gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.11 for #414 (mos-1063): hub on .54 VM 1012 as mosaic (Q181), R8 depends on the Case 2 install (#416), #418 dropped

AGENTS.md

@@ -25,15 +25,10 @@ green at every step. Not production software — a proven foundation.
 1. **Root is bootstrap-only.** First-class system configuration lives at the
    repository root; everything else gets a dedicated directory (`roles/`,
    `contracts/`, `missions/`, `tasks/`, `docs/`). Do not add new files to root.
-2. **Configuration**: each stack instance has exactly one system config. The
-   default instance's is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. Instance NAME's
-   is `~/.config/mosaic-NAME/config.json`, and its data root carries a marker
-   that names it. `~` is the home of the OS user that runs the instance. A
-   process reads only the config `MOSAIC_CONFIG` names, or the default's when
-   that is unset. Configs are created only by
-   `scripts/bootstrap.sh [--instance NAME]`, never overwritten, fail-closed on
-   any problem. Repo-scoped role authority lives in `roles/*.json`
-   (versioned, reviewed commits only).
+2. **Configuration**: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is the sole system
+   config — created only by `scripts/bootstrap.sh`, never overwritten,
+   fail-closed on any problem. Repo-scoped role authority lives in
+   `roles/*.json` (versioned, reviewed commits only).
 3. **Secrets** never enter the repository or container images; auth is
    runtime-only (read-only mount or environment variable).
 4. **Contracts** (`contracts/`) are immutable and image-baked. Missions and
@@ -182,8 +177,8 @@ Full reference — usage, fields, exit codes, safety notes:
 
 ## Data map (canon)
 
-- `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, or `~/.config/mosaic-NAME/config.json`
-  per named instance: system config (user-authored; never auto-written).
+- `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` — system config (user-authored; never
+  auto-written).
 - `<dataRoot>` (from config; default `~/.mosaic-dev`):
   - `runs/` — write-once run evidence (`result.json`, snapshots, `stderr.txt`)
   - `sessions/` — pi JSONL session trees, one directory per named session

agents/README.md

@@ -16,17 +16,6 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
 | Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
 | Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
-| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
-| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
-| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
-| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
-| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
-| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
 
 Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's

agents/bushroot/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Bushroot
-
-Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
-that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/duckworth/README.md

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Duckworth
-
-Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
-through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gander/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Gander
-
-Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for the human
-boundary row (P19 333, #1694, mos-0989).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gander/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gizmoduck/README.md

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# Gizmoduck
-
-Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
-(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
-access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
-the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
-repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+# T3 federation design: factory and hub (Vikunja #414, G3, G4, C1.1)
+
+Author Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5), 2026-10-20, r4.11. Design only, no product code. Reviewer Duckworth (Opus 5.5,
+mos-0978), r1 verdict changes B1-B5 (duckworth-0001, REVIEW.md at b402197ff), r2 verdict changes B6 (duckworth-0002,
+REVIEW-r2.md at 03a663cd7), r3 verdict changes B7 (duckworth-0003, REVIEW-r3.md at 45cbe5896), r4 verdict changes B8 (duckworth-0005, REVIEW-r4.md at
+4966136d4), r4.1 verdict changes, B8's issuer host (duckworth-0007, REVIEW-r4.1.md at b14f11136), r4.4 verdict changes B9 (duckworth-0010, REVIEW-r4.4.md at 4cf3ce232), r4.5 approved (duckworth-0012, REVIEW-r4.5.md at 912b1d325). R1, R2 and R5 go to Sage's
+queue once Duckworth approves, and Sage assigns owners. Code lines are at origin/refactor 9ae8c73ac. The
+Q175 SSO design is cited at Sage's local commit 817e8f51b (agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md), which was
+not on origin when this was written.
+
+Binding inputs: TARGET.md addendum 2026-10-20, DECISIONS Q175 to Q178, projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md and
+PLAN.md T3 (all in jason-master-restart).
+
+## Changes from r1
+
+- B1. A user principal now comes only from the Console's verified OIDC session. The user CLI takes the
+  human proof's walk, which refuses agent markers and binaries, and its direct parent must be the
+  Console from the bus's own tree. This needs the path-bound human proof (P19 333). Residual risk in 3.6.
+- B2. 3.6 names the ownership changes: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the `#human` gates and `thread.send`'s
+  sender fields. `message.send` is on no list, and `#threadFor` refuses users as a second wall.
+- B3. One level for 10-27, `collaborator`, with an exact verb list and a filter per read (3.5). Viewer and
+  every board read wait.
+- B4. Revocation has three triggers: the next user request, a 30 s broker timer, and a reload verb that
+  R5 calls. The launcher refuses to start a revoked thread, because the broker reports it on every
+  `threadsState`. It also SIGTERMs a running one (3.7). R4 now depends on R3 and R5.
+- B5. A separate uid per instance is a hard entry gate of R8, with checks (mos-0984 point 2).
+- N1 to N9 are handled where they apply: v1 count (2), `configDir` at business.mjs:25-28 (5), R1 takes
+  providers and peers as arguments (7), "human-only" (3.5), file checks (3.5), `instances` as the real limit
+  (3.5), provider removal needs a Console restart (3.7), Q1 is with Jason (9), client ids in R8 (7).
+- r3 (duckworth-0002): B6, the reply path to a user (3.6 item 7, runner header, R3 test and mutant, R7
+  asserts a reply). C1, the walk doesn't stop an unsandboxed same-uid agent (3.6). N10, `names` gates
+  through `#agent` (3.6 item 4). mos-0991: R8's gate accepts a separate host or a separate uid, and 3.8
+  checks the federation path for one-host assumptions. Q1 holds Jason's answer. morgana-0002 settles Q2.
+- r4 (duckworth-0003, mos-0996): B7, R8's gate now proves there is no privilege path from the factory to
+  the hub. Per mos-0996 (Vikunja #418) the hub runs on its own host, and for 10-27 the gate is the host form
+  only. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. The checks run as the factory uid with a clean
+  environment and pass only when the call fails: `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the
+  hub host with and without the agent socket. Factory root on the PVE nodes defeats the host form
+  (duckworth-0004, mos-1004), so it is an open R8 gate item with options O1 to O3 for Jason (Vikunja
+  #419, section 8). N11, `#waiting` returns null for `to` `user` (3.6 item 7, R3).
+  N12, R3 assumes nothing about how shares end (section 9 Q2). Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the shared
+  principal verifier before R3 (section 5).
+- r4.11 (mos-1063): the hub's host is settled, so the "own host, not dragon-lin or Melanie's server"
+  lines and the #418 dependency are gone. The hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), and R8
+  depends on the Case 2 install on .54 (#416). #418 is closed. #419 carries only the wording for
+  Melanie. Mos ruled the four functional checks stay blocking.
+- r4.10 (mos-1055, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183): R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts with Jason's
+  acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check
+  still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with who ran it. They report and don't refuse.
+  Agents may run the .54 checks as localadmin, which replaces r4.9's line. The mos-1042 order is now in
+  the R8 row. The wording still reaches Melanie only through Jason (#419).
+  Two lines that said R8 proves the factory has no login on the hub (sections 3.5 and 3.6) now say
+  factory agents keep ssh to .54 under Q183, recorded as accepted.
+- r4.9 (mos-1037): R8 names who runs the root checks on 10.1.1.54.
+- r4.8 (duckworth-0020 N22): R8 checks the hub user's limits on 10.1.1.54 instead of taking #421's plan
+  as done.
+- r4.7 (mos-1030, DECISIONS Q181): the hosts are settled. Case 1 is W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), the
+  same host as the Hermes agents, so section 8 lists them as one factory host. The hub, Case 2, is
+  W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Its OS user is `mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups
+  and no keys (ops-01's tightening plan section 3, Vikunja #421).
+- r4.6 (duckworth-0012 N21, morgana-0011): R6's notice is row 193's final user sentence, word for word
+  (row 193 design r5 section 5.7, morgana/row193 e2d161e2e). The start-order line now matches the
+  section 7 table: R2 waits on #412 phase 1, and R5 lands after R1.
+- r4.5 (duckworth-0010): B9, a user-thread run can't message the owner, but its decisions do reach the
+  owner's inbox, as Sage ruled for row 193 (sage-1368, morgana-0008)
+  and Mos kept (mos-1022). 3.6 item 7 says so, R6 tells
+  the user, and R3 tests both sides. N20, the start-order line waits for row 193's viewer level. R8
+  can't start while any host variable is unresolved.
+- r4.4 (mos-1020, mos-1019): N17, R4 is chained after row 193's viewer level and keeps the level-loss
+  test, which has to kill its mutant before R4 is done.
+- r4.3 (duckworth-0007): B8, an issuer that isn't on the hub host must pass the host-access, hypervisor
+  and backups rows against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call
+  check (section 8, sign-in row). N16, the dependency note covers every secret on a PVE guest. N17, R4's
+  level-loss test moves to row 193's viewer level. N18, 3.6 names `verifyPrincipal`. N19, the TLS check
+  runs through the public route and from the LAN.
+- r4.2 (mos-1013, morgana-0007): "factory" in R8 and section 8 means every principal outside the hub
+  instance, not only the dragon-lin uid: the dragon-lin dev uid, the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents,
+  and Jason's Hermes agents on W-jarvis. Every R8 check runs from each of their hosts. Hosts are variables
+  until Mos confirms them with Jason. The table rows don't change. Q1 is settled by Q180: P2P is
+  person-to-person. Row 193 calls `covers` with no level for share reads and with
+  `level: 'collaborator'` for create, open, send and share, so `covers` needs no other argument
+  (morgana-0007, row 193 DESIGN.md at 19c015741).
+- r4.1 (mos-1006, gander-0007, morgana-0005): R8's gate adds the identity provider path. A factory
+  credential that can administer the issuer the hub trusts gets in without the host (the B8 bullet below
+  has the rule). Mos accepted the sudo deviation (root ssh
+  and the `authorized_keys` check). Row 196's interface is settled: one verify per one-request
+  connection, `s.user` for that request only, and the walk mutants move to row 196. morgana-0005: grants
+  name bus project ids, and one pure `covers` in R1 matches a grant to a thread (3.5). R4's loss
+  predicate counts only collaborator grants, so a downgrade to viewer ends the run.
+- r4.1 (duckworth-0005): B8, the hub's issuer and TLS front end are in its trust base. The hub trusts
+  only an issuer no factory credential can administer, and TLS ends where the factory can't reach
+  (3.4, R8). A brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count. N13, the key check
+  is a procedure. N14, R3 consumes row 196's verifier and depends on it. N15, DNS control. mos-1009:
+  section 8 has a table of every privilege path (hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end,
+  certificate authority, DNS, network), each closed by a check or accepted by Jason with set wording.
+- r2.1 (mos-0988): the separate uid is row 190b. R8's gate points at 190b, R7 at row 190 (one uid,
+  scratch). P19 333 is on the 10-27 path (section 8).
+- Mos's rulings in mos-0978 and mos-0984 replace the r1 questions (section 9). The push credential note is
+  in section 10.
+
+## 1. Summary
+
+By 10-27, federation means a person from one instance can sign in to the other instance's Console and use
+exactly what its owner granted: one business, some projects and its thread instance, at the collaborator
+level. The receiving instance verifies that person itself through OIDC (Q175) and its broker enforces the
+grant on every request. Revoking a grant refuses the next request and stops that user's thread runs within
+about 30 s, or at once when the grant CLI makes the change.
+
+Instance-to-instance traffic, where an agent on the factory talks to a role on the hub, waits until after
+10-27 unless Jason rules otherwise (mos-0984 point 3). Section 6 sketches it (Ed25519 instance keys and
+signed HTTP requests) so the 10-27 slice doesn't block it.
+
+## 2. What exists today (measured)
+
+- F1. The bus is a local Unix socket per data root: `socketPath` at packages/cli/src/config.mjs:19, opened
+  at packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:169. Nothing listens on a network port. No live federation code exists.
+  The PRD lists REQ-FED-1 as post-v1 (packages/tasks/requirements.json:61).
+- F2. A business has exactly one human: `human` at packages/business/src/business.mjs:160.
+  `bindHuman` refuses any other name (packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538).
+- F3. The human proof is a cooperative same-uid process check, not a wall. `verifyHuman` compares the
+  caller's uid, start time, nonce and CLI path (packages/bus/src/human.mjs:52-72), then walks the parents
+  and refuses agent markers, launch records and agent binaries (:73-88). The tester proof refuses only
+  managed runs and allows agents by design (packages/bus/src/tester.mjs:5-9, :56-60). The server takes
+  exactly one of `cap`, `human` or `tester` per request (packages/bus/src/server.mjs:52-70).
+- F4. Authority for agents is checked in the broker: `#checkAuthority` and `#authorityFor`
+  (broker.mjs:763-799), with classification at :596-609. Every one of these is about a role run. Humans
+  get no roles. `#human` (broker.mjs:375-378) is the only human check.
+- F5. Threads have a single `owner` column (packages/bus/schema.sql:247). `#thread` refuses a thread whose
+  owner isn't the caller (broker.mjs:356-362). `#owner` returns `tester` or the human (broker.mjs:364-366).
+  `#threadFor` special-cases the human (:326) and checks reply chains for the tester only (`#testerOwns`,
+  :352-355, called at :337 and :342). `#threadHolders(business, instance, owner)` finds the held runs of
+  one owner's threads (broker.mjs:298-306).
+- F6. The Console reaches the bus as the one human by spawning `human-cli.mjs` per call
+  (packages/webui/src/bus.mjs:1-9, 27-31). Its entry is `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve`
+  (scripts/webui-service.sh:3). Its sign-in today trusts a proxy header (Sage's design, section "What exists
+  today"). Q175 replaces that with an OIDC relying party that takes a `subjects` list from a `console.sso`
+  key in config.json (Sage's design sections 1 and 4).
+- F7. config.json is read by one loader that refuses unknown top-level keys
+  (scripts/mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). The business file is writable by agents through
+  `organizationWriter` (packages/business/src/organization.mjs:83), which is why Sage put SSO config in
+  config.json and not the business file.
+- F8. Bus, Discord and Console run as `systemctl --user` units (scripts/bus-service.sh:200), so every
+  instance on a host runs under Jason's uid today.
+- F9. Board reads are per business, not per project or instance: `inbox`, `agents`, `tasks`, `trail` at
+  broker.mjs:2143-2146, `decisions` :2174, `credentials` :2195, `messages` :2217 (the Console's set is
+  views.mjs:3-13). `project.list` returns every project in the business (:2318-2322).
+- F10. The launcher restarts a thread that has pending messages and no holder (packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:533),
+  launched as the business human (:542), every 2 s (:133). Its `startedFor` guard is in memory. A claim end
+  stops a run only at its next bus call (broker.mjs:2273-2275). The idle stop is the one place that
+  SIGTERMs a thread runner (launcher.mjs:527).
+
+### The archived v1 federation (v1/apps/gateway/src/federation)
+
+What it does: mTLS between gateways with certificates from step-ca. The grant id and subject user id sit
+in custom certificate OIDs (ca.service.ts:22-24). A peer enrolls with a single-use, 15-minute bearer
+token. The guard reads the client certificate off the TLS socket (server/federation-auth.guard.ts:93-106)
+and re-checks the grant row on every request. Scopes are zod-validated resource lists
+(scope-schema.ts:15-99). Shared data is read-only list and get queries.
+
+Verdict: none of the code is reusable here.
+
+1. It is about 4,470 lines of NestJS, Drizzle and Postgres code without tests (9,198 with them), plus a
+   step-ca dependency. The new stack has none of those.
+2. Inbound federation never worked. The guard depends on `requestCert: true`, but the server is built as
+   `new FastifyAdapter({ bodyLimit })` with no TLS options (v1/apps/gateway/src/main.ts:50-53). Every
+   inbound call would get 401.
+3. mTLS is the wrong fit for the homelab path. Traefik terminates TLS in front of the Console (Sage's
+   design, public path). A client certificate would reach the app as a forwarded header, which is the
+   header trust Q175 point 1 rules out.
+
+Ideas worth keeping: re-check the grant on every request, never cache it in the credential. Keep
+enrollment short-lived and single-use. Tag every federated result with its source instance.
+
+## 3. The 10-27 slice
+
+### 3.1 What it must do
+
+1. D1. Each instance names itself and its peers in config.json, so the Console can show "you are on the
+   hub" and link to the factory. Peer entries carry no trust in the 10-27 slice. They are labels and URLs.
+2. D2. The owner of an instance grants a person access to one business, with a project list and an
+   instance list. Grants live in a human-authored access file on the receiving instance.
+3. D3. That person signs in to the receiving instance's Console with OIDC. The Console verifies the token
+   itself (Q175) and matches `(provider, sub)` to an access-file user with a live grant.
+4. D4. The broker, not the Console, enforces the grant on every request: which verbs, which projects,
+   which instances, and which threads (own threads only).
+5. D5. Revoking a grant refuses that user's next request on the Console and on the bus, and ends the runs
+   of that user's threads in that business.
+
+### 3.2 What waits
+
+- W1. Agent-to-agent traffic between instances (section 6).
+- W2. Shared threads between several users (C1.4), and a viewer level. Both are T1.3's. A granted user gets
+  private threads only.
+- W3. Remote owners. A grant never gives owner verbs: organization, instances, routes, plugins, limits,
+  decision resolution, launch revoke and the kill switch stay with the local human.
+- W4. A registry, `mosaic comms`, enrollment tokens and key rotation tooling. With two instances,
+  out-of-band setup by Jason is cheaper.
+- W5. Federated reads that merge results from both instances into one view, and any board read for a
+  granted user (F9).
+
+### 3.3 Instance identity in the slice
+
+An instance is its public HTTPS origin plus its own OIDC client at the provider. The factory and the hub
+are two clients, so their ID tokens carry different `aud` values. The Q175 audience check refuses a
+factory token presented at the hub, which makes tokens instance-bound by signature, not by a header. This
+holds only if the two client ids differ, which R8 checks. No instance key is needed until instances talk
+to each other (W1).
+
+### 3.4 Remote user identity
+
+A user is `(provider, sub)` where `provider` is an id from that instance's `console.sso.providers`. Q175
+already verifies signature, issuer, audience, expiry and nonce, and allows several providers. The hub
+trusts only an issuer that no factory credential can administer (B8, duckworth-0005), for example a
+Pocket ID on the hub's side. Jason then has his own account at that issuer, with a `sub` of its own. A
+separate brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count: factory agents hold an
+Authentik API token, and whoever administers the issuer can impersonate any user, reset a login or
+repoint a redirect. If Jason wants the hub on the factory's Authentik anyway, that is his decision, of
+the same kind as #419 (section 8). Either way the receiving instance checks the token. It never takes the
+home instance's word for who the user is.
+
+The owner path stays as Sage designed it: `console.sso` subjects sign in as the business human. Everyone
+else comes from the access file. The two lists are disjoint, and the loader refuses a subject in both.
+
+### 3.5 The access file and the collaborator level
+
+`<configDir>/access.json`, next to config.json, so it is per instance (`configDir` at business.mjs:25-28
+reads `MOSAIC_CONFIG`). It is not in config.json for two reasons. Revocation has to take effect without a
+restart, and a typo in config.json stops every tool on the instance (Sage's design, section 4). It is not
+in the business file because agents can write that (F7).
+
+```json
+{
+  "accessVersion": 1,
+  "revision": 3,
+  "users": [
+    { "id": "jason", "home": "factory", "subjects": [{ "provider": "authentik", "sub": "<sub>" }] }
+  ],
+  "grants": [
+    {
+      "id": "g-hub-1",
+      "user": "jason",
+      "business": "creative-hub",
+      "projects": ["*"],
+      "instances": ["researcher"],
+      "level": "collaborator",
+      "expires": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Rules the loader enforces, refusing the whole file on any failure (fail closed). The loader takes the
+provider ids, peer ids and declared businesses as arguments, so it stays pure:
+
+- The file is a regular file, not a symlink, owned by the instance's uid, with no group or other write.
+  These are the checks Sage's loader runs on the secret slot.
+- Unknown keys refuse. `accessVersion` is 1. `revision` is a positive integer.
+- A user id matches the business id rule and is never `human`, `tester`, or any business's `human`.
+- `subjects[].provider` names a given provider. A `(provider, sub)` pair appears once in the file and
+  never in `console.sso.subjects`.
+- `home` names a given peer, or is `local` for a non-federated extra user.
+- A grant names a declared business. `projects` is `["*"]` or bus project ids, the UUIDs
+  `project.create` makes (broker.mjs:2306). `instances` is
+  `["*"]` or declared instances. `level` is `collaborator`, the only level in 10-27. `expires` is optional
+  ISO time.
+- The loader checks a project entry's shape only (a UUID). It can't see the bus, so an id with no bus
+  project covers nothing.
+- A grant past `expires` is treated as absent.
+- A file that fails any rule leaves every user with no grant, which revokes everything. That is the safe
+  direction.
+
+Matching a grant to a thread (morgana-0005). A thread's `project` is a bus project id
+(`threads.project REFERENCES projects(id)`, packages/bus/schema.sql:245), set by `thread.create`
+(broker.mjs:2329-2345). A bus project may have no repo in the business file, so grants can't name
+business-file projects. They name bus project ids, not names. A name could be taken later: the tester,
+which runs from an agent, can call `project.create` (:2300), and nothing renames or deletes a project
+today. R1 exports one pure function, `covers(grant, { business, project, instance }, now, { level })`.
+It is true when the grant is unexpired, the business matches, `projects` is `["*"]` or holds the
+project id, `instances` is `["*"]` or holds the instance, and the grant's level is the one asked for,
+when one is asked for. The broker passes the thread row. `["*"]` also covers projects made after the
+grant, and the R5 help text says so. R5's `grant --project <name>` resolves the name to the id through
+`project.list` at grant time and writes the id. `mosaic access list` shows both. Row 193 uses the same
+`covers`.
+
+The collaborator level is an exact verb list. Every other verb fails `access-refused` before the verb's own
+checks. That covers all owner verbs (W3), every board read (F9), `message.*`, `decision.*`, project files,
+`spec.read`, `assistant.stop`, `launch.*`, `name.set` and `usage.*`.
+
+| Verb | Today | For a user |
+|---|---|---|
+| `project.list` | every project in the business (:2318-2322) | granted projects only |
+| `thread.create` | the business's one thread instance (:2331-2334) | project granted, and that instance in the grant's `instances`, else `access-refused` |
+| `thread.list` | owner filter (:2351-2362) | owner `user:<id>`, and only threads whose project and instance are still granted |
+| `thread.open` | `#thread` owner check (:2365-2371) | same, plus the thread's project and instance still granted |
+| `thread.send` | `#thread`, sender `human`, writes `human.input` (:2374-2398) | same grant check. Sender `from_role` `user`, `from_run` `user:<id>`, no `human.input` |
+| `thread.messages` | `#thread` (:2401-2420) | same grant check |
+| `names` | business-wide (:2288-2295) | granted instances only |
+
+`human.input` events are the owner's authority evidence (the `input` view, broker.mjs:1203-1207). A user's
+message must never write one, the same rule the tester follows at :2398.
+
+`instances` is the real limit of a grant. The thread instance runs with its full role authority and is
+launched as the business human (F10), so a collaborator's message drives that instance with the owner's
+role. A grant gives a user exactly what the granted instance can do. The grant docs and the R5 help text
+say so.
+
+Writes go through `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (row R5), atomically with a revision bump and one
+receipt line in `<dataRoot>/state/access-log.jsonl` (append-only, as `activation-log.jsonl` is). The
+CLI checks its caller with the human proof, but a direct file write by the instance's uid skips both the
+CLI and the receipt. The separate host keeps other instances' processes from making that write, but
+factory agents keep ssh to .54 (Q183), so one with a login there can make it. R8 records that as
+accepted (section 8). Jason may also edit the file by hand.
+
+### 3.6 The user principal in the broker
+
+The bar (B1, mos-0984 point 1): a bus user principal comes only from something the bus can verify. Here
+that is the Console's verified OIDC session, reached through a proof the bus checks itself. The calling
+process's claim alone isn't enough, and neither is a proof that admits agent ancestry.
+
+The proof. Row 196 (#1694, Gander) builds this check as the `user` kind of its shared `verifyPrincipal`,
+and R3 consumes it (section 5). The checks are the ones below. A new path-bound CLI, `packages/bus/src/user-cli.mjs`, with its own nonce variable
+(`MOSAIC_BUS_USER_NONCE`), so neither of the other CLIs' nonces proves it. The bus checks it with
+the `user` kind of row 196's `verifyPrincipal`, which:
+
+1. Runs `verifyHuman`'s checks with `cliPath` set to the bus's own `user-cli.mjs`: same uid as the bus,
+   start time, nonce, CLI path, and the parent walk that refuses agent markers, launch records and agent
+   binaries (human.mjs:64-96).
+2. Also requires the user CLI's direct parent to be the Console from the bus's own tree: `argv[1]` equals
+   the bus's resolved `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs`, and `argv[2]` is `serve`. This binds the user CLI to
+   the Console's tree, as #225 binds `human-cli` to its literal path.
+3. Takes `user` from the proof and binds it only if the access file gives that user a live grant in the
+   proof's business. Otherwise `access-revoked`.
+
+So the claim "I am user jason" comes from a process the bus has verified as its own Console, outside any
+agent. The Console makes that claim only after Q175 verified the ID token's signature, issuer, audience,
+expiry and nonce and mapped `(provider, sub)` to the user.
+
+This needs the path-bound human proof, P19 333. Residual risk, stated as Sage's design section 8 states it
+for the owner. The proof is a cooperative same-uid check. A non-agent process on the instance's uid, a
+shell Jason opens for example, can start its own copy of the Console's tree from the bus's path and claim
+any granted user. So can anything that can ptrace or write files as that uid. The walk refuses an agent
+in its normal process tree, but an unsandboxed agent on the same uid can get past it by starting the
+Console through `systemd-run --user` or by daemonizing so its parent chain ends at pid 1. That is the same
+hole the owner proof has (P19 333), not a new one. Other instances can't: the 10-27 hub runs on its own host, so its bus
+isn't on their host at all. Factory agents keep ssh to .54 and root on pve (Q183), so the host form doesn't stop them, and R8 records that as accepted (section 8). Federation adds no weaker path than the owner's.
+
+The broker changes, each with an R3 test:
+
+1. `bindUser({ business, user })` makes a session with `s.user` set and `s.human` and `s.tester` unset.
+2. `#owner(s)` (:364-366) returns `user:<id>` for a user session. Today it would return undefined.
+3. `#threadFor` (:318-345) refuses a user session with `thread-required-use-thread-send`, as it refuses
+   the human at :326. `message.send` is also off the verb list. Two walls, so a reply-chain send into
+   another user's thread fails even if one is removed (R3 mutant).
+4. The `if (!s.tester) this.#human(s)` gates on the six project and thread verbs above become a check
+   that admits the human, the tester, or a user with a live grant. `names` gates differently, with
+   `if (!s.human && !s.tester) this.#agent(s)` (:2290), so there the user branch goes before the `#agent`
+   fall-through, or a user session fails `#agent`.
+5. Every other `s.human` and `s.tester` branch (48 and 41 in broker.mjs) gets an audit line in R3's
+   packet: user refused, user treated as human, or not reachable for a user. Since every non-list verb
+   fails first, most are "not reachable", and the audit shows it.
+6. `refuse()` records `action.refused` for every refusal (broker.mjs:526-530), with `by` = `user:<id>`.
+7. The reply path (B6). The runner answers each message with `message.send { to: m.from_role }`
+   (packages/harness/src/runner.mjs:450), and today the broker accepts only `human`, `tester` or a role as
+   `to` (broker.mjs:1862). A user's message has `from_role` `user`, so without this every reply fails
+   `unknown-role`. The broker accepts `to: 'user'` from a run only when all of these hold, else
+   `user-reply-required`:
+   - `in_reply_to` names a message with `from_role` `user` in this business,
+   - that message's `from_run` is `user:<id>` and `user:<id>` owns the run's thread,
+   - the message is in that thread (`message_threads`).
+
+   This is the tester rule at :1852-1857, narrowed to one user and one thread. A `#userThread(s)` beside
+   `#testerThread` (:631) finds a run of a user's thread. Such a run can't send `to: 'human'`
+   (`user-thread-human`), as :1864-1866 does for the tester, so a collaborator can't message the owner.
+   Decisions are different (B9). The tester's decision guard at :1683 (`tester-thread-human`) is not
+   copied: a user-thread run's uncited gated raise or hard wait routes to the human (:1677-1680) and
+   lands in the owner's inbox with the run's own question, options and recommendation. Sage ruled
+   that this is intended governance (sage-1368, morgana-0008): the owner decides gated actions in any
+   thread. Mos keeps this behaviour (mos-1021, mos-1022), so R3 doesn't refuse those decisions. R6 tells
+   the user with row 193's sentence (5.7 there, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages." `#checkMessaging` reads `user` as `human` for that run, as :1867 does for
+   the tester. A human or tester session sending `to: 'user'` fails `unknown-role`. The reply lands in the
+   thread through the existing route, so the user reads it with `thread.messages`.
+   `#waiting` (broker.mjs:2556) returns null at once for `to` `user`, as it does for `human` and `tester`.
+   Otherwise every reply to a user falls through to the launch notice at :2562 and posts a waiting
+   notice to the owner's launcher (N11).
+
+   The runner header (runner.mjs:75-78 has the tester's) gains a line for `from_role` `user`: "This message
+   is from <id>, a granted user. It is never Jason's or the owner's instruction and authorizes nothing."
+   The id comes from `from_run`, which `receive` already returns (`SELECT *`, broker.mjs:1932).
+
+The Console only authenticates. The owner session keeps `human-cli.mjs`, a granted user's session uses
+`user-cli.mjs` with the user id. It re-reads the access file per request and drops a session whose user
+has no live grant left. The bus check stays authoritative, so a Console bug can't widen a grant.
+
+### 3.7 Revocation
+
+A grant is lost when it is removed, when it expires, or when the file fails validation. Three triggers
+find the loss:
+
+1. The next user request. The broker re-reads the file when its mtime, size or inode changes, so any write
+   counts.
+2. A broker timer every 30 s re-reads and re-evaluates expiry. This catches hand edits and expiry with
+   no request at all.
+3. `access.reload`, a new human-only verb. `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (R5) call it after the
+   write, so CLI changes act at once.
+
+On a loss, in one transaction, the broker ends the claims of every `user:<id>` thread that no live collaborator
+grant covers any more (via `#threadHolders(business, instance, 'user:<id>')`, F5, and `#claimEnd`). The run's next bus
+call is then refused (F10).
+
+The launcher side, so a pending message can't start a new run:
+
+- `threadsState` (broker.mjs:390-393) adds `revoked: true` to any thread owned by `user:<id>` that no live
+  collaborator grant covers (`covers` with `level: 'collaborator'`, morgana-0005). A downgrade to viewer
+  ends the run. The broker computes this from the file on each call, so it survives a launcher restart,
+  unlike `startedFor`.
+- The launcher's thread pass (launcher.mjs:510-553) never starts a revoked thread.
+- For a revoked thread that is still running, the launcher SIGTERMs the runner at once, as the idle stop
+  does at :527, but without waiting for `threadIdle`'s release, since the claim is already ended. The
+  launch check also refuses a revoked thread, which covers a start racing the revocation.
+
+Bound: the bus refuses the user and the run from the next request on. The runner gets SIGTERM within one
+launcher tick (2 s, launcher.mjs:133) of the broker seeing the loss. A model turn already in flight ends
+when its runner exits. Its last bus call is refused, so it can't deliver a reply into the thread.
+
+Removing a provider from `console.sso` is different. config.json is read at start, so that takes effect
+only after a Console restart. Removing the users from access.json acts at once, so the R5 help text says to
+do that first.
+
+### 3.8 One host or two (mos-0991)
+
+For 10-27 the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), a host of its own (mos-0996).
+Jason (mos-1013): dragon-lin is his workstation and won't host the final instances, and both cases run
+as VMs on the PVE node. Jason confirmed the hosts (DECISIONS Q181, mos-1030). The Case 1 instance is on W-jarvis,
+10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), and the hub, Case 2, is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). The hub's OS user is
+`mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Vikunja #421).
+It is a PVE VM, and Jason accepted the factory's paths to it (Q182, Q183, section 8). The federation path
+assumes nothing about sharing a host:
+
+- Nothing crosses between the instances' buses or filesystems. Each Console talks only to its own bus
+  through `user-cli` or `human-cli`, spawned on its own host. access.json lives in the receiving
+  instance's config dir. `federation.peers` holds URLs and labels, never a path or a socket. No row reads
+  a peer's file or socket.
+- In the 10-27 slice the two Consoles never call each other. The user's browser reaches each origin, and a
+  peer link is a plain link. Section 6 does need each Console's origin reachable from the other host, so
+  R8 checks that now and the later rows add no infra.
+- Each instance has its own OIDC client with its own redirect URI on its own origin (3.3). Each Console
+  must reach its provider's issuer and JWKS from its own host. The issuer is a privilege path too. Whoever administers it can mint a hub user, so
+  the hub's issuer is one the factory can't administer (3.4, R8). The factory's Console reaches its own
+  Authentik, and the hub's reaches its own issuer.
+- Q175 checks token expiry, and section 6 has a 60 s window on signed requests, so both hosts need a synced
+  clock.
+
+The only one-host piece is R7, which is scratch on one host by design (row 190). The uid form of R8's gate
+(row 190b) is a later option, outside the 10-27 gate.
+
+## 4. Fit with the current code
+
+- The bus stays a local socket. Federation reaches it only through the receiving instance's Console, which
+  is the one network-facing piece. No row opens a bus port.
+- The broker's agent authority path (broker.mjs:763-799) is untouched. User checks are a separate path,
+  next to `#human`, because humans have no role claim and `#agent` would refuse them (broker.mjs:367-374).
+- New ownership code is small but real: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the seven verb gates, `thread.send`'s
+  sender fields and `threadsState` (3.6, 3.7).
+- The business file keeps one `human`. Granted users sit outside it, which keeps every existing
+  business-file test and the organization writer unchanged.
+- The config loader gains one optional key, `federation`, in the same file Sage's phase 1 changes
+  (mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). Row R2 chains on that candidate and repeats its blast-radius rule: the key
+  goes in only after a copy that accepts it is pinned.
+
+```json
+"federation": {
+  "self": "hub",
+  "peers": [{ "id": "factory", "origin": "https://mosaic.woltje.com", "label": "Software factory" }]
+}
+```
+
+## 5. Dependencies on T1
+
+- T1.1, several instances per host (mos-0988). Row 190 (Darkwing) lands several instances on one uid,
+  for scratch tests. R7 runs on that. Row 190b (Darkwing, Opus, design first, chained on 190) puts the hub
+  under its own Linux user, with no factory process able to touch it (mos-0986). Rows R1 to R7 don't need
+  190b: they use separate `MOSAIC_CONFIG` files and data roots, which the code already honours
+  (business.mjs:25-28). For 10-27, R8's gate is the host form only (mos-0996), so 190b is a later
+  option, not an R8 dependency. With per-uid instances,
+  a factory-uid process can't read or write the hub's access.json or data root, and it can't pass the
+  hub's human or user proof, because `verifyHuman` requires the caller's uid to equal the bus's
+  (human.mjs:67). Inside one instance the proofs stay same-uid cooperative (3.6, P19 333).
+  The design doesn't plan a single-uid live run.
+- A separate host (mos-0991, mos-0996). The hub runs on its own host, which R8 checks and records (section 7,
+  3.8). It is a PVE VM, with the factory paths accepted by Jason (Q182, Q183, section 8).
+  mos-0996 measured why the other hosts fail: on dragon-lin `sudo -n true` succeeds for jwoltje, and
+  Melanie's server takes `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` from here with passwordless sudo behind it.
+- Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the bus human boundary before R3 (gander-0006): one shared verifier,
+  `verifyPrincipal(request, connection)` returning `{kind, business, id}`, with `SO_PEERCRED` binding
+  `proof.pid` to the connection. R3 consumes it for the `user` kind instead of writing its own
+  `verifyUser`, with the same checks as 3.6 (human walk, direct parent the bus tree's Console `serve`,
+  own nonce variable). It runs once for each one-request connection, and `s.user` holds for that
+  request only, with no role or grant cached (gander-0007). R3 owns every live grant check, the
+  `(provider, sub)` to user mapping and the user-name policy. Row 196 kills the agent-parent,
+  non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants. R3 keeps the reserved user-name mutant.
+- T1.1 live also needs two Consoles, two public origins, two reverse-proxy routes and two provider
+  clients, which are Jason-gated infra.
+- T1.2, #412 SSO. Hard dependency. Row R6 builds on Sage's phase 1 candidate (Q177 merge-chaining) and
+  goes live only after the phase 2 window.
+- T1.3, human users and RBAC. One user and grant model for local and federated humans (mos-0978 Q2).
+  Row 193 (Morgana) confirmed access.json as that store (morgana-0002, section 9 Q2). T1.3 adds `local`
+  users, the viewer level and `thread_shares`, and federation adds `home`. R1 is the shared loader, so row
+  193 builds on R1's candidate.
+
+## 6. After 10-27: instance-to-instance
+
+Sketch only, so the slice doesn't block it. If Jason puts agent-to-agent inside 10-27 (mos-0984 point 3),
+rows for it are added after r2.
+
+- Each instance gets an Ed25519 key in a secrets slot (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/<instance>/`, 0600,
+  per the Q173 slot rule). Peers pin each other's public keys in `federation.peers[].keys`. Public keys are
+  not secrets.
+- Requests between instances are signed with HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) over method, target URI,
+  authority, content digest, created time and a nonce. The receiving Console verifies the signature
+  itself, so the proof survives Traefik. A created time outside 60 s or a reused nonce refuses. No shared
+  secret, no bearer token.
+- A peer agent becomes a grant subject of kind `peer` (`factory/researcher`), in the same access file, so
+  grant and revoke work the same way. Removing a peer key refuses all of that peer's traffic at once.
+- First use: a factory agent sends a message into a hub thread it was granted, owned by `peer:factory`.
+
+## 7. Rows
+
+Owner model per Q177 and Q178. Opus 5.5 for hard design and builds, Haiku 5.5 at high effort for mid work,
+Codex gpt-6.1-sol for parallel builds. Every row has its own independent review (Filbert or Dewey) and
+gate. Chains follow Q177: a dependent row builds on its parent's candidate.
+
+| Row | Work | Owner model | Depends on | Test gate |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | `packages/business/src/access.mjs`: access.json loader and validator. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks | Codex Sol | none | business tests: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named, symlink, non-regular file, other owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, disjoint from the given subjects, `human`/`tester` ids, a level other than `collaborator`, a project entry that isn't a UUID. `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an expired grant doesn't, a level filter rejects another level |
+| R2 | `federation` key in scripts/mosaic-config.mjs | Haiku 5.5 high | Sage #412 phase 1 candidate | test-config.sh: valid key loads, unknown sub-key and bad origin refuse, config without it loads |
+| R5 | `mosaic access list, grant, revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, receipt line. Help text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order | Haiku 5.5 high | R1 | cli tests: tester and agent callers refused, concurrent write refuses on revision conflict, receipt appended, bad grant refused before write |
+| R3 | Broker user principal: consumes row 196's `verifyPrincipal` (`user` kind, `user-cli.mjs`), `bindUser`, the 3.6 changes, the collaborator verb list and its filters, per-request grant read, audit lines for every `s.human`/`s.tester` branch | Opus 5.5 | R1, row 196 | bus tests: each listed verb allowed, every other verb refused, a leak test per listed read (other projects, other instances, other users' threads), a reply-chain `message.send` into another user's thread refused, `thread.send` writes no `human.input`, the run's reply to a user's message reaches that user's `thread.messages`, a reply `to: 'user'` without a matching `in_reply_to` refused, a user-thread run sending `to: 'human'` refused, a reply to a user returns `waiting` null and posts no notice message, a user-thread run's uncited gated raise reaches the owner's inbox and no other inbox or role, while its `message.send` `to: 'human'` is still refused (B9, mos-1022), revoked and expired grant refused on next request, refusals recorded. Mutants (the agent-parent, non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants are row 196's): the grant read skipped, a read filter dropped, `#threadFor`'s user refusal removed, the reply-to check dropped (a run answers another user's message or one outside its thread), a user named like the human accepted |
+| R4 | Revocation: 30 s timer, `access.reload` verb, claim end on loss, `threadsState` `revoked`, launcher skip and SIGTERM, launch check refusal, R5 calls `access.reload` | Codex Sol | R3, R5, row 193's viewer level (mos-1019) | bus and launcher tests, each with a mutant: a hand edit removing the grant ends the run within one timer period, an expiry with no request ends it, a pending message followed by a launcher restart starts no run, a running revoked thread gets SIGTERM, a grant downgraded to viewer counts as a loss, another user's runs stay. R4 starts after row 193's viewer level lands, because before it R1 refuses any other level, the whole file fails, and the downgrade test can't kill its mutant (N17, mos-1020) |
+| R6 | Console: granted-user sign-in, `user-cli` transport per session, per-request grant re-read, owner-only controls hidden, a notice on the user's thread page with row 193's sentence word for word (B9, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages.", peer links | Opus 5.5 | Sage #412 phase 1, R1, R2, R3 | webui tests on Sage's fake OP: granted user signs in, ungranted `sub` refused, revoked mid-session gets 401 on next call, a granted user's owner-verb call refused by the bus even with the UI check removed (mutant), the thread page's notice equals row 193's sentence exactly (N21) |
+| R7 | Scratch two-instance acceptance: two configs, two data roots, two Consoles, one fake OP. The Consoles start outside agent ancestry (a transient user unit), as the user proof requires. They never use the live stack's units or ports | Haiku 5.5 high | R1-R6, row 190 (several instances on one uid) | script test: Jason granted collaborator on one hub project signs in to the hub, makes a thread, sends to the granted instance, gets the instance's reply in the thread, is refused on another project and on board reads, is revoked and gets refused with the run ended. The factory shows nothing of the hub |
+| R8 | Live window, not a code row: hub provider client, hub proxy route, access.json written by Jason, re-pins | Jason, Mos | the Case 2 install on .54 (#416), Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped (mos-1042), #412 phase 2, R7 | Host form only for 10-27 (mos-0996): the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181). R8 is a recorded acceptance (mos-1055). It starts with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check below still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and don't refuse. R8 runs after Bean and Chet are live and both Hermes gateways on .54 have stopped (mos-1042). Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The hub is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012), and its OS user is `mosaic`, with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Q181, Q183). R8 checks that on 10.1.1.54 as root and records whether each holds: `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under `/etc/sudoers.d` names it (N22). An agent or Jason runs these as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes into the R8 record with who ran them. The privilege checks run on every factory host in section 8's list (the dragon-lin dev uid, and W-jarvis at 10.1.1.53, which is the Case 1 VM with its agents and the Hermes agents), as each factory uid there under `env -i`, and each is recorded as passing only when the call fails: `sudo -n true`, `doas -n true`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes 10.1.1.54 true` as the hub user `mosaic`, as Jason's user and as root, each with and without the session's `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`. If `sudo -n` succeeds, as it does for jwoltje on dragon-lin (mos-0996 point 1), the factory counts as root on its own host. Then, as root through `sudo -n`: fingerprint every private key under every home and `/root`, and every key loaded in any agent socket found on the host (`ssh-add -l` per socket). Compare them with `ssh-keygen -lf` over every `authorized_keys` on the hub host, root's included, and no fingerprint matches. Run the ssh checks as root, once with no agent socket and once with each socket found, and record each result (N13). Every other privilege path is a named item in section 8's table (mos-1009): hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end, certificate authority, DNS and network. The record marks each one closed, with its check passing, or accepted under Q182 and Q183 with the table's wording. That wording goes to Melanie through Jason (#419), never to her directly. R8 also records whether the hub host's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on any factory host, no factory host mounts anything of the hub's, and whether the hub host runs no other instance or agent. These must work, or R8 stops and Mos takes it to Jason, because federation fails without them: the two provider client ids differ, each origin answers over HTTPS from the other host, each Console reaches its issuer's discovery URL, and both clocks are synced. The record holds Jason's acceptance and the check results side by side, so a passing check is a measured fact and an accepted path is named as accepted. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option, outside this gate. Then Jason signs in to the hub from his account and sends one message, Melanie revokes, and his next request is refused |
+
+R1 can start now. R5 can be briefed now against R1's exported interface and lands after R1. R2 starts
+when Sage's #412 phase 1 candidate exists. R3 starts when R1 has a candidate, R4 when R3, R5 and row 193's viewer level do (mos-1019).
+R6 waits on Sage's phase 1 candidate.
+
+## 8. Risk to 10-27
+
+The slice lands only if three things hold. #412 phase 1 has a reviewed candidate by about 10-23. P19 333,
+the path-bound human proof R3 depends on, is settled in time for R3 (Mos told Sage, mos-0988). The Case 2
+install on .54 (#416) is done in time for R8. Jason's answer on the factory paths is Q182 and Q183. R6 and R7 chain on #412 phase 1. R8 needs all three, plus
+two Jason-gated windows (#412 phase 2 and the federation re-pin), plus infra work only Jason does: a
+second public origin, a proxy route and a provider client. A failed privilege check
+doesn't stop R8. It goes into the record, and Mos takes it to Jason.
+
+The hypervisor path (Vikunja #419, mos-1004), accepted by Jason under Q182 and Q183. Factory agents hold root
+ssh to the PVE nodes (Q172). Root on a node can read a running VM's memory and disk, open its console,
+and change its config or boot. So it defeats the host form completely when the hub is a cluster VM
+(duckworth-0004). LUKS inside the VM doesn't close it alone: the key sits in the running VM's memory,
+which the node can read, and a node that can change the boot can capture the passphrase. Options:
+
+- O1. The hub runs on hardware outside the PVE cluster, where the factory has no root.
+- O2. A cluster VM, with factory root ssh removed on every node, no factory PVE token with console,
+  monitor, config, backup or snapshot rights on the VM, VM storage the factory can't read, and PBS
+  backups the factory can't read or that are encrypted with a key it doesn't hold.
+- O3. Jason accepts it as a residual. Then this section and R8 say plainly that the host form doesn't
+  stop a factory agent using PVE root, and Melanie is told.
+
+Jason's answer is O3, accepted (DECISIONS Q183 confirms Q4). His lines, verbatim:
+
+Q182 (DECISIONS.md:1514-1519, jason-master-restart):
+
+> "I am not pursuing a tightening of key and agent security on my workstation. I need my agents to be able to get onto the other workstations and servers."
+
+> "We will eventually have my agents running on my VM on PVE, but currently I accept the risk of agents running on my workstation."
+
+Q183 (DECISIONS.md:1535-1541):
+
+> "Security tightening on .53 and .54 is fine. I will still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all agents will need to have that access."
+
+> "Q4 appears to properly reflect my statements."
+
+Q4, as Mos asked it and Jason confirmed it:
+
+> "The #421 plan stops. Your key stays, and agents keep root on pve and PBS and ssh to .53 and .54. Each VM still gets a mosaic user without sudo to run its instance. The federation gate records your acceptance instead of refusing to start."
+
+So this section and R8 say it plainly: the host form doesn't stop a factory agent using PVE root, and
+R8 records that as accepted. Melanie is told through Jason (#419).
+
+### R8 privilege paths (mos-1009, duckworth-0005, Vikunja #419)
+
+Here and in R8, "factory" means every principal outside the hub instance (mos-1013), and "factory
+host" means each of their hosts:
+
+- the dragon-lin dev uid, on Jason's workstation
+- W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008): the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents, and Jason's Hermes agents.
+  ops-01 reports the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key has root on `pve`.
+
+Case 1 and the Hermes agents share W-jarvis, so they are one factory host (Q181, mos-1030). The hub is
+W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Every check in the
+table runs on each factory host, and a path is closed only when it passes on all of them.
+
+ops-01 measured the estate read-only at 19:10Z (relayed in mos-1009). There is one PVE node, `pve`,
+standalone, and its root `authorized_keys` holds the factory's key (dragon-lin's, and per mos-1013
+the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key), so the factory has root on the
+hypervisor without any API token. The only PBS is VM 1021 on that node, the factory has root on it, and
+its backups are unencrypted. The LAN is flat (10.1.0.0/16) with dragon-lin on it and no internal VLAN.
+The factory has used the jarvis Authentik token for admin changes. No hardware outside PVE without
+factory root has been confirmed. So today the factory administers every path below.
+
+Each path is a record item. Its check runs and the result is recorded. A path is closed when its check
+passes. Otherwise it is accepted under Q182 and Q183, and its wording goes into the R8 record and to
+Melanie through Jason (#419). Every check runs from the factory
+host, as root through `sudo -n` where the factory has it, and passes only when the call fails.
+
+| Path | Closed: the check | Accepted: the wording | Hub-local option |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Host access | The R8 sudo, doas, ssh and key checks (section 7, N13) | "Factory agents can log in to the hub host." | none needed, the checks can pass today |
+| Hypervisor | O1 or O2 above: no factory key in any PVE node's root `authorized_keys`, and a PVE API call on the hub VM fails with each token the factory holds | "Factory agents have root on the machine the hub runs on and can read its memory and disk." | O1, hardware outside PVE |
+| Backups | The hub's backups are encrypted with a key only Jason or Melanie holds: the PBS datastore shows the hub's snapshots encrypted, and the key's fingerprint matches no file on the factory host | "Factory agents can read the hub's backups in full." | client-side encrypted backups, key held by Jason or Melanie |
+| Sign-in provider (B8, mos-1006) | The hub's `console.sso` trusts only an issuer no factory credential administers, never a brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik. An admin API call on it fails with each identity provider token found on the factory host, and the issuer's list of admin tokens and service accounts (names only, never values) shows none held on the factory. An issuer that isn't on the hub host passes the host-access, hypervisor and backups rows itself, run against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call check (duckworth-0007) | "Anyone with admin on the factory's sign-in provider can sign in to the hub as any user, Melanie included." | an issuer on the hub host, such as Pocket ID (Q175 supports several providers) |
+| TLS front end (B8) | TLS for the hub's origin ends on the hub host: the certificate the origin serves, fetched both through the public route and from the LAN (N19), matches the key on the hub host, and no factory proxy, tunnel or overlay route names the hub's origin | "The factory's proxy sees every hub sign-in, cookie and message in clear." | TLS ending on the hub host |
+| Certificate authority (mos-1009) | The hub's certificate comes from a public CA through an ACME account whose key is only on the hub host, and the zone's CAA record names only that CA | "The factory can get a valid certificate for the hub's name." | ACME run on the hub host |
+| DNS (N15) | A zone edit for the hub's name fails with each DNS credential found on the factory host, and the zone's owner account is one the factory can't sign in to | "The factory can point the hub's name at a host it runs." | a zone or registrar account only Jason or Melanie holds |
+| Network | From the factory host, the hub host answers only on the ports R8 needs (HTTPS, and ssh where it is used), and nothing else is open to the LAN | "The hub host sits on the same flat LAN as the factory, and only its logins protect it." | a host firewall on the hub, a separate VLAN |
+
+Some paths depend on others. While the hypervisor row is open, every secret on a PVE guest is exposed to
+node root: the TLS key, the ACME account key, an issuer's database and signing key on a guest, and the
+backup key whenever a restore loads it (N16). So closing those rows doesn't help until the hypervisor
+row is closed too, or they sit on hardware outside PVE. The R8 record names every path that stays accepted.
+
+## 9. Rulings (mos-0978, mos-0984, mos-0991, mos-0996, mos-1004, mos-1006, mos-1009, mos-1013)
+
+1. Q1: human cross-access is the 10-27 slice (mos-0978). Duckworth's N8 put agent-to-agent's timing to
+   Jason through Mos. Jason answered "P2P federation is acceptable for 10-27" (mos-0991), and then "P2P is
+   person-to-person in this case" (DECISIONS Q180, mos-1013). The slice is human access only, with no
+   agent-to-agent rows.
+2. Q2, settled by row 193 (morgana-0002, to Sage too): access.json is the one user and grant store for
+   humans. Row 193 adds `home: "local"` users, uses the grant level as the human role, and keeps viewer and
+   collaborator. The owner stays outside the file. Thread shares go in a new append-only bus table,
+   `thread_shares`, not in access.json, and a share counts only while the named user's live grant covers
+   the thread's project and instance. The 10-27 slice ships collaborator only (W2), so when row 193 adds
+   viewer, R1's level check widens with it. `thread_shares` is append-only, so an unshare is an end row in
+   row 193's design. R3 assumes nothing about shares (N12).
+3. Q3 and B5: R8 never runs on a single uid (mos-0984 point 2). For 10-27 its isolation is the hub's own host,
+   .54 (Q181), the host form only (mos-0996). The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. Jason accepted
+   the factory paths, the hypervisor's included (Q182, Q183), so R8 records them (section 8).
+
+## 10. Notes
+
+- The r1 push used the repo-local credential helper `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` (set in the
+  canonical checkout's .git/config for git.mosaicstack.dev) with its default credential file,
+  `~/secrets/mosaic.gitea.json`, and no `MOSAIC_GITEA_CREDENTIAL_FILE` override. That file's user is
+  jason.woltje. The r2 push uses the same. Gizmoduck has no seat identity until T1 row 195 adds per-agent
+  git identity.

