launchpad: row 192 packet, mutant 23 equivalent and the guard kept (sage-1407)

webby-0019 B1, sage-1403: returnURL builds the Location from publicOrigin plus the
parsed pathname and search, checks the origin again and returns the href, so a
dot-segment `//host` path stays on the Console. Test 14 covers Webby's three cases
and asserts each Location's origin; mutant 22 restores the r1 returnPath (killed).
N1 design blob cite, N2 listed under Deviations, N3 SIGN_IN_COOKIE comment.

agents/README.md

@@ -19,12 +19,6 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
-| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
-| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
 | Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
 | Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |

agents/bushroot/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Bushroot
-
-Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
-that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/duckworth/README.md

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
 
 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gander/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Gander
-
-Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for the human
-boundary row (P19 333, #1694, mos-0989).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gander/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gizmoduck/README.md

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# Gizmoduck
-
-Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
-(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
-access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
-the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
-repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gizmoduck/work/machine-grant/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,926 +0,0 @@
-# Machine grant path, design draft r6 (Vikunja #436, row 210 follow-up)
-
-Owner: Gizmoduck. Reviewer: Duckworth. Sizing and row assignment: Sage. Design only. Code starts when
-Duckworth approves the design and row 210 lands (sage-1527).
-
-Sources: Q188 (DECISIONS.md:1642, jason-master-restart 8ecf252), mos-1115, mos-1120, mos-1125, mos-1127, mos-1131, mos-1133, mos-1139,
-sage-1527, Duckworth's r1 review (REVIEW-r1.md, duckworth/reviews d025ef492, corrected at 749080115), Duckworth's
-r3 and r4 review (REVIEW-r3.md, duckworth/reviews 9dceb2148, duckworth-0060), Duckworth's r5 diff check
-(REVIEW-r5.md, duckworth/reviews c3dc58f30, duckworth-0063),
-Honker's PRD 1.8 draft (honker/row194-b2 3c30f1036, REQ-TRUST-2 and REQ-GRANT-1 to -4), row 210 DESIGN r3
-(e021dfa26) and its approved candidate 455964f23. Code cites are `path:line` at origin/refactor f41729178
-unless they say "210:", which means the row 210 candidate 455964f23 (the same code as the branch head
-a2fd30390). Host facts come from ops-01's read-only check of .53 and .54 at 22:21Z (mos-1127).
-
-## r6 changes (from r5 7686fd783)
-
-Duckworth approved r5 with C1 and one note (duckworth-0063). The design is approved for code once row 210
-lands. r6 carries C1 and the note, for a diff check on those lines.
-
-- C1: a revoke can't be undone by a commands-change undo. After step 5 commits, the executor ignores an
-  abort (X5). Both undo paths that set a record back to `previous` only update a record that exists, never
-  insert one, and do nothing when a `grant.revoked` is newer than the decision (X3). G28 and an upsert
-  mutant cover it.
-- N1: a failed unlink at revoke step 2 no longer depends on the marker. At start, after the grant
-  reconcile, the bus unlinks every `host.<id>` key file that has no `host_grants` record (section 6, G27).
-
-## r5 changes (from r4 1c5705d6d)
-
-Duckworth's review of r3 and r4 (duckworth-0060) asked for changes, B1 and B2, with notes N1 to N11. mos-1139
-says to fix both and rules on N8.
-
-- B1: E2 step 1 is now one transaction: `#consumeGrant`, a check that the host isn't enrolled yet, then the
-  insert. A second approved enrollment for the same `hostId` ends `grant.failed host-enrolled`. `hosts` gets
-  the primary key (business, host id) in `3i-3j.sql`. G17 and two mutants cover it.
-- B2: X2 consumes first and claims second, in one turn of the event loop. A busy claim ends `grant.failed
-  host-busy` with a message. At start, a grant decision resolved yes with no `action.allowed` ends
-  `grant.failed interrupted` and never runs late (X3). `hosts.revoke` records `grant.revoked` even with no
-  reference and no claim, so X5's first bullet now matches the code. G11 and G23 cover it.
-- N1: the `ID_PATTERN` cite is marked `210:`.
-- N2: X5 states the build rule that `issue` and its `commit` stay synchronous, with a mutant.
-- N3, N4: `hosts.revoke` is its own verb in `bus/src/host-grants.mjs`, not 210's `credential-verbs.mjs`. It
-  writes a `pending` marker first, and the start reconcile finishes a revoke a restart cut short (section 6,
-  G27).
-- N5: the writer also refuses `disk`, `libvirt` and `incus-admin` (E3).
-- N6: a first `add` creates the file, and a leftover regular tmp is unlinked under the `flock` (E3, G25).
-- N7: the installer's line is written out exactly (E3).
-- N8: a dev instance is a business whose `bus.tester` var is exactly true (mos-1139, section 6).
-- N9: the row a run sheet strips row 210's `hosts` keys before the `--migrate` re-pin (S1).
-- N10: the writer list in the r3 changes now includes `hosts.check`. ops-01 reads only the three key types the
-  keyscan asks for (E1).
-- N11: Duckworth withdrew a PRD note. Section 6 step 1's record delete stays.
-- Row b grows by the revoke verb and its marker. My estimate goes from 1.5 days to 1.75 (section 12).
-
-## r4 changes (from r3 d8bcf8066)
-
-mos-1133 corrects S1's migration lines. r3 said the 3i-3j re-pin needs `--migrate` with Jason present (P19
-371). That was wrong. P19 371 predates Q173, and Q173 lets Mos, Sage or Darkwing re-pin, migrate, roll back
-and restore the mosaic-stack business on dragon-lin. S1 now says so and adds the .53 and .54 plan. Nothing
-else changed.
-
-## r3 changes (from r2 eb4c756a1)
-
-mos-1131 (from duckworth-0057 and mos-1129): under PRD 1.8 only an Approve creates a grant, and a hand edit
-of the business file makes nothing. So W1 is gone.
-
-- Enrolled hosts and grants are records in the bus store, written only by the executor, revoke,
-  `hosts.check` and `hosts.remove`, each in the same transaction as its event (section 5, S1). Nothing writes them into the
-  business file.
-- Row 210's hand-edited `hosts` keys stay a test path until row a (#436a) moves `host.run` to the store
-  records. After that the loader refuses those keys (S1).
-- B1 gets simpler. `host.run` reads the store at each call, so the broker needs no runtime apply. Only
-  `Credentials.register` stays (X4).
-- `registrySha256` stays, now over the store's host record. It is what 1.8 calls "the target or its
-  enrolled identity" (mos-1131 point 3).
-- Enrollment carries expected fingerprints, and the raise runs its own keyscan (E1, mos-1132 Q-M2).
-- Revokers follow mos-1124 d and mos-1132: the human, the assistant in its own organization (Q188's "Mos",
-  Mos's reading for prd.approve), and the tester on a dev instance only (section 6).
-- ops-01's Q-O2 rules and writer points a to d are in E3 and section 9.
-- X5 (B2) is 1.8's N2: a revoke during creation stops it, and nothing it made stays usable (mos-1131 point
-  4).
-- The store records need a new migration, `3i-3j.sql` (S1). That makes row a a schema change.
-
-## r2 changes (from r1 f6b6a04b6)
-
-- Enrollment is a request the chief raises and Jason approves, not a CLI Jason types (mos-1120 point 3).
-  Section 3 is rewritten. `hosts.enroll` stays, as the verb the executor runs.
-- The action is `credential.mint` with a `grant` binding, not a new `host.grant` (sage-1527 Q-S3, Honker's
-  REQ-GRANT-1). The hard-waits list doesn't change. R2 says why the binding still carries G1 to G10.
-- The binding adds a hash of the agent's role definition, because REQ-GRANT-2 voids an approval when the
-  definition changes. It also carries the full commands list (N2).
-- The host side follows ops-01's answer to Q-O1 (mos-1125): lines in a root-owned
-  `/etc/ssh/mosaic-keys/%u`, a dedicated install user, a forced command that only parses, and a root
-  writer in this repo that checks everything again (E3). This answers B5.
-- A target user with sudo is enrolled by name, and Jason's Approve of the enrollment covers it (E1, E3,
-  mos-1125's recommendation). Without this no `host.sudo` grant could be installed.
-- B1: a grant, a commands change, an enrollment and a revoke take effect in the running bus (X4).
-- B2: the executor holds an `#inflight` entry that revoke aborts, and a revoke works before any grant
-  exists (X5).
-- B3: progress events before each step, and a start-time reconcile that undoes to the state before the
-  decision (X3).
-- B4: the tag is a hash, recorded in events, and `list` and `sweep` only touch this business's recorded
-  tags (X2, step 2).
-- N1 to N3 answered in X1, R4 and E4.
-- Section 9 adds ops-01's point that a host line has no `command=` (mos-1125).
-- Answers recorded: Q-S1 to Q-S4, Q-M1, Q-O1. New questions Q-M2, Q-S5 and Q-O2.
-
-## 0. What Q188 asks for, and what this draft builds
-
-Q188 says no agent creates a grant. A request goes up the chain, only the chief raises it to Jason's inbox,
-Jason clicks Approve or Deny, and on Approve protected stack code creates the grant. Revoke stays instant, by
-Jason, Mos or the tester. mos-1115 puts machines first: issue the key, install it on the host with
-`from="<stack host>",restrict`, pin the host fingerprint, and on revoke drop the key and cut the connection.
-This replaces row 210 section 4, where Jason hand-edits three layers, runs `issue`, and ops-01 pastes the
-`authorized_keys` line.
-
-This draft covers:
-
-- host enrollment, once per host (section 3)
-- the grant request and its decision (section 4)
-- the executor that runs on Approve (section 5)
-- revoke (section 6)
-- how row 210's per-call decision becomes manual mode (section 7)
-
-Gitea and GitHub grants follow the same executor shape and are a later draft (section 11).
-
-One thing up front, because it changes what Jason sees on 10-27. A grant made this way still doesn't let an
-agent run a command without a click. Under PRD 1.7 `host.sudo` is a hard wait, and every `host.run` needs its
-own decision (210 D4). "Runs without a click" needs REQ-CRED-4 in PRD 1.8 (Vikunja #434, Honker through Sage)
-and the reviewed commit that routes `host.sudo`. This path and that routing are separate pieces, and the
-first is useless for Q188's goal without the second.
-
-## 1. Facts from the code
-
-- F1. **No chain of command exists in the data.** A role definition has only `roleVersion, name, title,
-  contract, tools, network, authority, credentials, messaging, skills` (`business/src/role.mjs:19-20`). There
-  is no `reportsTo` or manager field. The one fixed rank is the chief, the definition named
-  `chief-of-staff` (`bus/src/broker.mjs:157`), and the broker already checks an instance's definition against
-  it (`broker.mjs:593`, `:1990`). Who may message whom is the only structure, `#checkMessaging`
-  (`broker.mjs:617-627`).
-- F2. **Any agent may raise any action.** `decision.raise` stores `raised_by_role` and `raised_by_run`
-  (`broker.mjs:1703-1708`). No rule limits which role raises which action, and no raise names another agent
-  as its beneficiary.
-- F3. **A hard wait always routes to the human.** Any action outside `ROUTED` is in `GATED_ONLY`
-  (`business/src/vocabulary.mjs:88`), classifies `gated` (`broker.mjs:597-609`) and routes to `human`
-  (`broker.mjs:1677-1680`). A tester thread can't route to the human (`broker.mjs:1683`).
-- F4. **Resolving a decision runs nothing.** `decision.resolve` records a `decision_events` row and messages
-  the raiser (`broker.mjs:1752-1828`). An effect happens later, when a verb consumes the decision through
-  `#consumeAuthority`, which refuses `decision-consumed` if an `action.allowed` event other than the raise
-  already cites it (`broker.mjs:808-831`). `#consumeAuthority` needs the raiser's own agent session: it
-  checks `raised_by_role` and the raiser's thread against the caller (`broker.mjs:764`, `:786`). The
-  landing path is the only place where stack code reacts to a resolution, and even there the agent's own
-  `land_work` call does the work (`cli/src/launcher.mjs:555-600`).
-- F5. **The human proof.** `mosaic decide` resolves through `human-cli.mjs` (`cli/src/cli.mjs:142-175`,
-  `cli/src/transport.mjs:55-75`). `verifyHuman` is a same-UID cooperative check (`bus/src/human.mjs:50-52`),
-  and `#human` needs `via === 'cli'` and `outsideAgent` (`broker.mjs:375-378`).
-- F6. **The business file has one writer discipline.** `organizationWriter.write`
-  (`business/src/organization.mjs:177-219`): a lock dir, a revision that is the sha256 of the current bytes,
-  `previous.json`, tmp, fsync, rename, and receipts in `businesses/.history/<id>/changes.jsonl`. The bus child
-  does the write (`cli/src/host.mjs:215`, `bus/src/process.mjs:1-3`). Agent-reachable keys are
-  `ORGANIZATION_KEYS` and `INSTANCE_KEYS` (`broker.mjs:146-148`). Row 210's `hosts` keys sit outside both.
-- F7. **Row 210's pieces this path reuses:**
-  - the agent key store at `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/host.<id>` (210:
-    `bus/src/credentials.mjs:153-157`)
-  - `issue`, which writes tmp, fsync, rename, then calls `commit`, then sets memory and clears the revoked
-    mark (210: `credentials.mjs:243-280`, the clear at `:279`)
-  - `revoke`, which drops memory, aborts the call in flight and unlinks the file (210:
-    `credentials.mjs:284-298`, the abort at `:289`). It refuses `credential-unknown` for a service with no
-    loaded reference (210: `credentials.mjs:235-238`).
-  - the busy map `#inflight`, instance and service to an `AbortController` (210: `credentials.mjs:118`,
-    `busy` at `:332-334`, used by `host-run.mjs:249`)
-  - pinned `known_hosts` built from the registry's `hostKeys` with `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes` (210:
-    `bus/src/host-run.mjs:36`, `:170`)
-- F8. **Nothing on refactor generates keys or contacts a host.** No `ssh-keygen` or ssh spawn exists in
-  `packages/*/src`. Row 210 adds the ssh spawn, and row 210's tests already require `ssh-keygen` on the
-  machine (210 test list, first test).
-- F9. **The Console can't approve today.** It shows decisions and copies the `mosaic decide` command
-  (`webui/src/public/bus.js:3-5`). `decision.resolve` is not in `BUS_VERBS` (`webui/src/serve.mjs:62`).
-  Vikunja #435 adds Approve after Q175 sign-in (#412).
-- F10. **`credential.mint` is already a hard wait with no executor** (`vocabulary.mjs:38`).
-- F11. **The running bus never reloads the business file, except the limits.** The broker keeps a clone
-  made once (210: `broker.mjs:234`), and `host.run` reads `b.hosts` and `b.roles[role].hosts` from it (210:
-  `broker.mjs:1731-1735`). `Credentials` loads its references once, in the constructor (210:
-  `bus/src/runtime.mjs:85-98`, `credentials.mjs:125-147`). Only the limits read the file at each ask, and
-  `instances.set` answers `restart: true` (`business/src/instance-settings.mjs:73`, `:155`).
-- F12. **The business file has no room for state on a host or a grant.** A registry entry takes only
-  `address, port, user, hostKeys` (210: `business/src/hosts.mjs:75`), and a role's grant only `commands`
-  (210: `hosts.mjs:123`). Under 1.8 the file holds no grant at all (mos-1131), so hosts, grants, state, tags
-  and progress live in the bus store (S1).
-
-## 2. Shape
-
-```
-agent --message--> chief --decision.raise credential.mint + grant--> Jason's inbox
-                                                         |
-                                     mosaic decide (later: Console Approve, #435)
-                                                         |
-                          bus child grant executor (on resolve, approve only)
-               keygen -> install via host installer -> verify -> key file + store record + live refs
-```
-
-Revoke runs the other way: memory, then the in-flight call, then the key file, then the store record, then
-the host line.
-
-## 3. Host enrollment (once per host, a request like a grant)
-
-Installing a key on a host needs something on the host that already trusts the stack. Nothing on refactor
-holds that trust, so each host gets one enrollment. This is the step that remains for ops-01, once per
-host, and it goes on the ops-01 run sheet in the installer's I3 row (#432, mos-1120). Per-agent installs no
-longer need ops-01.
-
-A host here is a registry entry, so it has one user (F12). Two users on one machine are two host ids with the
-same address, each enrolled on its own.
-
-### E1. The request
-
-ops-01 reads the host's ed25519, ecdsa and rsa key fingerprints on the host, read-only
-(`/etc/ssh/ssh_host_{ed25519,ecdsa,rsa}_key.pub`). Those are the three types the keyscan asks for, so a
-fingerprint of any other type would make the raise refuse `host-key-mismatch` (N10). Host keys never travel
-by message (mos-1132). The request carries ordinary fields: address, port, the target user,
-whether that user has sudo, and the expected fingerprints. On the #433 VM, Mos or Sage passes them to the
-chief as the tester (Q173). On .53 and .54, Jason sends the request in the Console (Q118), with text Mos
-builds from ops-01's values. The chief raises a `credential.mint` decision with the binding (section 4, R4):
-
-```
-grant: { "method": "host-enroll", "host": "<hostId>", "address": "A", "port": 22, "user": "U",
-         "sudo": true, "fingerprints": ["SHA256:...", ...] }
-```
-
-The raise checks are 210 D3 layer 2's: the address rules, refusing loopback and this machine's names, the
-port range, the user pattern and the key types. It also refuses a `hostId` that is already enrolled, a user
-named `root`, `localadmin` or `mosaic-installer`, and a `sudo` that isn't a boolean.
-
-Before the raise transaction, the raise runs its own `ssh-keyscan -T 5 -p <port> -t ed25519,ecdsa,rsa
-<address>` from the stack host. The set of scanned fingerprints must equal the set in the request, or the
-raise refuses `host-key-mismatch` and nothing is stored. So two independent reads, ops-01's on the host and
-the stack's over the network, have to agree before Jason sees the binding (mos-1132). The scanned key lines
-go in the raise event body as `hostKeys`, and those are what E2 writes and E4 pins. The keyscan only reads
-the host's public keys. It logs in to nothing.
-
-The rendered block shows each fingerprint and the key line, so Jason can compare them with ops-01's. With `"sudo": true` it adds one line in plain words: "U has sudo on this host.
-Approving lets later grants for U be installed, and section 9's first limit applies to U."
-
-Jason approves with `mosaic decide` until #412 brings the Console inbox. No one pastes a host key. The keys
-come from the keyscan, checked against ops-01's fingerprints.
-
-The pin is never taken on trust from one connection (210 section 4). It is the keyscan result, and only
-when it matches the fingerprints ops-01 read on the host. E4's check fails closed on a wrong pin too.
-
-Not every host can be enrolled yet. jarvis on .53 and melanie on .54 wait for #423 steps 4 and 5
-(mos-1125 point 5).
-
-### E2. What the executor does
-
-On Approve the bus child runs `hosts.enroll`, with the same start rules as a grant (section 5, X1):
-
-1. **Recheck and consume** in one store transaction (B1): `#consumeGrant(business, decision, 'host-enroll')`
-   (X1), a check that no `hosts` record has this (business, `hostId`), then `host.enroll.step {decision,
-   host, step: 'registry'}` and the `hosts` record (S1) with the bound `address, port, user, sudo,
-   hostKeys`. If the host is already enrolled, the transaction writes only the spend and `grant.failed
-   {code: 'host-enrolled'}`, and the human and the chief get a message. The primary key (S1) refuses a
-   second insert as well. So of two approved enrollments for one `hostId`, the second never replaces the
-   pin, the user or the sudo mark under live grants, and enrolling again still means `hosts.remove` first
-   (E4). Enrollment needs no `#inflight` claim, because a second enrollment stops here, before anything
-   else is written.
-2. generates an installer key pair with `ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -C mosaic-installer-<tag>`, where `<tag>`
-   is the hash of section 5's X2 step 2 over (business, `@installer`, hostId), in a 0700 dir under
-   `<configDir>/secrets/run`, the dir row 210 already sweeps at start
-3. moves the private half to `<configDir>/secrets/hosts/<business>/<hostId>/installer`, mode 0600 in 0700
-   dirs, by the same tmp, fsync, rename steps as 210 `issue`. The path follows row 199 D1's
-   `secrets/agents/<business>/...` (Q-S2, mos-1120, sage-1527)
-4. records `host.enrolled {decision, host, registrySha256, installerFingerprint, user, sudo}` and messages
-   the human and the chief with what ops-01 installs (E3)
-
-No private material goes out. A failure at step 2 or 3 deletes the host record again and ends
-`grant.failed`, as X3 does. A restart after step 1 does the same (X3).
-
-The host's state is in the store record (S1):
-
-- `pending-install`: set by step 1
-- `ready`: set by a passing `hosts.check` whose `registrySha256` and installer fingerprint match the record
-
-### E3. The host side
-
-ops-01 answered Q-O1 with six changes (mos-1125). The stack side doesn't change. The host side is four
-files in this repo under `tools/host/`, each reviewed like code, and Duckworth reviews the writer, the
-sudoers line and the sshd drop-in before .53 (mos-1125 point 6):
-
-| File | Installed as | Does |
-|---|---|---|
-| `mosaic-keys` | `/usr/local/sbin/mosaic-keys`, root, 0755 | the installer key's forced command. Parses `SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND` against fixed patterns and runs `sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/mosaic-keys-write <request>`. Nothing else. |
-| `mosaic-keys-write` | `/usr/local/sbin/mosaic-keys-write`, root, 0755 | checks everything again and writes the line |
-| `mosaic-keys.sudoers` | `/etc/sudoers.d/mosaic-keys`, root, 0440 | `mosaic-installer ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/mosaic-keys-write` |
-| `mosaic-keys.sshd.conf` | `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/<nn>-mosaic-keys.conf` | `AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 /etc/ssh/mosaic-keys/%u` |
-
-The drop-in keeps both paths the hosts use today. On .53 and .54, `sshd_config` includes
-`sshd_config.d/*.conf` at line 12 and no file sets `AuthorizedKeysFile` (mos-1127 point 2). Root never
