deb11df783
Bind broker sessions to Linux SO_PEERCRED and /proc starttime ancestry, fence runtime generations, persist cryptographic single-use cycle tokens, and enforce protected Unix socket/state posture.\n\ncloses #828
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WI-1 lease broker security notes
- Trusted identity comes only from Linux
SO_PEERCREDplus/procstarttime, never request identity fields. - Descendant authorization is anchored to
(pid,starttime)and uses a complete second starttime pass to fail closed on disappearance or PID-reuse races. - Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits.
- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG.
Math.randomand model output are not token sources. - Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
- Same-principal filesystem modes are minimum hardening, not socket authenticity against the same UID. Distinct-principal service isolation is required for that stronger claim.
- WI-2+ security surfaces—receipts, promotion transactions, mutator gates, hooks, payload construction, and recovery—are explicitly out of scope.
Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred acceptance suite on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.