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fred d18ce04959 design rev 3: GLM round-2 findings
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
shared replay mode refused (seed-only rule, contract 3 SS4.3/SS7 item 4);
concurrency loser semantics and scope-mismatch collision added to rule 5
and witness 5; query-side correlation envelope specified; no-oracle
indistinguishability probe added to witness 9; fence authorization
scope pinned; SHARED-CONTRACT SS5.3 citation fixed, fleet-side ASKS
reference removed.
2026-08-29 20:00:54 -05:00
fred 7bc69286d1 design rev 2: GLM review findings 1-8
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Contract 5 §4 composed in full (fail-closed §4.4, CLI parity §4.5,
correlation id returned in result); idempotency re-attributed to
contract 3 §4.3 (via §7 item 4) and designed to the full fence/replay
envelope; harness error-code split fixed; full write-consumer set;
intake credential write joins the transaction; audit linkage pinned
FK-free; custody-schema cited at rev 13; witnesses 9-11 added
(correlation, CLI parity, fail-closed) plus the full §4.3 replay set.
2026-08-29 19:49:49 -05:00
fred 4753e285eb docs: agent enrollment command family v1 design (M4-4-0)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Design note for the rank-4 enrollment command family: contract
composition (contract 5 rank-4 row + envelope, contract 3 §3.5,
custody-schema rev 4 FK binding), assignment-scope pin per D11,
measured current state, command surface with closed error enum,
additive schema delta plan (0021), and the witness list the
implementation slice must ship. Amends no contract.
2026-08-29 19:37:16 -05:00
7 changed files with 17 additions and 6479 deletions
+17 -34
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@@ -197,41 +197,24 @@ conflict must amend one of them explicitly, never fork a third document
- A second writable task store beside PostgreSQL (native-kanban-sot invariants).
- Fully-designed federation in v1 (D3 — roadmap placeholder only).
### D15 — Tiered containerized deployment (2026-08-30, containerization lane)
### 12. Decision registry
The stack ships a tiered deployment target, additive to the architecture
gate (D8): (1) Standalone tier — docker compose is the canonical
single-host deployment: postgres, valkey, openbao, gateway, appservice
and the served webUI in one composition, with migrations, health checks,
and a documented install/upgrade path; the registry (CI-published
images) is the only deployment source. (2) Enterprise tier — Kubernetes
manifests for the same service set, phase-gated on the standalone tier
holding its acceptance bar. The v1 acceptance bar for the standalone
tier: compose-up healthy; webUI hosts agent chat; an in-stack agent can
open a PR to this repo; CI validates it; the running deployment adopts
the merged change (pull + restart). Federation (D3 clause) remains
deferred and unforeclosed. Implementation plan:
docs/plans/2026-08-30_containerization.md.
## 12. Decision registry
| ID | Decision (short form) |
| --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| D1 | Open-source, AI-first, self-hosted platform for agentic management + life OS |
| D2 | Hierarchy company→estate→project→workspace→kanban; bubble-up; granular RBAC |
| D3 | Standalone vs Enterprise; one-way conversion; per-user brains + Vault required in Enterprise; federation deferred |
| D4 | Re-runnable, extensible, per-mode onboarding wizards |
| D5 | North star = this rewrite of docs/PRD.md; stack docs/ = product SSOT |
| D6 | Only product-relevant material migrates from brains; operational records stay and link |
| D7 | Spec-inventory sweep launched immediately (executed; INPUTS baseline frozen by operator ruling T2, 2026-08-25) |
| D8 | webUI sits over official framework tooling; CLI primary |
| D9 | Not a hosted business; company = organizational separation for one operator |
| D10 | better-auth is the account system of record; external IdPs via OIDC |
| D11 | Small v1 slice; ALL phases on the documented roadmap from day one |
| D12 | HARD RULE: webUI never bypasses tooling; missing tool ⇒ build the tool first |