agents/gosalyn/README.md

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Gosalyn
-
-Worker seat for Mosaic Stack, MVP track T2 (Case 2, the creative writing hub, Vikunja #416).
-
-- T3 thread: 7604438a-0ded-41c8-bd3f-26f57fdb5cd2
-- Model: Opus 5.5 (Claude Code, T3)
-- Launched by Mos (Jason's main agent, T3 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e), who briefs the seat
-- Repository lead and queue: Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079)
-- Branch: gosalyn/case2-design, pushed only by this seat, landed on refactor by Sage
-
-Work lives in `work/`. The Case 2 design is `work/case2/DESIGN.md`.

agents/herb/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Herb
-
-Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for a second gate lane
-design row (#1695, mos-0977 item 6).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `herb/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/README.md

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Honker
-
-Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
-through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/work/queue-194/BUILD.md

@@ -1,757 +0,0 @@
-# Row 194 build notes
-
-Design r4 approved: DESIGN.md sha256 824ef884 at 7d0788236 (Webby webby-0014, review at e1e64ff01 on
-webby/reviews; Mos mos-1042; Sage sage-1387 "build now"). Build base: refactor aa1bd209e merged into
-honker/row194 at fa9eaa4c3.
-
-## Build notes from the approval (each gets a test and a mutant)
-
-- W-N1 (webby-0014 N1): launch refuses `instance-firing` while I has a `fire.stopped` with no `fire.done`.
-  Test case in T9c. Mutant M59: the check is dropped.
-- W-N2 (webby-0014 N2): the broker's hire-time check requires roleVersion 2, so a definition with no
-  action lists refuses. Test case in T8b. Mutant M60: the version check is dropped.
-- Grace (sage-1387): 5 s, one constant shared with row 191.
-
-## Chain state (2026-10-20T19:45Z)
-
-Rows 190, 191 and 193 have no product commits yet (rocko/row191 and darkwing/row190 sit at da230ca48, the
-brief commit). Slices that don't need row 191 build first. S6 waits for row 191's candidate.
-
-## Slices
-
-| Slice | Scope | Tests | State |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| S1 | business: vocabulary (role.hire, role.fire hard waits, HIRE_ALLOWED), role.mjs `hireable`, business.mjs keep/noHire/retired, instance-settings delete and veto ops, chief-of-staff.json `hireable: []` | T6 (business), T7, T8c, T17, D2.2 writer | done, see below |
-| S2 | bus: reloadBusiness and runtime callback, instance.launch/end/regenerate requests, instances.set delete, veto.set, instance.hire/fire, keep checks, D4 hook, tester checks | T8-T10, T9c, T12-T14, T18 | S2a (D3), S2b (veto, hook, keep, T13), S2c (requests, terminate, delete) and S2d (hire, fire, W-N1) and S2e (PRD 1.7 routing, sage-1471) done |
-| S3 | cli: launcher lifecyclePass, host ops, `business instance` verbs | T1-T6, T11 | S3a (launcher pass) and S3b (verbs, veto, end to end, T2a, T4, T6, T11) done |
-| S4 | harness: launch tool schema, hire and fire tools | T8 (D3 item 5) | done, see S4 notes |
-| S5 | webui: Agents section and routes | T16 | done, see S5 notes. The "still running after fire" flag waits for S6 |
-| S6 | row 191 chain: halted checks, fire SIGKILL through row 191's stop | T9a, T9b, T15 | waits on row 191 |
-| S7 | brief item 7 (rev 2547, sage-1586): a created agent's credential entry, the restart route | T19 (new) | waits on row 199 landing, see item 7 plan |
-| S8 | brief item 8 (rev 2556, sage-1588): fire and delete revoke the agent's credentials before the file changes | T20 (new) | waits on row 199 landing, see item 8 plan |
-
-## Changed assertions (D3 item 4, N4)
-
-Listed here as the build changes them.
-
-- `packages/business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs:53, :67, :72`: the row 165 read and add views
-  gain `kept: false` (D1, the read gains `kept` per instance). No other field changed.
-- `packages/business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs:70` (`added.restart` true to false) and `:91`
-  (`redefined.restart` true to false): the writer no longer asks for a restart. The bus decides,
-  after its reload (D3 items 2-3). The two test names say so.
-- `packages/cli/tests/instances.test.mjs`: `setup` boots the bus from the file through `bootConfig`, as
-  the unit does, instead of a one-role stub. The add test (T1) now expects the "no restart" line and
-  binds `sec-1` on the running bus. The `RESTART_NEEDED` text pins moved, unchanged, to a new test that
-  boots the old stub (`setup(t, { stub: true })`). Its coder has no credential references and the
-  file's has, so the bus doesn't reload, prints `RESTART_NEEDED` and doesn't bind `sec-1` (D3 item 3).
-- `packages/webui/tests/instances.test.mjs:25`: the fake writer's default answer is `restart: false`,
-  the usual answer now. The real-broker test boots through `bootConfig` and expects `restart: false`
-  (`:71`) and the log line `done restart=false` (`:74`). The answer-shape rows at `:140-145` keep
-  `restart: true`. Each row tests another field, or `restart: 'yes'`, so the value is not what they
-  check.
-- `packages/bus/tests/instances-verb.test.mjs` T12 (S2c): the human delete now answers `{request}`
-  where S2b refused `invalid-request`. The stub writer answers `instances.check` with the revision,
-  and the calls list gains that one check, actor `jason`. Nothing else in the test changed.
-- `packages/bus/tests/tester-writes.test.mjs:19` (row 175 pin): TESTER_VERBS gains `instance.launch`,
-  `instance.end` and `instance.request` (D4.1). TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS is unchanged.
-- `packages/bus/tests/instances-verb.test.mjs:78` keeps `restart: true`, now for a D3 item 3 reason:
-  its boot copy is a stub without the file's credential references. A comment there says so.
-  `reload.test.mjs` covers the reload from a file boot.
-- `packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:38` (S2d): the every-hard-wait loop gives `role.hire` and
-  `role.fire` a target and `arguments`, which their raise now requires (D2.1). The class and route it
-  checks are unchanged.
-- S2e (PRD 1.7 REQ-COS-3) takes back the S2d entry above. `role.hire` and `role.fire` left the hard
-  waits, so `packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs` and `packages/business/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs`
-  drop them from WAITS, and the bus file's every-hard-wait loop is back to its S2c form. The business
-  file gains a test that both are routed and not in GATED_ONLY.
-- `packages/bus/tests/reload.test.mjs` (S2e): its hard-wait example used `role.hire`, now routed. It
-  uses `spend`. The check is unchanged.
-- `packages/business/tests/chief-of-staff.test.mjs` (S2e): the chief's pinned authority and the test
-  name gain `role.hire` and `role.fire`. `packages/business/tests/role.test.mjs` gains the check that
-  no other shipped role holds either.
-- `packages/harness/tests/tools.test.mjs` and `packages/harness/tests/bundle.test.mjs` (S2e): the
-  chief's pinned tool lists gain `hire` and `fire`. Every held action needs a typed tool
-  (`untypedActions`), so the tools come forward from S4.
-- `packages/bus/tests/chief-of-staff.test.mjs` (S2e): the S2d decision-form tests are rewritten to the
-  reason form (below). The S2d raise tests with `arguments` are gone with the key.
-- `packages/bus/tests/lifecycle-verbs.test.mjs` V5 retry (S3a): `lifecycleDelete` on a retry now
-  answers `{transaction, retry: true}` with the failed delete's transaction, where S2c answered
-  `{transaction: null, retry: true}`. The launcher needs it to name `.retired/I-<transaction>`. The
-  test checks the value and that the retry still neither checks nor writes the file.
-- `packages/harness/tests/tools.test.mjs:48` (S4): the launch tool's `instance` was an enum of the
-  start-time listing. It is now `{type: "string", description, pattern: ID_PATTERN.source}`, and the
-  listing moves to the tool description, which the test matches. `:107` (the pm test's chief check)
-  asserts there is no enum and the description names `chief.launch.instances`.
-- `packages/business/tests/chief-of-staff.test.mjs` (S4): the contract test gains a match on the new
-  sentence that a hire is listed for `launch` at once but runs only after the human sets its route.
-
-- `packages/webui/tests/browser.test.mjs:21-22` (S5): the page's script list pins the scripts in
-  order. It now has `/agents.js` between `/chat.js` and `/bus.js`, and the comment names row 194.
-
-## S1 notes
-
-- Tests: `tests/lifecycle-settings.test.mjs` (new) holds T6's business part (V5 order, last listed,
-  clean delete, retired refusals for add and hire), T7 (V6) and the writer's hire and fire (D2.2).
-  T8c is in `role.test.mjs`, T17 in `business.test.mjs`.
-- `deleteRefusal`'s entry half (`entry.tracker`, `entry.credentials`) follows V5's wording "holds
-  credentials or a tracker bot". In a file that validates it is the same as the definition check: a
-  definition with no credential refuses an entry tracker or credentials at load. So no test reaches it
-  alone, and no mutant is listed for it.
-- END_PROTECTED is `assistant` only. The chief's own instance refuses delete and fire as
-  `organization-instance-referenced` (launch.by), not as protected.
-- The writer refuses an `assistant` hire `organization-definition-refused` through `definitionFor`, as
-  row 165's add does.
-- PRD draft: 69544f342 (sha256 c1f52d98…), sage-1395: adding to the fixed list is a PRD change.
-
-## S2a notes (D3 live reload)
-
-- `Broker.reloadBusiness(id, doc)` runs the boot check (`checkBusiness`, moved out of the
-  constructor unchanged) on a clone, then refuses a changed `human` and swaps the document in.
-- The runtime reloads after every committed write, through the chain `bootConfig` uses
-  (`loadBusiness`, `resolveInstance` with `organization.system`, `busBusiness`). Then `limits.refresh`
-  runs. `instances.set` answers `restart: !live`. Any other verb name now throws `invalid-request`
-  where it used to fall through to `plugins.set`.
-- D3 item 3 check: a role in the boot copy must keep its credential references and tracker bot. A role
-  not in the boot copy must have neither. The tracker sync block must match. Otherwise no reload and
-  `restart: true`. The first version compared one fingerprint over all roles, so every create failed
-  it. T14's create test caught that.
-- Consumers checked against item 3 (`runtime.mjs` startBroker):
-  - The Credentials store takes the role and sync references and the project roots it protects at
-    start. The tasks adapter takes the bots at start. All of these are compared.
-  - Limits read `settings.current` at each ask. The human proof reads `human` from the boot copy,
-    and `reloadBusiness` refuses a changed human, so the two agree.
-  - Web grants: the broker reads `roles.<I>.web` from its own document (`broker.mjs:1545`), so a
-    reload carries the grant. A hireable definition has no `web` tool.
-  - Usage loads its `usage-source` plug-ins from `b.plugins` at start. That was already so before
-    this row (`plugins.set` never restarted them). A reload doesn't change it, and it isn't compared.
-- Instance-running: `instances.set` op change with a `definition` on a declared instance with a
-  claim holder (or thread holders for a thread instance) refuses `instance-running` before the
-  writer. A vars or launch change still passes.
-- Tests: `packages/bus/tests/reload.test.mjs` (T14, 6 tests).
-
-## S2b notes (veto.set, the D4 hook, keep checks)
-
-- `LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS` (exported from `broker.mjs`) has one entry per verb and per `instances.set`
-  op: `instance.launch`, `instance.end`, `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set`, `instances.set add`,
-  `instances.set change`, `instances.set delete`. Choice: `#mayHuman(s, verb, target)` refuses
-  `human-required` for an entry missing from the list. So the list and the calls can't drift apart,
-  and T12 shows the hook got the exact entry: each listed human call passes. The tradeoff is that a
-  new human verb has to join the list before it works, which is what row 193 needs anyway.
-- `bindHuman` already refuses any human but the owner, so the hook's owner check can't fail on any
-  path today. It is the body row 193 replaces.
-- M46 (`veto.set` skips `#human`) is equivalent while the generic check runs first: no session
-  without `s.human` gets past `human-required`, and only `bindHuman` sets `s.human`, always with
-  `via: 'cli'` and `outsideAgent: true`. T18 shows the refusal. `#human` stays as the design asks.
-- `instances.set` now checks `op` in the broker (`add`, `change`, `delete`, else `invalid-request`).
-  The tester's delete refuses `tester-refused` (B6). Until S2c records the delete request, a human
-  delete refuses `invalid-request` after the hook. Without that, the writer's `set` op `delete` would
-  commit with no running or starting check and no workspace rename.
-- Keep: the `role.revoke` reason branch refuses `instance-kept` for any caller, not only the chief.
-  Only the chief holds `role.end` today, so this is the same set. A caller with `role.end` added
-  later is held to the forbid too. The `organization.set` check refuses when any key of
-  `args.instances` is kept, before the writer and before the grant is spent. The human's `limits.set`
-  isn't checked: the human owns the forbid.
-- T13 needed no code. `organization.set` and `limits.set` take only `ORGANIZATION_KEYS`, and
-  `limits` and `models` write only `launch.limits` and `launch.models`.
-- Tests: `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` T10 (reason end, decision end, model write), T13 and T18's
-  veto.set and instances.set paths on a stub writer. T18's file-bytes check and its hire and fire
-  cases come with S2d. `instances-verb.test.mjs` T12 (sessions, tester, hook). `reload.test.mjs`
-  gains veto.set.
-
-## S2c notes (lifecycle requests, terminate, delete)
-
-- A request is an `action.allowed` event, action `lifecycle.launch`, `.regenerate`, `.delete` or
-  `.end`, body `{action, request, via, by, ...}`. The human's also gets `human.input {kind: 'admin'}`.
-  The tester's gets none. Steps are `lifecycle.taken`, `lifecycle.done {request, run?, transaction?,
-  refusal?}` and `lifecycle.cancelled {request, by}`, with no role or run in the session. No new
-  table or event kind, so no migration.
-- Host ops for the launcher pass (S3), each in LAUNCH_OPS: `lifecycleRequests`, `lifecycleTake`,
-  `lifecycleDelete`, `lifecycleDone`. Choice: `lifecycleDelete` commits through the bus's own
-  organization callback, so the D3 reload runs after it as after any other write. The tradeoff is
-  one more host op instead of the launcher calling the writer.
-- The take re-checks: request-expired (60 s, `LIFECYCLE_REQUEST_MS`), then launch-revoked and
-  instance-retired for launch and regenerate only, then tester-off for a tester request. A refused
-  take writes `lifecycle.done` with the refusal, so the request closes. `lifecycle.end` never
-  expires: the runs it names still need the signal.
-- instance-starting counts any taken request of I, and any open one still under 60 s, delete
-  included. An open request past 60 s can only close request-expired, so it doesn't count. The end
-  request doesn't count.
-- Delete order at the verb (V5): keys and identifier, the 64-hex revision, the retired-name retry
-  gate, then `instances.check` (the writer's plan and validation, no write). A named organization
-  refusal fails at once. A BusinessError (the last-listed refusal) is held until instance-running
-  and instance-starting have passed, then answers invalid-request. Then revision-conflict, then the
-  request with `{revision}`. `lifecycleDelete` checks running and starting again after the take
-  (other requests only), then calls `instances.set` op delete with actor = the request's `by`.
-- Retry: a retired name that isn't in roles deletes again only when its last delete closed
-  `workspace-rename-failed`. The request carries `retry: true`, and `lifecycleDelete` answers
-  `{transaction: null, retry: true}` with no check and no write. The launcher (S3) retries the rename.
-- `lifecycleDone` carries `transaction`, so the delete's done names the commit the rename used.
-- Terminate (V3): every claim holder of I, or every thread holder for a thread instance, is revoked
-  with the reason (default "ended by the human" or "ended by the tester"). The answer names the held
-  runs plus the bound runs of I not yet ended, cancels open requests of I and lists taken ones. With
-  none of these it refuses not-held. The tester ends only its own threads and cancels only its own
-  requests.
-- The tester's business scope needs no check: its cap is bound to one business (M19), so another
-  business's instance answers unknown-role. `instance.request` needs no tester-file check: a tester
-  reads only requests it made.
-- The tester switch is read through a `testerOn` option. The runtime reads `bus.tester` from the
-  live file through `settings.current`, so a change applies with no restart. Anything but `true`,
-  or a read error, is off.
-- Refactor: the organization error mapping moved into `#organizationFail(e, verb)`, shared by the
-  organization verbs and `lifecycleDelete`. Same mapping as before.
-- Deferred: the halted checks (S6, row 191) and W-N1 (S2d with fire).
-- Tests: `packages/bus/tests/lifecycle-verbs.test.mjs` (12 tests: T12 lifecycle part, T12a, V2-V5,
-  the take and the runtime delete end to end). Probe mutants on the expiry, starting (verb and
-  take), the take's expiry and tester checks, the retry gate, the tester's own-request read and
-  not-held all died. They are not the M-list run.
-
-## S2d notes (the chief's hire and fire, W-N1)
-
-- Still hard waits (PRD 1.6). Under PRD 1.7 they move to ROUTED in S2e, with the reason form.
-- The raise: `decision.raise` takes `arguments`, only for `role.hire` (`{name, definition, vars?}`)
-  or `role.fire` (`{name, reason}`), and requires it for those. `target` must equal
-  `arguments.name`. The raise event records it, and the human's decision view shows it under
-  `authorization.arguments`. The shape checks are the call's (`#hireFireArgs`): identifiers, not
-  `human` or `tester`, vars only `model` and `limits.*`, reason 1-500 characters.
-- The call: `instance.hire {name, definition, vars?, decision}` and `instance.fire {name, reason,
-  decision}`, from a chief session only. Order: tester-refused, read-only and agent-required
-  (`#agent`), keys, `role-not-chief` (launch.by), not-configured, decision-mismatch for a decision of
-  another business, `#checkAuthority`, the call's arguments against the raise's (canonical JSON,
-  decision-mismatch), decision-consumed, instance-kept. The writer gets the chief as actor
-  (`chief-of-staff.chief`) and the context `{instance, run, decision}`, which changes.jsonl records.
-- Hire: `#hireable` loads the definition and the chief's own role file through the new `roleFile`
-  option (the runtime passes `loadRole(rolesDir, name)`). Version 1, any action off HIRE_ALLOWED
-  (`unhireableAction`), not on the chief's `hireable` list, on `noHire` or no file all refuse
-  definition-not-hireable before the writer. Then the writer's hire, then the consume with
-  `{transaction}`. Without `roleFile` a hire refuses not-configured.
-- Fire, before step A: instance-kept, unknown-role, organization-definition-refused (END_PROTECTED),
-  organization-instance-referenced (launch.by), and invalid-request for the last listed name.
-  Step A, one transaction: revoke the claims with the decision and reason, cancel open requests,
-  list taken ones, write `lifecycle.end {via: 'chief', by, runs, reason, kill: true}` when runs exist,
-  and `fire.stopped {cites, request}`. Step B: the writer's fire (already delisted is done). Step C,
-  one transaction: the consume with `{reason, transaction}` and `fire.done {cites, transaction}`.
-- The fire's own events cite the decision under `cites`, not `decision`, so `#spent` counts only the
-  consume. A failure at B or C leaves the decision unspent, so the repeat runs.
-- Choice: a repeat after a failed B or C asks for the kill again for any run of I still bound. A
-  revoked run stays bound until the launcher reports it ended, and a second signal to a dead
-  process does nothing. The tradeoff is a duplicate `lifecycle.end` against a run that may outlive
-  the first one.
-- W-N1 `#firing`: a `fire.stopped` with no `fire.done` for the same `cites`. It refuses
-  instance-firing at the human and tester verbs (`#launchable`), at the take of a launch or
-  regenerate (`#takeRefusal`), and at the chief's `role.launch` (`#authorityFor`).
-- `#organizationFail` passes the writer's own definition-not-hireable and instance-kept through by
-  name for hire and fire. They come from the file as it stands, after the broker's checks passed.
-- `lifecycleView` shows `kill: true` when the request carries it.
-- Deferred: the kill escalation in the launcher (S3, S6).
-- Tests: `packages/bus/tests/chief-of-staff.test.mjs`, 16 new (T8 x5, T8a, T8b x2, T9 x2, T9c x2,
-  T10, T18, the runtime end to end, W-N1 at the take). 39 in the file pass. Probe mutants on 21
-  lines (the arguments check, each W-N1 site, M60's version check, keep, the other-business check,
-  last-listed, kill, the chief's list, noHire, role-not-chief, the pre-check consume, both consumes'
-  events, the raise's argument rules, the revoke, the cancel, the pass-through, the view's kill) all
-  died. They are not the M-list run.
-
-## S2e notes (PRD 1.7 REQ-COS-3 routing, sage-1471, mos-1089)
-
-- Role-policy change, for Webby to review on its own: `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole gains
-  `role.hire` and `role.fire`. `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`
-  move both from the hard waits to ROUTED. `roles/chief-of-staff.md` and `roles/pm.md` drop them from
-  the hard-wait list, which `workflow-roles.test.mjs:113` pins to GATED_ONLY. No other shipped role
-  gains either action, and `role.test.mjs` pins that.
-- The call takes the reason form, as `role.end` does: `instance.hire {name, definition, vars?, reason}`
-  and `instance.fire {name, reason}`, with no decision. The reason is 1-500 characters for both.
-- Choice: the decision form is gone, not kept beside the reason form. A within-role raise closes at
-  once, so a decision there adds an event and no check. The `decision.raise` `arguments` key from S2d
-  goes with it. Tradeoff: if a later PRD gates hire again, the raise path comes back as new code.
-- Choice: hire takes a reason too. The PRD logs every hire and fire with its reason.
-- Order: tester-refused, read-only and agent-required, keys, `role-not-chief` (launch.by),
-  not-configured, `#checkAuthority` with `{target: name}`, instance-kept. `role-not-chief` comes before
-  the authority check, so a non-chief role refuses `role-not-chief` even when its file grants the
-  actions. A chief whose file lacks the grant refuses `decision-required`.
-- The writer gets only its own keys. The reason goes in the change context `{instance, run, reason}`,
-  which changes.jsonl records. The hire's consume detail is `{reason, transaction}`.
-- W-N1 `#firing` now goes by order, since the reason form has no decision id: a `fire.stopped` of the
-  subject with no later `fire.done` (`seq` after it) for the same subject. `fire.stopped` carries
-  `{action, request}` and `fire.done` `{action, transaction}`.
-- Harness: the typed `hire` and `fire` tools (verbs `instance.hire` and `instance.fire`) come forward
-  from S4, because a held action with no typed tool fails `untypedActions`. Each tool follows its own
-  grant. `roles/chief-of-staff.md` already names them. The rest of the S4 contract text and the runner
-  end to end for hire and fire stay in S4.
-- Going live is a later re-pin step with Mos (sage-1471). Landing the change doesn't put it on the live
-  stack.
-- Correction to S2d (found in S2e): S2d's broker imported `business/src/role.mjs`, which is not in
-  `seat/src/sandbox.mjs` RUNNER_FILES. The runner imports broker.mjs, so a session died with
-  ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND: cli `launcher.test.mjs` failed 15 of 29 and seat `sandbox.test.mjs` 4 of 10 at
-  089b92ca3. A bisect showed S2c passes 29 of 29. I had not run those two files for S2d. Fix:
-  `unhireableAction` moves into vocabulary.mjs, which is mounted, and role.mjs re-exports it.
-  RUNNER_FILES is unchanged, so the sandbox boundary does not widen. Rule from here (sage-1497): a
-  change to broker.mjs imports, or those of any RUNNER_FILES file, runs these four singly: seat
-  `sandbox.test.mjs`, cli `launcher.test.mjs`, cli `thread-launch.test.mjs` and cli
-  `git-socket.test.mjs`.
-- Mutant (sage-1497): broker.mjs imports `unhireableAction` from role.mjs again. Killed: sandbox.test
-  fails 4 of 10 (role.mjs outside RUNNER_FILES), launcher.test 15 of 29, thread-launch 7 of 11. git-socket
-  passes 24 of 24 under it, so it does not catch this one and stays on the list for its own sandbox runs.
-- Tests: `packages/bus/tests/chief-of-staff.test.mjs` S2d block rewritten to the reason form (39 pass),
-  with new tests for the reason bounds, `role-not-chief` with the grant, `decision-required` for a chief
-  without each grant, W-N1 by order, and the runtime end to end with the reason in the receipt context.
-  `packages/harness/tests/tools.test.mjs` gains the hire and fire tool shape test, and that no coder,
-  reviewer or pm gets either tool.
-- Probe (not the M-list run): 16 mutants, all killed. ROUTED drops of each action in the broker and in
-  vocabulary, the role file drops of each, `#firing` without the order and without the subject, the
-  reason unchecked, the writer given the reason, the context without it, no `#checkAuthority`, no
-  `role-not-chief`, the consume without the reason, the hire tool's reason optional, and the fire tool
-  gated on the hire grant. The last one survived at first and a one-grant check in tools.test killed it.
-
-## S3a notes (the launcher's lifecycle pass)
-
-- `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs` `lifecyclePass` runs on the tick after the thread and land passes.
-  It lists the open requests (host op `lifecycleRequests`) and carries each under `serialize`: the
-  take, the act, then `lifecycleDone`. A take that answers no closes nothing more here. A refusal
-  goes in the launch log as `refused` with the request id. A done that throws leaves the request
-  taken with no done, which S3b's CLI reports as `outcome-unknown`. The log line names a run that
-  did start.
-- Launch: `check()` and `start()` gain `human`. The human's request may name any declared instance,
-  as V2 asks. The listing limits the chief. launch.by still takes the `pm` branch (N8). A tester
-  request launches with `launchedBy: "tester"`.
-- End: SIGTERM to each run the verb named and to any other run of the instance in the registry,
-  each after the start-time check, with a `lifecycle-end` entry. The exit handler writes the one
-  `end` record. A thread instance's end signals only the runs the verb named, so the tester's end
-  leaves the human's threads alone. No SIGKILL escalation here: that is row 191's stop (S6).
-- Regenerate: the end's signals, then a wait until the old run leaves the registry, then a launch.
-  The wait runs under `serialize`, so no other start runs meanwhile. Past the request's mark
-  (`at` + 60 s, `lifecycleRequestMs` for tests) it closes `regenerate-timeout` and starts nothing. A
-  closing host closes it `host-closing`. Tradeoff: one stuck regenerate holds other starts for up to
-  60 s. The other choice, a second pass that comes back for it, needed state across ticks for the
-  same result.
-- Delete (V5 steps 1-3): `instance-running` against the registry first, then `lifecycleDelete` (the
-  writer's commit), then the rename of `workspaces/<b>/I/` to `workspaces/<b>/.retired/I-<tx>/`,
-  both 0700. The file goes first, so a failed rename can't leave a launchable name on the old
-  workspace. A failed rename closes `workspace-rename-failed` with the transaction. A later delete of
-  the name is the retry, and the broker now answers the failed transaction, so the rename target is
-  the same (changed assertion above). No workspace means nothing to rename.
-- `--no-launch` (row 163): the ticker now runs on a no-launch host, but only the lifecycle pass, and
-  `act` closes each request `launches-disabled` before any signal, start or rename. The thread and
-  land passes stay off, so `launcher.test.mjs`'s no-launch tests pass unchanged.
-- Tests: new `packages/cli/tests/lifecycle.test.mjs`, 9 tests on the in-process host of
-  thread-launch.test.mjs, with ticks called by the test: T2 (unlisted and launch.by launches, a
-  request past 60 s, a check refusal with its code in the log), T3 (`--no-launch`, `capacity-full`
-  with the limit in the log, `instance-running`), T4 (end at the verb, the signal, one end record,
-  the cancelled request never runs), T5 (a new run on the same workspace, `regenerate-timeout`
-  with a SIGSTOPped runner, `regenerate-thread` at the verb), V5 (a failed rename then the retry,
-  modes 0700, no workspace).
-- Singles at S3a: seat sandbox 10/10, cli launcher 29/29, thread-launch 11/11, git-socket 24/24,
-  bus lifecycle-verbs 12/12, cli instances 6/6, cli lifecycle 9/9, bus process 8/8. broker.mjs
-  imports did not change, and the four must-run files ran anyway.
-
-## S3b notes (the CLI verbs)
-
-- `packages/cli/src/instances.mjs`: `business instance launch|regenerate BUSINESS I [--wait S]
-  [--tester]`, `terminate BUSINESS I [--reason TEXT] [--tester]`, `delete BUSINESS I --revision REV
-  [--wait S]` and `business veto BUSINESS keep|unkeep INSTANCE|nohire|hire DEFINITION --revision
-  REV`. `--wait` takes 0 to 600 s and defaults to 30. Every usage error exits 4 before any bus call.
-  add and set refuse `--wait` and `--reason`.
-- Launch, regenerate and delete print the request id on stderr, then poll `instance.request` every
-  200 ms. Closed with a run or a transaction prints it and exits 0. A refusal prints its reason, the
-  request id and any transaction. A cancel prints who cancelled it. Still open at `--wait` says so and
-  names the 60 s expiry. Taken with no done is `outcome-unknown` and points at the launch log.
-  Terminate doesn't wait: it prints the revoked runs, the cancelled requests and any taken request
-  past cancelling.
-- Exit codes: every lifecycle outcome that isn't done (refusal, cancel, still open, outcome unknown)
-  exits 3, as the design's `--wait` timeout does. Tradeoff: errors.mjs has 1 for an unknown outcome
-  elsewhere. One code lets a script treat "the request did not do it" as one case, and the message
-  says which. A refusal at the verb keeps the transport's code (2), as add and set do.
-- The bus `instances` read gains `running` per instance (`#running`, from the claims), so the CLI
-  and S5 can show it without a second verb. An answer with no instances map passes through as
-  before. `bus instances-verb.test.mjs`'s stub writer answers `{ok: true}` and caught the first
-  version, which threw. The CLI view marks `kept` and `running r1, r2` and adds `retired:` and
-  `the chief may not hire:` lines.
-- `scripts/mosaic` sends `business veto` to packages/cli with instances and instance.
-- Tests: cli `instances.test.mjs` +8: the V6 veto ops and kept-delete refusal, the `running` read,
-  launch and regenerate printing the run, a closed refusal with its id (exit 3), `--wait 0` still
-  open and taken `outcome-unknown`, request-cancelled, terminate output and `not-held`, delete to
-  its transaction and `workspace-rename-failed` naming it, usage errors (exit 4, no call), and the
-  scripts/mosaic veto route. The existing route test gains the veto assertions. cli
-  `lifecycle.test.mjs` +5: the CLI end to end through the pass (launch, regenerate, `capacity-full`
-  with the request id, terminate, delete), T2a (`launch-revoked` at the take with no process, a
-  done that fails once leaves the request taken and the next pass starts nothing), T4 (a spawned
-  run the bus never bound is signalled, a mismatched start time is not), T6 (run evidence bytes
-  unchanged by a delete, the launch log only grows, a create and a launch of the retired name
-  refuse), T11 (two roots with business `acme`: a launch, a terminate and a delete in one leave the
-  other's files byte-identical). bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` +1: T11's bus half, a chief on a bus
-  with two businesses hires and fires only in its own.
-- Not covered here: T6's `instance-starting` and the V5 refusal order are bus tests from S2c.
-  `check()` refusing a retired name is shown through the verb and the take, since `check()` reads a
-  file that no longer lists the name.
-- Singles at S3b: cli instances 14/14, cli lifecycle 14/14, bus lifecycle-verbs 12/12, bus
-  instances-verb 3/3 (after the fix), bus chief-of-staff 40/40, webui instances 5/5, seat sandbox
-  10/10, cli launcher 29/29, thread-launch 11/11, git-socket 24/24, usage 2/2, project 4/4, app
-  30/30, host 42/42, tester-threads 5/5, tester-reads 6/6, stack-copy 12/12, queue dispatch 4/4,
-  runs task-cli 9/9, webui pinned-copy 10/10, service 31/31, views 3/3. The broker change adds no
-  import. The four must-run files ran while the `instances` guard was being written, and the guard
-  touches only the read. No test pins a hash of scripts/mosaic.
-
-## S4 notes (the launch tool takes a hire, D3 item 5)
-
-- `packages/harness/src/tools.mjs`: the launch tool's `instance` is a string with the ID_PATTERN
-  pattern, not an enum fixed when the bundle was built. The start-time listing stays in the
-  description. The host checks the listing at each launch (`instance-not-listed`), so the chief
-  launches its own hire in the same session. The hire and fire tools came forward in S2e.
-- The runner does not enforce a tool's schema pattern. A bad name reaches the host and refuses
-  `instance-not-listed`, so the end-to-end test asserts that. M15 (the enum kept) is killed by the
-  tools.test shape assertion, not by the end-to-end test.
-- `packages/cli/tests/lifecycle.test.mjs` gains the T8 end to end: the chief's session hires
-  `sec-2` (definition chief-information-security-officer, the shipped definition `hireable` accepts:
-  message.send and record.write, no credential) with `TOOL hire`, a launch refuses `no-route`, the
-  human sets the route with `instances.set` op change, the same session launches it (launchedBy
-  chief), `NOT A NAME` and `reviewer` refuse `instance-not-listed`, then `TOOL fire` ends its run,
-  leaves it `launched: false` and a later launch refuses `instance-not-listed`.
-- Route gap, raised with Sage (honker-0027): harness, model and thinking are agent-layer vars
-  (`business/src/vars.mjs:142-147`) and hire vars allow only model and limits.* (N3). So a hire runs
-  only after the human sets harness and thinking. D3 item 5 says the same session launches it, and
-  it does, after that human step. Letting hire vars carry the route would widen the chief's
-  authority, a policy change that is not mine to make. As built the human step stays, and
-  `roles/chief-of-staff.md` says so. Sage ruled (b) in sage-1521: the human route step stays, and
-  the manifest notes say that launch refuses `no-route` until the human sets the route.
-- sage-1521 also keeps exit 3 for every lifecycle outcome but done (outcome-unknown included, the
-  S3b tradeoff line above stands for Webby) and the S3a choices (a `--no-launch` host runs only the
-  lifecycle pass, `lifecycleDelete` answers the transaction on a retry). `roles/chief-of-staff.md`
-  is role policy: the manifest names it and the review request flags it as a policy change.
-- `roles/chief-of-staff.md` (role policy, named in the manifest): one paragraph on the hire's route
-  step and on a fired instance staying in the file off the list.
-- Singles, each run alone: business chief-of-staff 10/10, spec-review-contracts 3/3, role 19/19,
-  resolve 10/10, harness bundle 22/22, tools 23/23, runner 34/34, pi-session 8/8, seat sandbox
-  10/10, cli launcher 29/29, thread-launch 11/11, git-socket 24/24, lifecycle 15/15, webui reads
-  11/11. No test pins a hash of tools.mjs or roles/chief-of-staff.md. tools.mjs gains an import from
-  vocabulary.mjs, already in RUNNER_FILES, and the four must-run files passed after it.
-
-## Rebase onto row 192 (2026-10-20T22:10Z)
-
-Row 192 (4429a104f, Q175 phase 1 SSO) changed webui `serve.mjs`, `cli.mjs`, `app.js` and
-`index.html`, the files S5 changes. Before S5 the branch was rebased onto origin/refactor
-f41729178 as `honker/row194-b2`. `honker/row194` stays at f70b4da50 (no force-push). The only file
-both sides changed was `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`, whose blob was the same on both (9bfc6f76), so its five
-draft commits dropped as already upstream. The tree check: the rebased tip differs from f70b4da50
-by exactly the base's changes. Every test file the branch changes, the four must-run files and
-webui sso, service and reads were run again singly on the new base: 23 files, all pass.
-
-## S5 notes (the Console's Agents section, D7)
-
-- `packages/webui/src/public/agents.js` (new, `window.MosaicAgents.section`): Settings draws it after
-  the role instances, from the same instances read. The table has instance, definition, launched, kept
-  and running runs, and each row has Launch, a reason box and Terminate. A human also gets Regenerate,
-  Keep or Unkeep, and Delete. The protected assistant has no Delete. Each definition has a No-hire or
-  Allow-hiring button, and a Create form adds an instance of an accepted definition. Retired names show
-  as one line. D7's "retired" column is that line, since a retired name has no instance row.
-- Regenerate and Delete take a second click. The confirm says what happens: for Delete, "Its evidence
-  and its workspace under .retired stay." Cancel asks nothing.
-- Choice: every answer that names a request is followed at `/api/agent/request` every 2 s, up to 90
-  reads, until the request closes. D7 names launch and regenerate. Delete and terminate also answer a
-  request (S2c), so the page follows them too, and the receipt shows the close or its refusal reason.
-  A failed read is shown and the poll goes on. The request is never sent again. Past 90 reads the page
-  says the request is still open and asks for a fresh read. A sign-out stops the poll.
-- With `send` false the section shows "Agent actions are unavailable here. Use mosaic business instance
-  from the instance CLI." and every control is disabled. The tester sees Launch and Terminate only.
-- `serve.mjs`: `/api/instances` takes op `delete` with the revision and the instance alone and answers
-  the request. `/api/agent/launch`, `/regenerate`, `/terminate` and `/api/veto` each have
-  `instanceSend`'s boundary and one call to `agentWrite`, with only the route's keys. A reason is never
-  logged. `GET /api/agent/request?id=` takes one request id and adds the reason for a closed refusal or
-  a cancel. Every refusal code the S2/S3 verbs answer has a reason line (`AGENT_REASONS`), and a code
-  missing there shows as itself. No route has a `--send` exception.
-- `cli.mjs`: `agentWrite` reaches only `instance.launch`, `instance.regenerate`, `instance.end`,
-  `veto.set` and `instance.request` (`agentCaller` throws for any other). The tester listener gets
-  launch, end and request only (D4.1).
-- D4.1 at the webui: the tester listener lets launch and terminate through and refuses regenerate and
-  veto with no call. A tester delete on `/api/instances` is refused in `instanceSend` with no call
-  (`tester-refused`). The bus refuses it too (broker tester-refused), and this keeps the webui from
-  asking. The agents test covers it, and with the guard removed that test fails (control run).
-- Deferred to S6: the "still running after fire" flag needs the `lifecycle.end.alive` event, which
-  comes with row 191's stop.
-- Tests: webui `agents.test.mjs` (new, 8: actions and logs, boundary refusals, read-only, refusal and
-  unknown outcomes, the request read, delete, tester routes, agents.js served) and
-  `agents-browser.test.mjs` (new, 1: read-only, launch followed to close, confirms, terminate reason,
-  refusal, keep and unknown outcome).
-- Singles, each run alone, after the last code change: webui agents 8/8, agents-browser 1/1, browser
-  1/1, instances 5/5, instances-browser 1/1, serve 4/4, service 31/31, sso 28/28, sso-browser 2/2,
-  routes 5/5, routes-browser 1/1, tester-listener 10/10, tester-browser 2/2, tester-cli 2/2,
-  settings-write 4/4, send 13/13, send-browser 2/2, shell 5/5, cli launcher 29/29, thread-launch
-  11/11, git-socket 24/24, stack-copy 12/12, cli stack-release 174/174, seat sandbox 10/10. No test
-  pins a hash of a file S5 changes. shell.test reads bus.js strings and its POST count, which S5 leaves
-  alone because agents.js holds the section's writes.
-
-## Item 7 plan (brief rev 2547, sage-1586, from row 199 N2, duckworth-0068)
-
-Choice: create states that the agent needs a restart before `issue`. It doesn't register the entry with
-the running bus.
-
-- Today create and hire refuse a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-
-  scope`, `instance-settings.mjs:75-77`). So no created agent has a credential entry, and item 7 has nothing
-  to act on until row 199 lands. Row 199's D13 (origin/megavolt/row199-on-190
-  `agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/DESIGN.md:295-307`) has row 194 lift that refusal for the human's create
-  only. The agent is created with `store` references and no files. Hire stays uncredentialed.
-- The runtime already treats credential references as fixed at start (`runtime.mjs:115-134`). A file whose
-  references differ from the boot copy isn't reloaded, and `instances.set` answers `restart: true`
-  (`runtime.mjs:182`). The CLI prints RESTART_NEEDED (`packages/cli/src/instances.mjs:59, 235`), and the
-  Console's instances section prints RESTART_TEXT (`packages/webui/src/public/bus.js:691, 733`). So after the
-  lift, a human create of a credentialed definition answers `restart: true` with no new runtime code.
-  `credentials.issue` then refuses `credential-unknown`, because the broker's copy of the business doesn't
-  hold the agent (`broker.mjs:1443` on row 199) and Credentials has no reference for it
-  (`credentials.mjs:148-150, 157`).
-- Why not register: registering means a new path in row 199's Credentials that adds references to a running
-  store, plus a change to the fixed-at-start rule that row 194's D3 review accepted. The restart route changes
-  neither. It costs one bus restart per credentialed create, which the human already makes for any credential
-  change.
-- Build, after row 199 lands and this branch moves onto it (new branch name, no force):
-  1. `instance-settings.mjs`: a human `add` of a credentialed definition writes `store` references with the
-     date fields row 199 requires and no files. Hire keeps the refusal. The human's create is
-     `instances.set` op `add` (agents.js posts it to /api/instances), so it already answers `restart`. The
-     runtime comment at `runtime.mjs:115-116` ("Create and hire add neither") changes to say a human create
-     can.
-  2. `agents.js` createAgent: the receipt carries the answer's restart text, as bus.js does. Today it says
-     "Created X." and drops `restart`.
-  3. T19, bus test: a human create of a credentialed definition answers `restart: true`. Issue refuses
-     `credential-unknown` before a restart. After a bus restart over the same directories, issue works and the
-     status reads `valid`. Hire of the same definition still refuses. A browser assertion covers the restart
-     text in the Agents receipt.
-  4. Mutants: M61 the create refusal stays for the human (T19 fails at create). M62 `fixedRole` ignores
-     `credentials`, so the reload goes live and answers `restart: false` (T19 fails). M63 the Agents receipt
-     drops the restart text.
-- D13's revoke on fire and delete: Sage put it in row 194 as brief item 8 (sage-1588). See the item 8 plan.
-
-## Item 8 plan (brief rev 2556, 722136772, sage-1588, row 199 D13)
-
-`fire` and `delete` call `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before they change the
-business file. A failed revoke stops the verb with `credential-revoke-failed` and leaves the file unchanged.
-
-- Order: the verb's own checks, then the revoke, then the write. A verb its checks refuse revokes nothing.
-  Fire's checks are `instance-settings.mjs:254-265` (unknown, kept, end-protected, launch.by, last name).
-  Delete's are `planDelete` (`instance-settings.mjs:189-193`). A delete writes in the launcher's pass,
-  through `set` op `delete` after the take (comment at `instance-settings.mjs:187-188`), so its revoke goes
-  there, after `planDelete` and before the commit. The write runs under the same revision the
-  checks read, so a revision race refuses as today, after the revoke. That leaves an agent revoked with its
-  file unchanged, which is the safe side: Jason runs `issue` again if they still want it.
-- Where: the business package doesn't import the bus. The runtime passes the instance writer a revoke
-  callback, and fire and delete call it between the checks and the write. With no Credentials store (no
-  row 199 config) the callback is absent and nothing changes.
-- A fire of a name that isn't in `launch.instances` writes nothing (`instance-settings.mjs:262`) and calls
-  no revoke.
-- A revoke for an agent the running bus has no entry for (sage-1592): `credential-unknown` counts as
-  nothing to revoke only when the agent has no token file under the store, `secrets/agents/<business>/
-  <agent>/`. If a file is there while the bus doesn't know the entry (a file issued before a restart that
-  dropped the entry), the verb stops with `credential-revoke-failed`, so no agent is fired with its token
-  still on disk. Every other refusal stops the verb too.
-- Row 199 as of 86963d281 (origin/megavolt/row199-on-190) doesn't cover that case. `revoke(instance,
-  service)` calls `#known` first (`credentials.mjs:197-198`), and `#known` refuses `credential-unknown`
-  from the boot-time entries alone (`credentials.mjs:148-150`). It never looks at the disk. The store path
-  is `<storeRoot>/<business>/<agent>/<service>` (`credentials.mjs:71-76`), with storeRoot
-  `<configDir>/secrets/agents` (`credentials.mjs:40`). So the extra check stays: on `credential-unknown`,
-  look for any entry in the agent's store directory. Recheck at landing. If the landed revoke deletes or
-  refuses in that case, cite the line and drop the check.
-- Also to recheck at landing: D13's call reads `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})`, but
-  the class method is per service, `revoke(instance, service)`, and `remove(instance)` revokes every
-  service and then clears the agent's directory (`credentials.mjs:211-218`). The broker verb
-  `credentials.revoke` takes `agent, service, reason` (`broker.mjs:1437`). The build uses whatever the
-  landed code offers for every service of one agent, and records which.
-- Sage's pick (sage-1593): fire calls `revoke(instance, service)` for each service in the agent's entry
-  and keeps the directory, so the status still reads revoked and Jason deletes the Gitea or Vikunja token
-  (199 A5). Delete calls `remove(instance)`. Both count as the revoke for the order, the refusal on
-  failure, T20 and M64-M67. If the landed code differs from 86963d281, follow it and note the difference
-  here.
-- What that does to the sage-1592 check, as of 86963d281: `remove` takes its services from the boot-time
-  entries, so for an unknown agent it revokes nothing and doesn't refuse. It then lists the agent's store
-  directory and unlinks every token and tmp file, refusing `credential-file` for any other name
-  (`credentials.mjs:211-224`). So delete already leaves no token on disk, and the extra check applies to
-  fire only (sage-1592: cite the line and drop it). T20's delete case with a file and no entry expects the
-  file gone and the delete done. M67 runs against fire only. Recheck all of this at landing.
-- The reason: fire carries the chief's reason from the change context. Delete carries the human's request
-  reason. The actor is the verb's actor.
-- T20, bus tests, each for fire and for delete:
-  - With a credentialed agent: the revoke runs, the status reads revoked, and the file changes.
-  - With a revoke that fails (a stub store that throws): the verb refuses `credential-revoke-failed`, the
-    file's revision is unchanged, and the agent is still listed.
-  - The revoke runs before the write. The stub records the file revision it saw, and that revision is the
-    old one.
-  - With no entry in the running bus but a token file in the agent's store directory: the verb refuses
-    `credential-revoke-failed` and the file's revision is unchanged. With no entry and no file: the verb
-    goes on and the file changes (sage-1592).
-- Mutants: M64 drop the revoke call (the success case fails, the status isn't revoked). M65 move the revoke
-  after the write (the order check fails). M66 ignore the revoke's failure (the failing case writes the
-  file). M67 treat any `credential-unknown` as nothing to revoke (the token-on-disk case writes the file).
-  M64-M66 run against fire and delete, M67 against fire only (see sage-1593 above): M64a-b to M66a-b, M67.
-
-
-## b3 notes (items 7 and 8 on row 199's landing cb5fdb064, sage-1601)
-
-Branch `honker/row194-b3`, a new name per sage-1601. Its first commit 589ae2c1d squashes honker/row194-b2
-85edab7c7 onto cb5fdb064. A rebase of b2's commits stopped on the same five files many times, so I
-squashed. The five conflicts kept both sides:
-
-- broker imports, constructor, dispatch, and the credential and lifecycle verbs
-- runtime imports
-- the organization write, which takes detail and context
-- cli credentials and veto dispatch
-- the vocabulary comment, as row 199 wrote it
-
-Line numbers below are the b3 tip's.
-
-### Deviations from brief 722136772 and plan 85edab7c7
-
-1. Item 7 dates, sage-1605 pick (a). The human create writes the UTC create day as `rotateBy` and `expires`
-   (`instance-settings.mjs:118-120`). `checkCredentialRef` skips both date checks only for a store
-   reference with no file (ENOENT), and keeps the "not issued" warning (`business/src/credentials.mjs:73,
-   79-81, 110-113`). Every other reference keeps the checks. Tests: `business/tests/cli.test.mjs` "validate:
-   a not-issued store agent dated today passes, and an issued one with a past expiry fails", and T19 in
-   `instance-settings.test.mjs` (validate exits 0 with "not issued").
-2. fixedRole, sage-1605. A reference compares by kind and path only (`runtime.mjs:154-167`), because row
-   199's issue rewrites the date in the file outside the reload. Test: T19 in `bus/tests/reload.test.mjs`
-   (add, restart, issue, then a vars change goes live with restart false). The T14 date-only test stays.
-3. Delete takes all-store references, sage-1605. `deleteRefusal` refuses only when some reference isn't
-   `store: true` (`instance-settings.mjs:43-49`). A file or env reference refuses
-   `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` at the request, before any take (T20 delete case 2).
-4. Fire on a file or env reference revokes in memory, sage-1605. The result's `credentials.outsideStore`
-   names the services whose reference is outside the store (`runtime.mjs:122-124, 141-142`). T20 fire
-   case 1 checks `outsideStore: ['vikunja']` for coder.
-5. The `credential-revoke-failed` store-dir check stays, sage-1605 (`runtime.mjs:132-140`). It now runs after
-   delete's `remove` too. `remove` already leaves no token, so on delete it only refuses a name `remove`
-   would itself have refused.
-6. Tracker on add, honker-0049 and sage-1610 (a). A human add takes an optional `tracker: {bot, botId}`.
-   It is required for a definition with a vikunja credential (`organization-tracker-required`) and refused
-   for any other (`invalid-request`). checkBot and the bot uniqueness rule (other instances and
-   `tracker.sync`) run on the add path (`instance-settings.mjs:88-124`, `organization-tracker-bot-taken`).
-   `change` with a tracker refuses (`instance-settings.mjs:214`). The broker passes `tracker` through
-   (`broker.mjs:193-194`). CLI: `instance add ... [--bot BOT --bot-id N]` (`cli/src/instances.mjs:13, 73,
-   87-90, 107`, reasons at 22-27). The Console doesn't take a tracker: `INSTANCE_KEYS` in serve.mjs is
-   unchanged, the Agents and Settings forms still list credentialed definitions as not accepted, and a
-   vikunja add from the Console answers `organization-tracker-required` with a reason that names the CLI
-   (`webui/src/serve.mjs:332-333`, `webui/tests/instances.test.mjs`).
-7. Delete with a tracker bot, sage-1610 (b). The delete's result names the bot and says to remove the
-   Vikunja bot user and any token by hand (199 A5) (`instance-settings.mjs:199-202`). `lifecycleDelete`
-   returns `bot` (`broker.mjs:1386-1387`), the launcher carries it to `lifecycleDone`
-   (`cli/src/launcher.mjs:752-767`), `lifecycleDone` takes `bot` checked against BOT_NAME
-   (`broker.mjs:132, 1392-1393`), and `lifecycleView` shows it (`broker.mjs:147`). The CLI line
-   (`cli/src/instances.mjs:177-180`) and the Agents receipt (`webui/src/public/agents.js:113-115`) name it.
-   Tests: T20 bus delete case 1, T20 in `cli/tests/lifecycle.test.mjs`, and `agents-browser.test.mjs`.
-8. No Vikunja account. The create makes none and the delete removes none. Q188 and the `account.create`
-   hard wait aren't touched (sage-1610).
-9. The tester's add keeps the credential refusal. Row 175 W2 (`bus/tests/tester-writes.test.mjs:91`)
-   says the tester refuses credentials, and items 7 and sage-1610 name the human's add. The writer lifts
-   the refusal only when the actor isn't `tester` (`instance-settings.mjs` add, the `definitionFor` call).
-   The broker reserves that name: no human or role may be called `tester` (`broker.mjs:234, 237`). W2 has a
-   new case, a tester add with a valid tracker, which still refuses `organization-credentials-out-of-scope`.
-10. The commit hook is `beforeWrite` (`instance-settings.mjs:332-360`). A first draft named it `before`
-    beside a `let before`, a SyntaxError, so I renamed it.
-11. A failed delete revokes first. `Credentials.remove` revokes every service it knows before it reads the
-    directory (row 199 `bus/src/credentials.mjs` remove). When the directory then holds a name `remove`
-    refuses, the delete stops with the business file unchanged and the tokens already gone. That is the safe
-    side and matches item 8's note on a revision race. T20 delete case 1 asserts it.
-12. T20 uses real failures, not a stub store: a 0500 agent directory (fire) and a foreign file in the
-    store (delete). The revoke-before-write order is checked by the failing cases: a revoke after the write
-    would leave the file changed (M65).
-
-### Hunks for Duckworth's scoped check (sage-1605)
-
-- `packages/business/src/credentials.mjs`: 12 (DATE_KEY exported), 73, 79-81 (notIssued), 110-113 (the
-  no-file skip).
-- Credential verbs: `packages/bus/src/credential-verbs.mjs` and `bus/src/credentials.mjs` are unchanged from
-  cb5fdb064. The broker's `#requestCredential` (`broker.mjs:1679-1709`) is row 199's text as merged in the
-  589ae2c1d squash. b3's own credential hunks: the runtime revoke callback (`runtime.mjs:109-143`) and the
-  broker's `credential-revoke-failed` mapping (`broker.mjs:1816-1817`).
-- fixedRole: `packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:154-167`.
-
-### Mutants to run on Sage's slot (after M1-M60)
-
-- M61 the human create keeps the credential refusal (T19 business and bus fail at create).
-- M62 `fixedRole` ignores `credentials` (bus T19 fails: restart false).
-- M63 the Agents create receipt drops the restart text (agents-browser fails).
-- M64a/b drop the revoke call on fire and delete (T20 success cases fail).
-- M65a/b move the revoke after the write (T20 failing cases see the file changed).
-- M66a/b ignore the revoke's failure (T20 failing cases write the file).
-- M67 any `credential-unknown` counts as nothing to revoke, with the store-dir check dropped (T20 fire
-  case 2 writes the file).
-- M68 fixedRole compares the whole reference, dates included (bus T19 fails: restart true after issue).
-- M69 `checkCredentialRef` drops the no-file condition (the issued-past-expiry validate test passes wrongly).
-- M70 drop the vikunja tracker requirement (T19 business and the CLI tracker-required case fail).
-- M71 `deleteRefusal` refuses a tracker bot again (T20 delete cases and CLI T20 fail).
-- M72 skip checkBot on the add path (T19 business bad name and bad botId fail).
-- M73 the tester's add binds credentials too (tester-writes W2 fails on both reviewer-2 cases).
-
-### Pins and a missed failure
-
-- `bus/tests/channel-proof.test.mjs` pins `webui/src/bus.mjs`. b3 adds two STATUS entries, so it is repinned
-  with a comment, as rows 165 and 171 did. No proof or transport change.
-- `bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's vocabulary import. b2 imported `unhireableAction`
-  and never updated the pin, so the test fails on b2 too. I have no log of it running on b2. b3 fixes the pin.
-- `bus/tests/tester-writes.test.mjs` W2 caught the tester binding credentials through a tracker add. The
-  writer now lifts the credential refusal only when the actor is not `tester` (deviation 9), and W2 has a
-  case with a valid bot that still refuses.
-
-### b3 singles (2026-10-21T01:02Z)
-
-Every test file under `packages/{business,bus,harness,cli,webui}/tests`, run singly with `node --test`:
-158 files, 1501 pass, 0 fail. The first pass failed channel-proof, project-runtime and tester-writes (fixed
-above). After the fixes and the tester change in `instance-settings.mjs`, 17 files reran singly: 167 pass,
-0 fail. The total uses the rerun counts for those 17, summed by awk over the logs. Suites and mutants
-M1-M73 wait on Sage's slot.
-
-### sage-1620 (2026-10-21T01:05Z)
-
-- W2 reading confirmed. Each refused W2 case now asserts the log length as well as the bytes and revision
-  (`bus/tests/tester-writes.test.mjs`, inside the loop). M73 stays in the batch.
-- Deviation 11 accepted. The refusal text says a retry is safe: `credential-revoke-failed` has a reason in
-  the CLI (`cli/src/instances.mjs` REASONS) and in the Console (`webui/src/serve.mjs` AGENT_REASONS, shown on
-  a closed request's read). CLI T20 now fails a delete with a foreign file in rev-2's store, checks the text
-  and the unchanged revision, then clears the file and deletes. Console agents.test checks the read's reason.
-- Mutants for the slot: M74 drops the CLI reason (CLI T20 fails); M75 drops the Console reason (agents.test
-  fails).
-- Seat: every `packages/seat/tests` file singly (164 pass, 0 fail, 7 files) and the seat suite whole
-  (`node --test tests/`, 164 pass, 0 fail), for the broker import change (row 210's gate finding).
-  Touched files singly after this change: tester-writes 8, cli lifecycle 16, cli instances 14, webui agents
-  8, agents-browser 1, all pass.
-
-### Follow-up for 194: N1, a revoke that succeeds before a failed write (sage-1630, 2026-10-21T01:15Z)
-
-Duckworth's N1 (#1692 comment 29818), noted here as a follow-up with no b3 change. When the revoke succeeds
-and the write then refuses `revision-conflict` or `outcome-unknown`, the business file is unchanged and the
-tokens are gone, but neither refusal says so. Only `credential-revoke-failed` has the retry-safe text.
-
-- Order: `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:361` runs `beforeWrite` (the revoke), then `:362` runs
-  `writer.write`, which checks the revision under its lock (`business/src/organization.mjs:188`) and again
-  before publication (`:215`).
-- Fire reads a fresh revision (`instance-settings.mjs:311`), so a conflict there needs a concurrent write.
-- Delete is not a race. It commits with the revision the request recorded at raise time
-  (`bus/src/broker.mjs:1855`, checked against the file then), passed at `broker.mjs:1382` and
-  `instance-settings.mjs:193-198`. Any organization write between the raise and the take makes that
-  revision stale, and nothing compares it before the revoke. So a delete taken after such a write revokes
-  the agent's tokens and then refuses `revision-conflict` with the instance still listed.
-- Fix options: compare the request's revision with the fresh read before `beforeWrite` (the writer still
-  re-checks under its lock); or run `beforeWrite` inside `writer.write` after the `:188` check; and in
-  either case give `revision-conflict` and `outcome-unknown` text that says tokens may already be revoked
-  when a revoke ran.
-
-### sage-1634: N1 fixed in b3 (2026-10-21T01:20Z)
-
-Sage ruled N1 a blocker for 194: it is the row's own code in files the row already changes. Option 1 is in.
-The section above stays as written; this entry supersedes its "no b3 change".
-
-- `business/src/instance-settings.mjs` `commit()`: before `beforeWrite`, compare the requested revision with
-  `writer.read(business).revision` and refuse `revision-conflict` on a difference, without calling
-  `beforeWrite`. It runs for every caller (add, set, veto, hire, fire, delete). Every caller already read the
-  file with `writer.read` (it validates), so a file that went invalid in between refuses `BusinessError`,
-  also before any revoke.
-- Fire reads its revision fresh (`:311`) in the same synchronous call, so it reaches a stale revision only
-  through another process writing between that read and `commit()`. No test makes that happen without an
-  injected writer; the check is the same line, and the delete test kills both mutants.
-- Test: bus `lifecycle-revoke.test.mjs` T21. A delete raised on revision R and taken; a credential issue for
-  rev-3 writes the file; the delete refuses `revision-conflict`. The business file's bytes and rev-2's
-  Credentials entry are unchanged, the vikunja token file is still there with its bytes, the store holds only
-  it, and the status reads valid.
-- Refusal text: `revision-conflict` says the file changed since that revision (CLI `instances.mjs` REASONS,
-  Console `serve.mjs` INSTANCE_REASONS). Neither says anything was revoked, so no change. The Console's
-  AGENT_REASONS has no entry for it.
-- Mutants for the slot: M76 drops the early check (T21 fails: the token file is removed); M77 moves it after
-  `beforeWrite` (T21 fails the same way, then refuses).
-- Runs, singly or whole as Sage asked: business whole 207 pass, bus whole 525 pass, seat whole 164 pass
-  (sandbox.test included), cli instances 14, cli lifecycle 16, webui agents 8, all 0 fail.
-
-Follow-up (option 2, not in b3): run `beforeWrite` inside `writer.write`, under its lock and after the
-`organization.mjs:188` check. Until then a window remains: a write landing between the early read and the
-writer's lock still lets a fire or delete revoke and then refuse `revision-conflict`, and an `outcome-unknown`
-after a revoke still doesn't say the tokens are gone.