-writes into a user's home (mos-1125 point 1).
-
-Host config, all root-owned and written by ops-01 from the approved enrollment message:
-
-- `/etc/mosaic-keys/users`: the users the writer may touch
-- `/etc/mosaic-keys/privileged`: the users with sudo that Jason approved by name (E1 `"sudo": true`)
-- `/etc/mosaic-keys/from`: the `from=` value. The stack can't choose it.
-- `/etc/ssh/mosaic-keys/`: root, 0755. `mosaic-installer`'s own line lives here, in a root-owned
-  `mosaic-installer` file that ops-01 writes by hand.
-
-The installer's line is exactly this, with `<from>` the same value as `/etc/mosaic-keys/from` (N7):
-
-```
-restrict,command="/usr/local/sbin/mosaic-keys",from="<from>" ssh-ed25519 <base64> mosaic-installer-<tag>
-```
-
-E2 step 4's message carries the line with the public key filled in, and the I3 run sheet's host step quotes
-it. So a hand-written line can't drop `restrict` or `command=`.
-
-`mosaic-installer` is a dedicated user, never `localadmin` and never an agent user (mos-1125 point 2). It
-needs no entry in any sshd list, because .53 and .54 have no `AllowUsers`, `AllowGroups`, `DenyUsers`,
-`DenyGroups`, `ForceCommand` or `Match` block and `pam_access` is off (mos-1127 point 1).
-
-Requests:
-
-| Request | Effect |
-|---|---|
-| `list <user>` | prints each line of `/etc/ssh/mosaic-keys/<user>` whose tag matches the tag pattern |
-| `add <user> <type> <base64> <tag>` | appends `from="<from>",restrict <type> <base64> <tag>` unless the tag exists |
-| `remove <user> <tag>` | drops the line with that exact tag |
-
-`remove` of a tag that isn't there changes nothing and exits 0, so a revoke and an executor undo can both run
-it.
-
-What `mosaic-keys-write` checks, at every request (mos-1125 points 3 and 4):
-
-- the request matches the patterns again. Each tag matches `^mosaic-[0-9a-f]{32}$`, and each type and
-  base64 match E1's patterns.
-- `<user>` matches `^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$` before it is used in any path. `O_NOFOLLOW` covers only the
-  last component, so the pattern is what stops a `../x` relative to the dir fd (ops-01 point a).
-- `<user>` exists, is in `users`, and isn't uid 0, uid under 1000, `mosaic-installer` or `localadmin`. These
-  names and the uid rule are in the code, not in a file. `users` is always required.
-- `<user>` is in none of the groups `sudo`, `admin`, `wheel`, `docker`, `lxd`, `disk`, `libvirt` and
-  `incus-admin`, and has no sudo rights, unless it is in `privileged`. A group the host doesn't have counts
-  as no membership. `disk` reads and writes raw block devices, and `libvirt` and `incus-admin` start guests
-  with host mounts, so each is root by another route (N5). `privileged` only lifts this check. Being in it alone allows nothing (ops-01 Q-O2
-  point 1).
-- the sudo test is `LC_ALL=C sudo -l -U <user>`. Any output other than the exact line
-  `User <user> is not allowed to run sudo on <host>.` counts as having sudo (ops-01 Q-O2 point 4).
-- it never touches a line whose tag doesn't match the pattern.
-
-How it writes, so no path trick moves the write:
-
-- opens `/etc/ssh/mosaic-keys` with `O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW` and refuses unless it is root-owned and not
-  group or world writable
-- takes `flock` on `.lock` in that dir, a name the user pattern can't match, so sshd never reads it and
-  `list` never shows it (ops-01 point b)
-- opens the user's file relative to the dir fd with `O_NOFOLLOW`, and refuses one that isn't a regular
-  root-owned file. A first `add` for a user finds no file. `ENOENT` there means an empty list, and the
-  rename creates the file. `list` and `remove` on a missing file print nothing and change nothing (N6).
-- the tmp is `.<user>.tmp`, a name the user pattern can't match. Under the `flock`, a leftover tmp can only
-  come from a writer that crashed, so a regular root-owned one is unlinked first. A tmp that is a symlink
-  or not a regular file refuses, and nothing is written (N6).
-- writes the tmp with `O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW`, sets mode 0644, `fsync`, `renameat` over the file,
-  then `fsync` on the dir
-- logs to syslog the result, user, tag and key fingerprint. The fingerprint is sha256 over the decoded
-  blob, so no `ssh-keygen` runs
-
-sudo's `env_reset` drops `SSH_CONNECTION` on both hosts. So `mosaic-keys` logs `SSH_CONNECTION` and the request
-with `logger -t mosaic-keys` before it calls sudo, and the sudoers file stays one line with no `env_keep`
-(ops-01 point c). The hosts set `use_pty`. With `restrict` there is no pty, and sudo shouldn't allocate one
-when stdin isn't a tty. The #433 proof checks that `list` output and the exit code pass through unchanged
-(ops-01 point d).
-
-The writer is python3, standard library only, with `#!/usr/bin/python3 -I`, because `os.open` takes `dir_fd`
-and `O_NOFOLLOW` and a shell script can't do that safely. Both hosts have Python 3.12.3 at `/usr/bin/python3`,
-root-owned, and `python3 -I` imports every module the writer needs (ops-01, 22:26Z).
-
-When ops-01 writes `users` and `privileged` from an approved enrollment, ops-01 first checks the E1 `sudo`
-mark on the host. If the host disagrees, for example `sudo: false` for a user in `docker`, ops-01 writes
-neither file and reports back, and the enrollment needs a new request (ops-01 Q-O2 point 2).
-
-sshd's `StrictModes yes` (on both hosts, mos-1127 point 3) also refuses a key file whose path is writable by
-anyone but root or the user.
-
-The install proof runs on the #433 VM first (mos-1125 point 6), as ops-01 does it (mos-1127): `sshd -t`,
-`systemctl reload ssh`, then a new connection. An existing session survives the reload. Rollback removes
-the drop-in and reloads, which restores the old value. The run sheet's host step (#432, I3) cites these.
-
-This still doesn't make the installer key safe to lose. A key that can add a line for a privileged user is
-root on that host. Section 9 says so.
-
-### E4. Check
-
-After ops-01 installs the files and the installer line, `hosts.check <hostId>` connects as `mosaic-installer`
-with the installer key, the pinned `known_hosts` and 210's ssh options, and runs `list <user>`. A wrong pin
-exits 255 and refuses `host-key-mismatch`, as 210 does, and the host stays `pending-install`. A pass records
-`host.checked {host, registrySha256, installerFingerprint}` and sets the record `ready` in the same
-transaction. Only a `ready` host can be named in a grant (R4).
-
-The chief, the tester or the human may run `hosts.check`. It reads the host's lines and widens nothing past
-what Jason approved, so it needs no decision. `status` shows each host's state, pin fingerprints, installer
-fingerprint and last check time.
-
-`hosts.remove <hostId>` is for the human or the tester, as a revoke is (REQ-GRANT-4), because it only takes
-access away. It refuses `host-in-use` while any grant names the host and `host-line-left` while any event's
-`hostLineLeft` names the host and no later `sweep` cleared it (N3). Then it deletes the installer key and the
-host record, and records `host.removed` in the same transaction. ops-01 removes the
-installer line on the host. Enrolling the host again takes a new request.
-
-## 4. The request and the decision
-
-### R1. Up the chain
-
-An agent that needs host access sends the chief a message, as any request to the chief goes today
-(`#checkMessaging`, `broker.mjs:617-627`). There is no structured request verb (Q-S1). F1 gives the reason:
-nothing records who reports to whom, so the bus can't check a chain beyond "the chief raises it".
-
-"Not every agent may request" (Q188) is enforced at the raise. The target agent's definition must declare
-`{"service": "host"}` in `credentials` (210 D3 layer 1, a reviewed commit). An agent whose definition lacks
-it can ask, but the chief's raise for it refuses `host-not-declared`. Which definitions declare `host` is
-the reviewed list of agents that may hold a host grant.
-
-### R2. The action
-
-The request is a `credential.mint` decision, as Honker's REQ-GRANT-1 says. `credential.mint` is already a
-hard wait (`vocabulary.mjs:38`, F10), so it classifies `gated` for every role and routes to the human (F3).
-No role file may list it (REQ-WAIT-2), so it can never be routed, and the hard-waits list doesn't change.
-
-r1 used a new `host.grant` action because `credential.mint` names no host or argv. That reason doesn't
-hold. The binding lives in the raise's `grant` argument and the raise event body, not in the action name,
-so G1 to G10 test the same things either way. The executor starts only for a decision whose raise carries
-a `grant` binding.
-
-A `credential.mint` raise without `grant` keeps today's behaviour. Any agent may raise one, Jason may
-answer it, and nothing runs. It is a question for a hand-made credential, as it is now.
-
-### R3. Who may raise it
-
-The broker refuses a raise that carries `grant` unless the raiser's definition is `chief-of-staff`
-(`b.roles[s.role].definition === STAFF_TO`, the check at `broker.mjs:593`). Refusal: `grant-chief-only`. A
-tester thread can't raise it, because it routes to the human (`broker.mjs:1683`). Any other action with a
-`grant` argument refuses `invalid-request`.
-
-### R4. What the raise binds
-
-New raise argument `grant`, allowed only with `action === 'credential.mint'`. For a host grant:
-
-```
-grant: { "method": "host", "agent": "<instance>", "host": "<hostId>",
-         "commands": [["systemctl", "status"], ...], "rotateBy": "YYYY-MM-DD" }
-```
-
-`host-enroll` is E1's. A later draft adds `gitea` and `github`. Any other `method` refuses
-`invalid-request`.
-
-Checks at raise, all inside the raise transaction:
-
-- `agent` is a role instance of this business, and its definition declares `host` (R1)
-- `host` is `ready` (E2, E4), or the raise refuses `host-not-ready`
-- `commands` passes 210 D6's argv rules: no wildcard, no shell, no empty prefix, and the existing
-  refusals for `bash` and the like
-- `rotateBy` is a date inside 210's rotation window
-
-The broker appends a rendered block to the question, as 210 D4 does for `host.sudo`: agent, host id,
-address, user, whether the user has sudo (from `host.enrolled`), each argv prefix JSON-quoted, the rotate
-date, and whether this is a new key or a change to an existing grant's commands. The chief can't shape that
-block. If the question with the block exceeds the 4096-character cap (`broker.mjs:126`), the raise refuses
-`invalid-request`, as 210 D4 does (N2). The chief then splits the commands over two requests.
-
-The raise event body gets `grant = {method, agent, host, commands, commandsSha256, rotateBy, registrySha256,
-definitionSha256}`. The full `commands` list is stored there, and the executor reads it from that event at
-X2 step 1 and checks it against `commandsSha256` (N2). `registrySha256` hashes the host record's identity (`address, port, user, sudo,
-hostKeys`) at raise time, which is 1.8's "the target or its enrolled identity" (mos-1131), and `definitionSha256` hashes the agent's role definition file. REQ-GRANT-2 voids an approval
-when the agent, its definition, the target or the rights change after the raise. If either hash differs at
-X2 step 1, the executor refuses `decision-mismatch` and the chief raises again.
-
-### R5. Jason decides
-
-`mosaic decide <id> yes|no` as today (F5). After #435, the Console's Approve calls the same
-`decision.resolve` through `human-cli.mjs` behind Q175 sign-in. The executor keys on the resolution, not on
-the client, so #435 needs no executor change.
-
-## 5. The executor
-
-### X1. When it runs
-
-At resolve. Today a resolution runs nothing (F4), and the raiser comes back later to consume the decision.
-Here the raiser is the chief, and Q188 says no agent creates the grant, so the chief must not be the one
-whose call does it. The bus child starts the executor itself after the human's `decision.resolve` commits,
-when all of these hold: the decision's action is `credential.mint` and its raise carries `grant`, the route
-is `human`, the choice equals `approvalChoice`, and `via === 'cli'`. A resolve by an arbiter, the tester or
-an agent starts nothing (REQ-GRANT-2).
-
-The resolve call returns at once with `{grant: "started"}`. It does not wait on ssh. Jason sees the outcome
-in `mosaic hosts status` and as a message in his inbox from `system` when the executor ends.
-
-The executor can't use `#consumeAuthority`, because that needs the raiser's agent session (F4, N1). It gets
-its own path, `#consumeGrant(business, decisionId, method)`. In one transaction it checks the decision is
-resolved yes by the human via cli, checks `#spent` the same way (`broker.mjs:808-831`), and writes the
-`action.allowed` event with `operation: 'grant.<method>'` and actor `system/grant`. A second start finds it
-spent and refuses `decision-consumed`. It is a private method, and only the executor calls it.
-
-### X2. Steps
-
-1. **Recheck, consume, claim.** One store transaction: `#consumeGrant` (X1), the agent and its definition
-   still declare `host`, the definition hashes to `definitionSha256`, the host record hashes to
-   `registrySha256`, the host is `ready`, the `commands` in the raise event hash to `commandsSha256`, and no
-   revoke of this (agent, host) is newer than the raise. Any failure is `grant.failed` with its code, and
-   nothing remote has happened. Right after the commit, with no `await` between, the executor claims the
-   (agent, `host.<hostId>`) entry in `#inflight` (X5). The store is `DatabaseSync` (`store.mjs:1`), so the
-   transaction and the claim run in one turn of the event loop, and no revoke or `host.run` can run between
-   them. A claim that finds an entry, usually a running `host.run` from the same agent (210:
-   `credentials.mjs:355`), ends `grant.failed {code: 'host-busy'}` with a message to the human and the
-   chief, and the chief raises again (B2). The decision is spent before the claim, so every Approve ends in
-   `grant.applied` or `grant.failed`, never in silence.
-   I chose failing over waiting for the running call. A wait could last as long as 210's timeout while
-   Jason's inbox says "started", and a failure with a message is easier to see than a slow grant.
-2. **Key.** The tag is `mosaic-` and the first 32 hex digits of sha256 over business, agent and hostId
-   joined with a NUL byte. Names match `ID_PATTERN` (210: `vocabulary.mjs:143`, `:127` at f41729178), which has no NUL, so the join is
-   one to one, and the tag has a fixed length the host pattern accepts (B4). For a new grant,
-   `ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -C <tag>` in a fresh 0700 dir under `<configDir>/secrets/run`. For a
-   commands change with a live key, skip to step 5.
-3. **Install.** Write `grant.step {decision, agent, host, user, tag, step: 'install'}`. Connect as
-   `mosaic-installer` with the installer key, pinned (210's options), and run `list <user>`. If the tag is
-   there, `remove` it first: the tag is this agent's on this host, and step 2 only runs when the stack holds
-   no live key for it. Then `add <user> <type> <base64> <tag>`.
-4. **Verify.** Connect as `<user>` with the new key through a short-lived ssh-agent (210 D7) and run `true`.
-   The connection proves the line, the `from=` and the pin together. A failure here runs `remove <user> <tag>`
-   and ends `grant.failed`.
-5. **Go live.** Write `grant.step {..., step: 'commit', previous}`, where `previous` is the grant's
-   `commands` before this decision, or `null` for a new key. Then check the abort signal (X5), and with no
-   `await` between, run 210 `issue(agent, "host.<hostId>", privateKey, rotateBy, commit)`. For a new key the
-   reference is registered first (X4). `issue` writes the key file, then calls `commit`, which writes the
-   `host_grants` record (S1) with the decided `commands`, `rotateBy`, tag and decision id. Then `issue`
-   fills memory. For a commands change, step 5 is the abort check and one store transaction that updates
-   `commands` and the decision id, with no `issue`. The tmp dir from step 2 is removed in a `finally`.
-6. **Event and message.** `grant.applied {decision, agent, host, user, tag, fingerprint, commandsSha256}`
-   and a message to the human and the chief. The private key appears in no event, message or log (210 D8's
-   `assertCleanKey` runs on every event body).
-
-After step 6, or after any failure, the executor releases its `#inflight` entry in a `finally`.
-
-The tag is recorded in `grant.step` and `grant.applied`, so `list` output and `sweep` can be matched to this
-business's grants without trusting a comment on the host (B4).
-
-### X3. Failure and restart
-
-The steps are ordered so a failure leaves nothing an agent can use:
-
-| Fails at | State left | Cleanup |
-|---|---|---|
-| 1 | nothing | none |
-| 2 | tmp dir | `finally`, and the start sweep |
-| 3 | maybe a line with a key nobody holds | `remove <user> <tag>`, best effort |
-| 4 | a line, no grant | `remove`, best effort |
-| 5 before `commit` | a line, a key file, no grant record | unlink the key file, unregister (X4), `remove` |
-| 5 after `commit` | a line, a grant record, a key file | the record back to `previous` (deleted for a new key), 210 `revoke`, `remove` |
-
-Setting a record back to `previous`, here and in the restart table below, only updates a record that
-exists. It never inserts one, and it does nothing when a `grant.revoked` for the (agent, host) is newer than
-the decision. So a revoke that deleted the record stays done, and the next start loads no reference for it
-(C1).
-
-A best-effort `remove` that fails adds `hostLineLeft: <tag>` to `grant.failed`, and `status` shows it until
-`mosaic hosts sweep <hostId>` (human or tester) succeeds. `sweep` runs `list <user>` and removes each line
-whose tag is in this business's recorded `grant.step` tags and has no live grant. A line with any other tag
-is left alone, so a sweep can't touch another business's line on the same user (B4).
-
-**Restart.** A bus child that dies mid-executor leaves a spent decision with no `grant.applied` or
-`grant.failed`. At start, before `Credentials` loads, the bus reconciles each one from its last
-`grant.step` (or `host.enroll.step`), back to the state before the decision (B3):
-
-| Last step | Local undo, before load | Remote undo, after the bus is up |
-|---|---|---|
-| none | none (the tmp dir goes in 210's run-dir sweep) | none |
-| `install` | none | `remove <user> <tag>` |
-| `commit`, new key | unlink the key file if present, delete the grant record if present | `remove <user> <tag>` |
-| `commit`, commands change | set the record's `commands` back to `previous`, by the update-only rule above | none, the key and line didn't change |
-| enrollment `registry` | delete the installer key if present, delete the host record | none |
-
-Then it records `grant.failed {code: 'interrupted', tag}` with the tag listed every time, and `hostLineLeft:
-<tag>` if the remote undo failed. Jason gets a message. The chief raises again, and Jason approves again. I
-chose a new decision over an automatic retry because Jason approved one attempt at one moment, and a retry
-after a restart might be hours later. The remote undo only takes access away, so it needs no decision.
-
-A bus child can also die after the human's resolve commits and before step 1 runs. That leaves a grant
-decision resolved yes by the human via cli with no `action.allowed`. At start the reconcile spends each one
-through `#consumeGrant`, in the same transaction as `grant.failed {code: 'interrupted'}`, and Jason gets a
-message (B2). It never runs late, for the reason above, and a later start finds it spent. Enrollments get the
-same treatment.
-
-### X4. Taking effect in the running bus (B1)
-
-The running bus never reloads the business file (F11). The store records (S1) sidestep that:
-
-- After row a, `host.run` reads the host record and the agent's grant record from the store inside its
-  transaction at each call, and refuses `host-not-granted` unless the record's decision is a `credential.mint`
-  resolved yes by the human via cli and spent by `#consumeGrant` with `operation: 'grant.host'`. That is the
-  Approve record check. The record is read in place of `b.hosts` and `b.roles[role].hosts` (210: `broker.mjs:1731-1735`,
-  `:1962-1968`). A grant, a commands change, a revoke and a `hosts.remove` are seen by the next call with no
-  broker change.
-- `Credentials` still loads its references once (F11). It gets `register(instance, service, ref)`, which runs
-  the constructor's reference checks for one entry (210: `credentials.mjs:128-143`, moved into a shared
-  method) and sets `#refs`, and `unregister`, which drops an entry with no token. The executor registers
-  before `issue`, because `issue` refuses an unknown service (210: `credentials.mjs:235-238`).
-- At start, the runtime adds a store reference for each `host_grants` record to the references it hands
-  `Credentials` (210: `runtime.mjs:85-98`), so a restart finds the same keys.
-- Revoke deletes the grant record, and the reference left in memory reads as revoked with no file (199) until
-  the next start drops it.
-
-### X5. Revoke while the executor runs (B2)
-
-The executor's `#inflight` entry is an `AbortController` (210: `credentials.mjs:118`), the same entry that
-`revoke`'s `abort()` reaches (210: `credentials.mjs:289`). A new `Credentials.claim(instance, service)` sets
-it and returns the signal, and `release` deletes it.
-
-- A revoke before step 1 goes through `hosts.revoke` (section 6), which records `grant.revoked` for the
-  (agent, host) even when `Credentials` holds no reference and no claim. Step 1's "no revoke newer than the
-  raise" check finds it and ends `grant.failed {code: 'revoked'}` (B2). No revoke can fall between step 1's
-  transaction and its claim (X2).
-- A revoke during steps 2 to 5 aborts the claim. `hosts.revoke` doesn't call 210's `revoke` when
-  `Credentials` has no reference, because that refuses `credential-unknown` (210: `credentials.mjs:235-238`).
-  It calls a new `Credentials.abortClaim(instance, service)`, which aborts a live claim and answers
-  `{pending: true}`, and the broker records `grant.revoked {pending: true}`.
-- The executor checks `signal.aborted` after each `await`. At step 5 it checks right before `issue`, and
-  nothing between the check and `issue` awaits, so no revoke can run in between. That matters, because
-  `issue` clears the revoked mark (210: `credentials.mjs:279`).
-- Build rule (N2): `issue` and the `commit` it calls stay synchronous. `commit` is a store write and the
-  store is `DatabaseSync` (`store.mjs:1`), so nothing in `issue` yields today. An async `commit` would let a
-  revoke run between the key file write and the memory fill, and `issue` would then clear the revoked mark.
-  A mutant covers it.
