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Author SHA1 Message Date
code-infra-01 e3944935cc Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into fix/1327-setuppath-idempotency
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-20 10:57:01 -05:00
code-infra-01 ebbf682374 fix(#1327): sentinel-managed PATH block, default-home-only profile writes
setupPath() guarded its profile append on the binDir value it was about
to write, which is blind to accumulation across different Mosaic homes:
every wizard run against a fresh temp home appended a permanent # Mosaic
block to the operator's real shell profile (1,061 measured appends on
sb-it-1-dt, naming 1,058 unique /tmp dirs of which zero exist).

- S1/S5: managed block between >>> mosaic begin/end <<< sentinels,
  rewritten in place, both the POSIX and $env:Path arms
- S2: a target home that is not the resolved default skips the profile
  write entirely; a test harness can no longer touch the operator profile
- S3: byte-identical profile across repeated runs (any homes)
- S4: legacy unmarked # Mosaic pairs collapse into the managed block

S2 arm captured RED against pre-fix code (expected 'skipped', got
'added'), then GREEN post-fix; full suite 1585 passed.
2026-08-19 18:24:52 -05:00
13 changed files with 244 additions and 596 deletions
@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
import { type Type } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
import { AppModule } from '../app.module.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from '../commands/command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from '../commands/command-executor.service.js';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from '../commands/runtime-approval-verifier.js';
import { PreferencesModule } from '../preferences/preferences.module.js';
import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
const fakeDb = {
$client: { exec: async (): Promise<void> => {} },
execute: async (): Promise<{ rows: unknown[] }> => ({ rows: [] }),
select: () => ({
from: () => ({
where: async (): Promise<Array<{ count: number }>> => [{ count: 1 }],
}),
}),
insert: () => ({ values: async (): Promise<void> => {} }),
};
const fakeProviderService = {
onModuleInit: async (): Promise<void> => {},
onModuleDestroy: (): void => {},
getRegistry: () => ({ getAvailable: () => [], getAll: () => [], find: () => undefined }),
getDefaultModel: () => undefined,
listAvailableModels: () => [],
listProviders: () => [],
getAdapter: () => undefined,
getProvidersHealth: () => [],
};
function compileRealAppGraph(): Promise<TestingModule> {
return Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] })
.overrideProvider('DB_HANDLE')
.useValue({ db: fakeDb, close: async (): Promise<void> => {} })
.overrideProvider('DB')
.useValue(fakeDb)
.overrideProvider('STORAGE_ADAPTER')
.useValue({
name: 'required-security-wiring-test',
migrate: async (): Promise<void> => {},
close: async (): Promise<void> => {},
})
.overrideProvider('AUTH')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('BRAIN')
.useValue({ conversations: {}, agents: {} })
.overrideProvider('LOG_SERVICE')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY_ADAPTER')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(ProviderService)
.useValue(fakeProviderService)
.compile();
}
function providerToken(provider: unknown): unknown {
return typeof provider === 'function' ? provider : (provider as { provide?: unknown })?.provide;
}
interface MaskingConsumer {
moduleType: Type<unknown>;
token: Type<unknown>;
useValue: object;
}
async function compileWithoutProvider(
moduleType: Type<unknown>,
missingToken: Type<unknown>,
maskingConsumer: MaskingConsumer,
): Promise<{ error: unknown; moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined }> {
const touchedModules = new Set([moduleType, maskingConsumer.moduleType]);
const originals = Array.from(touchedModules, (touchedModule: Type<unknown>) => ({
moduleType: touchedModule,
providers: (Reflect.getMetadata('providers', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
exports: (Reflect.getMetadata('exports', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
}));
for (const original of originals) {
const providers = original.providers.flatMap((provider: unknown): unknown[] => {
const token = providerToken(provider);
if (original.moduleType === moduleType && token === missingToken) return [];
if (original.moduleType === maskingConsumer.moduleType && token === maskingConsumer.token) {
return [{ provide: maskingConsumer.token, useValue: maskingConsumer.useValue }];
}
return [provider];
});
const exports = original.exports.filter(
(exported: unknown): boolean =>
original.moduleType !== moduleType || providerToken(exported) !== missingToken,
);
Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', providers, original.moduleType);
Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', exports, original.moduleType);
}
let moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined;
let error: unknown;
try {
moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
} finally {
for (const original of originals) {
Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', original.providers, original.moduleType);
Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', original.exports, original.moduleType);
}
}
return { error, moduleRef };
}
async function closeIfCompiled(moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined): Promise<void> {
if (moduleRef) await moduleRef.close();
}
describe('required security wiring — real AppModule startup refusal', () => {
it('FL-01 positive control: the real graph compiles when CommandAuthorizationService is bound', async () => {
const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
try {
expect(moduleRef.get(CommandAuthorizationService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
CommandAuthorizationService,
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('FL-01 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
CommandsModule,
CommandAuthorizationService,
{
moduleType: CommandsModule,
token: CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
useValue: {},
},
);
await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
expect(
error,
'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing CommandAuthorizationService binding',
).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
expect(error.message).toContain('CommandExecutorService');
