mosaicstack/stack
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 80 Pull Requests 1 Actions Packages Projects Releases 15 Wiki Activity

fix(tools): use top-level tea comment invocation and formalize --login passthrough (#865) #866

Open
jason.woltje wants to merge 15 commits from fix/865-tea-cli-comment-invocation into main
pull from: fix/865-tea-cli-comment-invocation
merge into: mosaicstack:main
Conversation 6 Commits 15 Files Changed 7 +3851 -236
7 changed files with 3851 additions and 236 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

30
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/README.md
View File

@@ -4,6 +4,32 @@ These scripts provide host-aware GitHub and Gitea issue, pull-request, milestone
## Durable review provenance
A successful provider write command—or a wrapper message based only on that command's exit code—is **not** durable review provenance. Review comments count as durable provenance only after the wrapper reads the created provider record back and verifies that it belongs to the intended repository and pull request and contains the exact submitted body (or verifies the provider-returned record ID).
A successful provider write command—or a wrapper message based only on that command's exit code—is **not** durable review provenance. Review comments, approvals, and change requests count as durable provenance only after the wrapper reads the created provider record back and verifies that it was created by _this_ write.
`pr-review.sh` therefore fails closed when a Gitea comment cannot be written, its created comment ID cannot be identified, or provider read-back does not match. It reports comment success only after that read-back verification passes.
**The write is a direct Gitea REST `POST` that returns the created record's id.** Neither wrapper writes through `tea` — tea 0.11.1 can silently no-op while exiting 0 and cannot emit the id of a record it creates, so its exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write (#865). Instead:
- Comments (`issue-comment.sh`, and the `comment` action of `pr-review.sh`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/comments`, requiring a `201` and parsing the created comment's `id` from the response body.
- Reviews (`approve` / `request-changes`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/reviews` with the `event` (`APPROVED` / `REQUEST_CHANGES`), the review `body`, and `commit_id` pinned to the PR's current head, then parse the created review's `id`. The review body travels _in the review submit itself_ — there is no separate detached comment to reconcile (a Gitea `REQUEST_CHANGES` review requires a non-empty body, which the submit carries).
**Verification keys on that exact provider-returned id.** The wrapper then `GET`s that one record directly — `GET /issues/comments/{id}` or `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews/{id}` — and requires that its `id` equals the created id, its **author login equals the acting identity** (resolved via `GET /api/v1/user` for the token in use), and, for comments, its body exactly matches what was submitted **and its returned web URL belongs to this exact provider and repository** (the `issue_url` / `pull_request_url` origin — scheme, host, and effective port — and full path, i.e. deployment prefix + exact `owner/repo` + kind + number, must match; a suffix/`endsWith` test would accept a look-alike host or a decoy path prefix, so the whole normalized URL is compared). The `comment` action of `pr-review.sh` additionally requires the returned resource be a **pull request** (a populated `pull_request_url`); a bare `issue_url` is rejected, so if issue `#N` exists but PR `#N` does not, an issue comment cannot be reported as a verified PR comment. (`issue-comment.sh` legitimately keeps the broader issue-or-PR acceptance.) For reviews, its state matches the requested action, its reviewed `commit_id` equals the PR head, **and its persisted body equals the submitted body** — an exact, presence- and type-checked equality (a missing/`null` persisted body no longer counts as an empty match), because Gitea can finalize/reuse a pending review id whose stored content was authored elsewhere, so the body is bound too. The write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use the **same** credential — the effective login's token, or the host credential when no login is named — so the write is verified against the identity that actually performed it.
**A review's pinned head is re-checked after verification (current-head TOCTOU).** The `commit_id` is pinned to the PR head read _before_ the submit; between that read and the read-back the branch could advance (a force-push or a new commit), leaving a verified review attached to a now-superseded commit while the live tip carries unreviewed code. After the exact-id read-back succeeds, the wrapper re-reads the live PR head (`GET …/pulls/{n}`) and requires it still equals the submitted SHA; if the head advanced it fails closed (non-zero, no success line) rather than reporting a review that no longer covers the PR's current commit.
**This closes the concurrency window rather than documenting it.** Because verification keys on the id the create returned, a no-op create yields no id and fails closed with no list-scan fallback, and a _concurrent_ record — even one written by the _same_ identity with an identical body/state — has a _different_ id and cannot be mistaken for this write. There is no residual same-identity window: the earlier boundary-and-author heuristic (accept any `id > pre-write-max` with a matching author) is replaced entirely by exact-id attribution.
**Exact-id read-back is the sole authority.** Verification is a direct `GET` of the one record the create returned; there is no follow-up list enumeration. An earlier redundant pass that re-listed the record's page (`?limit=&page=1,2,…`) was removed: server-capped page sizes and list-pagination quirks made it a false-failure source (a durable, exact-id-verified record could be missed by a non-exhaustive enumeration), and it added nothing over the authoritative exact-id `GET`.
## Credential handling
The Gitea API token is **never passed on a curl command line.** An `Authorization: token <value>` argument would be visible to any local process that can read the process table (`ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`) for the lifetime of the request. Instead, every authenticated curl call writes the header into a private, mode-`0600` config file under `$TMPDIR` and passes it with `curl --config <file>` (`gitea_write_auth_config`), so only the file _path_ — never the token — appears in argv. Each such file is unlinked on every exit path (success and failure) by the caller's `RETURN` trap.
## `tea` invocation notes (Gitea)
- tea v0.11.1 has **no `comment` subcommand under `tea pr` or `tea issue`** — the `tea pr comment` / `tea issue comment` forms don't error, they silently fall through to a no-op and still exit 0, producing a false-success write (#865). tea's write subcommands (`tea comment`, `tea pr approve`/`reject`) also cannot report the id of the record they create, so their exit code cannot prove a durable write. These wrappers therefore do **not** write reviews or comments through `tea` at all; they use direct Gitea REST `POST`s that return the created record's id (see "Durable review provenance" above). `tea` is consulted only to enumerate the login list for host→login resolution.
- Because the review body is carried in the `POST …/reviews` submit itself, there is no separate detached review comment, and the historical `tea pr approve`/`reject` trailing-positional-argument vs. nonexistent `--comment`/`-comment` flag hazard (#835) no longer applies to these wrappers — no review comment is ever passed to `tea`.
### `--login` override
Both `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` accept an optional `--login <name>` flag that overrides the automatically detected Gitea login for that single invocation. The override selects **which credential the REST write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use** — its token is resolved from the tea config for that login name (`get_gitea_token_for_login`), falling back to the repo host's credential when no login is named. The resolved login is **host- and port-bound**: the login's configured URL host **and effective port** (the scheme's default port — 80 for `http`, 443 for `https` — applies when a port is omitted, symmetrically on both sides) must match the repo remote's, so a login name shared across hosts (or an override configured for a different Gitea, including one on a different port of the same host) can never send one host's credential to another — a host or port mismatch fails closed rather than leaking a cross-host token. Resolving the acting identity and the read-back from the _same_ login that performs the write is essential: a write performed under an overridden login must be verified against that login's identity, not the host default's. Callers who need a different login than the host default should pass `--login <reviewer-login>`.
As a durable successor to this mechanism, consider giving each reviewer/approver slot its own dedicated Gitea login credential, so that author≠reviewer holds at the credential level rather than relying on wrapper-level `--login` bookkeeping. This is a recommendation for future hardening, not something implemented by this flag.

867
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh
View File

@@ -563,6 +563,873 @@ get_gitea_token() {
return 1
}
# Stage the Gitea bearer credential for curl OUTSIDE the process argument vector.
# Passing "-H 'Authorization: token <value>'" on the curl command line exposes
# the token to anyone who can read the process table (ps / /proc/<pid>/cmdline)
# for the lifetime of the request. Instead, write the header into a private
# (mode 0600) curl config file and have callers pass it with `curl --config`, so
# only the FILE PATH — never the token — appears in argv. Prints the temp file
# path on success; the caller OWNS the file and MUST remove it on every exit
# path (success and failure). $1 = bearer token. Callers must not log the token.
gitea_write_auth_config() {
local token="$1" auth_file
auth_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-gitea-auth.XXXXXX") || return 1
# mktemp already creates the file with 0600; be explicit in case of an
# unusual umask so the credential is never briefly group/other readable.
chmod 600 "$auth_file" 2>/dev/null || true
# `header = "..."` is curl's config syntax for an extra request header. Only
# this filename reaches curl's argv; the token stays on disk, readable solely
# by this user, and is unlinked by the caller's trap after the request.
if ! printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$token" > "$auth_file"; then
rm -f "$auth_file"
return 1
fi
printf '%s' "$auth_file"
}
# Resolve the API token for a SPECIFIC tea login name from tea's own config
# (the same store tea itself writes/reads for `--login <name>`). This is what
# lets a REST write be performed AS the selected --login identity: tea keys its
# per-login tokens by `name` in $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/tea/config.yml (default
# ~/.config/tea/config.yml), exactly as the `tea` CLI resolves them, so a
# --login override and its REST read-back bind to the SAME credential/identity.
#
# $2 (repo host) binds the selected credential to the TARGET host: a tea login
# also records the `url` it authenticates against, and the matched login's URL
# host MUST equal the repo host. This fails closed when an override login is
# configured for a DIFFERENT host than the repo remote, so a login name shared
# across hosts (or a mistargeted override) can never send one host's credential
# to another host (cross-host credential leak). When $2 is empty the host bind
# is skipped (host-agnostic lookup) — callers that write should always pass it.
#
# Prints the token on success; returns non-zero (no output) if the config, a
# matching login token, or the host bind cannot be satisfied. Callers must not
# log the result.
get_gitea_token_for_login() {
local login_name="$1" repo_host="${2:-}" config_file
[[ -n "$login_name" ]] || return 1
config_file="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/tea/config.yml"
[[ -f "$config_file" ]] || return 1
LOGIN_NAME="$login_name" REPO_HOST="$repo_host" python3 - "$config_file" <<'PY'
import datetime
import os
import re
import sys
from urllib.parse import urlparse
wanted = os.environ["LOGIN_NAME"]
repo_host = os.environ.get("REPO_HOST", "").strip().lower()
config_path = sys.argv[1]
# PyYAML 6.0.3 SafeLoader implicit resolver patterns (YAML 1.1). An UNQUOTED
# plain scalar matching any of these is resolved by PyYAML to a NON-string type
# (null->None, bool, int, float, timestamp->date/datetime); a quoted scalar is
# ALWAYS a string. These mirror yaml/resolver.py so the PyYAML-absent fallback
# types unquoted scalars exactly as PyYAML would (see _implicit_nonstring).
_IMPLICIT_NULL = re.compile(r"^(?:~|null|Null|NULL|)$")
_IMPLICIT_BOOL = re.compile(
r"^(?:yes|Yes|YES|no|No|NO|true|True|TRUE|false|False|FALSE"
r"|on|On|ON|off|Off|OFF)$"
)
_IMPLICIT_INT = re.compile(
r"^(?:[-+]?0b[0-1_]+"
r"|[-+]?0[0-7_]+"
r"|[-+]?(?:0|[1-9][0-9_]*)"
r"|[-+]?0x[0-9a-fA-F_]+"
r"|[-+]?[1-9][0-9_]*(?::[0-5]?[0-9])+)$"
)
# NOTE: the exponent group requires an EXPLICIT sign ([eE][-+][0-9]+), matching
# PyYAML 6.0.3's resolver.py float regex exactly. An unsigned exponent (e.g.
# "1.0e10", ".5e10", "4.e8") is NOT matched by PyYAML's implicit float resolver
# -- PyYAML resolves those as plain strings -- so this pattern must not match
# them either, or the fallback over-rejects a token PyYAML would emit verbatim.
_IMPLICIT_FLOAT = re.compile(
r"^(?:[-+]?(?:[0-9][0-9_]*)\.[0-9_]*(?:[eE][-+][0-9]+)?"
r"|\.[0-9][0-9_]*(?:[eE][-+][0-9]+)?"
r"|[-+]?[0-9][0-9_]*(?::[0-5]?[0-9])+\.[0-9_]*"
r"|[-+]?\.(?:inf|Inf|INF)"
r"|\.(?:nan|NaN|NAN))$"
)
_IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP = re.compile(
r"^(?:[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]"
r"|[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]-[0-9][0-9]?-[0-9][0-9]?"
r"(?:[Tt]|[ \t]+)[0-9][0-9]?"
r":[0-9][0-9]:[0-9][0-9](?:\.[0-9]*)?"
r"(?:[ \t]*(?:Z|[-+][0-9][0-9]?(?::[0-9][0-9])?))?)$"
)
def _implicit_nonstring(text):
# True when an UNQUOTED plain scalar would be resolved by PyYAML's SafeLoader
# to a non-string type (null/bool/int/float/timestamp). Fuzzed against real
# PyYAML 6.0.3: it never returns False where PyYAML types the scalar as a
# non-string (i.e. never fail-open), and (post exponent-sign fix) no longer
# over-rejects unsigned-exponent spellings like "4.e8" or "1.0e10" -- those
# match PyYAML's own implicit float resolver exactly (explicit sign only),
# so PyYAML keeps them as strings and this function now agrees.
return bool(
_IMPLICIT_NULL.match(text)
or _IMPLICIT_BOOL.match(text)
or _IMPLICIT_INT.match(text)
or _IMPLICIT_FLOAT.match(text)
or _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP.match(text)
)
# PyYAML 6.0.3 SafeConstructor timestamp regexp (yaml/constructor.py). The
# constructor RE-parses a timestamp-tagged scalar with THIS pattern and then
# builds a datetime.date/datetime, which raises ValueError for an out-of-range
# calendar field (e.g. month 99, hour 25). _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP (the RESOLVER
# pattern) is byte-identical to PyYAML's resolver, so anything it tags is also
# tagged by PyYAML and re-matched here.
_TIMESTAMP_CONSTRUCT = re.compile(
r"""^(?P<year>[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9])
-(?P<month>[0-9][0-9]?)
-(?P<day>[0-9][0-9]?)
(?:(?:[Tt]|[ \t]+)
(?P<hour>[0-9][0-9]?)
:(?P<minute>[0-9][0-9])
:(?P<second>[0-9][0-9])
(?:\.(?P<fraction>[0-9]*))?
(?:[ \t]*(?P<tz>Z|(?P<tz_sign>[-+])(?P<tz_hour>[0-9][0-9]?)
