docs: tool-gateway mapping revision 2 — complete P0 table vs live surface, citation and witness fixes (GLM F1-F5)

Reviewed-on: #1425

.woodpecker/ci.yml

@@ -38,10 +38,12 @@ when:
   - event: push
     branch: main
 
-# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
-# repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).
-# This avoids from_secret which is blocked on pull_request events.
-# If the env vars aren't set, turbo falls back to local cache only.
+# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is wired in publish.yml via the
+# org-level Woodpecker secret `turbo_token` (events: push/tag/cron/manual/
+# deployment — never pull_request). This PR pipeline deliberately gets no
+# remote-cache credentials: an untrusted PR must not be able to write to (or
+# poison) the shared cache. Without TURBO_* env vars turbo falls back to
+# local cache only, which is the intended behavior here.
 
 steps:
   install:

.woodpecker/publish.yml

@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ variables:
   # non-excluded change still builds, so no transitive dep can silently go stale.
   # (Woodpecker: `when` entries are OR'd; `path` applies to push/PR only — hence
   # the separate `event: tag` entry.)
+  # #1407: ONE shared anchor for all three image steps. A second main-only
+  # anchor previously gated build-web/build-appservice, so next-lane pushes
+  # published gateway sha images with no web/appservice counterpart — no
+  # sha-parity set existed for next-lane containerized deploys. Every image
+  # step now builds on next too (sha-only destinations, enforced per step).
   - &image_build_when
     - event: tag
     - event: [push, manual]
@@ -44,16 +49,6 @@ variables:
           - '.woodpecker/**'
     - event: [push, manual]
       branch: next
-  - &main_image_build_when
-    - event: tag
-    - event: [push, manual]
-      branch: main
-      path:
-        exclude:
-          - 'packages/mosaic/**'
-          - 'docs/**'
-          - '**/*.md'
-          - '.woodpecker/**'
 
 when:
   - branch: [main, next]
@@ -73,6 +68,13 @@ steps:
   # being empty) and on any incomplete verification.
   verify:
     image: *node_image
+    environment:
+      # Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
+      # secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
+      TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
+      TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
+      TURBO_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: turbo_token
     commands:
       - *enable_pnpm
       # (a) Commit identity: the provider's claimed SHA must equal the actual
@@ -108,6 +110,13 @@ steps:
 
   build:
     image: *node_image
+    environment:
+      # Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
+      # secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
+      TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
+      TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
+      TURBO_TOKEN:
+        from_secret: turbo_token
     commands:
       - *enable_pnpm
       - pnpm build
@@ -460,7 +469,7 @@ steps:
 
   build-appservice:
     image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
-    when: *main_image_build_when
+    when: *image_build_when
     environment:
       REGISTRY_USER:
         from_secret: REGISTRY_USERNAME
@@ -474,8 +483,17 @@ steps:
       - echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
       - |
         DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
-        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
+        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
+          if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
+            echo "[publish] FATAL: next appservice publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "[publish] next appservice publish is sha-only"
+        elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
           DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:latest"
+        elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
+          echo "[publish] FATAL: appservice image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
+          exit 1
         fi
         if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
           DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
@@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ steps:
 
   build-web:
     image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
-    when: *main_image_build_when
+    when: *image_build_when
     environment:
       REGISTRY_USER:
         from_secret: REGISTRY_USERNAME
@@ -509,8 +527,17 @@ steps:
       - echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
       - |
         DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
-        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
+        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
+          if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
+            echo "[publish] FATAL: next web publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "[publish] next web publish is sha-only"
+        elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
           DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:latest"
+        elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
+          echo "[publish] FATAL: web image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
+          exit 1
         fi
         if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
           DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"

apps/gateway/src/workspace/teams.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { type CanActivate, type ExecutionContext, type INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import request from 'supertest';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
+import { TeamsController } from './teams.controller.js';
+import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
+
+const teamAlpha = { id: 'team-alpha', name: 'Alpha' };
+const teamBeta = { id: 'team-beta', name: 'Beta' };
+
+// user-1 is a member of team-alpha only; admin-1 has role admin.
+let currentUser: { id: string; role?: string } = { id: 'user-1' };
+
+const teamsServiceMock = {
+  findAll: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta])),
+  findAllForUser: vi.fn((userId: string) =>
+    Promise.resolve(userId === 'user-1' ? [teamAlpha] : []),
+  ),
+  findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta].find((t) => t.id === id))),
+  listMembers: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }])),
+  isMember: vi.fn((teamId: string, userId: string) =>
+    Promise.resolve(teamId === 'team-alpha' && userId === 'user-1'),
+  ),
+};
+
+const authGuard: CanActivate = {
+  canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
+    const requestContext = context
+      .switchToHttp()
+      .getRequest<{ user?: { id: string; role?: string } }>();
+    requestContext.user = currentUser;
+    return true;
+  },
+};
+
+describe('teams endpoints are scoped to membership', () => {
+  let app: INestApplication;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      controllers: [TeamsController],
+      providers: [{ provide: TeamsService, useValue: teamsServiceMock }],
+    })
+      .overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
+      .useValue(authGuard)
+      .compile();
+
+    app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
+    await app.init();
+    await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    currentUser = { id: 'user-1' };
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await app.close();
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams returns only the teams the user belongs to', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha]);
+    expect(teamsServiceMock.findAll).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams returns every team for an admin', async () => {
+    currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha, teamBeta]);
+    expect(teamsServiceMock.findAllForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 403 for a non-member', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 404 for a missing team', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-missing');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns the team for a member', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body).toEqual(teamAlpha);
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members returns 403 for a non-member and members for a member', async () => {
+    const denied = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members');
+    expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(teamsServiceMock.listMembers).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    const allowed = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members');
+    expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(allowed.body).toEqual([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }]);
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId allows a self-lookup on any team', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-1');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: false });
+  });
+
+  it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId denies looking up another user on a foreign team', async () => {
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-2');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('an admin can look up any membership', async () => {
+    currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
+    const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members/user-1');
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: true });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/workspace/teams.controller.ts

@@ -1,30 +1,68 @@
-import { Controller, Get, Param, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  Controller,
+  ForbiddenException,
+  Get,
+  NotFoundException,
+  Param,
+  UseGuards,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
 import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
+import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
 import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
 
+type RequestUser = { id: string; role?: string };
+
 @Controller('api/teams')
 @UseGuards(AuthGuard)
 export class TeamsController {
   constructor(private readonly teams: TeamsService) {}
 
