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shared replay mode refused (seed-only rule, contract 3 SS4.3/SS7 item 4); concurrency loser semantics and scope-mismatch collision added to rule 5 and witness 5; query-side correlation envelope specified; no-oracle indistinguishability probe added to witness 9; fence authorization scope pinned; SHARED-CONTRACT SS5.3 citation fixed, fleet-side ASKS reference removed.
316 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
316 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
---
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kind: spec
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status: active
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audience: developer
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---
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# Agent Enrollment Command Family — v1 Design (M4-4-0)
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Status: design note (implementation-facing; amends no contract).
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Authority chain: tool-gateway-mapping.md §3.1 rank-4 row + §4 envelope
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(ruled 2026-08-27), onboarding-wizard.md §3.5 (D11 minimal enrollment),
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custody-schema.md §5.2 at revision 13 (agent-grantee FK bound to the
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live `agents` table — a binding introduced at rev 4 and standing
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verbatim), PRD §9 D11. Where this note and a ratified contract disagree,
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the contract wins.
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## 1. What the contracts bind (and what they leave open)
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There is no standalone enrollment contract. The rank-4 family is defined
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by composition:
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1. **Contract 5 §3.1 rank 4:** "Enroll one agent: harness, credential
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reference/API-key intake (values never echoed), name/persona,
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assignment scope (contract 3 §3.5)."
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2. **Contract 5 §4 — all five sub-clauses:** §4.1 typed request/result
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DTOs validated at the Gateway boundary (expected-version only where
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an owning contract defines one); §4.2 closed per-family error enum
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(validation, authentication, authorization, not-found, conflict,
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precondition, internal) with HTTP mappings; §4.3 audit linkage — the
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envelope contributes correlation: every request accepts/generates a
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correlation id, carried into the audit events **and returned in the
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result**, with no second audit stream; §4.4 fail-closed — an
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operation that cannot evaluate its authorization or reach its owning
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tool refuses, never degrading to a fallback read or direct data
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access; §4.5 CLI parity — the family MUST be invocable through the
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official CLI against the same Gateway commands with the same
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request/result/error contracts (a Gateway command without CLI
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exposure is a tracked conformance gap).
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**Idempotency keys are NOT contract 5 §4.3:** the idempotency-key
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envelope is contract 3 §4.3, ratified as a drafting addition to
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contract 5 §4's command envelope via contract 3 §7 item 4. Its fence
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and replay rules bind as written there; §3.1 rule 5 below designs to
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them.
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3. **Contract 3 §3.5:** the wizard's enrollment step is minimal (one
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harness, API-key login, agent name and persona — D11), uses ONLY this
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family, and is skippable. Wizard witness §6.10: a run that skips the
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step produces zero enrollment-family mutations.
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4. **Custody-schema §5.2 (rev 13; binding introduced at rev 4):**
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contract 7's agent-grantee FK references the live `agents` table
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(`agents.id`, uuid); an enrollment surface with its own table would
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force a contract-7 amendment.
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**Assignment scope (open point, pinned here):** the rank-4 row cites
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contract 3 §3.5, which defines no assignment semantics; the PRD's full
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enrollment vision (Part I, Standalone flow) includes "account
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assignment", but the D11 v1 slice is exactly "one harness, API key,
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name/persona". v1 therefore scopes assignment to the two bindings the
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minimal slice already implies — the enrolling user becomes the agent's
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owner (`agents.owner_id`), and the credential reference names which of
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that user's stored provider credentials the agent uses. Richer
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assignment (multi-account, comms auto-enroll, workspace placement) is
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deferred with the rest of the PRD's full flow (D11); when a contract
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defines it, this family extends by ordinary amendment of the design.
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The deferral rests on contract 3 §3.5's explicit delegation of
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enrollment specifics to this family — not on reading the D11 list as
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exhaustive (it is not: the §3.1 `model`/`provider` fields are required
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by the live table's NOT NULL columns, though D11 does not name them).
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## 2. Current state (measured 2026-08-29 at `origin/next` = `94d626df`)
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- `agents` table (packages/db `schema.ts`): id uuid PK, name, provider,
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model, status enum, project_id (legacy `projects`, ON DELETE SET
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NULL), owner_id → users, system_prompt, allowed_tools, skills,
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is_system, config jsonb, timestamps. No harness column (provider and
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model describe the LLM backend, not the harness), no audit coupling.
