plans: #436b approved at r5 1be535aca (dewey-0763); build carry N9 (restart after a revoke on an open rotation, 404 on delete by id is done) and N10 (serviceLeft a list); DESIGN.md unchanged; no code change

Deviation from D9b, recorded for BUILD.md: withGitea takes the ticket, not a cap. The key is the
session checkPublish checked as an agent holding its claim (broker.publishSession), so a tester,
reader or human cap never reaches a token, and the token is usable only between checkPublish and
recordPublish or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused.

agents/README.md

@@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
 | Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
 | Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
+| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
+| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
+| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
 
 Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's

agents/bushroot/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Bushroot
+
+Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
+that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/duckworth/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Duckworth
+
+Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gander/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Gander
+
+Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for the human
+boundary row (P19 333, #1694, mos-0989).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gander/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/herb/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Herb
+
+Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for a second gate lane
+design row (#1695, mos-0977 item 6).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `herb/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Honker
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/launchpad/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Launchpad
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/megavolt/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Megavolt
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage under mos-0974 and mos-0977 item 5 for MVP T1 item 6, the
+credential store per agent with its own git identity (#1697).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `megavolt/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/megavolt/work/436b/BUILD-CARRY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# #436b build carry items
+
+The design is approved at r5: 1be535aca, DESIGN.md sha256 68df02cdf890564c6ed0a5426204114389ba7eb0eea1cf04f1bf5938b6de45f4. Dewey gave the approval in dewey-0763 (verdict sha256 de52be1b…6b68). Section 7 is approved at fa5658941 by duckworth-0067 and is unchanged since. DESIGN.md stays as approved. The row's build takes the items below, and its BUILD.md cites this file.
+
+- N9 (dewey-0763). Revoke writes `grant.revoked`, not a `grant.step`. A restart after a revoke on an open rotation therefore still sees a `commit` with no settle after it, and settles again: no file, `grant-lost`, a wrong message to Jason, and repeated deletes that come back 404 and go to `serviceLeft`. Two fixes:
+  - The section 5 restart row "`commit`, rotation, settle-pending" takes the held row's clause "with no `grant.revoked` after it".
+  - A 404 on a delete by id counts as done, not as a `serviceLeft` entry. That applies to revoke, sweep and the settle deletes.
+  - Add a test: revoke on an open rotation, then a restart. No settle runs, no Gitea call is made, and the restart sends no message about it.
+- N10 (dewey-0763). `grant.revoked {serviceLeft}` can now hold two ids, so it is a list of ids everywhere. `sweep` reads it as one.
+- duckworth-0067 N1 is in r4 (section 5, X-G15). Nothing more is carried for it.

agents/megavolt/work/436b/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+# Gitea grant path, design draft r5 (Vikunja #436b, Gitea #1697 follow-up)
+
+Author: Megavolt. Reviewer: Dewey. GitHub half: Bushroot. Base: Gizmoduck's #436a r6 (f9039682e, final,
+`agents/gizmoduck/work/machine-grant/DESIGN.md` on origin/gizmoduck/machine-grant-design) and row 199's
+DESIGN.md section 7a (e10e03f6b). Mos rulings used here: mos-1130 and mos-1136.
+
+This draft builds nothing. It says how an Approve in Jason's inbox makes an agent's Gitea user, its token and
+its forks with no manual step, and it answers mos-1130 item 3 (a to e) on the executor's admin credential.
+
+## r5 changes (dewey-0761 on r4 3e66f5acf)
+
+Section 7 is unchanged from fa5658941.
+
+- Item 1 (blocks). A revoke on an open rotation deletes both tokens. When the last `grant.step` is a
+  rotation's `commit` with no settle after it (settle-pending or `grant-token-unknown`), section 6 step 3
+  deletes `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId`, each failure to `serviceLeft`. Section 5's
+  `grant-token-unknown` text now says both (X-G5).
+- N8. Step 0 refuses `grant-token-unknown` while the agent is held, so a revoke is the only way out.
+
+## r4 changes (dewey-0759 on r3 fa5658941, sage-1578, duckworth-0067)
+
+Section 7 is unchanged from fa5658941, the text Duckworth approved and Gizmoduck cites.
+
+- Item 1 (blocks), option (b), Sage's ruling in sage-1578. A step 0 refusal leaves the decision unspent only
+  until the next start. #436a r6 X3's start reconcile spends every resolved-yes grant decision with no
+  `action.allowed` as `interrupted`, and this draft no longer claims otherwise. `grants run` works while the
+  bus that refused is still up; after a restart the chief raises again and Jason approves again. `status`
+  says so on each open decision (D5, section 4 step 0, section 5, X-G11). (a) would change #436a r6, which is
+  final. The cost is in D5.
+- Item 2 (blocks). A settle that gets 200 with an `id` that is neither token no longer leaves the file in use.
+  Memory drops the credential (199 `revoke`'s memory step), the file and both recorded tokens stay, nothing
+  is deleted at Gitea, and the step ends `grant.failed {code: 'grant-token-unknown'}` for Jason. A restart
+  keeps the credential out of memory (`Credentials` `held`, built in #436b's row like `reload`). Revoke clears
+  it (section 5, X-G6).
+- N7. 3d says the private session-less writer runs `#secretCheck` on every guarded body, as `#event` does
+  (`broker.mjs:559`). The sentence is in 3d, so section 7 doesn't change.
+- duckworth-0067 N1. Every reader of grant evidence filters on `kind = 'action.allowed'` and the grant actor
+  pair, so a `grant.*` name under another kind is not evidence (section 5, X-G15).
+
+## r3 changes (dewey-0756 on r2 6db7cc45d, gizmoduck-0081 and -0084, duckworth-0065, mos-1144)
+
+- B1 (blocks). Only `#consumeGrant`'s own record carries `decision`. Every other `grant.*` body names the
+  decision `grantDecision`, so `#spent` sees exactly one spend. A step 0 or step 1 refusal leaves the
+  decision unspent (section 7, X-G11, a mutant).
+- B2 (blocks). Settle with the seat token is proven on scratch (F13): `GET /api/v1/token` answers 200 with the
+  minted id and 401 after the token is deleted. Only a 401 ends `grant-lost`. 403, 404, 5xx, a timeout, an
+  unreachable Gitea or a failed C1 to C4 leave the step open as `settle-pending`, delete nothing, and retry
+  on the next start and in `grants sweep` (section 5, X-G6). `Credentials.reload` is built by #436b's own
+  row in `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`; row 199's candidate doesn't change.
+- B3 (blocks). Step 5 compares against the user's forks of every upstream in the agent's `publish` list, not
+  only `target.projects`. The rendered block names those other upstreams as reach the token may have. A fork
+  whose upstream has left `publish` refuses `gitea-reach-wider` with its name (section 2, step 5, X-G12).
+- Section 7, the guard (gizmoduck-0081, -0084, duckworth-0065): one pattern, `grant.*`, on `body.action` and
+  on `body.operation` (Dewey N2: the consume record's `operation: 'grant.<method>'`). #436a renames its
+  `host.enroll.step`, `host.enrolled`, `host.checked` and `host.removed` into `grant.host.*`, so row 210's
+  `host.sudo` and `host.run` stay outside. The grant actor is `actor_role NULL, actor_run 'grant'`, which no
+  session or human event can produce (answers Dewey N1, same safety as `_bus`).
+- D12 / Q-B4 closed by mos-1146 (section 8).
+- N3. Step 5 reads every page of `/user/repos` and checks the total. N4. One nonce format, and the adopt
+  check compares the lowercased login. N5. `grants run` takes the `#inflight` claim. N6. One open-decision
+  query, `openGrantDecisions`, for `status`, rotate's void count and the start reconcile (section 7).
+
+## r2 changes (from r1 714c07304, Dewey's dewey-0754, verdict sha256 20d63dfb…)
+
+- D1 (blocks). `gitea_users` records the Gitea user `id`, and every later grant, rotation and fire compares it
+  (step 2). A nonce goes in `grant.step user` before the create and in the user's `full_name`, so a restart
+  adopts a user it made and refuses anything else (section 5, X-G6). Both are proven on scratch (F8, F9).
+- D2 (blocks). The audit records are `action.allowed` bodies with reserved `grant.*` actions, plus a trigger
+  in the store migration that only `system/grant` writes them (section 7). A call and its result are two
+  records paired by `callId`, because `events` is append-only (3d). To settle once with Gizmoduck for #436a.
+- D3 (blocks). Seat-token rotation gets its own rows. After `issue` has renamed the file, the executor settles
+  by asking Gitea which token the file holds (`GET /api/v1/token`, F7), and goes forward or back on that
+  answer, never by guessing (section 5).
+- D4 (blocks). 3c and section 8 now state the real gap. Reading the admin file gives instance admin, which is
+  more than a forged Approve gives. `write:admin` resets any user's password, email and admin flag, proven on
+  scratch (F10). The separate uid is deferred on cost, and the draft says so.
+- D5. The admin checks run before `#consumeGrant`, so a predictable refusal leaves Jason's Approve unspent. A
+  human `mosaic grants run <decision>` starts it again (step 0). The raise refuses when the admin slot is past
+  its rotate-by date. r4 (sage-1578): unspent only until the next start, when #436a r6 X3's reconcile spends
+  it as `interrupted`. The cost: if a step 0 refusal is followed by a restart before Jason rotates the admin
+  token or upgrades Gitea, the chief raises again and Jason approves again.
+- D6. One list of start checks (3a, 3e). The "no organization" claim is now part of the bootstrap promise,
+  and the check is that `GET /user/repos` is empty, which catches org and collaborator repositories (F11, and
+  F12 for a site-admin token).
+- D7. Admin rotation: a timestamped name (F9: names are unique per user), `--rotate-by` required, and `setAt`
+  changes, so open approvals are voided and `status` says so.
+- D8. The restart's remote undo runs the same admin checks and writes the same call records.
+- D9 (Q-B1). On fire: `prohibit_login` (F10) and delete every token the user has, not only the recorded one.
+- D10 (Q-B2). Step 5 checks the seat token's real reach with `GET /user/repos` (F11). Section 8 says reach can
+  grow later.
+- D11. One Gitea per business, stated, and checked at `set` and at raise.
+- D12. Section 8 asks for the jason.woltje comparison. I can't check it myself.
+
+## 0. What this adds to #436a
+
+#436a section 11 left `method: "gitea"` for a later draft, because the executor needs an admin credential and
+roles may never hold the admin scope (`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:108-112`). That rule stays. The
+admin credential here is not a role service: no `useFor` reaches it, no definition can list it, and only the
+executor reads it.
+
+Everything in #436a's sections 4 and 5 holds unless this draft says otherwise: the `credential.mint` raise
+with a `grant` body, chief only (R3), the rendered block (R4), Jason's Approve via cli (R5, X1),
+`#consumeGrant` with `operation: 'grant.gitea'`, the `#inflight` claim and abort (X5), `grant.step` records and
+restart reconcile (X3), and revoke local first (section 6).
+
+What row 199 already gives: the agent's `identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`, its
+`publish: [project]` grant and each project's `remote` (199 D8, D9), the store and `issue(instance, service,
+token, date, commit)` (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:156`), and section 7a's rule that `issue` accepts a
+resolved `credential.mint` decision as the human path. `issue` writes the file (tmp, fsync, rename), then calls
+`commit`, then fills memory (`credentials.mjs:156-193`). Section 5 depends on that order.
+
+## 1. Facts, proven on a scratch Gitea
+
+Run on gitea/gitea:1.27.1 (sha256:fe4e4b1c8b93) on 127.0.0.1, throwaway data, container removed after each
+run. Scripts and logs: `/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r199/g436b/`. No log holds a token or password value.
+F1 to F6 were reported in megavolt-0034, and Mos accepted them in mos-1136.
+
+- F1 (`run4.log`). `POST /api/v1/users/{u}/tokens` with `Authorization: Basic <admin>:<admin token>` creates a
+  token for another user: 201. The same token in a `token` or `Bearer` header gets 401 on that route, while the
+  `token` header works on `GET /api/v1/user` (200). So the executor sends Basic on the token routes and
+  `token` everywhere else.
+- F2 (`run4.log`). The child-scope cap: a child scope broader than the parent's gets 403 ("cannot create an
+  access token with a broader scope than the authenticating token"), for `write:organization` and for `all`.
+  A narrower one gets 201.
+- F3 (`run4.log`). TOTP 2FA on the admin account blocks password Basic (401) and doesn't block token Basic
+  (201).
+- F4. The route's check is `reqSelfOrAdmin`: whether the account is a site admin, not the token's scope. Any
+  `write:user` token on a site-admin account can mint a token for any user.
+- F5. `write:X` implies `read:X` under Gitea's `HasScope`.
+- F6. The cap is Gitea #38406, backported in #38426 (de4b8277e9 on release/v1.27, 2026-07-12). It first ships
+  in v1.27.0. v1.27.0-rc0 lacks it, and so does every 1.24.x, 1.25.x and 1.26.x through 1.26.4.
+- F7 (`introspect.log`). `GET /api/v1/token` with the `token` header gives 200 with `id`, `name`, `scopes`,
+  `user`, `created_at` and `last_used_at`, and no token value. With Basic it gives 404. Scopes come back
+  normalized (3b).
+- F8 (`r2probe.log` 1a-1d). `POST /admin/users` with a `full_name` gives 201 with the user's `id` and that
+  `full_name`. `GET /users/SEAT-ONE` finds `seat-one` with the same `id`: names match case-insensitively. A
+  create of `Seat-One` next to `seat-one` gets 422.
+- F9 (`r2probe.log` 2a-2c). A second token with a name already used by that user gets 400. `GET
+  /users/{u}/tokens` with Basic lists the user's tokens.
+- F10 (`r2probe.log` 4a-4f, 5a). With `write:admin`, `PATCH /admin/users/{u}` on another site admin sets a new
+  password (200; the new password then signs in, the old one gets 401) and a new email. On a plain user it sets
+  `admin: true`, then `admin: false` with `prohibit_login: true`. Without `write:admin` the same PATCH gets 403.
+- F11 (`reach.log`). With the seat token (`write:repository`, `read:user`), `GET /user/repos` lists the user's
+  own fork, then also a repository it was made collaborator on, then also an org repository after it joined an
+  org team. `GET /user/orgs` and `GET /users/{u}/orgs` need `read:organization`, which neither token holds.
+- F12 (`c4.log`). With a site-admin account's three-scope token, `GET /user/repos` is empty on an instance
+  where other users and an org it isn't in hold public and private repositories: being site admin doesn't add
+  them. It lists a repository once the account is a collaborator, and an org repository once it joins that
+  org's team. Joining an org with no repositories leaves it empty, and `GET /user/orgs` gets 403 (no
+  `read:organization`).
+- F13 (`b2.log` b1-b7). Two seat tokens minted (201, ids 2 and 3). `GET /api/v1/token` with each token in the
+  `token` header gives 200, and the `id` is the minted one for both. After `DELETE` of seat-a's token (204), the
+  same call with it gives 401. After `prohibit_login` on seat-b (200), the call with seat-b's token gives 403
+  ("This account is prohibited from signing in"), not 401. A value never issued gives 401. So 401 is the only
+  answer that means the token is gone; 403 means the account is shut, and section 5 leaves it `settle-pending`.
+
+## 2. The binding
+
+The shared part (section 10) is proposed to Bushroot in megavolt-0036. This section is the Gitea half.
+
+```
+grant: { "method": "gitea", "agent": "<instance>", "rotateBy": "YYYY-MM-DD",
+         "target": { "projects": ["<project>", ...] } }
+```
+
+Code fixes the scopes of the agent's token: `write:repository` and `read:user`, row 199 A2's set. The raise
+can't name scopes, so the chief can't widen them.
+
+Checks at raise, inside the raise transaction. Each refusal stores nothing:
+
+- `agent` is a role instance of this business, its definition declares `{"service": "gitea"}`, and it has
+  `identity` and a `publish` grant (199 D8). Otherwise `gitea-not-declared`.
+- Each project in `target.projects` is in the agent's `publish` list (`remote-not-granted`), and its
+  `remote`'s origin equals `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`), the same checks as 199 D9 step 2.
+- The business has an admin slot for `gitea` whose recorded `url` has the same origin
+  (`grant-admin-missing`), and the slot isn't past its rotate-by date (`grant-admin-rotation-due`).
+- `rotateBy` is inside 199's rotation window.
+
+The rendered block, appended by the broker as #436a R4 does: agent, Gitea user, email, Gitea URL, each fork
+URL it will make (`<url>/<user>/<repo>`), the two fixed scopes, the rotate-by date, one of "new Gitea user",
+"existing stack-made user, new token" or "token rotation" (step 2), and the line "The token can write every
+repository this user can write. Step 5 checks that this is only its forks." Then, when the agent's `publish`
+list has projects outside `target.projects`, the line "It may also reach this user's existing forks of:" and
+each such upstream. The raise makes no network call, so the block names every such upstream, not only those
+with a fork (B3). The 4096-character cap applies as in R4.
+
+The raise event body gets `grant = {method, agent, target, rotateBy, definitionSha256, identitySha256,
+adminSha256}`:
+
+- `definitionSha256` as in #436a.
+- `identitySha256` over the agent's `identity`, its `publish` list and the `remote` of every project in
+  `publish` (step 5 checks against all of them).
+- `adminSha256` over the admin slot's metadata (`url`, `account`, `setAt`), never over the token.
+
+At step 1 any of the three that differs refuses `decision-mismatch`. So a changed identity, publish list,
+upstream or admin credential between raise and Approve voids the Approve (REQ-GRANT-2).
+
+## 3. The executor's admin credential (mos-1130 item 3)
+
+### 3a. A dedicated account
+
+One Gitea account per Gitea instance, named `mosaic-grant` by default. It is a site admin and has TOTP 2FA on
+(F3: the token path still works). Its password and TOTP secret stay with Jason and never reach the stack. It
+is never jason.woltje or any other human's account. It owns no repositories, belongs to no organization and is
+no repository's collaborator.
+
+The admin checks, one list, run at `set` (3e), before every executor start (step 0) and before every remote
+undo (section 5):
+
+- C1. `GET /api/v1/version` is at least 1.27.0 (F6), compared as numbers, or `gitea-too-old`.
+- C2. `GET /api/v1/user` gives `login == account` as recorded at `set`, and `is_admin` true, or
+  `grant-admin-account`.
+- C3. `GET /api/v1/token` gives exactly the three scopes (3b), or `grant-admin-scope`.
+- C4. `GET /api/v1/user/repos` is empty, or `grant-admin-not-dedicated`. By F11 and F12 this list covers
+  owned, collaborator and org-team repositories, and site admin alone doesn't fill it.
+
+What code can't check: that nobody else uses the account, and org membership with no repositories (F11: the
+orgs routes need `read:organization`, which the admin token doesn't hold and shouldn't). Both are the bootstrap
+step's promise and go in the approval notes (section 8).
+
+### 3b. The scopes, each shown needed
+
+The admin token holds exactly `write:admin`, `write:user` and `write:repository` (mos-1136 item 1). From
+`matrix.log`, with each scope dropped in turn:
+
+| Parent token | A1 create user | A2 mint seat token | A3 fork (seat token) | A5 delete seat token |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| all four | 201 | 201 | 202 | 204 |
+| without `write:admin` | **403** | 201 | 202 | 204 |
+| without `write:user` | 201 | **403** | 202 | **403** |
+| without `write:repository` | 201 | **403** (cap, F2) | 202 | 204 |
+| without `read:user` | 201 | 201 | 202 | 204 |
+
+- `write:admin` is needed for A1, and for `prohibit_login` on fire (F10).
+- `write:user` is needed for A2 and A5.
+- `write:repository` is needed only because of the cap. The seat's token holds `write:repository`, and a
+  parent must hold at least what it mints. The executor itself never writes a repository with it.
+- `read:user` is covered by `write:user` (F5), so it is dropped.
+
+C3 reads the scopes with the `token` header (F7). Gitea reports normalized scopes, so a token made with the
+three plus `read:user` reads as the three. That is harmless, because `read:user` adds nothing to `write:user`.
+A token made with `all`, or with another category, refuses.
+
+### 3c. Where it lives, who can read it
+
+- The token: `<configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/gitea/admin`, 0600, in 0700 dirs, owned by the stack's
+  OS user. Written and checked by row 199's store code (D1: tmp, fsync, rename, the mode and owner checks).
+- The metadata: `admin.json` next to it, 0600, holding `url`, `account`, `rotateBy` and `setAt`. No secret.
+- A business grants on one Gitea. `set` refuses a second `url` while a slot exists (`grant-admin-exists`;
+  `remove` first), and the raise checks the agent's Gitea against the slot's `url` (section 2). Two businesses
+  on one Gitea each hold their own token for the same `mosaic-grant` account.
+
+Who can read the file: the stack's OS user, and root.
+
+Whether an agent process runs as that uid:
+
+- On dragon-lin, yes. The stack runs as jwoltje, and so does every agent process on the machine: 13 claude, 4
+  codex and 2 pi processes, the bwrap sandboxes and node, counted 2026-10-20. That includes the T3 dev seats,
+  which are not sandboxed and can read any jwoltje file.
+- Stack workers run in the seat sandbox, which has a private HOME and no `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.ssh`
+  (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs`). A sandboxed worker can't reach the file by path. The sandbox doesn't
+  confine the network or the host uid (`sandbox.mjs:29-31`). So the file is safe from a sandboxed worker and
+  not from an unsandboxed process running as the same uid.
+- On the .53 and .54 installs (#432) the stack runs as its own OS user. Workers run sandboxed as that user.
+  The T3 seats don't run there.
+
+What a separate uid would buy. A same-uid process has two paths. It can forge a human proof (`verifyHuman` is
+a cooperative same-UID check, `packages/bus/src/human.mjs:50-52`), and an approved grant then gives it a
+two-scope token for a stack-made, non-admin user, because step 2 refuses foreign and admin users. Or it can
+read the admin file, which gives instance admin (section 8). A separate uid for the file and the executor would
+close the second path and leave the first. That is a real step up, from "a seat token for a stack user" to "no
+admin".
+
+I defer it on cost, not because it wouldn't help. It means the executor runs as its own process under its own
+uid, with an IPC path from the bus that carries the decision id and nothing the bus could forge. That is a row
+of its own, and it is cleaner after the human proof stops being same-uid (#435 behind Q175 sign-in). Jason
+approves the gap as section 8 states it.
+
+### 3d. Every use logged, and rotation
+
+Every Gitea call made with the admin token, and every call the executor makes with a seat token, writes two
+records (section 7 has where they live):
+
+```
+grant.call   { callId, reason, method: "gitea", op }        written before the call
+grant.result { callId, status }                             written after it
+```
+
+- `op` is one of `version`, `self`, `token-scopes`, `repos-check`, `user-get`, `user-create`, `user-patch`,
+  `token-list`, `token-create`, `token-delete`, `admin-rotate`, `fork-get`, `fork`, `seat-self`,
+  `seat-repos`, `token-whoami`.
+- `reason` is the decision id for a grant or its undo, the `grant.revoked` record id for a revoke, the
+  `grant.sweep` record id for a sweep, or `admin:<verb>` with the human actor for `set`, `rotate` and `remove`.
+- No body, no header, no token, no URL query. `Credentials.assertClean` (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:233`,
+  the runtime's `secretCheck`) runs on both. The private session-less writer of section 7 runs `#secretCheck`
+  on every guarded body it takes, `grant.step`, `grant.applied`, `grant.failed`, `grant.revoked`,
+  `grant.sweep` and the consume record included, as `#event` does (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:559`) (N7).
+- `events` is append-only (`events_no_update`, `packages/bus/src/migrations/3b.sql:131`), so the result is its
+  own record, written in the transaction of the step's next `grant.step` where there is one. A `grant.call`
+  with no `grant.result` means the process died during the call. Reconcile lists each one in its message.
+
+Rotation of the admin token: a human-only verb, `mosaic grants admin rotate gitea --rotate-by <date>`. It never
+runs from an agent, the chief or the tester, and it doesn't need a decision because only `verifyHuman` can
+start it:
+
+1. C1 to C4 with the current token.
+2. Mint a successor for the admin account itself: `POST /users/<account>/tokens` with Basic and the same three
+   scopes, named `mosaic-grant-<UTC yyyymmddThhmmssZ>`, so a second rotation on one day doesn't collide (F9).
+   F2's cap holds it to the current token's scopes.
+3. C2 and C3 with the successor.
+4. Write it through 199's tmp, fsync and rename. Update `admin.json` with the new `rotateBy` and a new `setAt`.
+5. Delete the old token at Gitea by name, with the new token. If that fails, `status` shows
+   `adminTokenLeft: <name>` until `rotate --finish` succeeds.
+
+A new `setAt` changes `adminSha256`, so every grant decision raised before the rotation and not yet run
+refuses `decision-mismatch` (fail closed). `rotate` prints how many open grant decisions that voids, and
+`status` lists them.
+
+`status` shows the rotate-by date. Past it, the raise and the executor refuse `grant-admin-rotation-due` until
+Jason rotates. A forgotten rotation stops grants rather than letting an old token run on.
+
+If the admin token leaks, Jason deletes it in Gitea (Settings, Applications, as `mosaic-grant`) or disables
+the account, then runs `mosaic grants admin remove gitea`, which unlinks the slot. Live agent tokens keep
+working. Each one is revoked on its own (section 6).
+
+### 3e. The one bootstrap step
+
+Once per Gitea instance per stack, at #436b deploy. This is the only manual credential step left, and
+Jason's approval names it:
+
+1. In Gitea, Jason creates `mosaic-grant` as a site admin with no repositories and no organizations, turns on
+   TOTP, and as that user creates a token with `write:admin`, `write:user` and `write:repository`.
+2. On the stack host, as the stack's OS user:
+   `mosaic grants admin set gitea --url <url> --account mosaic-grant --rotate-by <date>`, with the token on
+   stdin (never argv).
+
+`set` is human-only (`verifyHuman`). It runs C1 to C4 (3a) before it writes anything, and any failure writes
+nothing.
+
+## 4. The executor's steps
+
+0. **Start and pre-checks.** X1 starts the executor on Jason's yes. It claims `(agent, "gitea")` in
+   `#inflight` (#436a X5), then runs C1 to C4 and the admin rotate-by check. A refusal here writes
+   `grant.failed {code, grantDecision}` and leaves the decision unspent (section 7's spend rule). After the
+   fix (a rotation, an upgrade), Jason runs `mosaic grants run <decision>` (human-only, `verifyHuman`), which
+   starts step 0 again, claim included. That holds only while the bus that refused is up: at the next start,
+   #436a r6 X3's reconcile spends every resolved-yes grant decision with no `action.allowed` as
+   `interrupted`, a step 0 refusal included, and the chief raises again (D5, sage-1578). `status` lists each
+   such open decision with `spentAtNextStart: true`. While the agent is held (`grant-token-unknown`, section
+   5), step 0 refuses `grant-token-unknown`, so a revoke is the only way out (N8). While a start or another `grants run` holds the claim it refuses
+   `grant-busy` before any call, as #436a X2's `host-busy` does. It refuses `decision-consumed` for a spent
+   decision. No other path starts it. The tag is #436a X2 step 2's, over business, agent and `"gitea"`.
+1. **Recheck and consume**, in one transaction: `#consumeGrant` with `operation: 'grant.gitea'`, the
+   definition still declares `gitea`, the three hashes match (section 2), no revoke of `(agent, gitea)` newer
+   than the raise. A failure rolls the transaction back, so the decision is not spent, and then writes
+   `grant.failed {code, grantDecision}`. Nothing remote has changed. `grants run` may retry it, but these
+   refusals (`decision-mismatch`, a newer revoke, the definition) recur until the chief raises again.
+2. **User.** `GET /users/{user}` (F8: case-insensitive).
+   - 404: write `grant.step {step: 'user', nonce}`, where `nonce` is 16 random lowercase hex digits. Then
+     `POST /admin/users` with the agent's `gitea.user` and `email`, `full_name` = `<identity.name> [mosaic
+     <nonce>]`, a random password that is never stored, and `must_change_password: false`. Then, in one
+     transaction, record `gitea_users {user, id, nonce}` with the `id` from the response (F8) and
+     `grant.result`.
+   - 200, and `gitea_users` has this business and agent with the same `id`: go on. That is a second grant or a
+     rotation. A user deleted at Gitea and remade by a human under the same name has a new `id`, and refuses.
+   - 200 with any other `id`, or no `gitea_users` record: refuse `gitea-user-foreign`. The executor never mints
+     a token for a user this stack didn't create. Without this check an `identity` naming a human's account,
+     jason.woltje included, would get a token minted for that account on Approve.
+   - The user is a site admin, or has `prohibit_login`: refuse `gitea-user-admin` or `gitea-user-disabled`.
+3. **Token.** Write `grant.step {step: 'mint', tokenName}`, with the name `mosaic-<tag>-<decision>`. Then
+   `POST /users/{user}/tokens` with Basic and scopes `write:repository` and `read:user`. The value is held in
+   memory only. Write `grant.step {step: 'minted', tokenId}`.
+4. **Forks.** With the new token, for each project: `GET /repos/{user}/{repo}`. If it exists, its `parent`
+   must be the project's upstream, or `fork-foreign`. If it's 404, `POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks`.
+   Push-to-create stays off on the Gitea side (199 N11).
+5. **Verify.** With the new token: `GET /api/v1/user` gives `login == user` and the recorded `id`. Then
+   `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=50&page=N` from page 1 until a page holds fewer than 50, with the count
+   equal to `X-Total-Count`. More than 20 pages, or a count that disagrees, refuses `gitea-reach-unknown`.
+   Every listed repository must be owned by this user and have as `parent` the upstream of a project in the
+   agent's `publish` list (F11). Anything else refuses `gitea-reach-wider` and names it: a repository from a
+   collaborator or org-team add, or the user's old fork of an upstream that has left `publish`. So the token
+   never reaches past the rendered block (B3).
+6. **Go live.** Write `grant.step {step: 'commit', previousTokenId}` (`null` for a first grant). Check the
+   abort signal, and with no `await` between, call 199 `issue(agent, "gitea", token, rotateBy, commit)`.
+   `commit` writes the `gitea_grants` record (tokenId, tokenName, projects, rotateBy, decision). The reference
+   is registered first (#436a X4).
+7. **Old token.** For a rotation, `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{previousTokenId}` after the new one is live.
+   A failure adds `serviceLeft: <id>`, which `sweep` clears.
+8. **Applied.** `grant.applied {grantDecision, agent, user, userId, tokenId, forks}` and a message to the human and
+   the chief. The token appears in no record, message or log.
+
+The claim is released in a `finally`.
+
+## 5. Failure and restart
+
+Ordered so a failure leaves nothing an agent can use. "Delete the token" is `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{id
+or name}` with the admin token, after C1 to C4, with `grant.call` and `grant.result` whose reason is the
+decision (D8). Best effort; a failure adds `serviceLeft`.
+
+**Settle.** Once `issue` has renamed the file, the file may hold the new token or the previous one, and the
+record may name either. The executor and the restart never guess. They read the store file and ask Gitea which
+token it is: `GET /api/v1/token` with that value in the `token` header (F7 for admin tokens, F13 for the
+two-scope seat token; op `token-whoami`). The answer is an `id`, never a value.
+
+- 200, `id` is the new token: forward. The `gitea_grants` record gets the new token (if `commit` hadn't
+  run), memory loads the file (`Credentials.reload(instance, service)`, a new method with load's checks,
+  built in #436b's row; row 199 doesn't change), and the previous token is deleted.
+- 200, `id` is the previous token: back. The new token is deleted. The record keeps or gets the previous
+  token.
+- 401: the file's token no longer exists at Gitea (F13 b4). The previous token can't be in the file, so the
+  agent holds nothing usable. Delete both by id, unregister, delete the record, unlink the file, and end
+  `grant.failed {code: 'grant-lost'}`. A new decision is needed. No file at all is the same case.
+- 200, `id` is neither token: the file holds a live token this grant didn't mint and step 5 never checked.
+  Memory drops it (199 `revoke`'s memory step) and the agent gets `credential-unavailable`. The file, the
+  record and both recorded tokens stay, and nothing is deleted at Gitea. The step ends `grant.failed {code:
+  'grant-token-unknown', grantDecision, tokenId}`, where `tokenId` is the id Gitea gave, and Jason gets a
+  message. `status` shows `tokenUnknown`. At each start, before `Credentials` loads, the reconcile passes such
+  `(agent, "gitea")` pairs as `held` (a `Credentials` option built in #436b's row, like `reload`), so memory
+  never loads that file. A revoke (section 6) clears it: it unlinks the file and deletes both recorded tokens.
+  The unknown token is Jason's to look at.
+- Anything else is `settle-pending`, and nothing is deleted: 403, 404, 5xx, a timeout, Gitea unreachable, or
+  C1 to C4 failing first. The last `grant.step` stays `commit`, the
+  `grant.call` without a `grant.result` stays listed, and `status` shows `settlePending`. The file stays as
+  it is, and the agent can use it: it holds one of the two tokens, and both passed step 5. The next start
+  and `mosaic grants sweep gitea` settle again. Only a 401 deletes.
+
+| Fails at | State left | Cleanup |
+|---|---|---|
+| 0 | nothing, the decision unspent until the next start | none. `grants run` retries while this bus is up; after a restart the reconcile spends it (`interrupted`) |
+| 1 | nothing | none |
+| 2, before the create | nothing | none |
+| 2, after the create, before the record | a user with the nonce | none here. Restart adopts it by the nonce (below) |
+| 3, before `minted` | maybe a token nobody holds | delete the token by its recorded name |
+| 4 or 5 | a token, maybe some forks | delete the token. Forks stay; they hold only upstream content |
+| 6 before the rename, first grant | a token | unregister, delete the token |
+| 6 after the rename, first grant | a store file with the new token, maybe the record | unlink the file, unregister, delete the record if written, delete the token |
+| 6 before the rename, rotation | the previous grant intact | delete the new token |
+| 6 after the rename, rotation | the file holds the new token, memory the previous | settle (forward: the new token passed step 5) |
+| 7 | both tokens live, the new one in use | `serviceLeft: <previousTokenId>` |
+
+**Restart**, before `Credentials` loads, from the last `grant.step`, as #436a X3. The local part runs first;
+the remote part runs after the bus is up, with C1 to C4.
+
+| Last step | Local | Remote |
+|---|---|---|
+| `user` | none | `GET /users/{user}`. 200 with `full_name` ending `[mosaic <nonce>]`, not admin: adopt, record `gitea_users` with its `id`. 404: none. Anything else: `gitea-user-orphan` with the name, for Jason to look at; nothing is deleted |
+| `mint` or `minted` | none | delete the token by name |
+| `commit`, first grant | unlink the file if present, delete the record if present | delete the new token |
+| `commit`, rotation | none | settle |
+| `commit`, rotation, settle-pending | none; memory loads the file as usual | none. The step stays open, and the next start or `grants sweep` settles again |
+| `grant.failed {code: 'grant-token-unknown'}` with no `grant.revoked` after it | pass `(agent, "gitea")` as `held`; memory doesn't load the file | none. Jason's message repeats until a revoke |
+
+Every reader of grant evidence (this reconcile, `status`, `openGrantDecisions`'s callers, `grants sweep`)
+reads a `grant.*` record only where `kind = 'action.allowed'` and `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS
+'grant'`, so a `grant.*` name under another kind or actor is never evidence (duckworth-0067 N1).
+
+Then `grant.failed {code: 'interrupted'}` (or `grant.applied` if a rotation settled forward) and a message to
+Jason. A `grant.call` with no `grant.result` is listed in that message. After `interrupted`, the chief raises
+again and Jason approves again.
+
+## 6. Revoke
+
+As #436a section 6, with the same revokers (the human, the assistant in its own organization, the tester on
+dev only):
+
+1. 199 `revoke`: memory, abort a use or the executor in flight, unlink the file.
+2. One store transaction deletes the `gitea_grants` record and records `grant.revoked`.
+3. After C1 to C4, `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{tokenId}` with the admin token. If Gitea can't be reached,
+   `grant.revoked {serviceLeft: <tokenId>}`, and `mosaic grants sweep gitea` clears it later. When the last
+   `grant.step` is a rotation's `commit` with no settle after it (settle-pending, or `grant-token-unknown`),
+   two tokens are live and the record may name either (section 5), so the revoke deletes both
+   `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId`, each failure listed in `serviceLeft` (dewey-0761). The id
+   `grant-token-unknown` named is not one this stack minted; it stays for Jason.
+
+That closes 199 D12's gap: the token is gone at Gitea without Jason's A5 step.
+
+The Gitea user and its forks stay after a revoke, so a new grant can reuse them.
+
+On `credentials delete` (a fire), after the steps above and with the recorded `id` checked first:
+
+- `GET /users/{user}/tokens` with Basic (F9), and delete every token it lists, not only the recorded one. A
+  token the record doesn't know about doesn't outlive a fire.
+- `PATCH /admin/users/{user}` with `prohibit_login: true` (F10).
+- Each step that fails is listed in `serviceLeft`, and `sweep` retries it.
+
+## 7. Store records
+
+Two tables, in #436a S1's migration if #436a row b and this row land together, otherwise a `3j-3k.sql`:
+
+- `gitea_users`: business, agent, user, id, nonce, the decision that created it.
+- `gitea_grants`: business, agent, user, tokenId, tokenName, projects, rotate-by date, decision.
+
+The executor, revoke and `sweep` are the only writers, each in the transaction of its record. The admin slot
+is a file, not a table, so a store backup holds no admin token.
+
+The audit records (`grant.step`, `grant.call`, `grant.result`, `grant.applied`, `grant.failed`,
+`grant.revoked`, `grant.sweep`) are `action.allowed` events with that name in `body.action`. They are not new
+event kinds, so `events` and its CHECK (`3b.sql:9-30`) aren't rebuilt. This section is the rule's only home
+(mos-1144). #436a r6 (f9039682e) uses it too: #436a row a's BUILD.md cites this section at the commit Duckworth
+approves and maps r6's names to `body.action` values, with these renames (gizmoduck-0084):
+`host.enroll.step` to `grant.host.enroll.step`, `host.enrolled` to `grant.host.enrolled`, `host.checked` to
+`grant.host.checked`, `host.removed` to `grant.host.removed`. Cites are origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6.
+
+**The guarded namespace** is one pattern: an `action.allowed` whose `body.action` or `body.operation` GLOBs
+`'grant.*'`. `operation` is included because `#consumeGrant`'s consume record is
+`{operation: 'grant.<method>', decision}` (#436a X1), and a forged one would spend a decision (Dewey N2). Row
+210's `host.sudo` and `host.run`, written from agent sessions, stay outside it, and no grant-path name is left
+under `host.*`.
+
+**The grant actor** is `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS 'grant'`. The only production insert into `events`
+is `#event` (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:568`), which writes the session's role and run. Every session with a
+NULL role also has a NULL run: the human (`:537`), the reader (`:549`) and a session-less record (`:1124`). The
+tester's role is `tester`. So neither a session nor the human path can produce that pair, as no instance can
+be named `_bus` (`:166-168`). A `system` role would not be safe, because `system` matches `ID_PATTERN`
+(Dewey N1). The broker writes guarded events, the consume record included, through a private session-less
+writer added in #436a row a; `#event` is unchanged. Revoke, sweep and check run for the human, the assistant,
+the tester or the chief, and their events still go out under the grant actor, with `body.by` naming the caller
+the broker checked.
+
+**Two guards** stop a forged record:
+
+- `recordEvent`, the trusted adapters' path (`broker.mjs:1111`), refuses `reserved-event` for any
+  `action.allowed` in the guarded namespace, as it does today for `git.push.working` and the merge action.
+- The migration adds a trigger: an `action.allowed` in the guarded namespace aborts unless
+  `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS 'grant'`. That covers any path that misses the first guard.
+
+**Spend rule (B1).** `#spent` (`broker.mjs:811-817`) counts any `action.allowed` that names the decision in
+`body.decision` and whose `operation` isn't `decision.raise`; a record with no `operation` counts. So the
+consume record is the only guarded body with a `decision` key. Every other `grant.*` body names the decision
+`grantDecision`. A step 0 or step 1 refusal therefore leaves the decision unspent, and the start reconcile
+for "resolved yes, unspent" keeps reading `#spent` unchanged.
+
+A wider gap sits under this one and isn't this row's: today any `recordEvent` `action.allowed` that carries
+`body.decision` spends that decision. Follow-up for Sage to file.
+
+**Open decisions (N6).** One query, `openGrantDecisions(business, method)`: `credential.mint` decisions
+resolved yes by the human whose raise body has `grant.method = method`, and for which `#spent` is false.
+`status` lists them, `grants admin rotate` counts the ones it voids (all of them, since `adminSha256`
+changes), and the start reconcile reads the same query.
+
+**No task refs.** Guarded bodies never carry `target` or `task_ref` holding a task ref, so they stay clear of
+`task-subject-required` (`broker.mjs:561-565`) on any path. No other `action.allowed` reader sees these
+events: the rest key on `decision.raise` (`:670`, `:803`), `git.push.working` (`:863`, `:2019`) or
+routine (`:2100-2102`).
+
+## 8. Approval notes for Jason
+
+Stated once, here, for the #436b approval:
+
+- **Site admin plus `write:user`, and `write:admin`.** The admin token can mint a token for any Gitea user,
+  with any scope up to its own three, including users the stack didn't create (F4). With `write:admin` it can
+  also set any user's password, email and admin flag, and disable any user (F10, proven on scratch against a
+  second site admin). Whoever holds the token can take over any account on that Gitea, jason.woltje's
+  included, make any user a site admin, and read or write any repository. The executor uses none of that
+  beyond its steps, but the token itself can.
+- **Same uid on dragon-lin.** The token is a file readable by jwoltje, and every agent process on dragon-lin,
+  T3 dev seats included, runs as jwoltje (3c). The seat sandbox keeps sandboxed workers away from it. It does
+  not keep an unsandboxed same-uid process away. Such a process gets instance admin by reading the file, which
+  is more than it could get by forging an Approve. A separate uid would close that path. It is deferred on cost
+  (3c), not because it wouldn't help.
+- **For comparison, today (D12).** Every dev seat on dragon-lin already pushes as jason.woltje through
+  `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` (mos-1106). jason.woltje is a site admin on git.mosaicstack.dev, with
+  restricted false (mos-1146: Mos read `/api/v1/users/jason.woltje` with the mos token at 23:05:29Z; Jason's
+  token wasn't used). So a same-uid process on dragon-lin can already act as a site admin there through that
+  credential, and the admin file adds little exposure on that Gitea beyond what the seats already have. It
+  still matters on any other Gitea a business grants on, and once seats stop pushing as jason.woltje (#431).
+- **A seat token's reach can grow.** Step 5 checks, at the grant, that the token reaches only its forks. If
+  someone later adds the user to an org or as a collaborator, the token reaches that too, until the next grant
+  or rotation checks again.
+- **The admin account is dedicated by promise.** Code checks that it is a site admin with these three scopes
+  and no reachable repositories (C1 to C4). It can't check that nobody else uses it or that it is in no org.
+- **The bootstrap step** (3e) is the one manual credential step: Jason creates `mosaic-grant`, its TOTP and
+  its token, and enters the token once on stdin.
+
+## 9. Tests and mutants (for the row, not built here)
+
+Unit tests use a fake Gitea over TLS, as row 199's publish tests do. Section 1's facts get a scratch
+gitea/gitea:1.27.1 test on 127.0.0.1 with throwaway data, removed after. No test contacts git.mosaicstack.dev
+or any other live service. No token value is printed.
+
+| Test | Claim |
+|---|---|
+| X-G1 | a gitea raise for an agent without `gitea`, `identity` or `publish`, or a project outside `publish`, a remote on another host, no admin slot, or a slot past rotate-by refuses and stores nothing |
+| X-G2 | `set` refuses a version below 1.27.0 (fake reports 1.26.4, 1.27.0-rc0, and 1.9.0 against 1.27.0 as a string trap), a non-admin, a login mismatch, an account that reaches a repository, a token with another scope or `all`, and a second `url`. It writes nothing on any refusal |
+| X-G3 | on scratch 1.27.1, end to end: user made with the nonce and its `id` recorded, token minted with the two scopes, forks made, step 5 passes, `issue` writes the 0600 file, `grant.applied`, then revoke deletes the token at Gitea (gone from its list) |
+| X-G4 | an existing user with no record, a recorded name whose `id` differs (deleted and remade, and a case variant of the name), a site-admin user and a disabled user each refuse before any token call |
+| X-G5 | each failure row of section 5 leaves the stated state, rotation rows included. A failed delete leaves `serviceLeft`. A revoke while a rotation's `commit` is settle-pending, and one after `grant-token-unknown`, deletes both `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId` at the fake, and a failure of either lands in `serviceLeft`. A new grant for a held agent refuses `grant-token-unknown` at step 0, before any Gitea call |
+| X-G6 | a restart after `user` adopts a user whose `full_name` ends with ` [mosaic <nonce>]` (16 lowercase hex), whose lowercased login equals `gitea.user` lowercased and who isn't an admin; does nothing on 404; and reports `gitea-user-orphan` for a different `full_name`, a different login or an admin. A restart after `mint`, `minted` and `commit` of a first grant leaves no token at Gitea, no file and no record. A restart after `commit` of a rotation settles forward when the file holds the new token and back when it holds the previous one, ends `grant-lost` only on a 401, and stays `settle-pending` with nothing deleted on 403, 404, 500, a timeout and an unreachable fake. On 200 with an unknown `id` it drops the credential from memory, deletes nothing at Gitea, keeps the file, ends `grant-token-unknown`, and a second restart still doesn't load the file; a revoke then clears it |
+| X-G7 | an identity, publish, upstream or admin slot change between raise and Approve refuses `decision-mismatch` before any Gitea call. An admin rotate voids open grant decisions and `status` lists them |
+| X-G8 | every admin-token and seat-token call writes `grant.call` before it and `grant.result` after it, paired by `callId`. A crash between them is listed by reconcile. No record body holds a token |
+| X-G9 | admin rotate: C1 to C4, the successor named by time, checked, written, the old token deleted. Two rotations in one second's name refuse cleanly, not half done. Past rotate-by, the raise and the executor refuse |
+| X-G10 | seat-token rotation: the new token is live before the old one is deleted |
+| X-G11 | a step 0 refusal (rotation due, too old) and a step 1 refusal leave `#spent` false, and `grants run` by the human gets past `#consumeGrant`. `grants run` from an agent, the chief or the tester refuses. A `grants run` while a start holds the claim refuses `grant-busy` before any Gitea call. No `grant.*` body other than the consume record has a `decision` key. A step 0 refusal, then a restart, then `grants run`: the reconcile has spent the decision as `interrupted` and `grants run` refuses `decision-consumed`; before the restart `status` shows `spentAtNextStart` |
+| X-G12 | step 5 refuses `gitea-reach-wider` when the user was made collaborator on another repository, when it joined an org team, and when it owns a fork of an upstream that has left `publish`, and deletes the token. It passes with an old fork of a `publish` project outside `target.projects`, which the rendered block named. A fake returning 51 forks over two pages is read in full; a total that disagrees refuses `gitea-reach-unknown` |
+| X-G13 | `recordEvent` refuses an `action.allowed` with `body.action` `grant.call` (and each `grant.*`) and one with `body.operation` `grant.gitea`. A direct store insert aborts on the trigger for `grant.step` and `grant.host.enrolled` from a session, and for `grant.step` under the human's NULL pair. `host.sudo` from an agent session still writes |
+| X-G14 | fire: every token the user has is deleted, the user gets `prohibit_login`, and a failure of either lands in `serviceLeft` |
+| X-G15 | a `grant.step {step: 'commit'}` stored under `action.refused`, and one under the human's NULL pair, are ignored by the restart reconcile: no settle runs and no Gitea call is made |
+
+Mutants, a first list: drop the version floor; compare the version as a string; accept another admin scope;
+skip `gitea-user-foreign`; compare the user by name instead of `id`; skip the admin-user refusal; adopt a user
+at restart without the nonce; create the user before writing `grant.step user`; mint before writing
+`grant.step mint`; delete the old token before `issue`; settle a rotation by the record instead of
+`token-whoami`; run C1 to C4 after `#consumeGrant` instead of before; drop the `identitySha256` compare; drop
+`adminSha256`; skip the `grant.call` write; write `grant.result` before the call; drop the `grant.` reservation
+in `recordEvent`; drop the trigger; widen the trigger to `host.*` (breaks `host.sudo`); guard `body.action` only, not
+`operation`; key the trigger on `actor_run` alone; put `decision` in step 0's `grant.failed`; delete both
+tokens on a settle 403 or 5xx; compare step 5 against `target.projects` instead of `publish`; read one page
+of `/user/repos`; let `grants run` skip the claim; send the admin token in a `token` header on the mint route; revoke the
+remote token before the local steps; skip the fork `parent` check; skip step 5's reach check; delete only the
+recorded token on fire; let `grants run` accept an agent; keep the file in use on a settle 200 with an
+unknown `id`; load a `held` pair at start; revoke only `tokenId` on an open rotation; let step 0 pass a held agent; drop the `kind` filter from the restart reconcile.
+
+## 10. Shared with Bushroot's GitHub half (proposed in megavolt-0036, answer pending)
+
+- S1. The `grant` body: `{method, agent, rotateBy, target}`, scopes fixed by code per method.
+- S2. The admin slot: `<configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/<method>/admin`, set once by
+  `mosaic grants admin set <method>`, never an agent service. One service instance per method per business.
+- S3. `grant.call` and `grant.result` (r2: two records, paired by `callId`) for every service call, as reserved
+  `action.allowed` bodies (section 7).
+- S4. The executor shape: pre-checks before consume (step 0), claim, consume, mint, verify, `issue`, applied,
+  with `grant.step` before and after the mint, and settle by asking the service which credential the file
+  holds. GitHub may not fit "mint once and store" (App installation tokens expire within an hour). If so, S4
+  becomes per method and the rest stays shared.
+- S5. Revoke local first, then the record, then the service, with `serviceLeft` and `grants sweep`.
+- S6. A capability floor per method, checked at `set`, before every start and before every remote undo.
+
+Dewey notes items 2, 3 and 5 of dewey-0754 apply to S3, S4 and S6. The r2 text above carries them.
+
+## 11. Questions
+
+- Q-B1. Answered (dewey-0754 item 9): on fire, `prohibit_login` and delete every token (section 6). The PATCH
+  route is proven (F10).
+- Q-B2. Answered (dewey-0754 item 10): no organizations. The token's real reach is checked at step 5 and
+  stated in section 8.
+- Q-B3. Bushroot's answer on S1 to S6.
+- Q-B4. Answered (mos-1146): jason.woltje is a site admin on git.mosaicstack.dev, restricted false. Section 8
+  says so.
+- Q-B5. Answered (gizmoduck-0081, -0084, mos-1144): one rule for #436a and #436b, section 7. #436a row a's
+  BUILD.md cites section 7 at the commit Duckworth approves, or carries its text in full if row a's candidate
+  comes first. Duckworth checks it with that candidate.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/BUILD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
+
+Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
+4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
+by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
+
+Status: in progress. The full gate has not run; it is Sage's. Only single test files have run on
+this branch, apart from one slip noted under "Runs".
+
+## Commits so far
+
+- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
+  credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
+- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
+  the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
+  git.push.remote among the hard waits.
+- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
+- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
+- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
+  D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
+  call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
+- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
+  in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
+  `detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
+- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
+
+## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
+
+1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
+   carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
+   without identity commits as E7 (T6).
+2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
+   For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
+   the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
+   nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
+3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
+   caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
+   leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
+   issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
+4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
+   `forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
+   files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
+   messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
+5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
+   checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
+   `broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
+   or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
+   also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
+   only".
+6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
+   `roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
+   fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
+   should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
+
+7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
+   `reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
+8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
+   bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
+   status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
+9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
+   agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
+   agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
+   `create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
+10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
+    the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
+    and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
+    Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
+    holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
+11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
+    the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
+    `packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
+    limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
+    host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
+    `working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
+    `withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
+    until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
+    (`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
+    when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
+    refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
+    by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
+    On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
+    goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
+    (sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
+    at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
+    publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
+    the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
+    `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
+    end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
+    publish-timeout outcome).
+12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
+    clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
+    manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
+13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
+    launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
+    `recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
+    clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
+    it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
+    equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
+14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
+    T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
+    `working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
+    (`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
+    (`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
+    oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
+    DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
+    asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
+    refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
+    refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
+
+15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
+    (`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
+    gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
+    case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
+    `cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
+    fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
+
+## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
+
+Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
+`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
+no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
+git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
+that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
+
+## R1, the backup set
+
+Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
+`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
+`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
+`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
+through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
+one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
+`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
+never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
+copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
+
+## T1 limit
+
+A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
+dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
+
+## Runs
+
+Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
+hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
+credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
+usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
+business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
+tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
+plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
+tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
+file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
+
+Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
+checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
+credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
+Hash pins: none on a changed file.
+
+sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
+publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
+
+The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
+Hash pins: none on a changed file.
+
+Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
+which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
+minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
+
+Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
+Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
+No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
+
+r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
+and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
+
+r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
+drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
+
+r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
+and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
+
+r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
+remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
+agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
+repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
+found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
+step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
+`publish` require it (D8).
+
+r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
+has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
+and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
+N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
+
+## 0. Terms
+
+- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
+  `~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
+  instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
+- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
+  design says agent.
+- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
+- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
+
+## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
+
+| Code | Fact | Where |
+|---|---|---|
+| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
+| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
+| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
+| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
+| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
+| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
+| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
+| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
+| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
+| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
+
+So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
+the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
+share.
+
+## 2. The store (brief item 1)
+
+D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
+
+```
+<configDir>/secrets/agents/                       0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
+<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/    0700
+<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>   0600, the token only, one line
+```
+
+This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
+format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
+secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
+
+D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
+means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
+so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
+migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
+own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
+
+D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
+(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
+into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
+
+D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
+`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
+create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
+owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
+`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
+
+## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
+
+Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
+
+D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
+Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
+to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
+does for files today, extended to the dirs).
+
+D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
+verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
+frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
+there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
+host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
+`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
+`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
+`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
+`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
+
+D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
+is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
+per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
+
+## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
+
+| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
+| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
+| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
+
+D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
+provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
+short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
+credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
+instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
+Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
+doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
+
+## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
+
+D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
+optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
+step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
+grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
+"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
+fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
+it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
+commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
+
+D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
+
+```
+publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
+  -> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
+```
+
+The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
+
+1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
+   task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
+   ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
+   `broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
+   needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
+
+   **The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
+   (`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
+   `holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
+   `decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
+   raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
+   refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
+   refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
+   is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
+   refuses.
+   No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
+   reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
+   without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
+2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
+   project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
+   (`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
+   `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
+   fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
+   the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
+   5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
+   repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
+   agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
+   push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
+   equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
+   beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
+   (`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
+3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
+   the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
+   `work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
+   if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
+   caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
+   `validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
+4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
+   (`identity-mismatch`).
+5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
+   with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
+   `checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
+   (`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
+   `protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
+   or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
+   inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
+   PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
+   defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
+   `["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
+   is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
+   `store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
+   `credential-leak`.
+6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
+
+D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
+repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
+receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
+upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
+`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
+catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
+upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
+built on them.
+Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
+`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
+ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
+network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
+parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
+network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
+until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
+
+D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
+and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
+
+- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
+- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
+  `gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
+  percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
+  each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
+  form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
+  the owner that is used.
+- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
+  REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
+- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
+  `..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
+- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
+- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
+  sides.
+- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
+  upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
+  would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
+
+D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
+(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
+`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
+
+- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
+  email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
+  same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
+- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
+  step 5. The token never leaves that call.
+- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
+
+The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
+
+D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
+branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
+
+- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
+  named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
+  Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
+  or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
+  upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
+- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
+  branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
+  A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
+  depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
+
+Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
+`all`, no admin).
+
+D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
+socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
+`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
+root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
+
+## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
+
+All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
+human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
+`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
+(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
+writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
+kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
+
+| Verb | What it does |
+|---|---|
+| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
+| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
+| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
+| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
+| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
+
+D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
+`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
+token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
+confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
+end. Row 194's fire ends them.
+
+D13. **What row 194 calls.**
+
+- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
+- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
+  is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
+  `issue`.
+- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
+  the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
+  with its credentials still live on our side.
+- `regenerate`: no credential change.
+
+## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
+
+Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
+
+- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
+  `gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
+- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
+  `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
+- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
+  (`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
+  fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
+- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
+  the token pasted into stdin.
+- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
+- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
+
+Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
+
+## 7a. The grant path (mos-1124, Q188, Q190)
+
+Q188: no agent creates a grant. The chief raises the request, Jason approves it in the inbox, and protected
+stack code creates the grant. Jason called manual grant steps a no-fly, so A1 to A4 above are the fallback only.
+
+- a. `credentials.issue`, and so `rotate`, accepts a resolved `credential.mint` decision, Jason's Approve, as
+  the human path. #436b's executor calls it with that decision and nothing pasted. #436b adds that path and
+  the decision kind. Row 199 ships the verbs with today's human check only.
+- b. Under Q190 ("Q12: O1"), each agent seat gets its own Gitea account. On the Approve, #436b's executor does
+  A1 to A3: the seat's Gitea user, its token and its forks. Until #436b lands, pushes stay as jason.woltje.
+- c. Q185 settles Q-J1 and Q190 settles Q-J2.
+
+No code in 07141966e changes for this section. The executor and the decision route are #436b's.
+
+## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
+
+- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
+  `issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
+- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
+  Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
+- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
+  one.
+
+## 9. Questions
+
+Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
+
+- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
+- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
+  and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
+  Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
+  grants it to coder.
+- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
+  instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
+- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
+  row.
+
+Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
+
+- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account. Settled by Q185 (7a).
+- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3). Settled by Q190 (7a).
+
+## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
+
+- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
+  model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
+- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
+- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
+
+## 11. Tests and mutants
+
+All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
+127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
+
+- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
+  path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
+  status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
+- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
+  `action.refused`.
+- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
+  only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
+  the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
+  happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
+  exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
+  no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
+  spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
+  `decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
+  the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
+  and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
+  refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
+  fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
+  and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
+  agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
+  upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
+  and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
+  history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
+  neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
+  fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
+  path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
+  a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
+  sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
+  `identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
+- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
+  `changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
+- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
+  Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
+  The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
+- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
+
+Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
+the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
+check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
+ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
+`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
+check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
+oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
+the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
+D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
+check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
+
+## 12. Risks
+
+- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
+  and says what it includes.
+- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
+- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
+  Jason's network to confirm.