   @Get()
-  async list() {
-    return this.teams.findAll();
+  async list(@CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
+    if (user.role === 'admin') {
+      return this.teams.findAll();
+    }
+    return this.teams.findAllForUser(user.id);
   }
 
   @Get(':teamId')
-  async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
-    return this.teams.findById(teamId);
+  async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
+    return this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
   }
 
   @Get(':teamId/members')
-  async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
+  async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
+    await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
     return this.teams.listMembers(teamId);
   }
 
   @Get(':teamId/members/:userId')
-  async checkMembership(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @Param('userId') userId: string) {
+  async checkMembership(
+    @Param('teamId') teamId: string,
+    @Param('userId') userId: string,
+    @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser,
+  ) {
+    // A user may always ask about their own membership; anything else is
+    // team-scoped like the other routes.
+    if (userId !== user.id) {
+      await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
+    }
     const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, userId);
     return { isMember };
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Team-scoped access: admins see any team; everyone else only teams they
+   * are a member of. NotFoundException when the team does not exist and
+   * ForbiddenException when the user lacks access (same convention as the
+   * projects controller).
+   */
+  private async getAccessibleTeam(teamId: string, user: RequestUser) {
+    const team = await this.teams.findById(teamId);
+    if (!team) throw new NotFoundException('Team not found');
+    if (user.role === 'admin') return team;
+    const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, user.id);
+    if (!isMember) throw new ForbiddenException('Not a member of this team');
+    return team;
+  }
 }

apps/gateway/src/workspace/teams.service.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { eq, and, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { eq, and, inArray, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
 import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
 
 @Injectable()
@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@ export class TeamsService {
     return this.db.select().from(teams);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * List only the teams the user is a member of.
+   */
+  async findAllForUser(userId: string) {
+    const memberRows = await this.db
+      .select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
+      .from(teamMembers)
+      .where(eq(teamMembers.userId, userId));
+
+    const teamIds = memberRows.map((r) => r.teamId);
+    if (teamIds.length === 0) return [];
+
+    return this.db.select().from(teams).where(inArray(teams.id, teamIds));
+  }
+
   /**
    * Find a team by ID.
    */

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+kind: spec
+status: active
+---
+
+# Mosaic Stack Roadmap
+
+Companion to [docs/PRD.md](./PRD.md). Governed by the D11 rule: **every planned
+phase appears here from day one, even as a placeholder** — nothing exists only
+in heads. A phase marked _placeholder_ is a commitment to design it, not a
+design; scoping one requires its own PRD section or requirements doc plus
+review.
+
+Phases are product phases. The in-flight platform workstreams (KBN-100/101
+kanban SOT implementation, FCM #758, FCOM #766, TESS, RI #1275, and the other
+Part II contracts in the PRD) run as parallel tracks under their own issues
+and are prerequisites where noted.
+
+| Phase | Scope                                                                          | Status                                    |
+| ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------- |
+| P0    | Current state on `next`: read-only dashboard, chat, auth/SSO login, admin tabs | shipped, evolving                         |
+| P1    | **v1 slice** (PRD Part I §9)                                                   | next up                                   |
+| P2    | Connectors + comms + wizard expansion                                          | placeholder                               |
+| P3    | Full onboarding profile + M365                                                 | placeholder                               |
+| P4    | Enterprise mode + one-way conversion                                           | placeholder                               |
+| P5    | Federation                                                                     | placeholder (deliberately undesigned, D3) |
+
+## P0 — current state
+
+What exists on `next` today: web dashboard (login/register/SSO, chat,
+read-only projects/tasks, settings, admin user/system-health tabs), the
+Gateway, the CLI-first framework tooling, and the fleet control plane. The
+webUI audit (USC estate, webui-audit lane) measures the gap between this and
+P1.
+
+## P1 — v1 slice (D11)
+
+1. Standalone onboarding wizard: system/company name, component choices,
+   initial user, initial estate + project, seeded examples, re-runnable.
+2. Hierarchy core: company → estate → project → workspace → kanban, read-only
+   task bubble-up (kanban SOT Amendment A1 is the schema contract).
+3. Basic RBAC on the hierarchy.
+4. Minimal agent enrollment: one harness, API key, name/persona.
+
+Prerequisites: KBN-100/101 schema foundation; the D8 tool inventory and
+webUI→tool mapping (any missing tool is built first, D12).
+
+## P2 — connectors + comms + wizard expansion (placeholder)
+
+Email and drive connectors (Gmail/IMAP, Google Drive/OneDrive/Dropbox) with
+granular agentic-access consent; comms integrations (Matrix/Discord/Slack)
+including agent auto-enroll. Wizard gains the corresponding tabs (D4), plus
+the D4 capabilities deferred out of P1's minimal slice: expanded agent
+enrollment (OAuth login, multi-account, model choice with recommendation,
+account assignment, comms auto-enroll) and the Standalone SSO/OIDC
+configuration tab.
+
+## P3 — full onboarding profile + M365 (placeholder)
+
+Complete user onboarding profile (communication-style capture, optional
+voice-matching interview) under the D14 custody rule; M365 connectors,
+available to both deployment modes as ordinary connectors (same consent model
+as the P2 connector class). The Enterprise install flow's M365 prominence
+(D4) arrives with the Enterprise phase, P4.
+
+## P4 — Enterprise mode + conversion (placeholder)
+
+Enterprise install flow (org chart, RBAC focus, immediate OIDC, SSO
+prominent); per-user brains with architectural isolation (D14); Vault
+required; the one-way Standalone → Enterprise conversion (D3).
+
+## P5 — federation (placeholder)
+
+Connecting deployments: system-level config, assigned users, rights and
+data-access control, trusts with boundaries, strict data access, exfiltration
+monitoring. Explicitly not designed yet (D3); nothing in earlier phases may
+foreclose it. Requires its own PRD + threat model before any scoping.

docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md

@@ -372,3 +372,87 @@ The P0–P3 canon does not authorize:
 ## 7. Global release evidence
 
