358 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
358 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
# Independent Review — Native Kanban/SOT Canon
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**Reviewer:** `enhance-sol` (independent of author `planner-sol`)
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**Date:** 2026-07-13
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**Review mode:** design/contract only; read-only against the staged canon
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**Source plan:** `/home/hermes/agent-work/planning/mosaic-native-kanban-sot-plan.md` (`sha256:96ea4fb91436ec9a53f371d27276e27f62ecf817662599ff9152df0db55296e5`)
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**Canon reviewed:** every listed artifact under `/home/hermes/agent-work/planning/kanban-canon/`, including the four TypeScript contracts; the author scratchpad was also read as validation context.
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## Executive verdict
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# NO-GO
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The canon is not freeze-ready. I found **8 BLOCKERs**, **7 MAJORs**, and **1 MINOR**. The prose preserves the ratified authority model well, but the frozen types/schema leave concrete fail-closed, approval, fencing, tenant, outage-proposal, migration, and parallelization gaps. Those gaps would force implementation lanes either to invent contract semantics or to ship paths that violate fixed invariants.
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### Blocking findings
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1. Health/write authorization can be represented as contradictory, stale, or caller-asserted state.
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2. Coordinator failures collapse authoritative denial, unknown transport outcome, and version conflict into one permissive shape.
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3. Assignment proposals and approval proofs have no authoritative relational binding; lease acquisition accepts a forgeable proof DTO.
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4. Fencing uniqueness is present, but monotonic fencing and same-task lease/checkpoint binding are not.
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5. Workspace-safe accountable-owner, assignment-principal, and evidence/artifact relationships are not frozen.
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6. Attributable post-recovery proposals have neither a canonical table nor command contract.
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7. The slice graph starts schema/UI work before prerequisite threat and exact API/DTO freezes and contradicts coder4 lane order.
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8. P0 claims a migration map while publishing only generic rules; the concrete N-1 transition from current `origin/main` is absent.
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---
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## Findings
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### KCR-001 — BLOCKER — “Healthy” is not a proof and can be contradictory or stale
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**Location**
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- `contracts/health-state.v1.ts:21-31` — `KanbanHealthResponseV1` permits every combination of `state`, `readHealthProven`, and `writeHealthProven`.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:40-49` — `CoordinatorContextV1` accepts a caller-supplied `healthState` enum only.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:255-293` — every Coordinator operation, including mutating operations, accepts that context.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:171-184` — mutations are allowed only after live PostgreSQL read/write probes.
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**Violation**
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Fixed invariant 2 / `REQ-SOT-002`: mutations must fail closed unless write health is positively proven. The current type permits `{ state: 'healthy', writeHealthProven: false }`, and the Coordinator mutation boundary can be invoked with a stale or fabricated `{ healthState: 'healthy' }`. A Valkey/client-derived enum could therefore be mistaken for write authorization.
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**Minimal fix**
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1. Make `KanbanHealthResponseV1` a discriminated union with only these legal combinations: `healthy => read=true/write=true`, `read-only-degraded => read=true/write=false`, and `write-unavailable => read=false/write=false`.
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2. Do not accept write authority from a public DTO. Require Gateway/domain code to obtain and revalidate a fresh internal PostgreSQL write-health proof at mutation time (including `checkedAt`, bounded validity/policy revision, and transaction-local enforcement).
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3. Split pure evaluation context from mutation context; mutation methods must accept only an unforgeable/internal healthy context or perform the probe themselves.
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4. Add negative contract tests for contradictory state, expired proof, Valkey-only liveness, and caller-forged `healthy`.
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### KCR-002 — BLOCKER — Coordinator error shape can conflate denial, unknown outcome, and conflict
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**Location**
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:184-216` — one `CoordinatorFailureV1` allows every code to pair with arbitrary `retryable` and either `requestOutcome` value.
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- `contracts/health-state.v1.ts:51-106` — the Gateway health contract correctly distinguishes deliberate denial, transport uncertainty, and version conflict.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:177-216` — frozen client semantics require those cases not to be conflated.
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**Violation**
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Charter E and `REQ-SOT-002`. The current Coordinator result can legally encode `WRITE_HEALTH_UNPROVEN` as `retryable: true, requestOutcome: 'unknown'`, or `VERSION_CONFLICT` as retryable. That permits blind retry or a false “unknown” outcome after an authoritative fail-closed denial.