expect(error.message).toContain('CommandAuthorizationService');
});
it('FL-11 positive control: the real graph compiles when SystemOverrideService is bound', async () => {
const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
try {
expect(moduleRef.get(SystemOverrideService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
SystemOverrideService,
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('FL-11 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
PreferencesModule,
SystemOverrideService,
{
moduleType: CommandsModule,
token: CommandExecutorService,
useValue: {},
},
);
await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
expect(
error,
'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing SystemOverrideService binding',
).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
expect(error.message).toContain('AgentService');
expect(error.message).toContain('SystemOverrideService');
});
});
const actorScope = { userId: 'security-user', tenantId: 'security-tenant' };
const conversationId = 'security-conversation';
function directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>) {
const registry = {
getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
version: 1,
commands: [
{
name: 'system',
aliases: [],
description: 'Set instruction authority',
scope: 'agent' as const,
execution: 'socket' as const,
available: true,
},
],
skills: [],
})),
};
return new CommandExecutorService(
registry as never,
{ getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
{ set: systemOverrideSet, clear: vi.fn() } as never,
{ collect: vi.fn() } as never,
null,
{ agents: {} } as never,
null,
null,
{ getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []), getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
undefined as never,
);
}
function directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>): {
service: AgentService;
session: AgentSession;
} {
const service = new AgentService(
{
getDefaultModel: vi.fn(() => null),
getRegistry: vi.fn(() => ({})),
findModel: vi.fn(),
listAvailableModels: vi.fn(() => []),
} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ available: false } as never,
{} as never,
{ getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
{ loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
undefined as never,
null,
{ collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
null,
);
const session = {
id: conversationId,
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
piSession: { prompt: piPrompt },
listeners: new Set(),
unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
createdAt: Date.now(),
promptCount: 0,
channels: new Set(),
skillPromptAdditions: [],
sandboxDir: process.cwd(),
allowedTools: null,
userId: actorScope.userId,
tenantId: actorScope.tenantId,
metrics: {
tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
modelSwitches: 0,
messageCount: 0,
lastActivityAt: new Date(0).toISOString(),
},
} as unknown as AgentSession;
const internals = service as unknown as { sessions: Map<string, AgentSession> };
internals.sessions.set(conversationId, session);
return { service, session };
}
describe('required security wiring — malformed direct absence has zero effects', () => {
it('FL-01 refuses command execution before any command effect when authorization is absent', async () => {
const systemOverrideSet = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const executor = directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'system',
args: 'authority that must not be stored',
conversationId,
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await executor.execute(payload, actorScope);
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
}
expect
.soft(
error,
'absence read as permission: direct executor accepted missing command authorization',
)
.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect
.soft(
systemOverrideSet,
'absence read as permission: command effect occurred without command authorization',
)
.not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('FL-11 refuses prompt execution before any provider or session effect when system override authority is absent', async () => {
const piPrompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const { service, session } = directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt);
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.prompt(conversationId, 'must not reach provider', actorScope);
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
}
expect
.soft(
error,
'absence read as permission: direct session accepted missing system override authority',
)
.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect
.soft(
piPrompt,
'absence read as permission: provider prompt occurred without system override authority',
)
.not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect
.soft(
session.promptCount,
'absence read as permission: session state changed without system override authority',
)
.toBe(0);
});
});
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ function makeService(operatorMemory: unknown = null): AgentService {
{} as never,
{ getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
{ loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
{ get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null), renew: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
null,
null,
{ collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
operatorMemory as never,
+11 -9
View File
@@ -132,8 +132,9 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
@Inject(CoordService) private readonly coordService: CoordService,
@Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClientService: McpClientService,
@Inject(SkillLoaderService) private readonly skillLoaderService: SkillLoaderService,
@Optional()
@Inject(SystemOverrideService)
private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService | null,
@Optional()
@Inject(PreferencesService)
private readonly preferencesService: PreferencesService | null,
@@ -708,22 +709,23 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
}
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.promptCount += 1;
// Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact,
// authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority.
const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments);
// Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn).
// Required instruction-authority wiring is consulted before session/provider effects.
// Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn)
let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`;
const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
if (override) {
effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
if (this.systemOverride) {
const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
if (override) {
effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
}
}
session.promptCount += 1;
try {
await session.piSession.prompt(effectiveMessage);
} catch (err) {
@@ -80,10 +80,6 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
};
const allowAuthorization = {
authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
};
function buildService(
redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis,
mcpClient: {
@@ -102,7 +98,6 @@ function buildService(
null,
mockChatGateway as never,
mcpClient as never,
allowAuthorization as never,
);
}
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Inject(forwardRef(() => ChatGateway))
private readonly chatGateway: ChatGateway | null,
@Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService,
@Optional()
@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService,
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
) {}
async execute(
@@ -56,13 +57,13 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
};
}
const authorization = await this.authorization.authorize(
const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize(
def,
payload,
userId,
payload.approvalId,
);
if (!authorization.allowed) {
if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) {
return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
}
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
const def = this.registry
.getManifest()
.commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command);
if (!def) return null;
if (!def || !this.authorization) return null;
return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId);
}
@@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const allowAuthorization = {
authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
};
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function buildRegistry(): CommandRegistryService {
@@ -78,7 +74,6 @@ function buildExecutor(registry: CommandRegistryService): CommandExecutorService
null, // reloadService (optional)
null, // chatGateway (optional)
mockMcpClient as never,
allowAuthorization as never,
);
}
@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ describe('ReloadService — /reload command sanitizes plugin errors', () => {
reloadService,
mockChatGateway as never,
mockMcpClient as never,
{ authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }) } as never,
);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conv-1' };
+3 -3
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
| RI-2-001 | done | RI-N2 (Forge): remove stub-executor false success; `--simulate` typed `simulated` results that satisfy nothing; literal-`true` gates and echo-review replaced with real gates or typed waiting-for-authority | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-forge-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 20K | Independent review APPROVED 2026-08-17 (Gitea review 172 on PR #1278, head 99b8f6ea; reviewing seat fargo — recorded under shared host principal mos-dt-0, provenance correction posted by fred; wrapper gap filed by fred). Executed at head: forge tests 116/116, lint green, typecheck green after building macp dist (minimal-install artifact, not a defect), workspace typecheck 45/45, no external type consumers of the changed interfaces. CI red = known lane-wide fleet-test failure only, carries no information about this change (fred, log-content analysis, pipelines 2456-2458). Non-blocking finding: README L141-143 + skills/mosaic-forge/SKILL.md document bare forge run/resume, which now fails closed — fast-follow docs touch. Merge queued behind #1270. UPDATE 2026-08-18: #1270 merged; CI GREEN at head 4917df1f via serialized retry (pipeline 2477) - root cause of prior reds was CI-agent contention (web SPA timeouts under concurrent pipelines), superseding the fleet-test-failure theory. |
| RI-2-002 | done | RI-N2 (MACP): gate runner fails closed on empty commands, stub executors, and unimplemented CI-provider gates unless explicit simulate; typed capability failures | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-macp-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 15K | PR #1293 (head 2097379e): CI green (pipeline 2465), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 173, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - macp 109/109 verified at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-3-001 | done | RI-N4: complete probe inventory mapping every TS and shell quality-rail check to one canonical check with disposition (preserve/strengthen/retire, each named) | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-qr-probe-inventory | RI-0-001 | 12K | PR #1302 (head e06a47fac591): CI green (2484), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 187, fargo seat, 2026-08-18) — 54 rows / 21 canonical checks / dispositions 43-2-9-0 verified by row-count and code spot-checks. Merged by fargo at pinned head. |
| RI-3-002 | done | RI-N4: TS evaluator absorbs effective shell probes; typed results (passed/failed/blocked/error/not-applicable) with versioned digested check definitions; shell commands become thin adapters; contract/parity/negative-control tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-qr-evaluator | RI-3-001 | 30K | PR #1308 (head 68279d61): CI green (2506), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 188, fred, seven mutations incl. vacuous-pass + stage-removal). Merged by fargo at pinned head → next @ 245e0c4. Follow-up #1309 (digest wording). |
| RI-4-001 | done | RI-N3: one PRD application service — `mission --plan` persists mission↔PRD linkage (ids/versions/selected requirements); `mosaic prdy` routes through the service or becomes a named import/export adapter; Markdown is a labeled generated view; explicit conflict-aware import | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-prd-authority | RI-0-001 | 35K | PR #1294 (head 8d258e1d): CI green (pipeline 2466), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 174, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - prdy 20/20 + command specs 9/9 at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. PR #1294 (head 8d258e1d): CI green (2466), review 174. Merged 2026-08-18 overnight wave → next @ d92de53. |
| RI-3-002 | not-started | RI-N4: TS evaluator absorbs effective shell probes; typed results (passed/failed/blocked/error/not-applicable) with versioned digested check definitions; shell commands become thin adapters; contract/parity/negative-control tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-qr-evaluator | RI-3-001 | 30K | |
| RI-4-001 | in-progress | RI-N3: one PRD application service — `mission --plan` persists mission↔PRD linkage (ids/versions/selected requirements); `mosaic prdy` routes through the service or becomes a named import/export adapter; Markdown is a labeled generated view; explicit conflict-aware import | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-prd-authority | RI-0-001 | 35K | PR #1294 (head 8d258e1d): CI green (pipeline 2466), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 174, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - prdy 20/20 + command specs 9/9 at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-5-001 | done | RI-N5: typed freshness states (current/stale/partial/unknown/unavailable); no failed-fetch-renders-empty; stale derived verdicts → unknown; mutations disabled when stale; failure-matrix tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-web-stale-safety | RI-0-001 | 25K | |
| RI-V-001 | in-progress | Final verification + release evidence: all cards verified merged, negative controls demonstrated, real `next` publish run green on exact commit, evidence pack recorded | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-release-evidence | RI-1-002, RI-2-001, RI-2-002, RI-3-002, RI-4-001, RI-5-001 | 10K | Evidence pack live on branch docs/ri-050-release-evidence — all five requirements evidenced; registry credential fixed (jarvis, #1275 c23239) and PROVEN green: pipeline 2517 (retry of 2512, identical commit) all steps green incl. build-gateway; pack PR next, then topher review + merge, close #1275. |
| RI-V-001 | not-started | Final verification + release evidence: all cards verified merged, negative controls demonstrated, real `next` publish run green on exact commit, evidence pack recorded | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-release-evidence | RI-1-002, RI-2-001, RI-2-002, RI-3-002, RI-4-001, RI-5-001 | 10K | |
## Dispatch waves (max 2 parallel workers)
-130
View File
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
# RI-050 Release Evidence Pack (alpha 0.0.50 release-integrity floor)
> Status: **DRAFT — proof complete, awaiting review + merge**. All five normative requirements (RI-N1..N5) merged to `next` behind the live gate. Registry credential fixed 2026-08-18 23:47Z and **proven end-to-end**: push pipeline **2517** (retry of failed 2512 at the identical commit d4d32a8, only the secret changed between runs) — all steps green including `build-gateway`. Remaining for closure: this pack PR reviewed (topher), merged to `next`, its own push pipeline green, #1275 closed. Last updated 2026-08-19 by fargo (day-takeover orchestrator).