(?::(?P<tz_minute>[0-9][0-9]))?))?)?$""",
re.X,
)
def _int_constructible(text):
# Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_int and report whether it
# would succeed. A resolver-tagged int whose radix body is empty after
# underscore removal (e.g. "0b_", "0x_", "0x__") makes int(base) raise, so
# PyYAML fails the WHOLE document -> the fallback must fail closed too.
value = text.replace("_", "")
if value[:1] in ("+", "-"):
value = value[1:]
if value == "0":
return True
try:
if value.startswith("0b"):
int(value[2:], 2)
elif value.startswith("0x"):
int(value[2:], 16)
elif value[:1] == "0":
int(value, 8)
elif ":" in value:
[int(part) for part in value.split(":")]
else:
int(value)
except ValueError:
return False
return True
def _float_constructible(text):
# Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_float. Retained for the
# WHOLE-document invariant: _IMPLICIT_FLOAT now matches PyYAML's resolver
# pattern exactly (explicit-sign exponent only), and every scalar it tags
# is float()-constructible, so this never fails closed where PyYAML would
# emit a token.
value = text.replace("_", "").lower()
if value[:1] in ("+", "-"):
value = value[1:]
if value in (".inf", ".nan"):
return True
try:
if ":" in value:
[float(part) for part in value.split(":")]
else:
float(value)
except ValueError:
return False
return True
def _timestamp_constructible(text):
# Replicate PyYAML SafeConstructor.construct_yaml_timestamp: build the same
# datetime.date/datetime and report whether it raises. Returns False for an
# out-of-range calendar field (month/day/hour/...), matching PyYAML's
# whole-document ValueError.
match = _TIMESTAMP_CONSTRUCT.match(text)
if not match:
return False
values = match.groupdict()
try:
year = int(values["year"])
month = int(values["month"])
day = int(values["day"])
if not values["hour"]:
datetime.date(year, month, day)
return True
hour = int(values["hour"])
minute = int(values["minute"])
second = int(values["second"])
fraction = 0
if values["fraction"]:
frac = values["fraction"][:6]
frac += "0" * (6 - len(frac))
fraction = int(frac)
tzinfo = None
if values["tz_sign"]:
tz_hour = int(values["tz_hour"])
tz_minute = int(values["tz_minute"] or 0)
delta = datetime.timedelta(hours=tz_hour, minutes=tz_minute)
if values["tz_sign"] == "-":
delta = -delta
tzinfo = datetime.timezone(delta)
elif values["tz"]:
tzinfo = datetime.timezone.utc
datetime.datetime(
year, month, day, hour, minute, second, fraction, tzinfo=tzinfo
)
except (ValueError, OverflowError):
return False
return True
def _constructible(text):
# WHOLE-DOCUMENT INVARIANT: the fallback resolves the SAME login token as
# PyYAML safe_load or fails closed -- never less conservative -- INCLUDING
# when PyYAML raises a CONSTRUCTOR error anywhere in the document. A plain
# scalar can match a typed implicit resolver (int/float/timestamp) yet NOT be
# constructible (e.g. 2023-99-99, 0b_, 0x_); PyYAML then raises on the whole
# load and yields no token, so the fallback MUST fail closed for the whole
# document too. This returns True only when PyYAML's constructor would build
# the scalar (null/bool token sets are always constructible), else False so
# the caller fails closed. `text` is assumed to satisfy _implicit_nonstring.
if _IMPLICIT_NULL.match(text) or _IMPLICIT_BOOL.match(text):
return True
if _IMPLICIT_TIMESTAMP.match(text):
return _timestamp_constructible(text)
if _IMPLICIT_INT.match(text):
return _int_constructible(text)
if _IMPLICIT_FLOAT.match(text):
return _float_constructible(text)
return True
# PyYAML's Reader.check_printable scans the ENTIRE raw input stream (not just
# scalar contents, and NOT scoped by quoting) for code points outside its
# printable set and raises ReaderError -- a whole-document reject -- the instant
# one is found, no matter where it sits (an unrelated field, a comment, inside or
# outside quotes). To guarantee parity WITHOUT a hand-rolled subset (which missed
# the C1 block and BMP noncharacters), this is PyYAML 6.0.3's EXACT Reader
# printable definition, negated verbatim:
# Reader.NON_PRINTABLE =
# re.compile('[^\x09\x0A\x0D\x20-\x7E\x85\xA0-퟿-<2D>'
# '\U00010000-\U0010FFFF]')
# i.e. PRINTABLE = {TAB(0x09), LF(0x0A), CR(0x0D), 0x20-0x7E, NEL(0x85),
# 0xA0-0xD7FF, 0xE000-0xFFFD, 0x10000-0x10FFFF}; EVERYTHING else (all other C0
# controls, DEL 0x7F, the entire C1 block 0x80-0x84/0x86-0x9F, the surrogate
# range 0xD800-0xDFFF, and the BMP noncharacters 0xFFFE/0xFFFF) is non-printable
# -> whole-document fail closed. Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3
# in both directions: the C1 bytes and 0xFFFE/0xFFFF reject; NEL(0x85), 0xA0, and
# astral code points (e.g. U+1F600) are accepted and resolve the token. The prior
# C0/DEL/tab behavior is a strict subset of this. (A surrogate code point cannot
# occur in valid UTF-8, so it also trips the UTF-8 decode on read and fails
# closed; it is included here for exact definitional parity.)
_FORBIDDEN_CONTROL = re.compile(
"[^\x09\x0a\x0d\x20-\x7e\x85\xa0-퟿-<2D>\U00010000-\U0010ffff]"
)
# Sentinel: "outside the supported subset -> fail closed". Distinct from a
# genuine null (None), which is a valid resolved value.
_FAIL = object()
# Separators are SPACE-only: PyYAML rejects a tab used as key/value whitespace
# (before or after the ':') with a scanner error, so a tab there must NOT be
# treated as a benign separator. Space before the colon and one space after it
# stay valid (PyYAML strips a plain key's trailing spaces); a tab in either
# position makes the whole line fail to match -> the caller fails closed.
_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^([A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*) *:(?:[ ](.*)|)$")
_FLOW = set("[]{}*&!")
class _Bail(Exception):
# Raised the instant the document leaves the narrow tea-config subset this
# recognizer can prove it resolves IDENTICALLY to PyYAML. Caught by
# _safe_parse, which then fails closed (returns _FAIL) rather than guess.
pass
def _strip_properties(value):
# Consume a leading YAML node non-specific tag ('!' + space) and return the
# remaining node text for normal resolution. PyYAML's SafeLoader applies
# this TRANSPARENT property and then resolves the following node with its
# ordinary implicit typing, so (verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3)
# '! x' -> 'x', '! ' -> null, exactly as the bare node would resolve.
# Returns _FAIL for every form we do NOT reproduce identically, so the
# caller fails closed: a tag shorthand ('!x' -> ConstructorError), an
# explicit or verbatim tag ('!!str' / '!!int' / '!<...>' / '!foo') whose
# type coercion we do not emulate, a tab separator (PyYAML scanner error),
# a duplicate tag ('! ! x' -> ParserError).
#
# ANCHORS ('&name'): deliberately rejected in FULL, not just duplicates.
# Real PyYAML tracks anchor NAMES in a document-scoped composer registry
# and raises ComposerError ("found duplicate anchor") the instant the
# SAME anchor name is declared on a SECOND node anywhere in the document
# -- including on a totally unrelated node far from the token field. This
# line-oriented fallback has no such document-wide registry (and building
# one reliably, across every node shape this recognizer does not even
# parse, risks missing a scope and re-opening the fail-open). So instead
# of emulating the registry, every '&'-anchor property fails closed here,
# unconditionally. This is a conservative OVER-reject relative to PyYAML:
# a single, non-duplicated '&a x' is valid YAML that real PyYAML resolves
# to 'x', but we refuse it too. That is intentional and safe -- fail
# closed can only cost an emitted token PyYAML would have allowed, never
# emit one PyYAML would reject.
seen_tag = False
while value[:1] in ("!", "&"):
if value[0] == "!":
# Non-specific tag: '!' then AT LEAST ONE SPACE. A tab is a PyYAML
# scanner error; '!x' / '!!type' / '!<verbatim>' are typed/short tags.
if seen_tag or len(value) < 2 or value[1] != " ":
return _FAIL
seen_tag = True
value = value[1:].lstrip(" ")
else: # anchor '&name' -- always fail closed, see comment above
return _FAIL
return value
def _scalar(raw):
# Resolve a single flow scalar (quoted or plain) the way PyYAML would for
# tea's simple values, or _FAIL when it is outside the supported subset so
# the caller fails closed instead of guessing.
#
# A quoted scalar is ALWAYS a string (its contents returned verbatim); a '#'
# inside quotes is data. An UNQUOTED scalar ends at the first whitespace
# -preceded '#' (a YAML comment must be preceded by whitespace or line start,
# so "abc#def" stays literal while "abc # note" becomes "abc"), and is then
# subject to PyYAML's implicit typing: forms like 12345 / null / ~ / yes /
# 3.14 / a timestamp resolve to a NON-string (int/None/bool/float/date), so
# they return None here (PyYAML's path rejects a non-str token via _accept).
# Strip SPACES only, never tabs: PyYAML raises a scanner error on a tab in a
# plain/leading/trailing scalar position, so a tab must be PRESERVED here to
# trip the fail-closed guard below rather than be silently normalized away.
value = raw.strip(" ")
if not value:
return None # empty plain scalar -> null
if value[0] in ("'", '"'):
quote = value[0]
end = value.find(quote, 1)
if end == -1:
return _FAIL # unterminated quote: PyYAML would error / continue
rest = value[end + 1:].strip(" ")
if rest and not rest.startswith("#"):
return _FAIL # trailing junk after a quoted scalar
inner = value[1:end]
# Single-quote '' escaping and double-quote backslash escapes are NOT
# interpreted here; reject any scalar that uses them so we never diverge
# from PyYAML on escape handling.
if quote == "'" and "'" in inner:
return _FAIL
if quote == '"' and "\\" in inner:
return _FAIL
return inner
for i, ch in enumerate(value):
if ch == "#" and (i == 0 or value[i - 1] in (" ", "\t")):
value = value[:i]
break
value = value.strip(" ") # spaces only; a tab must survive to fail closed
if not value:
return None
if value[0] in ("!", "&"):
# Leading node property (non-specific tag '! ' / plain anchor '&name '):
# PyYAML applies it to the FOLLOWING node and resolves THAT, so strip the
# transparent forms and re-resolve the remainder EXACTLY (implicit typing
# and all). _strip_properties returns _FAIL for the tag/anchor forms
# PyYAML rejects or type-coerces, which fail closed here.
remainder = _strip_properties(value)
if remainder is _FAIL:
return _FAIL
return _scalar(remainder)
if value[0] in _FLOW or value[0] in ("|", ">", "@", "`", '"', "'", "%", ","):
return _FAIL # flow / block-scalar / reserved / directive / quote
# NOTE: "?" is deliberately NOT in the blanket-reject set above. Empirically
# verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3: "?x" (indicator immediately followed by
# a non-space) is a plain scalar string "?x" like "-x" and ":x" are -- only
# "?" alone or "? " (followed by space/EOL) opens a complex mapping key and
# is illegal in a value position. Blanket-rejecting every leading "?" would
# over-reject a token PyYAML accepts verbatim; the narrower check below
# (mirroring "-" and ":") handles exactly the illegal bare-indicator forms.
if value[0] in ("-", "?", ":") and (len(value) == 1 or value[1] in (" ", "\t")):
# A bare block indicator, not a plain scalar: '-'/'- ' opens a sequence
# entry, '?'/'? ' a complex mapping key, ':'/': ' a mapping value -- all
# illegal in a value position, where PyYAML raises a scanner error on the
# whole document. "-x"/"-1"/"?x"/":x" (indicator NOT followed by space)
# remain valid plain scalars and fall through. Fail closed on the bare
# indicator so the fallback never emits a token PyYAML would refuse.
return _FAIL
# NO blanket internal-indicator reject here. In BLOCK context (where a tea
# config value always sits) PyYAML treats ',[]{}' as ordinary plain-scalar
# content -- they are flow indicators ONLY inside a flow collection -- and
# treats '!&*|>#%@`' plus quotes as significant ONLY at the FIRST non-space
# character of a node (a leading one starts a tag/anchor/alias/block-scalar/
# comment/directive/reserved/quote), which the leading-char guard above
# (value[0] ...) already rejects. Verified empirically against real PyYAML
# 6.0.3: an INTERNAL '!' ',' '[' ']' '{' '}' '&' '*' '#'(not space-preceded)
# ':'(not space-followed) all resolve as a plain-string token. The only
# internal positions PyYAML treats as significant in block context are ' #'
# (whitespace-preceded '#' -> comment; stripped by the loop above) and ': '
# or a trailing ':' (-> mapping; rejected by the ": "/endswith(":") guard
# below). A blanket any(ch in _FLOW ...) scan over-rejected those internal
# indicators, dropping a token PyYAML emits verbatim; removing it restores
# parity while the position-specific guards keep the fail-open direction shut.
if "\t" in value:
# A tab anywhere in a plain scalar (leading, trailing, or embedded) is a
# PyYAML scanner error on the whole document -- it accepts tabs ONLY
# inside quoted scalars (handled above, returned verbatim). Fail closed
# so the fallback never emits a token PyYAML would refuse over a tab.
return _FAIL
if ": " in value or value.endswith(":"):
return _FAIL # nested-mapping-in-scalar / ambiguous
if _implicit_nonstring(value):
# A plain scalar PyYAML would tag as a non-string (null/bool/int/float/
# timestamp). If PyYAML's CONSTRUCTOR would build it, the value is a
# non-string -> null-equivalent for a token field: return None and keep
# parsing (as before). But if it matches a typed implicit resolver yet is
# NOT constructible (e.g. 2023-99-99, 0b_, 0x_), PyYAML raises on the
# WHOLE document and yields no token, so the fallback MUST fail closed
# for the whole document too -> _FAIL (which the caller turns into _Bail).
if not _constructible(value):
return _FAIL
return None
return value
class _Parser:
# A deliberately NARROW, conservative recognizer for the block-style YAML
# subset tea writes (mappings of scalar fields; a `logins:` block SEQUENCE of
# such mappings; optional shallow nested mappings for e.g. preferences). It
# reconstructs the SAME Python object PyYAML's SafeLoader would, but the
# instant it meets anything it cannot prove it handles identically -- a
# document marker (--- / ...), a block scalar (| / >), a flow collection, a
# duplicate mapping key, inconsistent indentation, an escape, or any line
# outside the grammar -- it raises _Bail so the whole resolution fails
# closed. This guarantees the module invariant (only ever MORE conservative
# than PyYAML, never less) at the DOCUMENT level, closing the structural
# fail-open classes (nested-logins shadow, block-scalar shadow, duplicate
# root key, malformed-after-valid, and extra-document) that a line scan that
# does not validate whole-document structure would miss.
def __init__(self, lines):
self.toks = []
for raw in lines:
if not raw.strip():
continue
lead = raw[: len(raw) - len(raw.lstrip(" \t"))]
if "\t" in lead:
raise _Bail() # tab in indentation: PyYAML scanner error
indent = len(lead)
body = raw[indent:]
if body.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
if re.match(r"^(---|\.\.\.)(\s|$)", body) or body in ("---", "..."):
raise _Bail() # document / end marker -> multi-doc -> fail closed
# rstrip SPACES only: a trailing tab is a PyYAML scanner error, so it
# must be kept on the token body to reach the fail-closed guards
# (rstrip() would swallow it and let a bad line resolve a token).
self.toks.append((indent, body.rstrip(" ")))
self.i = 0
def peek(self):
return self.toks[self.i] if self.i < len(self.toks) else None
def parse_document(self):
if not self.toks:
return None
node = self.parse_node(0)
if self.i != len(self.toks):
raise _Bail() # trailing unconsumed content -> malformed
return node
def parse_node(self, min_indent):
tok = self.peek()
if tok is None:
return None
indent, body = tok
if indent < min_indent:
return None
if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
return self.parse_seq(indent)
return self.parse_map(indent)
def parse_map(self, indent):
result = {}
while True:
tok = self.peek()
if tok is None:
break
cur_indent, body = tok
if cur_indent < indent:
break
if cur_indent > indent:
raise _Bail() # unexpected deeper line (bad indentation)
if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
raise _Bail() # sequence item where a mapping entry was expected
m = _KEY_RE.match(body)
if not m:
raise _Bail()
key = m.group(1)
inline = m.group(2)
self.i += 1
if key in result:
raise _Bail() # duplicate mapping key (PyYAML last-wins; we bail)
if inline is not None and inline.strip(" ") != "":
val = _scalar(inline)
if val is _FAIL:
raise _Bail()
result[key] = val
else:
result[key] = self.parse_block_value(indent)
return result
def parse_block_value(self, key_indent):