agents/morgana/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Morgana
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+n=0
+for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do
+  c=$(tr '\0' ' ' < $p/cmdline 2>/dev/null) || continue
+  case "$c" in *shell-snapshots*|*chrome-devtools-mcp*|*sage-busy-now*) continue;; esac
+  if echo "$c" | grep -qE 'node --test|gate\.sh|mutant|scripts/test-[a-z-]+\.sh|docker compose'; then echo "BUSY ${p#/proc/}: ${c:0:160}"; n=$((n+1)); fi
+done
+[ $n -eq 0 ] && echo CLEAR

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -o pipefail
+# Landing gate template (2026-10-14): sed the G= and OUT= lines and this comment.
+# Sequential suites, each teed to its own log; stops at the first failure.
+G=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-wt
+OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-out
+cd "$G" || exit 9
+mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 9  # a missing OUT failed the row 142 gate at step 1 (2026-10-15)
+# test-task.sh live cases run `docker compose` from $G, so without a name the project is "wt"
+# and leaves wt_default behind (row 142 gate, 2026-10-15). Name it per gate dir and remove it on exit.
+export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="$(basename "$(dirname "$G")")"
+trap 'docker network rm "${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "removed network ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default"' EXIT
+# A gate tree without the node_modules link fails cli tests with ENOENT (2026-10-13).
+[ -d "$G/node_modules" ] || { echo "STOP no node_modules in $G"; exit 8; }
+echo "base $(git rev-parse --short HEAD) dirty $(git status --short | grep -vc node_modules) DOCKER_HOST=${DOCKER_HOST:-unset}"
+run() { local name="$1" dir="$2" cmd="$3"
+  (cd "$G/$dir" && bash -c "$cmd") > "$OUT/$name.log" 2>&1; local rc=$?
+  echo "$name rc=$rc $(grep -E '^ℹ (pass|fail) [0-9]+' "$OUT/$name.log" | tr '\n' ' ') | $(tail -n1 "$OUT/$name.log")"
+  [ $rc -eq 0 ] || { echo "STOP $name"; exit $rc; }; }
+# No pkg-queue step: scripts/test-queue.sh runs packages/queue/tests/ itself (same 156 tests; CI debate item 2a, Vikunja #274).
+for d in packages/*/; do p=$(basename "$d"); [ -d "$d/tests" ] || continue; [ "$p" = queue ] && continue
+  run "pkg-$p" "packages/$p" 'node --test tests/*.test.mjs'; done
+for s in scripts/test-*.sh; do n=$(basename "$s" .sh); run "script-${n#test-}" . "bash $s"; done
+echo GATE_PASSED

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/timing-g189.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Row 189 gate timing (for row 197, Herb)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20T19:25:04Z. Gate on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), one lane. The slot was mine. Seats may have run single test files at the same time, which the slot rules allow, and I did not record that.
+Start 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z, end 2026-10-20T19:20:36Z. Total wall time: 659 s.
+
+Wall time per suite is the gap between one suite's log mtime and the one before it (the first suite starts at start.txt), so it includes node start-up. node's duration_ms is listed where the suite prints it. Scripts print no duration.
+
+| Suite | Wall s | duration_ms s | Ended (UTC) |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| pkg-bus | 3 | 3.8 | 19:09:40 |
+| pkg-business | 3 | 2.2 | 19:09:43 |
+| pkg-cli | 388 | 388.5 | 19:16:11 |
+| pkg-control-board | 1 | 0.8 | 19:16:12 |
+| pkg-conversation | 35 | 35.4 | 19:16:47 |
+| pkg-discord | 3 | 2.6 | 19:16:50 |
+| pkg-harness | 12 | 11.6 | 19:17:02 |
+| pkg-ledger | 13 | 13.5 | 19:17:15 |
+| pkg-mosaic | 3 | 2.3 | 19:17:18 |
+| pkg-plugins | 0 | 0.3 | 19:17:18 |
+| pkg-project | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:19 |
+| pkg-runs | 1 | 0.8 | 19:17:20 |
+| pkg-seat | 6 | 6.2 | 19:17:26 |
+| pkg-tasks | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:27 |
+| pkg-webui | 58 | 57.9 | 19:18:25 |
+| script-auth | 1 | - | 19:18:26 |
+| script-conductor | 5 | - | 19:18:31 |
+| script-config | 2 | - | 19:18:33 |
+| script-discord | 8 | - | 19:18:41 |
+| script-extension-package | 1 | - | 19:18:42 |
+| script-foundation | 40 | - | 19:19:22 |
+| script-land-work | 11 | - | 19:19:33 |
+| script-queue | 21 | - | 19:19:54 |
+| script-release | 11 | - | 19:20:05 |
+| script-task | 31 | - | 19:20:36 |
+
+Source: /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-g189/out/*.log mtimes and gate.log. The cli suite is about 59% of the run, and webui plus conversation add about 14%.

agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md

@@ -338,10 +338,14 @@ them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session re
    1. Back up the store, the pointer, the unit and config.json.
    2. Pin the phase 1 copy with the Console stopped. The copy's loader accepts a config with or without
       `console`, so the bus and seats keep reading the old config.
-   3. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
+   3. Straggler check (Mos's C1 condition, mos-0977): list every running process, unit and timer that
+      still runs from the old copy and reads config.json. Each one is restarted on the new copy or shown
+      not to re-read config. The old loader refuses the key, so a straggler would fail on its next read.
+      Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
+   4. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
       for that one key. The new loader reads it back (`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` validate) before anything
       starts.
-   4. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
+   5. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
    Acceptance: Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message and signs out. The forged-header
    check (a request with `X-authentik-username` and no cookie gets 401) runs either on a scratch Console or
    on live by Mos or Jason (B6). No agent sends the auth header to the live 7332 (section 8). The scratch

agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Row 189: `stack-release.sh activate --no-send`
+
+Gitea #1687. Vikunja P19 #413 (Q175 interim, #412). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md.
+Rulings: mos-0972 (the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2), mos-0973 (go; Sage builds,
+Dewey reviews; gate is the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh). Base: def2e7932 (refactor, the
+brief commit on 9ae8c73ac).
+
+## What it does
+
+`activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE` in a new `send_for_target`, which
+`console_for_target` calls after `proof_for_target`. `install_stack` renders the unit from
+`RUN_CONSOLE` and `write_pointer` writes the pointer from it, so both lose the flag and `flags_drift`
+stays quiet afterwards. Only `activate` takes the flag; the parser sends every other op to usage
+(exit 4).
+
+`check_target` lets a `--no-send` activate name the pointer's copy only when the pointer's Console
+flags hold `--send`. That run is a live-copy re-pin, the same path row 187 uses for the proof pair:
+the plan prints the live-copy note, the run stops both units, backs up the stopped store and starts
+them again. A plain same-copy activate, or a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, still
+refuses `already-active`.
+
+`--plan` prints one `send:` line after the `proof:` line, for activate and rollback:
+
+- `send: dropped; --no-send was given`
+- `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`
+- `send: carried` (the pointer's `--send` goes on unchanged)
+- `send: off`
+
+The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
+--send, so there is nothing to drop`.
+
+Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer's flags as they are, so once `--no-send` has run, nothing adds
+`--send` back. There is no re-enable flag (mos-0973). Q175 phase 2 changes the Console flags in its
+own row.
+
+docs/TOOLS.md: `[--no-send]` in the usage block and one paragraph after the proof paragraph.
+
+## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs, T55)
+
+1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send --tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
+   passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the other flags in order, status
+   says the unit flags match, the steps log has the drop line, the log line has from = to = B and the
+   backup sum equals the stopped store's, and the units stop and start in order.
+2. Plain same-copy activate, with `--tester-port` and with `--no-proof`, refuses `already-active`. So does
+   a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, and on a pointer that never held it.
+3. The four `send:` lines, the live-copy note on the same-copy plan only, and the Console line right
+   after `send:` without `--send`. The run on a pointer with no `--send` logs the nothing-to-drop line
+   and no drop line.
+4. After `--no-send` on C1, a rollback to B leaves `--send` out of the pointer and the unit, the steps
+   log never names `--send`, and status matches. pm-on after `activate --pm-after-harness --no-send`
+   keeps it off.
+5. `--no-send` on rollback (with and without `--plan`), pm-on, status, adopt and rehearse is a usage
+   error with the usage text, nothing written, started or logged. The usage text shows `[--no-send]`.
+6. A pointer holding both the proof pair and `--send`: the plans for `--no-proof`, `--no-send` and both
+   name what each drops and carries. `--no-send` keeps the pair, `--no-send` with a new pair replaces it,
+   `--no-proof` keeps `--send`, and both together leave neither. Status matches after each.
+
+`planTail` gains `'send: off'` after `'proof: off'`, because every plan now prints the line. T36 takes
+`out.slice(-n)` around `planTail`, so its four slice counts grow by one.
+
+## Mutants
+
+mutants.sh in this packet, run on the candidate. Each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh and runs T55
+plus T1 and T2.
+
+- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
+- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
+- M3: with `--no-send`, the pointer is written from `P_CONSOLE`, so it keeps `--send` while the unit
+  drops it.
+- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
+- M5: the parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
+
+Results: mutants-run.log, all five killed (M1 5 failures, M2 2, M3 7, M4 2, M5 2).
+
+## Deviations from the brief
+
+- The brief's line numbers were taken before row 163 landed. The candidate corrects them to the
+  9ae8c73ac lines (check_target :249-256, flags_drift :646-657, console_for_target :664-693, adopt
+  :828).
+- Test 5 also covers rehearse and `rollback --plan`, which the brief did not list.
+
+## Outbound calls
+
+None. The change edits an array before the existing unit render and pointer write. Every test uses
+the stand-in systemctl, units, stores and data root the file already builds; no test touches
+`~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+M1 KILLED fail=5
+M2 KILLED fail=2
+M3 KILLED fail=7
+M4 KILLED fail=2
+M5 KILLED fail=2

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Row 189 mutants M1-M5: each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh in the sage-b189 worktree, runs T55 and
+# the plan-tail tests, and restores the file from a checked backup.
+set -uo pipefail
+WT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189
+OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189-mut/out
+S=$WT/scripts/stack-release.sh
+mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 1
+cp -p "$S" "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" || { echo "backup failed"; exit 1; }
+ORIG=$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)
+[ "$(sha256sum "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "backup differs"; exit 1; }
+restore() { cp -p "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S"; [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "RESTORE FAILED"; exit 1; }; }
+trap restore EXIT
+
+mutate() {
+    case "$1" in
+        M1) sed -i '/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/d' "$S" ;;
+        M2) sed -i 's/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/{ [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; } ||/' "$S" ;;
+        M3) sed -i 's/^    write_pointer "\$TO" "\$RUN_PM" "\$RUN_PENDING" "\$P_CLAUDE" "\$T_SCHEMA" "\${RUN_CONSOLE\[@\]}"$/    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${P_CONSOLE[@]}"; else write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${RUN_CONSOLE[@]}"; fi/' "$S" ;;
+        M4) sed -i 's/^        SEND_PLAN="send: off"$/        SEND_PLAN="send: off"; [ "$OP" != rollback ] || RUN_CONSOLE+=(--send)/' "$S" ;;
+        M5) sed -i 's/--no-send) \[ "\$OP" = activate \] || usage;/--no-send) { [ "$OP" = activate ] || [ "$OP" = rollback ]; } || usage;/' "$S" ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+for m in M1 M2 M3 M4 M5; do
+    restore
+    mutate "$m"
+    if [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ]; then echo "$m NOT-APPLIED"; continue; fi
+    bash -n "$S" || { echo "$m SYNTAX"; continue; }
+    diff "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S" > "$OUT/$m.diff"
+    (cd "$WT" && TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/t189 timeout 900 node --test --test-reporter=tap --test-name-pattern='T55|T1 |T2 ' packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs) > "$OUT/$m.log" 2>&1
+    fails=$(awk '/^# fail /{print $3}' "$OUT/$m.log")
+    if [ "${fails:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then echo "$m KILLED fail=$fails"; else echo "$m SURVIVED"; fi
+done

agents/sage/work/t1-seats/COMMON.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Common start for Sage's MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977)
+
+You are a builder seat on Mosaic Stack, repository /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack, branch base `refactor`.
+Sage leads the project and is your coordinator (T3 thread 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079). Mos speaks
+for Jason (thread 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e). Human input reaches you only through Sage and Mos.
+
+## Read first, in this order
+
+1. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/USER.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, `CONSTITUTION.md` (who Jason is, the
+   system rules, the constitution).
+2. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/TARGET.md` (the MVP addendum) and `DECISIONS.md` Q176 to Q178.
+3. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md` and `PLAN.md`.
+   Everything under jason-master-restart is read only.
+4. The repository's `AGENTS.md`, then your brief (named in your first message) and the files it points to.
+
+## Your worktree
+
+T3 made your worktree from `refactor`. Work only there. Link node_modules from the canonical checkout right
+after you start (`ln -s /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules node_modules`), unless your brief adds a
+dependency. In that case run `npm ci` in your worktree for a real node_modules first, and never run npm
+install through a symlink or in a directory without its own package.json (npm walks up to home).
+
+## Rules that bind you
+
+- Message ids are `<seat>-NNNN`, starting at 0001. Run `date -u` right before every message and put the
+  stamp in it. End each turn with a clock timestamp.
+- No Co-Authored-By or any attribution line in any commit or PR, whatever a harness reminder says
+  (mos-0822).
+- Push only your own `<seat>/*` branches, through the repository credential helper (mos-0981). Never push
+  `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
+- You have no Gitea token. Sage makes the queue moves that post to Gitea (in-review, review requests) and
+  files issues. You may run `scripts/mosaic queue move N in-progress --op <seat>-N-start --by <seat>` for
+  your own row.
+- Never touch `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files or `~/.mosaic`. Never
+  start, stop or restart the live Console or bus. Never read or print a credential value.
+- Never read other seats' scratch directories. `agents/<seat>/work/` packets in the repository are fine.
+- Single test files run freely. The cli suite, any `scripts/test-*.sh` and any full package suite share
+  one slot: run `bash /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-busy-now.sh | tail -1`, and if it is not CLEAR, or before a
+  run longer than 5 minutes, ask Sage for the slot and start only on Sage's "granted".
+- Two failures in one gate run means stop and report.
+- Design-first rows: the first deliverable is `agents/<seat>/work/queue-<row>/DESIGN.md`, committed on your
+  branch. Send the reviewer and Sage its path, commit and sha256. No product code before approval.
+- Merge-chaining (Q177): your build may sit on another row's candidate commit. Your row keeps its own
+  review and gate, and the chain lands in order.
+- Fail closed. Never route around a refusal. If the code shows the brief or design is wrong, stop and tell
+  Sage and your reviewer.
+- Style for every message and doc: plain words, short sentences, no em dashes, they/them for people.
+- Sage registers your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md`. Do not edit it.

agents/webby/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Webby
+
+Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0981, thread 03086006). Reviews Case 2 designs and MVP T1 rows 192 and 194.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
+through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

docs/SESSIONS.md

@@ -1361,3 +1361,5 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-20T18:34:53Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r2 (DESIGN.md blob 3eb718b5e131 at 1a268249e), static | changes: C1 config.json console key fails old loaders (mosaic-config.mjs:113 rejects unknown keys; key add inside phase 2 window, rollback removes it, loader test), C2 app.js signs out only on opaqueredirect so 401 never shows sign-in; notes on tests 15/7/9a, Q-B 200-HTML classification, scratch Console flags; Q-E keep iss/sub escaped and capped; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:40:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r3 (DESIGN.md blob a152fd58e18e at 817e8f51b), static | approve on condition D1 (slot file checks stay out of shared loader, shape-only there) as a line edit; D2 notes: slot root from configDir, scratch dataRoot, name discovery GETs for Mos; C1/C2 and notes verified; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:41:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design D1/D2 check (DESIGN.md blob eba861f5d2bb at d55d86bb0), static git diff 817e8f51b..d55d86bb0 | ack: D1 and D2 match; design approved; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
+2026-10-20T18:57:10Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r2 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 5493c9df3ec0) | CHANGES to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 claim check on MOSAIC_CONFIG-only selection, B2 shared prefix drop-in dirs; N1-N7 notes; static read, no slot, no Gitea or queue record
+2026-10-20T19:00:04Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r3 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 98236a1aff98) | APPROVE to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 and B2 closed with M13 and M14, N7 settled by Sage's 48ebee0ff; static read, no slot; manifest round gets a queue review record (sage-1337)

docs/TOOLS.md

@@ -238,6 +238,12 @@ Exit codes: `0` ok · `2` invalid file or credential reference · `3` system
 config problem · `4` usage or a required file missing. Details:
 `packages/business/README.md`.
 