> Card: RI-V-001. All sections marked ⏳ pending their card's merge. Normative source:
> `docs/PRD.md` § Release Integrity Workstream (#1275).
## RI-N1 — Canonical terminal verification + exact-commit publish gate
| exhibit | evidence | where |
| ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------- |
| Gate live, fail-closed | Push pipeline **2486**: `verify` ran at exact commit, FAILED on a real latent defect (gateway cross-user-isolation cleanup on the no-DB path), and `build` / `publish-npm` / `build-gateway` were all **skipped**. First push in repo history that did not publish ungated (prior ungated publishes beside failing builds: 2439, 2462, 2482). | Woodpecker repo 47 pipeline 2486 |
| Gate-caught defect fixed | PR **#1304** (afterAll honors `dbAvailable`; both paths verified: dead-port 28 skipped + file passes; live-5433 28 passed). Review 180 (fred). | PR #1304 |
| First gated green npm publish | Push pipeline **2488** (post-#1304): `verify` GREEN → `build` GREEN → `publish-next-npm` GREEN, all publish effects behind the gate. | Woodpecker pipeline 2488 |
| Negative controls | PR **#1305**: structural DAG tests (S1 missing edge, S2 renamed effect incl. command-based npm/kaniko detection, S3 detach, S4 failure:ignore/success override, S5 when-filter, S6 HEAD-mover between verify and publish with legitimate-recheckout positive control, S7 removal) + subset-stage composition control in verify-release.test.mjs. Mutation-verified by the dispatching seat in both directions (true bypass → S1 assertion fires; non-bypass edit → correctly green). Scripts tests 20/20, CI 2490 green. | PR #1305 |
| ✅ Canonical command | `scripts/verify-release.mjs` (stage table pinned to ci.yml by checked-in test). Merged with #1277; now also invokes the RI-N4 evaluator via its `quality-rails` stage (#1308). | `scripts/verify-release.mjs` |
## RI-N2 — Forge + MACP fail-closed (typed explicit simulation)
- ✅ Forge: PR **#1278** merged (head 4917df1f; CI 2477; review 184 fred at pinned head — prior review 172 dismissed by rebase, correctly re-taken).
- ✅ MACP: PR **#1293** merged (head 2097379e; CI 2465; review 173).
- ✅ Post-merge behavior docs: PR **#1299** merged (head 8a405b14; CI 2497; review 186 fargo at pinned head — legitimate independent seat; merged 2026-08-18 with --expect-head pin, content-verified on next @ ff45f7b).
## RI-N3 — PRD authority
- ✅ PR **#1294** merged (head 8d258e1d; CI 2466; review 174).
## RI-N4 — Quality-rails evaluator
- ✅ Probe inventory: PR **#1302** merged (head e06a47fac59; CI 2484; review 187 fargo at pinned head; 54 rows / 21 canonical checks / dispositions 43-2-9-0 row-count-verified; merged 2026-08-18, content-verified on next @ 6435089).
- ✅ TS evaluator absorbs shell probes: PR **#1308** merged (head 68279d61; CI 2506; review 188 fred at pinned head — seven targeted mutations, seven detections, incl. the vacuous-pass hole M1 and stage-removal M7). Evaluator: typed fail-closed verdicts, digested versioned definitions, per-subject sets; QC-19 absorbed (verbatim-list parity oracle), QC-20 as thin adapter (verify.sh unmodified); verify-release `quality-rails` stage wired (RI-N1 consumes the evaluator). Worker-produced, independently verified by the dispatching seat (quality-rails 40/40 incl. sabotage control 6-failed/34-passed restored sha-verified; root build 25/25; typecheck 45/45).
## RI-N5 — Consequence-aware stale UI
- ✅ PR **#1300** merged (head a337d787; CI 2481; review 179). Web suite 199 → 281 tests (failure matrix + negative controls), independently re-run by the dispatching seat before merge.