 P0–P3 may close only when requirements traceability maps every requirement above to automated and situational evidence, including cross-workspace denials, DB/Valkey fault injection, concurrent leases, stale fencing, generated-file immutability, UI conflict/reconnect behavior, migration reconciliation, independent review, mandatory SecReview, and final Certifier evidence.
+
+## 8. Amendment A1 — hierarchy parentage and RBAC chain above workspaces
+
+**Status:** amendment to the ratified canon, added by reviewed PR under
+decision D13 (operator ruling, 2026-08-25; decision owner Jason). It adds
+parent structure ABOVE workspaces. Sections 1–7, every invariant in §3, and
+every REQ above remain binding verbatim, with exactly one express modification:
+the narrow portfolio-analytics carve-out stated in §8.2.4. Nothing else below
+this line is weakened.
+
+### 8.1 What is added
+
+1. A platform hierarchy exists above workspaces:
+   **company/organization → estate → platform-project → workspace**. Each
+   workspace belongs to exactly one platform-project, each platform-project to
+   exactly one estate, each estate to exactly one company.
+2. **Record class.** Hierarchy records (company, estate, platform-project,
+   their parentage edges, and hierarchy-level access grants) are a new,
+   explicitly named record class: **tenancy/authorization structure records**.
+   They are not business or orchestration records, so §3 invariant 10 and
+   REQ-TEN-001 do not apply to them and are not weakened by them — those two
+   requirements bind business/orchestration rows exactly as before.
+   Constraints on the new class:
+   - Hierarchy tables MUST NOT carry task, plan, or any other
+     business/orchestration payload — parentage, naming, and grant data only.
+   - A hierarchy record can never be the subject of work: it cannot be
+     claimed, ordered, gated, or referenced as a dependency by any
+     business/orchestration row.
+   - Hierarchy mutations flow through the same sole-writable-SOT, fail-closed,
+     audited mutation path as everything else (§8.2.3).
+3. The hierarchy serves exactly two runtime functions, plus audited
+   maintenance of its own structure:
+   - **RBAC evaluation:** access grants are declared per company, estate, or
+     platform-project and evaluate down the chain to workspace-scoped
+     authorization. Tenant context continues to be derived from authenticated
+     authority (REQ-TEN-001); the chain adds where grants can be declared,
+     not a bypass of workspace authorization.
+   - **Read-only roll-ups:** task and status visualization bubbles up the
+     hierarchy as aggregation over workspaces the reader is authorized on.
+   - **Chain maintenance (not a third runtime function):** re-parenting an
+     asset — moving a workspace to another platform-project, a
+     platform-project to another estate, and so on ("assets are transferable
+     subject to the structure", PRD Part I §4) — is an audited edit of the
+     hierarchy records themselves under §8.3. It never modifies
+     business/orchestration rows and never crosses a workspace boundary for
+     them; the workspace's contents move with the workspace untouched.
+4. Naming: this amendment says **platform-project** for the hierarchy level
+   above workspaces, because §5 REQ-PLAN-001 already defines `projects` as
+   planning entities INSIDE a workspace. The two are different objects. Final
+   terminology (rename of one or the other) is an implementation-PR decision
+   under this amendment's review; the schema MUST NOT merge them.
+
+### 8.2 What is explicitly unchanged
+
+1. `workspace_id` remains the hard mechanical isolation unit (§2 D2,
+   REQ-TEN-001). Hierarchy tables carry parentage; they do not create
+   cross-workspace relationships between business/orchestration rows, which
+   remain rejected (§3 invariant 10).
+2. Roll-up is **never a write**: no aggregation path may mutate, claim, order,
+   or gate work in any workspace. Bubble-up views are generated projections in
+   the sense of §3 invariant 5 — non-authoritative and never import sources.
+3. Fail-closed mutation health (§3 invariants 3–4), sole writable PostgreSQL
+   SOT, fencing, audit, and the Coordinator/Certifier authority rules are
+   untouched.
+4. No §6 non-goal is authorized, with one express, narrow carve-out that this
+   amendment makes to the "portfolio analytics" non-goal: the read-only
+   roll-up of §8.1 — per-workspace task counts and statuses aggregated up the
+   parent chain, over workspaces the reader is authorized on — is in scope.
+   Everything beyond that boundary (metrics, trends, forecasting, scoring,
+   dashboards computed across workspaces, any derived analytic that is not a
+   direct count/status aggregation) remains a non-goal. This is an explicit
+   narrowing by amendment, not a claim that §6 is unchanged; every other §6
+   non-goal is untouched.
+
+### 8.3 Acceptance (binding on the implementing PRs)
+
+- Schema tests prove each workspace resolves to exactly one
+  platform-project/estate/company chain and that chain edits are audited.
+- Authorization tests prove a grant at each hierarchy level yields exactly the
+  workspace permissions the chain implies, and that revocation up the chain
+  propagates.
+- Negative tests prove roll-up endpoints cannot mutate state and that a
+  reader sees aggregates only over workspaces they are authorized on
+  (no cross-tenant existence oracles).