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- Sole write path: `packages/brain/src/agents.ts` repository (the only
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module issuing `insert(agents)`), with three write consumers: the
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legacy `/api/agents` CRUD controller
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(`apps/gateway/src/agent/agent-configs.controller.ts`), the `/agent
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new` chat command (`apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts`
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→ `brain.agents.create`), and workspace bootstrap
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(`apps/gateway/src/workspace/project-bootstrap.service.ts`). All
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three keep serving existing consumers; none is touched by M4-4.
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- Sealed credential store exists: `ProviderCredentialsService`
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(apps/gateway/src/agent/) — one row per (userId, provider), values
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sealed at rest, decrypt server-side only, summaries never carry
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values.
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- Harness registry exists (`apps/gateway/src/harness/`), the validation
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source for the harness field.
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- Implementation pattern: the merged hierarchy module (M4-1) —
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transaction-scoped command context, in-tx authorization, discriminated
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result unions, same-transaction semantic audit event + transactional
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outbox, no-oracle not_found folding.
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**F1 — contract-5 mapping note (disposition, not an amendment):**
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`/api/agents` appears nowhere in contract 5 — neither as a P0 row nor in
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the §3.2 legacy non-substitutes list (the ruled §3.2 freeze names
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specific endpoints, and `/api/agents` is not among them). The operative
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constraints are §3.3's amendment-only rule for new mapping rows and §5's
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closure rule: this design adds no new consumer to `/api/agents` and
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builds the rank-4 family as the P1 path for enrollment. Adding the
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missing P0 row is a contract amendment for a future S2 pass; nothing in
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M4-4 depends on it.
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## 3. Command family surface (v1)
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One command, one query. Module: `apps/gateway/src/enrollment/`
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(`enrollment.module.ts`), mirroring the hierarchy module's shape.
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### 3.1 `agent.enroll` (mutation)
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Request DTO (shared types package, class-validator at the boundary):
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| Field | Type | Rule |
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| ---------------- | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `harness` | string | syntactically invalid (empty/malformed) → `validation_failed`; well-formed but not in the harness registry → `precondition_failed` |
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| `correlationId` | string (uuid) | optional; generated when absent (contract 5 §4.3); carried into audit events and returned in the result |
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| `replayMode` | 'actor-bound' | optional, default `actor-bound`. `shared` is seed-only (contract 3 §4.3 binds it to the §3.4 canonical seed key set and "no other operation can carry a shared declaration"; §7 item 4 closes it); a `shared` declaration here is refused `validation_failed`, executes nothing, and records no fence row |
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| `name` | string | non-empty, trimmed, ≤ 200 chars |
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| `persona` | string \| null | optional; stored as the agent's system prompt |
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| `model` | string | non-empty (provider-qualified model id) |
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| `provider` | string | non-empty; names the credential's provider |
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| `credential` | discriminated union | `{ mode: 'reference' }` — a credential for (actor, provider) MUST already exist; `{ mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value: string }` — value is sealed into the credential store in the same flow |
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| `idempotencyKey` | string (uuid) | required (contract 3 §4.3, ratified into contract 5 §4 via contract 3 §7 item 4) |
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Rules:
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1. **Never echoed.** The credential value appears in no result DTO, no
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audit event, no outbox payload, and no log line. The result carries
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only `{ provider, credentialMode }`.
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2. **Intake = the existing sealed store, inside the transaction.**
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`intake` writes through the sealed-store path
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(`ProviderCredentialsService.store` semantics: seal-at-rest, upsert
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per (userId, provider)) **in the same transaction** as the agent
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insert — a failure after the credential write rolls everything back,
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leaving no orphan credential. Enrollment persists no second copy and
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no plaintext.
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3. **Reference must resolve.** `reference` with no stored credential for
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(actor, provider) refuses with `precondition_failed` (nothing is
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created).
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4. **Ownership.** `owner_id` = the authenticated actor. v1 authorization
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is AuthGuard-authenticated user; no hierarchy grant is required
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because v1 enrollment binds no hierarchy node (§1 assignment-scope
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pin). `is_system` is never settable through this command.