## Known-open infrastructure item (not a card)
Gateway/ci-base **image** pushes fail on registry credentials: Woodpecker repo
secrets `REGISTRY_USERNAME`/`REGISTRY_PASSWORD` are rejected by the Gitea
container registry (explicit `UNAUTHORIZED` at `/v2/token`; pipeline 2494 after
PR #1306 corrected the secret references — previously masked as an ambiguous
push-permission error since at least 2439). Requires a package-scoped token
(Jason). The npm publish path is green and gated; this item tracks image pushes
only and predates the RI-050 floor.
**Update 2026-08-18 (fargo):** Jason set new secret values ~17:25Z; pipeline
**2507** (the #1308 merge push, first after the update, 18:0xZ) still fails
`build-gateway` with the identical `UNAUTHORIZED`. Read-only isolation (no
secrets read, no CI retries): the registry endpoint and auth mechanism are
HEALTHY — a valid Gitea token via basic-auth mints a JWT at `/v2/token` (200),
bad credentials 401 cleanly. Therefore the failure is isolated to the secret
VALUES, not the endpoint or pipeline. Most likely shape error (labeled guess):
the registry authenticates username + **API token with package scope**, not
username + login password; if REGISTRY_PASSWORD holds a login password rather
than a minted token value, `/v2/token` 401s exactly as observed. npm publishes
remained green in 2507; every publish step except the image push is gated and
green.
**Resolution 2026-08-18 23:47Z — FIXED on the Gitea server (jarvis, #1275
comment 23239).** Root cause was neither scope nor a missing token:
`REGISTRY_USERNAME` held `mosaic`, the **pre-rename org name**. Gitea's rename
redirect covers API/web paths but not Basic-auth username lookup, and
`mosaicstack` is an organization, which has no password — the pair could never
authenticate. Fix: `REGISTRY_USERNAME`=`woodpecker` (the existing service
account, Gitea user 41, already in `ci-publish`) and `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`= a
newly minted `write:package`-only token (`gitea admin user generate-access-token`
in the Gitea container; minting with a token is forbidden server-side). Events
`[push, tag]` preserved. Verified **without a pipeline run**:
`POST /v2/<pkg>/blobs/uploads/` opened then cancelled a session — **202** on
all four kaniko destinations (gateway, appservice, web, ci-base), anonymous
control **401**, wrong-owner control **401**. The earlier "Requires a
package-scoped token (Jason)" expectation is superseded: the defect was a
stale value from the org rename, not a scope grant Jason owed.
**Proof 2026-08-19 ~00:2xZ (fargo): pipeline 2517 green at build-gateway.**
Woodpecker retry of 2512 — identical commit d4d32a8, identical pipeline
config, only the server-side secret changed between runs — went green on
every step (clone, install, verify, build, publish-next-npm,
**build-gateway**). A/B at the same commit isolates the credential as the
variable; the stored value is byte-intact. Retry was serialized (sole run in
flight; merge-purpose CI queue guard had blocked on 2512's terminal failure
at the `next` head, which this retry also clears). The item is closed.
**Timing caveat (recorded so the pack does not outlive the memory of what the
pin was).** Every pipeline this pack cites — including headline 2517 —
finished by 2026-08-19 00:34Z, which is BEFORE the registry credential pin
landed at 2026-08-19 23:42:05Z. The A/B above remains sound regardless: it
compares identical commits (d4d32a8) with only the secret differing, so it
proves the credential value, not anything about the later pin. No pipeline
cited in this pack exercises the post-pin registry state; a green trunk
publish after the pin is a separate fact that this pack does not claim.
## Process record (audit trail)
- Merges executed under the jarvis principal (topher seat; identity provisioning
pending) via the Gitea API replicating `pr-merge.sh` semantics (head-pin +
squash + keep branch): `pr-merge.sh` hard-codes `main`-only targets and cannot
express this repo's `next` trunk — wrapper gap captured to OpenBrain
(id 9db7a95a) and to the framework queue.
- Reviews tonight: 175/178 (zane's #1298, both heads, by topher); 176/177/179/
180/181/182 (fred) — cross-review rule (producer ≠ reviewer) held on every
merge: producers were pi workers / zane; reviewers were the other seat.
- CI contention note: concurrent PR pipelines on the single CI agent can time
out the web SPA suite (measured 2470/2472 vs serialized 2475/2476/2477);
serialize retries when the queue is busy.
## Process record — 2026-08-18 day takeover (fargo)
- Takeover directive: Jason (via jarvis router + both seats' handoff documents,
relayed verbatim over comms). First-move conflict between the two handoffs
(zane: doctor PR first; topher: review-queue first) resolved on dependency
grounds per jarvis's read — topher's order won; zane's finding-2 doctor PR
(upgraded by fred's measurement) remains queued, nothing depends on it.
- Reviews 186 (#1299) + 187 (#1302): fargo, at pinned heads, as the legitimate
independent seat (topher dispatched both producers; cross-review rule held).
Both merged with --expect-head pinning via the REPO-COPY pr-merge.sh
(allows next; the installed copy still lags — zane's route, not the raw-API
break-glass), each preceded by ci-queue-wait -B next -R mosaicstack/stack.
CI green at both heads (2497, 2484). Merges content-verified on the shipping
ref (TASKS anchors at ff45f7b / 6435089).
