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@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
|
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| Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
|
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| Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
|
||||
| Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
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| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
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| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
|
||||
| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
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||||
| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
|
||||
| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
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| Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
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|
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Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's
|
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|
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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
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# Duckworth
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Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
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No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
|
||||
credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
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through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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@@ -1,655 +0,0 @@
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# T3 federation design: factory and hub (Vikunja #414, G3, G4, C1.1)
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Author Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5), 2026-10-20, r4.11. Design only, no product code. Reviewer Duckworth (Opus 5.5,
|
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mos-0978), r1 verdict changes B1-B5 (duckworth-0001, REVIEW.md at b402197ff), r2 verdict changes B6 (duckworth-0002,
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REVIEW-r2.md at 03a663cd7), r3 verdict changes B7 (duckworth-0003, REVIEW-r3.md at 45cbe5896), r4 verdict changes B8 (duckworth-0005, REVIEW-r4.md at
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4966136d4), r4.1 verdict changes, B8's issuer host (duckworth-0007, REVIEW-r4.1.md at b14f11136), r4.4 verdict changes B9 (duckworth-0010, REVIEW-r4.4.md at 4cf3ce232), r4.5 approved (duckworth-0012, REVIEW-r4.5.md at 912b1d325). R1, R2 and R5 go to Sage's
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queue once Duckworth approves, and Sage assigns owners. Code lines are at origin/refactor 9ae8c73ac. The
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Q175 SSO design is cited at Sage's local commit 817e8f51b (agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md), which was
|
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not on origin when this was written.
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|
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Binding inputs: TARGET.md addendum 2026-10-20, DECISIONS Q175 to Q178, projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md and
|
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PLAN.md T3 (all in jason-master-restart).
|
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|
||||
## Changes from r1
|
||||
|
||||
- B1. A user principal now comes only from the Console's verified OIDC session. The user CLI takes the
|
||||
human proof's walk, which refuses agent markers and binaries, and its direct parent must be the
|
||||
Console from the bus's own tree. This needs the path-bound human proof (P19 333). Residual risk in 3.6.
|
||||
- B2. 3.6 names the ownership changes: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the `#human` gates and `thread.send`'s
|
||||
sender fields. `message.send` is on no list, and `#threadFor` refuses users as a second wall.
|
||||
- B3. One level for 10-27, `collaborator`, with an exact verb list and a filter per read (3.5). Viewer and
|
||||
every board read wait.
|
||||
- B4. Revocation has three triggers: the next user request, a 30 s broker timer, and a reload verb that
|
||||
R5 calls. The launcher refuses to start a revoked thread, because the broker reports it on every
|
||||
`threadsState`. It also SIGTERMs a running one (3.7). R4 now depends on R3 and R5.
|
||||
- B5. A separate uid per instance is a hard entry gate of R8, with checks (mos-0984 point 2).
|
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- N1 to N9 are handled where they apply: v1 count (2), `configDir` at business.mjs:25-28 (5), R1 takes
|
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providers and peers as arguments (7), "human-only" (3.5), file checks (3.5), `instances` as the real limit
|
||||
(3.5), provider removal needs a Console restart (3.7), Q1 is with Jason (9), client ids in R8 (7).
|
||||
- r3 (duckworth-0002): B6, the reply path to a user (3.6 item 7, runner header, R3 test and mutant, R7
|
||||
asserts a reply). C1, the walk doesn't stop an unsandboxed same-uid agent (3.6). N10, `names` gates
|
||||
through `#agent` (3.6 item 4). mos-0991: R8's gate accepts a separate host or a separate uid, and 3.8
|
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checks the federation path for one-host assumptions. Q1 holds Jason's answer. morgana-0002 settles Q2.
|
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- r4 (duckworth-0003, mos-0996): B7, R8's gate now proves there is no privilege path from the factory to
|
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the hub. Per mos-0996 (Vikunja #418) the hub runs on its own host, and for 10-27 the gate is the host form
|
||||
only. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. The checks run as the factory uid with a clean
|
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environment and pass only when the call fails: `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the
|
||||
hub host with and without the agent socket. Factory root on the PVE nodes defeats the host form
|
||||
(duckworth-0004, mos-1004), so it is an open R8 gate item with options O1 to O3 for Jason (Vikunja
|
||||
#419, section 8). N11, `#waiting` returns null for `to` `user` (3.6 item 7, R3).
|
||||
N12, R3 assumes nothing about how shares end (section 9 Q2). Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the shared
|
||||
principal verifier before R3 (section 5).
|
||||
- r4.11 (mos-1063): the hub's host is settled, so the "own host, not dragon-lin or Melanie's server"
|
||||
lines and the #418 dependency are gone. The hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), and R8
|
||||
depends on the Case 2 install on .54 (#416). #418 is closed. #419 carries only the wording for
|
||||
Melanie. Mos ruled the four functional checks stay blocking.
|
||||
- r4.10 (mos-1055, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183): R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts with Jason's
|
||||
acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check
|
||||
still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with who ran it. They report and don't refuse.
|
||||
Agents may run the .54 checks as localadmin, which replaces r4.9's line. The mos-1042 order is now in
|
||||
the R8 row. The wording still reaches Melanie only through Jason (#419).
|
||||
Two lines that said R8 proves the factory has no login on the hub (sections 3.5 and 3.6) now say
|
||||
factory agents keep ssh to .54 under Q183, recorded as accepted.
|
||||
- r4.9 (mos-1037): R8 names who runs the root checks on 10.1.1.54.
|
||||
- r4.8 (duckworth-0020 N22): R8 checks the hub user's limits on 10.1.1.54 instead of taking #421's plan
|
||||
as done.
|
||||
- r4.7 (mos-1030, DECISIONS Q181): the hosts are settled. Case 1 is W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), the
|
||||
same host as the Hermes agents, so section 8 lists them as one factory host. The hub, Case 2, is
|
||||
W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Its OS user is `mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups
|
||||
and no keys (ops-01's tightening plan section 3, Vikunja #421).
|
||||
- r4.6 (duckworth-0012 N21, morgana-0011): R6's notice is row 193's final user sentence, word for word
|
||||
(row 193 design r5 section 5.7, morgana/row193 e2d161e2e). The start-order line now matches the
|
||||
section 7 table: R2 waits on #412 phase 1, and R5 lands after R1.
|
||||
- r4.5 (duckworth-0010): B9, a user-thread run can't message the owner, but its decisions do reach the
|
||||
owner's inbox, as Sage ruled for row 193 (sage-1368, morgana-0008)
|
||||
and Mos kept (mos-1022). 3.6 item 7 says so, R6 tells
|
||||
the user, and R3 tests both sides. N20, the start-order line waits for row 193's viewer level. R8
|
||||
can't start while any host variable is unresolved.
|
||||
- r4.4 (mos-1020, mos-1019): N17, R4 is chained after row 193's viewer level and keeps the level-loss
|
||||
test, which has to kill its mutant before R4 is done.
|
||||
- r4.3 (duckworth-0007): B8, an issuer that isn't on the hub host must pass the host-access, hypervisor
|
||||
and backups rows against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call
|
||||
check (section 8, sign-in row). N16, the dependency note covers every secret on a PVE guest. N17, R4's
|
||||
level-loss test moves to row 193's viewer level. N18, 3.6 names `verifyPrincipal`. N19, the TLS check
|
||||
runs through the public route and from the LAN.
|
||||
- r4.2 (mos-1013, morgana-0007): "factory" in R8 and section 8 means every principal outside the hub
|
||||
instance, not only the dragon-lin uid: the dragon-lin dev uid, the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents,
|
||||
and Jason's Hermes agents on W-jarvis. Every R8 check runs from each of their hosts. Hosts are variables
|
||||
until Mos confirms them with Jason. The table rows don't change. Q1 is settled by Q180: P2P is
|
||||
person-to-person. Row 193 calls `covers` with no level for share reads and with
|
||||
`level: 'collaborator'` for create, open, send and share, so `covers` needs no other argument
|
||||
(morgana-0007, row 193 DESIGN.md at 19c015741).
|
||||
- r4.1 (mos-1006, gander-0007, morgana-0005): R8's gate adds the identity provider path. A factory
|
||||
credential that can administer the issuer the hub trusts gets in without the host (the B8 bullet below
|
||||
has the rule). Mos accepted the sudo deviation (root ssh
|
||||
and the `authorized_keys` check). Row 196's interface is settled: one verify per one-request
|
||||
connection, `s.user` for that request only, and the walk mutants move to row 196. morgana-0005: grants
|
||||
name bus project ids, and one pure `covers` in R1 matches a grant to a thread (3.5). R4's loss
|
||||
predicate counts only collaborator grants, so a downgrade to viewer ends the run.
|
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- r4.1 (duckworth-0005): B8, the hub's issuer and TLS front end are in its trust base. The hub trusts
|
||||
only an issuer no factory credential can administer, and TLS ends where the factory can't reach
|
||||
(3.4, R8). A brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count. N13, the key check
|
||||
is a procedure. N14, R3 consumes row 196's verifier and depends on it. N15, DNS control. mos-1009:
|
||||
section 8 has a table of every privilege path (hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end,
|
||||
certificate authority, DNS, network), each closed by a check or accepted by Jason with set wording.
|
||||
- r2.1 (mos-0988): the separate uid is row 190b. R8's gate points at 190b, R7 at row 190 (one uid,
|
||||
scratch). P19 333 is on the 10-27 path (section 8).
|
||||
- Mos's rulings in mos-0978 and mos-0984 replace the r1 questions (section 9). The push credential note is
|
||||
in section 10.
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|
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## 1. Summary
|
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|
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By 10-27, federation means a person from one instance can sign in to the other instance's Console and use
|
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exactly what its owner granted: one business, some projects and its thread instance, at the collaborator
|
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level. The receiving instance verifies that person itself through OIDC (Q175) and its broker enforces the
|
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grant on every request. Revoking a grant refuses the next request and stops that user's thread runs within
|
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about 30 s, or at once when the grant CLI makes the change.
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|
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Instance-to-instance traffic, where an agent on the factory talks to a role on the hub, waits until after
|
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10-27 unless Jason rules otherwise (mos-0984 point 3). Section 6 sketches it (Ed25519 instance keys and
|
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signed HTTP requests) so the 10-27 slice doesn't block it.
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## 2. What exists today (measured)
|
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|
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- F1. The bus is a local Unix socket per data root: `socketPath` at packages/cli/src/config.mjs:19, opened
|
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at packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:169. Nothing listens on a network port. No live federation code exists.
|
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The PRD lists REQ-FED-1 as post-v1 (packages/tasks/requirements.json:61).
|
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- F2. A business has exactly one human: `human` at packages/business/src/business.mjs:160.
|
||||
`bindHuman` refuses any other name (packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538).
|
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- F3. The human proof is a cooperative same-uid process check, not a wall. `verifyHuman` compares the
|
||||
caller's uid, start time, nonce and CLI path (packages/bus/src/human.mjs:52-72), then walks the parents
|
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and refuses agent markers, launch records and agent binaries (:73-88). The tester proof refuses only
|
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managed runs and allows agents by design (packages/bus/src/tester.mjs:5-9, :56-60). The server takes
|
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exactly one of `cap`, `human` or `tester` per request (packages/bus/src/server.mjs:52-70).
|
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- F4. Authority for agents is checked in the broker: `#checkAuthority` and `#authorityFor`
|
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(broker.mjs:763-799), with classification at :596-609. Every one of these is about a role run. Humans
|
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get no roles. `#human` (broker.mjs:375-378) is the only human check.
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- F5. Threads have a single `owner` column (packages/bus/schema.sql:247). `#thread` refuses a thread whose
|
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owner isn't the caller (broker.mjs:356-362). `#owner` returns `tester` or the human (broker.mjs:364-366).
|
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`#threadFor` special-cases the human (:326) and checks reply chains for the tester only (`#testerOwns`,
|
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:352-355, called at :337 and :342). `#threadHolders(business, instance, owner)` finds the held runs of
|
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one owner's threads (broker.mjs:298-306).
|
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- F6. The Console reaches the bus as the one human by spawning `human-cli.mjs` per call
|
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(packages/webui/src/bus.mjs:1-9, 27-31). Its entry is `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve`
|
||||
(scripts/webui-service.sh:3). Its sign-in today trusts a proxy header (Sage's design, section "What exists
|
||||
today"). Q175 replaces that with an OIDC relying party that takes a `subjects` list from a `console.sso`
|
||||
key in config.json (Sage's design sections 1 and 4).
|
||||
- F7. config.json is read by one loader that refuses unknown top-level keys
|
||||
(scripts/mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). The business file is writable by agents through
|
||||
`organizationWriter` (packages/business/src/organization.mjs:83), which is why Sage put SSO config in
|
||||
config.json and not the business file.
|
||||
- F8. Bus, Discord and Console run as `systemctl --user` units (scripts/bus-service.sh:200), so every
|
||||
instance on a host runs under Jason's uid today.
|
||||
- F9. Board reads are per business, not per project or instance: `inbox`, `agents`, `tasks`, `trail` at
|
||||
broker.mjs:2143-2146, `decisions` :2174, `credentials` :2195, `messages` :2217 (the Console's set is
|
||||
views.mjs:3-13). `project.list` returns every project in the business (:2318-2322).
|
||||
- F10. The launcher restarts a thread that has pending messages and no holder (packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:533),
|
||||
launched as the business human (:542), every 2 s (:133). Its `startedFor` guard is in memory. A claim end
|
||||
stops a run only at its next bus call (broker.mjs:2273-2275). The idle stop is the one place that
|
||||
SIGTERMs a thread runner (launcher.mjs:527).
|
||||
|
||||
### The archived v1 federation (v1/apps/gateway/src/federation)
|
||||
|
||||
What it does: mTLS between gateways with certificates from step-ca. The grant id and subject user id sit
|
||||
in custom certificate OIDs (ca.service.ts:22-24). A peer enrolls with a single-use, 15-minute bearer
|
||||
token. The guard reads the client certificate off the TLS socket (server/federation-auth.guard.ts:93-106)
|
||||
and re-checks the grant row on every request. Scopes are zod-validated resource lists
|
||||
(scope-schema.ts:15-99). Shared data is read-only list and get queries.
|
||||
|
||||
Verdict: none of the code is reusable here.
|
||||
|
||||
1. It is about 4,470 lines of NestJS, Drizzle and Postgres code without tests (9,198 with them), plus a
|
||||
step-ca dependency. The new stack has none of those.
|
||||
2. Inbound federation never worked. The guard depends on `requestCert: true`, but the server is built as
|
||||
`new FastifyAdapter({ bodyLimit })` with no TLS options (v1/apps/gateway/src/main.ts:50-53). Every
|
||||
inbound call would get 401.
|
||||
3. mTLS is the wrong fit for the homelab path. Traefik terminates TLS in front of the Console (Sage's
|
||||
design, public path). A client certificate would reach the app as a forwarded header, which is the
|
||||
header trust Q175 point 1 rules out.
|
||||
|
||||
Ideas worth keeping: re-check the grant on every request, never cache it in the credential. Keep
|
||||
enrollment short-lived and single-use. Tag every federated result with its source instance.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The 10-27 slice
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 What it must do
|
||||
|
||||
1. D1. Each instance names itself and its peers in config.json, so the Console can show "you are on the
|
||||
hub" and link to the factory. Peer entries carry no trust in the 10-27 slice. They are labels and URLs.
|
||||
2. D2. The owner of an instance grants a person access to one business, with a project list and an
|
||||
instance list. Grants live in a human-authored access file on the receiving instance.
|
||||
3. D3. That person signs in to the receiving instance's Console with OIDC. The Console verifies the token
|
||||
itself (Q175) and matches `(provider, sub)` to an access-file user with a live grant.
|
||||
4. D4. The broker, not the Console, enforces the grant on every request: which verbs, which projects,
|
||||
which instances, and which threads (own threads only).
|
||||
5. D5. Revoking a grant refuses that user's next request on the Console and on the bus, and ends the runs
|
||||
of that user's threads in that business.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 What waits
|
||||
|
||||
- W1. Agent-to-agent traffic between instances (section 6).
|
||||
- W2. Shared threads between several users (C1.4), and a viewer level. Both are T1.3's. A granted user gets
|
||||
private threads only.
|
||||
- W3. Remote owners. A grant never gives owner verbs: organization, instances, routes, plugins, limits,
|
||||
decision resolution, launch revoke and the kill switch stay with the local human.
|
||||
- W4. A registry, `mosaic comms`, enrollment tokens and key rotation tooling. With two instances,
|
||||
out-of-band setup by Jason is cheaper.
|
||||
- W5. Federated reads that merge results from both instances into one view, and any board read for a
|
||||
granted user (F9).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Instance identity in the slice
|
||||
|
||||
An instance is its public HTTPS origin plus its own OIDC client at the provider. The factory and the hub
|
||||
are two clients, so their ID tokens carry different `aud` values. The Q175 audience check refuses a
|
||||
factory token presented at the hub, which makes tokens instance-bound by signature, not by a header. This
|
||||
holds only if the two client ids differ, which R8 checks. No instance key is needed until instances talk
|
||||
to each other (W1).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.4 Remote user identity
|
||||
|
||||
A user is `(provider, sub)` where `provider` is an id from that instance's `console.sso.providers`. Q175
|
||||
already verifies signature, issuer, audience, expiry and nonce, and allows several providers. The hub
|
||||
trusts only an issuer that no factory credential can administer (B8, duckworth-0005), for example a
|
||||
Pocket ID on the hub's side. Jason then has his own account at that issuer, with a `sub` of its own. A
|
||||
separate brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count: factory agents hold an
|
||||
Authentik API token, and whoever administers the issuer can impersonate any user, reset a login or
|
||||
repoint a redirect. If Jason wants the hub on the factory's Authentik anyway, that is his decision, of
|
||||
the same kind as #419 (section 8). Either way the receiving instance checks the token. It never takes the
|
||||
home instance's word for who the user is.
|
||||
|
||||
The owner path stays as Sage designed it: `console.sso` subjects sign in as the business human. Everyone
|
||||
else comes from the access file. The two lists are disjoint, and the loader refuses a subject in both.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.5 The access file and the collaborator level
|
||||
|
||||
`<configDir>/access.json`, next to config.json, so it is per instance (`configDir` at business.mjs:25-28
|
||||
reads `MOSAIC_CONFIG`). It is not in config.json for two reasons. Revocation has to take effect without a
|
||||
restart, and a typo in config.json stops every tool on the instance (Sage's design, section 4). It is not
|
||||
in the business file because agents can write that (F7).
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"accessVersion": 1,
|
||||
"revision": 3,
|
||||
"users": [
|
||||
{ "id": "jason", "home": "factory", "subjects": [{ "provider": "authentik", "sub": "<sub>" }] }
|
||||
],
|
||||
"grants": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "g-hub-1",
|
||||
"user": "jason",
|
||||
"business": "creative-hub",
|
||||
"projects": ["*"],
|
||||
"instances": ["researcher"],
|
||||
"level": "collaborator",
|
||||
"expires": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Rules the loader enforces, refusing the whole file on any failure (fail closed). The loader takes the
|
||||
provider ids, peer ids and declared businesses as arguments, so it stays pure:
|
||||
|
||||
- The file is a regular file, not a symlink, owned by the instance's uid, with no group or other write.
|
||||
These are the checks Sage's loader runs on the secret slot.
|
||||
- Unknown keys refuse. `accessVersion` is 1. `revision` is a positive integer.
|
||||
- A user id matches the business id rule and is never `human`, `tester`, or any business's `human`.
|
||||
- `subjects[].provider` names a given provider. A `(provider, sub)` pair appears once in the file and
|
||||
never in `console.sso.subjects`.
|
||||
- `home` names a given peer, or is `local` for a non-federated extra user.
|
||||
- A grant names a declared business. `projects` is `["*"]` or bus project ids, the UUIDs
|
||||
`project.create` makes (broker.mjs:2306). `instances` is
|
||||
`["*"]` or declared instances. `level` is `collaborator`, the only level in 10-27. `expires` is optional
|
||||
ISO time.
|
||||
- The loader checks a project entry's shape only (a UUID). It can't see the bus, so an id with no bus
|
||||
project covers nothing.
|
||||
- A grant past `expires` is treated as absent.
|
||||
- A file that fails any rule leaves every user with no grant, which revokes everything. That is the safe
|
||||
direction.
|
||||
|
||||
Matching a grant to a thread (morgana-0005). A thread's `project` is a bus project id
|
||||
(`threads.project REFERENCES projects(id)`, packages/bus/schema.sql:245), set by `thread.create`
|
||||
(broker.mjs:2329-2345). A bus project may have no repo in the business file, so grants can't name
|
||||
business-file projects. They name bus project ids, not names. A name could be taken later: the tester,
|
||||
which runs from an agent, can call `project.create` (:2300), and nothing renames or deletes a project
|
||||
today. R1 exports one pure function, `covers(grant, { business, project, instance }, now, { level })`.
|
||||
It is true when the grant is unexpired, the business matches, `projects` is `["*"]` or holds the
|
||||
project id, `instances` is `["*"]` or holds the instance, and the grant's level is the one asked for,
|
||||
when one is asked for. The broker passes the thread row. `["*"]` also covers projects made after the
|
||||
grant, and the R5 help text says so. R5's `grant --project <name>` resolves the name to the id through
|
||||
`project.list` at grant time and writes the id. `mosaic access list` shows both. Row 193 uses the same
|
||||
`covers`.
|
||||
|
||||
The collaborator level is an exact verb list. Every other verb fails `access-refused` before the verb's own
|
||||
checks. That covers all owner verbs (W3), every board read (F9), `message.*`, `decision.*`, project files,
|
||||
`spec.read`, `assistant.stop`, `launch.*`, `name.set` and `usage.*`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | Today | For a user |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `project.list` | every project in the business (:2318-2322) | granted projects only |
|
||||
| `thread.create` | the business's one thread instance (:2331-2334) | project granted, and that instance in the grant's `instances`, else `access-refused` |
|
||||
| `thread.list` | owner filter (:2351-2362) | owner `user:<id>`, and only threads whose project and instance are still granted |
|
||||
| `thread.open` | `#thread` owner check (:2365-2371) | same, plus the thread's project and instance still granted |
|
||||
| `thread.send` | `#thread`, sender `human`, writes `human.input` (:2374-2398) | same grant check. Sender `from_role` `user`, `from_run` `user:<id>`, no `human.input` |
|
||||
| `thread.messages` | `#thread` (:2401-2420) | same grant check |
|
||||
| `names` | business-wide (:2288-2295) | granted instances only |
|
||||
|
||||
`human.input` events are the owner's authority evidence (the `input` view, broker.mjs:1203-1207). A user's
|
||||
message must never write one, the same rule the tester follows at :2398.
|
||||
|
||||
`instances` is the real limit of a grant. The thread instance runs with its full role authority and is
|
||||
launched as the business human (F10), so a collaborator's message drives that instance with the owner's
|
||||
role. A grant gives a user exactly what the granted instance can do. The grant docs and the R5 help text
|
||||
say so.
|
||||
|
||||
Writes go through `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (row R5), atomically with a revision bump and one
|
||||
receipt line in `<dataRoot>/state/access-log.jsonl` (append-only, as `activation-log.jsonl` is). The
|
||||
CLI checks its caller with the human proof, but a direct file write by the instance's uid skips both the
|
||||
CLI and the receipt. The separate host keeps other instances' processes from making that write, but
|
||||
factory agents keep ssh to .54 (Q183), so one with a login there can make it. R8 records that as
|
||||
accepted (section 8). Jason may also edit the file by hand.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.6 The user principal in the broker
|
||||
|
||||
The bar (B1, mos-0984 point 1): a bus user principal comes only from something the bus can verify. Here
|
||||
that is the Console's verified OIDC session, reached through a proof the bus checks itself. The calling
|
||||
process's claim alone isn't enough, and neither is a proof that admits agent ancestry.
|
||||
|
||||
The proof. Row 196 (#1694, Gander) builds this check as the `user` kind of its shared `verifyPrincipal`,
|
||||
and R3 consumes it (section 5). The checks are the ones below. A new path-bound CLI, `packages/bus/src/user-cli.mjs`, with its own nonce variable
|
||||
(`MOSAIC_BUS_USER_NONCE`), so neither of the other CLIs' nonces proves it. The bus checks it with
|
||||
the `user` kind of row 196's `verifyPrincipal`, which:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Runs `verifyHuman`'s checks with `cliPath` set to the bus's own `user-cli.mjs`: same uid as the bus,
|
||||
start time, nonce, CLI path, and the parent walk that refuses agent markers, launch records and agent
|
||||
binaries (human.mjs:64-96).
|
||||
2. Also requires the user CLI's direct parent to be the Console from the bus's own tree: `argv[1]` equals
|
||||
the bus's resolved `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs`, and `argv[2]` is `serve`. This binds the user CLI to
|
||||
the Console's tree, as #225 binds `human-cli` to its literal path.
|
||||
3. Takes `user` from the proof and binds it only if the access file gives that user a live grant in the
|
||||
proof's business. Otherwise `access-revoked`.
|
||||
|
||||
So the claim "I am user jason" comes from a process the bus has verified as its own Console, outside any
|
||||
agent. The Console makes that claim only after Q175 verified the ID token's signature, issuer, audience,
|
||||
expiry and nonce and mapped `(provider, sub)` to the user.
|
||||
|
||||
This needs the path-bound human proof, P19 333. Residual risk, stated as Sage's design section 8 states it
|
||||
for the owner. The proof is a cooperative same-uid check. A non-agent process on the instance's uid, a
|
||||
shell Jason opens for example, can start its own copy of the Console's tree from the bus's path and claim
|
||||
any granted user. So can anything that can ptrace or write files as that uid. The walk refuses an agent
|
||||
in its normal process tree, but an unsandboxed agent on the same uid can get past it by starting the
|
||||
Console through `systemd-run --user` or by daemonizing so its parent chain ends at pid 1. That is the same
|
||||
hole the owner proof has (P19 333), not a new one. Other instances can't: the 10-27 hub runs on its own host, so its bus
|
||||
isn't on their host at all. Factory agents keep ssh to .54 and root on pve (Q183), so the host form doesn't stop them, and R8 records that as accepted (section 8). Federation adds no weaker path than the owner's.
|
||||
|
||||
The broker changes, each with an R3 test:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `bindUser({ business, user })` makes a session with `s.user` set and `s.human` and `s.tester` unset.
|
||||
2. `#owner(s)` (:364-366) returns `user:<id>` for a user session. Today it would return undefined.
|
||||
3. `#threadFor` (:318-345) refuses a user session with `thread-required-use-thread-send`, as it refuses
|
||||
the human at :326. `message.send` is also off the verb list. Two walls, so a reply-chain send into
|
||||
another user's thread fails even if one is removed (R3 mutant).
|
||||
4. The `if (!s.tester) this.#human(s)` gates on the six project and thread verbs above become a check
|
||||
that admits the human, the tester, or a user with a live grant. `names` gates differently, with
|
||||
`if (!s.human && !s.tester) this.#agent(s)` (:2290), so there the user branch goes before the `#agent`
|
||||
fall-through, or a user session fails `#agent`.
|
||||
5. Every other `s.human` and `s.tester` branch (48 and 41 in broker.mjs) gets an audit line in R3's
|
||||
packet: user refused, user treated as human, or not reachable for a user. Since every non-list verb
|
||||
fails first, most are "not reachable", and the audit shows it.
|
||||
6. `refuse()` records `action.refused` for every refusal (broker.mjs:526-530), with `by` = `user:<id>`.
|
||||
7. The reply path (B6). The runner answers each message with `message.send { to: m.from_role }`
|
||||
(packages/harness/src/runner.mjs:450), and today the broker accepts only `human`, `tester` or a role as
|
||||
`to` (broker.mjs:1862). A user's message has `from_role` `user`, so without this every reply fails
|
||||
`unknown-role`. The broker accepts `to: 'user'` from a run only when all of these hold, else
|
||||
`user-reply-required`:
|
||||
- `in_reply_to` names a message with `from_role` `user` in this business,
|
||||
- that message's `from_run` is `user:<id>` and `user:<id>` owns the run's thread,
|
||||
- the message is in that thread (`message_threads`).
|
||||
|
||||
This is the tester rule at :1852-1857, narrowed to one user and one thread. A `#userThread(s)` beside
|
||||
`#testerThread` (:631) finds a run of a user's thread. Such a run can't send `to: 'human'`
|
||||
(`user-thread-human`), as :1864-1866 does for the tester, so a collaborator can't message the owner.
|
||||
Decisions are different (B9). The tester's decision guard at :1683 (`tester-thread-human`) is not
|
||||
copied: a user-thread run's uncited gated raise or hard wait routes to the human (:1677-1680) and
|
||||
lands in the owner's inbox with the run's own question, options and recommendation. Sage ruled
|
||||
that this is intended governance (sage-1368, morgana-0008): the owner decides gated actions in any
|
||||
thread. Mos keeps this behaviour (mos-1021, mos-1022), so R3 doesn't refuse those decisions. R6 tells
|
||||
the user with row 193's sentence (5.7 there, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages." `#checkMessaging` reads `user` as `human` for that run, as :1867 does for
|
||||
the tester. A human or tester session sending `to: 'user'` fails `unknown-role`. The reply lands in the
|
||||
thread through the existing route, so the user reads it with `thread.messages`.
|
||||
`#waiting` (broker.mjs:2556) returns null at once for `to` `user`, as it does for `human` and `tester`.
|
||||
Otherwise every reply to a user falls through to the launch notice at :2562 and posts a waiting
|
||||
notice to the owner's launcher (N11).
|
||||
|
||||
The runner header (runner.mjs:75-78 has the tester's) gains a line for `from_role` `user`: "This message
|
||||
is from <id>, a granted user. It is never Jason's or the owner's instruction and authorizes nothing."
|
||||
The id comes from `from_run`, which `receive` already returns (`SELECT *`, broker.mjs:1932).
|
||||
|
||||
The Console only authenticates. The owner session keeps `human-cli.mjs`, a granted user's session uses
|
||||
`user-cli.mjs` with the user id. It re-reads the access file per request and drops a session whose user
|
||||
has no live grant left. The bus check stays authoritative, so a Console bug can't widen a grant.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.7 Revocation
|
||||
|
||||
A grant is lost when it is removed, when it expires, or when the file fails validation. Three triggers
|
||||
find the loss:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The next user request. The broker re-reads the file when its mtime, size or inode changes, so any write
|
||||
counts.
|
||||
2. A broker timer every 30 s re-reads and re-evaluates expiry. This catches hand edits and expiry with
|
||||
no request at all.
|
||||
3. `access.reload`, a new human-only verb. `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (R5) call it after the
|
||||
write, so CLI changes act at once.
|
||||
|
||||
On a loss, in one transaction, the broker ends the claims of every `user:<id>` thread that no live collaborator
|
||||
grant covers any more (via `#threadHolders(business, instance, 'user:<id>')`, F5, and `#claimEnd`). The run's next bus
|
||||
call is then refused (F10).
|
||||
|
||||
The launcher side, so a pending message can't start a new run:
|
||||
|
||||
- `threadsState` (broker.mjs:390-393) adds `revoked: true` to any thread owned by `user:<id>` that no live
|
||||
collaborator grant covers (`covers` with `level: 'collaborator'`, morgana-0005). A downgrade to viewer
|
||||
ends the run. The broker computes this from the file on each call, so it survives a launcher restart,
|
||||
unlike `startedFor`.
|
||||
- The launcher's thread pass (launcher.mjs:510-553) never starts a revoked thread.
|
||||
- For a revoked thread that is still running, the launcher SIGTERMs the runner at once, as the idle stop
|
||||
does at :527, but without waiting for `threadIdle`'s release, since the claim is already ended. The
|
||||
launch check also refuses a revoked thread, which covers a start racing the revocation.
|
||||
|
||||
Bound: the bus refuses the user and the run from the next request on. The runner gets SIGTERM within one
|
||||
launcher tick (2 s, launcher.mjs:133) of the broker seeing the loss. A model turn already in flight ends
|
||||
when its runner exits. Its last bus call is refused, so it can't deliver a reply into the thread.
|
||||
|
||||
Removing a provider from `console.sso` is different. config.json is read at start, so that takes effect
|
||||
only after a Console restart. Removing the users from access.json acts at once, so the R5 help text says to
|
||||
do that first.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.8 One host or two (mos-0991)
|
||||
|
||||
For 10-27 the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), a host of its own (mos-0996).
|
||||
Jason (mos-1013): dragon-lin is his workstation and won't host the final instances, and both cases run
|
||||
as VMs on the PVE node. Jason confirmed the hosts (DECISIONS Q181, mos-1030). The Case 1 instance is on W-jarvis,
|
||||
10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), and the hub, Case 2, is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). The hub's OS user is
|
||||
`mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Vikunja #421).
|
||||
It is a PVE VM, and Jason accepted the factory's paths to it (Q182, Q183, section 8). The federation path
|
||||
assumes nothing about sharing a host:
|
||||
|
||||
- Nothing crosses between the instances' buses or filesystems. Each Console talks only to its own bus
|
||||
through `user-cli` or `human-cli`, spawned on its own host. access.json lives in the receiving
|
||||
instance's config dir. `federation.peers` holds URLs and labels, never a path or a socket. No row reads
|
||||
a peer's file or socket.
|
||||
- In the 10-27 slice the two Consoles never call each other. The user's browser reaches each origin, and a
|
||||
peer link is a plain link. Section 6 does need each Console's origin reachable from the other host, so
|
||||
R8 checks that now and the later rows add no infra.
|
||||
- Each instance has its own OIDC client with its own redirect URI on its own origin (3.3). Each Console
|
||||
must reach its provider's issuer and JWKS from its own host. The issuer is a privilege path too. Whoever administers it can mint a hub user, so
|
||||
the hub's issuer is one the factory can't administer (3.4, R8). The factory's Console reaches its own
|
||||
Authentik, and the hub's reaches its own issuer.
|
||||
- Q175 checks token expiry, and section 6 has a 60 s window on signed requests, so both hosts need a synced
|
||||
clock.
|
||||
|
||||
The only one-host piece is R7, which is scratch on one host by design (row 190). The uid form of R8's gate
|
||||
(row 190b) is a later option, outside the 10-27 gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Fit with the current code
|
||||
|
||||
- The bus stays a local socket. Federation reaches it only through the receiving instance's Console, which
|
||||
is the one network-facing piece. No row opens a bus port.
|
||||
- The broker's agent authority path (broker.mjs:763-799) is untouched. User checks are a separate path,
|
||||
next to `#human`, because humans have no role claim and `#agent` would refuse them (broker.mjs:367-374).
|
||||
- New ownership code is small but real: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the seven verb gates, `thread.send`'s
|
||||
sender fields and `threadsState` (3.6, 3.7).
