veronica
f0d2dd9920
Applies the document contract from
docs/plans/2026-08-20_stack-docs-flatten-and-alignment.md section 3, partially:
`kind` and `status` only. `parent` is deliberately held until the flatten in
section 4 lands, so that 127 documents do not have to be re-pointed by hand
when docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml moves to docs/NORTH_STAR.yaml.
Scope, measured on origin/next at 63069149:
127 live docs = all *.md under docs/ minus docs/archive/ minus docs/_old_structure/
104 stamped here
19 held operator judgement (plan section 9), worklist in the same PR
3 held the SUPERSEDED TASKS.md stamps, which cite the moving path
1 untouched docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md, already stamped in W1
Kinds applied: 54 guide, 34 record, 9 spec, 6 tracking, 1 projection.
Every row carries a confidence and a one-line rationale in the worklist.
Two collisions with the existing state, both flagged rather than resolved:
1. docs/README.md:150-160 already documents a front-matter convention
(title/type/audience/status/source_of_truth) with its own allowed values.
It is applied to 4 of 127 files. Its `status` vocabulary is
current|draft|deprecated|historical; the new contract's is active|superseded-by.
The key collides. This commit lets the new contract win and rewrites
`status: current` to `status: active` on those 4 files, keeping their other
legacy keys untouched. No code reads any of them: `git grep source_of_truth`
outside docs/ returns nothing. docs/README.md still prescribes the old
convention and is an operator row, so it is not edited here.
2. Two of the plan's 20 operator rows are YAML files, not markdown
(docs/fleet/examples/roster-v2.yaml, docs/openapi-tess.yaml), and the
contract's front-matter form has no defined meaning for a .yaml document.
That gap also applies to docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml, the source of truth
itself. Raised in the worklist.
A third row from the plan, docs/fleet/north-star.md, no longer exists: W1
renamed it to docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md.
Verification: 104/104 parse with the expected kind and status in front matter;
the check was shown to reject a wrong kind before it was trusted. The diff
removes 4 lines total, all of them `status: current`.
43 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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kind: record
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status: active
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---
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# Security Review — Issue #756
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**Scope:** final current uncommitted Discord plugin, shared channel contract, gateway ingress, AgentService, and plugin registration delta
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**Snapshot:** `plugins/discord/src/index.ts` SHA-256 `5ee6b6aa4e2ff349f137f76b918d02c1254e12066cb48b136048e57bef36fdb2`
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**Verdict:** **APPROVE**
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## Final remediation verification
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| Area | Current evidence | Result |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ |
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| Attachment confidentiality and integrity | Ingress accepts bounded attachment metadata only when URL is HTTPS, query-free, fragment-free, and credential-free. Count, aggregate size, field length, MIME, and finite non-negative size validation apply before dispatch; `sizeBytes` is signed and retained. | Pass |
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| Trusted agent selection | Each binding names a required trusted `agentConfigId`; gateway resolves that config server-side and requires its configured name to equal the binding logical-agent ID. Client/provider input cannot select the agent for Discord ingress. | Pass |
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| Privileged operation routing | Gateway revalidates the binding and requires the signed conversation identity to match the configured logical agent before approve/stop actions. Paired admin identity and one-time approval checks remain enforced. | Pass |
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| Egress containment and delivery | Egress requires an aligned message/route, configured parent or exact observed thread target, and cleans response routes after completion, errors, typed-ingress failure, or bounded-map pressure. | Pass |
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| Side-effect limits | Per guild/authorized-parent/user rolling message and thread limits execute before thread creation or dispatch. | Pass |
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## Security controls reviewed
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- Default-deny guild, parent-channel, user, configured pairing, and role checks precede rate consumption and all side effects.
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- Gateway independently enforces Discord service authentication, HMAC integrity, allowlists, binding/role checks, attachment validation, and replay-ID rejection.
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- Thread authorization uses only the Discord thread parent; category parents cannot authorize ingress.
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- Agent-visible attachment references are explicitly labeled untrusted; binary content is not embedded. Persisted attachment name/URL values are redacted.
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- Egress uses deterministic nonces, bounded transient retry, typed terminal errors, and does not send to forged targets.
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- No secrets or message content were added to plugin logs.
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## Verification evidence
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| Command | Result |
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| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test` | PASS — 44 tests; v8 coverage: 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions |
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| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin typecheck` | PASS |
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| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types typecheck` | PASS |
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| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` | PASS |
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| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec vitest run src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts` | PASS — 29 tests |
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| `git diff --check` | PASS |
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No unresolved critical, high, medium, or low security findings were identified in the reviewed final delta.
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