- RI-3-002: one pi worker (zai/glm-5.3:high), independently verified by the
dispatching seat before push; PR #1308 reviewed by fred (188, seven
mutations incl. vacuous-pass and stage-removal) and merged head-pinned at
68279d61 → next @ 245e0c4.
- Registry-credential isolation measurement (above) performed read-only; no
secret values read, no retry-pushes against CI.
- One reviewer-scope disclosure (fred, review 188): fred's approval explicitly
did NOT re-run root build/typecheck/mosaic-vitest — those remain the
dispatching seat's numbers. The changed-package suites, verify-release
suite, and seven mutations were fred's own.
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
# #1179 — Required security DI wiring
## Objective
Eliminate the shared fail-open defect class **absence read as permission**:
- FL-01: missing `CommandAuthorizationService` must refuse Nest startup and must not permit command effects.
- FL-11: missing `SystemOverrideService` must refuse Nest startup and must not omit stored instruction authority while allowing provider/session effects.
## Tracking
- Issue: #1179, child of #1156
- Branch: `fix/1179-required-security-di`
- Base: `origin/next` at `216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02`
## Plan
1. RED: compile the real `AppModule` graph with each required provider independently removed, with a positive control for each intact binding.
2. RED: directly exercise each malformed absence path and assert zero command/provider/session effects.
3. Stop and report RED to the coordinator before production implementation.
4. After authorization, make both constructor injections required, remove absence-as-permission branches, and update explicit legitimate optional test seams.
5. Run focused Gateway tests, typecheck, lint, format, build, independent exact-head verification, and focused security review.
## Immutable path fence
Production changes are confined to:
- `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts`
Tests and task evidence are confined to:
- `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts`
- existing direct-constructor specs that require explicit required arguments
- `docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md`
No files in #1178, #1072, #1080, or #1054 lanes are in scope. `docs/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-owned and will not be modified.
## Budget
No explicit token ceiling was provided. Working assumption: one narrow Gateway security packet; split and stop if either arm requires unrelated module rewiring.
## Progress
- Intake read from #1179 and parent #1156.
- Base independently resolved from the issue's pre-native-stage ordering and repository `origin/next` ref; branch HEAD verified byte-for-byte against the remote ref.
- Real consumers and direct constructors inventoried.
## Tests
### RED
- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 4 failed, 2 passed before implementation.
- Both real-graph negative controls showed module compilation accepted the missing target binding.
- Direct FL-01 showed one unauthorized command effect; direct FL-11 showed one provider prompt and one session counter mutation.
### GREEN
- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 6/6 passed.
- FL-01-only production revert: exactly the two FL-01 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-11, passed.
- FL-11-only production revert: exactly the two FL-11 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-01, passed.
- Full Gateway suite: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 831 tests passed, 17 skipped.
- Gateway typecheck: passed.
- Gateway lint: passed.
- Gateway build: passed.
- Changed-file Prettier check: passed.
### Review
- Codex code review: APPROVE, 0 findings.
- Codex focused security review: risk `none`, 0 findings.
- Independent exact-head review remains assigned to Scrappy through the coordinator.
## Risks / blockers
- `AgentModule` / `CommandsModule` / `ChatModule` contain a production cycle; the module test therefore uses the real top-level `AppModule` and replaces only storage/network leaves, preserving the target service in each arm while isolating the separate required consumer that would otherwise mask that arm's defect.
- No broad module rewrite was required.
@@ -65,19 +65,6 @@ Each of these produced a wrong conclusion before it was written down.
conclusion drawn from it describes the wrong tree. Confirm `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`
is the tree you think it is before trusting any git output.
13. **Run the repository's PINNED tool version.** `npx <tool>` resolves a local `node_modules`
install when one is present and fetches the latest release when one is not, so the same
command answers differently depending on where it ran. A reviewer measuring in a fresh clone
or a detached worktree — which is exactly where reviewers measure — has no `node_modules` and
silently gets the latest release instead of the pinned one. Measured on mosaicstack#1313: the
lockfile pins prettier 3.8.1, under which three guides pass; a version-less `npx` in a
worktree resolved 3.9.6, under which the same three fail; and 3.0.0, the floor of the declared
`^3.0.0` range, fails a different one. Three versions, three verdicts, identical bytes. Use
`node_modules/.bin/<tool>`, or name the version the lockfile pins.
14. **A formatter or linter declared as a range is a dated verdict, not a fact.** If a lockfile
pins it, the gate is reproducible today and will disagree with itself the day the pin moves.
Report a formatting failure with the version that produced it, always.
### Feedback Categories
- **Blocker**: must fix before merge (security, bugs, test failures)
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
/**
* setupPath profile management (issue #1327, MOSAIC-IMPROVEMENTS 4c / D25).
*
* The profile append used to be guarded on the binDir value it was about to
* write, which is blind to accumulation across different Mosaic homes: every
* wizard run against a fresh temp home appended a permanent block to the
* operator's real shell profile (1,061 measured appends on sb-it-1-dt).
