127 lines
8.7 KiB
Markdown
127 lines
8.7 KiB
Markdown
# Brief: the Console checks that a signed-in request came through Traefik
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Vikunja #385, Gitea #1676. Owner Rocko or whichever seat is free, set at briefing. Gate owner Sage. Not on the window
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path (mos-0874). Built after the window rows 169, 175 and 176, as a partial fix with the limit recorded (mos-0878 Q2).
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Line numbers are at origin/refactor 835941b7c.
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Set at briefing (Sage, 2026-10-20): owner Rocko, reviewer Dewey. Base: the refactor head at briefing,
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7f519242e or later. Rows 180 and 181 change `scripts/stack-release.sh`, and row 180 changes
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`scripts/webui-service.sh` too. Both are in this row's file list. Build on the current head. Before
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in-review, rebase onto every landing of 180 or 181 that came in after your base and rerun every touched
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test file (the row 68 drift rule). Sage lands 178 only after 180, and after 181 if 181 is already in
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review by then.
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## The hole
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In preview mode, the Console treats a request as Jason's when the Host is the public name and the auth header (live:
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`X-authentik-username`) holds exactly the allowed user (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:453`, :466-469). Traefik and
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authentik set that header after sign-in and strip client copies. But the tunnel delivers every public request to
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127.0.0.1:7332 (`R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332`), so the Console can't tell Traefik's requests from a local
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process's. Any process on dragon-lin that can open 127.0.0.1:7332 can send `Host: <public name>` and
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`X-authentik-username: jason.woltje` and get Jason's sends, saves and settings writes. An agent can too, which gets
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around the human-shell guard (decisions 62 and 94).
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## The design
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Traefik adds a proof header with a secret value to every request it forwards to the Console. The Console refuses a
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signed-in request without the right value.
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### `packages/webui/src/serve.mjs` and `cli.mjs`
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- New serve flags `--proof-header NAME` and `--proof-file PATH`, given together and only with the preview flags.
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Either one alone refuses to start (exit 2).
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- The Console reads PATH once at start. It refuses to start (exit 2) unless the file is a regular file owned by the
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service's uid, has mode 0600 or 0400, and holds one line of at least 32 bytes from `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`. The value
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never appears on argv, in a log line, in an error message or in `/api/config`.
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- On a request with the public Host, the proof check runs before the auth header is read. It needs exactly one copy
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of NAME, and the value has to match by `crypto.timingSafeEqual` over equal-length buffers. Anything else answers
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401 `proxy proof required`, with no bus call and no board call. A missing value and a wrong value get the same
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answer.
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- A request with NAME and any other Host refuses 403, as the auth header does at :456.
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- The tester listener from row 176 refuses NAME 403.
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- Without the flags, the startup line says `proxy proof off`, so the live unit's state is visible in its journal.
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### `scripts/webui-service.sh` and `scripts/stack-release.sh`
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- Both flags join FLAGS, with the same checks. `render` refuses a PATH inside the repo or a copy, and a PATH it can't
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stat. It never reads the file.
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- `stack-release.sh` carries both flags through a re-pin and a rollback unchanged (`P_CONSOLE`).
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- Update `packages/webui/README.md`, `docs/TOOLS.md` and the unit template's header comment.
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### What this stops and what it doesn't
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The proof stops any process that can't read the proof file: another uid on the host, and a hostNetwork pod on the
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k8s-woltje node (Cilium `AllowLocalhost=always`). It also stops a `run-task.sh` worker if its sandbox hides the host's
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`~/.config`. The build checks that and records it in the packet, without assuming it.
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It doesn't stop a process running as the Console's own uid. The Console runs as a `systemctl --user` unit under
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jwoltje, and every T3 seat runs as jwoltje too. A seat can read any file the Console can read, and `ptrace_scope` 1
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doesn't stop that. Closing that part means the Console runs under a uid the seats don't have, which is a host and
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service change, so it's Jason's (Q173: infra). This row doesn't make that change. Agents acting as Jason only matter
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once the stack is in use, so uid separation is a question for Jason before he says "in use". It doesn't hold up the
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window. #385 stays open for his ruling (mos-0878 Q2).