docs/requirements/tool-gateway-mapping.md

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+# Tool↔Gateway Mapping Contract (D8)
+
+Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 5 of 9).
+Authority: PRD D8/D12 (Part I §8) — the webUI sits OVER official tooling:
+every webUI operation goes through the Gateway API backed by the same
+official framework tooling the CLI uses, and a webUI operation with no
+backing tool is scored **blocked on tooling** and the tool is built
+first. Measured input: the webui-audit A5 tooling baseline
+(operation-by-operation inventory of the current Gateway surface and the
+P1 gaps, cross-reviewed; `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/
+A5-tooling-baseline.md` in the estate brain). The T10 ruling adopted the
+targeted-update plan including building the D8 tools in A5's rank order.
+
+Revision 2 (GLM review F1–F5): the §2 table completed against an
+independent re-measurement of the live `apps/web` surface (mission
+reads, coordination status, capability-gated `turn:send` added); rank-6
+composition corrected to ranks 1 and 4; SOT citations corrected to §3
+invariant 11 / REQ-TASK-001 / §5+A1; the §3.2 retirement clause
+softened to match what the owning contracts actually schedule; §6.1
+scoped to outbound calls with an extractability lint, and §6.3 given
+static companions for §4.1 and §4.3.
+
+This contract binds three things: the operation→tool mapping itself
+(§2–§3), the command envelope every mapped operation satisfies
+(§4), and the process rule that keeps the mapping closed (§5). Domain
+semantics stay with their owning contracts — hierarchy (contract 1,
+`hierarchy-schema.md`), grants (contract 2, `rbac-grant-model.md`),
+wizard (contract 3, `onboarding-wizard.md`), identity
+(`identity-lifecycle.md`), kanban lifecycle (`native-kanban-sot.md`
+§5 and Amendment A1), roll-up (contract 8), API artifact format
+(contract 9).
+
+## 1. Definitions
+
+1. **Official tool**: a command implemented in the framework packages and
+   exposed through the Gateway API; the CLI remains the primary execution
+   method for the same command (D8). The webUI is a Gateway client only.
+2. **Mapped operation**: a webUI operation with a named official path in
+   §2 or §3. Anything else the webUI wants to do is unmapped and follows
+   §5.
+3. **Legacy non-substitute**: an existing endpoint that resembles a P1
+   need but is contractually barred from backing it (§3.2).
+
+## 2. P0 mapping (current operations, ratified as-is)
+
+This table is the complete measured P0 surface: every Gateway call the
+web app's production sources make at this revision's head appears as a
+row (independently re-measured at review; the three calls the first
+measurement missed — mission reads, coordination status, and the
+capability-gated `turn:send` emit — are rows below). The surface stays
+bound to these paths:
+
+| WebUI operation                                                   | Official path                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Register / log in / log out / OIDC callback                       | better-auth mount `/api/auth/*`; `GET /api/sso/providers`                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+| List/show projects (legacy read)                                  | `GET /api/projects`, `GET /api/projects/:id`                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| List tasks / task detail (legacy read)                            | `GET /api/tasks`, `GET /api/tasks/:id` — with the filtered legacy project/mission reads the same surfaces use                                                                                                                               |
+| Mission list (legacy read)                                        | `GET /api/missions`                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| Coordination status (legacy read)                                 | `GET /api/coord/status`                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| Conversation CRUD/search/messages                                 | `/api/conversations*`                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
+| Chat turn / stop / thinking / command execute+approve / streaming | `/chat` socket events `message`, `abort`, `set:thinking`, `command:execute`, `command:approve`; `turn:send` (capability-gated — emitted only when the server advertises the pi turn-runtime capability, which the current Gateway does not) |
+| Harness/model selection                                           | `GET /api/harnesses*`, `GET/PUT /api/chat/preferences/selection`                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| Preferences; provider inspect/test                                | `/api/memory/preferences`, `GET /api/providers`, `POST /api/providers/test`                                                                                                                                                                 |
+| Admin users / roles / ban / health                                | `/api/admin/users*`, `/api/admin/health`                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+
+P0 rows inherit §4 obligations as their backing controllers are next
+touched; they are not required to be retrofitted in one sweep.
+
+## 3. P1 mapping (bound to the build-first tools)
+
+1. Every P1 operation maps to exactly one build-first command family, in
+   the T10-ruled rank order:
+
+| Rank | Command family (owning contract)                                       | P1 webUI operations it backs                                                                                                                      |
+| ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1    | Hierarchy command family (contract 1 §5; grants attach per contract 2) | Company/estate/platform-project/workspace CRUD, parentage and reparenting, hierarchy reads; the wizard's initial-hierarchy step (contract 3 §3.4) |
+| 2    | Hierarchy RBAC command/evaluator (contract 2)                          | Grant create/change/revoke at company/estate/platform-project; inherited evaluation down to workspace; authorization-safe hierarchy queries       |
+| 3    | Typed kanban command/query surface (SOT §5, Amendment A1)              | Workspace task lifecycle (create/edit/cancel/archive/move), board rank, typed queries                                                             |
+| 4    | Agent enrollment command                                               | Enroll one agent: harness, credential reference/API-key intake (values never echoed), name/persona, assignment scope (contract 3 §3.5)            |
+| 5    | Authorized roll-up query (contract 8)                                  | Read-only aggregated task counts/statuses at every hierarchy level over readable workspaces only                                                  |
+| 6    | Onboarding orchestration (contract 3)                                  | The re-runnable wizard flow, composing ranks 1 and 4 (its only grant write rides inside the rank-1 company-create command, contract 2 §4.3)       |
+
+2. **Legacy non-substitutes.** The following MUST NOT back any P1
+   operation, matching the audit findings: legacy `/api/projects` and
+   `/api/tasks` CRUD (planning-data records, not hierarchy nodes and not
+   the typed kanban boundary); `POST /api/workspaces` (filesystem
+   bootstrap, not audited hierarchy parentage); `/api/teams` reads (no
+   grants, no inheritance); `POST /api/bootstrap/setup` (one-shot
+   epoch transition, identity §3 — not the re-runnable wizard); the MCP
+   `brain_*` task mutations (legacy Brain writes, not the typed kanban
+   commands). These stay serving their existing P0/host consumers until
+   the owning contract (or a successor amendment) schedules each
+   retirement — no such migration is scheduled at this revision; the
+   freeze stands on its own.
+3. New P1 mapping rows (operations this table does not list) are added by
+   amending this contract, not ad hoc (§5).
+
+## 4. Command envelope (request / result / error / audit)
+
+Binding on every mapped operation the build-first families expose:
+
+1. **Typed request and result.** Each command and query has an explicit
+   request DTO and result DTO in the shared types package, validated at
+   the Gateway boundary; unvalidated pass-through and `any`-typed
+   payloads are non-conformant. Mutations on records with an
+   expected-version rule in their owning contract carry the expected
+   version in the request and fail on mismatch with the conflict error
+   class (SOT §3 invariant 11 and REQ-TASK-001's concurrent-update
+   conflict acceptance; hierarchy per contract 1).
+2. **Error taxonomy.** Every error result carries a stable
+   machine-readable code from a closed per-family enum plus an HTTP
+   status mapping, distinguishing at minimum: validation failure,
+   authentication failure, authorization refusal, not-found, conflict
+   (version/uniqueness), precondition/state refusal (e.g. bootstrap
+   epoch, suspended team subjects), and internal fault. Where contract
+   2's no-existence-oracle rule applies, authorization refusal and
+   not-found are indistinguishable on the wire for unauthorized readers
+   — same code, same status, same shape.
+3. **Audit linkage.** A mutating mapped operation emits exactly the
+   audit events its owning contract defines (contract 1 §5.2, contract 2
+   §4.4, identity §§2–4, SOT audit rules); the envelope contributes the
+   correlation: every request accepts/generates a correlation id,
+   carried into the audit events and returned in the result, so a UI
+   action is traceable end to end. The mapping layer itself adds no
+   second audit stream.
+4. **Fail-closed.** A mapped operation that cannot evaluate its
+   authorization or reach its owning tool refuses (contract 2 §3.5); the
+   envelope never degrades to an unauthorized fallback read or a direct
+   data access.
+5. **CLI parity.** Each build-first family is invocable through the
+   official CLI against the same Gateway commands with the same
+   request/result/error contracts. No webUI-only command exists; a
+   Gateway command without CLI exposure is a conformance gap tracked at
+   the family's implementing issue.
+
+## 5. Closure rule (blocked on tooling)
+
+1. A webUI change that needs an operation with no mapping row is
+   **blocked on tooling**: the backing tool is built and mapped first
+   (D8). Scoring a gap "blocked on tooling" is mandatory, not
+   discretionary; working around it in the UI (direct DB or filesystem
+   access, calling a legacy non-substitute, embedding domain logic in
+   the web app) is non-conformant.
+2. The mapping is enforced closed by §6.1's inventory witness: the web
+   app's network surface must be a subset of the mapped paths.
+
+## 6. Verification requirements
+
+Binding on the implementing PRs:
+
+1. **Network-surface inventory witness:** a CI assertion extracting the
+   web app's outbound Gateway calls — route literals at request call
+   sites and outbound socket emits in `apps/web` sources (inbound
+   handler registrations are not calls and are out of scope) — and
+   failing on any call outside the §2/§3 mapped paths. The inventory is
+   closed like contract 1 §6.3's allowlist: a new call fails until a
+   mapping row exists in the same PR. Dynamic route construction that
+   evades extraction is resolved toward the witness, enforced by an
+   extractability lint: every request call site takes a literal or
+   template-literal path, and a call site that does not fails the
+   assertion itself (the web-side analogue of contract 1's
+   raw-execution prong), never an exemption for the caller.
+2. **Non-substitute witness:** the P1 surfaces (hierarchy, RBAC, kanban,
+   enrollment, roll-up, wizard UI) make zero calls to the §3.2 legacy
+   endpoints — asserted by the same inventory, scoped per surface.
+3. **Envelope witnesses per family:** for each build-first family — a
+   request with an invalid DTO is refused with the validation code; a
+   version-mismatch mutation returns the conflict code; an unauthorized
+   read of an existing node and a read of a nonexistent node return
+   indistinguishable results where the no-existence-oracle rule applies;
+   a correlation id submitted on a mutation appears in its audit
+   event(s) and result. Two static companions: a type-level assertion
+   that the family's boundary accepts no `any`-typed or unvalidated
+   pass-through payload (§4.1), and a single-emitter assertion that the
+   mapped operation's audit events originate only from the owning
+   contract's audit emitter (§4.3's no-second-audit-stream, made
+   checkable).
+4. **CLI-parity witness:** for each family, a CLI smoke invocation of at
+   least one command and one query against the Gateway succeeds with the
+   same typed result the web client receives.
+5. **Fail-closed witness:** with the owning tool or grant state
+   unreachable (fault injection), the mapped operation returns the
+   internal-fault or authorization-refusal class and performs no
+   fallback read/write (extends contract 2 §7.6 to the mapping layer).
+
+## Ruling request
+
+Ratify sections 1–6 as written, with one decision embedded:
+
+- Decision (§3.2): the legacy endpoints named there are **frozen for new
+  consumers** as of ratification — existing P0/host consumers keep
+  working, new UI or tool code may not call them, and each is retired by
+  the migration its owning contract schedules. Alternative if rejected:
+  allow P1 surfaces to reuse legacy endpoints as interim backends —
+  rejected by the audit's finding that they cannot satisfy the
+  hierarchy/kanban/RBAC contracts, so the interim would ship
+  non-conformant semantics.