*
* Arms below map to the requirements:
* S1 sentinel-managed block, rewritten in place
* S2 a non-default target home never touches the operator profile
* S3 byte-identical profile across repeated runs
* S4 legacy unmarked `# Mosaic` blocks collapse into the managed block
* S5 the Windows ($env:Path) arm shares the same block logic
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { tmpdir, homedir } from 'node:os';
let profilePathMock: string | null = null;
vi.mock('../platform/detect.js', () => ({
getShellProfilePath: (): string | null => profilePathMock,
}));
import { setupPath, managedBlockFor, stripLegacyPathBlocks } from './finalize.js';
// The real resolved default on this host. Tests use it as the comparator a
// non-default home must fail against, exactly as the wizard would.
const REAL_DEFAULT_HOME = join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic');
function tempHome(prefix: string): string {
const dir = join(tmpdir(), prefix);
mkdirSync(join(dir, 'bin'), { recursive: true });
return dir;
}
describe('setupPath profile management (#1327)', () => {
let workDir: string;
let profileFile: string;
let defaultLikeHome: string;
let otherHome: string;
const baseline = '# existing operator content\nexport EDITOR=vim\n';
beforeEach(() => {
workDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'setuppath-spec-'));
profileFile = join(workDir, '.bashrc');
writeFileSync(profileFile, baseline, 'utf-8');
profilePathMock = profileFile;
defaultLikeHome = tempHome(join(workDir, 'home-a', '.config', 'mosaic'));
otherHome = tempHome(join(workDir, 'home-b', '.config', 'mosaic'));
});
afterEach(() => {
profilePathMock = null;
rmSync(workDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
// S2 — the arm that MUST fail against the pre-fix code: a home that is not
// the resolved default may not modify the operator profile at all.
it('does not touch the operator profile when the target home is not the resolved default', () => {
const action = setupPath(otherHome, REAL_DEFAULT_HOME);
expect(action).toBe('skipped');
expect(readFileSync(profileFile, 'utf-8')).toBe(baseline);
});
it('returns skipped when no shell profile can be resolved', () => {
profilePathMock = null;
const action = setupPath(defaultLikeHome, defaultLikeHome);
expect(action).toBe('skipped');
});
// S1 + S3 — two distinct homes (each run as the resolved default in turn,
// the shape of two legitimate installs against one operator profile) and
// repeated runs against the same home both leave exactly one block.
it('leaves exactly one managed block after runs against two distinct homes', () => {
const first = setupPath(defaultLikeHome, defaultLikeHome);
expect(first).toBe('added');
const second = setupPath(otherHome, otherHome);
expect(second).toBe('added');
const content = readFileSync(profileFile, 'utf-8');
const beginCount = content.split('# >>> mosaic begin >>>').length - 1;
const endCount = content.split('# <<< mosaic end <<<').length - 1;
expect(beginCount).toBe(1);
expect(endCount).toBe(1);
expect(content).toContain(join(otherHome, 'bin'));
expect(content).toContain(baseline);
});
it('is byte-identical across repeated runs against the same home', () => {
setupPath(defaultLikeHome, defaultLikeHome);
const afterFirst = readFileSync(profileFile, 'utf-8');
const again = setupPath(defaultLikeHome, defaultLikeHome);
expect(again).toBe('already');
expect(readFileSync(profileFile, 'utf-8')).toBe(afterFirst);
});
// S4 — pre-existing unmarked blocks from the old append logic collapse
// into the single managed block instead of accumulating beside it.
it('collapses legacy unmarked # Mosaic blocks into the managed block', () => {
const legacy =
'# existing operator content\n' +
'# Mosaic\n' +
'export PATH="/tmp/mosaic-dead-wizard-1/bin:$PATH"\n' +
'export EDITOR=vim\n' +
'# Mosaic\n' +
'export PATH="/tmp/mosaic-dead-wizard-2/bin:$PATH"\n';
writeFileSync(profileFile, legacy, 'utf-8');
const action = setupPath(defaultLikeHome, defaultLikeHome);
expect(action).toBe('added');
const content = readFileSync(profileFile, 'utf-8');
expect(content).not.toContain('/tmp/mosaic-dead-wizard-1/bin');
expect(content).not.toContain('/tmp/mosaic-dead-wizard-2/bin');
expect(content).toContain('export EDITOR=vim');
expect(content.split('# >>> mosaic begin >>>').length - 1).toBe(1);
expect(content).toContain(join(defaultLikeHome, 'bin'));
});
});
describe('managed block helpers (#1327)', () => {
// S5 — the Windows arm shares markers and shape with the POSIX arm.