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### `console-allowed-uid` isn't a proof
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`~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/console-allowed-uid` (0600, 65 bytes, 2026-10-12, contents not read) is the
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Authentik uid for lead decision 101's switch from `--auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje` to
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`--auth-header X-authentik-uid --allow-user UID`. No code in the repo reads it. It's an operator input for that
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reinstall (`scripts/webui-service.sh:145-146`, `docs/TOOLS.md:516`), and the live unit still signs in by username.
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It's an identity, not a secret the proxy proves it holds. Once installed it sits in ExecStart, which any local process
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can read. This row neither reuses it nor retires it, and the uid switch stays a separate operator step.
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### Activation steps, not this row's
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1. The secret. A slot file, `~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/console-proof.token`, mode 0600, 43 or more
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characters from `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` (for example 32 random bytes in base64url). Under Q173 an agent may create it,
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as long as the value is never printed, logged, put on argv or sent in a message (mos-0878 Q2). Create it with
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`umask 077` and write it in one step, then check only `stat -c '%a %U %s'`.
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2. Traefik. A SealedSecret holding the same value, and a middleware on the Console's route in the mosaic-preview Argo
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app that sets the header (`headers.customRequestHeaders`, which replaces a client copy). That's ops-01's under R27.
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It narrows who gets in and opens nothing new from outside (mos-0878). Sealing the value means handing it to ops-01
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without printing it. The activation plan names that path, and Mos checks it before anything runs.
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3. The unit. After a store backup, add `--proof-header NAME --proof-file <slot path>` to the Console unit with
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`webui-service.sh install` and a restart, in a window Mos plan-checks. The order is middleware first, then the
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unit flags, then a signed-in check through the public name and a forged loopback request that has to get 401.
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Rollback drops the unit flags first, then the middleware. A STATE report follows. If the signed-in check through
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the public name fails, roll back at once, flags first and then the middleware, and record it in STATE.
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The turn-on doesn't wait for Jason (mos-0881). Outside traffic arrives only through Traefik with Authentik, and
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Traefik adds the proof, so whoever gets in from outside today still gets in. The callers it cuts off are local
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processes on dragon-lin and hostNetwork pods on k8s-woltje, which are inside callers. Step 2 is k3s under ops-01's R27
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standing authority, as infrastructure bc310ee was. Mos confirms this again at the 178 plan check.
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#385's Traefik pod-label part is already live as infrastructure bc310ee (PR #352, Argo sync 2026-10-19T22:45:04Z,
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Traefik FORWARDED and falco DROPPED on Hubble, #385 comment 290). #385 stays open for this row and Jason's uid
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question.
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## Tests
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1. A named request with the right proof and auth header passes, and the reads and the send path still work as before.
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2. A named request with no proof, a wrong proof, a proof one byte short, or a repeated proof header gets 401 with no
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bus call and no board call. Assert that the body never contains the value.
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3. NAME with a loopback Host or any other Host refuses 403. NAME on the row 176 tester listener refuses 403.
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4. Start-up refusals: one flag without the other; the flags without preview mode; a missing file, a directory, a
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symlink, mode 0644, another owner, a short value, a value with a newline in the middle or a bad character. Each
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one exits 2, and stderr never shows the value.
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5. The value never shows in the request log, in `/api/config`, or in `ps` output for the serve process. The test reads
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`/proc/<pid>/cmdline`.
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6. `webui-service.sh render` puts both flags in ExecStart, refuses a PATH inside the repo, and doesn't open the file.
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`stack-release.sh` keeps both flags across a re-pin and a rollback.
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7. A timing check isn't a gate test. The code uses `timingSafeEqual`, and a review grep confirms it.
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Mutants, each killed by some gate test (mos-0862):
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- the auth header is read before the proof check
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- a wrong proof with the right length passes
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- a missing proof passes when the flags are set
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- the proof is accepted with a loopback Host
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- mode 0644 accepted
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- the value is logged on refusal
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## Gate
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The reviewer approves the candidate manifest. Webui and cli suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh` green on Sage's
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gate. Landing changes nothing live. The live unit gets the flags only through the activation steps above, after the
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middleware.
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