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marcie f5ab5161db docs: apply prettier formatting (CI format step)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-29 23:56:44 -05:00
marcie ab2c15c0bf docs: prettier + A3R F1 (stray #/heading) + F2 (D15 registry row) 2026-08-29 23:56:25 -05:00
marcie 1ad328af63 docs: fold velma R5 verdict (C1 typed-ops scope, C2 checkpoint-lease gate, seat-grade identity)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
2026-08-29 23:31:02 -05:00
marcie 41c11388e4 docs: containerization plan + PRD D15 (tiered deployment, standalone v1 bar) 2026-08-29 23:24:56 -05:00
fred 143ba0f57a db: agent enrollment schema (M4-4a, migration 0021) (#1482)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
2026-08-30 01:47:06 +00:00
fred ee815a72b1 docs: agent enrollment command family v1 design (M4-4-0) (#1481)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
2026-08-30 01:21:00 +00:00
7 changed files with 6479 additions and 17 deletions
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@@ -197,24 +197,41 @@ conflict must amend one of them explicitly, never fork a third document
- A second writable task store beside PostgreSQL (native-kanban-sot invariants).
- Fully-designed federation in v1 (D3 — roadmap placeholder only).
### 12. Decision registry
### D15 — Tiered containerized deployment (2026-08-30, containerization lane)
| ID | Decision (short form) |
| --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| D1 | Open-source, AI-first, self-hosted platform for agentic management + life OS |
| D2 | Hierarchy company→estate→project→workspace→kanban; bubble-up; granular RBAC |
| D3 | Standalone vs Enterprise; one-way conversion; per-user brains + Vault required in Enterprise; federation deferred |
| D4 | Re-runnable, extensible, per-mode onboarding wizards |
| D5 | North star = this rewrite of docs/PRD.md; stack docs/ = product SSOT |
| D6 | Only product-relevant material migrates from brains; operational records stay and link |
| D7 | Spec-inventory sweep launched immediately (executed; INPUTS baseline frozen by operator ruling T2, 2026-08-25) |
| D8 | webUI sits over official framework tooling; CLI primary |
| D9 | Not a hosted business; company = organizational separation for one operator |
| D10 | better-auth is the account system of record; external IdPs via OIDC |
| D11 | Small v1 slice; ALL phases on the documented roadmap from day one |
| D12 | HARD RULE: webUI never bypasses tooling; missing tool ⇒ build the tool first |
| D13 | workspace_id stays the hard isolation unit; hierarchy is parent structure above; kanban SOT amended, not rewritten |
| D14 | Sensitive profile data in the user's own brain only; postgres holds structure/consent/pointers |
The stack ships a tiered deployment target, additive to the architecture
gate (D8): (1) Standalone tier — docker compose is the canonical
single-host deployment: postgres, valkey, openbao, gateway, appservice
and the served webUI in one composition, with migrations, health checks,
and a documented install/upgrade path; the registry (CI-published
images) is the only deployment source. (2) Enterprise tier — Kubernetes
manifests for the same service set, phase-gated on the standalone tier
holding its acceptance bar. The v1 acceptance bar for the standalone
tier: compose-up healthy; webUI hosts agent chat; an in-stack agent can
open a PR to this repo; CI validates it; the running deployment adopts
the merged change (pull + restart). Federation (D3 clause) remains
deferred and unforeclosed. Implementation plan:
docs/plans/2026-08-30_containerization.md.
## 12. Decision registry
| ID | Decision (short form) |
| --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| D1 | Open-source, AI-first, self-hosted platform for agentic management + life OS |
| D2 | Hierarchy company→estate→project→workspace→kanban; bubble-up; granular RBAC |
| D3 | Standalone vs Enterprise; one-way conversion; per-user brains + Vault required in Enterprise; federation deferred |
| D4 | Re-runnable, extensible, per-mode onboarding wizards |
| D5 | North star = this rewrite of docs/PRD.md; stack docs/ = product SSOT |
| D6 | Only product-relevant material migrates from brains; operational records stay and link |
| D7 | Spec-inventory sweep launched immediately (executed; INPUTS baseline frozen by operator ruling T2, 2026-08-25) |
| D8 | webUI sits over official framework tooling; CLI primary |
| D9 | Not a hosted business; company = organizational separation for one operator |
| D10 | better-auth is the account system of record; external IdPs via OIDC |
| D11 | Small v1 slice; ALL phases on the documented roadmap from day one |
| D12 | HARD RULE: webUI never bypasses tooling; missing tool ⇒ build the tool first |
| D13 | workspace_id stays the hard isolation unit; hierarchy is parent structure above; kanban SOT amended, not rewritten |
| D14 | Sensitive profile data in the user's own brain only; postgres holds structure/consent/pointers |
| D15 | Tiered containerized deployment: compose standalone tier (five-point v1 bar) + phase-gated k8s enterprise tier; registry-only image source | 2026-08-30 containerization lane; plan docs/plans/2026-08-30_containerization.md |
The full decision texts are recorded in the operator decision log (USC estate
brain, webui-audit lane, `GRILL.md`).