# The value after a "key:" with no inline scalar. A block SEQUENCE may sit
# at the same indent as the key (YAML permits `- ` aligned with the key --
# tea's own on-disk shape) or deeper; a block MAPPING must be strictly
# deeper; otherwise the value is null.
nxt = self.peek()
if nxt is None:
return None
ni, nb = nxt
is_item = nb.startswith("-") and (len(nb) == 1 or nb[1] in (" ", "\t"))
if is_item and ni >= key_indent:
return self.parse_seq(ni)
if ni > key_indent:
return self.parse_node(ni)
return None
def parse_seq(self, indent):
result = []
while True:
tok = self.peek()
if tok is None:
break
cur_indent, body = tok
if cur_indent < indent:
break
if cur_indent > indent:
raise _Bail()
if not (body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t"))):
break # a mapping entry at this indent ends the sequence
rest = body[1:].strip(" ") # spaces only; a tab must survive to bail
self.i += 1
if rest == "":
nxt = self.peek()
if nxt is not None and nxt[0] > indent:
result.append(self.parse_node(indent + 1))
else:
result.append(None)
continue
km = _KEY_RE.match(rest)
if km:
# "- key: value" opens a mapping whose fields continue at the
# column where the content after the dash began.
field_indent = indent + (len(body) - len(body[1:].lstrip()))
result.append(self.parse_inline_map(field_indent, km))
else:
val = _scalar(rest)
if val is _FAIL:
raise _Bail()
result.append(val)
return result
def parse_inline_map(self, field_indent, first_match):
result = {}
key = first_match.group(1)
inline = first_match.group(2)
if inline is not None and inline.strip(" ") != "":
val = _scalar(inline)
if val is _FAIL:
raise _Bail()
result[key] = val
else:
result[key] = self.parse_block_value(field_indent)
while True:
tok = self.peek()
if tok is None:
break
cur_indent, body = tok
if cur_indent != field_indent:
if cur_indent > field_indent:
raise _Bail()
break
if body.startswith("-") and (len(body) == 1 or body[1] in (" ", "\t")):
raise _Bail()
m = _KEY_RE.match(body)
if not m:
raise _Bail()
k = m.group(1)
iv = m.group(2)
self.i += 1
if k in result:
raise _Bail()
if iv is not None and iv.strip(" ") != "":
v = _scalar(iv)
if v is _FAIL:
raise _Bail()
result[k] = v
else:
result[k] = self.parse_block_value(field_indent)
return result
def _safe_parse(lines):
# Return the parsed root object (dict/list/scalar/None) when the WHOLE
# document is inside the supported subset, else _FAIL (fail closed).
try:
return _Parser(lines).parse_document()
except _Bail:
return _FAIL
except Exception:
return _FAIL
def _url_matches_repo_host(url):
# Mirror gitea_url_matches_host (detect-platform.sh): the login's recorded
# URL must name the SAME host AND the SAME effective port as the repo remote
# host, not merely the same hostname. A login configured for an explicit,
# non-default provider port (e.g. :9443) must NOT satisfy a portless (default
# -port) repo host, and a login on the matching port (e.g. :8443) must NOT be
# rejected. Ports are normalized by applying the login URL's scheme default
# (80 for http, else 443) to whichever side omits the port, symmetrically, so
# an implicit port and its explicit default-port form compare equal.
if not isinstance(url, str) or not url:
return False
configured = urlparse(url if "//" in url else f"//{url}")
remote = urlparse(f"//{repo_host}")
configured_host = configured.hostname
if not configured_host or configured_host.lower() != (remote.hostname or "").lower():
return False
default_port = 80 if configured.scheme == "http" else 443
configured_port = configured.port if configured.port is not None else default_port
remote_port = remote.port if remote.port is not None else default_port
return configured_port == remote_port
def _accept(token, url):
# Enforce the host bind before surfacing a token. When a repo host is given,
# the login's recorded URL host AND port must match it; a login with no
# usable URL (or a mismatched host/port) is rejected (fail closed) so a
# cross-host (or cross-port) credential is never emitted.
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
return None
if repo_host:
if not _url_matches_repo_host(url):
return None
return token
def _token_via_pyyaml():
# Preferred, fully general path when PyYAML is installed. Raises ImportError
# (caught by the caller) when the module is unavailable so the environment
# -robust fallback can take over instead of failing closed on every host
# that lacks PyYAML.
import yaml
with open(config_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
config = yaml.safe_load(handle)
logins = config.get("logins") if isinstance(config, dict) else None
if not isinstance(logins, list):
return None
for login in logins:
if isinstance(login, dict) and str(login.get("name") or "") == wanted:
return _accept(login.get("token"), login.get("url"))
return None
_BREAKS = "\r\n\x85

"
_VALUE_OPEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s+)*[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*:$")
_SEQ_OPEN_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s+)*-$")
def _value_open_before(prefix):
# True when a quote appearing at the END of `prefix` (the current logical
# line so far) begins a flow SCALAR value -- the only position where a quote
# opens a quoted scalar whose embedded line breaks PyYAML folds instead of
# splitting. That is: the prefix is empty/all-indent (root or block scalar
# start), or ends with a mapping ': ' or a sequence '- ' indicator that is
# SPACE-separated from the quote. A quote glued to the previous char (e.g.
# 'key:"x') is NOT a value opener (PyYAML needs the space), and a quote mid
# -content is literal -- both fail this test, so their breaks split the line
# exactly as before (fail closed / plain-scalar behavior preserved).
stripped = prefix.rstrip(" ")
if stripped == "":
return True # start of line (after any indentation) -> node value start
if prefix == stripped:
return False # no space before the quote -> not a value opener
return bool(_VALUE_OPEN_RE.match(stripped) or _SEQ_OPEN_RE.match(stripped))
def _fold_quoted_break_run(run):
# Reproduce PyYAML's flow-scalar folding (scan_flow_scalar_spaces +
# scan_flow_scalar_breaks) for the maximal ' \t' + line-break run inside a
# quoted scalar. A run with NO break is literal whitespace (verbatim). With a
# break: surrounding spaces/tabs are dropped; a single \n-class break
# (\n / \r / \r\n / \x85 NEL) folds to ONE space; 
 (LS) / 
 (PS)
# are kept verbatim; each ADDITIONAL break (a blank line) contributes its own
# break char (\n for the \n-class). Verified against real PyYAML 6.0.3 for
# both double- and single-quoted scalars (they fold identically here).
def _lb(s, j):
if s[j] == "\r" and j + 1 < len(s) and s[j + 1] == "\n":
return "\n", 2
if s[j] in "\r\n\x85":
return "\n", 1
return s[j], 1 # 
 / 
 preserved verbatim
n = len(run)
j = 0
while j < n and run[j] in " \t":
j += 1
if j >= n:
return run # pure whitespace, no break -> literal content
line_break, adv = _lb(run, j)
j += adv
breaks = []
while True:
while j < n and run[j] in " \t":
j += 1
if j < n and run[j] in _BREAKS:
b, adv = _lb(run, j)
j += adv
breaks.append(b)
else:
break
out = ""
if line_break != "\n":
out += line_break
elif not breaks:
out += " "
return out + "".join(breaks)
def _split_logical_lines(raw_text):
# Split like str.splitlines() EXCEPT a line break INSIDE a value-opening
# quoted scalar does NOT end the line: PyYAML keeps the quoted scalar together
# and folds the break (flow folding above), so we fold it and continue the
# same logical line. Only the break chars that survive the _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL
# gate reach here: \n, \r, \x85 (NEL), 
 (LS), 
 (PS). OUTSIDE
# quotes every one ends the line (matching PyYAML's block-level line breaks
# and str.splitlines), so a NEL/LS/PS used as the document's line-terminator
# style, and an UNQUOTED plain scalar carrying an embedded break, split and
# fail closed exactly as before. A quoted scalar left unterminated at EOF
# stays on the final line and fails closed in _scalar (PyYAML errors too).
out = []
cur = []
i = 0
n = len(raw_text)
quote = None
while i < n:
ch = raw_text[i]
if quote is None:
if ch in _BREAKS:
out.append("".join(cur))
cur = []
i += 2 if (ch == "\r" and i + 1 < n and raw_text[i + 1] == "\n") else 1
continue
if ch in ("'", '"') and _value_open_before("".join(cur)):
quote = ch
cur.append(ch)
i += 1
continue
cur.append(ch)
i += 1
continue
# inside a value-opening quoted scalar
if ch == quote:
cur.append(ch)
quote = None
i += 1
continue
if ch in " \t" or ch in _BREAKS:
j = i
has_break = False
while j < n and (raw_text[j] in " \t" or raw_text[j] in _BREAKS):
if raw_text[j] in _BREAKS:
has_break = True
j += 1
run = raw_text[i:j]
if has_break:
# A continuation line beginning (at column 0, no indent) with a
# document marker is a PyYAML scanner error even inside a quoted
# scalar; when the run ends on a break the continuation content at
# j is at column 0, so guard it and fail closed. (An INDENTED
# '---' is literal content to PyYAML and folds normally.)
if run[-1] in _BREAKS and raw_text[j:j + 3] in ("---", "...") and (
j + 3 >= n or raw_text[j + 3] in "\0 \t" + _BREAKS
):
raise _Bail()
cur.append(_fold_quoted_break_run(run))
else:
cur.append(run)
i = j
continue
cur.append(ch)
i += 1
if cur or not out:
out.append("".join(cur))
return out
def _token_via_lines():
# Conservative fallback for hosts without PyYAML. It parses config.yml with a
# strict recognizer (_safe_parse) of the narrow block-style subset tea writes,
# which reconstructs the SAME object PyYAML would OR fails closed (_FAIL) on
# ANYTHING it cannot prove it resolves identically -- document markers, block
# scalars, flow collections, duplicate keys, inconsistent indentation, or any
# line outside the grammar. On a recognized document it then resolves the
# login EXACTLY as the PyYAML path does (root `logins` list -> first entry
# whose `name` equals the request -> host/port-bound token), so the fallback
# can only ever be MORE conservative than PyYAML, never less.
with open(config_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
raw_text = handle.read()
# Whole-document, position-independent reject: PyYAML's Reader rejects the
# ENTIRE document (ReaderError) if a NON-printable code point (per its exact
# printable definition -- see _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL: C0 controls, DEL, the C1
# block, surrogates, and 0xFFFE/0xFFFF) appears ANYWHERE in the raw stream --
# in a plain scalar, inside single- or double-quoted scalars, in a comment,
# or in a field this recognizer never even looks at. Checking the raw text
# (before line splitting, which would otherwise split on some of these same
# code points -- e.g. \x0b, \x0c, \x1c-\x1e -- and obscure them) mirrors that
# exactly: fail closed for the whole document. (NEL 0x85, LS 0x2028 and PS
# 0x2029 are PRINTABLE to PyYAML's Reader, so they are NOT in
# _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL; _split_logical_lines below reproduces PyYAML's line-break
# semantics for them -- a structural break outside quotes, a FOLDED break
# inside a quoted scalar -- rather than str.splitlines(), which would wrongly
# split them mid-quote and fail-close a token PyYAML resolves.)
if _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL.search(raw_text):
return None
lines = _split_logical_lines(raw_text)
config = _safe_parse(lines)
if config is _FAIL:
return None
logins = config.get("logins") if isinstance(config, dict) else None
if not isinstance(logins, list):
return None
for login in logins:
if isinstance(login, dict) and str(login.get("name") or "") == wanted:
return _accept(login.get("token"), login.get("url"))
return None
try:
try:
token = _token_via_pyyaml()
except ImportError:
token = _token_via_lines()
except Exception:
raise SystemExit(1)
if isinstance(token, str) and token:
print(token)
raise SystemExit(0)
raise SystemExit(1)
PY
}
# Resolve HTTPS basic auth credentials for a Gitea host from ~/.git-credentials.
# Prints "username:password" for direct curl -u consumption. Callers must not log it.
get_gitea_basic_auth() {

299
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-comment.sh
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,26 @@
#!/bin/bash
# issue-comment.sh - Add a comment to an issue on GitHub or Gitea
# Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment>
# Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment> [--login <name>]
#
# tea v0.11.1 defines no `comment` subcommand under `tea issue` (or `tea pr`);
# the non-existent `tea issue comment ...` form does not error — tea silently
# no-ops and still exits 0, so a caller trusting the exit code believes a
# comment was posted when it was not (#865). tea 0.11.1 also cannot reliably
# emit the id of a record it created, so an exit code is the ONLY signal it
# offers — and that signal is untrustworthy. This script therefore does not
# write via tea at all: it POSTs the comment through the Gitea REST API (which
# returns the created comment object, including its id), then GETs that exact
# id back and fails closed unless it matches. Keying verification to the
# provider-returned created id means a concurrent comment cannot masquerade as
# this write and a no-op create simply yields no id to verify.
#
# --login override: the default login is resolved from the local `tea` login
# list for this repo's host (get_gitea_login). Pass --login <name> to override
# it for this invocation only. The REST write, the /user identity read, and the
# read-back are ALL performed with the token of the EFFECTIVE login (the
# override when given), so the write and its verification bind to the same
# identity — a --login override is never written under one credential and
# verified under a different default one.
set -e
@@ -10,6 +30,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
# Parse arguments
ISSUE_NUMBER=""
COMMENT=""
LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
@@ -21,12 +42,17 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--login)
LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment>"
echo "Usage: issue-comment.sh -i <issue_number> -c <comment> [--login <name>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -i, --issue Issue number (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Comment text (required)"
echo " -l, --login Override the detected Gitea tea login for this call"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
exit 0
;;
@@ -49,20 +75,273 @@ fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
# Resolve and cache the Gitea REST endpoint + token for the current remote,
# bound to a SPECIFIC login identity ($1). Populates GITEA_API_ROOT (…/api/v1),
# GITEA_API_BASE (…/api/v1/repos/<slug>), and GITEA_API_TOKEN.
#
# The token is resolved for the EFFECTIVE login (the --login override when
# given, otherwise the detected default) so that the single credential used for
# the write ALSO drives the /user identity read and the read-back — write token
# and read-back token are the same identity by construction (this is the
# credential-ordering fix: a --login override is no longer written under one
# credential and verified under a different default one). Falls back to the
# host-scoped credential ONLY when NO --login override was supplied (the
# best-effort default path). When $2 is "explicit" the login came from a
# caller-supplied --login: that exact login's token MUST resolve, and we FAIL
# CLOSED rather than silently downgrading the write to the host default
# identity — otherwise a caller relying on a dedicated per-role credential would
# be told the write succeeded as requested while it was attributed to the shared
# default. Returns non-zero (clear stderr) on any resolution failure.
gitea_resolve_api_for_login() {
local effective_login="$1" override_explicit="${2:-}" host configured_url repo
host=$(get_remote_host)
if [[ -n "$override_explicit" ]]; then
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") || {
echo "Error: could not resolve a host-matched Gitea token for --login '$effective_login' on host '$host'; refusing to fall back to the host default identity or a cross-host credential (comment write/read-back)" >&2
return 1
}
else
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") \
|| GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
echo "Error: Gitea token not found for login '$effective_login' (comment write/read-back)" >&2
return 1
}
fi
configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for comment read-back verification" >&2
return 1
}
repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
return 1
}
GITEA_API_ROOT="${configured_url%/}/api/v1"
GITEA_API_BASE="$GITEA_API_ROOT/repos/$repo"
