(at); } catch { return [`${path}: path can't be resolved`]; }
+    if (dir.isSymbolicLink()) return [`${path}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${at}`];
+    if (at === configDir) break;
+  }
+  const problems = [];
+  if (stat.uid !== uid) problems.push(`${path}: owned by uid ${stat.uid}, not ${uid}`);
+  if ((stat.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) problems.push(`${path}: mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}; use 600`);
+  return [...problems, ...forbidden(path, path, roots)];
+}
+
+// Key lifecycle states: active keys encrypt and decrypt, retired keys only decrypt, expired keys do
+// neither. keyTransitionAllowed is a pure check on one state edge. It doesn't persist state, stop a
+// restored backup from rolling a record back, or destroy key copies; E03 owns that proof.
+const KEY_STEPS = { active: ['retired', 'expired'], retired: ['expired'], expired: [] };
+export const keyTransitionAllowed = (from, to) => Object.hasOwn(KEY_STEPS, from) && KEY_STEPS[from].includes(to);
+// The use a record allows now. An invalid record or clock, or a time outside [createdAt, expiresAt), is none.
+export function keyUse(record, now = new Date()) {
+  if (validateRecord('content-key', record).length) return 'none';
+  const at = instant(now);
+  if (!(at >= Date.parse(record.createdAt) && at < Date.parse(record.expiresAt))) return 'none';
+  return record.state === 'active' ? 'encrypt-decrypt' : record.state === 'retired' ? 'decrypt' : 'none';
+}

packages/mail/tests/schema.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import {
+  checkBinding, checkKeyLocation, checkProtectedFile, checkSlotLocation, defaults, effectiveMailboxes, keyPath,
+  keyTransitionAllowed, keyUse, schemaBounds, slotDir, validateRecord,
+} from '../src/validate.mjs';
+
+// Synthetic records only. No credential, mailbox or provider is real, and nothing here opens a connection.
+const HUMAN = { kind: 'human', id: 'jason' };
+const AT = '2026-10-22T16:00:00.000Z';
+const source = (over = {}) => ({
+  recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-source-settings', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress', provider: 'imap',
+  ...defaults('source'), revision: 1, changedBy: HUMAN, changedAt: AT, ...over,
+});
+const data = (over = {}) => ({
+  recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-data-settings', business: 'acme', ...defaults('data'),
+  revision: 1, changedBy: HUMAN, changedAt: AT, ...over,
+});
+const access = (over = {}) => ({
+  recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-access', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress',
+  principal: { kind: 'agent', id: 'mail-specialist' }, rights: ['metadata', 'body'],
+  mailboxes: ['[email protected]'], mode: 'manual', approvalId: 'decision-1',
+  issuedAt: AT, expiresAt: '2026-10-29T16:00:00.000Z', revision: 1, ...over,
+});
+const CONFIG = '/home/op/.config/mosaic-acme';
+const ROOTS = { configDir: CONFIG, dataRoot: '/home/op/.mosaic-acme', repoRoot: '/src/stack', backupRoots: ['/backup/mosaic'] };
+const service = (over = {}) => ({
+  recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-service', business: 'acme', source: 'ingress', provider: 'imap',
+  mailbox: '[email protected]', scopes: ['mail.read'],
+  slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress/imap`, rotateBy: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+  approvalId: 'decision-2', revision: 1, ...over,
+});
+const contentKey = (over = {}) => ({
+  recordVersion: 1, kind: 'mail-content-key', business: 'acme', keyId: 'k1',
+  path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/k1`, state: 'active',
+  createdAt: AT, expiresAt: '2027-10-22T16:00:00.000Z', revision: 1, ...over,
+});
+const refused = (kind, value, text) => {
+  const problems = validateRecord(kind, value);
+  assert.ok(problems.some(problem => problem.includes(text)), `${kind} should be refused with "${text}": ${JSON.stringify(problems)}`);
+};
+
+test('T1 the defaults are off, empty and valid, and every record kind validates', () => {
+  const settings = defaults('source');
+  assert.equal(settings.sourceEnabled, false);
+  assert.deepEqual(settings.mailboxScope, []);
+  assert.deepEqual(settings.sourceMutations, []);
+  assert.equal(settings.sourceAdapter, null);
+  assert.equal(settings.accessMode, 'manual');
+  assert.equal(settings.unattendedWake, false);
+  assert.deepEqual(settings.wakeSenderAllowlist, []);
+  assert.deepEqual(settings.limits, {
+    pollSeconds: 60, sliceObservations: 50, sliceBytes: 10485760, pendingDeliveries: 1000, retainedBytes: 104857600,
+    parserInputBytes: 31457280, mimeDepth: 10, mimeParts: 100, normalizedTextBytes: 262144,
+    attachmentPartBytes: 10485760, attachmentMessageBytes: 10485760, staleScanIntervals: 3, pageSize: 20,
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(defaults('data'), { persistContent: false, bodyDraftDays: 30, attachmentDays: 7, metadataDays: 365, automaticPrune: false });
+  for (const [kind, value] of [['source', source()], ['data', data()], ['access', access()], ['service', service()], ['content-key', contentKey()]])
+    assert.deepEqual(validateRecord(kind, value), [], kind);
+  assert.throws(() => defaults('access'), /no settings defaults/);
+  assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('mailbox', {}), ['unknown record kind: mailbox']);