| D13 | workspace_id stays the hard isolation unit; hierarchy is parent structure above; kanban SOT amended, not rewritten |
| D14 | Sensitive profile data in the user's own brain only; postgres holds structure/consent/pointers |
| D15 | Tiered containerized deployment: compose standalone tier (five-point v1 bar) + phase-gated k8s enterprise tier; registry-only image source | 2026-08-30 containerization lane; plan docs/plans/2026-08-30_containerization.md |
| ID | Decision (short form) |
| --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| D1 | Open-source, AI-first, self-hosted platform for agentic management + life OS |
| D2 | Hierarchy company→estate→project→workspace→kanban; bubble-up; granular RBAC |
| D3 | Standalone vs Enterprise; one-way conversion; per-user brains + Vault required in Enterprise; federation deferred |
| D4 | Re-runnable, extensible, per-mode onboarding wizards |
| D5 | North star = this rewrite of docs/PRD.md; stack docs/ = product SSOT |
| D6 | Only product-relevant material migrates from brains; operational records stay and link |
| D7 | Spec-inventory sweep launched immediately (executed; INPUTS baseline frozen by operator ruling T2, 2026-08-25) |
| D8 | webUI sits over official framework tooling; CLI primary |
| D9 | Not a hosted business; company = organizational separation for one operator |
| D10 | better-auth is the account system of record; external IdPs via OIDC |
| D11 | Small v1 slice; ALL phases on the documented roadmap from day one |
| D12 | HARD RULE: webUI never bypasses tooling; missing tool ⇒ build the tool first |
| D13 | workspace_id stays the hard isolation unit; hierarchy is parent structure above; kanban SOT amended, not rewritten |
| D14 | Sensitive profile data in the user's own brain only; postgres holds structure/consent/pointers |
The full decision texts are recorded in the operator decision log (USC estate
brain, webui-audit lane, `GRILL.md`).
-99
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@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# Plan — Stack Containerization (tiered deployment)
Status: DRAFT for review. Charter: fleet/lanes/stack-containerization
(brain) NORTH-STAR.md; PRD amendment in the same PR adds D15.
Supersedes nothing; sequences the absorbed M4 remainder per its lane.
## Measured baseline (origin/next @ 143ba0f5, 2026-08-30)
- `docker-compose.yml`: dev infrastructure only — postgres (pgvector),
valkey, otel-collector, jaeger. No application services.
- `docker-compose.federated.yml`: standalone overlay for the FEDERATED
storage tier (own postgres/valkey; port-conflicts the base stack by
design). Not an app deployment.
- `docker/gateway.Dockerfile`, `docker/appservice.Dockerfile`:
multi-stage production builds (node:22-alpine) EXIST; the gateway image
includes the web SPA bundle (#1444).
- CI (`publish.yml`) builds and publishes these images (next-channel
prereleases + main stable), and runs `verify:release` fail-closed.
- Gap: no stack-level composition wires gateway+appservice+data plane
into one deployable unit; no blessed install/upgrade path; no
in-container agent-runtime story for the dogfood loop.
## Target (PRD D15 amendment)
Tiered deployment, additive to the existing architecture:
1. **Standalone tier (v1 bar)**: `docker compose up` on one host brings
postgres, valkey, openbao, gateway, appservice (and the webUI the
gateway serves) to healthy; migrations apply; the webUI hosts agent
chat; an in-stack agent can read this repo and open a PR; CI
validates; the deployment adopts merged images (pull + restart).
2. **Enterprise tier (post-v1)**: Kubernetes manifests (or Helm) for the
same service set, phase-gated on the standalone bar holding.
## Phases
### Phase A — blessed standalone compose
- A1 Compose service definitions for gateway + appservice joining the
existing infra compose (profiles: `dev` keeps today's behavior;
`stack` adds the app tier), with health checks and dependency order.
- A2 Migrations on boot (or an explicit migrate step) with idempotency
and version pinning; init-db.sql folded into pg-init.
- A3 Openbao in the compose set (secret plumbing for the app tier).