-- On abort the executor undoes as X3's failure table does at that step, then ends
-  `grant.failed {code: 'revoked'}`.
-- A revoke after step 5 is an ordinary revoke (section 6). Once step 5 commits, the executor ignores an
-  abort and goes on to step 6, so its undo never runs against a revoke that came after the commit (C1).
-
-While the executor holds the claim, a `host.run` for the same agent and host refuses `host-busy`. That only
-matters for a commands change on a live key, and it lasts until the executor ends.
-
-### S1. Grant records in the store
-
-Two tables in the bus store, added by a new migration `3i-3j.sql` next to `3h-3i.sql`
-(`bus/src/migrations/`):
-
-- `hosts`: business, host id, address, port, user, sudo, host keys, installer fingerprint, state
-  (`pending-install` or `ready`), the enrolling decision id. Primary key (business, host id), so the store
-  refuses a second enrollment of one host (B1).
-- `host_grants`: business, agent, host id, commands, rotate-by date, tag, the decision id that made or last
-  changed it. Primary key (business, agent, host id).
-
-The executor, revoke, `hosts.check` and `hosts.remove` are the only writers, each in the same transaction as
-its event. No broker verb takes these records from a request body. Every write cites a decision id or the
-revoker, as W1's receipts did.
-
-The business file holds none of it (mos-1131 point 2). A hand edit makes nothing:
-
-- Until row a lands, row 210's `hosts` keys and role grants in the business file stay as they are, a test
-  path (mos-1131).
-- Row a moves `host.run` to the store records. From then the loader refuses `hosts` at the top level and
-  `hosts` in a role (210: `hosts.mjs:75`, `:123`), so a hand-edited grant fails closed at load instead of
-  doing nothing quietly. Row 210's tests move to store fixtures in the same row.
-- The credential reference for `host.<id>` comes from the grant record (X4), not from
-  `roles.<agent>.credentials`.
-
-The store file is writable by the stack's OS user, like the key files (199 D6). Section 9's same-user limit
-covers it.
-
-A new store schema is a migration (mos-1133):
-
-- On dragon-lin the 3i-3j re-pin is an agent-run `--migrate` window under Q173. Mos, Sage or Darkwing runs
-  it as the tester, takes a backup first and sends a STATE report after. Jason doesn't need to be present.
-  P19 371 predates Q173 and doesn't apply.
-- On .53 and .54 the plan is for row a to land before the installs (row a in review by 10-24, installs
-  10-26). Both hosts then start at 3j and need no migration.
-- The row a run sheet removes row 210's `hosts` keys and role grants from the business file before the
-  `--migrate` re-pin, because the loader refuses them from then on (G14). Any 210 grant in use stops there,
-  and the agent needs a chief raise and an Approve to get it back (N9).
-- If row a slips past an install, a later round or the row a packet says so. That host then goes 3i to 3j through I3's
-  upgrade driver (#432), and Mos rules on it at that point.
-
-## 6. Revoke
-
-Q188: instant, by Jason, Mos or the tester. `mosaic hosts revoke <agent> <hostId> --reason R`. Every revoke
-is logged with who made it (REQ-GRANT-4).
-
-Who may revoke follows mos-1124 d and PRD 1.8 r3's REQ-GRANT-4 (d16ccdb91):
-
-- the human, always
-- the assistant (`THREAD_DEFINITION`, `vocabulary.mjs:131`), for grants in its own organization only. The
-  broker checks the grant's business against the session's.
-- the tester, with `--tester` (210 D9 already gives the tester `revoke`), on a dev instance only. On any
-  other instance a tester revoke refuses `tester-dev-only`.
-
-A dev instance is a business whose var `bus.tester` is exactly `true` (mos-1139, N8). `vars.mjs:125` defines
-the var for the business layer only, with a default of `false`, and `broker.mjs:544` already refuses to bind a
-tester unless it is exactly `true` (`tester-off`). `hosts.revoke` checks the same var again for the grant's
-business. A missing value or any other value means not dev, so `tester-dev-only` fails closed. I2's install
-never sets the var, so .53 and .54 are never dev (mos-1139).
-
-Q188's "Mos" is read as the assistant role, Jason's main interaction agent (mos-1132). That is Mos's reading,
-labelled as such in the PRD 1.8 approval notes, and Jason settles it at prd.approve. This replaces mos-1120's
-"Mos revokes with `--tester`".
-
-`hosts.revoke` is its own broker verb in a new module, `bus/src/host-grants.mjs`, next to the executor. It
-doesn't go through 210's `credential-verbs.mjs:21-24`, which refuses `credential-unknown` when the business
-file has no reference. After row a no `host.<id>` reference is in the business file at all (N3).
-
-Order, local first so the part that matters can't wait on the network:
-
-1. One store transaction deletes the `host_grants` record, if there is one, and records `grant.revoked
-   {tag, hostLine: 'pending'}`. The tag is computed (X2 step 2), so it exists even with no record (N4). The
-   next `host.run` refuses `host-not-granted` (X4). A new grant needs a new decision.
-2. Right after the commit, with no `await` between: 210 `revoke` if `Credentials` holds a reference
-   (memory, abort the `host.run` or the executor in flight, unlink the key file), or `abortClaim` if it
-   holds only a claim (X5). Steps 1 and 2 are the "instant" part, and neither touches the network. If the
-   unlink fails, the verb reports it. The key is already out of memory, and the next start removes the
-   file (below).
-3. `remove <user> <tag>` on the host through the installer. Success records `grant.revoke.closed {tag,
-   hostLine: 'removed'}`. If the host can't be reached, it records `grant.revoke.closed {tag, hostLineLeft:
-   <tag>}`, and `sweep` clears it later.
-
-A restart between the steps (N4) leaves a `grant.revoked` with `hostLine: 'pending'` and no
-`grant.revoke.closed`. At start, before `Credentials` loads, the reconcile unlinks that key file if it is
-there. No reference loads for it, because the record is gone (X4). After the bus is up, the reconcile runs
-step 3 and closes the marker. `status` shows an open marker as a revoke in progress.
-
-Step 3 closes the marker even when step 2's unlink failed. So the file doesn't wait on the marker: at every
-start, after the grant reconcile (X3) and before `Credentials` loads, the bus unlinks each `host.<id>` key
-file in the agent store that has no `host_grants` record (N1 of duckworth-0063). The grant reconcile runs
-first, so a key an interrupted executor wrote is already handled there.
-
-Step 3 is defense in depth. After step 1 the stack holds no copy of the key. The line only matters if
-something copied the key file before the revoke, which section 9's same-user limit allows.
-
-Remote processes that the killed ssh started may keep running (210 section 6). Revoke cuts the stack's
-connection, not what already runs on the host.
-
-`hosts remove` (E4) refuses while grants exist or a line is left. Revoking the installer itself is
-`hosts remove` and ops-01 deleting the line.
-
-## 7. Row 210's per-call decision becomes manual mode
-
-Row 210 lands as reviewed (mos-1115). Its D4 stays the code path: a `host.run` whose class is `gated` needs a
-decision bound to host, argv hash and stdin hash, spent once.
-
-What changes is when the class is `gated`:
-
-- Under PRD 1.7, `host.sudo` is a hard wait, so every call is gated. That is today.
-- Under PRD 1.8 with REQ-CRED-4, `host.sudo` is routed, and a definition that lists it within-role runs
-  granted commands with no decision (210 section 5).
-- Manual mode (Q188) puts the per-call decision back. Honker's REQ-TRUST-2 takes the list form: the
-  organization file holds a list of actions in manual mode, empty by default, set only by the user. While
-  an action is listed, it classifies `gated` for every role. `#classification` checks the list first
-  (`broker.mjs:597-609`).
-
-Manual mode is built from REQ-TRUST-2, not in the grant rows (sage-1527 Q-S3).
-
-## 8. PRD lines
-
-Honker's PRD 1.8 draft (honker/row194-b2 3c30f1036) carries this design as REQ-GRANT-1 to -4, generalized to
-all three methods. There is no REQ-CRED-5. Duckworth's PRD review (duckworth-0057) notes that this design
-uses `credential.mint` with the method in the `grant` body, not a new `host.grant` action. Points r2 sends
-Honker to match:
-
-- REQ-GRANT-2 says a host's identity comes from the host side "when the user enrolls it". Under mos-1120
-  the user approves the enrollment and the stack runs it, so "when the user approves its enrollment" fits
-  better.
-- REQ-GRANT-4 names the assistant as a revoker. Honker kept it under mos-1124 d, and this design now follows
-  it (section 6). Done in PRD r3 d16ccdb91.
-- An enrollment names a target user with sudo, and the Approve covers that user by name (E1, mos-1125).
-
-I don't edit the PRD.
-
-## 9. Limits, said plainly
-
-- **The installer key is root on a host with a privileged user.** It can add a line for a user in
-  `privileged`, and that user has sudo. It sits in `<configDir>/secrets`, readable by the stack's OS user
-  like every other key (199 D6). The writer limits which users it can touch, and a user with sudo is
-  touchable only after Jason approved that user by name in the enrollment (E1, E3). It doesn't limit what
-  those users can do.
-- **Rights gained later are caught at the next add, not before.** A user who gains sudo or `docker` after
-  enrollment, and isn't in `privileged`, is refused on the next `add`. Lines already in place stay until a
-  revoke, `remove` or `sweep` (ops-01 Q-O2 point 3).
-- **A host line has no `command=`** (ops-01, mos-1125). `add` writes `from=` and `restrict` only, so the host
-  doesn't enforce the granted argv prefixes. The bus enforces them (210 D6). A copied agent key is a full
-  shell as that user from the stack's address. A forced command per key that checks
-  `SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND` against the granted list would close that, but it means the writer also carries
-  every commands change to the host, and 210's argv encoding has to round-trip through it. I'd make it a
-  follow-up row and not part of rows a and b.
-- **The seat network isn't confined** (`seat/src/sandbox.mjs:29-31`, 210 section 6). An agent granted a
-  command that writes a file as root can plant its own key and ssh around the bus. `from=` doesn't help,
-  because the sandbox shares the stack's address. A network-confined sandbox closes it (Sage's follow-up).
-- **The human proof is cooperative same-UID** (`bus/src/human.mjs:50-52`). Approve is as strong as
-  `verifyHuman`, no stronger. This path adds nothing weaker, but grants raise the stakes of that check.
-- **Approve is not "runs without a click"** until PRD 1.8 routes `host.sudo` (section 0).
-- **Enrollment still needs ops-01 once per host.** I don't see a way around it without a trust anchor on the
-  host, and I'd rather say so than claim the flow is hands-free.
-- **The pin needs two reads to agree.** A wrong pin needs both the fingerprints in the request and the
-  stack's network path to the host changed in the same way. Either one alone makes the raise refuse.
-- **Tags assume one stack per business id.** Two stacks that both run a business with the same id and grant
-  the same agent name on the same host user would compute the same tag. Nothing runs two stacks today.
-
-## 10. Tests and mutants (for the rows, not built here)
-
-Tests use a scratch sshd on 127.0.0.1 with throwaway keys, as row 210 does, with `mosaic-keys` running as the
-scratch sshd's forced command. The writer's checks are tested by calling its functions with a temp dir as
-the root and a fake group and sudo lookup. The installed entry point fixes the `/etc` paths and passes no
-such argument. No real host is contacted.
-
-| Test | Claim |
-|---|---|
-| G1 | a `credential.mint` raise with `grant` from a role that isn't the chief refuses `grant-chief-only`, and nothing is stored. A `grant` on any other action refuses `invalid-request` |
-| G2 | a raise for an agent whose definition lacks `host` refuses `host-not-declared` |
-| G3 | a raise with a wildcard, shell or empty argv prefix refuses, the same cases as 210 D6 |
-| G4 | the rendered block is appended by the broker, the chief's question text can't forge it, and a question over 4096 characters with the block refuses `invalid-request` |
-| G5 | a `credential.mint` raise with `grant` routes to `human`, a tester thread can't raise it, and an approved `credential.mint` without `grant` runs nothing |
-| G6 | a yes from the human via cli starts the executor, while a no, a withdraw, or an arbiter resolve start nothing |
-| G7 | executor end to end on scratch sshd: line installed with the `from=` and tag, verify login works, the grant record written with its decision id, key file 0600, `grant.applied` with the tag |
-| G8 | each failure row of X3 leaves the stated state, and a failed `remove` leaves `hostLineLeft` |
-| G9 | a registry, role definition or commands change between raise and Approve refuses `decision-mismatch` before any remote step |
-| G10 | a second start for the same decision refuses `decision-consumed`, and `#consumeGrant` refuses an unresolved or agent-resolved decision |
-| G11 | a bus restart after `install`, after the key file is written and before `commit`, and after `commit` each reconcile to the state before the decision: no key file, no grant, no line, `grant.failed interrupted` with the tag. A restart after an enrollment's `registry` step drops the entry and the installer key. A restart after the resolve commits and before step 1 spends the decision, ends `grant.failed interrupted` with a message, and nothing runs later, for a grant and for an enrollment (B2) |
-| G12 | revoke: the grant record is gone and the `pending` marker written, then in the same turn the call in flight dies and the key file is gone, then the host line is gone and the marker closed, in that order |
-| G13 | revoke with the host down still does steps 1 and 2 and reports `hostLineLeft` |
-| G14 | `organization.set`, `limits.set` and `instances.set` still refuse `hosts` and `manual`. After row a, a business file with `hosts` or a role grant refuses at load |
-| G15 | no event, message, log line or receipt holds private key material (210 D8 check on every body) |
-| G16 | `mosaic-keys` refuses bad requests without calling the writer. The writer refuses a user not matching the pattern (`../x` included), a `privileged` user not in `users`, users outside `users`, root, uid under 1000, `mosaic-installer`, `localadmin`, a member of each refused group (`disk`, `libvirt` and `incus-admin` included), a user with a `sudo -l` line who isn't in `privileged`, bad tags and bad key text, and takes `from=` from the host file |
-| G17 | a `host-enroll` raise refuses loopback and this machine's names, bad fingerprints, an enrolled id and the reserved users. A keyscan set that differs from the request's fingerprints by one key, extra or missing, refuses `host-key-mismatch` and stores nothing. On Approve the executor writes the entry and the installer key 0600, records `host.enrolled`, and its message holds no private material. Of two approved enrollments for one `hostId`, the second ends `grant.failed host-enrolled` with its decision spent, and the first record, pin and installer key are unchanged. A direct second insert fails on the primary key (B1) |
-| G18 | `hosts.check` with a wrong pin exits 255, refuses `host-key-mismatch`, runs nothing and leaves the host `pending-install` |
-| G19 | a grant naming a host that isn't `ready` refuses `host-not-ready` |
-| G20 | `hosts.check` from the chief, the tester and the human marks the host `ready`, and any other role refuses |
-| G26 | revoke by the human works. The assistant's works in its own organization and refuses another's. The tester's works where `bus.tester` is exactly `true`, and refuses `tester-dev-only` where the grant's business has it missing or set to anything else (N8). Any other role refuses |
-| G21 | `hosts.remove` refuses `host-in-use` while a grant names the host, `host-line-left` while a line is left, and any agent other than the tester |
-| G22 | one bus, no restart: enroll, check, grant, a `host.run` that works, a commands change that the next `host.run` uses, and a revoke that the next `host.run` refuses `credential-unavailable` (B1) |
-| G23 | a revoke during install (a scratch `mosaic-keys` that waits on a fifo) ends `grant.failed revoked` with no key file, no grant and no line. A revoke before the executor starts, with no reference and no claim, records `grant.revoked`, and step 1 then ends `grant.failed revoked`. A grant whose claim finds a running `host.run` ends `grant.failed host-busy` with its decision spent and a message (B2) |
-| G24 | agent and host names at 64 characters with `.` and `_` give distinct tags of the fixed length. `sweep` leaves another business's line and an unrecorded `mosaic-` line on the same user (B4) |
-| G25 | the writer refuses a symlinked `/etc/ssh/mosaic-keys`, a symlinked user file, a group-writable dir, and a tmp that is a symlink or not a regular file. A leftover regular tmp is unlinked and the write goes ahead. A first `add` creates the file. A written file is root-owned 0644 (B5, N6) |
-| G27 | `hosts.revoke` works for an agent whose business file has no credentials reference (N3). A restart after revoke step 1, and one after step 2, each end at start with no key file, no record, the line removed and the marker closed (N4). A key file left by a failed step 2 unlink is gone after the next start, though the marker closed |
-| G28 | a commands change commits at step 5, a revoke follows before `grant.applied`, and the bus restarts: the start ends with no grant record, no reference and no key file. The same with a failure after step 5 in place of the restart (C1) |
-
-Mutants, a first list. The row's BUILD.md numbers them and adds more:
-
-- drop the chief check
-- start the executor on a `credential.mint` with no `grant`
-- skip the `ready` check
-- skip the keyscan compare, or compare only one key
-- skip the definition hash compare
-- drop the definition check
-- skip the commands hash compare
-- skip the host record hash compare
-- swap the order of install and the grant record write
-- skip `remove` on a verify failure
-- skip the start sweep
-- skip the reconcile's remote `remove`
-- skip the `grant.step` before install
-- `host.run` reads the business file instead of the grant record
-- revoke leaves the grant record
-- skip `register` before `issue`
-- drop the abort check before `issue`
-- add an `await` between the abort check and `issue`
-- revoke ignores a claim with no reference
-- build the tag without the business
-- `sweep` removes any `mosaic-` line
-- drop `from=` in the writer
-- let the writer touch a line outside the tag pattern
-- drop `O_NOFOLLOW` on the user file
-- drop one group from the writer's refused list
-- drop the user pattern check before the path use
-- treat a `privileged` entry as enough without `users`
-- let the writer accept a sudo user not in `privileged`
-- run revoke's host step before the local steps
-- start the executor on an arbiter resolve
-- start it on `no`
-- write the private key into the event body
-- drop the "not yet enrolled" check in E2 step 1
-- drop the `hosts` primary key
-- claim before consume, or put an `await` between them
-- skip the start check for a resolved, unspent grant decision
-- make `commit` async
-- route `hosts.revoke` through `credential-verbs.mjs`
-- skip the revoke marker reconcile
-- let the undo to `previous` insert a record (an upsert)
-- let the undo to `previous` run past a newer `grant.revoked`
-- let the executor act on an abort after step 5 commits
-- skip the start sweep of key files with no record
-- treat a missing `bus.tester` as dev
-
-## 11. Not in this draft
-
-- Gitea and GitHub grants (`method` `gitea` and `github`). The same flow: chief raise, Jason approves, the
-  executor mints a token through an admin credential Jason enters, writes the reference, and revoke deletes
-  the token at the service. The admin scope is refused today (`vocabulary.mjs:105-106`), so that is a
-  design of its own.
-- The Console Approve (#435) and the Console token entry. Both wait on Q175 sign-in (#412).
-- The network-confined sandbox (Sage's follow-up from 210 section 6).
-- A per-key forced command on the host (section 9).
-- Changing an enrolled host's user or sudo mark. Today that is `hosts remove` and a new enrollment.
-
-## 12. Questions
-
-Answered since r1:
-
-- Q-S1 (sage-1527): no `grant.ask` in row a. Messaging the chief, with the definition gating the raise, is
-  enough. If review finds a forgery path, the verb comes then. Duckworth agrees (N4).
-- Q-S2 (mos-1120, sage-1527): `<configDir>/secrets/hosts/<business>/<hostId>/installer`.
-- Q-S3 (sage-1527): manual mode is Honker's REQ-TRUST-2, and REQ-CRED-5 is folded into REQ-GRANT-1 to -4.
-- Q-S4 (sage-1527): the split stands, both rows are mine, and Duckworth reviews both.
-  - Row a (#436a): enrollment as the approved request, the four `tools/host` files, the store records and
-    their migration, `host.run` reading them, and `hosts status`. More than r2's 1 day, because of the
-    migration and moving 210's tests. My estimate is 1.5 days.
-  - Row b: the raise binding, the executor, reconcile and revoke, after row a. r5 adds the `hosts.revoke`
-    verb and its marker, so my estimate goes from 1.5 days to 1.75.
-  - Both come after row 210 lands and need the 1.8 line before landing. Target: in review by 10-24, so
-    row a lands before the 10-26 installs (S1, mos-1133).
-- Q-M1 (mos-1120): Mos revokes as the tester. Replaced by mos-1132, see below and section 6.
-- Q-O1 (ops-01 through mos-1125): yes, with the six changes now in E3.
-- Q-O2 (ops-01, reply to gizmoduck-0063): the `privileged` file is accepted, with four rules and four writer
-  points, all in E3 and section 9.
-- Q-S5 (mos-1124 d, through honker-0035): the assistant may revoke grants in its own organization, and the
-  tester only on a dev instance. PRD 1.8 r3 (d16ccdb91) REQ-GRANT-4 keeps that. Section 6 follows it.
-- **Q-M2 (mos-1132).** ops-01 is a T3 seat and can't message a chief. Host keys never travel by message.
-  The request carries expected fingerprints, and the raise runs its own keyscan (E1). On the #433 VM, Mos or
-  Sage passes the fields to the chief as the tester (Q173). On .53 and .54, Jason sends the request in the
-  Console (Q118), with text Mos builds from ops-01's values.
-- **Mos as a revoker (mos-1132).** Q188's "Mos" is read as the stack's assistant role, Jason's main
-  interaction agent. This is Mos's reading, labelled as such, and goes in the PRD 1.8 approval notes. Jason
-  settles it at prd.approve. Section 6 is written to it.
-
-Open: none from this draft.