# The provider WEB base (scheme + host + effective port + any deployment path
# prefix) that Gitea uses to build a comment's html issue_url/pull_request_url.
# Read-back verification pins the returned URL's origin + path prefix to THIS,
# not just a repo/issue suffix.
GITEA_WEB_BASE="${configured_url%/}"
return 0
}
# Resolve the login of the identity the API token authenticates as (GET
# /user). Used to attribute a read-back record to THIS invocation's writer so
# a concurrent write from a DIFFERENT identity cannot satisfy verification.
# Prints the login on success.
gitea_authenticated_login() {
local response_file auth_config status
response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-whoami.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$response_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for identity read" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$response_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_ROOT/user"); then
echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
return 1
fi
python3 - "$response_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
user = json.load(response)
login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
if not isinstance(login, str) or not login:
raise ValueError("missing authenticated login")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not resolve authenticated Gitea identity: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(login)
PY
}
# Post a comment to a Gitea issue via the supported REST API and verify it
# durably against a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id — never trust an exit code
# (#865 defect class: tea's non-existent `tea issue comment` no-ops yet exits
# 0). The write is a direct POST that returns the created comment object, so we
# learn the exact id of THIS write; we then GET that exact id and require
# id == created id AND author == acting identity AND exact body AND that it
# belongs to this issue. Because verification is keyed to the id the create
# returned, a concurrent comment (even same identity, same body) CANNOT
# masquerade as this write, and a suppressed/no-op write yields no created id
# and fails closed — there is no fallback list scan that a concurrent record
# could satisfy. Prints the created comment id on success.
#
# Args: $1 = issue number, $2 = comment body, $3 = acting identity login.
gitea_create_comment_verified() {
local issue_number="$1" comment_body="$2" acting_login="$3"
local payload write_file readback_file auth_config write_status readback_status created_id
payload=$(COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" python3 -c '
import json
import os
print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
')
write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-write.XXXXXX")
readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-issue-comment-getid.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for comment write" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST \
--config "$auth_config" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$payload" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/$issue_number/comments"); then
echo "Error: Gitea comment write transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea comment write failed with HTTP $write_status (#865: no durable comment created)" >&2
return 1
fi
created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
comment = json.load(response)
created_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
raise ValueError("create response carried no positive comment id")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea comment: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(created_id)
PY
) || return 1
if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/comments/$created_id"); then
echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
return 1
fi
EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" \
ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG="${GITEA_API_BASE##*/repos/}" \
EXPECTED_NUMBER="$issue_number" EXPECTED_WEB_BASE="$GITEA_WEB_BASE" \
python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
import json
import os
import sys
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
comment = json.load(response)
if not isinstance(comment, dict):
raise ValueError("response is not a comment object")
expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID"])
expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY"]
acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
slug = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG"]
number = os.environ["EXPECTED_NUMBER"]
web_base = os.environ["EXPECTED_WEB_BASE"]
# Gitea populates WEB (html) URLs here, not API paths. A plain issue comment
# carries issue_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/issues/<n> (pull_request_url
# empty); a comment posted to a PR's conversation carries
# pull_request_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/<n> (issue_url empty).
# Pin the returned URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+port) and its FULL path to this
# provider + repo + kind + number — an endswith/suffix test would accept a
# look-alike host (evil.example/deceptive/<slug>/issues/N) or a same-host
# decoy prefix (/other/<slug>/issues/N), so compare the whole thing.
base_origin, base_path = _origin_and_path(web_base)
expected_issue_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/issues/{number}"
expected_pr_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/pulls/{number}"
def _belongs(url, expected_path):
if not url:
return False
origin, path = _origin_and_path(url)
return origin == base_origin and path == expected_path
if comment.get("id") != expected_id:
raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
if (comment.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
raise ValueError("created comment is not authored by the acting identity")
if comment.get("body") != expected_body:
raise ValueError("created comment body does not match")
if not (
_belongs(comment.get("issue_url"), expected_issue_path)
or _belongs(comment.get("pull_request_url"), expected_pr_path)
):
raise ValueError("created comment does not belong to this issue on this provider/repo")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: Gitea comment persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
PY
echo "$created_id"
return 0
}
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
echo "Added comment to GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
# Build the invocation as an argv array (not unquoted $(get_gitea_repo_args)
# word-splitting) so the comment body — including Markdown backticks, $(...),
# and quotes — is passed verbatim and never re-split or shell-evaluated.
REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug)
GITEA_LOGIN_NAME=$(get_gitea_login) || {
echo "Error: could not resolve a Gitea login for this repo; cannot comment on issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER." >&2
# Resolve the login this comment should be attributed to: the --login
# override when given, otherwise the detected default for this repo's host.
# A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this repo host's login only
# as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login token, and
# gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host credential
# (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named, so the default credential
# still resolves even when the host tea has no matching login entry.
EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
[[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login 2>/dev/null || true)
# Bind the REST endpoint + token to the effective login, then derive the
# acting identity from that SAME credential (GET /user). The write below and
# its read-back both use this credential, so the write is verified against
# the identity that actually performed it. Passing "explicit" when --login
# was supplied forbids the host-default fallback: an unresolvable explicit
# override fails closed instead of writing under the default identity.
gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
comment_id=$(gitea_create_comment_verified "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN") || {
echo "Error: could not create and verify a comment on Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
exit 1
}
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" --repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME"
echo "Added comment to Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
echo "Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
exit 1

532
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-review.sh
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,21 @@
#!/bin/bash
# pr-review.sh - Review a pull request on GitHub or Gitea
# Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>]
# Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>] [--login <name>]
#
# Gitea reviews and comments are written through the supported REST API, not
# `tea`: tea 0.11.1 cannot emit the id of a record it creates and can silently
# no-op while exiting 0 (#865 defect class), so an exit code is the only — and
# untrustworthy — signal it offers. approve/request-changes POST to
# /pulls/{n}/reviews (returns the created review with its id); the `comment`
# action POSTs to /issues/{n}/comments (returns the created comment with its
# id). Each write is then verified by GETting that exact returned id, so a
# concurrent record cannot masquerade as this write and a no-op fails closed.
#
# --login override: the default login is resolved from the local tea login list
# for this repo's host (get_gitea_login_for_host). Pass --login <name> to
# override it for this invocation only. The REST write, the /user identity read,
# and every read-back are ALL performed with the token of the EFFECTIVE login,
# so the write and its verification bind to the same identity.
set -e
@@ -12,6 +27,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
PR_NUMBER=""
ACTION=""
COMMENT=""
LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
@@ -27,13 +43,18 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--login)
LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>]"
echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>] [--login <name>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -n, --number PR number (required)"
echo " -a, --action Review action: approve, request-changes, comment (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Review comment (required for request-changes)"
echo " -l, --login Override the detected Gitea tea login (approve/request-changes only)"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
exit 0
;;
@@ -56,51 +77,42 @@ fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
# Post a review comment body to a Gitea PR via the supported comments REST API
# and verify it durably via provider read-back (see docs on durable review
# provenance in README.md). Used by the `comment` action and, since `tea`
# v0.11.1 defines no `--comment`/`-comment` flag on `pr approve`/`pr reject`,
# also by the `approve` and `request-changes` actions to carry an optional
# review body that `tea` itself cannot attach.
# Post a comment to a Gitea PR (PR comments ARE issue comments) via the
# supported REST API and verify it against a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id. The
# write is a direct POST that returns the created comment object, so we learn
# the exact id of THIS write; we GET that exact id and require id == created id
# AND author == acting identity AND exact body AND that it belongs to this PR.
# Keying to the returned id means no concurrent comment (even same identity /
# body) can masquerade as this write, and a no-op create yields no id and fails
# closed. Requires GITEA_API_BASE / GITEA_API_TOKEN to be resolved first (via
# gitea_resolve_api_for_login). Prints the created comment id on success.
#
# Args: $1 = PR number, $2 = comment body
# On success: prints only the created comment ID to stdout, returns 0.
# On failure: prints an error to stderr, returns 1.
gitea_post_verified_comment() {
local pr_number="$1" comment_body="$2"
local host token configured_url repo api_base payload
local write_response_file readback_response_file comment_id
# Args: $1 = PR number, $2 = comment body, $3 = acting identity login.
gitea_create_comment_verified() {
local pr_number="$1" comment_body="$2" acting_login="$3"
local payload write_file readback_file auth_config write_status readback_status created_id
host=$(get_remote_host)
token=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
echo "Error: Gitea token not found for comment persistence" >&2
return 1
}
configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for comment persistence" >&2
return 1
}
repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
return 1
}
api_base="${configured_url%/}/api/v1/repos/$repo"
payload=$(COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" python3 -c '
import json
import os
print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
')
write_response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-write.XXXXXX")
readback_response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-readback.XXXXXX")
trap 'rm -f "$write_response_file" "$readback_response_file"' RETURN
write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-write.XXXXXX")
readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-getid.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for comment write" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $token" \
--config "$auth_config" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$payload" \
"$api_base/issues/$pr_number/comments"); then
"$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/$pr_number/comments"); then
echo "Error: Gitea comment write transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
@@ -109,26 +121,26 @@ print(json.dumps({"body": os.environ["COMMENT_BODY"]}))
return 1
fi
comment_id=$(python3 - "$write_response_file" <<'PY'
created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
comment = json.load(response)
comment_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
if not isinstance(comment_id, int) or comment_id <= 0:
raise ValueError("missing positive comment id")
created_id = comment.get("id") if isinstance(comment, dict) else None
if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
raise ValueError("create response carried no positive comment id")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea comment: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(comment_id)
print(created_id)
PY
) || return 1
if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-H "Authorization: token $token" \
"$api_base/issues/comments/$comment_id"); then
if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/issues/comments/$created_id"); then
echo "Error: Gitea comment read-back transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
@@ -137,13 +149,28 @@ PY
return 1
fi
if EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$comment_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" EXPECTED_REPO="$repo" EXPECTED_PR_NUMBER="$pr_number" \
python3 - "$readback_response_file" <<'PY'
EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY="$comment_body" \
ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG="${GITEA_API_BASE##*/repos/}" \
EXPECTED_NUMBER="$pr_number" EXPECTED_WEB_BASE="$GITEA_WEB_BASE" \
python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
import json
import os
import sys
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
comment = json.load(response)
@@ -151,27 +178,344 @@ try:
raise ValueError("response is not a comment object")
expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_ID"])
expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_COMMENT_BODY"]
expected_repo = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO"]
expected_pr = os.environ["EXPECTED_PR_NUMBER"]
issue_path = urlparse(comment.get("issue_url", "")).path.rstrip("/")
expected_suffix = f"/repos/{expected_repo}/issues/{expected_pr}"
acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
slug = os.environ["EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG"]
number = os.environ["EXPECTED_NUMBER"]
web_base = os.environ["EXPECTED_WEB_BASE"]
# Gitea populates WEB (html) URLs here, not API paths. A PR-conversation
# comment carries pull_request_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/<n> (with
# issue_url empty), while a plain issue comment carries
# issue_url = <web_base>/<owner>/<repo>/issues/<n> (with pull_request_url empty).
# This is the pr-review `comment` action, so the comment MUST land on a pull
# request: require pull_request_url. A plain issue_url is REJECTED — if issue
# #N exists but PR #N does not, POST /issues/N/comments creates an issue
# comment, and accepting that issue_url would let the wrapper falsely report a
# verified PR comment (issue-comment.sh legitimately keeps the broader
# issue-or-PR acceptance; a PR review does not).
# Pin the returned URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+port) and its FULL path to this
# provider + repo + kind + number — an endswith/suffix test would accept a
# look-alike host (evil.example/deceptive/<slug>/pulls/N) or a same-host
# decoy prefix (/other/<slug>/pulls/N), so compare the whole thing.
base_origin, base_path = _origin_and_path(web_base)
expected_pr_path = f"{base_path}/{slug}/pulls/{number}"
def _belongs(url, expected_path):
if not url:
return False
origin, path = _origin_and_path(url)
return origin == base_origin and path == expected_path
if comment.get("id") != expected_id:
raise ValueError("comment id mismatch")
raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
if (comment.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
raise ValueError("created comment is not authored by the acting identity")
if comment.get("body") != expected_body:
raise ValueError("comment body mismatch")
if not issue_path.endswith(expected_suffix):
raise ValueError("repository or PR mismatch")
raise ValueError("created comment body does not match")
if not _belongs(comment.get("pull_request_url"), expected_pr_path):
raise ValueError("claimed PR comment did not land on a pull request (kind=pulls) on this provider/repo")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: Gitea comment persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
PY
then
true
echo "$created_id"
return 0
}
# Resolve and cache the Gitea REST endpoint + token for the current remote,
# bound to a SPECIFIC login identity ($1). Populates GITEA_API_ROOT (…/api/v1),
# GITEA_API_BASE (…/api/v1/repos/<slug>), and GITEA_API_TOKEN.
#
# The token is resolved for the EFFECTIVE login (the --login override when
# given, otherwise the detected default), so the one credential used to submit
# the review/comment ALSO drives the /user identity read and every read-back —
# write token and read-back token are the same identity by construction. This
# is the credential-ordering fix: a --login override is no longer submitted
# under one credential and verified under a different default one. Falls back to
# the host-scoped credential ONLY when NO --login override was supplied (the
# best-effort default path). When $2 is "explicit" the login came from a
# caller-supplied --login: that exact login's token MUST resolve, and we FAIL
# CLOSED rather than silently downgrading the review/comment to the host default
# identity. Returns non-zero (clear stderr) on any resolution failure.
gitea_resolve_api_for_login() {
local effective_login="$1" override_explicit="${2:-}" host configured_url repo
host=$(get_remote_host)
if [[ -n "$override_explicit" ]]; then
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") || {
echo "Error: could not resolve a host-matched Gitea token for --login '$effective_login' on host '$host'; refusing to fall back to the host default identity or a cross-host credential (review write/read-back)" >&2
return 1
}
else
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$effective_login" "$host") \
|| GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
echo "Error: Gitea token not found for login '$effective_login' (review write/read-back)" >&2
return 1
}
fi
configured_url=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$host") || {
echo "Error: Configured Gitea URL not found for review read-back verification" >&2
return 1
}
repo=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$configured_url") || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea owner/repository relative to configured URL" >&2
return 1
}
GITEA_API_ROOT="${configured_url%/}/api/v1"
GITEA_API_BASE="$GITEA_API_ROOT/repos/$repo"
# The provider WEB base (scheme + host + effective port + any deployment path
# prefix) that Gitea uses to build a comment's html issue_url/pull_request_url.
# Read-back verification pins the returned URL's origin + path prefix to THIS,
# not just a repo/PR suffix.
GITEA_WEB_BASE="${configured_url%/}"