+});
+
+test('T2 the default scope reads nothing, and a read is the intersection of scope, provider and grant', () => {
+  const grant = access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] });
+  const providerMailboxes = ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'];
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: source(), providerMailboxes, access: grant }), []);
+  const enabled = source({ sourceEnabled: true, sourceAdapter: 'imap' });
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: enabled, providerMailboxes, access: grant }), [], 'enabled with the default empty scope');
+  const scoped = source({ sourceEnabled: true, sourceAdapter: 'imap', mailboxScope: ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'] });
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), ['[email protected]']);
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: null }), [], 'no grant');
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes: [], access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'provider denies');
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date('2026-10-29T16:00:00.000Z') }), [], 'expired grant');
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: access({ source: 'other' }), now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'grant for another source');
+  assert.deepEqual(effectiveMailboxes({ source: { ...scoped, sourceEnabled: false }, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT) }), [], 'disabled');
+  // Lifetime edges: the grant reads from issuedAt up to, not including, expiresAt.
+  const read = (over = {}) => effectiveMailboxes({ source: scoped, providerMailboxes, access: grant, now: new Date(AT), ...over });
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date('2026-10-22T15:59:59.999Z') }), [], 'before issuedAt');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date('2026-10-29T15:59:59.999Z') }), ['[email protected]'], 'the last instant before expiresAt');
+  // Malformed records or clock fail closed.
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ now: new Date(Number.NaN) }), [], 'invalid clock');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ now: AT }), [], 'a clock that is not a Date');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ expiresAt: 'not-a-date' }) }), [], 'invalid expiresAt');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ issuedAt: 'not-a-date' }) }), [], 'invalid issuedAt');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ access: access({ issuedAt: '2026-10-23T16:00:00.000Z' }) }), [], 'issued in the future');
+  const { mailboxes, ...noMailboxes } = grant;
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ access: noMailboxes }), [], 'grant without mailboxes');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ source: { ...scoped, mailboxScope: ['*'] } }), [], 'invalid source');
+  assert.deepEqual(read({ providerMailboxes: '[email protected]' }), [], 'provider list that is not an array');
+});
+
+test('T3 only a human changes settings', () => {
+  for (const kind of ['source', 'data']) {
+    const make = kind === 'source' ? source : data;
+    refused(kind, make({ changedBy: { kind: 'agent', id: 'mail-specialist' } }), 'changedBy.kind: must equal "human"');
+    refused(kind, make({ changedBy: { kind: 'system', id: 'mail' } }), 'changedBy.kind: must equal "human"');
+    const { changedBy, ...unsigned } = make();
+    refused(kind, unsigned, 'missing changedBy');
+  }
+});
+
+test('T4 unknown fields are refused at every level', () => {
+  refused('source', source({ secretRef: 'x' }), 'unknown key secretRef');
+  refused('source', source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, unlimited: 1 } }), 'unknown key unlimited');
+  refused('data', data({ purgeNow: true }), 'unknown key purgeNow');
+  refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'agent', id: 'a', asHuman: true } }), 'unknown key asHuman');
+  refused('service', service({ password: 'x' }), 'unknown key password');
+  refused('content-key', contentKey({ material: 'x' }), 'unknown key material');
+});
+
+test('T5 wildcards are refused in scopes, grants, allowlists and principals', () => {
+  refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['*'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+  refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['%'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+  refused('source', source({ wakeSenderAllowlist: ['*@example.test'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+  refused('access', access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+  refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'agent', id: '*' } }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+  refused('service', service({ mailbox: '*' }), 'wildcard not allowed');
+});
+
+test('T6 secret values are refused wherever they appear', () => {
+  const sentinels = [
+    '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----', 'eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJzZW50aW5lbCJ9.x',
+    'ghp_SENTINELSENTINEL', 'imaps://user:[email protected]', 'password=SENTINEL', 'client_secret: SENTINEL',
+  ];
+  for (const sentinel of sentinels) {
+    refused('service', service({ slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress/${sentinel}` }), 'looks like a secret value');