- A4 `.env.example` + `mosaic.config.json` defaults documented for the
standalone mode; mode recorded per the mode-conversion contract.
- A5 Smoke: `docker compose --profile stack up` green on a scratch host;
webUI served; agent chat reachable; failures catalogued and fixed.
- Acceptance: the five-point NORTH-STAR bar measured live.
### Phase B — component completion
- Interface assumption (velma verdict A1, P5-RM-005/006): in-stack
dogfood agents inherit SEAT-GRADE identity — credential-slot
isolation, wrapper-first enforcement, no privileged coordination
identity, evidence by references that resolve outside the container
lifetime.
- Decompose JIT from A5's catalogue. Known candidates: agent runtime
bits (brain/tool access paths in-container), repo credentials for the
dogfood agent, watch/comms surfaces inside the deployment.
### Phase C — CI/CD parity
- Publish pipeline is the only image source (already true); add the
deployment-side pull/upgrade path (compose pull + migrate + restart =
next iteration); document the promotion flow next -> registry ->
deployment.
### Phase D — coordinator integration (GATED)
- Gate (velma verdict C2): blocked until the checkpoint-and-lease child
of the guides-proposed control-plane refactor — core + WU-P1-CHECKPOINT
(schema, freshness, incarnation, clean-replacement resume; D57-D60
lineage) — carries an independent target-bound PASS. Wiring restarts
against the core alone re-creates the stale-incarnation failure class
D57-D60 closed. Transitive: inherits the T108 gates (P0 exit + Jason
P1 authorization).
- Scope (velma verdict C1): lifecycle actions (start/stop/restart/
health/recovery) executed by the SHIPPED coord client over the one
typed coordination contract (request id, actor identity, epoch,
revision, lease, correlation; typed stale rejection; worker role
boundary). No second coordination interface gets designed here —
containerization consumes the coordination contract, never defines it.
### Phase E — enterprise tier
- k8s manifests/Helm for the same set; phase-gated on Phase A holding.
### Absorbed M4 remainder
- M4-3 pivot: KBN-101 foundation first (per ruling R6), then expand DDL.
- M4-5: lands inside Phase B/C where natural.
- M4-6 (composes M4-1+M4-4): last, as designed.
## Non-goals (v1)
- No Kubernetes in v1; no multi-host federation; no replacement of the
fleet's brain-based seats (the stack is an additional operator
surface); no on-host image builds for deployment (registry only).
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
CREATE TYPE "public"."agent_outbox_status" AS ENUM('pending', 'processing', 'delivered');--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_audit_events" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"seq" bigint GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY (sequence name "agent_audit_events_seq_seq" INCREMENT BY 1 MINVALUE 1 MAXVALUE 9223372036854775807 START WITH 1 CACHE 1),
"event_type" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"causation_id" uuid,
"payload" jsonb NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_type_check" CHECK (event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_idempotency_fence" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"operation" text NOT NULL,
"idempotency_key" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"authorization_scope" text NOT NULL,
"payload_digest" text NOT NULL,
"replay_mode" text DEFAULT 'actor-bound' NOT NULL,
"outcome_agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check" CHECK (replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_outbox" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"event_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"status" "agent_outbox_status" DEFAULT 'pending' NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"delivered_at" timestamp with time zone
);
--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "harness" text;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "enrolled_at" timestamp with time zone;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_audit_events" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_causation_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("causation_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_outbox" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_outbox_event_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("event_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_audit_events_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("agent_id","seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_correlation_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("correlation_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx" ON "agent_idempotency_fence" USING btree ("operation","idempotency_key");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_outbox_event_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("event_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_outbox_status_created_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("status","created_at");
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@@ -148,13 +148,6 @@
"when": 1787963521142,
"tag": "0020_special_betty_brant",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 21,
"version": "7",
"when": 1788053011351,
"tag": "0021_agent_enrollment",
"breakpoints": true
}
]
}
@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
/**
* Agent enrollment schema witnesses — M4-4a, the schema-level half of the
* witness list in docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §5.