|
||||
- The business file keeps one `human`. Granted users sit outside it, which keeps every existing
|
||||
business-file test and the organization writer unchanged.
|
||||
- The config loader gains one optional key, `federation`, in the same file Sage's phase 1 changes
|
||||
(mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). Row R2 chains on that candidate and repeats its blast-radius rule: the key
|
||||
goes in only after a copy that accepts it is pinned.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
"federation": {
|
||||
"self": "hub",
|
||||
"peers": [{ "id": "factory", "origin": "https://mosaic.woltje.com", "label": "Software factory" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Dependencies on T1
|
||||
|
||||
- T1.1, several instances per host (mos-0988). Row 190 (Darkwing) lands several instances on one uid,
|
||||
for scratch tests. R7 runs on that. Row 190b (Darkwing, Opus, design first, chained on 190) puts the hub
|
||||
under its own Linux user, with no factory process able to touch it (mos-0986). Rows R1 to R7 don't need
|
||||
190b: they use separate `MOSAIC_CONFIG` files and data roots, which the code already honours
|
||||
(business.mjs:25-28). For 10-27, R8's gate is the host form only (mos-0996), so 190b is a later
|
||||
option, not an R8 dependency. With per-uid instances,
|
||||
a factory-uid process can't read or write the hub's access.json or data root, and it can't pass the
|
||||
hub's human or user proof, because `verifyHuman` requires the caller's uid to equal the bus's
|
||||
(human.mjs:67). Inside one instance the proofs stay same-uid cooperative (3.6, P19 333).
|
||||
The design doesn't plan a single-uid live run.
|
||||
- A separate host (mos-0991, mos-0996). The hub runs on its own host, which R8 checks and records (section 7,
|
||||
3.8). It is a PVE VM, with the factory paths accepted by Jason (Q182, Q183, section 8).
|
||||
mos-0996 measured why the other hosts fail: on dragon-lin `sudo -n true` succeeds for jwoltje, and
|
||||
Melanie's server takes `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` from here with passwordless sudo behind it.
|
||||
- Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the bus human boundary before R3 (gander-0006): one shared verifier,
|
||||
`verifyPrincipal(request, connection)` returning `{kind, business, id}`, with `SO_PEERCRED` binding
|
||||
`proof.pid` to the connection. R3 consumes it for the `user` kind instead of writing its own
|
||||
`verifyUser`, with the same checks as 3.6 (human walk, direct parent the bus tree's Console `serve`,
|
||||
own nonce variable). It runs once for each one-request connection, and `s.user` holds for that
|
||||
request only, with no role or grant cached (gander-0007). R3 owns every live grant check, the
|
||||
`(provider, sub)` to user mapping and the user-name policy. Row 196 kills the agent-parent,
|
||||
non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants. R3 keeps the reserved user-name mutant.
|
||||
- T1.1 live also needs two Consoles, two public origins, two reverse-proxy routes and two provider
|
||||
clients, which are Jason-gated infra.
|
||||
- T1.2, #412 SSO. Hard dependency. Row R6 builds on Sage's phase 1 candidate (Q177 merge-chaining) and
|
||||
goes live only after the phase 2 window.
|
||||
- T1.3, human users and RBAC. One user and grant model for local and federated humans (mos-0978 Q2).
|
||||
Row 193 (Morgana) confirmed access.json as that store (morgana-0002, section 9 Q2). T1.3 adds `local`
|
||||
users, the viewer level and `thread_shares`, and federation adds `home`. R1 is the shared loader, so row
|
||||
193 builds on R1's candidate.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. After 10-27: instance-to-instance
|
||||
|
||||
Sketch only, so the slice doesn't block it. If Jason puts agent-to-agent inside 10-27 (mos-0984 point 3),
|
||||
rows for it are added after r2.
|
||||
|
||||
- Each instance gets an Ed25519 key in a secrets slot (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/<instance>/`, 0600,
|
||||
per the Q173 slot rule). Peers pin each other's public keys in `federation.peers[].keys`. Public keys are
|
||||
not secrets.
|
||||
- Requests between instances are signed with HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) over method, target URI,
|
||||
authority, content digest, created time and a nonce. The receiving Console verifies the signature
|
||||
itself, so the proof survives Traefik. A created time outside 60 s or a reused nonce refuses. No shared
|
||||
secret, no bearer token.
|
||||
- A peer agent becomes a grant subject of kind `peer` (`factory/researcher`), in the same access file, so
|
||||
grant and revoke work the same way. Removing a peer key refuses all of that peer's traffic at once.
|
||||
- First use: a factory agent sends a message into a hub thread it was granted, owned by `peer:factory`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Rows
|
||||
|
||||
Owner model per Q177 and Q178. Opus 5.5 for hard design and builds, Haiku 5.5 at high effort for mid work,
|
||||
Codex gpt-6.1-sol for parallel builds. Every row has its own independent review (Filbert or Dewey) and
|
||||
gate. Chains follow Q177: a dependent row builds on its parent's candidate.
|
||||
|
||||
| Row | Work | Owner model | Depends on | Test gate |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| R1 | `packages/business/src/access.mjs`: access.json loader and validator. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks | Codex Sol | none | business tests: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named, symlink, non-regular file, other owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, disjoint from the given subjects, `human`/`tester` ids, a level other than `collaborator`, a project entry that isn't a UUID. `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an expired grant doesn't, a level filter rejects another level |
|
||||
| R2 | `federation` key in scripts/mosaic-config.mjs | Haiku 5.5 high | Sage #412 phase 1 candidate | test-config.sh: valid key loads, unknown sub-key and bad origin refuse, config without it loads |
|
||||
| R5 | `mosaic access list, grant, revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, receipt line. Help text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order | Haiku 5.5 high | R1 | cli tests: tester and agent callers refused, concurrent write refuses on revision conflict, receipt appended, bad grant refused before write |
|
||||
| R3 | Broker user principal: consumes row 196's `verifyPrincipal` (`user` kind, `user-cli.mjs`), `bindUser`, the 3.6 changes, the collaborator verb list and its filters, per-request grant read, audit lines for every `s.human`/`s.tester` branch | Opus 5.5 | R1, row 196 | bus tests: each listed verb allowed, every other verb refused, a leak test per listed read (other projects, other instances, other users' threads), a reply-chain `message.send` into another user's thread refused, `thread.send` writes no `human.input`, the run's reply to a user's message reaches that user's `thread.messages`, a reply `to: 'user'` without a matching `in_reply_to` refused, a user-thread run sending `to: 'human'` refused, a reply to a user returns `waiting` null and posts no notice message, a user-thread run's uncited gated raise reaches the owner's inbox and no other inbox or role, while its `message.send` `to: 'human'` is still refused (B9, mos-1022), revoked and expired grant refused on next request, refusals recorded. Mutants (the agent-parent, non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants are row 196's): the grant read skipped, a read filter dropped, `#threadFor`'s user refusal removed, the reply-to check dropped (a run answers another user's message or one outside its thread), a user named like the human accepted |
|
||||
| R4 | Revocation: 30 s timer, `access.reload` verb, claim end on loss, `threadsState` `revoked`, launcher skip and SIGTERM, launch check refusal, R5 calls `access.reload` | Codex Sol | R3, R5, row 193's viewer level (mos-1019) | bus and launcher tests, each with a mutant: a hand edit removing the grant ends the run within one timer period, an expiry with no request ends it, a pending message followed by a launcher restart starts no run, a running revoked thread gets SIGTERM, a grant downgraded to viewer counts as a loss, another user's runs stay. R4 starts after row 193's viewer level lands, because before it R1 refuses any other level, the whole file fails, and the downgrade test can't kill its mutant (N17, mos-1020) |
|
||||
| R6 | Console: granted-user sign-in, `user-cli` transport per session, per-request grant re-read, owner-only controls hidden, a notice on the user's thread page with row 193's sentence word for word (B9, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages.", peer links | Opus 5.5 | Sage #412 phase 1, R1, R2, R3 | webui tests on Sage's fake OP: granted user signs in, ungranted `sub` refused, revoked mid-session gets 401 on next call, a granted user's owner-verb call refused by the bus even with the UI check removed (mutant), the thread page's notice equals row 193's sentence exactly (N21) |
|
||||
| R7 | Scratch two-instance acceptance: two configs, two data roots, two Consoles, one fake OP. The Consoles start outside agent ancestry (a transient user unit), as the user proof requires. They never use the live stack's units or ports | Haiku 5.5 high | R1-R6, row 190 (several instances on one uid) | script test: Jason granted collaborator on one hub project signs in to the hub, makes a thread, sends to the granted instance, gets the instance's reply in the thread, is refused on another project and on board reads, is revoked and gets refused with the run ended. The factory shows nothing of the hub |
|
||||
| R8 | Live window, not a code row: hub provider client, hub proxy route, access.json written by Jason, re-pins | Jason, Mos | the Case 2 install on .54 (#416), Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped (mos-1042), #412 phase 2, R7 | Host form only for 10-27 (mos-0996): the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181). R8 is a recorded acceptance (mos-1055). It starts with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check below still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and don't refuse. R8 runs after Bean and Chet are live and both Hermes gateways on .54 have stopped (mos-1042). Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The hub is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012), and its OS user is `mosaic`, with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Q181, Q183). R8 checks that on 10.1.1.54 as root and records whether each holds: `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under `/etc/sudoers.d` names it (N22). An agent or Jason runs these as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes into the R8 record with who ran them. The privilege checks run on every factory host in section 8's list (the dragon-lin dev uid, and W-jarvis at 10.1.1.53, which is the Case 1 VM with its agents and the Hermes agents), as each factory uid there under `env -i`, and each is recorded as passing only when the call fails: `sudo -n true`, `doas -n true`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes 10.1.1.54 true` as the hub user `mosaic`, as Jason's user and as root, each with and without the session's `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`. If `sudo -n` succeeds, as it does for jwoltje on dragon-lin (mos-0996 point 1), the factory counts as root on its own host. Then, as root through `sudo -n`: fingerprint every private key under every home and `/root`, and every key loaded in any agent socket found on the host (`ssh-add -l` per socket). Compare them with `ssh-keygen -lf` over every `authorized_keys` on the hub host, root's included, and no fingerprint matches. Run the ssh checks as root, once with no agent socket and once with each socket found, and record each result (N13). Every other privilege path is a named item in section 8's table (mos-1009): hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end, certificate authority, DNS and network. The record marks each one closed, with its check passing, or accepted under Q182 and Q183 with the table's wording. That wording goes to Melanie through Jason (#419), never to her directly. R8 also records whether the hub host's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on any factory host, no factory host mounts anything of the hub's, and whether the hub host runs no other instance or agent. These must work, or R8 stops and Mos takes it to Jason, because federation fails without them: the two provider client ids differ, each origin answers over HTTPS from the other host, each Console reaches its issuer's discovery URL, and both clocks are synced. The record holds Jason's acceptance and the check results side by side, so a passing check is a measured fact and an accepted path is named as accepted. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option, outside this gate. Then Jason signs in to the hub from his account and sends one message, Melanie revokes, and his next request is refused |
|
||||
|
||||
R1 can start now. R5 can be briefed now against R1's exported interface and lands after R1. R2 starts
|
||||
when Sage's #412 phase 1 candidate exists. R3 starts when R1 has a candidate, R4 when R3, R5 and row 193's viewer level do (mos-1019).
|
||||
R6 waits on Sage's phase 1 candidate.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Risk to 10-27
|
||||
|
||||
The slice lands only if three things hold. #412 phase 1 has a reviewed candidate by about 10-23. P19 333,
|
||||
the path-bound human proof R3 depends on, is settled in time for R3 (Mos told Sage, mos-0988). The Case 2
|
||||
install on .54 (#416) is done in time for R8. Jason's answer on the factory paths is Q182 and Q183. R6 and R7 chain on #412 phase 1. R8 needs all three, plus
|
||||
two Jason-gated windows (#412 phase 2 and the federation re-pin), plus infra work only Jason does: a
|
||||
second public origin, a proxy route and a provider client. A failed privilege check
|
||||
doesn't stop R8. It goes into the record, and Mos takes it to Jason.
|
||||
|
||||
The hypervisor path (Vikunja #419, mos-1004), accepted by Jason under Q182 and Q183. Factory agents hold root
|
||||
ssh to the PVE nodes (Q172). Root on a node can read a running VM's memory and disk, open its console,
|
||||
and change its config or boot. So it defeats the host form completely when the hub is a cluster VM
|
||||
(duckworth-0004). LUKS inside the VM doesn't close it alone: the key sits in the running VM's memory,
|
||||
which the node can read, and a node that can change the boot can capture the passphrase. Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- O1. The hub runs on hardware outside the PVE cluster, where the factory has no root.
|
||||
- O2. A cluster VM, with factory root ssh removed on every node, no factory PVE token with console,
|
||||
monitor, config, backup or snapshot rights on the VM, VM storage the factory can't read, and PBS
|
||||
backups the factory can't read or that are encrypted with a key it doesn't hold.
|
||||
- O3. Jason accepts it as a residual. Then this section and R8 say plainly that the host form doesn't
|
||||
stop a factory agent using PVE root, and Melanie is told.
|
||||
|
||||
Jason's answer is O3, accepted (DECISIONS Q183 confirms Q4). His lines, verbatim:
|
||||
|
||||
Q182 (DECISIONS.md:1514-1519, jason-master-restart):
|
||||
|
||||
> "I am not pursuing a tightening of key and agent security on my workstation. I need my agents to be able to get onto the other workstations and servers."
|
||||
|
||||
> "We will eventually have my agents running on my VM on PVE, but currently I accept the risk of agents running on my workstation."
|
||||
|
||||
Q183 (DECISIONS.md:1535-1541):
|
||||
|
||||
> "Security tightening on .53 and .54 is fine. I will still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all agents will need to have that access."
|
||||
|
||||
> "Q4 appears to properly reflect my statements."
|
||||
|
||||
Q4, as Mos asked it and Jason confirmed it:
|
||||
|
||||
> "The #421 plan stops. Your key stays, and agents keep root on pve and PBS and ssh to .53 and .54. Each VM still gets a mosaic user without sudo to run its instance. The federation gate records your acceptance instead of refusing to start."
|
||||
|
||||
So this section and R8 say it plainly: the host form doesn't stop a factory agent using PVE root, and
|
||||
R8 records that as accepted. Melanie is told through Jason (#419).
|
||||
|
||||
### R8 privilege paths (mos-1009, duckworth-0005, Vikunja #419)
|
||||
|
||||
Here and in R8, "factory" means every principal outside the hub instance (mos-1013), and "factory
|
||||
host" means each of their hosts:
|
||||
|
||||
- the dragon-lin dev uid, on Jason's workstation
|
||||
- W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008): the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents, and Jason's Hermes agents.
|
||||
ops-01 reports the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key has root on `pve`.
|
||||
|
||||
Case 1 and the Hermes agents share W-jarvis, so they are one factory host (Q181, mos-1030). The hub is
|
||||
W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Every check in the
|
||||
table runs on each factory host, and a path is closed only when it passes on all of them.
|
||||
|
||||
ops-01 measured the estate read-only at 19:10Z (relayed in mos-1009). There is one PVE node, `pve`,
|
||||
standalone, and its root `authorized_keys` holds the factory's key (dragon-lin's, and per mos-1013
|
||||
the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key), so the factory has root on the
|
||||
hypervisor without any API token. The only PBS is VM 1021 on that node, the factory has root on it, and
|
||||
its backups are unencrypted. The LAN is flat (10.1.0.0/16) with dragon-lin on it and no internal VLAN.
|
||||
The factory has used the jarvis Authentik token for admin changes. No hardware outside PVE without
|
||||
factory root has been confirmed. So today the factory administers every path below.
|
||||
|
||||
Each path is a record item. Its check runs and the result is recorded. A path is closed when its check
|
||||
passes. Otherwise it is accepted under Q182 and Q183, and its wording goes into the R8 record and to
|
||||
Melanie through Jason (#419). Every check runs from the factory
|
||||
host, as root through `sudo -n` where the factory has it, and passes only when the call fails.
|
||||
|
||||
| Path | Closed: the check | Accepted: the wording | Hub-local option |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Host access | The R8 sudo, doas, ssh and key checks (section 7, N13) | "Factory agents can log in to the hub host." | none needed, the checks can pass today |
|
||||
| Hypervisor | O1 or O2 above: no factory key in any PVE node's root `authorized_keys`, and a PVE API call on the hub VM fails with each token the factory holds | "Factory agents have root on the machine the hub runs on and can read its memory and disk." | O1, hardware outside PVE |
|
||||
| Backups | The hub's backups are encrypted with a key only Jason or Melanie holds: the PBS datastore shows the hub's snapshots encrypted, and the key's fingerprint matches no file on the factory host | "Factory agents can read the hub's backups in full." | client-side encrypted backups, key held by Jason or Melanie |
|
||||
| Sign-in provider (B8, mos-1006) | The hub's `console.sso` trusts only an issuer no factory credential administers, never a brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik. An admin API call on it fails with each identity provider token found on the factory host, and the issuer's list of admin tokens and service accounts (names only, never values) shows none held on the factory. An issuer that isn't on the hub host passes the host-access, hypervisor and backups rows itself, run against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call check (duckworth-0007) | "Anyone with admin on the factory's sign-in provider can sign in to the hub as any user, Melanie included." | an issuer on the hub host, such as Pocket ID (Q175 supports several providers) |
|
||||
| TLS front end (B8) | TLS for the hub's origin ends on the hub host: the certificate the origin serves, fetched both through the public route and from the LAN (N19), matches the key on the hub host, and no factory proxy, tunnel or overlay route names the hub's origin | "The factory's proxy sees every hub sign-in, cookie and message in clear." | TLS ending on the hub host |
|
||||
| Certificate authority (mos-1009) | The hub's certificate comes from a public CA through an ACME account whose key is only on the hub host, and the zone's CAA record names only that CA | "The factory can get a valid certificate for the hub's name." | ACME run on the hub host |
|
||||
| DNS (N15) | A zone edit for the hub's name fails with each DNS credential found on the factory host, and the zone's owner account is one the factory can't sign in to | "The factory can point the hub's name at a host it runs." | a zone or registrar account only Jason or Melanie holds |
|
||||
| Network | From the factory host, the hub host answers only on the ports R8 needs (HTTPS, and ssh where it is used), and nothing else is open to the LAN | "The hub host sits on the same flat LAN as the factory, and only its logins protect it." | a host firewall on the hub, a separate VLAN |
|
||||
|
||||
Some paths depend on others. While the hypervisor row is open, every secret on a PVE guest is exposed to
|
||||
node root: the TLS key, the ACME account key, an issuer's database and signing key on a guest, and the
|
||||
backup key whenever a restore loads it (N16). So closing those rows doesn't help until the hypervisor
|
||||
row is closed too, or they sit on hardware outside PVE. The R8 record names every path that stays accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Rulings (mos-0978, mos-0984, mos-0991, mos-0996, mos-1004, mos-1006, mos-1009, mos-1013)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Q1: human cross-access is the 10-27 slice (mos-0978). Duckworth's N8 put agent-to-agent's timing to
|
||||
Jason through Mos. Jason answered "P2P federation is acceptable for 10-27" (mos-0991), and then "P2P is
|
||||
person-to-person in this case" (DECISIONS Q180, mos-1013). The slice is human access only, with no
|
||||
agent-to-agent rows.
|
||||
2. Q2, settled by row 193 (morgana-0002, to Sage too): access.json is the one user and grant store for
|
||||
humans. Row 193 adds `home: "local"` users, uses the grant level as the human role, and keeps viewer and
|
||||
collaborator. The owner stays outside the file. Thread shares go in a new append-only bus table,
|
||||
`thread_shares`, not in access.json, and a share counts only while the named user's live grant covers
|
||||
the thread's project and instance. The 10-27 slice ships collaborator only (W2), so when row 193 adds
|
||||
viewer, R1's level check widens with it. `thread_shares` is append-only, so an unshare is an end row in
|
||||
row 193's design. R3 assumes nothing about shares (N12).
|
||||
3. Q3 and B5: R8 never runs on a single uid (mos-0984 point 2). For 10-27 its isolation is the hub's own host,
|
||||
.54 (Q181), the host form only (mos-0996). The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. Jason accepted
|
||||
the factory paths, the hypervisor's included (Q182, Q183), so R8 records them (section 8).
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- The r1 push used the repo-local credential helper `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` (set in the
|
||||
canonical checkout's .git/config for git.mosaicstack.dev) with its default credential file,
|
||||
`~/secrets/mosaic.gitea.json`, and no `MOSAIC_GITEA_CREDENTIAL_FILE` override. That file's user is
|
||||
jason.woltje. The r2 push uses the same. Gizmoduck has no seat identity until T1 row 195 adds per-agent
|
||||
git identity.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# Honker
|
||||
|
||||
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
|
||||
|
||||
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
|
||||
credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
|
||||
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# Launchpad
|
||||
|
||||
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
|
||||
|
||||
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
|
||||
credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
|
||||
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
|
||||
# Row 192: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies sign-in itself (`--sso`)
|
||||
|
||||
Launchpad, 2026-10-20. Author Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Issue #1690. Brief
|
||||
`docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md`. Design `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` (blob 9e3eadb15c80).
|
||||
Rulings sage-1340 (F1 to F6) and sage-1347 (F7, F8). Plan launchpad-0001.
|
||||
|
||||
Base 53bb59462 (`base.txt`). Candidate: branch `launchpad/row192`, r1 83b32d8d8 and the round 2 commit on it.
|
||||
`candidate-manifest.sha256` lists the 18 changed code, test and doc paths; the packet files are not in it. Drift
|
||||
check at the r2 commit: `git log 53bb59462..origin/refactor` (origin/refactor ae3c36f24) touches none of the 18 paths.
|
||||
|
||||
No request in any test goes to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or 127.0.0.1:7332. Every provider
|
||||
is the fake OP in `tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`: https on 127.0.0.1 with a throwaway self-signed certificate,
|
||||
and a fetch that refuses any other origin. The public Host in the tests is `console.example.test`, sent as a
|
||||
header to the test's own loopback listener. No test reads or writes `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`,
|
||||
`~/.mosaic`, a slot file outside its temp dir, or a live unit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Files
|
||||
|
||||
| Path | Change |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `package.json`, `package-lock.json` | `oauth4webapi` 3.8.8, exact, at the root (design: the copy runs `npm ci` there). No other dependency. |
|
||||
| `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` | Accepts an optional `console.sso` key and checks it with `checkConsole`. Without the key, output is byte-identical (F2). |
|
||||
| `scripts/test-config.sh` | Test 25: a good `console.sso` passes; each refusal class refuses. 31/31. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs` (new) | `checkConsole`: shape, `publicOrigin`, 1 to 8 providers, issuer https with a trailing slash, slot names, `ALGS` (asymmetric only), 1 to 64 subjects. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs` (new) | The relying party: `readSlot`, discovery and JWKS with retry, `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, sessions, `health()`, `summary()`, `formTargets()`. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/serve.mjs` | Under `sso`: public Host only on the human listener (F4), `/auth/*` routes, session check before every page and API route, CSP `form-action` adds the end-session origins, tester listener refusals (F8). |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs` | `--sso`, its refusals, slot reads, the start lines, `close()` on stop. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs` | Under `--sso` the session check already ran, so the header-user check is skipped; the Origin check uses `publicOrigin`. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/src/public/app.js`, `bus.js`, `index.html` | 401 `sign-in required` signs the page out with a link to `/auth/login?return=...` (design test 24, F1). The Sign out form shows only when `/api/config` says `sso` (F7). |
|
||||
| `scripts/webui-service.sh` | Passes `--sso` through; `--send` refusal text names `--sso`. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs` | The `--send` refusal regex follows the new text. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/README.md` | New section "Sign-in in the Console (Q175 phase 1, #1690)". |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs` (new) | The fake OP. |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs` (new) | 28 tests: three positives and design tests 1 to 23 (some split in parts). |
|
||||
| `packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs` (new) | 2 tests: design test 24 with F1, and F7. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests run (single files, this worktree, final tree)
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Pass | Fail |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| sso | 28 | 0 |
|
||||
| sso-browser | 2 | 0 |
|
||||
| pinned-copy | 10 | 0 |
|
||||
| serve | 4 | 0 |
|
||||
| preview | 11 | 0 |
|
||||
| proof | 4 | 0 |
|
||||
| proof-cli | 3 | 0 |
|
||||
| send | 13 | 0 |
|
||||
| service | 31 | 0 |
|
||||
| tester-listener | 10 | 0 |
|
||||
| tester-cli | 2 | 0 |
|
||||
| board-held | 3 | 0 |
|
||||
| send-browser | 2 | 0 |
|
||||
| docs-browser | 1 | 0 |
|
||||
| chat | 23 | 0 |
|
||||
| chat-browser | 11 | 0 |
|
||||
| bus-browser | 2 | 0 |
|
||||
| settings-write | 4 | 0 |
|
||||
| project-file | 10 | 0 |
|
||||
| instances | 5 | 0 |
|
||||
| routes | 5 | 0 |
|
||||
| `scripts/test-config.sh` | 31 | 0 |
|
||||
|
||||
The first singles pass failed `pinned-copy` 1 of 10: `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND: Cannot find package
|
||||
'oauth4webapi'` from a copy's `sso.mjs`. The test's fixture repo writes an empty package.json and lock, so the
|
||||
copy's `npm ci` installs nothing, and `sso.mjs` imported oauth4webapi at module load. `cli.mjs` imports
|
||||
`sso.mjs` on every start, so plain `serve` broke. Fix: `sso.mjs` loads oauth4webapi inside `createSso`
|
||||
(`oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi')`). A Console without `--sso` never resolves the package. A real copy
|
||||
still has it from the root lock. Mutant 21 restores the static import and `pinned-copy` kills it. After the
|
||||
fix: pinned-copy, sso, sso-browser and serve rerun green (counts above).
|
||||
|
||||
Not run by me (slot work, busy at the time): the full webui package suite, the cli suite, and
|
||||
`scripts/test-*.sh` other than test-config. `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs` and
|
||||
`stack-release.test.mjs` also build copies with an empty lock and are the ones to watch for the same
|
||||
failure. They need Sage's gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mutants (`mutants.py`, run as `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`)
|
||||
|
||||
Each mutant edits one source file, runs one test file filtered to one test name, and restores the file
|
||||
checked by sha256. Final run on the final tree: `/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-final.log`.
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Mutant | Test | Result |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| 1 | drop validateApplicationLevelSignature | sso 9 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 2 | wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch | sso 9 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 3 | drop the subjects check | sso 10 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 4 | accept HS256 and none in ALGS | sso 11 start | KILLED |
|
||||
| 5 | take the provider from the query | sso 15 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 6 | tester listener reads sign-in cookies (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 7 | tester listener takes Authorization (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 8 | tester listener takes x-authentik-* (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 9 | skip the login record delete | sso 7 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 10 | drop HttpOnly from the session cookie | sso 20 and 21 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 11 | refresh last-seen on every request | sso 13 idle | KILLED |
|
||||
| 12 | build redirect_uri from the request Host | sso 22 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 13 | serve the loopback read path under --sso (F4) | sso 22 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 14 | bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 15 | bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 16 | app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 17 | app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 18 | signInRequired takes any 401 | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 19 | Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7) | sso-browser 2 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 20 | CSP form-action without the end-session origins | sso 13 CSP | KILLED |
|
||||
| 21 | import oauth4webapi at module load | pinned-copy | KILLED |
|
||||
| 22 | restore the r1 relative returnPath (round 2, B1) | sso 14 | KILLED |
|
||||
| 23 | drop the second origin check (round 2, sage-1403) | sso 14 | SURVIVED, equivalent, guard kept (sage-1407) |
|
||||
|
||||
Mutant 16 survived its first run: test 1 had no `getJSON` path. The History click on
|
||||
`/api/conversations` was added and it is now killed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from the design
|
||||
|
||||
- **F1 (sage-1340).** `bus.js` `fetchRead` and `fetchApi` apply the same 401 `sign-in required` rule as
|
||||
`app.js`, even when `/api/config` has no `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 1, mutants 14 and 15.
|
||||
- **F7 (sage-1347).** A Sign out form (`POST /auth/logout`) in the command bar, hidden unless `/api/config`
|
||||
says `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 2, mutant 19.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Proof header on 7333 under `--sso` (webby-0019 N2).** `cli.mjs` passes `testerProofHeader: null` under
|
||||
`--sso`, since `--sso` refuses the proof pair and there is no header name to refuse. A request to 7333 that
|
||||
still carries the old proof header is not refused for it. It gains nothing: under `--sso` no listener
|
||||
reads a proof header (`proof` is null in `startServer`). Left as is.
|
||||
|
||||
## Assumptions and choices
|
||||
|
||||
- **F8 (sage-1347).** Under `--sso` the tester listener refuses a request carrying `Authorization`, either
|
||||
`__Host-mosaic` cookie or any `x-authentik-*` header, case-insensitive (Node lower-cases header names).
|
||||
sso 12 sends one of each; mutants 6 to 8.
|
||||
- **oauth4webapi loads lazily** inside `createSso` (see the pinned-copy failure above).
|
||||
- **Client authentication** is `ClientSecretBasic`; the fake OP's token endpoint checks Basic auth.
|
||||
- **Caps**: 1 to 8 providers, 1 to 64 subjects per provider, 64 sessions, 32 pending logins. The 33rd login
|
||||
drops the oldest record (sso 17).
|
||||
- **CSP**: under `--sso`, `form-action` adds each provider's end-session origin. Chrome applies
|
||||
`form-action` to the redirect after the Sign out POST, so without it the logout stops at the Console.
|
||||
Tested in sso 13 CSP, mutant 20. Without `--sso` the CSP string is unchanged.
|
||||
- **`--send` refusal text** in cli.mjs and webui-service.sh now ends "or --sso".
|
||||
- **Start lines**: one `Sign-in provider:` line per provider with id, issuer, subject count and state
|
||||
(`ready`, `refused` or `unreachable`). No client id, secret or sub.
|
||||
- **Test 1** uses `console.example.test` as the public Host, not mosaic.woltje.com (no request goes there).
|
||||
- **Test 11 slot files**: the owner check is not tested; the test can't create a file owned by another uid
|
||||
without privilege. Symlink, 0644, 0640 and a file under the repository are tested.
|
||||
- **Test 23** covers a provider down at start: the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, loopback `/healthz`
|
||||
is 200 with `sso: { a: 'unreachable' }`, one `discovery-failed` line, and the retry makes sign-in work. An
|
||||
HS-only discovery at start refuses the start (in test 23 and in test 11 start).
|
||||
- **Test 22**: a Host of bare `localhost` without a port is not in the table. It hits the older
|
||||
`non-local Host refused` check before the sso check; a comment in the test says so.
|
||||
|
||||
## Round 2 (webby-0019)
|
||||
|
||||
- **B1, open redirect after sign-in.** `returnPath` took any URL on `publicOrigin`, and dot segments can
|
||||
normalize to a pathname of `//evil.example`, which a browser reads as scheme-relative in a relative
|
||||
Location. Fix per sage-1403: `returnURL` (renamed) builds an absolute URL, `publicOrigin + pathname +
|
||||
search`, checks its origin again, and returns its href. Anything else is `publicOrigin/`. The callback's
|
||||
Location is now always absolute on the Console. Test 14 asserts the exact Location and its origin for each
|
||||
case. It adds Webby's three rows (`/.//evil.example`, `/x/..//evil.example`,
|
||||
`https://console.example.test//evil.example`), each now `https://console.example.test//evil.example`, a path
|
||||
on the Console. It also adds `/board/./x`, which lands on `/board/x`. The positive test expects
|
||||
`https://console.example.test/board?x=1`.
|
||||
- **Mutant 22** restores the r1 relative `returnPath`; test 14 kills it.
|
||||
- **Mutant 23** drops the second origin check. It SURVIVES, and I read it as equivalent: `checkConsole`
|
||||
holds `publicOrigin` to a bare https origin, and a parsed https pathname always starts with `/`, so
|
||||
`publicOrigin + pathname` can't parse to another origin. Webby agrees (webby-0022). Sage's ruling
|
||||
(sage-1407): the check stays as an unreachable guard, and 23 is listed here as equivalent. That is a packet
|
||||
note, not a candidate change.
|
||||
- **N1.** The design cite is now blob 9e3eadb15c80 (`git rev-parse 83b32d8d8:agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`).
|
||||
- **N2.** Listed under Deviations.
|
||||
- **N3.** `SIGN_IN_COOKIE` has its own comment, above the row 177 comment and `TESTER_CHAT_WRITE`.
|
||||
- **N4.** Row 200 (#1698) covers it: `stack-release.sh` refuses `config-console-key` before any stop when the
|
||||
target's loader refuses the key, on activate and rollback.
|
||||
- **N5.** No change.
|
||||
|
||||
Round 2 runs, this worktree, final tree: `sso.test.mjs` 28/28 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/sso-r2.log`);
|
||||
mutants 22 and 23 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-r2.log`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Not done here
|
||||
|
||||
- Row 200 (#1698, `stack-release.sh activate --sso`) is chained on this candidate and starts only after the
|
||||
manifest is with Webby (sage-1369).