+    refused('service', service({ approvalId: sentinel }), 'looks like a secret value');
+    refused('access', access({ approvalId: sentinel }), 'looks like a secret value');
+  }
+  const problems = validateRecord('service', service({ approvalId: 'password=SENTINEL' }));
+  assert.ok(!problems.join('\n').includes('SENTINEL'), 'a refusal never echoes the value');
+});
+
+test('T7 incomplete scopes are refused', () => {
+  refused('access', access({ rights: [] }), 'access.rights: too few items');
+  refused('access', access({ mailboxes: [] }), 'access.mailboxes: too few items');
+  refused('access', access({ rights: ['metadata', 'send'] }), 'must be one of');
+  refused('access', access({ rights: ['body', 'body'] }), 'duplicate items');
+  refused('access', access({ expiresAt: AT }), 'must be after issuedAt');
+  refused('service', service({ scopes: [] }), 'service.scopes: too few items');
+  refused('service', service({ scopes: ['mail.send'] }), 'must be one of');
+  refused('source', source({ sourceEnabled: true }), 'an enabled source needs an enrolled adapter');
+  refused('source', source({ unattendedWake: true }), 'unattended wake needs at least one exact sender');
+  refused('source', source({ sourceMutations: ['mark-read'] }), 'too many items');
+  refused('source', source({ mailboxScope: ['[email protected]', '[email protected]'] }), 'duplicate items');
+  assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', source({ unattendedWake: true, wakeSenderAllowlist: ['[email protected]'] })), []);
+});
+
+test('T8 mismatched principal and source are refused', () => {
+  const scoped = source({ mailboxScope: ['[email protected]'] });
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service(), access: access() }), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ source: 'other' }) }), ['service: source mismatch']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ business: 'beta' }) }), ['service: business mismatch']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, service: service({ provider: 'm365' }) }), ['service: provider mismatch']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, access: access({ business: 'beta' }) }), ['access: business mismatch']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: scoped, access: access({ mailboxes: ['[email protected]'] }) }),
+    ['access: mailbox [email protected] outside the source scope']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkBinding({ source: source(), access: access() }), ['access: mailbox [email protected] outside the source scope'],
+    'the default empty scope admits no grant');
+  refused('access', access({ principal: { kind: 'service', id: 'mail' } }), 'must be one of agent, user');
+  assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(service({ slotPath: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/other/imap` }), ROOTS),
+    [`service.slotPath: must sit under ${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress`]);
+});
+
+test('T9 settings take changed values inside the schema bounds and refuse values outside them', () => {
+  for (const key of ['pollSeconds', 'parserInputBytes', 'mimeDepth', 'mimeParts', 'normalizedTextBytes', 'pageSize']) {
+    const { minimum, maximum } = schemaBounds('source', `limits.${key}`);
+    const at = value => source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, [key]: value } });
+    assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', at(minimum)), [], `${key} at its minimum`);
+    assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('source', at(maximum)), [], `${key} at its maximum`);
+    refused('source', at(minimum - 1), 'below the schema bound');
+    refused('source', at(maximum + 1), 'above the schema bound');
+    refused('source', at(minimum + 0.5), 'must be integer');
+  }
+  assert.equal(schemaBounds('source', 'limits.pageSize').maximum, 100);
+  refused('source', source({ limits: { ...defaults('source').limits, attachmentPartBytes: 20971520 } }), 'attachmentPartBytes exceeds attachmentMessageBytes');
+  assert.deepEqual(validateRecord('data', data({ bodyDraftDays: 90, metadataDays: 400 })), []);
+  refused('data', data({ metadataDays: 10 }), 'metadata and tombstones must outlive content');
+  refused('data', data({ persistContent: true }), 'persistContent: must equal false');
+  refused('data', data({ automaticPrune: true }), 'automaticPrune: must equal false');
+});
+
+test('T10 slot and key locations stay outside dataRoot, the repository and backups', () => {
+  assert.equal(slotDir({ configDir: CONFIG, business: 'acme', source: 'ingress' }), `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/ingress`);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(service(), ROOTS), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), ROOTS), []);
+  const nested = { ...ROOTS, dataRoot: CONFIG };
+  assert.ok(checkSlotLocation(service(), nested).some(problem => problem.includes('inside dataRoot')));
+  assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), nested).some(problem => problem.includes('inside dataRoot')));
+  assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), { ...ROOTS, backupRoots: ['/home/op/.config'] }).some(problem => problem.includes('inside a backup root')));
+  assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey(), { ...ROOTS, repoRoot: CONFIG }).some(problem => problem.includes('inside the repository')));