+`mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete` (row 199) goes to
+`packages/cli` and the bus's human-only credential verbs: an agent's own
+token in `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>`, read on
+stdin, never printed. The tester may run `status` and `revoke`. Details:
+`packages/cli/README.md`.
+
 `instances` and `instance add|set` (row 165) go to `packages/cli` and the
 bus's human-only `instances` and `instances.set` verbs, so they need a live
 bus host and refuse inside an agent session. `instances` prints the revision,
@@ -368,7 +374,7 @@ reports checkout or copy identity and refactor drift, and writes nothing.
 ```
 scripts/stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
 scripts/stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
 scripts/stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -480,6 +486,14 @@ copies. It checks the file with `stat` and `realpath` and never reads the value.
 or `off`. On the live copy it also notes that the run re-pins the pointer's copy
 and only the Console flags change.
 
+`activate ... --no-send` (row 189, mos-0972) drops `--send` from the pointer's
+Console flags and the unit, so the Console serves reads and no human sends. It
+may name the live copy while the pointer holds `--send`; once `--send` is gone a
+same-copy `--no-send` refuses `already-active`. Later activates, `pm-on` and
+rollbacks carry the pointer, so send stays off. No flag puts `--send` back.
+`--plan` prints one `send:` line: `dropped`, `off` with or without the
+`--no-send` note, or `carried`.
+
 #### A target past c216f47db: the PM after the harness kind
 
 From c216f47db on, the bus launches the PM only with a `harness` kind in the

docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send
 
 Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-0972 (Q175 interim, Vikunja #412). Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate owner
-Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit.
+Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit. The candidate corrects them;
+the first draft took them before row 163.
 
 This row builds the tool only. The live restart without `--send` is a separate step afterwards, a same-copy
 activate under Q173 with a backup first and a STATE report after. No test here touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the
@@ -14,11 +15,11 @@ Mos ruled that the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2, because wit
 process can forge `X-authentik-username` on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason (design section 8). On the pinned
 stack, the Console flags live in the pointer (`~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json`):
 
-- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:658-687) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
+- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:664-693) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
   `--tester-port` and the row 187 proof pair can change.
-- `check_target` (:247-249) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
-- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:822).
-- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:640-651) refuse
+- `check_target` (:249-256) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
+- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:828).
+- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:646-657) refuse
   `unit-flags-drift` on every later activate, pm-on and rollback.
 
 So the tool can't drop `--send` today. This row adds that one path.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP T1 item 6) and the MVP plan
+(`jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/PLAN.md` item 6, GAP-MAP G11 and G13; TARGET.md: "credentials store
+available for all agents; secrets protected with RLS equivalent" and "Agent uses own credentials for git and
+other actions"). Gitea #1697. Owner Megavolt (Opus 5.5, a new builder seat), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
+Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
+`agents/megavolt/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+This row draws a security boundary. Sage reviews the design's authority model, and Mos rules on it before any
+code is written.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- G11. Credential references exist per instance for Gitea and Vikunja only
+  (`packages/business/src/credentials.mjs`, `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs:103`). One
+  Claude env file is shared by every seat.
+- G13. Agents use their own Vikunja token (`packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs`). Git goes through the host
+  socket (`packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs`). Gitea tokens are loaded but never used.
+- The development repository's helper (`scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs`, wired in `.git/config` for
+  git.mosaicstack.dev) pushes as one identity. Until this row lands, seats push only their own `<seat>/*`
+  branches through it (mos-0981).
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The store. Where each agent's credentials live, per instance, under the row 190 config canon. File modes,
+   ownership and the read path. Which process may read which entry, and how the bus enforces that (the "RLS
+   equivalent"). A process asking for another agent's entry is refused and logged.
+2. Kinds. Gitea (git over HTTPS, and the API), Vikunja, and the model provider. Say which kinds 10-27 needs
+   and which wait. The model provider entry must not copy jwoltje's `claude-session.env`. If it needs a new
+   provider account or subscription, flag it for Jason and don't pick one.
+3. Git identity and push. Each agent commits with its own name and email and pushes with its own token to a
+   remote it is granted. Which refs an agent may push (its own branches, never the default branch or another
+   agent's), and where that's enforced: the Gitea side (branch protection, token scopes) and our side. How
+   this fits the host git socket, or replaces it.
+4. Lifecycle. Issue, rotate (`rotateBy`, `expires`), revoke and delete, and what row 194 (agent lifecycle) calls
+   when an agent is hired or fired. A fired agent's credentials stop working at once.
+5. Who does what. Creating a Gitea user or token, or any account outside the fleet, is Jason's (Q173
+   exclusions). The design lists each such step as a command or UI action for Jason. Agents never mint
+   accounts.
+6. Migration. Today's seats (jarvis helper, seat tokens) keep working until each moves. The mos-0981 push
+   rule ends only when Mos says so.
+7. What this row closes in G11 and G13, and what stays open.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No credential value is read, printed, logged or committed. Tests use fake tokens in scratch roots and a
+  fake Gitea.
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, `~/.mosaic` or the live
+  `.git/config` of the canonical checkout.
+- No request to git.mosaicstack.dev, tasks.woltje.com or any provider from a test.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, Mos rules on the authority model, then Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus,
+business, cli and tasks suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's
+mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "User and main agent can create and spawn
+agents" and "User maintains ability to terminate, regenerate, or create agents via WebUI or CLI ad-hoc", #415
+Case 1 "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids per agent" and
+"User maintains ability to restructure organization at will"). Gitea #1692. T1 item 5. Owner Honker, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate
+owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/DESIGN.md`. Webby reviews it before any
+code.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md G8, G9, C1.5, C1.6, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- The chief launches only listed instances (`roles/chief-of-staff.json`, harness `tools.mjs` launch,
+  `broker.mjs:1968`). No user verb launches an arbitrary agent.
+- Terminate exists (`packages/cli/src/cli.mjs:447`, `instances.mjs:9-11`, webui `serve.mjs:288, 535`). There
+  is no regenerate, no delete and no Console launch.
+- Instance changes need a bus restart (`instance-settings.mjs:35,75`, `organization.mjs:83`). Add and change
+  only, no delete.
+- Human-only membership acts as a veto today, but there is no per-agent veto list.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The verbs: create (from a role and a name), launch, terminate, regenerate (a fresh session with the same
+   identity and role), and delete (with what happens to its sessions, workspace and run evidence, which
+   stays write-once). Each one is a human verb on the CLI and a Console action.
+2. Chief hire/fire. What the chief may do on its own, and the per-agent veto: the human marks an agent so
+   the chief can't fire or replace it, and marks roles the chief can't hire. Where the veto lives and how
+   the broker enforces it.
+3. Live changes. Which changes take effect without a bus restart, and how a running bus picks them up
+   safely.
+4. RBAC. Human roles come from row 193 (Morgana). Until it lands, these verbs are owner-only. The design
+   states the hook that row 193 fills.
+5. Per instance. Row 190 runs one instance per OS user. Lifecycle verbs act on their own instance only.
+6. The kill switch (row 191, Rocko) refuses every launch path. These new launch paths check it too.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
+- Role authority is declared in `roles/` and changes only by reviewed commits (AGENTS.md invariant 7). This
+  row adds verbs, not new role authority. Any role file change is called out for review.
+- The build may chain on rows 190, 191 and 193 candidates (Q177).
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, cli, business and webui suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Brief: Melanie's hub instance on its own host (row 195, was 190b)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20. Rewritten for Mos's rulings mos-0998 and mos-1005 (Vikunja #418, #419). The first version
+put the hub under its own Linux user on dragon-lin. That form can't pass Duckworth's B7 there, because the
+factory uid's `sudo -n` succeeds on dragon-lin (Mos's recon, brain-redux
+`projects/mosaic-mvp/MELANIE-HOST-RECON.md`). Melanie's own server is ruled out too: it has 1.2 GiB RAM free
+with her two Hermes bots running, and co-tenancy would share her user and her passwordless sudo. The hub runs
+on a separate host. Which host is Jason's decision (#419): hardware outside the cluster, a cluster VM with
+factory PVE root removed, or a cluster VM with that residual accepted. This row is written so the host choice
+doesn't change it. Gitea #1693. On the 10-27 MVP path. Federation R8 (Gizmoduck's design r4, 04a6112be) needs
+this row or nothing.
+
+Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5 and B7), gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190
+(Q177): the hub runs under row 190's config canon. Design first. The first deliverable is
+`agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## Goal
+
+Melanie's hub instance (Case 2, C2-13) runs on its own host. No factory agent can read or write the hub's
+config, data root or secrets, reach its bus socket, or log in to the hub host. Her writing reaches the hub only
+through the existing git.mosaicstack.dev remotes, books repo only.
+
+## Provision (blank until Jason answers #419)
+
+Who provisions the host and how is left open. Sizing from Mos (mos-0998): 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 64 GB disk,
+internal network only. Each agent process measures 300 to 390 MB RSS on dragon-lin. The design takes the host
+as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying seat while the row runs.
+
+## The design must state
+
+1. The deploy. Exactly what Darkwing installs on the hub host and how: the stack copy, node, the units, the
+   config dir and data root under row 190's canon (O1: `~/.config/mosaic-NAME`, and "`~` is the home of the OS
+   user that runs the instance"). Which commands run as which user on the hub host, and which need its root.
+2. Re-pin, rollback and backup on the hub host, and who runs them after the deploy key is gone.
+3. How the hub gets model access without a copy of jwoltje's `claude-session.env` or any factory credential.
+   If that needs the credentials row (T1 item 6), say so and name the interim. If it needs a new subscription
+   or a new provider account, flag it for Jason and don't pick one (mos-1008).
+4. The books repo path. Which git.mosaicstack.dev remote, which credential the hub holds for it, and that it
+   can't read or push any other repository.
+5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
+   admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
+   holds it.
+6. The acceptance script, as code Duckworth can read. It takes Gizmoduck's list of infrastructure gate items
+   as its input (mos-1011), not a fixed set of checks. Each item names a path, its closed form and its
+   accepted form, and the script reports which form holds for each, or fails. The list covers at least:
+   - federation R8's separate-host form: the hub's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the
+     factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the hub's, and no factory agent holds a login or key
+     for the hub host
+   - B7: from the factory uid, `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub
+     host all fail
+   - the hypervisor and backup paths ops-01 measured (mos-1011: one PVE node the factory key has root on,
+     PBS on that node with unencrypted backups, a flat /16 LAN), each closed or accepted by Jason
+7. The identity provider and TLS front end (B8, mos-1008, mos-1011). Either the factory holds no credential
+   that can create users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub
+   uses an issuer the factory can't administer. A brand, tenant or app inside the same Authentik does not
+   count as separate. The same holds for the TLS front end that serves the hub. The proof is a failed admin
+   call from every token the factory's root can read. No credential value is printed in that proof.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Provisioning, hypervisor access and any infra or k3s change are Jason's (Q173 exclusions). Mos takes the
+  hypervisor residual (factory root on the PVE nodes, Q172) to Jason. It doesn't block this row.
+- Melanie's server (`[email protected]`) is reference only, read only, under Jason's authorization in
+  mos-0995. Nothing on it changes, and her Hermes bots keep running.
+- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
+- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
+  the acceptance script proves it.
+- The admin-call proof in point 7 and any call to the issuer or the TLS front end run only in a window Mos
+  approves, never as a test or an anonymous probe (Q175).
+- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
+  host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the acceptance script passes
+on the hub host from the factory uid, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0989 (P19 333, MOSAICSTA-173, is now on the 10-27 path: federation R3 and
+row 193 need it). Gitea #1694. Owner Gander (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat under mos-0977 item 5),
+reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Latest-by: DESIGN.md approved by 2026-10-22, landed by 2026-10-24, and in
+any case before federation R3 lands. R3 and row 193 may chain on this row's candidate (Q177). Base: refactor at
+the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/gander/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## The problem, as filed and as it now matters
+
+P19 333 as filed (row 87, mos-0657): the Console listens on a loopback TCP port, and any host process that
+reaches it, under any uid, acts as Jason. Jason accepted that as a documented limit for a one-user host
+(mos-0787, row 161). Two things change that:
+
+- Row 190b (#1693, mos-0986) puts Melanie's hub under its own Linux user. Factory processes then sit on another
+  uid, on the same host, next to the hub's ports and socket. The other-uid reach is now the Case 2 threat.
+- Federation r2 (gizmoduck-0004, 60b9b112a) binds a bus user only from a user-cli whose proof passes the human
+  walk, whose direct parent is the bus's own Console, and which holds a live grant. That rule rests on the
+  path-bound human proof (#225): today a same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts as the
+  human, without touching the Console. The Q175 design (section 8) names that limit and leaves it here.
+
+## What already settles part of it
+
+- Q175 phase 2 (#412) settles the Console-ingress part on the main port. Under `--sso`, 7332 answers any
+  non-public Host with 403 except `GET /healthz`, and every other request needs a verified OIDC session. A
+  process on another uid that reaches the port gets only `/healthz`. Phase 1 (row 192) builds it; it is live
+  only after the phase 2 window.
+- Row 189 (`--no-send`) is interim only. Until phase 2 the Console takes no human writes, so the reach is
+  read-only. It settles nothing.
+- Row 190b separates files and units by uid. Whether the hub's `broker.sock` refuses the factory uid depends on
+  its directory and socket modes, which this row checks and tests rather than assumes.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Inventory every listener and entry point per instance: the Console port, the tester listener (7333 today),
+   `broker.sock`, the human CLI wrapper, the Discord connector and anything row 190 adds. For each: who can
+   reach it today from the same uid and from another uid, with and without `--sso`.
+2. The tester listener. It serves reads and the row 175 tester writes to anything that reaches it, on any uid.
+   Close the other-uid reach (for example a unix socket with 0600 modes, or a peer-uid check on loopback), or
+   bring Mos a concrete reason it must stay open. bus.tester stays Jason's switch.
+3. The bus human boundary. How the bus tells the human's own verified call from a same-uid process that runs
+   `human-cli.mjs`. State what federation R3's direct-parent rule needs from the bus (peer credentials on
+   `broker.sock`, the parent check, how it can't be forged by a child of an agent), and what stays possible for
+   a same-uid process after this row. Say it plainly where a residual limit remains.
+4. Fit with row 193 (Morgana, human users and roles; Mos's B1 rule: a principal comes only from something the
+   bus verifies) and with federation R3. One mechanism, not three.
+5. Migration: the live single-user Console and bus keep working until each instance re-pins.
+6. Which parts of P19 333 this row closes, which parts Q175 phase 2 closes, and what P19 333 says when it is
+   closed.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Who can reach the Console from outside stays Jason's. This row changes what a host process can do once it
+  reaches a local port or socket.
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file. No test creates a real
+  second uid; use stand-ins as rows 190 and 190b do, and name any part only a Q173 window can prove.
+- No request to the live 127.0.0.1:7332 or 7333, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, webui and cli suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh`
+are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 and mos-0977 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "RBAC enforcement" and #415
+Case 1 "Additional users can be configured for access" and "Shared and private agent sessions available per
+user; RBAC"). Gitea #1691. T1 item 3. Owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief
+commit.
+
+Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md`. Duckworth reviews it before
+any code.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- One human per business: `packages/business/src/business.mjs:160`, and the broker's human check
+  (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538`).
+- Threads have an owner field only (`packages/bus/schema.sql:247`, `broker.mjs:353-360`). Nothing is private
+  or shared.
+- RBAC covers agents only (`role.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:769-799`, harness `gate.mjs`). Humans
+  have no roles.
+- The human proof is path-bound (#225, P19 333): any same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts
+  as the human. That limit is real and the design must say how several humans change it.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The human model. How a business lists several humans, how each is identified, and how a Console SSO
+   session (#412, row 192: each session names a provider subject mapped to a name) and a CLI call each
+   become exactly one of them. Starting rule (Mos, mos-0985, from Duckworth's federation review B1 at
+   b402197ff on origin duckworth/reviews): the bus takes a human principal only from something it verifies,
+   such as the Console's OIDC session under #412. A process's own claim of who it is never counts.
+2. Human roles. A small fixed set to start (for example owner, member, viewer), what each may do on the
+   bus and in the Console, and who may add or remove humans and change roles. Restructuring stays with
+   the owner (Case 1).
+3. Threads. Private threads (visible to their owner and the agents in them) and shared threads (visible to
+   named humans or all members). Schema change, migration of existing rows (all become the current human's),
+   and every read path that must filter.
+4. One user and grant store. Gizmoduck's federation design (thread 9312a896, design 6925f78f0 on
+   gizmoduck/federation-design) proposes `access.json` for grants. Mos's reading (mos-0977): one model for
+   local and federated humans, because two stores drift. Lead decision (Sage, 2026-10-20, to gizmoduck-0002):
+   row 193 takes Gizmoduck's human-authored `<configDir>/access.json` (federation DESIGN.md section 3.5) as
+   the one user and grant store, and extends it with local humans, roles and shared threads. Federation adds
+   only a `home` field. The design confirms this or brings a concrete reason against it to Sage and
+   Gizmoduck before the build. Federation's R1 (the access.json loader) then comes before this row's build.
+5. The bus human boundary. With several humans, the human verbs must know which human calls. State what a
+   same-uid process can still do (P19 333) and whether row 190's one-instance-per-OS-user direction narrows
+   it.
+6. Migration and rollback. Existing businesses keep working with their one human as owner.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Changing who can reach the Console from outside is Jason's. This row changes who is allowed once inside.
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
+- The build may chain on rows 190 and 192 candidates (Q177). Each row keeps its own review and gate.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business, cli and webui suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ before any code, as Q175 did. Then the build follows the design, with tests and
 
 Two or more instances run side by side on dragon-lin. Each one has its own config file, data root (store,
 broker.sock, host.lock, state, runs, sessions, workspaces), businesses, bus unit, Console unit and port,
-tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. Nothing one
-instance does can read or change another's state. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
+tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. No instance's
+commands, units or tools address another instance's state by default or by mistake. On one uid this is
+addressing only, not a security boundary: a same-uid process can still read another instance's files.
+Isolation against that is row 190b (#1693, mos-0986), one Linux user per instance. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
 config path, data root, unit names and ports stay as they are, and no re-pin is needed for it.
 
 ## Known single-instance points (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)

docs/plans/2026-10-20_retire-control-board.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-1008 item 2. Gitea #1696. MVP 10-27 work. Owner Bushroot (Haiku 5.5, a
+low-level model under Q177), reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+## Why
+
+`packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs` is a loopback HTTP service on 7331 with no authentication. It reads
+transcripts and writes through `/api/reply`. Any host process that reaches the port can do both. That fails
+Q175 ("zero trust with verification"). Gander found it in the row 196 inventory (gander-0004). Nothing listens
+on 7331 now (`ss -ltnp`, 2026-10-20T19:05:09Z), so retiring it costs the least.
+
+## Steps, in order
+
+1. Inventory first. List every reference to the control board and to 7331: scripts, units, `scripts/mosaic`
+   and other CLI dispatch, docs (AGENTS.md, READMEs, TOOLS.md), package.json scripts, tests, and the Console
+   (`packages/webui`). For each, say whether it starts the writer, reads its code, or only mentions it.
+   Commit the list as `agents/bushroot/work/queue-ROW/INVENTORY.md` and send it to Sage and Webby.
+2. Stop if something depends on it. If a reference shows a live dependency (the Console or another package
+   imports code that only the control board has, or a unit or script still starts it), stop. Sage takes it to
+   Mos before anything is removed.
+3. Otherwise retire the writer. Either remove the `serve` entry point, or make it refuse to start with a
+   message that points to the Console. Keep any read-only code another package imports, and say which.
+   Update the docs that tell people to start it. The AGENTS.md text about the control-board reply convention
+   is a separate matter. Change it only if it tells someone to start 7331.
+
+## Mos's call on the Console dependency (mos-1019)
+
+The inventory (004f133bd) found that the Console proxies `/api/board`, `/api/seen`, `/api/reply` and the
+conversation routes to `DEFAULT_BOARD` on 7331 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:12`), so the board view returns
+502 today. Mos took Sage's recommendation: retire the 7331 listener and its README start commands, and have
+the Console call the board's read code in-process, behind the Console's own auth (Q175 SSO on 7332).
+`/api/reply` stays only under `--send`. The DESIGN.md for that change comes before code, and Webby approves
+it.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+Nothing in the stack can start a writer on 7331. A test proves it: the entry point refuses (or is gone), no
+script or unit starts it, and a grep check finds no starter. Each change gets a mutant that brings the writer
+back and the test kills it. Mos added three items (mos-1019):
+
+- The board view answers from the Console with nothing listening on 7331.
+- Every board route sits behind the Console's auth.
+- A test proves `/api/reply` refuses without `--send`.
+
+Test fixtures that bind port 0 may stay if they only test the code in-process.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files or `~/.mosaic`.
+- No request to any live port.
+- Single test files run freely. Suites need Sage's slot.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves INVENTORY.md, then DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The control-board and webui package suites, the cli suite and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0977 item 6 ("put the design for a second gate lane on the list now")
+and the MVP push (mos-0974). Gitea #1695. Owner Herb (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat), reviewer
+Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
+`agents/herb/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## Why
+
+Every full run shares one slot today. A full gate (cli suite plus every `scripts/test-*.sh`) takes about 13
+minutes or more, reviewers' runs and mutants take the same slot, and with eight or more seats building for
+10-27 the slot is the bottleneck. The slot exists because concurrent runs broke each other. The busy check is
+`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh` (a copy of Sage's), and the gate is
+`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh` (a copy of Sage's template). The host has 16 cores and 62 GB.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Every shared resource two concurrent runs can collide on, found from the code and tests, not guessed:
+   Docker compose project names and networks (`scripts/test-task.sh` and others), fixed TCP ports in tests,
+   unix socket paths and their 107-byte limit under TMPDIR, the sandbox's private `/tmp`, shared caches,
+   scratch and worktree paths, the queue lock, and any test that reads host-wide state (process lists,
+   `pgrep`, `/proc`). For each: how a lane gets its own copy, or why it is safe to share.
+2. Timing. Which tests have time limits that a doubled CPU load could break, measured, and what changes (a
+   bound, or a lane rule that keeps those suites apart).
+3. The lane mechanism: lane ids, a lock per lane that a run takes and releases even on a crash, the busy
+   check that reports per lane, and how a seat asks for a lane. Sage still grants it.
+4. The gate template takes a lane id and isolates everything from point 1 by it.
+5. Proof: two full gates on different candidates at once, three times, with zero cross-failures, plus the
+   wall time of each against a single-lane run. Any flake found is named with its cause.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev` or slot files. The proof runs use
+  scratch roots only, and it needs Sage's grant of the whole slot while it runs.
+- Test code changes that only isolate a resource are in scope. A change to what a test checks is not, and
+  goes to its owner.
+- Docker networks and containers a run makes are removed by the run (trap), and nothing else is touched.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, both singly and in the two-lane proof.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Q175 (Jason's ruling), mos-0971/0973/0977 and Vikunja #412. Gitea #1690. MVP T1 item 2. Owner
+Launchpad, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+The design is approved: `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` at d55d86bb0 (blob eba861f5d2bb), Filbert r3
+approve plus the D1/D2 ack, Mos C1 confirmation in mos-0977, whose straggler-check condition is in the phase 2 window at b416d2ede. Build phase 1 exactly as the design says. If
+the code shows the design is wrong somewhere, stop and tell Sage, Webby and Filbert before building around it.
+
+## Scope (phase 1 only, design section 5 item 1)
+
+- oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly (design section 2). No other new dependency.
+- The OIDC relying party in the Console: `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, `/auth/signed-out`,
+  the callback steps 1-7, our own checks on top of the library, and sessions, cookies and Host rules
+  (design sections 1 and 3).
+- The shared loader, `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`, accepts an optional `console` key and checks only its
+  shape. The slot file checks and the read run in the Console's `--sso` start, and the slot resolves from
+  the config dir (section 4, D1, D2).
+- The degraded start for an unreachable provider, and the unreachable/refused classes (Q-B, section 4).
+- `--sso` for `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`, with its refusals against the old flags.
+- The tester listener rules (section 6).
+- The page: both fetch paths in `packages/webui/src/public/app.js` (:111 and :305) treat a 401
+  `sign-in required` as signed out, and the notice links to `/auth/login?return=<path>` (C2).
+- Logging as the design says, including the Q-E `subject-unknown` line.
+
+Out of scope: the phase 2 window, the live config.json key, phase 3 removals, the proxy-forwarded token
+(section 7), and any change to the live Console.
+
+## Tests and mutants
+
+Design section 9: tests 1-25, the positive paths, and every listed mutant, each killed by its named test.
+All tests run against the fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. No test reaches a real
+provider or Authentik, and no test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a
+slot file. Test 25 goes in `scripts/test-config.sh`.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No request of any kind to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or the live 127.0.0.1:7332 (mos-0971,
+  design section 8).
+- No credential value is read, printed or logged.
+- `npm install` runs only inside the worktree that has its own package.json, never in a directory that would
+  walk up to home.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves the manifest. Filbert approved the design and answers design questions. The webui and cli suites, `scripts/test-config.sh` and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Launchpad's finding F3 on row 192 (launchpad-0001) and Q175 (#412). Gitea #1698. Owner
+Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): it lands after row 192 and
+before the phase 2 window. Base: row 192's candidate.
+
+## Why
+
+The phase 2 window re-pins the Console to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
+(`agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`, section 5). `scripts/stack-release.sh` doesn't know `--sso` today.
+Its `proof_checks` (`:751`) requires `--public-host`, `--auth-header` and `--allow-user` whenever a proof pair is
+carried, and the pointer's Console flags still hold the forward-auth pair (`--auth-header X-authentik-username
+--allow-user jason.woltje`) that `--sso` refuses to start with. So the window can't run through the script, and
+a hand-edited pointer is not an option.
+
+## What the row does
+
+1. `activate ID BUSINESS --sso` writes Console flags with `--sso` and without `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`
+   and any proof pair, and `--plan` names each flag it drops and carries, in the style of row 189's `send:`
+   line. The design names the full flag set the phase 2 Console starts with and checks it against row 192's
+   refusals.
+2. Before anything stops, the script refuses a target copy whose Console doesn't support `--sso`, and refuses
+   when the config's `console` key or its slot file fails the checks row 192's `--sso` start runs. It reads
+   neither value and only uses the same stat and shape checks.
+3. Rollback from an `--sso` pointer to a pre-phase-1 copy follows the design's phase 2 rollback order (remove
+   the `console` key first). The script refuses a rollback that would start a Console on a config it can't
+   read, and says which step comes first.
+4. `docs/TOOLS.md` gets the flag.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live pointer, units, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`. Tests use scratch roots
+  and seeded pointers, as rows 187 and 189 do.
+- No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the
+mutants are killed (one per refusal, and one that keeps `--auth-header` in the written flags).

docs/plans/QUEUE.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->
 
-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
 
 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
 | 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
+| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
+| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
+| 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->
 

docs/plans/queue.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
   "canonicalRoot": "/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack",
-  "revision": 2236,
+  "revision": 2247,
   "rows": [
     {
       "id": 1,
@@ -19820,6 +19820,153 @@
       "createdAt": "2026-10-20T10:31:30.403Z",
       "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T11:11:25.098Z",
       "updatedBy": "sage"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 189,
+      "piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
+      "owner": "sage",
+      "issues": [
+        1687
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1687
+      ],
+      "state": "in-review",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+        "blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
+      },
+      "after": [
+        {
+          "id": 163,
+          "when": "done"
+        }
+      ],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "dewey"
+      ],
+      "review": {
+        "rounds": [
+          {
+            "n": 1,
+            "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+            "by": "sage",
+            "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+            "issue": 1687,
+            "candidate": {
+              "kind": "manifest",
+              "digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
+              "text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
+            },
+            "request": "comment",
+            "attempts": [
+              {
+                "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+                "by": "sage",
+                "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+                "state": "posted",
+                "comment": 29457,
+                "transport": {
+                  "outcome": "posted",
+                  "status": 201,
+                  "comment": 29457,
+                  "detail": "created"
+                },
+                "resolutions": []
+              }
+            ],
+            "duplicateRisk": false,
+            "receipts": []
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "sage",
+        "op": "sage-189-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
+      "updatedBy": "sage"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 190,
+      "piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+      "owner": "darkwing",
+      "issues": [
+        1688
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1688
+      ],
+      "state": "in-progress",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+        "blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
+      },
+      "after": [],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "filbert"
+      ],
+      "review": null,
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "darkwing",
+        "op": "darkwing-190-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
+      "updatedBy": "darkwing"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 191,
+      "piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+      "owner": "rocko",
+      "issues": [
+        1689
+      ],
+      "closes": [
+        1689
+      ],
+      "state": "in-progress",
+      "previousState": null,
+      "required": false,
+      "requiredSince": null,
+      "gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
+      "gateOwner": "sage",
+      "brief": {
+        "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
+        "anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+        "blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
+      },
+      "after": [],
+      "reviewers": [
+        "dewey"
+      ],
+      "review": null,
+      "claim": {
+        "seat": "rocko",
+        "op": "rocko-191-start"
+      },
+      "note": null,
+      "blockedReason": null,
+      "createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
+      "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
+      "updatedBy": "rocko"
     }
   ],
   "log": [
@@ -78756,6 +78903,329 @@
         "receipt": "ok sage-163-done rev 2236 row 163 in-review→done round 2"
       },
       "viewSha": "e44815d32d46b91ee37d4c3c4701716956ba35d29c16c24c89020cce345bd61b"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2237,
+      "op": "sage-189-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
+        "gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md#Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+        "issues": [
+          1687
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "sage",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": [
+          {
+            "id": 163,
+            "when": "done"
+          }
+        ],
+        "reviewers": [
+          "dewey"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
+          "blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-add rev 2237 row 189 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "70bf9967156881afecaba9ccf4edf8cbc63a344eb7c6407b3453c950781f34c5"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2238,
+      "op": "sage-189-briefed",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:22:01.437Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-briefed rev 2238 row 189 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "27ee8a26722d3eaf4c4b346e06ffdb853037aad2d1a7fe14f440cbe1bb9a2a27"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2239,
+      "op": "sage-189-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:22:18.476Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-start rev 2239 row 189 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "230578585341fcfc9429364332ca8b78988ffd669d3c1bb5e2e94a74d9916649"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2240,
+      "op": "sage-190-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+        "gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md#Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+        "issues": [
+          1688
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "darkwing",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": null,
+        "reviewers": [
+          "filbert"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
+          "blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-190-add rev 2240 row 190 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "b4319dbd993254b58e4db8be18769b04322028903e325c0c8cadcfdec527929f"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2241,
+      "op": "sage-191-add",
+      "verb": "add",
+      "args": {
+        "piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
+        "gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
+        "brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md#Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+        "issues": [
+          1689
+        ],
+        "note": null,
+        "owner": "rocko",
+        "gateOwner": "sage",
+        "after": null,
+        "reviewers": [
+          "dewey"
+        ],
+        "required": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": null,
+        "to": "queued",
+        "brief": {
+          "path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
+          "anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
+          "blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-191-add rev 2241 row 191 none→queued"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "2cdc7c37430226f1ea01ed9f3d60a2c12be16eddac38d18dc16f889c7b54b14e"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2242,
+      "op": "sage-190-brief",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 190,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:25.630Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-190-brief rev 2242 row 190 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "6203315b484302369ce5ea7d854082a6bca4a95f9793e14ec123f57381234c95"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2243,
+      "op": "sage-191-brief",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 191,
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:43:43.042Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": "queued",
+        "to": "briefed",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok sage-191-brief rev 2243 row 191 queued→briefed"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "9cc7dda5fa676258e864dedfdf2f4e3904c8723ba9c36474cff76757f52e5c07"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2244,
+      "op": "rocko-191-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 191,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "rocko",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 191,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok rocko-191-start rev 2244 row 191 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "cd2423e53ac82a667c737852bef6adfdafba82987f37cd090f5484b15b3a0e0c"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2245,
+      "op": "darkwing-190-start",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 190,
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "darkwing",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 190,
+        "from": "briefed",
+        "to": "in-progress",
+        "round": null,
+        "issue": null,
+        "candidate": null,
+        "receipt": "ok darkwing-190-start rev 2245 row 190 briefed→in-progress"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "014db845fb2e380678ab1250f2cd3c0d7b192dc39909416515482c810440149b"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2246,
+      "op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+      "verb": "move",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "to": "in-review",
+        "reason": null,
+        "candidate": "agents/sage/work/queue-189/candidate-manifest.sha256",
+        "evidence": null,
+        "issue": null
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "from": "in-progress",
+        "to": "in-review",
+        "round": 1,
+        "issue": 1687,
+        "candidate": {
+          "kind": "manifest",
+          "digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
+          "text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
+        },
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1 rev 2246 row 189 in-progress→in-review round 1 on #1687; request sage-189-inreview-1 requesting"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "d8a3aa936a9a819329e86679d0bfcf658d773d0f7cfd29c10587c6447f78e968"
+    },
+    {
+      "rev": 2247,
+      "op": "sage-189-inreview-1.outcome",
+      "verb": "review-outcome",
+      "args": {
+        "id": 189,
+        "attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+        "outcome": "posted",
+        "status": 201,
+        "comment": 29457,
+        "detail": "created"
+      },
+      "by": "sage",
+      "at": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
+      "semantics": 2,
+      "result": {
+        "row": 189,
+        "round": 1,
+        "attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
+        "state": "posted",
+        "receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1.outcome rev 2247 row 189 round 1 request sage-189-inreview-1 posted comment 29457"
+      },
+      "viewSha": "6d7e91ae3cab0b76e5c5d791fb821b97c9da7db16389ff2d531d7b77d2a069f1"
     }
   ]
 }

packages/bus/README.md

@@ -215,6 +215,13 @@ an operator inspect content and delivery evidence after an uncertain result.
 | `trail` | `{subject}`: task ref, decision UUID or message UUID. Linked records in broker write order. |