return 0
}
# Resolve the login of the identity the API token authenticates as (GET
# /user). Used to attribute a read-back review to THIS action's reviewer so a
# concurrent review from a DIFFERENT identity cannot satisfy verification.
# Prints the login on success.
gitea_authenticated_login() {
local response_file auth_config status
response_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-whoami.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$response_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for identity read" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$response_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$response_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_ROOT/user"); then
echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
return 1
fi
echo "$comment_id"
python3 - "$response_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
user = json.load(response)
login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
if not isinstance(login, str) or not login:
raise ValueError("missing authenticated login")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not resolve authenticated Gitea identity: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(login)
PY
}
# GET /pulls/{n} into a caller-owned response file and print its head commit
# SHA. This core sets NO RETURN trap and reuses a caller-provided auth config +
# response file, so it is safe to call from INSIDE another trapped function
# (the post-verify re-read below) without clobbering that function's cleanup
# trap. $1 = PR number, $2 = response file, $3 = curl auth config file.
gitea_read_pr_head_into() {
local pr_number="$1" pr_file="$2" auth_config="$3" status
if ! status=$(curl -sS -o "$pr_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number"); then
echo "Error: Gitea PR head read transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$status" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea PR head read failed with HTTP $status" >&2
return 1
fi
python3 - "$pr_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
pr = json.load(response)
head_sha = pr.get("head", {}).get("sha") if isinstance(pr, dict) else None
if not isinstance(head_sha, str) or not head_sha:
raise ValueError("missing PR head sha")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, AttributeError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not resolve PR head commit: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(head_sha)
PY
}
# Resolve the PR's current head commit SHA (GET /pulls/{n}). The review is
# submitted against — and later verified as pinned to — this exact commit, so a
# stale review left over from an earlier push cannot be mistaken for this one.
# Prints the head SHA on success.
gitea_pr_head_sha() {
local pr_number="$1" pr_file auth_config
pr_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-head.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$pr_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for PR head read" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$pr_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
gitea_read_pr_head_into "$pr_number" "$pr_file" "$auth_config"
}
# Submit a review to a Gitea PR via the supported REST API and verify it against
# a PROVIDER-RETURNED created id. tea 0.11.1's `pr approve`/`reject` cannot emit
# the id of the review it created and can silently no-op while exiting 0 (#865
# defect class), so this does NOT shell out to tea: it POSTs to
# /pulls/{n}/reviews with the event (APPROVED / REQUEST_CHANGES), the PR head
# commit_id, and the review body, which returns the created review object
# including its id. It then GETs that exact review id and requires
# id == created id AND author == acting identity AND state == expected AND
# commit_id == PR head. Keying to the returned id means no concurrent review
# (even same identity/state/head) can masquerade as this one, and a no-op
# submit yields no id and fails closed. Prints the created review id on success.
#
# Args: $1 = PR number, $2 = event (APPROVED|REQUEST_CHANGES),
# $3 = review body (may be empty for APPROVED), $4 = acting login,
# $5 = PR head sha.
gitea_submit_review_verified() {
local pr_number="$1" event="$2" review_body="$3" acting_login="$4" head_sha="$5"
local payload write_file readback_file recheck_file auth_config
local write_status readback_status created_id live_head
payload=$(REVIEW_EVENT="$event" REVIEW_BODY="$review_body" REVIEW_COMMIT="$head_sha" python3 -c '
import json
import os
print(json.dumps({
"event": os.environ["REVIEW_EVENT"],
"body": os.environ["REVIEW_BODY"],
"commit_id": os.environ["REVIEW_COMMIT"],
}))
')
write_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-submit.XXXXXX")
readback_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-getid.XXXXXX")
recheck_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-pr-review-recheck.XXXXXX")
auth_config=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$recheck_file"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for review submit" >&2
return 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$write_file" "$readback_file" "$recheck_file" "$auth_config"' RETURN
if ! write_status=$(curl -sS -o "$write_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST \
--config "$auth_config" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$payload" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number/reviews"); then
echo "Error: Gitea review submit transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
# Gitea returns 200 (occasionally 201) with the created review object.
if [[ "$write_status" != "200" && "$write_status" != "201" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea review submit failed with HTTP $write_status (#865: no durable review created)" >&2
return 1
fi
created_id=$(python3 - "$write_file" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
review = json.load(response)
created_id = review.get("id") if isinstance(review, dict) else None
if not isinstance(created_id, int) or created_id <= 0:
raise ValueError("submit response carried no positive review id")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: could not identify created Gitea review: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(created_id)
PY
) || return 1
if ! readback_status=$(curl -sS -o "$readback_file" -w '%{http_code}' \
--config "$auth_config" \
"$GITEA_API_BASE/pulls/$pr_number/reviews/$created_id"); then
echo "Error: Gitea review read-back transport failed" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$readback_status" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea review read-back failed with HTTP $readback_status" >&2
return 1
fi
EXPECTED_REVIEW_ID="$created_id" EXPECTED_STATE="$event" ACTING_LOGIN="$acting_login" \
EXPECTED_HEAD_SHA="$head_sha" EXPECTED_REVIEW_BODY="$review_body" \
python3 - "$readback_file" <<'PY' || return 1
import json
import os
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
review = json.load(response)
if not isinstance(review, dict):
raise ValueError("response is not a review object")
expected_id = int(os.environ["EXPECTED_REVIEW_ID"])
expected_state = os.environ["EXPECTED_STATE"]
acting_login = os.environ["ACTING_LOGIN"]
expected_head = os.environ["EXPECTED_HEAD_SHA"]
expected_body = os.environ["EXPECTED_REVIEW_BODY"]
if review.get("id") != expected_id:
raise ValueError("read-back id does not match the created id")
if (review.get("user") or {}).get("login") != acting_login:
raise ValueError("created review is not authored by the acting identity")
if review.get("state") != expected_state:
raise ValueError("created review is not in the expected state")
if review.get("commit_id") != expected_head:
raise ValueError("created review is not pinned to the PR head commit")
# Bind to the exact submitted body. On Gitea v1.25.4 SubmitReview may
# finalize/reuse a pending review id whose Content was authored elsewhere;
# the exact GET exposes the persisted body, so a mismatch (a reused/foreign
# review carrying different Content) fails closed even when id/author/state/
# head all line up. Require presence + string TYPE + exact equality rather
# than `(body or "")`: the old coalesce treated a missing/null persisted body
# as equal to an empty submitted one, so a non-empty submitted body that
# persisted as null (a suppressed/lost body) would have passed. When a
# non-empty body was submitted the persisted value MUST be that exact string;
# when an empty body was submitted the persisted value must be empty or
# absent (a non-empty persisted body is likewise a divergence — vice-versa).
persisted_body = review.get("body")
if expected_body == "":
if persisted_body not in (None, ""):
raise ValueError("created review carries a body but none was submitted")
elif not isinstance(persisted_body, str) or persisted_body != expected_body:
raise ValueError("created review body does not match the submitted body")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: Gitea review persistence verification failed: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
PY
# Current-head TOCTOU close-out: the review verified above is pinned to
# head_sha, but that head was read BEFORE the submit. Between then and now
# the PR branch may have advanced (a force-push or a new commit), which would
# leave this verified review attached to a now-superseded commit while the
# live tip carries unreviewed code — yet the wrapper would still report
# success. Re-read the LIVE PR head and require it STILL equals the submitted
# SHA; if it advanced, fail closed (nonzero, no created id emitted, no
# success line). This reuses the submit-scoped auth config + recheck file so
# it neither leaks the token to argv nor clobbers this function's cleanup.
live_head=$(gitea_read_pr_head_into "$pr_number" "$recheck_file" "$auth_config") || {
echo "Error: could not re-read Gitea PR head after review verification" >&2
return 1
}
if [[ "$live_head" != "$head_sha" ]]; then
echo "Error: Gitea PR head advanced from $head_sha to $live_head between review submit and verification; refusing to report a review pinned to a superseded commit (#865 current-head TOCTOU)" >&2
return 1
fi
echo "$created_id"
return 0
}
@@ -205,40 +549,76 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
case $ACTION in
approve)
repo=$(get_repo_slug)
host=$(get_remote_host)
login=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host")
# tea v0.11.1 defines no --comment/-comment flag on `pr approve`;
# route any review body via the durable comment API instead (#835).
tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$repo" --login "$login"
echo "Approved Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
comment_id=$(gitea_post_verified_comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT") || exit 1
echo "Added and verified review comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
fi
# A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
# only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
# token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
# credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
# tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
# the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
# then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
[[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
# Bind the REST endpoint + token to the effective login, then derive
# the acting identity from that SAME credential so the review submit
# and its read-back verify against the identity that performed them.
gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
head_sha=$(gitea_pr_head_sha "$PR_NUMBER") || exit 1
# The review body (if any) travels with the review itself in the REST
# submit — the created review record carries it — so there is no
# separate detached comment to reconcile.
review_id=$(gitea_submit_review_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "APPROVED" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN" "$head_sha") || {
echo "Error: could not submit and verify an APPROVED review on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Approved and verified Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (review ID $review_id)"
;;
request-changes)
if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
exit 1
fi
repo=$(get_repo_slug)
host=$(get_remote_host)
login=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host")
# tea v0.11.1 defines no --comment/-comment flag on `pr reject`;
# route the review body via the durable comment API instead (#835).
tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$repo" --login "$login"
echo "Requested changes on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
comment_id=$(gitea_post_verified_comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT") || exit 1
echo "Added and verified review comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
# A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
# only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
# token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
# credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
# tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
# the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
# then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
[[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
head_sha=$(gitea_pr_head_sha "$PR_NUMBER") || exit 1
review_id=$(gitea_submit_review_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "REQUEST_CHANGES" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN" "$head_sha") || {
echo "Error: could not submit and verify a REQUEST_CHANGES review on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Requested changes and verified on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (review ID $review_id)"
;;
comment)
if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required"
exit 1
fi
comment_id=$(gitea_post_verified_comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT") || exit 1
host=$(get_remote_host)
# A --login override always wins. Otherwise name this host's login
# only as a best effort: the login name merely selects a per-login
# token, and gitea_resolve_api_for_login falls back to the host
# credential (get_gitea_token) when no tea login is named — so a host
# tea's login list need not enumerate exotic (e.g. ported) hosts for
# the default credential to resolve. The single resolved token is
# then used for the write, the /user identity, and the read-back.
EFFECTIVE_LOGIN="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
[[ -n "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" ]] || EFFECTIVE_LOGIN=$(get_gitea_login_for_host "$host" 2>/dev/null || true)
gitea_resolve_api_for_login "$EFFECTIVE_LOGIN" "${LOGIN_OVERRIDE:+explicit}" || exit 1
ACTING_LOGIN=$(gitea_authenticated_login) || exit 1
comment_id=$(gitea_create_comment_verified "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" "$ACTING_LOGIN") || {
echo "Error: could not create and verify a comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER via a provider-returned created id (#865)." >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
;;
*)

897
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh
View File

@@ -312,4 +312,901 @@ if [[ "$override_wins" != "mosaicstack" ]]; then
fi
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote set-url origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# #865 Blocker 1 & 2: get_gitea_token_for_login must resolve the SAME token as
# PyYAML would (or fail closed identically) even when PyYAML is ABSENT, and must
# bind the credential to the repo host's scheme + host + EFFECTIVE PORT — not the
# hostname alone. These fixtures probe the ImportError-dispatched line-parser
# fallback under FORCED PyYAML absence with adversarial YAML shapes, asserting it
# NEVER misattributes a token from a nested sub-map or a mis-indented line, strips
# inline comments like PyYAML, fails closed where PyYAML errors, and rejects a
# port mismatch while accepting an exact / default-port match. When PyYAML is
# available the same fixtures also assert the PyYAML path agrees (equivalence).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIXTURE_XDG="$WORK_DIR/tokenfix"
NOYAML_DIR="$WORK_DIR/noyaml"
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea" "$NOYAML_DIR"
# A shadow `yaml` module that raises ImportError, forcing the fallback path.
printf 'raise ImportError("forced-absent for #865 fallback regression")\n' > "$NOYAML_DIR/yaml.py"
if python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then HAVE_PYYAML=true; else HAVE_PYYAML=false; fi
# Confirm the shim really does force ImportError, so the fallback is exercised.
if python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" python3 -c 'import yaml' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: PyYAML-absence shim did not force ImportError (fallback not exercised)" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
write_fixture() { printf '%s' "$1" > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"; }
# Resolve a token via the FORCED-fallback path (PyYAML shimmed to ImportError).
token_fallback() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
' _ "$1" "$2"
) 2>/dev/null || true
}
# Resolve a token via the normal path (uses PyYAML when installed).
token_pyyaml() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
' _ "$1" "$2"
) 2>/dev/null || true
}
assert_token() {
local desc="$1" expected="$2" login="$3" host="$4" got
got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected [$expected] got [$got]" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "FAIL pyyaml [$desc]: expected [$expected] got [$got]" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
}
# 1. Plain, well-formed entry resolves its token.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
'
assert_token "plain scalar" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# 2. A token nested inside a deeper SUB-MAP must NOT attach to the entry — PyYAML
# resolves the entry's own token to None here, so the fallback must too.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
extra:
token: TOK_NESTED_ATTACKER
- name: other
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_OTHER
'
assert_token "nested sub-map token is not attributed" "" primary git.example
assert_token "sibling entry still resolves its own token" "TOK_OTHER" other git.example
# 3. A MIS-INDENTED token line (deeper than the entry's fields) must not attach;
# PyYAML errors on this shape, so both fail closed.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_MISINDENT
'
assert_token "mis-indented token fails closed" "" primary git.example
# 4. A trailing inline comment on a scalar is stripped, exactly as PyYAML does.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_INLINE # trailing note
'
assert_token "inline comment stripped" "TOK_INLINE" primary git.example
# 5. A PyYAML-fail-closed case: tab indentation. PyYAML raises a scanner error;
# the fallback resolves no token. Both fail closed identically.
write_fixture "$(printf 'logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n\ttoken: TOK_TAB\n')"
assert_token "tab-indent fails closed like PyYAML" "" primary git.example
# 6. Host binding is scheme + host + EFFECTIVE PORT, not hostname alone.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: ported
url: https://git.example:8443
token: TOK_PORTED
'
assert_token "explicit port exact match accepted" "TOK_PORTED" ported git.example:8443
assert_token "portless repo host rejects :8443 login" "" ported git.example
assert_token "wrong explicit port rejected" "" ported git.example:9443
# 7. An implicit (portless) login URL equals the scheme's explicit default port.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: defported
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_DEFPORT
'
assert_token "implicit https vs explicit :443 match" "TOK_DEFPORT" defported git.example:443
assert_token "implicit https vs :8443 rejected" "" defported git.example:8443
# 8. An UNQUOTED token whose raw text PyYAML's implicit resolver types as a
# NON-string (int / null / bool / float) must fail closed: PyYAML yields a
# non-str value that _accept rejects, so the fallback must NOT surface the
# stringified scalar as a credential. Each raw form fails closed IDENTICALLY
# to PyYAML (a prior residual emitted "12345"/"null"/"true"/etc. here).
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed() {
local desc="$1" raw="$2"
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${raw}
"
assert_token "$desc" "" primary git.example
}
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted int token fails closed" "12345"
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted null token fails closed" "null"
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted tilde-null token fails closed" "~"
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted yes(bool) token fails closed" "yes"
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted true(bool) token fails closed" "true"
assert_nonstring_token_fails_closed "unquoted float token fails closed" "3.14"
# 9. A QUOTED scalar is ALWAYS a string, even when its contents look like a
# non-string implicit form. The quotes force str typing in PyYAML, so the
# fallback must accept the literal (quote-stripped) contents as the token.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: "12345"
'
assert_token "double-quoted digit token is a literal string" "12345" primary git.example
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: 'abc'
"
assert_token "single-quoted token is a literal string" "abc" primary git.example
# assert_fallback_fails_closed: the forced-fallback path MUST resolve no token
# (fail closed). Used for STRUCTURAL cases where PyYAML would resolve a DIFFERENT
# token (e.g. duplicate-key last-wins) — the fallback must never surface the
# wrong/stale token, so it fails closed instead; when PyYAML is present we also
# confirm it really does resolve a (divergent) token, proving the fallback is the
# strictly-more-conservative side and the case is a genuine fail-open guard.
assert_fallback_fails_closed() {
local desc="$1" login="$2" host="$3" got
got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected fail-closed, got a token" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
if [[ -z "$got" ]]; then
echo "FAIL [$desc]: expected PyYAML to resolve a divergent token" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