+  assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: '/home/op/.mosaic-acme/mail/acme/k1' }), ROOTS),
+    [`content-key.path: must sit under ${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme`, 'content-key.path: inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
+  assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/k2` }), ROOTS),
+    [`content-key.path: must be ${keyPath({ configDir: CONFIG, business: 'acme', keyId: 'k1' })}`]);
+  assert.ok(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail/acme/k1` }), ROOTS)[0].includes('must sit under'), 'apart from provider slots');
+  assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(contentKey({ path: `${CONFIG}/secrets/mosaic-stack/mail-content/acme/../acme/k1` }), ROOTS),
+    ['content-key.path: must be a normalized absolute path']);
+});
+
+test('T10b a symbolic link or alias can\'t move a slot or key into a forbidden root', () => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mail-place-'));
+  try {
+    const dataRoot = join(root, 'data');
+    const roots = { dataRoot, repoRoot: join(root, 'repo'), backupRoots: [join(root, 'backup')] };
+    // configDir is a symbolic link into dataRoot, with a real 0600 key behind it.
+    mkdirSync(join(dataRoot, 'cfg'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const configDir = join(root, 'config');
+    symlinkSync(join(dataRoot, 'cfg'), configDir);
+    const dir = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme');
+    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const file = join(dir, 'k1');
+    writeFileSync(file, 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
+    const key = contentKey({ path: file });
+    assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(key, { ...roots, configDir }), ['content-key.path: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
+    // A planned slot that doesn't exist yet resolves through its nearest existing ancestor.
+    const slot = service({ slotPath: join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail', 'acme', 'ingress', 'imap') });
+    assert.deepEqual(checkSlotLocation(slot, { ...roots, configDir }), ['service.slotPath: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
+    // A forbidden root named through an alias still covers the real configDir.
+    const realConfig = join(dataRoot, 'cfg');
+    const alias = join(root, 'alias');
+    symlinkSync(dataRoot, alias);
+    const realKey = contentKey({ path: join(realConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1') });
+    assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(realKey, { ...roots, dataRoot: alias, configDir: realConfig }),
+      ['content-key.path: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it']);
+    // The same layout outside every forbidden root passes.
+    const safeConfig = join(root, 'safe');
+    mkdirSync(safeConfig, { mode: 0o700 });
+    const safeKey = contentKey({ path: join(safeConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1') });
+    assert.deepEqual(checkKeyLocation(safeKey, { ...roots, configDir: safeConfig }), []);
+  } finally {
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test('T11 a protected file must be a regular owned 600 file with no symbolic link on its path', () => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mail-schema-'));
+  try {
+    const configDir = join(root, 'config');
+    const dir = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme');
+    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const file = join(dir, 'k1');
+    writeFileSync(file, 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }), []);
+    chmodSync(file, 0o640);
+    assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }).some(problem => problem.includes('mode 640')));
+    chmodSync(file, 0o400);
+    assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir }).some(problem => problem.includes('mode 400')));
+    chmodSync(file, 0o600);
+    assert.ok(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, uid: process.getuid() + 1 }).some(problem => problem.includes('owned by uid')));
+    const link = join(dir, 'k2');
+    symlinkSync(file, link);
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(link, { configDir }), [`${link}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`]);
+    const realDir = join(root, 'elsewhere');
+    mkdirSync(realDir, { mode: 0o700 });
+    writeFileSync(join(realDir, 'k3'), 'synthetic', { mode: 0o600 });
+    symlinkSync(realDir, join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta'));
+    const viaLink = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta', 'k3');
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(viaLink, { configDir }),
+      [`${viaLink}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${join(configDir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'beta')}`]);
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(join(dir, 'missing'), { configDir }), [`${join(dir, 'missing')}: not found`]);
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, 'k4'));
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(join(dir, 'k4'), { configDir }), [`${join(dir, 'k4')}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`]);
+    // The file must sit under configDir, lexically.