 | `decisions` | `{list}`: `roles` or `recent`; human and reader sessions only. Open decisions routed to a role, or the last 50 closed. |
 | `credentials` | No args; human and reader sessions only. `[{service,account,role,dateKind,date,state}]` for the capability's business, never a token, file path or variable name. |
+| `credentials.issue` | `{agent,service,token,date}`; human only (row 199, #1697). Writes the token to `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>` (0600, dirs 0700: tmp, fsync, rename), rewrites the agent's reference in the business file to `{"store":true,<rotateBy or expires>:date}`, then holds the token in memory, with no restart. Over an issued entry it is a rotate: the old value is gone from disk and memory when it returns. `service` is `gitea` or `vikunja` and the business file must already name it for the agent (`credential-unknown`). A token the bus already holds is `credential-leak`; a bad token `credential-format`; a bad date `credential-date`. Returns `{agent,verb,service,date,state}`, `verb` `issue` or `rotate`. The tester gets `tester-refused`. |
+| `credentials.revoke` | `{agent,service?,reason}`; human, or the tester (Q173). Drops the entry from memory, then unlinks a store file; a `file` or `env` reference keeps its file and becomes `store`, so a restart loads nothing. Without `service`, every kind the agent has. Returns `{agent,verb,services:[{service,state}]}`. |
+| `credentials.delete` | `{agent,reason}`; human only. `credentials.revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's store dir; a file there other than a token is `credential-file`. While the agent or one of its threads holds a claim, `agent-running`. |
+
+Each of the three leaves one receipt in the organization's `changes.jsonl`: the actor and a
+`detail` of `{verb,agent,kind,date or reason}`, never a value. A change to the store alone writes
+a receipt with empty `changes`. A refusal is `action.refused` with its code alone.
 | `requirements` | No args; role sessions only, as `task.create` is (row 90, #1584). The approved PRD's requirement ids, `{prd,version,requirements:[{id,title}]}`, from `packages/tasks/requirements.json`, loaded when the broker starts; a bad file refuses the start. A human session refuses `agent-required`, a reader `read-only`. |
 | `state` | No args; role, human and reader sessions (row 109, #1603). `{launch:{state,at,event},tasks:{open:[{task_ref,title}],total,cap}}` for the capability's business. `launch` is the latest `launch.revoked` or `launch.restored` event: `allowed` with `at` and `event` null when none exists. `open` is the tracker snapshot's open tasks in `task_ref` order, at most `cap` (the `tasks` page size, 50); `total` counts every open task. The harness runner reads it before each turn. Writes nothing. |
 | `replies` | `{id}`: a message UUID; human and reader sessions only. The messages whose `in_reply_to` is that id, oldest first, at most 50. Writes nothing. |

packages/bus/src/broker.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { NAME as HARNESS_NAME } from '../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs';
 import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';
 import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';
-import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
+import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
 
 // Kept closed while S1 lands; its vocabulary is the integration authority.
 export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   'git.push.working',
   'git.push.protected',
   'git.merge.protected',
+  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): publish to the agent's fork. Not in ROUTED, so a hard wait.
+  'git.push.remote',
   'review.request',
   'review.verdict',
   'record.write',
@@ -101,6 +103,11 @@ export const TESTER_VERBS = Object.freeze(['message.send', 'message.receive', 'm
 // Row 175: the organization verbs a tester may call. Its writes run every check the human's do
 // and log actor `tester`; row 176 adds routes reads; limits.set, organization.set and organization.revision refuse it.
 export const TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS = Object.freeze(['limits', 'plugins', 'instances', 'plugins.set', 'instances.set', 'routes.set', 'routes']);
+// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): the credential lifecycle, human-only. Under Q173 the tester may
+// revoke; issue (rotate is an issue over an issued entry) and delete refuse it, because a token it
+// issued would pass through its session (duckworth N1). The status read stays the `credentials` verb.
+export const CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.issue', 'credentials.revoke', 'credentials.delete']);
+const TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.revoke']);
 const SELF_KINDS = new Set(['task.created', 'task.assigned', 'task.state', 'task.closed', 'task.conflict']);
 const POLL_KINDS = new Set([
   'task.changed.external',
@@ -191,10 +198,13 @@ export class Broker {
   #received = new Set();
   // Row 137 (#1631): landings checkLand let start, by ticket, until recordLand or landRefused ends them.
   #landings = new Map();
+  // Row 199: a publish between checkPublish and recordPublish or publishRefused.
+  #publishes = new Map();
   #secretCheck;
   #credentialStatus;
   #requirements;
   #organization;
+  #credentialVerbs;
   #project;
   #usage;
   #limits;
@@ -203,13 +213,15 @@ export class Broker {
   #stops = new Map();
   #clock = 0;
   // credentialStatus is the runtime's metadata-only Credentials.status(); the broker never gets use().
-  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null }) {
+  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null }) {
     if (!object(businesses) || !Object.keys(businesses).length) fail('invalid-business');
     this.#businesses = structuredClone(businesses);
     this.#store = store;
     this.#secretCheck = secretCheck;
     this.#credentialStatus = credentialStatus;
     this.#organization = organization;
+    // Row 199: the runtime's credential lifecycle (credential-verbs.mjs); it holds the store, not the broker.
+    this.#credentialVerbs = credentialVerbs;
     this.#project = project;
     this.#usage = usage;
     this.#limits = limits;
@@ -795,7 +807,12 @@ export class Broker {
     // records `?? null` and the current holder reads undefined.
     if (action === 'role.revoke' && (context.holderRun ?? null) !== (this.#holder(s.business, target)?.holder_run ?? null))
       fail('decision-mismatch');
-    return { class: cls, decision: d.id };
+    // Row 199 (r4 B4): approve at A, push B, publish refuses.
+    if (action === 'git.push.remote' && (context.pushCommit ?? null) !== (this.#latestPush(s.business, target)?.commit ?? null))
+      fail('decision-mismatch');
+    return action === 'git.push.remote'
+      ? { class: cls, decision: d.id, pushCommit: context.pushCommit ?? null }
+      : { class: cls, decision: d.id };
   }
   // The raise's context: its target and approval option, from the decision.raise action.allowed.
   #raised(business, decision) {
@@ -858,13 +875,14 @@ export class Broker {
     if (body.commit !== push.commit) fail('verdict-stale');
   }
   // A push is the action.allowed recordPush wrote, the only one for git.push.working with a commit.
+  // role is the role that pushed (row 199, work-not-yours).
   #latestPush(business, task) {
     const r = this.#store.get(
-      "SELECT body FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
+      "SELECT body, actor_role FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
       business,
       task,
     );
-    return r ? JSON.parse(r.body) : null;
+    return r ? { ...JSON.parse(r.body), role: r.actor_role } : null;
   }
   // Row 93: the bus host's git socket asks before it takes a push's bytes. Nothing is recorded
   // unless it refuses: the push is recorded, and its authority consumed, once the ref moved.
@@ -998,6 +1016,98 @@ export class Broker {
     this.#landings.delete(ticket);
     return code;
   }
+  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3, D9b): the bus host's git socket publishes a task's
+  // recorded work commit to the agent's own fork. checkPublish runs before anything touches the
+  // network. The run holds its claim; git.push.remote is a hard wait, so it cites a decision the
+  // human resolved for this task, bound to the task's latest push (#authorityFor). The project must
+  // be in the agent's publish grant with an upstream; the fork is built from that upstream and the
+  // agent's own Gitea user, never from the request. The ticket carries the session and decision to
+  // recordPublish or publishRefused. No token is in the result.
+  checkPublish(cap, args) {
+    const s = this.#session(cap);
+    return this.#store.transaction(() => {
+      keys(args, ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch', 'decision'], ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch']);
+      if (!taskRef(args.task_ref) || (args.decision !== undefined && !id(args.decision))) fail('invalid-request');
+      identifier(args.project);
+      string(args.branch, 200);
+      this.#agent(s);
+      const { task_ref, project, branch } = args;
+      const decision = args.decision ?? null;
+      const result = this.#checkAuthority(s, 'git.push.remote', { decision, target: task_ref });
+      const facts = this.#publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result);
+      const ticket = randomUUID();
+      const dst = `refs/heads/${facts.user}/${branch}`;
+      this.#publishes.set(ticket, { s, task_ref, project, decision, dst, ...facts });
+      return { ticket, task_ref, project, fork: facts.fork, user: facts.user, email: facts.email, source: facts.source, dst };
+    });
+  }
+  // Steps 2 and 3, checked again at recordPublish. After routing a within-role publish has no
+  // decision, so the commit is the latest push's (N9); the git socket still checks the work ref tip.
+  #publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result) {
+    if (result.decision && this.#spent(s.business, result.decision)) fail('decision-consumed');
+    const b = this.#business(s.business);
+    const role = b.roles?.[s.role];
+    const upstream = b.projects?.[project]?.remote;
+    if (!role?.identity || !(role.publish ?? []).includes(project) || !upstream) fail('remote-not-granted');
+    const problem = forkProblem(upstream, role.identity);
+    if (problem) fail(problem);
+    const push = this.#latestPush(s.business, task_ref);
+    if (!push) fail('no-push');
+    if (push.role !== s.role) fail('work-not-yours');
+    if (push.project !== project) fail('work-ref');
+    const source = result.pushCommit ?? push.commit;
+    if (source !== push.commit) fail('decision-mismatch');
+    const user = role.identity.gitea.user;
+    return { fork: forkUrl(upstream, user), user, email: role.identity.email, source };
+  }
+  #publish(ticket) {
+    return (typeof ticket === 'string' && this.#publishes.get(ticket)) || fail('publish-unknown');
+  }
+  // Design D5: the only key the git socket's gitea token use gets is the agent checkPublish checked
+  // (#agent: a run holding its claim, never a tester, reader or human). Trusted host only.
+  publishSession(ticket) {
+    const { s } = this.#publish(ticket);
+    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, role: s.role });
+  }
+  // Where the bus process's git sends the push (D9 step 5): all from the ticket, none from the
+  // host's message. Trusted host only.
+  publishTarget(ticket) {
+    const { s, project, fork, user, source, dst } = this.#publish(ticket);
+    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, project, fork, user, source, dst });
+  }
+  // Step 6: records the push the git socket made as the action.allowed for git.push.remote, which
+  // spends the decision. The checks run again; the run may have ended while git ran, so the holder
+  // check is not repeated (as recordLand). Trusted host only.
+  recordPublish(ticket, pushed) {
+    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
+    const done = this.#store.transaction(() => {
+      keys(pushed, ['ref', 'commit', 'previous'], ['ref', 'commit', 'previous']);
+      if (!oid(pushed.commit) || (pushed.previous !== null && !oid(pushed.previous))) fail('invalid-request');
+      string(pushed.ref, 260);
+      const result = this.#authorityFor(t.s, 'git.push.remote', { decision: t.decision, target: t.task_ref });
+      const facts = this.#publishFacts(t.s, t.task_ref, t.project, result);
+      if (facts.source !== t.source || pushed.commit !== t.source || facts.fork !== t.fork || pushed.ref !== t.dst) fail('ref-moved');
+      const { ref, commit, previous } = pushed;
+      this.#event(
+        t.s,
+        'action.allowed',
+        { project: t.project, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous, action: 'git.push.remote', ...result, target: t.task_ref },
+        t.task_ref,
+      );
+      return { task_ref: t.task_ref, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous };
+    });
+    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
+    return done;
+  }
+  // Ends a publish that didn't push: action.refused with the code on the task's trail. The git
+  // socket answers the run with the same code. Trusted host only.
+  publishRefused(ticket, { code } = {}) {
+    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
+    if (!/^[a-z-]{1,64}$/.test(code ?? '')) fail('invalid-request');
+    this.#store.transaction(() => this.#event(t.s, 'action.refused', { code }, t.task_ref));
+    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
+    return code;
+  }
   // The outcome as a RESULT from the bus, as #notice sends: the runner takes a turn on it and sends
   // no automatic reply. It goes to the role in the thread the decision was raised in.
   #landMessage(s, decision, body) {
@@ -1245,6 +1355,7 @@ export class Broker {
         return this.#requestProject(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
       if (PROJECT_FILE_VERBS.includes(request.verb))
         return this.#requestProjectFile(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
+      if (CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(request.verb)) return this.#requestCredential(s, request.verb, structuredClone(args));
       if (["limits", "limits.set", "organization.set", "organization.revision", "plugins", "plugins.set", "instances", "instances.set", "routes", "routes.set"].includes(request.verb)) {
         // Row 123 (#1617, REQ-COS-1, REQ-LIMIT-1): organization.set is limits.set for a role whose
         // file lists organization.change. It takes the same keys, runs the same write path and
@@ -1316,6 +1427,35 @@ export class Broker {
       throw this.#refused(s, e, request);
     }
   }
+  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6). The token of an issue comes in args from the human's stdin; the
+  // secret check above has refused one the bus already holds, a refusal records its code alone, and
+  // nothing returned carries it. Outside the store transaction, as the organization branch.
+  #requestCredential(s, verb, a) {
+    if (s.tester ? !TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(verb) : !s.human) fail(s.tester ? 'tester-refused' : 'human-required');
+    if (!this.#credentialVerbs) fail('not-configured');
+    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') keys(a, ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date'], ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date']);
+    else keys(a, verb === 'credentials.revoke' ? ['agent', 'service', 'reason'] : ['agent', 'reason'], ['agent', 'reason']);
+    string(a.agent, 64);
+    if (a.service !== undefined && !['gitea', 'vikunja'].includes(a.service)) fail('invalid-request');
+    if (a.token !== undefined) string(a.token, 16384);
+    if (a.date !== undefined) string(a.date, 10);
+    if (a.reason !== undefined) string(a.reason, 500);
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(this.#business(s.business).roles, a.agent)) fail('credential-unknown');
+    // A running agent keeps its tokens until its runs end: delete waits for every claim to end.
+    if (verb === 'credentials.delete' && (this.#holder(s.business, a.agent)?.op === 'claim' || this.#threadHolders(s.business, a.agent).length))
+      fail('agent-running');
+    let result;
+    try {
+      result = this.#credentialVerbs(s.business, verb, a, s.tester ? 'tester' : s.human);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e instanceof BusError && e.code.startsWith('credential-')) throw e;
+      if (e.code === 'revision-conflict' || e.code?.startsWith('organization-')) fail(e.code);
+      if (e.name === 'BusinessError') fail('invalid-request');
+      throw new BusError('outcome-unknown');
+    }
+    this.#secretCheck(result);
+    return result;
+  }
   // Only the runner's bound session and delivered message identify a turn; no host path crosses the wire.
   // Row 156 (#1651, sage-0808): a role run's landing turn is a merge decision id instead. Its begin
   // needs the decision held for the run's role; its end needs that begin, since the landing may
@@ -1698,6 +1838,12 @@ export class Broker {
             by,
           );
         }
+        // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 1, r4 B4): a publish decision binds one commit, the task's
+        // latest recorded push now, read here and never taken from the agent. The human sees it.
+        const pushCommit =
+          a.action === 'git.push.remote' ? (this.#latestPush(s.business, a.target)?.commit ?? fail('no-push')) : null;
+        const question = pushCommit ? `${a.question} (commit ${pushCommit})` : a.question;
+        string(question);
         const did = randomUUID();
         this.#store.run(
           'INSERT INTO decisions(id,at,business,project,raised_by_role,raised_by_run,class,action,route_to,question,options,recommendation,task_ref,requirement_ref,blocking,supersedes,spec_path,spec_commit) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',
@@ -1710,7 +1856,7 @@ export class Broker {
           cls,
           a.action,
           route,
-          a.question,
+          question,
           JSON.stringify(a.options),
           a.recommendation,
           a.task_ref ?? null,
@@ -1732,6 +1878,7 @@ export class Broker {
             approvalChoice,
             holderRun:
               a.action === 'role.revoke' ? (this.#holder(s.business, a.target)?.holder_run ?? null) : null,
+            ...(pushCommit ? { pushCommit } : {}),
           },
           a.task_ref ?? (taskRef(a.target) ? a.target : did),
         );

packages/bus/src/credential-verbs.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
+// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete of one agent's credentials, for
+// the broker's human-only verbs. The broker checks the session, the keys and a running claim first.
+// Each verb leaves one receipt in the organization's changes.jsonl: the actor and a detail naming the
+// verb, agent, kinds, date or reason, never a value. Nothing here logs, and a result carries no token.
+const DATE_KEY = Object.freeze({ gitea: 'rotateBy', vikunja: 'expires' });
+const deny = (code) => {
+  throw new BusError(code);
+};
+export function credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer }) {
+  const state = (instance, service) =>
+    credentials.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service)?.state;
+  return (id, verb, args, actor) => {
+    const { agent } = args;
+    const instance = id + '/' + agent;
+    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
+    const current = document.roles?.[agent]?.credentials;
+    if (!current) deny('credential-unknown');
+    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') {
+      const { service, token, date } = args;
+      if (!current[service]) deny('credential-unknown');
+      // rotate is an issue over an entry the bus holds now; the old value is gone when this returns.
+      const kind = ['not-issued', 'revoked', undefined].includes(state(instance, service)) ? 'issue' : 'rotate';
+      const next = structuredClone(document);
+      next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: date };
+      const detail = { verb: kind, agent, kind: [service], date };
+      const status = credentials.issue(instance, service, token, date, () =>
+        writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail }),
+      );
+      return { agent, verb: kind, service, date: status.date, state: status.state };
+    }
+    const services = verb === 'credentials.revoke' && args.service ? [args.service] : Object.keys(current);
+    if (services.some((service) => !current[service])) deny('credential-unknown');
+    // Memory first, then the store file (Credentials.revoke), then the business file. A reference
+    // outside the store becomes `store` with its date, so a restart loads nothing for it. When that
+    // write fails, the entry stays revoked in memory and the refusal says to run the verb again.
+    if (verb === 'credentials.delete') credentials.remove(instance);
+    else for (const service of services) credentials.revoke(instance, service);
+    const detail = { verb: verb.slice('credentials.'.length), agent, kind: services, reason: args.reason };
+    const moved = services.filter((service) => current[service].store !== true);
+    if (moved.length) {
+      const next = structuredClone(document);
+      for (const service of moved)
+        next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: current[service][DATE_KEY[service]] };
+      writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail });
+    } else writer.record(id, { actor, detail });
+    return {
+      agent,
+      verb: detail.verb,
+      services: services.map((service) => ({ service, state: state(instance, service) ?? 'not-issued' })),
+    };
+  };
+}

packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
-import { openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants } from 'node:fs';
-import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import {
+  openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants, mkdirSync, writeSync, fsyncSync,
+  renameSync, unlinkSync, rmdirSync, readdirSync,
+} from 'node:fs';
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
 const deny = (code) => {
   throw new BusError(code);
@@ -13,9 +16,33 @@ const day = (value) =>
   /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(value) &&
   !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(value)) &&
   new Date(value).toISOString().slice(0, 10) === value;
+const TOKEN = /^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/;
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D4): a store dir is the stack instance's user's own and nobody else's.
+const privateDir = (path, { missing = false } = {}) => {
+  let st;
+  try {
+    st = lstatSync(path);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (missing && e.code === 'ENOENT') return false;
+    deny('credential-file');
+  }
+  if (!st.isDirectory() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) deny('credential-file');
+  return true;
+};
 export class Credentials {
   #tokens = new Map();
-  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env }) {
+  // Row 199: every reference the bus loaded, so issue, rotate, revoke and status work per entry.
+  #refs = new Map();
+  #revoked = new Set();
+  #storeRoot;
+  #repoRoots;
+  #dataRoot;
+  // storeRoot is <configDir>/secrets/agents (design D1); a reference with store: true must name the
+  // path under it for its own business, agent and service.
+  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env, storeRoot = null }) {
+    this.#storeRoot = storeRoot;
+    this.#repoRoots = repoRoots;
+    this.#dataRoot = dataRoot;
     try {
       for (const [instance, services] of Object.entries(references))
         for (const [service, ref] of Object.entries(services)) {
@@ -26,12 +53,41 @@ export class Credentials {
           if (
             (ref.service !== undefined && ref.service !== service) ||
             Object.keys(ref).some(
-              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
+              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', 'store', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
             ) ||
-            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env)
+            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env) ||
+            (ref.store !== undefined && (ref.store !== true || ref.file !== this.#storePath(instance, service)))
           )
             deny('credential-reference');
+          this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref, date });
+          const token = this.#read(ref, env);
+          if (token !== null) this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
+        }
+    } catch (e) {
+      this.close();
+      throw e;
+    }
+  }
+  #storePath(instance, service) {
+    if (!this.#storeRoot) deny('credential-reference');
+    const [business, agent, ...rest] = instance.split('/');
+    if (!business || !agent || rest.length || agent.startsWith('@')) deny('credential-reference');
+    return join(this.#storeRoot, business, agent, service);
+  }
+  // One token, read and checked, or null for a store reference with no file yet (design D3a).
+  #read(ref, env) {
           let token;
+          if (ref.store) {
+            const agentDir = dirname(ref.file);
+            privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
+            if (!privateDir(dirname(agentDir), { missing: true }) || !privateDir(agentDir, { missing: true })) return null;
+            try {
+              lstatSync(ref.file);
+            } catch (e) {
+              if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null;
+              deny('credential-file');
+            }
+          }
           if (ref.file) {
             if (!isAbsolute(ref.file)) deny('credential-location');
             let resolved, original;
@@ -43,7 +99,7 @@ export class Credentials {
             }
             if (original.isSymbolicLink() || !original.isFile()) deny('credential-file');
             if (
-              [...repoRoots, dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
+              [...this.#repoRoots, this.#dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
                 inside(
                   (() => {
                     try {
@@ -81,16 +137,98 @@ export class Credentials {
             if (!/^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$/.test(ref.env)) deny('credential-reference');
             token = env[ref.env];
           }
-          if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !/^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/.test(token))
-            deny('credential-format');
-          token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
-          if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
-          this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
-        }
-    } catch (e) {
-      this.close();
-      throw e;
+          return Credentials.#format(token);
+  }
+  static #format(token) {
+    if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !TOKEN.test(token)) deny('credential-format');
+    token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
+    if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
+    return token;
+  }
+  #known(instance, service) {
+    const known = this.#refs.get(instance + ':' + service);
+    if (!known) deny('credential-unknown');
+    return known;
+  }
+  // Row 199 (design section 6): write the token to the agent's store path (tmp, fsync, rename), then
+  // `commit` (the business file's reference becomes store), then memory. The token comes from the
+  // caller's stdin and is never logged. Returns the entry's new status.
+  issue(instance, service, token, date, commit = () => {}) {
+    this.#known(instance, service);
+    if (!day(date)) deny('credential-date');
+    token = Credentials.#format(token);
+    const file = this.#storePath(instance, service);
+    const agentDir = dirname(file);
+    mkdirSync(this.#storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
+    for (const dir of [dirname(agentDir), agentDir]) {
+      if (!privateDir(dir, { missing: true })) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+      privateDir(dir);
     }
+    const tmp = file + '.tmp';
+    try {
+      unlinkSync(tmp);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+    }
+    let fd;
+    try {
+      fd = openSync(tmp, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
+      writeSync(fd, token + '\n');
+      fsyncSync(fd);
+    } finally {
+      if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
+    }
+    renameSync(tmp, file);
+    const dirFd = openSync(agentDir, constants.O_RDONLY);
+    try {
+      fsyncSync(dirFd);
+    } finally {
+      closeSync(dirFd);
+    }
+    commit();
+    this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref: { service, store: true, file, [service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy']: date }, date });
+    this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
+    this.#revoked.delete(instance + ':' + service);
+    return this.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service);
+  }
+  // Memory first, then the store file (design section 6, D12). A file or env reference outside the
+  // store is never unlinked; the caller turns its reference into store, so a restart finds nothing.
+  revoke(instance, service) {
+    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
+    this.#tokens.delete(instance + ':' + service);
+    this.#revoked.add(instance + ':' + service);
+    if (ref.store) {
+      try {
+        unlinkSync(ref.file);
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+      }
+    }
+    return { file: Boolean(ref.store) };
+  }
+  // revoke for every service, then the agent's dir. A file other than a token or its tmp refuses.
+  remove(instance) {
+    const services = [...this.#refs.keys()].filter((k) => k.startsWith(instance + ':')).map((k) => k.slice(instance.length + 1));
+    for (const service of services) this.revoke(instance, service);
+    const agentDir = dirname(this.#storePath(instance, 'gitea'));
+    let names;
+    try {
+      names = readdirSync(agentDir);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return { services };
+      deny('credential-file');
+    }
+    if (names.some((n) => !/^(gitea|vikunja)(\.tmp)?$/.test(n))) deny('credential-file');
+    for (const n of names) unlinkSync(join(agentDir, n));
+    rmdirSync(agentDir);
+    return { services };
+  }
+  // The agent-facing use (design D5): the key comes only from the broker's verified session.
+  async useFor(session, service, operation) {
+    if (!session || typeof session.business !== 'string' || typeof session.role !== 'string' || session.role.startsWith('@'))
+      deny('credential-not-yours');
+    return this.use(session.business + '/' + session.role, service, operation);
   }
   assertClean(value) {
     let encoded;
@@ -109,14 +247,16 @@ export class Credentials {
     let result;
     try {
       result = await operation(entry.token);
-    } catch {
+    } catch (e) {
+      // Row 199: a host step's own refusal (publish) keeps its code; anything else is the service's.
+      if (e instanceof BusError) throw e;
       deny('service-failed');
     }
     this.assertClean(result);
     return result;
   }
   status() {
-    return [...this.#tokens.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
+    return [...this.#refs.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
       const i = key.lastIndexOf(':'),
         service = key.slice(i + 1),
         left = Date.parse(date + 'T00:00:00Z') - Date.now();
@@ -124,8 +264,11 @@ export class Credentials {
         instance: key.slice(0, i),
         service,
         date,
-        state:
-          service === 'gitea'
+        state: !this.#tokens.has(key)
+          ? this.#revoked.has(key)
+            ? 'revoked'
+            : 'not-issued'
+          : service === 'gitea'
             ? left <= 0
               ? 'rotation-due'
               : 'valid'
@@ -139,5 +282,6 @@ export class Credentials {
   }
   close() {
     this.#tokens.clear();
+    this.#refs.clear();
   }
 }

packages/bus/src/process.mjs

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ const LAUNCH_OPS = new Set([
   'checkLand',
   'recordLand',
   'landRefused',
+  'checkPublish',
+  'publishPush',
+  'publishResult',
+  'recordPublish',
+  'publishRefused',
   'landHeld',
   'threadsState',
   'threadIdle',
@@ -34,6 +39,12 @@ function launchOp(m) {
   if (m.op === 'checkLand') return runtime.checkLand(m.cap, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'recordLand') return runtime.recordLand(m.ticket, m.land);
   if (m.op === 'landRefused') return runtime.landRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
+  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. No entry returns a token.
+  if (m.op === 'checkPublish') return runtime.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args);
+  if (m.op === 'publishPush') return runtime.publishPush(m.ticket);
+  if (m.op === 'publishResult') return runtime.publishResult(m.ticket);
+  if (m.op === 'recordPublish') return runtime.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed);
+  if (m.op === 'publishRefused') return runtime.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'landHeld') return runtime.landHeld(m.record);
   // Row 121 (#1615): the launcher's view of the business's threads, and its idle release.
   if (m.op === 'threadsState') return runtime.threadsState(m.business);
@@ -99,7 +110,8 @@ if (!process.send) {
       booted = true;
       clearTimeout(timer);
       // `trackers` is S3's plain-data boot config; the adapter is loaded only when a business has one.
-      const { trackers, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
+      // Row 199: publishTls is the tests' scratch CA; no boot config sets it.
+      const { trackers, publishTls: _tls, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
       if (trackers) {
         const { tasksAdapter } = await import('../../tasks/src/adapter.mjs');
         config.tasks = tasksAdapter({ trackers });

packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs

@@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ import { Credentials } from './credentials.mjs';
 import { serve } from './server.mjs';
 import { launchSettings } from '../../business/src/launch-settings.mjs';
 import { readSessions } from '../../seat/src/session.mjs';
+import { publishRemote, workingRepo, WorkingError } from '../../seat/src/working.mjs';
 import { createLoader, hasModule } from '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';
 import { pluginSettings } from '../../business/src/plugin-settings.mjs';
 import { instanceSettings } from '../../business/src/instance-settings.mjs';
+import { organizationWriter } from '../../business/src/organization.mjs';
+import { credentialVerbs } from './credential-verbs.mjs';
 import { webService } from './web.mjs';
 import { verifyHuman } from './human.mjs';
 import { createUsage } from './usage.mjs';
@@ -72,6 +75,9 @@ export async function startBroker({
   repoRoots = [],
   tasks = null,
   organization = null,
+  // Row 199: the tests' scratch CA for publish's git (`-c http.sslCAInfo=...`). process.mjs drops
+  // it from the boot config, so only an in-process caller sets it.
+  publishTls = [],
 }) {
   let store, credentials, server, adapter;
   try {
@@ -86,7 +92,9 @@ export async function startBroker({
       ...repoRoots,
       ...Object.values(businesses).flatMap((b) => Object.values(b.projects ?? {}).map((p) => p.root)),
     ];
-    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot });
+    // Row 199 (#1697, design D1): the per-agent store is <configDir>/secrets/agents.
+    const storeRoot = organization ? join(organization.dir, 'secrets', 'agents') : null;
+    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot, storeRoot });
     store = new Store(dataRoot);
     // vikunja:19/305: the plug-in switch through the same human-only path as the limits: the verbs
     // plugins and plugins.set, logged in changes.jsonl with the actor, a missing module refused.
@@ -133,6 +141,11 @@ export async function startBroker({
       }:null,
       secretCheck: (value) => credentials.assertClean(value),
       credentialStatus: () => credentials.status(),
+      // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete, live with no restart; each
+      // rewrites or records through the organization writer, so changes.jsonl holds the receipt.
+      credentialVerbs: organization
+        ? credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) })
+        : null,
       // Row 65: a new launch binds only on a harness its business switches on, read from the file
       // as it stands now; an unreadable file switches none on.
       harnessOn: (id, name) => {
@@ -212,6 +225,42 @@ export async function startBroker({
     // Row 137 (#1631): the git socket's land op. checkLand's refusal is the run's, like checkPush's.
     // A landing then ends in recordLand or landRefused under its ticket, which outlive the run's cap.
     const checkLand = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkLand(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
+    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. checkPublish's refusal is the run's.
+    // The gitea token is used only under the open ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked,
+    // and the op table returns no token. A publish then ends in recordPublish or publishRefused,
+    // which files any refusal once, withGitea's included.
+    const checkPublish = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkPublish(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
+    const withGitea = async (ticket, fn) => credentials.useFor(broker.publishSession(ticket), 'gitea', fn);
+    // The push itself runs here, where the token is (D9 step 5), and the git socket's host polls
+    // for its end: the host's op channel answers one op at a time within 10 s, and ls-remote and
+    // push can take longer. Fork, user, source and dst all come from the ticket. A WorkingError's
+    // code is the refusal; git's stderr stays here.
+    const remotes = new Map();
+    function publishPush(ticket) {
+      if (remotes.has(ticket)) throw new BusError('publish-busy');
+      const { business, project, fork, user, source, dst } = broker.publishTarget(ticket);
+      const entry = { state: 'running' };
+      remotes.set(ticket, entry);
+      withGitea(ticket, (token) =>
+        publishRemote({ repo: workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project), fork, user, source, dst, token, tls: publishTls }).catch((e) => {
+          throw e instanceof WorkingError ? new BusError(e.code) : e;
+        }),
+      ).then(
+        (r) => Object.assign(entry, { state: 'pushed', ...r }),
+        (e) => {
+          // Not a refusal: the error's name and code only, never a message that could carry git's output.
+          if (!(e instanceof BusError)) process.stderr.write(`bus: publish git-failed: ${JSON.stringify({ name: e?.name, code: e?.code })}\n`);
+          Object.assign(entry, { state: 'refused', code: e instanceof BusError ? e.code : 'git-failed' });
+        },
+      );
+      return { state: 'running' };
+    }
+    function publishResult(ticket) {
+      const entry = remotes.get(ticket);
+      if (!entry) throw new BusError('publish-unknown');
+      if (entry.state !== 'running') remotes.delete(ticket);
+      return { ...entry };
+    }
     // Metadata only (service, date, state); the token stays in Credentials.
     function credentialStatus(business, role) {
       return credentials
@@ -237,6 +286,12 @@ export async function startBroker({
       checkLand,
       recordLand: (ticket, land) => broker.recordLand(ticket, land),
       landRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.landRefused(ticket, args),
+      checkPublish,
+      withGitea,
+      publishPush,
+      publishResult,
+      recordPublish: (ticket, pushed) => broker.recordPublish(ticket, pushed),
+      publishRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.publishRefused(ticket, args),
       landHeld: (record) => broker.landHeld(record),
       // Row 156 (#1651): the launcher's landing pass.
       landHolders: (business) => broker.landHolders(business),

packages/bus/tests/credential-store.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D3a, D4, section 6, T1 and T5): the per-agent credential store under
+// <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { Credentials } from '../src/credentials.mjs';
+
+const TOKEN = 'fake_store_token_0123456789';
+const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
+const AGENT = { business: 'acme', role: 'coder' };
+
+function setup(t) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-store-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const storeRoot = join(root, 'secrets', 'agents');
+  mkdirSync(storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
+  const file = join(storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'gitea');
+  const references = { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { service: 'gitea', store: true, file, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } };
+  const open = (extra = {}) => new Credentials({ references, storeRoot, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data', ...extra });
+  const state = (c) => c.status().find((e) => e.instance === 'acme/coder' && e.service === 'gitea').state;
+  const read = (c, session = AGENT) => c.useFor(session, 'gitea', async (token) => ({ same: token === TOKEN, rotated: token === ROTATED }));
+  return { root, storeRoot, file, references, open, state, read };
+}
+
+test('T1: a store reference with no file yet starts, and the agent is not-issued until issue', async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const c = s.open();
+  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
+  const status = c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
+  assert.equal(status.state, 'valid');
+  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
+  assert.equal(statSync(s.file).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
+  for (const dir of [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')]) assert.equal(statSync(dir).mode & 0o777, 0o700);
+  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
+  // A restart reads the issued file.
+  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(s.open()), { same: true, rotated: false });
+});
+
+test('T1: a store path the reference does not own, or no store root, refuses the reference', (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const other = join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'pm', 'gitea');
+  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { store: true, file: other, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-reference/);
+  assert.throws(() => new Credentials({ references: s.references, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data' }), /credential-reference/);
+  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/@tester': { gitea: { store: true, file: join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', '@tester', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }),
+    /credential-reference/);
+});
+
+test('T1: a wrong mode on the store root, a business dir, an agent dir or the file refuses start', (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  s.open().issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
+  for (const [path, bad, good] of [
+    [s.storeRoot, 0o750, 0o700],
+    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o705, 0o700],
+    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), 0o770, 0o700],
+    [s.file, 0o640, 0o600],
+  ]) {
+    chmodSync(path, bad);
+    assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/, path);
+    chmodSync(path, good);
+  }
+  s.open();
+});
+
+test('T1: a missing store root refuses start; a missing {file} reference still refuses start', (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  rmSync(s.storeRoot, { recursive: true });
+  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
+  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { coder: { gitea: { file: join(s.root, 'absent'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-file/);
+});
+
+test('T1: a store file that is a directory or a symlink refuses start', (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  mkdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  chmodSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o700);
+  mkdirSync(s.file, { mode: 0o700 });
+  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
+  rmSync(s.file, { recursive: true });
+  const target = join(s.root, 'target');
+  writeFileSync(target, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  symlinkSync(target, s.file);
+  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
+});
+
+test('T2: useFor keys from the session only', async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const c = s.open();
+  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: 'pm' }), /credential-unavailable/);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: '@tester' }), /credential-not-yours/);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, null), /credential-not-yours/);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme' }), /credential-not-yours/);
+});
+
+test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live with no restart, and revoke holds across one', async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const c = s.open();
+  let committed = 0;
+  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => committed++);
+  assert.equal(committed, 1);
+  // Rotate is a second issue: the new token is used at once, with no tmp file left.
+  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', ROTATED + '\n', '2099-06-01');
+  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: false, rotated: true });
+  assert.equal(c.status()[0].date, '2099-06-01');
+  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
+  // Revoke: memory first, then the file.
+  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: true });
+  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'revoked');
+  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
+  const restarted = s.open();
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(restarted), /credential-unavailable/);
+  assert.equal(s.state(restarted), 'not-issued');
+  // Delete removes the agent's dir.
+  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
+  assert.deepEqual(c.remove('acme/coder'), { services: ['gitea'] });
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), false);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
+});
+
+test('T5: a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory, and a bad token or date writes nothing', async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const c = s.open();