agents/gosalyn/README.md

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Gosalyn
-
-Worker seat for Mosaic Stack, MVP track T2 (Case 2, the creative writing hub, Vikunja #416).
-
-- T3 thread: 7604438a-0ded-41c8-bd3f-26f57fdb5cd2
-- Model: Opus 5.5 (Claude Code, T3)
-- Launched by Mos (Jason's main agent, T3 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e), who briefs the seat
-- Repository lead and queue: Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079)
-- Branch: gosalyn/case2-design, pushed only by this seat, landed on refactor by Sage
-
-Work lives in `work/`. The Case 2 design is `work/case2/DESIGN.md`.

agents/herb/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Herb
-
-Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for a second gate lane
-design row (#1695, mos-0977 item 6).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `herb/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/README.md

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
 
 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
-# host access through the credential store
-
-Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
-It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
-decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
-
-## What it changes
-
-Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
-REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
-remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
-and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
-only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
-agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
-(Vikunja #420).
-
-When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
-
-1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
-   `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
-2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
-   `roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
-3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
-   `reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
-   within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
-4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
-   commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
-   the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
-5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
-
-Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
-file commit in `roles/`.
-
-## Text for the PRD
-
-Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
-
-> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
-> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
-> <prd.approve decision id>.
-
-Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
-
-> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
->   needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
->   still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
->   agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
->   as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
->   keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
->   me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
->   Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
->   happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
-
-Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
->   adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
->   runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
->   an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
->   under this requirement, within these bounds:
->   - The chief acts only in its own organization.
->   - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
->     credentialed roles.
->   - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
->   - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
->     messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
->     working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
->     organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
->     hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
->     is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
->     change.
->   - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
->   - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
->     or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
->     WebUI or the CLI.
->   - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
->   - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
-
-Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
->   - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
->     bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
->     names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
->   - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
->     name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
->   - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
->     and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
->     the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
->     the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
->     repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
->   - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
->     agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
->     history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
->   - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
->     other role file grants it.
->   - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
->     the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
->
->   Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
-
-Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
->   for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
->   before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
->   REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
->   grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
-
-REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
-
-> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
-> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
-
-## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
-
-- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
-  sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
-- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
-  its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
-- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
-  named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
-- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
-  holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
-- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
-  duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
-  Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
-  sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
-  checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
-  bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
-- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
-  latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
-  the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
-  the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
-- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
-  credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
-  on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
-  (row 194 D2.3).
-- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
-  `hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
-- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
-  version lifts it.
-- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
-  check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
-  the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
-- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
-  mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
-  gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
-  owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
-- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
-  paragraph never edited in place except to append.

agents/launchpad/README.md

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
 
 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/launchpad/work/queue-192/BUILD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+# Row 192: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies sign-in itself (`--sso`)
+
+Launchpad, 2026-10-20. Author Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Issue #1690. Brief
+`docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md`. Design `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` (blob 9e3eadb15c80).
+Rulings sage-1340 (F1 to F6) and sage-1347 (F7, F8). Plan launchpad-0001.
+
+Base 53bb59462 (`base.txt`). Candidate: branch `launchpad/row192`, r1 83b32d8d8 and the round 2 commit on it.
+`candidate-manifest.sha256` lists the 18 changed code, test and doc paths; the packet files are not in it. Drift
+check at the r2 commit: `git log 53bb59462..origin/refactor` (origin/refactor ae3c36f24) touches none of the 18 paths.
+
+No request in any test goes to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or 127.0.0.1:7332. Every provider
+is the fake OP in `tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`: https on 127.0.0.1 with a throwaway self-signed certificate,
+and a fetch that refuses any other origin. The public Host in the tests is `console.example.test`, sent as a
+header to the test's own loopback listener. No test reads or writes `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`,
+`~/.mosaic`, a slot file outside its temp dir, or a live unit.
+
+## Files
+
+| Path | Change |
+| --- | --- |
+| `package.json`, `package-lock.json` | `oauth4webapi` 3.8.8, exact, at the root (design: the copy runs `npm ci` there). No other dependency. |
+| `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` | Accepts an optional `console.sso` key and checks it with `checkConsole`. Without the key, output is byte-identical (F2). |
+| `scripts/test-config.sh` | Test 25: a good `console.sso` passes; each refusal class refuses. 31/31. |
+| `packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs` (new) | `checkConsole`: shape, `publicOrigin`, 1 to 8 providers, issuer https with a trailing slash, slot names, `ALGS` (asymmetric only), 1 to 64 subjects. |
+| `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs` (new) | The relying party: `readSlot`, discovery and JWKS with retry, `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, sessions, `health()`, `summary()`, `formTargets()`. |
+| `packages/webui/src/serve.mjs` | Under `sso`: public Host only on the human listener (F4), `/auth/*` routes, session check before every page and API route, CSP `form-action` adds the end-session origins, tester listener refusals (F8). |
+| `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs` | `--sso`, its refusals, slot reads, the start lines, `close()` on stop. |
+| `packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs` | Under `--sso` the session check already ran, so the header-user check is skipped; the Origin check uses `publicOrigin`. |
+| `packages/webui/src/public/app.js`, `bus.js`, `index.html` | 401 `sign-in required` signs the page out with a link to `/auth/login?return=...` (design test 24, F1). The Sign out form shows only when `/api/config` says `sso` (F7). |
+| `scripts/webui-service.sh` | Passes `--sso` through; `--send` refusal text names `--sso`. |
+| `packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs` | The `--send` refusal regex follows the new text. |
+| `packages/webui/README.md` | New section "Sign-in in the Console (Q175 phase 1, #1690)". |
+| `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs` (new) | The fake OP. |
+| `packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs` (new) | 28 tests: three positives and design tests 1 to 23 (some split in parts). |
+| `packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs` (new) | 2 tests: design test 24 with F1, and F7. |
+
+## Tests run (single files, this worktree, final tree)
+
+| File | Pass | Fail |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| sso | 28 | 0 |
+| sso-browser | 2 | 0 |
+| pinned-copy | 10 | 0 |
+| serve | 4 | 0 |
+| preview | 11 | 0 |
+| proof | 4 | 0 |
+| proof-cli | 3 | 0 |
+| send | 13 | 0 |
+| service | 31 | 0 |
+| tester-listener | 10 | 0 |
+| tester-cli | 2 | 0 |
+| board-held | 3 | 0 |
+| send-browser | 2 | 0 |
+| docs-browser | 1 | 0 |
+| chat | 23 | 0 |
+| chat-browser | 11 | 0 |
+| bus-browser | 2 | 0 |
+| settings-write | 4 | 0 |
+| project-file | 10 | 0 |
+| instances | 5 | 0 |
+| routes | 5 | 0 |
+| `scripts/test-config.sh` | 31 | 0 |
+
+The first singles pass failed `pinned-copy` 1 of 10: `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND: Cannot find package
+'oauth4webapi'` from a copy's `sso.mjs`. The test's fixture repo writes an empty package.json and lock, so the
+copy's `npm ci` installs nothing, and `sso.mjs` imported oauth4webapi at module load. `cli.mjs` imports
+`sso.mjs` on every start, so plain `serve` broke. Fix: `sso.mjs` loads oauth4webapi inside `createSso`
+(`oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi')`). A Console without `--sso` never resolves the package. A real copy
+still has it from the root lock. Mutant 21 restores the static import and `pinned-copy` kills it. After the
+fix: pinned-copy, sso, sso-browser and serve rerun green (counts above).
+
+Not run by me (slot work, busy at the time): the full webui package suite, the cli suite, and
+`scripts/test-*.sh` other than test-config. `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs` and
+`stack-release.test.mjs` also build copies with an empty lock and are the ones to watch for the same
+failure. They need Sage's gate.
+
+## Mutants (`mutants.py`, run as `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`)
+
+Each mutant edits one source file, runs one test file filtered to one test name, and restores the file
+checked by sha256. Final run on the final tree: `/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-final.log`.
+
+| # | Mutant | Test | Result |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | drop validateApplicationLevelSignature | sso 9 | KILLED |
+| 2 | wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch | sso 9 | KILLED |
+| 3 | drop the subjects check | sso 10 | KILLED |
+| 4 | accept HS256 and none in ALGS | sso 11 start | KILLED |
+| 5 | take the provider from the query | sso 15 | KILLED |
+| 6 | tester listener reads sign-in cookies (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
+| 7 | tester listener takes Authorization (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
+| 8 | tester listener takes x-authentik-* (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
+| 9 | skip the login record delete | sso 7 | KILLED |
+| 10 | drop HttpOnly from the session cookie | sso 20 and 21 | KILLED |
+| 11 | refresh last-seen on every request | sso 13 idle | KILLED |
+| 12 | build redirect_uri from the request Host | sso 22 | KILLED |
+| 13 | serve the loopback read path under --sso (F4) | sso 22 | KILLED |
+| 14 | bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
+| 15 | bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
+| 16 | app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
+| 17 | app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
+| 18 | signInRequired takes any 401 | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
+| 19 | Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7) | sso-browser 2 | KILLED |
+| 20 | CSP form-action without the end-session origins | sso 13 CSP | KILLED |
+| 21 | import oauth4webapi at module load | pinned-copy | KILLED |
+| 22 | restore the r1 relative returnPath (round 2, B1) | sso 14 | KILLED |
+| 23 | drop the second origin check (round 2, sage-1403) | sso 14 | SURVIVED, equivalent, guard kept (sage-1407) |
+
+Mutant 16 survived its first run: test 1 had no `getJSON` path. The History click on
+`/api/conversations` was added and it is now killed.
+
+## Deviations from the design
+
+- **F1 (sage-1340).** `bus.js` `fetchRead` and `fetchApi` apply the same 401 `sign-in required` rule as
+  `app.js`, even when `/api/config` has no `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 1, mutants 14 and 15.
+- **F7 (sage-1347).** A Sign out form (`POST /auth/logout`) in the command bar, hidden unless `/api/config`
+  says `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 2, mutant 19.
+
+- **Proof header on 7333 under `--sso` (webby-0019 N2).** `cli.mjs` passes `testerProofHeader: null` under
+  `--sso`, since `--sso` refuses the proof pair and there is no header name to refuse. A request to 7333 that
+  still carries the old proof header is not refused for it. It gains nothing: under `--sso` no listener
+  reads a proof header (`proof` is null in `startServer`). Left as is.
+
+## Assumptions and choices
+
+- **F8 (sage-1347).** Under `--sso` the tester listener refuses a request carrying `Authorization`, either
+  `__Host-mosaic` cookie or any `x-authentik-*` header, case-insensitive (Node lower-cases header names).
+  sso 12 sends one of each; mutants 6 to 8.
+- **oauth4webapi loads lazily** inside `createSso` (see the pinned-copy failure above).
+- **Client authentication** is `ClientSecretBasic`; the fake OP's token endpoint checks Basic auth.
+- **Caps**: 1 to 8 providers, 1 to 64 subjects per provider, 64 sessions, 32 pending logins. The 33rd login
+  drops the oldest record (sso 17).
+- **CSP**: under `--sso`, `form-action` adds each provider's end-session origin. Chrome applies
+  `form-action` to the redirect after the Sign out POST, so without it the logout stops at the Console.
+  Tested in sso 13 CSP, mutant 20. Without `--sso` the CSP string is unchanged.
+- **`--send` refusal text** in cli.mjs and webui-service.sh now ends "or --sso".
+- **Start lines**: one `Sign-in provider:` line per provider with id, issuer, subject count and state
+  (`ready`, `refused` or `unreachable`). No client id, secret or sub.
+- **Test 1** uses `console.example.test` as the public Host, not mosaic.woltje.com (no request goes there).
+- **Test 11 slot files**: the owner check is not tested; the test can't create a file owned by another uid
+  without privilege. Symlink, 0644, 0640 and a file under the repository are tested.
+- **Test 23** covers a provider down at start: the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, loopback `/healthz`
+  is 200 with `sso: { a: 'unreachable' }`, one `discovery-failed` line, and the retry makes sign-in work. An
+  HS-only discovery at start refuses the start (in test 23 and in test 11 start).
+- **Test 22**: a Host of bare `localhost` without a port is not in the table. It hits the older
+  `non-local Host refused` check before the sso check; a comment in the test says so.
+
+## Round 2 (webby-0019)
+
+- **B1, open redirect after sign-in.** `returnPath` took any URL on `publicOrigin`, and dot segments can
+  normalize to a pathname of `//evil.example`, which a browser reads as scheme-relative in a relative
+  Location. Fix per sage-1403: `returnURL` (renamed) builds an absolute URL, `publicOrigin + pathname +
+  search`, checks its origin again, and returns its href. Anything else is `publicOrigin/`. The callback's
+  Location is now always absolute on the Console. Test 14 asserts the exact Location and its origin for each
+  case. It adds Webby's three rows (`/.//evil.example`, `/x/..//evil.example`,
+  `https://console.example.test//evil.example`), each now `https://console.example.test//evil.example`, a path
+  on the Console. It also adds `/board/./x`, which lands on `/board/x`. The positive test expects
+  `https://console.example.test/board?x=1`.
+- **Mutant 22** restores the r1 relative `returnPath`; test 14 kills it.
+- **Mutant 23** drops the second origin check. It SURVIVES, and I read it as equivalent: `checkConsole`
+  holds `publicOrigin` to a bare https origin, and a parsed https pathname always starts with `/`, so
+  `publicOrigin + pathname` can't parse to another origin. Webby agrees (webby-0022). Sage's ruling
+  (sage-1407): the check stays as an unreachable guard, and 23 is listed here as equivalent. That is a packet
+  note, not a candidate change.
+- **N1.** The design cite is now blob 9e3eadb15c80 (`git rev-parse 83b32d8d8:agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`).
+- **N2.** Listed under Deviations.
+- **N3.** `SIGN_IN_COOKIE` has its own comment, above the row 177 comment and `TESTER_CHAT_WRITE`.
+- **N4.** Row 200 (#1698) covers it: `stack-release.sh` refuses `config-console-key` before any stop when the
+  target's loader refuses the key, on activate and rollback.
+- **N5.** No change.
+
+Round 2 runs, this worktree, final tree: `sso.test.mjs` 28/28 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/sso-r2.log`);
+mutants 22 and 23 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-r2.log`).
+
+## Not done here
+
+- Row 200 (#1698, `stack-release.sh activate --sso`) is chained on this candidate and starts only after the
+  manifest is with Webby (sage-1369).
+- Full suites are for Sage's gate.

agents/launchpad/work/queue-192/base.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+53bb59462120a03a9f54b02881895e3f575e501c

agents/launchpad/work/queue-192/candidate-manifest.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+95d9a48812eebc415e3605239788e5b0746f1457a3bf0f9b9651a8c745e8b0f6  package.json
+390cbb0ef88de6cbc6d8f43b9e212abfdf0ef0e1c88fa02f5ab790caabc53eed  package-lock.json
+726b71bcfdb4d9409cefc86bed2fbe8e678c6efb50bcf5bb22344aeda1eee201  packages/webui/README.md
+f7b6b68906f13a644854b8083287dfa2936e8defc6207d05739e89763cc91440  packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs
+4a2d226bdbfee98b180103f71b3cb8122303cfac4aeece42bd30ce167ba6ff55  packages/webui/src/cli.mjs
+41ee8798c34ee491b80ae1b42c3e96cd5d12fb1603b1ab88ac2dd10b5fb27964  packages/webui/src/public/app.js
+e6c8f838eb7cdc2ae556c04451ca4c8f2d433117a17f285a144cfc7dff03e2a4  packages/webui/src/public/bus.js
+f276fa440ec938638cb3e0f1b812fafa929460a6b96f1dab4cf1076a7c0c18ea  packages/webui/src/public/index.html
+333d474b1c7e753938aedc639c08f9db0e787faf56aa8068d013fd304a0b3b7e  packages/webui/src/serve.mjs
+37b01ab0479d5f2a7ab9aac790931c6d88c790465392d9c0b65a105513f3e36b  packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs
+b624f044d361c648cefa161abe5f2b96e0cd8a83bc7816c9d501a2cd840988ca  packages/webui/src/sso.mjs
+84e31d4beba0de5ed6d192921bd7b016296c8b2a42b3fcf1176663e182320d9e  packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs
+ac01037743fcbf1efa641794d3878f113b6206033d2f66cde072a52ccfae1a51  packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs
+9358e3755e174b61532e2c528e733ffcdb48941cbadb825f1b0254bc55d1920e  packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs
+3f8527fd7ae1ffb2bffce3450971f125bd616954b534577ef54249c87f36e248  packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs
+f8307d4bd998634467fbed8748157754132b76affac051f320196161ce385e4a  scripts/mosaic-config.mjs
+3301c1fabf616bb961d62f6decd0a46dadb0f399b8ba7f3c2ca60023d2b24c78  scripts/test-config.sh
+7678bb6b45861c3dc6d775fc99269b1db7350ced60b89517d6ebeb4cc161781c  scripts/webui-service.sh

agents/launchpad/work/queue-192/mutants.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Row 192 (#1690) mutants: `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`. Each applies to the tree's source, runs one
+# test file (optionally one name pattern) and restores the file from a saved copy, checked by sha256.
+# Killed = test exit != 0.
+import hashlib, os, subprocess, sys, signal
+W = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[1]), 'packages', 'webui')
+if not os.path.isfile(os.path.join(W, 'src', 'sso.mjs')): sys.exit(f'ABORT no packages/webui/src/sso.mjs under {sys.argv[1]}')
+S, B, C, F = 'src/sso.mjs', 'src/serve.mjs', 'src/sso-config.mjs', 'src/public/'
+T, P = 'tests/sso.test.mjs', 'tests/sso-browser.test.mjs'
+M = [
+ ('drop validateApplicationLevelSignature (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
+ ('wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch {} } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
+ ('drop the subjects check (10)', S, [("if (name === undefined) {", "if (false) {")], T, '^10:'),
+ ('accept HS* in algs (11)', C, [("export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['PS256',", "export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['HS256', 'none', 'PS256',")], T, '^11: start'),
+ ('take the provider from the query (15)', S, [("const entry = record && providers.get(record.provider);", "const entry = record && providers.get(query.get('provider') ?? record.provider);")], T, '^15:'),
+ ('let the tester listener read cookies (12, F8)', B, [("SIGN_IN_COOKIE.test(req.headers.cookie ?? '') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
+ ('tester listener takes Authorization (12, F8)', B, [("Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'authorization') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
+ ('tester listener takes x-authentik-* (12, F8)', B, [(" || Object.keys(req.headers).some(h => h.startsWith('x-authentik-'))", "")], T, '^12:'),
+ ('skip the login record delete (7)', S, [("if (key !== null) logins.delete(key);\n    // The provider", "// The provider")], T, '^7:'),
+ ('drop HttpOnly from the session cookie (21)', S, [("`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}`", "`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax`")], T, '^20 and 21'),
+ ('refresh seen on every request (13)', B, [("sso.session(req, { touch: req.method === 'POST' || (req.method === 'GET' && !path.startsWith('/api/')) })", "sso.session(req, { touch: true })")], T, '^13: idle'),
+ ('build redirect_uri from the request Host (22)', S, [("const redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;", "let redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;"), ("    const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n", "    const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n    redirectUri = `https://${req.headers.host}/auth/callback`;\n")], T, '^22:'),
+ ('serve the loopback read path under --sso (22)', B, [("if (sso !== null && !named && !(path === '/healthz' && req.method === 'GET')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'public Host required' });", "")], T, '^22:'),
+ ('bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n    if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))", "    if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))")], P, '^a 401'),
+ ('bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n    if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'", "    if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'")], P, '^a 401'),
+ ('app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n    return { ok: res.ok, body };", "    return { ok: res.ok, body };")], P, '^a 401'),
+ ('app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, result)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n", "")], P, '^a 401'),
+ ('signInRequired takes any 401 (24)', F+'app.js', [("res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required'", "res.status === 401")], P, '^a 401'),
+ ('Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7)', F+'app.js', [("if (config.sso === true) { sso = true; $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }", "{ $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }")], P, '^the Sign out'),
+ ('form-action without the end-session origins (CSP)', B, [("form-action 'self'${sso ? sso.formTargets().map(o => ` ${o}`).join('') : ''}`", "form-action 'self'`")], T, '^13: the CSP'),
+ ('import oauth4webapi at module load (copies)', S, [("let oauth;\n", "import * as oauth from 'oauth4webapi';\n"), ("  oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi');\n", "")], 'tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs', '^serve runs from a copy'),
+ ('restore the r1 relative returnPath (14, webby-0019 B1)', S, [("      if (u.origin !== publicOrigin) return home;\n      const out = new URL(`${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`);\n      return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", "      return u.origin === publicOrigin ? u.pathname + u.search : '/';")], T, '^14:'),
+ ('drop the second origin check (14, sage-1403)', S, [("      return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", "      return `${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`;")], T, '^14:'),
+]
+sha = lambda b: hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest()
+only = sys.argv[2:]
+os.chdir(W)
+survived = []
+for i, (name, path, pairs, test, pat) in enumerate(M, 1):
+    if only and str(i) not in only: continue
+    orig = open(path, 'rb').read(); h = sha(orig)
+    src = orig.decode()
+    for a, b in pairs:
+        if src.count(a) != 1: sys.exit(f'ABORT {i} {name}: pattern found {src.count(a)} times')
+        src = src.replace(a, b)
+    try:
+        open(path, 'w').write(src)
+        p = subprocess.Popen(['node', '--test', f'--test-name-pattern={pat}', test], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, start_new_session=True)
+        try: out, _ = p.communicate(timeout=240)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            os.killpg(p.pid, signal.SIGKILL); out, _ = p.communicate(); out += b'\nTIMEOUT'
+        text = out.decode(errors='replace')
+        ran = [l for l in text.splitlines() if l.startswith('ℹ tests ')]
+        verdict = 'KILLED' if p.returncode != 0 else 'SURVIVED'
+        if verdict == 'SURVIVED': survived.append(name)
+        print(f'{i:2} {verdict} {name} [{ran[0] if ran else "no count"}]', flush=True)
+    finally:
+        open(path, 'wb').write(orig)
+        if sha(open(path, 'rb').read()) != h: sys.exit(f'ABORT restore failed for {path}')
+print('survived:', survived or 'none')

agents/megavolt/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Megavolt
-
-Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage under mos-0974 and mos-0977 item 5 for MVP T1 item 6, the
-credential store per agent with its own git identity (#1697).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `megavolt/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/morgana/README.md

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
 
 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/quackerjack/README.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Quackerjack
-
-Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
-rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
-section 7 (#414).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
-`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
-another seat's branch.