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**Minimal fix**
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Replace `CoordinatorFailureV1` with a discriminated union keyed by code/kind:
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- deliberate health denial: `not_applied`, `retryable:false`;
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- version conflict: `not_applied`, `retryable:false`, current version;
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- stale fence/session/eligibility/approval failures: exact non-retry semantics;
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- transport failure: a separate `retryable_transport_error`, `unknown`, same idempotency key.
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Reuse or map explicitly to `KanbanMutationFailureV1`, and add exhaustive client tests proving 503 authoritative bodies, 502/504/timeouts, and 409 cannot cross-map.
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### KCR-003 — BLOCKER — Approval proof is forgeable and is not linked to the persisted proposal
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**Location**
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:107-137` — proposal and approval DTOs.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:265-270` — `acquireApprovedLease` accepts the entire `ApprovalProofV1` by value.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:650-688` — `task_assignments` has no proposal expiry, task version, session binding, or proposal/approval FK.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:823-863` — `approval_decisions` can target only a task or mission and has no proposal/assignment relation.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:128-137` — lease acquisition requires authoritative approval under the exact policy revision.
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**Violation**
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Fixed invariant 5 and `REQ-COORD-002/003`. A caller can construct an `ApprovalProofV1`; the schema cannot prove that it belongs to the proposal, workspace, task version, agent/session, unexpired policy revision, or still-current approval. The DTO state vocabulary (`awaiting_approval | policy_pre_authorized`) also does not map directly to the persisted assignment states (`proposed | approved | ...`).
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**Minimal fix**
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Persist one authoritative proposal/assignment identity with task version, target agent/session, expiry, state, and policy revision. Add a workspace-aware approval relation to that identity. Change lease acquisition to accept IDs, then reload and lock proposal + approval + task inside PostgreSQL and verify workspace, current version, target session, state, expiry, and policy revision before creating the lease. Freeze one state vocabulary across schema and DTOs.
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### KCR-004 — BLOCKER — Fencing is unique but not monotonically increasing; relational binding is incomplete
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**Location**
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:694-743` — `task_leases` has positive/unique fencing tokens but no monotonic per-task counter.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:748-784` — checkpoints independently carry task, lease, and fencing token.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:905-910` — token equality is deferred to prose; same-task lease binding is not stated.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:140-175` — worker commands depend on fencing safety.
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**Violation**
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Fixed invariant 12 / `REQ-COORD-003`. Uniqueness permits token 10 followed by token 9. A lease can reference assignment A while naming task B in the same workspace, and a checkpoint can reference lease A while naming task B. `bigint(..., { mode: 'number' })` also eventually loses integer precision in JavaScript.
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**Minimal fix**
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Add a durable per-task fencing counter (or equivalent PostgreSQL sequence row) incremented atomically under task lock and use the returned value for every new lease. Add workspace-aware composite constraints tying lease to its exact task+assignment and checkpoint to exact task+lease+fence. Use bigint-safe representation (`bigint`/serialized decimal), and test monotonicity, concurrent claims, stale lower tokens, and mismatched same-workspace IDs.
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### KCR-005 — BLOCKER — Hard tenant boundary is not frozen for several polymorphic relationships
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**Location**
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:315-318` and `475-478` — project/task accountable owners are unvalidated `(kind, text id)` pairs.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:659-663` — assignment principals are unvalidated `(kind, text id)` pairs.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:758` and `841` — checkpoint/evidence artifact relationships are JSON arrays without workspace-aware FKs.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:89-96` — only selected polymorphic checks are delegated to domain transactions; owner/principal/evidence checks are not included.
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:101-108` — every relationship must reject cross-workspace IDs.
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**Violation**
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Fixed invariant 7 / `REQ-TEN-001` and `REQ-ID-001`. The frozen schema can name a team or agent from another workspace as owner/assignee, and can embed foreign-workspace artifact IDs in checkpoint or approval evidence arrays. A global user ID is also insufficient without active workspace membership validation.
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**Minimal fix**
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Use workspace-aware owner/assignment join tables or separate nullable user/team/agent columns with exactly-one checks and composite FKs where possible. Model checkpoint/evidence artifact links as workspace-scoped join rows, or freeze explicit transaction checks for every ID. Require active workspace membership for user principals and workspace-agent/session consistency for agent principals. Add DB/repository/API/Coordinator cross-workspace negative tests without existence oracles.
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### KCR-006 — BLOCKER — Post-recovery outage proposals have no canonical persistence or command surface
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**Location**
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:93-99` — proposal submission and authorized accept/reject are required.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:26-29` — outage notes may return only as authenticated proposals.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:243-267` — the thin command/query contract contains no proposal submit/get/accept/reject operations.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:1-916` — no proposal table captures proposed command, target/version, attribution, lifecycle, or decision.