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@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
# Plan — Stack Containerization (tiered deployment)
Status: DRAFT for review. Charter: fleet/lanes/stack-containerization
(brain) NORTH-STAR.md; PRD amendment in the same PR adds D15.
Supersedes nothing; sequences the absorbed M4 remainder per its lane.
## Measured baseline (origin/next @ 143ba0f5, 2026-08-30)
- `docker-compose.yml`: dev infrastructure only — postgres (pgvector),
valkey, otel-collector, jaeger. No application services.
- `docker-compose.federated.yml`: standalone overlay for the FEDERATED
storage tier (own postgres/valkey; port-conflicts the base stack by
design). Not an app deployment.
- `docker/gateway.Dockerfile`, `docker/appservice.Dockerfile`:
multi-stage production builds (node:22-alpine) EXIST; the gateway image
includes the web SPA bundle (#1444).
- CI (`publish.yml`) builds and publishes these images (next-channel
prereleases + main stable), and runs `verify:release` fail-closed.
- Gap: no stack-level composition wires gateway+appservice+data plane
into one deployable unit; no blessed install/upgrade path; no
in-container agent-runtime story for the dogfood loop.
## Target (PRD D15 amendment)
Tiered deployment, additive to the existing architecture:
1. **Standalone tier (v1 bar)**: `docker compose up` on one host brings
postgres, valkey, openbao, gateway, appservice (and the webUI the
gateway serves) to healthy; migrations apply; the webUI hosts agent
chat; an in-stack agent can read this repo and open a PR; CI
validates; the deployment adopts merged images (pull + restart).
2. **Enterprise tier (post-v1)**: Kubernetes manifests (or Helm) for the
same service set, phase-gated on the standalone bar holding.
## Phases
### Phase A — blessed standalone compose
- A1 Compose service definitions for gateway + appservice joining the
existing infra compose (profiles: `dev` keeps today's behavior;
`stack` adds the app tier), with health checks and dependency order.
- A2 Migrations on boot (or an explicit migrate step) with idempotency
and version pinning; init-db.sql folded into pg-init.
- A3 Openbao in the compose set (secret plumbing for the app tier).
- A4 `.env.example` + `mosaic.config.json` defaults documented for the
standalone mode; mode recorded per the mode-conversion contract.
- A5 Smoke: `docker compose --profile stack up` green on a scratch host;
webUI served; agent chat reachable; failures catalogued and fixed.
- Acceptance: the five-point NORTH-STAR bar measured live.
### Phase B — component completion
- Interface assumption (velma verdict A1, P5-RM-005/006): in-stack
dogfood agents inherit SEAT-GRADE identity — credential-slot
isolation, wrapper-first enforcement, no privileged coordination
identity, evidence by references that resolve outside the container
lifetime.
- Decompose JIT from A5's catalogue. Known candidates: agent runtime
bits (brain/tool access paths in-container), repo credentials for the
dogfood agent, watch/comms surfaces inside the deployment.
### Phase C — CI/CD parity
- Publish pipeline is the only image source (already true); add the
deployment-side pull/upgrade path (compose pull + migrate + restart =
next iteration); document the promotion flow next -> registry ->
deployment.
### Phase D — coordinator integration (GATED)
- Gate (velma verdict C2): blocked until the checkpoint-and-lease child
of the guides-proposed control-plane refactor — core + WU-P1-CHECKPOINT
(schema, freshness, incarnation, clean-replacement resume; D57-D60
lineage) — carries an independent target-bound PASS. Wiring restarts
against the core alone re-creates the stale-incarnation failure class
D57-D60 closed. Transitive: inherits the T108 gates (P0 exit + Jason
P1 authorization).
- Scope (velma verdict C1): lifecycle actions (start/stop/restart/
health/recovery) executed by the SHIPPED coord client over the one
typed coordination contract (request id, actor identity, epoch,
revision, lease, correlation; typed stale rejection; worker role
boundary). No second coordination interface gets designed here —
containerization consumes the coordination contract, never defines it.
### Phase E — enterprise tier
- k8s manifests/Helm for the same set; phase-gated on Phase A holding.