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway.ts

@@ -172,9 +172,10 @@ export function registerGatewayCommand(program: Command): void {
     .command('recover-token')
     .description('Recover an admin token — prompts for login if no valid session exists')
     .option('-g, --gateway <url>', 'Gateway URL (overrides meta.json)')
-    .action(async (cmdOpts: { gateway?: string }) => {
+    .option('-e, --email <email>', 'Headless: account email (password read from stdin line 2)')
+    .action(async (cmdOpts: { gateway?: string; email?: string }) => {
       const { runRecoverToken } = await import('./gateway/token-ops.js');
-      await runRecoverToken(cmdOpts.gateway);
+      await runRecoverToken(cmdOpts.gateway, cmdOpts.email);
     });
 
   // ─── logs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -202,9 +203,14 @@ export function registerGatewayCommand(program: Command): void {
 
   gw.command('uninstall')
     .description('Uninstall the gateway daemon and optionally remove data')
-    .action(async () => {
+    .option(
+      '-y, --yes',
+      'Headless: skip the confirmation prompt (required when stdin is not a TTY)',
+    )
+    .option('--remove-data', 'Also remove all gateway data (never implied by --yes)')
+    .action(async (cmdOpts: { yes?: boolean; removeData?: boolean }) => {
       const { runUninstall } = await import('./gateway/uninstall.js');
-      await runUninstall();
+      await runUninstall(cmdOpts);
     });
 
   // ─── doctor ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/install.ts

@@ -95,11 +95,17 @@ export async function runInstall(opts: InstallOpts): Promise<void> {
     // fatal (#1392): an install that reports success over an empty/partial
     // database is the exact T63 failure this command must never reproduce.
     let verifyResult: VerifyResult | undefined;
+    let verificationThrew = false;
     try {
       const { runPostInstallVerification } = await import('./verify.js');
       verifyResult = await runPostInstallVerification(configResult.host, configResult.port);
-    } catch {
-      // Non-fatal — verification is a courtesy
+    } catch (err) {
+      // Health/token/bootstrap courtesy failures are non-fatal, but a THROWN
+      // schema verification must not let install report success either (N2,
+      // rev-code-02 review 285): mark it and treat as fatal below.
+      verificationThrew = true;
+      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      prompter.warn(`Post-install verification errored: ${msg}`);
     }
     if (verifyResult && verifyResult.schemaMigrated === false) {
       prompter.warn(
@@ -107,6 +113,12 @@ export async function runInstall(opts: InstallOpts): Promise<void> {
       );
       process.exit(1);
     }
+    if (verificationThrew) {
+      prompter.warn(
+        'Gateway install ABORTED: post-install verification errored (see above); refusing to report success on an unverified database.',
+      );
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
   } catch (err) {
     // Stages normally return structured results for expected failures.
     // Anything that reaches here is an unexpected runtime error — render a

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/piped-credentials.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
+import { readCredentialsFromPipedStdin } from './piped-credentials.js';
+
+describe('readCredentialsFromPipedStdin — #1394 stdin dual path (real streams)', () => {
+  it('reads exactly two lines; email trimmed, password as-is', async () => {
+    const r = await readCredentialsFromPipedStdin(
+      Readable.from(['  [email protected]  \n', 'pw with spaces \n']),
+    );
+    expect(r.email).toBe('[email protected]');
+    expect(r.password).toBe('pw with spaces ');
+  });
+
+  it('empty stdin → nulls (the headless-no-credentials shape)', async () => {
+    const r = await readCredentialsFromPipedStdin(Readable.from(['']));
+    expect(r).toEqual({ email: null, password: null });
+  });
+
+  it('single line only → email set, password null', async () => {
+    const r = await readCredentialsFromPipedStdin(Readable.from(['only-email\n']));
+    expect(r.email).toBe('only-email');
+    expect(r.password).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('stops after two lines even if more follow', async () => {
+    const r = await readCredentialsFromPipedStdin(
+      Readable.from(['[email protected]\n', 'pw\n', 'extra\n', 'more\n']),
+    );
+    expect(r).toEqual({ email: '[email protected]', password: 'pw' });
+  });
+});