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- `TASKS.md:99-108` — KBN-110 does not own an outage-proposal command path.
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**Violation**
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Fixed invariant 4 / `REQ-SOT-004`. An implementation lane would have to invent storage or misuse artifacts/approval gates. Either path risks silently applying an outage note or creating shadow state.
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**Minimal fix**
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Add a workspace-scoped `change_proposals`/`outage_proposals` contract with authenticated proposer, source note digest, target aggregate, expected version, proposed typed command/payload, pending/accepted/rejected state, decision actor/reason/time, idempotency key, and audit linkage. Add explicit submit/query/accept/reject Gateway commands. Acceptance must execute the normal command in a healthy transaction; a proposal itself can never claim, order, satisfy a gate, or mutate the target.
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### KCR-007 — BLOCKER — Parallel slice ordering is not freeze-safe and contains a direct lane-order contradiction
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**Location**
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- `TASKS.md:43-60` — dependency graph makes KBN-010 and KBN-100 siblings.
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- `TASKS.md:88-97` — KBN-100 nevertheless depends on KBN-010 threat findings that alter constraints.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:243` and `INDEX.md:44-50` — exact route names/DTO placement remain unresolved.
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- `TASKS.md:110-130` — KBN-120/130 depend on a frozen endpoint/DTO contract, while mocks may begin before KBN-110 lands.
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- `TASKS.md:145-153` — KBN-200 says lane-serial after KBN-120.
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- `TASKS.md:248-254` — wave table runs KBN-200 before KBN-120.
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**Violation**
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Charter C and the mandatory freeze-before-parallelize gate. Schema can begin before tenant/threat findings are complete; web/CLI consumers have only semantic operations, not exact DTO/endpoint contracts; coder4 has two opposite legal orders. This does not create same-file edits immediately, but it guarantees contract invention or rework across active lanes.
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**Minimal fix**
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1. Make KBN-010 (or an explicit constraint-impact gate from it) a completed prerequisite of KBN-100.
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2. Add a small serialized KBN-105 endpoint/DTO/endpoint-registry freeze, with exact request/response/error DTOs, before KBN-120 and KBN-130 implementation.
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3. Choose one coder4 lane order and use it consistently in slice text, graph, and wave table.
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4. Name the exact MCP-owned files or assign their Gateway changes to coder3 before coder4 starts.
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### KCR-008 — BLOCKER — Claimed P0 migration map is absent; concrete N-1 hazards remain unresolved
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**Location**
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- `MISSION-MANIFEST.md:153-157` — P0 says to publish a migration map and states the build hold is lifted at line 3.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:101-121` — only generic expand/backfill/contract rules are supplied.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:1-916` — target-state declarations reuse live table names and make target fields required.
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- Current foundation evidence: `origin/main:packages/db/src/schema.ts:120-301` has no workspace keys, nullable project/mission links, legacy text status vocabularies, `tasks.tags`, `tasks.assignee`, `tasks.due_date`, mission JSON milestones/config, `mission_tasks.status`, and legacy agent fields.
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**Violation**
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Charter D / `REQ-MIG-001` and the P0 exit claim. The generic rule is correct, but coder2 lacks the required field-by-field transition map. A direct Drizzle reconciliation could attempt type narrowing/status conversion, add required workspace/project/owner columns too early, or drop legacy columns before N-1 readers and writers are retired.
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**Minimal fix**
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Publish a concrete current-main delta map before lifting the hold. For each existing table/column, specify expand, backfill, compatibility read/write, switch, and contract release. At minimum cover:
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- nullable-first `workspace_id`, required project/owner fields, and workspace backfill;
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- legacy task/project/mission status aliases or shadow columns before v1 emission;
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- `mission_tasks.status` read retirement and write-source prohibition;
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- mapping/retention for tags, assignee, due date, mission description/config/milestones, and agent fields;
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- current milestone circular FK ordering;
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- empty, production-shape, partial-resume, and rollback/downgrade tests already named in §4.
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Explicitly require legacy columns to remain in the unified Drizzle declaration during the expand/N-1 window.
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### KCR-009 — MAJOR — Dependency uniqueness permits parallel duplicate edges
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**Location**
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:561-567` — unique key includes `dependencyType`.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:47-49` — calls for a unique directed edge.
