Mosaic concepts pages now own the adapted content; source/license metadata under docs/reference/concepts. Adds ACT-1 agent-context planning capture, pinned concept test package + preparation utility, foundation observation notes (durability, evidence, federation, onboarding, workflow), and the #1495 consolidation assessment. TOOLS.md updated for the host-dev launcher.
161 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
161 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
# Installation, onboarding and reconfiguration — owner requirements
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Date: 2026-09-06. Recorded by darkwing.
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Status: captured future deployment/onboarding requirements and proposed CLI, not an
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implemented installer or permission to modify current bootstrap/config/auth behavior.
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No current install.sh implementation or compatibility is claimed.
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## Installation experience
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- Update the Mosaic installer for the new deployment structure and support switches
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for automation.
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- Basic or advanced installation must be selectable without an initial interactive
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"basic or advanced?" question. Define a mode switch/default in the later CLI charter;
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the owner has not specified its exact spelling or default.
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- Provide a step-by-step guide distinguishing required and optional steps. Optional
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steps offer Skip. Once required configuration is complete, allow Skip to finish
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without completing the optional sections.
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- Provide configuration mode for customization at any later time. Define resumable,
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validated reconfiguration rather than rerunning destructive installation.
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- Define unattended behavior for missing required input explicitly: report the
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missing requirements and fail, rather than unexpectedly prompt or invent defaults.
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## Required initial configuration
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| Area | Owner requirement |
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|---|---|
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| Deployment | Containerized or bare-metal |
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| System authentication | SSO, OIDC, LDAP or internal authentication |
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| Break-glass administrator | Always internal/basic authentication; username, password, email, independent of chosen external identity provider |
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| Internal initial user | Username, first name, password, email |
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| External-auth initial user | Initial user login through selected SSO/OIDC/LDAP path |
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| Site | Site name |
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| Instance | Name; default main |
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| Initial agent name | System-generated or user-selected |
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| Agent gender | male, female, neutral |
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| Agent personality | Compatible traits selected with multiple-choice checkboxes; examples technical, professional, friendly, flirty |
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| Agent communication style | Compatible traits selected with multiple-choice checkboxes; examples direct, teacher, terse, supportive |
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| Default harness | Mosaic/Pi recommended; Claude or Codex alternatives |
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| Initial harness account | OAuth or API account configuration for Claude, Codex or Pi; Pi provider choices include OpenRouter, Z.ai and others |
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| First project | Name; default general |
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| First workspace | Name; default chat |
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| Routing | System-selected or user-selected task routing/agent mapping |
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System login authentication and model-provider/harness account authentication are
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separate configuration domains. Agent personality/gender/style do not grant roles,
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permissions or access. Define trait compatibility rather than silently combining
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contradictory choices. Register scoped entities through the future Mosaic registry,
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not through filename inference or ad-hoc tmux identities.
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## Optional initial configuration
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System/use-case presets, potentially combined subject to a compatibility model:
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- Software factory
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- Personal assistant
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- Executive assistant
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- Enterprise / personal
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- Journal
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- Health tracker
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- Writing assistant
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- Social-media management
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- Business operations
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- Job-application tracker
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- Additional future presets
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The owner also specifies multi-user by default; do not interpret basic mode or a
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personal preset as permission to remove identity separation or access controls.
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Advanced user profile:
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- Last name, gender, profession, hobbies, skills
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- Food preferences
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- Family, marital status, children, pets
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- Automobiles and work history
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- Writing-style capture for the user's communication voice
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- Social-media account linking
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- Gmail / Google-services linking
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- Plugin add-ons, system skills and system extensions
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Other optional setup:
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- Custom agent-to-task mapping
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- Additional agent registration
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- Additional user registration
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Optional profile/account data is opt-in, classified and access-controlled. Sensitive
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health/family/work data must not automatically become globally shared agent context.
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Account linking needs explicit scopes/consent; selecting a preset is not permission
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to send messages, post publicly or take other external actions.
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## Proposed CLI — owner example preserved
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```sh
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./install.sh \
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--type container \
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--site homelab \
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--instance main \
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--auth internal \
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--admin_user <username> \
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--admin_pass <password> \
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--admin_email <email> \
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--user_username <username> \
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--user_name <name> \
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--user_pass <password> \
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--user_email <email> \
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--agent_name {-g|<name>} \
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--agent_gender {male|female|neutral} \
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--agent_persona {technical|professional|friendly|flirty|...} \
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--agent_comms {direct|teacher|terse|supportive|...} \
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--agent_harness {mosaic|pi|codex|claude} \
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--agent_auth_name <registry_name> \
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--agent_auth_type {oauth|api} \
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--agent_api_prov {openrouter|zai|...} \
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--agent_api_key <key> \
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--project general \
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--workspace chat \
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--routing {system|<custom_routing>}
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```
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This is proposed syntax with placeholders, not a runnable verified command. Exact
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bare-metal spelling, mode switch, generated-name option, repeatable trait syntax,
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routing input format and reconfiguration command remain to define. Clarify whether
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mosaic and pi are aliases or distinct public harness identifiers.
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## Security, durability and workflow design obligations
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1. Revise raw --admin_pass/--user_pass/--agent_api_key inputs before implementation:
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literal argv secrets can leak via shell history, process inspection and logs.
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Prefer protected file-descriptor/stdin or permission-checked secret-file inputs,
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masked interactive entry and supported secret-manager references. Never echo
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secrets, put them in ordinary config, Git, images, evidence or diagnostic receipts.
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2. Break-glass authentication must remain available through an identity-provider
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outage without being an unrestricted bypass. Specify protected password storage,
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account recovery/rotation, rate limiting, audit, privilege boundaries and testing.
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Clarify coexistence of the break-glass account and the everyday initial user.
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3. External user login and OAuth may require interactive consent; automation must
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support provider-authorized preconfiguration or explicitly pause at that gate.
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Do not claim a usable account before its required capability checks succeed.
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4. Publish resumable installation/reconfiguration checkpoints with secrets excluded.
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Record required-step completion, optional skips and recovery state. Restarting
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setup must not duplicate users/agents/projects or lose already configured work.
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5. Preserve fail-closed configuration and immutable evidence. Current repository
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canon permits system config creation only through scripts/bootstrap.sh and no
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overwrite. A future installer/reconfiguration authority model needs an explicit
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reviewed migration design; this note does not override that rule.
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6. Installation should establish the registered site/instance/project/workspace/agent
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bindings and supported routing policies. UI presets cannot widen reviewed role
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ceilings, bypass assignment requirements or silently retask existing agents.
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7. Compare bare-metal/container dependency, storage, service ownership, networking,
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upgrades and recovery workflows explicitly. Pin dependencies; never improvise
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unattended privilege escalation or installation after a failed precondition.
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8. Test basic/advanced and unattended modes; each auth/harness branch; external login
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failure; provider outage; missing required inputs; optional skips; interruption/
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resume; repeated install; protected secret handling; and later configuration.
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## Scope boundary and related work
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Related: foundation federation/comms, mechanical-workflow, durability and evidence-
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handoff topic notes dated 2026-09-06; accepted map at 7345f33; #50 auth/provider work.
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No installer, config mutation, account creation/linking, transport migration, package
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installation or external-deployment investigation follows from this capture.
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The current inspector and its schema/profile review stay unchanged. No worker is
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retasked. These requirements need a later deployment/onboarding charter and review.
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