+  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', 'short', '2099-01-01'), /credential-format/);
+  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-13-01'), /credential-date/);
+  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/pm', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01'), /credential-unknown/);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
+  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => { throw new Error('commit failed'); }), /commit failed/);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), true);
+  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
+});
+
+test('T5: revoke of a {file} reference forgets the token and never unlinks the file', async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const path = join(s.root, 'outside-token');
+  writeFileSync(path, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  const c = s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { file: path, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } });
+  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
+  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: false });
+  assert.equal(existsSync(path), true);
+  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
+});
+
+test('T5: delete refuses an agent dir holding anything but tokens', (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const c = s.open();
+  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
+  writeFileSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes'), 'x', { mode: 0o600 });
+  assert.throws(() => c.remove('acme/coder'), /credential-file/);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes')), true);
+});
+
+// Design D5: the name-keyed use() is the host's own, for @sync and the tracker's start check of each
+// role's token. Every other credential use goes through useFor, keyed from the broker's session. A
+// new use( call site outside this list fails here.
+test('D5: every credentials use( call site is on the allowlist', () => {
+  const packages = new URL('../../', import.meta.url);
+  const allowed = new Map([
+    ['bus/src/credentials.mjs', 1], // useFor's own call
+    ['tasks/src/adapter.mjs', 1], // the host's use(instance) for @sync and probe
+  ]);
+  const found = new Map();
+  const walk = (dir, rel) => {
+    for (const name of readdirSync(dir)) {
+      if (name === 'node_modules' || name === 'tests') continue;
+      const path = join(dir, name);
+      if (statSync(path).isDirectory()) walk(path, `${rel}${name}/`);
+      else if (name.endsWith('.mjs') || name.endsWith('.js')) {
+        const code = readFileSync(path, 'utf8').split('\n').filter((line) => !/^\s*\/\//.test(line)).join('\n');
+        const n = (code.match(/(?:credentials|this)\.use\(/g) ?? []).length;
+        if (n) found.set(`${rel}${name}`, n);
+      }
+    }
+  };
+  for (const pkg of readdirSync(packages)) if (statSync(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages), { throwIfNoEntry: false })?.isDirectory())
+    walk(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages).pathname, `${pkg}/src/`);
+  assert.deepEqual(Object.fromEntries([...found].sort()), Object.fromEntries([...allowed].sort()));
+});

packages/bus/tests/credential-verbs.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and
+// credentials.delete through the runtime. Human-only; the tester revokes and never issues. Each verb
+// is live with no restart and leaves one receipt in changes.jsonl with no value in it. Fake tokens in a
+// scratch root only.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
+import { Broker, CREDENTIAL_VERBS } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
+import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
+
+const TOKEN = 'fake_issued_token_0123456789';
+const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
+const OTHER = 'fake_other_token_5555555555';
+const DATE = '2099-01-01';
+const role = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } };
+
+async function setup(t) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-verbs-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
+  const doc = { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } };
+  doc.roles.coder.credentials.gitea = { store: true, rotateBy: DATE };
+  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), doc);
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  const store = (agent, service) => join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', agent, service);
+  // The bus's resolved business carries the same references; a store one names its derived file.
+  const demo = {
+    id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true },
+    roles: {
+      coder: { ...role, credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: store('coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: doc.roles.coder.credentials.vikunja } },
+      reviewer: { ...role, credentials: doc.roles.reviewer.credentials },
+    },
+  };
+  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) } });
+  t.after(() => bus.close());
+  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const tester = bus.broker.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
+  const ask = (cap, verb, args) => bus.broker.request(cap, { verb, args });
+  const file = () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'));
+  const receipts = () => {
+    const log = join(root, 'businesses/.history/demo/changes.jsonl');
+    return existsSync(log) ? readFileSync(log, 'utf8').trim().split('\n').map(JSON.parse) : [];
+  };
+  const committed = () => receipts().filter((r) => r.state === 'committed');
+  const status = (agent) => Object.fromEntries(bus.credentialStatus('demo', agent).map((e) => [e.service, e.state]));
+  return { root, bus, human, tester, ask, file, receipts, committed, status, store };
+}
+
+test('row 199: the lifecycle verbs refuse every session but the human, and the tester revokes only', (t) => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-gate-'));
+  const s = new Store(root);
+  t.after(() => { s.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+  const calls = [];
+  const b = new Broker({
+    store: s,
+    businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true }, roles: { coder: role } } },
+    credentialVerbs: (id, verb, args, actor) => (calls.push([verb, actor]), { ok: true }),
+  });
+  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const tester = b.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
+  const reader = b.bindReader({ business: 'demo' });
+  const coder = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
+  const args = {
+    'credentials.issue': { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE },
+    'credentials.revoke': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
+    'credentials.delete': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
+  };
+  assert.deepEqual(CREDENTIAL_VERBS, Object.keys(args));
+  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) {
+    assert.throws(() => b.request(reader, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
+    assert.throws(() => b.request(coder, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
+  }
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: args['credentials.issue'] }), /tester-refused/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /tester-refused/);
+  // Keys: a token on revoke, a missing reason, an unknown service, an unknown agent, an @ agent.
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { ...args['credentials.revoke'], token: TOKEN } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: 'coder' } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], service: 'model' } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], file: '/x' } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], agent: 'pm' } }), /credential-unknown/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: '@sync', reason: 'x' } }), /credential-unknown/);
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
+  // A refusal records its code alone, never the token.
+  const refused = s.all("SELECT body FROM events WHERE kind='action.refused'");
+  assert.ok(refused.length >= 10);
+  for (const { body } of refused) assert.equal(body.includes(TOKEN), false);
+  // delete waits for the agent's claim to end.
+  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /agent-running/);
+  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.release' });
+  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) b.request(human, { verb, args: args[verb] });
+  b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] });
+  assert.deepEqual(calls, [['credentials.issue', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'jason'], ['credentials.delete', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'tester']]);
+  // No lifecycle without the runtime's store.
+  const bare = new Broker({ store: s, businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, roles: { coder: role } } } });
+  const h2 = bare.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  assert.throws(() => bare.request(h2, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] }), /not-configured/);
+});
+
+test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live, rewrite the business file and leave one receipt each, with no value anywhere', async (t) => {
+  const c = await setup(t);
+  const coder = { business: 'demo', role: 'coder' };
+  const read = (service) => c.bus.credentials.useFor(coder, service, async (token) => token === TOKEN ? 'issued' : token === ROTATED ? 'rotated' : 'other');
+  assert.deepEqual(c.status('coder'), { gitea: 'not-issued', vikunja: 'valid' });
+  // issue: the file, then the business file's reference, then memory.
+  const issued = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN + '\n', date: DATE });
+  assert.deepEqual(issued, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'issue', service: 'gitea', date: DATE, state: 'valid' });
+  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'issued');
+  assert.equal(statSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
+  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: DATE });
+  let last = c.committed().at(-1);
+  assert.equal(last.actor, 'jason');
+  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'issue', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: DATE });
+  // The same token again is one the bus holds: the secret check refuses it before any write.
+  const count = c.receipts().length;
+  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE }), /credential-leak/);
+  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: 'short', date: DATE }), /credential-format/);
+  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: '2099-02-30' }), /credential-date/);
+  assert.equal(c.receipts().length, count);
+  // rotate: an issue over an issued entry, used at once.
+  const rotated = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: ROTATED, date: '2099-06-01' });
+  assert.equal(rotated.verb, 'rotate');
+  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'rotated');
+  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: '2099-06-01' });
+  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'rotate', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: '2099-06-01' });
+  // revoke of a store entry by the tester: memory and file, no document change, a receipt.
+  const bytes = readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8');
+  const revoked = c.ask(c.tester, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', reason: 'test' });
+  assert.deepEqual(revoked, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'revoke', services: [{ service: 'gitea', state: 'revoked' }] });
+  await assert.rejects(read('gitea'), /credential-unavailable/);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')), false);
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'), bytes);
+  last = c.committed().at(-1);
+  assert.equal(last.actor, 'tester');
+  assert.deepEqual(last.changes, []);
+  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'revoke', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], reason: 'test' });
+  // revoke of a {file} reference: memory, the outside file kept, the reference becomes store.
+  const outside = c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.file;
+  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'vikunja', reason: 'moved' });
+  await assert.rejects(read('vikunja'), /credential-unavailable/);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(outside), true);
+  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja, { store: true, expires: DATE });
+  assert.ok(c.committed().at(-1).changes.some((e) => e.path === 'roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.store' && e.new === true));
+  // delete: every kind revoked, the agent's dir gone, both references store.
+  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'reviewer', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: DATE });
+  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('reviewer', 'gitea')), true);
+  const deleted = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.delete', { agent: 'reviewer', reason: 'fired' });
+  assert.deepEqual(deleted.services.map((e) => e.state), ['revoked', 'revoked']);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(c.root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'reviewer')), false);
+  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.reviewer.credentials, { gitea: { store: true, rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: { store: true, expires: DATE } });
+  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'delete', agent: 'reviewer', kind: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], reason: 'fired' });
+  // The status read never carries a value.
+  assert.deepEqual(c.ask(c.human, 'credentials', {}).map((e) => e.state).sort(), ['revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked']);
+  // T4: no token in any file under the root (receipts, business file, events, logs).
+  const walk = (dir) => readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true }).flatMap((e) => e.isDirectory() ? walk(join(dir, e.name)) : e.isFile() ? [join(dir, e.name)] : []);
+  for (const path of walk(c.root))
+    for (const token of [TOKEN, ROTATED, OTHER]) assert.equal(readFileSync(path).includes(token), false, path);
+});

packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { fixture } from './spec-fixtures.mjs';
 
 // PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1, REQ-WAIT-2 and REQ-DEC-2 (row 139, #1633).
 const WAITS = ['spend', 'data.delete', 'network.expose', 'account.create', 'credential.mint', 'message.external',
-  'git.push.protected', 'deploy'];
+  'git.push.protected', 'git.push.remote', 'deploy'];
 const LEFT = ['git.merge.protected', 'policy.change', 'prd.approve', 'role.revoke'];
 const cite = f => ({ project: 'stack', spec_path: 'spec/north-star.md', spec_commit: f.commit });
 const routed = (f, d) => ({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) });
@@ -36,10 +36,14 @@ test('REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; th
 });
 
 test('REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it', async t => {
-  const f = await fixture(t);
+  const f = await fixture(t, { roles: { coder: { definition: 'coder',
+    authority: { withinRole: ['message.send', 'record.write', 'git.push.working'], crossRole: [] } } } });
+  // Row 199: a git.push.remote raise binds the task's latest push, so the task has one.
+  f.broker.recordPush(f.coder, { task_ref: 'vikunja:1/2', project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2',
+    commit: 'a'.repeat(40), previous: null });
   for (const action of WAITS) {
     for (const args of [{}, cite(f), { ...cite(f), domain: 'technical' }]) {
-      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...args });
+      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...(action === 'git.push.remote' ? { target: 'vikunja:1/2' } : {}), ...args });
       assert.deepEqual(routed(f, d), { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' }, `${action} ${JSON.stringify(args)}`);
     }
   }

packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ test('Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure: only the listed imports, n
     "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';",
     // Row 141 (#1635): the business ID_PATTERN for instance names. The vocabulary is already in
     // RUNNER_FILES and imports nothing. Row 155 (#1649) reads THREAD_DEFINITION and END_PROTECTED
-    // from it too.
-    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
+    // from it too. Row 199 (#1697) reads the D9c fork parse, forkProblem and forkUrl, from it.
+    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
   ]);
   assert.doesNotMatch(source, /\bimport\s*\(/);
   assert.doesNotMatch(readFileSync(new URL('../src/landing.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8'), /\bimport\b/);

packages/bus/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3 and 6, D9b): the broker side of publish. git.push.remote
+// is a hard wait; its decision binds the task's latest push (pushCommit). checkPublish builds the
+// agent's fork from the project's upstream and the agent's own Gitea user; recordPublish spends the
+// decision; publishRefused files the refusal.
+
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { fork } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
+import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+
+const TASK = 'vikunja:1/2';
+const A = 'a'.repeat(40);
+const B = 'b'.repeat(40);
+const C = 'c'.repeat(40);
+const identity = (user) => ({ name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: 'https://git.example', user } });
+const pusher = { withinRole: ['git.push.working', 'message.send'], crossRole: [] };
+function businesses(upstream = 'https://git.example/mosaic/stack') {
+  return {
+    demo: {
+      id: 'demo',
+      human: 'jason',
+      arbiters: { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' },
+      projects: { stack: { root: '/nonexistent', remote: upstream }, books: { root: '/nonexistent-books' } },
+      roles: {
+        coder: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-coder'), publish: ['stack'] },
+        second: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-second'), publish: ['stack'] },
+        plain: { authority: pusher },
+        reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } },
+      },
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function setup(t, upstream) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-'));
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  const b = new Broker({ store, businesses: businesses(upstream) });
+  t.after(() => {
+    store.close();
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  const caps = {};
+  for (const role of ['coder', 'second', 'plain', 'reviewer']) {
+    caps[role] = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: 'pi' });
+    b.request(caps[role], { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
+  }
+  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const call = (cap, verb, args) => b.request(cap, { verb, args });
+  const push = (commit, previous = null, role = 'coder', project = 'stack') => {
+    b.checkPush(caps[role], TASK);
+    return b.recordPush(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project, branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit, previous });
+  };
+  const raise = (role = 'coder') =>
+    call(caps[role], 'decision.raise', {
+      action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
+      options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
+    });
+  const approve = (role = 'coder') => {
+    const d = raise(role);
+    call(human, 'decision.resolve', { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' });
+    return d;
+  };
+  const publish = (decision, role = 'coder', extra = {}) =>
+    b.checkPublish(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ...(decision ? { decision: decision.id } : {}), ...extra });
+  const events = (kind) => store.all('SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? ORDER BY seq', kind).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
+  return { b, store, caps, human, call, push, raise, approve, publish, events };
+}
+
+test('a raise with no recorded push refuses no-push; a raise binds the latest push and shows it', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  assert.throws(() => f.raise(), /no-push/);
+  f.push(A);
+  const d = f.raise();
+  assert.match(d.question, new RegExp(`commit ${A}\\)$`));
+  const raised = f.events('action.allowed').find((e) => e.body.operation === 'decision.raise');
+  assert.equal(raised.body.pushCommit, A);
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) }, { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' });
+});
+
+test('happy path: the fork is the upstream repo under the agent\'s own user, the destination is host-built', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  const d = f.approve();
+  const r = f.publish(d);
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...r, ticket: typeof r.ticket }, {
+    ticket: 'string', task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', fork: 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack',
+    user: 'acme-coder', email: '[email protected]', source: A, dst: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat',
+  });
+  const done = f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
+  assert.deepEqual(done, { task_ref: TASK, fork: r.fork, ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
+  const allowed = f.events('action.allowed').filter((e) => e.body.action === 'git.push.remote' && e.body.operation !== 'decision.raise');
+  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
+  assert.equal(allowed[0].subject, TASK);
+  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.decision, d.id);
+  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, r.fork);
+  // Spent once.
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-consumed/);
+  assert.throws(() => f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /publish-unknown/);
+});
+
+test('a hard wait: no decision refuses, and a decision for another task refuses', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(null), /decision-required/);
+  const other = f.call(f.caps.coder, 'decision.raise', {
+    action: 'deploy', target: 'vikunja:1/3', question: 'Ship?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
+    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
+  });
+  f.call(f.human, 'decision.resolve', { id: other.id, choice: 'yes' });
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(other), /decision-mismatch/);
+  const d = f.raise();
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-not-approved/);
+});
+
+test('r4 B4: approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish refuses decision-mismatch', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  const d = f.approve();
+  f.push(B, A);
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-mismatch/);
+  // And a push between checkPublish and recordPublish refuses the record.
+  const f2 = setup(t);
+  f2.push(A);
+  const d2 = f2.approve();
+  const r = f2.publish(d2);
+  f2.push(C, A);
+  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
+  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: C, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
+});
+
+test('grant and fork refusals', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A, null, 'plain');
+  // plain has no identity and no grant; its raise still binds the push, the publish refuses.
+  const d = f.approve('plain');
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain'), /remote-not-granted/);
+  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain', { project: 'books' }), /remote-not-granted|decision-mismatch/);
+  // work-not-yours: second publishes a push coder made.
+  const g = setup(t);
+  g.push(A);
+  const d2 = g.approve('second');
+  assert.throws(() => g.publish(d2, 'second'), /work-not-yours/);
+});
+
+test('remote-not-fork, compared without case, and remote-host-mismatch, at push', (t) => {
+  for (const [upstream, code] of [
+    ['https://git.example/acme-coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
+    ['https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
+    ['https://other.example/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
+    ['https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
+  ]) {
+    const f = setup(t, upstream);
+    f.push(A);
+    const d = f.approve();
+    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), code, upstream);
+  }
+});
+
+test('two agents granted one project each get their own fork', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  const r1 = f.publish(f.approve());
+  assert.equal(r1.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack');
+  const g = setup(t);
+  g.push(A, null, 'second');
+  const r2 = g.publish(g.approve('second'), 'second');
+  assert.equal(r2.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-second/stack');
+  assert.equal(r2.dst, 'refs/heads/acme-second/feat');
+});
+
+test('the request cannot name the fork, the user or the destination', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  const d = f.approve();
+  for (const extra of [{ fork: 'https://git.example/x/stack' }, { dst: 'refs/heads/main' }, { user: 'x' }, { remote: 'https://x' }])
+    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'coder', extra), /invalid-request/);
+});
+
+test('publishRefused files the code on the task\'s trail and drops the ticket', (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  f.push(A);
+  const r = f.publish(f.approve());
+  assert.equal(f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'remote-unrelated' }), 'remote-unrelated');
+  const refused = f.events('action.refused').filter((e) => e.subject === TASK);
+  assert.deepEqual(refused.at(-1).body, { code: 'remote-unrelated' });
+  assert.throws(() => f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'x' }), /publish-unknown/);
+});
+
+test('git.push.remote is in neither ROUTED list and no shipped role grants it', async () => {
+  const { ACTIONS, HARD_WAITS } = await import('../src/broker.mjs');
+  const vocabulary = await import('../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs');
+  assert.ok(ACTIONS.includes('git.push.remote') && HARD_WAITS.includes('git.push.remote'));
+  assert.ok(!vocabulary.ROUTED.includes('git.push.remote'));
+  const { readdirSync, readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');
+  const dir = new URL('../../../roles/', import.meta.url);
+  for (const name of readdirSync(dir).filter((n) => n.endsWith('.json')))
+    assert.ok(!readFileSync(new URL(name, dir), 'utf8').includes('git.push.remote'), name);
+});
+
+// D1 and D9b through the real startBroker: the store is <configDir>/secrets/agents, and the gitea
+// token is used only under an open publish ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked.
+test('runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket only, and the store root is the organization dir', async (t) => {
+  const { startBroker } = await import('../src/runtime.mjs');
+  const { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } = await import('../../business/tests/helpers.mjs');
+  const { chmodSync, mkdirSync } = await import('node:fs');
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-rt-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
+  // The runtime reads the harness switch from the organization file as it stands.
+  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
+  const demo = businesses().demo;
+  demo.roles.coder.credentials = { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } };
+  const organization = { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) };
+  // No organization, no store root: a store reference refuses the start.
+  await assert.rejects(startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo } }), /credential-reference/);
+  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization });
+  t.after(() => bus.close());
+  assert.deepEqual(bus.credentialStatus('demo', 'coder'), [{ service: 'gitea', date: '2099-01-01', state: 'not-issued' }]);
+  const coder = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
+  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
+  bus.checkPush(coder, TASK);
+  bus.recordPush(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit: A, previous: null });
+  const d = bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'decision.raise', args: {
+    action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
+    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }] } });
+  bus.broker.request(human, { verb: 'decision.resolve', args: { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' } });
+  assert.throws(() => bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }), /decision-required/);
+  const ticket = bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', decision: d.id }).ticket;
+  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /credential-unavailable/);
+  bus.credentials.issue('demo/coder', 'gitea', 'fake_publish_token_0123456789', '2099-01-01');
+  assert.equal(await bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => token === 'fake_publish_token_0123456789'), true);
+  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => ({ echo: token })), /credential-leak/);
+  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea('not-a-ticket', async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
+  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(coder, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
+  bus.recordPublish(ticket, { ref: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat', commit: A, previous: null });
+  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
+});
+
+// Row 199 (D9b, deviation 11): the bus process answers the socket's five publish ops from their own
+// launchOp lines. A LAUNCH_OPS name without one would get launch-op-refused. A boot config that
+// carries publishTls still boots; process.mjs drops it before startBroker.
+test('the bus process answers the publish ops from their own lines, not launch-op-refused', async (t) => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-ops-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const child = fork(new URL('../src/process.mjs', import.meta.url), [], { stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore', 'ipc'] });
+  t.after(() => {
+    if (child.exitCode === null) child.kill('SIGKILL');
+  });
+  const ask = async (m) => {
+    const reply = once(child, 'message');
+    child.send(m);
+    return (await reply)[0];
+  };
+  const config = { dataRoot: root, businesses: businesses(), launches: [], readers: [], publishTls: ['-c', 'http.sslCAInfo=/nonexistent'] };
+  assert.equal((await ask({ op: 'boot', config })).ok, true);
+  const unknown = 'not-a-ticket';
+  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishPush', ticket: unknown, id: 1 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 1 });
+  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishResult', ticket: unknown, id: 2 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 2 });
+  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'recordPublish', ticket: unknown, pushed: { ref: 'refs/heads/x/y', commit: A, previous: null }, id: 3 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 3 });
+  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishRefused', ticket: unknown, args: { code: 'x' }, id: 4 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 4 });
+  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'checkPublish', cap: 'not-a-cap', args: { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }, id: 5 }), { ok: false, error: 'unauthenticated', id: 5 });
+  const exit = once(child, 'exit');
+  child.send({ op: 'close' });
+  assert.equal((await exit)[0], 0);
+});

packages/business/src/business.mjs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { checkVars } from "./vars.mjs";
 import { parseCredentialRef } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { loadRole } from "./role.mjs";
 import { checkPlugins } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
+import { forkProblem, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import {
   requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireId, requirePositiveInt, requireString, requireDistinctList, readJsonFile, deepFreeze,
 } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ function checkBot(tracker, where) {
   return { bot: tracker.bot, botId: tracker.botId };
 }
 
-function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where) {
+function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where, store = null) {
   requireObject(map, where);
   const names = Object.keys(map).sort();
   const wanted = [...services].sort();
@@ -48,10 +49,37 @@ function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where) {
     refuse(`${where} must reference exactly the services its role definition needs (${wanted.join(", ") || "none"}; got ${names.join(", ") || "none"})`);
   }
   const out = {};
-  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`);
+  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`, { store });
   return out;
 }
 
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D8): the agent's own git identity. The email is the one its Gitea user
+// has, so Gitea links the commits to that user; gitea.url is the instance its pushes go to.
+const EMAIL = /^[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]{1,64}@[A-Za-z0-9.-]{1,190}\.[A-Za-z]{2,24}$/;
+const NAME = /^[^\0\n\r<>]{1,100}$/;
+
+// Row 199 (design D9c): the parse is vocabulary.mjs's, where the broker reads it; this wraps it with
+// the loader's refusals. Returns {url, owner, repo}.
+export function httpsUrl(value, where, { repo = false } = {}) {
+  const parsed = parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo });
+  if (parsed.problem === "form") refuse(`${where} must be a normalized https URL with no user, query or fragment`);
+  if (parsed.problem === "instance") refuse(`${where} must name the Gitea instance only, https://HOST[:PORT]`);
+  if (parsed.problem === "repository") refuse(`${where} must name a repository, https://HOST/OWNER/REPO`);
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+function checkIdentity(identity, where) {
+  requireObject(identity, where);
+  rejectUnknownKeys(identity, ["name", "email", "gitea"], where);
+  if (typeof identity.name !== "string" || !NAME.test(identity.name)) refuse(`${where}.name must be 1 to 100 characters with no <, > or line break`);
+  if (typeof identity.email !== "string" || !EMAIL.test(identity.email)) refuse(`${where}.email must be an email address`);
+  requireObject(identity.gitea, `${where}.gitea`);
+  rejectUnknownKeys(identity.gitea, ["url", "user"], `${where}.gitea`);
+  httpsUrl(identity.gitea.url, `${where}.gitea.url`);
+  if (!giteaName(identity.gitea.user)) refuse(`${where}.gitea.user must be a Gitea user name`);
+  return { name: identity.name, email: identity.email, gitea: { url: identity.gitea.url, user: identity.gitea.user } };
+}
+
 function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   const where = `${file} tracker`;
   requireObject(tracker, where);
@@ -74,7 +102,7 @@ function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   return { sync, labels };
 }
 
-function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir) {
+function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
   const where = `${file} roles`;
   requireObject(roles, where);
   if (Object.keys(roles).length === 0) refuse(`${where} must declare at least one role instance`);
@@ -86,7 +114,7 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir) {
     requireId(instance, `${where} instance name`);
     const at = `${where}.${instance}`;
     requireObject(entry, at);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials"], at);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials", "identity", "publish"], at);
     requireId(entry.definition, `${at}.definition`);
     const definition = Object.hasOwn(definitions, entry.definition) ? definitions[entry.definition] : loadRole(rolesDir, entry.definition);
     definitions[entry.definition] = definition;
@@ -108,8 +136,18 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir) {
       holder: entry.holder === undefined ? null : requireId(entry.holder, `${at}.holder`),
       vars: checkVars(entry.vars ?? {}, "agent", `${at}.vars`),
       tracker,
-      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`),
+      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`,
+        { configDir: dirname(dirname(file)), business, agent: instance }),
     };
+    // Row 199 (#1697, design D8, D9 step 2): identity and publish are optional, so today's files
+    // load unchanged. publish needs both an identity and a gitea credential; the project ids it
+    // names are checked against projects once those are read.
+    if (entry.identity !== undefined) out[instance].identity = checkIdentity(entry.identity, `${at}.identity`);
+    if (entry.publish !== undefined) {
+      // N10: one message for both, naming the grant.
+      if (!out[instance].identity || !services.includes("gitea")) refuse(`${at}.publish needs identity and a gitea definition`);
+      out[instance].publish = requireDistinctList(entry.publish, `${at}.publish`, (p) => requireId(p, `${at}.publish entry`), { nonEmpty: true });
+    }
   }
   return { roles: out, definitions };
 }
@@ -159,7 +197,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   }
   const human = requireId(document.human, "business human");
   const vars = checkVars(document.vars ?? {}, "business", `${file} vars`);
-  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir);
+  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir, document.id);
 
   requireObject(document.arbiters, `${file} arbiters`);
   rejectUnknownKeys(document.arbiters, ["delivery", "technical"], `${file} arbiters`);
@@ -183,7 +221,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(document.projects)) {
     requireId(id, `${file} project id`);
     requireObject(entry, `${file} projects.${id}`);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo", "remote"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
     if (typeof entry.root !== "string" || !isAbsolute(entry.root) || normalize(entry.root) !== entry.root || entry.root.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.root must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
@@ -191,7 +229,18 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
         normalize(entry.repo) !== entry.repo || entry.repo.includes("\0"))) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.repo must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
-    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}) };
+    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 2): the upstream; a granted agent's work goes to its fork.
+    if (Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote")) httpsUrl(entry.remote, `${file} projects.${id}.remote`, { repo: true });
+    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}),
+      ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote") ? { remote: entry.remote } : {}) };
+  }
+  for (const [instance, role] of Object.entries(roles)) {
+    for (const project of role.publish ?? []) {
+      if (!Object.hasOwn(projects, project)) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which the business file doesn't declare`);
+      if (!projects[project].remote) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which has no "remote"`);
+      const problem = forkProblem(projects[project].remote, role.identity);
+      if (problem) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}: ${problem}`);
+    }
   }
 
   const tracker = checkTracker(document.tracker, file);

packages/business/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // lstat and realpath only; nothing in this package opens a token file.
 
 import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
-import { isAbsolute, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
+import { isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
 import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { SERVICES } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireDate } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -14,21 +14,35 @@ const WARN_DAYS = 7;
 const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
 // Shape check for one reference. Returns a frozen { service, file | env,
-// rotateBy | expires }.
-export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where) {
+// rotateBy | expires }. Row 199 (#1697, design D1 and D2): `store` is the
+// file at <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>, derived
+// here and never written, so an entry can't name another agent's file. A
+// reference with no agent (the tracker's sync bot) passes store = null and
+// can't use the form. A `file` reference into the agents' store must be the
+// agent's own path (`credential-not-yours`).
+export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
   if (!SERVICES.includes(service)) refuse(`${where}: unknown credential service ${JSON.stringify(service)}`);
   requireObject(ref, where);
   const dateKey = DATE_KEY[service];
-  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", dateKey], where);
+  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", "store", dateKey], where);
   const hasFile = ref.file !== undefined;
   const hasEnv = ref.env !== undefined;
-  if (hasFile === hasEnv) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file" or "env"`);
+  const hasStore = ref.store !== undefined;
+  if (Number(hasFile) + Number(hasEnv) + Number(hasStore) !== 1) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file", "env" or "store"`);
   const out = { service };
-  if (hasFile) {
+  if (hasStore) {
+    if (ref.store !== true) refuse(`${where}.store must be true`);
+    if (!store) refuse(`${where}: a "store" reference needs an agent`);
+    out.store = true;
+    out.file = storePath(store, service);
+  } else if (hasFile) {
     if (typeof ref.file !== "string" || !isAbsolute(ref.file) || normalize(ref.file) !== ref.file || ref.file.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${where}.file must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
     out.file = ref.file;
+    if (store && inside(join(store.configDir, "secrets", "agents"), ref.file) && ref.file !== storePath(store, service)) {
+      refuse(`${where}.file credential-not-yours: ${ref.file} is in the agents' store but not this agent's path`);
+    }
   } else {
     if (typeof ref.env !== "string" || !ENV_NAME.test(ref.env)) refuse(`${where}.env must match ${ENV_NAME}`);
     out.env = ref.env;
@@ -38,6 +52,11 @@ export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where) {
   return Object.freeze(out);
 }
 
+// The store path for one agent and service (design D1).
+export function storePath({ configDir, business, agent }, service) {
+  return join(configDir, "secrets", "agents", business, agent, service);
+}
+
 function inside(root, path) {
   const rel = relative(root, path);
   return rel === "" || (!rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && rel !== ".." && !isAbsolute(rel));
@@ -55,8 +74,10 @@ export function checkCredentialRef(ref, { forbiddenRoots = [], now = new Date(),
     let stat = null;
     try {
       stat = lstatSync(ref.file);
-    } catch {
-      problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
+    } catch (e) {
+      // Row 199 (design D3a): a store reference with no file is an agent not issued yet.
+      if (ref.store && e.code === "ENOENT") warnings.push(`${label}: not issued`);
+      else problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
     }
     if (stat) {
       if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) problems.push(`${label}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`);

packages/business/src/organization.mjs

@@ -174,7 +174,9 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     }
   }
 
-  function write(id, document, { revision, actor }) {
+  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): `detail` says what a credential verb did (verb, agent, kind,
+  // date, reason), never a value; the other setters pass none.
+  function write(id, document, { revision, actor, detail }) {
     requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
     requireId(id, "organization id");
     return withLock(id, ({ home, parent }) => {
@@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
       syncDir(tx);
       const event = {
         transaction, actor, business: id, before, after,
-        changes: changes(old, written), at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        changes: changes(old, written), ...(detail === undefined ? {} : { detail }), at: new Date().toISOString(),
       };
       log(id, { ...event, state: "prepared" });
       syncDir(home);
@@ -219,5 +221,22 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     });
   }
 
-  return { logFile, read, write, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
+  // Row 199: a receipt with no document change, for a credential verb that changes only the agents'
+  // store (a revoke or delete of store references). Committed at once; there is nothing to recover.
+  function record(id, { actor, detail }) {
+    requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
+    requireId(id, "organization id");
+    return withLock(id, () => {
+      recover(id);
+      const hash = sha256(regular(businessFilePath(id, dir)));
+      const transaction = randomUUID();
+      log(id, {
+        transaction, actor, business: id, before: hash, after: hash, changes: [], detail,
+        at: new Date().toISOString(), state: "committed",
+      });
+      return { revision: hash, transaction };
+    });
+  }
+
+  return { logFile, read, write, record, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
 }

packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   "git.push.working",
   "git.push.protected",
   "git.merge.protected",
+  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): the host pushes an agent's recorded work commit to the fork its
+  // business grants it. A hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3 until a PRD version routes it.
+  "git.push.remote",
   "review.request",
   "review.verdict",
   "record.write",
@@ -83,8 +86,8 @@ export const ROUTED = Object.freeze([
 // The hard waits (PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1): always gated, always the human's,
 // cited spec or not. A role file may not list these under withinRole or
 // crossRole (REQ-WAIT-2). Today this is spend, data.delete, network.expose,
-// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected and
-// deploy; a test pins the list.
+// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected,
+// git.push.remote and deploy; a test pins the list.