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:142-149` — duplicate edge attempts must fail.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-DEP-001`. The same predecessor/successor pair can be inserted three times, once per dependency type. That is not a unique directed edge and complicates readiness semantics.
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**Minimal fix**
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Make `(workspace_id, predecessor_task_id, successor_task_id)` unique independent of type, or explicitly redefine the requirement as one edge per type and freeze deterministic multi-edge completion semantics. The source plan says unique directed edge, so the former is the minimal faithful fix.
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### KCR-010 — MAJOR — Same-workspace planning relationships can contradict the project hierarchy
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**Location**
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:325` — `projects.currentMilestoneId` has no FK in the declaration.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:427-448` — mission/milestone association checks workspace but not common project.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:490-516` — a task’s project, mission, milestone, and parent only need share a workspace, not a project.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:905-908` — only current milestone is mentioned as a deferred invariant.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-PLAN-001` and schema correctness. A task in project A can point to a mission/milestone/parent task from project B in the same workspace. A mission can associate a milestone from another project despite having one required project.
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**Minimal fix**
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Add project-congruent composite keys/FKs (or freeze mandatory transaction checks) for task→mission, task→milestone, task→parent, mission→milestone, and project→current milestone. Add same-workspace/same-project negative tests.
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### KCR-011 — MAJOR — Immutable/append-only records can be erased by parent cascades
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**Location**
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:798-818` — `task_events` is described as append-only but remains under a workspace cascade.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:911` — only application-role UPDATE/DELETE privilege removal is stated.
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- Numerous canonical relationships use `onDelete('cascade')`, including workspace roots and artifact/checkpoint/event owners.
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:41-43` and `154-170` — audit must be append-only, attributable, and reconstructable.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-AUD-001`. Revoking direct DELETE on `task_events` does not prevent a parent delete from cascading into the audit log. Checkpoints and immutable artifacts also lack explicit append-only privilege/retention semantics.
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**Minimal fix**
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Use lifecycle/archive states and `RESTRICT` for canonical parent deletion during normal operation. Freeze a separate, audited retention/break-glass purge procedure. Apply INSERT/SELECT-only or equivalent immutability controls to task events, checkpoints, and immutable artifacts, and test that parent deletion cannot silently erase them.
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### KCR-012 — MAJOR — Coordinator persistence lacks durable quarantine/retry state and DTO/schema alignment
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**Location**
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:239-244` — expiry returns `quarantined` IDs.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:457-490` — task has only untyped `retryPolicy` metadata and no quarantine/execution disposition.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:173` — `evidenceIds` has no corresponding evidence table/type; schema has artifacts.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:479`, `663`, and agent role JSON — specialist roles are free text despite the frozen role vocabulary in `mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:19-29`.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-COORD-004` and internal consistency. PostgreSQL cannot deterministically reconstruct why/when a task was quarantined, its bounded retry state, or which typed evidence was submitted. Free-text roles allow the schema and engine to disagree.
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**Minimal fix**
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Freeze a durable execution/retry/quarantine record (attempt count, next eligibility, terminal reason, actor/policy, timestamps, version) or typed task columns with events. Align `evidenceIds` to artifact IDs or add a real evidence entity. Use one specialist-role enum/check across tasks, assignments, agents/sessions, DTOs, and Coordinator.
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### KCR-013 — MAJOR — Thin MVP promises task archive and tag filtering without target-state semantics
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**Location**
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:182-193` — users must archive tasks and filter by tags.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:252-267` — mutations include cancel but not archive task.
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- `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts:457-490` — no task archive field and no typed tags field/table.
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- Current `origin/main` already has `tasks.tags`, making omission from the target declaration a migration-loss hazard.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-UI-001/002` and internal acceptance consistency. “Archive” cannot be implemented without inventing whether it means cancelled, hidden, or soft-deleted; tag filtering has no frozen storage/query contract.
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**Minimal fix**
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Either remove task archive/tag acceptance from P1, or add explicit non-lifecycle archival semantics (`archived_at/by/reason`) and a workspace-safe tags model/query contract. Preserve/migrate the current tags column until the selected model is live.
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### KCR-014 — MAJOR — Recovery contract states critical rules only in comments and has no owning implementation slice
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**Location**
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- `contracts/recovery-posture.v1.ts:97-147` — exported JSON Schema validates only local field shapes.
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- `contracts/recovery-posture.v1.ts:150-156` — PITR/WAL, effective RPO, off-cluster, high-assurance minima, and audit rules are comments only.