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5. **Idempotency fence (contract 3 §4.3, in full).** The command layer
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records, in a uniqueness-constrained fence table in the same
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transaction as the mutation and its audit event: the key, the
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operation identifier (`agent.enroll`), the acting principal, the
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authorization scope, a digest of the canonicalized request payload
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(the digest input EXCLUDES the credential value — it covers
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provider + credentialMode, never plaintext), the declared replay
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mode (always `actor-bound` for this family — the `shared` refusal
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in the table above means no shared fence row can exist here; the
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column is kept for envelope-shape fidelity and mode-mismatch
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collision checks), and a reference to the committed outcome (the
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agent id). The recorded **authorization scope** for this family is
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pinned to the acting principal's platform-user scope (v1
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authorization is grant-free per rule 4, so the scope is the
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authenticated-user identity domain — recorded so the §4.3
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scope-equality check has a defined value). Fence uniqueness is the
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pair (operation identifier, key). **Replay:** a submission whose
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(operation, key) is recorded is first authorized exactly as a fresh
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submission; then replay-mode, scope, and digest equality are
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checked (a mismatch on any — including scope — is a collision);
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then **target-result authorization** — the submitter must hold, at
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replay time, read authority on the referenced agent row under
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§3.2's rule (owner or admin) — plus recorded-actor equality
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(`actor-bound`). A passing replay executes nothing, returns the
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recorded outcome, and appends a replay access event (non-mutation
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audit class: accessing principal, current correlation id,
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fence-row reference). Any equality or authorization failure refuses
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with the single bounded `conflict` shape — constant, identifying no
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record — preserving the no-existence-oracle rule. **Concurrency
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(contract 3 §4.3's rule, ratified via §7 item 4):** two submissions
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with the same (operation, key) serialize on the fence's unique
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constraint — exactly one executes; the loser waits for the winner's
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transaction, and is then handled as a replay if it committed
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(through the full replay path above) or executes afresh if it
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aborted. A unique-violation race never surfaces as an unhandled
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internal fault.
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6. **Audit + outbox, same transaction.** Insert into `agents` +
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sealed credential write (intake mode) + fence row + semantic audit
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event (`agent.enrolled`: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name,
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credentialMode — no credential material) + outbox row commit
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atomically, hierarchy-pattern style. Audit rows reference the agent
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by **snapshot id, not FK** — mirroring the hierarchy audit tables'
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deliberate FK-free linkage so audit history survives agent deletion
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through the legacy CRUD DELETE path.
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Result union: `enrolled { agent, correlationId }` | refusal from the
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§3.3 enum (refusals also carry the correlation id, per contract 5
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§4.3's end-to-end traceability). `agent` in the result is the persisted
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row minus nothing sensitive (the table stores no credential material).
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### 3.2 `agent.enrollment.get` (query)
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By agent id; actor must be the owner (or admin). Unauthorized and
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missing fold to the same `not_found` wire shape (contract 2
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no-existence-oracle rule, applied family-wide for uniformity).
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The query carries the same non-state envelope as the mutation
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(contract 5 §4.3; contract 3's envelope reconciliation confirms closed
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query responses carry it): typed request DTO with an optional
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`correlationId` (generated when absent) and a typed result —
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`found { agent, correlationId }` | `not_found` (the folded shape,
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also carrying the correlation id). Queries take no idempotency key
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(the fence binds mutations).
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### 3.3 Error enum (closed, §4.2)
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`validation_failed` 400 · `authentication_failed` 401 ·
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`authorization_refused` 403 (owner-only paths; folded to `not_found`
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where §3.2 applies) · `not_found` 404 · `conflict` 409 (the single
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bounded idempotency refusal shape of §3.1 rule 5) · `precondition_failed`
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422 (unresolvable credential reference; well-formed harness not in the
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registry — syntactic invalidity is `validation_failed` per the §3.1
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table) · `internal_fault` 500 (also the §4.4 fail-closed class when the
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owning tool is unreachable; unauthorized-fallback behavior is
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prohibited).
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## 4. Schema delta (migration 0021, additive-only)
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Extend `agents` — no new agent table, preserving custody-schema §5.2's
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FK binding without amendment:
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- `harness` text NULL — registered harness name; NULL for pre-existing
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rows (legacy rows predate the concept).
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- `enrolled_at` timestamptz NULL — set by `agent.enroll`; NULL marks a
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legacy (non-enrolled) row. No backfill: enrollment is a fact this
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command creates, not one to invent for existing rows.