*
* Witnesses the guarantees migration 0021's tables themselves carry: the
* event-type CHECK, monotonic per-agent append order (`seq`), deletion-safe
* linkage (no foreign key from the events or fence tables into `agents` —
* rows survive a legacy CRUD DELETE of the agent), the causation self-FK,
* the outbox's FK/uniqueness/status shape, the fence's UNIQUE
* (operation, key) and replay-mode CHECK, and the nullable enrollment
* columns on `agents` (legacy rows insert without them). The command-level
* witnesses (never-echo, same-tx atomicity, replay semantics, correlation,
* CLI parity, fail-closed) belong to the M4-4b implementation slice.
*
* Two legs run the same witness body:
* - PGlite (WASM Postgres): always runs.
* - Real PostgreSQL: runs when DATABASE_URL is set — the binding witness;
* CI migrates ci-postgres before `pnpm test`.
*/
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { createDb } from './client.js';
import { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
import { runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
import { agentAuditEvents, agentIdempotencyFence, agentOutbox, agents } from './schema.js';
type AnyDb = {
db: {
insert: (t: unknown) => { values: (v: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };
execute: (q: unknown) => Promise<{ rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]>;
};
close: () => Promise<void>;
};
/** Match a constraint failure anywhere along drizzle's cause chain. */
async function expectViolation(p: Promise<unknown>, re: RegExp, label = ''): Promise<void> {
let err: unknown;
try {
await p;
} catch (e) {
err = e;
}
expect(err, label || 'expected the statement to be refused').toBeDefined();
const messages: string[] = [];
let cur: unknown = err;
while (cur instanceof Error) {
messages.push(cur.message);
cur = (cur as { cause?: unknown }).cause;
}
expect(messages.join(' | '), label).toMatch(re);
}
function rows(res: { rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]): Record<string, unknown>[] {
return (Array.isArray(res) ? res : (res.rows ?? [])) as Record<string, unknown>[];
}
/** Unique per-run prefix so real-PG runs never collide and clean up safely. */
const T = `agent-e-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
type EventInsert = typeof agentAuditEvents.$inferInsert;
function eventRow(overrides: Partial<EventInsert> = {}): EventInsert {
return {
eventType: 'agent.enrolled',
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
agentId: randomUUID(),
correlationId: `${T}-corr-${randomUUID()}`,
payload: {
harness: 'claude-code',
provider: 'anthropic',
name: 'x',
credentialMode: 'reference',
},
...overrides,
};
}
type FenceInsert = typeof agentIdempotencyFence.$inferInsert;
function fenceRow(overrides: Partial<FenceInsert> = {}): FenceInsert {
return {
operation: 'agent.enroll',
idempotencyKey: `${T}-${randomUUID()}`,
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
authorizationScope: 'platform-user',
payloadDigest: `${T}-digest`,
outcomeAgentId: randomUUID(),
...overrides,
};
}
function witnessSuite(getHandle: () => AnyDb): void {
const db = () => getHandle().db as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createDb>['db'];
afterAll(async () => {
const d = db();
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_outbox WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
// Caused events first: the causation self-FK is RESTRICT.