}
# 10. tea's REAL on-disk shape: the `logins:` block SEQUENCE items sit at the
# SAME indentation as the key (dash at column 0), with extra scalar fields.
# The recognizer must resolve this exactly like PyYAML (regression guard so
# the stricter whole-document recognizer does not fail closed on real input).
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_REAL
default: false
ssh_host: ""
- name: other
url: https://other.example
token: TOK_REAL_OTHER
preferences:
editor: false
flags: null
'
assert_token "tea dash-at-column-0 real shape resolves" "TOK_REAL" primary git.example
assert_token "tea real shape sibling resolves own token" "TOK_REAL_OTHER" other other.example
# 11. NESTED-SHADOW: a nested `logins:` (NOT at root scope) must not be mistaken
# for the real root logins. The recognizer parses whole-document structure,
# so it selects the ROOT logins token exactly as PyYAML does — never the
# nested attacker token. (A prior line scan matched the FIRST logins at ANY
# indent and returned ATTACKER.)
write_fixture 'outer:
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ATTACKER_NESTED
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ROOT_TOK
'
assert_token "nested logins shadow selects ROOT token" "ROOT_TOK" primary git.example
# 12. BLOCK-SCALAR-SHADOW: text inside a YAML literal/folded block ( | or > ) is
# an OPAQUE scalar to PyYAML (so `logins` is a string, not a list) and must
# not be scanned as live logins entries. Both fail closed.
write_fixture 'logins: |
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ATTACKER_BLOCK
'
assert_token "block-scalar logins value fails closed" "" primary git.example
# A folded/literal block scalar anywhere is outside the recognizer's subset, so
# the fallback fails closed (conservative) even though PyYAML can still resolve
# the real root token past the opaque scalar. Fail-closed is the safe side.
write_fixture 'note: >
logins:
- name: primary
token: ATTACKER_FOLDED
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ROOT_OK
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "folded block scalar present fails closed" primary git.example
# 13. DUPLICATE-ROOT / DUPLICATE-FIELD: a duplicated `logins:` root key (PyYAML
# last-wins) or a duplicated field within a login must fail closed rather
# than take the FIRST (stale) value. PyYAML resolves the LAST; the fallback
# refuses to guess.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: FIRST_DUP
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: LAST_DUP
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "duplicate root logins key fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: FIRST_FIELD
token: SECOND_FIELD
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "duplicate token field fails closed" primary git.example
# 14. MALFORMED-AFTER-VALID: a syntax error LATER in the file makes PyYAML reject
# the WHOLE document; the recognizer must too (not emit the earlier token).
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
broken: a: b: c
'
assert_token "malformed line after valid login fails closed" "" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
broken: [unclosed
'
assert_token "unclosed flow after valid login fails closed" "" primary git.example
# 15. EXTRA-DOCUMENT: a multi-document file (--- separator, or ... end marker)
# makes PyYAML safe_load reject multi-document input; the recognizer fails
# closed on ANY document marker rather than emit the first doc's token.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
---
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: SECOND_DOC
'
assert_token "second document (--- separator) fails closed" "" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
...
trailing: 1
'
assert_token "end marker then more content fails closed" "" primary git.example
# 16. CONSTRUCTOR-VALIDITY / INVALID-INDICATOR: a plain scalar can match a typed
# implicit resolver (int/float/timestamp) yet be NON-constructible, or begin
# with an indicator a plain scalar may not start with. PyYAML then RAISES on
# the WHOLE document (constructor error / scanner error) and yields NO token,
# so the fallback must ALSO fail closed for the whole document -- even though
# the (unrelated) malformed key sits alongside an otherwise-valid logins
# block whose token is itself well-formed. A prior residual proved STRUCTURE
# and implicit TYPE but not constructor validity, so it ignored the malformed
# key and still emitted the valid login token (fail-open in the dangerous
# direction). assert_both_fail_closed asserts fallback == PyYAML == no token.
assert_both_fail_closed() {
local desc="$1" login="$2" host="$3" got
got=$(token_fallback "$login" "$host")
if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
echo "FAIL fallback [$desc]: expected fail-closed, got a token" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$HAVE_PYYAML" == true ]]; then
got=$(token_pyyaml "$login" "$host")
if [[ -n "$got" ]]; then
echo "FAIL pyyaml [$desc]: expected PyYAML to also fail closed (raise/no token), got a token" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
}
# write_bad_key_fixture: an unrelated root key carrying $1 as its plain scalar,
# followed by an otherwise-valid logins block whose token is well-formed.
write_bad_key_fixture() {
write_fixture "bad: $1
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
"
}
# Non-constructible TIMESTAMP-tagged scalars: match the resolver, but the
# calendar field is out of range so PyYAML's datetime construction raises.
write_bad_key_fixture '2023-99-99' # month 99 / day 99 invalid
assert_both_fail_closed "bad-date 2023-99-99 fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '2023-13-01' # month 13 invalid
assert_both_fail_closed "bad-month 2023-13-01 fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15T25:00:00' # hour 25 invalid
assert_both_fail_closed "bad-hour timestamp fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
# Non-constructible INT-tagged scalars: match the int resolver, but the radix
# body is empty after underscore removal so int(base) raises.
write_bad_key_fixture '0b_'
assert_both_fail_closed "empty-binary 0b_ fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '0x_'
assert_both_fail_closed "empty-hex 0x_ fails closed like PyYAML" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '0x__'
assert_both_fail_closed "empty-hex 0x__ (multi-underscore) fails closed" primary git.example
# Invalid plain-scalar INDICATOR forms: a plain scalar may not begin with '%'
# (directive) or ',' (flow) -- PyYAML raises a scanner/parser error on the whole
# document, so the fallback fails closed on the leading indicator.
write_bad_key_fixture '%broken'
assert_both_fail_closed "leading-%% directive indicator fails closed" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture ',bad'
assert_both_fail_closed "leading-comma flow indicator fails closed" primary git.example
# Bare block indicators in a value position ('-'/'- ', '?'/'? ', ':'/': '):
# PyYAML raises a scanner error on the whole document, so the fallback must fail
# closed rather than accept the indicator as a plain-scalar string.
write_bad_key_fixture '-'
assert_both_fail_closed "bare dash (seq indicator) fails closed" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '- x'
assert_both_fail_closed "dash-space (seq entry) fails closed" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '? key'
assert_both_fail_closed "question-space (complex key) fails closed" primary git.example
# ...but an indicator NOT followed by whitespace is a valid plain scalar string,
# so the token still resolves (no over-broad fail-close).
write_bad_key_fixture '-x'
assert_token "dash-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture ':x'
assert_token "colon-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# NOT over-broad: a genuinely CONSTRUCTIBLE typed scalar (or a look-alike PyYAML
# keeps as a plain string) leaves the document valid, so BOTH still resolve the
# login token -- the fix must not fail closed on these.
write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15'
assert_token "valid date unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture '2023-01-15 10:00:00'
assert_token "valid datetime unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# '0o_' is NOT matched by PyYAML's int resolver (YAML 1.1 octal is 0[0-7]+, not
# 0o...), so PyYAML keeps it a STRING and resolves the token; the fallback must
# agree (no spurious fail-close).
write_bad_key_fixture '0o_'
assert_token "0o_ is a plain string in PyYAML, token still resolves" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# '4.e8' matches the fallback's (superset) float pattern but PyYAML keeps it a
# string; either way it is constructible, so the token still resolves in both.
write_bad_key_fixture '4.e8'
assert_token "4.e8 float look-alike still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# A valid radix int as an unrelated key must not fail closed.
write_bad_key_fixture '0x1f'
assert_token "valid hex int unrelated key still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# 17. TAB / SCANNER PARITY: PyYAML raises a ScannerError on a tab used anywhere
# outside a quoted scalar -- leading, trailing, or embedded in a plain value,
# immediately after a key colon, before a key colon, or as indentation -- and
# yields NO token, accepting tabs ONLY inside single/double-quoted scalars
# (where the tab is preserved as string content). A prior fallback swallowed
# those tabs (via .strip()/.rstrip() normalization and [ \t] key separators)
# and still emitted the login token -- a fail-open in the dangerous direction.
# The recognizer now fails CLOSED for the whole document on any tab PyYAML
# rejects, while preserving the tabs PyYAML keeps (inside quotes). All tab
# positions were verified empirically against PyYAML 6.0.3 (ScannerError for
# each rejected position; string-preserved for quoted inner tabs).
TAB=$'\t'
# Fail-close: a tab in a plain value position (trailing / leading / embedded).
write_bad_key_fixture "l4o${TAB}"
assert_both_fail_closed "trailing tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture "${TAB}9"
assert_both_fail_closed "leading tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture "a${TAB}b"
assert_both_fail_closed "embedded tab in plain value fails closed" primary git.example
# Fail-close: a tab immediately after the key colon (no separating space).
write_fixture "bad:${TAB}9
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
"
assert_both_fail_closed "tab immediately after key colon fails closed" primary git.example
# Fail-close: a tab used as indentation (before a sequence dash).
write_fixture "logins:
${TAB}- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN
"
assert_both_fail_closed "tab used as indentation fails closed" primary git.example
# Fail-close: a tab trailing a sequence-mapping field value.
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_PLAIN${TAB}
"
assert_both_fail_closed "tab trailing a seq field value fails closed" primary git.example
# NOT over-broad: a tab strictly INSIDE a quoted scalar is valid YAML (PyYAML
# keeps it as string content), so the document parses and the login token still
# resolves in BOTH paths -- double-quoted and single-quoted.
write_bad_key_fixture "\"a${TAB}b\""
assert_token "tab inside a double-quoted value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
write_bad_key_fixture "'a${TAB}b'"
assert_token "tab inside a single-quoted value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
# ...and a quoted token value carrying an inner tab resolves to the exact string
# (tab preserved), identical to PyYAML's construction.
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: \"T${TAB}OK\"
"
assert_token "quoted token with inner tab resolves verbatim" "T${TAB}OK" primary git.example
# 18. CONTROL-CHARACTER FAIL-CLOSE (#865 round-9 blocker 1): PyYAML's Reader
# scans the ENTIRE raw document stream (not merely scalar contents, and NOT
# scoped by quoting) for bytes outside its printable set and raises
# ReaderError -- a WHOLE-DOCUMENT reject -- the instant one is found,
# regardless of where it sits: an unrelated field's plain scalar, inside a
# double- or single-quoted scalar, or a comment. Verified empirically against
# real installed PyYAML 6.0.3 (see detect-platform.sh's _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL
# comment): every C0 control byte {0x00-0x08, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0E-0x1F} plus DEL
# (0x7F) rejects in ALL THREE contexts (plain / double-quoted / single-quoted);
# only TAB(0x09), LF(0x0A), CR(0x0D) are accepted among the low byte range
# (TAB has its own narrower, position-aware coverage in section 17 above; LF/CR
# are line separators). A prior fallback ONLY guarded tabs and emitted the
# login token from documents PyYAML rejects over an UNRELATED field's control
# byte -- a dangerous fail-open (credential emission from a document PyYAML
# refuses). write_control_char_fixture writes the raw byte directly via
# printf's octal escape (never through a bash string/variable, which cannot
# hold an embedded NUL) so 0x00 is exercised faithfully alongside the rest.
write_control_char_fixture() {
local octal="$1" quote="${2:-}"
{
if [[ -n "$quote" ]]; then
printf 'bad: %sx' "$quote"
# shellcheck disable=SC2059 # deliberate: $octal supplies printf's
# own \NNN octal escape so the raw control byte reaches the file
# directly, never passing through a bash string (which truncates
# at an embedded NUL and so cannot represent byte 0x00 otherwise).
printf "\\${octal}"
printf 'y%s\n' "$quote"
else
printf 'bad: x'
# shellcheck disable=SC2059 # deliberate: $octal supplies printf's
# own \NNN octal escape so the raw control byte reaches the file
# directly, never passing through a bash string (which truncates
# at an embedded NUL and so cannot represent byte 0x00 otherwise).
printf "\\${octal}"
printf 'y\n'
fi
printf 'logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n token: TOK_PLAIN\n'
} > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"
}
# Plain (unquoted) unrelated-field placement: the full empirically-confirmed
# forbidden C0/DEL set.
for octal in 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 010 013 014 \
016 017 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 \
030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 177; do
write_control_char_fixture "$octal"
assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal in unrelated plain field fails closed" primary git.example
done
# Inside-quote variants (double and single) for the six bytes called out
# explicitly in the round-9 blocker report: 0x00,0x01,0x07,0x0e,0x1f,0x7f.
for octal in 000 001 007 016 037 177; do
write_control_char_fixture "$octal" '"'
assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal inside double-quoted unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
write_control_char_fixture "$octal" "'"
assert_both_fail_closed "control byte \\$octal inside single-quoted unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
done
# Same forbidden byte inside a comment line -- PyYAML's Reader check is
# stream-wide, so it rejects here too, not merely inside live scalar content.
{
printf '# note'
printf '\007'
printf 'here\nlogins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n token: TOK_PLAIN\n'
} > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"
assert_both_fail_closed "control byte in a comment line fails closed" primary git.example
# NOT over-broad: TAB/LF/CR remain accepted where PyYAML already accepts them
# (covered by section 17's tab fixtures and the ordinary newline-delimited
# fixtures used throughout this file), so no additional assertion is needed
# here beyond confirming the forbidden-control guard does not fire on them.
# 19. UNSIGNED-EXPONENT FLOAT OVER-REJECTION (#865 round-9 blocker 2): PyYAML
# 6.0.3's implicit float resolver requires an EXPLICIT SIGN on the exponent
# ([eE][-+][0-9]+); an unsigned exponent is NOT matched, so PyYAML resolves
# the scalar as a plain STRING, not a float. A prior fallback's float
# recognizer accepted an OPTIONAL sign ([eE][-+]?[0-9]+), over-matching these
# spellings as floats and dropping the token PyYAML would emit verbatim
# (over-rejection). Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3.
for form in '1.0e10' '+1.0e10' '-1.0e10' '1.0E10' '.5e10' '4.e8'; do
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${form}
"
assert_token "unsigned-exponent form '$form' is a PyYAML string, token resolves" "$form" primary git.example