agents/honker/work/queue-194/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,707 +0,0 @@
-# Row 194 design: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent veto
-
-Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` (blob a907109409ac). Gitea #1692. MVP T1 item 5 (mos-0974,
-mos-0977, DECISIONS Q176). Owner Honker, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at 53bb59462.
-Branch `honker/row194`.
-
-Related designs read: row 190 `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190/DESIGN.md` (r2, after mos-0986), row 191
-`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`. Row 193 is still in design. All line numbers below are at
-53bb59462.
-
-## Summary
-
-- One verb family on the CLI, `mosaic business instance <verb> BUSINESS INSTANCE`, and one Console section.
-  Create and delete change the business file. Launch, terminate and regenerate act on runs.
-- Every human verb goes through the bus with the human proof. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
-  launcher takes once and carries out under `serialize`. Launches go through the one `start()`, so
-  `--no-launch`, the limits, `launch.revoke` and row 191's switch all apply.
-- The chief hires (adds and lists an instance) and fires (ends its runs and delists it). It never deletes.
-  `role.hire` and `role.fire` are new hard waits, so Jason resolves each one (Mos, mos-1017). The routed
-  form waits on a PRD 1.7 draft in this packet.
-- A hire allowlist in code: the chief can hire only a definition whose every action is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`
-  (message, record, review request, assigned-task updates, and two actions that matter after row 199).
-  Launch, end, organization, naming, hire, verdict, merge and every later action stay out.
-- The per-agent forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes: `launch.keep`
-  (instances the chief can't fire, replace or end) and `launch.noHire` (definitions the chief can't hire).
-- The broker reloads a business from its file after each committed write. Create, delete, hire, fire and
-  veto changes then count without a bus restart. Hand edits still need one, except `bus.tester`.
-- No bus schema change and no migration. Named for review: two new vocabulary actions (hard waits), the
-  role-file `hireable` key, `"hireable": []` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json`, and three business-file keys.
-
-## What exists today (checked at 53bb59462)
-
-| # | Fact | Where |
-|---|---|---|
-| E1 | Instances are keys of the business file's `roles`. `launch.instances` lists those the chief may launch. The list must be non-empty | `business.mjs:121-132` |
-| E2 | The human adds an instance and changes its definition, vars and listing. No delete. Credentialed definitions are refused | `instance-settings.mjs:1-5, 22-31, 75-156` |
-| E3 | The broker copies the businesses once at start and refuses a role it doesn't know | `broker.mjs:208, 446` |
-| E4 | The chief launches over `launch.sock`. `fromSession` checks identity, then `check()` (which reloads the file), then `authorizeLaunch`, then `start()` | `launcher.mjs:232-327, 624-668` |
-| E5 | The chief's `launch` tool takes an enum of the instances listed when its bundle was built | `harness/src/tools.mjs:116-119` |
-| E6 | The chief ends a run with `role.revoke` plus a reason (`role.end`). Ending then launching again is already a replace | `broker.mjs:1601-1628`, `tools.mjs:167` |
-| E7 | `mosaic stop RUN` is a same-uid SIGTERM. It has no bus call and no human proof | `cli.mjs:447-454`, `seat/src/session.mjs:249-270` |
-| E8 | The Console stops only the assistant (`assistant.stop`) and writes instances through `instances.set` | `serve.mjs:282-289, 315-363, 535` |
-| E9 | The launcher already starts runs for the human on its 2 s tick: threads with pending messages, and merge holders | `launcher.mjs:133, 487-597` |
-| E10 | `launch.revoke` and `launch.restore` are human-only. A revoked business refuses `role.launch` | `broker.mjs:770-774, 2087-2095` |
-| E11 | Only the assistant is END_PROTECTED. Coder, reviewer, pm and cto all declare gitea and vikunja credentials | `vocabulary.mjs:135`, `roles/*.json` |
-
-The chief's veto today comes from the human-only membership in E2. The chief can only launch what the human
-listed. It has no way to create an instance, and the human has no way to stop the chief ending a given
-instance's runs.
-
-## D1. The verbs
-
-All of them are human verbs. Each is a broker verb behind `#human(s)` and then the D4 hook. Each logs its
-actor. The CLI usage joins `INSTANCES_USAGE` (`cli/src/instances.mjs:9`).
-
-| Verb | CLI | Bus verb | Effect |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| V1 create | `business instance add B I --definition DEF [--vars FILE] [--launch] --revision REV` | `instances.set` op `add` | as today, with no restart (D3) |
-| V2 launch | `business instance launch B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.launch` | one run, through the launcher |
-| V3 terminate | `business instance terminate B I [--reason TEXT]` | `instance.end` | ends every run of I and cancels I's open requests |
-| V4 regenerate | `business instance regenerate B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.regenerate` | V3, then V2 once the run has exited |
-| V5 delete | `business instance delete B I --revision REV [--wait SECONDS]` | `instances.set` op `delete` | a request. The launcher removes I from the business file and renames its workspace |
-| V6 veto | `business veto B (keep\|unkeep) I` and `business veto B (nohire\|hire) DEF`, each `--revision REV` | `veto.set` | edits `launch.keep` and `launch.noHire` |
-
-`mosaic business instances B` (read) gains, per instance: `running` (run ids from the bus claims), `kept`
-and `retired`. The top level gains `noHire`. `mosaic stop RUN` stays as it is. It is the same-uid operator
-tool, and V3 is the human verb.
-
-### D1.1 Requests (V2, V4, V5)
-
-The broker never starts a process or touches a workspace. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
-launcher carries out, as E9 already does for the human's threads. A request has three states, open, taken
-and closed, all recorded as `action.allowed` events with reserved action names:
-
-| Event | Written by | Body |
-|---|---|---|
-| `lifecycle.launch`, `lifecycle.regenerate`, `lifecycle.delete` | the broker, at the verb | `{ request, via }`, subject I, actor the human or `tester`. A `human.input` event goes with it, as `launch.revoke` does |
-| `lifecycle.taken` | host op `lifecycleTake` | `{ request }` |
-| `lifecycle.done` | host op `lifecycleDone` | `{ request, run? , refusal? }` |
-| `lifecycle.cancelled` | V3, for each open request of I | `{ request, by }` |
-
-1. The launcher's new `lifecyclePass` runs on the same tick as `threadPass` and `landPass`. It lists open
-   requests with host op `lifecycleRequests`.
-2. For each one, under `serialize`, it calls `lifecycleTake(request)`. That op runs in one store
-   transaction. It re-checks, in order: the request is still open (not taken, cancelled or closed), it is
-   less than 60 s old (else it closes as `request-expired`), the business isn't revoked (`launch_state`,
-   `launch-revoked`), I isn't retired, row 191's switch is off (`processing-halted`) for launch and
-   regenerate, and for a tester request `bus.tester` is true in the file (D4.1). Any failure closes the
-   request with that code. Otherwise it writes `lifecycle.taken` and answers go.
-3. Only after go does the pass act: `check(I, { human: true })` then `start()` for a launch, the V5 steps
-   for a delete.
-4. The pass then calls `lifecycleDone`. A taken request never runs again, whatever happens after the take.
-   If `lifecycleDone` throws, the request stays taken with no done event. The CLI reports that as
-   `outcome-unknown` with the request id, and the launcher log names the run.
-5. The CLI polls a read verb, `instance.request`, until the request closes or `--wait` runs out (default
-   30 s). A timeout exits 3 with the request id. An untaken request can still be taken within its 60 s.
-
-So the human's `launch.revoke` stops every untaken request, not only new ones (B4), and a bus restart
-can't start a request older than 60 s.
-
-### V2 launch
-
-1. At the verb the broker checks that I exists, isn't a thread instance (`not-thread-launch`: threads start
-   on a message), isn't retired, and that the business isn't revoked and, with row 191, isn't halted. These
-   repeat at the take (D1.1 item 2).
-2. After the take, `check(I, { human: true })` and `start({ instance: I, launchedBy })`, where
-   `launchedBy` is the business human or `tester`. `human: true` lets the human launch an instance that
-   isn't in `launch.instances`. The listing limits the chief, not the human. `launch.by` still goes through
-   the `pm: true` branch (`launcher.mjs:235`), as `--pm` does today. Every other step of `check()` and
-   `start()` is unchanged.
-
-### V3 terminate
-
-1. The broker revokes every claim I holds (`#claimEnd(s, h, 'revoke', null, reason, actor)`). A thread
-   instance has all its thread claims revoked, which is exactly `assistant.stop`.
-2. In the same transaction it writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for every open (untaken) request of I, so no
-   launch the human asked for before the terminate starts after it (B5).
-3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs. The launcher pass sends SIGTERM to each run's runner after
-   checking its start time, as the idle stop does (`launcher.mjs:526`). It also signals any run of I in the
-   launcher's registry that has spawned but not yet bound, which holds no claim yet. The existing exit
-   handler records the end, so the launch journal and `session.ended` are unchanged.
-4. Nothing held, nothing open and nothing in the registry answers `not-held`.
-5. Terminate is allowed while row 191's switch is on. It starts nothing.
-
-A taken launch request is past cancelling. Its run reaches the registry under `serialize`, and the next
-terminate ends it. The CLI's terminate output says so when a taken request exists.
-
-There is no SIGKILL escalation in this row. A run that ignores SIGTERM keeps running. `mosaic stop` and the
-limits are the operator's tools for it (N6).
-
-### V4 regenerate
-
-A fresh session with the same identity and role. It is V3 then V2 under one request. The pass takes the
-request, waits for the old run's exit handler, then runs `check()` and `start()`. The workspace stays, as
-it does across every launch today. The session is new because every non-thread launch gets a new run dir
-(`seat/src/session.mjs:107`, newRun). If the old run hasn't exited by the request's 60 s mark, the request
-closes as `regenerate-timeout`, nothing starts, and the old run is still running (N6).
-
-A thread instance (the assistant) refuses `regenerate-thread`. Its context lives in the thread's session
-directory, and clearing that is T1 item 7 (clear context). This row doesn't take it.
-
-### V5 delete
-
-`instances.set` gains op `delete`. At the verb the broker and the writer refuse, in this order:
-
-| Refusal | When |
-|---|---|
-| `tester-refused` | the caller is the tester (B6) |
-| `organization-definition-refused` | I is END_PROTECTED |
-| `organization-instance-referenced` | I is `launch.by` or an arbiter. The message names the reference |
-| `organization-instance-kept` | I is in `launch.keep`. The human runs `veto unkeep` first. Delete never clears a veto silently |
-| `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` | I holds credentials or a tracker bot. That stays a hand edit until the credentials row (row 199) |
-| `instance-running` | the broker sees a claim for I. The human terminates first |
-| `instance-starting` | an open or taken request for I has no done event |
-| BusinessError | I is the last name in `launch.instances` (E1). The message says so |
-
-The checks pass with no write, and the broker records a `lifecycle.delete` request. After the take, the
-launcher pass, under `serialize` so no `start()` of I runs alongside it:
-
-1. Re-checks the registry for I (`instance-running`) and re-runs the writer's checks against the file as it
-   stands. The `--revision` the human gave must still match, else `revision-conflict`.
-2. Commits the file through the organization writer. It removes `roles.I` and the references that exist
-   only for I: its `launch.instances` entry, its `launch.limits.tokens.instances` entry and its
-   per-instance model entry. It adds I to a new top-level list, `retired`. The build lists every place
-   `validateBusinessDocument` reads a role instance name and puts each one in one of the two groups (refuse
-   or remove). A reference the table doesn't name stops the build and goes back to Webby.
-3. Renames `workspaces/<b>/I/` to `workspaces/<b>/.retired/I-<transaction>/`, mode 0700. No workspace is
-   no rename.
-4. Calls `lifecycleDone` with the transaction.
-
-The file goes first. Once it is committed, `check()` refuses I as unknown, so no launch can open the old
-workspace even if step 3 fails. A failed rename closes the request with `workspace-rename-failed`, the
-transaction and the path left behind. A second `delete` of a retired name skips steps 1 and 2 and retries
-step 3 only. The file and evidence are already right, so this is the whole recovery.
-
-What stays:
-
-- Run evidence (`launches/<b>/<run>/`, `launches/<b>.jsonl`) and bus rows are untouched. They are
-  write-once.
-- The workspace, under `.retired`. This row deletes no file. A prune with a receipt is a later act.
-- `retired` stops a later create or hire from reusing the name. Decisions bind to the role instance and
-  outlive restarts (`broker.mjs:783-788`). A new `coder` would otherwise inherit an approval raised by the
-  old one. The tradeoff is a name that can't come back without a hand edit. I chose that over voiding
-  decisions, which would touch a second store.
-
-### V6 veto
-
-`veto.set` args: `{ revision, op: "keep" | "unkeep" | "nohire" | "hire", name }`. It goes through the
-organization writer, so it is logged with actor and diff in `changes.jsonl`. `keep` needs a declared,
-non-END_PROTECTED instance. `nohire` needs a name that matches the id pattern. A no-op answers
-`organization-no-change`. It is human-only and isn't in `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS`.
-
-## D2. Chief hire and fire
-
-### D2.1 Authority (Mos, mos-1015 and mos-1017, through Sage, sage-1362 and sage-1365)
-
-This row adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `ACTIONS` (`vocabulary.mjs:11`). Under PRD REQ-WAIT-3 a new
-action is a hard wait until a PRD version says it isn't (`vocabulary.mjs:52-57`), so both ship as hard
-waits. Jason resolves each one. There is no PRD change and no grant in a role file: `role.mjs:42` refuses
-a withinRole that lists a hard wait, and REQ-WAIT-2 forbids it.
-
-The flow in this row:
-
-1. The chief raises a `role.hire` or `role.fire` decision whose body carries the arguments (business,
-   name, definition, vars, or name and reason). A hard wait goes to the human only. No arbiter resolves it.
-2. Jason resolves it in the Console or the CLI.
-3. The chief calls `instance.hire` or `instance.fire` citing the decision. The broker checks it with
-   `#consumeAuthority(s, 'role.hire', { decision, target })`, as the `role.revoke` decision branch does,
-   and the arguments must equal the decision body field by field (N1, webby-0010). For hire that is
-   `name`, `definition` and `vars` (vars compared with `canonicalJson`, absent equal to absent only). For
-   fire it is `name` and `reason`. A key in the call that the body lacks, or a body key the call lacks,
-   refuses `decision-mismatch`. Every check below runs again at this call, so a veto set after the resolve
-   still refuses.
-
-The routed form, where the chief hires and fires without a decision each time, needs a PRD version that
-moves both actions to `ROUTED`. My draft is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. It quotes
-TARGET.md line 66 and carries Mos's bounds. Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console,
-and Sage opens that decision. When it lands, a later commit adds the two actions to both `ROUTED` lists
-(`vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:43-69`) and to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole. The broker then
-takes the `reason` form instead of a decision. The verbs and every check below stay the same. This row
-builds and tests the hard-wait form only. It writes the `hireable` key and its allowlist now (D2.3), because
-both forms use them.
-
-### D2.2 What the chief may do
-
-| Act | Bus verb | Rule |
-|---|---|---|
-| launch | `launch` (host) | as today: listed instances only |
-| end a run | `role.revoke` + reason | as today, and refused `instance-kept` when the target is kept (D2.4) |
-| hire | `instance.hire { name, definition, vars?, decision }` | adds and lists an instance. Refusals below |
-| fire | `instance.fire { name, reason, decision }` | ends I's runs, cancels I's open requests, and removes I from `launch.instances`. Refusals below |
-
-Only the business's chief, the instance named by `launch.by`, may call either verb. Any other caller
-refuses `role-not-chief`, even with a resolved decision, as `#classification` already limits
-`role.launch`. The broker reads `hireable` from that chief's own role file. Both act only in the chief's
-own business. Neither verb takes a business argument. The broker uses the
-cap's business, and a decision raised in another business refuses `decision-mismatch`. Row 191's switch
-refuses both while halted (D6). Every hire and fire writes `changes.jsonl` through the organization writer
-with actor the chief's instance and run, and the decision id.
-
-Hire refuses, in order:
-
-1. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition holds an action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED` (D2.3), whatever
-   any list says.
-2. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition isn't in the chief role file's `hireable` list, or is in
-   the business's `launch.noHire`.
-3. `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED, `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` for a
-   credentialed definition (until the credentials row, row 199), `invalid-request` for version 1.
-4. `organization-instance-retired` when the name is retired.
-5. When the name exists: a fired instance (in `roles`, not listed) is listed again only if `definition`
-   equals its current one and `vars` is absent. Any other definition or vars refuses
-   `organization-instance-exists`, and so does a listed name. A re-hire never moves an instance's
-   decisions to a different role (B3).
-
-Hire's `vars` may hold only the keys the chief can already set on an instance through `organization.set`
-(the model key, `broker.mjs:1266-1269`) and narrowing `limits.*` keys. Anything else, such as `harness`
-or a route, refuses `invalid-request`. The human sets those (N3).
-
-Fire refuses `instance-kept` for a kept instance, `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED,
-`organization-instance-referenced` for `launch.by`, and a BusinessError for the last listed instance. A
-fired instance stays in `roles`. The chief never deletes. Delete stays a human act because it retires the
-name.
-
-Fire ends the fired instance's processes, not only its claims (F4, Megavolt through sage-1374). Every run
-gets the shared model token at start: `ENV_ALLOW` (`packages/seat/src/session.mjs:83-94`) passes
-`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` and the other provider variables into the sandbox. A revoke
-can't take that token back, so a fired agent whose process lives on still holds it.
-
-The delist is a business file commit through the organization writer, and the revoke and events are store
-rows. No transaction covers both (webby-0011 B2), so fire runs in a fixed order, store side first:
-
-A. One store transaction: steps 1 to 3 below, plus `fire.stopped` with the decision id. The decision isn't
-   consumed yet.
-B. The delist through the organization writer (`launch.instances` loses I, logged in `changes.jsonl`).
-C. One store write consuming the decision and recording `fire.done`.
-
-If B or C fails, fire answers the step's code and the decision stays unconsumed. A second fire citing the
-same decision runs again. A finds nothing to revoke, cancel or stop, and that isn't a refusal for fire
-(unlike V3's `not-held`). B finds I already delisted and counts as done. C consumes. So a fire is safe to
-repeat until it's consumed. The other order would leave a delisted agent with a live process and its model
-token when the store step fails, which is the case F4 exists to stop. A halt between A and B doesn't stop
-B or C, because neither starts anything. A second fire while halted refuses (D6), and the halt's own stop
-covers the runs.
-
-Steps 1 to 3 are V3's, with one change:
-
-1. It revokes every claim the instance holds.
-2. It writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for each of the instance's open requests.
-3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs and `kill: true`. The launcher pass stops each runner, spawned
-   but unbound registry runs included, with escalation (sage-1380 item 1):
-   - SIGTERM after the identity check.
-   - After the grace, SIGKILL to any runner still alive, after the same identity check again, and
-     `lifecycle.end.killed` with the run and pid.
-   - A runner still alive after SIGKILL and the observe wait gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. The Console's
-     Agents section shows it to the human.
-   A runner whose identity no longer matches is never signalled. Every check, the recheck after the
-   grace included, uses the identity (start ticks plus boot id), never a bare pid, so a reused pid never
-   counts as the fired run (webby-0011 N2).
-
-Fire's answer lists the runs it is stopping. The delist stops any new chief launch (`launch` takes listed
-instances only). A human launch request already taken is past cancelling, as in V3. The human made it, the
-fire answer names it, and the human's terminate ends its run.
-
-The stop is row 191's per-run stop, not a second one, so the two can't fight (sage-1380 item 1). Row 191's
-design r2 (`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`, "Stop policy and completion") sends SIGTERM, waits
-5 s, sends SIGKILL to verified groups and namespaces, and observes for 2 s. Its identity check is start
-ticks plus boot id, which replaces the start-time check at `launcher.mjs:526`. Fire calls that routine for
-one instance's runs and uses its constants, so the grace is row 191's 5 s, not the 10 s in r3. The order:
-
-- Fire is refused while halted (D6), so a halt sweep never meets a fire that started after it.
-- A halt that comes during a fire's stop finds those runs already stopping. Each run has one stop receipt
-  (row 191's), and the first stop owns it. The halt sweep joins it instead of sending a second SIGTERM or
-  restarting the deadline, and counts the run in its remaining or quiescent totals.
-- The record says which stop owned it: reason `fire` with the decision, or row 191's `kill-switch` with
-  its generation.
-
-V3 terminate is unchanged. It still sends SIGTERM only (N6). Only fire escalates, because only a fired
-agent must lose the token at once. If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its
-candidate (Q177), as D6 already says.
-
-### D2.3 The hire allowlist (B2, sage-1365 item 4, webby-0010 B1)
-
-r2 and r3 had a deny list, `HIRE_FLOOR`. Webby's B1 showed it missed routed actions (`git.merge.protected`,
-which `roles/merge-gate.json` holds with no credentials, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`,
-`prd.approve`), and that any action added later would be hireable by default. That isn't fail-closed. r4
-replaces it with an allowlist.
-
-A definition is hireable only if every action in its withinRole and crossRole is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`:
-
-| Allowed action | Held today by |
-|---|---|
-| `message.send`, `record.write` | every v2 role file |
-| `review.request`, `task.update.assigned` | coder, cto, pm, reviewer |
-| `task.scope.change`, `git.push.working` | coder, cto, pm (credentialed, so they matter only after row 199) |
-
-Everything else in `ACTIONS` fails, including the actions of the old floor (`role.launch`, `role.end`,
-`role.revoke`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `role.hire`, `role.fire`) and those
-B1 named. An action added to `ACTIONS` later fails until a reviewed commit adds it here.
-`git.push.remote` (row 199, routed to coder by PRD 1.7) isn't on the list. A coder holding it stays
-unhireable until a reviewed commit adds it, after the credentials bound is lifted.
-
-Against today's role files: chief-of-staff, cto, merge-gate, pm, reviewer and security-reviewer fail.
-Assistant, researcher, coder and the five C-suite files pass the allowlist. Assistant is END_PROTECTED and
-coder is credentialed, so D2.2 item 3 refuses them. The C-suite files hold only `message.send` and
-`record.write`, so hiring one gives no authority beyond its name. `hireable` still has to list it.
-
-The list is a constant in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, `HIRE_ALLOWED`. It is checked twice:
-
-- At load. `role.mjs` validates the chief role file's `hireable` list: distinct definition names, each
-  present in `rolesDir`, version 2, and every action on `HIRE_ALLOWED`. A list naming one that isn't refuses
-  the role file (`hireable names <def>, which holds <action>`). The check reads only the named file's authority lists,
-  never its `hireable`, so a list can't recurse. `hireable` is an optional key on any role file. This is a
-  role schema change, named for review.
-- At hire, in the broker, against the definition as loaded then. A role file edited after load is caught
-  here.
-
-`hireable` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json` stays empty in this row (`[]`, Q4, sage-1374). Naming the first
-role kind is a separate policy commit in `roles/`, made after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision, as
-AGENTS.md invariant 7 requires. With an empty list the chief can hire nothing, even with Jason's resolve,
-until that commit. The row's tests use scratch role files whose `hireable` names a kind.
-
-### D2.4 The per-agent forbid and the veto (sage-1365 item 3)
-
-TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids
-per agent". The forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes:
-
-- `launch.keep`: instance names. The chief can't fire, replace or end a kept instance. The broker refuses
-  `instance-kept` for every chief act aimed at it except launch:
-  - `instance.fire`, even with a resolved `role.fire` decision. Mos's limit is that Jason's veto applies
-    to every hire and fire, so the human unkeeps before a fire.
-  - a hire of that name.
-  - `role.revoke` in the reason branch (`broker.mjs:1607-1613`). End then launch is a replace (E6).
-  - an `organization.set` write of that instance's model key (B7). A model change is a replace at the next
-    launch.
-
-  The `role.revoke` decision branch (`broker.mjs:1614-1615`) still ends a kept run. It ends a run, it
-  doesn't fire or replace, and it cites a decision the human resolved (Webby's Q2 ruling). The human's V3
-  and the limits also still end a kept run.
-- `launch.noHire`: definition names the chief can't hire into this business (D2.2 item 2).
-
-Why the chief can't change the forbid:
-
-- Only `veto.set` writes the lists. It is human-only (`#human(s)` then the D4 hook) and refuses the tester.
-- `organization.set`, the chief's one write verb, reaches only `ORGANIZATION_KEYS` (`broker.mjs:145`),
-  which exclude `launch` and `retired`.
-- `instances.set` is human or tester only (`broker.mjs:1248-1298`).
-- Hire and fire carry no field that writes either list.
-
-T18 tests each of those paths from a chief session and checks the business file bytes are unchanged.
-
-END_PROTECTED instances can't be kept (N7). That is intended: Q169 lets the chief end the assistant's
-runs, and the assistant's own stop is `assistant.stop`. Default, per "unless user forbids": nothing is
-kept and nothing is on `noHire`.
-
-### D2.5 Where it lives and how the broker enforces it
-
-The forbid lives in the business file, under `launch`, beside the membership it limits:
-`launch.keep: [instance]`, `launch.noHire: [definition]`, and top-level `retired: [instance]`. `hireable`
-lives in the chief's role file, because it bounds the role, not one business.
-
-`checkLaunch` (`business.mjs:118`) gains the two keys. Each list is distinct. `keep` names declared,
-non-protected instances. `noHire` entries need only the id pattern (N2). A stale deny entry is harmless,
-and a reviewed commit that removes a role file must not stop every business that lists it. `retired`
-names none of `roles`. This is the business-file schema change for review. Old files without the keys load
-unchanged. An old bus loader rejects a file that has them (`rejectUnknownKeys`), so a rollback past this
-row needs the keys removed first. The activation plan has to say so (R4).
-
-The broker enforces from its live copy of the business, which D3 keeps current. The checks sit in the
-`role.revoke` reason branch, in `organization.set`'s model write and in the two chief verbs, before any
-write.
-
-## D3. Live changes
-
-Today the broker's `#businesses` is fixed at start (E3), and `instances.set` answers `restart: true` for
-add and redefine.
-
-1. `Broker.reloadBusiness(id, document)` swaps in one business's validated document. It is synchronous, so
-   no request sees half of it. It refuses an unknown id and a document whose `human` changed (that is row
-   193's ground).
-2. The runtime's organization callback (`runtime.mjs:121-133`) calls it in one place, after every verb
-   that commits a write, whatever the verb (N1). Today that is `limits.set`, `instances.set`, `routes.set`
-   and `plugins.set`, and after this row `veto.set`, `instance.hire`, `instance.fire` and the launcher's
-   delete through the same writer. It loads from the file through the loader `bootConfig` uses
-   (`cli/src/config.mjs:88-105`), so the broker holds exactly what a restart would give it. Then
-   `limits.refresh(id)` runs, as `plugins.set` does now.
-3. Other startup consumers of `businesses` in `startBroker` (`runtime.mjs:75-81`): credential references,
-   usage, the web services and the tasks adapter's bots. A create or hire adds no credentials, no tracker
-   bot and no web grant, because credentialed definitions are refused. The build checks each consumer
-   against that claim. Any change that would need one of them still answers `restart: true` and doesn't
-   reload.
-4. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running`. A live cap must not change
-   authority under its run. This is new: today the change waits for the restart. Existing tests that pin
-   `restart: true` change with it (N4): `business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs`,
-   `bus/tests/instances-verb.test.mjs`, `cli/tests/instances.test.mjs:76-94` (the `RESTART_NEEDED` text and
-   the restart line) and `webui/tests/instances.test.mjs:25, 71, 74, 140-145`. The build names each
-   changed assertion in its manifest.
-5. The chief's `launch` tool (E5) takes `instance` as a string with the id pattern instead of the start-time
-   enum. Its description says the host refuses an unlisted instance. `check()` already refuses one
-   (`launcher.mjs:235`). Without this, the chief can't launch its own hire until its session restarts.
-   `tools.mjs` may carry hash pins in tests. The build greps for them (R5).
-6. Hand edits of the business file still need a restart. Nothing watches the file. The one exception is
-   `bus.tester` (D4.1), read from the file at each tester call.
-
-After this, `restart` is false for create, delete, hire, fire and veto changes, and true only under item 3.
-
-## D4. RBAC until row 193
-
-Every human verb above calls `#human(s)` and then one hook, `#mayHuman(s, verb, target)`. Until row 193
-lands, the hook passes for the business's one `human`, which is the owner. The verbs are listed once, in
-an exported `LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS` (`instance.launch`, `instance.end`, `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set`,
-and `instances.set` ops `add`, `change`, `delete`), so row 193 maps each verb to the human roles that may
-use it. Row 193 replaces the hook body and nothing else.
-
-### D4.1 The tester (Sage, sage-1355)
-
-What the tester may do after this row:
-
-| Verb | Tester |
-|---|---|
-| `instance.launch`, `instance.end` | yes, new |
-| `instances.set` ops `add`, `change` | yes, as today (row 175, `broker.mjs:103`, `serve.mjs:537`) |
-| `instances.set` op `delete` | no, `tester-refused` in the broker (B6) |
-| `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set` | no, `tester-refused` |
-
-The tester's cap is bound to one business, and only when that business sets `bus.tester` to true
-(`broker.mjs:542-546`). That stays Jason's switch, and no bus verb writes it. Two checks run on each tester
-lifecycle call, before any effect, and again at the take (D1.1):
-
-1. The request's business is the cap's business. Any other refuses `tester-refused`.
-2. `bus.tester` is exactly true in the business file as it stands, read through `settings.current(id)` as
-   `harnessOn` does (`runtime.mjs:136-142`), not from the broker's copy (B8). An unreadable file refuses
-   `tester-off`. So a hand edit turning testing off counts at the next tester call, without a restart.
-
-The request and done events record actor `tester`. The tester's Q173 tests of the Agents section then cover
-launch and terminate on a scratch business, and the rest through fixtures.
-
-## D5. One stack instance
-
-Row 190 carries the stack instance as the config `MOSAIC_CONFIG` names. These verbs take no instance name.
-The CLI reaches the broker socket under that config's `dataRoot`. The broker acts on its own businesses,
-launcher and data root. A business id that exists in two stack instances is two separate businesses. A test
-runs two scratch roots with the same business id and shows a launch, a terminate and a delete in one leave
-the other byte-identical (T11).
-
-## D6. The kill switch
-
-- Launch and regenerate end in `start()`, which row 191 gates (its D3 inventory, `launcher.mjs:329-457`).
-  The new pass adds no second start path.
-- The broker refuses `instance.launch` and `instance.regenerate` with `processing-halted` while the switch
-  is on (V2 step 1), and the take checks again (D1.1), so no request is waiting when a human resumes.
-- `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` are agent work verbs, so row 191's default refuses them while halted.
-  The build adds them to row 191's work table, not its read list. A hire Jason resolved before a halt
-  still refuses while halted, and the chief calls it again after the resume.
-- Terminate, create, delete and veto start nothing and stay allowed.
-- If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its candidate (Q177). The two halted
-  checks are written against its reader and tested with its fixture.
-
-## D7. The Console
-
-A new Settings section, "Agents", in its own `agents.js` file. Settings itself isn't rewritten. It lists
-each instance with definition, listed, kept, retired and running runs, and flags a run with a
-`lifecycle.end.alive` event as "still running after fire" (D2.2). It has these actions:
-
-- Create (definition select, from `definitions`), Delete (with a confirm naming what stays: the evidence
-  and the workspace under `.retired`).
-- Launch, Terminate (with an optional reason), Regenerate (with a confirm).
-- Keep and Unkeep per instance, and a No-hire toggle per definition.
-
-The routes are `POST /api/instances` (op `delete` joins `add` and `change`), `POST /api/agent/launch`,
-`/api/agent/terminate`, `/api/agent/regenerate` and `POST /api/veto`. Each uses `instanceSend`'s boundary:
-signed-in user, exact Origin, same-origin Fetch Metadata, JSON within 16 KiB, strict keys, one bus call
-through the human transport, and `outcome-unknown` on an unexpected answer. Launch and regenerate show the
-request, then poll `GET /api/agent/request?id=` until it closes.
-
-`agents.js` joins the static file list (`serve.mjs:28`) and `index.html` (N5).
-
-When `/api/config` says `send` is false, every action button shows as unavailable with the text "Agent
-actions are unavailable here. Use mosaic business instance from the instance CLI." This is the live state
-until Q175 phase 2. Every write test uses a fixture server and fixture writers, as rows 165 and 191 do. No
-route gets a `--send` exception.
-
-## D8. Tests
-
-Every test uses scratch roots under `TMPDIR` and the existing fixtures (`business/tests/helpers.mjs`,
-`cli/tests/helpers.mjs`, `webui/tests/tester-fixture.mjs`). None touches `~/.mosaic-dev`,
-`~/.config/mosaic-dev`, a live unit or a slot file.
-
-| Test | Shows | File |
-|---|---|---|
-| T1 | V1 create on a running bus: a launch of the new instance binds with no restart, and the answer says `restart: false` | cli `instances.test.mjs` |
-| T2 | V2: a human launch of an unlisted instance runs. `launch.by` goes through the `pm` branch (N8). A thread instance, a retired one and a revoked business refuse at the verb. A request older than 60 s never launches. A refused `check()` closes the request with its code | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` (new) |
-| T2a | Take: a `launch.revoke` between the request and the pass closes it `launch-revoked` with no process. A `lifecycleDone` that throws once leaves the request taken, and the next tick starts nothing. A taken request is never taken twice | same |
-| T3 | V2 with `--no-launch` and with each limit refusal: no process, request closed with the code | same |
-| T4 | V3: claims revoked, runner SIGTERMed after the start-time check, one end record. A mismatched start time sends no signal. An open request is cancelled and never starts. A spawned, unbound run in the registry is signalled | same |
-| T5 | V4: the new run starts only after the old exit, with a new run dir and the same workspace. A run that ignores SIGTERM closes the request `regenerate-timeout` with nothing started. The assistant refuses `regenerate-thread` | same |
-| T6 | V5: each refusal in the V5 table, in order, including `instance-starting` with an open request. A clean delete leaves the evidence bytes unchanged, commits the file before the rename, adds `retired`, and a create or hire of the same name refuses. A failed rename closes `workspace-rename-failed`, `check()` refuses the name, and a second delete renames only | business `instance-settings.test.mjs` and cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` |
-| T7 | V6: each op, the no-op refusal, an unknown `noHire` name accepted, and a `changes.jsonl` entry with actor `human` | business |
-| T8 | Chief hire (hard-wait form): no decision refuses. A decision raised by the chief goes to the human only, no arbiter. After the resolve, the hire adds and lists the instance, logs actor and decision, and the same chief session launches it (D3 item 5). Arguments that differ from the decision body refuse. A non-chief caller with a resolved decision refuses `role-not-chief`. Outside `hireable`, in `noHire`, credentialed, END_PROTECTED, retired, and extra vars each refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
-| T8a | Re-hire (B3): a fired name with the same definition and no vars is listed again. Another definition or vars refuses `organization-instance-exists` | same |
-| T8b | Hire allowlist (D2.3): one case per action in `ACTIONS` that is neither on `HIRE_ALLOWED` nor a hard wait (`role.mjs` already refuses those), looped from the lists, not typed by hand. A fixture definition, clean when the chief's role file loads and listed in `hireable`, is rewritten to hold that action before the hire. The hire refuses `definition-not-hireable`. A definition holding one allowed and one refused action refuses. One holding only allowed actions hires. A pin test fixes `HIRE_ALLOWED` to the six actions | same |
-| T8c | Allowlist at load: a role file whose `hireable` names a definition holding each refused action refuses at `loadRole`, one case per action, looped the same way. The mixed case refuses. A clean list loads. A missing, version 1 or duplicate name refuses | business `role.test.mjs` |
-| T9 | Chief fire: runs end, open requests cancelled, delisted, still in `roles`. Kept (even with a resolved decision), END_PROTECTED, `launch.by` and last-listed refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
-| T9a | Fire ends processes (F4, sage-1380 item 1): with a bound run and a spawned but unbound registry run of I, both fixture runners holding a stand-in model variable, fire answers both runs. After the launcher pass, neither runner pid is alive and I holds no claim. A fixture runner that ignores SIGTERM gets SIGKILL after the grace, is gone, and has `lifecycle.end.killed` with its run and pid. A stand-in whose kill is stubbed to fail gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. A runner whose identity changed before the SIGTERM, or between SIGTERM and SIGKILL, gets no signal. V3 terminate of a SIGTERM-ignoring runner sends no SIGKILL | cli `launcher.test.mjs` |
-| T9b | Fire and row 191's halt: a halt during a fire's stop sends no second SIGTERM, keeps the fire's deadline, writes one stop receipt with reason `fire` and the decision, and counts the run in its totals. A fire while halted refuses (D6) | cli `launcher.test.mjs`, on row 191's fixture |
-| T9c | Fire order (webby-0011 B2): the organization writer stubbed to fail after A commits. Fire answers the writer's code, I's claims are revoked and its runs stopped, I is still listed, and the decision is unconsumed. A second fire citing the same decision delists I and consumes it. A third fire refuses `decision-consumed`. With C stubbed to fail, the second fire finds I delisted and only consumes | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
-| T10 | Keep: chief `role.revoke` with a reason, fire, hire of that name and an `organization.set` model write aimed at a kept instance each refuse `instance-kept`. A `role.revoke` citing a human-resolved decision ends the kept run (Q2). The human's V3 works | same |
-| T11 | Two scratch stack instances with the same business id: V2, V3 and V5 in A leave B's root and config byte-identical. A chief of business A can't hire into business B on the same bus | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs`, bus |
-| T12 | Agent and reader sessions refuse every human verb before any effect. The tester gets exactly the D4.1 table, including `tester-refused` for `instances.set` op `delete` (B6). The D4 hook is called with the verb | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
-| T12a | Tester launch and terminate work on the cap's business with `bus.tester` true, record actor `tester`, and refuse `tester-refused` for a second business on the same bus. A file edit setting `bus.tester` to false, with no restart, refuses the next call and the take `tester-off`. An unreadable file refuses `tester-off` | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
-| T13 | `organization.set` with `launch`, `retired`, `keep` or `noHire` keys refuses | bus |
-| T14 | Live reload: after each committed verb, `plugins.set` and `routes.set` included, the broker answers from the new document. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running` | bus |
-| T15 | Kill switch (with row 191's fixture): launch and regenerate refuse `processing-halted` at the verb and at the take, hire and fire refuse, terminate works | bus and cli |
-| T16 | Console: each route's boundary refusals, a fixture write per action, `outcome-unknown` on a bad shape, unavailable buttons when `send` is false, request polling, and `agents.js` served from the static list | webui `agents.test.mjs` (new) |
-| T17 | Business file: the new keys validate, each bad entry refuses, and a file without them loads byte for byte as before | business `business.test.mjs` |
-| T18 | The forbid can't be changed by the chief (D2.4): from a chief session, `veto.set`, `organization.set` with each list key, `instances.set`, and hire and fire with extra fields all refuse, and the business file bytes are unchanged | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
-
-### Mutants
-
-Each one must fail at least one test. They run against the candidate, and the file is restored and its
-sha256 checked after each one.
-
-| # | Change | Killer |
-|---|---|---|
-| M1 | `instance.launch` skips `#human` | T12 |
-| M2 | the pass calls `check()` without `human: true` | T2 |
-| M3 | the take accepts a request older than 60 s | T2 |
-| M4 | the take skips the `launch_state` check | T2a |
-| M5 | terminate signals without the start-time check | T4 |
-| M6 | regenerate starts before the old exit | T5 |
-| M7 | delete skips the running check | T6 |
-| M8 | delete skips `retired` | T6 |
-| M9 | delete clears `keep` instead of refusing | T6 |
-| M10 | delete removes the workspace instead of renaming it | T6 |
-| M11 | the `keep` check is removed from the `role.revoke` reason branch | T10 |
-| M12 | `noHire` is not read by hire | T8 |
-| M13 | fire deletes the instance from `roles` | T9 |
-| M14 | `reloadBusiness` isn't called after `instances.set` | T1, T14 |
-| M15 | the tool enum is kept | T8 |
-| M16 | the halted check is dropped from `instance.launch` | T15 |
-| M17 | the Console route skips the Origin check | T16 |
-| M18 | `veto.set` joins `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS` | T12 |
-| M19 | the tester's business scope check is dropped | T12a |
-| M20 | the tester's `bus.tester` file read is dropped | T12a |
-| M21 | hire skips the role file's `hireable` list | T8 |
-| M22 | the take doesn't write `lifecycle.taken`, so a request can be taken twice | T2a |
-| M23 | terminate doesn't cancel open requests | T4 |
-| M24 | delete skips the `instance-starting` check | T6 |
-| M25 | delete renames before it commits the file | T6 |
-| M26 | the tester's `instances.set` op `delete` refusal is dropped | T12 |
-| M27 | the `keep` check is dropped from `organization.set`'s model write | T10 |
-| M28 | the `keep` check is added to the `role.revoke` decision branch | T10 |
-| M29 | a re-hire accepts a different definition | T8a |
-| M30 to M36 | the broker's hire check accepts one action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED`, one mutant per action: `role.launch`, `role.end`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `git.merge.protected`, `decision.resolve.technical` | T8b |
-| M37 to M43 | the same seven, accepted by the load check in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
-| M44 | fire skips `instance-kept` when a decision is cited | T9 |
-| M45 | `instance.hire` skips the `launch.by` caller check | T8 |
-| M46 | `veto.set` skips `#human` | T18 |
-| M47 | the broker's hire check needs some action on `HIRE_ALLOWED` instead of every action | T8b |
-| M48 | the same in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
-| M49 | fire revokes the claims but writes no `lifecycle.end`, so no runner is signalled | T9a |
-| M50 | fire's signal skips spawned but unbound registry runs | T9a |
-| M51 | fire's stop drops the SIGKILL escalation | T9a |
-| M52 | SIGKILL is sent without the second identity check | T9a |
-| M53 | a killed runner gets no `lifecycle.end.killed` | T9a |
-| M54 | V3 terminate escalates to SIGKILL as fire does | T9a |
-| M55 | the halt sweep sends its own SIGTERM and restarts the deadline on a run fire is stopping | T9b |
-| M56 | fire delists before the store step | T9c |
-| M57 | fire consumes the decision in step A | T9c |
-| M58 | a second fire with nothing to revoke refuses `not-held` | T9c |
-
-## Scope and boundaries
-
-- In the row: the verbs and passes above in `business` (vocabulary, role validation, instance-settings,
-  business validation), `bus` (broker verbs, reload, runtime callback), `cli` (instances command, launcher
-  pass, host ops), `harness` (the launch tool's schema, and the hire and fire tools), `webui` (routes and
-  the Agents section), the tests, the package READMEs and the PRD draft in this packet. `docs/TOOLS.md`
-  text goes to Sage.
-- Named for review:
-  - Vocabulary: `role.hire` and `role.fire` join `ACTIONS` as hard waits, under REQ-WAIT-3. The commit
-    message names them as hard waits, as REQ-WAIT-3 requires.
-  - Role schema: the optional `hireable` key, validated in `role.mjs` (D2.3).
-  - Role file: `roles/chief-of-staff.json` gains `"hireable": []`. No authority change.
-  - Business file schema: `launch.keep`, `launch.noHire`, `retired` (D2.5).
-- Not in the row: the routed form (after PRD 1.7), filling `hireable`, credentialed hires and deletes (row
-  199), clear context for the assistant (T1 item 7), human roles (row 193), SIGKILL escalation, and any
-  live activation or Console start.
-
-## Risks
-
-- R1. Case 1's working roles (coder, reviewer, pm, cto) all declare credentials (E11), and pm, cto and
-  reviewer fail the hire allowlist anyway. Neither the human verb nor the chief can create or delete credentialed
-  roles until the credentials row (row 199). That is the largest gap against Case 1, and it isn't this
-  row's to close.
-- R2. The human proof is path-bound and same-uid (P19 333). Any same-uid process that runs the tree's
-  `human-cli.mjs` can launch and delete. Row 190b's separate uid and row 193 narrow it. This row adds no
-  check of its own.
-- R3. The 60 s request window means a slow `check()` (checkouts) can still start a run up to that point
-  after the CLI gave up. The CLI says so on timeout.
-- R4. Rollback past this row needs `keep`, `noHire` and `retired` removed from each business file, and
-  `hireable` from the role file, or the old loaders refuse them. The activation plan states this.
-- R5. `tools.mjs`, `serve.mjs`, `broker.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs` and `role.mjs` may carry sha256 pins in
-  other packages' tests. The build greps the tests for every changed path plus a 64-hex value before
-  in-review, without a `head`.
-- R6. With `hireable` empty, the chief can hire nothing until the policy commit in `roles/` that follows
-  the `prd.approve` resolve names a kind (Q4). Case 1's "as needed" waits on that commit and on PRD 1.7.
-- R7. Fire's SIGKILL closes the SIGTERM-ignoring case (sage-1380). A runner still alive after SIGKILL
-  (an unkillable process, or a stop whose identity check fails) keeps the shared model token until the
-  human acts on `lifecycle.end.alive`. Only a per-agent model token (row 199 Q-M4, a later proxy row)
-  would let a fire revoke the token itself.
-
-## Questions and rulings
-
-- Q1, ruled by Mos (mos-1015, mos-1017, through sage-1365): `role.hire` and `role.fire` ship as hard
-  waits Jason resolves. The routed form needs PRD 1.7, drafted in `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. D2.1.
-- Q2, ruled by Webby (webby-0003): keep blocks the chief's `role.revoke` reason branch, not its decision
-  branch. D2.4.
-- Q3, ruled by Sage (sage-1355): launch and terminate are tester verbs scoped to the tester's own
-  business, behind `bus.tester`. D4.1.
-- Q4, ruled by Sage (sage-1374): `hireable` stays empty in this row. Naming the first role kind is a
-  separate policy commit in `roles/` after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision. Tests use scratch role
-  files that name a kind. D2.3.
-
-## r2 changes against webby-0003
-
-| Finding | Where |
-|---|---|
-| B1 | D2.1: hard waits under REQ-WAIT-3, no role grant. The routed form is PRD 1.7 (packet draft) |
-| B2 | D2.3: the floor from sage-1365 item 4, checked at load and at hire, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43 (an allowlist since r4) |
-| B3 | D2.2 hire item 5: a re-hire keeps the definition, T8a, M29 |
-| B4 | D1.1: one `lifecycleTake` transaction re-checks and writes `lifecycle.taken`, T2a, M4, M22 |
-| B5 | V3 cancels open requests and signals unbound runs. V5 refuses `instance-starting`, runs under `serialize`, commits the file before the rename, and states the recovery. T4, T6, M23 to M25 |
-| B6 | V5 table and D4.1: the tester's delete refuses, T12, M26 |
-| B7 | D2.4: keep covers `organization.set`'s model write, T10, M27 |
-| B8 | D4.1: `bus.tester` is read from the file at each call and at the take, T12a, M20 |
-| Q2 | D2.4, T10, M28 |
-| N1 | D3 item 2: one reload after every committed write |
-| N2 | D2.5: `noHire` takes any id-pattern name |
-| N3 | D2.2: hire's vars limited to the model key and narrowing `limits.*` |
-| N4 | D3 item 4 names the tests that change |
-| N5 | D7 and T16: `agents.js` joins `serve.mjs:28` and `index.html` |
-| N6 | V3 and V4: no SIGKILL, `regenerate-timeout` |
-| N7 | D2.4: intended, Q169 |
-| N8 | V2 item 2 and T2 |
-
-## r3 changes against sage-1374, sage-1377 and Megavolt's F4
-
-| Item | Where |
-|---|---|
-| Q4 ruled: `hireable` stays empty, the first kind is a later policy commit in `roles/` | D2.3, R6, Questions |
-| `instance.name` joins the floor (Webby B2, mos-1023 item 6) | D2.3 table, T8b, T8c, M47, M48 |
-| F4: fire ends the fired agent's processes, since `ENV_ALLOW` gives every run the shared model token | D2.2, D7, T9a, M49 to M51, R7 |
-| `git.push.remote` routed to coder only (mos-1028 item 3, row 199 r3) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`, REQ-LAND-2 and the REQ-WAIT-3 append |
-
-## r4 changes against webby-0010, sage-1380 and megavolt-0008
-
-| Item | Where |
-|---|---|
-| webby-0010 B1: the deny-list floor becomes the allowlist `HIRE_ALLOWED`, so merge-gate, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`, `prd.approve` and any later action are refused | D2.3, Summary, R1, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43, M47, M48, PRD REQ-COS-3 bound |
-| webby-0010 N1: field-by-field compare of the call against the decision body, extra or missing keys refuse | D2.1 item 3 |
-| webby-0010 N2: the model write is in REQ-COS-3's text | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
-| sage-1380 item 1: fire escalates to SIGKILL through row 191's per-run stop, and the order against a halt is fixed | D2.2, T9a, T9b, M51 to M55, R7 |
-| sage-1380 item 2 and megavolt-0008: REQ-LAND-2 binds one commit oid, and Megavolt's three text changes against row 199 r4 (e1aa6216c) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
-| webby-0011 B1: same as webby-0010 B1, M47 and M48 now allowlist mutants | D2.3 |
-| webby-0011 B2: fire runs store side first, then the delist, then the consume, safe to repeat | D2.2 order A to C, T9c, M56 to M58 |
-| webby-0011 N1: the remote-owner host check at each push | sent to Megavolt for row 199 |
-| webby-0011 N2: identity, not bare pid, at every check | D2.2 step 3 |
-| Q4: Webby's view matches Sage's ruling (empty) | no change |

agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
-# host access through the credential store
-
-Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
-It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
-decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
-
-## What it changes
-
-Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
-REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
-remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
-and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
-only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
-agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
-(Vikunja #420).
-
-When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
-
-1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
-   `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
-2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
-   `roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
-3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
-   `reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
-   within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
-4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
-   commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
-   the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
-5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
-
-Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
-file commit in `roles/`.
-
-## Text for the PRD
-
-Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
-
-> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
-> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
-> <prd.approve decision id>.
-
-Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
-
-> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
->   needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
->   still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
->   agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
->   as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
->   keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
->   me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
->   Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
->   happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
-
-Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
->   adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
->   runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
->   an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
->   under this requirement, within these bounds:
->   - The chief acts only in its own organization.
->   - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
->     credentialed roles.
->   - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
->   - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
->     messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
->     working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
->     organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
->     hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
->     is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
->     change.
->   - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
->   - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
->     or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
->     WebUI or the CLI.
->   - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
->   - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
-
-Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
->   - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
->     bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
->     names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
->   - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
->     name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
->   - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
->     and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
->     the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
->     the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
->     repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
->   - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
->     agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
->     history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
->   - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
->     other role file grants it.
->   - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
->     the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
->
->   Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
-
-Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
-
-> Added in version 1.7:
->
-> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
->   for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
->   before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
->   REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
->   grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
-
-REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
-
-> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
-> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
-
-## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
-
-- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
-  sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
-- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
-  its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
-- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
-  named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
-- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
-  holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
-- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
-  duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
-  Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
-  sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
-  checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
-  bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
-- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
-  latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
-  the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
-  the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
-- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
-  credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
-  on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
-  (row 194 D2.3).
-- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
-  `hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
-- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
-  version lifts it.
-- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
-  check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
-  the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
-- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
-  mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
-  gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
-  owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
-- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
-  paragraph never edited in place except to append.

agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md

@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
-# PRD 1.8 draft: trusted actions within role guardrails, the manual mode, and grants the chief of staff
-# requests and the user approves
-
-Draft by Honker for Vikunja #434, under Mos's assignment mos-1117 (through Sage, sage-1525). Not approved.
-It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision. Sage opens that decision and sends
-Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 008746b6e, plus the version 1.7 text Jason
-approved (PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md r2, 9ba31b5b3, decision d52febb5, mos-1089). Where 1.7 is not yet written into
-the PRD file, this draft's anchors name 1.7's sections.
-
-Revision 2 makes Mos's edits a to f (mos-1124, through Sage, sage-1534) and fixes Duckworth's B1 and B2
-with notes N1 to N6 (duckworth-0057) on r1 at 3c30f1036. Revision 3 fixes Duckworth's C1 and takes
-notes N1 and N2 (duckworth-0058) on r2 at 60f5ca8fa, with Gizmoduck's enrollment wording
-(gizmoduck-0067). Revision 4 makes Mos's rulings on duckworth-0057 (mos-1129, through Sage, sage-1538)
-on r3 at d16ccdb91: only an Approve creates a grant, one decision for a grant that makes an account, and
-the arbiter route for `host.sudo`. Revision 5 fixes two stale notes from Duckworth's r4 check
-(duckworth-0061 N1), with no change to the requirement text. Revision 6 makes Mos's wording for those
-notes and adds two items for Jason at approval (mos-1138, through Sage, sage-1548), again with no change
-to the requirement text.
-
-For Jason at approval: "The main agent or chief of staff" in Q10 is read as one role under two names,
-the chief of staff. So only the chief raises a grant request, and your assistant passes your own request
-to the chief. That reading is Mos's (mos-1124). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-1
-changes before the text goes into the PRD.
-
-Also for Jason at approval:
-
-- Only an Approve creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. An agent
-  that runs as the same OS user as the stack can still write the stack's own store. That is the B7
-  residual (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54), and this version doesn't close it.
-- Who decides a root command on another host changes. Once `host.sudo` is routed, a raise for it that
-  cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, as version 1.7 set for
-  `git.push.remote`, not to you. The grant and its allowlist still limit the command. In manual mode the
-  decision comes to you (REQ-TRUST-2).
-- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". "Mos" is read as your assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), limited to
-  grants in its own organization, and the tester may revoke only on a dev instance. That reading is Mos's
-  (mos-1124 d, mos-1132). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-4 changes before the text
-  goes into the PRD.
-- The broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of
-  command is the messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check (REQ-GRANT-1).
-
-## What it changes
-
-Today an agent acts without a raise only on actions its role file grants within-role, and the role
-files grant few. Every other use of a tool or command waits on a decision. Row 210 builds `host.sudo` as a
-hard wait, so Jason would decide each command run on another machine. Grants themselves are hand work:
-Jason makes every token and key from a runbook (REQ-CRED-1).
-
-Jason's ruling Q188 turns this around. Roles set what each agent may do, and by default agents do it at
-will within their sandbox and guardrails. A per-use raise happens only in a manual mode. No agent creates
-a grant. The chief of staff brings a grant request to the user's inbox, the user clicks Approve or Deny, and
-protected stack code does every step of making the grant. The user's own tokens are entered once in the
-WebUI and never reach an agent.
-
-This version adds:
-
-1. Trusted actions within role guardrails as the default mode (REQ-TRUST-1).
-2. Manual mode, a list of actions that each need a decision per use: who sets it, where it lives and what
-   it changes (REQ-TRUST-2).
-3. Grant requests, raised only by the chief of staff through the chain of command (REQ-GRANT-1).
-4. Approve and the protected grant code, with three grant methods: machine key, Gitea and GitHub
-   (REQ-GRANT-2).
-5. The user's tokens, entered in the WebUI and used only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
-6. Row 210's REQ-CRED-4, generalized from `host.sudo` to every role-listed action that uses a grant
-   (REQ-CRED-4).
-7. Instant revoke (REQ-GRANT-4).
-
-The hard waits stay with the user (Mos, mos-1117): spending money, deleting data, new external accounts,
-messages outside the fleet and the rest of REQ-WAIT-1. Approving a grant is the user resolving one of
-those hard waits, `credential.mint`. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's own Gitea user
-(Q190), is the same one decision: its method says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account
-name before Approve. So no hard wait moves to an agent.
-
-When this version lands, reviewed commits:
-
-1. add the manual-mode list to the organization file schema, written only on the human's path
-   (REQ-TRUST-2), and make the broker classify a listed action as needing a decision for each use, before
-   any other routing.
-2. add the grant request: a decision the chief of staff raises with action `credential.mint`, naming the
-   agent, the method and target, the exact rights and, when the method makes an account, the account
-   name (REQ-GRANT-1). The broker refuses a `credential.mint` raise from any other role. An
-   `account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as it does in version 1.7, such as a PM's
-   sign-up for a service.
-3. add the grant code that runs on a resolved Approve, one method at a time, and the grant record it
-   writes (REQ-GRANT-2, Vikunja #435 and #436).
-4. add the user's token store, written from the WebUI (or the CLI until the Console knows the signed-in
-   human) and read only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
-5. move `host.sudo` into both `ROUTED` lists, as row 199 does for `git.push.remote`, and route it under
-   REQ-CRED-4, with the arbiter route version 1.7 set for `git.push.remote`. Which definitions list it
-   within-role is a separate reviewed role commit in `roles/`.
-6. update the role contracts that list the hard waits: `roles/chief-of-staff.md:75` raises grant
-   requests with the REQ-GRANT-1 fields, and `roles/pm.md:55` asks the chief of staff for a grant instead
-   of raising `credential.mint` itself (line numbers on origin/refactor). Other roles that list the hard
-   waits get the same line as the PM. A role's messaging list carries the chain of command.
-
-## Text for the PRD
-
-Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
-
-> Version 1.8 records Jason's ruling Q188 of 2026-10-20: trusted actions within role guardrails by
-> default, a manual mode for per-use raises, and grants the chief of staff requests and the user
-> approves, approved by Jason in decision <prd.approve decision id>.
-
-Source, two new bullets above "Version 1.7 source":
-
-> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q188 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answers to Q8 and Q10, in part.
->   Q8: "I would rather grant the grant right to an agent that runs with strict guardrails. That agent
->   presents the final authorization for the user. Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically.
->   I see this as: User configures their PATs, API tokens, authorizations within the WebUI. The agent
->   presents the request for grant with X rights for another agent. The user reviews, then clicks
->   Approve/Deny. Click of Approve fires off protected mechanical methods to handle the grants on Github,
->   Gitea, .... services as needed. The tooling would need to exist and must be guarded." And "Disallowing
->   the agents to create grants autonomously is a necessary evil for better security. Requiring the user
->   to manually perform the steps is a no-fly." Q10: "Agents should have tools and command access based on
->   roles. Those roles dictate the allowed tools and commands. The use of a tool or command should not be
->   raised to the user unless the system is configured with a manual mode that requires user
->   interaction. By default I want to have the agents capable of running commands and tools at will
->   within their sandbox/guardrails. This allows autonomous actions by agents within their lanes. Perhaps
->   a "Trusted actions within approved guardrails" methodology." And "The main agent or chief of staff
->   would be responsible for surfacing the request to the user's inbox for approval. Not all agents are
->   capable or authorized to request directly. It must follow the chain of command properly." He agreed
->   with Mos's Q10 points 3 to 6: protected stack code does every step on Approve, his tokens are entered
->   in the WebUI and agents never see them, a command on the approved list runs without a click and any
->   other is refused, and he, Mos or the tester can revoke a grant at once.
-> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q190 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answer "Q12: O1": each agent seat
->   gets its own account on his Gitea, created through the Q188 approval path once the Gitea grants exist.
-
-Under "Decisions", after REQ-DEC-6, a new section:
-
-> ### Trusted actions
->
-> Added in version 1.8 (Q188).
->
-> - **REQ-TRUST-1.** Agents act within their role guardrails without asking. The default mode is
->   "trusted actions within approved guardrails". An action a role file grants within-role is done at
->   will, inside the agent's sandbox, its tool limit and its grants, and is logged. It raises nothing to
->   the user. An action the file doesn't grant within-role still routes by REQ-DEC-2, and a hard wait
->   still goes to the user (REQ-WAIT-1). Only a reviewed role change adds an action to a role file, and
->   REQ-WAIT-2 still keeps every hard wait out of every role file.
-> - **REQ-TRUST-2.** The user can put chosen actions in manual mode. The organization file holds the list
->   of actions in manual mode, empty by default. While an action is on the list, every use of it by any
->   role becomes a decision for that use, raised to the user, and the action waits until the user
->   resolves it. A decision denied, or not resolved, refuses the action. Each decision is used once. For a
->   command on another host, the decision names the host, the command and its input. Actions not on the
->   list are unchanged. Only the user changes the list, through the WebUI or the CLI. The chief of
->   staff's organization writes (REQ-ROLE-3) can't change it, and no agent can. Every change is logged
->   with who made it. A change applies to the next use, and a run already in progress keeps no
->   exemption.
-
-Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-3 (version 1.7):
-
-> Added in version 1.8 (Q188):
->
-> - **REQ-CRED-4.** An action a role definition lists within-role, and that uses a grant, runs without a
->   decision for each use only when all of these hold:
->   - the definition declares the credential kind the action uses;
->   - a grant names that agent, and that host or service;
->   - for a command, the command matches the grant's allowlist. A grant lists exact argv prefixes. A
->     wildcard grant is refused;
->   - the agent's key or token for that grant is issued and not revoked.
->
->   A command off the allowlist is refused, and adding one takes a new grant request (REQ-GRANT-1). An
->   action whose definition doesn't list it within-role still needs a decision for each use. Only a
->   reviewed role change adds an action to a definition. `host.sudo` routes under this requirement.
-> - **REQ-GRANT-1.** No agent creates or writes a grant. A grant request follows the chain of command,
->   and only the chief of staff raises it to the user's inbox. Any other role that needs a grant for
->   itself or for an agent it directs asks the chief of staff, through its chain: a worker role through its
->   PM, the PM and the CTO directly. The assistant passes the user's own request to the chief of staff
->   (REQ-ASSIST-1). The request names the agent, the grant method and its target, the exact rights, and a
->   rotate-by or expiry date. The chief raises one only for an agent whose reviewed role definition
->   allows that kind of credential, and the broker refuses any other. A grant can't name a wildcard, a
->   shell or an empty command. The request is a decision with the action `credential.mint`, so it goes
->   to the user as a hard wait (REQ-WAIT-1). A grant whose method makes an account, such as a seat's own
->   Gitea user (Q190), is the same one decision: the method in the grant says it makes an account, the
->   request names the account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user's one
->   resolution covers the account and its credential, so the hard-waits list doesn't change. An
->   `account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as version 1.7 has it. The broker checks
->   only that the chief of staff raised the request. The chain of command before that is in the
->   messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check.
-> - **REQ-GRANT-2.** The user approves or denies each grant request in the inbox. Approve is the only thing
->   that creates a grant, and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. No agent
->   creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. Row 210's hand-written
->   grants stay a test path until Vikunja #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. On Approve,
->   protected stack code does every step, not an agent and not the user: it records the grant, makes the
->   key or token, installs it on the machine or creates it on the service, and logs each step. On Deny
->   nothing is made, and the denial is logged. The grant methods are:
->   - machine key: a key for one agent on one enrolled host, with the command allowlist of REQ-CRED-4. A
->     host's identity comes from the host side when the user approves its enrollment, never from a first
->     connection. A host user with sudo receives a grant only after the user approved that user by name;
->   - Gitea: a token for one agent, and for an agent seat its own Gitea user (Q190), with an expiry. The
->     all scope and the admin scope are never granted;
->   - GitHub: a grant for one agent.
->
->   The Gitea and GitHub rights units come in a later design that Jason approves.
->
->   The approval binds the exact rights the user saw and the target or its enrolled identity. A change to
->   the agent, its definition, the target, the target's identity or the rights after the raise voids it. An
->   approval is used once. A grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side, so it
->   is never used. What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as
->   for a revoke (REQ-GRANT-4). A new grant needs a new approval, never an automatic retry. The grant
->   code runs only on a request the user resolved. A request resolved by an arbiter, the tester or any
->   agent makes nothing. A `credential.mint` decision raised before version 1.8, or without the fields of
->   REQ-GRANT-1, makes nothing when it is approved. Until the Console
->   knows the signed-in human (Vikunja #412), Approve is `mosaic decide` in the CLI (REQ-DEC-3).
-> - **REQ-GRANT-3.** The user enters their own personal access tokens and API tokens in the WebUI, or the
->   CLI. Only the grant code reads them, to make grants. No agent ever sees a token value or a key's
->   private half. Values appear in no event, log, message, prompt or agent file, and no agent can read
->   them back (REQ-VAR-2). Until the Console knows the signed-in human, they are entered through the
->   CLI.
-> - **REQ-GRANT-4.** A grant can be revoked at once by the user, by the assistant for a grant in its own
->   organization, or by the tester on a dev instance (Q173). A revoke needs no decision and no new trust.
->   It takes effect at once on the stack's side, without waiting on the network, so the next use is
->   refused. Removing the key or token at the host or service follows. Until that removal is done it stays
->   visible as pending. A revoke while the grant is being made stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
->   Every revoke is logged with who made it.
-
-REQ-CRED-1, appended:
-
-> Since version 1.8, a token or key for a grant is made by the grant code on the user's Approve
-> (REQ-GRANT-2), not by hand. Tokens that exist stay as they are.
-
-REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
-
-> `host.sudo` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-CRED-4 since version 1.8.
-
-Under "Risks and open questions", a new bullet:
-
-> - Trusted mode lets an agent run its allowed commands at will. On another host, an allowed command that
->   writes a file as root or starts a shell can plant a key, and the seat sandbox doesn't confine the
->   network, so root can outlive the grant and a revoke. The allowlist narrows this. A seat sandbox with
->   its own network namespace closes it. Until then the host's own audit log is the check after the fact
->   (row 210 design section 6).
-
-## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
-
-- REQ-TRUST-1 restates what REQ-DEC-2 already does for within-role actions ("routine and within-role
-  decisions are logged") and names it as the default mode. It grants nothing new by itself. What widens
-  is the role files, one reviewed commit at a time.
-- The hard waits stay with the user (mos-1117). REQ-GRANT-1 makes the grant request a `credential.mint`
-  decision, already a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-1, so Approve is the user resolving it. REQ-WAIT-2 stands:
-  no role file grants `credential.mint`. The grant code acts on the user's resolution, not on a role
-  grant. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's Gitea user under Q190, is the same one
-  `credential.mint` decision. So 1.8 doesn't change the hard-waits list (mos-1124 a, mos-1129 N4).
-- Manual mode: Sage asked who sets it, where it lives and what it changes. Mos accepted these choices
-  (mos-1124 b), and Jason can change them: a list of actions in the organization file, empty by
-  default, changed only by the user, outside the chief's organization writes. A list rather than one
-  switch follows Gizmoduck's #436 draft section 7 (gizmoduck/machine-grant-design f6b6a04b6), so Jason
-  can make host commands manual without making every action manual. Listing every within-role action
-  gives the whole-organization manual mode. Row 210's per-call `host.run` decision, bound to host, argv
-  and stdin and spent once, is this mode's decision for a host command (Q188, Mos's reading).
-- Gizmoduck's draft proposes REQ-CRED-5 (section 8) for the machine grant. Its content is in REQ-GRANT-1
-  to REQ-GRANT-4 here, generalized to all three methods, so 1.8 has no REQ-CRED-5. Their bounds in
-  gizmoduck-0062 items 4a to 4g are in the text: the chief raises only for an allowed definition, the
-  approval binds the rights shown, it is used once with no automatic retry, no value is ever seen, revoke
-  is at once on the stack's side with the host or service removal visible until done, every grant has a
-  rotate-by or expiry date, and the host identity comes from the host side. Duckworth has reviewed their
-  design r1 to r4 (duckworth-0056 and duckworth-0060), so a later change there may need a change here.
-- B1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side.
-  What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as for a revoke.
-- B2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): Mos chose Duckworth's second option. Only an Approve creates a grant,
-  and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. A grant written by hand makes
-  nothing. Jason's Q188 gives the reason: "Disallowing the agents to create grants autonomously is a
-  necessary evil for better security" and "Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically." Row
-  210's hand-written grants stay a test path until #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. r2
-  and r3 had a hand path in the business file, and r4 takes it out, with r3's load check on hand grants
-  (duckworth-0058 N1) and the note that a revoke never rewrites the user's file (duckworth-0058 N2).
-  The same-uid write to the stack's own store stays the B7 residual, and the top of this draft names it
-  for Jason.
-- C1 (duckworth-0058, sage-1538): `account.create` is the hard wait for any new external account, not
-  only a grant (REQ-WAIT-1, `vocabulary.mjs:43-46`, `roles/pm.md:55`). It stays as version 1.7 has it.
-  Only `credential.mint` is chief-only, and a grant that makes an account is a `credential.mint`
-  decision (N4), so a PM's sign-up for a service routes as before.
-- Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 (eb4c756a1, gizmoduck-0067): enrollment is a request the user approves
-  and the stack runs (mos-1120), and a host user with sudo is enrolled by name, the user's Approve
-  covering that user (mos-1125). REQ-GRANT-2's machine key says both. Their design r3 and r4 (1c5705d6d
-  section 6) give revoke to the user, the assistant in its own organization and the tester on a dev
-  instance, as REQ-GRANT-4 does (mos-1124 d).
-- N1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the approval binds the target or its enrolled identity.
-- N2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a revoke during creation stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
-- N3 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): landing step 6 lists the role contract updates (`roles/pm.md:55`,
-  `roles/chief-of-staff.md:75`). A `credential.mint` decision raised before 1.8, or one without the
-  grant fields, makes nothing when it is approved.
-- N4 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a decision carries one action (`a.action`, broker.mjs:1678 on
-  origin/refactor). A grant that makes an account is one `credential.mint` decision: the method in the
-  grant says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user clicks
-  once, and there is no separate `account.create` action for it. Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 reads it
-  the same way.
-- N5 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): `host.sudo` keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for
-  `git.push.remote`. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for
-  its domain (broker.mjs:1677-1678 on origin/refactor), and the grant and its allowlist still limit the
-  command. In manual mode the decision goes to the user. The top of this draft names this for Jason as a
-  change in who decides a root command on another host.
-- N6 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request.
-  The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and the role contracts (step 6 of "When this
-  version lands"). REQ-GRANT-1 says so.
-- Approving a grant doesn't by itself let a command run without a click. That needs REQ-CRED-4 and
-  `host.sudo` in the routed lists, step 5 of "When this version lands" (gizmoduck-0062 item 4i).
-- Which roles may request: Q188 says "Not all agents are capable or authorized to request directly. It
-  must follow the chain of command properly." The text makes the chief of staff the only role that raises,
-  the PM and the CTO ask it directly, and worker roles ask through their PM. Jason's words also name "the
-  main agent", but REQ-ASSIST-1 keeps the assistant out of directing agents, so it passes the user's
-  request to the chief rather than raising one. Mos accepted this (mos-1124 c) and reads "the main agent
-  or chief of staff" as one role under two names. That reading is Mos's, so the top of this draft puts it
-  to Jason at approval.
-- REQ-CRED-4 keeps row 210's conditions (origin/gizmoduck/row210-on-199-r2,
-  agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-210/DESIGN.md:376-392): the definition declares the kind, the grant names the
-  agent, an exact argv-prefix allowlist with wildcards refused, the key issued, and only a reviewed role
-  change adds the action. Row 210 put the grant in a hand-edited business file, which stays a test path until
-  #436a. Under 1.8 the grant is what Approve records, so "the business file grants that agent that host"
-  becomes "a grant names that agent and that host".
-- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". Mos is Jason's assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), so the text says the
-  assistant, limited to grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance (Q173).
-  Mos accepted this with those limits (mos-1124 d).
-- Approve in the Console needs the Console to know the signed-in human (Q175 phase 2, #412). Until then
-  Approve is `mosaic decide`, which REQ-DEC-3 already allows (mos-1124 e). This draft doesn't take
-  REQ-WEB-2, which stays with the Console decide buttons amendment (Vikunja 19/266). That amendment, or a
-  later version, moves Approve into the Console.
-- Roles already use a scoped Gitea token (`<read|write>:<category>`, all and admin never granted,
-  `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:105-106` on origin/refactor). It is a likely Gitea unit, not a settled
-  one. Only the machine key is designed so far. Gitea and GitHub are a later #436 draft, and minting a Gitea
-  token needs an admin credential the user enters, which is a design of its own (Gizmoduck's draft section
-  11). GitHub's rights unit isn't settled. So the text leaves both units to a later design Jason approves
-  (mos-1124 f), and keeps only the bounds: an expiry, and never the all or admin scope. The PRD names outcomes
-  and checks, not the grant code's steps, as REQ-CRED-3 does.
-- Jason expects the inbox Approve and the Gitea and GitHub grants by 10-27 (Q188 point 6). That is a
-  delivery date, so it is in the source and not in the requirement text.
-- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
-  paragraph never edited in place except to append.