|
||||
- Full suites are for Sage's gate.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
53bb59462120a03a9f54b02881895e3f575e501c
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
||||
95d9a48812eebc415e3605239788e5b0746f1457a3bf0f9b9651a8c745e8b0f6 package.json
|
||||
390cbb0ef88de6cbc6d8f43b9e212abfdf0ef0e1c88fa02f5ab790caabc53eed package-lock.json
|
||||
726b71bcfdb4d9409cefc86bed2fbe8e678c6efb50bcf5bb22344aeda1eee201 packages/webui/README.md
|
||||
f7b6b68906f13a644854b8083287dfa2936e8defc6207d05739e89763cc91440 packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs
|
||||
4a2d226bdbfee98b180103f71b3cb8122303cfac4aeece42bd30ce167ba6ff55 packages/webui/src/cli.mjs
|
||||
41ee8798c34ee491b80ae1b42c3e96cd5d12fb1603b1ab88ac2dd10b5fb27964 packages/webui/src/public/app.js
|
||||
e6c8f838eb7cdc2ae556c04451ca4c8f2d433117a17f285a144cfc7dff03e2a4 packages/webui/src/public/bus.js
|
||||
f276fa440ec938638cb3e0f1b812fafa929460a6b96f1dab4cf1076a7c0c18ea packages/webui/src/public/index.html
|
||||
333d474b1c7e753938aedc639c08f9db0e787faf56aa8068d013fd304a0b3b7e packages/webui/src/serve.mjs
|
||||
37b01ab0479d5f2a7ab9aac790931c6d88c790465392d9c0b65a105513f3e36b packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs
|
||||
b624f044d361c648cefa161abe5f2b96e0cd8a83bc7816c9d501a2cd840988ca packages/webui/src/sso.mjs
|
||||
84e31d4beba0de5ed6d192921bd7b016296c8b2a42b3fcf1176663e182320d9e packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs
|
||||
ac01037743fcbf1efa641794d3878f113b6206033d2f66cde072a52ccfae1a51 packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs
|
||||
9358e3755e174b61532e2c528e733ffcdb48941cbadb825f1b0254bc55d1920e packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs
|
||||
3f8527fd7ae1ffb2bffce3450971f125bd616954b534577ef54249c87f36e248 packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs
|
||||
f8307d4bd998634467fbed8748157754132b76affac051f320196161ce385e4a scripts/mosaic-config.mjs
|
||||
3301c1fabf616bb961d62f6decd0a46dadb0f399b8ba7f3c2ca60023d2b24c78 scripts/test-config.sh
|
||||
7678bb6b45861c3dc6d775fc99269b1db7350ced60b89517d6ebeb4cc161781c scripts/webui-service.sh
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
|
||||
# Row 192 (#1690) mutants: `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`. Each applies to the tree's source, runs one
|
||||
# test file (optionally one name pattern) and restores the file from a saved copy, checked by sha256.
|
||||
# Killed = test exit != 0.
|
||||
import hashlib, os, subprocess, sys, signal
|
||||
W = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[1]), 'packages', 'webui')
|
||||
if not os.path.isfile(os.path.join(W, 'src', 'sso.mjs')): sys.exit(f'ABORT no packages/webui/src/sso.mjs under {sys.argv[1]}')
|
||||
S, B, C, F = 'src/sso.mjs', 'src/serve.mjs', 'src/sso-config.mjs', 'src/public/'
|
||||
T, P = 'tests/sso.test.mjs', 'tests/sso-browser.test.mjs'
|
||||
M = [
|
||||
('drop validateApplicationLevelSignature (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
|
||||
('wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch {} } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
|
||||
('drop the subjects check (10)', S, [("if (name === undefined) {", "if (false) {")], T, '^10:'),
|
||||
('accept HS* in algs (11)', C, [("export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['PS256',", "export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['HS256', 'none', 'PS256',")], T, '^11: start'),
|
||||
('take the provider from the query (15)', S, [("const entry = record && providers.get(record.provider);", "const entry = record && providers.get(query.get('provider') ?? record.provider);")], T, '^15:'),
|
||||
('let the tester listener read cookies (12, F8)', B, [("SIGN_IN_COOKIE.test(req.headers.cookie ?? '') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
|
||||
('tester listener takes Authorization (12, F8)', B, [("Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'authorization') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
|
||||
('tester listener takes x-authentik-* (12, F8)', B, [(" || Object.keys(req.headers).some(h => h.startsWith('x-authentik-'))", "")], T, '^12:'),
|
||||
('skip the login record delete (7)', S, [("if (key !== null) logins.delete(key);\n // The provider", "// The provider")], T, '^7:'),
|
||||
('drop HttpOnly from the session cookie (21)', S, [("`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}`", "`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax`")], T, '^20 and 21'),
|
||||
('refresh seen on every request (13)', B, [("sso.session(req, { touch: req.method === 'POST' || (req.method === 'GET' && !path.startsWith('/api/')) })", "sso.session(req, { touch: true })")], T, '^13: idle'),
|
||||
('build redirect_uri from the request Host (22)', S, [("const redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;", "let redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;"), (" const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n", " const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n redirectUri = `https://${req.headers.host}/auth/callback`;\n")], T, '^22:'),
|
||||
('serve the loopback read path under --sso (22)', B, [("if (sso !== null && !named && !(path === '/healthz' && req.method === 'GET')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'public Host required' });", "")], T, '^22:'),
|
||||
('bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [(" if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))", " if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))")], P, '^a 401'),
|
||||
('bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [(" if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'", " if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'")], P, '^a 401'),
|
||||
('app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [(" if (signInRequired(res, body)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n return { ok: res.ok, body };", " return { ok: res.ok, body };")], P, '^a 401'),
|
||||
('app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [(" if (signInRequired(res, result)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n", "")], P, '^a 401'),
|
||||
('signInRequired takes any 401 (24)', F+'app.js', [("res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required'", "res.status === 401")], P, '^a 401'),
|
||||
('Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7)', F+'app.js', [("if (config.sso === true) { sso = true; $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }", "{ $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }")], P, '^the Sign out'),
|
||||
('form-action without the end-session origins (CSP)', B, [("form-action 'self'${sso ? sso.formTargets().map(o => ` ${o}`).join('') : ''}`", "form-action 'self'`")], T, '^13: the CSP'),
|
||||
('import oauth4webapi at module load (copies)', S, [("let oauth;\n", "import * as oauth from 'oauth4webapi';\n"), (" oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi');\n", "")], 'tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs', '^serve runs from a copy'),
|
||||
('restore the r1 relative returnPath (14, webby-0019 B1)', S, [(" if (u.origin !== publicOrigin) return home;\n const out = new URL(`${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`);\n return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", " return u.origin === publicOrigin ? u.pathname + u.search : '/';")], T, '^14:'),
|
||||
('drop the second origin check (14, sage-1403)', S, [(" return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", " return `${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`;")], T, '^14:'),
|
||||
]
|
||||
sha = lambda b: hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest()
|
||||
only = sys.argv[2:]
|
||||
os.chdir(W)
|
||||
survived = []
|
||||
for i, (name, path, pairs, test, pat) in enumerate(M, 1):
|
||||
if only and str(i) not in only: continue
|
||||
orig = open(path, 'rb').read(); h = sha(orig)
|
||||
src = orig.decode()
|
||||
for a, b in pairs:
|
||||
if src.count(a) != 1: sys.exit(f'ABORT {i} {name}: pattern found {src.count(a)} times')
|
||||
src = src.replace(a, b)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
open(path, 'w').write(src)
|
||||
p = subprocess.Popen(['node', '--test', f'--test-name-pattern={pat}', test], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, start_new_session=True)
|
||||
try: out, _ = p.communicate(timeout=240)
|
||||
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
||||
os.killpg(p.pid, signal.SIGKILL); out, _ = p.communicate(); out += b'\nTIMEOUT'
|
||||
text = out.decode(errors='replace')
|
||||
ran = [l for l in text.splitlines() if l.startswith('ℹ tests ')]
|
||||
verdict = 'KILLED' if p.returncode != 0 else 'SURVIVED'
|
||||
if verdict == 'SURVIVED': survived.append(name)
|
||||
print(f'{i:2} {verdict} {name} [{ran[0] if ran else "no count"}]', flush=True)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
open(path, 'wb').write(orig)
|
||||
if sha(open(path, 'rb').read()) != h: sys.exit(f'ABORT restore failed for {path}')
|
||||
print('survived:', survived or 'none')
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# Morgana
|
||||
|
||||
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
|
||||
|
||||
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
|
||||
credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
|
||||
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Q175 design: the Console verifies SSO itself (Vikunja #412)
|
||||
|
||||
Author Sage, 2026-10-20. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at refactor
|
||||
4ca8d6e94. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345 and 353). #385 stays open until the
|
||||
Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
|
||||
Author Sage, 2026-10-20, r3. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at
|
||||
refactor 4ca8d6e94 unless a line says otherwise. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345
|
||||
and 353). #385 stays open until the Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Changes from r2 (Filbert's r2 review, CHANGES)
|
||||
|
||||
- C1: the `console` key goes into the shared loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, which today refuses any
|
||||
unknown top-level key (:113). Section 4 names the blast radius. Jason step 4 moves inside the phase 2
|
||||
window, after the pin and before the Console starts. The phase 2 rollback removes `console` first. A
|
||||
test-config.sh case covers it (test 25). Mos confirms the sequence before phase 1 (section 5).
|
||||
- C2: under `--sso` the page treats a 401 `sign-in required` as signed out and links to
|
||||
`/auth/login?return=<path>` (section 5 phase 1, test 24).
|
||||
- Notes: tests 7 and 15 are built so that only the record rule refuses; test 9a is an alg test; Q-B's two
|
||||
classes are defined, and test 23 adds a 200 HTML page; the phase 2 scratch Console uses a scratch config,
|
||||
a dummy slot, no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
|
||||
- r3 fix (Filbert r3 approve): D1, the loader checks the slot reference's shape only, and the file checks
|
||||
run in the Console's `--sso` start; D2, the slot resolves from the config dir, and the scratch Console has
|
||||
a scratch dataRoot and an unreachable issuer (section 5).
|
||||
- Q-E: settled as Filbert ruled. The `subject-unknown` line keeps iss and sub, JSON-escaped and capped
|
||||
(section 1, tests 10 and 19).
|
||||
|
||||
## Changes from r1 (Filbert's r1 review, CHANGES)
|
||||
|
||||
- B1: the provider config moves to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` (section 4). Mos agreed (mos-0973). The
|
||||
Console prints provider ids, issuers and subject counts at start. The rehearse-strip follow-up is dropped.
|
||||
- B2: one return-path rule, `new URL(ret, publicOrigin).origin === publicOrigin` (section 1 step 7), with
|
||||
tests for `/\evil.example` and `/%09/evil.example`.
|
||||
- B3: refusals log a fixed code and the provider id, never the error or its cause (section 1).
|
||||
- B4: login records are capped at 32 (section 1 step 1), with a test.
|
||||
- B5: test 9 splits into a forged payload under a real kid and a kid missing from the JWKS, and a try/catch
|
||||
mutant joins the list. Test 2 no longer claims the signature mutant (section 9).
|
||||
- B6: the phase 2 forged-header check runs on a scratch Console, or Mos or Jason runs it on live (section 5).
|
||||
- Rulings: Q-B start degraded (section 4), Q-C only the public Host on 7332 (section 3), Q-D keep 1 h idle
|
||||
but polls don't count as activity (section 3).
|
||||
- Section 6: `startServer` throws on `tester && sso`, and `human` joins `tester` as a refused subject label.
|
||||
- The missing tests and nits N1-N5 are in sections 1, 3, 7 and 9.
|
||||
- Section 8: the human-cli statement stays as written (mos-0972). The recommendation is now Mos's ruling.
|
||||
|
||||
## The ruling this implements
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +56,9 @@ trust with verification" and confirmed five points (mos-0970):
|
||||
## What exists today
|
||||
|
||||
The live Console runs from copies/490e2771d3d0 with `--public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header
|
||||
X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`.
|
||||
X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`. Row 189 (#1687, P19 #413) adds
|
||||
`stack-release.sh activate --no-send`, and Mos's ruling mos-0972 takes `--send` off the live Console until
|
||||
phase 2.
|
||||
|
||||
- `previewOptions` (packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:205) builds `{ host, header, user }`.
|
||||
- A request is `named` when its Host equals the public name (:493). A named request passes sign-in when it
|
||||
@@ -45,41 +81,73 @@ New module `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs`, used only by the human listener (7332).
|
||||
|
||||
| Route | Method | What it does |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. |
|
||||
| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. A provider whose discovery hasn't succeeded gets 503 (section 4). |
|
||||
| `/auth/callback` | GET | Finish the flow, create the session, 303 to the saved return path. |
|
||||
| `/auth/logout` | POST | Same-origin checks, delete the session, 303 to the provider's `end_session_endpoint`. |
|
||||
| `/auth/signed-out` | GET | Static "signed out" page with a sign-in link. |
|
||||
|
||||
Every URL the Console hands a provider is built from the configured `publicOrigin`: `redirect_uri` is
|
||||
`publicOrigin + '/auth/callback'` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` is `publicOrigin + '/auth/signed-out'`. No
|
||||
code path reads the request's Host to build them (N2).
|
||||
|
||||
The flow per provider:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Start. Generate a state, a nonce and a PKCE verifier (`generateRandomState`, `generateRandomNonce`,
|
||||
`generateRandomCodeVerifier`), and a challenge with `calculatePKCECodeChallenge` (S256 only). Put them, the
|
||||
provider id and the return path in a server-side login record keyed by a random id. Set
|
||||
`__Host-mosaic_login` to that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`,
|
||||
`scope=openid profile email`, `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
|
||||
provider id, the return path and an expiry 10 minutes out in a server-side login record keyed by a random
|
||||
id. The store holds at most 32 login records; a new one evicts the oldest (B4). Set `__Host-mosaic_login` to
|
||||
that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`, `scope=openid profile email`,
|
||||
`code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
|
||||
2. Callback. Read exactly one `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie, then take and delete its record (single use, so a
|
||||
replayed callback finds nothing). Expire the cookie in the response. The provider comes from the record,
|
||||
never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers.
|
||||
never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers. Two tabs signing in at once each set the
|
||||
cookie, so the later one wins and the earlier tab's callback finds no record and gets the 403 page with a
|
||||
sign-in link (N5). That costs one retry and keeps one cookie per browser.
|
||||
3. `validateAuthResponse(as, client, url, record.state)` checks state, refuses an error response, and checks
|
||||
the `iss` parameter when the provider advertises RFC 9207.
|
||||
4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)`, then
|
||||
`processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })`.
|
||||
That checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and nonce, and checks `alg` against
|
||||
`client.id_token_signed_response_alg`.
|
||||
4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)` returns a
|
||||
`Response`. Keep that object. `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce:
|
||||
record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })` checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and
|
||||
nonce, and checks `alg` against `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`. That field gets the provider's whole
|
||||
`algs` array, which the library's `checkSigningAlgorithm` accepts, so a provider listing RS256 and ES256
|
||||
takes either and nothing else (N1). Test 16 pins this.
|
||||
5. Signature. oauth4webapi does not verify the signature of an ID token that came straight from the token
|
||||
endpoint over TLS (OIDC Core 3.1.3.7 allows that, and the library docs for
|
||||
`validateApplicationLevelSignature` say so). Point 2 asks for the JWKS check, so the callback always calls
|
||||
`validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` after step 4. It fetches the JWKS from the discovered
|
||||
`jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kid` and `alg`, and refuses HS* outright.
|
||||
6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's configured `algs`, the token's
|
||||
`iss` equals the configured issuer exactly, and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list. Anything
|
||||
else is a 403 that logs `refused sign-in iss=... sub=...` (never a token, code or cookie).
|
||||
7. Create the session (section 3) and 303 to the return path. The return path must start with one `/` and
|
||||
is otherwise replaced with `/`.
|
||||
`validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` with the same `Response` object from step 4. It fetches
|
||||
the JWKS from the discovered `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kty`, `kid`, `alg` and `use`, and refuses HS*
|
||||
outright. On a `kid` it doesn't have, it refetches the JWKS once if the cache is at least 60 s old, which
|
||||
covers key rotation (test 18). The call is not wrapped in a catch that continues; its throw ends the
|
||||
callback.
|
||||
6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's `algs`, the token's `iss` equals
|
||||
the configured issuer as a raw string compare, with no URL normalising (N3; the library's discovery check
|
||||
compares normalised hrefs, so this one is stricter), and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list.
|
||||
7. Create the session (section 3), then 303 to the return path. The rule (B2): resolve
|
||||
`u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin)`, and use `u.pathname + u.search` only when
|
||||
`u.origin === publicOrigin`; otherwise use `/`. A missing or unparsable `ret` gives `/`.
|
||||
|
||||
Every refusal in steps 2-6 ends at a 403 page saying sign-in failed, with a link back to `/auth/login`. No
|
||||
step falls back to a header.
|
||||
|
||||
Logging (B3). A refusal logs one line: a fixed code from a closed list (`login-record-missing`,
|
||||
`state-mismatch`, `auth-error-response`, `grant-failed`, `id-token-invalid`, `signature-invalid`,
|
||||
`alg-refused`, `issuer-mismatch`, `subject-unknown`, `discovery-failed`, `jwks-failed`) and the provider id.
|
||||
It never logs the exception, its message or its `cause`. oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims
|
||||
in `cause`, so even a message can leak. The one extra field is on `subject-unknown`: it logs `iss` and `sub`,
|
||||
because Jason step 3 reads his `sub` from that line (Q-E, Filbert's ruling). Authentik's default subject mode
|
||||
is a hashed user id that its admin view doesn't show, so the line is the practical source. Neither value is a
|
||||
credential. Three conditions hold:
|
||||
|
||||
- Only a token that passed steps 3-6 up to the subject check reaches this line. Every earlier refusal logs
|
||||
its own code and the provider id only.
|
||||
- Both values are written with `JSON.stringify` and each is cut to 255 characters first. Any account at the
|
||||
provider can get a signed token, so a `sub` may hold a newline, and an unescaped one would let a sign-in
|
||||
forge a log line.
|
||||
- Test 10 uses a `sub` holding `\n` and a fake `refused sign-in` suffix and asserts one escaped line.
|
||||
|
||||
Test 19 asserts that no log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id.
|
||||
It exempts only the `iss` and `sub` fields of the `subject-unknown` line.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Library: oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly
|
||||
|
||||
Mos's steer (mos-0971) was to prefer oauth4webapi over hand-rolled verification on `node:crypto` unless I
|
||||
@@ -103,34 +171,78 @@ entry. Root is right because `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-31` copies only the root
|
||||
webui's first runtime dependency. The root dependency rule (exact pins, never unversioned) applies to it.
|
||||
Upgrades are reviewed commits.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Sessions, cookies and logout
|
||||
### 3. Sessions, cookies, Host and logout
|
||||
|
||||
- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256, so a heap dump doesn't hold usable ids.
|
||||
- Cookie `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/`, no Domain, no Max-Age (a
|
||||
browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over https on
|
||||
this exact host.
|
||||
- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires at
|
||||
10 minutes server-side.
|
||||
- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256 and holds no raw id, so a heap dump
|
||||
doesn't hold usable ids. Test 20 checks that the store's keys and values never contain the cookie value.
|
||||
- Cookie, exactly: `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax`, no Domain, no
|
||||
Max-Age (a browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over
|
||||
https on this exact host. Test 21 asserts the whole Set-Cookie value, and a mutant drops `HttpOnly`.
|
||||
- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, the same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires
|
||||
at 10 minutes server-side.
|
||||
- Lax, not Strict, because the callback is a top-level navigation from the provider's site, and a Strict
|
||||
cookie set there would be missing on the redirect to `/`. Lax still keeps the session off cross-site POSTs.
|
||||
The write routes keep their exact `Origin` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` checks (:171, :250, :297, :340,
|
||||
:387, :425), so cross-site writes are refused twice.
|
||||
- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side. The store is in memory with a cap of 64 sessions
|
||||
(oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one human and keeps
|
||||
sessions off disk.
|
||||
- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side (Q-D, Filbert's ruling). The store is in memory with a
|
||||
cap of 64 sessions (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one
|
||||
human and keeps sessions off disk.
|
||||
- Activity (Q-D). Only a page load (a GET outside `/api/`) or a write (a POST) refreshes `seen`. The page's
|
||||
background reads don't: `refresh` re-reads the board every 10 s (packages/webui/src/public/app.js:346) and
|
||||
the 5 s timer at :301 redraws the age label. Without this rule an open tab would never go idle. Test 13
|
||||
covers it.
|
||||
- The session holds `{ provider, iss, sub, name, idToken, created, seen }`. `name` is the subject entry's
|
||||
label. It goes where `preview.user` goes today (send logs, settings, seat routes), so the downstream writer
|
||||
shape stays as it is. `idToken` is kept only as the logout hint and never leaves the server.
|
||||
- Host (Q-C, Filbert's ruling). Under `--sso`, 7332 serves only requests whose Host is the public host.
|
||||
Any other Host, loopback included, gets 403 `public Host required`, except `GET /healthz`. The loopback read
|
||||
path at :509-512 is gone under `--sso`. Today's readers of 127.0.0.1:7332 and where they go:
|
||||
- `scripts/webui-service.sh status` (:406), the stack-release gate (scripts/stack-release.sh:484) and the
|
||||
rehearse gate (:1369) read only `/healthz`, which stays open on loopback.
|
||||
- The webui README (:83) describes the loopback path. It changes in phase 1.
|
||||
- Agent reads of the board go to the tester listener on 7333, which already serves reads. I found no other
|
||||
code that reads 7332 on loopback. A person opening http://127.0.0.1:7332 in a local browser gets the 403
|
||||
and uses the public URL instead.
|
||||
Test 22 covers a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write, and `/healthz` passing.
|
||||
- Every request on 7332 except `/healthz` and `/auth/*` needs a valid session. Without one, `/api/*` gets
|
||||
401 JSON and other GETs get a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`.
|
||||
- Logout: `POST /auth/logout` with the same-origin checks. It deletes the session, expires the cookie, and
|
||||
303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
|
||||
303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=<publicOrigin>/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
|
||||
If the provider has no `end_session_endpoint`, it goes straight to `/auth/signed-out`.
|
||||
- Limit: signing out at the provider does not end a Console session until idle or absolute expiry. Back-channel
|
||||
logout is a follow-up, not phase 1.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Provider config: shape and location
|
||||
|
||||
Location (B1, Filbert's ruling, Mos agreed in mos-0973): a `console.sso` key in
|
||||
`~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. The reason is who can write it. The business file is writable by agents
|
||||
through `organizationWriter` (the tester verbs and the chief's `organization.set`), so a provider entry there
|
||||
could be changed by the agents the Console is meant to keep out. config.json is user-authored and never
|
||||
auto-written: `scripts/bootstrap.sh` creates it and nothing overwrites it. Adding the key is a Jason step
|
||||
(section 10).
|
||||
|
||||
The loader (C1). Every tool reads config.json through one loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs. Its `validate`
|
||||
refuses any top-level key other than `configVersion`, `environment`, `dataRoot` and `execution` with
|
||||
`unsupported configuration key` (:113). The business, seat, cli, discord, bootstrap, land-work, stack-copy and
|
||||
conductor-apply code all use it. So phase 1 changes the shared loader, not a Console-only reader:
|
||||
|
||||
- mosaic-config.mjs accepts an optional `console` key, and the strict `console.sso` shape validator (the
|
||||
config checks below, except the slot file checks) runs inside the loader. The fail-closed canon holds for
|
||||
every reader. The loader checks shape only and never touches a slot file: `clientSecret` must be
|
||||
`{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}`. The file checks and the read run only in the
|
||||
Console's `--sso` start (D1), so a missing slot or a 0640 slot stops the Console, not the stack.
|
||||
- The blast radius is the whole stack. A typo in `console.sso` makes every tool refuse the config, not just
|
||||
the Console. That's the price of one loader, and the reason step 4 writes the key inside a window with a
|
||||
backup first.
|
||||
- The other direction breaks too. A copy older than phase 1 refuses a config that has the key. If the key
|
||||
went in before the phase 2 pin, the live copy (490e2771d3d0 or later) would refuse its own config on the
|
||||
next read, and the bus, seats and host would stop. After phase 2, a rollback to a pre-phase-1 copy fails
|
||||
the same way until the key is removed. This is the same trap as the plug-in kind before a rollback.
|
||||
- Files without the key still load, on old and new copies.
|
||||
|
||||
Test 25 in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads, a malformed one fails with
|
||||
the bad key path named, and a config without `console` loads.
|
||||
|
||||
No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
@@ -151,38 +263,54 @@ No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Location: a new optional `console` key in the business file (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/<id>.json`). The
|
||||
Console already serves one business (`--business`), the identities map to that business's human, and Q173
|
||||
lets agents edit the test business with a backup first. Adding the key means adding `console` to `TOP_KEYS`
|
||||
(packages/business/src/business.mjs:21) with a strict validator. It's additive, and existing files without
|
||||
it still load. The alternative is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, which is user-authored and never
|
||||
auto-written. That fits a deployment setting well, but it puts per-business identity in system config.
|
||||
**Filbert, rule on this one.**
|
||||
At start, `--sso` prints one line per provider: its id, its issuer and the number of subjects. No client id
|
||||
value beyond that, no secret, no `sub`.
|
||||
|
||||
The slot is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, read at start. The Console refuses to start if
|
||||
the file isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode bits, or
|
||||
resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or put in a refusal message.
|
||||
The slot is `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, where `configDir` is the directory of the config file
|
||||
the loader read (`MOSAIC_CONFIG`, default `~/.config/mosaic-dev`), so a scratch config gets a scratch slot
|
||||
(D2). The Console's `--sso` start reads it. The Console refuses to start if
|
||||
the file is a symlink, isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode
|
||||
bits (0640 refuses as well as 0644), or resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or
|
||||
put in a refusal message.
|
||||
|
||||
`stack-release.sh rehearse` copies a backup onto a scratch root. A rehearsed Console must not use the live
|
||||
redirect URI, so rehearse strips `console.sso` from the scratch business file and the rehearsed Console runs
|
||||
without SSO (tester listener only). That's a row 163 follow-up, named in the build brief.
|
||||
`stack-release.sh rehearse` starts its Console with `serve --port N --business B` and no `--sso`, so a
|
||||
rehearsed Console never reads `console.sso` and never uses the live redirect URI. No rehearse change is
|
||||
needed; r1's follow-up is dropped.
|
||||
|
||||
Startup checks for each provider, all fail-closed (the Console doesn't start, and the message names the
|
||||
provider and the check):
|
||||
Config checks, run at start without the network. Any failure refuses the start, and the message names the
|
||||
provider and the check:
|
||||
|
||||
- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment. Discovery returns that issuer exactly.
|
||||
- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`, and `algs` holds only
|
||||
asymmetric algs from the library's list. mosaic-preview advertises HS256 only, so the Console refuses it at
|
||||
start.
|
||||
- `publicOrigin` is an https origin with no path, query or fragment.
|
||||
- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
|
||||
- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment.
|
||||
- `algs` is non-empty and holds only asymmetric algs from the library's list. `HS256`, any `HS*` and `none`
|
||||
refuse.
|
||||
- `subjects` is non-empty, each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters, and no `name` is `tester` or `human`.
|
||||
- `clientSecret` is `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}` (shape only, in the loader).
|
||||
- In the Console's `--sso` start only, the slot file passes the file checks above.
|
||||
|
||||
Discovery checks, run per provider when its discovery succeeds:
|
||||
|
||||
- Discovery returns `issuer` exactly.
|
||||
- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`. mosaic-preview advertises HS256
|
||||
only, so it fails here.
|
||||
- `code_challenge_methods_supported` includes `S256`.
|
||||
- `jwks_uri` returns at least one key usable for one of `algs`. The empty mosaic-preview JWKS fails here too.
|
||||
- `subjects` is non-empty, and each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters.
|
||||
- `client.id_token_signed_response_alg` is set to `algs[0]`, so the library enforces it per token.
|
||||
- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
|
||||
|
||||
Starting while the provider is unreachable refuses the start. A Console with no working sign-in serves
|
||||
nothing, so refusing loudly costs nothing, and the unit restarts it. The tradeoff is that an IdP outage
|
||||
keeps the Console down until the IdP is back. With every route behind a session, it would be unusable anyway.
|
||||
Unreachable provider (Q-B, Filbert's ruling). Config errors still refuse the start. Each fetch of the
|
||||
discovery document or the JWKS lands in one of two classes:
|
||||
|
||||
- Unreachable: a network error, a timeout, a status other than 200, or a body that doesn't parse as JSON. An
|
||||
Authentik maintenance page served as 200 HTML is unreachable, not refused, so it can't block a restart.
|
||||
- Refused: a JSON document that fails the issuer, alg, S256 or JWKS check.
|
||||
|
||||
An unreachable provider doesn't stop the Console. It starts, that provider's `/auth/login` gets 503
|
||||
`sign-in unavailable`, and a retry runs with backoff (5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes). `/healthz` stays
|
||||
200 and adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable" | "refused" }`, so the gates still pass and an operator
|
||||
can see the state. A refused provider at start refuses the start, because it's a configuration problem. On a
|
||||
later retry it stays disabled with the `discovery-failed` code until a restart. Sessions already made keep
|
||||
working while a provider is unreachable, since a session check needs no network. Test 23 covers the degraded
|
||||
start, a 200 HTML page, and the recovery.
|
||||
|
||||
Several providers: Pocket ID, WorkOS and other compliant OPs use the same entry shape. The login page lists
|
||||
them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session records which provider made it.
|
||||
@@ -190,13 +318,48 @@ them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session re
|
||||
### 5. Retiring `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` and the proof header
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Phase 1 (code row).** Add `--sso` to `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`. It reads `console.sso` from
|
||||
the business file. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
|
||||
config.json. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
|
||||
`--sso`, `named` means "has a session", and `writer` comes from the session. `--send` needs `--sso` or the
|
||||
old preview set. Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
|
||||
old preview set. Phase 1 also carries the loader change and its test-config.sh case (section 4, test 25).
|
||||
Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
|
||||
|
||||
The page (C2). Today app.js signs out only on `res.type === 'opaqueredirect'` (packages/webui/src/public/
|
||||
app.js:111 and :305), which is the outpost's redirect. Under `--sso` the Console answers an `/api/*`
|
||||
request without a session with 401 `sign-in required`, so the page would show an error on every 10 s
|
||||
refresh and never offer a way back. Phase 1 makes both fetch paths treat a 401 whose body has
|
||||
`error: 'sign-in required'` as signed out, and the signed-out notice links to
|
||||
`/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`. Other 401s stay errors. The opaqueredirect branch stays
|
||||
until phase 3, because the preview flags still run behind the outpost until then. Test 24 covers it.
|
||||
|
||||
Before phase 1 starts, Mos confirms the config.json sequence in phase 2 (C1).
|
||||
2. **Phase 2 (Jason-gated window).** Re-pin to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
|
||||
instead of the preview flags, after the Jason steps below. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). Acceptance:
|
||||
Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message, signs out, and a forged-header request with no
|
||||
cookie gets 401.
|
||||
instead of the preview flags, after Jason steps 1 to 3. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). The order
|
||||
inside the window:
|
||||
1. Back up the store, the pointer, the unit and config.json.
|
||||
2. Pin the phase 1 copy with the Console stopped. The copy's loader accepts a config with or without
|
||||
`console`, so the bus and seats keep reading the old config.
|
||||
3. Straggler check (Mos's C1 condition, mos-0977): list every running process, unit and timer that
|
||||
still runs from the old copy and reads config.json. Each one is restarted on the new copy or shown
|
||||
not to re-read config. The old loader refuses the key, so a straggler would fail on its next read.
|
||||
Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
|
||||
4. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
|
||||
for that one key. The new loader reads it back (`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` validate) before anything
|
||||
starts.
|
||||
5. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
|
||||
Acceptance: Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message and signs out. The forged-header
|
||||
check (a request with `X-authentik-username` and no cookie gets 401) runs either on a scratch Console or
|
||||
on live by Mos or Jason (B6). No agent sends the auth header to the live 7332 (section 8). The scratch
|
||||
Console runs from the same copy as `serve --sso --port <scratch port>`, with `MOSAIC_CONFIG` pointing at a
|
||||
scratch config in a scratch dir. That config has a scratch `dataRoot`, and any business it serves comes
|
||||
from the scratch config dir; neither points at live. Its dummy client secret sits in the scratch slot
|
||||
(`<scratch configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`). Its issuer is an unreachable loopback host, not
|
||||
Authentik, so the scratch Console sends nothing outbound (D2, mos-0971). It comes up in the degraded
|
||||
state (Q-B), and the 401 check needs no sign-in. It has no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
|
||||
|
||||
Rollback for phase 2: remove the `console` key from config.json first (restore the step 1 backup), then
|
||||
roll the pointer back. An older copy's loader refuses a config holding the key (section 4), so the other
|
||||
order stops the bus and seats. The window plan lists that order, and the STATE check after a rollback
|
||||
reads config.json for the key's absence.
|
||||
3. **Phase 3 (code row).** Remove `previewOptions`, `proofOptions` and their tests. `cli.mjs` and
|
||||
`webui-service.sh` refuse the old flags with `--auth-header was retired by Q175; use --sso`. Close #385
|
||||
with the phase 2 STATE and the phase 3 commit.
|
||||
@@ -211,13 +374,15 @@ The tester listener exists so agents can test as the tester and never as Jason (
|
||||
- It never mounts `/auth/*` (404), never reads a cookie, and refuses any request carrying `Authorization` or a
|
||||
`__Host-mosaic_session` / `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie (403 `tester listener takes no sign-in`). The same
|
||||
goes for `X-authentik-jwt` and the old auth and proof header names.
|
||||
- `startServer` throws when its options hold both `tester` and `sso`, so the SSO module can't be mounted on
|
||||
the tester listener by a wiring mistake. A unit test calls it with both.
|
||||
- Its writer stays the fixed `{ tester: true, user: 'tester' }`, and it allows only the row 175 writes, as
|
||||
today. No session or header can change it.
|
||||
- Its bus calls stay on `TESTER_CLI`. The bus checks the tester proof and refuses human verbs from it, and the
|
||||
broker refuses a business whose human is `tester` and any role named `tester`. So nothing that reaches 7333
|
||||
can become the human.
|
||||
- 7332 keeps refusing `x-mosaic-tester` for every Host (:485).
|
||||
- `subjects` validation refuses an entry named `tester`.
|
||||
- `subjects` validation refuses a `name` of `tester` or `human`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7. Point 5, the proxy-forwarded token
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +390,9 @@ Not in phase 1. Point 5 makes it optional and the code flow covers the ruling. I
|
||||
|
||||
- Verify with jose (MIT, exact pin), against the JWKS from the configured issuer's own discovery. Never use
|
||||
the `X-authentik-meta-jwks` header, because it arrives with the request and the forger controls it.
|
||||
- Use the same alg allow list, iss, aud (the proxy provider's client id), exp and subject list.
|
||||
- Use the same alg allow list, iss, exp and subject list. `aud` is the proxy provider's client id, and the
|
||||
config check refuses it if it equals any code-flow `clientId`, so an ID token issued to the Console can't be
|
||||
replayed as a proxy token or the other way round (N4).
|
||||
- The mosaic-preview provider signs with HS256 and has an empty JWKS, so its `X-authentik-jwt` fails every
|
||||
check until Jason gives it an RSA or EC key (Jason step 1).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -237,9 +404,11 @@ Today, with `--send` live, any same-uid process on dragon-lin can connect to 127
|
||||
strips client copies of the header, so a remote forger needs local code execution first. Users on other uids
|
||||
can reach the loopback port too (P19 333).
|
||||
|
||||
Recommendation: Mos restarts the Console without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path stops
|
||||
carrying writes, and only Jason's sends through the Console stop. That's a Mos call (Console start belongs to
|
||||
Jason or Mos). Until then, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332. The tests use fixture servers.
|
||||
Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path
|
||||
stops carrying writes, and Jason sends piece 1 with `mosaic talk pm` instead. Row 189 (`stack-release.sh
|
||||
activate --no-send`, #1687) makes that change through the pointer so the unit and stack-active.json stay in
|
||||
step; the restart follows its landing. Until phase 2, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332.
