2.7 KiB
2.7 KiB
Tess Verification Matrix
| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
| AC-TESS-09 | all | pnpm typecheck, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs |
Every milestone |
| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
Security Abuse Suite Minimum
- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
Evidence Rules
Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.