### Absorbed M4 remainder
- M4-3 pivot: KBN-101 foundation first (per ruling R6), then expand DDL.
- M4-5: lands inside Phase B/C where natural.
- M4-6 (composes M4-1+M4-4): last, as designed.
## Non-goals (v1)
- No Kubernetes in v1; no multi-host federation; no replacement of the
fleet's brain-based seats (the stack is an additional operator
surface); no on-host image builds for deployment (registry only).
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
CREATE TYPE "public"."agent_outbox_status" AS ENUM('pending', 'processing', 'delivered');--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_audit_events" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"seq" bigint GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY (sequence name "agent_audit_events_seq_seq" INCREMENT BY 1 MINVALUE 1 MAXVALUE 9223372036854775807 START WITH 1 CACHE 1),
"event_type" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"causation_id" uuid,
"payload" jsonb NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_type_check" CHECK (event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_idempotency_fence" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"operation" text NOT NULL,
"idempotency_key" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"authorization_scope" text NOT NULL,
"payload_digest" text NOT NULL,
"replay_mode" text DEFAULT 'actor-bound' NOT NULL,
"outcome_agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check" CHECK (replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_outbox" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"event_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"status" "agent_outbox_status" DEFAULT 'pending' NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"delivered_at" timestamp with time zone
);
--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "harness" text;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "enrolled_at" timestamp with time zone;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_audit_events" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_causation_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("causation_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_outbox" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_outbox_event_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("event_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_audit_events_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("agent_id","seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_correlation_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("correlation_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx" ON "agent_idempotency_fence" USING btree ("operation","idempotency_key");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_outbox_event_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("event_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_outbox_status_created_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("status","created_at");
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@@ -148,6 +148,13 @@
"when": 1787963521142,
"tag": "0020_special_betty_brant",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 21,
"version": "7",
"when": 1788053011351,
"tag": "0021_agent_enrollment",
"breakpoints": true
}
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
/**
* Agent enrollment schema witnesses — M4-4a, the schema-level half of the
* witness list in docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §5.
*
* Witnesses the guarantees migration 0021's tables themselves carry: the
* event-type CHECK, monotonic per-agent append order (`seq`), deletion-safe
* linkage (no foreign key from the events or fence tables into `agents` —
* rows survive a legacy CRUD DELETE of the agent), the causation self-FK,
* the outbox's FK/uniqueness/status shape, the fence's UNIQUE
* (operation, key) and replay-mode CHECK, and the nullable enrollment
* columns on `agents` (legacy rows insert without them). The command-level
* witnesses (never-echo, same-tx atomicity, replay semantics, correlation,
* CLI parity, fail-closed) belong to the M4-4b implementation slice.
*
* Two legs run the same witness body:
* - PGlite (WASM Postgres): always runs.
* - Real PostgreSQL: runs when DATABASE_URL is set — the binding witness;
* CI migrates ci-postgres before `pnpm test`.
*/
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { createDb } from './client.js';
import { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
import { runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
import { agentAuditEvents, agentIdempotencyFence, agentOutbox, agents } from './schema.js';
type AnyDb = {
db: {
insert: (t: unknown) => { values: (v: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };
execute: (q: unknown) => Promise<{ rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]>;
};
close: () => Promise<void>;
};
/** Match a constraint failure anywhere along drizzle's cause chain. */
async function expectViolation(p: Promise<unknown>, re: RegExp, label = ''): Promise<void> {
let err: unknown;
try {
await p;
} catch (e) {
err = e;
}
expect(err, label || 'expected the statement to be refused').toBeDefined();
const messages: string[] = [];
let cur: unknown = err;
while (cur instanceof Error) {
messages.push(cur.message);
cur = (cur as { cause?: unknown }).cause;
}
expect(messages.join(' | '), label).toMatch(re);
}
function rows(res: { rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]): Record<string, unknown>[] {
return (Array.isArray(res) ? res : (res.rows ?? [])) as Record<string, unknown>[];
}
/** Unique per-run prefix so real-PG runs never collide and clean up safely. */
const T = `agent-e-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
type EventInsert = typeof agentAuditEvents.$inferInsert;
function eventRow(overrides: Partial<EventInsert> = {}): EventInsert {
return {
eventType: 'agent.enrolled',
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
agentId: randomUUID(),
correlationId: `${T}-corr-${randomUUID()}`,
payload: {
harness: 'claude-code',
provider: 'anthropic',
name: 'x',
credentialMode: 'reference',
},
...overrides,
};
}
type FenceInsert = typeof agentIdempotencyFence.$inferInsert;
function fenceRow(overrides: Partial<FenceInsert> = {}): FenceInsert {
return {
operation: 'agent.enroll',
idempotencyKey: `${T}-${randomUUID()}`,
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
authorizationScope: 'platform-user',
payloadDigest: `${T}-digest`,
outcomeAgentId: randomUUID(),
...overrides,
};
}
function witnessSuite(getHandle: () => AnyDb): void {
const db = () => getHandle().db as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createDb>['db'];
afterAll(async () => {
const d = db();
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_outbox WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
// Caused events first: the causation self-FK is RESTRICT.