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/piped-credentials.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { createInterface } from 'node:readline';
+
+/**
+ * Read email + password as two lines from non-TTY stdin (the headless dual
+ * path for callers that cannot pass argv: printf 'email\npassword\n' | …).
+ * Caller gates on !isTTY; the password line is kept as-is (no trim —
+ * whitespace may be intentional).
+ *
+ * Separate module (not login.ts) so tests can exercise the REAL reader
+ * against real streams while token-ops specs mock this seam cleanly.
+ */
+export function readCredentialsFromPipedStdin(
+  input: NodeJS.ReadableStream = process.stdin,
+): Promise<{ email: string | null; password: string | null }> {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const lines: string[] = [];
+    const rl = createInterface({ input });
+    rl.on('line', (l) => {
+      lines.push(l);
+      if (lines.length >= 2) rl.close();
+    });
+    rl.on('close', () => {
+      resolve({ email: (lines[0] ?? '').trim() || null, password: lines[1] ?? null });
+    });
+  });
+}

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/recover-token.spec.ts

@@ -16,11 +16,20 @@ vi.mock('./daemon.js', () => ({
 
 vi.mock('./login.js', () => ({
   getGatewayUrl: vi.fn().mockReturnValue('http://localhost:14242'),
-  // promptLine/promptSecret are used by ensureSession; return fixed values so tests don't block on stdin
+  // promptLine/promptSecret are used by ensureSession on the TTY path; return fixed
+  // values so tests never block on stdin.
   promptLine: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('[email protected]'),
   promptSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('test-password'),
 }));
 
+// #1394: non-TTY runs resolve credentials from piped stdin instead of prompts.
+vi.mock('./piped-credentials.js', () => ({
+  readCredentialsFromPipedStdin: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+    email: '[email protected]',
+    password: 'test-password',
+  }),
+}));
+
 const mockFetch = vi.fn();
 vi.stubGlobal('fetch', mockFetch);
 
@@ -65,7 +74,7 @@ describe('ensureSession', () => {
     expect(mockSignIn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
-  it('prompts for credentials and signs in when stored session is invalid', async () => {
+  it('resolves piped-stdin credentials and signs in when stored session is invalid', async () => {
     mockLoadSession.mockReturnValueOnce({ cookie: 'old-cookie', userId: 'u1', email: '[email protected]' });
     mockValidateSession.mockResolvedValueOnce(false);
     const newAuth = { cookie: fakeCookie, userId: 'u2', email: '[email protected]' };
@@ -76,7 +85,7 @@ describe('ensureSession', () => {
     expect(mockSaveSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(baseUrl, newAuth);
   });
 
-  it('prompts for credentials when no session exists', async () => {
+  it('resolves piped-stdin credentials when no session exists', async () => {
     mockLoadSession.mockReturnValueOnce(null);
     const newAuth = { cookie: fakeCookie, userId: 'u2', email: '[email protected]' };
     mockSignIn.mockResolvedValueOnce(newAuth);
@@ -84,6 +93,10 @@ describe('ensureSession', () => {
     const cookie = await ensureSession(baseUrl);
     expect(cookie).toBe(fakeCookie);
     expect(mockSignIn).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    // The non-TTY path resolves credentials from the piped-stdin seam, not prompts.
+    expect(
+      vi.mocked(await import('./piped-credentials.js')).readCredentialsFromPipedStdin,
+    ).toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
   it('exits non-zero when signIn fails', async () => {
@@ -111,7 +124,7 @@ describe('runRecoverToken', () => {
     vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
   });
 
-  it('prompts for login, mints a token, and persists it when no session exists', async () => {
+  it('signs in via piped stdin, mints a token, and persists it when no session exists', async () => {
     mockLoadSession.mockReturnValueOnce(null);
     const newAuth = { cookie: fakeCookie, userId: 'u2', email: '[email protected]' };
     mockSignIn.mockResolvedValueOnce(newAuth);

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/schema-check.spec.ts

@@ -153,4 +153,29 @@ describe('resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath', () => {
       if (prevHome !== undefined) vi.stubEnv('HOME', prevHome);
     }
   });
+
+  it('gives MOSAIC_CONFIG NO authority (N1, review 285): env never overrides file resolution', async () => {
+    const { resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath } = await import('./schema-check.js');
+    const daemonDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'schema-check-env-'));
+    tmpDirs.push(daemonDir);
+    const daemonHome = join(daemonDir, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway');
+    mkdirSync(daemonHome, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(daemonHome, 'mosaic.config.json'), JSON.stringify(LOCAL_CFG));
+    // A stale env var pointing at a DIFFERENT file must be ignored entirely:
+    const decoyDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'schema-check-decoy-'));
+    tmpDirs.push(decoyDir);
+    const decoyPath = join(decoyDir, 'mosaic.config.json');
+    writeFileSync(decoyPath, JSON.stringify(STANDALONE_CFG));
+
+    const prevHome = process.env['HOME'];
+    vi.stubEnv('HOME', daemonDir);
+    vi.stubEnv('MOSAIC_CONFIG', decoyPath);
+    try {
+      const resolved = resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath();
+      expect(resolved).toBe(join(daemonHome, 'mosaic.config.json'));
+      expect(resolved).not.toBe(decoyPath);
+    } finally {
+      if (prevHome !== undefined) vi.stubEnv('HOME', prevHome);
+    }
+  });
 });

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/schema-check.ts

@@ -53,8 +53,11 @@ export const SCHEMA_FAIL_REMEDIATION = [
  */
 export function resolveSchemaCheckConfigPath(explicit?: string): string | undefined {
   if (explicit) return resolve(explicit);
+  // NOTE: no env-var candidate, deliberately. apps/gateway/src/env.ts gives env
+  // NO config authority (a stale MOSAIC_CONFIG could verify a database the
+  // daemon never reads — rev-code-02 review 285, note N1). Resolution order
+  // mirrors the daemon's file priorities only.
   const candidates = [
-    process.env['MOSAIC_CONFIG'],
     join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', 'mosaic.config.json'), // daemon-written
     resolve(process.cwd(), 'mosaic.config.json'),
     join(homedir(), '.mosaic', 'mosaic.config.json'),

