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CI-red root cause (classification a: my round-4 change fails in the clean/cold CI env): get_gitea_token_for_login hard-required PyYAML (`import yaml`), which is absent on CI's node:24-alpine (python3 without py3-yaml). Round-4's --login override cases were the first to exercise that path, turning the mosaic package test (test:framework-shell -> test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh) RED. Fix: add an indentation-aware line-parser fallback that resolves the SAME per-name token PyYAML would from tea's flat `logins:` list; PyYAML stays the fast path. This also repairs a latent production defect (--login overrides were silently unusable on any PyYAML-less host). Auditor blockers folded into the same round-5: 1. issue_url vs pull_request_url shape (correctness): Gitea populates WEB (html) URLs in issue_url/pull_request_url, not API paths, and a PR-conversation comment carries pull_request_url (issue_url empty). Verification now accepts either web shape scoped to the repo slug + number, so a durable write is never rejected for URL shape. Test stubs now emit the REAL Gitea web shapes. 2. Cross-host credential binding (security): get_gitea_token_for_login now takes the repo host and requires the matched login's configured URL host to equal it; an override login configured for a different host FAILS CLOSED instead of sending a cross-host credential. Regression tests added to both suites. 3. Non-exhaustive enumeration (false-fail): removed the redundant, non-exhaustive post-verification list enumeration (gitea_fetch_all + confirm_*_enumerable) from both wrappers; the exact-id GET is authoritative. Pagination cases dropped; a guard asserts no list enumeration is performed. 4. Trap clobbering / temp-file leak (security/hygiene): removing the nested enumeration eliminates the RETURN-trap nesting that clobbered caller cleanup; remaining RETURN traps are single/non-nested and clean up on all exit paths. Temp-file leak regression tests (success + failure paths) added to both suites. 5. README: corrected the exhaustive-pagination claim and documented host-bound --login selection. Preserves every round-2/3/4 fix (explicit --login fail-closed at all write sites, token->identity attribution seam). Gates: cold `pnpm turbo run test --filter=@mosaicstack/mosaic` green (14/14); full test-*.sh suite green with AND without PyYAML; bash -n, shellcheck -x -S warning, prettier --check README clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
30 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
30 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
# Git provider wrappers
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These scripts provide host-aware GitHub and Gitea issue, pull-request, milestone, and CI operations.
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## Durable review provenance
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A successful provider write command—or a wrapper message based only on that command's exit code—is **not** durable review provenance. Review comments, approvals, and change requests count as durable provenance only after the wrapper reads the created provider record back and verifies that it was created by _this_ write.
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**The write is a direct Gitea REST `POST` that returns the created record's id.** Neither wrapper writes through `tea` — tea 0.11.1 can silently no-op while exiting 0 and cannot emit the id of a record it creates, so its exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write (#865). Instead:
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- Comments (`issue-comment.sh`, and the `comment` action of `pr-review.sh`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/comments`, requiring a `201` and parsing the created comment's `id` from the response body.
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- Reviews (`approve` / `request-changes`) `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/reviews` with the `event` (`APPROVED` / `REQUEST_CHANGES`), the review `body`, and `commit_id` pinned to the PR's current head, then parse the created review's `id`. The review body travels _in the review submit itself_ — there is no separate detached comment to reconcile (a Gitea `REQUEST_CHANGES` review requires a non-empty body, which the submit carries).
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**Verification keys on that exact provider-returned id.** The wrapper then `GET`s that one record directly — `GET /issues/comments/{id}` or `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews/{id}` — and requires that its `id` equals the created id, its **author login equals the acting identity** (resolved via `GET /api/v1/user` for the token in use), and, for comments, its body exactly matches what was submitted, or, for reviews, its state matches the requested action and its reviewed `commit_id` equals the PR head. The write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use the **same** credential — the effective login's token, or the host credential when no login is named — so the write is verified against the identity that actually performed it.
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**This closes the concurrency window rather than documenting it.** Because verification keys on the id the create returned, a no-op create yields no id and fails closed with no list-scan fallback, and a _concurrent_ record — even one written by the _same_ identity with an identical body/state — has a _different_ id and cannot be mistaken for this write. There is no residual same-identity window: the earlier boundary-and-author heuristic (accept any `id > pre-write-max` with a matching author) is replaced entirely by exact-id attribution.
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**Exact-id read-back is the sole authority.** Verification is a direct `GET` of the one record the create returned; there is no follow-up list enumeration. An earlier redundant pass that re-listed the record's page (`?limit=&page=1,2,…`) was removed: server-capped page sizes and list-pagination quirks made it a false-failure source (a durable, exact-id-verified record could be missed by a non-exhaustive enumeration), and it added nothing over the authoritative exact-id `GET`.
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## `tea` invocation notes (Gitea)
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- tea v0.11.1 has **no `comment` subcommand under `tea pr` or `tea issue`** — the `tea pr comment` / `tea issue comment` forms don't error, they silently fall through to a no-op and still exit 0, producing a false-success write (#865). tea's write subcommands (`tea comment`, `tea pr approve`/`reject`) also cannot report the id of the record they create, so their exit code cannot prove a durable write. These wrappers therefore do **not** write reviews or comments through `tea` at all; they use direct Gitea REST `POST`s that return the created record's id (see "Durable review provenance" above). `tea` is consulted only to enumerate the login list for host→login resolution.
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- Because the review body is carried in the `POST …/reviews` submit itself, there is no separate detached review comment, and the historical `tea pr approve`/`reject` trailing-positional-argument vs. nonexistent `--comment`/`-comment` flag hazard (#835) no longer applies to these wrappers — no review comment is ever passed to `tea`.
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### `--login` override
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Both `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` accept an optional `--login <name>` flag that overrides the automatically detected Gitea login for that single invocation. The override selects **which credential the REST write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use** — its token is resolved from the tea config for that login name (`get_gitea_token_for_login`), falling back to the repo host's credential when no login is named. The resolved login is **host-bound**: the login's configured URL host must match the repo remote's host, so a login name shared across hosts (or an override configured for a different Gitea) can never send one host's credential to another — a host mismatch fails closed rather than leaking a cross-host token. Resolving the acting identity and the read-back from the _same_ login that performs the write is essential: a write performed under an overridden login must be verified against that login's identity, not the host default's. Callers who need a different login than the host default should pass `--login <reviewer-login>`.
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As a durable successor to this mechanism, consider giving each reviewer/approver slot its own dedicated Gitea login credential, so that author≠reviewer holds at the credential level rather than relying on wrapper-level `--login` bookkeeping. This is a recommendation for future hardening, not something implemented by this flag.
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