+    const outside = join(realDir, 'k3');
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(outside, { configDir }), [`${outside}: must sit under ${configDir}`]);
+    const dotted = `${configDir}/../elsewhere/k3`;
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(dotted, { configDir }), [`${dotted}: must be a normalized absolute path`]);
+    // A symbolic-link configDir is refused, even with a real 0600 file behind it.
+    const linkedConfig = join(root, 'linked-config');
+    symlinkSync(configDir, linkedConfig);
+    const viaConfig = join(linkedConfig, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'mail-content', 'acme', 'k1');
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(viaConfig, { configDir: linkedConfig }), [`${viaConfig}: a symbolic link sits on the path at ${linkedConfig}`]);
+    // A forbidden root named through an alias still covers the file.
+    const alias = join(root, 'alias');
+    symlinkSync(root, alias);
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, dataRoot: alias }), [`${file}: resolves inside dataRoot; mail secrets live outside it`]);
+    assert.deepEqual(checkProtectedFile(file, { configDir, dataRoot: join(root, 'data') }), []);
+  } finally {
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test('T12 the key lifecycle moves forward only, and an expired key gives no use', () => {
+  assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('active', 'retired'));
+  assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('active', 'expired'));
+  assert.ok(keyTransitionAllowed('retired', 'expired'));
+  for (const [from, to] of [['retired', 'active'], ['expired', 'active'], ['expired', 'retired'], ['active', 'active'], ['lost', 'active'], ['constructor', 'active']])
+    assert.equal(keyTransitionAllowed(from, to), false, `${from} -> ${to}`);
+  const now = new Date('2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), now), 'encrypt-decrypt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'retired' }), now), 'decrypt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'expired' }), now), 'none');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date('2027-10-22T16:00:00.000Z')), 'none', 'past expiresAt, whatever the state says');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'retired' }), new Date('2027-10-22T15:59:59.999Z')), 'decrypt', 'the last instant before expiresAt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date(AT)), 'encrypt-decrypt', 'from createdAt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date('2026-10-22T15:59:59.999Z')), 'none', 'before createdAt');
+  // Malformed records or clock fail closed.
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'escrowed' }), now), 'none', 'unknown state');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ state: 'constructor' }), now), 'none', 'prototype key as state');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ createdAt: 'not-a-date' }), now), 'none', 'invalid createdAt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey({ expiresAt: 'not-a-date' }), now), 'none', 'invalid expiresAt');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), new Date(Number.NaN)), 'none', 'invalid clock');
+  assert.equal(keyUse(contentKey(), '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'), 'none', 'a clock that is not a Date');
+  refused('content-key', contentKey({ state: 'escrowed' }), 'must be one of');
+  refused('content-key', contentKey({ expiresAt: AT }), 'must be after createdAt');
+});
+
+test('T13 the disabled schema leaves v1 unchanged: no mail kind, no mail action', () => {
+  const kinds = readFileSync(new URL('../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  const vocabulary = readFileSync(new URL('../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.ok(!/mail/i.test(kinds), 'core mail-source registration waits for the approved PRD version and the source, grant and route approvals');
+  assert.ok(!/mail\.access/.test(vocabulary), 'mail.access waits for a Jason-approved PRD version');
+  const prd = readFileSync(new URL('../../../docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.ok(!/REQ-MAIL-/.test(prd), 'the addendum is a draft until Jason approves it');
+});
+
+test('T14 every addendum requirement maps to build rows, and every row E01-E16 is covered', () => {
+  const draft = readFileSync(new URL('../../../docs/prd/mail-addendum-draft.md', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.match(draft, /^- Status: draft, not approved\./m);
+  const blocks = draft.split(/^- \*\*(?=REQ-MAIL-)/m).slice(1);
+  const ids = blocks.map(block => block.match(/^(REQ-MAIL-\d+)\.\*\*/)[1]);
+  assert.deepEqual(ids, Array.from({ length: ids.length }, (_, index) => `REQ-MAIL-${index + 1}`));
+  assert.equal((draft.match(/\*\*REQ-MAIL-/g) ?? []).length, ids.length);
+  const covered = new Set();
+  for (const [index, block] of blocks.entries()) {
+    const rows = block.match(/^ {2}Rows: (E\d\d(?:, E\d\d)*)\.$/m);
+    assert.ok(rows, `${ids[index]} names its rows`);
+    for (const row of rows[1].split(', ')) covered.add(row);
+  }
+  const all = Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, index) => `E${String(index + 1).padStart(2, '0')}`);
+  assert.deepEqual([...covered].sort(), all);
+});