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/token-ops.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('../../auth.js', () => ({
+  loadSession: vi.fn(),
+  validateSession: vi.fn(),
+  signIn: vi.fn(),
+  saveSession: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+vi.mock('./login.js', () => ({
+  getGatewayUrl: vi.fn().mockReturnValue('http://localhost:14242'),
+  promptLine: vi.fn(),
+  promptSecret: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+vi.mock('./piped-credentials.js', () => ({
+  readCredentialsFromPipedStdin: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+vi.mock('./daemon.js', () => ({
+  readMeta: vi.fn(),
+  writeMeta: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+import { ensureSession } from './token-ops.js';
+import { loadSession, validateSession, signIn, saveSession } from '../../auth.js';
+import { promptLine, promptSecret } from './login.js';
+import { readCredentialsFromPipedStdin } from './piped-credentials.js';
+
+const URL = 'http://localhost:14242';
+
+function asNonTTY(): void {
+  Object.defineProperty(process.stdin, 'isTTY', { value: false, configurable: true });
+}
+
+describe('ensureSession — #1394 credential precedence (flag > piped stdin > prompt)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+    vi.mocked(loadSession).mockReturnValue(null);
+    asNonTTY();
+  });
+
+  it('stored valid session wins; no credentials touched', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(loadSession).mockReturnValue({ cookie: 'SESS', email: '[email protected]' } as never);
+    vi.mocked(validateSession).mockResolvedValue(true);
+    await expect(ensureSession(URL)).resolves.toBe('SESS');
+    expect(signIn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('flag email + stdin password: FLAG wins for email, stdin supplies the password', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(signIn).mockResolvedValue({ cookie: 'NEW', email: '[email protected]' } as never);
+    vi.mocked(readCredentialsFromPipedStdin).mockResolvedValue({
+      email: '[email protected]',
+      password: 'stdin-pw',
+    });
+
+    await ensureSession(URL, { email: '[email protected]' });
+
+    expect(signIn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL, '[email protected]', 'stdin-pw');
+    expect(promptLine).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(promptSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('stdin-only path (no flag): both credentials from piped lines', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(signIn).mockResolvedValue({ cookie: 'NEW2', email: '[email protected]' } as never);
+    vi.mocked(readCredentialsFromPipedStdin).mockResolvedValue({
+      email: '[email protected]',
+      password: 'spw',
+    });
+
+    await ensureSession(URL);
+    expect(signIn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL, '[email protected]', 'spw');
+  });
+
+  it('no credentials headless → exit(2) with --email guidance; signIn untouched', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(readCredentialsFromPipedStdin).mockResolvedValue({ email: null, password: null });
+    const exit = vi.spyOn(process, 'exit').mockImplementation((() => {
+      throw new Error('EXIT');
+    }) as never);
+    const err = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
+
+    await expect(ensureSession(URL)).rejects.toThrow('EXIT');
+    expect(exit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(2);
+    expect(err).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('--email'));
+    expect(signIn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    exit.mockRestore();
+    err.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('successful sign-in persists the session', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(signIn).mockResolvedValue({ cookie: 'C', email: '[email protected]' } as never);
+    vi.mocked(readCredentialsFromPipedStdin).mockResolvedValue({
+      email: '[email protected]',
+      password: 'pw',
+    });
+
+    await ensureSession(URL);
+    expect(saveSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL, expect.anything());
+  });
+});

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/token-ops.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { loadSession, validateSession, signIn, saveSession } from '../../auth.js';
 import { readMeta, writeMeta } from './daemon.js';
 import { getGatewayUrl, promptLine, promptSecret } from './login.js';
+import { readCredentialsFromPipedStdin } from './piped-credentials.js';
 
 interface MintedToken {
   id: string;
@@ -107,8 +108,24 @@ export async function requireSession(gatewayUrl: string): Promise<string> {
  * Ensure a valid session for the gateway, prompting for credentials if needed.
  * On sign-in failure, prints the error and exits non-zero.
  * Returns the session cookie.
+ *
+ * Credential precedence when sign-in is needed (#1394):
+ *   1. explicit opts (--email flag; highest)
+ *   2. non-TTY stdin — first line email, second line password (headless dual
+ *      path for callers without argv access: printf 'email\npassword\n' | …)
+ *   3. interactive prompt (TTY only)
  */
-export async function ensureSession(gatewayUrl: string): Promise<string> {
+export interface SessionCredentialOptions {
+  /** Email from an explicit flag (argv). Highest precedence. */
+  email?: string;
+  /** Password from an explicit source. Rare; passwords normally come via stdin/prompt. */
+  password?: string;
+}
+
+export async function ensureSession(
+  gatewayUrl: string,
+  opts: SessionCredentialOptions = {},
+): Promise<string> {
   // Try the stored session first
   const session = loadSession(gatewayUrl);
   if (session) {
@@ -119,10 +136,25 @@ export async function ensureSession(gatewayUrl: string): Promise<string> {
     console.log(`No session found for ${gatewayUrl}. Please sign in.`);
   }
 
-  // Prompt for credentials — password must not be echoed to the terminal
-  const email = await promptLine('Email: ');
-  // Do not trim password — it may contain intentional leading/trailing whitespace
-  const password = await promptSecret('Password: ');
+  let email = opts.email;
+  let password = opts.password;
+  if ((!email || !password) && !process.stdin.isTTY) {
+    const piped = await readCredentialsFromPipedStdin();
+    email = email ?? piped.email ?? undefined;
+    password = password ?? piped.password ?? undefined;
+  }
+  if (!email || !password) {
+    if (!process.stdin.isTTY) {
+      console.error(
+        'No valid session and no credentials available headlessly. Provide --email plus ' +
+          "a password line on stdin (printf 'email\\npassword\\n' | …), or run interactively.",
+      );
+      process.exit(2);
+    }
+    email = await promptLine('Email: ');
+    // Do not trim password — it may contain intentional leading/trailing whitespace
+    password = await promptSecret('Password: ');
+  }
 
   const auth = await signIn(gatewayUrl, email, password).catch((err: unknown) => {
     console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
@@ -146,11 +178,12 @@ export async function runRotateToken(gatewayUrl?: string): Promise<void> {
 }
 
 /**
- * `mosaic gateway config recover-token` — prompts for login if no session exists.
+ * `mosaic gateway config recover-token` — signs in if no session exists.
+ * Passes the --email flag through to ensureSession (#1394 dual path).
  */
-export async function runRecoverToken(gatewayUrl?: string): Promise<void> {
+export async function runRecoverToken(gatewayUrl?: string, email?: string): Promise<void> {
   const url = getGatewayUrl(gatewayUrl);
-  const cookie = await ensureSession(url);
+  const cookie = await ensureSession(url, { email });
   const label = `CLI recovery token (${new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 16).replace('T', ' ')})`;
   const minted = await mintAdminToken(url, cookie, label);
   persistToken(url, minted);