|
||||
The tests use fixture servers.
|
||||
|
||||
To be clear about the limit: SSO protects Console ingress. It doesn't protect the bus's human boundary. The
|
||||
human proof is path-bound (#225), so a same-uid process can already run the tree's `human-cli.mjs` and act
|
||||
@@ -249,11 +418,11 @@ as the human without touching the Console. Q175 doesn't change that. P19 333 own
|
||||
|
||||
All tests run against a fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. It's a loopback https
|
||||
server with a self-signed cert. Each test passes the library a `customFetch` that trusts only that cert, so
|
||||
production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a
|
||||
JWKS, and authorization, token and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an
|
||||
HMAC secret for the forgeries). No test reaches a real provider. Each refusal test asserts the status, that no
|
||||
`__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was never called. Each test also passes once
|
||||
unmutated, as the control.
|
||||
production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a JWKS, and authorization, token
|
||||
and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an HMAC secret for the
|
||||
forgeries). It can serve two issuers at once and rotate its keys. No test reaches a real provider. Each
|
||||
refusal test asserts the status, that no `__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was
|
||||
never called. Each test also passes once unmutated, as the control.
|
||||
|
||||
Refusals Mos named:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -261,35 +430,87 @@ Refusals Mos named:
|
||||
Fetch Metadata, and no cookie: 401 on `/api/bus/message`, `/api/settings` and `/api/config`, and a 303 to
|
||||
login on `/`.
|
||||
2. HS256 ID token. The fake OP signs the ID token with HS256, using the client secret as the key (the classic
|
||||
confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback.
|
||||
3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused.
|
||||
4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's clock tolerance):
|
||||
refused.
|
||||
confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback. The library's alg check refuses it
|
||||
before any signature check, so this test proves the alg rule, not the signature check. Test 9 covers that.
|
||||
3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused. Also an `aud`
|
||||
array holding our client id and another, with no `azp`: refused.
|
||||
4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's 30 s clock
|
||||
tolerance): refused.
|
||||
|
||||
More refusals:
|
||||
|
||||
5. Wrong `iss`, both a different issuer and a trailing-slash variant.
|
||||
6. Nonce mismatch or missing nonce.
|
||||
7. State mismatch, a missing login cookie, a replayed callback (record already taken), an expired login record,
|
||||
and two login cookies.
|
||||
and two login cookies. For the replay, the fake OP is set to accept the same code twice, so the second
|
||||
callback reaches the record lookup and only the take-and-delete rule refuses it.
|
||||
8. A provider that demands no PKCE. The token request must carry `code_verifier`, and the fake OP refuses a
|
||||
wrong one.
|
||||
9. `alg: none`, and an RS256 token signed by a key not in the JWKS.
|
||||
10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one log line with iss and sub only.
|
||||
11. Startup refusals: HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch,
|
||||
a slot with mode 0644, and `--sso` together with `--auth-header`.
|
||||
9. The signature check (B5), three cases: (a) `alg: none`; (b) an RS256 token whose header names a real kid in
|
||||
the JWKS, with a changed payload and the original signature; (c) an RS256 token signed by a key whose kid
|
||||
isn't in the JWKS, even after the refetch. (a) is refused by the alg check in step 4, so it's an alg test
|
||||
like test 2. Only (b) and (c) reach step 5, and (b) is the case only the signature check catches.
|
||||
10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one `subject-unknown` log line with the provider id,
|
||||
iss and sub only.
|
||||
11. Start refusals: `algs` holding `HS256` or `none`, HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty
|
||||
JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a subject named `tester` or `human`, `--sso` together with
|
||||
`--auth-header`, and slot files that are a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640, or under the repo. The owner
|
||||
check has no test: making a file owned by another uid needs root, which the suite doesn't have. The
|
||||
review reads that branch instead.
|
||||
12. Tester port: a valid session cookie (taken from a 7332 sign-in), `Authorization: Bearer <valid id token>`,
|
||||
and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404.
|
||||
and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404. `startServer` with `tester` and `sso`
|
||||
throws.
|
||||
13. Session: idle expiry, absolute expiry, a logout followed by reuse of the old cookie, and logout without
|
||||
same-origin (refused, session kept).
|
||||
14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example` and `return=https://evil.example` both land on `/`.
|
||||
same-origin (refused, session kept). Background `/api/` GETs every 10 s for over an hour don't keep the
|
||||
session alive; a page load does.
|
||||
14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example`, `return=https://evil.example`, `return=/\evil.example` and
|
||||
`return=/%09/evil.example` all land on `/`, and `return=/board?x=1` lands there.
|
||||
15. Provider mix-up. Two providers, A and B. A login started for A whose callback carries B's `iss` and a
|
||||
code from B is refused, and a `provider=` query on the callback is ignored. B's code is issued against
|
||||
A-record's PKCE challenge, so the verifier matches and only the record rule (the callback belongs to A)
|
||||
refuses it.
|
||||
16. Several algs: a provider with `algs: ["RS256", "ES256"]` takes a token signed with either, and refuses
|
||||
PS256 even when the JWKS holds a usable PS256 key.
|
||||
17. Login record cap: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first login's callback finds no record.
|
||||
18. JWKS rotation: the fake OP rotates to a new key with a new kid. A sign-in after the rotation succeeds
|
||||
through the one refetch, and a token under the removed kid is refused.
|
||||
19. Logs: across every test in this file, captured log lines hold none of the tokens, codes, states, nonces,
|
||||
verifiers, the client secret or a session id that the test produced.
|
||||
20. The session store holds no raw session id (keys are sha256 values, and no value holds the cookie).
|
||||
21. Set-Cookie: the exact session and login cookie strings, including the expiry of the login cookie at
|
||||
callback.
|
||||
22. Host: under `--sso`, a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write each get 403; `/healthz` on
|
||||
loopback gets 200.
|
||||
23. Degraded start: the fake OP is down at start; the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, `/healthz` reports
|
||||
`unreachable`; the OP comes up and the next retry makes sign-in work. A discovery URL that answers 200
|
||||
with an HTML page also counts as `unreachable` and the Console starts. A provider that answers with
|
||||
HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
|
||||
24. Signed-out page (C2). A page test in the board-held.test.mjs style stubs fetch to answer 401
|
||||
`{ error: 'sign-in required' }`: the page shows the signed-out notice, its link is
|
||||
`/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`, and the refresh stops. A 401 with another error stays an
|
||||
error. The existing opaqueredirect case still signs out.
|
||||
25. Loader (C1), in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads; a malformed one (an HS
|
||||
alg, a missing `slot` field, a slot name outside the pattern, an unknown key under `console`) fails and
|
||||
names the bad key path, and no case reads a slot file (the file cases stay in test 11); a config without
|
||||
`console` loads.
|
||||
|
||||
Positive paths: an RS256 and an ES256 provider each complete sign-in and one send, and two providers configured
|
||||
together each work with their own subjects.
|
||||
|
||||
Mutants for the gate: drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (test 2 or 9 must fail), drop the
|
||||
`subjects` check, accept HS* in `algs`, take the provider from the query, let the tester listener read
|
||||
cookies, and skip the login record delete.
|
||||
Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
|
||||
|
||||
- drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (9b);
|
||||
- wrap that call in a try/catch that continues (9b);
|
||||
- drop the `subjects` check (10);
|
||||
- accept HS* in `algs` (11);
|
||||
- take the provider from the query (15);
|
||||
- let the tester listener read cookies (12);
|
||||
- skip the login record delete (7);
|
||||
- drop `HttpOnly` from the session cookie (21);
|
||||
- refresh `seen` on every request (13);
|
||||
- build `redirect_uri` from the request Host (a test with a different Host on `/auth/login` checks the
|
||||
`redirect_uri` sent to the fake OP);
|
||||
- serve the loopback read path under `--sso` (22).
|
||||
|
||||
### 10. Jason-gated steps
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -300,16 +521,21 @@ cookies, and skip the login record delete.
|
||||
post-logout URI `https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out`, keep RS256, and give the client id. Put the
|
||||
client secret into slot `console-sso-authentik` (or say an agent may create the slot file from a value he
|
||||
puts in place, per the Q173 secrets rule). Agents never see the value.
|
||||
3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one refusal log line on his first
|
||||
sign-in attempt.
|
||||
4. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
|
||||
3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one `subject-unknown` log line on his
|
||||
first sign-in attempt.
|
||||
4. The `console.sso` entry in `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, inside the phase 2 window, after the pin
|
||||
and before the Console starts (section 5). He writes it, or he gives an agent the go to write that one
|
||||
key from the values in steps 2 and 3, with a backup of the file first. config.json is user-authored, so
|
||||
this isn't covered by Q173. Writing it earlier stops every tool on the live copy, whose loader refuses
|
||||
the key.
|
||||
5. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
|
||||
later, so the Console is the only gate, changes who can reach the Console from outside and is his call.
|
||||
5. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
|
||||
6. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
|
||||
|
||||
## Questions for review
|
||||
|
||||
- Q-A: the config location, business file `console` key or config.json (section 4).
|
||||
- Q-B: refuse to start when the IdP is unreachable, or start and refuse sign-ins (section 4).
|
||||
- Q-C: should the loopback-Host read path on 7332 also go behind the session, as proposed? Public traffic
|
||||
arrives from 127.0.0.1 too, and only Host keeps it off that path today.
|
||||
- Q-D: 8 h absolute and 1 h idle, or shorter.
|
||||
Q-A to Q-E are settled (Filbert r1 and r2, Mos mos-0973). One open point, for Mos:
|
||||
|
||||
- The config.json sequence (C1): the key goes in only inside the phase 2 window, after the pin and before
|
||||
the Console starts, with a backup first, and a rollback removes it before the pointer moves (section 5).
|
||||
Mos confirms this before phase 1 starts.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md
|
||||
4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584 agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log
|
||||
ddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh
|
||||
5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md
|
||||
38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf docs/TOOLS.md
|
||||
fe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs
|
||||
16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f scripts/stack-release.sh
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
# Common start for Sage's MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977)
|
||||
|
||||
You are a builder seat on Mosaic Stack, repository /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack, branch base `refactor`.
|
||||
Sage leads the project and is your coordinator (T3 thread 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079). Mos speaks
|
||||
for Jason (thread 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e). Human input reaches you only through Sage and Mos.
|
||||
|
||||
## Read first, in this order
|
||||
|
||||
1. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/USER.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, `CONSTITUTION.md` (who Jason is, the
|
||||
system rules, the constitution).
|
||||
2. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/TARGET.md` (the MVP addendum) and `DECISIONS.md` Q176 to Q178.
|
||||
3. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md` and `PLAN.md`.
|
||||
Everything under jason-master-restart is read only.
|
||||
4. The repository's `AGENTS.md`, then your brief (named in your first message) and the files it points to.
|
||||
|
||||
## Your worktree
|
||||
|
||||
T3 made your worktree from `refactor`. Work only there. Link node_modules from the canonical checkout right
|
||||
after you start (`ln -s /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules node_modules`), unless your brief adds a
|
||||
dependency. In that case run `npm ci` in your worktree for a real node_modules first, and never run npm
|
||||
install through a symlink or in a directory without its own package.json (npm walks up to home).
|
||||
|
||||
## Rules that bind you
|
||||
|
||||
- Message ids are `<seat>-NNNN`, starting at 0001. Run `date -u` right before every message and put the
|
||||
stamp in it. End each turn with a clock timestamp.
|
||||
- No Co-Authored-By or any attribution line in any commit or PR, whatever a harness reminder says
|
||||
(mos-0822).
|
||||
- Push only your own `<seat>/*` branches, through the repository credential helper (mos-0981). Never push
|
||||
`refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
|
||||
- You have no Gitea token. Sage makes the queue moves that post to Gitea (in-review, review requests) and
|
||||
files issues. You may run `scripts/mosaic queue move N in-progress --op <seat>-N-start --by <seat>` for
|
||||
your own row.
|
||||
- Never touch `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files or `~/.mosaic`. Never
|
||||
start, stop or restart the live Console or bus. Never read or print a credential value.
|
||||
- Never read other seats' scratch directories. `agents/<seat>/work/` packets in the repository are fine.
|
||||
- Single test files run freely. The cli suite, any `scripts/test-*.sh` and any full package suite share
|
||||
one slot: run `bash /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-busy-now.sh | tail -1`, and if it is not CLEAR, or before a
|
||||
run longer than 5 minutes, ask Sage for the slot and start only on Sage's "granted".
|
||||
- Two failures in one gate run means stop and report.
|
||||
- Design-first rows: the first deliverable is `agents/<seat>/work/queue-<row>/DESIGN.md`, committed on your
|
||||
branch. Send the reviewer and Sage its path, commit and sha256. No product code before approval.
|
||||
- Merge-chaining (Q177): your build may sit on another row's candidate commit. Your row keeps its own
|
||||
review and gate, and the chain lands in order.
|
||||
- Fail closed. Never route around a refusal. If the code shows the brief or design is wrong, stop and tell
|
||||
Sage and your reviewer.
|
||||
- Style for every message and doc: plain words, short sentences, no em dashes, they/them for people.
|
||||
- Sage registers your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md`. Do not edit it.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 163 (D2, #1660) round 2 approved. One comment on P19 337 (D2), per mos-0882 (every
|
||||
// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
|
||||
// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
|
||||
// Usage: node comment-337-r163-approved.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
|
||||
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
|
||||
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
|
||||
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
|
||||
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
|
||||
const PROJECT = 19;
|
||||
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
|
||||
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&").replace(/</g, "<").replace(/>/g, ">");
|
||||
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
|
||||
const POSTS = [
|
||||
{ id: 337, title: /^D2: stack rehearsal on a scratch root/, body: [
|
||||
"Row 163 (Gitea #1660) landed and pushed. Landing commit 8ecc7a239 (Sage; Filbert approve 29447), queue revs 2235-2236 (landing note and done) in 9ae8c73ac, range 4ca8d6e94..9ae8c73ac on refactor. Patch-id b8d5f8a37c24 matches candidate c6f4f4c12596. #1660 is closed with comment 29450.",
|
||||
"Sage gate passed at 18:16Z on eaa0f2666: cli 472/472 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. The pushed commit is a cherry-pick of eaa0f2666 onto 7f57419b3, which adds only the Q175 design doc, and no test reads that file. Mos dropped the Part B wait when Q175 replaced Part B (mos-0971).",
|
||||
"Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. Rehearse and bus start --no-launch go live at the next re-pin, where the Q173 backup and STATE report apply.",
|
||||
] },
|
||||
{ id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
|
||||
"Design r1 is committed: agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md in 7f57419b3 (blob 91e5b1b5e737), pushed in 9ae8c73ac. The Console becomes an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. It always calls validateApplicationLevelSignature, because the library skips the signature check on a token-endpoint ID token. Identity is an (iss, sub) pair, and only asymmetric algs are accepted.",
|
||||
"Filbert's r1 review asks for changes in the doc before any code (B1-B6). B1 moves the provider config to config.json, because agents have write paths into the business file. B2 closes an open-redirect hole. B3 keeps the library's error causes out of logs. B4 caps login records. B5 fixes the signature mutant test. B6 removes a live forged-header probe from the phase 2 acceptance. Their rulings: Q-B start degraded when the IdP is unreachable, Q-C yes (7332 accepts only the public Host under --sso), Q-D keep idle expiry but don't refresh it on poll GETs. r2 follows.",
|
||||
"Interim (mos-0972): the Console runs without --send until phase 2. stack-release.sh has no way to drop --send that keeps stack-active.json and the unit in step, so a small tool row comes first, through review.",
|
||||
] },
|
||||
];
|
||||
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
|
||||
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
|
||||
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
|
||||
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
|
||||
return { status: r.status, json };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
|
||||
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
|
||||
const save = () => {
|
||||
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
|
||||
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
|
||||
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
|
||||
};
|
||||
for (const P of POSTS) {
|
||||
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
|
||||
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
|
||||
for (const P of POSTS) {
|
||||
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
|
||||
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
|
||||
rec.comments.push(e);
|
||||
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
|
||||
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
|
||||
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
|
||||
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
|
||||
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
|
||||
save();
|
||||
}
|
||||
save();
|
||||
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
|
||||
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
// Sage, 2026-10-20: files the activate --no-send row (mos-0972, mos-0973) as one P19 task, owner Sage, no due date.
|
||||
// Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. No labels, assignees, due dates or bucket moves. Refuses if
|
||||
// the title exists. Prints no secret.
|
||||
// Usage: node file-no-send-row.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
|
||||
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
|
||||
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
|
||||
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
|
||||
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
|
||||
const PROJECT = 19;
|
||||
const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
|
||||
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&").replace(/</g, "<").replace(/>/g, ">");
|
||||
const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
|
||||
const T = {
|
||||
title: "stack-release.sh activate --no-send: drop the Console's --send and keep the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972)",
|
||||
description: ps(SIG, [
|
||||
"Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without --send until Q175 phase 2 (P19 #412), because with --send live any same-uid process can forge X-authentik-username on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason.",
|
||||
"stack-release.sh has no path that drops --send and keeps ~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json and the unit in step: console_for_target (:658-687) carries the pointer's flags, check_target (:247-249) allows a same-copy activate only for the proof pair, and adopt refuses once a pointer exists. A hand reinstall makes flags_drift refuse every later activate, pm-on and rollback.",
|
||||
"The row adds activate --no-send, modeled on row 187's --no-proof. It drops --send from the pointer and the unit. A same-copy activate is allowed when the pointer holds --send. Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer as they do now. There is no re-enable flag. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md. Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh (mos-0973 go).",
|
||||
"After landing: a same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 with --no-send under Q173, with the plan output sent to Mos first, a backup first and a STATE report after. Then row 66 lands.",
|
||||
]),
|
||||
};
|
||||
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
|
||||
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
|
||||
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
|
||||
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
|
||||
return { status: r.status, json };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
|
||||
async function existing() {
|
||||
const out = [];
|
||||
for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
|
||||
const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
|
||||
if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
|
||||
out.push(...list(r.json));
|
||||
if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
|
||||
}
|
||||
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
|
||||
const save = () => {
|
||||
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
|
||||
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
|
||||
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
|
||||
};
|
||||
if ((await existing()).some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
|
||||
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
|
||||
const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
|
||||
rec.created = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
|
||||
if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`);
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
|
||||
Object.assign(rec.created, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done, inverse: `mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/${r.json.id} with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's` });
|
||||
if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push("create read-back differs");
|
||||
}
|
||||
save();
|
||||
console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:21:15.323Z",
|
||||
"project": 19,
|
||||
"created": {
|
||||
"status": 201,
|
||||
"id": 413,
|
||||
"readBack": 200,
|
||||
"done": false,
|
||||
"inverse": "mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/413 with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"problems": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:19:36.544Z",
|
||||
"comments": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"task": 337,
|
||||
"status": 201,
|
||||
"id": 372,
|
||||
"readBack": 200,
|
||||
"found": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"task": 412,
|
||||
"status": 201,
|
||||
"id": 373,
|
||||
"readBack": 200,
|
||||
"found": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"problems": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# Webby
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0981, thread 03086006). Reviews Case 2 designs and MVP T1 rows 192 and 194.
|
||||
|
||||
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
|
||||
credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
|
||||
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
|
||||
+4
-18
@@ -1357,21 +1357,7 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
|
||||
2026-10-20T15:26:33Z | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 163 (#1660) r2 for Filbert's r1 changes (F1-F3, N1) | in-review r2, Filbert reviewer: candidate 2c090eefd on code 2a5f3a3a0, base 4f02486d5, manifest c6f4f4c12596; tests R14 R15 + R4/R9/R11 cases, read-only Registry #write() returns; gate passed, K34-K41 killed; Mos checked manifest (mos-0967); revs 2230 (Filbert) and 2231-2233 committed 92cc6011c c539995cf; request comment 29446; P19 337 comment 367; packet 7af166574; lands after B7
|
||||
2026-10-20T15:40:36Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 163 r2 review (D2 rehearse, candidate 2c090eefd, manifest c6f4f4c12596) | approve, comment 29447 rev 2234: 249/249 singles pass; my M1-M6 and N1 mutants all killed (R14, R9, R11, R4, R15, session test)
|
||||
2026-10-20T15:42:00Z | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 163 (#1660) r2 verdict intake | approved by Filbert (comment 29447, rev 2234 committed cd2b377bb); P19 337 comment 367 -> 368; candidate 2c090eefd manifest c6f4f4c12596 waits to land after B7, fresh gate if the base moves
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:44:50Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r1 for Vikunja #414 (G3, G4, C1.1), agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md, on branch gizmoduck/federation-design off origin/refactor 9ae8c73ac | design committed and pushed; rows R1-R8 wait for Filbert or Dewey review before Sage's queue; Q1-Q3 to Mos
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:56:54Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r2 for Vikunja #414, answering Duckworth's B1-B5 and N1-N9 (duckworth-0001) and Mos's mos-0978 and mos-0984 rulings, agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md | r2 committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth and Mos for re-review; R1, R2, R5 wait for Duckworth's approval before Sage's queue
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:58:23Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r2.1 for Vikunja #414, mos-0988: R8 uid gate on row 190b, R7 on row 190, P19 333 in the risk | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; Duckworth's r2 verdict pending
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:00:18Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r3 for Vikunja #414, answering duckworth-0002 B6 (user reply path), C1 and N10 | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth for approval on the diff
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:01:43Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r3.1 for Vikunja #414, mos-0991 (R8 gate accepts a separate host or uid, one-host audit 3.8, Q1 answer) and morgana-0002 (Q2 settled, access.json is the human store) | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth with r3
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:04:18Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r4 for Vikunja #414, answering duckworth-0003 B7 (privilege paths in R8's gate), N11 (#waiting for user replies), N12 | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:08:20Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | Correction to the 19:04:18Z line: commit 04a6112be carried only that SESSIONS line, because the DESIGN.md edit script failed on an anchor and the chain still committed and pushed, and nothing went to Duckworth then. r4 proper: B7 per mos-0996 and mos-1004 (host form only, sudo, doas and ssh checks, hypervisor path an open R8 item with O1 to O3 on Vikunja #419), N11, N12, row 196 verifier noted per gander-0006 | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth and Mos, reply to Gander
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:12:55Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5) | T3 federation design r4.1 for Vikunja #414: B8 (duckworth-0005, issuer and TLS front end), N13 key procedure, N14 R3 on row 196, N15 DNS; mos-1006 (identity provider path, sudo deviation accepted); mos-1009 (privilege path table, each closed or accepted per #419); gander-0007 (verifier interface); morgana-0005 (grants name bus project ids, one covers in R1, R4 counts collaborator grants only) | committed and pushed on gizmoduck/federation-design; sent to Duckworth, copies to Mos, Morgana and Gander
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:16:08Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.2 for #414 (mos-1013, morgana-0007) | factory means every principal outside the hub instance, hosts as variables, Q180 settles Q1 |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:16:56Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.3 for #414 (duckworth-0007) | B8 issuer host passes host-access, hypervisor and backups rows, N16-N19 |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:17:11Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.4 for #414 (mos-1020) | R4 chained after row 193's viewer level, keeps the level-loss test (N17) |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:20:55Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.5 for #414 (duckworth-0010, mos-1022) | B9 user-thread decisions reach the owner's inbox by ruling, R3 tests it, N20 start order, R8 waits on host variables |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:28:44Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.6 for #414 (duckworth-0012 N21, morgana-0011) | R6 notice is row 193's sentence word for word, start-order line matches the table |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:29:44Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.7 for #414 (mos-1030, Q181) | hosts settled: Case 1 and Hermes on W-jarvis 10.1.1.53, hub W-Melanie-OC 10.1.1.54 user mosaic |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:31:06Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.8 for #414 (duckworth-0020 N22) | R8 checks mosaic's sudo, groups, keys and sudoers.d on 10.1.1.54 |
|
||||
| 2026-10-20T19:35:32Z | Gizmoduck | T3 federation design r4.9 for #414 (mos-1037) | R8 names Jason as localadmin running the root checks on 10.1.1.54 |
|
||||
2026-10-20T19:59:12Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5, 9312a896) | federation design r4.10 (#414, mos-1055): R8 is a recorded acceptance citing DECISIONS Q182 and Q183 verbatim, checks report not refuse, agents may run the .54 checks, mos-1042 order in the R8 row | to Duckworth for ack, cc Mos and Sage
|
||||
2026-10-20T20:01:20Z | Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5, 9312a896) | federation design r4.11 (#414, mos-1063): hub on .54 VM 1012 as mosaic (Q181), R8 depends on #416 not #418, functional checks stay blocking | to Duckworth with r4.10, cc Mos and Sage
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:19:06Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r1 (#412, DESIGN.md blob 91e5b1b5e737 at 7f57419b3), static read incl. oauth4webapi 3.8.8 | changes: B1 config in config.json not business file, B2 return-path backslash, B3 log redaction of library error causes, B4 login-record cap, B5 test 9 not 2 kills signature mutant, B6 phase 2 live forged-header probe; rulings Q-B start degraded, Q-C yes, Q-D 8h abs + idle ignores polls; step 5 reading confirmed; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:34:53Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r2 (DESIGN.md blob 3eb718b5e131 at 1a268249e), static | changes: C1 config.json console key fails old loaders (mosaic-config.mjs:113 rejects unknown keys; key add inside phase 2 window, rollback removes it, loader test), C2 app.js signs out only on opaqueredirect so 401 never shows sign-in; notes on tests 15/7/9a, Q-B 200-HTML classification, scratch Console flags; Q-E keep iss/sub escaped and capped; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:40:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r3 (DESIGN.md blob a152fd58e18e at 817e8f51b), static | approve on condition D1 (slot file checks stay out of shared loader, shape-only there) as a line edit; D2 notes: slot root from configDir, scratch dataRoot, name discovery GETs for Mos; C1/C2 and notes verified; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
|
||||
2026-10-20T18:41:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design D1/D2 check (DESIGN.md blob eba861f5d2bb at d55d86bb0), static git diff 817e8f51b..d55d86bb0 | ack: D1 and D2 match; design approved; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
||||
# Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-0972 (Q175 interim, Vikunja #412). Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate owner
|
||||
Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit.
|
||||
|
||||
This row builds the tool only. The live restart without `--send` is a separate step afterwards, a same-copy
|
||||
activate under Q173 with a backup first and a STATE report after. No test here touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the
|
||||
live units or a slot file. Every test uses the stand-in `systemctl`, units, stores and data root that
|
||||
`packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` already builds.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why
|
||||
|
||||
Mos ruled that the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2, because with `--send` live any same-uid
|
||||
process can forge `X-authentik-username` on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason (design section 8). On the pinned
|
||||
stack, the Console flags live in the pointer (`~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json`):
|
||||
|
||||
- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:658-687) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
|
||||
`--tester-port` and the row 187 proof pair can change.
|
||||
- `check_target` (:247-249) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
|
||||
- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:822).
|
||||
- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:640-651) refuse
|
||||
`unit-flags-drift` on every later activate, pm-on and rollback.
|
||||
|
||||
So the tool can't drop `--send` today. This row adds that one path.
|
||||
|
||||
## The change
|
||||
|
||||
1. `activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE`, so `install_stack` leaves it out of the
|
||||
Console unit and `write_pointer` leaves it out of the pointer. Only `activate` takes it. It combines with
|
||||
`--tester-port`, the proof pair and `--no-proof`.
|
||||
2. An activate with `--no-send` may name the pointer's copy when the pointer's Console flags hold `--send`. It
|
||||
re-pins the live copy with only the Console flags changed, as row 187 does for the pair, including the
|
||||
live-copy plan note and the backup of the stopped store. Without `--send` in the pointer, a same-copy
|
||||
`--no-send` still refuses `already-active`.
|
||||
3. The steps log records `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
|
||||
--send, so there is nothing to drop`.
|
||||
4. `--plan` prints one `send:` line for an activate or rollback: `send: dropped; --no-send was given`,
|
||||
`send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`, `send: carried` when the pointer's
|
||||
`--send` goes on unchanged, or `send: off`.
|
||||
5. `rollback` and `pm-on` don't change: they carry the pointer's flags. So once `--no-send` has run, a rollback
|
||||
to an earlier copy keeps send off. There is no flag to turn send back on. Q175 phase 2 changes the Console
|
||||
flags in its own row.
|
||||
6. `docs/TOOLS.md` "Pinned stack update" gets `--no-send` in the usage block and one sentence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send` and `--tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
|
||||
passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the preview flags and
|
||||
`--tester-port 7333` in order. Status says `unit flags: match the pointer`. The steps log has the drop
|
||||
line. The log line has from = to = B, and the stopped store was backed up.
|
||||
2. A plain same-copy activate still refuses `already-active`. So does a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is
|
||||
gone.
|
||||
3. `--plan` prints the four `send:` lines in their cases, with the live-copy note on the same-copy run.
|
||||
4. After `--no-send`, a rollback to the earlier copy and `pm-on` both leave `--send` out of the pointer and
|
||||
the unit.
|
||||
5. `--no-send` on `rollback`, `pm-on`, `status` or `adopt` is a usage error (exit 4).
|
||||
6. `--no-send` with the proof pair, and with `--no-proof`, on a pointer holding both: each drops what it
|
||||
names and keeps the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mutants (each must fail at least one test)
|
||||
|
||||
- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
|
||||
- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
|
||||
- M3: `--no-send` drops `--send` from the pointer but not from the unit (it writes the pointer from
|
||||
`P_CONSOLE`).
|
||||
- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
|
||||
- M5: the arg parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Dewey approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the
|
||||
mutants are killed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
# Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "User and main agent can create and spawn
|
||||
agents" and "User maintains ability to terminate, regenerate, or create agents via WebUI or CLI ad-hoc", #415
|
||||
Case 1 "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids per agent" and
|
||||
"User maintains ability to restructure organization at will"). Gitea #1692. T1 item 5. Owner Honker, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate
|
||||
owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
|
||||
|
||||
Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/DESIGN.md`. Webby reviews it before any
|
||||
code.
|
||||
|
||||
## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md G8, G9, C1.5, C1.6, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
|
||||
|
||||
- The chief launches only listed instances (`roles/chief-of-staff.json`, harness `tools.mjs` launch,
|
||||
`broker.mjs:1968`). No user verb launches an arbitrary agent.
|
||||
- Terminate exists (`packages/cli/src/cli.mjs:447`, `instances.mjs:9-11`, webui `serve.mjs:288, 535`). There
|
||||
is no regenerate, no delete and no Console launch.
|
||||
- Instance changes need a bus restart (`instance-settings.mjs:35,75`, `organization.mjs:83`). Add and change
|
||||
only, no delete.
|
||||
- Human-only membership acts as a veto today, but there is no per-agent veto list.
|
||||
|
||||
## What the design must settle
|
||||
|
||||
1. The verbs: create (from a role and a name), launch, terminate, regenerate (a fresh session with the same
|
||||
identity and role), and delete (with what happens to its sessions, workspace and run evidence, which
|
||||
stays write-once). Each one is a human verb on the CLI and a Console action.
|
||||
2. Chief hire/fire. What the chief may do on its own, and the per-agent veto: the human marks an agent so
|
||||
the chief can't fire or replace it, and marks roles the chief can't hire. Where the veto lives and how
|
||||
the broker enforces it.
|
||||
3. Live changes. Which changes take effect without a bus restart, and how a running bus picks them up
|
||||
safely.
|
||||
4. RBAC. Human roles come from row 193 (Morgana). Until it lands, these verbs are owner-only. The design
|
||||
states the hook that row 193 fills.
|
||||
5. Per instance. Row 190 runs one instance per OS user. Lifecycle verbs act on their own instance only.
|
||||
6. The kill switch (row 191, Rocko) refuses every launch path. These new launch paths check it too.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
|
||||
- Role authority is declared in `roles/` and changes only by reviewed commits (AGENTS.md invariant 7). This
|
||||
row adds verbs, not new role authority. Any role file change is called out for review.
|
||||
- The build may chain on rows 190, 191 and 193 candidates (Q177).