agents/launchpad/README.md

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Launchpad
-
-Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
-through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/megavolt/README.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# Megavolt
-
-Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage under mos-0974 and mos-0977 item 5 for MVP T1 item 6, the
-credential store per agent with its own git identity (#1697).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `megavolt/*`
-branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/BUILD.md

@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
-
-Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
-4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
-by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
-
-Status: candidate on megavolt/row199-on-190, rebased on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 (sage-1555). The
-full gate and the section 11 mutants ran in Sage's slot; results under "Runs".
-
-## Commits so far
-
-- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
-  credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
-- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
-  the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
-  git.push.remote among the hard waits.
-- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
-- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
-- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
-  D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
-  call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
-- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
-  in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
-  `detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
-- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
-
-## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
-
-1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
-   carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
-   without identity commits as E7 (T6).
-2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
-   For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
-   the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
-   nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
-3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
-   caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
-   leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
-   issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
-4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
-   `forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
-   files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
-   messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
-5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
-   checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
-   `broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
-   or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
-   also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
-   only".
-6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
-   `roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
-   fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
-   should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
-
-7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
-   `reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
-8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
-   bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
-   status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
-9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
-   agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
-   agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
-   `create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
-10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
-    the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
-    and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
-    Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
-    holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
-11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
-    the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
-    `packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
-    limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
-    host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
-    `working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
-    `withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
-    until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
-    (`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
-    when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
-    refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
-    by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
-    On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
-    goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
-    (sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
-    at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
-    publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
-    the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
-    `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
-    end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
-    publish-timeout outcome).
-12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
-    clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
-    manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
-13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
-    launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
-    `recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
-    clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
-    it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
-    equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
-14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
-    T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
-    `working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
-    (`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
-    (`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
-    oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
-    DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
-    asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
-    refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
-    refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
-
-15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
-    (`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
-    gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
-    case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
-    `cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
-    fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
-
-16. **The bus process refuses a boot config carrying `publishTls` (M26, sage-1563).** process.mjs
-    used to drop `publishTls` from the boot config before `startBroker`, and no test could see the
-    drop. The host's boot config (`packages/cli/src/config.mjs`) never carries it; it is the tests'
-    scratch CA for an in-process runtime only. A boot that carries it now refuses
-    `invalid-host-request` and the process exits 2, rather than trusting it or dropping it quietly.
-    The test: `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs`, "the bus process answers the publish ops from their own
-    lines". Every test file that reads process.mjs ran singly, green (see "Runs").
-17. **M17 is equivalent: `#authorityFor`'s pushCommit comparison is also made by `#publishFacts`.**
-    A git.push.remote raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push` (`broker.mjs` raise,
-    `pushCommit = ... ?? fail('no-push')`), so every publish decision carries a pushCommit.
-    `#publishFacts` takes `source = result.pushCommit` and refuses `decision-mismatch` when it isn't
-    `#latestPush(task_ref).commit`, the same two values `#authorityFor` compares. The check stays as
-    defense in depth, for a decision whose context lacks pushCommit, which no code path writes today.
-    Duckworth judges it, as with M27.
-
-## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
-
-Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
-`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
-no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
-git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
-that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
-
-## R1, the backup set
-
-Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
-`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
-`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
-`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
-through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
-one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
-`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
-never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
-copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
-
-## T1 limit
-
-A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
-dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
-
-## Runs
-
-Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
-hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
-credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
-usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
-business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
-tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
-plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
-tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
-file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
-
-Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
-checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
-credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
-publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
-which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
-minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.
-
-Rebase (sage-1555): the 21 commits from megavolt/row199 sit on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 as the new
-branch megavolt/row199-on-190 (no force-push). `git range-diff` shows all 21 patches as `=`; the
-merge of 12c85ada1 flattened with an empty remerge-diff.
-
-Full gate, Sage's slot, on c6868ba41 (base 00d4cc1f6), logs started 2026-10-20T22:55:44Z: bus 476
-pass 0 fail; business 191/0; tasks 97/0; cli 522/0 (472 s); seat 163/0; scripts/test-queue.sh
-156/0; test-auth, test-conductor, test-config, test-discord, test-extension-package,
-test-foundation, test-land-work, test-release and test-task each exit 0. The test-task compose run
-left the network megavolt-row199_default with 0 containers; I removed it.
-
-Section 11 mutants, batch 1, on c6868ba41, 2026-10-20T23:09:03Z to 23:09:56Z, restores verified and
-packages/ clean: 22 of 28 killed; M27 survived, expected equivalent (deviation 13). Five expected
-kills survived, each a test gap: M05 (the token in the push URL), M06 (revoke unlinks before it drops
-memory), M12 (http.followRedirects=false dropped), M17 (#authorityFor's pushCommit check dropped)
-and M26 (publishTls reaches startBroker). Launchpad's stack-release single file ran alongside from
-23:09:28Z, so batch 2 reruns all 28 (sage-1563).
-
-Fixes, each checked by its mutant alone: 5fa7b2553 seat publish, a test reads git's argv through a
-PATH shim and finds no token and no userinfo (M05 killed); the 302 test's target shares the CA git
-trusts, so only http.followRedirects=false keeps git off it (M12 killed). 116eeec48 bus,
-credential-store: revoke's unlink fails (dir 0500) and the token is already out of memory (M06
-killed); process.mjs refuses publishTls, deviation 16 (M26 killed, its anchor is now the refusal
-line). M17 is equivalent, deviation 17. Single files after the fixes, each green: seat publish (12),
-bus credential-store (12), bus publish (12), bus process (8), and every other file that reads
-process.mjs: bus credential-status (4), limit-checks (16), land (17), tasks (9), end-launch (7); cli
-trackers-boot (1), thread-launch (11), publish-socket (7). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-Section 11 mutants, batch 2, all 28, on 7c3cdd940 in Sage's slot (sage-1565), 2026-10-20T23:17:59Z to
-23:18:48Z, restores verified and packages/ clean: 26 killed; M17 and M27 survived, both expected
-equivalent (deviations 17 and 13). Each of the five batch 1 survivors but M17 now fails its test. Then
-pkg-bus 477 pass 0 fail, pkg-seat 164/0, pkg-cli 522/0 (461 s), ending 23:26:40Z. No other seat's run
-was active: the busy check said CLEAR before the batch started. Logs:
-/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r199/batch2-20261020T231650Z/.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
-
-Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
-Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
-No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
-
-r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
-and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
-
-r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
-drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
-
-r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
-and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
-
-r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
-remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
-agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
-repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
-found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
-step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
-`publish` require it (D8).
-
-r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
-has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
-and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
-N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
-
-## 0. Terms
-
-- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
-  `~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
-  instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
-- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
-  design says agent.
-- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
-- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
-
-## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
-
-| Code | Fact | Where |
-|---|---|---|
-| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
-| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
-| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
-| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
-| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
-| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
-| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
-| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
-| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
-| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
-
-So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
-the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
-share.
-
-## 2. The store (brief item 1)
-
-D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
-
-```
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/                       0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/    0700
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>   0600, the token only, one line
-```
-
-This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
-format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
-secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
-
-D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
-means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
-so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
-migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
-own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
-
-D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
-(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
-into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
-
-D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
-`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
-create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
-owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
-`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
-
-## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
-
-Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
-
-D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
-Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
-to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
-does for files today, extended to the dirs).
-
-D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
-verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
-frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
-there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
-host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
-`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
-`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
-`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
-`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
-
-D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
-is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
-per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
-
-## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
-
-| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
-|---|---|---|
-| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
-| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
-| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
-
-D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
-provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
-short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
-credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
-instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
-Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
-doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
-
-## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
-
-D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
-optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
-step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
-grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
-"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
-fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
-it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
-commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
-
-D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
-
-```
-publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-  -> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
-```
-
-The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
-
-1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
-   task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
-   ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
-   `broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
-   needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
-
-   **The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
-   (`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
-   `holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
-   `decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
-   raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
-   refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
-   refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
-   is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
-   refuses.
-   No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
-   reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
-   without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
-2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
-   project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
-   (`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
-   `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
-   fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
-   the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
-   5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
-   repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
-   agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
-   push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
-   equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
-   beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
-   (`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
-3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
-   the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
-   `work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
-   if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
-   caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
-   `validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
-4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
-   (`identity-mismatch`).
-5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
-   with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
-   `checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
-   (`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
-   `protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
-   or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
-   inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
-   PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
-   defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
-   `["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
-   is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
-   `store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
-   `credential-leak`.
-6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
-
-D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
-repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
-receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
-upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
-`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
-catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
-upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
-built on them.
-Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
-`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
-ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
-network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
-parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
-network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
-until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
-
-D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
-and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
-
-- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
-- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
-  `gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
-  percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
-  each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
-  form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
-  the owner that is used.
-- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
-  REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
-- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
-  `..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
-- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
-- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
-  sides.
-- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
-  upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
-  would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
-
-D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
-(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
-`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
-
-- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
-  email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
-  same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
-- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
-  step 5. The token never leaves that call.
-- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
-
-The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
-
-D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
-branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
-
-- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
-  named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
-  Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
-  or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
-  upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
-- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
-  branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
-  A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
-  depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
-
-Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
-`all`, no admin).
-
-D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
-socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
-`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
-root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
-
-## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
-
-All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
-human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
-`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
-(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
-writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
-kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
-
-| Verb | What it does |
-|---|---|
-| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
-| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
-| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
-| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
-| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
-
-D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
-`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
-token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
-confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
-end. Row 194's fire ends them.
-
-D13. **What row 194 calls.**
-
-- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
-- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
-  is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
-  `issue`.
-- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
-  the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
-  with its credentials still live on our side.
-- `regenerate`: no credential change.
-
-## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
-
-Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
-
-- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
-  `gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
-- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
-  `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
-- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
-  (`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
-  fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
-- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
-  the token pasted into stdin.
-- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
-- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
-
-Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
-
-## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
-
-- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
-  `issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
-- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
-  Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
-- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
-  one.
-
-## 9. Questions
-
-Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
-
-- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
-- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
-  and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
-  Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
-  grants it to coder.
-- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
-  instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
-- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
-  row.
-
-Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
-
-- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account.
-- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3).
-
-## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
-
-- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
-  model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
-- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
-- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
-
-## 11. Tests and mutants
-
-All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
-127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
-
-- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
-  path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
-  status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
-- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
-  `action.refused`.
-- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
-  only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
-  the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
-  happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
-  exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
-  no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
-  spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
-  `decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
-  the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
-  and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
-  refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
-  fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
-  and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
-  agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
-  upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
-  and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
-  history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
-  neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
-  fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
-  path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
-  a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
-  sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
-  `identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
-- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
-  `changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
-- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
-  Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
-  The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
-- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
-
-Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
-the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
-check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
-ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
-`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
-check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
-oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
-the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
-D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
-check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
-
-## 12. Risks
-
-- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
-  and says what it includes.
-- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
-- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
-  Jason's network to confirm.

agents/morgana/README.md

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Morgana
-
-Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
-through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/quackerjack/README.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Quackerjack
-
-Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
-rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
-section 7 (#414).
-
-No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
-`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
-another seat's branch.

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-n=0
-for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do
-  c=$(tr '\0' ' ' < $p/cmdline 2>/dev/null) || continue
-  case "$c" in *shell-snapshots*|*chrome-devtools-mcp*|*sage-busy-now*) continue;; esac
-  if echo "$c" | grep -qE 'node --test|gate\.sh|mutant|scripts/test-[a-z-]+\.sh|docker compose'; then echo "BUSY ${p#/proc/}: ${c:0:160}"; n=$((n+1)); fi
-done
-[ $n -eq 0 ] && echo CLEAR

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-set -o pipefail
-# Landing gate template (2026-10-14): sed the G= and OUT= lines and this comment.
-# Sequential suites, each teed to its own log; stops at the first failure.
-G=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-wt
-OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-out
-cd "$G" || exit 9
-mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 9  # a missing OUT failed the row 142 gate at step 1 (2026-10-15)
-# test-task.sh live cases run `docker compose` from $G, so without a name the project is "wt"
-# and leaves wt_default behind (row 142 gate, 2026-10-15). Name it per gate dir and remove it on exit.
-export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="$(basename "$(dirname "$G")")"
-trap 'docker network rm "${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "removed network ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default"' EXIT
-# A gate tree without the node_modules link fails cli tests with ENOENT (2026-10-13).
-[ -d "$G/node_modules" ] || { echo "STOP no node_modules in $G"; exit 8; }
-echo "base $(git rev-parse --short HEAD) dirty $(git status --short | grep -vc node_modules) DOCKER_HOST=${DOCKER_HOST:-unset}"
-run() { local name="$1" dir="$2" cmd="$3"
-  (cd "$G/$dir" && bash -c "$cmd") > "$OUT/$name.log" 2>&1; local rc=$?
-  echo "$name rc=$rc $(grep -E '^ℹ (pass|fail) [0-9]+' "$OUT/$name.log" | tr '\n' ' ') | $(tail -n1 "$OUT/$name.log")"
-  [ $rc -eq 0 ] || { echo "STOP $name"; exit $rc; }; }
-# No pkg-queue step: scripts/test-queue.sh runs packages/queue/tests/ itself (same 156 tests; CI debate item 2a, Vikunja #274).
-for d in packages/*/; do p=$(basename "$d"); [ -d "$d/tests" ] || continue; [ "$p" = queue ] && continue
-  run "pkg-$p" "packages/$p" 'node --test tests/*.test.mjs'; done
-for s in scripts/test-*.sh; do n=$(basename "$s" .sh); run "script-${n#test-}" . "bash $s"; done
-echo GATE_PASSED

agents/sage/work/gate-lane/timing-g189.md

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# Row 189 gate timing (for row 197, Herb)
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20T19:25:04Z. Gate on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), one lane. The slot was mine. Seats may have run single test files at the same time, which the slot rules allow, and I did not record that.
-Start 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z, end 2026-10-20T19:20:36Z. Total wall time: 659 s.
-
-Wall time per suite is the gap between one suite's log mtime and the one before it (the first suite starts at start.txt), so it includes node start-up. node's duration_ms is listed where the suite prints it. Scripts print no duration.
-
-| Suite | Wall s | duration_ms s | Ended (UTC) |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| pkg-bus | 3 | 3.8 | 19:09:40 |
-| pkg-business | 3 | 2.2 | 19:09:43 |
-| pkg-cli | 388 | 388.5 | 19:16:11 |
-| pkg-control-board | 1 | 0.8 | 19:16:12 |
-| pkg-conversation | 35 | 35.4 | 19:16:47 |
-| pkg-discord | 3 | 2.6 | 19:16:50 |
-| pkg-harness | 12 | 11.6 | 19:17:02 |
-| pkg-ledger | 13 | 13.5 | 19:17:15 |
-| pkg-mosaic | 3 | 2.3 | 19:17:18 |
-| pkg-plugins | 0 | 0.3 | 19:17:18 |
-| pkg-project | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:19 |
-| pkg-runs | 1 | 0.8 | 19:17:20 |
-| pkg-seat | 6 | 6.2 | 19:17:26 |
-| pkg-tasks | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:27 |
-| pkg-webui | 58 | 57.9 | 19:18:25 |
-| script-auth | 1 | - | 19:18:26 |
-| script-conductor | 5 | - | 19:18:31 |
-| script-config | 2 | - | 19:18:33 |
-| script-discord | 8 | - | 19:18:41 |
-| script-extension-package | 1 | - | 19:18:42 |
-| script-foundation | 40 | - | 19:19:22 |
-| script-land-work | 11 | - | 19:19:33 |
-| script-queue | 21 | - | 19:19:54 |
-| script-release | 11 | - | 19:20:05 |
-| script-task | 31 | - | 19:20:36 |
-
-Source: /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-g189/out/*.log mtimes and gate.log. The cli suite is about 59% of the run, and webui plus conversation add about 14%.

agents/sage/work/prd18-raise/decision.json

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
- "seq": 22,
- "id": "3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2",
- "at": "2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z",
- "business": "mosaic-stack",
- "project": null,
- "raised_by_role": "pm",
- "raised_by_run": "rc9e993da24cf",
- "class": "gated",
- "action": "prd.approve",
- "route_to": "human",
- "question": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?\n\nFile: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Duckworth reviewed it (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and Mos checked it (mos-1140). The tip of branch honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb), which is not used here. This approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above. The PM copied these values from the request and did not compute or check the sha256.\n\nNotes the approval carries:\n1. Mos's reading: \"the main agent or chief of staff\" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.\n2. Mos's reading: revoke by \"you, Mos or the tester\" means the user, the assistant (\"Mos\", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.\n3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.\n4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.\n5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.\n\nSource: a tester request relayed by the chief (message 6990efb4, tester message d54a190e). It is a test request, not Jason's instruction. It takes the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): non-blocking, no task, uncited, so it goes to the human's Inbox. I recommend yes because two reviewers have passed r5 and the open points are written down above, not hidden.",
- "options": [
-  {
-   "key": "yes",
-   "text": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted: the r5 file at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 with the sha256 below, and only that."
-  },
-  {
-   "key": "no",
-   "text": "Don't approve. Say what changes, and a new revision comes back for review."
-  }
- ],
- "recommendation": "yes",
- "task_ref": null,
- "requirement_ref": null,
- "blocking": false,
- "supersedes": null,
- "spec_path": null,
- "spec_commit": null,
- "authorization": {
-  "action": "prd.approve",
-  "target": null,
-  "approvalChoice": "yes"
- }
-}

agents/sage/work/prd18-raise/inbox.json

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "seq": 22,
-    "id": "3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2",
-    "at": "2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z",
-    "business": "mosaic-stack",
-    "project": null,
-    "raised_by_role": "pm",
-    "raised_by_run": "rc9e993da24cf",
-    "class": "gated",
-    "action": "prd.approve",
-    "route_to": "human",
-    "question": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?\n\nFile: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Duckworth reviewed it (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and Mos checked it (mos-1140). The tip of branch honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb), which is not used here. This approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above. The PM copied these values from the request and did not compute or check the sha256.\n\nNotes the approval carries:\n1. Mos's reading: \"the main agent or chief of staff\" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.\n2. Mos's reading: revoke by \"you, Mos or the tester\" means the user, the assistant (\"Mos\", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.\n3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.\n4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.\n5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.\n\nSource: a tester request relayed by the chief (message 6990efb4, tester message d54a190e). It is a test request, not Jason's instruction. It takes the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): non-blocking, no task, uncited, so it goes to the human's Inbox. I recommend yes because two reviewers have passed r5 and the open points are written down above, not hidden.",
-    "options": [
-      {
-        "key": "yes",
-        "text": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted: the r5 file at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 with the sha256 below, and only that."
-      },
-      {
-        "key": "no",
-        "text": "Don't approve. Say what changes, and a new revision comes back for review."
-      }
-    ],
-    "recommendation": "yes",
-    "task_ref": null,
-    "requirement_ref": null,
-    "blocking": false,
-    "supersedes": null,
-    "spec_path": null,
-    "spec_commit": null,
-    "authorization": {
-      "action": "prd.approve",
-      "target": null,
-      "approvalChoice": "yes"
-    }
-  }
-]

agents/sage/work/prd18-raise/msg.txt

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-[mos test] Please have the PM raise a prd.approve decision for PRD 1.8, the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): blocking false, no task_ref, recommendation yes, gated to the human. The PM must not compute or change the sha256; it copies the values below.
-
-Question: "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?"
-File: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Reviewed by Duckworth (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and checked by Mos (mos-1140). The branch tip of honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb) that is not used; the approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above.
-
-The decision notes must carry these five items:
-1. Mos's reading: "the main agent or chief of staff" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.
-2. Mos's reading: revoke by "you, Mos or the tester" means the user, the assistant ("Mos", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.
-3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.
-4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.
-5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.
-
-Reply with the decision id once raised. Do not resolve it.

agents/sage/work/prd18-raise/talk.txt

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-sent d54a190e to chief
-chief (RESULT, re d54a190e) cc46a7b4:
-I passed your request to the pm without changing any of it, and launched the pm so it can act on it. No decision id yet, because the pm hasn't raised the decision.
-
-- **Message to pm:** 6990efb4-8321-4d0e-9b8a-771f65625b83. It says the request comes from a tester and authorizes nothing, and it carries your PRD 1.8 values and the five notes as you wrote them.
-- **pm launch:** run rc9e993da24cf.
-
-When the pm answers with the decision id, I'll send it to you.

agents/sage/work/prd18-raise/trail.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-trail 3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2: 4 row(s)
-2026-10-20T22:40:47.949Z  events#1550  session.launched  pm
-2026-10-20T22:40:47.969Z  role_claims#102  claim pm by rc9e993da24cf
-2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z  decisions#22  gated prd.approve → human: Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted? File: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit …
-2026-10-20T22:41:14.445Z  events#1553  action.allowed  pm  decision.raise  decision 3a6c8fb9

agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,42 +1,8 @@
 # Q175 design: the Console verifies SSO itself (Vikunja #412)
 
-Author Sage, 2026-10-20, r3. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at
-refactor 4ca8d6e94 unless a line says otherwise. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345
-and 353). #385 stays open until the Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
-
-## Changes from r2 (Filbert's r2 review, CHANGES)
-
-- C1: the `console` key goes into the shared loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, which today refuses any
-  unknown top-level key (:113). Section 4 names the blast radius. Jason step 4 moves inside the phase 2
-  window, after the pin and before the Console starts. The phase 2 rollback removes `console` first. A
-  test-config.sh case covers it (test 25). Mos confirms the sequence before phase 1 (section 5).
-- C2: under `--sso` the page treats a 401 `sign-in required` as signed out and links to
-  `/auth/login?return=<path>` (section 5 phase 1, test 24).
-- Notes: tests 7 and 15 are built so that only the record rule refuses; test 9a is an alg test; Q-B's two
-  classes are defined, and test 23 adds a 200 HTML page; the phase 2 scratch Console uses a scratch config,
-  a dummy slot, no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
-- r3 fix (Filbert r3 approve): D1, the loader checks the slot reference's shape only, and the file checks
-  run in the Console's `--sso` start; D2, the slot resolves from the config dir, and the scratch Console has
-  a scratch dataRoot and an unreachable issuer (section 5).
-- Q-E: settled as Filbert ruled. The `subject-unknown` line keeps iss and sub, JSON-escaped and capped
-  (section 1, tests 10 and 19).
-
-## Changes from r1 (Filbert's r1 review, CHANGES)
-
-- B1: the provider config moves to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` (section 4). Mos agreed (mos-0973). The
-  Console prints provider ids, issuers and subject counts at start. The rehearse-strip follow-up is dropped.
-- B2: one return-path rule, `new URL(ret, publicOrigin).origin === publicOrigin` (section 1 step 7), with
-  tests for `/\evil.example` and `/%09/evil.example`.
-- B3: refusals log a fixed code and the provider id, never the error or its cause (section 1).
-- B4: login records are capped at 32 (section 1 step 1), with a test.
-- B5: test 9 splits into a forged payload under a real kid and a kid missing from the JWKS, and a try/catch
-  mutant joins the list. Test 2 no longer claims the signature mutant (section 9).
-- B6: the phase 2 forged-header check runs on a scratch Console, or Mos or Jason runs it on live (section 5).
-- Rulings: Q-B start degraded (section 4), Q-C only the public Host on 7332 (section 3), Q-D keep 1 h idle
-  but polls don't count as activity (section 3).
-- Section 6: `startServer` throws on `tester && sso`, and `human` joins `tester` as a refused subject label.
-- The missing tests and nits N1-N5 are in sections 1, 3, 7 and 9.
-- Section 8: the human-cli statement stays as written (mos-0972). The recommendation is now Mos's ruling.
+Author Sage, 2026-10-20. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at refactor
+4ca8d6e94. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345 and 353). #385 stays open until the
+Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
 
 ## The ruling this implements
 
@@ -56,9 +22,7 @@ trust with verification" and confirmed five points (mos-0970):
 ## What exists today
 
 The live Console runs from copies/490e2771d3d0 with `--public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header
-X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`. Row 189 (#1687, P19 #413) adds
-`stack-release.sh activate --no-send`, and Mos's ruling mos-0972 takes `--send` off the live Console until
-phase 2.
+X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`.
 
 - `previewOptions` (packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:205) builds `{ host, header, user }`.
 - A request is `named` when its Host equals the public name (:493). A named request passes sign-in when it
@@ -81,73 +45,41 @@ New module `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs`, used only by the human listener (7332).
 
 | Route | Method | What it does |
 |---|---|---|
-| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. A provider whose discovery hasn't succeeded gets 503 (section 4). |
+| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. |
 | `/auth/callback` | GET | Finish the flow, create the session, 303 to the saved return path. |
 | `/auth/logout` | POST | Same-origin checks, delete the session, 303 to the provider's `end_session_endpoint`. |
 | `/auth/signed-out` | GET | Static "signed out" page with a sign-in link. |
 
-Every URL the Console hands a provider is built from the configured `publicOrigin`: `redirect_uri` is
-`publicOrigin + '/auth/callback'` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` is `publicOrigin + '/auth/signed-out'`. No
-code path reads the request's Host to build them (N2).
-
 The flow per provider:
 
 1. Start. Generate a state, a nonce and a PKCE verifier (`generateRandomState`, `generateRandomNonce`,
    `generateRandomCodeVerifier`), and a challenge with `calculatePKCECodeChallenge` (S256 only). Put them, the
-   provider id, the return path and an expiry 10 minutes out in a server-side login record keyed by a random
-   id. The store holds at most 32 login records; a new one evicts the oldest (B4). Set `__Host-mosaic_login` to
-   that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`, `scope=openid profile email`,
-   `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
+   provider id and the return path in a server-side login record keyed by a random id. Set
+   `__Host-mosaic_login` to that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`,
+   `scope=openid profile email`, `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
 2. Callback. Read exactly one `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie, then take and delete its record (single use, so a
    replayed callback finds nothing). Expire the cookie in the response. The provider comes from the record,
-   never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers. Two tabs signing in at once each set the
-   cookie, so the later one wins and the earlier tab's callback finds no record and gets the 403 page with a
-   sign-in link (N5). That costs one retry and keeps one cookie per browser.
+   never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers.
 3. `validateAuthResponse(as, client, url, record.state)` checks state, refuses an error response, and checks
    the `iss` parameter when the provider advertises RFC 9207.
-4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)` returns a
-   `Response`. Keep that object. `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce:
-   record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })` checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and
-   nonce, and checks `alg` against `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`. That field gets the provider's whole
-   `algs` array, which the library's `checkSigningAlgorithm` accepts, so a provider listing RS256 and ES256
-   takes either and nothing else (N1). Test 16 pins this.
+4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)`, then
+   `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })`.
+   That checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and nonce, and checks `alg` against
+   `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`.
 5. Signature. oauth4webapi does not verify the signature of an ID token that came straight from the token
    endpoint over TLS (OIDC Core 3.1.3.7 allows that, and the library docs for
    `validateApplicationLevelSignature` say so). Point 2 asks for the JWKS check, so the callback always calls
-   `validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` with the same `Response` object from step 4. It fetches
-   the JWKS from the discovered `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kty`, `kid`, `alg` and `use`, and refuses HS*
-   outright. On a `kid` it doesn't have, it refetches the JWKS once if the cache is at least 60 s old, which
-   covers key rotation (test 18). The call is not wrapped in a catch that continues; its throw ends the
-   callback.
-6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's `algs`, the token's `iss` equals
-   the configured issuer as a raw string compare, with no URL normalising (N3; the library's discovery check
-   compares normalised hrefs, so this one is stricter), and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list.
-7. Create the session (section 3), then 303 to the return path. The rule (B2): resolve
-   `u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin)`, and use `u.pathname + u.search` only when
-   `u.origin === publicOrigin`; otherwise use `/`. A missing or unparsable `ret` gives `/`.
+   `validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` after step 4. It fetches the JWKS from the discovered
+   `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kid` and `alg`, and refuses HS* outright.
+6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's configured `algs`, the token's
+   `iss` equals the configured issuer exactly, and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list. Anything
+   else is a 403 that logs `refused sign-in iss=... sub=...` (never a token, code or cookie).
+7. Create the session (section 3) and 303 to the return path. The return path must start with one `/` and
+   is otherwise replaced with `/`.
 
 Every refusal in steps 2-6 ends at a 403 page saying sign-in failed, with a link back to `/auth/login`. No
 step falls back to a header.
 
-Logging (B3). A refusal logs one line: a fixed code from a closed list (`login-record-missing`,
-`state-mismatch`, `auth-error-response`, `grant-failed`, `id-token-invalid`, `signature-invalid`,
-`alg-refused`, `issuer-mismatch`, `subject-unknown`, `discovery-failed`, `jwks-failed`) and the provider id.
-It never logs the exception, its message or its `cause`. oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims
-in `cause`, so even a message can leak. The one extra field is on `subject-unknown`: it logs `iss` and `sub`,
-because Jason step 3 reads his `sub` from that line (Q-E, Filbert's ruling). Authentik's default subject mode
-is a hashed user id that its admin view doesn't show, so the line is the practical source. Neither value is a
-credential. Three conditions hold:
-
-- Only a token that passed steps 3-6 up to the subject check reaches this line. Every earlier refusal logs
-  its own code and the provider id only.
-- Both values are written with `JSON.stringify` and each is cut to 255 characters first. Any account at the
-  provider can get a signed token, so a `sub` may hold a newline, and an unescaped one would let a sign-in
-  forge a log line.
-- Test 10 uses a `sub` holding `\n` and a fake `refused sign-in` suffix and asserts one escaped line.
-
-Test 19 asserts that no log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id.
-It exempts only the `iss` and `sub` fields of the `subject-unknown` line.
-
 ### 2. Library: oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly
 
 Mos's steer (mos-0971) was to prefer oauth4webapi over hand-rolled verification on `node:crypto` unless I
@@ -171,78 +103,34 @@ entry. Root is right because `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-31` copies only the root
 webui's first runtime dependency. The root dependency rule (exact pins, never unversioned) applies to it.
 Upgrades are reviewed commits.
 
-### 3. Sessions, cookies, Host and logout
+### 3. Sessions, cookies and logout
 
-- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256 and holds no raw id, so a heap dump
-  doesn't hold usable ids. Test 20 checks that the store's keys and values never contain the cookie value.
-- Cookie, exactly: `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax`, no Domain, no
-  Max-Age (a browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over
-  https on this exact host. Test 21 asserts the whole Set-Cookie value, and a mutant drops `HttpOnly`.
-- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, the same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires
-  at 10 minutes server-side.
+- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256, so a heap dump doesn't hold usable ids.
+- Cookie `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/`, no Domain, no Max-Age (a
+  browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over https on
+  this exact host.
+- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires at
+  10 minutes server-side.
 - Lax, not Strict, because the callback is a top-level navigation from the provider's site, and a Strict
   cookie set there would be missing on the redirect to `/`. Lax still keeps the session off cross-site POSTs.
   The write routes keep their exact `Origin` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` checks (:171, :250, :297, :340,
   :387, :425), so cross-site writes are refused twice.
-- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side (Q-D, Filbert's ruling). The store is in memory with a
-  cap of 64 sessions (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one
-  human and keeps sessions off disk.
-- Activity (Q-D). Only a page load (a GET outside `/api/`) or a write (a POST) refreshes `seen`. The page's
-  background reads don't: `refresh` re-reads the board every 10 s (packages/webui/src/public/app.js:346) and
-  the 5 s timer at :301 redraws the age label. Without this rule an open tab would never go idle. Test 13
-  covers it.
+- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side. The store is in memory with a cap of 64 sessions
+  (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one human and keeps
+  sessions off disk.
 - The session holds `{ provider, iss, sub, name, idToken, created, seen }`. `name` is the subject entry's
   label. It goes where `preview.user` goes today (send logs, settings, seat routes), so the downstream writer
   shape stays as it is. `idToken` is kept only as the logout hint and never leaves the server.
-- Host (Q-C, Filbert's ruling). Under `--sso`, 7332 serves only requests whose Host is the public host.
-  Any other Host, loopback included, gets 403 `public Host required`, except `GET /healthz`. The loopback read
-  path at :509-512 is gone under `--sso`. Today's readers of 127.0.0.1:7332 and where they go:
-  - `scripts/webui-service.sh status` (:406), the stack-release gate (scripts/stack-release.sh:484) and the
-    rehearse gate (:1369) read only `/healthz`, which stays open on loopback.
-  - The webui README (:83) describes the loopback path. It changes in phase 1.
-  - Agent reads of the board go to the tester listener on 7333, which already serves reads. I found no other
-    code that reads 7332 on loopback. A person opening http://127.0.0.1:7332 in a local browser gets the 403
-    and uses the public URL instead.
-  Test 22 covers a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write, and `/healthz` passing.
 - Every request on 7332 except `/healthz` and `/auth/*` needs a valid session. Without one, `/api/*` gets
   401 JSON and other GETs get a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`.
 - Logout: `POST /auth/logout` with the same-origin checks. It deletes the session, expires the cookie, and
-  303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=<publicOrigin>/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
+  303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
   If the provider has no `end_session_endpoint`, it goes straight to `/auth/signed-out`.
 - Limit: signing out at the provider does not end a Console session until idle or absolute expiry. Back-channel
   logout is a follow-up, not phase 1.
 
 ### 4. Provider config: shape and location
 
-Location (B1, Filbert's ruling, Mos agreed in mos-0973): a `console.sso` key in
-`~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. The reason is who can write it. The business file is writable by agents
-through `organizationWriter` (the tester verbs and the chief's `organization.set`), so a provider entry there
-could be changed by the agents the Console is meant to keep out. config.json is user-authored and never
-auto-written: `scripts/bootstrap.sh` creates it and nothing overwrites it. Adding the key is a Jason step
-(section 10).
-
-The loader (C1). Every tool reads config.json through one loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs. Its `validate`
-refuses any top-level key other than `configVersion`, `environment`, `dataRoot` and `execution` with
-`unsupported configuration key` (:113). The business, seat, cli, discord, bootstrap, land-work, stack-copy and
-conductor-apply code all use it. So phase 1 changes the shared loader, not a Console-only reader:
-
-- mosaic-config.mjs accepts an optional `console` key, and the strict `console.sso` shape validator (the
-  config checks below, except the slot file checks) runs inside the loader. The fail-closed canon holds for
-  every reader. The loader checks shape only and never touches a slot file: `clientSecret` must be
-  `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}`. The file checks and the read run only in the
-  Console's `--sso` start (D1), so a missing slot or a 0640 slot stops the Console, not the stack.
-- The blast radius is the whole stack. A typo in `console.sso` makes every tool refuse the config, not just
-  the Console. That's the price of one loader, and the reason step 4 writes the key inside a window with a
-  backup first.
-- The other direction breaks too. A copy older than phase 1 refuses a config that has the key. If the key
-  went in before the phase 2 pin, the live copy (490e2771d3d0 or later) would refuse its own config on the
-  next read, and the bus, seats and host would stop. After phase 2, a rollback to a pre-phase-1 copy fails
-  the same way until the key is removed. This is the same trap as the plug-in kind before a rollback.
-- Files without the key still load, on old and new copies.
-
-Test 25 in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads, a malformed one fails with
-the bad key path named, and a config without `console` loads.
-
 No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
 
 ```json
@@ -263,54 +151,38 @@ No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
 }
 ```
 
-At start, `--sso` prints one line per provider: its id, its issuer and the number of subjects. No client id
-value beyond that, no secret, no `sub`.
+Location: a new optional `console` key in the business file (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/<id>.json`). The
+Console already serves one business (`--business`), the identities map to that business's human, and Q173
+lets agents edit the test business with a backup first. Adding the key means adding `console` to `TOP_KEYS`
+(packages/business/src/business.mjs:21) with a strict validator. It's additive, and existing files without
+it still load. The alternative is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, which is user-authored and never
+auto-written. That fits a deployment setting well, but it puts per-business identity in system config.
+**Filbert, rule on this one.**
 
-The slot is `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, where `configDir` is the directory of the config file
-the loader read (`MOSAIC_CONFIG`, default `~/.config/mosaic-dev`), so a scratch config gets a scratch slot
-(D2). The Console's `--sso` start reads it. The Console refuses to start if
-the file is a symlink, isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode
-bits (0640 refuses as well as 0644), or resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or
-put in a refusal message.
+The slot is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, read at start. The Console refuses to start if
+the file isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode bits, or
+resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or put in a refusal message.
 
-`stack-release.sh rehearse` starts its Console with `serve --port N --business B` and no `--sso`, so a
-rehearsed Console never reads `console.sso` and never uses the live redirect URI. No rehearse change is
-needed; r1's follow-up is dropped.
+`stack-release.sh rehearse` copies a backup onto a scratch root. A rehearsed Console must not use the live
+redirect URI, so rehearse strips `console.sso` from the scratch business file and the rehearsed Console runs
+without SSO (tester listener only). That's a row 163 follow-up, named in the build brief.
 
-Config checks, run at start without the network. Any failure refuses the start, and the message names the
-provider and the check:
+Startup checks for each provider, all fail-closed (the Console doesn't start, and the message names the
+provider and the check):
 
-- `publicOrigin` is an https origin with no path, query or fragment.
-- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
-- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment.
-- `algs` is non-empty and holds only asymmetric algs from the library's list. `HS256`, any `HS*` and `none`
-  refuse.
-- `subjects` is non-empty, each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters, and no `name` is `tester` or `human`.
-- `clientSecret` is `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}` (shape only, in the loader).
-- In the Console's `--sso` start only, the slot file passes the file checks above.
-
-Discovery checks, run per provider when its discovery succeeds:
-
-- Discovery returns `issuer` exactly.
-- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`. mosaic-preview advertises HS256
-  only, so it fails here.
+- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment. Discovery returns that issuer exactly.
+- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`, and `algs` holds only
+  asymmetric algs from the library's list. mosaic-preview advertises HS256 only, so the Console refuses it at
+  start.
 - `code_challenge_methods_supported` includes `S256`.
 - `jwks_uri` returns at least one key usable for one of `algs`. The empty mosaic-preview JWKS fails here too.
+- `subjects` is non-empty, and each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters.
+- `client.id_token_signed_response_alg` is set to `algs[0]`, so the library enforces it per token.
+- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
 
-Unreachable provider (Q-B, Filbert's ruling). Config errors still refuse the start. Each fetch of the
-discovery document or the JWKS lands in one of two classes:
-
-- Unreachable: a network error, a timeout, a status other than 200, or a body that doesn't parse as JSON. An
-  Authentik maintenance page served as 200 HTML is unreachable, not refused, so it can't block a restart.
-- Refused: a JSON document that fails the issuer, alg, S256 or JWKS check.
-
-An unreachable provider doesn't stop the Console. It starts, that provider's `/auth/login` gets 503
-`sign-in unavailable`, and a retry runs with backoff (5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes). `/healthz` stays
-200 and adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable" | "refused" }`, so the gates still pass and an operator
-can see the state. A refused provider at start refuses the start, because it's a configuration problem. On a
-later retry it stays disabled with the `discovery-failed` code until a restart. Sessions already made keep
-working while a provider is unreachable, since a session check needs no network. Test 23 covers the degraded
-start, a 200 HTML page, and the recovery.
+Starting while the provider is unreachable refuses the start. A Console with no working sign-in serves
+nothing, so refusing loudly costs nothing, and the unit restarts it. The tradeoff is that an IdP outage
+keeps the Console down until the IdP is back. With every route behind a session, it would be unusable anyway.
 