done
# Parity guard: a genuine SIGNED-exponent float is still typed as a non-string
# float by PyYAML and must still fail closed (not regress into over-acceptance).
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: 1.0e+10
'
assert_token "signed-exponent genuine float still fails closed" "" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: 1.0e-10
'
assert_token "signed-exponent (negative) genuine float still fails closed" "" primary git.example
# 20. RESIDUAL OVER-REJECTION found via round-9 differential fuzzing (folded into
# this round, not split off): a plain scalar starting with "?" NOT followed by
# whitespace (e.g. "?x") is a valid PyYAML string -- only a bare "?" or "? "
# (question mark followed by space/EOL) opens a complex mapping key and is
# illegal in a value position. A prior blanket-reject set treated EVERY
# leading "?" as illegal, over-rejecting a token PyYAML accepts verbatim.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ?x
'
assert_token "question-mark-not-space is a plain string, token resolves" "?x" primary git.example
# 21. PRINTABLE-BOUNDARY FAIL-CLOSE (#865 round-10 blocker 1): the round-9 guard
# used a hand-rolled C0/DEL subset that MISSED code points PyYAML's Reader
# also rejects -- the C1 block (U+0080-0084, U+0086-009F) and the BMP
# noncharacters U+FFFE/U+FFFF -- so the fallback still emitted the token from
# documents PyYAML rejects whole (fail-open). The guard now uses PyYAML
# 6.0.3's EXACT Reader.NON_PRINTABLE character class (see detect-platform.sh
# _FORBIDDEN_CONTROL). Verified empirically against real PyYAML 6.0.3:
# PRINTABLE = {0x09,0x0A,0x0D, 0x20-0x7E, 0x85(NEL), 0xA0-0xD7FF,
# 0xE000-0xFFFD, 0x10000-0x10FFFF}; everything else fails the whole document
# closed. write_codepoint_fixture emits a chosen Unicode code point's real
# UTF-8 bytes (via python3, since bash strings cannot faithfully carry many
# of these) into a selectable position, then the login block follows.
write_codepoint_fixture() {
# $1 = hex code point (e.g. 0x80); $2 = position: field|comment|token|nelterm
CP_HEX="$1" CP_POS="$2" python3 - "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
import sys
cp = int(__import__("os").environ["CP_HEX"], 16)
pos = __import__("os").environ["CP_POS"]
ch = chr(cp)
head = "logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n token: TOK_PLAIN\n"
if pos == "field":
doc = head + "other: x" + ch + "y\n"
elif pos == "comment":
doc = head + "# note x" + ch + "y here\n"
elif pos == "token":
doc = "logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n token: T" + ch + "K\n"
elif pos == "nelterm":
# NEL (U+0085) used as the line terminator throughout: PyYAML treats it as a
# line break (printable, NOT a ReaderError) and resolves the token; the
# fallback's _split_logical_lines splits on NEL identically OUTSIDE a quote
# -> parity, token resolves. (Round 23 covers NEL/LS/PS INSIDE a quote, where
# PyYAML folds rather than breaks and a naive splitlines() would over-split.)
doc = ("logins:" + ch + " - name: primary" + ch
+ " url: https://git.example" + ch + " token: TOK_NEL" + ch)
else:
raise SystemExit("bad pos")
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(doc)
PY
}
# C1-block + BMP-noncharacter code points fail the WHOLE document closed in an
# unrelated field and in a comment, exactly as PyYAML's ReaderError does.
for cphex in 0x80 0x81 0x84 0x86 0x9f 0xfffe 0xffff; do
write_codepoint_fixture "$cphex" field
assert_both_fail_closed "code point $cphex in unrelated field fails closed" primary git.example
write_codepoint_fixture "$cphex" comment
assert_both_fail_closed "code point $cphex in a comment fails closed" primary git.example
done
# NOT over-broad: printable code points PyYAML ACCEPTS must still resolve the
# token in BOTH paths -- NEL(0x85) as a line separator, U+00A0 (NBSP) inside a
# value, and an astral code point (U+1F600) inside the token value.
write_codepoint_fixture 0x85 nelterm
assert_token "NEL (U+0085) line-terminator resolves token" "TOK_NEL" primary git.example
write_codepoint_fixture 0xa0 field
assert_token "U+00A0 in unrelated value still resolves token" "TOK_PLAIN" primary git.example
write_codepoint_fixture 0x1f600 token
assert_token "astral U+1F600 inside token resolves verbatim" "$(printf 'T\360\237\230\200K')" primary git.example
# 22. INTERNAL-INDICATOR OVER-REJECTION (#865 round-10 blocker 2): the round-9
# recognizer blanket-rejected any plain scalar CONTAINING a flow indicator
# ([]{}*&!), but in BLOCK context PyYAML treats ',[]{}' as ordinary content
# and treats '!&*#...' as significant ONLY at the FIRST non-space char. So an
# INTERNAL indicator is legal plain-string content and PyYAML emits the token
# verbatim; the fallback dropped it (over-rejection). Verified empirically
# against real PyYAML 6.0.3. The fix removes the blanket internal scan while
# the leading-char guard and the ' #'/': '/trailing-':' guards keep the
# fail-OPEN direction shut.
for tv in 'a!b' 'a,b' 'a[b' 'a]b' 'a{b' 'a}b' 'a&b' 'a*b' 'a[b]c' 'a{b}c' 'a,b,c' 'a#b' 'a:b'; do
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${tv}
"
assert_token "internal-indicator token '$tv' resolves verbatim" "$tv" primary git.example
done
# Fail-OPEN direction stays shut: a LEADING indicator, a ' #' comment tail, an
# internal ': ' (colon-space) inline map, and a trailing ':' each make PyYAML
# resolve NO usable string token (tag/flow/anchor reject or None, comment strip,
# or a mapping), so BOTH must fail closed. (Leading tag/anchor/flow are the
# documented, round-9-approved structural fail-closed class; kept intact here.)
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: !x
'
assert_both_fail_closed "leading '!' tag token fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: [a]
'
assert_both_fail_closed "leading '[' flow-seq token fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: a # trailing comment
'
# ' #' comment tail: PyYAML strips the comment -> token is the string 'a', which
# still resolves. This is the NOT-over-broad boundary partner of the guard.
assert_token "space-hash comment tail strips to plain token" "a" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: a: b
'
assert_both_fail_closed "internal colon-space (inline map) token fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ab:
'
assert_both_fail_closed "trailing colon (map indicator) token fails closed" primary git.example
# 23. EMBEDDED LINE-BREAK INSIDE A QUOTED SCALAR (#865 round-11 blocker A): the
# round-10 fallback split the raw document with str.splitlines(), which breaks
# at NEL(U+0085), LS(U+2028) and PS(U+2029) -- code points that are PRINTABLE
# to PyYAML's Reader. Inside a flow (quoted) scalar PyYAML does NOT break at
# these: it LINE-FOLDS a double/single-quoted scalar (NEL/LF/CR -> a single
# space; LS/PS -> the char verbatim), so it resolves ONE token, while
# splitlines() cut the value mid-quote and failed the whole document closed
# (over-rejection). The fallback now uses _split_logical_lines, which
# reproduces PyYAML's flow-folding. Verified empirically vs real PyYAML 6.0.3.
# write_break_fixture emits a chosen break code point in a selectable context.
write_break_fixture() {
# $1 = hex code point of the break; $2 = context: dq|sq|plain|comment|dq2
CP_HEX="$1" Q_STYLE="$2" python3 - "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
import sys, os
cp = int(os.environ["CP_HEX"], 16)
q = os.environ["Q_STYLE"]
ch = chr(cp)
head = "logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n token: "
if q == "dq":
doc = head + '"tok' + ch + 'en"'
elif q == "sq":
doc = head + "'tok" + ch + "en'"
elif q == "plain":
doc = head + "tok" + ch + "en"
elif q == "dq2":
# blank line inside a quoted scalar: PyYAML folds a two-break run to a literal
# newline, which the recognizer's key regex cannot carry -> endorsed
# fail-closed over-reject (see assert_fallback_fails_closed below).
doc = head + '"tok' + ch + ch + 'en"'
elif q == "comment":
doc = ("logins:\n - name: primary\n url: https://git.example\n"
" token: TOK_PLAIN\n# c" + ch + "x")
else:
raise SystemExit("bad q")
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(doc + "\n")
PY
}
# NEL folds to a single space inside double- AND single-quoted scalars: the token
# resolves identically in both paths (fallback no longer over-splits).
write_break_fixture 0x85 dq
assert_token "NEL inside double-quote folds to space, token resolves" "tok en" primary git.example
write_break_fixture 0x85 sq
assert_token "NEL inside single-quote folds to space, token resolves" "tok en" primary git.example
# LS(U+2028)/PS(U+2029) are preserved VERBATIM by PyYAML's flow fold (they are
# not \n-class breaks); the fallback must surface them byte-for-byte.
write_break_fixture 0x2028 dq
assert_token "LS inside double-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\250en')" primary git.example
write_break_fixture 0x2028 sq
assert_token "LS inside single-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\250en')" primary git.example
write_break_fixture 0x2029 dq
assert_token "PS inside double-quote is verbatim" "$(printf 'tok\342\200\251en')" primary git.example
# Direction-sensitivity: the SAME code points UNQUOTED (a plain scalar) or in a
# COMMENT make PyYAML raise a scanner error, so both paths must fail closed. The
# fold rule applies ONLY inside a quoted scalar.
write_break_fixture 0x85 plain
assert_token "NEL in an unquoted plain scalar fails closed" "" primary git.example
write_break_fixture 0x2028 plain
assert_token "LS in an unquoted plain scalar fails closed" "" primary git.example
write_break_fixture 0x85 comment
assert_token "NEL in a comment fails closed" "" primary git.example
# Endorsed fail-closed over-reject: a blank line inside a quoted scalar folds to a
# literal newline that the recognizer cannot carry -- PyYAML resolves a
# (newline-bearing) token, the fallback fails closed (strictly safer).
write_break_fixture 0x85 dq2
assert_fallback_fails_closed "blank-line-in-quote (NEL run) fails closed" primary git.example
# 24. LEADING NON-SPECIFIC TAG / ANCHOR PROPERTY (#865 round-11 blocker B, revised
# in round 12): the round-10 recognizer blanket-rejected any scalar beginning
# with '!' or '&'. Round 11 taught it to strip a transparent NON-SPECIFIC tag
# ('! ' bang + SPACE) and a transparent plain ANCHOR ('&name ') so '! x' /
# '&a x' resolve the STRING 'x', matching PyYAML. Round 12 discovered that the
# anchor half of that was a HIGH fail-open: PyYAML's Composer tracks anchor
# NAMES in a document-scoped registry and raises ComposerError ("found
# duplicate anchor") the instant the SAME name is declared on a SECOND node
# ANYWHERE in the document (even an unrelated one) -- the fallback's
# per-scalar-only view has no such registry and would emit the later token.
# Round 12's fix: reject EVERY '&'-anchor property, unconditionally. The
# transparent NON-SPECIFIC TAG behavior ('! x' -> 'x') is unchanged and still
# verified below; only the anchor half now fails closed (deliberate
# conservative over-reject, verified safe both ways against real PyYAML 6.0.3).
for pair in '! x=x' '! x y=x y' '! "q"=q' "! 'q'=q"; do
tv="${pair%%=*}"; want="${pair#*=}"
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${tv}
"
assert_token "tag property token '$tv' resolves node string" "$want" primary git.example
done
# Fail-OPEN direction stays shut. '!x' (bang + NON-space) is a tag HANDLE ->
# ConstructorError; '!foo x'/'* a'/'! !x' raise; a property over a NON-string node
# ('! 123'/'! true'/'! null') types non-str -> no usable token. All fail closed in
# BOTH paths.
for tv in '!x' '!foo x' '* a' '! !x' '! 123' '! true' '! null' '&a &b x'; do
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${tv}
"
assert_token "non-resolving property token '$tv' fails closed" "" primary git.example
done
# Round 12: a SINGLE, non-duplicated '&a x' is valid YAML that real PyYAML
# resolves to the string 'x' (round-11 behavior, and still true of the oracle).
# The fallback now rejects it anyway -- a deliberate, endorsed CONSERVATIVE
# over-reject (see the round-12 comment block above): fail-closed can only cost
# an emitted token PyYAML would have allowed, never emit one PyYAML rejects, and
# a per-scalar recognizer cannot safely prove document-wide anchor-name
# uniqueness. assert_fallback_fails_closed also confirms PyYAML really does
# resolve a token here, proving this is a genuine (safe-direction) divergence
# and not an accidental parity loss.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: &a x
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: single non-duplicated anchor '&a x' now fails closed (conservative over-reject; PyYAML resolves x)" primary git.example
# Same over-reject for the combined tag+anchor forms round 11 used to resolve.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ! &b x
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: '! &b x' (tag+anchor) now fails closed (conservative over-reject)" primary git.example
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: &b ! x
'
assert_fallback_fails_closed "round-12: '&b ! x' (anchor+tag) now fails closed (conservative over-reject)" primary git.example
# Endorsed fail-closed over-reject: an EXPLICIT tag ('!!str x', verbose
# '!<tag:yaml.org,2002:str> x') forces a string PyYAML resolves, but the fallback
# recognizes only the transparent non-specific tag and fails closed (safer).
for tv in '!!str x' '!<tag:yaml.org,2002:str> x'; do
write_fixture "logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ${tv}
"
assert_fallback_fails_closed "explicit-tag token '$tv' fails closed" primary git.example
done
# 25. #865 round 12 HIGH fail-open closure: DUPLICATE ANCHOR NAME across separate
# nodes. Real PyYAML's Composer tracks anchor names in a DOCUMENT-SCOPED
# registry and raises ComposerError ("found duplicate anchor ... first
# occurrence") the instant the SAME anchor name is declared a second time
# ANYWHERE in the document -- failing the WHOLE document closed, no token,
# regardless of how far the duplicate sits from the logins block. The round-11
# fallback tracked anchors only WITHIN a single scalar's `_strip_properties`
# call, so it had no visibility into a duplicate declared on an unrelated
# node and would still emit the (later) token: fail-open. The round-12 fix
# (reject every '&'-anchor property, unconditionally -- see section 24 above)
# closes this as a strict superset: since NO anchor is ever accepted, a
# duplicate anchor can never slip through. These cases exercise that
# document-wide duplicate-anchor invariant specifically (as opposed to
# section 24's single-anchor-on-the-token-field cases) and pair each fallback
# assertion with confirmation that real PyYAML also fails closed here (via
# ComposerError), proving this was a genuine fail-open, not a hypothetical.
write_fixture 'first: &same one
second: &same two
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_DUP_ROOT
'
assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: duplicate anchor name on two unrelated root nodes fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'outer:
nested: &dup x
dup_root: &dup y
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: TOK_DUP_NESTED
'
assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: duplicate anchor name across a nested node and a root node fails closed" primary git.example
write_fixture 'first: &dup one
logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: &dup TOK_DUP_TOKEN_NODE
'
assert_both_fail_closed "round-12: anchor name declared earlier and repeated on the token-bearing node fails closed" primary git.example
# Regression guard: the non-specific TAG half of section 24 ('! x' -> 'x') is
# UNCHANGED by the round-12 anchor fix and must still resolve.
write_fixture 'logins:
- name: primary
url: https://git.example
token: ! x
'
assert_token "round-12 regression: '! x' (tag, no anchor) still resolves 'x'" "x" primary git.example
echo "Gitea login resolution regression harness passed"

571
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Regression harness for issue-comment.sh's Gitea comment write + verification