 export const GATED_ONLY = Object.freeze(ACTIONS.filter((action) => !ROUTED.includes(action)));
 
 // pi's documented built-in tools; the same list scripts/mosaic-task.mjs
@@ -133,3 +136,50 @@ export const THREAD_DEFINITION = "assistant";
 // the human resolved through the CLI, may end or revoke. Row 155 moves the list here, and no
 // organization write may give an instance one of them.
 export const END_PROTECTED = Object.freeze([THREAD_DEFINITION]);
+
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D9c): the Gitea URL parse. It lives here because the broker reads it and
+// this file imports nothing. Gitea's name rule for users and repositories: letters, digits, "_", "."
+// and "-", not "." or "..".
+export const giteaName = (name) =>
+  typeof name === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/.test(name) && name !== "." && name !== "..";
+
+// An https URL that is already its own normalized form, so a dot segment, an encoded dot, userinfo, a
+// query, a fragment, an upper-case host or an explicit :443 each fail, and the path checked is the
+// path used. With repo, the path is exactly /OWNER/REPO (one ".git" stripped); without, it is "/".
+// Returns {url, owner, repo}, or {problem} naming the rule that failed: form, instance or repository.
+export function parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo = false } = {}) {
+  let url = null;
+  try {
+    url = typeof value === "string" ? new URL(value) : null;
+  } catch {
+    url = null;
+  }
+  const normal = url && (repo ? [url.origin + url.pathname] : [url.origin, url.origin + "/"]);
+  if (!url || url.protocol !== "https:" || !normal.includes(value)) return { problem: "form" };
+  if (!repo) return url.pathname === "/" ? { url } : { problem: "instance" };
+  const segments = url.pathname.split("/").slice(1);
+  const name = segments[1]?.endsWith(".git") ? segments[1].slice(0, -4) : segments[1];
+  if (segments.length !== 2 || !giteaName(segments[0]) || !giteaName(name)) return { problem: "repository" };
+  return { url, owner: segments[0], repo: name };
+}
+
+// Design D9 step 2: the agent's fork of an upstream, https://HOST[:PORT]/<user>/REPO, or null for an
+// upstream that doesn't parse. The owner is always the agent's own Gitea user; nothing else names it.
+// URL.host drops a default port, so 443 counts the same on both sides.
+export function forkUrl(upstream, user) {
+  const { url, repo } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
+  return url ? `https://${url.host}/${user}/${repo}` : null;
+}
+
+// The refusal code for publishing `upstream` as an agent with `identity`, or null. Gitea compares
+// names without case (lower_name), so the owner check does too. An upstream or gitea.url that doesn't
+// parse is remote-not-granted: the business loader refuses both, so only a hand-built business gets
+// here.
+export function forkProblem(upstream, identity) {
+  const { url, owner } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
+  const instance = parseGiteaUrl(identity?.gitea?.url).url;
+  if (!url || !instance || typeof identity.gitea.user !== "string") return "remote-not-granted";
+  if (url.host !== instance.host) return "remote-host-mismatch";
+  if (owner.toLowerCase() === identity.gitea.user.toLowerCase()) return "remote-not-fork";
+  return null;
+}

packages/business/tests/agent-identity.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697): an agent's own git identity, its publish grant, the project's upstream and the
+// credential store reference. Design D1, D8, D9 step 2 and D9c.
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { BusinessError, parseCredentialRef, validateBusinessDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
+import { forkProblem, forkUrl } from "../src/vocabulary.mjs";
+import { businessDoc, FAR_DATE, REPO_ROLES, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
+
+function refuses(fn, pattern) {
+  assert.throws(fn, (error) => {
+    assert.ok(error instanceof BusinessError, `expected BusinessError, got ${error}`);
+    assert.equal(error.exitCode, 2);
+    assert.match(error.message, pattern);
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+
+const IDENTITY = { name: "Coder", email: "[email protected]", gitea: { url: "https://git.example", user: "acme-coder" } };
+
+// The fixture with coder granted publish on stack, whose upstream is mosaic/stack.
+function check(mutate) {
+  const root = tmp();
+  const doc = businessDoc(root);
+  doc.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack";
+  doc.roles.coder.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY);
+  doc.roles.coder.publish = ["stack"];
+  mutate?.(doc, root);
+  return validateBusinessDocument(doc, join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
+}
+
+test("today's files load unchanged: identity, publish and remote are optional", () => {
+  const root = tmp();
+  const business = validateBusinessDocument(businessDoc(root), join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
+  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.identity, undefined);
+  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.publish, undefined);
+  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, undefined);
+});
+
+test("a granted agent loads with its identity, grant and the project's upstream", () => {
+  const business = check();
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...business.roles.coder.identity, gitea: { ...business.roles.coder.identity.gitea } }, IDENTITY);
+  assert.deepEqual([...business.roles.coder.publish], ["stack"]);
+  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, "https://git.example/mosaic/stack");
+});
+
+test("N10: publish needs identity and a gitea definition, and the error names the grant", () => {
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.roles.coder.identity; }), /roles\.coder\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.chief.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY); d.roles.chief.publish = ["stack"]; }),
+    /roles\.chief\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
+});
+
+test("publish names declared projects that have a remote, each once", () => {
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["books"]; }), /publish names books, which the business file doesn't declare/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.projects.stack.remote; }), /publish names stack, which has no "remote"/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = []; }), /publish/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["stack", "stack"]; }), /publish/);
+});
+
+test("identity fields are checked", () => {
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.email = "coder"; }), /identity\.email/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.name = "a\nb"; }), /identity\.name/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.extra = 1; }), /identity/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = ".."; }), /gitea\.user/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = "a/b"; }), /gitea\.user/);
+});
+
+test("D9c: the upstream must be its own normalized form, exactly /OWNER/REPO", () => {
+  const bad = {
+    "a dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/../mosaic/stack",
+    "an encoded dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/%2e%2e/mosaic/stack",
+    "an extra segment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/more",
+    "a missing segment": "https://git.example/stack",
+    "a trailing slash": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/",
+    userinfo: "https://u:[email protected]/mosaic/stack",
+    "a query": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack?x=1",
+    "a fragment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack#f",
+    "an explicit :443": "https://git.example:443/mosaic/stack",
+    "an upper-case host": "https://GIT.example/mosaic/stack",
+    "a backslash": "https://git.example\\mosaic\\stack",
+    "a name outside Gitea's rule": "https://git.example/mosaic/st%41ck",
+    "a dot-dot repo": "https://git.example/mosaic/...git",
+    http: "http://git.example/mosaic/stack",
+  };
+  for (const [what, remote] of Object.entries(bad)) {
+    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = remote; }), BusinessError, what);
+  }
+});
+
+test("D9c: one .git is stripped, and the fork is built from the stripped name", () => {
+  assert.equal(check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git"; }).projects.stack.remote,
+    "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git");
+  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack");
+  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example:3000/acme-coder/stack");
+});
+
+test("D9c: gitea.url names the instance only", () => {
+  for (const url of ["https://git.example/gitea", "https://git.example/gitea/", "https://git.example/?x", "https://git.example:443", "http://git.example"]) {
+    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = url; }), BusinessError, url);
+  }
+  check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = "https://git.example/"; });
+});
+
+test("the upstream's host and port must be the agent's Gitea's", () => {
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://other.example/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
+  assert.equal(forkProblem("https://git.example/mosaic/stack", { gitea: { url: "https://git.example/", user: "u" } }), null);
+});
+
+test("remote-not-fork: an upstream the agent's own user owns, compared without case", () => {
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
+  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
+});
+
+test("store references: own path only (design D1, D3a)", () => {
+  const store = { configDir: "/cfg", business: "acme", agent: "coder" };
+  const ref = parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store });
+  assert.equal(ref.file, "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
+  assert.equal(ref.store, true);
+  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r"), /store/);
+  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, file: "/a", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }), /exactly one/);
+  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/pm/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }),
+    /credential-not-yours/);
+  assert.equal(parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }).file,
+    "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
+});

packages/business/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { validateRoleDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
 import { tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
 
 const WAITS = ["spend", "data.delete", "network.expose", "account.create", "credential.mint", "message.external",
-  "git.push.protected", "deploy"];
+  "git.push.protected", "deploy", "git.push.remote"];
 const LEFT = ["git.merge.protected", "policy.change", "prd.approve", "role.revoke"];
 const role = (authority) => {
   const dir = tmp();

packages/cli/README.md

@@ -1009,6 +1009,19 @@ names no one; the restart itself needs Mos's go or Jason's hand. A vars or launc
 prints `no restart`, because the launcher reads it at its next launch check.
 The Console Settings page has the same read and write (`packages/webui`).
 
+## credentials (row 199)
+
+`mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester]` lists each agent's
+credential kinds with date and state, never a value. `issue AGENT gitea
+--rotate-by DATE` and `issue AGENT vikunja --expires DATE` read the token on
+stdin (pipe it, or paste it and end input) and send it once to the bus's
+`credentials.issue`; it is never an argument. `rotate` is the same over an
+entry the bus holds now, and refuses before reading stdin when there is none.
+`revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT` and `delete AGENT --reason TEXT` drop the
+entries; `delete` refuses `agent-running` while the agent holds a claim. With
+`--tester` only `status` and `revoke` run. After a rotate or revoke, delete
+the old token in Gitea or Vikunja yourself; the bus only forgets it.
+
 ## Token usage
 
 `mosaic usage [--business ID] [--json] [--tester]` reads the bus's accounting, without

packages/cli/src/cli.mjs

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import { projectBusCommand, projectCommand, PROJECT_BUS_USAGE, PROJECT_USAGE } f
 import { resolveThread, threadCommand, threadMembers, threadsCommand, THREAD_TALK_USAGE, THREAD_USAGE, THREADS_USAGE } from "./thread.mjs";
 import { limitsCommand, LIMITS_USAGE } from "./limits.mjs";
 import { pluginsCommand, PLUGINS_USAGE } from "./plugins.mjs";
+import { credentialsCommand, CREDENTIALS_USAGE } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { instancesCommand, INSTANCES_USAGE } from "./instances.mjs";
 import { createChannelCaller } from "../../plugins/src/channel.mjs";
 import { PluginError } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ export const USAGE = `usage:
   ${USAGE_USAGE}
   ${LIMITS_USAGE}
   ${PLUGINS_USAGE}
+  ${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}
   ${INSTANCES_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_BUS_USAGE}
@@ -576,6 +578,8 @@ export async function main(argv, io = { env: process.env, stdin: process.stdin,
   if (verb === "limits") return limitsCommand(rest,io,p=>callFor(p,io,deps));
   if (verb === "usage") return usageCommand(rest, io, p => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "plugins") return pluginsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
+  // Row 199 (#1697): issue and rotate read the token on stdin.
+  if (verb === "credentials") return credentialsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   // Row 165 (#1662): scripts/mosaic sends only `business instances` and `business instance` here.
   if (verb === "business") return instancesCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "talk") return talk(rest, io, deps);

packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// `mosaic credentials` (row 199, #1697, design section 6): an agent's per-agent credentials through
+// the broker's credentials, credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and credentials.delete. Every verb
+// is the human's; with --tester (Q173) only status and revoke. issue and rotate read the token on
+// stdin, never argv, and nothing here prints it: the broker's answer carries the kind, date and state.
+import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
+
+export const CREDENTIALS_USAGE = "mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester] | issue|rotate AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE | " +
+  "issue|rotate AGENT vikunja --expires DATE | revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT [--tester] | delete AGENT --reason TEXT [--business ID]";
+const DATE_FLAG = Object.freeze({ gitea: "--rotate-by", vikunja: "--expires" });
+const MAX_TOKEN = 16384;
+
+function parse(args) {
+  const out = { positional: [], flags: new Set(), values: {} };
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const arg = args[i];
+    if (arg === "--json" || arg === "--tester") out.flags.add(arg);
+    else if (["--business", "--rotate-by", "--expires", "--reason"].includes(arg)) {
+      if (!args[i + 1] || Object.hasOwn(out.values, arg)) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
+      out.values[arg] = args[++i];
+    } else if (arg.startsWith("--")) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
+    else out.positional.push(arg);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// The whole of stdin, one token; a terminal shows what is typed, so a pipe or a paste then EOF.
+async function readToken(stdin) {
+  let text = "";
+  for await (const chunk of stdin) {
+    text += chunk;
+    if (text.length > MAX_TOKEN + 2) throw new CliError("refused: the token on stdin is too long", 2);
+  }
+  if (!text.trim()) throw new CliError("refused: no token on stdin; pipe or paste it, then end input", 4);
+  return text;
+}
+
+// The states the bus's status() gives a held token: gitea is valid or rotation-due, vikunja valid,
+// expiring or expired. not-issued and revoked hold none.
+const ISSUED = new Set(["valid", "rotation-due", "expiring", "expired"]);
+
+export async function credentialsCommand(args, io, callFor) {
+  const parsed = parse(args);
+  const [verb = "status", agent, kind, ...extra] = parsed.positional;
+  const v = parsed.values;
+  const shape = {
+    status: () => kind === undefined && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"] && !v["--reason"],
+    issue: () => agent && DATE_FLAG[kind] && v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] && !v[kind === "gitea" ? "--expires" : "--rotate-by"] && !v["--reason"],
+    revoke: () => agent && (kind === undefined || DATE_FLAG[kind]) && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
+    delete: () => agent && kind === undefined && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
+  };
+  shape.rotate = shape.issue;
+  if (extra.length || !shape[verb]?.()) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
+  // Q173 (duckworth N1): a token the tester issued would pass through its session.
+  if (parsed.flags.has("--tester") && !["status", "revoke"].includes(verb)) {
+    throw new CliError(`--tester takes only status and revoke\n${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}`, 4);
+  }
+  try {
+    const call = callFor(parsed);
+    let result;
+    if (verb === "status") {
+      const rows = await call("credentials", {});
+      result = agent ? rows.filter((r) => r.role === agent) : rows;
+      if (!parsed.flags.has("--json")) {
+        io.stdout.write(result.map((r) => `${r.role}\t${r.service}\t${r.state}\t${r.dateKind} ${r.date}`).join("\n") + (result.length ? "\n" : ""));
+        return;
+      }
+    } else if (verb === "issue" || verb === "rotate") {
+      // rotate names an entry the bus holds now; checked before stdin is read.
+      if (verb === "rotate") {
+        const held = (await call("credentials", {})).find((r) => r.role === agent && r.service === kind);
+        if (!ISSUED.has(held?.state)) throw new CliError(`refused: ${agent} has no issued ${kind} credential to rotate; use issue`, 2);
+      }
+      const token = await readToken(io.stdin);
+      result = await call("credentials.issue", { agent, service: kind, token, date: v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] });
+    } else if (verb === "revoke") {
+      result = await call("credentials.revoke", { agent, ...(kind ? { service: kind } : {}), reason: v["--reason"] });
+    } else result = await call("credentials.delete", { agent, reason: v["--reason"] });
+    io.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof CliError) throw error;
+    throw new CliError(error.message, 2);
+  }
+}

packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs

@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@
 //          squash that will land. The gate runs after the answer, and its
 //          outcome is the broker's: recordLand or landRefused, each on the
 //          task's trail and told to the role as a RESULT message.
+//   publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
+//          (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D11). The host answers {"ok": true,
+//          "result": {fork, ref, commit, previous}} or a refusal. The broker's
+//          checkPublish names the fork, the agent's email, the source commit
+//          and the destination; the request names none of them. publish
+//          (working.mjs) checks the work ref and the commits' identity under
+//          the repository's lock, then the bus process runs ls-remote and the
+//          push with the agent's gitea token (publishPush), and the host polls
+//          publishResult every publishPollMs: the host's op channel answers
+//          one op at a time within 10 s. The poll ends at publishDeadlineMs
+//          (publish-timeout), past git's own limit on each of the four git
+//          runs. recordPublish files the push; any refusal after checkPublish
+//          is filed once, by publishRefused.
 //
 // A refusal is {"ok": false, "error": "<code>"}, and the connection ends.
 // The host checks, in order: identity (a role of this business), the request
@@ -64,9 +77,10 @@ import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, createReadStream, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
 import { createServer } from "node:net";
 import { join } from "node:path";
+import { GIT_GRACE_MS, GIT_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
 import { gitSocketPath } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
 import { gateEnv, isMosaicStack, rootHits, runGate } from "../../seat/src/landing.mjs";
-import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
+import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, publish, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
 import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
 
 const HEADER_MAX = 4096;
@@ -84,6 +98,11 @@ export const bodyDeadline = (size) => BODY_IDLE_MS + Math.ceil(size / BODY_MIN_R
 const MAX_ACTIVE = 8;
 // The longest close() waits for its host-closing answers to leave.
 export const CLOSE_WAIT_MS = 2000;
+// How often the host asks the bus process whether a publish's push ended.
+const PUBLISH_POLL_MS = 200;
+// The longest the host polls: publishRemote runs at most four git commands
+// (ls-remote, cat-file, merge-base, push), each ended by git's own limit.
+const PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS = 4 * (GIT_TIMEOUT_MS + GIT_GRACE_MS) + 30_000;
 const CAP = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
 const OID = /^[0-9a-f]{40}([0-9a-f]{24})?$/;
 
@@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ Applied-under: git socket land (bus host)
 // host: startHost()'s handle; business: loadBusiness() output. bundleMax,
 // bodyDeadline, bodyIdle, maxActive, fsck and gate (LAND_GATE's shape) are
 // for the tests.
-export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE }) {
+export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE, publishPollMs = PUBLISH_POLL_MS, publishDeadlineMs = PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS }) {
   const path = gitSocketPath(dataRoot);
   const dir = join(dataRoot, "bus-host");
   let server = null;
@@ -386,6 +405,55 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
     })();
   }
 
+  async function doPublish(socket, cap, req) {
+    const { task_ref, branch, decision } = req;
+    const p = project(req.project);
+    if (!p || !validBranch(branch) || (decision !== undefined && typeof decision !== "string")) throw new Refusal("invalid-request");
+    workRef(task_ref);
+    const facts = await op({ op: "checkPublish", cap, args: { task_ref, project: req.project, branch, ...(decision === undefined ? {} : { decision }) } });
+    const { ticket } = facts;
+    // From the ticket on, a refusal is the publish's own, filed once by publishRefused.
+    const refused = async (e) => {
+      const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof Recorded || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";
+      if (code === "git-failed") log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${code}: ${e.message}`);
+      await host.op({ op: "publishRefused", ticket, args: { code } }).catch((x) => log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: refusal ${code} not recorded: ${x.code ?? x.message}`));
+      return new Recorded(code);
+    };
+    let pushed;
+    try {
+      pushed = await publish({
+        dataRoot, business: b.id, project: req.project, root: p.root, taskRef: task_ref, source: facts.source, email: facts.email, env,
+        remote: async () => {
+          await op({ op: "publishPush", ticket });
+          const until = Date.now() + publishDeadlineMs;
+          for (;;) {
+            // The bus's git may still finish after this; the fork could then hold the commit with
+            // no record, as when recordPublish refuses after a push.
+            if (Date.now() >= until) {
+              log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: publish-timeout; the bus process's push may still reach the fork`);
+              throw new Refusal("publish-timeout");
+            }
+            await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, publishPollMs));
+            const r = await op({ op: "publishResult", ticket });
+            if (r.state === "pushed") return { ref: r.ref, commit: r.commit, previous: r.previous };
+            if (r.state === "refused") throw new Recorded(r.code);
+          }
+        },
+      });
+    } catch (e) {
+      throw await refused(e);
+    }
+    // The commit is on the fork now; a record the broker refuses is filed as that refusal.
+    let result;
+    try {
+      result = await op({ op: "recordPublish", ticket, pushed });
+    } catch (e) {
+      log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${pushed.commit} is on ${facts.fork} but wasn't recorded: ${e.code}`);
+      throw await refused(e);
+    }
+    socket.end(`${JSON.stringify({ ok: true, result: { fork: result.fork, ref: result.ref, commit: result.commit, previous: result.previous } })}\n`);
+  }
+
   async function serve(socket) {
     let cap = null;
     let subject = null;
@@ -410,7 +478,8 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
       if (req.op === "push") await doPush(socket, cap, req, rest, file);
       else if (req.op === "fetch") await doFetch(socket, cap, req, file);
       else if (req.op === "land") await doLand(socket, cap, req);
-      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch or land");
+      else if (req.op === "publish") await doPublish(socket, cap, req);
+      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch, land or publish");
     } catch (e) {
       if (e instanceof Recorded) return fail(e.code);
       const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";

packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs

@@ -47,8 +47,9 @@
 // launchedBy = the business's human and no caller capability.
 //
 // listen() also serves the git socket (src/git-socket.mjs, row 93), which
-// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working or
-// review.verdict, or a merge decision to land (landHeld, row 137);
+// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working,
+// review.verdict or git.push.remote (row 199), or a merge decision to land
+// (landHeld, row 137);
 // session.json names it as gitSocket.
 //
 // Thread sessions (row 121, #1615). A thread instance (an instance whose
@@ -397,8 +398,9 @@ export function createLauncher({
     const transcript = call(model.harness, "transcript", () => harness.transcript({ runDir, store }));
     const harnessMounts = call(model.harness, "mounts", () => harness.mounts({ env }));
     // Row 93: the git socket, for a role that pushes work or reviews it. Row 137: or lands it.
+    // Row 199 (D11): or publishes it, once a reviewed commit routes git.push.remote within-role.
     const held = [...resolved.limits.authority.withinRole, ...resolved.limits.authority.crossRole];
-    const git = land || held.includes("git.push.working") || held.includes("review.verdict") ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
+    const git = land || ["git.push.working", "review.verdict", "git.push.remote"].some((a) => held.includes(a)) ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
     writeSessionFile(runDir, {
       ...sessionDefaults,
       business: b.id,

packages/cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): `mosaic credentials`. issue and rotate read the token on
+// stdin and pass it once to credentials.issue; nothing printed carries it. --tester takes status and
+// revoke only. A fake transport records the calls; no bus runs here.
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { main } from "../src/cli.mjs";
+import { io, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
+
+const TOKEN = "fake_cli_token_0123456789";
+const MOSAIC = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../../scripts/mosaic", import.meta.url));
+const ROWS = [
+  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "valid" },
+  { service: "vikunja", account: "bot", role: "coder", dateKind: "expires", date: "2099-01-01", state: "not-issued" },
+  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "reviewer", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "revoked" },
+];
+
+function deps(calls, rows = ROWS) {
+  const answer = (who) => (business) => async (verb, args) => {
+    calls.push({ who, business, verb, args });
+    if (verb === "credentials") return rows;
+    if (verb === "credentials.issue") return { agent: args.agent, verb: "issue", service: args.service, date: args.date, state: "valid" };
+    return { agent: args.agent, verb: verb.slice(12), services: [] };
+  };
+  return { system: { dataRoot: "/nonexistent" }, transport: answer("human"), testerTransport: answer("tester") };
+}
+const withStdin = (x, text) => {
+  x.stdin.end(text);
+  return x;
+};
+
+test("row 199: issue and rotate send the stdin token once to credentials.issue and print no value", async () => {
+  const calls = [];
+  const d = deps(calls);
+  const x = withStdin(io(), TOKEN + "\n");
+  await main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls, [{ who: "human", business: "acme", verb: "credentials.issue", args: { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", token: TOKEN + "\n", date: "2099-01-01" } }]);
+  assert.equal(x.out.text.includes(TOKEN), false);
+  assert.equal(JSON.parse(x.out.text).state, "valid");
+  // rotate checks the entry is issued before it reads stdin.
+  calls.length = 0;
+  await main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials", "credentials.issue"]);
+  calls.length = 0;
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "vikunja", "--expires", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /no issued vikunja credential to rotate; use issue/);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
+  // No token on stdin, the date flag of the other kind, a token in argv: refused before any write.
+  calls.length = 0;
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "\n"), d), /no token on stdin/);
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--expires", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "x".repeat(17000)), d), /too long/);
+  assert.equal(calls.filter((c) => c.verb === "credentials.issue").length, 0);
+  // From inside an agent run, the human's verbs refuse before any call.
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io({ CLAUDECODE: "1" }), TOKEN), d), /outside any agent run/);
+});
+
+// gizmoduck-0050: a gitea key past its rotate-by date is rotation-due, and rotate is how a human
+// clears it. Every state the bus's status() gives a held token rotates; the other two refuse.
+test("row 199: rotate goes ahead on each held state, rotation-due included, and refuses not-issued, revoked and an unknown entry", async () => {
+  const states = { valid: true, "rotation-due": true, expiring: true, expired: true, "not-issued": false, revoked: false };
+  for (const [state, held] of Object.entries(states)) {
+    const calls = [];
+    const d = deps(calls, [{ service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2020-01-01", state }]);
+    const run = main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
+    if (held) await run;
+    else await assert.rejects(run, /no issued gitea credential to rotate; use issue/);
+    assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), held ? ["credentials", "credentials.issue"] : ["credentials"], state);
+  }
+  const calls = [];
+  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "tester", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), deps(calls)), /no issued gitea credential/);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
+});
+
+test("row 199: status, revoke and delete; the tester runs status and revoke only", async () => {
+  const calls = [];
+  const d = deps(calls);
+  const x = io();
+  await main(["credentials", "status", "coder", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
+  assert.equal(x.out.text, "coder\tgitea\tvalid\trotateBy 2099-01-01\ncoder\tvikunja\tnot-issued\texpires 2099-01-01\n");
+  const j = io();
+  await main(["credentials", "--json", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], j, d);
+  assert.equal(JSON.parse(j.out.text).length, 3);
+  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], io(), d);
+  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
+  await main(["credentials", "delete", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
+  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => [c.who, c.verb, c.args]), [
+    ["human", "credentials", {}],
+    ["tester", "credentials", {}],
+    ["tester", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", reason: "fired" }],
+    ["human", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
+    ["human", "credentials.delete", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
+  ]);
+  calls.length = 0;
+  for (const args of [
+    ["issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
+    ["rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
+    ["delete", "coder", "--reason", "x", "--tester"],
+  ]) await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /--tester takes only status and revoke/);
+  for (const args of [["revoke", "coder"], ["delete", "coder"], ["delete", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "x"], ["revoke", "coder", "model", "--reason", "x"], ["purge", "coder"]])
+    await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], io(), d), /mosaic credentials/, args.join(" "));
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
+});
+
+test("row 199: scripts/mosaic sends credentials to packages/cli, not the seat CLI", (t) => {
+  const root = tmp(t, "mosaic-cli-cred-route-");
+  const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: join(root, "home"), MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(root, "none.json") };
+  const r = spawnSync(MOSAIC, ["credentials", "purge"], { env, encoding: "utf8" });
+  assert.equal(r.status, 4);
+  assert.match(r.stderr, /^mosaic: mosaic credentials \[status \[AGENT\]\]/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /mosaic launch </);
+});

packages/cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D9, D9b, D11, T3): the git socket's publish op end to end. The socket,
+// working.mjs, the bus runtime (in this process, so its publishTls can name the scratch CA), the
+// per-agent store and a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1. The host stand-in answers the socket's ops
+// the way packages/bus/src/process.mjs does. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { chmodSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { connect } from "node:net";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
+import { startBroker } from "../../bus/src/runtime.mjs";
+import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from "../../business/tests/helpers.mjs";
+import { pushWorking } from "../../harness/src/git-tools.mjs";
+import { gitEnv } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
+import { workRef } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
+import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "../../seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs";
+import { createGitSocket } from "../src/git-socket.mjs";
+
+const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
+const TASK2 = "vikunja:1/3";
+const TOKEN = "fake_socket_token_0123456789";
+const TOKEN2 = "fake_second_token_0123456789";
+
+function git(cwd, ...args) {
+  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
+  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
+  return r.stdout.trim();
+}
+function commit(dir, text, email) {
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
+  git(dir, "add", "README");
+  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
+  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
+}
+function raw(path, req) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const s = connect(path);
+    let buf = "";
+    s.on("connect", () => s.write(`${JSON.stringify(req)}\n`));
+    s.on("data", (b) => (buf += b));
+    s.on("end", () => resolve(JSON.parse(buf.split("\n")[0])));
+    s.on("error", reject);
+  });
+}
+// The socket's ops, answered as process.mjs's launchOp answers them.
+const OPS = {
+  identity: (r, m) => r.identity(m.cap),
+  refuse: (r, m) => r.refuse(m.cap, m.code, m.subject),
+  checkPush: (r, m) => r.checkPush(m.cap, m.task_ref),
+  recordPush: (r, m) => r.recordPush(m.cap, m.push),
+  checkPublish: (r, m) => r.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args),
+  publishPush: (r, m) => r.publishPush(m.ticket),
+  publishResult: (r, m) => r.publishResult(m.ticket),
+  recordPublish: (r, m) => r.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed),
+  publishRefused: (r, m) => r.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args),
+};
+
+async function setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs } = {}) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "cli-publish-"));
+  const down = [];
+  t.after(async () => {
+    for (const fn of down) await fn();
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  const ca = scratchCa(join(root, "ca"));
+  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(root, "gitea"), tls: ca, users: { coder: TOKEN, second: TOKEN2 } });
+  down.push(() => gitea.close());
+  const project = join(root, "project");
+  mkdirSync(project);
+  git(project, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
+  commit(project, "one", "[email protected]");
+  // Each agent's fork and the upstream, mosaic/stack, all clones of the root.
+  for (const owner of ["coder", "second", "mosaic"]) {
+    mkdirSync(join(gitea.repo(owner, "stack"), ".."), { recursive: true });
+    git(root, "clone", "-q", "--bare", project, gitea.repo(owner, "stack"));
+  }
+  const forkRepo = gitea.repo("coder", "stack");
+
+  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
+  writeJson(join(root, "businesses/demo.json"), { ...businessDoc(root, "demo"), plugins: { harness: ["pi"] } });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, "data"), { mode: 0o700 });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, "secrets", "agents"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  chmodSync(join(root, "secrets"), 0o700);
+  const agent = (user) => ({
+    authority: { withinRole: ["git.push.working", "message.send"], crossRole: [] },
+    identity: { name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: gitea.origin, user } },
+    publish: ["stack"],
+    credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", user, "gitea"), rotateBy: "2099-01-01" } },
+  });
+  const demo = {
+    id: "demo", human: "jason", arbiters: { technical: "reviewer", delivery: "reviewer" },
+    projects: { stack: { root: project, remote: `${gitea.origin}/mosaic/stack` } },
+    roles: {
+      coder: agent("coder"),
+      second: agent("second"),
+      reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send"], crossRole: [] } },
+    },
+  };
+  const dataRoot = join(root, "data");
+  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot, businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) }, publishTls: ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`] });
+  down.unshift(() => bus.close());
+  // A test sets hooks[op] to act around one op: hook(message, next), where next() answers it.
+  const hooks = {};
+  const host = { op: async (m) => (hooks[m.op] ? hooks[m.op](m, () => OPS[m.op](bus, m)) : OPS[m.op](bus, m)) };
+  const logs = [];
+  mkdirSync(join(dataRoot, "bus-host"), { mode: 0o700 });
+  const sock = createGitSocket({ host, business: demo, dataRoot, env: process.env, log: (l) => logs.push(l), publishPollMs: 20, ...(publishDeadlineMs ? { publishDeadlineMs } : {}) });
+  down.unshift(() => sock.close());
+  await sock.listen();
+
+  const caps = {};
+  for (const role of ["coder", "second"]) {
+    caps[role] = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: "demo", role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: "pi" });
+    bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "role.claim", args: {} });
+  }
+  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: "demo", human: "jason", via: "cli", outsideAgent: true });
+  // Each agent's workspace: a clone of the root with one commit of its own on feat, pushed to the
+  // working repo for its task.
+  const work = async (role, task) => {
+    const workspace = join(root, `ws-${role}`);
+    const tmp = join(root, `tmp-${role}`);
+    mkdirSync(workspace);
+    mkdirSync(tmp);
+    git(workspace, "clone", "-q", project, "stack");
+    const clone = join(workspace, "stack");
+    git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
+    const commitId = commit(clone, `work by ${role}`, `${role}@example.com`);
+    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps[role], workspace, tmp, task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
+    return commitId;
+  };
+  // A second commit on the coder's feat, pushed to the working repo through the socket.
+  const again = async () => {
+    const workspace = join(root, "ws-coder");
+    const commitId = commit(join(workspace, "stack"), "more work", "[email protected]");
+    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps.coder, workspace, tmp: join(root, "tmp-coder"), task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
+    return commitId;
+  };
+  const approve = (role = "coder", task = TASK) => {
+    const d = bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "decision.raise", args: {
+      action: "git.push.remote", target: task, task_ref: task, question: "Publish?", blocking: false, recommendation: "yes",
+      options: [{ key: "yes", text: "Yes" }, { key: "no", text: "No" }] } });
+    bus.broker.request(human, { verb: "decision.resolve", args: { id: d.id, choice: "yes" } });
+    return d.id;
+  };
+  const publish = (decision, extra = {}, role = "coder", task = TASK) =>
+    raw(sock.path, { cap: caps[role], op: "publish", task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat", decision, ...extra });
+  // The bus holds the writer lock; the test reads its events through a read-only handle.
+  const events = (kind, task = TASK) => {
+    const db = new DatabaseSync(join(dataRoot, "bus", "bus.sqlite"), { readOnly: true });
+    try {
+      return db.prepare("SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? AND subject=? ORDER BY seq").all(kind, task).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
+    } finally {
+      db.close();
+    }
+  };
+  return { root, bus, gitea, forkRepo, work: await work("coder", TASK), more: work, again, hooks, caps, approve, publish, logs, events };
+}
+
+test("T3 end to end: publish under an approved decision sends the work commit to the agent's own fork and records it once", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  // Nothing issued: the store has no token, and the refusal is filed once.
+  const first = w.approve();
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "credential-unavailable" });
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["credential-unavailable"]);
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
+
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
+  const reply = await w.publish(first);
+  assert.deepEqual(reply, { ok: true, result: { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null } });
+  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
+  // Every request went to the agent's fork; the upstream, mosaic/stack, received none.
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path === "/coder/stack/git-receive-pack" && r.user === "coder"));
+  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
+  const allowed = w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise");
+  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
+  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`);
+  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.commit, w.work);
+  // The decision is spent.
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "decision-consumed" });
+  // T4: no token in any answer, event or log line, nor in any file under the scratch root but the
+  // agent's own store file.
+  assert.equal(JSON.stringify([reply, w.events("action.allowed"), w.events("action.refused"), w.logs]).includes(TOKEN), false);
+  const store = join(w.root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", "coder", "gitea");
+  const holding = readdirSync(w.root, { recursive: true })
+    .map((name) => join(w.root, name))
+    .filter((file) => lstatSync(file).isFile() && readFileSync(file).includes(TOKEN));
+  assert.deepEqual(holding, [store]);
+});
+
+test("T3 end to end: a fork the token can't reach is fork-unavailable, filed once, and nothing is recorded as allowed", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", "fake_wrong_token_0123456789", "2099-01-01");
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "fork-unavailable" });
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["fork-unavailable"]);
+  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
+});
+
+test("a bad branch or project refuses before the broker; a fork, user or ref in the request is ignored", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  const d = w.approve();
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { branch: "../main" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { project: "nope" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
+  // Filed through the socket's refuse op, as a bad push request is; no publish ticket opened.
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["invalid-request", "invalid-request"]);
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
+  // The broker builds the fork and the destination; the request's own are never read.
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
+  const reply = await w.publish(d, { fork: "https://127.0.0.1:1/other/stack", user: "other", dst: "refs/heads/main", ref: "refs/heads/main" });
+  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null });
+  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
+  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "-q", "--verify", "refs/heads/other/feat"], { env: gitEnv() }).status, 1);
+});
+
+test("T3 end to end: two agents, one project, each lands on its own fork only; the upstream receives nothing", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  const second = await w.more("second", TASK2);
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/second", "gitea", TOKEN2, "2099-01-01");
+  assert.equal((await w.publish(w.approve())).ok, true);
+  const coderRequests = w.gitea.requests.length;
+  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "coder"], ["coder", "coder"]);
+  const reply = await w.publish(w.approve("second", TASK2), {}, "second", TASK2);
+  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/second/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/second/feat", commit: second, previous: null });