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New tables, mirroring the hierarchy audit/outbox pair (pattern reuse,
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separate store): `agent_audit_events` (append-only: id, event_type,
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actor id, agent id — snapshot value, no FK, per §3.1 rule 6 —
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correlation id, causation id, payload jsonb, created_at; per-agent
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ordering index), `agent_outbox` (hierarchy-outbox shape), and
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`agent_idempotency_fence` (contract 3 §4.3 shape: operation identifier,
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key, acting principal, authorization scope, canonicalized-payload
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digest, replay mode, committed-outcome reference (agent id), created_at;
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UNIQUE (operation identifier, key)). Persona reuses the existing
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`system_prompt` column; no version column (no ratified expected-version
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rule names `agents` — §4.1 binds only where the owning contract defines
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one).
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Witnesses (real PostgreSQL, lane standard): append-only enforcement,
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same-tx atomicity (agent row + credential write + fence row + audit +
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outbox all-or-nothing under injected failure at multiple points,
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including after the credential write), fence uniqueness on
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(operation, key).
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Sequencing: additive DDL via the same migration path as 0018–0020
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(hierarchy). The docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md §5.3 DDL
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gate binds the kanban lane's audit/proposal DDL, not this lane; if a
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pending operator ruling on migration sequencing changes mechanics
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lane-wide, re-check before generating 0021.
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## 5. Witnesses the implementation slice must ship
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1. Never-echo: enroll via `intake`, assert the value string is absent
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from the HTTP result, the audit row, the outbox payload, and captured
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logs.
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2. Sealed-store single-copy: after intake, the credential exists only in
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`provider_credentials` (sealed), and `agents` has no credential
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column at all.
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3. Reference-resolution refusal (`precondition_failed`, no row created).
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4. Harness refusals, both codes: syntactically invalid →
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`validation_failed`; well-formed registry miss →
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`precondition_failed` (against the live registry).
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5. Idempotency (contract 3 §4.3 set): actor-bound replay returns the
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recorded outcome and executes nothing (no new agent/audit/outbox
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mutation rows; a replay access event is appended); payload-digest
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mismatch, replay-mode mismatch, scope mismatch, and different-actor
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actor-bound replay each refuse with the single bounded `conflict`
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shape; a replay is re-authorized fresh (a submitter whose
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authorization was revoked since the original is refused, not
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replayed); a `shared` declaration on `agent.enroll` is refused
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`validation_failed` with nothing executed and no fence row
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recorded (seed-only rule); two concurrent same-(operation, key)
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submissions produce exactly one mutation, the loser resolving
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through the replay path (no unhandled unique-violation fault).
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6. Same-tx atomicity fault injection (agent / credential write / fence
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/ audit / outbox), including a failure injected after the intake
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credential write commits its statement — everything rolls back, no
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orphan credential.
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7. Wizard-facing zero-mutation witness (contract 3 §6.10 shape): no
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call → zero rows in `agents`/`agent_audit_events`/`agent_outbox`/
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`agent_idempotency_fence` attributable to the family.
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8. `is_system` injection attempt is rejected by DTO validation.
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9. Correlation-id witness (contract 5 §6.3): a correlation id submitted
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on `agent.enroll` appears in its audit event(s) and in the result;
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the same holds for `agent.enrollment.get`'s result; the §6.3 static
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companions (no `any`-typed boundary pass-through; single audit
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emitter) apply. §6.3's no-existence-oracle probe: an unauthorized
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`agent.enrollment.get` of an existing agent and a get of a
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nonexistent id return indistinguishable results.
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10. CLI-parity witness (contract 5 §6.4): a CLI smoke invocation of
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`agent.enroll` and `agent.enrollment.get` against the Gateway
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succeeds with the same typed results the web client receives. The
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implementation slice therefore SHIPS CLI exposure for both
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operations (contract 5 §4.5 — a Gateway command without CLI
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exposure is a tracked conformance gap; this design refuses to open
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one).
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11. Fail-closed witness (contract 5 §6.5): with the owning tool or
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grant state unreachable (fault injection), the operation returns
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the internal-fault or authorization-refusal class and performs no
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fallback read/write.
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## 6. Out of scope
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Wizard orchestration (M4-6); any UI (D8/D12); un-enroll/update lifecycle
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(no contract requires it in v1 — the legacy write surfaces named in §2
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keep serving existing consumers); OAuth login, multi-account, comms
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auto-enroll, model recommendation (PRD full flow, deferred by D11);
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contract amendments (F1 recorded above for a future S2 pass). CLI
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exposure is explicitly IN scope (witness 10 — contract 5 §4.5 binds it).
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