await d.execute(
sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'} AND causation_id IS NOT NULL`,
);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE actor_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE name LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
});
// ── agents: nullable enrollment columns (no backfill semantics) ────────────
it('legacy agent rows insert without enrollment columns; enrolled rows carry both', async () => {
const legacyId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: legacyId,
name: `${T}-legacy`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const legacy = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${legacyId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(legacy['harness']).toBeNull();
expect(legacy['enrolled_at']).toBeNull();
const enrolledId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: enrolledId,
name: `${T}-enrolled`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
harness: 'claude-code',
enrolledAt: new Date(),
});
const enrolled = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${enrolledId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(enrolled['harness']).toBe('claude-code');
expect(enrolled['enrolled_at']).not.toBeNull();
});
// ── agent_audit_events: CHECK, ordering, deletion-safe linkage ─────────────
it('accepts both declared event types and refuses an undeclared one', async () => {
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrolled' }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed' }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.deleted' })),
/type_check|violates check/i,
'undeclared event type must be refused',
);
});
it('assigns strictly increasing seq in insert order for one agent', async () => {
const agentId = randomUUID();
const c1 = `${T}-seq-1-${randomUUID()}`;
const c2 = `${T}-seq-2-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: c1 }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed', correlationId: c2 }));
const res = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT correlation_id, seq FROM agent_audit_events WHERE agent_id = ${agentId} ORDER BY seq ASC`,
),
);
expect(res.map((r) => r['correlation_id'])).toEqual([c1, c2]);
expect(Number(res[1]!['seq'])).toBeGreaterThan(Number(res[0]!['seq']));
});
it('has no foreign key into agents, and events survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_audit_events'
`),
);
// The causation self-FK is the ONLY foreign key on the events table.
expect([...new Set(fks.map((r) => r['referenced_table']))]).toEqual(['agent_audit_events']);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({ id: agentId, name: `${T}-doomed`, provider: 'anthropic', model: 'claude-fable-5' });
const corr = `${T}-survive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: corr }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT agent_id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
it('enforces the causation self-FK and RESTRICTs deleting a cause', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ causationId: randomUUID() })),
/foreign key/i,
'causation must reference an existing event',
);
const causeCorr = `${T}-cause-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: causeCorr }));
const cause = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${causeCorr}`,
),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(
eventRow({
eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed',
causationId: cause['id'] as string,
}),
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${cause['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
'a cause with dependent events must not be deletable',
);
});
// ── agent_outbox shape ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('outbox rows require an existing event, one outbox row per event, closed status enum', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: randomUUID(), correlationId: `${T}-corr` }),
/foreign key/i,
'outbox must reference an existing event',
);
const corr = `${T}-ob-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
const eventId = event['id'] as string;
await db().insert(agentOutbox).values({ eventId, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId, correlationId: `${T}-ob2` }),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'one outbox record per event',
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO agent_outbox (event_id, correlation_id, status)
VALUES (${eventId}, ${`${T}-ob3`}, 'failed')`,
),
/invalid input value for enum|22P02/i,
'status outside pending/processing/delivered must be refused',
);
});
it('outbox FK RESTRICTs event deletion while the outbox row exists', async () => {
const corr = `${T}-obr-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: event['id'] as string, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${event['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
);
});
// ── agent_idempotency_fence: (operation, key) uniqueness, mode CHECK ───────
it('refuses a duplicate (operation, key) pair but allows the same key under another operation', async () => {
const key = `${T}-fence-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key })),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'fence uniqueness is (operation, key)',
);
// Same key, different operation identifier: a distinct fence.
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, operation: 'agent.other' }));
});
it('defaults replay mode to actor-bound and refuses an undeclared mode', async () => {
const key = `${T}-mode-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
const row = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT replay_mode FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
)[0]!;
expect(row['replay_mode']).toBe('actor-bound');
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ replayMode: 'unbound' as 'actor-bound' })),
/replay_mode_check|violates check/i,
'a mode outside actor-bound/shared must be refused',
);
});
it('fence has no foreign key at all, and rows survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_idempotency_fence'
`),
);
expect(fks).toHaveLength(0);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: agentId,
name: `${T}-fdoomed`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const key = `${T}-fsurvive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, outcomeAgentId: agentId }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT outcome_agent_id FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['outcome_agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
}
// ── Leg 1: PGlite (always runs — local witness signal) ───────────────────────
describe('agent enrollment schema witnesses — PGlite', () => {
let dir: string;
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createPgliteDb>;
beforeAll(async () => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'agent-enroll-witness-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
// ── Leg 2: real PostgreSQL (binding witness, ci-postgres in CI) ──────────────
const hasPostgres = Boolean(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
describe.skipIf(!hasPostgres)('agent enrollment schema witnesses — real PostgreSQL', () => {
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
beforeAll(() => {
handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']!);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
-111
View File
@@ -302,11 +302,6 @@ export const agents = pgTable(
skills: jsonb('skills').$type<string[]>(),
isSystem: boolean('is_system').notNull().default(false),
config: jsonb('config'),
// Enrollment (M4-4, docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4).