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, cli, business and webui suites and every
|
||||
`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
# Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 and mos-0977 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "RBAC enforcement" and #415
|
||||
Case 1 "Additional users can be configured for access" and "Shared and private agent sessions available per
|
||||
user; RBAC"). Gitea #1691. T1 item 3. Owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief
|
||||
commit.
|
||||
|
||||
Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md`. Duckworth reviews it before
|
||||
any code.
|
||||
|
||||
## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
|
||||
|
||||
- One human per business: `packages/business/src/business.mjs:160`, and the broker's human check
|
||||
(`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538`).
|
||||
- Threads have an owner field only (`packages/bus/schema.sql:247`, `broker.mjs:353-360`). Nothing is private
|
||||
or shared.
|
||||
- RBAC covers agents only (`role.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:769-799`, harness `gate.mjs`). Humans
|
||||
have no roles.
|
||||
- The human proof is path-bound (#225, P19 333): any same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts
|
||||
as the human. That limit is real and the design must say how several humans change it.
|
||||
|
||||
## What the design must settle
|
||||
|
||||
1. The human model. How a business lists several humans, how each is identified, and how a Console SSO
|
||||
session (#412, row 192: each session names a provider subject mapped to a name) and a CLI call each
|
||||
become exactly one of them. Starting rule (Mos, mos-0985, from Duckworth's federation review B1 at
|
||||
b402197ff on origin duckworth/reviews): the bus takes a human principal only from something it verifies,
|
||||
such as the Console's OIDC session under #412. A process's own claim of who it is never counts.
|
||||
2. Human roles. A small fixed set to start (for example owner, member, viewer), what each may do on the
|
||||
bus and in the Console, and who may add or remove humans and change roles. Restructuring stays with
|
||||
the owner (Case 1).
|
||||
3. Threads. Private threads (visible to their owner and the agents in them) and shared threads (visible to
|
||||
named humans or all members). Schema change, migration of existing rows (all become the current human's),
|
||||
and every read path that must filter.
|
||||
4. One user and grant store. Gizmoduck's federation design (thread 9312a896, design 6925f78f0 on
|
||||
gizmoduck/federation-design) proposes `access.json` for grants. Mos's reading (mos-0977): one model for
|
||||
local and federated humans, because two stores drift. Lead decision (Sage, 2026-10-20, to gizmoduck-0002):
|
||||
row 193 takes Gizmoduck's human-authored `<configDir>/access.json` (federation DESIGN.md section 3.5) as
|
||||
the one user and grant store, and extends it with local humans, roles and shared threads. Federation adds
|
||||
only a `home` field. The design confirms this or brings a concrete reason against it to Sage and
|
||||
Gizmoduck before the build. Federation's R1 (the access.json loader) then comes before this row's build.
|
||||
5. The bus human boundary. With several humans, the human verbs must know which human calls. State what a
|
||||
same-uid process can still do (P19 333) and whether row 190's one-instance-per-OS-user direction narrows
|
||||
it.
|
||||
6. Migration and rollback. Existing businesses keep working with their one human as owner.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- Changing who can reach the Console from outside is Jason's. This row changes who is allowed once inside.
|
||||
- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
|
||||
- The build may chain on rows 190 and 192 candidates (Q177). Each row keeps its own review and gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business, cli and webui suites and every
|
||||
`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
# Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176, Vikunja #414 "Kill switch is available to
|
||||
stop all processing immediately"). Gitea #1689. T1 item 4. Owner Rocko, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor
|
||||
at the brief commit.
|
||||
|
||||
Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN.md`, which Dewey reviews before
|
||||
any code. Then the build follows the design, with tests and mutants.
|
||||
|
||||
## The goal
|
||||
|
||||
One human command and one Console button stop all processing at once and keep it stopped until the human
|
||||
clears it:
|
||||
|
||||
- The bus takes no new work. Agent verbs that start or continue work refuse with a fixed code while the
|
||||
switch is on. Reads and the human's own verbs, including the clear, still work.
|
||||
- Every running managed session and task run is stopped (SIGTERM, then SIGKILL after a bounded wait), and
|
||||
each stop is recorded as an event.
|
||||
- Discord stops (its existing STOP file and `stop` verb) and can't restart while the switch is on.
|
||||
- New launches refuse: the launcher, chief hire, `run-task.sh`, and any other path that starts an agent.
|
||||
- The switch survives a bus restart and a host reboot (it lives in the data root, not in memory).
|
||||
- Turning it on and clearing it are human-only verbs, through the bus human proof, and each leaves one
|
||||
event with who and when.
|
||||
|
||||
## What exists today (GAP-MAP.md G10, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
|
||||
|
||||
These are pieces, with no single switch over them. The design inventories every path that starts or
|
||||
continues work and says how each one checks the switch:
|
||||
|
||||
- `launch.revoke` and `launch.restore` in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs` (around :2087), human-only.
|
||||
- The `mosaic launches off|on` verbs in `packages/cli/src/cli.mjs` (around :456-533) and
|
||||
`packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs` (around :769).
|
||||
- The Discord STOP file (`packages/discord/src/cli.mjs:18-27`).
|
||||
|
||||
## What the design must settle
|
||||
|
||||
1. Where the switch state lives, its format, and how each process reads it (the broker checks on every
|
||||
work verb; the launcher and Discord check before start). The race: a launch already past its check when
|
||||
the switch goes on must still be stopped.
|
||||
2. The CLI verb names (for example `mosaic halt` and `mosaic resume`) and the Console button. The button
|
||||
is a human write, so it goes through the same writer and same-origin checks as other Console writes, and
|
||||
it works under the Q175 SSO session (#412) once phase 2 lands. Until then, test it with fixture servers
|
||||
only.
|
||||
3. Per instance. Row 190 adds several instances per host. The switch is per instance, so it stops one
|
||||
instance and never another. The design names how it finds the instance's data root. This row may build
|
||||
on the row 190 candidate (Q177 merge-chaining).
|
||||
4. What a stopped run's record says, so run evidence stays write-once and honest.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests
|
||||
|
||||
Each part of the goal gets a test: work verbs refuse, a running stand-in session and run are stopped,
|
||||
Discord refuses to start, every launch path refuses, the switch survives a restart, an agent can't set or
|
||||
clear it, and the clear lets work resume. Mutants: drop the check from one launch path, let an agent clear
|
||||
the switch, keep the switch in memory only, skip the SIGKILL after the wait. Each one must fail a test.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units, a real Discord bot or a slot file. Use the stand-in
|
||||
units, scratch data roots and fixture servers the suites already build.
|
||||
- Rocko has no git credentials. Sage commits the candidate and runs the queue moves Rocko can't.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Dewey approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite, the bus, discord and webui package suites and
|
||||
every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
# Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0974 (MVP, DECISIONS Q176-Q178, Vikunja #414). Gitea #1688. T1 item 1. Owner
|
||||
Darkwing, reviewer Filbert, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. This row blocks both MVP
|
||||
cases: Case 1 (Jason's software factory) and Case 2 (Melanie's creative writing hub) run as two instances
|
||||
on one homelab host, beside the current mosaic-stack test instance.
|
||||
|
||||
Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190/DESIGN.md`. Filbert reviews it
|
||||
before any code, as Q175 did. Then the build follows the design, with tests and mutants.
|
||||
|
||||
## The goal
|
||||
|
||||
Two or more instances run side by side on dragon-lin. Each one has its own config file, data root (store,
|
||||
broker.sock, host.lock, state, runs, sessions, workspaces), businesses, bus unit, Console unit and port,
|
||||
tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. Nothing one
|
||||
instance does can read or change another's state. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
|
||||
config path, data root, unit names and ports stay as they are, and no re-pin is needed for it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known single-instance points (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
|
||||
|
||||
The design starts with a full inventory. Grep every script and package, not only these:
|
||||
|
||||
- `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in`: `mosaic-bus@<business>` sets no `MOSAIC_CONFIG` and reads the
|
||||
fixed `EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`.
|
||||
- `packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in` and `scripts/webui-service.sh`: one `mosaic-webui.service`.
|
||||
- `packages/discord/systemd/[email protected]` and `scripts/discord-service.sh`.
|
||||
- `scripts/stack-copy.sh:8` hardcodes `BUSINESS=mosaic-stack`, and `:95` reads `mosaic-webui.service`.
|
||||
- `scripts/stack-release.sh`: unit names, the Console port and the tester port default, `COPIES` (:28), the
|
||||
pointer under `$DATA/state` (:1474), and `rehearse`.
|
||||
- `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`, `scripts/bootstrap.sh`, `scripts/reset.sh`, `scripts/land-work.sh`,
|
||||
`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs`, `packages/business/src/{business,vars}.mjs`, and
|
||||
`packages/conversation/src/guard.mjs` each name the default config path or data root.
|
||||
|
||||
## What the design must settle
|
||||
|
||||
1. Instance identity. How a name maps to its config file and how every tool picks the instance (an
|
||||
`--instance NAME` flag, `MOSAIC_CONFIG`, or both), and what happens with neither (the current default,
|
||||
unchanged). Name rules, and refusal of a name that collides.
|
||||
2. Config canon. AGENTS.md invariant 2 says `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is the sole system config,
|
||||
created only by `scripts/bootstrap.sh`. Several instances mean several config files. The design proposes
|
||||
the exact wording change and how bootstrap creates an instance config without overwriting one. Mos rules
|
||||
on the canon change before the build.
|
||||
3. Unit names and templates. The bus, Console and Discord units per instance, how `MOSAIC_CONFIG` and the
|
||||
Claude env file reach each unit, and how the current unit names stay valid for the default instance.
|
||||
4. Ports. Each instance's Console and tester ports, with a refusal when two instances claim the same port.
|
||||
5. Stack copies and the pointer. Whether copies are shared between instances (read-only trees, so sharing
|
||||
may be fine) and how the pointer, activation log, backups and `flags_drift` stay per instance.
|
||||
`stack-release.sh` and `stack-copy.sh` take the instance.
|
||||
6. Secrets. The per-instance Claude session env file and the secrets slot root, resolved from the instance's
|
||||
config dir (the Q175 design resolves its slot the same way: `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`).
|
||||
7. Isolation proof. What the tests show: two instances started side by side on stand-in units and scratch
|
||||
roots, each reads only its own config and data root, a command aimed at one never touches the other, and
|
||||
the default instance's paths and unit names are byte-identical to today.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file. Use the stand-in
|
||||
systemctl, units and scratch roots that `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` already builds.
|
||||
- Standing up a real second instance on dragon-lin is a later window under Q173, with a backup first and a
|
||||
STATE report after. Exposing a new Console through the tunnel or Traefik changes who can reach it from
|
||||
outside, so it waits for Jason. SSO (Q175, #412) comes first for any instance a second user can reach.
|
||||
- Merge-chaining (Q177): rows that need instances (human users, kill switch, lifecycle) may build on this
|
||||
row's candidate. This row keeps its own review and gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Filbert approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
|
||||
Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
# Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso)
|
||||
|
||||
Sage, 2026-10-20, for Q175 (Jason's ruling), mos-0971/0973/0977 and Vikunja #412. Gitea #1690. MVP T1 item 2. Owner
|
||||
Launchpad, reviewer Webby (mos-0981), gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
|
||||
|
||||
The design is approved: `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` at d55d86bb0 (blob eba861f5d2bb), Filbert r3
|
||||
approve plus the D1/D2 ack, Mos C1 confirmation in mos-0977, whose straggler-check condition is in the phase 2 window at b416d2ede. Build phase 1 exactly as the design says. If
|
||||
the code shows the design is wrong somewhere, stop and tell Sage, Webby and Filbert before building around it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope (phase 1 only, design section 5 item 1)
|
||||
|
||||
- oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly (design section 2). No other new dependency.
|
||||
- The OIDC relying party in the Console: `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, `/auth/signed-out`,
|
||||
the callback steps 1-7, our own checks on top of the library, and sessions, cookies and Host rules
|
||||
(design sections 1 and 3).
|
||||
- The shared loader, `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`, accepts an optional `console` key and checks only its
|
||||
shape. The slot file checks and the read run in the Console's `--sso` start, and the slot resolves from
|
||||
the config dir (section 4, D1, D2).
|
||||
- The degraded start for an unreachable provider, and the unreachable/refused classes (Q-B, section 4).
|
||||
- `--sso` for `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`, with its refusals against the old flags.
|
||||
- The tester listener rules (section 6).
|
||||
- The page: both fetch paths in `packages/webui/src/public/app.js` (:111 and :305) treat a 401
|
||||
`sign-in required` as signed out, and the notice links to `/auth/login?return=<path>` (C2).
|
||||
- Logging as the design says, including the Q-E `subject-unknown` line.
|
||||
|
||||
Out of scope: the phase 2 window, the live config.json key, phase 3 removals, the proxy-forwarded token
|
||||
(section 7), and any change to the live Console.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests and mutants
|
||||
|
||||
Design section 9: tests 1-25, the positive paths, and every listed mutant, each killed by its named test.
|
||||
All tests run against the fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. No test reaches a real
|
||||
provider or Authentik, and no test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a
|
||||
slot file. Test 25 goes in `scripts/test-config.sh`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- No request of any kind to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or the live 127.0.0.1:7332 (mos-0971,
|
||||
design section 8).
|
||||
- No credential value is read, printed or logged.
|
||||
- `npm install` runs only inside the worktree that has its own package.json, never in a directory that would
|
||||
walk up to home.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Webby approves the manifest. Filbert approved the design and answers design questions. The webui and cli suites, `scripts/test-config.sh` and every
|
||||
`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.
|
||||
+4
-1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->
|
||||
|
||||
Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
|
||||
Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2236 by `queue render`. Do not e
|
||||
| 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
|
||||
| 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
|
||||
| 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
|
||||
| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
|
||||
| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
|
||||
| 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- mosaic-queue:end -->
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+471
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"canonicalRoot": "/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack",
|
||||
"revision": 2236,
|
||||
"revision": 2247,
|
||||
"rows": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 1,
|
||||
@@ -19820,6 +19820,153 @@
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-20T10:31:30.403Z",
|
||||
"updatedAt": "2026-10-20T11:11:25.098Z",
|
||||
"updatedBy": "sage"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 189,
|
||||
"piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
|
||||
"owner": "sage",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1687
|
||||
],
|
||||
"closes": [
|
||||
1687
|
||||
],
|
||||
"state": "in-review",
|
||||
"previousState": null,
|
||||
"required": false,
|
||||
"requiredSince": null,
|
||||
"gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
|
||||
"blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"after": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 163,
|
||||
"when": "done"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"dewey"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"review": {
|
||||
"rounds": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"n": 1,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
|
||||
"issue": 1687,
|
||||
"candidate": {
|
||||
"kind": "manifest",
|
||||
"digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
|
||||
"text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584 agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"request": "comment",
|
||||
"attempts": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
|
||||
"state": "posted",
|
||||
"comment": 29457,
|
||||
"transport": {
|
||||
"outcome": "posted",
|
||||
"status": 201,
|
||||
"comment": 29457,
|
||||
"detail": "created"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"resolutions": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"duplicateRisk": false,
|
||||
"receipts": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"claim": {
|
||||
"seat": "sage",
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-start"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"blockedReason": null,
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
|
||||
"updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
|
||||
"updatedBy": "sage"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 190,
|
||||
"piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
|
||||
"owner": "darkwing",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1688
|
||||
],
|
||||
"closes": [
|
||||
1688
|
||||
],
|
||||
"state": "in-progress",
|
||||
"previousState": null,
|
||||
"required": false,
|
||||
"requiredSince": null,
|
||||
"gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
|
||||
"blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"after": [],
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"filbert"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"review": null,
|
||||
"claim": {
|
||||
"seat": "darkwing",
|
||||
"op": "darkwing-190-start"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"blockedReason": null,
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
|
||||
"updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
|
||||
"updatedBy": "darkwing"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 191,
|
||||
"piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
|
||||
"owner": "rocko",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1689
|
||||
],
|
||||
"closes": [
|
||||
1689
|
||||
],
|
||||
"state": "in-progress",
|
||||
"previousState": null,
|
||||
"required": false,
|
||||
"requiredSince": null,
|
||||
"gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
|
||||
"blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"after": [],
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"dewey"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"review": null,
|
||||
"claim": {
|
||||
"seat": "rocko",
|
||||
"op": "rocko-191-start"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"blockedReason": null,
|
||||
"createdAt": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
|
||||
"updatedAt": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
|
||||
"updatedBy": "rocko"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"log": [
|
||||
@@ -78756,6 +78903,329 @@
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-163-done rev 2236 row 163 in-review→done round 2"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "e44815d32d46b91ee37d4c3c4701716956ba35d29c16c24c89020cce345bd61b"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2237,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-add",
|
||||
"verb": "add",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"piece": "stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413)",
|
||||
"gate": "Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed",
|
||||
"brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md#Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1687
|
||||
],
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"owner": "sage",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"after": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 163,
|
||||
"when": "done"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"dewey"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:21:38.646Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 189,
|
||||
"from": null,
|
||||
"to": "queued",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send",
|
||||
"blob": "0444b774faf09084311357fdd59b0ef3a3d347eb"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-189-add rev 2237 row 189 none→queued"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "70bf9967156881afecaba9ccf4edf8cbc63a344eb7c6407b3453c950781f34c5"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2238,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-briefed",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 189,
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:22:01.437Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 189,
|
||||
"from": "queued",
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-189-briefed rev 2238 row 189 queued→briefed"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "27ee8a26722d3eaf4c4b346e06ffdb853037aad2d1a7fe14f440cbe1bb9a2a27"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2239,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-start",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 189,
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:22:18.476Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 189,
|
||||
"from": "briefed",
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-189-start rev 2239 row 189 briefed→in-progress"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "230578585341fcfc9429364332ca8b78988ffd669d3c1bb5e2e94a74d9916649"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2240,
|
||||
"op": "sage-190-add",
|
||||
"verb": "add",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"piece": "several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
|
||||
"gate": "Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed",
|
||||
"brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md#Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1688
|
||||
],
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"owner": "darkwing",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"after": null,
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"filbert"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:42:48.052Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 190,
|
||||
"from": null,
|
||||
"to": "queued",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host",
|
||||
"blob": "79fa60fbf17a352edc5431d6aabc77c72ec5c48f"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-190-add rev 2240 row 190 none→queued"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "b4319dbd993254b58e4db8be18769b04322028903e325c0c8cadcfdec527929f"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2241,
|
||||
"op": "sage-191-add",
|
||||
"verb": "add",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"piece": "one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414)",
|
||||
"gate": "Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed",
|
||||
"brief": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md#Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
|
||||
"issues": [
|
||||
1689
|
||||
],
|
||||
"note": null,
|
||||
"owner": "rocko",
|
||||
"gateOwner": "sage",
|
||||
"after": null,
|
||||
"reviewers": [
|
||||
"dewey"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"required": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:43:05.222Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 191,
|
||||
"from": null,
|
||||
"to": "queued",
|
||||
"brief": {
|
||||
"path": "docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md",
|
||||
"anchor": "Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches",
|
||||
"blob": "aed33125fa67ae69af73c18ffc9e2a83481421f3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-191-add rev 2241 row 191 none→queued"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "2cdc7c37430226f1ea01ed9f3d60a2c12be16eddac38d18dc16f889c7b54b14e"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2242,
|
||||
"op": "sage-190-brief",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 190,
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:43:25.630Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 190,
|
||||
"from": "queued",
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-190-brief rev 2242 row 190 queued→briefed"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "6203315b484302369ce5ea7d854082a6bca4a95f9793e14ec123f57381234c95"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2243,
|
||||
"op": "sage-191-brief",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 191,
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:43:43.042Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 191,
|
||||
"from": "queued",
|
||||
"to": "briefed",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-191-brief rev 2243 row 191 queued→briefed"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "9cc7dda5fa676258e864dedfdf2f4e3904c8723ba9c36474cff76757f52e5c07"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2244,
|
||||
"op": "rocko-191-start",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 191,
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "rocko",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:45:05.621Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 191,
|
||||
"from": "briefed",
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok rocko-191-start rev 2244 row 191 briefed→in-progress"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "cd2423e53ac82a667c737852bef6adfdafba82987f37cd090f5484b15b3a0e0c"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2245,
|
||||
"op": "darkwing-190-start",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 190,
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "darkwing",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:45:23.430Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 190,
|
||||
"from": "briefed",
|
||||
"to": "in-progress",
|
||||
"round": null,
|
||||
"issue": null,
|
||||
"candidate": null,
|
||||
"receipt": "ok darkwing-190-start rev 2245 row 190 briefed→in-progress"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "014db845fb2e380678ab1250f2cd3c0d7b192dc39909416515482c810440149b"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2246,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-inreview-1",
|
||||
"verb": "move",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 189,
|
||||
"to": "in-review",
|
||||
"reason": null,
|
||||
"candidate": "agents/sage/work/queue-189/candidate-manifest.sha256",
|
||||
"evidence": null,
|
||||
"issue": null
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:46:06.124Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 189,
|
||||
"from": "in-progress",
|
||||
"to": "in-review",
|
||||
"round": 1,
|
||||
"issue": 1687,
|
||||
"candidate": {
|
||||
"kind": "manifest",
|
||||
"digest": "67af69bd579561fd8c20be2a47695240a9f09f119dbfff88a8e72e2a7416e668",
|
||||
"text": "70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md\n4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584 agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log\nddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh\n5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md\n38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf docs/TOOLS.md\nfe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs\n16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f scripts/stack-release.sh\n"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1 rev 2246 row 189 in-progress→in-review round 1 on #1687; request sage-189-inreview-1 requesting"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "d8a3aa936a9a819329e86679d0bfcf658d773d0f7cfd29c10587c6447f78e968"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"rev": 2247,
|
||||
"op": "sage-189-inreview-1.outcome",
|
||||
"verb": "review-outcome",
|
||||
"args": {
|
||||
"id": 189,
|
||||
"attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
|
||||
"outcome": "posted",
|
||||
"status": 201,
|
||||
"comment": 29457,
|
||||
"detail": "created"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"by": "sage",
|
||||
"at": "2026-10-20T18:46:24.267Z",
|
||||
"semantics": 2,
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"row": 189,
|
||||
"round": 1,
|
||||
"attempt": "sage-189-inreview-1",
|
||||
"state": "posted",
|
||||
"receipt": "ok sage-189-inreview-1.outcome rev 2247 row 189 round 1 request sage-189-inreview-1 posted comment 29457"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"viewSha": "6d7e91ae3cab0b76e5c5d791fb821b97c9da7db16389ff2d531d7b77d2a069f1"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+11
-1
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
|
||||
"version": "0.0.3",
|
||||
"license": "UNLICENSED",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1"
|
||||
"@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1",
|
||||
"oauth4webapi": "3.8.8"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sdk": {
|
||||
@@ -1933,6 +1934,15 @@
|
||||
"url": "https://opencollective.com/node-fetch"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/oauth4webapi": {
|
||||
"version": "3.8.8",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/oauth4webapi/-/oauth4webapi-3.8.8.tgz",
|
||||
"integrity": "sha512-8N28E+a/oxfXWBgOMt+ZP/JUf/XR+IFbvkAEPP3gznXOMv9BpAAwiIj0TFNz3tGTPc0ZQ8zmWBNgN1nAys0gng==",
|
||||
"license": "MIT",
|
||||
"funding": {
|
||||
"url": "https://github.com/sponsors/panva"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"node_modules/openai": {
|
||||
"version": "6.40.0",
|
||||
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/openai/-/openai-6.40.0.tgz",
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"description": "Minimal Mosaic Stack container proof of concept: one Pi agent, four local contract files, one real model request returning MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.",
|
||||
"license": "UNLICENSED",
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1"
|
||||
"@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1",
|
||||
"oauth4webapi": "3.8.8"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -129,6 +129,45 @@ Switching the Console, bus or wrapper, changing any unit, and starting or
|
||||
stopping either service requires Mos's go for that live step. Agents build
|
||||
and test fixtures; they stop before the live sequence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sign-in in the Console (Q175 phase 1, #1690)
|
||||
|
||||
`serve --sso [--send] [--tester-port N]` makes the Console an OpenID Connect
|
||||
relying party. It reads `console.sso` from the system config (`publicOrigin`
|
||||
and one or more providers, each with its issuer, client id, a client secret
|
||||
slot, the signing algorithms it accepts and the subjects allowed in). The
|
||||
design is `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`. `--sso` can't be combined
|
||||
with `--public-host`, `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`; `--send`
|
||||
takes `--sso` in place of the preview set.
|
||||
|
||||
- The client secret is read once at start from
|
||||
`<config dir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`. The start refuses a slot that is
|
||||
a symbolic link, not a regular file, owned by another user, has any group or
|
||||
other mode bit, or sits in the repository, the `--checkout` directory or a
|
||||
stack copy. The value is never printed.
|
||||
- At start the Console fetches each provider's discovery document and JWKS. A
|
||||
provider that can't be reached (a network error, a timeout, a status other
|
||||
than 200, or a body that isn't JSON) leaves the Console up with that
|
||||
provider's `/auth/login` at 503 and a retry every 5 s, doubling, capped at 5
|
||||
minutes. A document that fails a check (issuer, algorithms, S256, a usable
|
||||
key) refuses the start. `/healthz` adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable"
|
||||
| "refused" }`.
|
||||
- The Console listener serves only the Host of `publicOrigin`, whatever port
|
||||
it listens on. Any other Host, a loopback one included, gets 403 `public
|
||||
Host required`, except `GET /healthz`, which stays open on loopback for the
|
||||
status and release gates. The loopback operator path in the preview section
|
||||
above does not exist under `--sso`.
|
||||
- Without a session, `/api/*` gets 401 `sign-in required` and a page load gets
|
||||
a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`. The page then shows the signed-out line
|
||||
with a link back to sign-in. A session lasts at most 8 hours and ends after 1
|
||||
hour without a page load or a write; a restart ends every session.
|
||||
- The page shows Sign out only under `--sso`. It posts to `/auth/logout`, which
|
||||
ends the session and goes to the provider's end-session endpoint when it has
|
||||
one, or to `/auth/signed-out`.
|
||||
- With `--tester-port`, the tester listener refuses any request carrying an
|
||||
`Authorization` header, a `__Host-mosaic_session` or `__Host-mosaic_login`
|
||||
cookie, or an `x-authentik-*` header (403 `tester listener takes no
|
||||
sign-in`). It never serves `/auth/*`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Message a role (row 76, #1570)
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ export async function chatHTTP(req, res, { path, search, chat, named, send, prev
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== preview.origin) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!send || !named || !preview) return refuse(403, 'read-only');
|
||||
if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return refuse(401, 'unauthenticated');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the session was checked before this route.
|
||||
if (preview.sso !== true && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return refuse(401, 'unauthenticated');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,20 +7,23 @@ import { views } from '../../bus/src/views.mjs';
|
||||
import { loadSystem, socketPath, REPO, rolesDir } from '../../cli/src/config.mjs';
|
||||
import { configDir } from '../../business/src/business.mjs';
|
||||
import { consoleReads, redactor } from './reads.mjs';
|
||||
import { createSso, readSlot } from './sso.mjs';
|
||||
import { statSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { ID_PATTERN } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
|
||||
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
|
||||
const usage = 'node packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve [--port N] [--tester-port N] [--checkout PATH] [--board http://127.0.0.1:7331] [--business ID] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]]';
|
||||
const usage = 'node packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve [--port N] [--tester-port N] [--checkout PATH] [--board http://127.0.0.1:7331] [--business ID] [--sso [--send]] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]]';
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (args.length === 1 && ['--help', '-h'].includes(args[0])) { console.log(usage); process.exit(0); }
|
||||
if (args.shift() !== 'serve') throw new Error(usage);
|
||||
const options = { board: DEFAULT_BOARD, port: 7330 }, preview = {}, proofFlags = {};
|
||||
let sendOn = false, testerPort = null;
|
||||
let sendOn = false, ssoOn = false, testerPort = null;
|
||||
while (args.length) {
|
||||
const flag = args.shift();
|
||||
// Row 76 (#1570): the one flag without a value.
|
||||
if (flag === '--send') { sendOn = true; continue; }
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the Console signs people in itself, from console.sso in config.json.
|
||||
if (flag === '--sso') { ssoOn = true; continue; }
|
||||
const value = args.shift();
|
||||
if (!value) throw new Error(`missing value for ${flag}`);
|
||||
if (flag === '--port') {
|
||||
@@ -51,9 +54,10 @@ try {
|
||||
else throw new Error(`unknown option: ${flag}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (testerPort !== null && (testerPort === options.port || testerPort === 7332)) throw new Error('--tester-port must differ from --port and cannot be the forwarded port 7332');
|
||||
if (ssoOn && (Object.keys(preview).length || Object.keys(proofFlags).length)) throw new Error('--sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*');
|
||||
options.preview = previewOptions(preview);
|
||||
const proof = proofOptions(proofFlags, options.preview);
|
||||
if (sendOn && !options.preview) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)');
|
||||
if (sendOn && !options.preview && !ssoOn) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso');
|
||||
// The bus views (slice 1 S5) need the system config. Without it the
|
||||
// board still serves and the bus routes answer not-configured.
|
||||
// The Queue, Business and Settings reads (row 54) need no bus; without
|
||||
@@ -77,31 +81,46 @@ try {
|
||||
busLine = `Bus: ${options.business ?? 'the running bus host\'s business'}`;
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
const why = redactor({ configDir: configDir() })(err.message);
|
||||
if (ssoOn) throw new Error(`--sso needs the system config (${why})`);
|
||||
if (sendOn) throw new Error(`--send needs the bus configured (${why})`);
|
||||
if (testerPort !== null) throw new Error(`--tester-port needs the bus configured (${why})`);
|
||||
busLine = `Bus: not configured (${why})`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const reads = consoleReads({ root: REPO, queueRoot: options.checkout ?? REPO, system, configDir: configDir(), rolesDir: rolesDir(), business: options.business ?? null });
|
||||
const server = await startServer({ board: options.board, port: options.port, bus, reads, preview: options.preview, proof, send, settingsWrite, projectFiles, projectFile, projectSave, chat, nameWrite, assistantStop, instancesWrite, routesWrite });
|
||||
// The sign-in config is checked again here, then each slot file, before anything listens. A
|
||||
// provider that can't be reached starts degraded; one whose discovery is refused stops the start.
|
||||
let sso = null;
|
||||
if (ssoOn) {
|
||||
if (!system.console?.sso) throw new Error('--sso needs console.sso in the system config');
|
||||
const secrets = new Map(system.console.sso.providers.map(p => [p.id, readSlot(configDir(), p, { repo: REPO, checkout: options.checkout ?? null })]));
|
||||
sso = await createSso(system.console.sso, { secrets });
|
||||
}
|
||||
let server;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
server = await startServer({ board: options.board, port: options.port, bus, reads, preview: options.preview, sso, proof, send, settingsWrite, projectFiles, projectFile, projectSave, chat, nameWrite, assistantStop, instancesWrite, routesWrite });
|
||||
} catch (err) { sso?.close(); throw err; }
|
||||
let testerServer = null;
|
||||
if (testerPort !== null) {
|
||||
const call = busCaller({ dataRoot: system.dataRoot, socket: socketPath(system.dataRoot), business: options.business ?? null, cli: TESTER_CLI });
|
||||
const testerBus = { ...views({ call }), names: () => call('names'), instances: () => call('instances'), routes: () => call('routes') };
|
||||
try {
|
||||
testerServer = await startServer({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: testerPort, board: options.board,
|
||||
tester: true, testerProofHeader: proof?.header ?? null, testerAuthHeader: options.preview?.header ?? null, bus: testerBus, reads,
|
||||
tester: true, testerNoSignIn: ssoOn, testerProofHeader: proof?.header ?? null, testerAuthHeader: options.preview?.header ?? null, bus: testerBus, reads,
|
||||
projectFiles: args => call('project.files', args), projectFile: args => call('project.file', args),
|
||||
instancesWrite: args => call('instances.set', args), routesWrite: args => call('routes.set', args), nameWrite: args => call('name.set', args),
|
||||
// Row 177 (#1675): the tester's own chat, through the tester CLI; 7332's stays the human's.
|
||||
chat: createChat({ call }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
} catch (err) { await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); throw err; }
|
||||
} catch (err) { sso?.close(); await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); throw err; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
const previewLine = options.preview ? `\nPreview: https://${options.preview.host}/ through the proxy, signed-in user from ${options.preview.header}, ${send ? 'reads and human messages to roles (--send); one line per send below' : 'read-only'}` : '';
|
||||
const proofLine = `\nProxy: proxy proof ${proof ? 'on' : 'off'}`;
|
||||
// One line per provider: id, issuer, subject count and state. No client id, secret or sub.
|
||||
const health = sso?.health() ?? {};
|
||||
const ssoLines = sso ? `\nSign-in: ${sso.publicOrigin}/ (--sso), ${send ? 'reads and human writes (--send)' : 'read-only'}` + sso.summary().map(p => `\nSign-in provider: ${p.id} issuer ${p.issuer} subjects ${p.subjects} (${health[p.id]})`).join('') : '';
|
||||
const queueLine = options.checkout ? '\nQueue: read from the --checkout directory' : '';
|
||||
console.log(`Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/\nBoard: ${options.board}\n${busLine}${queueLine}${previewLine}${proofLine}${testerServer ? `\nTester Console: http://127.0.0.1:${testerServer.address().port}/ (binds the tester)` : ''}\nCtrl-C stops this server.`);
|
||||
for (const signal of ['SIGINT', 'SIGTERM']) process.once(signal, () => { server.close(); testerServer?.close(); });
|
||||
console.log(`Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/\nBoard: ${options.board}\n${busLine}${queueLine}${previewLine}${ssoLines}${proofLine}${testerServer ? `\nTester Console: http://127.0.0.1:${testerServer.address().port}/ (binds the tester)` : ''}\nCtrl-C stops this server.`);
|
||||
for (const signal of ['SIGINT', 'SIGTERM']) process.once(signal, () => { sso?.close(); server.close(); testerServer?.close(); });
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
console.error(`refused: ${err.message}`);
|
||||
process.exitCode = 2;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
|
||||
// The first one sets body.signed-out (the listener below); after that no Console fetch is made.
|
||||
const out = () => document.body.classList.contains('signed-out');
|
||||
const signOut = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new Event('mosaic-signed-out')); };
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the Console itself answers a read without a session with 401
|
||||
// `sign-in required`; that signs the page out too, and the line links to the Console's sign-in.
|
||||
// Any other 401 stays an error. `sso` comes from /api/config.
|
||||
let sso = false;
|
||||
const signInRequired = (res, body) => res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required';
|
||||
const signedOut = () => Object.assign(new Error('the sign-in proxy redirected it, so it never reached the Console'), { signedOut: true });
|
||||
const labels = { registration: 'registered', 'first-user-message': 'first message', 'tmux-pane': 'tmux pane', 'session-cwd': 'session cwd', 'workspace-git-root': 'git root' };
|
||||
const source = value => value ? `<span class="source">${esc(labels[value] || value)}</span>` : '';
|
||||
@@ -110,6 +115,7 @@
|
||||
const res = await fetch(path, { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' });
|
||||
if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
let body; try { body = await res.json(); } catch { body = { error: `HTTP ${res.status}` }; }
|
||||
if (signInRequired(res, body)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
return { ok: res.ok, body };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function blockNode(b) {
|
||||
@@ -304,6 +310,7 @@
|
||||
const res = await fetch(path, value === undefined ? { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' } : { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify(value), redirect: 'manual' });
|
||||
if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
const result = await res.json();
|
||||
if (signInRequired(res, result)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw Object.assign(new Error(result.error || `HTTP ${res.status}`), { status: res.status });
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -452,7 +459,7 @@
|
||||
});
|
||||
// Signed out: everything drawn from a Console read goes, because none of it can be refreshed. The
|
||||
// line says so once; the send form (bus.js) keeps its draft and receipt. Reload is the way back.
|
||||
document.addEventListener('mosaic-signed-out', () => {
|
||||
document.addEventListener('mosaic-signed-out', e => {
|
||||
if (out()) return;
|
||||
document.body.classList.add('signed-out');
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer); convGen++;
|
||||
@@ -461,9 +468,13 @@
|
||||
for (const id of ['projects', 'waiting', 'seen', 'sessions']) $(id).replaceChildren();
|
||||
$('refresh').disabled = $('pause').disabled = true;
|
||||
const line = $('signed-out');
|
||||
line.innerHTML = '<p><b>Signed out.</b> Reload the page to sign in.</p>'; line.hidden = false;
|
||||
line.innerHTML = sso || e.detail?.signIn
|
||||
? `<p><b>Signed out.</b> <a href="/auth/login?${esc(new URLSearchParams({ return: location.pathname + location.search }))}">Sign in again</a>.</p>`
|
||||
: '<p><b>Signed out.</b> Reload the page to sign in.</p>';
|
||||
line.hidden = false; $('sign-out').hidden = true;
|
||||
// Focus moves to the line only if what had it is gone or disabled, never out of a form being typed in.
|
||||
setTimeout(() => { const a = document.activeElement; if (!a || a === document.body || a.disabled || !a.getClientRects().length) line.focus(); });
|
||||
});
|
||||
api('/api/config').then(config => { board = config.board; $('board-url').textContent = `Board: ${board}`; }).catch(err => { if (machine) error(err); }).finally(refresh);
|
||||
// Sign out (sage-1347, F7): a plain same-origin form POST to /auth/logout, shown only under --sso.