await d.execute(
sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'} AND causation_id IS NOT NULL`,
);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE actor_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE name LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
});
// ── agents: nullable enrollment columns (no backfill semantics) ────────────
it('legacy agent rows insert without enrollment columns; enrolled rows carry both', async () => {
const legacyId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: legacyId,
name: `${T}-legacy`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const legacy = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${legacyId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(legacy['harness']).toBeNull();
expect(legacy['enrolled_at']).toBeNull();
const enrolledId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: enrolledId,
name: `${T}-enrolled`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
harness: 'claude-code',
enrolledAt: new Date(),
});
const enrolled = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${enrolledId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(enrolled['harness']).toBe('claude-code');
expect(enrolled['enrolled_at']).not.toBeNull();
});
// ── agent_audit_events: CHECK, ordering, deletion-safe linkage ─────────────
it('accepts both declared event types and refuses an undeclared one', async () => {
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrolled' }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed' }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.deleted' })),
/type_check|violates check/i,
'undeclared event type must be refused',
);
});
it('assigns strictly increasing seq in insert order for one agent', async () => {
const agentId = randomUUID();
const c1 = `${T}-seq-1-${randomUUID()}`;
const c2 = `${T}-seq-2-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: c1 }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed', correlationId: c2 }));
const res = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT correlation_id, seq FROM agent_audit_events WHERE agent_id = ${agentId} ORDER BY seq ASC`,
),
);
expect(res.map((r) => r['correlation_id'])).toEqual([c1, c2]);
expect(Number(res[1]!['seq'])).toBeGreaterThan(Number(res[0]!['seq']));
});
it('has no foreign key into agents, and events survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_audit_events'
`),
);
// The causation self-FK is the ONLY foreign key on the events table.
expect([...new Set(fks.map((r) => r['referenced_table']))]).toEqual(['agent_audit_events']);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({ id: agentId, name: `${T}-doomed`, provider: 'anthropic', model: 'claude-fable-5' });
const corr = `${T}-survive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: corr }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT agent_id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
it('enforces the causation self-FK and RESTRICTs deleting a cause', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ causationId: randomUUID() })),
/foreign key/i,
'causation must reference an existing event',
);
const causeCorr = `${T}-cause-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: causeCorr }));
const cause = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${causeCorr}`,
),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(
eventRow({
eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed',
causationId: cause['id'] as string,
}),
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${cause['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
'a cause with dependent events must not be deletable',
);
});
// ── agent_outbox shape ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('outbox rows require an existing event, one outbox row per event, closed status enum', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: randomUUID(), correlationId: `${T}-corr` }),
/foreign key/i,
'outbox must reference an existing event',
);
const corr = `${T}-ob-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
const eventId = event['id'] as string;
await db().insert(agentOutbox).values({ eventId, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId, correlationId: `${T}-ob2` }),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'one outbox record per event',
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO agent_outbox (event_id, correlation_id, status)
VALUES (${eventId}, ${`${T}-ob3`}, 'failed')`,
),
/invalid input value for enum|22P02/i,
'status outside pending/processing/delivered must be refused',
);
});
it('outbox FK RESTRICTs event deletion while the outbox row exists', async () => {
const corr = `${T}-obr-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: event['id'] as string, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${event['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
);
});
// ── agent_idempotency_fence: (operation, key) uniqueness, mode CHECK ───────
it('refuses a duplicate (operation, key) pair but allows the same key under another operation', async () => {
const key = `${T}-fence-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key })),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'fence uniqueness is (operation, key)',
);
// Same key, different operation identifier: a distinct fence.