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/uninstall.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+
+vi.mock('./daemon.js', () => ({
+  GATEWAY_HOME: '/tmp/u-test-gateway-home',
+  getDaemonPid: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(null),
+  readMeta: vi.fn(),
+  stopDaemon: vi.fn(),
+  uninstallGatewayPackage: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+import { runUninstall } from './uninstall.js';
+import { readMeta, uninstallGatewayPackage } from './daemon.js';
+
+describe('gateway uninstall — #1390 headless semantics', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('non-TTY without --yes FAILS LOUD (exit 1, nothing touched)', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue({
+      version: '0.0.7',
+      installedAt: '',
+      entryPoint: '',
+      host: 'localhost',
+      port: 14242,
+    });
+    const exit = vi.spyOn(process, 'exit').mockImplementation((() => {
+      throw new Error('EXIT');
+    }) as never);
+    const err = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
+
+    await expect(runUninstall()).rejects.toThrow('EXIT');
+    expect(exit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(1);
+    expect(err).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('stdin is not a TTY'));
+    expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    exit.mockRestore();
+    err.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('--yes proceeds headlessly WITHOUT removing data (never implied)', async () => {
+    const meta = {
+      version: '0.0.7',
+      installedAt: '',
+      entryPoint: '',
+      host: 'localhost',
+      port: 14242,
+    };
+    vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue(meta);
+    const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
+
+    await runUninstall({ yes: true });
+
+    expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('Gateway data kept'));
+    log.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('--yes --remove-data removes data headlessly', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue({
+      version: '0.0.7',
+      installedAt: '',
+      entryPoint: '',
+      host: 'localhost',
+      port: 14242,
+    });
+    mkdirSync('/tmp/u-test-gateway-home', { recursive: true }); // existsSync gate
+    const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
+
+    await runUninstall({ yes: true, removeData: true });
+
+    expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('Gateway data removed'));
+    log.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('no meta → clean no-op even with --yes', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(readMeta).mockReturnValue(null);
+    const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
+    await runUninstall({ yes: true });
+    expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Gateway is not installed.');
+    expect(uninstallGatewayPackage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    log.mockRestore();
+  });
+});

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/uninstall.ts

@@ -8,30 +8,65 @@ import {
   uninstallGatewayPackage,
 } from './daemon.js';
 
-export async function runUninstall(): Promise<void> {
-  const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
+export interface UninstallOptions {
+  /** Skip the confirmation prompt (headless/scripted uninstall). */
+  yes?: boolean;
+  /** Also remove all gateway data at GATEWAY_HOME (never implied by --yes). */
+  removeData?: boolean;
+}
+
+export async function runUninstall(opts: UninstallOptions = {}): Promise<void> {
+  const nonInteractive = Boolean(opts.yes) || process.env['MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES'] === '1';
+
+  // Non-TTY without explicit consent must FAIL LOUD, not quietly do nothing:
+  // the pre-fix behavior (prompt on a closed stdin → default No → exit 0,
+  // gateway untouched) reported success-by-silence to every scripted caller
+  // (#1390). An explicit refusal beats a silent no-op.
+  if (!nonInteractive && !process.stdin.isTTY) {
+    console.error(
+      'gateway uninstall: stdin is not a TTY and no --yes was given — refusing to ' +
+        'run an interactive uninstall headlessly (nothing was changed). ' +
+        'Use --yes (and --remove-data to also delete gateway data), or run from a terminal.',
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  const rl = nonInteractive
+    ? null
+    : createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
   try {
-    await doUninstall(rl);
+    await doUninstall(rl as NonNullable<typeof rl>, opts, nonInteractive);
   } finally {
-    rl.close();
+    rl?.close();
   }
 }
 
-function prompt(rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>, question: string): Promise<string> {
+function prompt(
+  rl: NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof createInterface>>,
+  question: string,
+): Promise<string> {
   return new Promise((resolve) => rl.question(question, resolve));
 }
 
-async function doUninstall(rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>): Promise<void> {
+async function doUninstall(
+  rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>,
+  opts: UninstallOptions,
+  nonInteractive: boolean,
+): Promise<void> {
   const meta = readMeta();
   if (!meta) {
     console.log('Gateway is not installed.');
     return;
   }
 
-  const answer = await prompt(rl, 'Uninstall Mosaic Gateway? [y/N] ');
-  if (answer.toLowerCase() !== 'y') {
-    console.log('Aborted.');
-    return;
+  if (nonInteractive) {
+    console.log(`Uninstalling Mosaic Gateway (--yes${opts.removeData ? ' --remove-data' : ''})...`);
+  } else {
+    const answer = await prompt(rl, 'Uninstall Mosaic Gateway? [y/N] ');
+    if (answer.toLowerCase() !== 'y') {
+      console.log('Aborted.');
+      return;
+    }
   }
 
   // Stop if running
@@ -45,13 +80,20 @@ async function doUninstall(rl: ReturnType<typeof createInterface>): Promise<void
     }
   }
 
-  // Remove config/data
-  const removeData = await prompt(rl, `Remove all gateway data at ${GATEWAY_HOME}? [y/N] `);
-  if (removeData.toLowerCase() === 'y') {
+  // Remove config/data. Interactive: ask. Headless: only with the explicit
+  // flag — destructive recursion is never implied by --yes alone (#1390).
+  let removeData = Boolean(opts.removeData);
+  if (!nonInteractive) {
+    const answer = await prompt(rl, `Remove all gateway data at ${GATEWAY_HOME}? [y/N] `);
+    removeData = answer.toLowerCase() === 'y';
+  }
+  if (removeData) {
     if (existsSync(GATEWAY_HOME)) {
       rmSync(GATEWAY_HOME, { recursive: true, force: true });
       console.log('Gateway data removed.');
     }
+  } else {
+    console.log(`Gateway data kept at ${GATEWAY_HOME}.`);
   }
 
   // Uninstall npm package

packages/mosaic/src/commands/gateway/verify.ts

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ export async function runPostInstallVerification(
     const { runMigrations, getMigrationStatus } = await import('@mosaicstack/db');
     const result = await checkDatabaseSchema(
       { runMigrations, getMigrationStatus },
-      process.env['MOSAIC_CONFIG'],
+      undefined, // resolver mirrors daemon file priorities; env has no config authority (N1)
     );
     if (result.status === 'ok') {
       ok(result.detail);