stack/docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md

#1179 — Required security DI wiring

Objective

Eliminate the shared fail-open defect class absence read as permission:

• FL-01: missing CommandAuthorizationService must refuse Nest startup and must not permit command effects.
• FL-11: missing SystemOverrideService must refuse Nest startup and must not omit stored instruction authority while allowing provider/session effects.

Tracking

• Issue: #1179, child of #1156
• Branch: fix/1179-required-security-di
• Base: origin/next at 216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02

Plan

1. RED: compile the real AppModule graph with each required provider independently removed, with a positive control for each intact binding.
2. RED: directly exercise each malformed absence path and assert zero command/provider/session effects.
3. Stop and report RED to the coordinator before production implementation.
4. After authorization, make both constructor injections required, remove absence-as-permission branches, and update explicit legitimate optional test seams.
5. Run focused Gateway tests, typecheck, lint, format, build, independent exact-head verification, and focused security review.

Immutable path fence

Production changes are confined to:

• apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts
• apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts

Tests and task evidence are confined to:

• apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts
• existing direct-constructor specs that require explicit required arguments
• docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md

No files in #1178, #1072, #1080, or #1054 lanes are in scope. docs/TASKS.md is orchestrator-owned and will not be modified.

Budget

No explicit token ceiling was provided. Working assumption: one narrow Gateway security packet; split and stop if either arm requires unrelated module rewiring.

Progress

• Intake read from #1179 and parent #1156.
• Base independently resolved from the issue's pre-native-stage ordering and repository origin/next ref; branch HEAD verified byte-for-byte against the remote ref.
• Real consumers and direct constructors inventoried.

Tests

RED

• required-security-wiring.test.ts: 4 failed, 2 passed before implementation.
• Both real-graph negative controls showed module compilation accepted the missing target binding.
• Direct FL-01 showed one unauthorized command effect; direct FL-11 showed one provider prompt and one session counter mutation.

GREEN

• required-security-wiring.test.ts: 6/6 passed.
• FL-01-only production revert: exactly the two FL-01 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-11, passed.
• FL-11-only production revert: exactly the two FL-11 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-01, passed.
• Full Gateway suite: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 831 tests passed, 17 skipped.
• Gateway typecheck: passed.
• Gateway lint: passed.
• Gateway build: passed.
• Changed-file Prettier check: passed.

Review

• Codex code review: APPROVE, 0 findings.
• Codex focused security review: risk none, 0 findings.
• Independent exact-head review remains assigned to Scrappy through the coordinator.

Risks / blockers

• AgentModule / CommandsModule / ChatModule contain a production cycle; the module test therefore uses the real top-level AppModule and replaces only storage/network leaves, preserving the target service in each arm while isolating the separate required consumer that would otherwise mask that arm's defect.
• No broad module rewrite was required.