|
||||
api('/api/config').then(config => { board = config.board; $('board-url').textContent = `Board: ${board}`; if (config.sso === true) { sso = true; $('sign-out').hidden = out(); } }).catch(err => { if (machine) error(err); }).finally(refresh);
|
||||
})();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
|
||||
const out = () => document.body.classList.contains('signed-out');
|
||||
const signOut = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new Event('mosaic-signed-out')); };
|
||||
const signedOut = () => new ReadError('signed-out', 'The sign-in proxy redirected the read.', 0);
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, sage-1340 F1): under --sso a read without a session gets 401 `sign-in
|
||||
// required` from the Console itself. That signs out the same way; any other 401 stays an error.
|
||||
const signInRequired = (res, body) => res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required';
|
||||
const signOutSso = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('mosaic-signed-out', { detail: { signIn: true } })); };
|
||||
// `replies` takes a message id as `id`; trail takes `subject`.
|
||||
async function fetchRead(verb, subject) {
|
||||
if (out()) throw signedOut();
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +42,7 @@
|
||||
catch { throw new ReadError('unreachable', 'The Console server did not answer.', 0); }
|
||||
if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
try { body = await res.json(); } catch { throw new ReadError('unreachable', 'The Console server did not answer.', 0); }
|
||||
if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows)) throw new ReadError(typeof body?.error === 'string' ? body.error : 'invalid-response', typeof body?.message === 'string' ? body.message : `HTTP ${res.status}`, res.status);
|
||||
return { ...body, rows: body.rows, at: body.at };
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +55,7 @@
|
||||
try { res = await fetch(`/api/${path}`, { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' }); } catch { throw unreachable(); }
|
||||
if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
try { body = await res.json(); } catch { throw unreachable(); }
|
||||
if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }
|
||||
if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) throw Object.assign(new ReadError(typeof body?.error === 'string' ? body.error : 'invalid-response', typeof body?.message === 'string' ? body.message : `HTTP ${res.status}`, res.status), { module: true });
|
||||
return body;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
<header class="cmdbar"><a href="/" class="wordmark"><svg class="mark" viewBox="0 0 16 17" aria-hidden="true"><use href="/icons.svg#mark"/></svg>Mosaic<small>Console</small></a>
|
||||
<button type="button" class="cmdk" id="cmdk" aria-haspopup="dialog" aria-controls="cmdk-dialog"><svg class="i" aria-hidden="true"><use href="/icons.svg#i-search"/></svg><span>Go to a view, decision or task</span><kbd>Ctrl K</kbd></button>
|
||||
<p class="fresh" id="fresh"><span id="fresh-board"></span><span id="fresh-bus"></span></p>
|
||||
<div class="cmd-right"><label>Palette<select id="palette"></select></label><label>Appearance<select id="mode"><option value="system">system</option><option value="light">light</option><option value="dim">dim</option><option value="dark">dark</option></select></label><button class="btn" id="refresh" type="button">Refresh</button><button class="btn" id="pause" type="button" aria-pressed="false">Pause</button></div></header>
|
||||
<div class="cmd-right"><label>Palette<select id="palette"></select></label><label>Appearance<select id="mode"><option value="system">system</option><option value="light">light</option><option value="dim">dim</option><option value="dark">dark</option></select></label><button class="btn" id="refresh" type="button">Refresh</button><button class="btn" id="pause" type="button" aria-pressed="false">Pause</button><form id="sign-out" method="post" action="/auth/logout" hidden><button class="btn" type="submit">Sign out</button></form></div></header>
|
||||
<div class="frame">
|
||||
<nav class="tree" aria-label="Console"><h2 class="tree-title">Console</h2><ul class="s1-sections" id="sections"></ul><div id="board-tree"><h2 class="tree-title">Projects</h2><div id="projects"><p class="muted">Loading projects…</p></div><p class="small muted">Select a project to filter sessions. Waiting on you always shows all projects.</p></div></nav>
|
||||
<main id="main" class="content" tabindex="-1"><div id="signed-out" class="banner ref" role="alert" tabindex="-1" hidden></div><div id="bus-down" class="banner err" role="alert" hidden></div><div class="page-head" id="board-head"><div><h1>Control board</h1><p id="status" class="small muted" role="status">Loading board…</p></div><div class="filters"><label><input id="show-machine" type="checkbox">Show machine sessions</label></div></div>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ async function body(req, max = 4096) {
|
||||
// Row 65 (mos-0840) adds `routes`: each instance's harness, model, thinking and fallback.
|
||||
const BUS_VERBS = ['inbox', 'tasks', 'agents', 'trail', 'decisions', 'credentials', 'replies', 'messages', 'usage', 'limits', 'names', 'instances', 'routes'];
|
||||
const DECISION_LISTS = ['roles', 'recent'];
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, F8): either sign-in cookie, which the tester listener refuses under --sso.
|
||||
const SIGN_IN_COOKIE = /(?:^|;)\s*__host-mosaic_(?:session|login)\s*=/i;
|
||||
// Row 177 (#1675): the chat writes the tester listener lets through, exactly the four chatHTTP routes.
|
||||
const TESTER_CHAT_WRITE = /^\/api\/chat\/(?:projects|threads|threads\/[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\/(?:messages|open))$/i;
|
||||
async function busRead(res, bus, verb, search) {
|
||||
@@ -160,14 +162,18 @@ async function busRead(res, bus, verb, search) {
|
||||
// broker's to refuse. Nothing retries; an outcome the bus can't confirm is reported as unknown.
|
||||
const SEND_KEYS = ['to', 'body', 'in_reply_to'];
|
||||
const one = (req, name) => (req.headersDistinct[name]?.length === 1 ? req.headersDistinct[name][0] : null);
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the writer comes from a session the handler already checked,
|
||||
// so it carries `sso: true` and the public origin; the preview writer still checks its header.
|
||||
const signedIn = (req, p) => p.sso === true || one(req, p.header) === p.user;
|
||||
const ownOrigin = p => p.origin ?? `https://${p.host}`;
|
||||
async function busSend(req, res, { send, preview, log }) {
|
||||
if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
if (!signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
let to = null;
|
||||
// `to` is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line.
|
||||
const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} send user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} to=${typeof to === 'string' ? JSON.stringify(to.slice(0, 64)) : 'none'} ${outcome}`);
|
||||
// `sent` tells the page which it was: false, nothing was written; 'unknown', it may have been.
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a send needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a send needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'a send needs Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin');
|
||||
let value;
|
||||
try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
|
||||
@@ -241,10 +247,10 @@ export function proofOptions({ proofHeader, proofFile } = {}, preview = null) {
|
||||
// REQ-WEB-1: same signed-in send boundary, a distinct strict settings payload.
|
||||
async function settingsSend(req, res, { settingsWrite, preview, log }) {
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message) => json(res, status, { error, message, sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) {
|
||||
if (!signedIn(req, preview)) {
|
||||
return refuse(401, 'sign-in required', 'sign in again');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) {
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) {
|
||||
return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'settings need the Console origin');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') {
|
||||
@@ -292,8 +298,8 @@ async function seatSend(req, res, { route, write, preview, log }) {
|
||||
// The instance is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line.
|
||||
const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} ${route.kind} user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instance=${quoted(instance)} ${outcome}`);
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
|
||||
let value;
|
||||
try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
|
||||
@@ -335,8 +341,8 @@ async function instanceSend(req, res, { instancesWrite, preview, log }) {
|
||||
// The instance is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line. Vars are never logged.
|
||||
const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} instance user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instance=${quoted(instance)} ${outcome}`);
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
|
||||
let value;
|
||||
try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
|
||||
@@ -382,8 +388,8 @@ async function routesSend(req, res, { routesWrite, preview, log }) {
|
||||
let names = [];
|
||||
const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} routes user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instances=${quoted(names.join(','))} ${outcome}`);
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
|
||||
let value;
|
||||
try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
|
||||
@@ -420,8 +426,8 @@ async function projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview, log }) {
|
||||
const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} project-file user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} project=${quoted(target?.project)} path=${quoted(target?.path)} ${outcome}`);
|
||||
// `sent` tells the page which it was: false, nothing was written; 'unknown', it may have been.
|
||||
const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
|
||||
if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a save needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (!signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
|
||||
if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a save needs the Console\'s own Origin');
|
||||
if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'a save needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
|
||||
let value;
|
||||
try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, FILE_SAVE_MAX)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
|
||||
@@ -460,13 +466,17 @@ async function projectFileRead(res, read, path, search) {
|
||||
return json(res, busStatus(code), { error: code, message: err instanceof BusReadError ? err.message : code });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// `send` is the bus write (row 76): `args => Promise<{id}>`, only with the preview mode. `log`
|
||||
// `send` is the bus write (row 76): `args => Promise<{id}>`, only with the preview mode or `sso`.
|
||||
// `sso` is createSso() from sso.mjs (Q175 phase 1): the human listener signs people in itself.
|
||||
// `testerNoSignIn` makes the tester listener refuse anything that looks like a sign-in (--sso). `log`
|
||||
// takes one line per send attempt that got past sign-in; never the body. `fieldsFile` is for
|
||||
// tests; the field table is otherwise the committed packages/tasks/fields.json.
|
||||
export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEFAULT_BOARD, timeout = 20000, bus = null, reads = null, preview = null, tester = false, testerAuthHeader = null, proof = null, testerProofHeader = null, send = null, settingsWrite = null, projectFiles = null, projectFile = null, projectSave = null, chat = null, nameWrite = null, assistantStop = null, instancesWrite = null, routesWrite = null, log = line => console.log(line), fieldsFile = undefined } = {}) {
|
||||
export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEFAULT_BOARD, timeout = 20000, bus = null, reads = null, preview = null, sso = null, tester = false, testerNoSignIn = false, testerAuthHeader = null, proof = null, testerProofHeader = null, send = null, settingsWrite = null, projectFiles = null, projectFile = null, projectSave = null, chat = null, nameWrite = null, assistantStop = null, instancesWrite = null, routesWrite = null, log = line => console.log(line), fieldsFile = undefined } = {}) {
|
||||
if (!isLoopback(host)) throw new Error('refusing to bind to non-loopback host');
|
||||
if (host === 'localhost') host = '127.0.0.1';
|
||||
if (tester && preview !== null) throw new Error('tester listener cannot use preview mode');
|
||||
if (tester && sso !== null) throw new Error('tester listener cannot use sso');
|
||||
if (sso !== null && (preview !== null || proof !== null)) throw new Error('--sso cannot be combined with --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*');
|
||||
if (tester && host !== '127.0.0.1') throw new Error('tester listener must bind 127.0.0.1');
|
||||
// Row 177 (#1675): chat is allowed. The tester listener's chat binds the tester, so the bus keeps it on tester threads.
|
||||
if (tester && [send, settingsWrite, projectSave, assistantStop].some(value => value !== null)) throw new Error('tester listener permits only instance, route, name and chat writes');
|
||||
@@ -476,21 +486,26 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
|
||||
throw new Error('preview mode needs --public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user together');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (proof !== null && (preview === null || tester)) throw new Error('proxy proof needs preview mode');
|
||||
if (send !== null && (preview === null || typeof send !== 'function')) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)');
|
||||
if (send !== null && ((preview === null && sso === null) || typeof send !== 'function')) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso');
|
||||
const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
|
||||
res.setHeader('x-content-type-options', 'nosniff');
|
||||
res.setHeader('referrer-policy', 'no-referrer');
|
||||
res.setHeader('content-security-policy', "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'");
|
||||
// Under --sso the Sign out form's POST is redirected to the provider's end-session endpoint, and
|
||||
// browsers apply form-action to that redirect, so those origins (from discovery) are allowed too.
|
||||
res.setHeader('content-security-policy', `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'${sso ? sso.formTargets().map(o => ` ${o}`).join('') : ''}`);
|
||||
// Presence, even with an empty value: never turn the public listener into a tester ingress.
|
||||
if (!tester && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'x-mosaic-tester')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'tester listener required' });
|
||||
if (tester && testerAuthHeader && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, testerAuthHeader.toLowerCase())) return json(res, 403, { error: 'proxy header refused' });
|
||||
if (tester && testerProofHeader && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, testerProofHeader.toLowerCase())) return json(res, 403, { error: 'proxy proof header refused' });
|
||||
// Under --sso the tester listener reads no cookie and takes no sign-in of any kind (design section 6).
|
||||
if (tester && testerNoSignIn && (Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'authorization') || SIGN_IN_COOKIE.test(req.headers.cookie ?? '') || Object.keys(req.headers).some(h => h.startsWith('x-authentik-'))))
|
||||
return json(res, 403, { error: 'tester listener takes no sign-in' });
|
||||
let path, search;
|
||||
// Node keeps the first of repeated Host headers; a second one (a loopback Host, then NAME) is
|
||||
// never legitimate, so it is refused before any check reads the Host.
|
||||
if ((req.headersDistinct.host?.length ?? 0) > 1) return json(res, 400, { error: 'repeated Host refused' });
|
||||
// Preview mode: a request for the public name, exactly, as the proxy forwards it.
|
||||
const named = preview !== null && (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === preview.host;
|
||||
const named = preview !== null ? (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === preview.host : sso !== null && (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === sso.publicHost;
|
||||
// The proof precedes every auth-header read, including the wrong-Host fence.
|
||||
if (proof !== null) {
|
||||
const values = req.headersDistinct[proof.header];
|
||||
@@ -512,19 +527,34 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
|
||||
}
|
||||
({ pathname: path, search } = new URL(req.url, 'http://localhost'));
|
||||
} catch { return json(res, 400, { error: 'invalid URL' }); }
|
||||
// Under --sso the human listener serves only the public Host, whatever its port; GET /healthz
|
||||
// alone stays open on a loopback Host for the status and release gates (Q-C).
|
||||
if (sso !== null && !named && !(path === '/healthz' && req.method === 'GET')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'public Host required' });
|
||||
// No CORS. JSON content type and same-origin checks keep browser forms out.
|
||||
if (req.headers.origin && req.headers.origin !== (named ? `https://${preview.host}` : `http://${req.headers.host}`)) return json(res, 403, { error: 'cross-origin request refused' });
|
||||
if (named) {
|
||||
if (req.headers.origin && req.headers.origin !== (named ? (sso ? sso.publicOrigin : `https://${preview.host}`) : `http://${req.headers.host}`)) return json(res, 403, { error: 'cross-origin request refused' });
|
||||
let signer = preview;
|
||||
if (sso !== null && named) {
|
||||
if (path.startsWith('/auth/')) return sso.handle(req, res, path, search);
|
||||
// Only a page load or a write keeps a session alive; the page's background reads don't (Q-D).
|
||||
const session = path === '/healthz' ? null : sso.session(req, { touch: req.method === 'POST' || (req.method === 'GET' && !path.startsWith('/api/')) });
|
||||
if (!session && path !== '/healthz') {
|
||||
if (path.startsWith('/api/') || req.method !== 'GET') return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
res.writeHead(303, { location: `/auth/login?return=${encodeURIComponent(path + search)}`, 'cache-control': 'no-store' });
|
||||
return res.end();
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (session) signer = { sso: true, user: session.name, host: sso.publicHost, origin: sso.publicOrigin };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (named && preview !== null) {
|
||||
// One value, equal to the user id; the proxy strips client copies and sets it after sign-in.
|
||||
const values = req.headersDistinct[preview.header];
|
||||
if (!values || values.length !== 1 || values[0] !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
}
|
||||
const writer = tester ? { tester: true, user: 'tester', origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}` } : preview;
|
||||
const writer = tester ? { tester: true, user: 'tester', origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}` } : signer;
|
||||
if (tester && !['GET', 'HEAD'].includes(req.method) && !['/api/instances', '/api/routes', '/api/name'].includes(path) && !TESTER_CHAT_WRITE.test(path))
|
||||
return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', sent: false });
|
||||
if(path==='/api/settings'&&req.method==='POST'){
|
||||
if(!send||!settingsWrite||!named)return json(res,403,{error:'read-only',sent:false});
|
||||
return settingsSend(req,res,{settingsWrite,preview,log});
|
||||
return settingsSend(req,res,{settingsWrite,preview:signer,log});
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (Object.hasOwn(SEAT_ROUTES, path)) {
|
||||
if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
|
||||
@@ -544,18 +574,18 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (path === '/api/project-file' && req.method === 'POST') {
|
||||
if (!send || !projectSave || !named) return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', sent: false });
|
||||
return projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview, log });
|
||||
return projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview: signer, log });
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Message sending has its own bounded payload and repeats the identity check.
|
||||
if (send && path === '/api/bus/message') {
|
||||
if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
|
||||
return busSend(req, res, { send, preview, log });
|
||||
return busSend(req, res, { send, preview: signer, log });
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (path === '/api/chat' || path.startsWith('/api/chat/')) {
|
||||
return chatHTTP(req, res, { path, search, chat, named, send, preview: writer, log });
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Nothing else but GET and HEAD gets past here in preview mode, whatever the Host.
|
||||
if (preview !== null && req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', message: 'the Console preview is read-only' });
|
||||
if ((preview !== null || sso !== null) && req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', message: 'the Console preview is read-only' });
|
||||
// The conversation routes (#1507, CHAT-02) keep their query; the board validates it.
|
||||
const conversation = path === '/api/conversations' || path === '/api/conversation';
|
||||
const allowed = path === '/api/board' || conversation ? 'GET' : ['/api/seen', '/api/reply'].includes(path) ? 'POST' : null;
|
||||
@@ -607,8 +637,8 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
|
||||
if (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
|
||||
// `send`: the page shows the composer only where a send can pass (the public name, --send on).
|
||||
// `edit`: the editor shows Save only where a save can pass, the same test as the route's.
|
||||
if (path === '/api/config') return json(res, 200, { board: upstream, ...(tester ? { tester: true } : {}), send: !tester && Boolean(send) && named, edit: !tester && Boolean(send) && Boolean(projectSave) && named });
|
||||
if (path === '/healthz') return json(res, 200, { ok: true });
|
||||
if (path === '/api/config') return json(res, 200, { board: upstream, ...(tester ? { tester: true } : {}), ...(sso ? { sso: true } : {}), send: !tester && Boolean(send) && named, edit: !tester && Boolean(send) && Boolean(projectSave) && named });
|
||||
if (path === '/healthz') return json(res, 200, { ok: true, ...(sso ? { sso: sso.health() } : {}) });
|
||||
if (path === '/favicon.ico') { res.writeHead(204); return res.end(); }
|
||||
const file = files.get(path);
|
||||
if (!file) return json(res, 404, { error: 'not found' });
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the shape of config.json's optional `console` key. The one loader,
|
||||
// scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, runs this on every read, so a bad key refuses the config for every
|
||||
// tool (design section 4, C1). The Console's --sso start runs it again before it uses the value.
|
||||
// Shape only: nothing here touches the network or a slot file. A refusal names the key path and
|
||||
// never quotes a value, so a refusal can't print a client id or a subject.
|
||||
|
||||
// The asymmetric algorithms oauth4webapi 3.8.8 verifies (its supported(), build/index.js). No HS*
|
||||
// and no none, so a client secret can never be a signing key.
|
||||
export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['PS256', 'ES256', 'RS256', 'PS384', 'ES384', 'RS384', 'PS512', 'ES512', 'RS512', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA', 'ML-DSA-44', 'ML-DSA-65', 'ML-DSA-87']);
|
||||
const PROVIDER_ID = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;
|
||||
const SLOT = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,64}$/;
|
||||
const SUB = /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,255}$/;
|
||||
const CLIENT_ID = /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,255}$/;
|
||||
// The name goes where the preview's --allow-user went (serve.mjs USER): visible ASCII, no comma.
|
||||
const NAME = /^[\x21-\x2b\x2d-\x7e]{1,64}$/;
|
||||
// The bus keeps these for the tester and the human role (section 6), so no subject can sign in as one.
|
||||
const RESERVED_NAMES = ['tester', 'human'];
|
||||
|
||||
const object = v => typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
|
||||
function refuse(where, why) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`${where} ${why}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function keys(value, where, allowed, required = allowed) {
|
||||
if (!object(value)) refuse(where, 'must be a JSON object');
|
||||
for (const key of Object.keys(value)) if (!allowed.includes(key)) refuse(`${where}.${key}`, 'is not a supported key');
|
||||
for (const key of required) if (!Object.hasOwn(value, key)) refuse(`${where}.${key}`, 'is required');
|
||||
}
|
||||
function httpsURL(value, where) {
|
||||
let url;
|
||||
if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length > 512) refuse(where, 'must be an https URL of at most 512 characters');
|
||||
try { url = new URL(value); } catch { refuse(where, 'must be an https URL'); }
|
||||
if (url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash || value.includes('?') || value.includes('#')) {
|
||||
refuse(where, 'must be https with no credentials, query or fragment');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return url;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Returns the value unchanged when it passes; throws an Error naming the bad key path otherwise.
|
||||
export function checkConsole(value, where = 'console') {
|
||||
keys(value, where, ['sso']);
|
||||
const sso = value.sso, at = `${where}.sso`;
|
||||
keys(sso, at, ['publicOrigin', 'providers']);
|
||||
const origin = httpsURL(sso.publicOrigin, `${at}.publicOrigin`);
|
||||
if (origin.origin !== sso.publicOrigin) refuse(`${at}.publicOrigin`, 'must be an https origin with no path, query, fragment or trailing slash');
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(sso.providers) || sso.providers.length === 0 || sso.providers.length > 8) refuse(`${at}.providers`, 'must be a list of 1 to 8 providers');
|
||||
const ids = new Set();
|
||||
sso.providers.forEach((p, i) => {
|
||||
const pat = `${at}.providers[${i}]`;
|
||||
keys(p, pat, ['id', 'issuer', 'clientId', 'clientSecret', 'algs', 'subjects']);
|
||||
if (typeof p.id !== 'string' || !PROVIDER_ID.test(p.id)) refuse(`${pat}.id`, 'must match [a-z0-9-]{1,32}');
|
||||
if (ids.has(p.id)) refuse(`${pat}.id`, 'repeats an earlier provider id');
|
||||
ids.add(p.id);
|
||||
httpsURL(p.issuer, `${pat}.issuer`);
|
||||
if (typeof p.clientId !== 'string' || !CLIENT_ID.test(p.clientId)) refuse(`${pat}.clientId`, 'must be 1 to 255 visible characters');
|
||||
keys(p.clientSecret, `${pat}.clientSecret`, ['slot']);
|
||||
if (typeof p.clientSecret.slot !== 'string' || !SLOT.test(p.clientSecret.slot)) refuse(`${pat}.clientSecret.slot`, 'must match [a-z0-9-]{1,64}');
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(p.algs) || p.algs.length === 0) refuse(`${pat}.algs`, 'must be a non-empty list');
|
||||
p.algs.forEach((alg, j) => {
|
||||
if (!ALGS.includes(alg)) refuse(`${pat}.algs[${j}]`, `must be one of ${ALGS.join(', ')}; HS* and none are refused`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (new Set(p.algs).size !== p.algs.length) refuse(`${pat}.algs`, 'repeats an algorithm');
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(p.subjects) || p.subjects.length === 0 || p.subjects.length > 64) refuse(`${pat}.subjects`, 'must be a list of 1 to 64 subjects');
|
||||
const subs = new Set();
|
||||
p.subjects.forEach((s, j) => {
|
||||
const sat = `${pat}.subjects[${j}]`;
|
||||
keys(s, sat, ['sub', 'name']);
|
||||
if (typeof s.sub !== 'string' || !SUB.test(s.sub)) refuse(`${sat}.sub`, 'must be 1 to 255 visible characters');
|
||||
if (subs.has(s.sub)) refuse(`${sat}.sub`, 'repeats an earlier subject');
|
||||
subs.add(s.sub);
|
||||
if (typeof s.name !== 'string' || !NAME.test(s.name)) refuse(`${sat}.name`, 'must be 1 to 64 visible characters');
|
||||
if (RESERVED_NAMES.includes(s.name.toLowerCase())) refuse(`${sat}.name`, `must not be ${RESERVED_NAMES.join(' or ')}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
return value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md): the Console as an OIDC relying
|
||||
// party. Used only by the human listener under --sso; startServer refuses it on the tester listener.
|
||||
// Every URL handed to a provider is built from the configured publicOrigin, never from a request's
|
||||
// Host. A refusal logs one fixed code and the provider id, never an exception, its message or its
|
||||
// cause: oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims there.
|
||||
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
|
||||
import { closeSync, constants, fstatSync, lstatSync, openSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
|
||||
import { join, relative, isAbsolute, resolve } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { checkConsole } from './sso-config.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
// oauth4webapi loads in createSso, not here: cli.mjs imports this module on every start, and a
|
||||
// Console without --sso must not need the package (pinned-copy.test.mjs builds copies whose lock
|
||||
// installs nothing). A real copy installs it from the root lock.
|
||||
let oauth;
|
||||
|
||||
export const SESSION_COOKIE = '__Host-mosaic_session';
|
||||
export const LOGIN_COOKIE = '__Host-mosaic_login';
|
||||
const ATTRS = 'Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax';
|
||||
const LOGIN_MAX_AGE = 600;
|
||||
const SESSION_ABSOLUTE = 8 * 3600 * 1000, SESSION_IDLE = 3600 * 1000;
|
||||
const MAX_SESSIONS = 64, MAX_LOGINS = 32;
|
||||
const FETCH_TIMEOUT = 10000;
|
||||
const RETRY_CAP = 300000;
|
||||
const CODES = new Set(['login-record-missing', 'state-mismatch', 'auth-error-response', 'grant-failed', 'id-token-invalid', 'signature-invalid', 'alg-refused', 'issuer-mismatch', 'subject-unknown', 'discovery-failed', 'jwks-failed']);
|
||||
|
||||
const sha256 = value => createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex');
|
||||
const escape = text => String(text).replace(/[&<>"']/g, c => `&#${c.charCodeAt(0)};`);
|
||||
const under = (parent, child) => { const rel = relative(parent, child); return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(rel)); };
|
||||
|
||||
// The slot file holding a provider's client secret (design section 4, D1). Only the Console's --sso
|
||||
// start calls this. A refusal names the provider and the check, never the path's contents.
|
||||
export function readSlot(configDir, provider, { repo, checkout = null, copies = join(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME || join(homedir(), '.local', 'share'), 'mosaic-stack', 'copies') } = {}) {
|
||||
const where = `console.sso provider ${provider.id} client secret slot`;
|
||||
const file = join(resolve(configDir), 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', provider.clientSecret.slot);
|
||||
let st;
|
||||
try { st = lstatSync(file); } catch { throw new Error(`${where} is missing`); }
|
||||
if (st.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error(`${where} must not be a symbolic link`);
|
||||
let fd, real, text;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
|
||||
st = fstatSync(fd);
|
||||
if (!st.isFile()) throw new Error(`${where} must be a regular file`);
|
||||
if (st.uid !== process.getuid()) throw new Error(`${where} must be owned by the Console's user`);
|
||||
if (st.mode & 0o077) throw new Error(`${where} must have no group or other permission bits`);
|
||||
real = realpathSync(file);
|
||||
for (const root of [repo, checkout, copies].filter(Boolean)) {
|
||||
let base;
|
||||
try { base = realpathSync(root); } catch { base = resolve(root); }
|
||||
if (under(base, real)) throw new Error(`${where} must not be inside the repository or a stack copy`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
text = readFileSync(fd, 'utf8');
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw err.message?.startsWith(where) ? err : new Error(`${where} is not readable`);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const secret = text.endsWith('\n') ? text.slice(0, -1) : text;
|
||||
if (!secret || /[\r\n]/.test(secret)) throw new Error(`${where} must hold one non-empty line`);
|
||||
return secret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function cookies(req, name) {
|
||||
const found = [];
|
||||
for (const part of (req.headers.cookie ?? '').split(';')) {
|
||||
const at = part.indexOf('=');
|
||||
if (at > 0 && part.slice(0, at).trim() === name) found.push(part.slice(at + 1).trim());
|
||||
}
|
||||
return found;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The JWKS check at discovery, the same filter the library's key selection uses (kty, alg, use,
|
||||
// key_ops, crv; RSA at least 2048 bits), without a kid since no token is at hand yet.
|
||||
function usableKey(jwk, alg) {
|
||||
const kty = { RS: 'RSA', PS: 'RSA', ES: 'EC', Ed: 'OKP', ML: 'AKP' }[alg.slice(0, 2)];
|
||||
if (jwk === null || typeof jwk !== 'object' || jwk.kty !== kty) return false;
|
||||
if (jwk.alg !== undefined && jwk.alg !== alg) return false;
|
||||
if (jwk.use !== undefined && jwk.use !== 'sig') return false;
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(jwk.key_ops) && !jwk.key_ops.includes('verify')) return false;
|
||||
const crv = { ES256: 'P-256', ES384: 'P-384', ES512: 'P-521', Ed25519: 'Ed25519', EdDSA: 'Ed25519' }[alg];
|
||||
if (crv && jwk.crv !== crv) return false;
|
||||
if (kty === 'RSA' && (typeof jwk.n !== 'string' || Buffer.from(jwk.n, 'base64url').length * 8 < 2048)) return false;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
class Unreachable extends Error {}
|
||||
class Refused extends Error {}
|
||||
const https = value => { try { return new URL(value).protocol === 'https:'; } catch { return false; } };
|
||||
|
||||
// One provider's discovery and JWKS. Throws Unreachable (network, timeout, a status other than 200,
|
||||
// a body that isn't JSON) or Refused (a JSON document that fails a check). Q-B, design section 4.
|
||||
async function discover(p, fetchOptions) {
|
||||
let response, text;
|
||||
const options = () => ({ ...fetchOptions, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
|
||||
try {
|
||||
response = await oauth.discoveryRequest(new URL(p.issuer), options());
|
||||
if (response.status !== 200 || !/^application\/json\b/i.test(response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '')) throw new Error();
|
||||
text = await response.text();
|
||||
JSON.parse(text);
|
||||
} catch { throw new Unreachable(); }
|
||||
let as;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
as = await oauth.processDiscoveryResponse(new URL(p.issuer), new Response(text, { status: 200, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } }));
|
||||
} catch { throw new Refused(); }
|
||||
if (as.issuer !== p.issuer) throw new Refused();
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(as.id_token_signing_alg_values_supported) || !p.algs.some(a => as.id_token_signing_alg_values_supported.includes(a))) throw new Refused();
|
||||
if (!Array.isArray(as.code_challenge_methods_supported) || !as.code_challenge_methods_supported.includes('S256')) throw new Refused();
|
||||
if (![as.authorization_endpoint, as.token_endpoint, as.jwks_uri].every(https)) throw new Refused();
|
||||
if (as.end_session_endpoint !== undefined && !https(as.end_session_endpoint)) throw new Refused();
|
||||
let jwks;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const fetcher = fetchOptions[oauth.customFetch] ?? fetch;
|
||||
const res = await fetcher(as.jwks_uri, { method: 'GET', headers: { accept: 'application/json, application/jwk-set+json' }, redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
|
||||
if (res.status !== 200) throw new Error();
|
||||
jwks = JSON.parse(await res.text());
|
||||
} catch { throw new Unreachable(); }
|
||||
if (jwks === null || typeof jwks !== 'object' || !Array.isArray(jwks.keys)) throw new Refused();
|
||||
const usable = p.algs.filter(alg => jwks.keys.some(k => usableKey(k, alg)));
|
||||
if (!usable.length) throw new Refused();
|
||||
return as;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// `config` is console.sso, checked again here; `secrets` maps provider id to its client secret
|
||||
// (readSlot). `fetch` is for tests: a fetch that trusts only the fake OP's certificate.
|
||||
// `retryFirst` is for tests too; production waits 5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes.
|
||||
export async function createSso(config, { secrets, fetch: customFetch = null, log = line => console.log(line), retryFirst = 5000 } = {}) {
|
||||
checkConsole({ sso: config });
|
||||
oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi');
|
||||
const publicOrigin = config.publicOrigin;
|
||||
const publicHost = new URL(publicOrigin).host;
|
||||
const redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;
|
||||
const fetchOptions = customFetch ? { [oauth.customFetch]: customFetch } : {};
|
||||
const sessions = new Map(), logins = new Map();
|
||||
const timers = new Set();
|
||||
let closed = false;
|
||||
const refuse = (code, provider, extra = '') => {
|
||||
if (!CODES.has(code)) throw new Error(`unknown sso log code ${code}`);
|
||||
log(`${new Date().toISOString()} sso refused code=${code} provider=${provider}${extra}`);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const providers = new Map(config.providers.map(p => {
|
||||
if (typeof secrets?.get(p.id) !== 'string') throw new Error(`console.sso provider ${p.id} has no client secret`);
|
||||
return [p.id, {
|
||||
config: p, state: 'unreachable', as: null, jwks: {},
|
||||
client: { client_id: p.clientId, id_token_signed_response_alg: [...p.algs] },
|
||||
auth: oauth.ClientSecretBasic(secrets.get(p.id)),
|
||||
subjects: new Map(p.subjects.map(s => [s.sub, s.name])),
|
||||
}];
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
async function attempt(entry, atStart) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
entry.as = await discover(entry.config, fetchOptions);
|
||||
entry.jwks = {};
|
||||
entry.state = 'ready';
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
if (err instanceof Refused) {
|
||||
entry.state = 'refused';
|
||||
refuse('discovery-failed', entry.config.id);
|
||||
if (atStart) throw new Error(`console.sso provider ${entry.config.id} refused at discovery: the issuer, algorithms, S256 or JWKS check failed`);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
entry.state = 'unreachable';
|
||||
refuse('discovery-failed', entry.config.id);
|
||||
throw err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
function retry(entry, delay) {
|
||||
if (closed) return;
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(async () => {
|
||||
timers.delete(timer);
|
||||
try { await attempt(entry, false); } catch { retry(entry, Math.min(delay * 2, RETRY_CAP)); }
|
||||
}, delay);
|
||||
timer.unref();
|
||||
timers.add(timer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const entry of providers.values()) {
|
||||
try { await attempt(entry, true); } catch (err) {
|
||||
if (!(err instanceof Unreachable)) throw err;
|
||||
retry(entry, retryFirst);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const page = (res, status, title, html, headers = {}) => {
|
||||
res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8', 'cache-control': 'no-store', ...headers });
|
||||
res.end(`<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>${escape(title)}</title><main style="font-family:sans-serif;max-width:32rem;margin:4rem auto"><h1>${escape(title)}</h1>${html}</main>\n`);
|
||||
};
|
||||
const redirect = (res, location, setCookie = []) => {
|
||||
res.writeHead(303, { location, 'cache-control': 'no-store', ...(setCookie.length ? { 'set-cookie': setCookie } : {}) });
|
||||
res.end();
|
||||
};
|
||||
const failed = (res, setCookie = []) => page(res, 403, 'Sign-in failed', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in again</a></p>', setCookie.length ? { 'set-cookie': setCookie } : {});
|
||||
const expire = name => `${name}=; ${ATTRS}; Max-Age=0`;
|
||||
const remember = (map, key, value, cap) => {
|
||||
while (map.size >= cap) map.delete(map.keys().next().value);
|
||||
map.set(key, value);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// B2: only a URL on publicOrigin itself; anything else, or nothing, is publicOrigin's `/`. The
|
||||
// Location is absolute and its origin checked again: dot segments can leave a pathname of `//host`,
|
||||
// which as a relative Location a browser reads as another origin (webby-0019 B1, sage-1403).