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-n=0
-for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do
-  c=$(tr '\0' ' ' < $p/cmdline 2>/dev/null) || continue
-  case "$c" in *shell-snapshots*|*chrome-devtools-mcp*|*sage-busy-now*) continue;; esac
-  if echo "$c" | grep -qE 'node --test|gate\.sh|mutant|scripts/test-[a-z-]+\.sh|docker compose'; then echo "BUSY ${p#/proc/}: ${c:0:160}"; n=$((n+1)); fi
-done
-[ $n -eq 0 ] && echo CLEAR

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-set -o pipefail
-# Landing gate template (2026-10-14): sed the G= and OUT= lines and this comment.
-# Sequential suites, each teed to its own log; stops at the first failure.
-G=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-wt
-OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-out
-cd "$G" || exit 9
-mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 9  # a missing OUT failed the row 142 gate at step 1 (2026-10-15)
-# test-task.sh live cases run `docker compose` from $G, so without a name the project is "wt"
-# and leaves wt_default behind (row 142 gate, 2026-10-15). Name it per gate dir and remove it on exit.
-export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="$(basename "$(dirname "$G")")"
-trap 'docker network rm "${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "removed network ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default"' EXIT
-# A gate tree without the node_modules link fails cli tests with ENOENT (2026-10-13).
-[ -d "$G/node_modules" ] || { echo "STOP no node_modules in $G"; exit 8; }
-echo "base $(git rev-parse --short HEAD) dirty $(git status --short | grep -vc node_modules) DOCKER_HOST=${DOCKER_HOST:-unset}"
-run() { local name="$1" dir="$2" cmd="$3"
-  (cd "$G/$dir" && bash -c "$cmd") > "$OUT/$name.log" 2>&1; local rc=$?
-  echo "$name rc=$rc $(grep -E '^ℹ (pass|fail) [0-9]+' "$OUT/$name.log" | tr '\n' ' ') | $(tail -n1 "$OUT/$name.log")"
-  [ $rc -eq 0 ] || { echo "STOP $name"; exit $rc; }; }
-# No pkg-queue step: scripts/test-queue.sh runs packages/queue/tests/ itself (same 156 tests; CI debate item 2a, Vikunja #274).
-for d in packages/*/; do p=$(basename "$d"); [ -d "$d/tests" ] || continue; [ "$p" = queue ] && continue
-  run "pkg-$p" "packages/$p" 'node --test tests/*.test.mjs'; done
-for s in scripts/test-*.sh; do n=$(basename "$s" .sh); run "script-${n#test-}" . "bash $s"; done
-echo GATE_PASSED

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/timing-g189.md

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Row 189 gate timing (for row 197, Herb)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20T19:25:04Z. Gate on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), one lane. The slot was mine. Seats may have run single test files at the same time, which the slot rules allow, and I did not record that.
-Start 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z, end 2026-10-20T19:20:36Z. Total wall time: 659 s.
-
-Wall time per suite is the gap between one suite's log mtime and the one before it (the first suite starts at start.txt), so it includes node start-up. node's duration_ms is listed where the suite prints it. Scripts print no duration.
-
-| Suite | Wall s | duration_ms s | Ended (UTC) |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| pkg-bus | 3 | 3.8 | 19:09:40 |
-| pkg-business | 3 | 2.2 | 19:09:43 |
-| pkg-cli | 388 | 388.5 | 19:16:11 |
-| pkg-control-board | 1 | 0.8 | 19:16:12 |
-| pkg-conversation | 35 | 35.4 | 19:16:47 |
-| pkg-discord | 3 | 2.6 | 19:16:50 |
-| pkg-harness | 12 | 11.6 | 19:17:02 |
-| pkg-ledger | 13 | 13.5 | 19:17:15 |
-| pkg-mosaic | 3 | 2.3 | 19:17:18 |
-| pkg-plugins | 0 | 0.3 | 19:17:18 |
-| pkg-project | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:19 |
-| pkg-runs | 1 | 0.8 | 19:17:20 |
-| pkg-seat | 6 | 6.2 | 19:17:26 |
-| pkg-tasks | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:27 |
-| pkg-webui | 58 | 57.9 | 19:18:25 |
-| script-auth | 1 | - | 19:18:26 |
-| script-conductor | 5 | - | 19:18:31 |
-| script-config | 2 | - | 19:18:33 |
-| script-discord | 8 | - | 19:18:41 |
-| script-extension-package | 1 | - | 19:18:42 |
-| script-foundation | 40 | - | 19:19:22 |
-| script-land-work | 11 | - | 19:19:33 |
-| script-queue | 21 | - | 19:19:54 |
-| script-release | 11 | - | 19:20:05 |
-| script-task | 31 | - | 19:20:36 |
-
-Source: /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-g189/out/*.log mtimes and gate.log. The cli suite is about 59% of the run, and webui plus conversation add about 14%.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-# Row 189: `stack-release.sh activate --no-send`
-
-Gitea #1687. Vikunja P19 #413 (Q175 interim, #412). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md.
-Rulings: mos-0972 (the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2), mos-0973 (go; Sage builds,
-Dewey reviews; gate is the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh). Base: def2e7932 (refactor, the
-brief commit on 9ae8c73ac).
-
-## What it does
-
-`activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE` in a new `send_for_target`, which
-`console_for_target` calls after `proof_for_target`. `install_stack` renders the unit from
-`RUN_CONSOLE` and `write_pointer` writes the pointer from it, so both lose the flag and `flags_drift`
-stays quiet afterwards. Only `activate` takes the flag; the parser sends every other op to usage
-(exit 4).
-
-`check_target` lets a `--no-send` activate name the pointer's copy only when the pointer's Console
-flags hold `--send`. That run is a live-copy re-pin, the same path row 187 uses for the proof pair:
-the plan prints the live-copy note, the run stops both units, backs up the stopped store and starts
-them again. A plain same-copy activate, or a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, still
-refuses `already-active`.
-
-`--plan` prints one `send:` line after the `proof:` line, for activate and rollback:
-
-- `send: dropped; --no-send was given`
-- `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`
-- `send: carried` (the pointer's `--send` goes on unchanged)
-- `send: off`
-
-The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
---send, so there is nothing to drop`.
-
-Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer's flags as they are, so once `--no-send` has run, nothing adds
-`--send` back. There is no re-enable flag (mos-0973). Q175 phase 2 changes the Console flags in its
-own row.
-
-docs/TOOLS.md: `[--no-send]` in the usage block and one paragraph after the proof paragraph.
-
-## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs, T55)
-
-1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send --tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
-   passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the other flags in order, status
-   says the unit flags match, the steps log has the drop line, the log line has from = to = B and the
-   backup sum equals the stopped store's, and the units stop and start in order.
-2. Plain same-copy activate, with `--tester-port` and with `--no-proof`, refuses `already-active`. So does
-   a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, and on a pointer that never held it.
-3. The four `send:` lines, the live-copy note on the same-copy plan only, and the Console line right
-   after `send:` without `--send`. The run on a pointer with no `--send` logs the nothing-to-drop line
-   and no drop line.
-4. After `--no-send` on C1, a rollback to B leaves `--send` out of the pointer and the unit, the steps
-   log never names `--send`, and status matches. pm-on after `activate --pm-after-harness --no-send`
-   keeps it off.
-5. `--no-send` on rollback (with and without `--plan`), pm-on, status, adopt and rehearse is a usage
-   error with the usage text, nothing written, started or logged. The usage text shows `[--no-send]`.
-6. A pointer holding both the proof pair and `--send`: the plans for `--no-proof`, `--no-send` and both
-   name what each drops and carries. `--no-send` keeps the pair, `--no-send` with a new pair replaces it,
-   `--no-proof` keeps `--send`, and both together leave neither. Status matches after each.
-
-`planTail` gains `'send: off'` after `'proof: off'`, because every plan now prints the line. T36 takes
-`out.slice(-n)` around `planTail`, so its four slice counts grow by one.
-
-## Mutants
-
-mutants.sh in this packet, run on the candidate. Each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh and runs T55
-plus T1 and T2.
-
-- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
-- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
-- M3: with `--no-send`, the pointer is written from `P_CONSOLE`, so it keeps `--send` while the unit
-  drops it.
-- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
-- M5: the parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
-
-Results: mutants-run.log, all five killed (M1 5 failures, M2 2, M3 7, M4 2, M5 2).
-
-## Deviations from the brief
-
-- The brief's line numbers were taken before row 163 landed. The candidate corrects them to the
-  9ae8c73ac lines (check_target :249-256, flags_drift :646-657, console_for_target :664-693, adopt
-  :828).
-- Test 5 also covers rehearse and `rollback --plan`, which the brief did not list.
-
-## Outbound calls
-
-None. The change edits an array before the existing unit render and pointer write. Every test uses
-the stand-in systemctl, units, stores and data root the file already builds; no test touches
-`~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-M1 KILLED fail=5
-M2 KILLED fail=2
-M3 KILLED fail=7
-M4 KILLED fail=2
-M5 KILLED fail=2

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Row 189 mutants M1-M5: each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh in the sage-b189 worktree, runs T55 and
-# the plan-tail tests, and restores the file from a checked backup.
-set -uo pipefail
-WT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189
-OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189-mut/out
-S=$WT/scripts/stack-release.sh
-mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 1
-cp -p "$S" "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" || { echo "backup failed"; exit 1; }
-ORIG=$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)
-[ "$(sha256sum "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "backup differs"; exit 1; }
-restore() { cp -p "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S"; [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "RESTORE FAILED"; exit 1; }; }
-trap restore EXIT
-
-mutate() {
-    case "$1" in
-        M1) sed -i '/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/d' "$S" ;;
-        M2) sed -i 's/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/{ [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; } ||/' "$S" ;;
-        M3) sed -i 's/^    write_pointer "\$TO" "\$RUN_PM" "\$RUN_PENDING" "\$P_CLAUDE" "\$T_SCHEMA" "\${RUN_CONSOLE\[@\]}"$/    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${P_CONSOLE[@]}"; else write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${RUN_CONSOLE[@]}"; fi/' "$S" ;;
-        M4) sed -i 's/^        SEND_PLAN="send: off"$/        SEND_PLAN="send: off"; [ "$OP" != rollback ] || RUN_CONSOLE+=(--send)/' "$S" ;;
-        M5) sed -i 's/--no-send) \[ "\$OP" = activate \] || usage;/--no-send) { [ "$OP" = activate ] || [ "$OP" = rollback ]; } || usage;/' "$S" ;;
-    esac
-}
-
-for m in M1 M2 M3 M4 M5; do
-    restore
-    mutate "$m"
-    if [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ]; then echo "$m NOT-APPLIED"; continue; fi
-    bash -n "$S" || { echo "$m SYNTAX"; continue; }
-    diff "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S" > "$OUT/$m.diff"
-    (cd "$WT" && TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/t189 timeout 900 node --test --test-reporter=tap --test-name-pattern='T55|T1 |T2 ' packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs) > "$OUT/$m.log" 2>&1
-    fails=$(awk '/^# fail /{print $3}' "$OUT/$m.log")
-    if [ "${fails:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then echo "$m KILLED fail=$fails"; else echo "$m SURVIVED"; fi
-done

agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-4429a104f.md

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-# Re-pin 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192, Q175 phase 1), with npm ci in the new copy
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, draft 1, for mos-1099 item 3 under DECISIONS Q173. Mos checks this file at its commit before
-P0. Any change to this file or to NEW after the check means Mos checks again (mos-0849/0850).
-
-This is a smaller window than `repin-rows-177-185.md` (draft 2, which Mos checked in mos-0929). Where a step is
-the same, this file names that file's step and says what differs. The 7332 matrix, the snapshot, the W9 list and
-the rollback compare are reused unchanged.
-
-## Who, and what nobody does
-
-- Sage operates, as the tester. Darkwing holds the gate lane for row 190 round 3 tonight, so I take the
-  operator seat. Mos verifies each step's output before the next one and runs `rehearse` (P3), which reads the
-  live config and a live backup (`docs/TOOLS.md` `rehearse`: Jason or Mos runs it).
-- Jason has no step. Q173 covers a re-pin of this test system with a backup first and a STATE report after.
-  Nothing is pruned.
-- Nobody acts as Jason: no `--by jason`, no human shell or tmux pane, every bus read and write carries
-  `--tester`, and no request carries `jason.woltje`. `bus.tester` stays as it is; if it isn't `true`, stop at P1.
-- No pi (mos-0865 D2, P19 #383). No Save in the human Console, no `mosaic name`.
-- Outside reach doesn't change. The Console keeps its current flags. `--sso` stays off: row 192's sign-in code is
-  dormant without the flag, and `cli.mjs:57` refuses `--sso` with the preview flags the pointer carries anyway.
-  The proof pair stays unset. The tunnel still forwards 7332 only (P4 and W10 check it).
-
-## Names
-
-- OLD, live: `490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c`, activation `20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0`, pointer
-  `pm: true`, schema 3i, Console `--port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username
-  --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333` (no `--send`, read from `stack-release.sh status` between 21:36Z and 21:39Z).
-- NEW: `4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0`, row 192's landing, 106 commits past OLD counting records.
-  The commits after it (5b8def2f1 plans, 176a6bf4b sessions, 305857c8f queue) are records and don't move NEW. If
-  another code row lands before W0 (row 190 is the likely one), NEW stays here unless Mos rules otherwise.
-- REPO: the canonical checkout. `activate` runs REPO's `webui-service.sh`, so the four service scripts are held
-  at NEW for the window (P5).
-- `P=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-pin-de352dfaf` (`business-check.mjs`, `console-check.sh`, checked against
-  `agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-de352dfaf/SCRIPTS.sha256`).
-- `WIN=agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/`, where every transcript goes.
-- `SNAP=$WIN/snapshot.mjs`, a copy of `agents/darkwing/work/window-rows-177-185/snapshot.mjs`, sha256
-  `639fd28a2674aaa03ce824e3394b4052f21cdef7d6fa49bae61a9927ed341e67` (mos-0899). I check the sha before S1, S2
-  and any D3.
-
-## What NEW carries over OLD
-
-The path-limited log over `packages`, `scripts`, `roles`, `contracts`, `adapters`, `skills` and the package files:
-
-| Row | Commit | Live effect |
-|---|---|---|
-| 186 | 269134d8d | Tool only: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do. |
-| 187 | 9a71e4e80 | Tool: activate sets, carries and drops the proof pair. The pointer has no pair, so nothing changes. |
-| 188 | 8fc0ee216 | Tool: proof file checks on a carried pair. No pair, no effect. |
-| 163 | 8ecc7a239 | Tool: `rehearse`, which P3 uses, and `bus start --no-launch`. CLI `cli.mjs` and `launcher.mjs` gain the `--no-launch` path; the default start is unchanged. |
-| 189 | ace27dc5e | Tool: `activate --no-send`. Live already runs without `--send`; the pointer carries that. |
-| 192 | 4429a104f | Console `--sso` (off here), `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` load becomes async, `webui-service.sh` renders `--sso` only when given, and a new dependency, oauth4webapi 3.8.8. `cli.mjs` imports `sso.mjs` at the top, so the Console won't start from a copy without that module. |
-
-No schema step: `SCHEMA_VERSION` (`packages/bus/src/store.mjs:17`) is 3i at OLD and NEW, and no migration was
-added. `--plan` must say `migration: none`. No roles, skills, contracts, adapters or plug-in kinds changed. So: no
-harness set, no skill carry, no `pm-on`. One `activate --pm`.
-
-## npm ci in the new copy
-
-mos-1099 asks for npm ci in the new copy. `stack-copy.sh copy` already does it: it extracts the archive to a temp
-dir, refuses without `package.json` and `package-lock.json` (:55), runs `npm ci --no-audit --no-fund` there and
-writes no copy if it fails (:56). W0 checks the result: `node_modules/oauth4webapi/package.json` in the copy reads
-3.8.8, and `node --input-type=module -e "await import('oauth4webapi')"` from the copy exits 0. The live copy is
-163M; `/home` has 30G free (94% used), enough for one more.
-
-## Backups
-
-| Before | Backup | Taken by |
-|---|---|---|
-| W5 | the stopped store, `$DATA/backups/stack/<W5 activation id>/` with SHA256SUMS, DATA_ROOT, SCHEMA 3i, STAMP | `stack-release.sh` (row 185: every activate) |
-| W5 | the rollback set (units, wrapper, pointer) | `stack-release.sh` |
-| W9 | the business file, `cp -p` to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json.pre-window-<stamp>` with its sha256, as evidence nothing wrote it | Sage, in W0b |
-
-## Before the window (nothing stopped)
-
-| # | Who | Step |
-|---|-----|------|
-| P0 | Mos | The `$P` sha check, as in the 177-185 plan P0. |
-| P1 | Sage | The business file, read only, the same values as the 177-185 plan P1. I report its sha256 now rather than assume the 06:15Z value. `business-check.mjs` for OLD now and for NEW after W0: LOAD_OK both. |
-| W0 | Sage | `cd $REPO && scripts/stack-copy.sh copy $NEW`, in a gap between gate-lane runs, since npm ci is heavy. Then the two npm checks above, and `diff <(git -C $REPO show $NEW:package-lock.json) $COPIES/$NEW/package-lock.json` empty. W0 writes only under `copies/` and changes nothing live, so it moves before P2 and P3, which need the copy. |
-| P2 | Sage | `console-check.sh $NEW` against a stub Console of NEW on a scratch port, once without and once with `--tester-port` on a second scratch port. CONSOLE_PASS both. |
-| P3 | Mos | `scripts/stack-release.sh rehearse $NEW mosaic-stack --backup 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0 --port <scratch>`. It must pass every gate check but the PM's, with the pointer's Console flags. It stops no unit and writes no pointer. Transcript in `$WIN/p3/`. |
-| P4 | Sage | The tunnel read, as in the 177-185 plan P4. |
-| P5 | Sage | `git -C $REPO diff --quiet $NEW HEAD -- scripts/stack-release.sh scripts/webui-service.sh scripts/bus-service.sh scripts/stack-copy.sh` and an empty `git status --porcelain` on the same four. Row 190 round 3 touches `webui-service.sh`; if it lands before W5, P5 fails and the window waits for Mos's ruling. |
-| P6 | Sage | The 7332 matrix (a)-(g) on OLD, as in the 177-185 plan, saved as `$WIN/matrix-old.txt`. |
-
-## The window
-
-| # | Who | Step |
-|---|-----|------|
-| W0b | Sage | The business file copy. |
-| W1 | Sage | Idle check (`mosaic agents --business mosaic-stack --tester`, `mosaic launches list`), the start stamp from `date -u`, then S1 `node $SNAP --store "$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite" --held`. |
-| W2 | Sage | `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack`: pointer on OLD, `pm: true`, 3i, last line ok, unit flags match. |
-| W3 | Sage | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm --plan`. Must show from OLD to NEW, `migration: none`, the backup line, and the Console line with OLD's flags exactly: no `--send`, no `--sso`, no proof pair, `--tester-port 7333`. Any other difference stops here. |
-| W4 | Sage | The unit reads, as in the 177-185 plan W4. |
-| W5 | Sage, on Mos's go | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm`. Exit 0, `result ok`, every gate check including `pm_launched`. Record the activation id, the backup path and STAMP, and the backup SHA256SUMS sha256. Then `status`. |
-| W9 | Sage, after Mos verifies W5 | The 177-185 plan's W9 list unchanged, the chief turn and the one `assistant` thread turn included (mos-0929 Q3), plus two lines: the webui journal since the W5 stamp (with `UTC`) has one `Proxy: proxy proof off` and no `Sign-in:` line, and `ls -l /proc/<Console pid>/cwd` names the NEW copy. |
-| W10 | Sage | The browser check on 127.0.0.1:7333 and the matrix again as `$WIN/matrix-new.txt`, identical to `matrix-old.txt`. Then P4 again. |
-| W11 | Sage | STATE report in `$WIN/STATE.md`, posted on P19 386 and P19 412 and on Gitea #1690. |
-
-## Stop conditions and rollback
-
-The same as the 177-185 plan. Two failures in one window: stop and report (mos-0823).
-
-Rollback: `stack-release.sh rollback mosaic-stack --plan`, then the real run. The previous distinct copy in the
-log is 490e2771d, both are 3i, so no `--restore` and no data loss. OLD takes the same Console flags. The R1 and
-R1post compares are as in the 177-185 plan. A restore past W5 follows that plan's D3 steps, with Mos deciding.
-
-Keep every copy. Prune nothing.
-
-## Questions for the plan check
-
-- Q1: NEW is row 192 alone, not bundled with row 190. Row 190 (several instances) changes `stack-release.sh`
-  and `webui-service.sh` and deserves its own window. I recommend running this one first.
-- Q2: Sage operates instead of Darkwing, who is on the row 190 gate. OK?
-- Q3: W0 before P2 and P3. It writes a copy only. OK?
-
-## What Sage ran for this plan
-
-Read only, 2026-10-20 between 21:36Z and 21:39Z (clock read 21:39:50Z at the commit): `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack` (pointer, last five log
-lines, unit flags match, 106 commits of drift), `git rev-list --count`, `SCHEMA_VERSION` at both ends, the
-path-limited log, `git diff --stat` on the service scripts, CLI and config loader, `stack-copy.sh:23-56`,
-`webui/src/cli.mjs:15-120`, `docs/TOOLS.md` on `rehearse`, `du -sh` of the live copy and `df -h /home`. Nothing
-live was changed.

agents/webby/README.md

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0981, thread 03086006). Reviews Case 2 designs and MVP T1 rows 192 and 194.
 