 Several providers: Pocket ID, WorkOS and other compliant OPs use the same entry shape. The login page lists
 them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session records which provider made it.
@@ -318,48 +190,13 @@ them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session re
 ### 5. Retiring `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` and the proof header
 
 1. **Phase 1 (code row).** Add `--sso` to `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`. It reads `console.sso` from
-   config.json. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
+   the business file. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
    `--sso`, `named` means "has a session", and `writer` comes from the session. `--send` needs `--sso` or the
-   old preview set. Phase 1 also carries the loader change and its test-config.sh case (section 4, test 25).
-   Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
-
-   The page (C2). Today app.js signs out only on `res.type === 'opaqueredirect'` (packages/webui/src/public/
-   app.js:111 and :305), which is the outpost's redirect. Under `--sso` the Console answers an `/api/*`
-   request without a session with 401 `sign-in required`, so the page would show an error on every 10 s
-   refresh and never offer a way back. Phase 1 makes both fetch paths treat a 401 whose body has
-   `error: 'sign-in required'` as signed out, and the signed-out notice links to
-   `/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`. Other 401s stay errors. The opaqueredirect branch stays
-   until phase 3, because the preview flags still run behind the outpost until then. Test 24 covers it.
-
-   Before phase 1 starts, Mos confirms the config.json sequence in phase 2 (C1).
+   old preview set. Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
 2. **Phase 2 (Jason-gated window).** Re-pin to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
-   instead of the preview flags, after Jason steps 1 to 3. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). The order
-   inside the window:
-   1. Back up the store, the pointer, the unit and config.json.
-   2. Pin the phase 1 copy with the Console stopped. The copy's loader accepts a config with or without
-      `console`, so the bus and seats keep reading the old config.
-   3. Straggler check (Mos's C1 condition, mos-0977): list every running process, unit and timer that
-      still runs from the old copy and reads config.json. Each one is restarted on the new copy or shown
-      not to re-read config. The old loader refuses the key, so a straggler would fail on its next read.
-      Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
-   4. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
-      for that one key. The new loader reads it back (`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` validate) before anything
-      starts.
-   5. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
-   Acceptance: Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message and signs out. The forged-header
-   check (a request with `X-authentik-username` and no cookie gets 401) runs either on a scratch Console or
-   on live by Mos or Jason (B6). No agent sends the auth header to the live 7332 (section 8). The scratch
-   Console runs from the same copy as `serve --sso --port <scratch port>`, with `MOSAIC_CONFIG` pointing at a
-   scratch config in a scratch dir. That config has a scratch `dataRoot`, and any business it serves comes
-   from the scratch config dir; neither points at live. Its dummy client secret sits in the scratch slot
-   (`<scratch configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`). Its issuer is an unreachable loopback host, not
-   Authentik, so the scratch Console sends nothing outbound (D2, mos-0971). It comes up in the degraded
-   state (Q-B), and the 401 check needs no sign-in. It has no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
-
-   Rollback for phase 2: remove the `console` key from config.json first (restore the step 1 backup), then
-   roll the pointer back. An older copy's loader refuses a config holding the key (section 4), so the other
-   order stops the bus and seats. The window plan lists that order, and the STATE check after a rollback
-   reads config.json for the key's absence.
+   instead of the preview flags, after the Jason steps below. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). Acceptance:
+   Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message, signs out, and a forged-header request with no
+   cookie gets 401.
 3. **Phase 3 (code row).** Remove `previewOptions`, `proofOptions` and their tests. `cli.mjs` and
    `webui-service.sh` refuse the old flags with `--auth-header was retired by Q175; use --sso`. Close #385
    with the phase 2 STATE and the phase 3 commit.
@@ -374,15 +211,13 @@ The tester listener exists so agents can test as the tester and never as Jason (
 - It never mounts `/auth/*` (404), never reads a cookie, and refuses any request carrying `Authorization` or a
   `__Host-mosaic_session` / `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie (403 `tester listener takes no sign-in`). The same
   goes for `X-authentik-jwt` and the old auth and proof header names.
-- `startServer` throws when its options hold both `tester` and `sso`, so the SSO module can't be mounted on
-  the tester listener by a wiring mistake. A unit test calls it with both.
 - Its writer stays the fixed `{ tester: true, user: 'tester' }`, and it allows only the row 175 writes, as
   today. No session or header can change it.
 - Its bus calls stay on `TESTER_CLI`. The bus checks the tester proof and refuses human verbs from it, and the
   broker refuses a business whose human is `tester` and any role named `tester`. So nothing that reaches 7333
   can become the human.
 - 7332 keeps refusing `x-mosaic-tester` for every Host (:485).
-- `subjects` validation refuses a `name` of `tester` or `human`.
+- `subjects` validation refuses an entry named `tester`.
 
 ### 7. Point 5, the proxy-forwarded token
 
@@ -390,9 +225,7 @@ Not in phase 1. Point 5 makes it optional and the code flow covers the ruling. I
 
 - Verify with jose (MIT, exact pin), against the JWKS from the configured issuer's own discovery. Never use
   the `X-authentik-meta-jwks` header, because it arrives with the request and the forger controls it.
-- Use the same alg allow list, iss, exp and subject list. `aud` is the proxy provider's client id, and the
-  config check refuses it if it equals any code-flow `clientId`, so an ID token issued to the Console can't be
-  replayed as a proxy token or the other way round (N4).
+- Use the same alg allow list, iss, aud (the proxy provider's client id), exp and subject list.
 - The mosaic-preview provider signs with HS256 and has an empty JWKS, so its `X-authentik-jwt` fails every
   check until Jason gives it an RSA or EC key (Jason step 1).
 
@@ -404,11 +237,9 @@ Today, with `--send` live, any same-uid process on dragon-lin can connect to 127
 strips client copies of the header, so a remote forger needs local code execution first. Users on other uids
 can reach the loopback port too (P19 333).
 
-Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path
-stops carrying writes, and Jason sends piece 1 with `mosaic talk pm` instead. Row 189 (`stack-release.sh
-activate --no-send`, #1687) makes that change through the pointer so the unit and stack-active.json stay in
-step; the restart follows its landing. Until phase 2, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332.
-The tests use fixture servers.
+Recommendation: Mos restarts the Console without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path stops
+carrying writes, and only Jason's sends through the Console stop. That's a Mos call (Console start belongs to
+Jason or Mos). Until then, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332. The tests use fixture servers.
 
 To be clear about the limit: SSO protects Console ingress. It doesn't protect the bus's human boundary. The
 human proof is path-bound (#225), so a same-uid process can already run the tree's `human-cli.mjs` and act
@@ -418,11 +249,11 @@ as the human without touching the Console. Q175 doesn't change that. P19 333 own
 
 All tests run against a fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. It's a loopback https
 server with a self-signed cert. Each test passes the library a `customFetch` that trusts only that cert, so
-production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a JWKS, and authorization, token
-and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an HMAC secret for the
-forgeries). It can serve two issuers at once and rotate its keys. No test reaches a real provider. Each
-refusal test asserts the status, that no `__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was
-never called. Each test also passes once unmutated, as the control.
+production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a
+JWKS, and authorization, token and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an
+HMAC secret for the forgeries). No test reaches a real provider. Each refusal test asserts the status, that no
+`__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was never called. Each test also passes once
+unmutated, as the control.
 
 Refusals Mos named:
 
@@ -430,87 +261,35 @@ Refusals Mos named:
    Fetch Metadata, and no cookie: 401 on `/api/bus/message`, `/api/settings` and `/api/config`, and a 303 to
    login on `/`.
 2. HS256 ID token. The fake OP signs the ID token with HS256, using the client secret as the key (the classic
-   confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback. The library's alg check refuses it
-   before any signature check, so this test proves the alg rule, not the signature check. Test 9 covers that.
-3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused. Also an `aud`
-   array holding our client id and another, with no `azp`: refused.
-4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's 30 s clock
-   tolerance): refused.
+   confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback.
+3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused.
+4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's clock tolerance):
+   refused.
 
 More refusals:
 
 5. Wrong `iss`, both a different issuer and a trailing-slash variant.
 6. Nonce mismatch or missing nonce.
 7. State mismatch, a missing login cookie, a replayed callback (record already taken), an expired login record,
-   and two login cookies. For the replay, the fake OP is set to accept the same code twice, so the second
-   callback reaches the record lookup and only the take-and-delete rule refuses it.
+   and two login cookies.
 8. A provider that demands no PKCE. The token request must carry `code_verifier`, and the fake OP refuses a
    wrong one.
-9. The signature check (B5), three cases: (a) `alg: none`; (b) an RS256 token whose header names a real kid in
-   the JWKS, with a changed payload and the original signature; (c) an RS256 token signed by a key whose kid
-   isn't in the JWKS, even after the refetch. (a) is refused by the alg check in step 4, so it's an alg test
-   like test 2. Only (b) and (c) reach step 5, and (b) is the case only the signature check catches.
-10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one `subject-unknown` log line with the provider id,
-    iss and sub only.
-11. Start refusals: `algs` holding `HS256` or `none`, HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty
-    JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a subject named `tester` or `human`, `--sso` together with
-    `--auth-header`, and slot files that are a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640, or under the repo. The owner
-    check has no test: making a file owned by another uid needs root, which the suite doesn't have. The
-    review reads that branch instead.
+9. `alg: none`, and an RS256 token signed by a key not in the JWKS.
+10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one log line with iss and sub only.
+11. Startup refusals: HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch,
+    a slot with mode 0644, and `--sso` together with `--auth-header`.
 12. Tester port: a valid session cookie (taken from a 7332 sign-in), `Authorization: Bearer <valid id token>`,
-    and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404. `startServer` with `tester` and `sso`
-    throws.
+    and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404.
 13. Session: idle expiry, absolute expiry, a logout followed by reuse of the old cookie, and logout without
-    same-origin (refused, session kept). Background `/api/` GETs every 10 s for over an hour don't keep the
-    session alive; a page load does.
-14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example`, `return=https://evil.example`, `return=/\evil.example` and
-    `return=/%09/evil.example` all land on `/`, and `return=/board?x=1` lands there.
-15. Provider mix-up. Two providers, A and B. A login started for A whose callback carries B's `iss` and a
-    code from B is refused, and a `provider=` query on the callback is ignored. B's code is issued against
-    A-record's PKCE challenge, so the verifier matches and only the record rule (the callback belongs to A)
-    refuses it.
-16. Several algs: a provider with `algs: ["RS256", "ES256"]` takes a token signed with either, and refuses
-    PS256 even when the JWKS holds a usable PS256 key.
-17. Login record cap: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first login's callback finds no record.
-18. JWKS rotation: the fake OP rotates to a new key with a new kid. A sign-in after the rotation succeeds
-    through the one refetch, and a token under the removed kid is refused.
-19. Logs: across every test in this file, captured log lines hold none of the tokens, codes, states, nonces,
-    verifiers, the client secret or a session id that the test produced.
-20. The session store holds no raw session id (keys are sha256 values, and no value holds the cookie).
-21. Set-Cookie: the exact session and login cookie strings, including the expiry of the login cookie at
-    callback.
-22. Host: under `--sso`, a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write each get 403; `/healthz` on
-    loopback gets 200.
-23. Degraded start: the fake OP is down at start; the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, `/healthz` reports
-    `unreachable`; the OP comes up and the next retry makes sign-in work. A discovery URL that answers 200
-    with an HTML page also counts as `unreachable` and the Console starts. A provider that answers with
-    HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
-24. Signed-out page (C2). A page test in the board-held.test.mjs style stubs fetch to answer 401
-    `{ error: 'sign-in required' }`: the page shows the signed-out notice, its link is
-    `/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`, and the refresh stops. A 401 with another error stays an
-    error. The existing opaqueredirect case still signs out.
-25. Loader (C1), in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads; a malformed one (an HS
-    alg, a missing `slot` field, a slot name outside the pattern, an unknown key under `console`) fails and
-    names the bad key path, and no case reads a slot file (the file cases stay in test 11); a config without
-    `console` loads.
+    same-origin (refused, session kept).
+14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example` and `return=https://evil.example` both land on `/`.
 
 Positive paths: an RS256 and an ES256 provider each complete sign-in and one send, and two providers configured
 together each work with their own subjects.
 
-Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
-
-- drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (9b);
-- wrap that call in a try/catch that continues (9b);
-- drop the `subjects` check (10);
-- accept HS* in `algs` (11);
-- take the provider from the query (15);
-- let the tester listener read cookies (12);
-- skip the login record delete (7);
-- drop `HttpOnly` from the session cookie (21);
-- refresh `seen` on every request (13);
-- build `redirect_uri` from the request Host (a test with a different Host on `/auth/login` checks the
-  `redirect_uri` sent to the fake OP);
-- serve the loopback read path under `--sso` (22).
+Mutants for the gate: drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (test 2 or 9 must fail), drop the
+`subjects` check, accept HS* in `algs`, take the provider from the query, let the tester listener read
+cookies, and skip the login record delete.
 
 ### 10. Jason-gated steps
 
@@ -521,21 +300,16 @@ Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
    post-logout URI `https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out`, keep RS256, and give the client id. Put the
    client secret into slot `console-sso-authentik` (or say an agent may create the slot file from a value he
    puts in place, per the Q173 secrets rule). Agents never see the value.
-3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one `subject-unknown` log line on his
-   first sign-in attempt.
-4. The `console.sso` entry in `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, inside the phase 2 window, after the pin
-   and before the Console starts (section 5). He writes it, or he gives an agent the go to write that one
-   key from the values in steps 2 and 3, with a backup of the file first. config.json is user-authored, so
-   this isn't covered by Q173. Writing it earlier stops every tool on the live copy, whose loader refuses
-   the key.
-5. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
+3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one refusal log line on his first
+   sign-in attempt.
+4. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
    later, so the Console is the only gate, changes who can reach the Console from outside and is his call.
-6. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
+5. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
 
 ## Questions for review
 
-Q-A to Q-E are settled (Filbert r1 and r2, Mos mos-0973). One open point, for Mos:
-
-- The config.json sequence (C1): the key goes in only inside the phase 2 window, after the pin and before
-  the Console starts, with a backup first, and a rollback removes it before the pointer moves (section 5).
-  Mos confirms this before phase 1 starts.
+- Q-A: the config location, business file `console` key or config.json (section 4).
+- Q-B: refuse to start when the IdP is unreachable, or start and refuse sign-ins (section 4).
+- Q-C: should the loopback-Host read path on 7332 also go behind the session, as proposed? Public traffic
+  arrives from 127.0.0.1 too, and only Host keeps it off that path today.
+- Q-D: 8 h absolute and 1 h idle, or shorter.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-# Row 189: `stack-release.sh activate --no-send`
-
-Gitea #1687. Vikunja P19 #413 (Q175 interim, #412). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md.
-Rulings: mos-0972 (the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2), mos-0973 (go; Sage builds,
-Dewey reviews; gate is the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh). Base: def2e7932 (refactor, the
-brief commit on 9ae8c73ac).
-
-## What it does
-
-`activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE` in a new `send_for_target`, which
-`console_for_target` calls after `proof_for_target`. `install_stack` renders the unit from
-`RUN_CONSOLE` and `write_pointer` writes the pointer from it, so both lose the flag and `flags_drift`
-stays quiet afterwards. Only `activate` takes the flag; the parser sends every other op to usage
-(exit 4).
-
-`check_target` lets a `--no-send` activate name the pointer's copy only when the pointer's Console
-flags hold `--send`. That run is a live-copy re-pin, the same path row 187 uses for the proof pair:
-the plan prints the live-copy note, the run stops both units, backs up the stopped store and starts
-them again. A plain same-copy activate, or a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, still
-refuses `already-active`.
-
-`--plan` prints one `send:` line after the `proof:` line, for activate and rollback:
-
-- `send: dropped; --no-send was given`
-- `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`
-- `send: carried` (the pointer's `--send` goes on unchanged)
-- `send: off`
-
-The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
---send, so there is nothing to drop`.
-
-Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer's flags as they are, so once `--no-send` has run, nothing adds
-`--send` back. There is no re-enable flag (mos-0973). Q175 phase 2 changes the Console flags in its
-own row.
-
-docs/TOOLS.md: `[--no-send]` in the usage block and one paragraph after the proof paragraph.
-
-## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs, T55)
-
-1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send --tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
-   passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the other flags in order, status
-   says the unit flags match, the steps log has the drop line, the log line has from = to = B and the
-   backup sum equals the stopped store's, and the units stop and start in order.
-2. Plain same-copy activate, with `--tester-port` and with `--no-proof`, refuses `already-active`. So does
-   a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, and on a pointer that never held it.
-3. The four `send:` lines, the live-copy note on the same-copy plan only, and the Console line right
-   after `send:` without `--send`. The run on a pointer with no `--send` logs the nothing-to-drop line
-   and no drop line.
-4. After `--no-send` on C1, a rollback to B leaves `--send` out of the pointer and the unit, the steps
-   log never names `--send`, and status matches. pm-on after `activate --pm-after-harness --no-send`
-   keeps it off.
-5. `--no-send` on rollback (with and without `--plan`), pm-on, status, adopt and rehearse is a usage
-   error with the usage text, nothing written, started or logged. The usage text shows `[--no-send]`.
-6. A pointer holding both the proof pair and `--send`: the plans for `--no-proof`, `--no-send` and both
-   name what each drops and carries. `--no-send` keeps the pair, `--no-send` with a new pair replaces it,
-   `--no-proof` keeps `--send`, and both together leave neither. Status matches after each.
-
-`planTail` gains `'send: off'` after `'proof: off'`, because every plan now prints the line. T36 takes
-`out.slice(-n)` around `planTail`, so its four slice counts grow by one.
-
-## Mutants
-
-mutants.sh in this packet, run on the candidate. Each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh and runs T55
-plus T1 and T2.
-
-- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
-- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
-- M3: with `--no-send`, the pointer is written from `P_CONSOLE`, so it keeps `--send` while the unit
-  drops it.
-- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
-- M5: the parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
-
-Results: mutants-run.log, all five killed (M1 5 failures, M2 2, M3 7, M4 2, M5 2).
-
-## Deviations from the brief
-
-- The brief's line numbers were taken before row 163 landed. The candidate corrects them to the
-  9ae8c73ac lines (check_target :249-256, flags_drift :646-657, console_for_target :664-693, adopt
-  :828).
-- Test 5 also covers rehearse and `rollback --plan`, which the brief did not list.
-
-## Outbound calls
-
-None. The change edits an array before the existing unit render and pointer write. Every test uses
-the stand-in systemctl, units, stores and data root the file already builds; no test touches
-`~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.

agents/sage/work/queue-189/candidate-manifest.sha256

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md
-4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log
-ddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c  agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh
-5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e  docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md
-38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf  docs/TOOLS.md
-fe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f  packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs
-16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f  scripts/stack-release.sh

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-M1 KILLED fail=5
-M2 KILLED fail=2
-M3 KILLED fail=7
-M4 KILLED fail=2
-M5 KILLED fail=2

agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Row 189 mutants M1-M5: each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh in the sage-b189 worktree, runs T55 and
-# the plan-tail tests, and restores the file from a checked backup.
-set -uo pipefail
-WT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189
-OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189-mut/out
-S=$WT/scripts/stack-release.sh
-mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 1
-cp -p "$S" "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" || { echo "backup failed"; exit 1; }
-ORIG=$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)
-[ "$(sha256sum "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "backup differs"; exit 1; }
-restore() { cp -p "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S"; [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "RESTORE FAILED"; exit 1; }; }
-trap restore EXIT
-
-mutate() {
-    case "$1" in
-        M1) sed -i '/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/d' "$S" ;;
-        M2) sed -i 's/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/{ [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; } ||/' "$S" ;;
-        M3) sed -i 's/^    write_pointer "\$TO" "\$RUN_PM" "\$RUN_PENDING" "\$P_CLAUDE" "\$T_SCHEMA" "\${RUN_CONSOLE\[@\]}"$/    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${P_CONSOLE[@]}"; else write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${RUN_CONSOLE[@]}"; fi/' "$S" ;;
-        M4) sed -i 's/^        SEND_PLAN="send: off"$/        SEND_PLAN="send: off"; [ "$OP" != rollback ] || RUN_CONSOLE+=(--send)/' "$S" ;;
-        M5) sed -i 's/--no-send) \[ "\$OP" = activate \] || usage;/--no-send) { [ "$OP" = activate ] || [ "$OP" = rollback ]; } || usage;/' "$S" ;;
-    esac
-}
-
-for m in M1 M2 M3 M4 M5; do
-    restore
-    mutate "$m"
-    if [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ]; then echo "$m NOT-APPLIED"; continue; fi
-    bash -n "$S" || { echo "$m SYNTAX"; continue; }
-    diff "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S" > "$OUT/$m.diff"
-    (cd "$WT" && TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/t189 timeout 900 node --test --test-reporter=tap --test-name-pattern='T55|T1 |T2 ' packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs) > "$OUT/$m.log" 2>&1
-    fails=$(awk '/^# fail /{print $3}' "$OUT/$m.log")
-    if [ "${fails:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then echo "$m KILLED fail=$fails"; else echo "$m SURVIVED"; fi
-done

agents/sage/work/queue-66/R3.md

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Row 66 round 3: rebase only
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20. Round 2 (candidate 0f4a57956, manifest cee63e06fdea) was approved by Filbert (29442) and
-Dewey (29443). Its base 5487ed39d is now far behind refactor, and rows 190 and 192 changed four of its paths.
-Under the base drift rule a drifted candidate gets a new round on the new base before it lands.
-
-- Candidate: branch `sage/row66-r3`, commit 2369c00e36874e1100b301e0d01cbd105c0c5d4f, two cherry-picks of 8ec03b45a and 0f4a57956 onto c40d846cb.
-  No conflicts and no hand edits.
-- `git patch-id --stable` of the r3 diff (c40d846cb..2369c00e36874e1100b301e0d01cbd105c0c5d4f) equals the r2 diff's (5487ed39d..0f4a57956):
-  6d085621fd355d43ccaf0efaefe7e74179888ff2.
-- Manifest `candidate-manifest-r3.sha256`, sha256 42e3876ca1689719f0e07e66fc9fbd6e4faf3c07678da024accb54c58caef0d1. Same 23 paths as r2. Four hashes differ, and only
-  because the base moved: `docs/TOOLS.md`, `scripts/stack-copy.sh`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`,
-  `packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs`. The other 19 are byte-identical to r2.
-- Singles on the new base (`singles-r3.log`): every touched test file plus the unslop selftest, all green.
-  `packages/bus/tests/channel-proof.test.mjs` pins plug-in hashes and names `index.mjs`; it reads only channel
-  plug-ins, not the two harness files this row changes, and it passes (2/0).
-- Still to do: the full gate on my slot after the MVP gates, then the landing sessions on both harnesses that
-  the row's gate names.
-
-What I ask the reviewers: confirm the rebase. In the four drifted files, check that row 66's hunks sit correctly
-next to rows 190 and 192 (`stack-copy.sh` COPY_PATHS in particular). Nothing else changed.

agents/sage/work/queue-66/candidate-manifest-r3.sha256

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-b99e7f4bf58ac68c8f5fa58eb7b90c0f85b15ca9a80fd093f6aaeafeac931608  adapters/README.md
-c32d2a3276db92433d4e3c4f4b45fab048d9a46119d9f69cead6a11cfacfeadb  agents/sage/work/queue-66/BUILD.md
-ac318150f5e6193adf3750d76b64c643c29f324310c4004b0bdde8caef863b53  docs/TOOLS.md
-64a2d00ba57b8673c0905f322711023c10d4dfdc0ccc7e6daa2c440b4d57e34e  packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs
-b027dc74583217b4151173ecbabfcfbfc7b108ac6b7a8e93dd21a2834051714f  packages/harness/README.md
-bfb2156c609eeaf87c9e209c562576a5ef47535eaeee61d841bb0bd75a76a69d  packages/harness/src/runner.mjs
-0a27f2c8de7b9191f9c0d4a209331c63ff7630923e669838b41715924b0a64b0  packages/harness/tests/bundle.test.mjs
-81d0352f2dcd41eb2e2ef962365d9b97515d7e8d9668a35bb9ce9dce4f1451ea  packages/harness/tests/claude-session.test.mjs
-b16f33442cefd5b5ae2af85edab33250ee6b31025e437edf0e4eba9fe0afa793  packages/harness/tests/fixtures/fake-adapter.mjs
-1e187a2e23a197640d139e6975dfaf83dd7e337c360d128833678dc60f3e2046  packages/harness/tests/pi-session.test.mjs
-37ca6ad6467573658c1ac6807b6cd00e3f9da289107fb689190a1872bff9b89c  packages/harness/tests/runner.test.mjs
-04c24058f37260c9192d5036c8cf28b50faba8e3e3bf57f198d233485d0d57e6  packages/plugins/harness/claude-code/index.mjs
-2c1252e8e8db3ba4551bf1e34156ddf4e933cc664fc157105bef9a2705d6ce3b  packages/plugins/harness/pi/index.mjs
-7e0bea27d4360a39874fa64b3506a85f83888613a285ec0b087d74bf22b76421  packages/plugins/README.md
-ec4ec9502ee8e766e3abd04d9f724c0d8ff4ef114394a0f76d5320c2dc715c5c  packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs
-f6141dac9a8c61573e4198480fed85e093992ee9c19fb55e9bc2752381b7b07a  packages/seat/tests/sandbox.test.mjs
-09c6cadaf2e27677c95ba5bcb6a359cb6b3ce596ba1db6171b26586d4f9834a8  packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs
-e9ff91cd073a1b784f9ea440b18db913ce8107df6246e3b0b0e962eda43f046b  scripts/stack-copy.sh
-7ee6ed6e6ac55b1348d40a358372e66c86fdebacd90001d447040133e1187882  tools/unslop-hook/claude-hook.js
-ce1dfb11d0a8e8efd3d6dae67cc259c2e7443a62c7416bdedd4c71306d8c6df1  tools/unslop-hook/extension.ts
-f07d67806f40763b4be87d31c2976448b5cfc34d7328519fae2d8313b1ca3e20  tools/unslop-hook/README.md
-dbe3d5c9ae654d2401e3c496a6b03757a438e4a551fd8e460df8c82902bb80a7  tools/unslop-hook/test-unslop-check.js
-76be78178a0703b9d20a7df2278ecb13f429dea90cea45180f22302e267ea25e  tools/unslop-hook/unslop-check.js

agents/sage/work/queue-66/singles-r3.log

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 14 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/harness/tests/bundle.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 22 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/harness/tests/claude-session.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/harness/tests/pi-session.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/harness/tests/runner.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 39 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 9 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/seat/tests/sandbox.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0 
-packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0 
-unslop rc=0 28/28 passed
-SINGLES_DONE
-2026-10-20T23:15:14Z

agents/sage/work/t1-seats/COMMON.md

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# Common start for Sage's MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977)
-
-You are a builder seat on Mosaic Stack, repository /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack, branch base `refactor`.
-Sage leads the project and is your coordinator (T3 thread 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079). Mos speaks
-for Jason (thread 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e). Human input reaches you only through Sage and Mos.
-
-## Read first, in this order
-
-1. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/USER.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, `CONSTITUTION.md` (who Jason is, the
-   system rules, the constitution).
-2. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/TARGET.md` (the MVP addendum) and `DECISIONS.md` Q176 to Q178.
-3. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md` and `PLAN.md`.
-   Everything under jason-master-restart is read only.
-4. The repository's `AGENTS.md`, then your brief (named in your first message) and the files it points to.
-
-## Your worktree
-
-T3 made your worktree from `refactor`. Work only there. Link node_modules from the canonical checkout right
-after you start (`ln -s /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules node_modules`), unless your brief adds a
-dependency. In that case run `npm ci` in your worktree for a real node_modules first, and never run npm
-install through a symlink or in a directory without its own package.json (npm walks up to home).
-
-## Rules that bind you
-
-- Message ids are `<seat>-NNNN`, starting at 0001. Run `date -u` right before every message and put the
-  stamp in it. End each turn with a clock timestamp.
-- No Co-Authored-By or any attribution line in any commit or PR, whatever a harness reminder says
-  (mos-0822).
-- Push only your own `<seat>/*` branches, through the repository credential helper (mos-0981). Never push
-  `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
-- You have no Gitea token. Sage makes the queue moves that post to Gitea (in-review, review requests) and
-  files issues. You may run `scripts/mosaic queue move N in-progress --op <seat>-N-start --by <seat>` for
-  your own row.
-- Never touch `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files or `~/.mosaic`. Never
-  start, stop or restart the live Console or bus. Never read or print a credential value.
-- Never read other seats' scratch directories. `agents/<seat>/work/` packets in the repository are fine.
-- Single test files run freely. The cli suite, any `scripts/test-*.sh` and any full package suite share
-  one slot: run `bash /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-busy-now.sh | tail -1`, and if it is not CLEAR, or before a
-  run longer than 5 minutes, ask Sage for the slot and start only on Sage's "granted".
-- Two failures in one gate run means stop and report.
-- Design-first rows: the first deliverable is `agents/<seat>/work/queue-<row>/DESIGN.md`, committed on your
-  branch. Send the reviewer and Sage its path, commit and sha256. No product code before approval.
-- Merge-chaining (Q177): your build may sit on another row's candidate commit. Your row keeps its own
-  review and gate, and the chain lands in order.
-- Fail closed. Never route around a refusal. If the code shows the brief or design is wrong, stop and tell
-  Sage and your reviewer.
-- Style for every message and doc: plain words, short sentences, no em dashes, they/them for people.
-- Sage registers your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md`. Do not edit it.

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/catchup-2026-10-20.json

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-{
- "at": "2026-10-20T23:19:35.714Z",
- "comments": [
-  {
-   "task": 413,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 411,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 424,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 412,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 414,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 413,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  }
- ],
- "problems": []
-}

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/comment-337-412-r163-landed.mjs

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 163 (D2, #1660) round 2 approved. One comment on P19 337 (D2), per mos-0882 (every
-// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
-// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
-// Usage: node comment-337-r163-approved.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
-if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
-if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
-const PROJECT = 19;
-const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
-const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
-const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
-const POSTS = [
-  { id: 337, title: /^D2: stack rehearsal on a scratch root/, body: [
-    "Row 163 (Gitea #1660) landed and pushed. Landing commit 8ecc7a239 (Sage; Filbert approve 29447), queue revs 2235-2236 (landing note and done) in 9ae8c73ac, range 4ca8d6e94..9ae8c73ac on refactor. Patch-id b8d5f8a37c24 matches candidate c6f4f4c12596. #1660 is closed with comment 29450.",
-    "Sage gate passed at 18:16Z on eaa0f2666: cli 472/472 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. The pushed commit is a cherry-pick of eaa0f2666 onto 7f57419b3, which adds only the Q175 design doc, and no test reads that file. Mos dropped the Part B wait when Q175 replaced Part B (mos-0971).",
-    "Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. Rehearse and bus start --no-launch go live at the next re-pin, where the Q173 backup and STATE report apply.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
-    "Design r1 is committed: agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md in 7f57419b3 (blob 91e5b1b5e737), pushed in 9ae8c73ac. The Console becomes an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. It always calls validateApplicationLevelSignature, because the library skips the signature check on a token-endpoint ID token. Identity is an (iss, sub) pair, and only asymmetric algs are accepted.",
-    "Filbert's r1 review asks for changes in the doc before any code (B1-B6). B1 moves the provider config to config.json, because agents have write paths into the business file. B2 closes an open-redirect hole. B3 keeps the library's error causes out of logs. B4 caps login records. B5 fixes the signature mutant test. B6 removes a live forged-header probe from the phase 2 acceptance. Their rulings: Q-B start degraded when the IdP is unreachable, Q-C yes (7332 accepts only the public Host under --sso), Q-D keep idle expiry but don't refresh it on poll GETs. r2 follows.",
-    "Interim (mos-0972): the Console runs without --send until phase 2. stack-release.sh has no way to drop --send that keeps stack-active.json and the unit in step, so a small tool row comes first, through review.",
-  ] },
-];
-const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
-async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
-  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
-  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
-  return { status: r.status, json };
-}
-const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
-const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
-const save = () => {
-  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
-  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
-  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
-};
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
-  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
-}
-writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
-  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
-  rec.comments.push(e);
-  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
-  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
-  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
-  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
-  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
-  save();
-}
-save();
-process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
-if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/comment-412-r192-landed.mjs

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 192 (Q175 phase 1, #1690) landed. One comment on P19 412, per mos-0882 (every
-// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
-// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
-// Usage: node comment-412-r192-landed.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
-if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
-if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
-const PROJECT = 19;
-const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
-const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
-const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
-const POSTS = [
-  { id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
-    "Row 192 (Q175 phase 1, Gitea #1690) landed and pushed. Landing commit 4429a104f (Launchpad's launchpad/row192 53bb59462..37582e820, manifest round 2, 18 paths; Webby approved). Patch-id 4a486902614d matches the reviewed diff. Queue revs 2429-2430 (landing note and done) are in 305857c8f, range 32b54ac3b..305857c8f on refactor. #1690 is closed.",
-    "Sage gate on 088087ac9: package suites 2758 pass 0 fail, scripts/test-*.sh 429 pass 0 fail, mutants 22 of 23 killed (#23, the second origin check, ruled equivalent). The Console now verifies SSO itself under --sso as an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. mosaic-config.mjs load is now async, so in-flight rows that call it rebase and await it (row 190 round 3 is doing this).",
-    "Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. The new dependency needs npm ci in a new stack copy, so the live re-pin is a window with Mos (mos-1099 item 3); Sage sends Mos the plan. Row 200 (phase 2) follows.",
-  ] },
-];
-const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
-async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
-  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
-  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
-  return { status: r.status, json };
-}
-const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
-const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
-const save = () => {
-  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
-  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
-  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
-};
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
-  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
-}
-writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
-  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
-  rec.comments.push(e);
-  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
-  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
-  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
-  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
-  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
-  save();
-}
-save();
-process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
-if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/comment-catchup-2026-10-20.mjs

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-// Sage, 2026-10-20: catch-up landing and status comments on P19 413 (row 189), 424 (row 210) and 414 (rows 201
-// and 204), per mos-0882. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits.
-// Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
-// Usage: node comment-catchup-2026-10-20.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
-if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
-if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
-const PROJECT = 19;
-const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
-const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
-const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
-const POSTS = [
-  { id: 413, title: /^stack-release\.sh activate --no-send/, body: [
-    "Row 189 landed on refactor as ace27dc5e (Gitea #1687): stack-release.sh activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer and the unit in step. Dewey approved (comment 29485), and Sage's gate passed.",
-    "The stack activation log shows the same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 after the landing: activation 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0, result ok at 19:30:00Z, with backup 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0. Since then the live Console runs without --send. The re-pin to 4429a104f at 22:02Z (row 192) carried the pointer's flags, no --send and no --sso, as its W3 plan check required.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 424, title: /^Credential store: per-agent host access/, body: [
-    "Status, 2026-10-20 23:20Z. Row 210 (Gizmoduck) builds this task. Its design r3 is approved, and the machine-grant design final r6 f9039682e is approved for code once row 210 lands (mos-1141, mos-1143). Every grant name sits under grant.* behind one guard (mos-1144). No agent creates a grant: the chief requests, Jason approves, and protected code creates it (Q188).",
-    "Order (mos-1135, mos-1137): row 210 lands only after row 199, the per-agent credential store. Row 199's gate is green on c6868ba41. Megavolt fixed five surviving mutants and is rerunning all 28 now on 7c3cdd940, before the Duckworth review. Rows 190, 199 and 210 go live together in the one 10-24 window with the 3i-3j migration (mos-1145 line 9), backup first, under Q173.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 414, title: /^MVP platform: the Given list for Cases 1 and 2/, body: [
-    "RBAC rows landed (Given list, RBAC enforcement). Row 201, FED R1: access.json loader and validator with covers, afad4993f (Gitea #1699), Gizmoduck, Duckworth approved (comment 29581). Gate: business 173/0, scripts/test-*.sh 422/0, mutants 44 of 44 killed.",
-    "Row 204, 193a: the access level check widened to viewer, d0bbc5c1c (Gitea #1702), Morgana, Duckworth approved (comment 29595). LEVELS gains collaborator and viewer, covers() takes a required least level, and an unknown grant level covers nothing. Gate: packages and scripts 2789/0, mutants 7 of 7 killed.",
-    "Neither changes the live stack. Rows 205-208 (193b1 to 193d) follow, and 206 adds a schema step, so it goes live only in a --migrate window.",
-  ] },
-];
-const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
-async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
-  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
-  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
-  return { status: r.status, json };
-}
-const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
-const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
-const save = () => {
-  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
-  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
-  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
-};
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
-  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
-}
-writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
-  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
-  rec.comments.push(e);
-  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
-  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
-  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
-  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
-  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
-  save();
-}
-save();
-process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
-if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/comment-w11-r190-2026-10-20.mjs

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-// Sage, 2026-10-20: W11 of the re-pin window 490e2771d to 4429a104f (STATE.md in commit 99a406ed3) on P19 386, 412
-// and 393, and the row 190 landing (00d4cc1f6, #1688) on P19 414, per mos-0882. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the
-// sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits. Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
-// Usage: node comment-w11-r190-2026-10-20.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
-if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
-if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
-const PROJECT = 19;
-const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
-const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
-const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
-const STATE = "agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/STATE.md in commit 99a406ed3 (pushed), sha256 a4d0a7b12f431f15";
-const POSTS = [
-  { id: 386, title: /^Q173 test system: tester writes/, body: [
-    "Q173 re-pin window, 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192), done. STATE report: " + STATE + ".",
-    "Activation 20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 with --pm, exit 0, every gate check including pm_launched. Store stays on 3i, migration none. Backup ~/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 (SHA256SUMS b61d6484), rollback set beside it; rollback would go to 490e2771d. Business file unchanged (sha256 1e49bdf0). Console flags unchanged: no --send, no --sso, --tester-port 7333.",
-    "W0 to W10 passed, nothing rolled back. W10 stopped once on two browser checks; both were checks written before row 192 (the hidden #sign-out link, and a chat check that read only the first project list). Mos passed them (mos-1135) and the corrected checks are in the plan. Matrix line g is 6575 bytes, not 6454, because row 192 grows index.html by 121 bytes; Mos passed it (mos-1137).",
-    "S1 to S2 store deltas include task_snapshots +7 and task_comment_cursors +5. The writer is the bus's Vikunja poll (packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs tick, sync.mjs recordTask), source 'poll', not the window. Nobody acted as Jason: no --by jason, no pi, no Save, no mosaic name, bus.tester untouched.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
-    "Row 192 (Q175 phase 1) is live in copy 4429a104f since activation 20261020T220206Z (Q173 window with Mos). The sign-in code is in the copy but dormant: the Console runs without --sso, and the proof pair stays unset. The new oauth4webapi 3.8.8 dependency came in through npm ci in the new copy and imports cleanly from it.",
-    "STATE report: " + STATE + ". The webui journal since activation shows one 'Proxy: proxy proof off' line and no 'Sign-in:' line, as expected without --sso.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 393, title: /^dragon-lin: seven legacy user units in failed state/, body: [
-    "Current failure times read during the Q173 re-pin window W11 (systemctl --user show, CDT with UTC): mosaic-standup-pm.service failed 2026-10-19 19:00:28 CDT (10-20 00:00:28Z), exit 1. mosaic-install-drift.service failed 2026-10-20 00:12:54 CDT (05:12:54Z), exit 9. [email protected] failed 2026-10-20 13:16:12 CDT (18:16:12Z), exit 4.",
-    "The marker's journal at 18:16:12Z says its tmux send to jarvis failed ('tmux target not found', socket mosaic-fleet), so that page never arrived; the record is in ~/.local/state/mosaic-unit-failures/20261020.jsonl. mosaic-reconcile.service itself last ran OK at 17:16:27 CDT (22:16:27Z), so the marker is stale until reset.",
-    "All three predate the re-pin at 22:02Z and come from the legacy ~/.mosaic and jarvis-brain setup. The window changed none of them. Disabling or resetting any still needs Jason or ops-01's charter. Details: " + STATE + ", section 'Failed user units'.",
-  ] },
-  { id: 414, title: /^MVP platform: the Given list for Cases 1 and 2/, body: [
-    "Row 190 (several Mosaic Stack instances on one host, MVP T1.1, Gitea #1688) landed and pushed: 00d4cc1f6 on refactor (99a406ed3..00d4cc1f6). Squash of Darkwing's darkwing/row190-r3 176a6bf4b..df65a3d4c, 25 paths, manifest cc0ea9e8, Filbert approved round 3; patch-id matches the branch diff.",
-    "Sage gate on d0bbc5c1c with the patch: 15 package suites 2664 pass 0 fail, 10 scripts/test-*.sh suites 429 pass 0 fail. Mutants 20 of 20 killed. Not live: the stack runs copy 4429a104f until a re-pin. Row 230 (C2-13a) now carries row 190's @CONFIG_ENV@ and @SESSION_ENV@ tokens (gosalyn-0058 item 4).",
-  ] },
-];
-const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
-async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
-  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
-  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
-  return { status: r.status, json };
-}
-const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
-const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
-const save = () => {
-  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
-  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
-  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
-};
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
-  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
-}
-writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
-for (const P of POSTS) {
-  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
-  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
-  rec.comments.push(e);
-  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
-  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
-  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
-  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
-  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
-  save();
-}
-save();
-process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
-if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/file-no-send-row.mjs

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Sage, 2026-10-20: files the activate --no-send row (mos-0972, mos-0973) as one P19 task, owner Sage, no due date.
-// Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. No labels, assignees, due dates or bucket moves. Refuses if
-// the title exists. Prints no secret.
-// Usage: node file-no-send-row.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
-import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
-if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
-if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
-const PROJECT = 19;
-const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
-const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
-const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
-const T = {
-  title: "stack-release.sh activate --no-send: drop the Console's --send and keep the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972)",
-  description: ps(SIG, [
-    "Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without --send until Q175 phase 2 (P19 #412), because with --send live any same-uid process can forge X-authentik-username on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason.",
-    "stack-release.sh has no path that drops --send and keeps ~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json and the unit in step: console_for_target (:658-687) carries the pointer's flags, check_target (:247-249) allows a same-copy activate only for the proof pair, and adopt refuses once a pointer exists. A hand reinstall makes flags_drift refuse every later activate, pm-on and rollback.",
-    "The row adds activate --no-send, modeled on row 187's --no-proof. It drops --send from the pointer and the unit. A same-copy activate is allowed when the pointer holds --send. Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer as they do now. There is no re-enable flag. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md. Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh (mos-0973 go).",
-    "After landing: a same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 with --no-send under Q173, with the plan output sent to Mos first, a backup first and a STATE report after. Then row 66 lands.",
-  ]),
-};
-const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
-async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
-  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
-  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
-  return { status: r.status, json };
-}
-const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
-async function existing() {
-  const out = [];
-  for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
-    const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
-    if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
-    out.push(...list(r.json));
-    if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
-  }
-  throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
-}
-const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
-const save = () => {
-  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
-  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
-  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
-};
-if ((await existing()).some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
-writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
-const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
-rec.created = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
-if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`);
-else {
-  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
-  Object.assign(rec.created, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done, inverse: `mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/${r.json.id} with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's` });
-  if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push("create read-back differs");
-}
-save();
-console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/no-send-row-2026-10-20.json

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-{
- "at": "2026-10-20T18:21:15.323Z",
- "project": 19,
- "created": {
-  "status": 201,
-  "id": 413,
-  "readBack": 200,
-  "done": false,
-  "inverse": "mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/413 with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's"
- },
- "problems": []
-}

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/r163-landed-412-design-2026-10-20.json

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-{
- "at": "2026-10-20T18:19:36.544Z",
- "comments": [
-  {
-   "task": 337,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 372,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 412,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 373,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  }
- ],
- "problems": []
-}

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/r192-landed-412-2026-10-20.json