|
||||
function returnURL(ret) {
|
||||
const home = `${publicOrigin}/`;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (typeof ret !== 'string' || !ret) return home;
|
||||
const u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin);
|
||||
if (u.origin !== publicOrigin) return home;
|
||||
const out = new URL(`${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`);
|
||||
return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;
|
||||
} catch { return home; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function start(res, entry, ret) {
|
||||
const state = oauth.generateRandomState(), nonce = oauth.generateRandomNonce(), verifier = oauth.generateRandomCodeVerifier();
|
||||
const challenge = await oauth.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(verifier);
|
||||
const id = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
|
||||
remember(logins, sha256(id), { provider: entry.config.id, state, nonce, verifier, ret: typeof ret === 'string' ? ret.slice(0, 2048) : '/', expires: Date.now() + LOGIN_MAX_AGE * 1000 }, MAX_LOGINS);
|
||||
const url = new URL(entry.as.authorization_endpoint);
|
||||
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries({ client_id: entry.config.clientId, response_type: 'code', scope: 'openid profile email', redirect_uri: redirectUri, state, nonce, code_challenge: challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' })) url.searchParams.set(k, v);
|
||||
return redirect(res, url.href, [`${LOGIN_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}; Max-Age=${LOGIN_MAX_AGE}`]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function login(res, query) {
|
||||
const asked = query.get('provider');
|
||||
const ret = query.get('return');
|
||||
if (asked === null && providers.size > 1) {
|
||||
const items = [...providers.values()].map(e => `<li><a href="/auth/login?${escape(new URLSearchParams({ provider: e.config.id, ...(ret ? { return: ret } : {}) }))}">${escape(e.config.id)}</a></li>`).join('');
|
||||
return page(res, 200, 'Sign in', `<ul>${items}</ul>`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const entry = asked === null ? [...providers.values()][0] : providers.get(asked);
|
||||
if (!entry) return page(res, 404, 'Unknown sign-in provider', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in</a></p>');
|
||||
if (entry.state !== 'ready') return page(res, 503, 'sign-in unavailable', '<p>The sign-in provider can\'t be reached. Try again shortly.</p>');
|
||||
return start(res, entry, ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Design section 1, steps 2-7. Each refusal ends here with one log line and the 403 page.
|
||||
async function callback(res, query, req) {
|
||||
const clear = [expire(LOGIN_COOKIE)];
|
||||
const ids = cookies(req, LOGIN_COOKIE);
|
||||
const key = ids.length === 1 ? sha256(ids[0]) : null;
|
||||
const record = key === null ? undefined : logins.get(key);
|
||||
if (key !== null) logins.delete(key);
|
||||
// The provider comes from the record, never from the query.
|
||||
const entry = record && providers.get(record.provider);
|
||||
if (!record || record.expires <= Date.now() || !entry) {
|
||||
refuse('login-record-missing', record?.provider ?? 'none');
|
||||
return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const pid = entry.config.id;
|
||||
if (entry.state !== 'ready') { refuse('discovery-failed', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
|
||||
let params;
|
||||
try { params = oauth.validateAuthResponse(entry.as, entry.client, query, record.state); } catch (err) {
|
||||
refuse(err instanceof oauth.AuthorizationResponseError ? 'auth-error-response' : 'state-mismatch', pid);
|
||||
return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const options = () => ({ ...fetchOptions, [oauth.jwksCache]: entry.jwks, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
|
||||
let response;
|
||||
try { response = await oauth.authorizationCodeGrantRequest(entry.as, entry.client, entry.auth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier, options()); } catch {
|
||||
refuse('grant-failed', pid); return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let result, claims;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
result = await oauth.processAuthorizationCodeResponse(entry.as, entry.client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true });
|
||||
claims = oauth.getValidatedIdTokenClaims(result);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
refuse(err instanceof oauth.ResponseBodyError ? 'grant-failed' : 'id-token-invalid', pid);
|
||||
return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Step 5: the library skips this for a token-endpoint ID token; point 2 needs it, on the same
|
||||
// Response object. Its throw ends the callback.
|
||||
try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {
|
||||
const fetching = !(err instanceof oauth.OperationProcessingError || err instanceof oauth.UnsupportedOperationError) || [oauth.RESPONSE_IS_NOT_CONFORM, oauth.RESPONSE_IS_NOT_JSON].includes(err.code);
|
||||
refuse(fetching ? 'jwks-failed' : 'signature-invalid', pid);
|
||||
return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Step 6: our own checks on top of the library's.
|
||||
let header;
|
||||
try { header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(result.id_token.split('.')[0], 'base64url').toString('utf8')); } catch { header = null; }
|
||||
if (!header || !entry.config.algs.includes(header.alg)) { refuse('alg-refused', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
|
||||
if (claims.iss !== entry.config.issuer) { refuse('issuer-mismatch', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
|
||||
const name = typeof claims.sub === 'string' ? entry.subjects.get(claims.sub) : undefined;
|
||||
if (name === undefined) {
|
||||
refuse('subject-unknown', pid, ` iss=${JSON.stringify(String(claims.iss).slice(0, 255))} sub=${JSON.stringify(String(claims.sub).slice(0, 255))}`);
|
||||
return failed(res, clear);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Step 7: the session, then the return path.
|
||||
const id = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'), now = Date.now();
|
||||
remember(sessions, sha256(id), { provider: pid, iss: claims.iss, sub: claims.sub, name, idToken: result.id_token, created: now, seen: now }, MAX_SESSIONS);
|
||||
return redirect(res, returnURL(record.ret), [...clear, `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}`]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The session for this request, or null. `touch` is true only for a page load or a write (Q-D).
|
||||
function session(req, { touch = false } = {}) {
|
||||
const ids = cookies(req, SESSION_COOKIE);
|
||||
if (ids.length !== 1) return null;
|
||||
const key = sha256(ids[0]);
|
||||
const s = sessions.get(key);
|
||||
if (!s) return null;
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
if (now - s.created >= SESSION_ABSOLUTE || now - s.seen >= SESSION_IDLE) { sessions.delete(key); return null; }
|
||||
if (touch) s.seen = now;
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function logout(req, res) {
|
||||
const one = name => (req.headersDistinct[name]?.length === 1 ? req.headersDistinct[name][0] : null);
|
||||
if (one('origin') !== publicOrigin || one('sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') {
|
||||
return page(res, 403, 'Sign-out refused', '<p>Sign out from the Console page.</p>');
|
||||
}
|
||||
const ids = cookies(req, SESSION_COOKIE);
|
||||
const key = ids.length === 1 ? sha256(ids[0]) : null;
|
||||
const s = key === null ? undefined : sessions.get(key);
|
||||
if (key !== null) sessions.delete(key);
|
||||
const entry = s && providers.get(s.provider);
|
||||
let location = `${publicOrigin}/auth/signed-out`;
|
||||
if (entry?.as?.end_session_endpoint) {
|
||||
const url = new URL(entry.as.end_session_endpoint);
|
||||
url.searchParams.set('id_token_hint', s.idToken);
|
||||
url.searchParams.set('post_logout_redirect_uri', `${publicOrigin}/auth/signed-out`);
|
||||
url.searchParams.set('client_id', entry.config.clientId);
|
||||
location = url.href;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return redirect(res, location, [expire(SESSION_COOKIE)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// `/auth/*` on the human listener; the caller has already checked the Host.
|
||||
async function handle(req, res, path, search) {
|
||||
const query = new URLSearchParams(search);
|
||||
if (path === '/auth/logout') {
|
||||
if (req.method !== 'POST') return page(res, 405, 'Method not allowed', '');
|
||||
return logout(req, res);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (req.method !== 'GET') return page(res, 405, 'Method not allowed', '');
|
||||
if (path === '/auth/login') return login(res, query);
|
||||
if (path === '/auth/callback') return callback(res, query, req);
|
||||
if (path === '/auth/signed-out') return page(res, 200, 'Signed out', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in</a></p>');
|
||||
return page(res, 404, 'Not found', '');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
publicOrigin, publicHost, sessions, logins, handle, session, returnURL,
|
||||
health: () => Object.fromEntries([...providers].map(([id, e]) => [id, e.state])),
|
||||
formTargets: () => [...new Set([...providers.values()].filter(e => e.as?.end_session_endpoint).map(e => new URL(e.as.end_session_endpoint).origin))],
|
||||
summary: () => config.providers.map(p => ({ id: p.id, issuer: p.issuer, subjects: p.subjects.length })),
|
||||
close() { closed = true; for (const t of timers) clearTimeout(t); timers.clear(); },
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design section 9): a fake OpenID provider for the --sso tests. A loopback
|
||||
// https server with a self-signed certificate made in a temp dir; `op.fetch` is a fetch that trusts
|
||||
// only that certificate, so the code under test needs no insecure flag. It serves any number of
|
||||
// issuers (`/<name>/`) at once, each with discovery, a JWKS, authorization, token and end-session
|
||||
// endpoints. Keys come from node:crypto. Nothing here reaches any other host.
|
||||
import { constants, createHash, createHmac, generateKeyPairSync, randomBytes, sign } from 'node:crypto';
|
||||
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
|
||||
import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { createServer, request } from 'node:https';
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
||||
|
||||
export const b64url = value => Buffer.from(typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)).toString('base64url');
|
||||
|
||||
export function rsaKey(kid = `rsa-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`, bits = 2048) {
|
||||
const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: bits });
|
||||
return { kid, alg: 'RS256', privateKey, jwk: { ...publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' }), kid, use: 'sig', alg: 'RS256' } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
export function ecKey(kid = `ec-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`) {
|
||||
const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' });
|
||||
return { kid, alg: 'ES256', privateKey, jwk: { ...publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' }), kid, use: 'sig', alg: 'ES256' } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
export function psKey(kid = `ps-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`) {
|
||||
const k = rsaKey(kid);
|
||||
return { ...k, alg: 'PS256', jwk: { ...k.jwk, alg: 'PS256' } };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A compact JWS. `alg` HS256 uses `hmac` as the key, `none` has an empty signature.
|
||||
export function jwt(header, payload, { key = null, hmac = null } = {}) {
|
||||
const input = `${b64url(header)}.${b64url(payload)}`;
|
||||
let sig = '';
|
||||
if (header.alg === 'HS256') sig = createHmac('sha256', hmac).update(input).digest('base64url');
|
||||
else if (header.alg === 'RS256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), key).toString('base64url');
|
||||
else if (header.alg === 'PS256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), { key, padding: constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: 32 }).toString('base64url');
|
||||
else if (header.alg === 'ES256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), { key, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }).toString('base64url');
|
||||
return `${input}.${sig}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function certificate() {
|
||||
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'fake-oidc-'));
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const r = spawnSync('openssl', ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'ec', '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:P-256', '-nodes', '-days', '1',
|
||||
'-subj', '/CN=127.0.0.1', '-addext', 'subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1', '-keyout', join(dir, 'key.pem'), '-out', join(dir, 'cert.pem')], { encoding: 'utf8' });
|
||||
if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl failed: ${r.stderr}`);
|
||||
return { key: readFileSync(join(dir, 'key.pem')), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, 'cert.pem')) };
|
||||
} finally { rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One issuer's state. `discovery` is merged over the defaults; `mode` is 'ok', 'down' (the socket is
|
||||
// destroyed) or 'html' (200 with an HTML page) for discovery.
|
||||
function issuerState(name, base, opts) {
|
||||
const keys = opts.keys ?? [rsaKey()];
|
||||
return {
|
||||
name, issuer: `${base}/${name}/`, keys, retired: [], clientId: opts.clientId ?? `client-${name}`, clientSecret: opts.clientSecret ?? `secret-${name}-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`,
|
||||
discovery: opts.discovery ?? {}, mode: 'ok', jwksOverride: null, codes: new Map(), acceptTwice: false, requirePkce: true,
|
||||
tokenRequests: [], authorizeRequests: [], jwksFetches: 0, discoveryFetches: 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function fakeOidc() {
|
||||
const { key, cert } = certificate();
|
||||
const issuers = new Map();
|
||||
const server = createServer({ key, cert }, (req, res) => {
|
||||
const url = new URL(req.url, 'https://127.0.0.1');
|
||||
const [, name, ...rest] = url.pathname.split('/');
|
||||
const iss = issuers.get(name);
|
||||
const route = rest.join('/');
|
||||
const json = (status, body, type = 'application/json') => { res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': type }); res.end(typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)); };
|
||||
if (!iss) return json(404, { error: 'no issuer' });
|
||||
if (route === '.well-known/openid-configuration') {
|
||||
iss.discoveryFetches++;
|
||||
if (iss.mode === 'down') return req.socket.destroy();
|
||||
if (iss.mode === 'html') return json(200, '<!doctype html><title>Sign in</title>', 'text/html');
|
||||
return json(200, discovery(iss));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (route === 'jwks') {
|
||||
iss.jwksFetches++;
|
||||
return json(200, iss.jwksOverride ?? { keys: iss.keys.map(k => k.jwk) });
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (route === 'authorize') { iss.authorizeRequests.push(Object.fromEntries(url.searchParams)); return json(200, { ok: true }); }
|
||||
if (route === 'end-session') return json(200, { ok: true });
|
||||
if (route === 'token' && req.method === 'POST') {
|
||||
let text = '';
|
||||
req.on('data', c => (text += c));
|
||||
req.on('end', () => {
|
||||
const form = new URLSearchParams(text);
|
||||
const basic = Buffer.from((req.headers.authorization ?? '').replace(/^Basic /, ''), 'base64').toString();
|
||||
const [id, secret] = basic.split(':').map(decodeURIComponent);
|
||||
iss.tokenRequests.push({ form: Object.fromEntries(form), clientId: id });
|
||||
if (id !== iss.clientId || secret !== iss.clientSecret) return json(401, { error: 'invalid_client' });
|
||||
const grant = iss.codes.get(form.get('code'));
|
||||
if (!grant) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant' });
|
||||
if (!iss.acceptTwice) iss.codes.delete(form.get('code'));
|
||||
if (form.get('redirect_uri') !== grant.redirectUri) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'redirect_uri' });
|
||||
if (iss.requirePkce && createHash('sha256').update(form.get('code_verifier') ?? '').digest('base64url') !== grant.challenge) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'pkce' });
|
||||
return json(200, { access_token: randomBytes(16).toString('hex'), token_type: 'Bearer', expires_in: 300, id_token: grant.idToken });
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return json(404, { error: 'not found' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
|
||||
const base = `https://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
|
||||
|
||||
const discovery = iss => ({
|
||||
issuer: iss.issuer, authorization_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}authorize`, token_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}token`, jwks_uri: `${iss.issuer}jwks`,
|
||||
end_session_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}end-session`, response_types_supported: ['code'], subject_types_supported: ['public'],
|
||||
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [...new Set(iss.keys.map(k => k.alg))], code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
|
||||
...iss.discovery,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A fetch over node:https that trusts only this certificate. oauth4webapi passes a Headers object
|
||||
// and a string or URLSearchParams body.
|
||||
const opFetch = (input, init = {}) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const url = new URL(typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.href ?? input.url);
|
||||
if (url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.hostname !== '127.0.0.1' || url.port !== String(server.address().port)) return reject(new TypeError(`fake OP fetch refuses ${url.origin}`));
|
||||
const headers = Object.fromEntries(new Headers(init.headers ?? {}));
|
||||
const body = init.body === undefined || init.body === null ? undefined : String(init.body);
|
||||
if (body !== undefined) headers['content-length'] = Buffer.byteLength(body);
|
||||
const req = request(url, { method: init.method ?? 'GET', headers, ca: cert, signal: init.signal }, res => {
|
||||
const chunks = [];
|
||||
res.on('data', c => chunks.push(c));
|
||||
res.on('end', () => {
|
||||
const h = new Headers();
|
||||
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(res.headers)) h.set(k, Array.isArray(v) ? v.join(', ') : v);
|
||||
const response = new Response(res.statusCode === 204 ? null : Buffer.concat(chunks), { status: res.statusCode, headers: h });
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(response, 'url', { value: url.href });
|
||||
resolve(response);
|
||||
});
|
||||
res.on('error', reject);
|
||||
});
|
||||
req.on('error', reject);
|
||||
req.end(body);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
base, fetch: opFetch, cert,
|
||||
issuer(name, opts = {}) { const iss = issuerState(name, base, opts); issuers.set(name, iss); return iss; },
|
||||
// A code for `iss` whose ID token is built from the start redirect's nonce, the claims and header
|
||||
// overrides. `challenge` defaults to the start redirect's; `idToken` replaces the token outright.
|
||||
grant(iss, authorizeUrl, { sub = `user-${iss.name}`, claims = {}, header = {}, key = iss.keys[0], idToken = null, challenge = null, redirectUri = null } = {}) {
|
||||
const q = new URL(authorizeUrl).searchParams;
|
||||
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
|
||||
const payload = { iss: iss.issuer, sub, aud: iss.clientId, iat: now, exp: now + 300, nonce: q.get('nonce'), ...claims };
|
||||
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(payload)) if (v === undefined) delete payload[k];
|
||||
const token = idToken ?? jwt({ alg: key.alg, kid: key.kid, typ: 'JWT', ...header }, payload, { key: key.privateKey, hmac: iss.clientSecret });
|
||||
const code = randomBytes(12).toString('base64url');
|
||||
iss.codes.set(code, { idToken: token, challenge: challenge ?? q.get('code_challenge'), redirectUri: redirectUri ?? q.get('redirect_uri') });
|
||||
return { code, idToken: token, payload };
|
||||
},
|
||||
rotate(iss, next = rsaKey()) { iss.retired.push(...iss.keys); iss.keys = [next]; return next; },
|
||||
close: () => new Promise(r => { server.close(r); server.closeAllConnections(); }),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ function fakeCopy(dir) {
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(copyRoot(dir), 'packages', 'webui', 'src', 'cli.mjs'), '');
|
||||
return copyRoot(dir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const SEND_REFUSAL = /^webui-service: --send needs the preview mode \(--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user\)$/m;
|
||||
const SEND_REFUSAL = /^webui-service: --send needs the preview mode \(--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user\) or --sso$/m;
|
||||
const TEMPLATE = readFileSync(join(REPO, 'packages', 'webui', 'systemd', 'mosaic-webui.service.in'), 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
// The unit as the base script renders it (row 75): the template with its four
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design test 24, sage-1340 F1, sage-1347 F7): the page under --sso. A read
|
||||
// the Console answers 401 `sign-in required` signs the page out the way a proxy redirect does, and
|
||||
// the line links to /auth/login with the current path and query; any other 401 stays an error. Both
|
||||
// fetch paths in app.js and both in bus.js (fetchRead and fetchApi) do it. The Sign out form shows
|
||||
// only when /api/config says sso. The board-held.test.mjs stub, with two lists of paths: those in
|
||||
// window.__signIn answer 401 `sign-in required`, those in window.__other 401 `unauthenticated`. A
|
||||
// page URL holding `sso` gets `sso: true` added to /api/config. Poll timers fire after 150 ms.
|
||||
import { test } from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
|
||||
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { Store } from '../../bus/src/store.mjs';
|
||||
import { Broker } from '../../bus/src/broker.mjs';
|
||||
import { views } from '../../bus/src/views.mjs';
|
||||
import { startServer } from '../src/serve.mjs';
|
||||
import { browser } from './browser.mjs';
|
||||
import { fixture, close } from './fixture.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
const businesses = { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'cto', delivery: 'pm' }, roles: { pm: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } }, cto: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } } } } };
|
||||
|
||||
const stub = `(() => {
|
||||
const real = window.fetch.bind(window);
|
||||
window.__reqs = []; window.__signIn = []; window.__other = [];
|
||||
const timeout = window.setTimeout.bind(window);
|
||||
window.setTimeout = (f, ms, ...rest) => timeout(f, ms === 10000 ? 150 : ms, ...rest);
|
||||
const answer = (status, body) => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
|
||||
window.fetch = async (url, init = {}) => {
|
||||
const path = String(url).split('?')[0];
|
||||
window.__reqs.push(path);
|
||||
if (window.__signIn.includes(path)) return answer(401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
if (window.__other.includes(path)) return answer(401, { error: 'unauthenticated' });
|
||||
if (path === '/api/config' && /sso/.test(location.search)) return answer(200, { ...(await (await real(url, init)).json()), sso: true });
|
||||
return real(url, init);
|
||||
};
|
||||
})();`;
|
||||
|
||||
async function setup() {
|
||||
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'webui-sso-browser-'));
|
||||
const store = new Store(root), b0 = new Broker({ store, businesses });
|
||||
b0.request(b0.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'pm', run: 'pm-run', harness: 'pi', address: 'pm-run' }), { verb: 'role.claim' });
|
||||
const reader = b0.bindReader({ business: 'demo' });
|
||||
const bus = views({ call: async (verb, args = {}) => structuredClone(b0.request(reader, { verb, args })) });
|
||||
const f = await fixture(), b = await browser({ machine: true });
|
||||
const web = await startServer({ port: 0, board: f.boardURL, bus }), base = `http://127.0.0.1:${web.address().port}/`;
|
||||
await b.call('Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument', { source: stub });
|
||||
await b.viewport(1280);
|
||||
const wait = expr => b.evaluate(`(async()=>{for(let i=0;i<100;i++){if(${expr})return true;await new Promise(r=>setTimeout(r,50))}throw new Error('Condition timed out: '+${JSON.stringify(expr)})})()`);
|
||||
const text = sel => b.evaluate(`document.querySelector(${JSON.stringify(sel)})?.textContent ?? null`);
|
||||
const shown = sel => b.evaluate(`(()=>{const e=document.querySelector(${JSON.stringify(sel)});return !!e && !e.hidden && getComputedStyle(e).display !== 'none' && !!e.getClientRects().length})()`);
|
||||
const reqs = () => b.evaluate('window.__reqs.length');
|
||||
const settle = () => new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 600));
|
||||
const done = async () => { await b.close(); await close(web); await f.close(); store.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); };
|
||||
return { b, base, wait, text, shown, reqs, settle, done };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const LOADED = 'document.querySelector("table.sessions [data-open=\'proj/agent1\']")';
|
||||
const LINE = 'Signed out. Sign in again.';
|
||||
|
||||
test('a 401 sign-in required on each fetch path signs the page out with a sign-in link and stops the refresh; another 401 stays an error', { timeout: 120000 }, async () => {
|
||||
const { b, base, wait, text, shown, reqs, settle, done } = await setup();
|
||||
// The line, its link back to this page, the Sign out form gone, and no further fetch.
|
||||
const out = async ret => {
|
||||
await wait('!document.querySelector("#signed-out").hidden');
|
||||
assert.equal(await text('#signed-out'), LINE);
|
||||
assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#signed-out a").getAttribute("href")'), `/auth/login?return=${encodeURIComponent(ret)}`);
|
||||
assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), false);
|
||||
assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#refresh").disabled'), true);
|
||||
const n = await reqs();
|
||||
await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#refresh").click(), true');
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
assert.equal(await reqs(), n, 'the page fetched after signing out');
|
||||
};
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// app.js api(): the Board read, with sso on from /api/config.
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&x=1`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/board'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
|
||||
await out('/?sso&x=1');
|
||||
|
||||
// app.js getJSON: the conversation catalogue behind History.
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&conv`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/conversations'), document.querySelector('table.sessions [data-history="proj/agent1"]').click(), true`);
|
||||
await out('/?sso&conv');
|
||||
|
||||
// app.js api(): the board POST behind Seen.
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&seen`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`document.querySelector('table.sessions [data-open="proj/agent1"]').click(), true`);
|
||||
await wait('document.querySelector("#inspection [data-seen]")');
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/seen'), document.querySelector('#inspection [data-seen]').click(), true`);
|
||||
await out('/?sso&seen');
|
||||
|
||||
// bus.js fetchRead and fetchApi, on a page whose /api/config has no sso: the link comes from
|
||||
// the 401 itself (F1).
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?read#/inbox`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/bus/inbox'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
|
||||
await out('/?read');
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?module`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/queue'), location.hash = '#/queue', true`);
|
||||
await out('/?module');
|
||||
|
||||
// Any other 401 is an error: no sign-out, and the polls go on.
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&other`);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await b.evaluate(`window.__other.push('/api/board', '/api/bus/inbox', '/api/queue'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#signed-out").hidden'), true);
|
||||
assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.body.classList.contains("signed-out")'), false);
|
||||
const n = await reqs();
|
||||
await settle();
|
||||
assert.ok(await reqs() > n, 'the refresh stopped on another 401');
|
||||
assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), true);
|
||||
} finally { await done(); }
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the Sign out form shows only when /api/config says sso, and posts to /auth/logout', { timeout: 120000 }, async () => {
|
||||
const { b, base, wait, shown, done } = await setup();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await b.navigate(base);
|
||||
await wait(LOADED);
|
||||
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));
|
||||
assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), false);
|
||||
await b.navigate(`${base}?sso`);
|
||||
await wait(`${LOADED} && !document.querySelector("#sign-out").hidden`);
|
||||
assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), true);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(await b.evaluate('(() => { const f = document.querySelector("#sign-out"); return [f.method, f.getAttribute("action"), f.querySelector("button").textContent, f.querySelector("button").type]; })()'), ['post', '/auth/logout', 'Sign out', 'submit']);
|
||||
} finally { await done(); }
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md section 9): the Console as an
|
||||
// OIDC relying party (--sso). Every provider is the fake OP in helpers/fake-oidc.mjs on loopback;
|
||||
// no test reaches a real provider, the live Console or a real config or slot file. The public name
|
||||
// is console.example.test, sent only as a Host header to the test's own loopback listener. Each
|
||||
// refusal checks the status, that no session cookie was set and that the send stub never ran.
|
||||
import { test } from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
|
||||
import { request } from 'node:http';
|
||||
import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
|
||||
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
import { startServer } from '../src/serve.mjs';
|
||||
import { createSso, readSlot, SESSION_COOKIE, LOGIN_COOKIE } from '../src/sso.mjs';
|
||||
import { close } from './fixture.mjs';
|
||||
import { b64url, ecKey, fakeOidc, jwt, psKey, rsaKey } from './helpers/fake-oidc.mjs';
|
||||
|
||||
const HOST = 'console.example.test', ORIGIN = `https://${HOST}`;
|
||||
const CLI = fileURLToPath(new URL('../src/cli.mjs', import.meta.url));
|
||||
const MSG = JSON.stringify({ to: 'coder', body: 'Please look at row 192.' });
|
||||
// Test 19: every log line any test here captured, and every token, code, state, nonce, verifier,
|
||||
// client secret and session id any test produced. The last test checks the one against the other.
|
||||
const ALL_LINES = [], PRODUCED = new Set();
|
||||
|
||||
// node:http, not fetch: fetch can't set Host, Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site.
|
||||
function call(port, { method = 'GET', path = '/', headers = {}, body, host = HOST } = {}) {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const length = body === undefined ? {} : { 'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(body) };
|
||||
const req = request({ host: '127.0.0.1', port, method, path, headers: { host, ...length, ...headers } }, res => {
|
||||
let text = '';
|
||||
res.on('data', c => (text += c));
|
||||
res.on('end', () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode, headers: res.headers, body: text && (res.headers['content-type'] ?? '').startsWith('application/json') ? JSON.parse(text) : text }));
|
||||
});
|
||||
req.on('error', reject);
|
||||
req.end(body);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
const setCookies = r => [r.headers['set-cookie'] ?? []].flat();
|
||||
const sessionOf = r => setCookies(r).find(c => c.startsWith(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=`) && !c.includes('Max-Age=0'))?.split(';')[0] ?? null;
|
||||
const writeHeaders = cookie => ({ ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}), origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin', 'content-type': 'application/json' });
|
||||
|
||||
function providerFor(iss, extra = {}) {
|
||||
return { id: iss.name, issuer: iss.issuer, clientId: iss.clientId, clientSecret: { slot: iss.name }, algs: [...new Set(iss.keys.map(k => k.alg))], subjects: [{ sub: `user-${iss.name}`, name: `person-${iss.name}` }], ...extra };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A fake OP with `issuers`, createSso over them, and the human listener with a counting send.
|
||||
async function setup(t, { issuers = [{ name: 'a' }], provider = {}, before = null, retryFirst = 5000, server = {} } = {}) {
|
||||
const op = await fakeOidc();
|
||||
t.after(() => op.close());
|
||||
const iss = issuers.map(o => op.issuer(o.name, o));
|
||||
for (const i of iss) PRODUCED.add(i.clientSecret);
|
||||
before?.(op, iss);
|
||||
const config = { publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: iss.map(i => providerFor(i, provider[i.name] ?? {})) };
|
||||
const lines = [];
|
||||
const log = line => { lines.push(line); ALL_LINES.push(line); };
|
||||
const sso = await createSso(config, { secrets: new Map(iss.map(i => [i.name, i.clientSecret])), fetch: op.fetch, log, retryFirst });
|
||||
t.after(() => sso.close());
|
||||
const sends = [];
|
||||
const bus = Object.fromEntries(['inbox', 'tasks', 'agents', 'trail', 'decisions'].map(v => [v, async () => [{ verb: v }]]));
|
||||
const web = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9', bus, sso, send: async args => { sends.push(args); return { id: 'msg-0001' }; }, log, ...server });
|
||||
t.after(() => close(web));
|
||||
return { op, iss, sso, port: web.address().port, lines, sends, config, bus };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GET /auth/login; returns the authorize URL and the login cookie (name=value).
|
||||
async function begin(env, { provider = null, ret = null, query = null, host = HOST } = {}) {
|
||||
const q = query ?? new URLSearchParams({ ...(provider ? { provider } : {}), ...(ret !== null ? { return: ret } : {}) }).toString();
|
||||
const r = await call(env.port, { path: `/auth/login${q ? `?${q}` : ''}`, host });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 303, `login start: ${r.status} ${r.body}`);
|
||||
const cookie = setCookies(r)[0].split(';')[0];
|
||||
const location = r.headers.location;
|
||||
const params = new URL(location).searchParams;
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(cookie.split('=')[1]);
|
||||
for (const k of ['state', 'nonce', 'code_challenge']) PRODUCED.add(params.get(k));
|
||||
for (const record of env.sso.logins.values()) PRODUCED.add(record.verifier);
|
||||
return { r, cookie, location, params };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function callback(env, begun, { code, state = begun.params.get('state'), extra = {}, cookie = begun.cookie } = {}) {
|
||||
const q = new URLSearchParams({ ...(code !== undefined ? { code } : {}), state, ...extra });
|
||||
return call(env.port, { path: `/auth/callback?${q}`, headers: cookie ? { cookie } : {} });
|
||||
}
|
||||
function grant(env, begun, iss, opts = {}) {
|
||||
const g = env.op.grant(iss, begun.location, opts);
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(g.code);
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(g.idToken);
|
||||
return g;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A whole sign-in: start, a code at the OP, the callback. Returns the callback answer and the
|
||||
// session cookie (name=value) when one was set.
|
||||
async function signIn(env, { iss = env.iss[0], ret = null, opts = {} } = {}) {
|
||||
const begun = await begin(env, { provider: env.iss.length > 1 ? iss.name : null, ret });
|
||||
const g = grant(env, begun, iss, opts);
|
||||
const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code });
|
||||
const session = sessionOf(r);
|
||||
if (session) PRODUCED.add(session.split('=')[1]);
|
||||
return { begun, g, r, session };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function refused(env, r, code) {
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 403, `expected 403, got ${r.status}`);
|
||||
assert.equal(sessionOf(r), null, 'a session cookie was set');
|
||||
assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0, 'the send stub ran');
|
||||
assert.ok(setCookies(r).includes(`${LOGIN_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`), 'the login cookie was not expired');
|
||||
if (code) assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), new RegExp(` sso refused code=${code} provider=`), env.lines.at(-1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test('positive: an RS256 provider signs in and sends one message, and the session reads', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
assert.notEqual(env.port, 7332);
|
||||
const { r, session } = await signIn(env, { ret: '/board?x=1' });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 303);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.headers.location, `${ORIGIN}/board?x=1`);
|
||||
assert.ok(session);
|
||||
const send = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/api/bus/message', headers: writeHeaders(session), body: MSG });
|
||||
assert.equal(send.status, 200, JSON.stringify(send.body));
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(env.sends, [{ to: 'coder', body: 'Please look at row 192.' }]);
|
||||
assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), / send user="person-a" to="coder" id=msg-0001$/);
|
||||
const read = await call(env.port, { path: '/api/bus/inbox', headers: { cookie: session } });
|
||||
assert.equal(read.status, 200);
|
||||
const config = await call(env.port, { path: '/api/config', headers: { cookie: session } });
|
||||
assert.equal(config.body.sso, true);
|
||||
assert.equal(config.body.send, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('positive: an ES256 provider signs in and sends', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'e', keys: [ecKey()] }] });
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(env.config.providers[0].algs, ['ES256']);
|
||||
const { session } = await signIn(env);
|
||||
assert.ok(session);
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/api/bus/message', headers: writeHeaders(session), body: MSG })).status, 200);
|
||||
assert.equal(env.sends.length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('positive: two providers each sign in their own subjects, and one provider\'s subject is unknown to the other', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a' }, { name: 'b', keys: [ecKey()] }] });
|
||||
const list = await call(env.port, { path: '/auth/login?return=%2Fboard' });
|
||||
assert.equal(list.status, 200);
|
||||
assert.match(list.body, /provider=a&return=%2Fboard/);
|
||||
assert.match(list.body, /provider=b&return=%2Fboard/);
|
||||
const [a, b] = env.iss;
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env, { iss: a })).session);
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env, { iss: b })).session);
|
||||
const names = [...env.sso.sessions.values()].map(s => s.name);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(names, ['person-a', 'person-b']);
|
||||
const cross = await signIn(env, { iss: b, opts: { sub: 'user-a' } });
|
||||
refused({ ...env, sends: [] }, cross.r, 'subject-unknown');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('1: a forged x-authentik header without a cookie is 401 on the API and a sign-in redirect on a page', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const forged = { 'x-authentik-username': 'jason.woltje', origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin', 'content-type': 'application/json' };
|
||||
for (const [method, path, body] of [['POST', '/api/bus/message', MSG], ['POST', '/api/settings', '{}'], ['GET', '/api/config', undefined]]) {
|
||||
const r = await call(env.port, { method, path, headers: forged, body });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 401, `${method} ${path}`);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'sign-in required' });
|
||||
}
|
||||
const page = await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: forged });
|
||||
assert.equal(page.status, 303);
|
||||
assert.equal(page.headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2F');
|
||||
const deep = await call(env.port, { path: '/board?x=1' });
|
||||
assert.equal(deep.headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2Fboard%3Fx%3D1');
|
||||
assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('2: an HS256 ID token keyed with the client secret and a real RSA kid is refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
const { r } = await signIn(env, { opts: { header: { alg: 'HS256', kid: iss.keys[0].kid } } });
|
||||
refused(env, r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('3: a wrong aud, and an aud list holding another client with no azp, are refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { aud: 'another-client' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { aud: [env.iss[0].clientId, 'another-client'] } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('4: a token that expired 10 minutes ago is refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iat: now - 900, exp: now - 600 } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('5: another issuer, and the issuer without its trailing slash, are refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iss: `${env.op.base}/other/` } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iss: iss.issuer.slice(0, -1) } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('6: a nonce mismatch and a missing nonce are refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { nonce: 'not-the-nonce' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { nonce: undefined } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('7: state mismatch, no login cookie, a replay, an expired record and two login cookies are refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
let begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, state: 'wrong-state' }), 'state-mismatch');
|
||||
begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, cookie: null }), 'login-record-missing');
|
||||
// Replay: the OP takes the code twice, so only the take-and-delete rule refuses the second callback.
|
||||
iss.acceptTwice = true;
|
||||
begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
const g = grant(env, begun, iss);
|
||||
const first = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code });
|
||||
assert.equal(first.status, 303);
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(sessionOf(first).split('=')[1]);
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code }), 'login-record-missing');
|
||||
iss.acceptTwice = false;
|
||||
begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
for (const record of env.sso.logins.values()) record.expires = Date.now() - 1;
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code }), 'login-record-missing');
|
||||
begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
const other = await begin(env);
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, cookie: `${begun.cookie}; ${other.cookie}` }), 'login-record-missing');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('8: the token request carries the PKCE verifier, and the OP refuses a wrong one', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
const { r, begun } = await signIn(env);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 303);
|
||||
const { form } = iss.tokenRequests.at(-1);
|
||||
assert.equal(begun.params.get('code_challenge_method'), 'S256');
|
||||
const { createHash } = await import('node:crypto');
|
||||
assert.equal(createHash('sha256').update(form.code_verifier).digest('base64url'), begun.params.get('code_challenge'));
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { challenge: 'not-the-challenge' } })).r, 'grant-failed');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('9: alg none, a changed payload under a real kid, and an unknown kid even after the refetch are refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
// (a) alg none: the alg rule, before any signature check.