 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

docs/SESSIONS.md

@@ -1361,7 +1361,3 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-20T18:34:53Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r2 (DESIGN.md blob 3eb718b5e131 at 1a268249e), static | changes: C1 config.json console key fails old loaders (mosaic-config.mjs:113 rejects unknown keys; key add inside phase 2 window, rollback removes it, loader test), C2 app.js signs out only on opaqueredirect so 401 never shows sign-in; notes on tests 15/7/9a, Q-B 200-HTML classification, scratch Console flags; Q-E keep iss/sub escaped and capped; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:40:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r3 (DESIGN.md blob a152fd58e18e at 817e8f51b), static | approve on condition D1 (slot file checks stay out of shared loader, shape-only there) as a line edit; D2 notes: slot root from configDir, scratch dataRoot, name discovery GETs for Mos; C1/C2 and notes verified; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:41:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design D1/D2 check (DESIGN.md blob eba861f5d2bb at d55d86bb0), static git diff 817e8f51b..d55d86bb0 | ack: D1 and D2 match; design approved; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
-2026-10-20T18:57:10Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r2 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 5493c9df3ec0) | CHANGES to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 claim check on MOSAIC_CONFIG-only selection, B2 shared prefix drop-in dirs; N1-N7 notes; static read, no slot, no Gitea or queue record
-2026-10-20T19:00:04Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r3 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 98236a1aff98) | APPROVE to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 and B2 closed with M13 and M14, N7 settled by Sage's 48ebee0ff; static read, no slot; manifest round gets a queue review record (sage-1337)
-2026-10-20T20:40:15Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 (#1688) manifest round 1 review, candidate 8862feccc (static) | CHANGES: B1 base drift, row 189 ace27dc5e conflicts in stack-release.sh, rebase + full gate rerun; N1-N7 notes; Gitea 29634, queue rev 2362 (uncommitted, left for Sage)
-2026-10-20T21:29:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 (#1688) manifest round 2 review, candidate 537a02392 (static) | CHANGES: B1 base drift, row 192 4429a104f conflicts in mosaic-config.mjs and webui-service.sh (async load); round 2 content fine; Gitea 29685, queue rev 2447 (uncommitted, left for Sage)