it('builds the $env:Path variant inside the same markers', () => {
const block = managedBlockFor('C:\\Users\\op\\.config\\mosaic\\bin', true);
expect(block).toContain('# >>> mosaic begin >>>');
expect(block).toContain('# <<< mosaic end <<<');
expect(block).toContain('$env:Path = "C:\\Users\\op\\.config\\mosaic\\bin;$env:Path"');
});
it('builds the POSIX export variant inside the same markers', () => {
const block = managedBlockFor('/home/op/.config/mosaic/bin', false);
expect(block).toContain('# >>> mosaic begin >>>');
expect(block).toContain('export PATH="/home/op/.config/mosaic/bin:$PATH"');
expect(block).toContain('# <<< mosaic end <<<');
});
it('strips legacy $env:Path pairs on the Windows arm', () => {
const legacy =
'# Mosaic\n$env:Path = "C:\\tmp\\dead\\bin;$env:Path"\n' +
'# Mosaic\n$env:Path = "C:\\tmp\\dead2\\bin;$env:Path"\n' +
'Write-Host hi\n';
const stripped = stripLegacyPathBlocks(legacy, true);
expect(stripped).not.toContain('C:\\tmp\\dead');
expect(stripped).toContain('Write-Host hi');
});
});
+72 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { platform } from 'node:os';
import type { WizardPrompter } from '../prompter/interface.js';
import type { ConfigService } from '../config/config-service.js';
import type { WizardState } from '../types.js';
import { getShellProfilePath } from '../platform/detect.js';
import { DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME } from '../constants.js';
import { ManifestError } from '../framework/manifest.js';
import {
getDefaultSkillPaths,
@@ -144,32 +145,87 @@ function runDoctor(mosaicHome: string): DoctorResult {
type PathAction = 'already' | 'added' | 'skipped';
function setupPath(mosaicHome: string, _p: WizardPrompter): PathAction {
const binDir = join(mosaicHome, 'bin');
const currentPath = process.env['PATH'] ?? '';
const PATH_BLOCK_BEGIN = '# >>> mosaic begin >>>';
const PATH_BLOCK_END = '# <<< mosaic end <<<';
const PATH_BLOCK_NOTE = '# Managed by the Mosaic installer; this block is rewritten on install.';
if (currentPath.includes(binDir)) {
return 'already';
/**
* The managed PATH block written into the operator's shell profile.
*
* The block is delimited by begin/end sentinels so any number of installs,
* against any homes, collapse to exactly one block: the writer replaces the
* region between the sentinels instead of appending a second copy (#1327).
*/
export function managedBlockFor(binDir: string, isWindows: boolean): string {
const exportLine = isWindows
? `$env:Path = "${binDir};$env:Path"`
: `export PATH="${binDir}:$PATH"`;
return `${PATH_BLOCK_BEGIN}\n${PATH_BLOCK_NOTE}\n${exportLine}\n${PATH_BLOCK_END}\n`;
}
/**
* Remove legacy unmarked `# Mosaic` PATH pairs appended by pre-#1327
* installs. Only the exact two-line shape this installer used to write is
* removed; any other `# Mosaic` comment line is left alone.
*/
export function stripLegacyPathBlocks(content: string, isWindows: boolean): string {
const legacyExport = isWindows ? /^\$env:Path = ".*;\$env:Path"$/ : /^export PATH=".*:\$PATH"$/;
const lines = content.split('\n');
const kept: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
const line = lines[i] ?? '';
const next = i + 1 < lines.length ? lines[i + 1] : undefined;
if (line === '# Mosaic' && next !== undefined && legacyExport.test(next)) {
i += 1;
continue;
}
kept.push(line);
}
return kept.join('\n');
}
/** Drop the region between the managed-block sentinels, first occurrence. */
function withoutManagedBlock(content: string): string {
const beginIdx = content.indexOf(PATH_BLOCK_BEGIN);
if (beginIdx < 0) return content;
const endIdx = content.indexOf(PATH_BLOCK_END, beginIdx);
if (endIdx < 0) return content;
return content.slice(0, beginIdx) + content.slice(endIdx + PATH_BLOCK_END.length);
}
export function setupPath(mosaicHome: string, resolvedDefaultHome: string): PathAction {
// Never write outside the home under test (#1327 S2): a wizard run against
// a non-default home (test harnesses, throwaway installs) must not mutate
// the operator's real shell profile.
if (mosaicHome !== resolvedDefaultHome) {
return 'skipped';
}
const binDir = join(mosaicHome, 'bin');
const profilePath = getShellProfilePath();
if (!profilePath) return 'skipped';
const isWindows = platform() === 'win32';
const exportLine = isWindows
? `\n# Mosaic\n$env:Path = "${binDir};$env:Path"\n`
: `\n# Mosaic\nexport PATH="${binDir}:$PATH"\n`;
const block = managedBlockFor(binDir, isWindows);
// Check if already in profile
let content = '';
if (existsSync(profilePath)) {
const content = readFileSync(profilePath, 'utf-8');
if (content.includes(binDir)) {
return 'already';
}
content = readFileSync(profilePath, 'utf-8');
}
// Migration (#1327 S4): legacy unmarked blocks collapse into the managed
// block, and an existing managed block is rewritten in place rather than
// appended beside itself (S1/S3).
const base = stripLegacyPathBlocks(withoutManagedBlock(content), isWindows);
const trimmed = base.replace(/\n+$/, '');
const next = trimmed.length === 0 ? block : `${trimmed}\n${block}`;
if (next === content) {
return 'already';
}
try {
appendFileSync(profilePath, exportLine, 'utf-8');
writeFileSync(profilePath, next, 'utf-8');
return 'added';
} catch {
return 'skipped';
@@ -286,7 +342,7 @@ export async function finalizeStage(
}
// 7. PATH setup
const pathAction = setupPath(state.mosaicHome, p);
const pathAction = setupPath(state.mosaicHome, DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME);
let summaryShown = false;
const showSummary = () => {