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, operation: 'agent.other' }));
});
it('defaults replay mode to actor-bound and refuses an undeclared mode', async () => {
const key = `${T}-mode-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
const row = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT replay_mode FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
)[0]!;
expect(row['replay_mode']).toBe('actor-bound');
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ replayMode: 'unbound' as 'actor-bound' })),
/replay_mode_check|violates check/i,
'a mode outside actor-bound/shared must be refused',
);
});
it('fence has no foreign key at all, and rows survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_idempotency_fence'
`),
);
expect(fks).toHaveLength(0);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: agentId,
name: `${T}-fdoomed`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const key = `${T}-fsurvive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, outcomeAgentId: agentId }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT outcome_agent_id FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['outcome_agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
}
// ── Leg 1: PGlite (always runs — local witness signal) ───────────────────────
describe('agent enrollment schema witnesses — PGlite', () => {
let dir: string;
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createPgliteDb>;
beforeAll(async () => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'agent-enroll-witness-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
// ── Leg 2: real PostgreSQL (binding witness, ci-postgres in CI) ──────────────
const hasPostgres = Boolean(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
describe.skipIf(!hasPostgres)('agent enrollment schema witnesses — real PostgreSQL', () => {
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
beforeAll(() => {
handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']!);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
+111
View File
@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ export const agents = pgTable(
skills: jsonb('skills').$type<string[]>(),
isSystem: boolean('is_system').notNull().default(false),
config: jsonb('config'),
// Enrollment (M4-4, docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4).
// NULL on both marks a legacy (non-enrolled) row; no backfill — enrollment
// is a fact the rank-4 command creates, not one to invent for existing rows.
harness: text('harness'),
enrolledAt: timestamp('enrolled_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
@@ -1279,3 +1284,109 @@ export const hierarchyOutbox = pgTable(
index('hierarchy_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Agent enrollment (M4-4) — rank-4 command family audit/outbox/fence stores.
// Design: docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4.
// Pattern reuse from the hierarchy audit/outbox pair, separate store. Audit
// rows reference the agent by snapshot id, deliberately with NO FK, so audit
// history survives agent deletion through the legacy CRUD DELETE path.
// Idempotency for this family lives in agent_idempotency_fence (contract 3
// §4.3 envelope, ratified into contract 5 §4 via contract 3 §7 item 4) — the
// audit and outbox tables carry no idempotency key of their own.
export const AGENT_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPES = [
// Semantic mutation event of agent.enroll.
'agent.enrolled',
// Non-mutation access class: a passing idempotent replay appends this and
// nothing else (accessing principal, current correlation id, fence-row
// reference in the payload).
'agent.enrollment.replayed',
] as const;
export const agentAuditEvents = pgTable(
'agent_audit_events',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// Global append order; per-agent ordering is a filter on agent_id ordered
// by seq.
seq: bigint('seq', { mode: 'number' }).notNull().generatedAlwaysAsIdentity(),
eventType: text('event_type').notNull(),
// No FK: audit events outlive every principal and every target.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
agentId: uuid('agent_id').notNull(),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
causationId: uuid('causation_id').references((): AnyPgColumn => agentAuditEvents.id, {
onDelete: 'restrict',
}),
// Immutable snapshot at event time; never carries credential material
// (§3.1 rule 1: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name, credentialMode).
payload: jsonb('payload').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_audit_events_seq_idx').on(t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx').on(t.agentId, t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_correlation_idx').on(t.correlationId),
check(
'agent_audit_events_type_check',
sql`event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed')`,
),
],
);
export const agentOutboxStatusEnum = pgEnum('agent_outbox_status', [
'pending',
'processing',
'delivered',
]);
export const agentOutbox = pgTable(
'agent_outbox',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// FK into the append-only events table: never dangles, RESTRICT is safe.
eventId: uuid('event_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => agentAuditEvents.id, { onDelete: 'restrict' }),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
status: agentOutboxStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('pending'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
deliveredAt: timestamp('delivered_at', { withTimezone: true }),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_outbox_event_idx').on(t.eventId),
index('agent_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// Contract 3 §4.3 fence shape. Uniqueness is (operation, key); the recorded
// replay mode is always 'actor-bound' for this family (`shared` is seed-only
// and refused at validation — design §3.1), but the column keeps the ratified
// envelope shape and serves the mode-mismatch collision check. The payload
// digest input EXCLUDES the credential value (design §3.1 rule 5).
export const agentIdempotencyFence = pgTable(
'agent_idempotency_fence',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
operation: text('operation').notNull(),
idempotencyKey: text('idempotency_key').notNull(),
// No FK: fence rows outlive principals, mirroring the audit tables.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
authorizationScope: text('authorization_scope').notNull(),
payloadDigest: text('payload_digest').notNull(),
replayMode: text('replay_mode').notNull().default('actor-bound'),
// Committed-outcome reference (the enrolled agent's id). Snapshot value,
// no FK: the fence must keep answering replays after a legacy DELETE.
outcomeAgentId: uuid('outcome_agent_id').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx').on(t.operation, t.idempotencyKey),
check(
'agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check',
sql`replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared')`,
),
],
);