docs/TOOLS.md

@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ reports checkout or copy identity and refactor drift, and writes nothing.
 ```
 scripts/stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
 scripts/stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
 scripts/stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -480,14 +480,6 @@ copies. It checks the file with `stat` and `realpath` and never reads the value.
 or `off`. On the live copy it also notes that the run re-pins the pointer's copy
 and only the Console flags change.
 
-`activate ... --no-send` (row 189, mos-0972) drops `--send` from the pointer's
-Console flags and the unit, so the Console serves reads and no human sends. It
-may name the live copy while the pointer holds `--send`; once `--send` is gone a
-same-copy `--no-send` refuses `already-active`. Later activates, `pm-on` and
-rollbacks carry the pointer, so send stays off. No flag puts `--send` back.
-`--plan` prints one `send:` line: `dropped`, `off` with or without the
-`--no-send` note, or `carried`.
-
 #### A target past c216f47db: the PM after the harness kind
 
 From c216f47db on, the bus launches the PM only with a `harness` kind in the

docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send
 
 Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-0972 (Q175 interim, Vikunja #412). Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate owner
-Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit. The candidate corrects them;
-the first draft took them before row 163.
+Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit.
 
 This row builds the tool only. The live restart without `--send` is a separate step afterwards, a same-copy
 activate under Q173 with a backup first and a STATE report after. No test here touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the
@@ -15,11 +14,11 @@ Mos ruled that the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2, because wit
 process can forge `X-authentik-username` on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason (design section 8). On the pinned
 stack, the Console flags live in the pointer (`~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json`):
 
-- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:664-693) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
+- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:658-687) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
   `--tester-port` and the row 187 proof pair can change.
-- `check_target` (:249-256) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
-- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:828).
-- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:646-657) refuse
+- `check_target` (:247-249) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
+- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:822).
+- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:640-651) refuse
   `unit-flags-drift` on every later activate, pm-on and rollback.
 
 So the tool can't drop `--send` today. This row adds that one path.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP T1 item 6) and the MVP plan
-(`jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/PLAN.md` item 6, GAP-MAP G11 and G13; TARGET.md: "credentials store
-available for all agents; secrets protected with RLS equivalent" and "Agent uses own credentials for git and
-other actions"). Gitea #1697. Owner Megavolt (Opus 5.5, a new builder seat), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
-Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
-`agents/megavolt/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
-
-This row draws a security boundary. Sage reviews the design's authority model, and Mos rules on it before any
-code is written.
-
-## What exists today (GAP-MAP, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
-
-- G11. Credential references exist per instance for Gitea and Vikunja only
-  (`packages/business/src/credentials.mjs`, `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs:103`). One
-  Claude env file is shared by every seat.
-- G13. Agents use their own Vikunja token (`packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs`). Git goes through the host
-  socket (`packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs`). Gitea tokens are loaded but never used.
-- The development repository's helper (`scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs`, wired in `.git/config` for
-  git.mosaicstack.dev) pushes as one identity. Until this row lands, seats push only their own `<seat>/*`
-  branches through it (mos-0981).
-
-## What the design must settle
-
-1. The store. Where each agent's credentials live, per instance, under the row 190 config canon. File modes,
-   ownership and the read path. Which process may read which entry, and how the bus enforces that (the "RLS
-   equivalent"). A process asking for another agent's entry is refused and logged.
-2. Kinds. Gitea (git over HTTPS, and the API), Vikunja, and the model provider. Say which kinds 10-27 needs
-   and which wait. The model provider entry must not copy jwoltje's `claude-session.env`. If it needs a new
-   provider account or subscription, flag it for Jason and don't pick one.
-3. Git identity and push. Each agent commits with its own name and email and pushes with its own token to a
-   remote it is granted. Which refs an agent may push (its own branches, never the default branch or another
-   agent's), and where that's enforced: the Gitea side (branch protection, token scopes) and our side. How
-   this fits the host git socket, or replaces it.
-4. Lifecycle. Issue, rotate (`rotateBy`, `expires`), revoke and delete, and what row 194 (agent lifecycle) calls
-   when an agent is hired or fired. A fired agent's credentials stop working at once.
-5. Who does what. Creating a Gitea user or token, or any account outside the fleet, is Jason's (Q173
-   exclusions). The design lists each such step as a command or UI action for Jason. Agents never mint
-   accounts.
-6. Migration. Today's seats (jarvis helper, seat tokens) keep working until each moves. The mos-0981 push
-   rule ends only when Mos says so.
-7. What this row closes in G11 and G13, and what stays open.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- No credential value is read, printed, logged or committed. Tests use fake tokens in scratch roots and a
-  fake Gitea.
-- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, `~/.mosaic` or the live
-  `.git/config` of the canonical checkout.
-- No request to git.mosaicstack.dev, tasks.woltje.com or any provider from a test.
-
-## Gate
-
-Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, Mos rules on the authority model, then Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus,
-business, cli and tasks suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's
-mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-# Federation build rows R1, R2 and R5 (#414)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's orders mos-1023 item 1, mos-1028 item 2 and mos-1034 item 1. The design is
-Gizmoduck's `agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` at a1daa3c07 on `gizmoduck/federation-design` (r4.9,
-sha256 a31cbebd070f9e3a5ca4ccb158b1747c6f5a83c3469855705b0026a581fb5c6a). Duckworth approved r4.5
-(duckworth-0012), r4.6, r4.7 (duckworth-0020) and r4.8 (duckworth-0021, 8a22d0897 on `duckworth/reviews`),
-and acked r4.9 (duckworth-0024). r4.7 applies Jason's Q181 hosts, r4.8 adds N22's R8 checks and r4.9 names who
-runs them. None of them changes R1, R2 or R5. Section 7's table
-sets each row's scope and test gate. Vikunja P19 #414. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches
-(mos-0981).
-
-The other R rows are filed when their parents have candidates: R3 after R1 and row 196, R4 after R3, R5 and
-row 193's viewer level (193a, mos-1019), R6 after #412 phase 1, R1, R2 and R3, R7 after R1-R6 and row 190.
-R8 is a live window, not a code row. Its brief is the last section here.
-
-## Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator
-
-Owner Gizmoduck, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. No parent.
-
-`packages/business/src/access.mjs`: the access.json loader and validator from DESIGN.md section 3.5, and the
-pure `covers`. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks. The
-exported interface is what R5 and row 193a build against, so the manifest names it, and any change to it in
-review goes to Sage before it lands. Section 7 names `covers` but not the loader and validator exports or
-the context shape. Morgana's 193a (508ee4d61 on `morgana/row193a`) assumes `checkAccess(doc, {providers,
-peers, businesses})`, with `businesses` mapping an id to `{human, instances}`, throwing a `BusinessError` that
-names the key path. Use those names, or tell Morgana and Quackerjack yours before the manifest goes to
-Duckworth. Row 193a later widens the level check to `viewer` on R1's candidate (mos-1019).
-
-Tests, in `packages/business/tests/`: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named. That covers a
-symlink, a non-regular file, another owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, a grant disjoint from the given
-subjects, `human` and `tester` ids, any level other than `collaborator`, and a project entry that isn't a
-UUID. For `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, while an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an
-expired grant doesn't, and a level filter rejects another level. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
-
-Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. Tests
-use scratch roots. Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
-gate, and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke
-
-Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on R1 (Q177). The build starts now against
-R1's exported interface as the R1 manifest names it, and R5 lands after R1 and rebases onto R1's landing.
-
-`mosaic access list`, `grant` and `revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, a receipt line. The help
-text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order (DESIGN.md section 7, row R5). R4 later makes
-these verbs call `access.reload`, so R5 leaves no other reload path.
-
-Context (sage-1419). `ssoSubjects` is row 192's `console.sso.providers[].subjects` flattened to `{provider,
-sub}` pairs; the design's "`console.sso.subjects`" in 3.5 is shorthand for it. `providers` is the list of
-`providers[].id`, read through `loadSystem` and row 192's `checkConsole`. `peers` is `[]` until R2 lands, so a grant
-naming a peer home refuses. R5 rebases onto row 192's landing as well as R1's.
-
-Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/`: tester and agent callers are refused, a concurrent write refuses on a
-revision conflict, the receipt line is appended, and a bad grant is refused before anything is written. One
-mutant per refusal, each killed.
-
-Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. The
-human proof in tests uses the scratch stand-in pattern (a scratch bus verifies its own human-cli path).
-Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
-and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config
-
-Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192 (#412 phase 1). The build starts when
-row 192 has a candidate, on that candidate.
-
-A `federation` key in `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` with the shape in DESIGN.md section 3. A config with no
-`federation` key still loads as it does today. This changes the config schema, so the manifest lists every
-reader of the key.
-
-Tests, in `scripts/test-config.sh`: a valid key loads, an unknown sub-key and a bad origin refuse, and a
-config without the key loads. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
-
-Boundaries: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is user-authored and is not touched. Tests use scratch config
-dirs only.
-
-Gate: Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and
-the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54
-
-A live window, not a code row (DESIGN.md section 7, row R8). The brief follows r4.11, b93f098f0 on
-`gizmoduck/federation-design` (sha256 1bcee8df0a3a8628a6646535b756c936ca6d9e7bcfa7e1dd2bf1d3f01715c8e6),
-which Duckworth acked with r4.10 (duckworth-0034). Mos closed design rounds there (mos-1072). Run by Jason and
-Mos. Nothing here authorizes a step on any host; each step waits for the window's go.
-
-What changed since r4.9 (DECISIONS Q182, Q183, mos-1055, mos-1063). R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts
-with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. The privilege and host
-checks still run, and each result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and
-don't refuse. The four functional checks named at the end of section 7's R8 row still stop R8 when they fail
-(mos-1066 item 1).
-
-Order (mos-1042 item 2). R8 runs after the Case 2 install on .54 (#416, due by 2026-10-27, Jason's latest-by
-date in Q176, mos-1069), after Bean and Chet are live in Case 2, and after both Hermes gateways on 10.1.1.54
-have stopped. Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The risk, stated for 10-27: federation between the two
-instances depends on Melanie's switch-over date.
-
-Entry checks, all before anything starts:
-- R7, #412 phase 2 and Jason's #419 answer, as section 7 lists.
-- The four hub user checks on 10.1.1.54 (N22, mos-1035 item 1): `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id
-  mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under
-  `/etc/sudoers.d` names `mosaic`. An agent or Jason runs them as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes
-  into the R8 record with who ran them.
-- The factory privilege checks, the key fingerprint comparison and the section 8 privilege path table, each
-  as section 7's R8 row states them.
-
-Build notes:
-- N1 (Duckworth, duckworth-0034, mos-1072). A check that fails on a path Jason didn't name in Q182 or Q183 is
-  marked "not named in Q182 or Q183" in the record, not filed under the acceptance. Examples: a factory mount
-  of hub data, another agent on .54, a provider admin token. Mos takes each one to Jason.
-- N2 (Duckworth, doc-only). The Q183 and Q4 quotes in section 8 are excerpts. When the R8 record quotes them,
-  it marks each omission with "…" and checks the full text at DECISIONS.md:1535-1541 in jason-master-restart
-  (read only).
-
-Done when every entry check has its output recorded, Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie
-revokes, and his next request is refused.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_force-push-guard.md

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-1078 (Vikunja P19 #426) and its go mos-1083 item 1. Owner Rocko,
-reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. Starts after row 191.
-
-## Why
-
-Morgana force-pushed a seat branch on 2026-10-20 (morgana-0016). Mos took it to Jason. Force-push is a
-Q173 exclusion, and canon says never force-push, but nothing mechanical stops one. Mos: "Done means a
-force-push from a seat worktree is refused, with a test that shows it."
-
-Earlier the same day, a busy check chained as `| tail -1 &&` passed while the slot was BUSY. The script it
-called prints BUSY or CLEAR, but it exits 0 either way.
-
-The guard has two layers:
-- (a) Gitea protection with force-push off on seat branch patterns and on refactor, next and main. ops-01
-  sets it up, through Mos (mos-1082). That part isn't this row.
-- (b) The client hook below. It can be bypassed with `--no-verify`, so (a) is the real guard and (b) is the
-  early refusal.
-
-## What ships
-
-1. `scripts/git-hooks/pre-push` (new). For each ref line git passes on stdin:
-   - It refuses when the remote sha isn't all zeros and isn't an ancestor of the local sha (`git
-     merge-base --is-ancestor`). The refusal names the ref and both shas, and the hook exits 1.
-   - A new branch passes. A delete (local sha all zeros) is refused.
-   - Any failure of the check refuses too, for example an unknown remote object. The hook fetches nothing.
-     If the remote tip isn't present locally, it refuses and says to fetch first.
-2. Install, following `scripts/queue-commit.sh --install-hook`. Either add a `--install-push-hook` there or
-   ship a small `scripts/install-git-hooks.sh`, whichever fits the existing code better. Say which in BUILD.md.
-   - The install copies the hook into the common `.git/hooks`, which every seat worktree shares.
-   - It refuses when `core.hooksPath` is set (the husky trap, 2026-10-09). It refuses when an installed
-     pre-push differs from the repository copy, unless `--force-install` is given.
-   - It never edits the installed copy in place.
-3. `scripts/slot-busy.sh` (new), the shared busy check.
-   - It prints one BUSY line per matching process, or CLEAR.
-   - It exits 0 on CLEAR, 1 on BUSY and 2 on its own error.
-   - It matches `node --test`, `gate.sh`, `mutant`, `scripts/test-*.sh` and `docker compose` command lines.
-     It skips its own process and shell snapshots.
-   - It reads `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and the cwd link only, never file contents under another seat's
-     directory.
-   - Usage in `docs/TOOLS.md`: `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh > LOG && gate`, with `set -o pipefail` in any
-     script that pipes it. Never `| tail -1 &&`.
-
-## Tests
-
-Add them to `scripts/test-land-work.sh` or a new `scripts/test-git-guard.sh` (say which). Run against a scratch
-bare remote and a scratch clone with a worktree, never against origin:
-- A rewritten branch pushed with `--force` from a worktree is refused, and the remote ref is unchanged.
-- A `+refspec` push is refused.
-- A fast-forward push passes.
-- A new branch passes.
-- A delete is refused.
-- A remote tip that's missing locally is refused.
-- The install refuses with `core.hooksPath` set, and refuses a differing installed hook.
-- `slot-busy.sh` exits 1 with a fake `node --test` process running (a sleeping stand-in with that argv),
-  and 0 without one.
-- `slot-busy.sh | tail -1 && false` doesn't apply here. The test runs `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh >/dev/null
-  && echo ran`, and asserts it doesn't print `ran` while BUSY.
-
-Mutants, each killed:
-- drop the ancestor check
-- treat an unknown remote object as passing
-- let a delete pass
-- install over a set `core.hooksPath`
-- `slot-busy.sh` exits 0 on BUSY
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- Install the hook in the canonical checkout only after landing, as its own step with Sage. Tests use
-  scratch repositories.
-- No push to origin from a test. No change to Gitea config. That's ops-01's.
-- Don't touch `~/.mosaic`, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`.
-
-## Gate
-
-Dewey approves the manifest. The new or changed `scripts/test-*.sh` file and every other `scripts/test-*.sh`
-are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. Done when the hook is installed in the canonical
-checkout and a scripted force-push from a seat worktree to a scratch remote is refused there. ops-01's
-server proof (a refused force-push, plus a fast-forward push and a new branch that go through) is recorded
-in Vikunja #426 by Mos.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Jason's rulings Q183 and Q184 relayed by Mos (mos-1056 item 3, mos-1067). Gitea #1707, Vikunja P19
-#424, due 2026-10-27 (Q184: "Q5: by 10.27"). Owner Gizmoduck (design and build), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
-Sage. Chained on row 199's candidate (Q177): row 199 design r6 (4d3007ec9 on `megavolt/row199`, approved in
-duckworth-0027) is not reopened. This row lands after 199 and rebases onto its landing.
-
-## What Jason asked for
-
-Q183, through Mos: "I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works as some sort of variable for
-the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to keep the agents sandboxed with proper
-security... If we can utilize the credential store in Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with
-NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a happy man." Q183 also says not every agent needs that access.
-
-Mos's requirements (mos-1067 item 1):
-- An agent asks for a host credential by name.
-- The stack checks a grant for that agent and that host, and does the ssh and sudo for it.
-- The agent never sees the key or any secret value.
-- Only agents with a grant can do it.
-
-The PRD text is REQ-CRED-3, drafted by Honker for PRD 1.7 (sage-1422). If it misses 1.7 it goes into 1.8, and
-this row lands only after the version that holds it is approved.
-
-## What row 199 gives and what it doesn't (megavolt-0019)
-
-It builds on 199 as 199 stands: the store layout under `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/`, the
-lifecycle verbs and their `changes.jsonl` receipts, `useFor(session, service, fn)` with the D5 allowlist test,
-`assertClean` on every result, and the grant shape of `publish` (a list on the role entry, checked by the
-broker, plus a hard-wait action that isn't routed).
-
-This row's own changes:
-- A host kind in the closed kind set (vocabulary.mjs `SERVICES`, credentials.mjs, the broker's service check,
-  the CLI date flag, the remove regex), with a naming rule for one credential per host or per agent.
-- A per-kind value check. An OpenSSH private key fails today's `TOKEN` pattern.
-- Handing the key to ssh without the agent seeing it: an ssh-agent on a private socket, or a 0600 temp file
-  removed on every path, the way publish's one-shot helper works.
-- Pinned host keys per host, and no trust on first use.
-- The command boundary: what an agent may run under sudo, and how output returns without echoing the secret.
-  This is the main design work.
-- The executor: a ticket and a host op running in the bus child, the same split row 199 uses for publish
-  (Megavolt's deviation in 199's BUILD.md).
-
-## Steps
-
-1. DESIGN.md first, in `agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-ROW/`. It answers each item above, names the grant shape
-   (`roles.<agent>.hosts` and a `host.sudo` action, or a reasoned alternative), says who grants (Jason, through
-   a reviewed role change, unless REQ-CRED-3 says otherwise), and lists tests and mutants. Duckworth approves it
-   before code. Sage reads it too, because it gives agents sudo on hosts.
-2. Build on 199's candidate. Single test files run freely. Suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
-3. The live part is not this row. Putting a key in the store and granting a host is a separate window with
-   Jason or Mos, after landing.
-
-## Hosts
-
-The first targets are `localadmin` with NOPASSWD sudo on 10.1.1.53 and 10.1.1.54 (#423 step 1, applied by
-ops-01 at 20:05:47Z), and the servers agents already reach as localadmin (Q172). ops-01 owns the host side.
-Tests use scratch sshd fixtures on 127.0.0.1 or fakes, never a real host.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files, the live units or `~/.mosaic`. No key is
-  read, copied or printed. No ssh to any real host from a test or a seat.
-- No widening of row 199's kinds or regex inside row 199. Both rows touch them, so this row rebases after 199
-  lands.
-
-## Gate
-
-Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every
-`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed (one per refusal, plus one that leaks
-the key into the agent's output and one that skips the host key pin).

docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, third version, for Darkwing's rewrite request and sage-1439. Gitea #1693.
-
-Why it changed:
-- The first two versions put Melanie's hub on its own Linux user, then on its own host, Jason's choice under
-  #419.
-- Q181 settled the hosts: Case 1 (Jason's software factory) runs on 10.1.1.53 and Case 2 (Melanie's hub) on
-  10.1.1.54.
-- Q182 and Q183 made the hub's privilege checks a recorded acceptance. They report and don't refuse
-  (federation R8, mos-1055, mos-1063, mos-1066).
-- The Case 2 install on .54 is Gosalyn's C2-13 plus its window (#416, due by 2026-10-27). It is not this row.
-
-This row now installs Case 1 on .53. On the 10-27 MVP path (mos-0974, T1 item 1).
-
-Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190's candidate (the config
-canon) and on C2-13's candidate (the install script), Q177. It reuses C2-13's `case2-install.sh`,
-`case2-precheck.sh` and `case2-unit.sh` by input, not by copy. A gap in them goes to Gosalyn as a C2-13
-change, or into this row's manifest as a named, reviewed change to those files. Design first:
-`agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md`.
-
-## Goal
-
-Jason's software factory runs on 10.1.1.53 as `mosaic` under `/srv/mosaic`, in the same unit form as Case 2
-(design 9, Q181). It uses row 190's config canon and the model account the factory uses today (Q185,
-mos-1081 item 1). No new provider account.
-
-## Provision
-
-- ops-01 runs the root steps over ssh as `localadmin`: `useradd mosaic`, `/srv/mosaic` and the unit through
-  `case2-unit.sh` from a root-owned checkout. #423 step 1 (localadmin with NOPASSWD sudo on .53 and .54) was
-  applied at 20:05:47Z (mos-1066, mos-1077), and nothing else in #423 gates this row.
-- #423 step 4 (jarvis sudo) waits until Case 1 is live on .53.
-- The host list comes from Q181. Agents may run read-only checks on .53 as `localadmin`.
-
-## The design must state
-
-1. The install as input values to C2-13's scripts: user, home, business file, roles, the human id, the
-   token slot path. Which commands run as `mosaic` through `sudo -u mosaic -H`, and which as root through
-   ops-01.
-2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2: the factory roles in place of the library business, no library sync,
-   and any precheck item that doesn't apply, each with a reason.
-3. Model access through the existing factory account (Q185). Placing the credential on .53 is a step under
-   the Q173 secrets rule, done in the window. It is never copied by the script, and its value is never
-   printed.
-4. Re-pin, rollback and backup on .53, and who runs them.
-5. The acceptance checks, as code Duckworth can read. Each check names a path and gives it one of three
-   marks: closed, accepted under Q182 or Q183, or "not named in Q182 or Q183". An accepted path doesn't
-   fail the row. An unnamed one is reported to Mos, who takes it to Jason (the R8 N1 rule). The functional
-   checks fail the row when they fail: the unit runs as `mosaic`, the Console answers on its port on the
-   internal network only, and one tester message gets a reply.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- Infra and k3s changes, exposure outside the internal network, and spend stay Jason's (Q173 exclusions).
-- No change to dragon-lin's `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, its live units or `~/.mosaic`.
-- No credential value is printed, logged or committed.
-- Tests use scratch roots and stand-ins. Nothing in a test reaches .53.
-- The run on .53 is a window with Jason's or Mos's go, a backup first where state exists, and a STATE report
-  after.
-
-## Gate
-
-Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
-every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the window's acceptance
-run passes on .53, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0989 (P19 333, MOSAICSTA-173, is now on the 10-27 path: federation R3 and
-row 193 need it). Gitea #1694. Owner Gander (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat under mos-0977 item 5),
-reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Latest-by: DESIGN.md approved by 2026-10-22, landed by 2026-10-24, and in
-any case before federation R3 lands. R3 and row 193 may chain on this row's candidate (Q177). Base: refactor at
-the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/gander/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
-
-## The problem, as filed and as it now matters
-
-P19 333 as filed (row 87, mos-0657): the Console listens on a loopback TCP port, and any host process that
-reaches it, under any uid, acts as Jason. Jason accepted that as a documented limit for a one-user host
-(mos-0787, row 161). Two things change that:
-
-- Row 190b (#1693, mos-0986) puts Melanie's hub under its own Linux user. Factory processes then sit on another
-  uid, on the same host, next to the hub's ports and socket. The other-uid reach is now the Case 2 threat.
-- Federation r2 (gizmoduck-0004, 60b9b112a) binds a bus user only from a user-cli whose proof passes the human
-  walk, whose direct parent is the bus's own Console, and which holds a live grant. That rule rests on the
-  path-bound human proof (#225): today a same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts as the
-  human, without touching the Console. The Q175 design (section 8) names that limit and leaves it here.
-
-## What already settles part of it
-
-- Q175 phase 2 (#412) settles the Console-ingress part on the main port. Under `--sso`, 7332 answers any
-  non-public Host with 403 except `GET /healthz`, and every other request needs a verified OIDC session. A
-  process on another uid that reaches the port gets only `/healthz`. Phase 1 (row 192) builds it; it is live
-  only after the phase 2 window.
-- Row 189 (`--no-send`) is interim only. Until phase 2 the Console takes no human writes, so the reach is
-  read-only. It settles nothing.
-- Row 190b separates files and units by uid. Whether the hub's `broker.sock` refuses the factory uid depends on
-  its directory and socket modes, which this row checks and tests rather than assumes.
-
-## What the design must settle
-
-1. Inventory every listener and entry point per instance: the Console port, the tester listener (7333 today),
-   `broker.sock`, the human CLI wrapper, the Discord connector and anything row 190 adds. For each: who can
-   reach it today from the same uid and from another uid, with and without `--sso`.
-2. The tester listener. It serves reads and the row 175 tester writes to anything that reaches it, on any uid.
-   Close the other-uid reach (for example a unix socket with 0600 modes, or a peer-uid check on loopback), or
-   bring Mos a concrete reason it must stay open. bus.tester stays Jason's switch.
-3. The bus human boundary. How the bus tells the human's own verified call from a same-uid process that runs
-   `human-cli.mjs`. State what federation R3's direct-parent rule needs from the bus (peer credentials on
-   `broker.sock`, the parent check, how it can't be forged by a child of an agent), and what stays possible for
-   a same-uid process after this row. Say it plainly where a residual limit remains.
-4. Fit with row 193 (Morgana, human users and roles; Mos's B1 rule: a principal comes only from something the
-   bus verifies) and with federation R3. One mechanism, not three.
-5. Migration: the live single-user Console and bus keep working until each instance re-pins.
-6. Which parts of P19 333 this row closes, which parts Q175 phase 2 closes, and what P19 333 says when it is
-   closed.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- Who can reach the Console from outside stays Jason's. This row changes what a host process can do once it
-  reaches a local port or socket.
-- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file. No test creates a real
-  second uid; use stand-ins as rows 190 and 190b do, and name any part only a Q173 window can prove.
-- No request to the live 127.0.0.1:7332 or 7333, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
-
-## Gate
-
-Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, webui and cli suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh`
-are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# Row 193 build rows: 193a, 193b1, 193b2, 193c and 193d (#1691)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's go mos-1034 item 4. Row 193's design is Morgana's
-`agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md` at e2d161e2e on `morgana/row193` (r5, sha256
-dd7fcb419ed8510e9d8d74b569183386d0942af8b68eecc0bbb5e182e677b523), approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0018).
-Section 8 lists the tests and mutants, and section 9 the split. The brief behind them is
-`docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md`. Vikunja P19 #414/#415, Gitea #1691.
-
-Owner Morgana for every row, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Each row chains on its parent's candidate
-(Q177) and rebases onto the parent's landing. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches (mos-0981).
-Single test files run freely, and suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
-
-Boundaries for every row: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, any
-live access.json or `~/.mosaic`. No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
-No user thread goes live before 193b1's message filter has landed (mos-1021 B2, FED R8).
-
-The owner-visible records are fixed by Mos (mos-1023 item 2) and named in one user sentence, which FED R6
-reuses word for word: "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks
-and project files, but not your messages."
-
-## Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer
-
-Chained on FED R1. Started early on `morgana/row193a` (508ee4d61) against R1's interface as the FED brief
-names it, with Sage's go (sage-1373). R1's level check accepts `viewer` and still refuses any other new
-level. Tests in `packages/business/tests/` (section 8, Business), with the four mutants in Morgana's
-BUILD.md. FED R4 chains on this row.
-
-Duckworth's N1 on R1 (duckworth-0033, sage-1417): with viewer added, `covers` called with no level would let a
-viewer grant cover a collaborator ask. This row makes `level` required in `covers`, with a test and a mutant that
-makes it optional again. R3 and R4 call `covers` with a level.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
-gate, and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
-
-Chained on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. The bus gets the viewer verb list, per-grant level
-checks, board reads refused to users, and the section 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter with `#readable`
-owner-only. No schema change. The governance pin test names each item in the user sentence above. Bus tests
-and mutants 1, 3, 6, 10, 11 and 12 from section 8.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
-and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j)
-
-Chained on 193b1. `thread_shares`, the share verbs, the share rules of `#readable` and `#threadRead`, and the
-section 5.5 share filters. Schema 3i to 3j. The table is append-only, and row 181's restore guard and
-`COUNTED` include it. Bus tests for shares and the migration, and mutants 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 from section 8.
-Going live needs a `--migrate` window with Jason. Sage takes it to Mos when this row is near.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite, the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
-Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer
-
-Chained on FED R5. `mosaic access user add/remove` and `grant --level viewer`, only where R5 lacks them. They
-refuse tester and agent callers, write a receipt line and call `access.reload` (section 8, CLI). If R5
-already has all of them, this row records that and closes with no code.
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
-and the mutants are killed.
-
-## Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only
-
-Chained on FED R6, row 192 and 193b2 (for share controls). A viewer has no composer or share control, and
-with each UI check removed the bus still refuses (section 8, Webui).
-
-Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The webui suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
-gate, and the mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md

@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ before any code, as Q175 did. Then the build follows the design, with tests and
 
 Two or more instances run side by side on dragon-lin. Each one has its own config file, data root (store,
 broker.sock, host.lock, state, runs, sessions, workspaces), businesses, bus unit, Console unit and port,
-tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. No instance's
-commands, units or tools address another instance's state by default or by mistake. On one uid this is
-addressing only, not a security boundary: a same-uid process can still read another instance's files.
-Isolation against that is row 190b (#1693, mos-0986), one Linux user per instance. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
+tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. Nothing one
+instance does can read or change another's state. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
 config path, data root, unit names and ports stay as they are, and no re-pin is needed for it.
 
 ## Known single-instance points (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)

docs/plans/2026-10-20_retire-control-board.md

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-1008 item 2. Gitea #1696. MVP 10-27 work. Owner Bushroot (Haiku 5.5, a
-low-level model under Q177), reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
-
-## Why
-
-`packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs` is a loopback HTTP service on 7331 with no authentication. It reads
-transcripts and writes through `/api/reply`. Any host process that reaches the port can do both. That fails
-Q175 ("zero trust with verification"). Gander found it in the row 196 inventory (gander-0004). Nothing listens
-on 7331 now (`ss -ltnp`, 2026-10-20T19:05:09Z), so retiring it costs the least.
-
-## Steps, in order
-
-1. Inventory first. List every reference to the control board and to 7331: scripts, units, `scripts/mosaic`
-   and other CLI dispatch, docs (AGENTS.md, READMEs, TOOLS.md), package.json scripts, tests, and the Console
-   (`packages/webui`). For each, say whether it starts the writer, reads its code, or only mentions it.
-   Commit the list as `agents/bushroot/work/queue-ROW/INVENTORY.md` and send it to Sage and Webby.
-2. Stop if something depends on it. If a reference shows a live dependency (the Console or another package
-   imports code that only the control board has, or a unit or script still starts it), stop. Sage takes it to
-   Mos before anything is removed.
-3. Otherwise retire the writer. Either remove the `serve` entry point, or make it refuse to start with a
-   message that points to the Console. Keep any read-only code another package imports, and say which.
