deb11df783
Bind broker sessions to Linux SO_PEERCRED and /proc starttime ancestry, fence runtime generations, persist cryptographic single-use cycle tokens, and enforce protected Unix socket/state posture.\n\ncloses #828
12 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
12 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
# WI-1 lease broker security notes
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- Trusted identity comes only from Linux `SO_PEERCRED` plus `/proc` starttime, never request identity fields.
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- Descendant authorization is anchored to `(pid,starttime)` and uses a complete second starttime pass to fail closed on disappearance or PID-reuse races.
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- Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits.
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- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
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- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
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- Same-principal filesystem modes are minimum hardening, not socket authenticity against the same UID. Distinct-principal service isolation is required for that stronger claim.
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- WI-2+ security surfaces—receipts, promotion transactions, mutator gates, hooks, payload construction, and recovery—are explicitly out of scope.
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Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred acceptance suite on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.
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