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{
- "at": "2026-10-20T21:35:49.240Z",
- "comments": [
-  {
-   "task": 412,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 395,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  }
- ],
- "problems": []
-}

agents/sage/work/vikunja-setup/w11-r190-2026-10-20.json

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-{
- "at": "2026-10-20T22:51:44.218Z",
- "comments": [
-  {
-   "task": 386,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 406,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 412,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 407,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 393,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 408,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  },
-  {
-   "task": 414,
-   "status": 201,
-   "id": 409,
-   "readBack": 200,
-   "found": true
-  }
- ],
- "problems": []
-}

agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-4429a104f.md

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# Re-pin 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192, Q175 phase 1), with npm ci in the new copy
-
-Sage, 2026-10-20, draft 1, for mos-1099 item 3 under DECISIONS Q173. Mos checks this file at its commit before
-P0. Any change to this file or to NEW after the check means Mos checks again (mos-0849/0850).
-
-This is a smaller window than `repin-rows-177-185.md` (draft 2, which Mos checked in mos-0929). Where a step is
-the same, this file names that file's step and says what differs. The 7332 matrix, the snapshot, the W9 list and
-the rollback compare are reused unchanged.
-
-## Who, and what nobody does
-
-- Sage operates, as the tester. Darkwing holds the gate lane for row 190 round 3 tonight, so I take the
-  operator seat. Mos verifies each step's output before the next one and runs `rehearse` (P3), which reads the
-  live config and a live backup (`docs/TOOLS.md` `rehearse`: Jason or Mos runs it).
-- Jason has no step. Q173 covers a re-pin of this test system with a backup first and a STATE report after.
-  Nothing is pruned.
-- Nobody acts as Jason: no `--by jason`, no human shell or tmux pane, every bus read and write carries
-  `--tester`, and no request carries `jason.woltje`. `bus.tester` stays as it is; if it isn't `true`, stop at P1.
-- No pi (mos-0865 D2, P19 #383). No Save in the human Console, no `mosaic name`.
-- Outside reach doesn't change. The Console keeps its current flags. `--sso` stays off: row 192's sign-in code is
-  dormant without the flag, and `cli.mjs:57` refuses `--sso` with the preview flags the pointer carries anyway.
-  The proof pair stays unset. The tunnel still forwards 7332 only (P4 and W10 check it).
-
-## Names
-
-- OLD, live: `490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c`, activation `20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0`, pointer
-  `pm: true`, schema 3i, Console `--port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username
-  --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333` (no `--send`, read from `stack-release.sh status` between 21:36Z and 21:39Z).
-- NEW: `4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0`, row 192's landing, 103 commits past OLD (`git rev-list --count 490e2771d..4429a104f`).
-  The 106 that `status` showed is OLD to HEAD 305857c8f, so it also counts the three record commits below.
-  The commits after it (5b8def2f1 plans, 176a6bf4b sessions, 305857c8f queue) are records and don't move NEW. If
-  another code row lands before W0 (row 190 is the likely one), NEW stays here unless Mos rules otherwise.
-- REPO: the canonical checkout. `activate` runs REPO's `webui-service.sh`, so the four service scripts are held
-  at NEW for the window (P5).
-- `P=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-pin-de352dfaf` (`business-check.mjs`, `console-check.sh`, checked against
-  `agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-de352dfaf/SCRIPTS.sha256`).
-- `WIN=agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/`, where every transcript goes.
-- `SNAP=$WIN/snapshot.mjs`, a copy of `agents/darkwing/work/window-rows-177-185/snapshot.mjs`, sha256
-  `639fd28a2674aaa03ce824e3394b4052f21cdef7d6fa49bae61a9927ed341e67` (mos-0899). I check the sha before S1, S2
-  and any D3.
-
-## What NEW carries over OLD
-
-The path-limited log over `packages`, `scripts`, `roles`, `contracts`, `adapters`, `skills` and the package files:
-
-| Row | Commit | Live effect |
-|---|---|---|
-| 186 | 269134d8d | Tool only: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do. |
-| 187 | 9a71e4e80 | Tool: activate sets, carries and drops the proof pair. The pointer has no pair, so nothing changes. |
-| 188 | 8fc0ee216 | Tool: proof file checks on a carried pair. No pair, no effect. |
-| 163 | 8ecc7a239 | Tool: `rehearse`, which P3 uses, and `bus start --no-launch`. CLI `cli.mjs` and `launcher.mjs` gain the `--no-launch` path; the default start is unchanged. |
-| 189 | ace27dc5e | Tool: `activate --no-send`. Live already runs without `--send`; the pointer carries that. |
-| 192 | 4429a104f | Console `--sso` (off here), `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` load becomes async, `webui-service.sh` renders `--sso` only when given, and a new dependency, oauth4webapi 3.8.8. `cli.mjs` imports `sso.mjs` at the top, so the Console won't start from a copy without that module. |
-
-No schema step: `SCHEMA_VERSION` (`packages/bus/src/store.mjs:17`) is 3i at OLD and NEW, and no migration was
-added. `--plan` must say `migration: none`. No roles, skills, contracts, adapters or plug-in kinds changed. So: no
-harness set, no skill carry, no `pm-on`. One `activate --pm`.
-
-## npm ci in the new copy
-
-mos-1099 asks for npm ci in the new copy. `stack-copy.sh copy` already does it: it extracts the archive to a temp
-dir, refuses without `package.json` and `package-lock.json` (:55), runs `npm ci --no-audit --no-fund` there and
-writes no copy if it fails (:56). W0 checks the result: `node_modules/oauth4webapi/package.json` in the copy reads
-3.8.8, and `node --input-type=module -e "await import('oauth4webapi')"` from the copy exits 0. The live copy is
-163M; `/home` has 30G free (94% used), enough for one more.
-
-## Backups
-
-| Before | Backup | Taken by |
-|---|---|---|
-| W5 | the stopped store, `$DATA/backups/stack/<W5 activation id>/` with SHA256SUMS, DATA_ROOT, SCHEMA 3i, STAMP | `stack-release.sh` (row 185: every activate) |
-| W5 | the rollback set (units, wrapper, pointer) | `stack-release.sh` |
-| W9 | the business file, `cp -p` to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json.pre-window-<stamp>` with its sha256, as evidence nothing wrote it | Sage, in W0b |
-
-## Before the window (nothing stopped)
-
-| # | Who | Step |
-|---|-----|------|
-| P0 | Mos | The `$P` sha check, as in the 177-185 plan P0. |
-| P1 | Sage | The business file, read only, the same values as the 177-185 plan P1. I report its sha256 now rather than assume the 06:15Z value. `business-check.mjs` for OLD now and for NEW after W0: LOAD_OK both. |
-| W0 | Sage | `cd $REPO && scripts/stack-copy.sh copy $NEW`, in a gap between gate-lane runs, since npm ci is heavy. Then the two npm checks above, and `diff <(git -C $REPO show $NEW:package-lock.json) $COPIES/$NEW/package-lock.json` empty. W0 writes only under `copies/` and changes nothing live, so it moves before P2 and P3, which need the copy. |
-| P2 | Sage | `console-check.sh $NEW` against a stub Console of NEW on a scratch port, once without and once with `--tester-port` on a second scratch port. CONSOLE_PASS both. |
-| P3 | Mos | `scripts/stack-release.sh rehearse $NEW mosaic-stack --backup 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0 --port <scratch>`. It must pass every gate check but the PM's. It stops no unit and writes no pointer. Transcript in `$WIN/p3/`. Correction (mos-1107): `rehearse` starts NEW's Console with only `--port` and `--business`, not the pointer's flags. So Mos also starts NEW's Console by hand with the pointer's flags on two scratch ports and reads healthz and `/api/config` on both, then stops it (`$WIN/p3/flags-check.txt`, `flags-console.log`). |
-| P4 | Sage | The tunnel read, as in the 177-185 plan P4. |
-| P5 | Sage | `git -C $REPO diff --quiet $NEW HEAD -- scripts/stack-release.sh scripts/webui-service.sh scripts/bus-service.sh scripts/stack-copy.sh` and an empty `git status --porcelain` on the same four. Row 190 round 3 touches `webui-service.sh`; if it lands before W5, P5 fails and the window waits for Mos's ruling. |
-| P6 | Sage | The 7332 matrix (a)-(g) on OLD, as in the 177-185 plan, saved as `$WIN/matrix-old.txt`. |
-
-## The window
-
-| # | Who | Step |
-|---|-----|------|
-| W0b | Sage | The business file copy. |
-| W1 | Sage | Idle check (`mosaic agents --business mosaic-stack --tester`, `mosaic launches list`), the start stamp from `date -u`, then S1 `node $SNAP --store "$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite" --held`. |
-| W2 | Sage | `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack`: pointer on OLD, `pm: true`, 3i, last line ok, unit flags match. |
-| W3 | Sage | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm --plan`. Must show from OLD to NEW, `migration: none`, the backup line, and the Console line with OLD's flags exactly: no `--send`, no `--sso`, no proof pair, `--tester-port 7333`. Any other difference stops here. |
-| W4 | Sage | The unit reads, as in the 177-185 plan W4. |
-| W5 | Sage, on Mos's go | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm`. Exit 0, `result ok`, every gate check including `pm_launched`. Record the activation id, the backup path and STAMP, and the backup SHA256SUMS sha256. Then `status`. |
-| W9 | Sage, after Mos verifies W5 | The 177-185 plan's W9 list unchanged, the chief turn and the one `assistant` thread turn included (mos-0929 Q3), plus two lines: the webui journal since the W5 stamp (with `UTC`) has one `Proxy: proxy proof off` and no `Sign-in:` line, and `ls -l /proc/<Console pid>/cwd` names the NEW copy. |
-| W10 | Sage | The browser check on 127.0.0.1:7333 and the matrix again as `$WIN/matrix-new.txt`, identical to `matrix-old.txt`. Then P4 again. Corrections after the window (mos-1135, mos-1137): the matrix line for a file the pin changes isn't "identical". Line (g) serves `index.html`, which row 192 grows by 121 bytes (6470 to 6591), so (g) is 200 non-json at 6575 bytes, not 6454. The two browser checks come from the 177-185 window, before row 192 and before a second thread project. "Only tester forms" now allows `#sign-out` while it is `hidden` and `/api/config` has no `sso: true`. "Chat lists the W9 thread" now reads every `.chat-projects section.panel` list (chat.js:93 renders one per project), not the first. |
-| W11 | Sage | STATE report in `$WIN/STATE.md`, posted on P19 386 and P19 412 and on Gitea #1690. |
-
-## Stop conditions and rollback
-
-The same as the 177-185 plan. Two failures in one window: stop and report (mos-0823).
-
-Rollback: `stack-release.sh rollback mosaic-stack --plan`, then the real run. The previous distinct copy in the
-log is 490e2771d, both are 3i, so no `--restore` and no data loss. OLD takes the same Console flags. The R1 and
-R1post compares are as in the 177-185 plan. A restore past W5 follows that plan's D3 steps, with Mos deciding.
-
-Keep every copy. Prune nothing.
-
-## Questions for the plan check
-
-- Q1: NEW is row 192 alone, not bundled with row 190. Row 190 (several instances) changes `stack-release.sh`
-  and `webui-service.sh` and deserves its own window. I recommend running this one first.
-- Q2: Sage operates instead of Darkwing, who is on the row 190 gate. OK?
-- Q3: W0 before P2 and P3. It writes a copy only. OK?
-
-## What Sage ran for this plan
-
-Read only, 2026-10-20 between 21:36Z and 21:39Z (clock read 21:39:50Z at the commit): `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack` (pointer, last five log
-lines, unit flags match, 106 commits of drift), `git rev-list --count`, `SCHEMA_VERSION` at both ends, the
-path-limited log, `git diff --stat` on the service scripts, CLI and config loader, `stack-copy.sh:23-56`,
-`webui/src/cli.mjs:15-120`, `docs/TOOLS.md` on `rehearse`, `du -sh` of the live copy and `df -h /home`. Nothing
-live was changed.

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w1-agents.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-chief  rbb708846b605  claude-code  since 2026-10-20T19:29:59.053Z
-pm  rc36b17ef3788  claude-code  since 2026-10-20T20:20:56.278Z
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w10-browser.txt

@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "settings loaded": {
-    "pass": true
-  },
-  "settings": {
-    "banner": "Tester Console. Changes are recorded as tester, never as the human.",
-    "h1": "Settings",
-    "forms": [
-      "sign-out",
-      "conv-form",
-      "routes-form",
-      "instance-add-form",
-      "instance-change-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form"
-    ],
-    "convFormHidden": true,
-    "panels": [
-      "Routing",
-      "Role instances",
-      "Seat names"
-    ],
-    "instancesTable": true,
-    "nameForms": 6,
-    "routesForm": true,
-    "routesSubmitEnabled": true,
-    "forbidden": [],
-    "tokenLimitsPanel": false
-  },
-  "tester banner": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": "Tester Console. Changes are recorded as tester, never as the human."
-  },
-  "instance, routes and name editors present": {
-    "pass": true
-  },
-  "only tester forms (conv-form is index.html:21, global and hidden)": {
-    "pass": false,
-    "detail": [
-      "sign-out",
-      "conv-form",
-      "routes-form",
-      "instance-add-form",
-      "instance-change-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form",
-      "tester-name-form"
-    ]
-  },
-  "no launch settings, assistant, limit reset or send": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": []
-  },
-  "no Token limits panel (plan W10 item 2, amended)": {
-    "pass": true
-  },
-  "board": {
-    "busViewHidden": true,
-    "banner": true,
-    "headings": [
-      "Waiting on you –",
-      "All sessions –"
-    ],
-    "unavailable": false,
-    "length": 179,
-    "forms": [
-      "sign-out",
-      "conv-form"
-    ]
-  },
-  "board reads": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": {
-      "busViewHidden": true,
-      "banner": true,
-      "headings": [
-        "Waiting on you –",
-        "All sessions –"
-      ],
-      "unavailable": false,
-      "length": 179,
-      "forms": [
-        "sign-out",
-        "conv-form"
-      ]
-    }
-  },
-  "chat": {
-    "hash": "#/chat",
-    "banner": true,
-    "threads": [
-      {
-        "href": "#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28",
-        "name": "w9",
-        "instance": "assistant"
-      }
-    ],
-    "conversationOpen": false,
-    "forms": [
-      "sign-out",
-      "conv-form",
-      "chat-project-form"
-    ]
-  },
-  "chat lists the W9 thread": {
-    "pass": false,
-    "detail": [
-      {
-        "href": "#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28",
-        "name": "w9",
-        "instance": "assistant"
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  "W9 thread page not opened": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": "#/chat"
-  },
-  "tester banner on chat": {
-    "pass": true
-  },
-  "requests": [
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/config",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/config",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/messages",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus-status",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/messages",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/settings",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/usage",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/settings",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/usage",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/names",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/names",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/instances",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/instances",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/routes",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/routes",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/limits",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/limits",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/inbox",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/agents",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/messages",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/chat/projects",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/chat/threads",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/business",
-      "refused": false
-    }
-  ],
-  "no write through the listener": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": []
-  },
-  "no request to the W9 thread messages or open": {
-    "pass": true,
-    "detail": []
-  }
-}
-W10 browser: FAIL
-# exit 1

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w10-diag.txt

@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "config": {
-    "sso": null
-  },
-  "forms": [
-    {
-      "id": "sign-out",
-      "hidden": true,
-      "action": "/auth/logout",
-      "method": "post"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "conv-form",
-      "hidden": true,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "routes-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "instance-add-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "instance-change-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "tester-name-form",
-      "hidden": false,
-      "action": null,
-      "method": null
-    }
-  ],
-  "chat": {
-    "hash": "#/chat",
-    "open": false,
-    "projects": [
-      {
-        "project": "window-20261020-0801",
-        "threads": [
-          "#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28"
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "project": "window-20261020-2205",
-        "threads": [
-          "#/chat/threads/446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899"
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  },
-  "requests": [
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/config",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/config",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/messages",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus-status",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/messages",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/settings",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/usage",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/settings",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/usage",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/names",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/names",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/instances",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/instances",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/routes",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/routes",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/limits",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/bus/limits",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/config",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/chat/projects",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/chat/threads",
-      "refused": false
-    },
-    {
-      "method": "GET",
-      "url": "/api/business",
-      "refused": false
-    }
-  ]
-}
-sign-out hidden true, sso null; W9 thread listed true; thread page open false; writes 0
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w10-matrix.txt

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-a 200 ok=true
-b 401 error="sign-in required"
-c 401 error="sign-in required"
-d 403 error="proxy Host refused"
-e 403 error="tester listener required"
-f 403 error="proxy header refused"
-g 200 non-json 6575 bytes
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w10-p4.txt

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# P4 2026-10-20T22:31:29Z
-DropInPaths=
-ExecStart={ path=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel ; argv[]=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel client --fingerprint ce+ISFvMAhuoCRDuc7riIf+hYz87TLHk/C9C/H8QsUg= --keepalive 25s --max-retry-interval 10s http://10.1.1.227:8080 R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332 ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[n/a] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=0 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
-# exit 0
-# R: specs (1): R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332 
-P4 PASS: one R: spec R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332, DropInPaths empty
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w11-bus.txt

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-ActiveState=active
-DropInPaths=
-MainPID=2950923
-ExecStart={ path=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/scripts/mosaic ; argv[]=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/scripts/mosaic bus start mosaic-stack --pm ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[Tue 2026-10-20 17:02:08 CDT] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=2950923 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
-WorkingDirectory=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w11-failed.txt

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-● jarvis-curation-gate.service                            loaded failed failed Jarvis curation-gate liveness check (wake the agent if staged pulls sit uncurated)
-● jarvis-retro-check.service                              loaded failed failed Jarvis weekly retrospective ARTIFACT check (did Sunday's tick produce a retro?)
-● jarvis-retro.service                                    loaded failed failed Jarvis weekly retrospective tick
-● mosaic-install-drift.service                            loaded failed failed Assert the installed Mosaic binaries still match the committed source (drift, not failure)
-● mosaic-standup-pm.service                               loaded failed failed Coordinator standup trigger (evening)
-● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-curation-gate.service to the local agent seat
-● [email protected]   loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-retro-check.service to the local agent seat
-● [email protected]         loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-retro.service to the local agent seat
-● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit mosaic-install-drift.service to the local agent seat
-● [email protected]     loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit mosaic-reconcile.service to the local agent seat
-● setspark-tmp-guard.service                              loaded failed failed SetSpark: /tmp and scratch guard
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w11-tunnel.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-ActiveState=active
-SubState=running
-ActiveEnterTimestamp=Tue 2026-10-13 08:40:19 CDT
-MainPID=1317
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w11-webui.txt

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-ActiveState=active
-DropInPaths=
-MainPID=2950925
-ExecStart={ path=/usr/bin/node ; argv[]=/usr/bin/node /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve --checkout /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack --port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333 ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[Tue 2026-10-20 17:02:08 CDT] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=2950925 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
-WorkingDirectory=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-agents.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-chief  r097436c91816  claude-code  since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.951Z
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-cc.txt

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-PASS markdown-preview.js is served and equals the copy's
-PASS /api/config on loopback: send=false edit=false
-PASS project.files through the Console: head=ae0b17c9586e51da7bc1b7e548c6acf913a55665 files=2 spec=true error=none
-PASS project.file spec/north-star.md through the Console: commit=ae0b17c9586e51da7bc1b7e548c6acf913a55665 length=99 error=none
-PASS loopback save refused: HTTP 403 error=read-only sent=false
-CONSOLE_PASS
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-launches.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "business": "mosaic-stack",
-    "instance": "chief",
-    "run": "r097436c91816",
-    "launchedBy": "jason",
-    "harness": "claude-code",
-    "model": "claude-opus-5-5",
-    "provider": "anthropic",
-    "modelKey": "opus",
-    "pid": 2951160,
-    "startTime": "63491912",
-    "runnerPid": 2951161,
-    "runnerStartTime": "63491912",
-    "runDir": "/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/launches/mosaic-stack/r097436c91816",
-    "startedAt": "2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z",
-    "live": true
-  }
-]

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-launches.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-r097436c91816  mosaic-stack/chief  claude-code claude-opus-5-5  by jason  since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z  running
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-names.json

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-[]
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-project.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-created project window-20261020-2205  id 77e7b45f-8c34-49a3-b2fa-9cf565177c30
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-reply-at.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1792533965

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-status.txt

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-pointer: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json
-  {"copy":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","business":"mosaic-stack","pm":true,"claude":"/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/claude","console":["--port","7332","--public-host","mosaic.woltje.com","--auth-header","X-authentik-username","--allow-user","jason.woltje","--tester-port","7333"],"schema":"3i","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z"}
-log (last five lines):
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T07:58:02Z","op":"activate","from":"89af38a83afa22a8a4f0d368a0a4030ad15a0efa","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T19:29:56Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"started"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T19:30:00Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:06Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"started"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"ok"}
-check:
-  bus: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  Console: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  CLI: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  result: pass
-bus status:
-  host: mosaic-stack, pid 2950923, running, since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.133Z, notifier off
-  socket: present
-  writer.lock: pid 2950981
-  boot: organization file loaded at 2026-10-20T22:02:08.125Z
-unit flags: match the pointer
-drift: 6 commit(s) on refactor since the pointer's copy
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-talk-chief.txt

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-sent c5b43f04 to chief
-chief (RESULT, re c5b43f04) c3e236d7:
-Got the re-pin of 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 from the tester; I took no action because a tester message authorizes nothing, and I launched and changed nothing.
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-talk-thread.txt

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-sent b4b66ced to window-20261020-2205/w9
-assistant (RESULT, re b4b66ced) cfa7ea99:
-Assistant (run r497f1c817d4d) got the [mos test] message and is replying in one line as asked, without treating it as Jason's instruction or acting on it.
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-thread-read.json

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "seq": 570,
-    "id": "b4b66ced-d088-4b9c-a944-306f164028f9",
-    "at": "2026-10-20T22:05:58.283Z",
-    "business": "mosaic-stack",
-    "from_role": "tester",
-    "from_run": "tester-cli",
-    "to_role": "assistant",
-    "class": "REQUEST",
-    "in_reply_to": null,
-    "decision": null,
-    "corrects": null,
-    "body": "[mos test] reply with one line, then stop",
-    "to_name": null
-  },
-  {
-    "seq": 571,
-    "id": "cfa7ea99-7ccb-4225-80a6-9a903540e337",
-    "at": "2026-10-20T22:06:04.247Z",
-    "business": "mosaic-stack",
-    "from_role": "assistant",
-    "from_run": "r497f1c817d4d",
-    "to_role": "tester",
-    "class": "RESULT",
-    "in_reply_to": "b4b66ced-d088-4b9c-a944-306f164028f9",
-    "decision": null,
-    "corrects": null,
-    "body": "Assistant (run r497f1c817d4d) got the [mos test] message and is replying in one line as asked, without treating it as Jason's instruction or acting on it.",
-    "to_name": null
-  }
-]

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-thread.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-created window-20261020-2205/w9  id 446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899  instance assistant
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-threads.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-window-20261020-0801/w9  assistant  d0ba7a66
-window-20261020-2205/w9  assistant  446201de
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-tid.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9-usage.json

@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "total": {
-    "input": 62,
-    "output": 9623,
-    "cacheWrite": 186650,
-    "cacheRead": 404132,
-    "unknownTurns": 1
-  },
-  "byRun": [
-    {
-      "run": "r8fba7e598156",
-      "input": 0,
-      "output": 0,
-      "cacheWrite": 0,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 1
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r4a96e2142e4d",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 52,
-      "cacheWrite": 11750,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "rc78c9700c8e9",
-      "input": 14,
-      "output": 1519,
-      "cacheWrite": 18187,
-      "cacheRead": 89559,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r293f33bcbc63",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 44,
-      "cacheWrite": 18595,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r34520a581318",
-      "input": 6,
-      "output": 323,
-      "cacheWrite": 26349,
-      "cacheRead": 14307,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r7e99838f9f93",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 44,
-      "cacheWrite": 9858,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "rc964611b2092",
-      "input": 4,
-      "output": 120,
-      "cacheWrite": 26138,
-      "cacheRead": 23870,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "rbb708846b605",
-      "input": 12,
-      "output": 2089,
-      "cacheWrite": 17285,
-      "cacheRead": 73823,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "rc36b17ef3788",
-      "input": 16,
-      "output": 5221,
-      "cacheWrite": 36717,
-      "cacheRead": 202573,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r097436c91816",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 131,
-      "cacheWrite": 11915,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "run": "r497f1c817d4d",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 80,
-      "cacheWrite": 9856,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    }
-  ],
-  "byInstance": [
-    {
-      "instance": "chief",
-      "input": 36,
-      "output": 4114,
-      "cacheWrite": 85486,
-      "cacheRead": 177689,
-      "unknownTurns": 1
-    },
-    {
-      "instance": "coder",
-      "input": 2,
-      "output": 44,
-      "cacheWrite": 18595,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "instance": "assistant",
-      "input": 4,
-      "output": 124,
-      "cacheWrite": 19714,
-      "cacheRead": 0,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    },
-    {
-      "instance": "pm",
-      "input": 20,
-      "output": 5341,
-      "cacheWrite": 62855,
-      "cacheRead": 226443,
-      "unknownTurns": 0
-    }
-  ],
-  "byProvider": [
-    {
-      "provider": "anthropic",
-      "input": 62,
-      "output": 9623,
-      "cacheWrite": 186650,
-      "cacheRead": 404132,
-      "unknownTurns": 1
-    }
-  ],
-  "byModel": [
-    {
-      "provider": "anthropic",
-      "model": "claude-opus-5-5",
-      "input": 62,
-      "output": 9623,
-      "cacheWrite": 186650,
-      "cacheRead": 404132,
-      "unknownTurns": 1
-    }
-  ],
-  "byAccount": [
-    {
-      "account": null,
-      "input": 62,
-      "output": 9623,
-      "cacheWrite": 186650,
-      "cacheRead": 404132,
-      "unknownTurns": 1
-    }
-  ]
-}
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9b-launches-after.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-r097436c91816  mosaic-stack/chief  claude-code claude-opus-5-5  by jason  since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z  running
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/.w9b-poll.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-[
-  {
-    "business": "mosaic-stack",
-    "instance": "chief",
-    "run": "r097436c91816",
-    "launchedBy": "jason",
-    "harness": "claude-code",
-    "model": "claude-opus-5-5",
-    "provider": "anthropic",
-    "modelKey": "opus",
-    "pid": 2951160,
-    "startTime": "63491912",
-    "runnerPid": 2951161,
-    "runnerStartTime": "63491912",
-    "runDir": "/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/launches/mosaic-stack/r097436c91816",
-    "startedAt": "2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z",
-    "live": true
-  }
-]

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/S1.json

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "3i",
-  "tables": {
-    "decision_events": {
-      "rows": 21,
-      "maxSeq": 21,
-      "sha256": "28dd95056663dd5eb7442a3d815b73a4a3cd311a0e854fd82dc54f7dc3e6ef26"
-    },
-    "decisions": {
-      "rows": 21,
-      "maxSeq": 21,
-      "sha256": "fef1058660b0d128ef21089dda5e0fba7f71763d8325148fe521de0d3f57e4ad"
-    },
-    "deliveries": {
-      "rows": 1726,
-      "maxSeq": 1726,
-      "sha256": "8667571f4a05ce3621b04cf2dc5eb0311bac3d3aff1858584c78445c5c4c2fb4"
-    },
-    "events": {
-      "rows": 1525,
-      "maxSeq": 1525,
-      "sha256": "e51827e31f2fa5a9a50993e5a10f37f1dee383b7d673f793006bd2ba1e9a5573"
-    },
-    "instance_names": {
-      "rows": 0,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
-    },
-    "message_threads": {
-      "rows": 2,
-      "maxSeq": null
-    },
-    "messages": {
-      "rows": 567,
-      "maxSeq": 567
-    },
-    "meta": {
-      "rows": 3,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "89fec56e7293d19e0b2f6cd8c0ef745ebf99e4115abeaea7fbdbc98a261332d9"
-    },
-    "projects": {
-      "rows": 1,
-      "maxSeq": 1,
-      "sha256": "a3945f7462895e0e302029c542d384a6d33e559da900e6461d78bbcd7cc28b16"
-    },
-    "role_claims": {
-      "rows": 98,
-      "maxSeq": 98,
-      "sha256": "ac6694fd0b365469f7486ae1f31486cd52b31be7bc0399938b7361f22454362e"
-    },
-    "task_comment_cursors": {
-      "rows": 215,
-      "maxSeq": 215,
-      "sha256": "7f80df8efb90b502a9530a7ed5068d59be59b2eb318aa4e64ce6bf481762a5e9"
-    },
-    "task_snapshots": {
-      "rows": 401,
-      "maxSeq": 401,
-      "sha256": "cced8c7f90ecaa60eee3010d987013d8c0301563cb888860fd91b8c5a02f0a00"
-    },
-    "thread_claims": {
-      "rows": 2,
-      "maxSeq": 2,
-      "sha256": "6046c7088779aa2f6e9b3fd2c7520404b1678a4fcae71c2b9157a008bba22a5f"
-    },
-    "thread_opens": {
-      "rows": 0,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
-    },
-    "threads": {
-      "rows": 1,
-      "maxSeq": 1,
-      "sha256": "3043721efd386f23dfdaad4acf41e0d553ff6182f0068c2133a615141bcf772a"
-    },
-    "usage_records": {
-      "rows": 30,
-      "maxSeq": 30,
-      "sha256": "7ecbc0606273043b017d778bb23880377bfe367f788d234289b7c132caa588f2",
-      "byRun": [
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r8fba7e598156",
-          "input": "0",
-          "output": "0",
-          "unknownTurns": 1
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r4a96e2142e4d",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "52",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc78c9700c8e9",
-          "input": "14",
-          "output": "1519",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r293f33bcbc63",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "44",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r34520a581318",
-          "input": "6",
-          "output": "323",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r7e99838f9f93",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "44",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc964611b2092",
-          "input": "4",
-          "output": "120",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rbb708846b605",
-          "input": "12",
-          "output": "2089",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc36b17ef3788",
-          "input": "16",
-          "output": "5221",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  },
-  "untimed": [
-    "message_threads",
-    "meta",
-    "task_comment_cursors"
-  ]
-}

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/S2.json

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schema": "3i",
-  "tables": {
-    "decision_events": {
-      "rows": 21,
-      "maxSeq": 21,
-      "sha256": "28dd95056663dd5eb7442a3d815b73a4a3cd311a0e854fd82dc54f7dc3e6ef26"
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-    "decisions": {
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-      "maxSeq": 21,
-      "sha256": "fef1058660b0d128ef21089dda5e0fba7f71763d8325148fe521de0d3f57e4ad"
-    },
-    "deliveries": {
-      "rows": 1740,
-      "maxSeq": 1740,
-      "sha256": "554ce5b377ffacc72bfde11c99c920cd5d30337c8bfa217275d0073b587e2169"
-    },
-    "events": {
-      "rows": 1543,
-      "maxSeq": 1543,
-      "sha256": "0151673193d0286ce8f3b234d7d21fa2b0f43f2ceec55644cccaa5cbd77603dd"
-    },
-    "instance_names": {
-      "rows": 0,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
-    },
-    "message_threads": {
-      "rows": 4,
-      "maxSeq": null
-    },
-    "messages": {
-      "rows": 571,
-      "maxSeq": 571
-    },
-    "meta": {
-      "rows": 3,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "89fec56e7293d19e0b2f6cd8c0ef745ebf99e4115abeaea7fbdbc98a261332d9"
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-    "projects": {
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-    "role_claims": {
-      "rows": 101,
-      "maxSeq": 101,
-      "sha256": "fb47114defbb8a57dd148a06fbaf61b30f791a81f14b1510b8c32690506b4308"
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-    "task_comment_cursors": {
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-      "maxSeq": 220,
-      "sha256": "df03c84094999299499de01107ddd08636df6156f5c9ccd2ff6e8c43e459f7e4"
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-    "task_snapshots": {
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-      "maxSeq": 408,
-      "sha256": "e2243a89388afba07e8d096b4961deeb2d17c656cdcace54b46eac7001393814"
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-    "thread_claims": {
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-      "sha256": "088b8236570d8afe03364b85803fdc5034cce2cef6ed7b16f8b99bf6366524ad"
-    },
-    "thread_opens": {
-      "rows": 0,
-      "maxSeq": null,
-      "sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
-    },
-    "threads": {
-      "rows": 2,
-      "maxSeq": 2,
-      "sha256": "819fd24c64e279d0debad5ab5dbbe533d8e6f26de58277c69510b9cbbaadbc3a"
-    },
-    "usage_records": {
-      "rows": 34,
-      "maxSeq": 34,
-      "sha256": "de614f3d62c9b3819757c5659bee40085cb86cc873b7bfe381b13e254ddb7cad",
-      "byRun": [
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r8fba7e598156",
-          "input": "0",
-          "output": "0",
-          "unknownTurns": 1
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r4a96e2142e4d",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "52",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc78c9700c8e9",
-          "input": "14",
-          "output": "1519",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r293f33bcbc63",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "44",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r34520a581318",
-          "input": "6",
-          "output": "323",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r7e99838f9f93",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "44",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc964611b2092",
-          "input": "4",
-          "output": "120",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rbb708846b605",
-          "input": "12",
-          "output": "2089",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "rc36b17ef3788",
-          "input": "16",
-          "output": "5221",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r097436c91816",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "131",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        },
-        {
-          "business": "mosaic-stack",
-          "run": "r497f1c817d4d",
-          "input": "2",
-          "output": "80",
-          "unknownTurns": 0
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  },
-  "untimed": [
-    "message_threads",
-    "meta",
-    "task_comment_cursors"
-  ]
-}

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/STATE.md

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-# Re-pin window 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192, Q175 phase 1), STATE report (W11)
-
-Operator and tester: Sage. Plan: `agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-4429a104f.md` at f41729178, sha256
-e1272d1a391e00fb1291d47da9973c0ba342d65fcd42f583ea007e883c1f32b9 (checked before W0b, W9). The plan file in
-this commit carries three corrections made after the window. They are listed at the end, so its sha256 differs
-now. Tool blob 3b068b1546d4 (`scripts/stack-release.sh`). OLD 490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c, NEW
-4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0. Every stamp below comes from `date -u` or from the transcript `W.txt`
-in this directory. Mos's gos: mos-1113 (W5), mos-1114 (W9 to W11), mos-1128 (W9b accepted), mos-1135 (W10
-browser part), mos-1137 (line g, post W11).
-
-## Outcome
-
-NEW is live for mosaic-stack with its PM, and the store stays on 3i. Row 192's sign-in code is in the copy but
-dormant, because the Console runs without `--sso`. W0 to W10 passed, and nothing was rolled back. W10 stopped
-once on two failed browser checks. I diagnosed both read-only as checks written before row 192, not faults in
-NEW, and Mos passed them (mos-1135). Matrix line (g) isn't byte-identical, for a known cause, and Mos passed it
-(mos-1137). Nobody acted as Jason. There was no `--by jason`, no pi, no Save and no `mosaic name`, and
-`bus.tester` was not touched.
-
-## Stamps and activation
-
-| Step | Start (UTC) | Result |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| P1 values, business-check OLD | file written 21:43:13Z | values as planned, LOAD_OK (`p1.txt`) |
-| W0 copy NEW with npm ci, business-check NEW | 21:45:57Z | copied, lockfile diff empty, LOAD_OK (`w0.txt`) |
-| P2 console-check on a stub of NEW | 21:46:09Z | CONSOLE_PASS without and with `--tester-port` (`p2.txt`) |
-| P3 rehearsal (Mos) | 21:52:31Z to 21:52:34Z | REHEARSAL_PASS, rc 0 (`p3/`) |
-| P3 flags check (Mos) | 21:53:52Z to 21:53:56Z | NEW Console with the pointer flags on 7341/7342: healthz 200 both, then gone, 0 listeners |
-| P4, P5, P6 | 22:00:17Z | P4 PASS, P5 PASS (HEAD 4385b9ec1), `matrix-old.txt` |
-| W0b business file copy | 22:00:49Z | sha256 1e49bdf0 |
-| W1 idle check, S1 | 22:00:49.758Z | chief idle; S1 a7649760 |
-| W2 status | 22:00:49.819Z | pointer OLD, pm true, 3i, unit flags match |
-| W3 plan | 22:00:50.068Z | exit 0 (`W3-plan.txt` 45de68d4) |
-| W4 unit read | 22:00:50.238Z | OLD units, no drop-ins, bus `--pm`, no quote or backslash |
-| W5 activate (mos-1113) | 22:02:06.776Z, end 22:02:09.556Z | exit 0, gate passed, activate ok |
-| W5 status | 22:02:13.885Z | pointer NEW, pm true, 3i, unit flags match |
-| W9 checks and turns (mos-1114) | 22:05:51Z to 22:06:06Z | pass |
-| W9b run end and S2 | 22:21:05.171Z, S2 22:21:07Z | ended by the launcher (thread-idle); S2 1a444f5a |
-| W10 browser (stop), diagnosis | 22:29:14Z, 22:30:02Z | 10 of 12, then both failures traced to the checks |
-| W10 matrix, P4 (mos-1135) | 22:31:29Z | a-f identical, g +121 bytes; P4 PASS |
-| W11 reads | 22:44:33Z to 22:44:34Z | units, tunnel, business file, failed units |
-
-Activation id 20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6. Pointer `at` 2026-10-20T22:02:09Z.
-
-## Backups and hashes
-
-- Store backup: `~/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6`, SHA256SUMS sha256
-  b61d64843c9e2a153842606353450838da9cb778c8f3b9c27cc9366dd72ec0c9.
-- Rollback set: `~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-rollback/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6`. Rollback goes to 490e2771d.
-- Business file: 1e49bdf05e62607972958f5b7298cfd600c7825812370e26d7c2a842f2af9b93 at P1, at W0b and again at
-  W11. The W0b copy is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json.pre-window-20261020T220049Z` with the
-  same hash. Nothing in the window wrote it. `backups.txt` holds the W0b and W5 lines.
-
-## Pointer before and after
-
-Before (W2): copy 490e2771d3d0, pm true, schema 3i, activation 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0. Console flags
-`--port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje
---tester-port 7333`.
-
-After (W5, W9 and W11): copy 4429a104f6d6, pm true, schema 3i, activation 20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6. The
-Console flags are the same, with no `--send`, no `--sso` and no proof pair. Bus pid 2950923 and Console pid
-2950925, both since 22:02:08Z. Status shows drift of 6 commits on refactor since the pointer's copy (records).
-
-## Unit ExecStart lines (no Environment values)
-
-W11, after. Both units active, DropInPaths empty, WorkingDirectory the NEW copy:
-
-```
-bus:   ~/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/scripts/mosaic bus start mosaic-stack --pm   (MainPID 2950923)
-webui: /usr/bin/node ~/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve --checkout /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack --port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333   (MainPID 2950925)
-```
-
-W4 read the same two lines on OLD's copy (W.txt 329-344). The bus Environment has 2 assignments with no quote or
-backslash. The values are not recorded. The Console's cwd is the NEW copy (W9). The webui journal since W5 has one
-"Proxy: proxy proof off" line and no "Sign-in:" line.
-
-Tunnel: `mosaic-preview-tunnel.service` active, running, MainPID 1317, since 2026-10-13 08:40:19 CDT. The window
-didn't touch it. P4 before and after shows one R: spec, `R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332`.
-
-## S1, S2 and the store
-
-S1 (`S1.json`, sha256 a7649760c3439705c8b5f3af26d0c21aea1081c1eb295fd02aef3a642064194b) is W1's held read at
-22:00:49Z. S2 (`agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/S2.json`, sha256
-1a444f5ac0049bc78e397b6928e1008cfe8cbc30989bbf2042b4ed27f56a4173) is the held read after the assistant run
-ended, at 22:21:07Z. Both are 3i. SNAP (`snapshot.mjs`, 639fd28a) was checked before each.
-
-| Table | S1 rows | S2 rows | S2 vs S1 |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| decisions, decision_events | 21, 21 | 21, 21 | same sha256 |
-| meta, instance_names, thread_opens | 3, 0, 0 | 3, 0, 0 | same sha256 |
-| deliveries | 1726 | 1740 | +14 |
-| events | 1525 | 1543 | +18 |
-| role_claims | 98 | 101 | +3 |
-| messages | 567 | 571 | +4 (counts only) |
-| message_threads | 2 | 4 | +2 (counts only) |
-| usage_records | 30 | 34 | +4 |
-| projects, threads, thread_claims | 1, 1, 2 | 2, 2, 4 | +1, +1, +2 |
-| task_snapshots | 401 | 408 | +7 |
-| task_comment_cursors | 215 | 220 | +5 |
-
-For every grown table with a seq, maxSeq grew by exactly the row delta.
-
-The task_snapshots and task_comment_cursors rows (mos-1128 item 2). The writer is the bus's own Vikunja poll, not
-an agent. `packages/bus/src/process.mjs:104` loads the tasks adapter. Its timer runs `tick` every `pollSeconds`
-(`packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs:192-197`), and `sync.mjs:169` calls `broker.recordTask` with no cap
-(`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:1123`). That writes `source 'poll'` with role and run null (`broker.mjs:1159-1174`)
-and the comment cursors (`:1131-1138`). The adapter logs only on an error (`adapter.mjs:115`), so the bus journal
-has no line for a good tick. That's why there's no sync line between 22:05Z and 22:22Z. The rows, read
-read-only after the window:
-
-- task_snapshots 402-404 at 22:05:08Z: P19 436, 435 and 434, all updated 22:04:55-56Z. 405-406 at 22:12:38Z: 438
-  and 437. 407 at 22:17:08Z: 438 again. 408 at 22:19:08Z: 431. All have `source poll`, `via cursor`, role null
-  and run null. These are tracker edits made by seats during the window, which the poll picked up.
-- task_comment_cursors 216-220: tasks 424, 432, 438, 431 and 436, last comments 397 to 401. These are the
-  comments seats posted on P19 in the same minutes (398 is Mos's comment on #432).
-
-Rows after S2 (task_snapshots 409 at 22:33Z, cursors 221-223) are the same poll and are outside the window.
-
-## W9 output
-
-- Status, console-check (CONSOLE_PASS), the journal counts, the Console cwd and one running chief from this
-  start (r097436c91816) all passed.
-- `talk chief --tester` (c5b43f04): the chief replied that a tester message authorizes nothing and it took no
-  action.
-- Project `window-20261020-2205`, thread 446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899. `talk --thread` (b4b66ced) got one
-  assistant reply from run r497f1c817d4d. `thread read` shows the tester REQUEST and the assistant RESULT.
-- `threads`, `names` (empty) and `usage` read fine. The human-thread probe was skipped: S1's one thread is the
-  177-185 window's tester thread d0ba7a66, so no human thread exists.
-- W9b: the launcher logged launch at 22:06:00.766Z, thread-idle at 22:21:05.149Z and end at 22:21:05.171Z
-  (reason stopped, exit 0). Nobody stopped it by hand.
-
-## W10
-
-The browser check (`w10-browser.mjs`, dda57ccf) ran against 127.0.0.1:7333 with fetch and XHR limited to GET and
-HEAD. It made no writes and sent no W9 thread request. 10 of 12 checks passed. The two that failed:
-
-1. "Only tester forms": `#sign-out` was in the list. It is row 192's form at `packages/webui/src/public/index.html:12`,
-   `hidden`. `app.js:479` shows it only when `/api/config` has `sso: true`. The live config has no `sso`
-   key, and the form stayed hidden.
-2. "Chat lists the W9 thread": the check read only the first `ul.chat-thread-list`. `chat.js:93` renders one list
-   per project, and W9 made the second project. The diagnosis (`w10-diag.mjs`, 42d0844b) read every panel and
-   found 446201de listed.
-
-Both checks come from the 177-185 window (Darkwing's `window-rows-177-185/w10-browser.mjs`), written before row
-192 and before a second thread project existed. Corrected, they now read:
-
-- Only tester forms, allowing `#sign-out` when it is `hidden` and `/api/config` has no `sso: true`.
-- The W9 thread is in some `.chat-projects section.panel` thread list, not only the first.
-
-Both corrections are in the plan's W10 line, for the next window that copies this one.
-
-The matrix (`matrix-new.txt` against `matrix-old.txt`). Lines a to f are byte-identical. Line g is 200 non-json
-both times, but 6454 bytes on OLD and 6575 on NEW. `index.html` is 6470 bytes at 490e2771d and 6591 at 4429a104f,
-+121, and the only hunk is the line 12 form. The served page grew by the same 121. The plan's W10 line now says a
-line for a file the pin changes isn't "identical", with this case as its example. P4 again at 22:31:29Z: PASS.
-
-## Failed user units (mos-1128 item 3)
-
-All three predate the re-pin at 22:02Z and come from the legacy `~/.mosaic` and jarvis-brain setup, not the
-stack. P19 #393, "dragon-lin: seven legacy user units in failed state", covers all three (filed by Mos on
-10-20 at about 01:42Z). It has no comments yet. The current failure times are later than the ones #393 lists,
-so I added a comment with them. Times are from `systemctl --user show` (CDT) with UTC alongside.
-
-| Unit | Runs | Failed | #393 |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| mosaic-standup-pm.service | `~/.mosaic/tools/coordinator/standup_trigger.py pm` | 2026-10-19 19:00:28 CDT (10-20 00:00:28Z), exit 1 | listed |
-| mosaic-install-drift.service | `~/src/jarvis-brain/scripts/alerting/mosaic-install-drift` | 2026-10-20 00:12:54 CDT (05:12:54Z), exit 9 | listed, with an older time |
-| mosaic-unit-failed@mosaic-reconcile.service | `~/.local/bin/mosaic-unit-failed mosaic-reconcile.service` | 2026-10-20 13:16:12 CDT (18:16:12Z), exit 4 | listed, with an older time |
-
-The marker's journal at 18:16:12Z says the escalation's tmux send to jarvis failed ("tmux target not found",
-socket mosaic-fleet), so the page wasn't delivered. The record is on disk in
-`~/.local/state/mosaic-unit-failures/20261020.jsonl`. `mosaic-reconcile.service` failed at that time (exit 7)
-but last ran OK at 17:16:27 CDT (22:16:27Z). The marker stays failed until something resets it. The journal no
-longer has lines for the other two units. The window changed none of these units, and touching them is
-outside it (`~/.mosaic` is off limits, and #393 needs Jason or ops-01's charter to disable any). W11's list also
-shows `setspark-tmp-guard.service` failed. It belongs to another project, and I've left it.
-
-## Corrections to the plan, made after the window
-
-- NEW is 103 commits past OLD (`git rev-list --count 490e2771d..4429a104f`), not 106. The 106 in `status` was OLD
-  to HEAD 305857c8f, so it also counted the three record commits.
-- P3: `rehearse` starts NEW's Console with only `--port` and `--business`, not the pointer's flags. Mos's
-  separate flags check covers that (`p3/flags-check.txt`, `p3/flags-console.log`). The line was wrong as
-  written (mos-1107).
-- W10: the matrix line g size change and the two corrected browser checks, as above.
-
-## Files
-
-`W.txt` (transcript), `S1.json`, `S2.json`, `matrix-old.txt`, `matrix-new.txt`, `backups.txt`, `W3-plan.txt`,
-`W5.txt`, `W5-status.txt`, `w0.txt`, `p1.txt`, `p2.txt`, `p3/` (Mos's rehearsal and flags check), `p456.sh`,
-`w9.sh`, `w9b.sh`, `w9.out`, `w9b.out`, `w10-browser.mjs`, `w10-diag.mjs` with their outputs (the three
-screenshots stay on disk in this directory, uncommitted, since the push check refuses binaries),
-and the `.w9*`, `.w10*` and `.w11*` reads. The store snapshot tool is `snapshot.mjs` (639fd28a).