-   Update the docs that tell people to start it. The AGENTS.md text about the control-board reply convention
-   is a separate matter. Change it only if it tells someone to start 7331.
-
-## Mos's call on the Console dependency (mos-1019)
-
-The inventory (004f133bd) found that the Console proxies `/api/board`, `/api/seen`, `/api/reply` and the
-conversation routes to `DEFAULT_BOARD` on 7331 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:12`), so the board view returns
-502 today. Mos took Sage's recommendation: retire the 7331 listener and its README start commands, and have
-the Console call the board's read code in-process, behind the Console's own auth (Q175 SSO on 7332).
-`/api/reply` stays only under `--send`. The DESIGN.md for that change comes before code, and Webby approves
-it.
-
-## Acceptance
-
-Nothing in the stack can start a writer on 7331. A test proves it: the entry point refuses (or is gone), no
-script or unit starts it, and a grep check finds no starter. Each change gets a mutant that brings the writer
-back and the test kills it. Mos added three items (mos-1019):
-
-- The board view answers from the Console with nothing listening on 7331.
-- Every board route sits behind the Console's auth.
-- A test proves `/api/reply` refuses without `--send`.
-
-Test fixtures that bind port 0 may stay if they only test the code in-process.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files or `~/.mosaic`.
-- No request to any live port.
-- Single test files run freely. Suites need Sage's slot.
-
-## Gate
-
-Webby approves INVENTORY.md, then DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The control-board and webui package suites, the cli suite and
-every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0977 item 6 ("put the design for a second gate lane on the list now")
-and the MVP push (mos-0974). Gitea #1695. Owner Herb (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat), reviewer
-Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
-`agents/herb/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
-
-## Why
-
-Every full run shares one slot today. A full gate (cli suite plus every `scripts/test-*.sh`) takes about 13
-minutes or more, reviewers' runs and mutants take the same slot, and with eight or more seats building for
-10-27 the slot is the bottleneck. The slot exists because concurrent runs broke each other. The busy check is
-`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh` (a copy of Sage's), and the gate is
-`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh` (a copy of Sage's template). The host has 16 cores and 62 GB.
-
-## What the design must settle
-
-1. Every shared resource two concurrent runs can collide on, found from the code and tests, not guessed:
-   Docker compose project names and networks (`scripts/test-task.sh` and others), fixed TCP ports in tests,
-   unix socket paths and their 107-byte limit under TMPDIR, the sandbox's private `/tmp`, shared caches,
-   scratch and worktree paths, the queue lock, and any test that reads host-wide state (process lists,
-   `pgrep`, `/proc`). For each: how a lane gets its own copy, or why it is safe to share.
-2. Timing. Which tests have time limits that a doubled CPU load could break, measured, and what changes (a
-   bound, or a lane rule that keeps those suites apart).
-3. The lane mechanism: lane ids, a lock per lane that a run takes and releases even on a crash, the busy
-   check that reports per lane, and how a seat asks for a lane. Sage still grants it.
-4. The gate template takes a lane id and isolates everything from point 1 by it.
-5. Proof: two full gates on different candidates at once, three times, with zero cross-failures, plus the
-   wall time of each against a single-lane run. Any flake found is named with its cause.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev` or slot files. The proof runs use
-  scratch roots only, and it needs Sage's grant of the whole slot while it runs.
-- Test code changes that only isolate a resource are in scope. A change to what a test checks is not, and
-  goes to its owner.
-- Docker networks and containers a run makes are removed by the run (trap), and nothing else is touched.
-
-## Gate
-
-Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
-gate, both singly and in the two-lane proof.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-# Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, for Launchpad's finding F3 on row 192 (launchpad-0001) and Q175 (#412). Gitea #1698. Owner
-Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): it lands after row 192 and
-before the phase 2 window. Base: row 192's candidate.
-
-## Why
-
-The phase 2 window re-pins the Console to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
-(`agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`, section 5). `scripts/stack-release.sh` doesn't know `--sso` today.
-Its `proof_checks` (`:751`) requires `--public-host`, `--auth-header` and `--allow-user` whenever a proof pair is
-carried, and the pointer's Console flags still hold the forward-auth pair (`--auth-header X-authentik-username
---allow-user jason.woltje`) that `--sso` refuses to start with. So the window can't run through the script, and
-a hand-edited pointer is not an option.
-
-## What the row does
-
-1. `activate ID BUSINESS --sso` writes Console flags with `--sso` and without `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`
-   and any proof pair, and `--plan` names each flag it drops and carries, in the style of row 189's `send:`
-   line. The design names the full flag set the phase 2 Console starts with and checks it against row 192's
-   refusals.
-2. Before anything stops, the script refuses a target copy whose Console doesn't support `--sso`, and refuses
-   when the config's `console` key or its slot file fails the checks row 192's `--sso` start runs. It reads
-   neither value and only uses the same stat and shape checks.
-3. Rollback from an `--sso` pointer to a pre-phase-1 copy follows the design's phase 2 rollback order (remove
-   the `console` key first). The script refuses a rollback that would start a Console on a config it can't
-   read, and says which step comes first.
-4. `docs/TOOLS.md` gets the flag.
-
-## Boundaries
-
-- No change to the live pointer, units, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`. Tests use scratch roots
-  and seeded pointers, as rows 187 and 189 do.
-- No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
-
-## Gate
-
-Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the
-mutants are killed (one per refusal, and one that keeps `--auth-header` in the written flags).

docs/plans/QUEUE.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->
 
-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2455 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
 
 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -225,48 +225,9 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2455 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
 | 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
-| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | done | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | Landed ace27dc5e on refactor (cherry-pick of candidate d6116771f onto a4a42dbac). Gate GATE_PASSED on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z-19:20:36Z, 25 suites rc=0. patch-id ce89378718f6 for both 0c177e9ef and ace27dc5e; range-diff differs only in the message. Landed manifest hashes to 67af69bd (Dewey approve 29485). Base drift 0217b71c8..a4a42dbac: 7 doc/README files, none on manifest paths, no test reads them. Brief re-pinned to blob 29a9e6d2d. |
-| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
+| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
+| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
 | 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
-| 192 | Q175 phase 1: the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso), OIDC RP with oauth4webapi 3.8.8, no live change (MVP T1.2, #412) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1690 | done | — | Webby approves the manifest; webui and cli suites, scripts/test-config.sh and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; design section 9 mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md` § Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso) | Landed 4429a104f on refactor (squash of launchpad/row192 53bb59462..37582e820, round 2 manifest 6f8cee14...7787). patch-id 4a4869026 matches the reviewed diff on all 18 paths. Gate on 088087ac9: package suites 2758/0, scripts 429/0, mutants 22 of 23 killed (#23 equivalent, sage-1407). npm ci in canonical, oauth4webapi 3.8.8. Live re-pin is a window with Mos (mos-1099 item 3). |
-| 193 | many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads, one access.json store (MVP T1.3, Vikunja #414/#415) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1691 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, business, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md` § Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads | — |
-| 194 | agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) with a per-agent hire/fire veto (MVP T1.5, Vikunja #414/#415) | honker; reviewers webby | #1692 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, cli, business and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto | — |
-| 195 | row 195: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 as mosaic under /srv/mosaic, reusing C2-13's scripts by input under row 190's canon (Q181, Q182/Q183, Q185; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1) | darkwing; reviewers duckworth | #1693 | briefed | 190 done | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md` § Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195) | sage-1439: rewritten to Case 1 on .53 (f24f2cd40). Chains on C2-13's candidate too once C2-13 is queued. Darkwing starts DESIGN.md after row 190's mutants. |
-| 196 | the human boundary across uids and humans: Console, tester listener, broker.sock and the path-bound human proof (P19 333, before federation R3, mos-0989) | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1694 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md` § Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333) | — |
-| 197 | a second gate lane: two full gates at once on dragon-lin, design first (mos-0977 item 6) | herb; reviewers webby | #1695 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate, singly and in the two-lane proof (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md` § Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin | Order with row 198 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. After B1 the shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review. |
-| 198 | retire the control board writer on 7331 (unauthenticated loopback writer, Q175; mos-1008) | bushroot; reviewers webby | #1696 | in-progress | 192 done, 197 done | Webby approves INVENTORY.md then the manifest; control-board, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_retire-control-board.md` § Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331 | Order with row 197 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review; shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. |
-| 199 | MVP T1 item 6: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote (G11, G13; mos-0974) | megavolt; reviewers duckworth | #1697 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md; Mos rules on the authority model; Duckworth approves the manifest; bus, business, cli and tasks suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote | — |
-| 200 | stack-release.sh activate --sso for the Q175 phase 2 window (row 192 F3; chained on 192) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1698 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md` § Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite) | — |
-| 201 | FED R1: access.json loader and validator, and covers (#414) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1699 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator | — |
-| 202 | FED R5: mosaic access list, grant and revoke (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers duckworth | #1700 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
-| 203 | FED R2: the federation key in the system config (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers webby | #1701 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config | Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): starts on 192's candidate, lands after 192 (Sage) |
-| 204 | 193a: access level check widened to viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1702 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
-| 205 | 193b1: viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter (#1691; also after FED R3 and R4 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1703 | queued | 196 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter | — |
-| 206 | 193b2: thread shares, schema 3j (#1691; live needs a --migrate window with Jason) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1704 | queued | 205 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite, cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j) | — |
-| 207 | 193c: mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1705 | queued | 202 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer | — |
-| 208 | 193d: Console shared list, share controls and viewer read-only (#1691; also after FED R6 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1706 | queued | 192 done, 206 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; webui suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only | — |
-| 209 | FED R8: the hub window on 10.1.1.54, a recorded acceptance (#414, r4.11 b93f098f0; live window run by Jason and Mos, after the Case 2 install #416, Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways stopped) | sage; reviewers duckworth | — | queued | — | Every entry check's output is in the R8 record with who ran it; Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie revokes, his next request is refused; Duckworth checks the record (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54 | Stays queued until its entry gates near: Case 2 install on .54 (#416, by 2026-10-27), Bean and Chet live, both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped, R7, #412 phase 2, #419 answer. Filed per mos-1073 after duckworth-0034 (Sage) |
-| 210 | Agent host access with sudo through the credential store: grant per agent and host, the stack does ssh and sudo, the agent never sees the key (#1707, Vikunja #424, Q183/Q184, due 10-27; chained on row 199's candidate) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1707 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest; bus, business, cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` § Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424) | Design runs before 199 lands (Q177 chain on 199's candidate). after cleared so Gizmoduck can claim; lands only after 199 and rebases onto it. |
-| 211 | Force-push guard: scripts/git-hooks/pre-push refuses non-fast-forward and delete pushes from every worktree, and scripts/slot-busy.sh exits 1 on BUSY (#1709, Vikunja #426, mos-1078/1083) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1709 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest; the new or changed scripts/test-*.sh and every other scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed; hook installed in the canonical checkout with a scripted refused force-push (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_force-push-guard.md` § Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426) | — |
-| 212 | Case 2 C2-01 packages/library: mapping, scope, reader, resolver, R-rules, renderItems, survey | gosalyn; reviewers webby | #1713 | in-progress | — | Webby approves the manifest. The library tests and the cli suite are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-01 packages/library: mapping, scope, reader, resolver, R-rules, renderItems, survey | — |
-| 213 | Case 2 C2-08 creative roles, persona file and block, M1, M2, M6, M10, prompt passed by file | morgana; reviewers webby | #1714 | in-progress | — | Webby approves the manifest. The business, bus and harness suites, `scripts/test-config.sh` and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the `models` mutant is killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-08 creative roles, persona file and block, M1, M2, M6, M10, prompt passed by file | — |
-| 214 | Case 2 C2-11a editor wikilink node, after measuring whether [[ round-trips | rocko; reviewers filbert | #1715 | briefed | — | Filbert approves the manifest. The webui suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-11a editor wikilink node, after measuring whether [[ round-trips | — |
-| 215 | Case 2 C2-04 the library entry in the business file, consumer skips, M9, mirror, library.file and library.status | herb; reviewers filbert | #1716 | briefed | — | Filbert approves the manifest. The business, seat, cli, project, bus and webui suites are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-04 the library entry in the business file, consumer skips, M9, mirror, library.file and library.status | — |
-| 216 | Case 2 C2-05a lookup index and queries | researcher; reviewers filbert | #1717 | briefed | — | Filbert approves the manifest. The library suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-05a lookup index and queries | — |
-| 217 | Case 2 C2-06 the cited-reply guard, the page store and the three notices | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1718 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest. The library, bus and harness suites are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-06 the cited-reply guard, the page store and the three notices | — |
-| 218 | Case 2 C2-12 the setup sheet for Melanie and the survey run sheet | sage; reviewers webby | #1719 | briefed | — | Doc only. Webby approves it against C2-01's real flags. Before landing, grep `packages/*/tests` and `scripts/test-*.sh` to confirm no test reads either file. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-12 the setup sheet for Melanie and the survey run sheet | — |
-| 219 | Case 2 C2-09a one thread per creative instance | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1720 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The bus, cli and webui suites are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. Watch for hash pins on `bus.js` and `broker.mjs` (`packages/bus/tests/channel-proof.test.mjs` pins a webui file). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-09a one thread per creative instance | — |
-| 220 | Case 2 C2-10a no raw session view (M7) and no raw Discord engine (M8) | researcher; reviewers filbert | #1721 | briefed | — | Filbert approves the manifest. The conversation and discord suites and `scripts/test-discord.sh` are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. No test reaches a Discord server. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-10a no raw session view (M7) and no raw Discord engine (M8) | — |
-| 221 | Case 2 C2-20 Bean and Chet persona import, with a count-only dry run | gosalyn; reviewers webby | #1722 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest. The test file runs green on its own and the cli suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-20 Bean and Chet persona import, with a count-only dry run | — |
-| 222 | Case 2 C2-03a fetch-only sync | megavolt; reviewers dewey | #1723 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The library and bus suites are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`, and the mutant is killed. A search of the test run's output for the fixture token finds nothing. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-03a fetch-only sync | — |
-| 223 | Case 2 C2-07 runner retry on a guard refusal, and the runner's notices | researcher; reviewers filbert | #1724 | briefed | — | Filbert approves the manifest. The harness suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-07 runner retry on a guard refusal, and the runner's notices | — |
-| 224 | Case 2 C2-05b broker lookup verbs and typed tools | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1725 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The bus and harness suites are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-05b broker lookup verbs and typed tools | — |
-| 225 | Case 2 C2-10b Console chat: cited items and the status line | researcher; reviewers dewey | #1726 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The webui suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. Grep for hash pins on `bus.js` and `serve.mjs` before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-10b Console chat: cited items and the status line | — |
-| 226 | Case 2 C2-13 install script and precheck for the host | gosalyn; reviewers webby | #1727 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest. The test file and the cli suite are green on Sage's gate, along with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. The run on the host is a separate window with Jason's go. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-13b install script and library precheck | — |
-| 227 | Case 2 C2-14 end-to-end acceptance on a scratch root | launchpad; reviewers dewey | #1728 | briefed | — | Dewey runs the script and approves. It is green on Sage's gate with every `scripts/test-*.sh`. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-14 end-to-end acceptance on a scratch root | — |
-| 228 | Row A: ZAI_API_KEY passes through ENV_ALLOW to sessions, README line, pass-through test (XS, Haiku high) | researcher; reviewers webby | #1729 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest. The mutant is killed. The seat suite and the cli suite are green on Sage's gate with every scripts/test-*.sh. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § Brief: row A, ZAI_API_KEY in the session env allowlist | — |
-| 229 | Row B: per-instance pi agent dir for Chet's Codex login, design only, starts after 10-27 (#428) | gosalyn; reviewers webby | #1730 | queued | — | A live check, with Jason's or Mos's go, that two clients on one ChatGPT login don't revoke each other's refresh tokens. No build row starts before it passes. Held until after 10-27. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § Brief: row B, a per-instance pi agent dir for Chet's Codex login (#428) | — |
-| 230 | Case 2 C2-13a unit render and host precheck (case2-unit.sh, case2-precheck.sh) | gosalyn; reviewers webby | #1732 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest. The test file and the cli suite are green on Sage's gate, along with every scripts/test-*.sh. A run on a host is a separate window with Jason's go. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-13a unit render and host precheck | — |
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->
 

packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs

@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ async function seed(e,{copy=B,pm=false,store='3g',pointer:how='adopt'}={}){
 const rolledBack=(code,to=B)=>`stack-release: ${code}; rolled back to ${to}, which passed the gate\n`;
 const planBackup=(e)=>`backup: the run backs up the stopped store to ${e.data}/backups/stack/<activation>/ before any migration`;
 const planNoBackup='backup: none; the run rolls back before the backup';
-const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off','send: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];
+const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];
 
 // --- The T table ---
 
@@ -1030,17 +1030,17 @@ test('T36 --plan shows the pending state and lists the row 169 refusals it can s
   return r.out.split('\n');
  };
  let out=await quiet(0,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
  biz(e,HARNESS);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',A,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
  assert.equal(out.at(-2),'refuses pm-after-harness-set: the business file already sets harness ["claude-code"]; use --pm');
  biz(e);assert.equal((await run(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness')).code,0);
  out=await quiet(3,'activate',C,'acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
  out=await quiet(0,'rollback','acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
 });
 
 // Row 176 test 11: supported and older Console copies deliberately differ from the checkout.
@@ -1706,113 +1706,6 @@ test('T54 row 188: a carried pair gets the proof file checks, and a proof file i
  });
 });
 
-// Row 189 (#1687, mos-0972/0973): activate --no-send drops the pointer's --send; nothing turns it back on.
-const sendLines=(out)=>out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('send:'));
-const noSend=(c)=>c.filter((x)=>x!=='--send');
-const LIVE_NOTE=`note: ${B} is the pointer's copy; the run re-pins it and only the Console flags change`;
-test('T55 row 189: activate --no-send drops --send, and rollback and pm-on carry it off',async(t)=>{
- await t.test('test 1: a live-copy --no-send drops --send from the pointer and the unit, keeps the rest in order, logs the step and backs up the stopped store',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']),want=noSend(base);
-  assert.deepEqual(want.slice(-2),['--tester-port','7333']);
-  const sum=createHash('sha256').update(readFileSync(e.store)).digest('hex'),n=calls(e).length;
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
-  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
-  const act=pointer(e).activation,l=logLines(e).at(-1);
-  assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result,l.backup],['activate',B,B,'ok',act]);assert.equal(backupSum(e,act),sum);
-  assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[`stop ${CON}`,`stop ${BUS}`,`start ${BUS}`,`start ${CON}`]);
-  await noLeak(e);
- });
- await t.test('test 2: a plain live-copy activate still refuses already-active, and so does --no-send once --send is gone',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
-  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
-  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--tester-port','7333'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
-  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-proof'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
-  const r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
-  const g=await mk(t);await seedPreview(g);
-  await refused(g,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
-  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
- });
- await t.test('test 3: --plan prints one send: line in each case, with the live-copy note on a same-copy run',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
-  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
-  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[LIVE_NOTE]);
-  assert.equal(out[out.indexOf('send: dropped; --no-send was given')+1],`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${B} --copies ${COPIES} ${noSend(base).join(' ')}`);
-  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme');
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: carried']);assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[]);
-  assert.ok(out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('Console: ')).endsWith(' --send'));
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send')),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send')),['send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send']);
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme')),['send: off']);
-  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'rollback','acme')),['send: off']);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop\n/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/drop --send/);
-  await noLeak(e);
- });
- await t.test('test 4: after --no-send, a rollback to the earlier copy leaves --send out of the pointer and the unit',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/--send/);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  await noLeak(e);
- });
- await t.test('test 4: pm-on after --no-send keeps --send off',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,{pm:true},['--send']);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  biz(e,HARNESS);
-  r=await prun(e,'pm-on','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.equal(pointer(e).pm,true);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  await noLeak(e);
- });
- await t.test('test 5: --no-send on rollback, pm-on, status, adopt or rehearse is a usage error',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
-  const usageText=(await prun(e,'--help')).err,n=calls(e).length,logs=logLines(e).length,before=fp(e);
-  for(const args of [['rollback','acme','--no-send'],['rollback','acme','--plan','--no-send'],['pm-on','acme','--no-send'],['status','acme','--no-send'],['adopt','acme','--no-send'],
-   ['rehearse','acme','--backup','/tmp/x','--port','7400','--no-send']]){
-   const r=await prun(e,...args);assert.equal(r.code,4,args.join(' '));assert.equal(r.out,'');assert.equal(r.err,usageText);
-  }
-  assert.match(usageText,/\| --no-proof\] \[--no-send\]/);
-  assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
-  await noLeak(e);
- });
- await t.test('test 6: with both a pair and --send in the pointer, --no-send and --no-proof each drop what they name and keep the rest',async(t)=>{
-  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']),pre=noSend(base),f=await proofFile(e),g=await proofFile(e,'proof2.189',0o400);
-  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(f));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f),'--send']);
-  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');
-  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: carried']);
-  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');
-  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: carried, header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
-  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');
-  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f)]);
-  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send',...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two'));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two')]);
-  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  const h=await mk(t),hbase=await seedPreview(h,undefined,['--send']),hpre=noSend(hbase),k=await proofFile(h);
-  r=await prun(h,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(k));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,[...hpre,'--send']);
-  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
-  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,hpre);assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(h),/--proof-| --send( |$)/);
-  const steps=stepText(h);
-  assert.match(steps,/Z --no-proof was given and the pointer holds no proof pair, so there is nothing to drop\n/);assert.match(steps,/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
-  r=await prun(h,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
-  for(const x of [e,h])await noLeak(x);
- });
-});
-
 // --- rehearse (D2, row 163; the brief's "Stack rehearsal on a scratch root") ---
 // Copies of their own in RCOPIES: the real scripts/mosaic, config loader, business loader, roles and
 // mosaic-config.mjs, with stand-ins for the bus host (cli.mjs), the Console, the Store and

scripts/stack-release.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # Moves the bus, the Console and the human CLI from the pointer's copy to another copy together,
 # behind a health gate, and puts the old stack back inside the same run when the gate fails.
 # Console tester listener flags follow target support (row 176, #1674); so does the row 178 proof
-# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685). activate --no-send drops --send (row 189, #1687).
+# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685).
 # Design and tests: agents/darkwing/work/queue-162/BUILD.md.
 #
 # Who runs it. Decision 96 (Mos, mos-0716) lets this script stop and start the live units under
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ BIN="$HOME/.npm-global/bin"
 UNIT_DIR="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/systemd/user"
 CONSOLE_UNIT=mosaic-webui.service
 TIMEOUT=60 WANT_PM=0 AFTER_HARNESS=0 MIGRATE=0 PLAN=0 RESTORE="" EVENTS="" TESTER_PORT=""
-PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 NO_SEND=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""
+PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""
 
 usage() {
     cat >&2 <<'USAGE'
 usage: stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
        stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
        stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
        stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
        stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ parse_opts() {
             --proof-header) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_HEADER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --proof-file) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_FILE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --no-proof) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_PROOF=1; shift ;;
-            --no-send) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_SEND=1; shift ;;
             --migrate) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; MIGRATE=1; shift ;;
             --restore) [ "$OP" = rollback ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || usage; RESTORE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
             --backup) [ "$OP" = rehearse ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && { [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || [[ "$2" =~ ^/[A-Za-z0-9/._+-]*$ ]]; } || usage; R_BACKUP="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@@ -245,16 +244,14 @@ target_schema() {
 in_chain() { local v; for v in "${T_CHAIN[@]}"; do [ "$v" != "$1" ] || return 0; done; return 1; }
 
 # The item 3 checks on the target copy, in order: copy, schema, already-active. An activate that
-# sets a proof pair, drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, or drops the pointer's --send with
-# --no-send, may name the pointer's copy: it re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187,
-# Part B's B3 and B-R1; row 189, mos-0972).
+# sets a proof pair, or drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, may name the pointer's copy: it
+# re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187, Part B's B3 and B-R1).
 check_target() {
     copy_exists "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-missing "no copy $TO in $COPIES"
     copy_ok "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-unreachable "$TO is not reachable from refactor and origin/refactor"
     target_schema "$TO" || refuse copy-schema-unknown "cannot read SCHEMA_VERSION and its chain from $COPIES/$TO/packages/bus/src/store.mjs"
     [ "$TO" != "$P_COPY" ] || [ -n "$PROOF_HEADER" ] ||
         { [ "$NO_PROOF" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --proof-header "* ]]; } ||
-        { [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --send "* ]]; } ||
         refuse already-active "$TO is the pointer's copy"
 }
 
@@ -693,33 +690,6 @@ console_for_target() {
         DROP_TESTER="--tester-port $inherited"
     fi
     proof_for_target
-    send_for_target
-}
-
-# Row 189 (mos-0972): --no-send drops --send from RUN_CONSOLE, so the unit and the pointer both lose
-# it; without the flag the pointer's --send goes on unchanged. Rollback and pm-on never take it, so
-# they carry the pointer as it is. Sets SEND_PLAN (the plan's send: line) and SEND_STEP.
-send_for_target() {
-    local had=0 i
-    local -a without_send=()
-    for ((i = 0; i < ${#RUN_CONSOLE[@]}; i++)); do
-        if [ "${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}" = --send ]; then had=1; else without_send+=("${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}"); fi
-    done
-    SEND_STEP=""
-    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then
-        RUN_CONSOLE=("${without_send[@]}")
-        if [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
-            SEND_PLAN="send: dropped; --no-send was given"
-            SEND_STEP="drop --send; --no-send was given"
-        else
-            SEND_PLAN="send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send"
-            SEND_STEP="--no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop"
-        fi
-    elif [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
-        SEND_PLAN="send: carried"
-    else
-        SEND_PLAN="send: off"
-    fi
 }
 
 # Row 187: the row 178 proof pair in RUN_CONSOLE. A new pair replaces the pointer's and goes last;
@@ -973,7 +943,6 @@ plan() {
     echo "bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES$([ "$RUN_PM" = 0 ] || echo ' --pm') --claude $P_CLAUDE"
     [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || echo "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
     echo "$PROOF_PLAN"
-    echo "$SEND_PLAN"
     echo "Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES${RUN_CONSOLE[*]:+ ${RUN_CONSOLE[*]}}"
     echo "CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper $TO --copies $COPIES --bin $BIN"
     local r
@@ -987,7 +956,6 @@ run_steps() {
     capture || refuse capture-failed "could not write the rollback set $RS; nothing was stopped"
     [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || say "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
     [ -z "$PROOF_STEP" ] || say "$PROOF_STEP"
-    [ -z "$SEND_STEP" ] || say "$SEND_STEP"
     trap 'after_fail signal' INT TERM HUP
     stop_both || rollback_in_run stop-timeout
     if [ -e "$STORE" ]; then
@@ -1510,7 +1478,7 @@ STORE="$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite"
 BUS_UNIT="mosaic-bus@$BUSINESS.service"
 FROM="" TO="" ACT="" RS="" POST="" BACKUP="" TAKEN="" RESTORED="" STEPS="" COUNT="" UNCLEAN="" FAIL=""
 STORE_SCHEMA="" START_EPOCH="" START_MS=0 GATE="" GATE_WHY="" S_CHANGED=""
-P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" SEND_PLAN="" SEND_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
+P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
 R="" R_RC=0 R_EARLY=() R_BK="" R_HOST_PID="" R_CONSOLE_PID="" R_STARTED="" LIVE_CFG="" LIVE_BIZ=""
 case "$OP" in
     adopt) do_adopt ;;