jason.woltje
abd2791f59
WI-2: mutator-class guard for the compaction directive-freshness mechanism — command-position parser (prefix x var-indirection unified) + primitive-anchored invariant backstop + all-tools-hook fail-close. Parser-complete on principle: realistic evasion matrix RED-regression-covered, residual exotic evasions proven backstop-caught (B-tests), lens-convergence reached. closes #829
15 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
15 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# WI-1 lease broker security notes
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- Trusted identity comes only from Linux `SO_PEERCRED` plus `/proc` starttime, never request identity fields.
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- Descendant authorization is anchored to `(pid,starttime)` and uses a complete second starttime pass to fail closed on disappearance or PID-reuse races.
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- Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits.
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- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
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- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
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- Built-in `0700`/`0600` filesystem modes provide same-principal hardening only, not socket authenticity against the same UID. WI-1 provides no distinct-principal isolation. That stronger deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary, and the boundary must preserve authenticated client identity for the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry authorization rather than substituting a shared proxy identity.
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- WI-2 whole-class authorization denies every consequential, unknown, and custom tool while UNVERIFIED; it does not inspect shell strings or trust wrapper selection. First-class Claude/Pi, both Claudex dispatch modes, PRDY, QA remediation, coord, orchestrator, and fleet starts converge on broker register-before-exec; Claudex additionally installs the mandatory all-tools hook inside its preserved isolated config and fails closed on unsafe settings.
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- The permanent `check-runtime-launches.py` suite/CI guard scans production source for direct literal, absolute-path, process-API, command-array, and dynamic Claude/Pi launches. It has no bypass allowlist: an unrecognized launch form fails CI until routed through the common boundary.
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- WI-2 promotion consumes a WI-1 cycle token before VERIFIED becomes visible. Observer revocation, runtime-generation replacement, broker restart, and monotonic TTL expiry remove authority.
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- Receipt observation, payload construction, compaction observers, and constrained recovery implementation remain later surfaces. A receipt can become a promotion prerequisite but is never the safety mechanism.
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Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred and mutator-gate acceptance suites on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.
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