45 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
45 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# Lease broker operations
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Place the socket and state file in a dedicated directory with mode `0700`. Start the packaged daemon with:
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```bash
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python3 "$MOSAIC_HOME/tools/lease-broker/daemon.py" \
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--socket /run/user/1000/mosaic-lease/broker.sock \
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--state /run/user/1000/mosaic-lease/state.json
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```
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The broker refuses an existing parent directory whose mode is not exactly `0700`, an existing state file not at `0600`, corrupt/incompatible state, or an already-existing socket path. After bind it sets the socket to `0600`. It never silently unlinks a pre-existing socket. On normal termination it unlinks only the socket inode it created, so it does not remove a replacement path.
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Before launching Claude, Claudex, or Pi, export the socket path; `mosaic` then runs the runtime through the packaged register-and-exec wrapper:
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```bash
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export MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/user/1000/mosaic-lease/broker.sock
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mosaic claude # or: mosaic claudex, mosaic yolo claudex, mosaic pi
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```
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The wrapper obtains a broker-minted session ID, creates a private `generation-<session>.state` file beside the socket, and `exec`s the runtime without changing its PID/starttime anchor. The all-tools Claude `PreToolUse` hook and Pi `tool_call` handler inherit that identity and read the current generation from the file. Claudex retains its isolated proxy environment and config directory; Mosaic merges the mandatory all-tools and compaction-lifecycle hooks into that isolated `settings.json` before invoking the same wrapper. PRDY init/update, QA remediation, coord, orchestrator, and fleet launchers also converge on this boundary. Broker registration failure, unsafe isolated settings, unsafe generation state, or missing identity denies launch/tool execution fail-closed; broker timeout/unavailability and malformed replies also block tools.
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Claude `PreCompact` and `SessionStart(compact)` hooks and Pi pre-/post-compaction handlers invoke `revoke-lease.py`. Pi `session_start` reload/new/resume/fork and Claude resume/clear advance the locked generation before revocation, so a replacement session inherits no lease even when PID/starttime stay unchanged. Do not invoke the revoker manually as a way to restore authority; it only removes authority. If a lifecycle hook reports failure, stop consequential work and repair broker/generation-state availability before re-verification.
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Run the permanent launch inventory locally with:
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```bash
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python3 packages/mosaic/framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root .
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```
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The same check runs in the Mosaic package test suite and therefore in root CI. Any direct Claude/Pi binary launch must be replaced with `launch-runtime.py`, `execLeaseGatedRuntime`, or the gated `mosaic` runtime command; do not add static allowlist exceptions.
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Clients must complete the request boundary before waiting for a reply. After sending the single JSON object and its terminating newline, the client **MUST half-close the socket's write side** (`shutdown(SHUT_WR)` in POSIX clients; `socket.end()` in Node) and only then await the response. Merely calling `write()` and waiting is invalid: the broker waits for EOF to enforce the exact-one-frame contract and fails closed at its one-second deadline. Do not replace `end()` with `write()` in client helpers. A delayed second frame remains malformed and is rejected.
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`mosaic_context_recover` is the only unverified mutator class. Its durable `mosaic-context-refresh` skill is a thin wrapper over `tools/lease-broker/recover-context.py`: `begin` has the broker rebuild the validated `B_payload`/`H_payload`, revoke first, and mint a new `PENDING_DELIVERY` receipt challenge; `complete` accepts neither receipt text nor a challenge argument. Claude maps only the exact direct recovery executable/validated arguments to this exempt tool identity; ordinary `Bash` remains gated. Pi exposes only the `mosaic_context_recover` custom tool; ordinary `bash` and all other tools remain gated. A normal-path receipt cannot be replayed through recovery because each retry begins a distinct recovery cycle and recovery completion cannot receive caller-presented evidence.
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Production daemon startup creates a separate private observer socket unless a test-only `--test-observer-file` fixture is selected. Claude's Stop hook sends its exact latest assistant entry and Pi's `message_end` handler sends only finalized assistant content to that authenticated transport; the broker public socket never accepts message text. This is byte-build and private out-of-process harness wiring only: do not activate it against a live daemon, live socket, systemd service, tmux session, or model-output stream outside the controlled integration procedure.
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Receipt honesty is load-bearing: absent, malformed, prefix-truncated, and observable adapter-mutated terminal receipts do not promote. A tail-only case is non-promoting only where the concrete terminal payload is malformed or observably incomplete. A tail-preserving middle drop is **not receipt-detectable**; it is the disclosed T-C injection-contract residual deferred to WI-7 server-side evidence. The receipt remains a T-A delivery/liveness prerequisite, never a safety, obedience, or residency proof. The framework skill is source-resident and bridge-projected on install/upgrade; do not hand-create a live runtime symlink.
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After a runtime exits, its `generation-<session>.state` file may be removed only after verifying that no process for that broker-minted session remains; stale files carry no lease authority but should be retained during incident analysis. After a broker crash, preserve the protected state file and restart only after verifying that no broker owns the socket. Restart intentionally clears all volatile VERIFIED leases. A leftover socket requires an operator to verify the owning service is stopped and remove that exact socket deliberately. Corrupt, oversized, symlinked, or non-regular state fails closed; do not overwrite it. Preserve it for incident review and establish new state only through an explicit operational decision, which invalidates prior sessions and tokens.
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## Security posture
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Directory `0700` plus socket/state `0600` is built-in same-principal hardening only: it excludes other UIDs but does **not** stop the same UID from unlinking and counterfeiting the socket. It therefore does not close T-C same-UID replacement. WI-1 does not provide a distinct-principal boundary. A stronger distinct-principal deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary that clients cannot unlink or rebind and that preserves the authenticated client identity required by the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry checks. Server-side branch protection remains the irreducible backstop.
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