+  for (const r of w.gitea.requests.slice(coderRequests)) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "second"], ["second", "second"]);
+  const refs = (owner) => git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.gitea.repo(owner, "stack")}`, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname) %(objectname)");
+  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes(`refs/heads/coder/feat ${w.work}`), true);
+  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes("refs/heads/second/"), false);
+  assert.equal(refs("second").includes(`refs/heads/second/feat ${second}`), true);
+  assert.equal(refs("second").includes("refs/heads/coder/"), false);
+  assert.equal(refs("mosaic").split("\n").length, 1, "the upstream holds only main");
+});
+
+// sage-1440 on BUILD.md 14: a push between checkPublish and the git push refuses, with one code
+// for each place it can come in, and the fork never receives a commit the decision didn't bind.
+test("T3: a push after checkPublish and before the lock refuses ref-moved; the fork receives nothing", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
+  w.hooks.checkPublish = async (m, next) => {
+    const facts = await next();
+    await w.again();
+    return facts;
+  };
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "ref-moved" });
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["ref-moved"]);
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", "refs/heads/coder/"), "");
+});
+
+test("T3: a push recorded while the bus process pushes refuses decision-mismatch; only the decision's commit reached the fork", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t);
+  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
+  // The working repo's lock is held through the git push, so a socket push would wait for it; the
+  // broker's record of a newer push is what a push that won the lock leaves.
+  w.hooks.publishPush = async (m, next) => {
+    w.bus.checkPush(w.caps.coder, TASK);
+    w.bus.recordPush(w.caps.coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat", ref: workRef(TASK), commit: "c".repeat(40), previous: w.work });
+    return next();
+  };
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "decision-mismatch" });
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["decision-mismatch"]);
+  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
+  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
+  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("wasn't recorded")));
+});
+
+test("sage-1440: the publishResult poll is bounded: publish-timeout, filed once, and nothing recorded", async (t) => {
+  const w = await setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs: 150 });
+  let polls = 0;
+  w.hooks.publishResult = async () => {
+    polls++;
+    return { state: "running" };
+  };
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "publish-timeout" });
+  assert.ok(polls > 0);
+  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["publish-timeout"]);
+  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
+  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("publish-timeout")));
+});

packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs

@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ async function seed(e,{copy=B,pm=false,store='3g',pointer:how='adopt'}={}){
 const rolledBack=(code,to=B)=>`stack-release: ${code}; rolled back to ${to}, which passed the gate\n`;
 const planBackup=(e)=>`backup: the run backs up the stopped store to ${e.data}/backups/stack/<activation>/ before any migration`;
 const planNoBackup='backup: none; the run rolls back before the backup';
-const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];
+const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off','send: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];
 
 // --- The T table ---
 
@@ -1030,17 +1030,17 @@ test('T36 --plan shows the pending state and lists the row 169 refusals it can s
   return r.out.split('\n');
  };
  let out=await quiet(0,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
  biz(e,HARNESS);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',A,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
  assert.equal(out.at(-2),'refuses pm-after-harness-set: the business file already sets harness ["claude-code"]; use --pm');
  biz(e);assert.equal((await run(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness')).code,0);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',C,'acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
  out=await quiet(0,'rollback','acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
 });
 
 // Row 176 test 11: supported and older Console copies deliberately differ from the checkout.
@@ -1706,6 +1706,113 @@ test('T54 row 188: a carried pair gets the proof file checks, and a proof file i
  });
 });
 
+// Row 189 (#1687, mos-0972/0973): activate --no-send drops the pointer's --send; nothing turns it back on.
+const sendLines=(out)=>out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('send:'));
+const noSend=(c)=>c.filter((x)=>x!=='--send');
+const LIVE_NOTE=`note: ${B} is the pointer's copy; the run re-pins it and only the Console flags change`;
+test('T55 row 189: activate --no-send drops --send, and rollback and pm-on carry it off',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('test 1: a live-copy --no-send drops --send from the pointer and the unit, keeps the rest in order, logs the step and backs up the stopped store',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']),want=noSend(base);
+  assert.deepEqual(want.slice(-2),['--tester-port','7333']);
+  const sum=createHash('sha256').update(readFileSync(e.store)).digest('hex'),n=calls(e).length;
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
+  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  const act=pointer(e).activation,l=logLines(e).at(-1);
+  assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result,l.backup],['activate',B,B,'ok',act]);assert.equal(backupSum(e,act),sum);
+  assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[`stop ${CON}`,`stop ${BUS}`,`start ${BUS}`,`start ${CON}`]);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 2: a plain live-copy activate still refuses already-active, and so does --no-send once --send is gone',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--tester-port','7333'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-proof'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  const r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  const g=await mk(t);await seedPreview(g);
+  await refused(g,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 3: --plan prints one send: line in each case, with the live-copy note on a same-copy run',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[LIVE_NOTE]);
+  assert.equal(out[out.indexOf('send: dropped; --no-send was given')+1],`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${B} --copies ${COPIES} ${noSend(base).join(' ')}`);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme');
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: carried']);assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[]);
+  assert.ok(out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('Console: ')).endsWith(' --send'));
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send')),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send')),['send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send']);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme')),['send: off']);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'rollback','acme')),['send: off']);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop\n/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/drop --send/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 4: after --no-send, a rollback to the earlier copy leaves --send out of the pointer and the unit',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/--send/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 4: pm-on after --no-send keeps --send off',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,{pm:true},['--send']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  biz(e,HARNESS);
+  r=await prun(e,'pm-on','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).pm,true);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 5: --no-send on rollback, pm-on, status, adopt or rehearse is a usage error',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  const usageText=(await prun(e,'--help')).err,n=calls(e).length,logs=logLines(e).length,before=fp(e);
+  for(const args of [['rollback','acme','--no-send'],['rollback','acme','--plan','--no-send'],['pm-on','acme','--no-send'],['status','acme','--no-send'],['adopt','acme','--no-send'],
+   ['rehearse','acme','--backup','/tmp/x','--port','7400','--no-send']]){
+   const r=await prun(e,...args);assert.equal(r.code,4,args.join(' '));assert.equal(r.out,'');assert.equal(r.err,usageText);
+  }
+  assert.match(usageText,/\| --no-proof\] \[--no-send\]/);
+  assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 6: with both a pair and --send in the pointer, --no-send and --no-proof each drop what they name and keep the rest',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']),pre=noSend(base),f=await proofFile(e),g=await proofFile(e,'proof2.189',0o400);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(f));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f),'--send']);
+  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: carried']);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: carried, header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f)]);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send',...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two'));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two')]);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  const h=await mk(t),hbase=await seedPreview(h,undefined,['--send']),hpre=noSend(hbase),k=await proofFile(h);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(k));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,[...hpre,'--send']);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,hpre);assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(h),/--proof-| --send( |$)/);
+  const steps=stepText(h);
+  assert.match(steps,/Z --no-proof was given and the pointer holds no proof pair, so there is nothing to drop\n/);assert.match(steps,/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  r=await prun(h,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  for(const x of [e,h])await noLeak(x);
+ });
+});
+
 // --- rehearse (D2, row 163; the brief's "Stack rehearsal on a scratch root") ---
 // Copies of their own in RCOPIES: the real scripts/mosaic, config loader, business loader, roles and
 // mosaic-config.mjs, with stand-ins for the bus host (cli.mjs), the Console, the Store and

packages/seat/src/checkout.mjs

@@ -101,8 +101,10 @@ export function gitEnv(env = process.env) {
 // consequence: a Ctrl-C at the terminal of a host run by hand no longer
 // reaches its git, though a systemd stop still does (it kills the cgroup).
 // `stdin` names a file git reads as its input (row 137: patch-id); without
-// it git gets none.
-export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null } = {}) {
+// it git gets none. `pass` (row 199, publish) is written once to a pipe on
+// fd 3, which git and what it starts inherit; publish's credential helper
+// reads its token there, so the token is in no argv, env, URL or file.
+export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) {
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     let input = "ignore";
     try {
@@ -110,8 +112,10 @@ export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null } = {}) {
     } catch (e) {
       return resolve({ ok: false, out: "", err: "", why: e.code ?? e.message });
     }
-    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe"] });
+    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe", ...(pass === null ? [] : ["pipe"])] });
     if (typeof input === "number") closeSync(input);
+    // A git that never asked for it closes the pipe unread: EPIPE is no fault.
+    if (pass !== null) child.stdio[3].on("error", () => {}).end(pass);
     let out = "";
     let err = "";
     let signalled = false;

packages/seat/src/working.mjs

@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@
 //     compare and swap (base-moved), then record() runs; when it throws, main
 //     goes back, and a main that can't go back refuses rollback-failed.
 // dropLand removes the worktree; the caller runs it on every path.
+//
+// publish (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D9b) sends a recorded work commit to
+// the agent's own fork. It runs in two processes, because the gitea token
+// lives in the bus process and the lock in the host's:
+//   publish, in the host, under the lock: the seed; the work ref is at the
+//     source commit (ref-moved); every commit in main..source has author and
+//     committer email equal to the agent's (identity-mismatch); then
+//     remote(), which the caller wires to publishRemote in the bus process.
+//   publishRemote, in the bus process, with the token on fd 3 only:
+//     `ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD <dst>`; a non-zero exit refuses
+//     fork-unavailable. The fork's HEAD must be a commit this repository has
+//     and an ancestor of main (remote-unrelated, an empty fork included).
+//     Then `push <fork> <source>:<dst>` by oid, with no `+`. Only https
+//     crosses (protocol.https.allow), redirects are refused, and output
+//     holding the token refuses credential-leak. Git's stderr is never
+//     returned: it can carry the URL.
 
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -101,7 +117,7 @@ export const FSCK = ["-c", "transfer.fsckObjects=true"];
 
 // `limits` is { timeoutMs, graceMs }; the tests shorten them. runGit
 // (checkout.mjs) runs git in its own process group and signals the group.
-const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin });
+const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin, pass });
 // git with this call's env and limits, for the helpers below.
 const bound = (env, limits) => (args, opts = {}) => git(args, env, { ...opts, limits });
 
@@ -402,3 +418,75 @@ async function removeWorktree(repo, worktree, g) {
   if (!r.ok) rmSync(worktree, { recursive: true, force: true });
   await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "worktree", "prune"]);
 }
+
+// await publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env, limits })
+// Resolves what remote() resolves; rejects with WorkingError.
+export function publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
+  if (!PROJECT.test(project ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || typeof email !== "string" || !email) refuse("invalid-request");
+  const ref = `refs/heads/${workRef(taskRef)}`;
+  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project);
+  const g = bound(env, limits);
+  return locked(repo, async () => {
+    try {
+      if (!lstatSync(repo).isDirectory()) refuse("working-repo-invalid");
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e instanceof WorkingError) throw e;
+      refuse("working-repo-invalid", `${repo} can't be read: ${e.code}`);
+    }
+    await seed(repo, root, g);
+    const at = `--git-dir=${repo}`;
+    if ((await tip(repo, ref, g)) !== source) refuse("ref-moved", `${ref} isn't at ${source}`);
+    const range = await g([at, "log", "--format=%ae%x00%ce", `refs/heads/main..${source}`]);
+    if (!range.ok) refuse("working-repo-invalid", range.why);
+    for (const line of range.out.split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
+      if (line !== `${email}\0${email}`) refuse("identity-mismatch", `a commit in main..${source.slice(0, 12)} isn't by ${email}`);
+    }
+    return remote();
+  });
+}
+
+const HOST = /^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}(:[0-9]{1,5})?$/;
+const NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/;
+// The one-shot helper: for a `get` on https at exactly the fork's host and
+// port, it answers the user and the line it reads from fd 3. Anything else,
+// and `store` and `erase`, gets no answer. HOST and NAME keep both shell-safe.
+const helper = (host, user) =>
+  `!f() { test "$1" = get || exit 0; p=; h=; while IFS= read -r l; do case "$l" in protocol=*) p=\${l#protocol=};; host=*) h=\${l#host=};; "") break;; esac; done; ` +
+  `test "$p" = https && test "$h" = '${host}' || exit 0; IFS= read -r t <&3 || exit 0; printf 'username=%s\\npassword=%s\\n' '${user}' "$t"; }; f`;
+
+// await publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls, env, limits })
+// Resolves { ref, commit, previous }, previous being dst's tip on the fork
+// before the push, or null. `tls` is for the tests' scratch CA only.
+export async function publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls = [], env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
+  let url;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(fork);
+  } catch {
+    refuse("invalid-request");
+  }
+  if (url.protocol !== "https:" || !HOST.test(url.host) || !NAME.test(user ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || !dst?.startsWith(`refs/heads/${user}/`)) refuse("invalid-request");
+  const secret = String(token).trim();
+  const net = async (args) => {
+    const pre = [...tls, "-c", "protocol.https.allow=always", "-c", "http.followRedirects=false", "-c", "credential.helper=", "-c", `credential.helper=${helper(url.host, user)}`];
+    const r = await git([`--git-dir=${repo}`, ...args], env, { pre, limits, pass: `${secret}\n` });
+    if (r.out.includes(secret) || r.err.includes(secret)) refuse("credential-leak");
+    return r;
+  };
+  const g = bound(env, limits);
+  const listed = await net(["ls-remote", "--symref", fork, "HEAD", dst]);
+  if (!listed.ok) refuse("fork-unavailable");
+  let head = null;
+  let previous = null;
+  for (const line of listed.out.split("\n")) {
+    const [oid, name] = line.split("\t");
+    if (!OID.test(oid ?? "")) continue;
+    if (name === "HEAD") head = oid;
+    else if (name === dst) previous = oid;
+  }
+  if (!head) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork is empty");
+  const known = await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "cat-file", "-e", `${head}^{commit}`]);
+  if (!known.ok || !(await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", head, "refs/heads/main"])).ok) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork's HEAD isn't in main's history");
+  const pushed = await net(["push", "--porcelain", "--no-follow-tags", fork, `${source}:${dst}`]);
+  if (!pushed.ok) refuse(/\((non-fast-forward|fetch first)\)/.test(pushed.out) ? "non-fast-forward" : "push-failed");
+  return { ref: dst, commit: source, previous };
+}

packages/seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design T3): a fake Gitea for publish, on 127.0.0.1 over TLS with a scratch CA,
+// serving bare repositories under `<dir>/repos/<user>/<repo>.git` through git http-backend. Every
+// request needs Basic auth with the user and token it was made with, or with any pair in `users`,
+// as a private repository on Gitea does. It records each request's method, path and user, never the password. `redirect`
+// makes every request a 302 to `redirect`. A repository's own hooks run on a push, so a test can
+// make the fork echo something back as `remote:` lines. Nothing here leaves 127.0.0.1.
+import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createServer } from "node:https";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+// A CA and a server certificate for IP 127.0.0.1, made once per directory with openssl.
+export function scratchCa(dir) {
+  mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const ssl = (...args) => {
+    const r = spawnSync("openssl", args, { cwd: dir, encoding: "utf8" });
+    if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl ${args[0]}: ${r.stderr}`);
+  };
+  ssl("req", "-x509", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "ca.key", "-out", "ca.pem", "-days", "2", "-subj", "/CN=mosaic test CA");
+  ssl("req", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "server.key", "-out", "server.csr", "-subj", "/CN=127.0.0.1");
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, "san.ext"), "subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1\n");
+  ssl("x509", "-req", "-in", "server.csr", "-CA", "ca.pem", "-CAkey", "ca.key", "-CAcreateserial", "-out", "server.pem", "-days", "2", "-extfile", "san.ext");
+  return { ca: join(dir, "ca.pem"), key: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.key")), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.pem")) };
+}
+
+export async function fakeGitea({ dir, tls, user, token, users = { [user]: token }, redirect = null }) {
+  const root = join(dir, "repos");
+  mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+  const requests = [];
+  const server = createServer({ key: tls.key, cert: tls.cert }, (req, res) => {
+    const url = new URL(req.url, "https://127.0.0.1");
+    const auth = /^Basic (.+)$/.exec(req.headers.authorization ?? "");
+    const [who, pass] = auth ? Buffer.from(auth[1], "base64").toString().split(":") : [null, null];
+    requests.push({ method: req.method, path: url.pathname, user: who });
+    if (redirect) {
+      res.writeHead(302, { location: redirect + req.url });
+      return res.end();
+    }
+    if (!who || !Object.hasOwn(users, who) || pass !== users[who]) {
+      res.writeHead(401, { "www-authenticate": 'Basic realm="Gitea"' });
+      return res.end();
+    }
+    // /<owner>/<repo>/info/refs and the like, on <root>/<owner>/<repo>.git.
+    const m = /^\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+?)(?:\.git)?(\/.*)$/.exec(url.pathname);
+    if (!m) {
+      res.writeHead(404);
+      return res.end();
+    }
+    const cgi = spawn("git", ["http-backend"], {
+      env: {
+        PATH: process.env.PATH,
+        GIT_PROJECT_ROOT: root,
+        GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL: "1",
+        GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM: "1",
+        GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: "/dev/null",
+        HOME: "/nonexistent",
+        PATH_INFO: `/${m[1]}/${m[2]}.git${m[3]}`,
+        REQUEST_METHOD: req.method,
+        QUERY_STRING: url.search.slice(1),
+        CONTENT_TYPE: req.headers["content-type"] ?? "",
+        HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING: req.headers["content-encoding"] ?? "",
+        GIT_PROTOCOL: req.headers["git-protocol"] ?? "",
+        REMOTE_USER: who,
+        REMOTE_ADDR: "127.0.0.1",
+      },
+      stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"],
+    });
+    req.pipe(cgi.stdin);
+    const chunks = [];
+    cgi.stdout.on("data", (c) => chunks.push(c));
+    cgi.on("close", () => {
+      const out = Buffer.concat(chunks);
+      const split = out.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
+      const head = out.subarray(0, split).toString().split("\r\n");
+      const headers = {};
+      let status = 200;
+      for (const line of head) {
+        const [k, ...v] = line.split(":");
+        if (k.toLowerCase() === "status") status = Number.parseInt(v.join(":").trim(), 10);
+        else headers[k] = v.join(":").trim();
+      }
+      res.writeHead(status, headers);
+      res.end(out.subarray(split + 4));
+    });
+  });
+  await new Promise((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
+  const port = server.address().port;
+  return {
+    port,
+    origin: `https://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
+    requests,
+    repo: (owner, name) => join(root, owner, `${name}.git`),
+    close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(r)),
+  };
+}

packages/seat/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 3 to 5, D9a, T3): publish and publishRemote (src/working.mjs)
+// against a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1 (fake-gitea.mjs) with a scratch CA, passed only through
+// the `tls` parameter. Fake tokens in a scratch root. Each refusal that should reach the network
+// checks the fake saw the request, so no case passes because git refused https first.
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { gitEnv } from "../src/checkout.mjs";
+import { publish, publishRemote, push, workingRepo } from "../src/working.mjs";
+import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "./fake-gitea.mjs";
+
+const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
+const TOKEN = "fake_publish_token_0123456789";
+const USER = "coder";
+const EMAIL = "[email protected]";
+const DST = "refs/heads/coder/feat";
+
+function git(cwd, ...args) {
+  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
+  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
+  return r.stdout.trim();
+}
+function commit(dir, text, email = EMAIL) {
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
+  git(dir, "add", "README");
+  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
+  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
+}
+const rejects = (p, code) => assert.rejects(p, (e) => e.code === code || assert.fail(`${e.code}: ${e.message}, wanted ${code}`));
+
+// A root, a coder's clone with work on feat pushed to the working repo, and a fake Gitea whose
+// coder/stack fork is a bare clone of the root.
+async function world(t, { fork = true, redirect = null } = {}) {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "mosaic-publish-"));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const root = join(dir, "root");
+  mkdirSync(root);
+  git(root, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
+  const first = commit(root, "one", "[email protected]");
+  const clone = join(dir, "clone");
+  git(dir, "clone", "-q", root, clone);
+  git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
+  const work = commit(clone, "work");
+  const dataRoot = join(dir, "data");
+  mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const file = join(dir, "b.bundle");
+  git(clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
+  await push({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
+  const ca = scratchCa(join(dir, "ca"));
+  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(dir, "gitea"), tls: ca, user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect });
+  t.after(() => gitea.close());
+  const forkRepo = gitea.repo(USER, "stack");
+  if (fork) {
+    mkdirSync(join(forkRepo, ".."), { recursive: true });
+    git(dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", root, forkRepo);
+  }
+  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`];
+  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, "acme", "stack");
+  const remote = (extra = {}) => publishRemote({ repo, fork: `${gitea.origin}/${USER}/stack`, user: USER, source: work, dst: DST, token: TOKEN + "\n", tls, ...extra });
+  const go = (extra = {}) => publish({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, source: work, email: EMAIL, remote: () => remote(), ...extra });
+  return { dir, root, first, clone, work, dataRoot, repo, gitea, forkRepo, tls, remote, go };
+}
+
+test("T3: publish pushes the work commit by oid to <user>/<branch> on the fork, with the token only through the helper", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: null });
+  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), w.work);
+  // Every request went to the fork's path, and each one that carried auth carried the agent's user.
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
+  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\/(info\/refs|git-receive-pack|git-upload-pack)$/);
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.user === USER && r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")));
+  // A second publish of the same commit is a no-op push and names the previous tip.
+  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: w.work });
+  // The working repo holds no remote and no credential config.
+  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.repo}`, "config", "--get-regexp", "^(remote|credential)\\."], { env: gitEnv() }).stdout.toString(), "");
+});
+
+test("T3: a moved fork branch refuses non-fast-forward; no + and no force", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
+  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.root, other);
+  const elsewhere = commit(other, "elsewhere");
+  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${elsewhere}:${DST}`);
+  await rejects(w.go(), "non-fast-forward");
+  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), elsewhere);
+});
+
+test("T3: D9a: an empty fork and an unrelated fork refuse remote-unrelated; a missing fork refuses fork-unavailable", async (t) => {
+  const empty = await world(t, { fork: false });
+  git(empty.dir, "init", "-q", "--bare", empty.forkRepo);
+  await rejects(empty.go(), "remote-unrelated");
+  assert.ok(empty.gitea.requests.length > 0);
+  assert.equal(empty.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
+
+  const unrelated = await world(t, { fork: false });
+  const alone = join(unrelated.dir, "alone");
+  mkdirSync(alone);
+  git(alone, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
+  commit(alone, "unrelated");
+  git(unrelated.dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", alone, unrelated.forkRepo);
+  await rejects(unrelated.go(), "remote-unrelated");
+  assert.equal(unrelated.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
+
+  const missing = await world(t, { fork: false });
+  await rejects(missing.go(), "fork-unavailable");
+  assert.ok(missing.gitea.requests.length > 0);
+});
+
+test("T3: a fork past main refuses remote-unrelated until root catches up", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
+  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.forkRepo, other);
+  const ahead = commit(other, "ahead");
+  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${ahead}:refs/heads/main`);
+  await rejects(w.go(), "remote-unrelated");
+});
+
+test("T3: a wrong token refuses fork-unavailable; git's stderr isn't in the refusal", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  await assert.rejects(w.remote({ token: "fake_wrong_token_0123456789" }), (e) => e.code === "fork-unavailable" && e.message === "fork-unavailable");
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
+  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", DST), "");
+});
+
+test("T3: a 302 is not followed: fork-unavailable, and the target sees no request", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  const target = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "target"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca2")), user: USER, token: TOKEN });
+  t.after(() => target.close());
+  const bounce = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "bounce"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca3")), user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect: target.origin });
+  t.after(() => bounce.close());
+  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${join(w.dir, "ca3", "ca.pem")}`];
+  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `${bounce.origin}/${USER}/stack`, tls }), "fork-unavailable");
+  assert.ok(bounce.requests.length > 0);
+  assert.equal(target.requests.length, 0);
+});
+
+test("T3: the helper answers only the fork's host and port: a fork on another port gets no token", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  // The fork names port 1; insteadOf (through the tests' tls parameter) sends git to the fake's
+  // port. The helper was told port 1, so it answers nothing and no password goes out.
+  const before = w.gitea.requests.length;
+  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `https://127.0.0.1:1/${USER}/stack`, tls: [...w.tls, "-c", `url.https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/.insteadOf=https://127.0.0.1:1/`] }), "fork-unavailable");
+  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > before, "the rewritten URL reached the fake");
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.slice(before).some((r) => r.user !== null), false, "no credential went to a host the helper wasn't told");
+});
+
+test("T3: a fork that echoes the token refuses credential-leak", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  const hook = join(w.forkRepo, "hooks", "pre-receive");
+  writeFileSync(hook, `#!/bin/sh\necho ${TOKEN} >&2\nexit 0\n`);
+  chmodSync(hook, 0o755);
+  await rejects(w.go(), "credential-leak");
+});
+
+test("T3: no tls parameter, no trust: the scratch CA reaches git only through it", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  await rejects(w.remote({ tls: [] }), "fork-unavailable");
+});
+
+test("D9 steps 3 and 4: ref-moved and identity-mismatch refuse before any request", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  await rejects(w.go({ source: w.first }), "ref-moved");
+  const other = commit(w.clone, "by someone else", "[email protected]");
+  const file = join(w.dir, "b2.bundle");
+  git(w.clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
+  await push({ dataRoot: w.dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root: w.root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
+  await rejects(w.go({ source: other }), "identity-mismatch");
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
+});
+
+test("publishRemote refuses a fork, user or destination that isn't shell- and ref-safe before any git", async (t) => {
+  const w = await world(t);
+  for (const extra of [
+    { fork: `http://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/${USER}/stack` },
+    { fork: `https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}'/${USER}/stack` },
+    { user: "co'der" },
+    { dst: "refs/heads/main" },
+    { dst: "refs/heads/pm/feat" },
+    { source: "HEAD" },
+  ]) await rejects(w.remote(extra), "invalid-request");
+  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
+});

packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs

@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         tree: null,
         bots: new Set([businesses[name].tracker.sync.botId, ...Object.values(s.roles).map((r) => r.botId)]),
         sync: use('@sync'),
-        as: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
+        // Row 199 (#1697, design D5): a request's call keys from the broker's session for its cap,
+        // never from a role name. probe is the host's own start check of each role's token.
+        as: (session, method, path, opts) =>
+          credentials.useFor(session, 'vikunja', (token) => call(token, method, path, opts)),
+        probe: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
         state: 'starting',
         refused: null,
         queue: Promise.resolve(),
@@ -96,7 +100,7 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         timers: [],
       };
       ctx.syncCall = (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.sync(method, path, opts);
-      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.as(role, method, path, opts);
+      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.probe(role, method, path, opts);
       ctx.handle = verbs(ctx);
       contexts.set(name, ctx);
     }

packages/tasks/src/startup.mjs

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
   if (probe.status === 404 || probe.status === 403 || outcome(probe) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
   expect(probe, 401, 'tracker-unexpected');
   for (const [role, r] of Object.entries(ctx.roles)) {
-    const control = await ctx.as(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
+    const control = await ctx.probe(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
     if (control.status !== 404 || control.json?.code !== 4002) {
       expect(control, 404, 'tracker-unexpected');
       refuse('tracker-unexpected');
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
     const probes = [['DELETE', `/tasks/${MISSING}`, undefined]];
     if (r.definition !== 'pm') probes.push(['POST', `/tasks/${MISSING}/labels`, { label_id: 1 }]);
     for (const [method, path, body] of probes) {
-      const p = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
+      const p = await ctx.probe(role, method, path, { body });
       if (p.status === 404 || p.status === 403 || outcome(p) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
       if (p.status !== 401) refuse(p.status === 0 || p.status >= 500 ? 'tracker-unavailable' : 'tracker-unexpected');
     }

packages/tasks/src/verbs.mjs

@@ -122,8 +122,9 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
   const relatedTo = (task, kind, other) =>
     Array.isArray(task.related_tasks?.[kind]) && task.related_tasks[kind].some((t) => t?.id === other);
   // One write with the acting role's token. An uncertain answer is settled by a re-read.
-  async function step(role, method, path, body, at, done) {
-    const r = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
+  // `me` is the broker's session for the caller's cap (design D5).
+  async function step(me, method, path, body, at, done) {
+    const r = await ctx.as(me, method, path, { body });
     const o = outcome(r);
     if (o === 'ok') return r;
     if (o === 'uncertain' && at !== null && done) {
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     if (!mine) fail('tracker-role');
     if (PM_VERBS.has(verb) && mine.definition !== 'pm') fail('field-writer');
     const plan = prepare(verb, args, role, mine);
-    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, role, plan);
+    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, me, plan);
     const at = target(args.task_ref);
     const before = await read(at);
     if (args.expect !== undefined && args.expect !== before.digest) {
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let landed = 0;
     try {
       for (const [method, path, body, done] of work.steps) {
-        await step(role, method, path, body, at, done);
+        await step(me, method, path, body, at, done);
         landed++;
       }
     } catch (e) {
@@ -385,12 +386,12 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
         fail('unknown-verb');
     }
   }
-  async function create(cap, role, plan) {
+  async function create(cap, me, plan) {
     if (!ctx.broker.taskView(ctx.business, 'input', plan.request)) fail('request-not-found');
     await located(plan.others);
     ctx.broker.authorize(cap, 'task.create', { decision: plan.decision, target: null });
     // No re-read can find a create whose answer was lost, so an uncertain create is reported as such.
-    const r = await step(role, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
+    const r = await step(me, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
     if (r.status !== 201 && r.status !== 200) fail('tracker-unexpected');
     checkTask(r.json);
     const id = r.json.id;
@@ -399,9 +400,9 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let failure = null;
     try {
       for (const l of plan.labels)
-        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
+        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
       for (const x of plan.relations)
-        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
+        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
           relatedTo(a.task, x.kind, x.other),
         );
     } catch (e) {

roles/chief-of-staff.md

@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
+`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
+moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

roles/pm.md

@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
+`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
+moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

scripts/mosaic

@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ if [ "${1:-}" = business ]; then
   exec node "$REPO/packages/business/src/cli.mjs" "$@"
 fi
 case "${1:-}" in
-  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
+  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|credentials|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
 esac
 exec node "$REPO/packages/seat/src/cli.mjs" "$@"

scripts/stack-release.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # Moves the bus, the Console and the human CLI from the pointer's copy to another copy together,
 # behind a health gate, and puts the old stack back inside the same run when the gate fails.
 # Console tester listener flags follow target support (row 176, #1674); so does the row 178 proof
-# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685).
+# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685). activate --no-send drops --send (row 189, #1687).
 # Design and tests: agents/darkwing/work/queue-162/BUILD.md.
 #
 # Who runs it. Decision 96 (Mos, mos-0716) lets this script stop and start the live units under
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ BIN="$HOME/.npm-global/bin"
 UNIT_DIR="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/systemd/user"
 CONSOLE_UNIT=mosaic-webui.service
 TIMEOUT=60 WANT_PM=0 AFTER_HARNESS=0 MIGRATE=0 PLAN=0 RESTORE="" EVENTS="" TESTER_PORT=""
-PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""
+PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 NO_SEND=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""
 
 usage() {
     cat >&2 <<'USAGE'
 usage: stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
        stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
        stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
        stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
        stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ parse_opts() {
             --proof-header) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_HEADER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --proof-file) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_FILE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --no-proof) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_PROOF=1; shift ;;
+            --no-send) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_SEND=1; shift ;;
             --migrate) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; MIGRATE=1; shift ;;
             --restore) [ "$OP" = rollback ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || usage; RESTORE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --backup) [ "$OP" = rehearse ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && { [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || [[ "$2" =~ ^/[A-Za-z0-9/._+-]*$ ]]; } || usage; R_BACKUP="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@@ -244,14 +245,16 @@ target_schema() {
 in_chain() { local v; for v in "${T_CHAIN[@]}"; do [ "$v" != "$1" ] || return 0; done; return 1; }
 
 # The item 3 checks on the target copy, in order: copy, schema, already-active. An activate that
-# sets a proof pair, or drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, may name the pointer's copy: it
-# re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187, Part B's B3 and B-R1).
+# sets a proof pair, drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, or drops the pointer's --send with
+# --no-send, may name the pointer's copy: it re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187,
+# Part B's B3 and B-R1; row 189, mos-0972).
 check_target() {
     copy_exists "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-missing "no copy $TO in $COPIES"
     copy_ok "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-unreachable "$TO is not reachable from refactor and origin/refactor"
     target_schema "$TO" || refuse copy-schema-unknown "cannot read SCHEMA_VERSION and its chain from $COPIES/$TO/packages/bus/src/store.mjs"
     [ "$TO" != "$P_COPY" ] || [ -n "$PROOF_HEADER" ] ||
         { [ "$NO_PROOF" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --proof-header "* ]]; } ||
+        { [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --send "* ]]; } ||
         refuse already-active "$TO is the pointer's copy"
 }
 
@@ -690,6 +693,33 @@ console_for_target() {
         DROP_TESTER="--tester-port $inherited"
     fi
     proof_for_target
+    send_for_target
+}
+
+# Row 189 (mos-0972): --no-send drops --send from RUN_CONSOLE, so the unit and the pointer both lose
+# it; without the flag the pointer's --send goes on unchanged. Rollback and pm-on never take it, so
+# they carry the pointer as it is. Sets SEND_PLAN (the plan's send: line) and SEND_STEP.
+send_for_target() {
+    local had=0 i
+    local -a without_send=()
+    for ((i = 0; i < ${#RUN_CONSOLE[@]}; i++)); do
+        if [ "${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}" = --send ]; then had=1; else without_send+=("${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}"); fi
+    done
+    SEND_STEP=""
+    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then
+        RUN_CONSOLE=("${without_send[@]}")
+        if [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
+            SEND_PLAN="send: dropped; --no-send was given"
+            SEND_STEP="drop --send; --no-send was given"
+        else
+            SEND_PLAN="send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send"
+            SEND_STEP="--no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop"
+        fi
+    elif [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
+        SEND_PLAN="send: carried"
+    else
+        SEND_PLAN="send: off"
+    fi
 }
 
 # Row 187: the row 178 proof pair in RUN_CONSOLE. A new pair replaces the pointer's and goes last;
@@ -943,6 +973,7 @@ plan() {
     echo "bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES$([ "$RUN_PM" = 0 ] || echo ' --pm') --claude $P_CLAUDE"
     [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || echo "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
     echo "$PROOF_PLAN"
+    echo "$SEND_PLAN"
     echo "Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES${RUN_CONSOLE[*]:+ ${RUN_CONSOLE[*]}}"
     echo "CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper $TO --copies $COPIES --bin $BIN"
     local r
@@ -956,6 +987,7 @@ run_steps() {
     capture || refuse capture-failed "could not write the rollback set $RS; nothing was stopped"
     [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || say "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
     [ -z "$PROOF_STEP" ] || say "$PROOF_STEP"
+    [ -z "$SEND_STEP" ] || say "$SEND_STEP"
     trap 'after_fail signal' INT TERM HUP
     stop_both || rollback_in_run stop-timeout
     if [ -e "$STORE" ]; then
@@ -1478,7 +1510,7 @@ STORE="$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite"
 BUS_UNIT="mosaic-bus@$BUSINESS.service"
 FROM="" TO="" ACT="" RS="" POST="" BACKUP="" TAKEN="" RESTORED="" STEPS="" COUNT="" UNCLEAN="" FAIL=""
 STORE_SCHEMA="" START_EPOCH="" START_MS=0 GATE="" GATE_WHY="" S_CHANGED=""
-P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
+P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" SEND_PLAN="" SEND_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
 R="" R_RC=0 R_EARLY=() R_BK="" R_HOST_PID="" R_CONSOLE_PID="" R_STARTED="" LIVE_CFG="" LIVE_BIZ=""
 case "$OP" in
     adopt) do_adopt ;;