// NULL on both marks a legacy (non-enrolled) row; no backfill — enrollment
// is a fact the rank-4 command creates, not one to invent for existing rows.
harness: text('harness'),
enrolledAt: timestamp('enrolled_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
@@ -1284,109 +1279,3 @@ export const hierarchyOutbox = pgTable(
index('hierarchy_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Agent enrollment (M4-4) — rank-4 command family audit/outbox/fence stores.
// Design: docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4.
// Pattern reuse from the hierarchy audit/outbox pair, separate store. Audit
// rows reference the agent by snapshot id, deliberately with NO FK, so audit
// history survives agent deletion through the legacy CRUD DELETE path.
// Idempotency for this family lives in agent_idempotency_fence (contract 3
// §4.3 envelope, ratified into contract 5 §4 via contract 3 §7 item 4) — the
// audit and outbox tables carry no idempotency key of their own.
export const AGENT_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPES = [
// Semantic mutation event of agent.enroll.
'agent.enrolled',
// Non-mutation access class: a passing idempotent replay appends this and
// nothing else (accessing principal, current correlation id, fence-row
// reference in the payload).
'agent.enrollment.replayed',
] as const;
export const agentAuditEvents = pgTable(
'agent_audit_events',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// Global append order; per-agent ordering is a filter on agent_id ordered
// by seq.
seq: bigint('seq', { mode: 'number' }).notNull().generatedAlwaysAsIdentity(),
eventType: text('event_type').notNull(),
// No FK: audit events outlive every principal and every target.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
agentId: uuid('agent_id').notNull(),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
causationId: uuid('causation_id').references((): AnyPgColumn => agentAuditEvents.id, {
onDelete: 'restrict',
}),
// Immutable snapshot at event time; never carries credential material
// (§3.1 rule 1: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name, credentialMode).
payload: jsonb('payload').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_audit_events_seq_idx').on(t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx').on(t.agentId, t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_correlation_idx').on(t.correlationId),
check(
'agent_audit_events_type_check',
sql`event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed')`,
),
],
);
export const agentOutboxStatusEnum = pgEnum('agent_outbox_status', [
'pending',
'processing',
'delivered',
]);
export const agentOutbox = pgTable(
'agent_outbox',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// FK into the append-only events table: never dangles, RESTRICT is safe.
eventId: uuid('event_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => agentAuditEvents.id, { onDelete: 'restrict' }),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
status: agentOutboxStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('pending'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
deliveredAt: timestamp('delivered_at', { withTimezone: true }),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_outbox_event_idx').on(t.eventId),
index('agent_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// Contract 3 §4.3 fence shape. Uniqueness is (operation, key); the recorded
// replay mode is always 'actor-bound' for this family (`shared` is seed-only
// and refused at validation — design §3.1), but the column keeps the ratified
// envelope shape and serves the mode-mismatch collision check. The payload
// digest input EXCLUDES the credential value (design §3.1 rule 5).
export const agentIdempotencyFence = pgTable(
'agent_idempotency_fence',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
operation: text('operation').notNull(),
idempotencyKey: text('idempotency_key').notNull(),
// No FK: fence rows outlive principals, mirroring the audit tables.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
authorizationScope: text('authorization_scope').notNull(),
payloadDigest: text('payload_digest').notNull(),
replayMode: text('replay_mode').notNull().default('actor-bound'),
// Committed-outcome reference (the enrolled agent's id). Snapshot value,
// no FK: the fence must keep answering replays after a legacy DELETE.
outcomeAgentId: uuid('outcome_agent_id').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx').on(t.operation, t.idempotencyKey),
check(
'agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check',
sql`replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared')`,
),
],
);