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { header: { alg: 'none' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
// (b) a real kid's signature over another payload: only the signature check catches it.
|
||||
let begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
const real = env.op.grant(iss, begun.location);
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(real.idToken);
|
||||
const [h, , s] = real.idToken.split('.');
|
||||
const forged = `${h}.${b64url({ ...real.payload, name: 'changed' })}.${s}`;
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss, { idToken: forged }).code }), 'signature-invalid');
|
||||
// (c) a key the JWKS never held, again after the cache is old enough to refetch.
|
||||
t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.now() });
|
||||
const stranger = rsaKey('not-in-jwks');
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: stranger } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
|
||||
const fetches = iss.jwksFetches;
|
||||
t.mock.timers.tick(61000);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: stranger } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
|
||||
assert.equal(iss.jwksFetches, fetches + 1, 'no refetch');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('10: a valid token for a subject not configured is 403 with one subject-unknown line', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const before = env.lines.length;
|
||||
const { r } = await signIn(env, { opts: { sub: 'stranger' } });
|
||||
refused(env, r, 'subject-unknown');
|
||||
const added = env.lines.slice(before);
|
||||
assert.equal(added.length, 1);
|
||||
assert.match(added[0], new RegExp(`^\\S+ sso refused code=subject-unknown provider=a iss=${JSON.stringify(env.iss[0].issuer).replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\/]/g, '\\$&')} sub="stranger"$`));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('11: start refusals: HS or none algs, reserved names, HS-only discovery, an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a short RSA key', async t => {
|
||||
const op = await fakeOidc();
|
||||
t.after(() => op.close());
|
||||
const start = (iss, extra = {}) => createSso({ publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: [providerFor(iss, extra)] }, { secrets: new Map([[iss.name, iss.clientSecret]]), fetch: op.fetch, log: l => ALL_LINES.push(l) });
|
||||
const a = op.issuer('a');
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(a.clientSecret);
|
||||
for (const [extra, why] of [
|
||||
[{ algs: ['HS256'] }, /algs\[0\] must be one of .*HS\* and none are refused/],
|
||||
[{ algs: ['none'] }, /algs\[0\] must be one of/],
|
||||
[{ subjects: [{ sub: 'u', name: 'tester' }] }, /subjects\[0\]\.name must not be tester or human/],
|
||||
[{ subjects: [{ sub: 'u', name: 'Human' }] }, /subjects\[0\]\.name must not be tester or human/],
|
||||
]) await assert.rejects(start(a, extra), why);
|
||||
const refusedAtDiscovery = /console\.sso provider \w+ refused at discovery/;
|
||||
// The mosaic-preview shape: HS256 only.
|
||||
const hs = op.issuer('hs', { discovery: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['HS256'] } });
|
||||
await assert.rejects(start(hs, { algs: ['RS256'] }), refusedAtDiscovery);
|
||||
const empty = op.issuer('empty');
|
||||
empty.jwksOverride = { keys: [] };
|
||||
await assert.rejects(start(empty), refusedAtDiscovery);
|
||||
const plain = op.issuer('plain', { discovery: { code_challenge_methods_supported: ['plain'] } });
|
||||
await assert.rejects(start(plain), refusedAtDiscovery);
|
||||
const moved = op.issuer('moved');
|
||||
moved.discovery = { issuer: `${op.base}/elsewhere/` };
|
||||
await assert.rejects(start(moved), refusedAtDiscovery);
|
||||
const small = op.issuer('small', { keys: [rsaKey('small', 1024)] });
|
||||
await assert.rejects(start(small), refusedAtDiscovery);
|
||||
// The control: the same OP and provider start.
|
||||
const sso = await start(a);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(sso.health(), { a: 'ready' });
|
||||
sso.close();
|
||||
await assert.rejects(startServer({ port: 0, sso, preview: { host: HOST, header: 'remote-user', user: 'jason' } }), /--sso cannot be combined/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('11: slot files: a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640 and a file under the repository are refused, and no message holds the value', t => {
|
||||
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'webui-sso-slot-'));
|
||||
t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
|
||||
const dir = join(root, 'config'), slots = join(dir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack');
|
||||
mkdirSync(slots, { recursive: true });
|
||||
const provider = slot => ({ id: 'a', clientSecret: { slot } });
|
||||
const value = 'slot-value-do-not-print';
|
||||
const opts = { repo: join(root, 'repo'), copies: join(root, 'copies') };
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(slots, 'good'), `${value}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
assert.equal(readSlot(dir, provider('good'), opts), value);
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(root, 'target'), value, { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
symlinkSync(join(root, 'target'), join(slots, 'link'));
|
||||
for (const [slot, mode] of [['wide', 0o644], ['group', 0o640]]) { writeFileSync(join(slots, slot), value); chmodSync(join(slots, slot), mode); }
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(slots, 'two'), `${value}\nmore\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(slots, 'empty'), '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
|
||||
const cases = [
|
||||
['missing', /slot is missing$/, opts],
|
||||
['link', /must not be a symbolic link$/, opts],
|
||||
['wide', /must have no group or other permission bits$/, opts],
|
||||
['group', /must have no group or other permission bits$/, opts],
|
||||
['two', /must hold one non-empty line$/, opts],
|
||||
['empty', /must hold one non-empty line$/, opts],
|
||||
// The config dir itself under the repository, and under a --checkout.
|
||||
['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, repo: root }],
|
||||
['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, checkout: dir }],
|
||||
['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, copies: dir }],
|
||||
];
|
||||
for (const [slot, why, o] of cases) {
|
||||
let err = null;
|
||||
try { readSlot(dir, provider(slot), o); } catch (e) { err = e; }
|
||||
assert.ok(err, `${slot} was read`);
|
||||
assert.match(err.message, /^console\.sso provider a client secret slot /);
|
||||
assert.match(err.message, why, slot);
|
||||
assert.equal(err.message.includes(value), false);
|
||||
assert.equal(err.message.includes(root), false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('11: the CLI refuses --sso with the old flags and without console.sso, and starts with a good one', async t => {
|
||||
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wsso-'));
|
||||
t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
|
||||
const env = { ...process.env, MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(root, 'cfg', 'config.json'), XDG_DATA_HOME: join(root, 'xdg') };
|
||||
for (const flags of [['--auth-header', 'remote-user'], ['--public-host', HOST], ['--allow-user', 'jason'], ['--proof-header', 'x-proof']]) {
|
||||
const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso', ...flags], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 2, flags.join(' '));
|
||||
assert.match(r.stderr, /^refused: --sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-\*$/m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const missing = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
|
||||
assert.equal(missing.status, 2);
|
||||
assert.match(missing.stderr, /^refused: --sso needs the system config \(/);
|
||||
const op = await fakeOidc();
|
||||
t.after(() => op.close());
|
||||
const a = op.issuer('a');
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(a.clientSecret);
|
||||
mkdirSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack'), { recursive: true });
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(root, 'ca.pem'), op.cert);
|
||||
const base = { configVersion: 1, environment: 'development', dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), execution: { backend: 'docker', provider: 'zai', model: 'm' } };
|
||||
writeFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG, JSON.stringify(base));
|
||||
const noKey = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
|
||||
assert.equal(noKey.status, 2);
|
||||
assert.match(noKey.stderr, /^refused: --sso needs console\.sso in the system config$/m);
|
||||
writeFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG, JSON.stringify({ ...base, console: { sso: { publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: [providerFor(a)] } } }));
|
||||
writeFileSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'a'), `${a.clientSecret}\n`, { mode: 0o644 });
|
||||
const wide = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
|
||||
assert.equal(wide.status, 2);
|
||||
assert.match(wide.stderr, /^refused: console\.sso provider a client secret slot must have no group or other permission bits$/m);
|
||||
chmodSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'a'), 0o600);
|
||||
// The child trusts the fake OP's certificate through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS; the code under test has no flag for it.
|
||||
const child = spawn(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { env: { ...env, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: join(root, 'ca.pem') } });
|
||||
t.after(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'));
|
||||
let out = '', err = '';
|
||||
child.stderr.on('data', c => (err += c));
|
||||
await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`no start line: ${out} ${err}`)), 15000);
|
||||
child.stdout.on('data', c => { out += c; if (out.includes('Ctrl-C')) { clearTimeout(timer); resolve(); } });
|
||||
child.on('exit', () => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(new Error(`exited: ${err}`)); });
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.match(out, new RegExp(`^Sign-in: ${ORIGIN}/ \\(--sso\\), read-only$`, 'm'));
|
||||
assert.match(out, new RegExp(`^Sign-in provider: a issuer ${a.issuer.replace(/[.]/g, '\\.')} subjects 1 \\(ready\\)$`, 'm'));
|
||||
assert.equal(out.includes(a.clientSecret) || err.includes(a.clientSecret), false);
|
||||
assert.equal(out.includes(a.clientId), false);
|
||||
const port = Number(out.match(/^Mosaic Console: http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)\//m)[1]);
|
||||
const health = await call(port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${port}` });
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(health.body, { ok: true, sso: { a: 'ready' } });
|
||||
child.kill('SIGTERM');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('12: under --sso the tester listener refuses each kind of sign-in, has no /auth, and startServer refuses tester with sso', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const tester = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9', bus: env.bus, tester: true, testerNoSignIn: true, log: () => {} });
|
||||
t.after(() => close(tester));
|
||||
const port = tester.address().port, host = `127.0.0.1:${port}`;
|
||||
const { session, g, begun } = await signIn(env);
|
||||
assert.ok(session);
|
||||
const plain = await call(port, { path: '/api/config', host });
|
||||
assert.equal(plain.status, 200, 'control: a request with no sign-in is served');
|
||||
for (const headers of [
|
||||
{ cookie: session },
|
||||
{ cookie: `theme=dark; ${begun.cookie}` },
|
||||
{ cookie: `${SESSION_COOKIE.toLowerCase()}=x` },
|
||||
{ authorization: `Bearer ${g.idToken}` },
|
||||
{ 'x-authentik-jwt': g.idToken },
|
||||
{ 'X-Authentik-Username': 'jason.woltje' },
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const r = await call(port, { path: '/api/config', host, headers });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 403, JSON.stringify(Object.keys(headers)));
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'tester listener takes no sign-in' });
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(port, { path: '/auth/login', host })).status, 404);
|
||||
await assert.rejects(startServer({ port: 0, tester: true, sso: env.sso }), /tester listener cannot use sso/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('13: idle and absolute expiry, logout then reuse, a cross-origin logout, and background reads that don\'t keep a session', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const read = cookie => call(env.port, { path: '/api/bus/inbox', headers: { cookie } });
|
||||
const record = () => [...env.sso.sessions.values()].at(-1);
|
||||
// Background reads don't move `seen`; a page load does.
|
||||
let { session } = await signIn(env);
|
||||
const old = Date.now() - 59 * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
record().seen = old;
|
||||
assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
|
||||
assert.equal(record().seen, old, 'a background read refreshed the session');
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: { cookie: session } })).status, 200);
|
||||
assert.ok(record().seen > old, 'a page load did not refresh the session');
|
||||
// Idle: 59 minutes of background reads, then one more past the hour.
|
||||
record().seen = Date.now() - 61 * 60 * 1000;
|
||||
assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 401);
|
||||
// Absolute.
|
||||
({ session } = await signIn(env));
|
||||
record().created = Date.now() - 8 * 3600 * 1000;
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: { cookie: session } })).headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2F');
|
||||
// Logout needs same-origin; refused, the session stays.
|
||||
({ session } = await signIn(env));
|
||||
const cross = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' } });
|
||||
assert.equal(cross.status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
|
||||
const noOrigin = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } });
|
||||
assert.equal(noOrigin.status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
|
||||
const out = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } });
|
||||
assert.equal(out.status, 303);
|
||||
const end = new URL(out.headers.location);
|
||||
assert.equal(`${end.origin}${end.pathname}`, `${env.iss[0].issuer}end-session`);
|
||||
assert.equal(end.searchParams.get('post_logout_redirect_uri'), `${ORIGIN}/auth/signed-out`);
|
||||
assert.equal(end.searchParams.get('client_id'), env.iss[0].clientId);
|
||||
assert.ok(end.searchParams.get('id_token_hint'));
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(setCookies(out), [`${SESSION_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`]);
|
||||
assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 401);
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(env.port, { method: 'GET', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session } })).status, 405);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('13: the CSP lets the Sign out form reach the provider\'s end-session origin, and only under --sso', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const r = await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${env.port}` });
|
||||
assert.match(r.headers['content-security-policy'], new RegExp(`; form-action 'self' ${env.op.base.replace(/[.]/g, '\\.')}$`));
|
||||
const plain = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9' });
|
||||
t.after(() => close(plain));
|
||||
const p = await call(plain.address().port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${plain.address().port}` });
|
||||
assert.match(p.headers['content-security-policy'], /; form-action 'self'$/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('14: open redirects land on /, and a path on the Console lands there', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
for (const [query, where] of [
|
||||
['return=%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
|
||||
['return=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
|
||||
['return=%2F%5Cevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
|
||||
['return=/%09/evil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
|
||||
// Dot segments that leave a pathname of //evil.example stay on the Console (webby-0019 B1).
|
||||
['return=%2F.%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
|
||||
['return=%2Fx%2F..%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
|
||||
[`return=${encodeURIComponent(`${ORIGIN}//evil.example`)}`, `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
|
||||
['return=%2Fboard%2F.%2Fx', `${ORIGIN}/board/x`],
|
||||
['return=%2Fboard%3Fx%3D1', `${ORIGIN}/board?x=1`],
|
||||
['', `${ORIGIN}/`],
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
const begun = await begin(env, { query });
|
||||
const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, env.iss[0]).code });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 303);
|
||||
assert.equal(r.headers.location, where, query);
|
||||
assert.equal(new URL(r.headers.location).origin, ORIGIN, query);
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(sessionOf(r).split('=')[1]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('15: a callback for A carrying B\'s code and iss, and a provider= query, is refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a' }, { name: 'b' }] });
|
||||
const [, b] = env.iss;
|
||||
for (const extra of [{ iss: b.issuer, provider: 'b' }, { provider: 'b' }]) {
|
||||
const begun = await begin(env, { provider: 'a' });
|
||||
// B's code against A's PKCE challenge and nonce, for B's own subject: only the record rule
|
||||
// (this callback belongs to A) stands in the way.
|
||||
const g = grant(env, begun, b, { sub: 'user-b' });
|
||||
const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code, extra });
|
||||
refused(env, r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.equal(b.tokenRequests.length, 0, 'B\'s token endpoint was called');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('16: a provider with RS256 and ES256 takes either, and refuses PS256 with a usable PS256 key in the JWKS', async t => {
|
||||
const rsa = rsaKey(), ec = ecKey(), ps = psKey();
|
||||
const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a', keys: [rsa, ec, ps] }], provider: { a: { algs: ['RS256', 'ES256'] } } });
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env, { opts: { key: rsa } })).session);
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env, { opts: { key: ec } })).session);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: ps } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('17: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first one\'s callback finds none', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const first = await begin(env);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) await begin(env);
|
||||
assert.equal(env.sso.logins.size, 32);
|
||||
refused(env, await callback(env, first, { code: grant(env, first, env.iss[0]).code }), 'login-record-missing');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('18: after a key rotation a sign-in works through one refetch, and the removed kid is refused', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const [iss] = env.iss;
|
||||
t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.now() });
|
||||
const old = iss.keys[0];
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
|
||||
const fetches = iss.jwksFetches;
|
||||
env.op.rotate(iss);
|
||||
t.mock.timers.tick(61000);
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
|
||||
assert.equal(iss.jwksFetches, fetches + 1);
|
||||
refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: old } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('20 and 21: the store holds no raw session id, and the cookie strings are exact', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const begun = await begin(env);
|
||||
assert.match(setCookies(begun.r)[0], new RegExp(`^${LOGIN_COOKIE}=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=600$`));
|
||||
for (const key of env.sso.logins.keys()) assert.match(key, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
|
||||
const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, env.iss[0]).code });
|
||||
const set = setCookies(r);
|
||||
assert.equal(set.length, 2);
|
||||
assert.equal(set[0], `${LOGIN_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`);
|
||||
assert.match(set[1], new RegExp(`^${SESSION_COOKIE}=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax$`));
|
||||
const id = set[1].split(';')[0].split('=')[1];
|
||||
PRODUCED.add(id);
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of env.sso.sessions) {
|
||||
assert.match(key, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
|
||||
assert.notEqual(key, id);
|
||||
assert.equal(JSON.stringify(value).includes(id), false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('22: a loopback Host is 403 on a page, a read and a write; /healthz on loopback is 200; a redirect_uri never comes from the Host', async t => {
|
||||
const env = await setup(t);
|
||||
const { session } = await signIn(env);
|
||||
const loop = `127.0.0.1:${env.port}`;
|
||||
for (const [method, path, body] of [['GET', '/', undefined], ['GET', '/api/board', undefined], ['GET', '/api/bus/inbox', undefined], ['POST', '/api/bus/message', MSG]]) {
|
||||
// A loopback Host on this listener's port; any other Host is already the older non-local refusal.
|
||||
for (const host of [loop, `localhost:${env.port}`]) {
|
||||
const r = await call(env.port, { method, path, host, body, headers: { cookie: session, 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
|
||||
assert.equal(r.status, 403, `${method} ${path} ${host}`);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'public Host required' });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const health = await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: loop });
|
||||
assert.equal(health.status, 200);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(health.body, { ok: true, sso: { a: 'ready' } });
|
||||
assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0);
|
||||
const begun = await begin(env, { host: HOST.toUpperCase() });
|
||||
assert.equal(begun.params.get('redirect_uri'), `${ORIGIN}/auth/callback`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('23: a provider down at start leaves the Console up and 503, and the retry makes sign-in work', async t => {
|
||||
let env = await setup(t, { retryFirst: 50, before: (op, [a]) => { a.mode = 'down'; } });
|
||||
assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/auth/login' })).status, 503);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual((await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${env.port}` })).body.sso, { a: 'unreachable' });
|
||||
assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), / sso refused code=discovery-failed provider=a$/);
|
||||
env.iss[0].mode = 'ok';
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 100 && env.sso.health().a !== 'ready'; i++) await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 20));
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(env.sso.health(), { a: 'ready' });
|
||||
assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
|
||||
// A 200 HTML page at the discovery URL is unreachable too, and the Console starts.
|
||||
env = await setup(t, { before: (op, [a]) => { a.mode = 'html'; } });
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(env.sso.health(), { a: 'unreachable' });
|
||||
// HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
|
||||
await assert.rejects(setup(t, { before: (op, [a]) => { a.discovery = { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['HS256'] }; } }), /refused at discovery/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('19: no captured log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id', () => {
|
||||
assert.ok(ALL_LINES.length > 20, `only ${ALL_LINES.length} lines`);
|
||||
assert.ok(PRODUCED.size > 50, `only ${PRODUCED.size} values`);
|
||||
for (const line of ALL_LINES) {
|
||||
for (const value of PRODUCED) if (value) assert.equal(line.includes(value), false, `a log line holds a produced value: ${line.slice(0, 80)}`);
|
||||
assert.match(line, /^\S+ (sso refused code=[a-z-]+ provider=[a-z0-9-]+( iss="[^"]*" sub="[^"]*")?|send user="[^"]+" to="[^"]*" (id=msg-0001|error=[a-z -]+))$/, line);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
|
||||
import os from "node:os";
|
||||
import path from "node:path";
|
||||
import process from "node:process";
|
||||
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
|
||||
|
||||
const SUPPORTED_CONFIG_VERSION = 1;
|
||||
const SUPPORTED_ENVIRONMENTS = new Set(["development", "production"]);
|
||||
@@ -106,13 +107,30 @@ function isAncestorOf(ancestor, candidate) {
|
||||
return rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(rel);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function validate(document, file) {
|
||||
// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the optional `console` key, checked for shape only by the Console's own
|
||||
// checker. It is imported only when the key is there, so a config without it never needs the
|
||||
// Console's code, and a copy of this file alone still reads one.
|
||||
async function validateConsole(value) {
|
||||
let checkConsole;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
({ checkConsole } = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..", "packages", "webui", "src", "sso-config.mjs")).href));
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
fail(2, 'the "console" key needs packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs beside this loader');
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return checkConsole(value);
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
fail(2, error.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function validate(document, file) {
|
||||
if (!isPlainObject(document)) {
|
||||
fail(2, "configuration must be a JSON object");
|
||||
}
|
||||
rejectUnknownKeys(
|
||||
document,
|
||||
["configVersion", "environment", "dataRoot", "execution"],
|
||||
["configVersion", "environment", "dataRoot", "execution", "console"],
|
||||
"configuration",
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -146,6 +164,10 @@ function validate(document, file) {
|
||||
fail(2, `unsupported execution.adapter: ${JSON.stringify(adapter)} (supported: ${[...SUPPORTED_ADAPTERS].join(", ")})`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Last, so the older checks keep their order. The key is in the output only when the file has
|
||||
// it, so a config without it prints what it always printed.
|
||||
const consoleKey = Object.hasOwn(document, "console") ? await validateConsole(document.console) : undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
configVersion: document.configVersion,
|
||||
environment: document.environment,
|
||||
@@ -156,10 +178,11 @@ function validate(document, file) {
|
||||
model: document.execution.model,
|
||||
adapter,
|
||||
},
|
||||
...(consoleKey === undefined ? {} : { console: consoleKey }),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function load(file) {
|
||||
async function load(file) {
|
||||
const raw = readRaw(file);
|
||||
if (raw === null) {
|
||||
fail(3, `configuration not found: ${file} (run scripts/bootstrap.sh to create it)`);
|
||||
@@ -170,7 +193,7 @@ function load(file) {
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
fail(2, `configuration is not valid JSON (${file}): ${error.message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return validate(document, file);
|
||||
return await validate(document, file);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function shellQuote(value) {
|
||||
@@ -194,7 +217,7 @@ const file = configPath();
|
||||
switch (operation) {
|
||||
case "bootstrap": {
|
||||
if (fs.existsSync(file)) {
|
||||
load(file); // validate only; never rewrite
|
||||
await load(file); // validate only; never rewrite
|
||||
process.stderr.write(`mosaic-config: configuration already present, validated without changes: ${file}\n`);
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -206,26 +229,26 @@ switch (operation) {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(fd, `${JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_CONFIG, null, 2)}\n`);
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
if (error.code === "EEXIST") {
|
||||
load(file);
|
||||
await load(file);
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
fail(1, `unable to create configuration: ${error.message}`);
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
if (fd !== undefined) fs.closeSync(fd);
|
||||
}
|
||||
load(file);
|
||||
await load(file);
|
||||
process.stderr.write(`mosaic-config: created default configuration: ${file}\n`);
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
case "validate": {
|
||||
const resolved = load(file);
|
||||
const resolved = await load(file);
|
||||
process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify(resolved, null, 2)}\n`);
|
||||
process.exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
case "env": {
|
||||
const resolved = load(file);
|
||||
const resolved = await load(file);
|
||||
process.stdout.write(
|
||||
[
|
||||
`MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT=${shellQuote(resolved.dataRoot)}`,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -151,6 +151,52 @@ else
|
||||
FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); echo "${C_FAIL}FAIL${C_RESET} env exports resolve correctly"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Q175 phase 1 (#1690), design test 25: the optional console key ---
|
||||
# Shape only. The slot path is a FIFO, so a loader that opened the slot would block and the
|
||||
# timeout would fail the case; no case reads a slot file.
|
||||
mkdir -p "$SANDBOX/secrets/mosaic-stack"
|
||||
mkfifo "$SANDBOX/secrets/mosaic-stack/console-sso-test"
|
||||
sso_body() {
|
||||
printf '{"configVersion":1,"environment":"development","dataRoot":"%s","execution":{"backend":"docker","provider":"zai","model":"m"},"console":%s}' "$DATA_ROOT" "$1"
|
||||
}
|
||||
# provider [ALGS] [CLIENT_SECRET]: one provider entry; an empty argument takes the valid value.
|
||||
provider() {
|
||||
local algs='["RS256"]' secret='{"slot":"console-sso-test"}'
|
||||
[ -n "${1:-}" ] && algs="$1"
|
||||
[ -n "${2:-}" ] && secret="$2"
|
||||
printf '{"id":"fake","issuer":"https://op.test/app/","clientId":"client-1","clientSecret":%s,"algs":%s,"subjects":[{"sub":"user-1","name":"jason.woltje"}]}' "$secret" "$algs"
|
||||
}
|
||||
cfg sso-valid.json "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider)"']}}')"
|
||||
OUT="$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/sso-valid.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate 2>&1)"
|
||||
[ $? -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q '"publicOrigin": "https://console.test"'
|
||||
check "valid console.sso loads and is in the output" $?
|
||||
|
||||
# expect_refusal NAME PATH-IN-MESSAGE BODY: exit 2, and the message names the bad key path.
|
||||
expect_refusal() {
|
||||
cfg sso-bad.json "$2"
|
||||
local err rc
|
||||
err="$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/sso-bad.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate 2>&1 >/dev/null)"
|
||||
rc=$?
|
||||
[ "$rc" -eq 2 ] && printf '%s' "$err" | grep -qF -- "$3"
|
||||
check "$1 (exit $rc)" $?
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect_refusal "console.sso HS256 alg exits 2 naming the path" \
|
||||
"$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '["HS256"]')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].algs[0] must be one of'
|
||||
expect_refusal "console.sso alg none exits 2 naming the path" \
|
||||
"$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '["RS256","none"]')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].algs[1] must be one of'
|
||||
expect_refusal "console.sso missing slot field exits 2 naming the path" \
|
||||
"$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '' '{}')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].clientSecret.slot is required'
|
||||
expect_refusal "console.sso slot name outside the pattern exits 2 naming the path" \
|
||||
"$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '' '{"slot":"../x"}')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].clientSecret.slot must match'
|
||||
expect_refusal "unknown key under console exits 2 naming the path" \
|
||||
"$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider)"']},"extra":1}')" 'console.extra is not a supported key'
|
||||
|
||||
# Without the key: the output is exactly what the loader printed before phase 1 (sage-1340, F2).
|
||||
cfg no-console.json '{"configVersion":1,"environment":"development","dataRoot":"'$DATA_ROOT'","execution":{"backend":"docker","provider":"zai","model":"m"}}'
|
||||
EXPECTED="$(printf '{\n "configVersion": 1,\n "environment": "development",\n "dataRoot": "%s",\n "execution": {\n "backend": "docker",\n "provider": "zai",\n "model": "m",\n "adapter": "pi"\n }\n}' "$DATA_ROOT")"
|
||||
[ "$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/no-console.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate)" = "$EXPECTED" ]
|
||||
check "config without console loads with unchanged output" $?
|
||||
|
||||
# --- validation must not modify the file ---
|
||||
SUM_INVALID_BEFORE=$(sha256sum "$SANDBOX/invalid.json" | cut -d' ' -f1)
|
||||
MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/invalid.json" $CONFIG_OP validate >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
|
||||
# character set and refused otherwise. --proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH
|
||||
# go together under preview; only the path is carried here, never the secret.
|
||||
# render checks ownership, mode and location without opening the proof file.
|
||||
# --sso (Q175 phase 1, #1690): the Console signs people in itself from
|
||||
# console.sso in config.json. It refuses the preview set and the proof pair,
|
||||
# and --send takes it in place of the preview set. Nothing secret is carried.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# There is no start, stop, enable or restart verb. The Console reads the
|
||||
# main listener's bus through the human transport; the optional loopback
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +71,7 @@ REPO="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
|
||||
TEMPLATE="$REPO/packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in"
|
||||
UNIT_NAME="mosaic-webui.service"
|
||||
USAGE="usage: scripts/webui-service.sh copy COMMIT [--copies DIR] [--allow-worktree] | render [--copy ID [--copies DIR]] [FLAGS] | install --copy ID [--copies DIR] [--dir DIR] [--no-reload] [--allow-worktree] [FLAGS] | uninstall [--dir DIR] [--no-reload] | status [--dir DIR]
|
||||
FLAGS: [--port N] [--business ID] [--board URL] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send]] [--tester-port N] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]
|
||||
FLAGS: [--port N] [--business ID] [--board URL] [--sso [--send] | --public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send]] [--tester-port N] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]
|
||||
--tester-port: 1024..65535, different from --port and never 7332; loopback tester listener.
|
||||
--allow-worktree is for the tests only: copy and install otherwise refuse outside the canonical checkout."
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +94,7 @@ PUBLIC_HOST=""
|
||||
AUTH_HEADER=""
|
||||
ALLOW_USER=""
|
||||
SEND=0
|
||||
SSO=0
|
||||
PROOF_HEADER=""
|
||||
PROOF_FILE=""
|
||||
PROOF_SET=0
|
||||
@@ -114,6 +118,7 @@ parse_flags() {
|
||||
--proof-header) [ $# -ge 2 ] || usage; PROOF_HEADER="$2"; PROOF_SET=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--proof-file) [ $# -ge 2 ] || usage; PROOF_FILE="$2"; PROOF_SET=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--send) SEND=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift ;;
|
||||
--sso) SSO=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift ;;
|
||||
*) usage ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
@@ -166,9 +171,13 @@ serve_flags() {
|
||||
[ -z "$PUBLIC_HOST" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
|
||||
[ -z "$AUTH_HEADER" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
|
||||
[ -z "$ALLOW_USER" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
|
||||
# serve refuses --send without the preview set; refuse it here first,
|
||||
# so no unit is written that would only exit 2 at start.
|
||||
[ "$SEND" = 0 ] || [ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || die "--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)"
|
||||
# serve refuses --sso with the preview set or the proof pair, and --send
|
||||
# without --sso or the preview set; refuse them here first, so no unit is
|
||||
# written that would only exit 2 at start.
|
||||
if [ "$SSO" = 1 ] && { [ "$preview" -ne 0 ] || [ "$PROOF_SET" = 1 ]; }; then
|
||||
die "--sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
[ "$SEND" = 0 ] || [ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || [ "$SSO" = 1 ] || die "--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso"
|
||||
if [ "$preview" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
[ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || die "--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user go together: all three or none"
|
||||
case "$PUBLIC_HOST" in [A-Za-z0-9]*) ;; *) die "public host must be a hostname, no port or scheme: $PUBLIC_HOST" ;; esac
|
||||
@@ -201,6 +210,7 @@ serve_flags() {
|
||||
{ [ "$proof_mode" = 600 ] || [ "$proof_mode" = 400 ]; } && [ "$proof_uid" = "$(id -u)" ] || die "invalid proxy proof file metadata"
|
||||
flags="$flags --proof-header $PROOF_HEADER --proof-file $PROOF_FILE"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
[ "$SSO" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --sso"
|
||||
[ "$SEND" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --send"
|
||||
[ "$TESTER_SET" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --tester-port $TESTER_PORT"
|
||||
echo "$flags"
|
||||
@@ -385,14 +395,17 @@ status_unit() {
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "copy: none; the unit runs from $wd"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# render puts --send after the allowed user and optional proof pair,
|
||||
# before the tester port. The allowed user
|
||||
# render puts --send after the allowed user and optional proof pair, or
|
||||
# after --sso, before the tester port. The allowed user
|
||||
# starts with a letter or digit (N5), so it is never the value --send.
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.* --allow-user [^ ][^ ]*( --proof-header [^ ]+ --proof-file /[^ ]+)? --send( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.*( --allow-user [^ ][^ ]*( --proof-header [^ ]+ --proof-file /[^ ]+)?| --sso) --send( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
|
||||
echo "send: on (--send; human messages to roles)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "send: off (read-only)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.* --sso( --send)?( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
|
||||
echo "sign-in: the Console's own (--sso)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
local tester_port
|
||||
tester_port="$(sed -n 's/^ExecStart=.* --tester-port \([0-9][0-9]*\)$/\1/p' "$target")"
|
||||
if [ -n "$tester_port" ]; then
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user