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/W3-plan.txt

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-plan: activate for mosaic-stack
-from: 490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c
-to: 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-store schema: 3i (read from the store the running bus holds)
-target schema: 3i
-migration: none; the store is at the target's version
-backup: the run backs up the stopped store to /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/<activation>/ before any migration
-commits: the run adds 103 (newest first, at most 200):
-  4429a104f webui: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself under --sso, OIDC RP with oauth4webapi 3.8.8 (row 192, #1690)
-  32b54ac3b plans: Case 2 row briefs from Gosalyn's 51006710a (webby-0034 N1/N2 and webby-0035: row A README :711 one line per variable, C2-13 owns README :713 and says the precheck prints only variable names)
-  6025ddd9c plans: Case 2 row briefs from Gosalyn's a2d94b2c2 (Webby r9 notes, webby-0032: row A README line on claude-session.env and the dist/providers/data/zai.json path, C2-13 XDG_DATA_HOME precheck and last-assignment-wins key file parse)
-  ecbfd6deb plans: Case 2 row briefs from Gosalyn's 29e85196b (design r9 for mos-1090: row A out of scope points at design 10 step 2d, C2-13 precheck checks the hub key file by name and mode, claude marker check only for claude-code harness, EnvironmentFile= fixed in case2-unit.sh)
-  0498c0613 agents: Gosalyn seat dir, README from gosalyn/case2-design, so Case 2 rows can name the seat as owner (#416)
-  49d1f3a23 plans: Case 2 slice row briefs plus rows A and B, from Gosalyn's f325657c7 on gosalyn/case2-design (#416, design r8, C2-13 copy id and profile asks for row 195, C2-20 count-only note, row A ZAI_API_KEY per mos-1086/mos-1089, row B #428 after 10-27)
-  628e2ca5c sessions: Filbert row 190 manifest round 1 CHANGES (base drift on row 189)
-  088087ac9 queue: revs 2248-2361+. Sage: rows 210 (#424 host access, Gizmoduck) and 211 (#426 force-push guard, Rocko) added and briefed; row 195 re-briefed to the Case 1 install on .53; review requests for 200 r1/r2 and 202; plus earlier Sage revs. Other seats' revs: Launchpad 2254, 2283-2284, 2286, 2311-2313, 2328-2329, 2344, 2347-2348 (rows 192/200); Honker 2255; Morgana 2257, 2320, 2326-2327 (row 204); Gander 2262; Herb 2265; Dewey 2268; Bushroot 2273; Megavolt 2276; Webby 2303, 2316, 2339, 2355 (row 192/200 verdicts); Gizmoduck 2304, 2318-2319 and the row 210 claim (rows 201/210); Quackerjack 2317, 2341-2342 (row 202); Duckworth 2323, 2335, 2353 (rows 201/204/202 verdicts); Darkwing 2354, 2357 (row 190 in-review)
-  a0fbefd48 plans: pre-push force-push hook and failing busy check brief (Vikunja #426, mos-1078, mos-1083; owner Rocko, reviewer Dewey)
-  f24f2cd40 plans: row 195 brief becomes the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (Q181 hosts, Q182/Q183 recorded acceptance, Q185 existing account, chained on rows 190 and C2-13; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1; sage-1439)
-  9ba31b5b3 agents: Honker's PRD 1.7 draft r2 on refactor for the prd.approve raise (11cb0423b, sha256 e896746df595d1b5155130ca163fbf63b0dc38a87a8dd154af77f1a6d1328647, Duckworth approved duckworth-0039, Vikunja #420)
-  9db578ff5 plans: agent host access with sudo through the credential store brief (#1707, Vikunja #424, Q183/Q184, chained on row 199)
-  8eb9ddd12 plans: FED R8 brief to r4.11 (b93f098f0, recorded acceptance, Duckworth N1/N2, #416 date), R5 context source (sage-1419), 193a makes covers level required (duckworth-0033 N1)
-  ae3c36f24 agents: Gizmoduck seat dir and roster row (FED R1 owner, #414)
-  a2af7ab49 plans: FED R1, R5, R2 and R8 briefs (#414, r4.9 a1daa3c07) and row 193a-d build briefs (#1691); Quackerjack seat dir and roster row
-  aa1bd209e gate-lane: row 189 gate timing table for row 197 (Herb)
-  ace27dc5e row 189 (#1687): stack-release.sh activate --no-send drops the Console's --send (Sage; Dewey approve 29485; Sage gate passed)
-  a4a42dbac plans: stack-release --sso brief (#1698, Launchpad, reviewer Webby, row 192 F3; chained on 192)
-  a31f1a0f8 plans: row 198 brief records Mos's call, in-process board reads behind the Console's auth (mos-1019)
-  992650232 plans: agent credentials and git identity brief (MVP T1 item 6, #1697, Megavolt, reviewer Duckworth); Megavolt seat dir
-  a7661ada0 plans: row 195 acceptance script takes Gizmoduck's gate item list; B8 issuer and TLS front end (mos-1011)
-  f871cb309 plans: retire the control board writer on 7331 brief (#1696, Bushroot, reviewer Webby, mos-1008 item 2); Bushroot seat dir
-  0bbd23c61 plans: row 195 brief adds the identity provider check and flags any new model account for Jason (mos-1008)
-  0217b71c8 plans: row 195 brief rewritten as the hub on its own host, host left to Jason (#1693, mos-0998, mos-1005)
-  c6f528a32 plans: second gate lane brief (#1695, Herb, reviewer Webby, mos-0977 item 6); Herb seat dir; gate template and busy check copies for the row
-  96f243faf plans: human boundary row brief (P19 333, #1694, Gander, reviewer Duckworth, mos-0989); Gander seat dir; seat READMEs name the credentials row, not row 195 (now 190b)
-  c86269935 sessions: Filbert row 190 design review r3, approved
-  48ebee0ff plans: row 190 brief scopes isolation to addressing on one uid, points to row 190b (Filbert N7, mos-0986)
-  66bdd84b8 sessions: Filbert row 190 design review r2, changes requested
-  6966164f0 plans: row 190b brief, Melanie's hub under its own Linux user (#1693, Darkwing, reviewer Duckworth), mos-0986
-  53bb59462 sage: common start for MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977, mos-0981)
-  5e01c3683 agents: seat dirs and roster rows for Launchpad, Morgana, Honker (Sage's T1 builders) and Webby, Duckworth (Mos's reviewers); row 193 brief takes Mos's B1 starting rule (mos-0985)
-  9f56d2098 plans: rows 192 and 194 review by Webby, not Filbert or Dewey (mos-0981)
-  0599b119f plans: MVP T1 briefs, SSO phase 1 (#1690, Launchpad), human users (#1691, Morgana), agent lifecycle (#1692, Honker), mos-0974/0977
-  b416d2ede sage: Q175 SSO design, Mos C1 condition (mos-0977): straggler check before Jason step 4 in the phase 2 window
-  5fc73a729 revs 2237-2247: row 189 added, briefed, started, in-review round 1 (Dewey, comment 29457); rows 190 (Darkwing) and 191 (Rocko) added and briefed for MVP T1 (mos-0974); darkwing-190-start (rev 2245, Darkwing's) and rocko-191-start (rev 2244, made for Rocko)
-  99772421a sage: row 189 candidate manifest for Dewey's review (d6116771f)
-  da230ca48 plans: MVP T1 briefs, several instances per host (#1688, Darkwing) and the kill switch (#1689, Rocko), mos-0974
-  4f2d1be68 sessions: Filbert Q175 SSO design D1/D2 ack
-  d55d86bb0 sage: Q175 SSO design r3 fix, Filbert r3 D1 (loader checks slot shape only) and D2 (slot from config dir, scratch Console dataRoot and unreachable issuer)
-  c56ccf916 sessions: Filbert Q175 SSO design review r3, approve with D1
-  817e8f51b sage: Q175 SSO design r3 for #412, Filbert r2 C1 (shared loader, config.json inside the phase 2 window, rollback order, test 25) and C2 (401 signed-out page, test 24), notes and Q-E
-  5d019d876 sessions: Filbert Q175 SSO design review r2, changes
-  59475fc5a sage: row 163 landing record, P19 comments 372/373 on 337/412, and P19 #413 filed for the --no-send row
-  1a268249e sage: Q175 SSO design r2 for #412, Filbert r1 B1-B6, rulings Q-B/Q-C/Q-D, config in config.json (mos-0973)
-  def2e7932 plans: brief for stack-release activate --no-send (Q175 interim, mos-0972/0973, #1687, P19 413)
-  c30b36fff sessions: Filbert Q175 SSO design review r1, changes
-  9ae8c73ac queue: revs 2235-2236: row 163 Sage landing note (8ecc7a239, patch-id b8d5f8a37c24, gate passed on eaa0f2666) and done
-  8ecc7a239 row 163 (#1660): stack-release.sh rehearse, the D2 rehearsal on a scratch root from a backup, and bus start --no-launch (Sage; Filbert approve 29447; Sage gate passed)
-  7f57419b3 sage: Q175 SSO design for #412, OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, for Filbert review (mos-0970, mos-0971)
-  4ca8d6e94 sage: row 42 run log, S7 reachability pass (51cebff7 answered by cff1e9ad after a chief launch, mos-0969)
-  22e5e825b sage: row 42 run log, plain mosaic on a pinned host supersedes the 10-12 full-path line (mos-0968)
-  e6dea74b2 sessions: Sage row 163 r2 approval intake; P19 337 comment 368 script and record
-  cd2b377bb queue: rev 2234: row 163 r2 approve from Filbert (op filbert-163-r2, comment 29447, candidate c6f4f4c12596)
-  ceccb0ef2 sessions: Filbert row 163 r2 review, approve
-  10ab8ea62 sessions: Sage row 163 r2 in-review; P19 337 comment 367 script and record
-  c539995cf queue: revs 2231-2233: row 163 r2 in-review from Sage (ops sage-163-r2-start, sage-163-inreview-2, .outcome; request comment 29446, reviewer Filbert, manifest c6f4f4c12596)
-  92cc6011c queue: rev 2230: row 163 r1 changes from Filbert (op filbert-163-r1, comment 29445, candidate 430212299beb)
-  7af166574 sage: row 163 r2 packet (candidate 2c090eefd on code 2a5f3a3a0, base 4f02486d5: diff, manifest c6f4f4c12596, gate passed, mutants K34-K41 killed)
-  2244e8baf sessions: Filbert row 163 r1 review, changes
-  bde0fdec9 sessions: Sage row 163 r1 in-review; P19 337 comment 366 script and record
-  def677bc7 queue: revs 2228-2229: row 163 r1 in-review from Sage (ops sage-163-inreview-1, .outcome; request comment 29444, reviewer Filbert, manifest 430212299beb)
-  51f67f1f8 sage: row 163 packet (candidate 4be3f6aec on 580500699: diff, manifest 430212299beb, gate passed, mutants K1-K33 killed after four survivors got tests)
-  5b298bd00 sessions: Dewey row 66 r1 (changes) and r2 (approve) reviews
-  565bc32c2 queue: revs 2223-2227: row 66 r2 round from Sage (2223-2225, ops sage-r66-r2-start, sage-r66-inreview-2); r2 verdicts from Filbert (2226, op filbert-66-r2, approve) and Dewey (2227, op dewey-66-r2, approve)
-  5140aa9e8 sessions: Filbert row 66 r2 review, approve
-  973cb5a87 queue: revs 2220-2222: row 163 Sage start (2220); row 66 r1 verdicts from Filbert (2221, op filbert-66-r1) and Dewey (2222, op dewey-66-r1)
-  b82ec9353 sage: row 66 r2 packet (candidate 0f4a57956: diff, manifest cee63e06fdea, gate, mutants K1-K4 killed, singles rerun)
-  3560c450a sessions: Filbert row 66 r1 review, changes
-  4f02486d5 sage: row 66 r1 packet (candidate 8ec03b45a: diff, manifest e68c6bce5ec4, gate r2), row 42 run log (trigger (a), mos-0960), SESSIONS line
-  263ea8a9a queue: revs 2215-2219: row 66 Sage start (2215), in-review round 1 on candidate manifest e68c6bce5ec4 (8ec03b45a) and request comment 29437 (2216-2217); row 163 brief re-pinned to b1500d96ad27 (6020bb43a) and briefed (2218-2219)
-  6020bb43a plans: D2 brief owner is sage (row 163, #1660), and D2 lands after the Part B window (mos-0958, mos-0959)
-  5487ed39d sage: row 188 landing record: P19 411 (N1) and comments 361-363 script and record, 409/410 description restore after a partial done update, SESSIONS line
-  31e328958 queue: revs 2209-2214: row 188 Darkwing start, in-review and request 29432 (2209-2211); Filbert approve 29433 (2212); Sage landing note (8fc0ee216, patch-id c9a56b167c07, stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2, gate passed) and done (2213-2214)
-  8fc0ee216 row 188 (#1686, P19 409, 410): stack-release T54, the proof file checks on a carried pair and a proof file inside the repository (Darkwing; Filbert approve 29433; Sage gate passed)
-  23a609c5c sessions: Filbert row 188 r1 review, approve
-  b9c1c9fe2 sage: Part B draft 2 A2 passed (mos-0958), row 188 launched, Vikunja comments 358-360 script and record, SESSIONS line
-  525990ecb queue: revs 2207-2208: row 188 add and briefed (Sage), #1686, P19 409/410, gates Part B (mos-0956)
-  148a9503d sage: Part B window file draft 2 for mos-0957 (F1: B6 and B-R1 name the stop's endLaunch rows, PB5 counts per step; F2: PB6, PB7 and B-R1 matrices run (a)-(h)); Q2 answered, Q1 to Jason's list
-  240f21650 brief: stack-release tests for a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410, #1686, mos-0956)
-  742e98976 sage: Part B window file, the read window's end stamp from the clock (10:29Z, not 10:40Z)
-  288ab1b5a sage: Part B window file for Mos's A2 check (live-copy B3 and B-R1, Q1 on J2 order), SESSIONS lines for Darkwing (row 187, 10:25:22Z) and Sage
-  a843ae284 sage: row 187 landing, P19 407-410 filed and P19 385 comment 357, #1685 closed (comment 29425), SESSIONS line
-  652d6f3a8 queue: revs 2201-2206: row 187 Darkwing start, in-review and request comment 29423 (2201-2203); Filbert approve comment 29424 (2204); landing note (9a71e4e80, patch-id 6b57c47bc661, gate passed) and done (Sage 2205-2206)
-  9a71e4e80 row 187 (#1685): activate sets, carries and drops the Console's proof pair
-  d17328a55 sessions: Filbert row 187 r1 review, approve
-  f81ebfbae sage: row 186 follow-ups filed as P19 405 and 406, P19 404 closed (mos-0955)
-  9760d4967 sage: row 186 landing, P19 404 comment 354 and SESSIONS line, with Darkwing's row 186 SESSIONS line (09:13:21Z)
-  16a936c79 queue: revs 2198-2200: row 186 Filbert approve comment 29419 (2198); landing note (269134d8d, patch-id c97b9f6e25cd, gate passed) and done (Sage 2199-2200)
-  269134d8d row 186 (#1684): the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do
-  3c5da3a91 sessions: Filbert row 186 r1 review, approve
-  b367f5730 sage: rows 186-187 Vikunja comments (P19 404 351, P19 385 352-353) and SESSIONS line (mos-0954)
-  5a768d82c queue: row 187 added and briefed (Part B A0, #1685), with Darkwing's row 186 start (rev 2193)
-  6de3c86be plans: brief for row 187, activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0, #1685)
-  1d7fd75e2 queue: row 186 added and briefed (P19 404, #1684)
-  f5c72a5c3 plans: brief for row 186, the activate plan's backup line (P19 404, #1684)
-  b724b7b0b sessions: Sage Part A window line, with Darkwing's 06:53:53Z and 08:28:01Z lines
-  e24a13ad8 sage: Vikunja scripts and read-back records 2026-10-13 to 10-20 (decision 110, mos-0882)
-  21aa1cab0 darkwing: re-pin window rows 177-185 packet, STATE.md (sha256 b586f11c9b6f1329), W.txt (edd4622c5c45ef3f), S1/S2/S2b/B snapshots, matrices, W10 browser check and P3 rehearsals (#1683; P19 386)
-  9ddd8a92c plans: repin-rows-177-185 draft 4, R1 snapshot after the plain rollback (mos-0943)
-  e7637b99c plans: repin-rows-177-185 draft 3, R1post expects one tester action.refused per refused read (mos-0935, mos-0942)
-  2ea05700b plans: mos-0928 plan draft 2, NEW is the row 185 landing 490e2771d
-  010666074 queue: revs 2185-2190: row 185 start and in-review on bf87dbba with request comment 29403 (Darkwing 2185-2187); Filbert approve comment 29404 (2188); landing note (490e2771d, patch-id 774cd23186d5, gate passed) and done (Sage 2189-2190)
-bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 --copies /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies --pm --claude /home/jwoltje/.local/bin/claude
-proof: off
-send: off
-Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 --copies /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies --port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333
-CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 --copies /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies --bin /home/jwoltje/.npm-global/bin

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/W5-status.txt

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-pointer: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json
-  {"copy":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","business":"mosaic-stack","pm":true,"claude":"/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/claude","console":["--port","7332","--public-host","mosaic.woltje.com","--auth-header","X-authentik-username","--allow-user","jason.woltje","--tester-port","7333"],"schema":"3i","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z"}
-log (last five lines):
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T07:58:02Z","op":"activate","from":"89af38a83afa22a8a4f0d368a0a4030ad15a0efa","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T19:29:56Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"started"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T19:30:00Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:06Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"started"}
-  {"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"ok"}
-check:
-  bus: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  Console: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  CLI: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-  result: pass
-bus status:
-  host: mosaic-stack, pid 2950923, running, since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.133Z, notifier off
-  socket: present
-  writer.lock: pid 2950981
-  boot: organization file loaded at 2026-10-20T22:02:08.125Z
-unit flags: match the pointer
-drift: 6 commit(s) on refactor since the pointer's copy
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/W5.txt

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-stack-release: captured the rollback set: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-rollback/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6
-stack-release: stopped both units
-stack-release: stopped store schema: 3i
-stack-release: backup: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6
-stack-release: installed 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-stack-release: gate passed on 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-stack-release: activate ok: 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 is live for mosaic-stack
-# exit 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/backups.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-W0b 2026-10-20T22:00:49Z business file copy /home/jwoltje/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json.pre-window-20261020T220049Z sha256 1e49bdf05e62607972958f5b7298cfd600c7825812370e26d7c2a842f2af9b93 (source /home/jwoltje/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json sha256 1e49bdf05e62607972958f5b7298cfd600c7825812370e26d7c2a842f2af9b93)
-W5 2026-10-20T22:02:13Z activation 20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 backup /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 SHA256SUMS sha256 b61d64843c9e2a153842606353450838da9cb778c8f3b9c27cc9366dd72ec0c9

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/matrix-new.txt

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-a 200 ok=true
-b 401 error="sign-in required"
-c 401 error="sign-in required"
-d 403 error="proxy Host refused"
-e 403 error="tester listener required"
-f 403 error="proxy header refused"
-g 200 non-json 6575 bytes

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/matrix-old.txt

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# P6 2026-10-20T22:00:17Z
-a 200 ok=true
-b 401 error="sign-in required"
-c 401 error="sign-in required"
-d 403 error="proxy Host refused"
-e 403 error="tester listener required"
-f 403 error="proxy header refused"
-g 200 non-json 6454 bytes

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p1-business-check-old.txt

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-copy 490e2771d: roles 6, projects 1, arbiters 2
-HOLDS chief instance.name yes
-HOLDS pm instance.name no
-LOAD_OK

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p1.txt

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
- "bus.tester": true,
- "plugins": {
-  "usage-source": [
-   "transcript"
-  ],
-  "channel": [
-   "cli",
-   "webui"
-  ],
-  "harness": [
-   "claude-code"
-  ]
- },
- "launch.by": "chief",
- "launch.instances has assistant": true,
- "roles with pi harness": [],
- "sha256": "1e49bdf05e62607972958f5b7298cfd600c7825812370e26d7c2a842f2af9b93"
-}

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p2.txt

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-start 2026-10-20T21:46:09Z
-business-check.mjs: OK
-console-check.sh: OK
-1ba3c7efbc84a1d7eb8ee0068d32b7917f4e75cdc4066703944cea4c20db5b93  /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-pin-de352dfaf/fixture/console-stub.mjs
-a4500094e7c7a6dc21797eaf2d696f9814f272ece945c2735b79e4593f9c9503  /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-p2-4429/console-stub-tester.mjs
-== run 1: pinned stub, no tester listener
-stub pid 2495939 port 39561
-PASS markdown-preview.js is served and equals the copy's
-PASS /api/config on loopback: send=false edit=false
-PASS project.files through the Console: head=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa files=2 spec=true error=none
-PASS project.file spec/north-star.md through the Console: commit=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa length=4 error=none
-PASS loopback save refused: HTTP 403 error=read-only sent=false
-CONSOLE_PASS
-PORT 39561
-CALLS []
-run 1 console-check rc=0
-== run 2: main listener plus a tester listener on a second port
-stub pid 2496085 port 35213 tester port 35945
-PASS markdown-preview.js is served and equals the copy's
-PASS /api/config on loopback: send=false edit=false
-PASS project.files through the Console: head=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa files=2 spec=true error=none
-PASS project.file spec/north-star.md through the Console: commit=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa length=4 error=none
-PASS loopback save refused: HTTP 403 error=read-only sent=false
-CONSOLE_PASS
-PASS main refuses x-mosaic-tester: HTTP 403 "tester listener required"
-PASS tester /api/config: HTTP 200 "tester":true
-PASS tester /api/config send and edit off: HTTP 200 "send":false,"edit":false
-PASS tester refuses the main auth header: HTTP 403 "proxy header refused"
-PASS tester refuses project-file save: HTTP 403 
-PORT 35213
-TPORT 35945
-CALLS []
-TESTER_PASS
-run 2 console-check rc=0 tester rc=0
-end 2026-10-20T21:46:10Z

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/end.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-2026-10-20T21:52:34Z

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/flags-check.txt

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-flags-check start 2026-10-20T21:53:52Z
-pid 2729699 alive: yes
-127.0.0.1:7341
-127.0.0.1:7342
-main /healthz: 200
-tester /healthz: 200
-main /api/config: {"board":"http://127.0.0.1:7331","send":false,"edit":false}
-pid 2729699 after TERM: gone
-listeners after: 0
-flags-check end 2026-10-20T21:53:56Z

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/flags-console.log

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:7341/
-Board: http://127.0.0.1:7331
-Bus: mosaic-stack
-Preview: https://mosaic.woltje.com/ through the proxy, signed-in user from x-authentik-username, read-only
-Proxy: proxy proof off
-Tester Console: http://127.0.0.1:7342/ (binds the tester)
-Ctrl-C stops this server.

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/rc.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-rc=0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/rehearse.out

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-PASS copy: 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0, schema 3i
-PASS port: 127.0.0.1:7341 is free
-PASS backup: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0 matches its SHA256SUMS
-PASS scratch-root: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/rehearsals/20261020T215231Z-4429a104f6d6/data from the backup, config and business file under /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/rehearsals/20261020T215231Z-4429a104f6d6/config, business.diff beside them
-PASS data-root-live: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/rehearsals/20261020T215231Z-4429a104f6d6/data is not the live data root
-PASS sessions-live: no running session named in the data root
-PASS data-root-scratch
-PASS notify-off: binding null, so no Discord bridge
-PASS tracker-configured: bootConfig sets no trackers
-PASS credential-ref-live: 9 reference(s), each a placeholder
-PASS migration: not needed: the backup is already 3i
-PASS gate: host-up, bus-status, console-up, healthz and copy-match on 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-PASS no-session: no sessions.json and no launches under /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/rehearsals/20261020T215231Z-4429a104f6d6/data
-PASS console-stopped: pid 2675437
-PASS host-stopped: pid 2675436
-PASS host-released-store
-PASS backup-unchanged
-PASS live-config-unchanged
-REHEARSAL_PASS
-rehearsal directory: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/rehearsals/20261020T215231Z-4429a104f6d6

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p3/start.txt

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-2026-10-20T21:52:31Z

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p4.txt

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# P4 2026-10-20T22:00:17Z
-DropInPaths=
-ExecStart={ path=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel ; argv[]=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel client --fingerprint ce+ISFvMAhuoCRDuc7riIf+hYz87TLHk/C9C/H8QsUg= --keepalive 25s --max-retry-interval 10s http://10.1.1.227:8080 R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332 ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[n/a] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=0 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
-# exit 0
-# R: specs (1): R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332 
-P4 PASS: one R: spec R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332, DropInPaths empty
-rc 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p456.sh

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# P4-P6 of agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-4429a104f.md (f41729178), adapted from Darkwing's window-rows-177-185/p456.sh, read only.
-# P4 the tunnel unit, P5 the four REPO scripts against NEW, P6 the 7332 matrix on OLD (matrix-old.txt).
-# usage: p456.sh p4|p5|p6
-set -uo pipefail
-REPO=/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack
-WIN=$REPO/agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f
-NEW=4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
-FILES=(scripts/stack-release.sh scripts/webui-service.sh scripts/bus-service.sh scripts/stack-copy.sh)
-# The plan's <32 letters>: a fixed dummy, not a secret. matrix-new.txt uses the same value.
-PROOF=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdef
-
-p4() {
-  echo "# P4 $(date -u +%FT%TZ)"
-  local out; out="$(systemctl --user show mosaic-preview-tunnel.service -p ExecStart -p DropInPaths)"; local rc=$?
-  printf '%s\n' "$out"; echo "# exit $rc"
-  local specs; specs="$(grep -oE 'R:[^ ;]+' <<<"$out")"
-  local n; n="$(grep -c . <<<"$specs")"
-  echo "# R: specs ($n): $(tr '\n' ' ' <<<"$specs")"
-  local drop; drop="$(sed -n 's/^DropInPaths=//p' <<<"$out")"
-  if [[ $rc -eq 0 && $n -eq 1 && "$specs" == "R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332" && -z "$drop" ]]; then
-    echo "P4 PASS: one R: spec R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332, DropInPaths empty"
-  else
-    echo "P4 FAIL"; return 3
-  fi
-}
-
-p5() {
-  echo "# P5 $(date -u +%FT%TZ); HEAD $(git -C $REPO rev-parse HEAD)"
-  git -C $REPO diff --quiet $NEW HEAD -- "${FILES[@]}"; local d=$?
-  echo "# git diff --quiet $NEW HEAD -- ${FILES[*]}: exit $d"
-  local st; st="$(git -C $REPO status --porcelain -- "${FILES[@]}")"; local s=$?
-  echo "# git status --porcelain (exit $s): [${st}]"
-  for f in "${FILES[@]}"; do echo "# $f HEAD blob $(git -C $REPO rev-parse HEAD:$f) NEW blob $(git -C $REPO rev-parse $NEW:$f)"; done
-  if [[ $d -eq 0 && $s -eq 0 && -z "$st" ]]; then echo "P5 PASS"; else echo "P5 FAIL"; return 3; fi
-}
-
-# one matrix line: label, then curl arguments; prints "<label> <code> <error or ok field>"
-req() {
-  local label="$1"; shift
-  local body; body="$(mktemp -p "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}")"
-  local code; code="$(curl -s -m 10 -o "$body" -w '%{http_code}' "$@")"
-  local field; field="$(node -e '
-    let s = require("fs").readFileSync(process.argv[1], "utf8"), j;
-    try { j = JSON.parse(s); } catch { console.log("non-json " + s.length + " bytes"); process.exit(0); }
-    console.log(j.error !== undefined ? "error=" + JSON.stringify(j.error) : "ok=" + JSON.stringify(j.ok));
-  ' "$body")"
-  rm -f "$body"
-  echo "$label $code $field"
-}
-
-p6() {
-  req a http://127.0.0.1:7332/healthz
-  req b -H 'Host: mosaic.woltje.com' http://127.0.0.1:7332/
-  req c -H 'Host: mosaic.woltje.com' -H "X-Mosaic-Proof: $PROOF" http://127.0.0.1:7332/
-  req d -H 'X-authentik-username: tester-probe' http://127.0.0.1:7332/
-  req e -H 'x-mosaic-tester: 1' http://127.0.0.1:7332/
-  req f -H 'X-authentik-username: tester-probe' http://127.0.0.1:7333/
-  req g -H "X-Mosaic-Proof: $PROOF" http://127.0.0.1:7333/
-}
-
-case "${1:-}" in
-  p4) p4 ;;
-  p5) p5 ;;
-  p6) p6 ;;
-  *) echo "usage: p456.sh p4|p5|p6" >&2; exit 2 ;;
-esac

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/p5.txt

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# P5 2026-10-20T22:00:17Z; HEAD 4385b9ec183a2da4136ccd639d2a6b041eb9c68f
-# git diff --quiet 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 HEAD -- scripts/stack-release.sh scripts/webui-service.sh scripts/bus-service.sh scripts/stack-copy.sh: exit 0
-# git status --porcelain (exit 0): []
-# scripts/stack-release.sh HEAD blob 3b068b1546d4020cffde5d73929d9130afe91911 NEW blob 3b068b1546d4020cffde5d73929d9130afe91911
-# scripts/webui-service.sh HEAD blob 0a32547c54ac233e75a21f4817ae230855dbc088 NEW blob 0a32547c54ac233e75a21f4817ae230855dbc088
-# scripts/bus-service.sh HEAD blob f71250204dfeceb51beeea5941ebbf3a33ce4b92 NEW blob f71250204dfeceb51beeea5941ebbf3a33ce4b92
-# scripts/stack-copy.sh HEAD blob 24bbb02a6aa8d7857da7be3b6815105a9fef629f NEW blob 24bbb02a6aa8d7857da7be3b6815105a9fef629f
-P5 PASS
-rc 0

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/snapshot.mjs

@@ -1,235 +0,0 @@
-// Merged window B+C, S1, S2 and D3 (repin-merged-bc.md "S1 and S2"): a read-only snapshot of every
-// table in a bus store, so the 3h to 3i migration and a restore can be checked without the bus.
-// OLD's broker doesn't take --tester on usage, names or threads.
-//
-// usage: node snapshot.mjs --store /abs/bus.sqlite (--held | --stopped) [--after STAMP] [--backup /abs/bus.sqlite]
-//   --held     the running bus holds the store: a plain readOnly open, which adds no file to a WAL
-//              store that already has -wal and -shm (as stack-release.sh does for a held store).
-//              Refuses store-not-held when either is absent
-//   --stopped  the bus is stopped: refuses store-unclean when -wal or -shm is present, else opens
-//              with immutable=1 and readOnly, which creates no file and leaves the store's mtime
-//              and sha256 alone
-//   --after    also counts each timed table's rows with `at` after STAMP (mos-0838 D3, before a
-//              --restore). STAMP is a backup's STAMP file, in now_ms form (stack-release.sh:43,
-//              2026-10-20T00:11:14.123Z). The count is a text compare, as the tool's own heldcount
-//              does, so every `at` in every timed table must have that form: a table with any
-//              other value refuses at-format and names the table (sage-1125)
-//   --backup   also compares every table with a stack-release backup's bus.sqlite, which opens as
-//              --stopped opens a store: immutable=1 and readOnly, refusing backup-unclean when -wal
-//              or -shm is present, so nothing writes into the backup set
-//
-// It prints one JSON object: the schema version, then for every table in sqlite_master (type
-// table, less sqlite_*) the row count, the max seq and a sha256 of the rows (in seq order, else in
-// column order). `untimed` names the tables with no `at` column. For usage_records it adds per-run
-// input and output sums, counted as `mosaic usage` counts them (usage.mjs turnRecords). messages
-// and message_threads hold bodies and names, so they print counts only, no sha256 (sage-1125). It
-// prints counts, hashes and table and meta key names only: no message body, no instance, project
-// or thread name, no credential and no file content. It reads no config: the store path is always
-// given.
-//
-// With --backup, each table gets `vsBackup` and `stopTables` names every table other than events
-// whose rows differ from the backup's (sage-1123): a row with `at` after STAMP, a row past the
-// backup's max seq, a changed row at or below it, a changed untimed table, or a table only one
-// side has. meta counts only when a key other than schema_version and schema_digest changed (the
-// 3h to 3i migration sets those two). Events are left to the tool's own --events N.
-import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite';
-import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { existsSync, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
-import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
-
-// usage_records is hashed on these columns in this order, never SELECT * (mos-0888 F1), as
-// 3h-3i.sql:9 copies it. Every other table is hashed on its own columns in name order, so a
-// rebuild that reorders columns keeps the hash. usage_records with any other column set refuses.
-const USAGE_COLUMNS = ['seq', 'at', 'business', 'run', 'instance', 'provider', 'model', 'account', 'turn', 'source',
-  'phase', 'status', 'code', 'cursor', 'input', 'output', 'cache_write', 'cache_read'];
-const COUNTS_ONLY = new Set(['messages', 'message_threads']);
-const SCHEMA_KEYS = ['schema_digest', 'schema_version'];
-const STAMP = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3}Z$/;
-
-function refuse(code, detail) {
-  process.stderr.write(`snapshot: ${code}: ${detail}\n`);
-  process.exit(1);
-}
-
-function args(argv) {
-  const o = {};
-  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
-    const a = argv[i];
-    if (a === '--store' || a === '--after' || a === '--backup') {
-      if (i + 1 >= argv.length) refuse('usage', `${a} needs a value`);
-      o[a.slice(2)] = argv[++i];
-    } else if (a === '--held' || a === '--stopped') {
-      if (o.mode) refuse('usage', 'give one of --held and --stopped');
-      o.mode = a.slice(2);
-    } else refuse('usage', `unknown argument ${a}`);
-  }
-  if (!o.store || !o.mode) refuse('usage', 'node snapshot.mjs --store /abs/bus.sqlite (--held | --stopped) [--after STAMP] [--backup /abs/bus.sqlite]');
-  if (!isAbsolute(o.store)) refuse('usage', '--store must be an absolute path');
-  if (o.backup !== undefined && !isAbsolute(o.backup)) refuse('usage', '--backup must be an absolute path');
-  if (o.after !== undefined && !(STAMP.test(o.after) && Number.isFinite(Date.parse(o.after))))
-    refuse('usage', '--after must be a STAMP like 2026-10-20T00:11:14.123Z');
-  return o;
-}
-
-function file(path, code) {
-  if (!existsSync(path) || !lstatSync(path).isFile()) refuse(code, `${path} is not a file`);
-}
-
-function immutable(path, code) {
-  for (const f of [path + '-wal', path + '-shm'])
-    if (existsSync(f)) refuse(code, `${f} is present; an immutable read would skip the WAL`);
-  return new DatabaseSync(pathToFileURL(path).href + '?immutable=1', { readOnly: true });
-}
-
-function open({ store, mode }) {
-  file(store, 'store-missing');
-  if (mode === 'stopped') return immutable(store, 'store-unclean');
-  // A plain readOnly open of a WAL store with no -wal and -shm creates them, so a store that
-  // nothing holds refuses here instead of gaining two files.
-  for (const f of [store + '-wal', store + '-shm'])
-    if (!existsSync(f)) refuse('store-not-held', `${f} is absent; use --stopped for a store the bus doesn't hold`);
-  return new DatabaseSync(store, { readOnly: true });
-}
-
-const q = (name) => `"${name.replaceAll('"', '""')}"`;
-const value = (v) => (typeof v === 'bigint' ? String(v) : v instanceof Uint8Array ? { hex: Buffer.from(v).toString('hex') } : v);
-
-// The same records `mosaic usage` counts: per (run, turn, source) the latest row, an end row
-// winning; a turn is known only when that row is an end row with status known.
-function byRun(rows) {
-  const turns = new Map();
-  for (const row of rows) {
-    const key = JSON.stringify([row.business, row.run, row.turn, row.source]);
-    if (row.phase === 'end' || !turns.has(key)) turns.set(key, row);
-  }
-  const runs = new Map();
-  for (const row of turns.values()) {
-    const key = JSON.stringify([row.business, row.run]);
-    if (!runs.has(key)) runs.set(key, { business: row.business, run: row.run, input: 0n, output: 0n, unknown: new Set() });
-    const r = runs.get(key);
-    if (row.phase === 'end' && row.status === 'known') {
-      r.input += BigInt(row.input);
-      r.output += BigInt(row.output);
-    } else r.unknown.add(row.turn);
-  }
-  return [...runs.values()].map(({ unknown, input, output, ...r }) => ({
-    ...r, input: String(input), output: String(output), unknownTurns: unknown.size,
-  }));
-}
-
-// meta is compared by key: the names of the keys whose value differs, never the values.
-function metaKeys(db) {
-  return new Map(db.prepare('SELECT key, value FROM meta').all().map((r) => [String(r.key), String(r.value)]));
-}
-
-// One table: rows, max seq and sha256; rows after `after`; with `priorMax` (the backup's max
-// seq) a second hash of the rows at or below it and the count of rows above it. The hashes stay
-// inside: a COUNTS_ONLY table's `t` gets none.
-function read(db, table, { after, priorMax } = {}) {
-  const cols = db.prepare('SELECT name FROM pragma_table_info(?)').all(table).map((c) => c.name);
-  if (!cols.length) refuse('table-missing', table);
-  let hashed = [...cols].sort();
-  if (table === 'usage_records') {
-    if (JSON.stringify(hashed) !== JSON.stringify([...USAGE_COLUMNS].sort()))
-      refuse('columns-changed', `usage_records has columns ${hashed.join(',')}`);
-    hashed = USAGE_COLUMNS;
-  }
-  const seq = cols.includes('seq');
-  const at = cols.includes('at');
-  const stmt = db.prepare(`SELECT ${hashed.map(q).join(',')} FROM ${q(table)} ORDER BY ${seq ? 'seq' : hashed.map(q).join(',')}`);
-  stmt.setReadBigInts(true);
-  const full = createHash('sha256');
-  const prior = createHash('sha256');
-  const limit = priorMax === undefined ? undefined : BigInt(priorMax ?? 0);
-  let rows = 0;
-  let rowsAfter = 0;
-  let badAt = 0;
-  let newRows = 0;
-  const kept = [];
-  for (const row of stmt.iterate()) {
-    rows++;
-    const line = JSON.stringify(hashed.map((c) => value(row[c]))) + '\n';
-    full.update(line);
-    if (seq && limit !== undefined) {
-      if (row.seq <= limit) prior.update(line);
-      else newRows++;
-    }
-    if (after !== undefined && at) {
-      if (typeof row.at !== 'string' || !STAMP.test(row.at)) badAt++;
-      else if (row.at > after) rowsAfter++;
-    }
-    if (table === 'usage_records') kept.push(row);
-  }
-  if (badAt) refuse('at-format', `${table} has ${badAt} row(s) whose at is not in the STAMP form, so a text compare with --after would miscount`);
-  const sha256 = full.digest('hex');
-  const t = { rows, maxSeq: seq ? (db.prepare(`SELECT max(seq) AS m FROM ${q(table)}`).get().m ?? null) : null };
-  if (!COUNTS_ONLY.has(table)) t.sha256 = sha256;
-  if (after !== undefined && at) t.rowsAfter = rowsAfter;
-  if (table === 'usage_records') t.byRun = byRun(kept);
-  return { t, sha256, cols: hashed, seq, at, newRows, priorSha: seq && limit !== undefined ? prior.digest('hex') : null };
-}
-
-// Tables only: no index, view or trigger, and none of SQLite's own sqlite_* tables.
-const tablesOf = (db) => db.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name NOT LIKE 'sqlite\\_%' ESCAPE '\\' ORDER BY name")
-  .all().map((r) => r.name);
-
-const o = args(process.argv.slice(2));
-if (o.backup !== undefined) file(o.backup, 'backup-missing');
-const db = open(o);
-const bdb = o.backup === undefined ? null : immutable(o.backup, 'backup-unclean');
-const out = {};
-try {
-  db.exec('BEGIN');
-  out.schema = db.prepare("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").get()?.value ?? null;
-  const names = tablesOf(db);
-  const base = new Map();
-  if (bdb) {
-    out.backupSchema = bdb.prepare("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").get()?.value ?? null;
-    for (const name of tablesOf(bdb)) base.set(name, read(bdb, name));
-  }
-  out.tables = {};
-  out.untimed = [];
-  const stop = [];
-  for (const name of names) {
-    const b = base.get(name);
-    const r = read(db, name, { after: o.after, priorMax: b ? b.t.maxSeq : undefined });
-    if (!r.at) out.untimed.push(name);
-    if (bdb) {
-      const v = { backupRows: b ? b.t.rows : null };
-      let changed;
-      if (!b) changed = true;
-      else if (name === 'meta') {
-        const now = metaKeys(db);
-        const then = metaKeys(bdb);
-        v.keysChanged = [...new Set([...now.keys(), ...then.keys()])].filter((k) => now.get(k) !== then.get(k)).sort();
-        changed = v.keysChanged.some((k) => !SCHEMA_KEYS.includes(k));
-      } else if (r.seq) {
-        v.backupMaxSeq = b.t.maxSeq;
-        v.newRows = r.newRows;
-        v.priorSame = JSON.stringify(r.cols) === JSON.stringify(b.cols) && r.priorSha === b.sha256;
-        changed = r.newRows > 0 || !v.priorSame;
-      } else {
-        v.same = JSON.stringify(r.cols) === JSON.stringify(b.cols) && r.sha256 === b.sha256;
-        changed = !v.same;
-      }
-      if ((r.t.rowsAfter ?? 0) > 0) changed = true;
-      r.t.vsBackup = v;
-      if (changed && name !== 'events') stop.push(name);
-    }
-    out.tables[name] = r.t;
-  }
-  if (bdb) {
-    out.onlyInBackup = [...base.keys()].filter((n) => !names.includes(n));
-    out.stopTables = [...stop, ...out.onlyInBackup].sort();
-  }
-  if (o.after !== undefined) {
-    out.after = o.after;
-    out.eventsAfter = out.tables.events?.rowsAfter ?? null;
-  }
-} finally {
-  try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch {}
-  db.close();
-  bdb?.close();
-}
-process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out, null, 2) + '\n');

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/w.sh

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Re-pin 4429a104f window step wrapper (copied from Darkwing's window-rows-177-185/w.sh): w.sh FILE TITLE CMD... runs CMD in REPO under a clean env (no ANTHROPIC_*, CLAUDE_*,
-# MOSAIC_* or pi variables), appends the title, command, output, exit code and date -u stamps to window/FILE,
-# prints the output, and exits with CMD's exit code.
-set -uo pipefail
-W=/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f
-f="$W/$1"; title="$2"; shift 2
-E=(env -i HOME="$HOME" PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" LANG=C.UTF-8
-  XDG_RUNTIME_DIR="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS="${DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS:-unix:path=$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/bus}")
-t0=$(date -u +%FT%T.%3NZ)
-{ echo; echo "## $title"; echo "# start $t0"; echo "# command: (cd \$REPO && <clean env> $*)"; } >> "$f"
-out=$(cd /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack && "${E[@]}" "$@" 2>&1); rc=$?
-printf '%s\n' "$out" >> "$f"
-echo "# exit $rc, end $(date -u +%FT%T.%3NZ)" >> "$f"
-printf '%s\n# exit %s\n' "$out" "$rc"
-exit $rc

agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/w0-copy.err

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-npm warn deprecated [email protected]: Use your platform's native DOMException instead
-
-added 128 packages in 2s
-npm warn install-scripts 3 packages had install scripts blocked because they are not covered by allowScripts:
-npm warn install-scripts   @google/[email protected] (preinstall: echo 'preinstall: no-op')
-npm warn install-scripts   [email protected] (postinstall: node install.js)
-npm warn install-scripts   [email protected] (postinstall: node scripts/postinstall)
-npm warn install-scripts
-npm warn install-scripts Run `npm install-scripts ls` to review, or `npm install-scripts approve <pkg>` to allow.