0b953faf79
Prune consumed and revoked tokens, cap pending token state, reject oversized serialization before replacement, and roll back in-memory mutations when persistence fails.\n\ncloses #828
12 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
12 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# WI-1 lease broker security notes
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- Trusted identity comes only from Linux `SO_PEERCRED` plus `/proc` starttime, never request identity fields.
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- Descendant authorization is anchored to `(pid,starttime)` and uses a complete second starttime pass to fail closed on disappearance or PID-reuse races.
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- Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits.
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- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
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- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
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- Built-in `0700`/`0600` filesystem modes provide same-principal hardening only, not socket authenticity against the same UID. WI-1 provides no distinct-principal isolation. That stronger deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary, and the boundary must preserve authenticated client identity for the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry authorization rather than substituting a shared proxy identity.
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- WI-2+ security surfaces—receipts, promotion transactions, mutator gates, hooks, payload construction, and recovery—are explicitly out of scope.
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Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred acceptance suite on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.
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