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- `REQUIREMENTS.md:270-277` — parser rejection of impossible combinations is acceptance-critical.
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- `TASKS.md:75-244` — no bounded slice owns recovery config parsing, override audit, backup/WAL setup, or restore/break-glass evidence.
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**Violation**
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`REQ-REC-001`. A consumer using the advertised JSON Schema can accept weakened high-assurance values, PITR without WAL, or an impossible RPO. The task plan has no lane accountable for closing that acceptance criterion.
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**Minimal fix**
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Export a normative `validateRecoveryPostureV1`/schema refinement with machine-testable cross-field checks and add a bounded Infra/recovery slice (serialized if it touches shared config) owning config parsing, override audit, mechanism verification, restore test, and break-glass evidence. Recovery config must continue to expose no authority/gate knobs.
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### KCR-015 — MAJOR — Pure Coordinator slice cannot implement two frozen methods without persistence access
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**Location**
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:259-263` — `explainEligibility` receives only `taskId`, not a structured snapshot.
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- `contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts:289-293` — `recoverFromPostgres` explicitly reads PostgreSQL.
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- `TASKS.md:145-153` — KBN-200 is a pure engine with no SQL, Drizzle, Gateway, or Valkey.
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- `TASKS.md:157-164` — persistence belongs to coder3/KBN-210.
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**Violation**
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Charter C and internal consistency. coder4 cannot implement the frozen port in a pure package without crossing coder3’s persistence boundary. If coder3 implements the port instead, KBN-200’s acceptance and ownership are misassigned.
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**Minimal fix**
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Split the contract into a pure decision engine that receives complete immutable snapshots and a persistence/orchestration service port implemented by KBN-210. Move `recoverFromPostgres` and ID-based loading to the adapter/service; make pure explanation accept a snapshot.
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### KCR-016 — MINOR — Health denial code/state pairs are not correlated by type
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**Location**
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- `contracts/health-state.v1.ts:35-61` — either denial code can pair with either degraded state.
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- `SHARED-CONTRACT.md:188-190` — prose defines `KANBAN_WRITE_UNAVAILABLE` specifically for `write-unavailable`.
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**Violation**
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Health contract precision. A client can receive a semantically inconsistent authoritative body even after KCR-001’s broader state fix.
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**Minimal fix**
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Make deliberate denial a two-variant union with exact code/state pairing.
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---
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## Clean checks / invariants that do hold
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The review did **not** find a gap in these areas:
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- The canon consistently selects current `mosaicstack/stack` + Drizzle/PostgreSQL and rejects greenfield/Prisma revival.
|
||
- Every artifact states PostgreSQL is the sole writable SOT and Valkey/files are non-authoritative.
|
||
- Generated `TASKS.md`, `mission.json`, and exports are consistently declared read-only and never import sources. KBN-300’s importer is scoped to immutable legacy JSON/Vikunja snapshots, not generated projections.
|
||
- Recovery config exposes recovery fields only; it contains no direct fail-open, SOT, Coordinator-authority, or gate-waiver knob.
|
||
- The Coordinator interface contains no `createTask`, acceptance-edit, gate-waive, certify, merge, release, or provider-close method. `submitForReview` is type-limited to `in_review`, not `done` or `certified`.
|
||
- Certifier is consistently final independent gate with no merge authority.
|
||
- The seven canonical task status values match across requirements, shared prose, schema, and Coordinator’s ready/in-review surfaces.
|
||
- One-active-lease partial uniqueness, no-self-edge, outbox aggregate-revision/event-type uniqueness, optimistic task/project/mission/milestone versions, and N-1 test categories are explicitly present.
|
||
- The file-tree partition is mostly well separated once the ordering/freeze defects in KCR-007 are corrected.
|
||
|
||
## Required re-review scope
|
||
|
||
After remediation, re-review at minimum:
|
||
|
||
1. health/coordinator discriminated unions and mutation-time health proof;
|
||
2. proposal/approval/assignment/lease relational model;
|
||
3. monotonic fencing and composite bindings;
|
||
4. tenant-safe polymorphic relationships;
|
||
5. outage-proposal persistence and commands;
|
||
6. concrete current-main migration map;
|
||
7. corrected dependency graph and exact API/DTO freeze;
|
||
8. recovery validator/owner slice;
|
||
9. all schema and DTO vocabulary alignment.
|
||
|
||
## Overall verdict
|
||
|
||
**NO-GO — 8 BLOCKERs must be resolved before the v1 contract is frozen or parallel implementation begins.**
|