# (#865).
#
# The #865 defect class: tea 0.11.1's `tea issue comment ...` (a nonexistent
# subcommand) silently no-ops yet exits 0, and tea cannot emit the id of a
# record it created — so an exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write.
# The wrapper therefore does NOT write via tea at all. It POSTs the comment to
# the Gitea REST API (which returns the created comment object, including its
# id), then GETs THAT EXACT id back and requires it to match on id, author
# (acting identity), body, and issue. Because verification is keyed to the id
# the create returned, no concurrent comment can masquerade as this write, and a
# suppressed/no-op create yields no id and fails closed.
#
# This harness models a REAL server: the curl stub keeps persistent comment
# state on disk, the POST actually CREATES and PERSISTS a record and returns its
# id, and the read-back GET reads that same state. There is no independently
# fabricated record for the wrapper to "find" — the only way verification
# passes is if the POST genuinely created the record the read-back retrieves.
# It proves the wrapper:
# 1. never shells out to tea to write (no `tea comment` / `tea issue comment`);
# 2. creates the comment via REST POST and learns the provider-returned id;
# 3. verifies THAT EXACT id by direct GET, attributed to the acting identity;
# 4. fails closed when the write is a no-op even though a concurrent
# SAME-IDENTITY comment with the same body already exists (the closed
# concurrency window — no fallback list scan can rescue a no-op);
# 5. fails closed when the created record is not authored by the acting
# identity;
# 6. treats the exact-id GET as the SOLE authority — it performs NO follow-up
# list enumeration (the stub exposes no comment-list endpoint, so any
# residual enumeration attempt would fail the run);
# 7. with a RESOLVABLE --login override, performs the write, the /user identity
# lookup, and the read-back ALL under THAT login's token/identity — never
# the host default;
# 8. with an UNRESOLVABLE --login override, FAILS CLOSED (nonzero, no write, no
# success line) instead of silently downgrading to the host default
# identity — the token seam maps each bearer token to the identity it
# authenticates as, so a misattributed write is caught;
# 9. with a --login override whose tea config URL is a DIFFERENT host than the
# repo remote, FAILS CLOSED (host-bound token selection) rather than sending
# that other host's credential cross-host;
# 10. leaves NO temp files behind (POST/GET bodies + metadata) on either the
# success or the failure path — nested function-scoped RETURN traps do not
# clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-comment-readback}"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
XDG_DIR="$WORK_DIR/xdg"
TEA_LOG="$WORK_DIR/tea.log"
CURL_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl.log"
# Full curl argv per invocation — proves the bearer token never rides in argv.
CURL_ARGV_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl-argv.log"
AUTH_LOG="$WORK_DIR/auth.log"
OUTPUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/output.log"
CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
ISSUE_NUMBER=7
REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
API_BASE="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack"
API_ROOT="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1"
BODY='durable "note" -- marker'
ACTING_LOGIN="primary-reviewer"
FOREIGN_LOGIN="other-writer"
# A dedicated per-role --login override identity, with its own token stored in
# tea's config (exactly the author-not-equal-reviewer hardening path).
OVERRIDE_LOGIN="delegated-reviewer"
DEFAULT_TOKEN="test-only-placeholder"
OVERRIDE_TOKEN="override-token-placeholder"
# A --login override whose tea config URL points at a DIFFERENT Gitea host than
# the repo remote (git.mosaicstack.dev). Its token must NEVER be sent to the
# repo host: host-bound selection must fail closed on the host mismatch.
CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="foreign-host-reviewer"
CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="cross-host-token-placeholder"
# tea config: the override login has its own token here (as tea itself stores
# per-login tokens). The default login name ("mosaicstack") is deliberately NOT
# present, so the no-override default path resolves via the host credential
# fallback while an explicit --login must resolve from this file or fail closed.
# A second login is configured for a DIFFERENT host to exercise host-bound
# rejection.
mkdir -p "$XDG_DIR/tea"
OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
python3 - "$XDG_DIR/tea/config.yml" <<'PY'
import os
import sys
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write("logins:\n")
handle.write(f" - name: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_LOGIN']}\n")
handle.write(" url: https://git.mosaicstack.dev\n")
handle.write(f" token: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_TOKEN']}\n")
handle.write(f" - name: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_LOGIN']}\n")
handle.write(" url: https://git.uscllc.com\n")
handle.write(f" token: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_TOKEN']}\n")
PY
CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL="https://git.mosaicstack.dev" python3 - "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'PY'
import json
import os
import sys
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as credentials:
json.dump({
"gitea": {
"mosaicstack": {
"url": os.environ["CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL"],
"token": "test-only-placeholder",
}
}
}, credentials)
PY
# tea stub: only ever answers the login list (used to resolve the default login
# name). It must NEVER be asked to write a comment — the wrapper writes via REST.
cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG"
if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
exit 0
fi
echo "Unexpected tea command (wrapper must not write via tea): $*" >&2
exit 92
SH
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea"
# curl stub: a small REST server backed by persistent on-disk comment state.
# GET /user -> acting identity
# POST /issues/7/comments -> CREATE + PERSIST, return created object
# GET /issues/comments/{id} -> read the persisted record by exact id
# There is deliberately NO comment-LIST endpoint: exact-id read-back is the sole
# authority, so any residual list enumeration attempt hits the unexpected-request
# guard and fails the test.
cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# Record the FULL argv exactly as spawned, before consumption. The bearer token
# must NOT appear here — it is delivered via a curl --config file (#865 ITEM 3a),
# so only the config file PATH may show up.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG"
output_file=""
method="GET"
url=""
data=""
auth_token=""
config_file=""
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
-o) output_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-H)
[[ "$2" == Authorization:* ]] && auth_token="${2##* }"
shift 2 ;;
-K|--config) config_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-w) shift 2 ;;
-X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-d|--data) data="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-s|-S|-sS) shift ;;
http://*|https://*) url="$1"; shift ;;
*) shift ;;
esac
done
# Resolve the bearer token from the curl --config file (its real, secure source);
# fall back to an -H header only for defense in depth. The config line is
# `header = "Authorization: token <value>"`.
if [[ -z "$auth_token" && -n "$config_file" && -f "$config_file" ]]; then
config_hdr="$(grep -i 'Authorization' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [[ "$config_hdr" == *"token "* ]]; then
auth_token="${config_hdr##*token }"
auth_token="${auth_token%\"}"
fi
fi
path="${url%%\?*}"
query="${url#*\?}"
[[ "$query" == "$url" ]] && query=""
printf '%s %s\n' "$method" "$url" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG"
# Map the presented bearer token to the identity it authenticates as — the same
# derivation Gitea's own /user does. The wrapper's write, /user lookup, and
# read-back must all carry the SAME token, so the acting identity recorded here
# reveals which credential actually performed the request.
acting_identity=""
case "$auth_token" in
"$ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN" ;;
"$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN" ;;
"$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" ;;
esac
printf '%s %s %s\n' "$method" "$path" "${acting_identity:-<unauthenticated>}" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG"
write_response() {
local status="$1" body="$2"
[[ -n "$output_file" ]] || exit 96
printf '%s' "$body" > "$output_file"
printf '%s' "$status"
}
if [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT/user" ]]; then
[[ -n "$acting_identity" ]] || { write_response 401 '{"message":"unauthenticated"}'; exit 0; }
write_response 200 "$(ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN="$acting_identity" python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
print(json.dumps({"login": os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN"]}))
PY
)"
elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE/issues/7/comments" ]]; then
result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="${acting_identity:-$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN}" ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA="$data" python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"]
mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE"]
acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN"]
foreign = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN"]
repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG"]
body = json.loads(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA"]).get("body")
with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
comments = json.load(handle)
# no-op-concurrent: the wrapper's own write is SUPPRESSED (returns 200 with no
# created object) even though a concurrent same-identity comment already exists
# in state. Nothing is persisted; there is no created id to verify.
if mode == "no-op-concurrent":
print("200")
print(json.dumps({}))
raise SystemExit(0)
author = foreign if mode == "author-mismatch" else acting
new_id = (max((c["id"] for c in comments), default=0)) + 1
# REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB (html) path, not an API path,
# and a plain issue comment leaves pull_request_url empty. The URL-injection
# modes persist a record whose id/author/body are all correct but whose
# issue_url is forged, so ONLY the origin+path verification can catch them.
issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
if mode == "url-wrong-host":
issue_url = f"https://evil.example/{repo}/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-wrong-owner":
issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/attacker/stack/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-wrong-repo":
issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/other/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-suffix-injection":
# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/issues/7") test would ACCEPT this.
issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/deceptive/{repo}/issues/7"
record = {
"id": new_id,
"body": body,
"user": {"login": author},
"issue_url": issue_url,
"pull_request_url": "",
}
comments.append(record)
with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(comments, handle)
print("201")
print(json.dumps(record))
PY
)
write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then
result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"]
wanted = int(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID"])
with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
comments = json.load(handle)
match = next((c for c in comments if c["id"] == wanted), None)
if match is None:
print("404")
print(json.dumps({"message": "not found"}))
else:
print("200")
print(json.dumps(match))
PY
)
write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
else
echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2
exit 97
fi
SH
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/curl"
# Seed persistent server state for a mode, then run the wrapper against it.
seed_state() {
local mode="$1"
ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE="$mode" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY="$BODY" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING="$ACTING_LOGIN" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO="$REPO_SLUG" \
python3 - "$STATE_FILE" <<'PY'
import json
import os
import sys
mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE"]
body = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY"]
acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING"]
repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO"]
# REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB path, pull_request_url empty.
issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
def comment(cid, text, author):
return {
"id": cid,
"body": text,
"user": {"login": author},
"issue_url": issue_url,
"pull_request_url": "",
}
if mode == "fresh-success":
# 50 pre-existing comments already exist; the comment this run creates
# becomes id 51, proving exact-id read-back works regardless of how many
# comments precede it (no list enumeration is involved).
comments = [comment(i, f"prior {i}", acting) for i in range(1, 51)]
elif mode == "no-op-concurrent":
# A concurrent SAME-IDENTITY comment with the IDENTICAL body already exists.
# The wrapper's own write will be a no-op; it must still fail closed because
# no created id is returned — it must not scan and accept this record.
comments = [comment(55, body, acting)]
else: # author-mismatch
comments = []
with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(comments, handle)
PY
}
run_comment() {
local mode="$1"
shift
: > "$TEA_LOG"
: > "$CURL_LOG"
: > "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"
: > "$AUTH_LOG"
: > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
seed_state "$mode"
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG="$CURL_LOG" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG="$CURL_ARGV_LOG" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG="$AUTH_LOG" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE="$STATE_FILE" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE="$mode" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="$ACTING_LOGIN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN="$FOREIGN_LOGIN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN="$DEFAULT_TOKEN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG="$REPO_SLUG" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE="$API_BASE" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT="$API_ROOT" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-comment.sh" -i "$ISSUE_NUMBER" -c "$BODY" "$@"
) > "$OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1
}
# Assert the wrapper left no scratch temp files behind in TMPDIR (POST/GET
# request bodies + metadata). Called after both success and failure paths so a
# clobbered/leaked RETURN trap is caught on every exit route.
assert_no_temp_leak() {
local context="$1" leaked
# Includes the curl auth-config files (mosaic-gitea-auth-*), which carry the
# bearer token and must be unlinked on every exit path.
leaked=$(find "$TMP_SCRATCH" -type f \( -name 'mosaic-issue-comment-*' -o -name 'mosaic-gitea-auth-*' \) 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -n "$leaked" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: issue-comment temp files leaked ($context):" >&2
printf '%s\n' "$leaked" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# Assert the presented bearer token NEVER appeared in curl's argv (it must travel
# via a curl --config file), and that --config auth was actually used. On the
# expected path grep matches nothing, so no token value is ever printed.
assert_token_not_in_argv() {
local context="$1"
if grep -qF -e "$DEFAULT_TOKEN" -e "$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" -e "$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: a Gitea bearer token leaked into curl argv ($context)" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! grep -q -- '--config' "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: curl was not invoked with --config file auth ($context)" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# Case 1: a genuine REST create (id 51) is verified end to end via its exact
# provider-returned id — no list enumeration is involved.
run_comment fresh-success
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 51)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
# The write is a REST POST, never a tea comment.
grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments$" "$CURL_LOG"
if grep -Eq '^comment |^issue comment ' "$TEA_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper wrote a comment via tea instead of REST" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Read-back is a DIRECT GET of the exact created id.
grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51$" "$CURL_LOG"
# Acting identity resolved via GET /user.
grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user$" "$CURL_LOG"
# No comment-list enumeration is performed — the exact-id GET is authoritative.
if grep -Eq "^GET $API_BASE/issues/7/comments(\?|$)" "$CURL_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper performed a redundant comment-list enumeration" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Default path (no --login): the host credential fallback resolves, and the
# write is performed AND self-verified under the host-default acting identity.
grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51 $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
# Success path leaves no scratch temp files behind.
assert_no_temp_leak "fresh-success"
# ITEM 3a: the token drove the write/read-back chain but never appeared in curl
# argv — it was passed via a curl --config file.
assert_token_not_in_argv "fresh-success default-token"
# Case 2: a no-op write with a concurrent SAME-IDENTITY, same-body comment
# already present must FAIL CLOSED — the closed concurrency window.
if run_comment no-op-concurrent; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper reported success when its write no-opped but a concurrent same-identity comment existed" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a concurrent record for a no-op write (window not closed)" >&2
exit 1
fi
# It must NOT have fallen back to a list scan that could find the concurrent id.
if grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/55$" "$CURL_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper read back the concurrent comment id 55 (illegitimate fallback)" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Case 3: a created record NOT authored by the acting identity must FAIL CLOSED.
if run_comment author-mismatch; then
echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a created comment authored by a different identity" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
echo "FAIL: read-back did not enforce acting-identity authorship" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Failure-after-read-back path must ALSO leave no scratch temp files behind
# (proves the RETURN traps clean up on the error-return route, not just success).
assert_no_temp_leak "author-mismatch"
# Case 4: a RESOLVABLE --login override — the write, the /user identity lookup,
# and the read-back must ALL be performed under THAT login's token/identity, not
# the host default. The override login has id 1 (empty seed).
run_comment override-success --login "$OVERRIDE_LOGIN"
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 1)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/1 $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG"
# The host-default identity must NOT have performed ANY request in this run.
if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: an explicit --login override request was performed under the host default identity" >&2
cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Case 5: an UNRESOLVABLE --login override (name absent from tea config) must
# FAIL CLOSED — no silent downgrade to the host default identity: nonzero exit,
# no success line, and NO write performed.
if run_comment override-unresolvable --login "nonexistent-typo-login"; then
echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override did not fail closed" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override reported success" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override still performed a write" >&2
exit 1
fi
# And it must not have silently fallen back to the host default identity.
if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Case 6: a --login override that IS present in tea config but whose URL is a
# DIFFERENT host than the repo remote must FAIL CLOSED (host-bound selection).
# The cross-host token must NEVER be sent to the repo host, and no write occurs.
if run_comment cross-host --login "$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN"; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override did not fail closed" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override reported success" >&2
exit 1
fi
# The cross-host credential must not have performed ANY request against the repo
# host — no request may be attributed to the cross-host identity.
if grep -q " $CROSS_HOST_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host credential was sent to the repo host (cross-host leak)" >&2
cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override still performed a write" >&2
exit 1
fi
# It must not have silently downgraded to the host default identity either.
if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2
exit 1
fi
assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host"
# Cases 7-10 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url is forged. Verification pins the
# URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix
# + exact owner/repo + kind + number), so each forgery must FAIL CLOSED. A bare
# endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and
# prefix-injection variants.
for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection; do
if run_comment "$bad_mode"; then
echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) passed verification" >&2
exit 1
fi
assert_no_temp_leak "$bad_mode"
done
# Sanity: the exact same verification path still ACCEPTS a legitimate web-shaped
# issue_url (already exercised by Case 1's fresh-success), so the tightened check
# is not rejecting genuine writes.
echo "issue-comment.sh REST create + exact-id read-back regression passed"

891
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff