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Author SHA1 Message Date
jason.woltje b93f098f0b gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.11 for #414 (mos-1063): hub on .54 VM 1012 as mosaic (Q181), R8 depends on the Case 2 install (#416), #418 dropped 2026-10-20 15:01:20 -05:00
jason.woltje 3568441ab0 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.10 for #414 (mos-1055): R8 records Jason's acceptance (DECISIONS Q182, Q183) instead of refusing; checks report, agents may run the .54 checks 2026-10-20 14:59:13 -05:00
jason.woltje a1daa3c07c gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.9 for #414 (mos-1037): Jason runs R8's root checks on 10.1.1.54 as localadmin, no factory uid runs them 2026-10-20 14:35:32 -05:00
jason.woltje eb651aa68a gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.8 for #414 (duckworth-0020 N22): R8 checks on 10.1.1.54 that mosaic has no sudo, no extra groups, no authorized keys and no sudoers.d entry 2026-10-20 14:31:06 -05:00
jason.woltje 2d3c3cfbdf gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.7 for #414 (mos-1030, Q181): host variables replaced, Case 1 and the Hermes agents share W-jarvis 10.1.1.53 as one factory host, hub is W-Melanie-OC 10.1.1.54 with OS user mosaic (no sudo, groups or keys, #421) 2026-10-20 14:29:44 -05:00
jason.woltje 1b32e65e36 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.6 for #414: R6's notice is row 193's final user sentence word for word with an exact-match test (N21, morgana-0011), start-order line matches the section 7 table 2026-10-20 14:28:44 -05:00
jason.woltje acd5f1f426 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.5 for #414 (duckworth-0010, mos-1022): user-thread runs can't message the owner but their gated decisions reach the owner's inbox by ruling (B9, sage-1368), R3 tests it reaches the owner and nobody else, R6 tells the user, start order waits for row 193's viewer level (N20), R8 waits on host variables 2026-10-20 14:20:55 -05:00
jason.woltje b67bc6de98 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.4 for #414 (mos-1020): R4 chained after row 193's viewer level and keeps the level-loss test, which must kill its mutant (N17) 2026-10-20 14:17:11 -05:00
jason.woltje 17d69e6606 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.3 for #414 (duckworth-0007): an issuer off the hub host passes the host-access, hypervisor and backups rows and a hosted issuer's admins the failed-call check (B8), PVE guest secrets note (N16), level-loss test moves to row 193 (N17), 3.6 names verifyPrincipal (N18), TLS check through the public route (N19) 2026-10-20 14:16:56 -05:00
jason.woltje d517783919 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.2 for #414: factory means every principal outside the hub instance (dragon-lin dev uid, Case 1 VM and agents, W-jarvis Hermes agents), checks run on each factory host, hosts as variables (mos-1013), Q1 settled by Q180, covers needs no further argument (morgana-0007) 2026-10-20 14:16:08 -05:00
jason.woltje 73677b87d5 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4.1 for #414: privilege path table with closed and accepted forms (mos-1009), issuer and TLS front end (B8), key procedure (N13), R3 consumes row 196 (N14), DNS (N15), grants name bus project ids with one covers (morgana-0005) 2026-10-20 14:12:55 -05:00
jason.woltje a659e41f30 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4 for #414, correcting 04a6112be (only its SESSIONS line landed): R8 gate host form only with sudo, doas and ssh checks (B7, mos-0996), hypervisor path open with O1-O3 (mos-1004, #419), #waiting skips user replies (N11), shares end by row 193 (N12), row 196 verifier (gander-0006) 2026-10-20 14:08:26 -05:00
jason.woltje 04a6112be4 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r4 for #414 (duckworth-0003): R8 gate proves no sudo, doas, su, polkit or ssh path from the factory uid to the hub (B7), #waiting skips user replies (N11), shares end by row 193 (N12) 2026-10-20 14:04:18 -05:00
jason.woltje a2840a6beb gizmoduck: T3 federation design r3.1 for #414: R8 isolation gate accepts a separate host or a separate uid, one-host audit (mos-0991), Q1 answer recorded, Q2 settled by row 193 (morgana-0002) 2026-10-20 14:01:43 -05:00
jason.woltje 940e0e816c gizmoduck: T3 federation design r3 for #414 (duckworth-0002): user reply path with a reply-to check and runner header (B6), same-uid agent hole stated as P19 333 (C1), names gate (N10) 2026-10-20 14:00:18 -05:00
jason.woltje 5ad67f6715 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r2.1 for #414 (mos-0988): R8's uid gate on row 190b, R7 on row 190, P19 333 on the 10-27 path 2026-10-20 13:58:23 -05:00
jason.woltje 60b9b112a1 gizmoduck: T3 federation design r2 for #414: user proof bound to the Console tree outside agents (B1), named ownership changes (B2), one collaborator level with an exact verb list (B3), three revocation triggers and launcher refusal (B4), separate uid as R8's entry gate (B5) 2026-10-20 13:56:54 -05:00
jason.woltje 6925f78f0e gizmoduck: T3 federation design r1 for #414 (G3, G4, C1.1): 10-27 slice is OIDC-verified cross-instance user grants enforced in the broker, rows R1-R8, Q1-Q3 for Mos 2026-10-20 13:44:50 -05:00
335 changed files with 1665 additions and 48815 deletions
+6 -11
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@@ -25,15 +25,10 @@ green at every step. Not production software — a proven foundation.
1. **Root is bootstrap-only.** First-class system configuration lives at the
repository root; everything else gets a dedicated directory (`roles/`,
`contracts/`, `missions/`, `tasks/`, `docs/`). Do not add new files to root.
2. **Configuration**: each stack instance has exactly one system config. The
default instance's is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. Instance NAME's
is `~/.config/mosaic-NAME/config.json`, and its data root carries a marker
that names it. `~` is the home of the OS user that runs the instance. A
process reads only the config `MOSAIC_CONFIG` names, or the default's when
that is unset. Configs are created only by
`scripts/bootstrap.sh [--instance NAME]`, never overwritten, fail-closed on
any problem. Repo-scoped role authority lives in `roles/*.json`
(versioned, reviewed commits only).
2. **Configuration**: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is the sole system
config — created only by `scripts/bootstrap.sh`, never overwritten,
fail-closed on any problem. Repo-scoped role authority lives in
`roles/*.json` (versioned, reviewed commits only).
3. **Secrets** never enter the repository or container images; auth is
runtime-only (read-only mount or environment variable).
4. **Contracts** (`contracts/`) are immutable and image-baked. Missions and
@@ -182,8 +177,8 @@ Full reference — usage, fields, exit codes, safety notes:
## Data map (canon)
- `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, or `~/.config/mosaic-NAME/config.json`
per named instance: system config (user-authored; never auto-written).
- `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` — system config (user-authored; never
auto-written).
- `<dataRoot>` (from config; default `~/.mosaic-dev`):
- `runs/` — write-once run evidence (`result.json`, snapshots, `stderr.txt`)
- `sessions/` — pi JSONL session trees, one directory per named session
-3
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@@ -5174,6 +5174,3 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi
2026-10-20 04:44:54 UTC | Row 178 round 2 preparation | Before: Dewey C1 five render guards lacked killing tests. Added independent refusal fixtures, a temporary uid+1 id stub with cleanup, and empty loopback proof case; activation ordering recorded in r2 BUILD. Product unchanged; syntax/text preflight only, no test or mutant execution. Pending row 181 rebase and Sage slot.
2026-10-20 05:10:34 UTC | Row 178 #1676 round 2 verified | Before: C1 render refusals lacked killing tests and row 181 base was pending. Rebased onto 931651f2d, kept all COUNTED/count code and tests, appended T178 tail; added independent owner/collision/absolute/charset/header and empty-loopback proof tests. Four files singly 156/156, all 24 mutants killed, metadata and sandbox fixture probes pass; scratch sweep empty. Packet agents/rocko/work/queue-178/r2/, candidate 9300a670, inventory d0dcde7b (59/59), scan 58 files no findings; in-review revs 2166-2167, expected no-token request failure. No live actions or commits.
2026-10-21T01:28:05Z | Darkwing | row 232 #1734 installer I1 build, round 1 in review | Before: stack-release.sh managed only user units (systemctl --user), and stack-copy.sh had no bundle copy. After: --units external (adopt, activate, rollback --to, status, confirm, revert, gate --since, AWAITING-UNITS, stale-start, external-pm, --plan --expect-from) and stack-copy check --units external, copy --bundle FILE SHA, wrapper ID --create; user mode byte-identical to the base by test. First build 0af0c73c6 on 00d4cc1f6; rebased onto row 200 (cb5fdb064) as a0ffabc3f on darkwing/row232-r1; --sso refused under external (D9), row 200 config_checks run under external (D10). Gate on Sage's slot (sage-1618): cli 561/0, every scripts/test-*.sh green; 17/17 mutants killed. Results commit 84f1a91e6 (pushed, seat branch only). Manifest 7a3b4ea1 (9 paths), queue revs 2595-2596, request comment 29825, reviewer Filbert. Packet agents/darkwing/work/queue-232/BUILD.md.
2026-10-21T04:50:44Z | Darkwing | row 233 #1735 installer I3 build, round 1 in review | Before: root had no upgrade driver for root-owned units and no host run sheet; stack-release.sh had no rehearse --backup last and no external plan refusals. After: scripts/stack-upgrade.sh upgrade and rollback (r6 A1-A5, A2f, R1-R4) with 20 tests, docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md, TOOLS.md lines, and on Sage's rulings stack-release.sh --backup last, BACKUP_STORE and the --plan refusals open-activation and migrate-required (3 tests). Base e65a3ab4d (row 232's landing). Gate on Sage's slot (sage-1704) on d99166ade: cli 616/0, every scripts/test-*.sh green, 1201/0 summed by awk; m1-m8 8/8 killed. Correction: the process sweep after the gate found an orphaned sleep 60 from the lock test's flock holder (N1); 08db6ac3f fixes it test only, Sage ruled the gate stands (sage-1707), rerun c0 20/0 and m1 killed with 0 left (sage-1708). Tip 1a1dc80ca (pushed, seat branch only). Manifest 464ce9eb (7 paths), queue revs 2644 and 2647, request comment 29901, reviewer Filbert. Packet agents/darkwing/work/queue-233/BUILD.md.
2026-10-21T06:37:41Z | Darkwing | row 240 #1746 installer I4 build, round 1 in review | Before: root had no host check for the bwrap AppArmor profile, its pins or a boot unit, and stack-upgrade.sh exited 1 args-failed when the args move after A5 failed, while exit 1 means the old copy runs. After: scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh (seven items, --check, --enforce, --upstream), scripts/case1-pins.sh, mosaic-hostcheck.service and 16 tests; the args move failure exits 5 args-failed, documented in TOOLS.md and run sheet section 6 and tested; run sheet section 3 puts the pinned npm on PATH and names the bin/claude.exe --claude path; sections 8 and 10 have precheck lines. Verification: slot run r1 on 47ec9fe2f failed at the singles (the new N1 test's after hook threw ENOENT after the fixture cleanup removed the root); b45852daa drops the hook; r2 on b45852daa green: singles 16/0 and 21/0, c0 plus M1-M8 8/8 killed, cli 639/0, scripts 585/0. Candidate darkwing/row240-r3 ad1b23ab2 on c771a36f4, manifest 573ece95 (9 paths), revs 2694 and 2695, comment 29943.
+3 -7
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@@ -86,8 +86,7 @@ The layers each adapter relies on, and what they don't cover, are in
### A role's skills (row 64)
A managed session's skills reach both adapters as text in the bundle's
`prompt.md`, which they pass as a file: `pi` with `--system-prompt <path>`
and `claude` with `--system-prompt-file <path>` (row 213). Neither adapter loads a
`prompt.md`, which they pass with `--system-prompt`. Neither adapter loads a
skill of its own: `pi` keeps `--no-skills`, since role sessions never get
`MOSAIC_SKILLS`, and `claude` keeps `--disable-slash-commands` and
`--restricted`. Sage chose this on 2026-10-19 from a probe, recorded in
@@ -105,8 +104,5 @@ skill of its own: `pi` keeps `--no-skills`, since role sessions never get
The cost is prompt size: a role's skill text is in every turn, where the
other routes load a skill when it's used. The bundle caps a role's skills at
64 KiB together. The cap dates from when `claude` passed `prompt.md` as one
argument, which Linux caps at 128 KiB; row 213 passes the file instead, so no
local user reads the prompt in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`. Pi 0.85.1 uses the path
string itself as the prompt when the file is missing or can't be read, so the
pi adapter exits 2 unless the path is a readable regular file.
64 KiB together, since `claude` passes `prompt.md` as one argument and Linux
caps one argument at 128 KiB.
+3 -10
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@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ need MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG
for f in "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS" "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG"; do
[ -r "$f" ] || { echo "claude adapter: not readable: $f" >&2; exit 2; }
done
PROMPT_FILE=$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE
case "$PROMPT_FILE" in
/*) ;;
*) PROMPT_FILE="$(pwd)/$PROMPT_FILE" ;;
esac
[ "${MOSAIC_INTERACTIVE:-}" != "1" ] || { echo "claude adapter: interactive mode isn't supported" >&2; exit 2; }
CLAUDE=claude
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN:-}" ]; then
@@ -61,10 +56,7 @@ fi
# Flags:
# -p one-shot: print the answer and exit
# --output-format text stdout is the answer only
# --system-prompt-file the generated prompt replaces the default, given
# as a file so no local user reads it in
# /proc/<pid>/cmdline (row 213); absolute, since
# the cd above changed the working directory
# --system-prompt the generated prompt replaces the default
# --effort the instance's thinking var (row 65; 2.1.302 takes
# low, medium, high, xhigh, max)
# --restricted no user/project/local settings files; --settings
@@ -84,9 +76,10 @@ fi
# text in the system prompt (row 64)
ALLOWED=mcp__mosaic
[ -z "${MOSAIC_TOOLS:-}" ] || ALLOWED="$MOSAIC_TOOLS,mcp__mosaic"
PROMPT_CONTENT="$(cat "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE")"
"$CLAUDE" -p "$MOSAIC_REQUEST" \
--output-format text \
--system-prompt-file "$PROMPT_FILE" \
--system-prompt "$PROMPT_CONTENT" \
--model "$MOSAIC_MODEL" \
--effort "$MOSAIC_THINKING" \
--restricted \
+4 -14
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@@ -8,17 +8,7 @@
set -eu
[ -n "${MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE:-}" ] || { echo "pi adapter: MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE is required" >&2; exit 2; }
# Row 213 (C2-08): pi gets the prompt as a path, so no local user reads it in /proc/<pid>/cmdline.
# Pi 0.85.1 reads --system-prompt as a file only when the path exists and reads, and otherwise
# uses the path string itself as the prompt, without a warning for a missing file
# (dist/core/resource-loader.js resolvePromptInput). So the path must be a regular readable
# file here, and is made absolute before the cd below, since pi resolves it from its own cwd.
PROMPT_FILE=$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE
case "$PROMPT_FILE" in
/*) ;;
*) PROMPT_FILE="$(pwd)/$PROMPT_FILE" ;;
esac
[ -f "$PROMPT_FILE" ] && [ -r "$PROMPT_FILE" ] || { echo "pi adapter: system prompt not readable: $MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
[ -r "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" ] || { echo "pi adapter: system prompt not readable: $MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
# MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME is optional in headless mode (identity section is then
# omitted); interactive launches always set it via scripts/agent.sh.
@@ -104,8 +94,7 @@ fi
# All flags documented in the pi package README (CLI Reference):
# -p/--print one-shot mode: print the response and exit (omitted in
# interactive TUI mode)
# --system-prompt replace the default prompt with the generated one, given
# as the file's absolute path (checked above), never its text
# --system-prompt replace the default prompt with the generated one
# --no-* no ambient context/skills/extensions/templates/themes
# EXT_FLAGS the explicitly provided extensions only (-e)
# SESSION_FLAGS ephemeral | persistent | forked (per env)
@@ -114,6 +103,7 @@ fi
# --offline no startup network operations (update checks/telemetry)
# --no-approve ignore project-local .pi/ files (settings, SYSTEM.md)
# whatever trust is saved for the workspace
PROMPT_CONTENT="$(cat "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE")"
set -- \
--offline \
--no-approve \
@@ -128,7 +118,7 @@ set -- \
--provider "$PI_PROVIDER" \
--model "$PI_MODEL" \
$THINKING_FLAG \
--system-prompt "$PROMPT_FILE"
--system-prompt "$PROMPT_CONTENT"
# One-shot mode appends -p and the request (both safely quoted);
# interactive mode appends nothing - clean TUI.
[ "$INTERACTIVE" = "1" ] || set -- "$@" -p "$MOSAIC_REQUEST"
-11
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@@ -16,17 +16,6 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
| Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
| Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
| Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
| Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's
-8
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# Bushroot
Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
-153
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@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
# Row 195 build: `scripts/case1-accept.sh`
Row 195 (#1693), the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53. Design r7 at 5425ea2f3, approved by Duckworth
(duckworth-0087, `agents/duckworth/work/row195/REVIEW-r7.md` at 58d930f89; Gitea 29962). Sage's go to build
is sage-1817.
## What this commit holds
- `scripts/case1-accept.sh` (new, 100755): section 5's acceptance, F1-F11 and P1-P11.
- `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs` (new): section 5's cases.
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: the `case1-accept.sh` entry after the hostcheck entry.
- This file.
- `DESIGN.md`, doc-only fixes Sage named in sage-1817, with no new design round:
- Duckworth's N1. Section 1's human-id row cited `broker.mjs:245`; the check is `broker.mjs:321`.
- Row 226's state at :21 and :326. It said "unclaimed"; 226 is assigned to Gosalyn, briefed and not
started (sage-1814).
- :340 said I'd send the section 6 items to Gosalyn once 226 was claimed. I sent them on 2026-10-21
and Gosalyn acknowledged (gosalyn-0085), so the line now says that.
Nothing else changes. No `case2-*.sh`, `stack-upgrade.sh`, `stack-release.sh`, `case1-hostcheck.sh` or run
sheet edit, and nothing touches .53 (sage-1809).
## Deviations from section 5, and choices it left open
1. P4's mark is the single token `accepted Q182+Q183`. Section 5 lists `accepted Q182` and `accepted
Q183` as marks and gives P4 both. One line can carry one mark, and P4 is the only Q182 path, so the
count list has `accepted Q182+Q183` in place of `accepted Q182`.
2. The test seam replaces `getent`. Under `--root`, the script reads `DIR/etc/passwd` and `DIR/etc/group`
with awk. Without it, the same helper calls `getent`. The groups of a user are its primary gid, then
each group whose member list names it, which is what `id -G` prints. So there is no fake `id`, and
the script never calls `id` for another user.
3. P10 reads the port floor from `/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_unprivileged_port_start` rather than calling
`sysctl`, so the seam covers it the way hostcheck's item 7 is covered. There is no fake `sysctl`.
4. There is no fake `bwrap`, `claude`, `node` or `hostcheck.sh` on PATH. The script runs each by the
absolute path the args file or the install names, so the test puts stubs at those paths under
`--root`, and the fake `sudo` runs the stack's user's commands from the tree.
5. The args file must say `--profile factory` and name `--business`. Both are new refusals beyond
`stack-upgrade.sh`'s rules. A library file, or one for another business, would make F4 and F7
check the wrong thing. After `--`, `--port` and `--tester-port` must be numeric. The args file is the
only source of the ports.
6. F8, F9 and F11 read file metadata as root: `stat`, `-L` and `find -maxdepth 1 -name '*.json'`. None
opens the credential. F9 parses `managed-settings.json` with the pinned node, run by root: that node
and that file are both root's own, installed by ops-01.
7. F7 reads `launch.by` from `$HOME/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/<id>.json` as the stack's user. That
path is `businessFilePath(id)` under the default config, which is what the unit uses. It doesn't load
the copy's `business.mjs` as `stack-release.sh`'s `plugins launchby` does. The user runs the whole
check and prints one line, and root accepts only `ok <instance> run <run>` (sage-1653: root doesn't
parse the user's output beyond a fixed pattern).
8. F5 names a process claude when its argv0's basename or its `comm` starts with `claude`. The window
confirms this against a real role session. If the bwrap'd claude shows another name, F5 fails closed
and the fix is this match, not the label check.
9. F3 and F5 run together. `talk` goes out in the background under `timeout 330`, and the `/proc` scan
repeats every half second until it finds a labelled pair or `talk` exits. F3's line prints first, then
F4, then F5, so the output keeps id order. F3 passes on exit 0 with the `sent` line and a reply line,
both counted on stdout only (`cli.mjs:395` and the `formatMessage` write); talk's error goes to stderr.
12. `--claude` must match `^/[A-Za-z0-9/._+@-]+$`. The `@` is for `node_modules/@anthropic-ai/...`;
`stack-upgrade.sh` doesn't check `--claude` at all.
10. F1 requires all four uids in `/proc/<MainPID>/status` (real, effective, saved, filesystem) to be the
user's.
11. Evidence text the stack's user controls (talk's last line, the precheck's last line, F6's and F10's
`--version`) is cut to printable ASCII, one line, 200 bytes.
## Tests
`packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs`, 22 tests. Every case builds a scratch host with every F check
passing and every P check closed or accepted, then changes one thing:
- all pass: exit 0, ids in order, each P mark, the count lines match the check lines, and the stand-in
credential's value appears nowhere;
- each F check failing alone exits 1 with only its line failing;
- F3 on exit 0 with only the `sent` line, and its evidence taking talk's stderr;
- F1 on a failed unit and on `User=root`; F2 on healthz failing and on another pid holding the port;
- F5 on `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (complain)`, a trailing space on either label,
no bwrap of the user's, and passing on `comm` alone;
- F6 on a stub that prints nothing and on a path outside `claude-<pin>`;
- F7 on two live PM launches, a live one for another business, and no `launch.by`;
- F8 on 0640, on another owner and on a symlink, never printing the credential;
- F9 on a group-writable mode, another owner and a number for the flag;
- F11 on one `*.json` under `discord/`, and passing on an empty directory;
- each P check's unnamed mark, with the line count each fault makes: P6 one line per member, P9 one per
missing item; P2, P5, P10 and P11 in more than one way;
- every P check unnamed at once still exits 0;
- nine bad args files refuse with exit 2 before any command runs, each with its own refusal text;
- usage errors, and a user's run without `--root`, exit 2;
- every in-instance call goes through `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin`,
read from the fake `sudo`'s argv, and root's other `sudo` calls are exactly `-l -U mosaic`,
`-l -U localadmin` and the jarvis bwrap probe;
- the host check records `--check` and never `--enforce`.
## Mutants
Section 5's twelve, each one exact replacement in `scripts/case1-accept.sh`, run by
`/mnt/storage/scratch/darkwing-195-out/mutants.py` in Sage's slot (sage-1865). All twelve were killed.
After each one the script's bytes were restored, and the final sha256 matched (`d434f15ff638...`). The
killers below are the tests that failed in each mutant's saved log.
| # | Mutant | Killed by |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | F1 passes on a MainPID owned by root | each F alone |
| 2 | F2 accepts a listener on 0.0.0.0 | each F alone |
| 3 | F3 passes without a reply | each F alone; F3 exit 0 with no reply line |
| 4 | F5 matches a substring | F5 labels (the trailing space) |
| 5 | F6 skips the `--version` check | each F alone; F6 stub and path |
| 6 | F8 skips the owner check | F8 0640, owner and symlink |
| 7 | F11 ignores `discord/` | each F alone; F11 `*.json` |
| 8 | P1 closes on any output | P unnamed; every P unnamed |
| 9 | P5 maps to `closed` with jarvis in docker | P unnamed; every P unnamed; P2 and P5 names docker |
| 10 | P9 drops the jarvis item | P unnamed; P9 per item |
| 11 | P11 accepts any `Before=` | P unnamed; every P unnamed |
| 12 | a P check's `unnamed` sets the exit to 1 | P unnamed; every P unnamed; P10 and P11; P2 and P5; P9 per item |
Mutant 1 survived the F1 variants test (a failed unit, `User=root`), because those faults fail F1 on the
unit's state and `User=`, not on the uid line. Each F alone covers the uid line.
## Pre-slot read review
Since every test run is slot work, a read-only subagent traced each case through the script before the
first slot run, executing nothing. It found four defects, all fixed in this commit:
- The `--claude` regex had no `@`, so every run refused the args file, the real .53 one included.
- The fake `stat` logged the args-file call, so the bad-args test's "no command ran" check would fail.
- The P5 and P6 faults each rewrote `etc/group` from the constant, so applying both lost P5's change.
- F3 counted stderr into its line count, so a mutant dropping the exit check survived. F3 now counts
stdout only, and a `sent`-only case covers the line count.
## Run environment
The build commit ddf7dce6c sits on base 4ced5e63d (origin/refactor when it was pushed). It was first built
on c515273db as 4a51d392c. Row 238 then changed `docs/TOOLS.md`, so I cherry-picked the three commits onto
4ced5e63d as `darkwing/row195-b`. `git range-diff` shows all three identical. node v26.8.1 on dragon-lin,
every run behind my busy check and Sage's, chained with `&&`.
- Step 1, sage-1829 (07:41:54Z to 07:42:05Z), TMPDIR `/tmp/dw195`:
`node --test packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs`, 22 pass, 0 fail, 11.0 s.
- Step 2, sage-1865 (08:34:27Z to 08:36:21Z), TMPDIR `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/r195`: the twelve mutants
above, all killed.
- Step 3, the gate (08:36:21Z to 08:47:06Z), same TMPDIR, `COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=darkwing-r195`:
| Suite | Result |
|---|---|
| packages/cli (`node --test tests/*.test.mjs`) | 662 pass, 0 fail, 0 skipped |
| test-auth.sh | 15 passed, 0 failed |
| test-conductor.sh | 17 passed, 0 failed |
| test-config.sh | 31 passed, 0 failed |
| test-discord.sh | 78 passed, 0 failed |
| test-extension-package.sh | 18 passed, 0 failed |
| test-foundation.sh | 44 passed, 0 failed |
| test-land-work.sh | 86 passed, 0 failed |
| test-queue.sh | 156 node pass, 0 fail; 28 passed, 0 failed |
| test-release.sh | 14 passed, 0 failed |
| test-task.sh | 98 passed, 0 failed |
Summed: 818 node tests passed with 0 failed, and 429 selftests passed with 0 failed. The compose network
was removed afterwards, and the sweep found no process left in the worktree, the output directory or the
TMPDIR. This file's results are a doc-only commit on top of the build, so nothing that ran has changed.
-388
View File
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
# Row 195 design: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (r7)
Darkwing, 2026-10-21. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md`, blob 45be7f09afc1, section "Brief: the
Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195)". Gitea #1693. Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Branch
`darkwing/row195-r7` on c515273db. r6 (b7239bb66 on `darkwing/row195`, approved duckworth-0055) is the base,
carried unchanged as 7398b7dd7. The r6 text is in that commit and in b7239bb66.
## Changes from r6
Q187 (mos-1108) made install and upgrade product commands, and mos-1118 split r6 into the installer rows
(`docs/plans/2026-10-20_installer-rows.md`). That brief says row 195 "shrinks to the factory profile's
values and the Case 1 acceptance". So r7 is mostly a cut. What r6 designed now ships elsewhere:
| r6 piece | Now | State |
|---|---|---|
| `stack-release.sh --units external`: `confirm`, `revert`, `gate`, `rollback --to`, external `adopt` and `status`; `stack-copy.sh check --units external` and bundle copies | row 232, I1 | landed |
| `case1-repin.sh` (A1-A5, A2f, R1-R4) | `scripts/stack-upgrade.sh`, row 233, I3 | landed |
| the host steps 2a, 2a', 2a'' and the window's root steps | `docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` sections 1-10, row 233 | landed |
| `case1-hostcheck.sh`, `case1-pins.sh`, `mosaic-hostcheck.service` (the drift stop, r6 B2) | row 240, I4 | landed c515273db |
| the unit render, `--profile factory`, `--pm`, `--claude`, the factory serve flags, the precheck | row 230, C2-13a, I2 | landed |
| the install as `mosaic`: bootstrap, business file, copy | row 226, C2-13b, I2, `scripts/case2-install.sh` | assigned to Gosalyn, briefed, not started |
| `docs/guides/case1-install.md` | the host run sheet, plus section 6 of this file | |
Other changes:
- Claude moves under `/opt` (sage-1522, run sheet section 3). `--claude` is
`/opt/mosaic-stack/claude-<pin>/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/bin/claude.exe`, root's, and root
installs and upgrades it. r6's `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` is gone. F6 reads the new path.
- The args file is `/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args` (run sheet section 7), not `case1-unit.args`. It holds
`--copy` too, and `stack-upgrade.sh` rewrites only that line, after confirm passes.
- Both units are `WantedBy=multi-user.target` and start at boot (Q189, mos-1122). r6's "the Console has no
`[Install]`, root starts it by hand after a reboot" no longer holds.
- The business id is stated, with the DEFERRED 240 N1 reasoning (sage-1809, sage-1813). Section 7.
- The window can't run until row 226 lands. Sage added 226 to row 195's after list at rev 2718
(sage-1813). Section 6 lists what row 195 needs from 226's install.
- The acceptance runs as root through ops-01, not as `localadmin`. `aa-status`, `sudo -l -U`,
`systemd-run --uid` and the hostcheck all need root. It gains four functional checks for items the run
sheet marks "precheck line missing" (F8-F11) and one host line (P11). Section 5.
- The Discord row in section 2 changed. The precheck's "no Discord binding" line is C2-13b's and is
library-only, so for the factory it's F11 in the acceptance.
What row 195 still builds: `scripts/case1-accept.sh` and its test (section 5). The rest of this file is
inputs, the window order and the record the reviewer checks.
## 0. What I checked on the host
Read only, as `localadmin` over ssh, 2026-10-20 between 20:40Z and 21:51Z. Nothing in r7 touched .53
(sage-1809). The window's first step re-reads these, since they can drift in a day: unattended-upgrades
runs daily.
| Item | 10.1.1.53 on 2026-10-20 | Needed |
|---|---|---|
| OS | Ubuntu 24.04.5, kernel 6.8.0-124, x86_64, 12 cores, 94 GiB, 217 GiB free on `/` | fits |
| `mosaic` user, group, `/srv/mosaic` | absent | run sheet section 1 |
| node | `/usr/local/bin/node` v22.22.2, root-owned | 24 or later, under `/opt` (run sheet section 2) |
| claude | not on localadmin's PATH | under `/opt` (run sheet section 3) |
| bwrap | absent; apt candidate `bubblewrap 0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3` | run sheet section 4 |
| user namespaces | `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1`, apparmor 4.0.1, no bwrap profile loaded | run sheet section 4 |
| profiles that name bwrap | none (`grep -rlw bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` exits 1) | hostcheck item 3 |
| `fs.protected_hardlinks` | 1 | hostcheck item 6 |
| `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` | 1024 | run sheet section 5 |
| listeners below 1024 | 22 (sshd) and 53 (the resolver); 732 is free | the Console's port |
| ports 7330-7333 | free | 7333 is the tester port |
| `localadmin` | NOPASSWD sudo (#423 step 1, mos-1066, mos-1077) | ops-01's root path |
| `jarvis` | groups sudo, docker, lxd, adm | #423 step 4 removes them (P5) |
| unattended-upgrades | on, with the security pocket, which carries bubblewrap | the drift stop (row 240) |
| journald | `SplitMode=uid` | the PM check reads `launches list`, not the journal (row 232) |
## 1. The factory profile's values
Instance `dev`, row 190's default (mos-1118 choice 4). `~` is `mosaic`'s home.
| Input | Value | Who gives it |
|---|---|---|
| user | `mosaic`, primary group `mosaic` with no other member | fixed |
| home | `/srv/mosaic`, 0700 | fixed |
| config dir | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev` | row 190 |
| data root | `/srv/mosaic/.mosaic-dev`, marker `{"instanceVersion":1,"name":"dev"}` | row 190 |
| business | `mosaic-stack`, file `<configDir>/businesses/mosaic-stack.json` | fixed (section 7) |
| profile | `factory` for `case2-install.sh`, `case2-unit.sh` and `case2-precheck.sh` | fixed |
| roles | the factory set from `roles/`, with a chief that has a harness var | the go names the set (section 2) |
| human id | Jason's, not `tester` (`broker.mjs:321`) | the go |
| model credential | `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, `mosaic` 0600, one line `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=...` | Jason places it (section 3) |
| token slot path | none | section 2 |
| node | `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<v>/bin/node`, `<v>` 24 or later | the go names `<v>` and its sha256 |
| claude | `/opt/mosaic-stack/claude-<pin>/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/bin/claude.exe`, `<pin>` 2.1.304 unless the go names a newer one | the go |
| PM | on (`--pm`) | fixed |
| Console | `--port 732` on 127.0.0.1, with the unit's `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` | fixed |
| tester | `--tester-port 7333` on 127.0.0.1 (P10) | fixed |
| board | none | fixed |
| release | a git bundle of `refs/heads/refactor` and the 40-hex commit (run sheet section 6) | the go names both and the bundle's sha256 |
The args file. `/etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args`, `root:root` 0644, one argument per line (run sheet section 7):
```
--profile
factory
--user
mosaic
--home
/srv/mosaic
--business
mosaic-stack
--copy
<40-hex commit>
--node
/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<v>/bin/node
--claude
/opt/mosaic-stack/claude-<pin>/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/bin/claude.exe
--pm
--
--port
732
--business
mosaic-stack
--tester-port
7333
```
`case2-unit.sh` takes exactly these before `--` (`scripts/case2-unit.sh:54`), and `stack-upgrade.sh`
refuses `args-unreadable` on anything else (`scripts/stack-upgrade.sh:126-148`). The factory profile
refuses the preview trio, `--send` and the proof pair (`case2-unit.sh:169`). .53 has no proxy, and Jason
reaches the Console with `ssh -L` (sage-1451 Q3). Changing a serve flag is a re-install with its own go,
not an upgrade.
Why the port is 732 (r6, mos-1101 item 5). Role sessions share the host's network namespace
(`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:67`), so while the Console is down a session could bind a port above the
floor and answer in its place. Below 1024 only the Console unit can bind, through its capability. The
tester port can't go below 1024 (`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:33`), so P10 records it.
PATH for `mosaic`'s steps. `sudo -u mosaic -H` resets PATH to sudo's `secure_path`, which finds
`/usr/local/bin/node`, v22. So every `mosaic` step runs as
`sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<v>/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin ...`, the list
`case2-unit.sh` renders as the units' PATH. `stack-upgrade.sh` builds it from the args file's `--node`.
## 2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2
| Case 2 (library) | Case 1 (factory) | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| business file with the library mapping | `mosaic-stack` with no `library` key. The precheck refuses a library project under `factory` (`profile-library-business`, `case2-precheck.sh:127-128`) | the factory has no books repo |
| `bean`, `chet`, persona vars and files, specialists | the factory roles from `roles/`, with a chief that has a harness var | the go names the set. I haven't read Jason's live business file and won't. The acceptance needs only the chief (F3); a chief with no harness var answers `no-route`. The human adds roles later with `instances.set`, no new row |
| token slot `library-gitea` | none | the factory's per-agent git identity is row 199's credential store (Megavolt, #1697). Until it lands, git work stays on dragon-lin (Q182) |
| `bus.tester` off | on; the precheck refuses it off under `factory` (`case2-precheck.sh:135`) | the acceptance and the Q173 test system need the tester |
| persona modes and digests, `library.sync`, `library.status` | skipped | no persona files, no library (C2-13b brief, `factory` profile) |
| `ZAI_API_KEY` in `claude-session.env` | not checked; the file holds `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | no instance has provider `zai` (run sheet section 9) |
| no Discord binding (C2-13b, library only) | none either. F11 checks that `<dataRoot>/discord/` holds no binding | the factory's connector stays on dragon-lin. Two connectors on one bot token would split its events |
| the claude marker prompt | runs, since the chief's harness is claude-code | |
| serve flags: preview trio, `--send`, proof pair | `--port 732`, `--business mosaic-stack`, `--tester-port 7333` | no proxy on .53 |
| bus: no `--pm`, no `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` | `--pm`, and `Environment=MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN=<--claude>` | the PM dispatches the factory's work; without the path the bus finds no claude on the unit's PATH |
| Console proof file (run sheet section 9, .54) | none | no proof pair |
All of these are inputs to the landed scripts. Row 230 implemented the four factory items r6 asked for
(serve flags, `--pm`, `--claude`, row 190's tokens), and nothing in them hardcodes a Case 1 value.
## 3. Model access
Q185: Case 1 uses the account the factory uses today, the Claude subscription behind dragon-lin's
`claude-session.env`. No script copies that file and none reads its value. In the window, Jason, or the
person he names under the Q173 secrets rule, makes a credential for .53 from that account and writes it
to `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env` as `mosaic`, mode 0600 (run sheet
section 9). Nobody prints it. The check is `stat -c '%U %a %F' PATH` only (F8).
The bus unit reads it through `EnvironmentFile=-` (`case2-unit.sh:243`). The leading `-` means a missing
file doesn't stop the bus, so the chief's first launch would fail instead. The window places the file
before the units start (section 6, W9), and the precheck's claude marker prompt then proves it works
without printing it.
Quota: the factory on dragon-lin and on .53 share one subscription. Q185's "use existing" accepts that.
The pi harness stays off on .53 until P19 #383 settles (mos-0865). The business file names claude only.
## 4. Upgrade, rollback and backup on .53
All three are `scripts/stack-upgrade.sh` (row 233), run as root by ops-01 from `/root/mosaic-stack` at the
reviewed commit. Usage, exits and the step log are in `docs/TOOLS.md`, "Root's upgrade driver", and run
sheet section 6.
| Action | Command | Who | Go |
|---|---|---|---|
| upgrade | `stack-upgrade.sh upgrade --instance dev --bundle /srv/mosaic/incoming/<sha>.bundle --sha <sha>` after run sheet section 6's per-upgrade lines | ops-01 | Mos per run; `--migrate` also needs Jason present (decision 96) |
| rollback | `stack-upgrade.sh rollback --instance dev --to <copy> [--restore <ACT> [--events N]]` | ops-01 | Mos per run. Mos or Sage picks `<copy>` from `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack --units external`, read as `mosaic`. The plan refuses unless it is the previous distinct copy |
| backup of the store | A3's `backup_store` into `<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<ACT>`, inside every upgrade | the driver | the upgrade's |
| rehearsal | `stack-release.sh rehearse` against the log's newest backup, before anything stops, on `--rehearse-port`, default 7339, which section 0 found free | the driver | the upgrade's |
| backup of the VM | a PBS backup of VM 1008 before the install window and before any `--migrate` | ops-01 | the window's go (Q182, Q183: agents keep PBS) |
Three .53 specifics:
1. The first upgrade after install needs `--no-rehearsal` in its go. The install's adopt takes no backup,
so the log records none, the rehearsal exits 3 (`no-backup`), and the driver goes on only with the
flag (`stack-upgrade.sh:323-324`). Every later upgrade refuses the flag (`rehearsal-required`).
2. Exit 5 (`args-failed`): the new stack is live and confirmed, but `dev.args` still names the old copy.
ops-01 moves the file the result line names into place with `mv -f`, and nothing else (run sheet
section 6).
3. Exit 2 leaves both units stopped and the activation open. ops-01 sends Mos the exit and the last
lines of `/var/log/mosaic-stack/upgrade-dev.log`, and Jason or Mos settles it with `confirm` or `revert`
as on dragon-lin. A unit that doesn't stop within `--timeout` ends here on purpose (A2f's
`stale-start`, duckworth-0055 N1, now in run sheet section 6).
The store backup doesn't hold the config dir or the credential. PBS backups of VM 1008 hold the whole disk,
the credential included (P4). A restore swaps only the store and leaves `claude-session.env` in place.
Re-install, for a serve flag or role change, is not an upgrade. It needs its own go and runs: stop the
Console, then the bus; rewrite `dev.args` with the same `--copy`; `case2-unit.sh` with it; both units start
again from the render. Row 230 N1 (webby-0046) holds here: a re-render with the units running leaves each on
its old copy, so ops-01 stops both first. `stack-upgrade.sh` already stops both before it renders.
## 5. Acceptance: `scripts/case1-accept.sh`
New in this row. ops-01 runs it as root on .53, from `/root/mosaic-stack`:
```
case1-accept.sh --business mosaic-stack --args /etc/mosaic-stack/dev.args --claude-pin <pin> --node-pin <v>
```
It reads the user, home, node, claude and ports from the args file and refuses (exit 2) when that file
fails `stack-upgrade.sh`'s rules. Every check inside the instance runs as
`sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin`. It changes nothing on the host
except what F3's message writes to the store. It prints one line per check, `<id> <path> <mark>
<evidence>`, then a count of each mark. Marks: `closed`, `accepted Q182`, `accepted Q183`, `accepted
mos-1096`, `accepted mos-1101`, and `unnamed`, which means "not named in Q182, Q183 or a Mos ruling".
It exits 1 when any F check fails and 0 otherwise. A P check never changes the exit. Each `unnamed`
line goes to Mos, who takes it to Jason (R8 N1). Duckworth reads the whole output.
It prints no value from `claude-session.env` and never opens it.
Functional checks. Any failure fails the row:
| Id | Check | How |
|---|---|---|
| F1 | the units run as `mosaic` | for `[email protected]` and `mosaic-webui.service`: active, `User=mosaic`, and the uid in `/proc/<MainPID>/status` is `mosaic`'s |
| F2 | the Console answers on 127.0.0.1:732 only | `curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:732/healthz` succeeds, and `ss -Hltnp` shows 732 bound to 127.0.0.1 only, by the Console's MainPID. Jason reaches it with `ssh -L 7332:127.0.0.1:732 [email protected]`. A LAN listener waits for Q175 SSO (sage-1451 Q3) |
| F3 | one tester message gets a reply | as `mosaic`: `mosaic talk chief <marker> --business mosaic-stack --tester --wait 300`. A stored reply to the marked message passes. The inbox shows decisions only, so it isn't used |
| F4 | the precheck passes | `case2-precheck.sh --business mosaic-stack --profile factory` as `mosaic` exits 0 |
| F5 | a role session runs under bwrap with the profile | while F3's reply is pending: a `/usr/bin/bwrap` process owned by `mosaic` has a claude child. Its `/proc/<pid>/attr/current` equals `bwrap (enforce)` and the child's equals `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, exact strings after the trailing newline is cut |
| F6 | claude is the pin | the args file's `--claude` path sits under `/opt/mosaic-stack/claude-<pin>/`, and its `--version` as `mosaic` prints `<pin> (Claude Code)` |
| F7 | the PM run is live | `launches list --json` as `mosaic` has exactly one live entry for the PM's instance (`launch.by`), the check `confirm` runs |
| F8 | the credential's file | `stat -c '%U %a %F'` on `claude-session.env` reads `mosaic 600 regular file`, and it isn't a symlink. Run sheet section 9 marks this "precheck line missing" |
| F9 | the autoupdater is off | `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` is `root:root` 0644 and its `env.DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER` is `"1"`. Run sheet section 3 marks this "precheck line missing" |
| F10 | node is the pin | the args file's `--node` is `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<v>/bin/node` with `<v>` the `--node-pin`, and its `--version` prints `<v>`. Run sheet section 2 marks this "precheck line missing" |
| F11 | no Discord binding | `/srv/mosaic/.mosaic-dev/discord/` is absent or holds no `*.json` (section 2) |
Host paths. These report and never fail the row:
| Id | Path | Mark | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | `mosaic` has sudo | closed only when `sudo -l -U mosaic` prints "is not allowed to run sudo"; any other output is unnamed | the `sudo -l` result |
| P2 | `mosaic` has supplementary groups or a key | closed when `id -G mosaic` is one entry and `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty | `id`, file state |
| P3 | `localadmin` NOPASSWD sudo, reached with the dragon-lin key | accepted Q183 | `sudo -l -U localadmin` |
| P4 | root on pve over VM 1008, and PBS backups that hold `/srv/mosaic` with the credential | accepted Q182 and Q183 | a fixed line; the script can't see pve |
| P5 | `jarvis`, which runs Hermes, reaches `/srv/mosaic` through sudo, docker or lxd | closed when `jarvis` is in none of the three; unnamed otherwise. #423 step 4 removes all four groups before the install (mos-1091 4c) | `id jarvis` |
| P6 | other members of sudo, docker, lxd | closed when sudo holds only `localadmin` and docker and lxd are empty; each other member is its own unnamed line | `getent group` lines |
| P7 | a file under `/etc/sudoers.d` naming `mosaic` | closed when none | file names |
| P8 | the Console or tester reachable from the LAN | closed when 732 and 7333 are bound to 127.0.0.1 only, each by the Console's MainPID, and nothing listens on 7331 | listener table |
| P9 | a user namespace through `/usr/bin/bwrap` | accepted mos-1096 only while all eight hold, unnamed otherwise: hostcheck items 1 to 6, read from `/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/hostcheck.sh --check`'s own `ok N` lines (item 7 is P10's floor); `sudo -u jarvis /usr/bin/bwrap --version` fails with "Permission denied"; `getent group mosaic` lists no member and no other account has its gid. F5 adds the label of a real role session | the hostcheck lines and each item |
| P10 | a session binds the tester port 7333 while the Console is down | accepted mos-1101 while the port floor is above 732 and 7333 is held by the Console's MainPID | the floor, the owner pid |
| P11 | the boot check runs before the bus | closed when `mosaic-hostcheck.service` is enabled and `systemctl show -p Before` on it names `mosaic-bus@<business>.service` for the args file's business; unnamed otherwise (section 7) | the `Before=` value |
P9 reads hostcheck's output, which root's own script prints, by matching `^ok [1-6] ` lines. It runs `--check` only,
never `--enforce`, so the acceptance can't close bwrap.
Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs`. The script takes a test seam, `--root DIR`, for
`/proc`, `/etc`, `/srv/mosaic` and `getent`, and refuses it when run as root, as the hostcheck does. Fake
`systemctl`, `curl`, `ss`, `sudo`, `bwrap`, `sysctl`, `stat`, `claude`, `node` and `hostcheck.sh` on PATH.
Nothing reaches .53 or dragon-lin's live state, and no test reads a real credential. Cases:
- every check passing exits 0, with the counts matching the lines;
- each F check failing alone exits 1 with its line;
- F5 fails on `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (complain)` and a trailing space;
- F6 fails on a stub `claude.exe` that prints nothing and on a path outside `claude-<pin>`;
- F8 fails on mode 0640, on another owner and on a symlink, and the stand-in credential's value never
appears in the output;
- F11 fails on one `*.json` under `discord/`;
- each P check in each of its marks: P1 with output that grants nothing but lacks the refusal text
(unnamed), P9 unnamed once for each item missing, P10 unnamed with the floor at 700 and with 7333 held
by another pid, P11 unnamed with `Before=` naming another business;
- every P check `unnamed` still exits 0;
- a bad args file refuses with exit 2 before any check;
- every in-instance call goes through `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=<node dir>:...`, read from the fake
`sudo`'s recorded argv;
- the hostcheck fake records `--check` and never `--enforce`.
Mutants, each killed by a named case:
1. F1 passes on a MainPID owned by root.
2. F2 accepts a listener on 0.0.0.0.
3. F3 passes without a reply.
4. F5 matches a substring.
5. F6 skips the `--version` check.
6. F8 skips the owner check.
7. F11 ignores `discord/`.
8. P1 closes on any output.
9. P5 maps to `closed` with `jarvis` in docker.
10. P9 drops the jarvis item.
11. P11 accepts any `Before=`.
12. A P check's `unnamed` sets the exit to 1.
## 6. The .53 window
Nothing in this row touches .53 (sage-1809). Every root step below is ops-01's, over
`ssh [email protected]` with `sudo`, and waits on a Jason decision (mos-1086). The window needs:
- row 226 landed;
- Jason's or Mos's go naming the commit, the bundle's sha256, the node and claude pins, the role set and
Jason's human id;
- a backup first;
- a STATE report after.
| # | Step | Runs as | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| W0 | re-read section 0's items; stop on any change and report it | `localadmin`, read only | section 0 |
| W1 | PBS backup of VM 1008 | ops-01 on pve | section 4 |
| W2 | the stack's user and home | root | run sheet 1 |
| W3 | node under `/opt` | root | run sheet 2 |
| W4 | claude under `/opt`, managed settings | root | run sheet 3 |
| W5 | bubblewrap, the profile, the statoverride, the no-new-privs test, the drift stop; `hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0 with item 7 at 1023 | root | run sheet 4 |
| W6 | the port floor (read) | root | run sheet 5 |
| W7 | the bundle, root's checkout at `<sha>`, `mosaic`'s clone | root, then `sudo -u mosaic -H` | run sheet 6 |
| W8 | `case2-install.sh --profile factory` with section 1's inputs: bootstrap, the business file, roles, human id, the copy | `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=...` | row 226 |
| W9 | place `claude-session.env` | Jason, or who he names | run sheet 9, section 3 |
| W10 | write `dev.args` (section 1); `case2-unit.sh` from it, which enables both units and starts the bus, then the Console | root | run sheet 7, 10 |
| W11 | `case2-precheck.sh --business mosaic-stack --profile factory` exits 0; `hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0 with item 7 at 732 | `mosaic`; root | row 230, 240 |
| W12 | `stack-release.sh adopt mosaic-stack --units external`, unless row 226's install does it | `sudo -u mosaic -H` | row 232 |
| W13 | `case1-accept.sh` (section 5); the output to Duckworth, then Mos confirms | root | this row |
| W14 | STATE report to Mos | ops-01 | brief |
Install rollback, any step before W13 passes. Stop and disable both units, remove their files and
`dev.args`, then the run sheet's rollbacks for sections 4, 3 and 2 in that order. Removing the user and
home (`userdel -r mosaic`) needs its own Mos go, since it deletes the home. W1's backup covers the rest.
What row 195 needs from row 226. Row 226 is assigned to Gosalyn, briefed and not started, so I'm listing what the window
needs from its design, not designing it:
1. `--profile factory` writes the business file with `bus.tester` on and no `library` key, and the roles
the go names.
2. It writes no token slot and no persona files (its brief says so).
3. It runs before the unit render, since the copy must exist for `case2-unit.sh --copy`, and it starts no
unit.
4. Who writes `dev.args`. The C2-13b brief says the install doesn't write unit files, and the run sheet
says "I2's install writes it". `mosaic` can't write `/etc/mosaic-stack`. So either root's part of I2
writes it, or ops-01 writes it from section 1 at W10. Either works for row 195. The file's content is
fixed above.
5. Whether it runs `adopt`. If it doesn't, W12 does.
I sent these to Gosalyn on 2026-10-21 (gosalyn-0085 acknowledged), and the run sheet takes whichever answer 226 gives.
## 7. The business id
.53's business id is `mosaic-stack` (sage-1813). It appears in:
- the args file, twice;
- the bus unit `[email protected]`;
- the business file name;
- `case1-accept.sh --business`.
The landed boot unit `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-hostcheck.service` has
`[email protected]`. So at boot the drift stop runs before .53's bus, and DEFERRED 240
N1 (da3051ccc: `After=mosaic-hostcheck.service` in `mosaic-bus.service.in`) doesn't bind this row.
If a go ever names another id for .53, the window stops before W8, and the N1 fix lands first as its own
reviewed row. P11 is the check on the host. It reads `unnamed` when the boot unit's `Before=` doesn't
name the installed bus.
DEFERRED 240 N2 (the apt hook goes in before the first `--check`) is a run sheet order note. This row
doesn't edit the run sheet, so it stays deferred.
## 8. Rulings this design rests on
- sage-1451: Q1 system units; Q3 the Console on 127.0.0.1 with `ssh -L`; Q4 a rebase goes to a new branch
name (#426(a), mos-1086).
- mos-1091, mos-1096, mos-1098, mos-1101: the bwrap path, its profile and P9; the port squat and P10; .53
runs the PM. Their r6 sections stand, and rows 232, 233, 240 and 230 implemented them.
- mos-1108 (Q187) and mos-1118: the installer rows and the scope cut. mos-1122 (Q189): both units start at
boot.
- sage-1522: claude under `/opt`, root-owned.
- sage-1809: no step on .53, root steps named and left to ops-01, the business id stated.
- sage-1813: 226 in the after list (rev 2718); the id is `mosaic-stack` and 240 N1 doesn't apply.
- Q185: the factory's model account. Q173: credentials placed by Jason or his named person.
## 9. Manifest (planned)
- `scripts/case1-accept.sh` (new), mode 100755.
- `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs` (new). Section 5's cases and mutants.
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: a `case1-accept.sh` entry with usage, marks and exits, beside the hostcheck entry.
- `agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/BUILD.md` (new): run environment, the mutant results, deviations.
- No change to `case2-*.sh`, `stack-upgrade.sh`, `stack-release.sh`, `case1-hostcheck.sh` or the run
sheet. Two follow-ups stay out of this row:
- row 230 r2 N1. The "still on copy" line reads the id from the unit file. On .53 neither the install
nor `stack-upgrade.sh` reaches that line, since both start from stopped units.
- DEFERRED 240 N2.
- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, dragon-lin's units or `~/.mosaic`.
Gate: Duckworth approves this design, then the manifest; the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh`
green on Sage's gate; section 5's twelve mutants killed in a slot Sage grants.
-287
View File
@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
# Row 232 (I1): stack-release external units and bundle copies
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_installer-rows.md` section I1, blob `f35e7e57daee` (commit ad6f0be7a). Gitea
#1734, Vikunja P19 #432. Owner Darkwing, reviewer Filbert, gate owner Sage. Design input: row 195 DESIGN r6,
`agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md` at b7239bb66 (approved in duckworth-0055). Where the brief and
r6 differ, the brief wins. sage-1561 ruled where the stack user's `stack-release.sh` runs: from its own
clone of the release bundle, so `check_target`, the plan's commit list and status drift are unchanged and
nothing adds `safe.directory`.
## Files
Base: cb5fdb064 (row 199's landing, on top of row 200's 9e1085816). Branch `darkwing/row232-r1`. The first
build, 0af0c73c6 on `darkwing/row232`, sat on 00d4cc1f6 (row 190); row 200 landed first, so this one is
rebased onto it (see D9 and D10).
- `scripts/stack-release.sh`: `--units user|external`, the `sc` and `jctl` backend, `confirm`, `revert`,
`gate --since`, `rollback --to`, `--plan --expect-from`, the external gate (start floor, PM check from
`launches list`), `external-pm`, and the `awaiting units:` status line.
- `scripts/stack-copy.sh`: `check --units external`, `copy --bundle FILE SHA`, `wrapper ID --create`.
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-external.test.mjs` (new, 25 tests).
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-fixture.mjs` (new): the helpers `stack-release.test.mjs` defined, moved
so both files share them. See deviation D1.
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs`: the helpers leave and one import line comes in. The 74 tests
have the same names and the same bodies as on the base.
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`: three new `row 232:` tests and a wider `node:fs` import.
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: the stack-copy usage block and three paragraphs, the stack-release usage block, and a new
subsection "Root-owned units (`--units external`, row 232)".
- `packages/cli/README.md`: one paragraph.
- This file.
The worktree's `node_modules` symlink is not part of the candidate.
## User mode is unchanged
Every `systemctl` call goes through `sc` and every `journalctl` call through `jctl`. Under `user` they
are `systemctl --user "$@"` and `journalctl --user "$@"`. Under `external`, `sc` allows only `show`,
`is-active` and `list-units`, and `jctl` returns 1, so an external run can't start, stop, install or read
the journal even through a path the tests miss.
Two tests hold the brief's "every command line and every byte of output":
- `user mode: every systemctl call carries --user, and activate, rollback and check make the base's
calls`. A fixture repo gets the base's two scripts from `git show cb5fdb064:`. The same activate,
rollback and `stack-copy.sh check` run from both trees, and the recorded argv (with the fixture root and
port replaced by placeholders) must match line for line. Every call carries `--user`.
- `user mode: a default activate --plan prints the base's bytes`, for four plans.
The base output is produced live from the base blobs, not stored as a fixture file. See deviation D3.
## r6 section 7, test by test
All in `stack-release-external.test.mjs` unless named.
| r6 :742-812 item | Test |
|---|---|
| `units-running` (N4), store, log and TAKEN left | `units-running (N4) refuses while a unit is active...`; also checks that `failed` counts as down and that the Console is checked first |
| activate leaves the pointer, writes `AWAITING-UNITS` and a backup | `activate stages: ...`, which also checks the set's file list, `UNITS.sha256`, no `--user`, no journal call and `status` |
| `open-activation` with zero, two, the wrong copy, one not open | `confirm and revert refuse open-activation ...` |
| `confirm` polls: 3 s fails at `--timeout 1`, passes at `--timeout 10` | `confirm polls: bus status good after 3 s fails ...` and `confirm polls to a pass ...` |
| `stale-start` floor with `started` at .900 | `stale-start: @1792540799 fails ...` and `stale-start is a gate code ...` |
| `confirm` pass writes pointer, ok, removes marker; timeout writes `FAILED` and exits 1 | the two polling tests |
| `activation-failed` when `FAILED` exists | `confirm polls: ... FAILED then refuses activation-failed` |
| lines carry the started op, from, to, activation and backup | `sameAsStarted` in every confirm test, and sequence 7 |
| `gate` (N2) with and without `--since` | `gate (N2, A2f): ...` and the usage test |
| `--plan --expect-from` (N5), activate and `rollback --to` | sequence 7 |
| A3 order: capture-failed, marker-failed, wrapper failure after migrate | `A3 order: ...` and sequence 2 |
| refusals log no activation; `interrupted` unchanged | `open-activation` test and sequence 5 |
| PM check: one, none, two, early, not live, other business, other instance; no journal call | `the external PM check reads launches list ...` (modes '', coder, none, twolive, early, dead, other) and `journalCalls` in every external test |
| `external-pm` | `pm-on and activate --pm-after-harness refuse external-pm` |
| `revert` restores TAKEN only after a migration | `revert puts the wrapper back and leaves the store ...` and sequences 2 and 8 |
| `confirm --rollback` per cause, `unrecorded`, `rollback-failed`, mismatch | sequences 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8, and `confirm --rollback refuses rollback-mismatch, and logs rollback-failed ...` |
| sequences 1-8 | `sequence 1:` to `sequence 8:`, each ending with the `closed` check (one started and one result line, empty `interrupted`, no marker or `FAILED`, a following `--plan` that doesn't refuse `interrupted-run`) |
| `rollback --to` refuses not-previous; `rollback --restore` finds an external backup | sequence 7, and `confirm --rollback after a --restore swap ...` |
| `gate` writes nothing | the `gate (N2, A2f)` test and sequence 4 compare the log, the pointer and the state tree |
| `confirm`, `revert`, `gate`, `--to` refuse without `--units external` | `confirm, revert, gate, --to and --expect-from need --units external ...` |
| default path: every call carries `--user`; default `--plan` bytes | the two user-mode tests above |
The brief's additions, in `stack-copy.test.mjs`:
- `row 232: copy --bundle copies a SHA the bundle's refactor reaches, byte-identical to copy SHA, and
refuses the rest`: a short SHA, a missing file, a symlink, a bundle that fails `git bundle verify`, a
bundle with no `refs/heads/refactor`, a SHA not in the bundle, and a SHA the bundle carries on another
branch that refactor doesn't reach. The bundle copy's tree matches `copy SHA`'s byte for byte, and the
`release:` and `bundle sha256:` lines are checked.
- `row 232: wrapper --create writes the first wrapper only, the same bytes wrapper ID writes, and refuses
over any file`, a symlink included. Without `--create` a missing wrapper still refuses.
- `row 232: check --units external reads the system units, the default reads the user units`.
## Mutants
`mutants.sh` in my scratch (not committed, it edits the worktree), 17 mutants: r6's re-pin list (:817-838)
minus the three `case1-repin.sh` ones, plus the brief's two. Each one applies exact replacements after a
checked backup, runs `bash -n`, runs its named killers, restores the file and checks its sha256. Two
controls run first with no change: the whole external file, and stack-copy's `row 232:` tests.
| Mutant | Killers |
|---|---|
| m01 `confirm` writes the pointer on a gate failure | `confirm polls: bus status` |
| m02 `gate_once` in place of `gate` | `confirm polls to a pass`, `stale-start is a gate code` |
| m03 PM check counts any instance | `external PM check` |
| m04 PM check drops the `startedAt` bound | `external PM check` |
| m05 `confirm` takes the newest `AWAITING-UNITS` | `open-activation` |
| m06 `rollback --to` skips the comparison | `sequence 7:` |
| m07 the default path drops `--user` from one call (`is-active`) | `user mode: every systemctl` |
| m08 the timeout writes r4's interim `rollback pending` line | `confirm polls: bus status`, `sequence 1:`, `sequence 5:` |
| m09 `AWAITING-UNITS` last, after the wrapper | `sequence 2:` |
| m10 a refusal names the open activation | `sequence 5:`, `open-activation` |
| m11 `stale-start` is a refusal | `stale-start is a gate code` |
| m12 `revert` restores without `MIGRATING` | `revert puts the wrapper back` |
| m13 `confirm` logs op `confirm` | `sequence 7:`, `confirm polls to a pass` |
| m14 `MIGRATING` after the migration | `sequence 8:` |
| m15 `gate` takes its floor from the log without `--since` | `gate (N2` |
| m16 `copy --bundle` skips the reachability check | stack-copy `row 232:` |
| m17 `wrapper --create` overwrites | stack-copy `row 232:` |
## Deviations and choices
D1. The shared helpers moved to a new file, `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-fixture.mjs`. The brief's
files list names `stack-release.test.mjs` "where a shared helper moves" but not a destination. Importing
from the other test file would run its 74 tests twice, so the helpers need a module of their own.
D2. The fixture's T17 check (what a run may never remove) now exempts a rollback set's `AWAITING-UNITS` and
`FAILED`. `confirm` removes both when it closes the activation (r6 A5 and R4). User mode writes neither, so
user-mode runs check exactly what they did.
D3. The user-mode argv and `--plan` tests read the base's scripts with `git show cb5fdb064:` rather than
storing their output as a fixture file. A later row that changes user-mode output on purpose moves the
`BASE` constant in the test to its own base, or the test fails. I chose this over a stored fixture because
a stored copy can drift from the base without anyone noticing.
D4. `marker-failed` is reached by making `state/stack-rollback` unwritable. r6 says "an existing `$RS`", but
`next_activation` never picks a taken name, so no test can make the run meet an existing `$RS`. The
exclusive `mkdir` is still what refuses.
D5. The stale-start polling case turns the enter time to `@1792540800`, not r6's `@1792540805`, with the
started line at 1792540800.900. That also checks that the floor is the whole second, so .900 doesn't push it
to 1792540801.
D6. No fake `sudo` or `case2-unit.sh`. r6's sequences ran under them because r6 had `case1-repin.sh` drive
the steps, and that script is I3's. Here the test plays root: it stops and starts the fake system units and
installs with the existing `bus-service.sh` and `webui-service.sh` stand-ins, between the real
`stack-release.sh` calls, on one log.
D7. The fake marker in the `open-activation` test is named `20000101T000000Z-<C1 prefix>` so it sorts
before the real one. A marker that sorted after it would leave m05 (newest marker) alive.
D8. m10 sets `ACT` inside `open_activation`, where r6's wording ("ACT set before the checks") lands in this
code. `ACT` is set only after every check in `confirm`.
D9. Row 200's `--sso` is a usage error under `--units external`, with the proof flags, `--no-proof` and
`--no-send`. It is a Console flag, and root's Console unit carries the Console flags; the script under
external renders no Console line and never calls `console_for_target`, so `sso_checks` doesn't run there
either. The usage text, the TOOLS.md bullet and the external usage test name it.
D10. Row 200's `config_checks` runs under `--units external` too, after `plugin_checks`, in both the
`--plan` and run paths of `activate` and `rollback --to`. It checks the target's loader against the stack
user's `config.json`, which the bus on a VM still reads, so a `console` key the target refuses would break
root's bus start the same way. The cost is one more refusal (`config-console-key`) an external run can
print; I took it over a bus that fails after root's start. The rebase changed no user-mode line: the
conflicts were the `SSO=0` globals line, the `plan` body (row 200's `SSO_PLAN` line sits in the user
branch) and the two `--plan` lines that gained `config_checks`. In the tests, row 200's fixture lines
(the loaders, `sso-config.mjs` and the `--sso` cli.mjs line for C1 and C) moved into
`stack-release-fixture.mjs` with the rest of the copy setup, and the `ALGS` import stays in
`stack-release.test.mjs`, which T57 uses.
## duckworth-0055's notes on r6 (brief line 169)
Duckworth's r6 approval (REVIEW-r5.md at 23f5520b5) carried two notes.
- N1, A2's stop timeout under `gate --since`. A unit that never stopped keeps its old `ActiveEnterTimestamp`,
so `gate --since` fails it with `stale-start`, and the run ends at exit 2 with root stopping the units.
That is intended: a unit that won't stop is a fair reason to stop. In I1 this is the gate code and its
polling (`stale-start: @1792540799 fails ...`, `gate (N2, A2f)`, m11). The run sheet's A2f line and the
re-pin test that points "exits 1 with OLD's gate passing" at an A3 exit 3 belong to I3, which owns
`scripts/stack-upgrade.sh` and `docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md`. I'll name both in the I3 build.
- N2, the claude path under `/opt/mosaic-stack` (gosalyn-0058, sage-1522). I1 doesn't touch it. Under
`--units external` the script checks no claude pin of its own (`no-claude-pin` applies only to user
mode), because root's unit carries it. The `--claude` value, the managed-settings reasoning, F6 and the
run sheet's claude step go to I2 and I3.
## Run environment
Worktree `/mnt/storage/scratch/darkwing-r232`, `TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/r232`, node from PATH.
One external file run takes about 94 s.
## Results
Singles on the rebased candidate, before the gate:
| File | Tests | Pass | Fail |
|---|---|---|---|
| `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-external.test.mjs` | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs` | 16 | 16 | 0 |
| `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs` (row 200's T57 included) | 192 | 192 | 0 |
| `packages/cli/tests/stack-instances.test.mjs` | 23 | 23 | 0 |
| `packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs` | 10 | 10 | 0 |
| `packages/cli/tests/channel-recovery.test.mjs` (imports `channel-fixture.mjs`, which names the scripts) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| `packages/cli/tests/host.test.mjs` (reads `packages/cli/README.md`) | 42 | 42 | 0 |
These are every test file that reads `stack-release.sh` or `stack-copy.sh` (a grep of `packages/*/tests` and
`scripts/`). None of them pins a sha256 of a changed file. `packages/cli/tests/host.test.mjs` reads
`packages/cli/README.md` for a unit file name; this row only adds a paragraph there. The grep and the runs
were repeated on the rebased tree on 2026-10-21; the reader set is the same. A dry run of `mutants.sh`
matches each of the 17 replacements once on the rebased scripts.
### Gate, 2026-10-21, Sage's slot (sage-1618)
Candidate a0ffabc3f on `darkwing/row232-r1`, run by `~/darkwing-scratch/r232/gate.sh`: the cli suite, then
every `scripts/test-*.sh`, one after another, stopping at the first failure. busy.sh passed at 01:07:49Z
after Launchpad's single `stack-release.test.mjs` run ended. The gate stopped at the first one, so the
chain waited for that PID to exit and checked again. The EXIT trap removed the compose network; no
container was left.
| Step | Time (UTC) | Result |
|---|---|---|
| `packages/cli`, `node --test tests/*.test.mjs` | 01:07:50 to 01:17:53 | 561 pass, 0 fail, 0 skipped |
| `scripts/test-auth.sh` | 01:17:53 to 01:17:54 | 15 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-conductor.sh` | 01:17:54 to 01:18:00 | 17 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-config.sh` | 01:18:00 to 01:18:02 | 31 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-discord.sh` | 01:18:02 to 01:18:12 | 78 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-extension-package.sh` | 01:18:12 to 01:18:13 | 18 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-foundation.sh` | 01:18:13 to 01:19:01 | 44 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-land-work.sh` | 01:19:01 to 01:19:14 | 86 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-queue.sh` | 01:19:14 to 01:19:37 | 156 node tests pass, queue suite 28 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-release.sh` | 01:19:37 to 01:19:51 | 14 passed, 0 failed |
| `scripts/test-task.sh` | 01:19:51 to 01:20:44 | 98 passed, 0 failed |
### Mutants, 2026-10-21, same slot
`~/darkwing-scratch/r232/mutants.sh`, right after the gate. Both controls (the external file whole, and
stack-copy's `^row 232: ` tests) exited 0 on the unmutated tree. Each mutant was applied after a checked
backup and a syntax check, ran its killers from the table above, and was put back with its sha256
checked. The script stops on any restore mismatch, and it ran to its end.
| Mutant | Killer exit | Result |
|---|---|---|
| m01 pointer on gate failure | 1 | killed |
| m02 gate once | 1 | killed |
| m03 PM from any instance | 1 | killed |
| m04 no startedAt check | 1 | killed |
| m05 newest marker | 1 | killed |
| m06 --to not compared | 1 | killed |
| m07 one call without --user | 1 | killed |
| m08 interim pending line | 1 | killed |
| m09 marker written last | 1 | killed |
| m10 refusal names the open activation | 1 | killed |
| m11 stale-start refuses | 1 | killed |
| m12 revert always restores | 1 | killed |
| m13 confirm op | 1 | killed |
| m14 MIGRATING after migrate | 1 | killed |
| m15 gate floor from the log | 1 | killed |
| m16 bundle reachability unchecked | 1 | killed |
| m17 --create overwrites | 1 | killed |
17 of 17 killed, 01:22:16 to 01:24:32Z. I read the logs for m01 and m09, two of the quick kills: each failed on
its named test's assertion (m09 on `AWAITING-UNITS` in sequence 2), not on a load error.
## Round 2: rebase onto 8fede5fc6 (sage-1673)
Rebase only. Before the landing gate, a check of BASE..HEAD on the manifest paths found that row 230
(c8bc5cf4c) had changed one of them after the round 1 base, cb5fdb064. Sage ruled a re-round with a
scoped review, the same shape as row 210 round 3.
Branch `darkwing/row232-r2`: the two round 1 commits, a0ffabc3f and 84f1a91e6, cherry-picked onto
8fede5fc6 with no conflict, then this section. No code or test changed.
- `git merge-tree --write-tree origin/refactor darkwing/row232-r1` (refactor at 8fede5fc6) gives tree
837bde79236c with no conflict. The cherry-picked tip before this section has the same tree.
- `packages/cli/README.md` is a clean 3-way merge. Row 230's hunk is at lines 710-717 (the session credential
paragraph); this row's is a new paragraph at 773. With `git patch-id --stable`, the README diff from r1 to
r2 is 02b679e2, the same as row 230's README diff `cb5fdb064..8fede5fc6`. This row's README diff is
c395ecd2 on both bases (`cb5fdb064..r1` and `8fede5fc6..r2`).
- The seven code, test and doc paths other than the README hash the same as in manifest 7a3b4ea1, which
Filbert approved in round 1: `docs/TOOLS.md`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`,
`packages/cli/tests/stack-release-external.test.mjs`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-fixture.mjs`,
`packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs`, `scripts/stack-copy.sh`, `scripts/stack-release.sh`.
This file also matched until this section was appended. Its other lines are unchanged.
- The one test that reads the README, `host.test.mjs:855`, looks for the unit's `EnvironmentFile=` line.
That line is unchanged context in row 230's hunk.
- No row 230 test reads `stack-release.sh` or `stack-copy.sh`, and no test of this row reads a row 230 file.
Nothing was run for this round. The landing gate runs on the r2 tip on Sage's slot.
Follow-up, doc-only (sage-1673): `scripts/case2-unit.sh:108` and `scripts/case2-precheck.sh:157` cite
`scripts/stack-copy.sh:8` and `:22` for `COPIES` and `copy_root`. With this row those lines are `:10` and
`:26`. Only comments are affected and no test reads them. Row 233 doesn't touch those scripts, so the fix
goes on the #1732 carry list.
-249
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@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
# Row 233 (I3): root's upgrade driver and the host run sheet
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_installer-rows.md` section I3, blob `e61291bcf1c6` (commit a0e3d7cfd), re-pinned
by Sage (sage-1685, rev 2631) from `f35e7e57daee` (ad6f0be7a). The later blob only appends I4; the I3 text
is the same. Gitea #1735, Vikunja P19
#432. Owner Darkwing, reviewer Filbert, gate owner Sage. Design input: row 195 DESIGN r6,
`agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md` at b7239bb66, sections 2, 4 and 7. Where the brief and r6
differ, the brief wins. Sage's rulings during the build: sage-1650 and sage-1652 (`--backup last`, the
`--no-rehearsal` mapping, `--rehearse-port`, hostcheck), and sage-1653 (`from_log newest`, the two external
plan refusals, the `BACKUP_STORE` line).
## Files
Base: e65a3ab4d, row 232's landing, on `darkwing/row233-r1`. The build started on ea1e85c7b
(`darkwing/row233`, row 232's candidate e6ca230d2 and its BUILD.md) before row 232 landed. The three row 232
files this row changes are identical on the two bases, so the uncommitted diff moved across unchanged.
- `scripts/stack-upgrade.sh` (new): `upgrade` and `rollback`, root's side of r6 A1-A5, A2f and R1-R4.
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-upgrade.test.mjs` (new, 20 tests).
- `docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` (new).
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: a new subsection "Root's upgrade driver (`scripts/stack-upgrade.sh`, row 233)", plus the
row 232 lines below.
- Row 232 files, changed on Sage's rulings (the brief's files list doesn't name them):
- `scripts/stack-release.sh`:
- `rehearse --backup last` takes the newest backup the log records (`from_log newest`) and prints
`PASS backup-last`. With none it fails `no-backup`, exits 3 and makes no rehearsal directory.
A newest backup that isn't an activation id aborts `backup-unreadable`, exit 1.
- The rehearsal prints `BACKUP_STORE <activation id> schema <version>` before its migration step.
- `--plan` under `--units external` refuses `open-activation` when any rollback set holds
`AWAITING-UNITS`, and `migrate-required` for a migrating target without `--migrate`. Root reads
only the plan's exit, so these two have to be refusals there. User mode prints the same bytes.
- `packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs`: three new `row 233:` tests for `--backup last`.
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: `--backup ACTIVATION|PATH|last` in the rehearse usage, a paragraph on `last`, and a
paragraph on the two external plan refusals.
- This file.
## The brief, item by item
| Brief item | Where |
|---|---|
| Root runs from a root-owned checkout, never a copy | `head-mismatch` (A1); TOOLS.md; run sheet section 6 |
| I2's render with `/etc/mosaic-stack/<instance>.args`, `--copy` the one changed value | `read_args`, `args_with`; the args test |
| The args file changes only after a confirmed run | `prepare_args` before A2, `mv` after A5; sequences 1 and 7, m6 |
| `copy --bundle` as the stack's user before A1 | the `fetch`, `ff`, `copy` steps; sequence 1's sudo keys |
| A rehearsal before A2, a failed one refuses with nothing stopped | `rehearse`; three rehearsal tests, m4 |
| The root lock, held to the end, rollback included | `flock -n 9`; the lock test and sequence 3's probe, m1, m2 |
| A1 refuses `open-activation` | stack-release.sh's external plan; the AWAITING-UNITS test, m3 |
| `migrate-required` without `--migrate` | stack-release.sh's external plan; its test, m5 |
| The step log, 0640, one line per step | `logl`, `step`; every test checks lines against `STEP` |
| Exit codes 0-3 | `finish`, `refuse`; exit 4 is usage |
| duckworth-0055's notes | the next section |
| Root parses no stack user output beyond exits | the step log test; the one exception is sage-1653's `BACKUP_STORE` |
| The host run sheet | `docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` |
## duckworth-0055's notes on r6 (brief line 169)
- N1, A2's stop timeout under `gate --since`. Row 232's BUILD.md left two pieces to I3. The run sheet's
A2f line is in section 6 ("When a run doesn't exit 0", exit 2). The test is `N1: a bus that outlives
A2's timeout keeps its old start`: a bus that ignores `stop` keeps its old `ActiveEnterTimestamp`,
`wait-down` logs `rc=1 ... state: active`, A2f restarts and gates, the gate fails `stale-start`, and the
driver stops both units and exits 2. Sequence 4 is the other half: an A3 exit 3 goes to A2f and exits
1 with the old copy's gate passing.
- N2, the claude path under `/opt/mosaic-stack`. Run sheet section 3 installs it there as root with
managed settings. The args file's `--claude` carries it, and `case2-unit.sh` already refuses a binary
that isn't root's or sits under the home. The driver passes the args file through and adds no claude
check of its own. F6 is I2's.
## Sage's rulings during the build
- sage-1650 and sage-1652. Root always runs the rehearsal and maps its exit:
- 0 goes on, or refuses `rehearsal-required` with `--no-rehearsal`.
- 3 refuses `no-backup`, or with `--no-rehearsal` logs `rehearsal-skipped` and goes on.
- Anything else refuses `rehearsal-failed`.
`--rehearse-port N`, default 7339. Hostcheck: a missing file or a nonzero `--check` refuses
`profile-drift`.
- sage-1653. `from_log newest`, and the external plan refusals `open-activation` and `migrate-required`.
Residual: the `BACKUP_STORE` id and schema land in root's step log, but nothing ties that backup to the
one the activation's own backup step takes later. A stopped backup before the upgrade would close that
gap; it's a later row, not this one.
## Tests
`stack-upgrade.test.mjs` runs the driver as the test's user against a scratch root, with the test seams
`STACK_UPGRADE_*`. The stand-ins are a fake `sudo` (logs its argv, checks the driver's form, then runs the
real command as the test's user, r6's B1 pattern), a fake `case2-unit.sh` render that installs and starts
the fixture units, a fake `systemctl` for root's system units, and a shell `hostcheck.sh`. The stack's
user's steps run the real `stack-release.sh` and `stack-copy.sh` from a clone made from a real bundle. The
units, copies and store are `stack-release-fixture.mjs`'s.
| Test | Covers |
|---|---|
| sequence 1 | confirm fails healthz, rollback with `--cause A5`, exit 1; every sudo call in the driver's form |
| sequence 2 | `activate --migrate` fails at the wrapper, store restored, `--cause A3`, exit 1 |
| sequence 3 | render fails, `--cause A4`; a probe run during `render-old` refuses `upgrade-running` |
| sequence 4 | stage exits 3, A2f restarts and gates the old units, exit 1 |
| N1 | a unit that won't stop: A2f's gate fails `stale-start`, exit 2, units stopped |
| sequence 5 | confirm of the wrong copy refused, `--cause A5`, exit 1 |
| sequence 6 | revert fails, exit 2; the next run refuses `interrupted-run` at its plan |
| sequence 7 | two upgrades and a `rollback --to` with `--restore`; the args file after each confirm; `to-not-previous` |
| sequence 8 | a migration that writes and fails, store back byte for byte, exit 1 |
| lock | a second run while the lock is held: one log line, no call |
| open-activation | any `AWAITING-UNITS` refuses at A1, nothing stopped |
| migrate-required | refused without `--migrate`, no rehearsal, nothing stopped |
| rehearsal-failed | the rehearsal's argv, exit 3, nothing stopped |
| `BACKUP_STORE` | the line after a match; four malformed lines log `BACKUP_STORE none` |
| no-backup | the real rehearsal with no backup refuses; `--no-rehearsal` logs the skip and goes on |
| backup-last | the real rehearsal names the newest backup; `--no-rehearsal` with one refuses `rehearsal-required` |
| args file | group write, other write, two `--copy`, an unknown flag, a symlink, `args-differ` |
| hostcheck | nonzero `--check` and a missing file refuse `profile-drift` before the plan |
| head-mismatch | checkout not at `--sha`; a commit the clone can't fast-forward to refuses `fetch-failed` |
| usage | twelve bad argvs exit 4 with no log and no lock |
The step log check (`STEP`) runs in every test that reads the log: each line must be a step line or the
result line, and none may hold the stack user's output (`stack-release:`, `PASS `, `FAIL `, `REHEARSAL`,
the fake rehearsal's text).
## Mutants
`~/darkwing-scratch/r233/mutants.sh`, not committed because it edits the worktree. It has the brief's six
mutants and two for sage-1650's mapping. The method is row 232's: a checked backup, exact replacements, a
syntax check, the named killers, then the file put back with its sha256 checked. One control runs first:
the whole `stack-upgrade.test.mjs` with no change. `DRY=1` matched each replacement once on the candidate
(2026-10-21).
| Mutant | File | Killers |
|---|---|---|
| m1 drop the flock | stack-upgrade.sh | `a second run while the lock is held`, `sequence 3:` |
| m2 release the lock when the rollback starts | stack-upgrade.sh | `sequence 3:` |
| m3 skip A1's open-activation check | stack-release.sh | `A1 refuses open-activation` |
| m4 skip the rehearsal | stack-upgrade.sh | `the rehearsal runs after the plan`, `sequence 1:` |
| m5 accept a migrating target without `--migrate` | stack-release.sh | `migrate-required` |
| m6 write the args file before confirm | stack-upgrade.sh | `sequence 7:`, `sequence 1:` |
| m7 `--no-rehearsal` accepted with a backup | stack-upgrade.sh | `refuses rehearsal-required` |
| m8 drop the `rehearsal-skipped` line | stack-upgrade.sh | `a real rehearsal with no backup` |
## Deviations
D1. The brief has A1 refuse `open-activation` for an open `AWAITING-UNITS` or a non-empty `interrupted`
set. The interrupted case refuses with row 232's existing code, `interrupted-run`; only `AWAITING-UNITS`
gives `open-activation`. Both reach root as `plan-refused`, exit 3 (sequence 6, the open-activation test).
D2. Root copies one line of the stack user's output into its log, `BACKUP_STORE`, on sage-1653. It
matches a fixed pattern first, takes the last match, logs `BACKUP_STORE none` otherwise, and decides
nothing on it.
D3. The stack user's steps carry no `--instance`. The driver takes `--instance dev` only, row 190's default
instance, which the stack user's commands select with no flag. A named instance's units are a later row.
D4. Most tests fake the rehearsal in the fake `sudo`: the fixture's stub copies can't pass a real one. Two
tests run the real rehearsal (`faults/real-rehearse`): no-backup and backup-last. `stack-release.test.mjs`
covers `--backup last` itself.
D5. Any nonzero `--plan` exit refuses `plan-refused`, exit 3, whatever the code. The stack user's output
above it names the refusal; root doesn't parse it.
D6. `rollback --restore ACT` is accepted without `--events`, as `stack-release.sh rollback` accepts it.
The brief's usage pairs them. `--events` without `--restore` is a usage error.
D7. The refusal of any `STACK_UPGRADE_*` seam when run as root has no test, because the tests don't run
as root. It is three lines at the top of the script.
D8. The fake `sudo` keeps the test's environment, where real `sudo` resets it. The driver passes
everything the stack user needs through `env PATH=...` and `-H`, and the fake checks that form.
D9. Exit 3 means nothing stopped, not nothing changed. A refusal after `fetch` leaves the stack user's
clone fast-forwarded and the new copy made. Both are the user's own state, and the next run reuses them.
TOOLS.md and the run sheet say so.
D10. The brief's usage has neither `--no-rehearsal` nor `--rehearse-port`. Both come from sage-1650 and
sage-1652.
## Decisions
- `rollback` has no HEAD check. Its target is an older copy than root's checkout, which already exists.
It fetches, copies and rehearses nothing (sequence 7).
- The new args file is written next to the old one (`.dev.args.XXXXXX`, same mode) before A2, so a full
`/etc` refuses before anything stops. It moves into place after A5. A2f and the rollback remove it; a failed move keeps it and names it.
- Every stack user step gets `--copies` explicitly, so the copies directory comes from the args file's
`--home`, never from the user's environment.
- The stack's user does the fetch, the fast-forward and the copy, so root never runs git on a tree that
user can write.
- A4 is the render, and `case2-unit.sh` starts the bus, then the Console. The forward path has no
`systemctl start` of its own; only A2f does.
## Run environment
Worktree `/mnt/storage/scratch/darkwing-r233`, `TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/r233`, node from PATH. One
whole `stack-upgrade.test.mjs` run takes about 56 s.
## Results
### Singles, run 1, 2026-10-21, Sage's slot (sage-1689)
`~/darkwing-scratch/r233/singles.sh` on `darkwing/row233-r1` (base e65a3ab4d, uncommitted tree), 03:48:20Z
to 03:59:00Z. These are the test files that read a changed script. `stack-instances.test.mjs` reads
`stack-release.sh`, so it joined the three named in the plan.
| File | Result |
|---|---|
| `stack-upgrade.test.mjs` | 20 pass, 0 fail |
| `stack-release.test.mjs` | 194 pass, 1 fail |
| `stack-release-external.test.mjs` | 25 pass, 0 fail |
| `stack-instances.test.mjs` | 23 pass, 0 fail |
The failure was my test, not the script. "row 233: --backup last takes the newest backup..." compares
`untouched(e)` before and after the run, and `untouched` includes `existsSync(e.log)`. The test took its
before snapshot ahead of `rlog()`, which writes the log, so that flag went from false to true. Every hash in
the snapshot matched. The fix takes the snapshot after `rlog()`. No other row 233 test calls `untouched`.
### Singles, run 2
`~/darkwing-scratch/r233/rerun.sh` on aacfa2d7a, Sage's slot (sage-1695), 04:13:05Z to 04:21:28Z:
`stack-release.test.mjs` whole, 195 pass, 0 fail, 0 skipped. The fixed test passed. The other three files
did not change after run 1. The gate and the mutants run next, in Sage's slot.
### Gate and mutants, 2026-10-21, Sage's slot (sage-1704)
`~/darkwing-scratch/r233/gate.sh` then `mutants.sh`, chained behind `busy.sh`, on d99166ade (code
aacfa2d7a; d99166ade changes only this file). Counts are an awk sum over `gate-r1.out`.
| Part | Time (UTC) | Result |
|---|---|---|
| cli suite (`node --test tests/*.test.mjs`) | 04:29:01-04:37:27 | 616 pass, 0 fail, 0 skipped |
| the 10 `scripts/test-*.sh` | 04:37:27-04:39:38 | selftests 429 passed, 0 failed; `test-queue`'s node part 156 pass, 0 fail |
| gate total | | 1201 pass, 0 fail, 11 suites, `GATE_PASSED` |
| c0 control | 04:39:38-04:40:35 | exit 0 |
| m1-m8 | 04:40:35-04:41:25 | 8 of 8 killed, every one exit 1 |
Every restore passed its sha256 check, and `git diff` was clean at d99166ade afterwards. The EXIT trap
removed the `darkwing-r233_default` network.
N1, found in the process sweep after the run: a `sleep 60` was left with its cwd in `packages/cli`.
`stack-upgrade.test.mjs:312` spawns `flock LOCK sleep 60`, and its `t.after` SIGKILLs only the flock, so
flock's child outlives the test by up to 60 s. It exited on its own. Row 232's T20
(`stack-release.test.mjs:370`) spawns its holder `detached` and kills the group with `process.kill(-pid)`.
The fix is the same two lines. That test is one of m1's killers.
Sage ruled it a fix now (sage-1707), and 08db6ac3f makes it, test only. After the gate's d99166ade
the only change outside this file is that test:
```
$ git diff --stat d99166ade 08db6ac3f
packages/cli/tests/stack-upgrade.test.mjs | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
```
The gate stands on Sage's ruling. The rerun is the whole `stack-upgrade.test.mjs` singly plus m1, in
Sage's slot, with a sweep for a leftover `sleep` afterwards.
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# Row 240 (I4): root's host check, its pins and the boot unit
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_installer-rows.md` section I4, blob `4a5a65020f00` (commit b00d7d94d, rev 2665,
the pin row 240 carries; the I3 carry items came in with it). Sage split it out of I3 (sage-1650). Gitea #1746, Vikunja P19 #432. Owner Darkwing, reviewer Filbert, gate owner Sage.
Design: row 195 DESIGN r6 B2, `agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md` at b7239bb66, :262-303 (the script,
the three callers) and :839-860 (files, test cases, mutants). Where the brief and r6 differ, the brief wins.
## Files
Drafted on `darkwing/row240-r1` from d99166ade (row 233's candidate) while row 233's gate ran, then applied
as one patch onto row 233's landing, 57f59e0c3, on `darkwing/row240-r2` (sage-1753). It applied cleanly; between
the two bases the only change on this row's paths is 233's N1 test fix in `stack-upgrade.test.mjs`. Row 234
then landed as c771a36f4 on 57f59e0c3. Sage preferred that the gate run with it in the tree (sage-1773), so both
commits were picked onto c771a36f4 as `darkwing/row240-r3`. That was a clean pick: the 42 paths changed from
57f59e0c3 to c771a36f4 share none with this row's 9.
- `scripts/case1-pins.sh` (new, 0644): `PIN_PROFILES_VERSION`, `PIN_PROFILE_SHA256`, `PIN_BUBBLEWRAP_VERSION`,
r6 section 0's values.
- `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` (new, 0755): the seven items and `--check`, `--enforce`, `--upstream`.
- `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-hostcheck.service` (new): the boot oneshot.
- `packages/cli/tests/case1-hostcheck.test.mjs` (new, 16 tests). The cli suite's `tests/*.test.mjs` glob picks
it up.
- `docs/guides/host-run-sheet.md` section 4: the install lines that replace "Install them from row 240's run
sheet lines once it lands", plus rollback, drift recovery and `--upstream` before a re-pin window. Sections
3, 6, 8 and 10 for the I3 carry items below.
- `scripts/stack-upgrade.sh` and `packages/cli/tests/stack-upgrade.test.mjs`: I3 N1 below.
- `docs/TOOLS.md`: a new subsection "Root's host check (`scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh`, row 240)" after the
upgrade driver's.
Brief line 257 said I3's `stack-upgrade.sh` doesn't change. Sage's ruling sage-1727 widened the row to it for
N1 alone. Its default `STACK_UPGRADE_HOSTCHECK=/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/hostcheck.sh` is where the run
sheet installs this script.
## Carried from I3
Filbert's row 233 approve (Gitea 29922) left five notes. Sage ruled N1, N4 and N5 into this row and N2 and N3
to DEFERRED.md (sage-1727).
| Note | Change |
|---|---|
| N1: `stack-upgrade.sh` exits 1 `args-failed` when the args move after A5 fails, but exit 1 means the old copy runs | The move's failure exits 5 `args-failed`. The header, TOOLS.md's step 5 and exit line, and run sheet section 6's exit list name exit 5 and what root does: move the new file the result line names into place. Test `row 240: I3 N1: a failed args move after A5 exits 5 ...` makes `/etc/mosaic-stack` read-only at confirm and checks exit 5, the step names, `args rc=1`, the result line, both units on the new copy, the old args file's bytes and the new file beside it. The step log regex takes `exit=5`. Mutant M8. |
| N4: section 3's `npm install` has no npm on root's PATH, and the `--claude` path is unnamed while `node_modules/.bin/claude` is a symlink `case2-unit.sh:140` refuses | The install line runs with section 2's pinned node first on PATH (the postinstall runs `node` too). The `--claude` path is `node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/bin/claude.exe`, and a `--version` line catches the postinstall's 500-byte stub. |
| N5: sections 8 and 10 lack precheck lines | Each gets "Precheck line: none" and its missing line. |
Exit 5 is new rather than 2 because 2 means both units are stopped, and here both run. Exit 4 stays usage.
The `claude.exe` path comes from the 2.1.304 package itself: `npm view` gives `bin.claude` as `bin/claude.exe`,
and its `install.cjs` hardlinks the platform binary over that placeholder, or copies it across devices, then
sets 0755. I downloaded the tarball into `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/r240/cc304` and read it; nothing ran. The
run sheet says a newer pin needs the same check.
## The brief, item by item
| Brief line | Where |
|---|---|
| 247 `case1-pins.sh` holds the three pins | `scripts/case1-pins.sh`; the pins test checks the values against r6's |
| 248-249 seven items, `--check` exits 0 or 1 | `items()` and the final dispatch; the check tests |
| 250-251 `--enforce`: `apparmor_parser -R`, `root:root 0700`, `DRIFT`, a log line, exit 0 | `enforce()` and `stop_bwrap()`; the four enforce tests |
| 252 `--upstream` compares the current deb to the pin | `upstream()`; the upstream test |
| 253 the boot oneshot | `mosaic-hostcheck.service`; the boot unit test |
| 254-255 fakes for every host tool, r6's seven case groups, seven mutants | the test file; Tests and Mutants below |
| 257 the I3 run sheet item points here | run sheet section 4 |
## Tests
Fakes on PATH, each logging its argv to `$HC/calls.log`: `aa-status`, `dpkg`, `dpkg-statoverride`,
`apparmor_parser`, `systemd-run`, `stat`, `chown`, `chmod`, `apt-get`, `dpkg-deb`. `host(t)` builds a scratch
root (`/etc`, `/proc/sys`, `/usr/bin/bwrap`, `/var/log`) and a lib dir with a copy of the script and fixture
pins that hold the fixture profile's sha256. Every run passes `--root`.
r6's case groups (:843-856) against the tests:
| r6 case | Tests |
|---|---|
| `--check` exits 0 with all seven, 1 with each failing alone, its line naming it | `check: exits 0 ...`, `check: exits 1 with each item failing alone ...`, plus one test per item for the item's edge cases |
| item 3: a second file naming `bwrap` as a word, `/{usr/,}bin/bwrap` included; passes with the profile alone | `check: item 3 ...` |
| item 4: `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)` or a trailing space fails; the argv carries `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes` and the 2a' properties | `check: item 4 ...` checks the whole argv |
| item 7: the floor at 732 fails | `check: item 6 ...; item 7 ...` (733 passes as the control) |
| `--enforce` exits 0 on a pass and every failure; unload, close, `DRIFT`, one log line; `DRIFT` present with every item passing still closes | `enforce: a pass ...`, `enforce: each failure ...`, `enforce: with DRIFT present ...` |
| `--enforce` never calls `dpkg-statoverride` with `--update`, `--add` or `--remove` | `enforce: no unload ...; never writes the statoverride` (every call is `--list /usr/bin/bwrap`) |
| a bubblewrap version other than the pin is a line, not a failure | `check: a bubblewrap version other than the install pin ...` |
| `--upstream` against a differing deb prints the difference, exits 0 | `upstream: ...` (also: a match, a deb with no profile, a failed download) |
| the unit: `Type=oneshot`, `After=apparmor.service`, `[email protected]`, runs `--enforce` | `boot unit: ...` |
The last test also checks that the repo script reads `scripts/case1-pins.sh` beside it, that bad usage exits
2, and that a non-root run without `--root` refuses.
Singles are the two files that run a changed script: `case1-hostcheck.test.mjs` and `stack-upgrade.test.mjs`.
Sage asked (sage-1759) whether `stack-release.test.mjs` or `stack-release-external.test.mjs`, which share
`stack-release-fixture.mjs`, run `stack-upgrade.sh` or `case1-pins.sh`. They don't. `grep -cF` for
`stack-upgrade`, `case1-pins`, `case1-hostcheck` and `hostcheck` gives 0 in all three files; the control
`stack-release.sh` gives 2 in the fixture and 8 in `stack-release.test.mjs`. `scripts/stack-release.sh` names
`stack-upgrade.sh` once, in a comment (:2061). The gate's cli suite runs both files anyway.
## Mutants
r6's seven (:858-860) and one for I3 N1, scripted in `~/darkwing-scratch/r240/mutants.sh` with r233's method: a checked backup,
an exact replacement that must match once, `bash -n`, the named killer by `--test-name-pattern`, the restore
and a sha256 check. A dry run matched all eight once each. Results below.
| Mutant | Change | Killer |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | `--enforce` exits 1 after the stop | `enforce: each failure exits 0 ...` |
| M2 | `[ ! -e "$DRIFT" ] \|\| had=1` becomes `true \|\| had=1` | `enforce: with DRIFT present ...` |
| M3 | item 1's `dpkg -S` becomes `owner=""; rc=1` | `check: item 1 fails when a package owns ...` |
| M4 | item 3's `grep -rlw bwrap` becomes `grep -rlF /usr/bin/bwrap` | `check: item 3 ...` |
| M5 | item 4's `[ "$label" = "$LABEL" ]` becomes a substring match | `check: item 4 ...` |
| M6 | item 4 drops `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes` | `check: item 4 ...` (argv) |
| M7 | item 7's `-gt` becomes `-ge` | `check: item 6 ...; item 7 fails with the floor at 732 ...` |
| M8 | `stack-upgrade.sh`'s `finish 5 args-failed` becomes `finish 1 args-failed` (I3 N1) | `row 240: I3 N1: a failed args move ...` |
## Deviations
- Repo name `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` (r6), installed as `/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/hostcheck.sh`, the
name in brief line 239 and I3's `stack-upgrade.sh` default. r6's apt hook line says `case1-hostcheck.sh`;
the run sheet's hook uses the installed name.
- `stat` is a fake too. r6 lists seven fakes; a test can't make a root-owned file, so item 5's `stat` reads a
fixture.
- Item 7 with no Console unit installed reads the port as 1023 and says so ("1023, because no Console unit
is installed"). Until I2 installs the unit the floor must be above 1023. A unit with no `--port` fails.
- Item 4 runs under `timeout 60`. A hung `systemd-run` would otherwise hang the apt hook and the boot unit.
## Decisions
- Fail closed where r6 is silent:
- pins with no 64-hex sha fail item 1;
- `dpkg -S` exit 1 (no owner) passes, exit 0 fails with the owner, any other exit fails with the code;
- a failed `aa-status` fails item 2 and counts as loaded, so `--enforce` tries the unload.
- `--root DIR` is the test seam (r6 :840). Root refuses it; a non-root user needs it. Both exit 2. Root runs
with `PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin`.
- `DRIFT` is append-only (`<stamp> <failed line>`), and `--enforce` never removes it. The log line is written
only when the stop runs: `<stamp> enforce stop items=<ids or none> drift-before=<0|1> unload=<rc=N|no-file|skipped> chown=N chmod=N`.
- `--upstream` exits 1 when the download or the unpack fails, since it then compared nothing. A deb without
the profile file is a difference (exit 0), per r6 :302-303.
- The bubblewrap note reads the version from `dpkg -s bubblewrap`.
- The run sheet's recovery steps (`chown root:mosaic`, `chmod 0750`, `apparmor_parser -r`, then `--check`
before root removes `DRIFT`) are mine. r6 says only that root removes `DRIFT` in a reviewed step.
## Run environment
Worktree `/mnt/storage/scratch/darkwing-r240b`, branch `darkwing/row240-r3` on c771a36f4, with `node_modules`
linked to the canonical checkout's. Node v26.8.1, kernel 7.2.2-1-cachyos, 16 CPUs, TMPDIR
`/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/r240`, compose project `darkwing-r240b`. Sage's slot (sage-1773, 06:16Z). Each run is
one chain behind `busy.sh`, launched from `/`: `~/darkwing-scratch/r240/run-all.sh` checks the HEAD pin and a
clean tree, runs the singles, then the mutants (8 killed, none surviving, the tree clean after), then the gate
(the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh`), each stopping the chain on failure, then sweeps `/proc` cwd links
for anything left in the r240 trees.
## Results
Run r1, 06:17:10Z on 47ec9fe2f, failed at the singles. `case1-hostcheck.test.mjs` passed 16/0/0, and
`stack-upgrade.test.mjs` went 20 pass, 1 fail. The failure was the N1 test's own `t.after` hook, which ran
`chmodSync(e.etc, 0o755)` after the fixture's cleanup had already removed the scratch root, so it threw ENOENT.
Every assertion in the test body had passed, exit 5 included. The fixture's cleanup runs `chmod -R u+w` on the
root before `rmSync`, so the 0555 dir never needed the hook. b45852daa drops it and changes nothing else. The
mutants and the gate didn't run. The sweep found nothing left. Sage counted r1 as this slot's one failure
(sage-1788).
Run r2, 06:20:41Z to 06:33:28Z on b45852daa, passed. The counts come from awk over the .out files
(`~/darkwing-scratch/r233/sum.sh`):
| Step | Result |
|---|---|
| `case1-hostcheck.test.mjs` | 16/0/0 |
| `stack-upgrade.test.mjs` | 21/0/0 |
| c0 control | exit 0 |
| M1-M8 | 8/8 killed, none survived, every restore's sha256 matched, tree clean after |
| `packages/cli` suite | 639/0/0 |
| `scripts/test-*.sh` | auth 15, conductor 17, config 31, discord 78, extension-package 18, foundation 44, land-work 86, queue 156 node + 28 selftest, release 14, task 98; 585 pass, 0 fail |
| Gate total | 11 suites, 1224 pass, 0 fail |
| Sweep | nothing left in the r240 trees; the compose network was removed |
This commit adds only these BUILD.md lines. No test reads BUILD.md.
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# Duckworth
Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Gander
Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for the human
boundary row (P19 333, #1694, mos-0989).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gander/*`
branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Gizmoduck
Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# T3 federation design: factory and hub (Vikunja #414, G3, G4, C1.1)
Author Gizmoduck (Opus 5.5), 2026-10-20, r4.11. Design only, no product code. Reviewer Duckworth (Opus 5.5,
mos-0978), r1 verdict changes B1-B5 (duckworth-0001, REVIEW.md at b402197ff), r2 verdict changes B6 (duckworth-0002,
REVIEW-r2.md at 03a663cd7), r3 verdict changes B7 (duckworth-0003, REVIEW-r3.md at 45cbe5896), r4 verdict changes B8 (duckworth-0005, REVIEW-r4.md at
4966136d4), r4.1 verdict changes, B8's issuer host (duckworth-0007, REVIEW-r4.1.md at b14f11136), r4.4 verdict changes B9 (duckworth-0010, REVIEW-r4.4.md at 4cf3ce232), r4.5 approved (duckworth-0012, REVIEW-r4.5.md at 912b1d325). R1, R2 and R5 go to Sage's
queue once Duckworth approves, and Sage assigns owners. Code lines are at origin/refactor 9ae8c73ac. The
Q175 SSO design is cited at Sage's local commit 817e8f51b (agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md), which was
not on origin when this was written.
Binding inputs: TARGET.md addendum 2026-10-20, DECISIONS Q175 to Q178, projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md and
PLAN.md T3 (all in jason-master-restart).
## Changes from r1
- B1. A user principal now comes only from the Console's verified OIDC session. The user CLI takes the
human proof's walk, which refuses agent markers and binaries, and its direct parent must be the
Console from the bus's own tree. This needs the path-bound human proof (P19 333). Residual risk in 3.6.
- B2. 3.6 names the ownership changes: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the `#human` gates and `thread.send`'s
sender fields. `message.send` is on no list, and `#threadFor` refuses users as a second wall.
- B3. One level for 10-27, `collaborator`, with an exact verb list and a filter per read (3.5). Viewer and
every board read wait.
- B4. Revocation has three triggers: the next user request, a 30 s broker timer, and a reload verb that
R5 calls. The launcher refuses to start a revoked thread, because the broker reports it on every
`threadsState`. It also SIGTERMs a running one (3.7). R4 now depends on R3 and R5.
- B5. A separate uid per instance is a hard entry gate of R8, with checks (mos-0984 point 2).
- N1 to N9 are handled where they apply: v1 count (2), `configDir` at business.mjs:25-28 (5), R1 takes
providers and peers as arguments (7), "human-only" (3.5), file checks (3.5), `instances` as the real limit
(3.5), provider removal needs a Console restart (3.7), Q1 is with Jason (9), client ids in R8 (7).
- r3 (duckworth-0002): B6, the reply path to a user (3.6 item 7, runner header, R3 test and mutant, R7
asserts a reply). C1, the walk doesn't stop an unsandboxed same-uid agent (3.6). N10, `names` gates
through `#agent` (3.6 item 4). mos-0991: R8's gate accepts a separate host or a separate uid, and 3.8
checks the federation path for one-host assumptions. Q1 holds Jason's answer. morgana-0002 settles Q2.
- r4 (duckworth-0003, mos-0996): B7, R8's gate now proves there is no privilege path from the factory to
the hub. Per mos-0996 (Vikunja #418) the hub runs on its own host, and for 10-27 the gate is the host form
only. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. The checks run as the factory uid with a clean
environment and pass only when the call fails: `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the
hub host with and without the agent socket. Factory root on the PVE nodes defeats the host form
(duckworth-0004, mos-1004), so it is an open R8 gate item with options O1 to O3 for Jason (Vikunja
#419, section 8). N11, `#waiting` returns null for `to` `user` (3.6 item 7, R3).
N12, R3 assumes nothing about how shares end (section 9 Q2). Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the shared
principal verifier before R3 (section 5).
- r4.11 (mos-1063): the hub's host is settled, so the "own host, not dragon-lin or Melanie's server"
lines and the #418 dependency are gone. The hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), and R8
depends on the Case 2 install on .54 (#416). #418 is closed. #419 carries only the wording for
Melanie. Mos ruled the four functional checks stay blocking.
- r4.10 (mos-1055, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183): R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts with Jason's
acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check
still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with who ran it. They report and don't refuse.
Agents may run the .54 checks as localadmin, which replaces r4.9's line. The mos-1042 order is now in
the R8 row. The wording still reaches Melanie only through Jason (#419).
Two lines that said R8 proves the factory has no login on the hub (sections 3.5 and 3.6) now say
factory agents keep ssh to .54 under Q183, recorded as accepted.
- r4.9 (mos-1037): R8 names who runs the root checks on 10.1.1.54.
- r4.8 (duckworth-0020 N22): R8 checks the hub user's limits on 10.1.1.54 instead of taking #421's plan
as done.
- r4.7 (mos-1030, DECISIONS Q181): the hosts are settled. Case 1 is W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), the
same host as the Hermes agents, so section 8 lists them as one factory host. The hub, Case 2, is
W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Its OS user is `mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups
and no keys (ops-01's tightening plan section 3, Vikunja #421).
- r4.6 (duckworth-0012 N21, morgana-0011): R6's notice is row 193's final user sentence, word for word
(row 193 design r5 section 5.7, morgana/row193 e2d161e2e). The start-order line now matches the
section 7 table: R2 waits on #412 phase 1, and R5 lands after R1.
- r4.5 (duckworth-0010): B9, a user-thread run can't message the owner, but its decisions do reach the
owner's inbox, as Sage ruled for row 193 (sage-1368, morgana-0008)
and Mos kept (mos-1022). 3.6 item 7 says so, R6 tells
the user, and R3 tests both sides. N20, the start-order line waits for row 193's viewer level. R8
can't start while any host variable is unresolved.
- r4.4 (mos-1020, mos-1019): N17, R4 is chained after row 193's viewer level and keeps the level-loss
test, which has to kill its mutant before R4 is done.
- r4.3 (duckworth-0007): B8, an issuer that isn't on the hub host must pass the host-access, hypervisor
and backups rows against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call
check (section 8, sign-in row). N16, the dependency note covers every secret on a PVE guest. N17, R4's
level-loss test moves to row 193's viewer level. N18, 3.6 names `verifyPrincipal`. N19, the TLS check
runs through the public route and from the LAN.
- r4.2 (mos-1013, morgana-0007): "factory" in R8 and section 8 means every principal outside the hub
instance, not only the dragon-lin uid: the dragon-lin dev uid, the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents,
and Jason's Hermes agents on W-jarvis. Every R8 check runs from each of their hosts. Hosts are variables
until Mos confirms them with Jason. The table rows don't change. Q1 is settled by Q180: P2P is
person-to-person. Row 193 calls `covers` with no level for share reads and with
`level: 'collaborator'` for create, open, send and share, so `covers` needs no other argument
(morgana-0007, row 193 DESIGN.md at 19c015741).
- r4.1 (mos-1006, gander-0007, morgana-0005): R8's gate adds the identity provider path. A factory
credential that can administer the issuer the hub trusts gets in without the host (the B8 bullet below
has the rule). Mos accepted the sudo deviation (root ssh
and the `authorized_keys` check). Row 196's interface is settled: one verify per one-request
connection, `s.user` for that request only, and the walk mutants move to row 196. morgana-0005: grants
name bus project ids, and one pure `covers` in R1 matches a grant to a thread (3.5). R4's loss
predicate counts only collaborator grants, so a downgrade to viewer ends the run.
- r4.1 (duckworth-0005): B8, the hub's issuer and TLS front end are in its trust base. The hub trusts
only an issuer no factory credential can administer, and TLS ends where the factory can't reach
(3.4, R8). A brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count. N13, the key check
is a procedure. N14, R3 consumes row 196's verifier and depends on it. N15, DNS control. mos-1009:
section 8 has a table of every privilege path (hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end,
certificate authority, DNS, network), each closed by a check or accepted by Jason with set wording.
- r2.1 (mos-0988): the separate uid is row 190b. R8's gate points at 190b, R7 at row 190 (one uid,
scratch). P19 333 is on the 10-27 path (section 8).
- Mos's rulings in mos-0978 and mos-0984 replace the r1 questions (section 9). The push credential note is
in section 10.
## 1. Summary
By 10-27, federation means a person from one instance can sign in to the other instance's Console and use
exactly what its owner granted: one business, some projects and its thread instance, at the collaborator
level. The receiving instance verifies that person itself through OIDC (Q175) and its broker enforces the
grant on every request. Revoking a grant refuses the next request and stops that user's thread runs within
about 30 s, or at once when the grant CLI makes the change.
Instance-to-instance traffic, where an agent on the factory talks to a role on the hub, waits until after
10-27 unless Jason rules otherwise (mos-0984 point 3). Section 6 sketches it (Ed25519 instance keys and
signed HTTP requests) so the 10-27 slice doesn't block it.
## 2. What exists today (measured)
- F1. The bus is a local Unix socket per data root: `socketPath` at packages/cli/src/config.mjs:19, opened
at packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs:169. Nothing listens on a network port. No live federation code exists.
The PRD lists REQ-FED-1 as post-v1 (packages/tasks/requirements.json:61).
- F2. A business has exactly one human: `human` at packages/business/src/business.mjs:160.
`bindHuman` refuses any other name (packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:532-538).
- F3. The human proof is a cooperative same-uid process check, not a wall. `verifyHuman` compares the
caller's uid, start time, nonce and CLI path (packages/bus/src/human.mjs:52-72), then walks the parents
and refuses agent markers, launch records and agent binaries (:73-88). The tester proof refuses only
managed runs and allows agents by design (packages/bus/src/tester.mjs:5-9, :56-60). The server takes
exactly one of `cap`, `human` or `tester` per request (packages/bus/src/server.mjs:52-70).
- F4. Authority for agents is checked in the broker: `#checkAuthority` and `#authorityFor`
(broker.mjs:763-799), with classification at :596-609. Every one of these is about a role run. Humans
get no roles. `#human` (broker.mjs:375-378) is the only human check.
- F5. Threads have a single `owner` column (packages/bus/schema.sql:247). `#thread` refuses a thread whose
owner isn't the caller (broker.mjs:356-362). `#owner` returns `tester` or the human (broker.mjs:364-366).
`#threadFor` special-cases the human (:326) and checks reply chains for the tester only (`#testerOwns`,
:352-355, called at :337 and :342). `#threadHolders(business, instance, owner)` finds the held runs of
one owner's threads (broker.mjs:298-306).
- F6. The Console reaches the bus as the one human by spawning `human-cli.mjs` per call
(packages/webui/src/bus.mjs:1-9, 27-31). Its entry is `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve`
(scripts/webui-service.sh:3). Its sign-in today trusts a proxy header (Sage's design, section "What exists
today"). Q175 replaces that with an OIDC relying party that takes a `subjects` list from a `console.sso`
key in config.json (Sage's design sections 1 and 4).
- F7. config.json is read by one loader that refuses unknown top-level keys
(scripts/mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). The business file is writable by agents through
`organizationWriter` (packages/business/src/organization.mjs:83), which is why Sage put SSO config in
config.json and not the business file.
- F8. Bus, Discord and Console run as `systemctl --user` units (scripts/bus-service.sh:200), so every
instance on a host runs under Jason's uid today.
- F9. Board reads are per business, not per project or instance: `inbox`, `agents`, `tasks`, `trail` at
broker.mjs:2143-2146, `decisions` :2174, `credentials` :2195, `messages` :2217 (the Console's set is
views.mjs:3-13). `project.list` returns every project in the business (:2318-2322).
- F10. The launcher restarts a thread that has pending messages and no holder (packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:533),
launched as the business human (:542), every 2 s (:133). Its `startedFor` guard is in memory. A claim end
stops a run only at its next bus call (broker.mjs:2273-2275). The idle stop is the one place that
SIGTERMs a thread runner (launcher.mjs:527).
### The archived v1 federation (v1/apps/gateway/src/federation)
What it does: mTLS between gateways with certificates from step-ca. The grant id and subject user id sit
in custom certificate OIDs (ca.service.ts:22-24). A peer enrolls with a single-use, 15-minute bearer
token. The guard reads the client certificate off the TLS socket (server/federation-auth.guard.ts:93-106)
and re-checks the grant row on every request. Scopes are zod-validated resource lists
(scope-schema.ts:15-99). Shared data is read-only list and get queries.
Verdict: none of the code is reusable here.
1. It is about 4,470 lines of NestJS, Drizzle and Postgres code without tests (9,198 with them), plus a
step-ca dependency. The new stack has none of those.
2. Inbound federation never worked. The guard depends on `requestCert: true`, but the server is built as
`new FastifyAdapter({ bodyLimit })` with no TLS options (v1/apps/gateway/src/main.ts:50-53). Every
inbound call would get 401.
3. mTLS is the wrong fit for the homelab path. Traefik terminates TLS in front of the Console (Sage's
design, public path). A client certificate would reach the app as a forwarded header, which is the
header trust Q175 point 1 rules out.
Ideas worth keeping: re-check the grant on every request, never cache it in the credential. Keep
enrollment short-lived and single-use. Tag every federated result with its source instance.
## 3. The 10-27 slice
### 3.1 What it must do
1. D1. Each instance names itself and its peers in config.json, so the Console can show "you are on the
hub" and link to the factory. Peer entries carry no trust in the 10-27 slice. They are labels and URLs.
2. D2. The owner of an instance grants a person access to one business, with a project list and an
instance list. Grants live in a human-authored access file on the receiving instance.
3. D3. That person signs in to the receiving instance's Console with OIDC. The Console verifies the token
itself (Q175) and matches `(provider, sub)` to an access-file user with a live grant.
4. D4. The broker, not the Console, enforces the grant on every request: which verbs, which projects,
which instances, and which threads (own threads only).
5. D5. Revoking a grant refuses that user's next request on the Console and on the bus, and ends the runs
of that user's threads in that business.
### 3.2 What waits
- W1. Agent-to-agent traffic between instances (section 6).
- W2. Shared threads between several users (C1.4), and a viewer level. Both are T1.3's. A granted user gets
private threads only.
- W3. Remote owners. A grant never gives owner verbs: organization, instances, routes, plugins, limits,
decision resolution, launch revoke and the kill switch stay with the local human.
- W4. A registry, `mosaic comms`, enrollment tokens and key rotation tooling. With two instances,
out-of-band setup by Jason is cheaper.
- W5. Federated reads that merge results from both instances into one view, and any board read for a
granted user (F9).
### 3.3 Instance identity in the slice
An instance is its public HTTPS origin plus its own OIDC client at the provider. The factory and the hub
are two clients, so their ID tokens carry different `aud` values. The Q175 audience check refuses a
factory token presented at the hub, which makes tokens instance-bound by signature, not by a header. This
holds only if the two client ids differ, which R8 checks. No instance key is needed until instances talk
to each other (W1).
### 3.4 Remote user identity
A user is `(provider, sub)` where `provider` is an id from that instance's `console.sso.providers`. Q175
already verifies signature, issuer, audience, expiry and nonce, and allows several providers. The hub
trusts only an issuer that no factory credential can administer (B8, duckworth-0005), for example a
Pocket ID on the hub's side. Jason then has his own account at that issuer, with a `sub` of its own. A
separate brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik doesn't count: factory agents hold an
Authentik API token, and whoever administers the issuer can impersonate any user, reset a login or
repoint a redirect. If Jason wants the hub on the factory's Authentik anyway, that is his decision, of
the same kind as #419 (section 8). Either way the receiving instance checks the token. It never takes the
home instance's word for who the user is.
The owner path stays as Sage designed it: `console.sso` subjects sign in as the business human. Everyone
else comes from the access file. The two lists are disjoint, and the loader refuses a subject in both.
### 3.5 The access file and the collaborator level
`<configDir>/access.json`, next to config.json, so it is per instance (`configDir` at business.mjs:25-28
reads `MOSAIC_CONFIG`). It is not in config.json for two reasons. Revocation has to take effect without a
restart, and a typo in config.json stops every tool on the instance (Sage's design, section 4). It is not
in the business file because agents can write that (F7).
```json
{
"accessVersion": 1,
"revision": 3,
"users": [
{ "id": "jason", "home": "factory", "subjects": [{ "provider": "authentik", "sub": "<sub>" }] }
],
"grants": [
{
"id": "g-hub-1",
"user": "jason",
"business": "creative-hub",
"projects": ["*"],
"instances": ["researcher"],
"level": "collaborator",
"expires": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z"
}
]
}
```
Rules the loader enforces, refusing the whole file on any failure (fail closed). The loader takes the
provider ids, peer ids and declared businesses as arguments, so it stays pure:
- The file is a regular file, not a symlink, owned by the instance's uid, with no group or other write.
These are the checks Sage's loader runs on the secret slot.
- Unknown keys refuse. `accessVersion` is 1. `revision` is a positive integer.
- A user id matches the business id rule and is never `human`, `tester`, or any business's `human`.
- `subjects[].provider` names a given provider. A `(provider, sub)` pair appears once in the file and
never in `console.sso.subjects`.
- `home` names a given peer, or is `local` for a non-federated extra user.
- A grant names a declared business. `projects` is `["*"]` or bus project ids, the UUIDs
`project.create` makes (broker.mjs:2306). `instances` is
`["*"]` or declared instances. `level` is `collaborator`, the only level in 10-27. `expires` is optional
ISO time.
- The loader checks a project entry's shape only (a UUID). It can't see the bus, so an id with no bus
project covers nothing.
- A grant past `expires` is treated as absent.
- A file that fails any rule leaves every user with no grant, which revokes everything. That is the safe
direction.
Matching a grant to a thread (morgana-0005). A thread's `project` is a bus project id
(`threads.project REFERENCES projects(id)`, packages/bus/schema.sql:245), set by `thread.create`
(broker.mjs:2329-2345). A bus project may have no repo in the business file, so grants can't name
business-file projects. They name bus project ids, not names. A name could be taken later: the tester,
which runs from an agent, can call `project.create` (:2300), and nothing renames or deletes a project
today. R1 exports one pure function, `covers(grant, { business, project, instance }, now, { level })`.
It is true when the grant is unexpired, the business matches, `projects` is `["*"]` or holds the
project id, `instances` is `["*"]` or holds the instance, and the grant's level is the one asked for,
when one is asked for. The broker passes the thread row. `["*"]` also covers projects made after the
grant, and the R5 help text says so. R5's `grant --project <name>` resolves the name to the id through
`project.list` at grant time and writes the id. `mosaic access list` shows both. Row 193 uses the same
`covers`.
The collaborator level is an exact verb list. Every other verb fails `access-refused` before the verb's own
checks. That covers all owner verbs (W3), every board read (F9), `message.*`, `decision.*`, project files,
`spec.read`, `assistant.stop`, `launch.*`, `name.set` and `usage.*`.
| Verb | Today | For a user |
|---|---|---|
| `project.list` | every project in the business (:2318-2322) | granted projects only |
| `thread.create` | the business's one thread instance (:2331-2334) | project granted, and that instance in the grant's `instances`, else `access-refused` |
| `thread.list` | owner filter (:2351-2362) | owner `user:<id>`, and only threads whose project and instance are still granted |
| `thread.open` | `#thread` owner check (:2365-2371) | same, plus the thread's project and instance still granted |
| `thread.send` | `#thread`, sender `human`, writes `human.input` (:2374-2398) | same grant check. Sender `from_role` `user`, `from_run` `user:<id>`, no `human.input` |
| `thread.messages` | `#thread` (:2401-2420) | same grant check |
| `names` | business-wide (:2288-2295) | granted instances only |
`human.input` events are the owner's authority evidence (the `input` view, broker.mjs:1203-1207). A user's
message must never write one, the same rule the tester follows at :2398.
`instances` is the real limit of a grant. The thread instance runs with its full role authority and is
launched as the business human (F10), so a collaborator's message drives that instance with the owner's
role. A grant gives a user exactly what the granted instance can do. The grant docs and the R5 help text
say so.
Writes go through `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (row R5), atomically with a revision bump and one
receipt line in `<dataRoot>/state/access-log.jsonl` (append-only, as `activation-log.jsonl` is). The
CLI checks its caller with the human proof, but a direct file write by the instance's uid skips both the
CLI and the receipt. The separate host keeps other instances' processes from making that write, but
factory agents keep ssh to .54 (Q183), so one with a login there can make it. R8 records that as
accepted (section 8). Jason may also edit the file by hand.
### 3.6 The user principal in the broker
The bar (B1, mos-0984 point 1): a bus user principal comes only from something the bus can verify. Here
that is the Console's verified OIDC session, reached through a proof the bus checks itself. The calling
process's claim alone isn't enough, and neither is a proof that admits agent ancestry.
The proof. Row 196 (#1694, Gander) builds this check as the `user` kind of its shared `verifyPrincipal`,
and R3 consumes it (section 5). The checks are the ones below. A new path-bound CLI, `packages/bus/src/user-cli.mjs`, with its own nonce variable
(`MOSAIC_BUS_USER_NONCE`), so neither of the other CLIs' nonces proves it. The bus checks it with
the `user` kind of row 196's `verifyPrincipal`, which:
1. Runs `verifyHuman`'s checks with `cliPath` set to the bus's own `user-cli.mjs`: same uid as the bus,
start time, nonce, CLI path, and the parent walk that refuses agent markers, launch records and agent
binaries (human.mjs:64-96).
2. Also requires the user CLI's direct parent to be the Console from the bus's own tree: `argv[1]` equals
the bus's resolved `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs`, and `argv[2]` is `serve`. This binds the user CLI to
the Console's tree, as #225 binds `human-cli` to its literal path.
3. Takes `user` from the proof and binds it only if the access file gives that user a live grant in the
proof's business. Otherwise `access-revoked`.
So the claim "I am user jason" comes from a process the bus has verified as its own Console, outside any
agent. The Console makes that claim only after Q175 verified the ID token's signature, issuer, audience,
expiry and nonce and mapped `(provider, sub)` to the user.
This needs the path-bound human proof, P19 333. Residual risk, stated as Sage's design section 8 states it
for the owner. The proof is a cooperative same-uid check. A non-agent process on the instance's uid, a
shell Jason opens for example, can start its own copy of the Console's tree from the bus's path and claim
any granted user. So can anything that can ptrace or write files as that uid. The walk refuses an agent
in its normal process tree, but an unsandboxed agent on the same uid can get past it by starting the
Console through `systemd-run --user` or by daemonizing so its parent chain ends at pid 1. That is the same
hole the owner proof has (P19 333), not a new one. Other instances can't: the 10-27 hub runs on its own host, so its bus
isn't on their host at all. Factory agents keep ssh to .54 and root on pve (Q183), so the host form doesn't stop them, and R8 records that as accepted (section 8). Federation adds no weaker path than the owner's.
The broker changes, each with an R3 test:
1. `bindUser({ business, user })` makes a session with `s.user` set and `s.human` and `s.tester` unset.
2. `#owner(s)` (:364-366) returns `user:<id>` for a user session. Today it would return undefined.
3. `#threadFor` (:318-345) refuses a user session with `thread-required-use-thread-send`, as it refuses
the human at :326. `message.send` is also off the verb list. Two walls, so a reply-chain send into
another user's thread fails even if one is removed (R3 mutant).
4. The `if (!s.tester) this.#human(s)` gates on the six project and thread verbs above become a check
that admits the human, the tester, or a user with a live grant. `names` gates differently, with
`if (!s.human && !s.tester) this.#agent(s)` (:2290), so there the user branch goes before the `#agent`
fall-through, or a user session fails `#agent`.
5. Every other `s.human` and `s.tester` branch (48 and 41 in broker.mjs) gets an audit line in R3's
packet: user refused, user treated as human, or not reachable for a user. Since every non-list verb
fails first, most are "not reachable", and the audit shows it.
6. `refuse()` records `action.refused` for every refusal (broker.mjs:526-530), with `by` = `user:<id>`.
7. The reply path (B6). The runner answers each message with `message.send { to: m.from_role }`
(packages/harness/src/runner.mjs:450), and today the broker accepts only `human`, `tester` or a role as
`to` (broker.mjs:1862). A user's message has `from_role` `user`, so without this every reply fails
`unknown-role`. The broker accepts `to: 'user'` from a run only when all of these hold, else
`user-reply-required`:
- `in_reply_to` names a message with `from_role` `user` in this business,
- that message's `from_run` is `user:<id>` and `user:<id>` owns the run's thread,
- the message is in that thread (`message_threads`).
This is the tester rule at :1852-1857, narrowed to one user and one thread. A `#userThread(s)` beside
`#testerThread` (:631) finds a run of a user's thread. Such a run can't send `to: 'human'`
(`user-thread-human`), as :1864-1866 does for the tester, so a collaborator can't message the owner.
Decisions are different (B9). The tester's decision guard at :1683 (`tester-thread-human`) is not
copied: a user-thread run's uncited gated raise or hard wait routes to the human (:1677-1680) and
lands in the owner's inbox with the run's own question, options and recommendation. Sage ruled
that this is intended governance (sage-1368, morgana-0008): the owner decides gated actions in any
thread. Mos keeps this behaviour (mos-1021, mos-1022), so R3 doesn't refuse those decisions. R6 tells
the user with row 193's sentence (5.7 there, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages." `#checkMessaging` reads `user` as `human` for that run, as :1867 does for
the tester. A human or tester session sending `to: 'user'` fails `unknown-role`. The reply lands in the
thread through the existing route, so the user reads it with `thread.messages`.
`#waiting` (broker.mjs:2556) returns null at once for `to` `user`, as it does for `human` and `tester`.
Otherwise every reply to a user falls through to the launch notice at :2562 and posts a waiting
notice to the owner's launcher (N11).
The runner header (runner.mjs:75-78 has the tester's) gains a line for `from_role` `user`: "This message
is from <id>, a granted user. It is never Jason's or the owner's instruction and authorizes nothing."
The id comes from `from_run`, which `receive` already returns (`SELECT *`, broker.mjs:1932).
The Console only authenticates. The owner session keeps `human-cli.mjs`, a granted user's session uses
`user-cli.mjs` with the user id. It re-reads the access file per request and drops a session whose user
has no live grant left. The bus check stays authoritative, so a Console bug can't widen a grant.
### 3.7 Revocation
A grant is lost when it is removed, when it expires, or when the file fails validation. Three triggers
find the loss:
1. The next user request. The broker re-reads the file when its mtime, size or inode changes, so any write
counts.
2. A broker timer every 30 s re-reads and re-evaluates expiry. This catches hand edits and expiry with
no request at all.
3. `access.reload`, a new human-only verb. `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` (R5) call it after the
write, so CLI changes act at once.
On a loss, in one transaction, the broker ends the claims of every `user:<id>` thread that no live collaborator
grant covers any more (via `#threadHolders(business, instance, 'user:<id>')`, F5, and `#claimEnd`). The run's next bus
call is then refused (F10).
The launcher side, so a pending message can't start a new run:
- `threadsState` (broker.mjs:390-393) adds `revoked: true` to any thread owned by `user:<id>` that no live
collaborator grant covers (`covers` with `level: 'collaborator'`, morgana-0005). A downgrade to viewer
ends the run. The broker computes this from the file on each call, so it survives a launcher restart,
unlike `startedFor`.
- The launcher's thread pass (launcher.mjs:510-553) never starts a revoked thread.
- For a revoked thread that is still running, the launcher SIGTERMs the runner at once, as the idle stop
does at :527, but without waiting for `threadIdle`'s release, since the claim is already ended. The
launch check also refuses a revoked thread, which covers a start racing the revocation.
Bound: the bus refuses the user and the run from the next request on. The runner gets SIGTERM within one
launcher tick (2 s, launcher.mjs:133) of the broker seeing the loss. A model turn already in flight ends
when its runner exits. Its last bus call is refused, so it can't deliver a reply into the thread.
Removing a provider from `console.sso` is different. config.json is read at start, so that takes effect
only after a Console restart. Removing the users from access.json acts at once, so the R5 help text says to
do that first.
### 3.8 One host or two (mos-0991)
For 10-27 the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181), a host of its own (mos-0996).
Jason (mos-1013): dragon-lin is his workstation and won't host the final instances, and both cases run
as VMs on the PVE node. Jason confirmed the hosts (DECISIONS Q181, mos-1030). The Case 1 instance is on W-jarvis,
10.1.1.53 (VM 1008), and the hub, Case 2, is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). The hub's OS user is
`mosaic`, a system user with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Vikunja #421).
It is a PVE VM, and Jason accepted the factory's paths to it (Q182, Q183, section 8). The federation path
assumes nothing about sharing a host:
- Nothing crosses between the instances' buses or filesystems. Each Console talks only to its own bus
through `user-cli` or `human-cli`, spawned on its own host. access.json lives in the receiving
instance's config dir. `federation.peers` holds URLs and labels, never a path or a socket. No row reads
a peer's file or socket.
- In the 10-27 slice the two Consoles never call each other. The user's browser reaches each origin, and a
peer link is a plain link. Section 6 does need each Console's origin reachable from the other host, so
R8 checks that now and the later rows add no infra.
- Each instance has its own OIDC client with its own redirect URI on its own origin (3.3). Each Console
must reach its provider's issuer and JWKS from its own host. The issuer is a privilege path too. Whoever administers it can mint a hub user, so
the hub's issuer is one the factory can't administer (3.4, R8). The factory's Console reaches its own
Authentik, and the hub's reaches its own issuer.
- Q175 checks token expiry, and section 6 has a 60 s window on signed requests, so both hosts need a synced
clock.
The only one-host piece is R7, which is scratch on one host by design (row 190). The uid form of R8's gate
(row 190b) is a later option, outside the 10-27 gate.
## 4. Fit with the current code
- The bus stays a local socket. Federation reaches it only through the receiving instance's Console, which
is the one network-facing piece. No row opens a bus port.
- The broker's agent authority path (broker.mjs:763-799) is untouched. User checks are a separate path,
next to `#human`, because humans have no role claim and `#agent` would refuse them (broker.mjs:367-374).
- New ownership code is small but real: `#owner`, `#threadFor`, the seven verb gates, `thread.send`'s
sender fields and `threadsState` (3.6, 3.7).
- The business file keeps one `human`. Granted users sit outside it, which keeps every existing
business-file test and the organization writer unchanged.
- The config loader gains one optional key, `federation`, in the same file Sage's phase 1 changes
(mosaic-config.mjs:112-116). Row R2 chains on that candidate and repeats its blast-radius rule: the key
goes in only after a copy that accepts it is pinned.
```json
"federation": {
"self": "hub",
"peers": [{ "id": "factory", "origin": "https://mosaic.woltje.com", "label": "Software factory" }]
}
```
## 5. Dependencies on T1
- T1.1, several instances per host (mos-0988). Row 190 (Darkwing) lands several instances on one uid,
for scratch tests. R7 runs on that. Row 190b (Darkwing, Opus, design first, chained on 190) puts the hub
under its own Linux user, with no factory process able to touch it (mos-0986). Rows R1 to R7 don't need
190b: they use separate `MOSAIC_CONFIG` files and data roots, which the code already honours
(business.mjs:25-28). For 10-27, R8's gate is the host form only (mos-0996), so 190b is a later
option, not an R8 dependency. With per-uid instances,
a factory-uid process can't read or write the hub's access.json or data root, and it can't pass the
hub's human or user proof, because `verifyHuman` requires the caller's uid to equal the bus's
(human.mjs:67). Inside one instance the proofs stay same-uid cooperative (3.6, P19 333).
The design doesn't plan a single-uid live run.
- A separate host (mos-0991, mos-0996). The hub runs on its own host, which R8 checks and records (section 7,
3.8). It is a PVE VM, with the factory paths accepted by Jason (Q182, Q183, section 8).
mos-0996 measured why the other hosts fail: on dragon-lin `sudo -n true` succeeds for jwoltje, and
Melanie's server takes `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` from here with passwordless sudo behind it.
- Row 196 (#1694, Gander) owns the bus human boundary before R3 (gander-0006): one shared verifier,
`verifyPrincipal(request, connection)` returning `{kind, business, id}`, with `SO_PEERCRED` binding
`proof.pid` to the connection. R3 consumes it for the `user` kind instead of writing its own
`verifyUser`, with the same checks as 3.6 (human walk, direct parent the bus tree's Console `serve`,
own nonce variable). It runs once for each one-request connection, and `s.user` holds for that
request only, with no role or grant cached (gander-0007). R3 owns every live grant check, the
`(provider, sub)` to user mapping and the user-name policy. Row 196 kills the agent-parent,
non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants. R3 keeps the reserved user-name mutant.
- T1.1 live also needs two Consoles, two public origins, two reverse-proxy routes and two provider
clients, which are Jason-gated infra.
- T1.2, #412 SSO. Hard dependency. Row R6 builds on Sage's phase 1 candidate (Q177 merge-chaining) and
goes live only after the phase 2 window.
- T1.3, human users and RBAC. One user and grant model for local and federated humans (mos-0978 Q2).
Row 193 (Morgana) confirmed access.json as that store (morgana-0002, section 9 Q2). T1.3 adds `local`
users, the viewer level and `thread_shares`, and federation adds `home`. R1 is the shared loader, so row
193 builds on R1's candidate.
## 6. After 10-27: instance-to-instance
Sketch only, so the slice doesn't block it. If Jason puts agent-to-agent inside 10-27 (mos-0984 point 3),
rows for it are added after r2.
- Each instance gets an Ed25519 key in a secrets slot (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/<instance>/`, 0600,
per the Q173 slot rule). Peers pin each other's public keys in `federation.peers[].keys`. Public keys are
not secrets.
- Requests between instances are signed with HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) over method, target URI,
authority, content digest, created time and a nonce. The receiving Console verifies the signature
itself, so the proof survives Traefik. A created time outside 60 s or a reused nonce refuses. No shared
secret, no bearer token.
- A peer agent becomes a grant subject of kind `peer` (`factory/researcher`), in the same access file, so
grant and revoke work the same way. Removing a peer key refuses all of that peer's traffic at once.
- First use: a factory agent sends a message into a hub thread it was granted, owned by `peer:factory`.
## 7. Rows
Owner model per Q177 and Q178. Opus 5.5 for hard design and builds, Haiku 5.5 at high effort for mid work,
Codex gpt-6.1-sol for parallel builds. Every row has its own independent review (Filbert or Dewey) and
gate. Chains follow Q177: a dependent row builds on its parent's candidate.
| Row | Work | Owner model | Depends on | Test gate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | `packages/business/src/access.mjs`: access.json loader and validator. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks | Codex Sol | none | business tests: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named, symlink, non-regular file, other owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, disjoint from the given subjects, `human`/`tester` ids, a level other than `collaborator`, a project entry that isn't a UUID. `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an expired grant doesn't, a level filter rejects another level |
| R2 | `federation` key in scripts/mosaic-config.mjs | Haiku 5.5 high | Sage #412 phase 1 candidate | test-config.sh: valid key loads, unknown sub-key and bad origin refuse, config without it loads |
| R5 | `mosaic access list, grant, revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, receipt line. Help text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order | Haiku 5.5 high | R1 | cli tests: tester and agent callers refused, concurrent write refuses on revision conflict, receipt appended, bad grant refused before write |
| R3 | Broker user principal: consumes row 196's `verifyPrincipal` (`user` kind, `user-cli.mjs`), `bindUser`, the 3.6 changes, the collaborator verb list and its filters, per-request grant read, audit lines for every `s.human`/`s.tester` branch | Opus 5.5 | R1, row 196 | bus tests: each listed verb allowed, every other verb refused, a leak test per listed read (other projects, other instances, other users' threads), a reply-chain `message.send` into another user's thread refused, `thread.send` writes no `human.input`, the run's reply to a user's message reaches that user's `thread.messages`, a reply `to: 'user'` without a matching `in_reply_to` refused, a user-thread run sending `to: 'human'` refused, a reply to a user returns `waiting` null and posts no notice message, a user-thread run's uncited gated raise reaches the owner's inbox and no other inbox or role, while its `message.send` `to: 'human'` is still refused (B9, mos-1022), revoked and expired grant refused on next request, refusals recorded. Mutants (the agent-parent, non-Console-parent and kind-confusion mutants are row 196's): the grant read skipped, a read filter dropped, `#threadFor`'s user refusal removed, the reply-to check dropped (a run answers another user's message or one outside its thread), a user named like the human accepted |
| R4 | Revocation: 30 s timer, `access.reload` verb, claim end on loss, `threadsState` `revoked`, launcher skip and SIGTERM, launch check refusal, R5 calls `access.reload` | Codex Sol | R3, R5, row 193's viewer level (mos-1019) | bus and launcher tests, each with a mutant: a hand edit removing the grant ends the run within one timer period, an expiry with no request ends it, a pending message followed by a launcher restart starts no run, a running revoked thread gets SIGTERM, a grant downgraded to viewer counts as a loss, another user's runs stay. R4 starts after row 193's viewer level lands, because before it R1 refuses any other level, the whole file fails, and the downgrade test can't kill its mutant (N17, mos-1020) |
| R6 | Console: granted-user sign-in, `user-cli` transport per session, per-request grant re-read, owner-only controls hidden, a notice on the user's thread page with row 193's sentence word for word (B9, N21): "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages.", peer links | Opus 5.5 | Sage #412 phase 1, R1, R2, R3 | webui tests on Sage's fake OP: granted user signs in, ungranted `sub` refused, revoked mid-session gets 401 on next call, a granted user's owner-verb call refused by the bus even with the UI check removed (mutant), the thread page's notice equals row 193's sentence exactly (N21) |
| R7 | Scratch two-instance acceptance: two configs, two data roots, two Consoles, one fake OP. The Consoles start outside agent ancestry (a transient user unit), as the user proof requires. They never use the live stack's units or ports | Haiku 5.5 high | R1-R6, row 190 (several instances on one uid) | script test: Jason granted collaborator on one hub project signs in to the hub, makes a thread, sends to the granted instance, gets the instance's reply in the thread, is refused on another project and on board reads, is revoked and gets refused with the run ended. The factory shows nothing of the hub |
| R8 | Live window, not a code row: hub provider client, hub proxy route, access.json written by Jason, re-pins | Jason, Mos | the Case 2 install on .54 (#416), Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped (mos-1042), #412 phase 2, R7 | Host form only for 10-27 (mos-0996): the hub runs on .54, VM 1012, as user `mosaic` (Q181). R8 is a recorded acceptance (mos-1055). It starts with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, DECISIONS Q182 and Q183, quoted in section 8. Every privilege and host check below still runs, and its result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and don't refuse. R8 runs after Bean and Chet are live and both Hermes gateways on .54 have stopped (mos-1042). Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The hub is W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012), and its OS user is `mosaic`, with no sudo, no groups and no keys (Q181, Q183). R8 checks that on 10.1.1.54 as root and records whether each holds: `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under `/etc/sudoers.d` names it (N22). An agent or Jason runs these as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes into the R8 record with who ran them. The privilege checks run on every factory host in section 8's list (the dragon-lin dev uid, and W-jarvis at 10.1.1.53, which is the Case 1 VM with its agents and the Hermes agents), as each factory uid there under `env -i`, and each is recorded as passing only when the call fails: `sudo -n true`, `doas -n true`, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes 10.1.1.54 true` as the hub user `mosaic`, as Jason's user and as root, each with and without the session's `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`. If `sudo -n` succeeds, as it does for jwoltje on dragon-lin (mos-0996 point 1), the factory counts as root on its own host. Then, as root through `sudo -n`: fingerprint every private key under every home and `/root`, and every key loaded in any agent socket found on the host (`ssh-add -l` per socket). Compare them with `ssh-keygen -lf` over every `authorized_keys` on the hub host, root's included, and no fingerprint matches. Run the ssh checks as root, once with no agent socket and once with each socket found, and record each result (N13). Every other privilege path is a named item in section 8's table (mos-1009): hypervisor, backups, sign-in provider, TLS front end, certificate authority, DNS and network. The record marks each one closed, with its check passing, or accepted under Q182 and Q183 with the table's wording. That wording goes to Melanie through Jason (#419), never to her directly. R8 also records whether the hub host's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on any factory host, no factory host mounts anything of the hub's, and whether the hub host runs no other instance or agent. These must work, or R8 stops and Mos takes it to Jason, because federation fails without them: the two provider client ids differ, each origin answers over HTTPS from the other host, each Console reaches its issuer's discovery URL, and both clocks are synced. The record holds Jason's acceptance and the check results side by side, so a passing check is a measured fact and an accepted path is named as accepted. The uid form (row 190b) is a later option, outside this gate. Then Jason signs in to the hub from his account and sends one message, Melanie revokes, and his next request is refused |
R1 can start now. R5 can be briefed now against R1's exported interface and lands after R1. R2 starts
when Sage's #412 phase 1 candidate exists. R3 starts when R1 has a candidate, R4 when R3, R5 and row 193's viewer level do (mos-1019).
R6 waits on Sage's phase 1 candidate.
## 8. Risk to 10-27
The slice lands only if three things hold. #412 phase 1 has a reviewed candidate by about 10-23. P19 333,
the path-bound human proof R3 depends on, is settled in time for R3 (Mos told Sage, mos-0988). The Case 2
install on .54 (#416) is done in time for R8. Jason's answer on the factory paths is Q182 and Q183. R6 and R7 chain on #412 phase 1. R8 needs all three, plus
two Jason-gated windows (#412 phase 2 and the federation re-pin), plus infra work only Jason does: a
second public origin, a proxy route and a provider client. A failed privilege check
doesn't stop R8. It goes into the record, and Mos takes it to Jason.
The hypervisor path (Vikunja #419, mos-1004), accepted by Jason under Q182 and Q183. Factory agents hold root
ssh to the PVE nodes (Q172). Root on a node can read a running VM's memory and disk, open its console,
and change its config or boot. So it defeats the host form completely when the hub is a cluster VM
(duckworth-0004). LUKS inside the VM doesn't close it alone: the key sits in the running VM's memory,
which the node can read, and a node that can change the boot can capture the passphrase. Options:
- O1. The hub runs on hardware outside the PVE cluster, where the factory has no root.
- O2. A cluster VM, with factory root ssh removed on every node, no factory PVE token with console,
monitor, config, backup or snapshot rights on the VM, VM storage the factory can't read, and PBS
backups the factory can't read or that are encrypted with a key it doesn't hold.
- O3. Jason accepts it as a residual. Then this section and R8 say plainly that the host form doesn't
stop a factory agent using PVE root, and Melanie is told.
Jason's answer is O3, accepted (DECISIONS Q183 confirms Q4). His lines, verbatim:
Q182 (DECISIONS.md:1514-1519, jason-master-restart):
> "I am not pursuing a tightening of key and agent security on my workstation. I need my agents to be able to get onto the other workstations and servers."
> "We will eventually have my agents running on my VM on PVE, but currently I accept the risk of agents running on my workstation."
Q183 (DECISIONS.md:1535-1541):
> "Security tightening on .53 and .54 is fine. I will still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all agents will need to have that access."
> "Q4 appears to properly reflect my statements."
Q4, as Mos asked it and Jason confirmed it:
> "The #421 plan stops. Your key stays, and agents keep root on pve and PBS and ssh to .53 and .54. Each VM still gets a mosaic user without sudo to run its instance. The federation gate records your acceptance instead of refusing to start."
So this section and R8 say it plainly: the host form doesn't stop a factory agent using PVE root, and
R8 records that as accepted. Melanie is told through Jason (#419).
### R8 privilege paths (mos-1009, duckworth-0005, Vikunja #419)
Here and in R8, "factory" means every principal outside the hub instance (mos-1013), and "factory
host" means each of their hosts:
- the dragon-lin dev uid, on Jason's workstation
- W-jarvis, 10.1.1.53 (VM 1008): the Case 1 instance's VM and its agents, and Jason's Hermes agents.
ops-01 reports the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key has root on `pve`.
Case 1 and the Hermes agents share W-jarvis, so they are one factory host (Q181, mos-1030). The hub is
W-Melanie-OC, 10.1.1.54 (VM 1012). Every check in the
table runs on each factory host, and a path is closed only when it passes on all of them.
ops-01 measured the estate read-only at 19:10Z (relayed in mos-1009). There is one PVE node, `pve`,
standalone, and its root `authorized_keys` holds the factory's key (dragon-lin's, and per mos-1013
the `jarvis@w-jarvis` key), so the factory has root on the
hypervisor without any API token. The only PBS is VM 1021 on that node, the factory has root on it, and
its backups are unencrypted. The LAN is flat (10.1.0.0/16) with dragon-lin on it and no internal VLAN.
The factory has used the jarvis Authentik token for admin changes. No hardware outside PVE without
factory root has been confirmed. So today the factory administers every path below.
Each path is a record item. Its check runs and the result is recorded. A path is closed when its check
passes. Otherwise it is accepted under Q182 and Q183, and its wording goes into the R8 record and to
Melanie through Jason (#419). Every check runs from the factory
host, as root through `sudo -n` where the factory has it, and passes only when the call fails.
| Path | Closed: the check | Accepted: the wording | Hub-local option |
|---|---|---|---|
| Host access | The R8 sudo, doas, ssh and key checks (section 7, N13) | "Factory agents can log in to the hub host." | none needed, the checks can pass today |
| Hypervisor | O1 or O2 above: no factory key in any PVE node's root `authorized_keys`, and a PVE API call on the hub VM fails with each token the factory holds | "Factory agents have root on the machine the hub runs on and can read its memory and disk." | O1, hardware outside PVE |
| Backups | The hub's backups are encrypted with a key only Jason or Melanie holds: the PBS datastore shows the hub's snapshots encrypted, and the key's fingerprint matches no file on the factory host | "Factory agents can read the hub's backups in full." | client-side encrypted backups, key held by Jason or Melanie |
| Sign-in provider (B8, mos-1006) | The hub's `console.sso` trusts only an issuer no factory credential administers, never a brand, tenant or application in the factory's Authentik. An admin API call on it fails with each identity provider token found on the factory host, and the issuer's list of admin tokens and service accounts (names only, never values) shows none held on the factory. An issuer that isn't on the hub host passes the host-access, hypervisor and backups rows itself, run against its own host, and a hosted issuer's admin accounts each pass the failed-call check (duckworth-0007) | "Anyone with admin on the factory's sign-in provider can sign in to the hub as any user, Melanie included." | an issuer on the hub host, such as Pocket ID (Q175 supports several providers) |
| TLS front end (B8) | TLS for the hub's origin ends on the hub host: the certificate the origin serves, fetched both through the public route and from the LAN (N19), matches the key on the hub host, and no factory proxy, tunnel or overlay route names the hub's origin | "The factory's proxy sees every hub sign-in, cookie and message in clear." | TLS ending on the hub host |
| Certificate authority (mos-1009) | The hub's certificate comes from a public CA through an ACME account whose key is only on the hub host, and the zone's CAA record names only that CA | "The factory can get a valid certificate for the hub's name." | ACME run on the hub host |
| DNS (N15) | A zone edit for the hub's name fails with each DNS credential found on the factory host, and the zone's owner account is one the factory can't sign in to | "The factory can point the hub's name at a host it runs." | a zone or registrar account only Jason or Melanie holds |
| Network | From the factory host, the hub host answers only on the ports R8 needs (HTTPS, and ssh where it is used), and nothing else is open to the LAN | "The hub host sits on the same flat LAN as the factory, and only its logins protect it." | a host firewall on the hub, a separate VLAN |
Some paths depend on others. While the hypervisor row is open, every secret on a PVE guest is exposed to
node root: the TLS key, the ACME account key, an issuer's database and signing key on a guest, and the
backup key whenever a restore loads it (N16). So closing those rows doesn't help until the hypervisor
row is closed too, or they sit on hardware outside PVE. The R8 record names every path that stays accepted.
## 9. Rulings (mos-0978, mos-0984, mos-0991, mos-0996, mos-1004, mos-1006, mos-1009, mos-1013)
1. Q1: human cross-access is the 10-27 slice (mos-0978). Duckworth's N8 put agent-to-agent's timing to
Jason through Mos. Jason answered "P2P federation is acceptable for 10-27" (mos-0991), and then "P2P is
person-to-person in this case" (DECISIONS Q180, mos-1013). The slice is human access only, with no
agent-to-agent rows.
2. Q2, settled by row 193 (morgana-0002, to Sage too): access.json is the one user and grant store for
humans. Row 193 adds `home: "local"` users, uses the grant level as the human role, and keeps viewer and
collaborator. The owner stays outside the file. Thread shares go in a new append-only bus table,
`thread_shares`, not in access.json, and a share counts only while the named user's live grant covers
the thread's project and instance. The 10-27 slice ships collaborator only (W2), so when row 193 adds
viewer, R1's level check widens with it. `thread_shares` is append-only, so an unshare is an end row in
row 193's design. R3 assumes nothing about shares (N12).
3. Q3 and B5: R8 never runs on a single uid (mos-0984 point 2). For 10-27 its isolation is the hub's own host,
.54 (Q181), the host form only (mos-0996). The uid form (row 190b) is a later option. Jason accepted
the factory paths, the hypervisor's included (Q182, Q183), so R8 records them (section 8).
## 10. Notes
- The r1 push used the repo-local credential helper `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` (set in the
canonical checkout's .git/config for git.mosaicstack.dev) with its default credential file,
`~/secrets/mosaic.gitea.json`, and no `MOSAIC_GITEA_CREDENTIAL_FILE` override. That file's user is
jason.woltje. The r2 push uses the same. Gizmoduck has no seat identity until T1 row 195 adds per-agent
git identity.
-310
View File
@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
# Row 234 (#436a row a, Gitea #1740): host enrollment, store records and bus schema 3i to 3j
Gizmoduck, 2026-10-21. Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Lands by 10-25, before the .53 and .54 installs
(mos-1134).
- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md`, section "Machine grant row a: enrollment, store records
and migration 3i-3j", blob 64451be5 (queue rev 2617).
- Design: `agents/gizmoduck/work/machine-grant/DESIGN.md` r6, f9039682e on `gizmoduck/machine-grant-design`,
approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0064, REVIEW-r6.md at 8ea792256). Not reopened here. Cites "r6:" are lines
of that file.
- Grant event rule: #436b section 7, fa5658941 on `megavolt/row199`,
`agents/megavolt/work/436b/DESIGN.md:431-490`, file sha256
96510b83778e79a71b33d0d5f6fd0c806dfe74f6de315ff4a9f1fbe5620f6c69, approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0067).
- Base: origin/refactor 8fede5fc6, with rows 199 (cb5fdb064) and 210 (f5753c0e8) landed. Branch
`gizmoduck/row234`. Code cites are `path:line` at 8fede5fc6 unless they say otherwise.
## Names: r6 against section 7
r6's `grant.*` and `host.enroll.*` names are `body.action` values on `action.allowed` events, not event
kinds. The `events` kind CHECK isn't rebuilt. Four r6 names move under `grant.`:
| r6 | This row |
|---|---|
| `host.enroll.step` | `grant.host.enroll.step` |
| `host.enrolled` | `grant.host.enrolled` |
| `host.checked` | `grant.host.checked` |
| `host.removed` | `grant.host.removed` |
Only the consume record carries `decision`: `{operation: 'grant.host-enroll', decision}`. Every other
guarded body names the decision `grantDecision`, so r6's `decision` field in step, enrolled and failed bodies
is `grantDecision` here. The actor of every guarded event is `actor_role` NULL with `actor_run` 'grant',
and `body.by` names the caller the broker checked.
## Split (r6 section 12 Q-S4)
Row a builds:
1. **Schema 3i to 3j.** `migrations/3i-3j.sql` adds `hosts` and `host_grants` (r6 S1, primary keys
(business, host) and (business, agent, host)) and the guard trigger: an `action.allowed` whose
`body.action` or `body.operation` GLOBs `'grant.*'` aborts unless the actor is (NULL, 'grant').
`SCHEMA_VERSION` 3j, a migration test with a step that fails partway.
2. **Grant event writer.** A private session-less broker writer for guarded events. `#event` doesn't change.
`recordEvent` refuses `reserved-event` for the guarded namespace.
3. **The `grant` raise frame.** `decision.raise` takes `grant` only with `credential.mint`, only from the chief
(`grant-chief-only`), and in row a only with `method: 'host-enroll'`. Any other method refuses
`invalid-request` until row b adds `host`. E1's checks, the `ssh-keyscan` set compare before the raise
transaction, and the rendered block.
4. **Enrollment executor.** `#consumeGrant`, the start on the human's cli yes (X1), E2 steps 1 to 4, the
installer key at `<configDir>/secrets/hosts/<business>/<hostId>/installer`, the failure cleanup, and the
start reconcile for enrollments: the `registry` step undo, and a resolved-yes unspent enrollment ending
`grant.failed interrupted` (X3).
5. **`hosts.check` and `hosts.remove`** (E4), with `mosaic hosts status|check|remove`.
6. **`tools/host/`**: `mosaic-keys`, `mosaic-keys-write`, `mosaic-keys.sudoers`, `mosaic-keys.sshd.conf` (E3).
7. **`host.run` on the store** (X4 first and third bullets): it reads the `hosts` and `host_grants` records
and the Approve record check, and at start the runtime gives `Credentials` a reference per `host_grants`
record. The loader refuses `hosts` at the top level and in a role (S1). Row 210's tests move to store
fixtures.
8. **Reader filter** (duckworth-0067 N1): every grant-evidence reader in this row (status, the start
reconcile, `openGrantDecisions`) filters `kind = 'action.allowed' AND actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run =
'grant'`, with a test that an `action.refused` look-alike and a session-written one are ignored.
`hosts.remove`'s `hostLineLeft` reader is one of them (duckworth-0079 M4).
Row b keeps the `host` method's raise binding (R4), the grant executor (X2), the grant rows of X3, X5,
`Credentials.register`/`claim`/`abortClaim`, revoke (section 6) and `sweep`. So row a has no way to make a
`host_grants` record outside a test fixture, and from its landing to row b's no agent holds a host grant
(r6 N9, the run sheet strips row 210's keys).
Tests in row a (r6 section 10): G1 and G5 for the `host-enroll` raise, G6 and G10 for the enrollment
executor, G11's enrollment cases, G14, G15, G16, G17, G18, G20, G21 (its `host-line-left` case reads an
event fixture until row b writes `hostLineLeft`), G25, the migration test, the trigger cases, the reader
filter test, and row 210's T-tests on store fixtures. Row b: G2 to G4, G7 to G9, G11's grant cases, G12,
G13, G19, G22 to G24, G26 to G28.
## Early check items (duckworth-0079, REVIEW-build-split.md 10672772e on `duckworth/reviews`)
Moves into row a:
- M1. G4 for the `host-enroll` block (r6:240-242): a question can't forge the block, and the 4096-character
limit holds with the block appended. G4 for the `host` block stays in row b.
- M2. The tag function (r6:265-266), because E2 step 2 tags the installer line. G24's first sentence moves
here: names of 64 characters with `.` and `_` give distinct tags of the fixed length. The `sweep` half
stays in row b.
- M3. A store-fixture test that `host.run` refuses `host-not-granted` for no record, an unresolved decision,
a decision resolved by an arbiter, the tester or an agent or not via cli, a consume record with operation
`grant.host-enroll` in place of `grant.host`, and an unspent decision (X4 first bullet, r6:593-596). A
restart test that a `host_grants` fixture gives `Credentials` a reference (X4 third bullet).
G21's `host-line-left` case:
- F1. The fixture goes through this row's private grant writer in the real shape: `action.allowed`, actor
(NULL, 'grant'), `body.action` 'grant.failed', `body.host`, `body.hostLineLeft`. No raw SQL around the
trigger.
- F2. `hosts.remove` reads `body.hostLineLeft` from any guarded body, not only `grant.failed`.
- F3. Decided: a guarded body that carries `hostLineLeft` also carries `host`. Row b adds `host` to
`grant.revoke.closed`, so its body is `{tag, host, hostLineLeft}` (r6:716 has `{tag, hostLineLeft}`).
The reader matches on `body.host`, and doesn't map tags back to hosts through `grant.step`. A direct
field is one equality in SQL, and a tag lookup would add a second reader that the N1 filter also has to
cover.
- F4. Row b carry: "no later `sweep` cleared it" (r6:403) needs `grant.sweep`, which only row b writes. Row
b adds the sweep clear to `hosts.remove` with a G21 case, and its G8 or G13 shows `hosts.remove`
refusing after a real `hostLineLeft` write, not only after the fixture. Until then row a's check is "any
guarded `hostLineLeft` for this host refuses".
## Mutants (r6:838-883, numbered here)
Row a, killed on this row's tree:
| # | Mutant |
|---|---|
| A1 | drop the chief check |
| A2 | start the executor on a `credential.mint` with no `grant` |
| A3 | start it on an arbiter resolve |
| A3b | start it on a `cli` yes by someone other than the human (duckworth-0083 N8) |
| A4 | start it on `no` |
| A5 | skip the keyscan compare |
| A6 | compare only one key |
| A7 | write the private key into the event body |
| A8 | drop the "not yet enrolled" check in E2 step 1 |
| A9 | drop the `hosts` primary key |
| A10 | skip the start check for a resolved, unspent enrollment decision |
| A11 | `host.run` reads the business file instead of the grant record |
| A12 | build the tag without the business |
| A13 | drop `from=` in the writer |
| A14 | let the writer touch a line outside the tag pattern |
| A15 | drop `O_NOFOLLOW` on the user file |
| A16 | drop one group from the writer's refused list |
| A17 | drop the user pattern check before the path use |
| A18 | treat a `privileged` entry as enough without `users` |
| A19 | let the writer accept a sudo user not in `privileged` |
| A20 | trigger: drop the `body.operation` arm, so the consume record passes from a session |
| A21 | trigger: accept actor_role NULL with any actor_run |
| A22 | a grant reader drops the `kind = 'action.allowed'` or actor filter. The runner splits it: A22a drops the kind, and G21's `action.refused` look-alikes kill it. A22b drops the actor, which the trigger can't stand in for, because 3i-3j adds the trigger without checking old rows. Its killer is the grant-migration test "A22b, sage-1703": a session-written `grant.host.removed` with `hostLineLeft` and a `grant.host-enroll` row from 3i, migrated to 3j, where `hosts.remove` still removes the host and `reconcileGrants` ends nothing |
| A23 | `host.run` skips the Approve record check (any `host_grants` record is enough) |
Row b keeps the rest of r6's list: the `ready` check, the three hash compares, the definition check, the
install and record order, `remove` on a verify failure, both start sweeps, the reconcile's remote `remove`,
the `grant.step` before install, revoke leaving the record, `register` before `issue`, the abort check and
the `await` before `issue`, revoke and an unreferenced claim, `sweep` and any `mosaic-` line, revoke's host
step order, claim before consume, the resolved unspent grant decision, an async `commit`, `hosts.revoke`
through `credential-verbs.mjs`, the revoke marker reconcile, the upsert, the undo past `grant.revoked`, the
abort after step 5 and a missing `bus.tester` as dev.
## Broker functions this row touches (sage-1677)
For row 236 (Megavolt), which rebuilds on this landing. Old lines are `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs` at
8fede5fc6, new lines are at the last commit that changed this file (they moved by 10 after `runEnrollment`
went in). The planned list is kept in this file's history (827b89ea6).
Changed:
- `constructor` (:279): one more option, `hostGrant`, the object `host-grant.mjs` builds.
- `recordEvent` (old :1243-1251, new :1606): one more refusal. An `action.allowed` whose `body.action` or
`body.operation` is a `grant.*` name refuses `reserved-event`.
- `request()` (old :1362, new :1726): two routes ahead of the sync path, a `decision.raise` with `grant` to
`#raiseGrant` and the `hosts.*` verbs to `#requestHosts`. Both are async.
- `requestHost` (old :1712-1795, new :2079): the business-file lookups (old :1730-1736) become one
`#hostAccess` call, in the same transaction as `#agent`. `commands` and `entry` come from it.
- `#dispatch` (old :1796, new :2160) gets a fifth parameter, `enroll`, which only `#raiseGrant` passes.
- `decision.raise` (new :2244): `grant` joins the allowed keys, and `grant` without `enroll` (or the
reverse) refuses `invalid-request`. The `host.sudo` block reads `#hostAccess` in place of `b.hosts`
and the role's `hosts`, and an undefined `target` still refuses `host-unknown`. `validArgv` and
`validStdin` now run after the access check, so a malformed argv for an ungranted host refuses
`host-not-granted` first. The enrollment block is appended to the question before `string(question)`,
so the 4096 cap counts it (M1). The decision's raise body carries `grant: enroll`.
- `decision.resolve` (new :2409): when `op` is `resolved`, `#approvedGrant` reads the decision, and a
`host-enroll` grant starts `#runEnrollment` from `setImmediate`, after the transaction commits. The
result adds `grant: 'started'`.
New, all private but two:
- `#grantEvent` (:657), the writer of guarded events. It runs the secret check, then `writeGrantEvent`.
- `#approvedGrant` (:667), `#consumeGrant` (:678). `#consumeGrant` sits after `#approvedGrant`, not next
to `#consumeAuthority` as planned.
- `#hostRecord` (:685), `#hostAccess` (:692), `#grantNotice` (:708), `#enrollFailed` (:736),
`#runEnrollment` (:750), `#openGrantDecisions` (:823).
- `runEnrollment` (:745), public, a trusted entry to `#runEnrollment` for G10. No verb reaches it.
- `reconcileGrants` (:833), public, which `runtime.mjs` calls once at start.
- `#raiseGrant` (:866), `#hostsCaller` (:886), `#requestHosts` (:900), `#hostLinesLeft` (:964).
Module level, new (:184-230): `GRANT_RUN`, `grantName`, `GRANT_EVIDENCE` (the N1 filter as SQL),
`registrySha256`, `writeGrantEvent` (exported, the one writer of guarded events, which test fixtures use
for F1), `HOSTS_VERBS`, `fingerprintOf`, `INSTALLER_COMMENT`.
Unchanged: `#event`, `#spent`, `#consumeAuthority`.
Other `src` files:
- `bus/src/host-grant.mjs`, new: the keyscan, the installer key pair, and `hosts.check`'s `list`.
- `bus/src/runtime.mjs`: builds `hostGrant`, calls `reconcileGrants` before the server starts, and adds
the `host_grants` references before `new Credentials` (X4 third bullet).
- `bus/src/host-run.mjs`: `runHost` takes `command`, sent as is in place of the sudo argv, for the
installer's `list`.
- `bus/src/server.mjs`: the `hosts.*` verbs and a raise with `grant` go down the async path.
- `bus/src/store.mjs`: the 3i-3j step, `SCHEMA_VERSION` 3j. `bus/src/credentials.mjs` exports
`privateDir`.
- `business/src/business.mjs` and `business/src/hosts.mjs`: the loader refuses `hosts` (S1).
`checkHosts` and `checkHostGrants` are gone.
- `cli/src/hosts.mjs`, new, routed from `cli.mjs` and `scripts/mosaic`.
## Decisions taken in the build
- **`#hostAccess` binds the agent and the host.** X4 says the Approve record check passes when the
decision is an approved `host` grant with a `grant.host` consume. The check also requires the grant's
`agent` to equal the session's role and its `host` to equal the requested host. Without that, an
approved grant for one agent and host would vouch for any `host_grants` row that names its decision.
Cost: none for row b, whose executor writes the row from the same grant.
- **Store fixtures are written the real way.** `bus/tests/host-fixtures.mjs` inserts the decision rows by
SQL, but every guarded event goes through `writeGrantEvent`, so the trigger sees it (F1). An enrollment
fixture writes `grant.host.enrolled`, or the start reconcile reads it as interrupted.
- **The resolver test for host kinds is gone.** `business/tests/hosts.test.mjs` lost its D5 case, because
the loader now refuses `host.<id>` credential refs. The `isHostKind` filter in `business/src/resolve.mjs`
can't be reached now. I left it in, since row b may want it back, and it's one line.
- **Store before Credentials.** The runtime already opened the store before `Credentials`. The
`host_grants` references depend on that order, and the comment there says so.
- **CLI.** `mosaic hosts` prints tab lines, and `--json` prints the bus rows. Usage errors exit 4 and bus
refusals exit 2, as `mosaic credentials` does. There is no enroll command: enrollment is the chief's raise.
- **Host tools tests live in the bus suite.** `bus/tests/host-tools.test.mjs` loads the writer by path
through a Python harness under `python3 -B -I`. The harness passes its own key dir, config dir, owner
uid and user, group and sudo lookups, and runs `mosaic-keys` from a copy with stub `sudo` and `logger`.
The gate runs the bus suite, so G16 and G25 run there. The real `pwd`, `grp` and `sudo -l` paths are
checked on the #433 VM, not here. The test also runs `visudo -c` on the sudoers file and `sshd -T` on
the drop-in.
- **Writer details the design left open.** The `from` file must hold exactly one value matching
`[0-9A-Za-z.:/*?!_-]+(,[0-9A-Za-z.:/*?!_-]+)*`, so it can't close the quote. `users`, `privileged` and `from` must be
regular, owned by the owner uid and not group or world writable, and are opened without following a
symlink. Lines starting with `#` are comments. A refusal exits 1 with its code on stderr and in syslog.
`add` of a tag that is already there exits 0 and writes nothing.
- **`runEnrollment` is public for G10 (duckworth-0081 B1).** G10 needs a second start for a spent
decision, and the resolve path can't give one: a second resolve refuses `decision-closed`
(broker.mjs:2416) before the executor runs. So
`#runEnrollment` returns its code (`enrolled`, `host-enrolled` or the refusal), and a public
`runEnrollment` calls it, as `reconcileGrants` is public. The test checks a spent
decision gives `decision-consumed`, and an open or agent-resolved one gives `not-authorized`, with
nothing written. That second case also reaches the `via` and `by` checks in `#approvedGrant`, so A3 is
no longer vacuous (N1).
Who can call it (sage-1692): only code holding the `Broker` object, which is the bus process and the
tests. The one `new Broker` in `src` is `runtime.mjs:126`, and no `src` file calls `runEnrollment`;
the resolve path calls the private `#runEnrollment` from `setImmediate` (broker.mjs:2445). A seat
holds no `Broker`. It reaches the bus only over `broker.sock`, where `server.mjs` calls a fixed set of
methods by name (`request` at :134 and :140, `identity`, `disconnect`). `request()` routes on the verb
through the `#dispatch` switch, and neither file looks a method up by name (no `this[` in either), so no
verb string can reach `runEnrollment`.
- **A `sudo -l` that times out refuses `user-sudo` (N2).** `_sudo` returns an empty answer on
`TimeoutExpired`, which isn't the expected line, so `main` logs the refusal and exits 1.
- **Keyscan comment (N3).** A scan that can't start refuses `host-failed`. One that runs and finds no key
returns no lines, and the raise refuses `host-key-mismatch`. The comment in `host-grant.mjs` now says so.
- **No tag on in-run `grant.failed` (N4).** r6:578 tags only the `interrupted` one, so the code follows it.
- **Run sheet (N5).** The writer refuses `config-privileged` when the file is missing, so each host needs an
empty, root-owned `/etc/mosaic-keys/privileged` (0644) before the first enrollment.
## Mutant results (Sage's slot, 2026-10-21)
All 25 killed: A1 to A23, with A3b added for duckworth-0083 N8 and A22 split into A22a and A22b. The
runner is `mutants.py` outside the repo. Each mutant gets its own session, a 420 s limit with a group kill,
and a byte restore checked against git status. None hung. Run 1 (04:24Z, on 95f966b1c) killed A1 to A22a
and stopped at A22b, which survived. Run 2 (04:43Z, on 097892741) killed A22b and A23.
- Each kill comes from a named assertion in the mutant's own test files, except A9. Dropping the `hosts`
primary key leaves `host_grants`' foreign key with no parent key, so the store refuses to open
("foreign key mismatch") and 28 of 29 tests fail at setup. That's a structural kill, not the S1 test.
The schema can't exist without the key (sage-1709).
- A22b drops the actor filter from `GRANT_EVIDENCE`. The trigger can't stand in for it, because a 3i store
can hold a session-written grant row that the 3i-3j step keeps. The grant-migration test "A22b,
sage-1703" kills it (see the A22 row above).
Follow-up, not in row a: G18's control calls `runHost` directly, so nothing runs `hg.check` end to end
with a good pin (duckworth-0083 N9). The #433 VM run covers it.
## Status at 097892741
Done: every Split item, 1 to 8, duckworth-0081 B1 to B3, duckworth-0083 N8, and all 25 mutants killed.
Single files in the slot, all exit 0, 178 pass and 0 fail by an awk sum over 23 logs: bus grant-enroll
24, host-run 24, grant-migration 6, host-tools 6, account-migration 3, chief-of-staff 18,
comment-migration 5, hard-waits 13, name-migration 1, project-runtime 3, spec-migration 1,
thread-migration 3, usage-migration 1, project-files 8, spec-socket 6, spec-review 12, land 17, spec 4;
harness spec-tools 2, raise-domain 2; business hosts 4; cli hosts 5; seat sandbox 10.
Left: Sage runs the whole bus, business and cli suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh` at the landing gate,
after Duckworth approves.
## Round 3 (sage-1742): two tests that count the schema
The landing gate failed `packages/bus/tests/schema.test.mjs:522`. It counts the tables and triggers that
`schema.sql` creates, and row a adds two tables and a trigger, so the counts go from 16 to 18 tables and
from 70 to 71 triggers. My singles didn't run it because I took it for a test of other rows' tables.
I grepped `packages/*/tests/*` for `sqlite_master` and `schema.sql`, with `schema.test.mjs:517` as the
positive control. That turned up one more test that would fail: T46 in
`packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs:910`. It puts every schema table in exactly one of four lists, and
hosts and host_grants were in none. I'd left the stack-release tests out of the r2 singles on the claim that
they don't load the bus, but T46 reads `schema.sql`. Both tables go in its untimed list (Sage's ruling,
sage-1745: the message_threads pattern). Neither has an `at` column. Row a writes hosts at five lines,
and each runs in one store transaction with a `grant.*` events row, which the restore guard counts.
`#grantEvent` (broker.mjs:657) writes that row through `writeGrantEvent` (:201, INSERT INTO events at
:212).
- :737 DELETE, in `#enrollFailed`, with grant.failed at :738. Both callers wrap it in a transaction,
:816 and :849.
- :763 INSERT, in the step 1 transaction (:754), with grant.host.enroll.step at :761.
- :783 UPDATE installer_fingerprint, in the step 4 transaction (:780), with grant.host.enrolled at :784.
- :932 DELETE, in the hosts.remove transaction (:927), with grant.host.removed at :933.
- :950 UPDATE state ready, in the hosts.check transaction (:944), with grant.host.checked at :951.
Row a writes no host_grants rows. It only reads them (broker.mjs:695, :930, runtime.mjs:103). Row b adds
the writes, and each must share a transaction with a `grant.*` event the same way. That goes on row
235's carry list. The other hits pin an older schema
(account, comment, name, spec, thread and usage migrations, chief-of-staff 3c) or count only their own
tables (state.test.mjs:106 reads every table but pins no list, threads.test.mjs:129).
hosts and host_grants are mutable by design, so the refused-labels loop above `schema.test.mjs:517` gets no
entry for them. hosts.check updates a host to ready. hosts.remove and a failed enrollment delete the
record. Row b updates and deletes grant records. Neither table has append-only triggers. The one new
trigger, events_grant_actor, guards events. grant-migration.test.mjs tests it, and it killed mutants
A20 and A21.
-598
View File
@@ -1,598 +0,0 @@
# Row 235 build: machine grant row b (#436, Gitea #1741)
Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md`, "Machine grant row b: raise binding, executor,
reconcile and revoke". Design r6 f9039682e. Built on row 234's landing c771a36f4 (sage-1775), branch
gizmoduck/row235-b. Line numbers below were read on b0320d395, whose src files are byte-identical to the landing's.
## Squash onto 4ced5e63d (sage-1812, sage-1831)
Steps 1-6 were six local commits on c771a36f4 (gizmoduck/row235-b, tip f9fff4300). Sage named
4ced5e63d as the base, so this branch, gizmoduck/row235-c, holds one commit on it: the diff
c771a36f4..f9fff4300 applied with `git apply --index`. N10 is in that commit. N12 needs no change,
because row b doesn't touch schema.sql.
Rows 240, 228 and 238 landed between c771a36f4 and 4ced5e63d and changed 18 paths. One of them is
also mine:
- `packages/cli/README.md`. Row 228 (86249ac55) changed the session credential paragraphs at about
lines 432 and 706. My hunk adds three lines on `hosts revoke` and `hosts sweep` at about line 1052.
The two don't overlap, so the blob here is row 228's blob plus my three lines, with no landed line
reverted. cli tests/host.test.mjs:855 reads this README, and run 1's cli suite covers it.
The other 12 paths are byte-identical to f9fff4300. The line numbers in the step notes below were read
on the old base.
## Run 1 (sage-1831, sage-1833, sage-1838)
Run 1 on 4d4bb4af6, 07:45-07:54Z, failed: 1351 tests, 1285 pass, 66 fail. The 66 are 33 tests counted
twice, once in the files run and once in the bus suite. The cli suite, the cli hosts test, seat
sandbox.test and bus project-runtime.test passed. Two defects, both mine:
- grant-executor.test.mjs, 32 tests. setup() never made `dir/data`, and `new Store` lstats its root
(store.mjs:137), so every test stopped at setup with ENOENT. setup() now makes it, mode 0700.
- credential-claim.test.mjs:76 (X4), 1 test. A register after a revoke left the key in `#revoked`, so
status() said `revoked` for a new grant's reference that has no token yet. register now clears
`#revoked`, as unregister does. `#revoked` feeds only status(), and issue clears it as well.
Both fixes are amended into the one commit. The rerun covers the five bus files, the bus suite, and
cli credentials.test.mjs and verbs.test.mjs, which read credential state strings.
## Run 1 rerun (sage-1842, sage-1843)
The rerun on ac7c45975, 08:06-08:07Z, failed: 701 tests, 695 pass, 6 fail, which are 3 grant-executor
tests counted in both the files run and the bus suite. All three were test defects that run 1's setup
failure had hidden. No src file changed for them:
- G10. The two fixture decisions were built after `before`, and grantDecision (host-fixtures.mjs)
INSERTs one events row each, so the count read 13 for 11. The test now builds them first, asserts
they added exactly 2 rows, and then pins the executor's 0 against that count.
- G27. setup's t.after removes the scratch dir before a hook the test adds later runs, so the test's
chmod hook hit ENOENT after the body had passed. The body now restores the mode in a try/finally.
- G22. The slow run's promise had no handler until `refusesWith`, four lines on. The revoke rejected it
first, and node failed the test on the unhandled rejection. The handler now goes on at creation.
The fix is one more amend of the single commit. The rerun is grant-executor.test.mjs whole plus the bus
suite.
Rerun 1c on 5df4b52c5, 08:15Z, was green: 623 of 623, grant-executor 34 of 34 and the bus suite 589 of 589.
## Mutants B1-B37 (sage-1894, sage-1899, sage-1904)
Three chunks ran on 5df4b52c5, 09:22-09:37Z. Restores matched HEAD after each. 33 were killed and four
survived. Two of the misses were mine, in the file lists:
- B2 and B23 listed only grant-executor, and that file never makes the raise either mutant changes.
grant-enroll.test.mjs:227 (A2, A4) resolves a plain `credential.mint` yes and a host grant no, and
asserts no grant events for either. mutants.py now lists grant-enroll and grant-executor for both.
B2 then ran alone and A2 killed it. B23 runs again with this round's tests.
The other two survivors needed tests, and Sage ruled on all four (sage-1904):
- B16 drops the abort check after `verify`. The check after `step('commit')` still ends the grant
revoked, so G23 X5's asserts held. The run then logs a commit step for a grant that never committed.
G23 X5 now asserts that its only `grant.step` is `install`.
- B17 adds `await null` after the commit check. Sage accepted it as equivalent. `await null` yields
only to microtasks. Every revoke starts in a macrotask of its own (a socket request, or a test's
call), so none can land in that gap. There is no test for it.
- B27 makes issue's commit callback async. issue() doesn't await it, so the executor returns `applied`
before the INSERT runs. The two differ only when the commit transaction throws, and a real store can
throw there with a full disk, an I/O error or a busy timeout. Under the mutant that throw becomes an
unhandled rejection after the key file is written, and the catch's undo never runs. The new G8 test
makes the store's `run` throw SQLITE_FULL once on the host_grants INSERT. It asserts host-failed, no
record, key file, reference or line, and the steps install, commit, failed. The store object comes
from the test's setup, so src gains no seam.
These two test changes went in as a new commit on gizmoduck/row235-d (8b13d0ca0). That branch then
moved onto row 213's landing as gizmoduck/row235-e, below. B16, B23 and B27 run there, after the touched
test files run whole.
## Rebase onto 62ddc96cc (sage-1922)
Row 213 landed as 361ba2387, and refactor's tip is 62ddc96cc, with only docs past it. gizmoduck/row235-e
starts at 62ddc96cc and cherry-picks 8b13d0ca0's one commit. The patch-id is unchanged (c062b73fa9f1).
row235-c and row235-d stay as they were.
Between 4ced5e63d and 62ddc96cc, 361ba2387 is the only commit that touches a file of mine. The one
drifted path is `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`:
- 213 adds `CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS` to the vocabulary import at :6, and refuses `decision.raise` from a
creative role with `decision-not-allowed` at :2176. Both hunks stay as landed.
- My 31 removed broker lines read the same before and after the cherry-pick, so no landed line is
reverted.
`packages/cli/README.md` isn't in 361ba2387. Every other path of mine is byte-identical to 8b13d0ca0.
Line numbers in the section below were read on the row235-e working tree; earlier sections keep theirs.
## Creative roles get no host grant (mos-1163, sage-1905, sage-1908, sage-1916)
Brief blob b16e236188f6 (4364dddb0, rev 2784) requires two refusals: the writer, at the raise and at the
step 1 recheck, and host.run at spend time, with the record kept. Webby's N2 on row 213 r4 asks whether
a creative role can spend a decision another role raised.
The spend answer. Mos confirmed it read-only (mos-1164, sage-1916) on 8b13d0ca0 and 01e1fe512; the
row235-e line follows each:
- Only the chief raises a host grant. `#raiseGrant` refuses `grant-chief-only` for any other
definition: :1232 on 8b13d0ca0, :870 on 01e1fe512, :1238 here. The hosts verbs check the same at
:1307 on 8b13d0ca0, :896 on 01e1fe512, :1313 here. `chief-of-staff` isn't in `CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS`.
- No agent spends one. `#consumeGrant` (:697) is called for a host grant only from `#runHostGrant`
(:902) and from the restart reconcile (:1106), which ends it interrupted. `#runHostGrant` starts from
the resolve hook (:2881) only when `#approvedGrant` returns a grant, and that needs a close by the
business's human, via cli, with the raise's approval choice (:691). An agent's resolve records via
`broker`, so it starts nothing (grant-enroll A3). The public `runHostGrant` (:891) is a trusted API
that no verb reaches.
So a creative role can't raise, approve or spend a host grant. The gap was a different one: the chief
could raise a grant whose `agent` is a creative role, and the human could approve it. The only check on
that agent was `#hostDefinition`, which refuses `host-not-declared` (:864) unless the definition's
`credentials` names `host`. Row 213's `checkCreative` (business/src/role.mjs:143) limits a creative
role's tools, authority and messaging, not its `credentials`, so a creative role file naming `host`
passed both the raise and the step 1 recheck.
As built:
- Writer. `#hostDefinition` refuses `host-creative-role` (:862) before the `host-not-declared` check.
The raise binding (:1266) and the step 1 recheck (:879) both call it, so a grant raised before its
agent's instance moved to a creative definition ends at step 1, spent, with no remote step.
- Spend. `#hostAccess` refuses `host-creative-role` (:714) when the agent's current definition is
creative, before it reads the record. Both callers go through it: host.run (:2543) and the host.sudo
raise (:2778). The record stays, because revoke still owns the cleanup (sage-1908). This goes past
the brief's writer line in the same direction; Sage tells Mos.
Tests:
- grant-host.test.mjs:115. A `muse` role on a `research` definition that declares host. The raise
refuses `host-creative-role` and adds no decision.
- grant-executor.test.mjs:947. The restart moves `ops` to a creative definition that declares host,
then a fixture grant runs. It ends `host-creative-role` at step 1, the decision is spent, and there is
no remote request and no record. The fixture comes after the restart, because the restart's reconcile
ends any resolved, unspent host grant as interrupted.
- grant-executor.test.mjs:958. An applied grant, then a restart with `ops` creative, then host.run
refuses `host-creative-role`. No remote request is added, sudo.log has no `systemctl`, and the record
is still there.
The broker clones `businesses` when it's built, so a definition change needs a new Broker. The test's
`restart()` gains a `business` parameter, default unchanged, for that.
Mutants: B38 removes the `#hostDefinition` line, run against grant-host and grant-executor. B39 removes
the `#hostAccess` line, run against grant-executor.
## Run 2 (sage-1928)
Run 2 on 534f2254a, 10:12:52-10:14:51Z, was green. grant-host.test.mjs 9 of 9, grant-executor.test.mjs
37 of 37 and grant-enroll.test.mjs 24 of 24, each run whole. grant-enroll is unchanged, but it drives the
broker, and broker.mjs changed. Then the five mutants, all killed, with the restore matching HEAD:
| Id | Killed by |
|---|---|
| B16 | G23 (X5), the revoke as verify returns |
| B23 | A2, A4 |
| B27 | G8, the store fault in the commit transaction |
| B38 | both mos-1163 tests |
| B39 | the sage-1908 test |
## Mutant results, B1-B39
| Run | Head | Killed | Survived |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1-B13, 09:22Z | 5df4b52c5 | 12 | B2 (file list) |
| B2 alone, B14-B37, 09:28-09:37Z | 5df4b52c5 | 21 | B16, B17, B23, B27 |
| B16 B23 B27 B38 B39, 10:13Z | 534f2254a | 5 | none |
38 of 39 are killed. B17 is equivalent (sage-1904), for the macrotask reason in the B1-B37 section.
B1-B37 ran on 5df4b52c5, before the move onto row 213's landing, and weren't rerun on 534f2254a.
`--check` matches all 39 anchors once on 534f2254a.
## Carry list
- N10 (duckworth-0084, row 234 r1): `cli/src/hosts.mjs:30-31` reads `shape[verb]` off a plain object,
so `mosaic hosts constructor` passes usage and the bus refuses it with exit 2 instead of 4. Row b adds
`hosts revoke` and `hosts sweep` to the same table (design r6 :562, :680), so the fix goes in with
them: `Object.hasOwn(shape, verb)` and a usage test for an `Object.prototype` name (sage-1726).
- Untimed tables (sage-1745, row 234 r3): stack-release T46 lists hosts and host_grants as untimed
because every write to them shares one store transaction with a `grant.*` events row. Row a writes only
hosts. Every host_grants INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE row b adds must do the same, and BUILD.md lists each
with its event line. A write without one is a stop to raise with Sage.
- N12 (duckworth-0086, row 234 r3, doc-only): row 234's round 3 list of other schema hits leaves out
`packages/cli/tests/stack-release-fixture.mjs:214` and `scripts/test-land-work.sh:254`. Both look up
one table by name and need no change. If row b changes the schema, its grep list names them.
## What row a already gives row b (b0320d395)
- `#approvedGrant`, `#consumeGrant(business, decision, method)` and `GRANT_EVIDENCE` (broker.mjs:667-690).
Row b calls `#consumeGrant` with `'host'`.
- `#openGrantDecisions(business, method)` and `reconcileGrants()` (broker.mjs:823-860), which today handle
`host-enroll` only. Row b adds the `host` method, the `grant.step` undo table (r6 X3) and the
revoke-marker reconcile (r6 section 6, N4).
- The resolve hook at broker.mjs:2444-2445 starts `#runEnrollment` for `host-enroll`. Row b adds the same
start for `host`, under the same human, via cli and choice checks.
- `host.run` already reads the store grant record and checks the Approve record (broker.mjs:691-703).
- The raise check `grant-chief-only` (broker.mjs:870, :896). `host-grant.mjs:55` refuses every method but
`host-enroll`, and row b opens it to `host`.
- `Credentials` has `#inflight` with the `host-busy` claim inside `runHost` (credentials.mjs:118, :355).
It has no `claim`, `abortClaim`, `register` or `unregister`. Row b adds those (r6 X4, X5).
## Plan, in build order
1. Raise binding (r6 R1-R4): the `grant` argument for `method: 'host'`, `host-not-declared`,
`host-not-ready`, the 210 D6 argv rules, `rotateBy`, the rendered block and the 4096 cap, and the raise
body hashes. Tests G1-G5, G19.
2. `Credentials.claim`, `release`, `abortClaim`, `register`, `unregister`, with the shared reference check.
3. The executor in `bus/src/host-grants.mjs`, steps 1-6 (r6 X2), with failure undo (X3) and the abort rule
(X5, C1). Tests G7-G10, G15, G23, G24.
4. Restart reconcile for `grant.step`, unspent `host` decisions, and the start sweep of `host.<id>` key
files with no record (r6 X3, N1). Tests G11, G27, G28.
5. `hosts.revoke` and `hosts.sweep` verbs, plus the CLI `revoke` and `sweep` with N10. Tests G12, G13,
G26, G27.
6. G22 end to end on one bus. Then the mutant list from r6 section 10 for row b, numbered B1 onward in
this file, with the upsert mutant and the abort-after-commit mutant included.
There is no schema step. If one turns out to be needed, I stop and ask Sage to re-brief first.
## Step 1 notes (raise binding, read on b0320d395)
Where the code goes:
- `#raiseGrant` (broker.mjs:866-885) runs the checks and keyscan for `host-enroll` today, and every raise
with `grant` reaches it (:1738-1739). Row b branches on `a.grant?.method`. `host` takes no keyscan, so
its checks can all run inside the one raise transaction, as R4 asks.
- `enrollCheck` (host-grant.mjs:50-69) refuses every method but `host-enroll` (:55). Row b adds a sibling
`hostGrantCheck` for the R4 shape `{method, agent, host, commands, rotateBy}` and keeps `enrollCheck`
as it is, so the 234 tests don't move.
- The raise body is at broker.mjs:2270, :2345-2353 and :2391. `enroll` becomes a generic `grant`
binding. The question block for `host` follows the `host.sudo` block (:2337-2341): agent, host id,
address, user, sudo, each prefix JSON-quoted, rotate date, and new key or changed commands. The
4096 cap comes from `string(question)` (:2354).
- The argv rules come from `checkCommands` (business/src/hosts.mjs:67-87): no wildcard, no empty prefix,
no glob characters, a bare name or an absolute path, and `refusedCommand` for shells and runners. It
throws `refuse(...)` with a message, so the bus maps any throw to `invalid-request`, as `enrollCheck`
maps `checkAddress` (host-grant.mjs:57-61).
- `host-not-declared`: the agent's definition must list `{"service": "host"}`. business.mjs:126-129 reads
`definition.credentials` and filters out `HOST_SERVICE` (vocabulary.mjs:113). The bus needs the
definition's service list. Read how the running business exposes the definition before choosing.
- Both lookups are answered. `loadBusiness` returns `definitions`, each role file's validated document
(business/src/business.mjs:114-124, :159, returned at :267). `busBusiness` clones the whole business
(bus/src/business.mjs:7), so the broker has `b.definitions`. `#definitions` already reads it
(broker.mjs:1027-1029), and the comment there says the broker doesn't read `roles/` (sage-0590).
- `host-not-declared` checks `b.definitions[b.roles[agent].definition].credentials` for
`{service: 'host'}`. role.mjs:118 normalizes a host entry to exactly that.
- Deviation from R4: `definitionSha256` is sha256 over `canonicalJson` of that validated definition,
not over the file's bytes. The broker doesn't read `roles/`. A whitespace-only edit to the file no
longer voids an approval, but any change to a field the loader keeps still does. The bus sees a
definition change only after a business reload or restart, the same as every other role field.
This goes in the round 1 note.
Assumption, accepted for round 1 by Sage (sage-1782), for Duckworth to check in review: design R4 says `rotateBy` is "a date inside 210's rotation window", but 210
defines no window in code. It checks only that the value is a real calendar day (bus
credentials.mjs:16-20, issue at :245). The business load calls a past `rotateBy` a problem
(business/src/credentials.mjs:114). So the raise takes a real day strictly after today, UTC, and refuses
`invalid-request` otherwise. There is no upper bound, because no requirement states one and 210
checks none.
## Step 1 as built (not run yet; no slot)
- `hostGrantCheck(grant, today)` in host-grant.mjs takes exactly `method`, `agent`, `host`, `commands` and
`rotateBy`. `agent` must match ID_PATTERN and `host` HOST_ID. `commands` goes through `checkCommands`,
and any throw becomes `invalid-request`. `rotateBy` must pass 210's `day` (now exported from bus
credentials.mjs) and be later than the bus clock's UTC day.
- `#raiseGrant` branches on `a.grant?.method === 'host'` after the chief check and before `enrollCheck`.
So a host-enroll shape with `method: 'host'` still refuses `invalid-request`, and the 234 G1 list holds.
- `#hostGrantBinding` runs inside the raise transaction. It refuses `unknown-role` for an agent that
isn't a role instance (the code bindLaunch uses, broker.mjs:522). It refuses `host-not-declared`, and
`host-unknown` for a host with no record, as `#hostAccess` does. A record in `pending-install` refuses
`host-not-ready`. R4 names only `host-not-ready`. I picked `host-unknown` for a missing record so
"not enrolled" and "enrolled but not checked" stay apart.
- `commandsSha256` is sha256 over `JSON.stringify(commands)`. For arrays of strings this equals
canonicalJson, and step 3's executor recomputes it the same way.
- `#dispatch` takes `binding = {body, block}` in place of `enroll`. The enrollment block moved into
`enrollBinding` at module level with its text unchanged, so the 234 G4 test reads the same question.
- No new import in broker.mjs, so RUNNER_FILES doesn't change. host-grant.mjs now imports
business/src/util.mjs for canonicalJson. Nothing in the sandbox loads host-grant.mjs. Before in-review
I still run seat sandbox.test.mjs and bus project-runtime.test.mjs whole.
- The new-key line reads host_grants (a SELECT). Step 1 writes no host_grants row.
- Tests: bus/tests/grant-host.test.mjs, G1 (host), G2, G3, rotateBy, G19, R4/G5 body hashes, G4 block.
The G5 tester-thread case: a thread run is always THREAD_DEFINITION, never chief-of-staff, so
`grant-chief-only` refuses it first. The test covers the tester's own cap (`tester-refused`).
## Step 2 as built (not run yet)
- The constructor's per-reference checks moved into `#checkRef`, in the same order, and `register` calls
it (r6 X4). `register` reads no file. A key file that a failed revoke unlink left at the path stays
unused until the start sweep (step 4) removes it. `register` refuses `credential-reference` while the
entry holds a live token. An entry with no token, revoked or never issued, is replaced, so a new grant
after a revoke registers again.
- `unregister` drops an entry with no token and clears its revoked mark. A live token refuses.
- `claim` refuses `host-busy` when the slot is held, by a claim or a `host.run`, and returns the signal.
It needs no reference, because the executor claims at step 1 and registers at step 5.
`release(instance, service, signal)` frees the slot only for its own signal. I added the signal
argument so a late release can't free a later claim.
- `abortClaim` aborts whatever holds the slot and returns `{pending}`. An aborted claim keeps the slot
until the executor releases it in its `finally` (X2).
- Tests: bus/tests/credential-claim.test.mjs. The D5 `use(` allowlist is unchanged.
## Step 3 as built (not run yet)
Where the code goes. The remote steps are in host-grant.mjs (`grantKey`, `install`, `verify`, `remove`)
and the orchestration is `#runHostGrant` in broker.mjs, next to `#runEnrollment`. BUILD.md's plan said a
new `bus/src/host-grants.mjs`. I kept row 234's split instead: the broker holds every store write and
host-grant.mjs holds the network and key files. A new broker import would also change what the sandbox
must mount (RUNNER_FILES), and this way broker.mjs gains none.
The broker gets `hostKeys`, made by `grantKeys({credentials, storeRoot})` in host-grant.mjs. It wraps
only `claim`, `release`, `abortClaim`, `register`, `unregister`, `issue` and `revoke`, keyed by
(business, agent, hostId). The broker still never gets `use()`. runtime.mjs builds it and passes it in.
`hostReference` gives the store reference, and the runtime's start load uses the same function.
Every host_grants write in step 3, with its event (sage-1745):
| Write | Where | Event in the same transaction |
|---|---|---|
| INSERT, a new key | the `commit` callback that `issue` calls | `grant.applied` |
| UPDATE commands and decision, a commands change | step 5's transaction | `grant.applied` |
No other step 3 code writes host_grants.
Deviations from r6, for the round 1 note:
- `grant.applied` commits with the record, inside `commit`, not after `issue` at step 6. The untimed-table
rule needs an event in the record's transaction. `grant.step commit` can't be that event, because X2
writes it before the key file. So X3's "5 after commit" row has nothing to undo in the executor: once the
record commits, `grant.applied` has too. What's left in `issue` after `commit` is the memory fill, which
writes no file and no store row. The executor sets `committed` after the transaction returns and from
then ignores an abort (C1). The restart reconcile (step 4) keeps the commit row, because a crash can fall
between the key file write and `commit`.
- Event bodies name the decision as `grantDecision`, as row 234's enrollment events do. The consume record
is the only grant body with `decision`, so `#spent` counts it and nothing else.
- For a commands change, `grant.applied` has `fingerprint: null`. The executor holds no key on that path.
The record's `rotate_by` stays. X2 names only commands and the decision id.
- The keygen dir goes as soon as `grantKey` has read the key back into memory, not in step 5's `finally`.
- Step 4 runs `true` as the remote command as is, not through the sudo argv, since a user with no sudo
must pass it too.
- `hostGrant()` takes `installerUser`, `mosaic-installer` by default. Only the tests change it, because
the scratch sshd logs in only as the test's own user.
- A commands-change UPDATE that changes no row ends `host-changed`. Only a revoke deletes a live record,
and a revoke aborts the claim first, so this is a guard.
Step 1 codes, after the spend and in its transaction: `host-not-configured`, `unknown-role`,
`host-not-declared`, `decision-mismatch` (definition, registry or commands hash), `host-unknown`,
`host-not-ready`, `revoked` (a `grant.revoked` of the agent and host after the raise). The definition
check moved into `#hostDefinition`, which the raise binding uses too.
Tests: bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs, a scratch sshd on 127.0.0.1 with stub `list`, `add` and
`remove` that edit a second authorized-keys file. G7 (new key, and a commands change), G8 (install, verify,
a failed remove, step 5 before commit, a failed step 1 check), G9, G10, G15, G23 (a revoke during install
through `abortClaim`, a `grant.revoked` before start, and a held slot), G24's tag part. G23's held slot
uses `claim` in place of a running `host.run`. Both hold the same `#inflight` entry. The `revoke` verb
comes in step 5, so G23 here writes `grant.revoked` through the fixture writer and aborts through
`abortClaim`. Step 5 adds the verb's own path.
## Step 4 as built (not run yet)
The restart reconcile has three parts, in start order:
1. `sweepHostKeys` (host-grant.mjs), in runtime.mjs right before `Credentials` loads. In each loaded
business's agent store it unlinks every `host.<id>` file that has no `host_grants` record, and logs
one `hosts: {"event":"host-key-swept",...}` line per file to stderr. A store dir that isn't private
refuses `credential-file`, and so does the start. A name that isn't `host.` plus a valid host id
stays, so ssh-keygen's `.pub` stays too. A business the bus didn't load is left alone.
2. `reconcileGrants`, where row 234 already calls it, after `Credentials` loads and before the socket
opens. For a `host` grant it ends a spent decision that has no `grant.applied` and no `grant.failed`.
It also spends and ends an unspent one the human resolved yes. Each ends `grant.failed interrupted`,
with the tag and a notice. When the last step is `install`, or `commit` with `previous: null`, a line
may be left. For those, it claims the (agent, `host.<id>`) slot and queues the decision for part 3.
3. `reconcileHosts`, which runtime.mjs calls once `serve` returns, with no await, so a start doesn't
wait on the network. Each queued decision runs `remove <user> <tag>` through the installer, as the
step's `user`. Then it ends `grant.failed interrupted`, with `hostLineLeft` if the remove failed or
there's no host record, and releases the claim. The claim makes a new grant for the same agent and
host refuse `host-busy` while the remove runs. Otherwise its new line, with the same tag, could be
removed.
Deviations from r6's restart table, for the round 1 note:
- No record write on restart. Step 3 commits the record with `grant.applied` in one transaction. So a
decision with no `grant.applied` has no record. For a new key, the record undo has nothing to delete.
For a commands change, the "back to `previous`" undo has nothing to put back. What's left of the
`commit, new key` row is the key file, written before `commit`, and the start sweep unlinks it.
The `commit, commands change` row ends interrupted with nothing undone. G28's "a revoke before
`grant.applied`" can't happen, because they commit together. Step 5 tests G28 as a change, then a
revoke, then a restart.
- The local undo of row 234's enrollments stays after `Credentials` loads, where row 234 put it. That
undo touches only the installer key and the host record, and `Credentials` reads neither.
- The host grant part writes no `host_grants` row, so the untimed-table rule (sage-1745) adds nothing
here.
Fixture change: `hostGrantRecord` (tests/host-fixtures.mjs) writes `grant.applied` after a `grant.host`
spend, as the executor always does. Without it, a start over a fixture record ends that record's
decision `interrupted`. Row 234's M3 start test (host-run.test.mjs:602) does that start. No test counts
the fixture's grant events (checked by grep across the bus tests).
Tests in grant-executor.test.mjs, through a `restart` helper that follows runtime.mjs's order on the
same store:
- G11 after `install`: the line goes, the slot is held between the two parts, and the grant ends
interrupted. A second start adds nothing, and `runHostGrant` refuses `decision-consumed`.
- G11 after a new key's `commit` with the key file written: no key file, record, reference or line.
- G11 after a change's `commit`: the record, key and line are unchanged, and the host gets no request.
- G11 (B2) before step 1, spent and unspent: each ends interrupted with a notice, and the unspent one
is spent exactly once.
- A failed remote undo, and a missing host record: each ends with `hostLineLeft` and the sweep hint.
- A finished grant: the reconcile adds nothing.
- N1 (G27's sweep part): only files with no record in loaded businesses go, and a dir that isn't private
refuses.
The revoke-marker part of the reconcile (section 6, N4) comes with the revoke verb in step 5.
## Step 5 as built (not run yet)
Two new bus verbs, `hosts.revoke` and `hosts.sweep`, join `HOSTS_VERBS`. The CLI gets
`mosaic hosts revoke AGENT HOST --reason R` and `mosaic hosts sweep HOST`.
`hosts.revoke {agent, host, reason}` follows r6 section 6:
1. One transaction deletes the `host_grants` record and writes `grant.revoked` with a new `revoke` id
(a UUID), the computed tag, `hostLine: "pending"`, `granted`, `reason` and `by`. With no record it
still writes the marker, with `granted: false`, so a stale line can be named (N4). A host with no
record refuses `host-unknown` and writes nothing.
2. With no await between, `Credentials.revoke` drops the key from memory, aborts a `host.run` in flight
and unlinks the file. With no reference (`credential-unknown`), an executor holds only a claim, so
`abortClaim` stops it. Any other throw, such as an unlink that fails, comes back as `keyFile: "left"`.
The record is already gone, so the next start's sweep unlinks that file.
3. `remove <user> <tag>` through the installer, as the host record's user (the executor's user too).
Then `grant.revoke.closed` with the same `revoke` id and `hostLine: "removed"`, or `hostLineLeft`.
Callers (G26): the human, and the assistant of the session's business, checked with `#threaded`. The
tester can call it when `bus.tester` is exactly `true`, read again at the call. Any other agent gets
`revoke-refused`, a code new in this row. A tester session can't hold a business whose `bus.tester`
isn't `true`, since `bindTester` refuses `tester-off`, and the broker's businesses don't change while
it runs. So `tester-dev-only` can't be reached from a test. The check stays for N8, in case a later
row reloads businesses.
`hosts.sweep {host}` is the human's or the tester's; an agent gets `human-required`. It runs
`list <user>`, then removes each listed tag that this business recorded for the host in a `grant.step`
or `grant.revoked` and that no live grant holds. Another business's line and an unrecorded `mosaic-`
line stay (G24's sweep part). It writes `grant.host.swept {host, removed, left, by}`, where `left` is
each earlier left tag still listed and not removed. `#hostLinesLeft` now starts from the last
`grant.host.swept` and adds only later `hostLineLeft` bodies (F4).
The restart reconcile adds the marker part: `reconcileGrants` collects each `grant.revoked` with
`hostLine: "pending"`, a text `revoke` id and no `grant.revoke.closed` of that id. `reconcileHosts`
runs step 3 for each. A `grant.revoked` with no `revoke` id, as G23's fixtures write, isn't reopened.
`hosts.status` adds `revoking`, the tags of the open markers on the host.
Other changes:
- N10: the CLI checks the verb with `Object.hasOwn`, so `constructor`, `toString` or `__proto__` is a
usage error.
- `--reason` is required with `revoke` and refused with any other verb.
- The reason goes through the broker's `string(x, 500)`, as `credentials.revoke`'s does, so a reason of
only spaces is accepted there too.
- Correction to step 4: the first G11 test expected `list` then `remove`. `reconcileHosts` sends only
`remove`, so the test now expects that.
Residuals for the round 1 note:
- A new grant whose line goes in while a revoke's step 3 or a sweep runs can lose that line, if it has
the revoked tag. Revoke holds no claim during step 3. If the remove lands after the new grant's
verify, the grant is recorded but its line is gone, so its logins fail. I didn't add a claim, because
a revoke must not wait on a slot.
- The enrollment's installer tag is never in the sweep's set, so a `hostLineLeft` naming it stays
until the human removes it by hand.
Tests in grant-executor.test.mjs:
- G12: the human's revoke of a live grant, and the bodies of both markers. A restart adds nothing.
- G12 (N4): a revoke with no record removes the computed tag's line. Bad args refuse
`invalid-request` and an unknown host `host-unknown`.
- G13: a revoke during `install` aborts the executor, which ends `revoked`. A raise before a revoke
and started after it ends `revoked` at step 1.
- G26: who may revoke and who may sweep.
- G27: a restart after step 1 (the sweep takes the key file, then step 3 runs), after step 2 with the
host down (`hostLineLeft`, then a sweep clears it), and a file a revoke couldn't unlink.
- G28: a commands change, then a revoke, then a restart.
- G24 (B4): the sweep's tag set, a failing `list`, and the left list it records.
The CLI tests in packages/cli/tests/hosts.test.mjs cover revoke and sweep, the N10 usage cases and the
`revoking` field in a status line.
## Step 6 as built (not run yet)
New tests in grant-executor.test.mjs:
- G22 (B1), one bus with no restart. The chief enrolls web1, the human approves, and `hosts.check`
marks it ready. A grant of `echo` follows, then a `host.run` of `echo hi` that prints `hi`. A
`sleep` raise refuses `command-not-granted`, and after a commands change to `echo` and `sleep` the
next `host.run` of `sleep 30` starts. A revoke kills that run with `credential-unavailable`. The next
call refuses `host-not-granted`.
- G12: the local steps finish before the host step. With the host's `remove` held, the record and key
file are already gone and `hosts.status` shows the tag under `revoking`.
- G13: a revoke whose host `remove` fails returns `hostLineLeft`, drops the record and key, and closes
the marker, so a restart adds nothing.
- G23 (X5): a revoke right after the executor's spend reaches its claim and the grant ends `revoked`.
- G23 (X5): a revoke that lands as `verify` returns ends `revoked` with no record, key file or line.
Only the abort check after `verify` catches it.
The fixture gains a `sudo` stub (logs to sudo.log, then runs the command as the test's user), a
`hold-remove` flag, `opts.enroll` (no host record and no installer key) and `opts.wrap` (changes the
host API the broker gets). `hostGrant` gets a fake `scan` that returns the scratch sshd's host key.
G22 deviations, for the round 1 note:
- `checkAddress` (business/src/hosts.mjs:62) refuses this machine's address, so the test enrolls
192.0.2.10 with the fake keyscan. It then points the record at the scratch sshd with an SQL update
and adds the enrolled installer key to the sshd's authorized keys. Enrollment, check, grant, run and
revoke all go through the real code after that.
- r6 B1 says the next `host.run` after a revoke refuses `credential-unavailable`. Here it refuses
`host-not-granted`, because step 1 deletes the record and `requestHost` checks the record
(`#hostAccess`) before it reaches the key. The call in flight does refuse `credential-unavailable`.
### Mutants
`/mnt/storage/scratch/gizmo-235-out/mutants.py` holds each mutant as anchored edits. `--check` applies
them in memory and runs no test. All 39 anchors match once. Each mutant runs its named test files.
From r6 section 10, as they apply to row b:
| Id | Mutant | Test file |
|---|---|---|
| B1 | drop the chief check on a host grant raise | grant-host (G1) |
| B2 | start the executor on a `credential.mint` with no `grant` | grant-enroll (A2), grant-executor |
| B3 | skip the `ready` check at the raise | grant-host (G19) |
| B4 | skip the `ready` check at step 1 | grant-executor |
| B5 | skip the definition hash compare | grant-executor (G9) |
| B6 | drop the definition check (`host-not-declared`) | grant-host (G2), grant-executor (G9) |
| B7 | skip the commands hash compare | grant-executor (G9) |
| B8 | skip the host record hash compare | grant-executor (G9) |
| B9 | write the grant record before install | grant-executor (G8) |
| B10 | skip `remove` on a verify failure | grant-executor (G8) |
| B11 | skip the start sweep of key files with no record | grant-executor (N1, G27) |
| B12 | skip the reconcile's remote `remove` | grant-executor (G11) |
| B13 | skip the `grant.step` before install | grant-executor (G11) |
| B14 | revoke leaves the grant record | grant-executor (G12) |
| B15 | skip `register` before `issue` | grant-executor (G7) |
| B16 | drop the abort check after `verify`, the last one before `issue` | grant-executor (G23 X5) |
| B17 | add an `await` between the abort check and `issue` | grant-executor |
| B18 | revoke ignores a claim with no reference | grant-executor (G13, G23 X5) |
| B19 | build the tag without the business | grant-executor (G24) |
| B20 | `sweep` removes any `mosaic-` line | grant-executor (G24 B4) |
| B21 | run revoke's host step before the local steps | grant-executor (G12) |
| B22 | start the executor on an arbiter resolve | grant-executor (G10) |
| B23 | start it on `no` | grant-enroll (A2, A4), grant-executor |
| B24 | write the private key into the event body | grant-executor (G15) |
| B25 | put an `await` between the spend and the claim | grant-executor (G23 X5) |
| B26 | skip the start check for a resolved, unspent grant decision | grant-executor (G11 B2) |
| B27 | make `commit` async | grant-executor (G8) |
| B28 | route `hosts.revoke` to `Credentials.revoke` alone, as `credential-verbs.mjs` would | grant-executor (G12, G27) |
| B29 | skip the revoke marker reconcile | grant-executor (G27) |
Row 235's own:
| Id | Mutant | Test file |
|---|---|---|
| B30 | skip the `grant.revoked` check at step 1 | grant-executor (G13, G23) |
| B31 | the sweep set keeps a live grant's tag | grant-executor (G24 B4) |
| B32 | reopen a `grant.revoked` with no revoke id | grant-executor (G27) |
| B33 | step 3 reports `removed` when the host remove fails | grant-executor (G13, G27) |
| B34 | any agent revokes, not just the assistant | grant-executor (G26) |
| B35 | `hostLineLeft` ignores the last sweep | grant-executor (G24 B4, G27) |
| B36 | a stale `release` frees a later claim | credential-claim (X5), grant-executor |
| B37 | `register` replaces an entry with a live token | credential-claim (X4) |
| B38 | drop the creative check in `#hostDefinition` | grant-host (mos-1163), grant-executor (mos-1163) |
| B39 | drop the creative check in `#hostAccess` | grant-executor (sage-1908) |
B17 may survive. `await null` yields only to microtasks, and every revoke starts in a macrotask of its
own (a socket request, or a test's call), so none can land in that gap. If it survives I'll report it
as equivalent under this build, not add a test that fakes a microtask revoke.
Section 10 items not run as row b mutants, and why:
- The upsert mutant ("let the undo to `previous` insert a record") and "run past a newer
`grant.revoked`". Row 235 has no undo to `previous`. A commands change commits the UPDATE and
`grant.applied` in one transaction (sage-1745), so a restart after it leaves the record as it is
(G11). The UPDATE can't meet a missing record either: step 1 reads the live record, and nothing
awaits between there and the UPDATE. An upsert there would be equivalent.
- "let the executor act on an abort after step 5 commits". The record and `grant.applied` commit
together, and no abort check follows the commit, so no code path reaches the `if (committed)` guard
with an abort. Removing the guard is equivalent. C1's case is covered by G28 with a later revoke.
- "treat a missing `bus.tester` as dev". The tester check can't be reached from a test (step 5 notes).
- Row a's: the keyscan compare, the writer items, the "not yet enrolled" check, the `hosts` primary key
and `host.run` reading the business file. Row 234 ran those as A5, A6, A8, A9, A11 and A13-A19.
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# Gosalyn
Worker seat for Mosaic Stack, MVP track T2 (Case 2, the creative writing hub, Vikunja #416).
- T3 thread: 7604438a-0ded-41c8-bd3f-26f57fdb5cd2
- Model: Opus 5.5 (Claude Code, T3)
- Launched by Mos (Jason's main agent, T3 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e), who briefs the seat
- Repository lead and queue: Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079)
- Branch: gosalyn/case2-design, pushed only by this seat, landed on refactor by Sage
Work lives in `work/`. The Case 2 design is `work/case2/DESIGN.md`.
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# Row 212 build notes, C2-01 packages/library (#1713, Vikunja #416)
## Rounds
- Round 1: bdf18272a on gosalyn/c2-01, base 32b54ac3b. Webby approved it in Gitea comment 29704.
- Round 2: d3c7bbf839d9c3bf50f154b18e7e4472fbd005ed on gosalyn/c2-01-r2, rebased onto 9b5362018 after row 232 drifted three paths (sage-1714). Webby approved it at merge scope, rev 2666 against comment 29921 (webby-0052).
- Round 3: this commit on gosalyn/c2-01-r3, one commit on the row 234 landing c771a36f4 (sage-1736, sage-1779, mos-1160). Row 234 changed scripts/mosaic, so round 3 review covers that one file.
## Round 2 merge
range-diff 32b54ac3b..bdf18272a against 9b5362018..d3c7bbf83 shows one change, the context line where upstream added `credentials` to the scripts/mosaic case line. Patch-id moved from 8f80dfa3 to 175f45c6 for that reason only. All three drifted hunks keep both sides:
- scripts/stack-copy.sh COPY_PATHS reads `packages/queue/src packages/library/src`. Row 232's bundle, --create, --units and instance code is unchanged.
- scripts/mosaic runs the `library survey` exec block before the case line, and the case line keeps `credentials`.
- packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs adds `packages/library/src/index.mjs` to the copy file list.
## Round 2 singles, evidence for the 19 paths other than scripts/mosaic
Run on d3c7bbf83 in Sage's slot (sage-1723) from 2026-10-21T05:00:09Z to 05:11:29Z. The HEAD and a clean tree were checked first. The counts are an awk sum over the 23 logs: 481 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped, 0 cancelled, and every file exited rc=0.
| Package | File | Pass |
|---|---|---|
| library | links | 6 |
| library | mapping | 7 |
| library | reader | 11 |
| library | render | 11 |
| library | survey | 4 |
| cli | app | 30 |
| cli | case2-unit | 30 |
| cli | credentials | 5 |
| cli | host | 42 |
| cli | instances | 5 |
| cli | project | 4 |
| cli | stack-copy | 16 |
| cli | stack-instances | 23 |
| cli | stack-release-external | 25 |
| cli | stack-release | 192 |
| cli | tester-reads | 6 |
| cli | tester-threads | 5 |
| cli | usage | 2 |
| queue | dispatch | 4 |
| runs | task-cli | 9 |
| webui | pinned-copy | 10 |
| webui | service | 31 |
| webui | views | 3 |
The file list comes from the library tests plus every test that names scripts/mosaic or stack-copy.sh, by basename and by join() path. No 64-hex pin in the tests names a merged path.
## Round 3 scripts/mosaic
The only path both row 234 and this row change is scripts/mosaic. Row 234 added `hosts` to the cli case line and changed nothing else in the file. Round 3 takes the landed blob cce1fdee4 and adds this row's six-line `library survey` block before the case line by hand, so `hosts` stays. The mode stays 100755. The other 19 paths are byte-identical to d3c7bbf83. Against d3c7bbf83 the only difference is the `hosts` context line.
Round 3 runs only the tests that read scripts/mosaic, in Sage's slot. Their counts go to Sage in T3 and onto #1713, since this file can't hold them and stay one commit. Those tests are library survey, cli app, case2-unit, credentials, hosts, host, instances, project, stack-copy, stack-release, stack-release-external, stack-upgrade, tester-reads, tester-threads and usage, queue dispatch, runs task-cli, webui pinned-copy, service and views, plus scripts/test-queue.sh. hosts.test.mjs is new with row 234.
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# Row 230: C2-13a unit render and host precheck
Gitea #1732. Vikunja #416 (track T2). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md, section "C2-13a",
blob f6b4933f0f47 (01b40d357, sage-1562). Base: 00d4cc1f6 (row 190). Reviewer: Webby. Gate: the cli
suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh.
## What ships
`scripts/case2-unit.sh` renders `[email protected]` and `mosaic-webui.service` from the two existing
templates into the system unit directory, for the default instance only. It writes each unit through
a temp file at mode 0644, runs `daemon-reload`, enables both units, starts the bus and then the
Console. If the bus fails to start, the script refuses and leaves the Console unstarted. Both units
get `WantedBy=multi-user.target`, and neither gets `After=` or `Wants=`. The script never links a unit
file into place. A re-install refuses unless each installed unit passes the same checks, both units
name one copy, and each equals the render apart from the copy id.
`--profile library` (the default) refuses `--pm`, `--claude`, `--tester-port` and `--sso`, and needs
the preview proxy flags plus the proof pair. `--profile factory` refuses the six proxy flags and takes
`--pm` and `--claude`. Both refuse `--checkout` and `--board`.
`scripts/case2-precheck.sh --business ID [--profile factory|library]` runs as `<user>`. It prints one
`ok` or `REFUSED` line per check and exits 1 if any check refused. It prints variable names only,
never values.
`packages/cli/README.md:713` now says nothing creates the session env file, only the Case 2 precheck
reads it, and the precheck prints only variable names (webby-0034 N2, webby-0035).
## Deviations for review
Sage accepted all six for the build (sage-1570). Webby rules on each.
1. The precheck takes `--business ID`. The brief names no other way to find the business file.
2. A run root `<dataRoot>/launches/<business>` that doesn't exist passes, with a note that the first
launch creates it at 0700 (session.mjs:47 and newRun). A symlink refuses, and so does an existing
entry that isn't a 0700 directory.
3. The claude marker check passes when the reply holds the marker and input plus cache tokens are at
most 2000. **The 2000 ceiling is unmeasured.** The tests use fakes at 40 and 9000 tokens. Measuring
it on a real claude belongs to row 195's install run, not this row.
4. A non-root test can't create a root-owned proof file. For the "proof not owned by the user" case,
the fake getent reports another uid for the user, so the user's own file reads as someone else's.
5. The unit script refuses `%h` left in any unit, rendered or installed. A system unit expands `%h`
to root's home. The render replaces every `%h`, so the test edits an installed unit to reach it.
6. With `--auth-header X-Authentik-Uid`, the allowed user must be 64 lower-case hex characters (lead
decision 101). The test covers both the refusal and the pass.
## Tests (packages/cli/tests/case2-unit.test.mjs, 30 cases after round 2)
The tests use a scratch unit directory and a scratch home, plus fake systemctl, getent, sudo, id,
node, bwrap and claude. They never touch /etc/systemd, ~/.mosaic-dev, ~/.config/mosaic-dev or a
live unit. Every precheck case asserts its output doesn't hold the fixture key.
- Unit: the clean library render, PATH for a node outside the default list and for /usr/bin/node, the
systemctl order, a failed bus start, no `systemctl link`, factory `--pm` and `--claude` rendered and
absent, re-install to another copy, edits to an installed unit, template restrictions,
EnvironmentFile placement, unknown tokens, PermissionsStartOnly and `+`/`-+` Exec prefixes,
symlinked unit paths, bad `--node`, re-install drift, a split copy pair, bad copy ids, every library
and factory flag refusal, and bad `--claude`.
- Precheck: a good host, node older than 24, more than one group, sudo succeeding, XDG_DATA_HOME,
HOME mismatch, a run root mode, a bad config, bwrap failing, the port floor at or below the Console
port, a missing Console unit, bus.tester per profile, profile-library-business, the claude check
(no route, replaces, appends, missing, the unit's MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN beating PATH), and the session
env file (missing, 0644, symlink, empty, emptied by a later line, quoted).
- Bind (mos-1100): inside `binds()` plus `sandboxArgv()`, a bind on port 980 gets EACCES, and a bind
on a free port of 1024 or above succeeds. The test fails if the host's floor is at or below 980.
## Verification
Round 1 singles, run before the gate: case2-unit.test.mjs passes 28/28 with no skips, and host.test.mjs (it
reads the cli README) passes 42/42. No test pins a hash of the README. No other test reads the two
scripts.
## Round 2 (webby-0046, sage-1589, sage-1590, sage-1591)
Base: origin/refactor (rebased from 00d4cc1f6; the 15 commits between touch none of the five paths
or the two unit templates). Branch gosalyn/c2-13a-r2.
B1. The precheck now has a case for each refusal Webby named: the user missing from passwd (:77),
a business file that is unparsable, missing or fails the schema (:137), a run root that is a symlink
to a 0700 directory (:151), a Console ExecStart with no --port (:179), an unreadable port floor
(:180), a claude reply without the marker (:223) and a claude reply that isn't JSON (:224). The fake
claude gained `nomarker` and `text` kinds. The no-claude-code case and the missing-claude case share
a PATH without `/usr/bin/claude` (`pathWithoutClaude`), so the no-claude-code case now shows a host
with no claude passes.
N1 (ruled in for this round). Before writing, `case2-unit.sh` asks `systemctl is-active` for both
units. For each unit that was running, it prints that the unit is still on its old copy, never
"started", and then that the bus and Console must restart together to reach the new copy. A unit
that wasn't running gets "started ... on copy". A fresh install prints the round 1 line. The script
still restarts nothing. The new test covers both units running and only the Console running.
N4. The README line at :713 is rewrapped.
Mutants, run in Sage's slot on a scratch worktree, one branch each: :77, :137, :151, :179, :180,
:223, :224, a precheck that refuses with no claude on PATH (for the no-claude-code case), and an
install that prints "started" for a running unit (sage-1591).
## Carry items for row 195
- N1's restart. Row 195 restarts the bus and Console together after a re-install over running
units, as the install line now asks.
- N2. A system drop-in check like `bus-service.sh:122-145`, so a drop-in under
`[email protected]/` or `mosaic-webui.service.d/` can't change what the checked unit runs.
- N3. The precheck finds claude on the shell PATH. The bus unit's `PATH=` is what a session uses
when `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` is unset, so the check should search that PATH.
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# Herb
Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for a second gate lane
design row (#1695, mos-0977 item 6).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `herb/*`
branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Honker
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
# host access through the credential store
Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
## What it changes
Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
(Vikunja #420).
When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
`roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
`reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
file commit in `roles/`.
## Text for the PRD
Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
> <prd.approve decision id>.
Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
> needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
> still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
> agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
> as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
> keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
> me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
> Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
> happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
> Added in version 1.7:
>
> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
> adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
> runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
> an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
> under this requirement, within these bounds:
> - The chief acts only in its own organization.
> - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
> credentialed roles.
> - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
> - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
> messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
> working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
> organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
> hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
> is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
> change.
> - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
> - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
> or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
> WebUI or the CLI.
> - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
> - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
> Added in version 1.7:
>
> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
> - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
> bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
> names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
> - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
> name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
> - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
> and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
> the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
> the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
> repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
> - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
> agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
> history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
> - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
> other role file grants it.
> - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
> the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
>
> Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
> Added in version 1.7:
>
> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
> for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
> before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
> REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
> grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
(row 194 D2.3).
- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
`hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
version lifts it.
- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
paragraph never edited in place except to append.
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# Launchpad
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Megavolt
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage under mos-0974 and mos-0977 item 5 for MVP T1 item 6, the
credential store per agent with its own git identity (#1697).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `megavolt/*`
branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
Status: candidate on megavolt/row199-on-190, rebased on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 (sage-1555). The
full gate and the section 11 mutants ran in Sage's slot; results under "Runs".
## Commits so far
- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
git.push.remote among the hard waits.
- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
`detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
without identity commits as E7 (T6).
2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
`forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
`broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
only".
6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
`roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
`reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
`create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
`packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
`working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
`withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
(`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
(sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
`bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
publish-timeout outcome).
12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
`recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
`working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
(`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
(`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
(`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
`cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
16. **The bus process refuses a boot config carrying `publishTls` (M26, sage-1563).** process.mjs
used to drop `publishTls` from the boot config before `startBroker`, and no test could see the
drop. The host's boot config (`packages/cli/src/config.mjs`) never carries it; it is the tests'
scratch CA for an in-process runtime only. A boot that carries it now refuses
`invalid-host-request` and the process exits 2, rather than trusting it or dropping it quietly.
The test: `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs`, "the bus process answers the publish ops from their own
lines". Every test file that reads process.mjs ran singly, green (see "Runs").
17. **M17 is equivalent: `#authorityFor`'s pushCommit comparison is also made by `#publishFacts`.**
A git.push.remote raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push` (`broker.mjs` raise,
`pushCommit = ... ?? fail('no-push')`), so every publish decision carries a pushCommit.
`#publishFacts` takes `source = result.pushCommit` and refuses `decision-mismatch` when it isn't
`#latestPush(task_ref).commit`, the same two values `#authorityFor` compares. The check stays as
defense in depth, for a decision whose context lacks pushCommit, which no code path writes today.
Duckworth judges it, as with M27.
## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
## R1, the backup set
Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
## T1 limit
A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
## Runs
Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
Hash pins: none on a changed file.
sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
Hash pins: none on a changed file.
Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.
Rebase (sage-1555): the 21 commits from megavolt/row199 sit on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 as the new
branch megavolt/row199-on-190 (no force-push). `git range-diff` shows all 21 patches as `=`; the
merge of 12c85ada1 flattened with an empty remerge-diff.
Full gate, Sage's slot, on c6868ba41 (base 00d4cc1f6), logs started 2026-10-20T22:55:44Z: bus 476
pass 0 fail; business 191/0; tasks 97/0; cli 522/0 (472 s); seat 163/0; scripts/test-queue.sh
156/0; test-auth, test-conductor, test-config, test-discord, test-extension-package,
test-foundation, test-land-work, test-release and test-task each exit 0. The test-task compose run
left the network megavolt-row199_default with 0 containers; I removed it.
Section 11 mutants, batch 1, on c6868ba41, 2026-10-20T23:09:03Z to 23:09:56Z, restores verified and
packages/ clean: 22 of 28 killed; M27 survived, expected equivalent (deviation 13). Five expected
kills survived, each a test gap: M05 (the token in the push URL), M06 (revoke unlinks before it drops
memory), M12 (http.followRedirects=false dropped), M17 (#authorityFor's pushCommit check dropped)
and M26 (publishTls reaches startBroker). Launchpad's stack-release single file ran alongside from
23:09:28Z, so batch 2 reruns all 28 (sage-1563).
Fixes, each checked by its mutant alone: 5fa7b2553 seat publish, a test reads git's argv through a
PATH shim and finds no token and no userinfo (M05 killed); the 302 test's target shares the CA git
trusts, so only http.followRedirects=false keeps git off it (M12 killed). 116eeec48 bus,
credential-store: revoke's unlink fails (dir 0500) and the token is already out of memory (M06
killed); process.mjs refuses publishTls, deviation 16 (M26 killed, its anchor is now the refusal
line). M17 is equivalent, deviation 17. Single files after the fixes, each green: seat publish (12),
bus credential-store (12), bus publish (12), bus process (8), and every other file that reads
process.mjs: bus credential-status (4), limit-checks (16), land (17), tasks (9), end-launch (7); cli
trackers-boot (1), thread-launch (11), publish-socket (7). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
Section 11 mutants, batch 2, all 28, on 7c3cdd940 in Sage's slot (sage-1565), 2026-10-20T23:17:59Z to
23:18:48Z, restores verified and packages/ clean: 26 killed; M17 and M27 survived, both expected
equivalent (deviations 17 and 13). Each of the five batch 1 survivors but M17 now fails its test. Then
pkg-bus 477 pass 0 fail, pkg-seat 164/0, pkg-cli 522/0 (461 s), ending 23:26:40Z. No other seat's run
was active: the busy check said CLEAR before the batch started. Logs:
/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r199/batch2-20261020T231650Z/.
-416
View File
@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
`publish` require it (D8).
r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
## 0. Terms
- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
`~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
design says agent.
- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
| Code | Fact | Where |
|---|---|---|
| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
share.
## 2. The store (brief item 1)
D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
```
<configDir>/secrets/agents/ 0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/ 0700
<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind> 0600, the token only, one line
```
This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
does for files today, extended to the dirs).
D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
|---|---|---|
| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
```
publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
```
The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
`broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
**The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
(`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
`holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
`decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
refuses.
No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
(`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
`identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
(`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
`work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
`validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
(`identity-mismatch`).
5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
`checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
(`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
`protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
`["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
`store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
`credential-leak`.
6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
built on them.
Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
`gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
the owner that is used.
- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
`..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
sides.
- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
step 5. The token never leaves that call.
- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
`all`, no admin).
D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
| Verb | What it does |
|---|---|
| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
end. Row 194's fire ends them.
D13. **What row 194 calls.**
- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
`issue`.
- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
with its credentials still live on our side.
- `regenerate`: no credential change.
## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
`gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
`write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
(`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
the token pasted into stdin.
- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
`issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
one.
## 9. Questions
Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
grants it to coder.
- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
row.
Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account.
- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3).
## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
## 11. Tests and mutants
All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
`action.refused`.
- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
`decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
`identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
`changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
## 12. Risks
- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
and says what it includes.
- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
Jason's network to confirm.
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# Row 237: one decision publishes once (#1743)
Megavolt, 2026-10-21 (from `date -u`). Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`
§ "row 199 follow-up N1", blob dca67d310e1b. Source: Duckworth's row 199 round 1 note N1
(duckworth-0068). Base: `cb5fdb064` (row 199's landing). Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage.
## The defect
`checkPublish` opens a ticket after checking the decision is unspent. The decision is spent only at
`recordPublish`, which runs after the bus process has pushed. Two `checkPublish` calls on one decision
therefore both get tickets, and both push. With different branches, the commit lands on two fork refs:
`refs/heads/<user>/feat` and `refs/heads/<user>/other`. The second `recordPublish` then refuses
`decision-consumed`, but by then its push has already reached the fork.
## The fix, and why this option
`checkPublish` refuses `publish-busy` when an open ticket in `#publishes` holds the same business and
decision (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:1038-1040`). It runs after the authority and fact checks, so a
spent decision still refuses `decision-consumed` first.
The brief's other option, rechecking `#spent` in `publishTarget`, doesn't close the race. Both tickets
reach `publishTarget` before either push ends, and nothing is spent until `recordPublish`. So both
rechecks pass and both pushes run. The only state that exists while the first push runs is the open
ticket, so the check reads that.
A refusal (`publishRefused`) drops the ticket and leaves the decision unspent, so a retry on the same
decision gets a new ticket. That is row 199's behaviour, unchanged. A within-role publish has no
decision and isn't affected.
## Tests
- `packages/bus/tests/publish.test.mjs:186`. A second ticket refuses `publish-busy`, on the same branch
and on another. After `publishRefused` the retry gets a ticket and a third refuses busy. After
`recordPublish` there is one `action.allowed` for git.push.remote and the next call refuses
`decision-consumed`. Another agent's decision on the same task isn't held.
- `packages/cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs:269`. End to end through the git socket, the bus runtime
and the TLS fake Gitea. While the first publish holds its ticket, a second publish on the same
decision to branch `other` gets `publish-busy`. The fake Gitea gets exactly one `git-receive-pack`,
the fork has only `refs/heads/coder/feat`, and there is one `action.allowed`.
Runs on this branch, single files:
- publish.test.mjs: 13/13.
- publish-socket.test.mjs: 8/8.
## Mutant
M1 removes the `publish-busy` line. Both tests fail:
- The bus test fails at the first busy assert.
- The cli test fails because the second publish answers `ok: true` with `ref: refs/heads/coder/other`.
That is the defect: two refs on the fork.
Logs are in `/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r237/` (m1-bus.log, m1b-cli.log). `cmp` confirmed
broker.mjs matched the saved copy after the restore. The first cli mutant run (m1-cli.log) was against
a hook that recursed on every checkPublish. I fixed the hook to fire only for branch `feat` and reran
it (m1b-cli.log).
## Residuals, not fixed here
1. **A ticket that never ends holds its decision until the bus restarts.** `#publishes` is in memory.
That happens when the host dies between checkPublish and recordPublish or publishRefused. It fails
closed (`publish-busy`), and a restart clears it.
2. **publish-timeout (sage-1440).** The socket files `publishRefused` and drops the ticket, but the bus
process's push may still be running. A retry on the same decision can then open a ticket while that
push is live. This is the same residual the socket already logs ("the bus process's push may still
reach the fork"). Closing it means the runtime's `remotes` must keep the decision busy until its push
settles, which reaches into runtime.mjs. That is beyond the brief's two options.
3. **checkLand has the same shape.** `#landings` takes a ticket per call and the decision is spent at
`recordLand`. Whether two landings on one decision can both reach main isn't checked here. That's a
follow-up for Sage to row or dismiss.
## Gate
Per the brief: Duckworth approves the manifest, the bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green
on Sage's gate, and M1 is killed. This row also changes a cli test file, so the cli suite (or that file
alone) should run on the gate too.
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# Row 241: one decision lands once (#1747, P19 441)
Megavolt, 2026-10-21 (from `date -u`). Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`
§ "Brief: row 237 follow-up, one decision lands once, with tests at the broker", c25785d3d. Source:
row 237 residual 3, megavolt-0068, megavolt-0069 and sage-1651. Base: origin/refactor f5753c0e8, row 210's landing.
Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Tests only; no source changes.
## Why landing has no row 237 race
Row 237 fixed publish: two tickets on one decision both pushed, because the decision is spent only
after the push, and a push to a remote fork can't be taken back. Landing has the same ticket shape
(`checkLand` opens a ticket, `recordLand` spends the decision), but three guards keep one decision
from landing twice:
1. **land-busy, the outer guard.** `doLand` in `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:351` refuses
`land-busy` while another landing runs. The slot is taken before the first await, and freed only
when the landing ends. There is one git socket per launcher, and one host per dataRoot (host.lock).
So through the socket two landings never overlap, and a later one stops at `checkLand` with
`decision-consumed`. Even past that, applying the same reviewed patch to the new main fails
`base-conflict` in `prepareLand`.
2. **The CAS on main.** `finishLand` (`packages/seat/src/working.mjs:391`) moves main with
`update-ref main <commit> <old>`, so a landing prepared on a tip that has since moved refuses
`base-moved` and writes nothing.
3. **The recordLand recheck.** `finishLand` calls `record()`, which is `recordLand`, under the same
repository lock. `recordLand` runs `#landFacts` again (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:963`), which
refuses `decision-consumed` once the decision is spent. When `record()` throws, `finishLand` moves
main back.
Guards 2 and 3 can't be reached end to end, because guard 1 stops a second landing first. So they are
pinned below the socket, and no test bypasses land-busy.
### The unrecorded-commit window
Between the `update-ref` and the end of `record()`, main names the squash, which isn't recorded yet.
That window is under the repository's lock, so no other push, review or landing in this host sees
it. If `record()` refuses, main moves back. If moving back fails, `finishLand` refuses
`rollback-failed` and main keeps naming an unrecorded commit (tested at `working.test.mjs:555`, the
main.lock case). That is existing behaviour, unchanged here.
## The test
`packages/bus/tests/land.test.mjs:312`. Two tickets pass `checkLand` on one decision before either
records. `recordLand` on the first lands. `recordLand` on the second refuses `decision-consumed`
(:319), and leaves one merge `action.allowed`, one RESULT and no `action.refused`. `landRefused`, as
the socket would call it, then files the refusal and ends the ticket.
**The assert that pins the recordLand recheck is :319.** The `#spent` line is shared with
`checkLand`, so dropping it also fails :144 (a `checkLand` after the decision is spent). Only :319
shows the recheck at record time.
Single file on this branch: land.test.mjs 18/18.
Whole suites on this branch before in-review: bus 500/500, seat 164/164, cli 565/565 (02:52 to 03:01Z).
## Mutants
| Mutant | Change | Killed by |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | drop the `#spent` line in `#landFacts` (broker.mjs:963) | land.test.mjs: :312 at :319, and :94 at :144 (16/2) |
| M2 | drop `land.old` from the `update-ref` in `finishLand` (working.mjs:391) | working.test.mjs:555 at :567, the `base-moved` assert (25/1) |
| M3 | drop the `land-busy` throw (git-socket.mjs:351) | git-socket.test.mjs:812 at :825, the `land-busy` assert (23/1) |
Each run was one test file on base f5753c0e8 (row 210's landing, which moved the `#spent` line from
:945 to :963), 2026-10-21 02:51Z. Each assert failed with "Missing expected exception" or "rejection".
`cmp` confirmed each source matched its saved copy after the restore. M2 is killed by the existing
working.test:555, so per the brief working.test.mjs isn't changed. Logs: `/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r241/`
(m1.log to m3.log, with each diff).
## Gate
Per the brief: Duckworth approves the manifest; the bus, seat and cli suites and every
`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate; the three mutants are killed.
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# Row 242 build: a retry after publish-timeout pushes once
Row 242, #1748, P19 440. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md, "Brief: row 237
follow-up N1, a retry after publish-timeout pushes once" (9d165be8c). Base: origin/refactor
8fede5fc6 (row 210 landed f5753c0e8).
## The defect
The git socket polls publishResult until publishDeadlineMs, then refuses publish-timeout
(packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:433) while the bus process's push (runtime publishPush) can
still be running. The socket then calls publishRefused, which went straight to
broker.publishRefused: it filed the refusal and deleted the ticket. checkPublish no longer saw an
open ticket on the decision, so a retry got a new ticket and pushed a second ref while the first
push was still on its way to the fork.
## Fix chosen: hold the decision until the push ends, then record a push that reached the fork
packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs, `publishRefused` and `settle`:
- If the bus has no push for the ticket, publishRefused goes to the broker as before.
- If the push is still running, the refusal code is held on the entry and the ticket stays open.
checkPublish refuses another publish on the decision with publish-busy (row 237's check),
the same as when the socket is still polling.
- When the push ends, `settle` runs:
- A push that reached the fork is recorded with broker.recordPublish, which spends the
decision. The bus logs `pushed after the git socket refused <code>; recorded`.
- A push that failed is filed as publishRefused with the socket's code.
- If recordPublish refuses with a BusError, that code is filed instead.
- If the push has already ended when the refusal arrives, it's settled at once. The sage-1440 test
relies on this: its push fails fast, so publish-timeout is filed once, immediately, as before.
Why hold rather than kill. Killing the git client doesn't undo a push the fork has already
received: receive-pack can update the ref after the client dies. After a kill the bus would have
to ls-remote the fork to learn what landed, and the result could still race the server. Holding
waits for the push's own outcome. Each git run in publishRemote already has its own limit
(publishRemote defaults to checkout.mjs GIT_LIMITS), so a hold is bounded. Holding also reuses the existing publish-busy
state, and the refusal text is unchanged.
Why record and not only hold. If the hold just filed publish-timeout once the push ended, the
ticket would close and the decision would be free again with a ref on the fork. A retry would then
push a second ref. Recording the late push spends the decision, so the retry gets
decision-consumed.
The publish-timeout refusal text is unchanged (brief condition).
## Test
packages/cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs:302, "row 242: a retry after publish-timeout refuses
publish-busy while the bus process's push runs; the late push is recorded and the decision pushes
once".
- publishDeadlineMs 150 and a store token. The fork's pre-receive hook writes `held`, then loops
until the test writes `release`.
- The first publish gives publish-timeout. The test waits for `held`.
- A retry to branch `other` gives publish-busy (:322). Refused events: ["publish-busy"]. No
git.push.remote allowed event.
- The test writes `release` and waits until there is exactly one allowed event, with ref
refs/heads/coder/feat and the work commit.
- The next retry gives decision-consumed (:330).
- Exactly one git-receive-pack request reached the fake Gitea, and the fork has only
refs/heads/coder/feat. Refused events: ["publish-busy", "decision-consumed"]. No TOKEN appears in
events or logs.
Fail fast (sage-1681): the body is wrapped in try/finally, and the finally writes `release`. Under
the first mutant run, the assert at the retry failed and the hook was never released. setup's
teardown waits for the fake Gitea, which waited for the held push, so the file hung until I stopped
it. Now a failed assert ends the hook and the run. Each wait is bounded at 10 s with an assert.fail.
## Mutants
Script: /mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r242/mutants.sh. Each mutant: save, one-line sed, run
publish-socket.test.mjs whole, restore, cmp.
| Mutant | Change | Expected kill |
|---|---|---|
| M1 | export `publishRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.publishRefused(ticket, args)` again (removes the fix) | :302 at :322: the retry gets a new ticket and its own push, so publish-timeout, not publish-busy (seen in the stopped 03:06Z run) |
| M2 | `settle` files publishRefused without trying recordPublish (hold only) | :302 at the wait for one allowed event, then :330 |
Results (Sage's slot, sage-1686, 2026-10-21T03:35:00Z to 03:35:15Z): both killed, both restored
(cmp ok).
- M1: publish-socket 8/1, the row 242 test fails at :322 in 0.5 s.
- M2: publish-socket 8/1, the row 242 test fails at :327, the wait for one allowed event, through
the assert.fail inside `until` (:311) after its 10 s bound, in 10.3 s.
## Suites
On Sage's slot (sage-1686), on base 8fede5fc6 plus this row:
- bus `node --test tests/*.test.mjs`: 499/499, 03:35:20Z to 03:35:34Z. This is one fewer than
Sage's 241 gate (500) because the base predates row 241's land.test case.
- cli `node --test tests/*.test.mjs`: 566/566, 03:35:34Z to 03:43:47Z. That's 565 plus the
row 242 test.
Singles before the slot: publish-socket.test.mjs 9/9, bus publish.test.mjs 13/13. The seat suite
and scripts/test-*.sh are left for Sage's landing gate.
## Residuals
- The agent was told publish-timeout, but the push is recorded later and the run isn't
notified. The allowed event and the bus log line are the only trace. A later publish on the
decision gets decision-consumed, which tells the agent the decision was used. Whether the run
should get a RESULT for a late record is a follow-up question for Sage.
- A late push whose recordPublish refuses (Duckworth N2) is filed with that code: the ref stays on
the fork and the decision is not spent, the same residual as an in-band push whose record
refuses.
- The hold lives in the bus process's memory, like the broker's open tickets. A bus restart during
a hold drops both, the same as today for any publish in flight.
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# Morgana
Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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# Row 213 (C2-08) build: creative roles, persona file and block, M1, M2, M6, M10, prompt by file
Morgana (Opus 5.5), 2026-10-20. Queue row 213, Gitea #1714. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md`
§ C2-08 (on `refactor` from 32b54ac3b). Design: Gosalyn's Case 2 design r10, sections 4 and 5.
Reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: `base.txt` (088087ac9). Manifest: `candidate-manifest.sha256`.
D1 and D2 approved as deviations in sage-1492.
## What it is
1. **Six creative roles** (`roles/<name>.json` and `.md`, roleVersion 2): companion and research get
read and web, with network api-only. ideas, proofreader, fact-checker and continuity get read only, with
network none. All six get withinRole `["message.send"]`, no credentials, and messaging that sends to and
receives from `human` only. `vocabulary.mjs` names them in `CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS`, plus `CREATIVE_KINDS`,
`CREATIVE_TOOLS` and `THREAD_DEFINITIONS`. `END_PROTECTED` becomes `THREAD_DEFINITIONS`.
2. **M1** (`role.mjs` `checkCreative`): a creative role file is refused if it names a tool outside
`CREATIVE_TOOLS`, holds any authority but withinRole `message.send`, lacks `messaging`, names anyone but
`human` in messaging, or is version 1.
3. **M2**: since the role files name no write, edit or bash tool, the existing gate refuses write, edit and
bash on pi and Write, Edit and Bash on claude-code for each creative role. No gate code changed. The
test pins it.
4. **M6**: `tools.mjs` leaves `raise_decision` out for a creative definition. `broker.mjs` refuses
`decision.raise` from a creative session with `decision-not-allowed`, after `#secretCheck` and before
the spec-cited path, so a cited raise is refused too.
5. **M10**: a creative instance belongs to the human.
- `launch-settings.mjs` `creativeHumanOnly` gives `organization-creative-human-only` to any other actor.
It covers: a `models` key that a creative instance's `model` or `fallback.model` var names (changed or
removed), `setRoutes` for the instance, and the `instances` key. The `instances` key is refused for
every actor with `organization-creative-instance`, because the model changes through `instances.set`
or `routes.set`.
- `instance-settings.mjs`: add, change and redefine to or from a creative definition are the human's.
A creative definition is `END_PROTECTED`, so the new `closed()` lets this writer still add and change
one. `accepted` and `protected` use `closed()` too, so the human's Console form offers the creative
definitions and marks those instances as editable.
6. **Persona** (design 4): vars `persona.name` (one line, max 40) and `persona.sha256` (64 lowercase hex),
agent layer. The file lives at `<configDir>/personas/<business>/<instance>.md`.
- `bundle.mjs` `readPersona` opens it with O_NOFOLLOW and refuses with `persona-invalid` when the file
is missing, a symlink, not a regular file, owned by another uid, carries group or other mode bits, is
over 8000 characters, is not UTF-8, or holds `</persona-file>` or a line starting `# ` or `## `.
- It refuses with `persona-mismatch` when the bytes don't match the digest.
- A file present with no `persona.sha256` var is ignored. A digest with no `personaDir` refuses.
- The block sits between the contract and `## This session`, wrapped in
`<persona-file instance=... sha256=...>`.
7. **Web**: `webPlan` refuses `web-source-not-allowed` when a creative definition is on
`harness-builtin`, so every creative fetch goes through the broker.
8. **Prompt by file**: claude passes `--system-prompt-file <path>`, and pi passes `--system-prompt <path>`.
Both make the path absolute. The prompt text no longer appears in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`.
`adapters/README.md` says so.
## Refusal codes
`persona-invalid`, `persona-mismatch`, `web-source-not-allowed`, `organization-creative-human-only` and
`organization-creative-instance` are new. `decision-not-allowed` is named in the brief but is also new in
code. My morgana-0021 message called it an existing code, which was wrong.
## Deviations (sage-1492)
- **D1** `packages/business/src/business.mjs`: `checkPersonaVars`, plus one call line at the end of
`checkRoles`'s per-instance block. The persona vars are accepted only on an instance of a creative
definition, and only both together. Without D1, any instance's agent layer could carry a persona
digest, and the bundle would read a persona file for a pm or chief.
Test: `business.test.mjs` "persona vars: agent layer, creative definition only, both or neither". It
covers the business layer, pm and chief, one key alone and malformed values. `instance-settings.test.mjs`
also covers it: changing a persona-carrying companion to security-reviewer is refused.
Mutants: D1a, D1b, D1c.
- **D2** `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs`: one line, `personaDir: join(configDir(env), "personas"),` in the
`buildBundle` call. Without it a creative instance with a persona can never launch.
Test: `launcher.test.mjs` "row 213 a creative instance's persona is read from <configDir>/personas: off
its digest the launch fails with the mismatch as its reason". Mutant: D2.
- **Adapter tests' file** (webby-0040 N1). Brief line 68 puts the adapter tests in `claude-session.test.mjs`
and `pi-session.test.mjs`. They are in `harness/tests/creative.test.mjs` instead, next to the other row 213
harness tests, so the row's adapter cases sit in one file and the two session test files stay unchanged.
Same cases: argv holds the absolute prompt path and no marker, and pi refuses a missing, unreadable or
directory prompt.
The checkRoles change sits in its own block and the launcher change is one line, so the rebase over rows
194 and 199 (both touch `business.mjs`, and 199 touches `launcher.mjs`) stays small.
## Pinned-test edits and the pi tightening (sage-1492, named here)
1. `packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs:26`: the pinned broker import line gains
`CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS` (M6 reads it).
2. `packages/harness/tests/skills.test.mjs:170`: the test checked the prompt text in argv after
`--system-prompt`. Each adapter now passes a path, so the test looks up the flag for each harness,
checks that the next argument is the bundle's prompt file, and reads the MARKED and chief checks from
that file.
3. `adapters/pi/adapter.sh`: `[ -f "$PROMPT_FILE" ] && [ -r "$PROMPT_FILE" ]`, exit 2 otherwise. Pi 0.85.1
uses the path string as the prompt when it can't read the file. Test: `harness/tests/creative.test.mjs`
"pi refuses a missing, unreadable or directory prompt" (pi never runs). Mutant: A1.
One more pinned assertion changed: `business/tests/assistant.test.mjs` REQ-HARN-2 expected only the
assistant to hold `web`. Companion and research now hold it too.
## Files
Source: `packages/business/src/{vocabulary,role,vars,business,launch-settings,instance-settings}.mjs`,
`packages/harness/src/{bundle,tools}.mjs`, `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`, `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs`,
`adapters/{pi,claude}/adapter.sh`, `adapters/README.md`, `roles/{companion,research,ideas,proofreader,
fact-checker,continuity}.{json,md}`.
Tests changed: `business/tests/{role,business,launch-settings,instance-settings,assistant}.test.mjs`,
`harness/tests/skills.test.mjs`, `bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs`, `cli/tests/launcher.test.mjs`.
New: `harness/tests/creative.test.mjs` (7), `bus/tests/creative.test.mjs` (3).
I grepped `packages/*/tests` and `scripts/` for each changed source path next to a 64-hex string. The hits
are `thread-migration.test.mjs` (a DDL digest, not a pin on `broker.mjs`; 3/3 pass) and discord's own
`tools.mjs`. No test pins a changed file.
## Evidence
Each file alone from its package with `node --test --test-reporter=tap <file>`, 2026-10-20, all fail 0:
- Touched: business role 17, business 17, launch-settings 16, instance-settings 12, assistant 11; harness
creative 7, skills 10, bundle 22; bus creative 3, project-runtime 3; cli launcher 30. Round 2 reran
bus creative, instance-settings, business, launch-settings, role, harness creative and bundle, bus
tester-writes 8 and chief-of-staff 18, and the vars readers business vars 7, discord context 7 and git 12.
- Other files that read a changed path: business hard-waits, record-grants, token-limit-settings,
workflow-roles, chief-of-staff, project-repo, plugin-settings; harness bundle 22, tools 22,
claude-session 8, pi-session 8, raise-domain, spec-tools, claude-gate, mcp-server, gate, runner 34,
git-tools; bus hard-waits, launch-notice, tester-writes, business, broker 16, workflow-roles, web 19,
task-page, thread-migration 3; discord git, web, setspark, engine, tools; plugins harness, loader; seat
working, sandbox, session; cli launch-limit-checks, limits, git-socket, launch-account, thread-launch,
launch-limits, launch-routes, instances, stack-copy, stack-release 174; webui limits-browser, editor,
settings-form, tester-browser.
Suites, `scripts/test-*.sh` and the mutants are not run yet. They need Sage's slot.
Drift: `git diff --stat 088087ac9 305857c8f` over the 35 manifest paths is empty (2026-10-20, sage-1501).
Row 192's async `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` and `webui-service.sh` are outside the manifest. The broker's
new import comes from `vocabulary.mjs`, which it already imported, so `RUNNER_FILES` doesn't change.
Mutants: `mutants.py` in this directory, 31 mutants over 11 files. It backs up each file to scratch first,
aborts on a bad backup or any anchor count other than one (all 31 checked as unique without editing), runs
the named test files per mutant, restores each file after its mutant and again in `finally`. Log:
`mutants.log`, written on the run. The brief's `models` mutant is L1.
| Mutant | File | Tests |
|---|---|---|
| D1a/b/c persona vars check (D1) | business.mjs | business, instance-settings |
| D2 no personaDir (D2) | launcher.mjs | launcher |
| L1 models key by anyone (the `models` mutant) | launch-settings.mjs | launch-settings |
| L2 fallback.model not checked | launch-settings.mjs | launch-settings |
| L3 instances key allowed | launch-settings.mjs | launch-settings |
| L4 setRoutes by anyone | launch-settings.mjs | launch-settings |
| L5 creativeHumanOnly never refuses | launch-settings.mjs | launch-settings, instance-settings |
| I1/I2/I3 add, change, redefine by anyone | instance-settings.mjs | instance-settings |
| R1/R2/R3 checkCreative off, wider tools, non-human messaging | role.mjs | role |
| B1-B8 mode bits, digest, headings, symlink, char cap, block, no dir, builtin web | bundle.mjs | harness creative |
| T1 raise_decision offered | tools.mjs | harness creative |
| K1 broker raise check off | broker.mjs | bus creative |
| K2/K3 chief or tester session reaches the writer as the human (round 2, B1) | broker.mjs | bus creative |
| V1 persona.name line separators accepted (round 2, N3) | vars.mjs | business |
| A1 pi without -f; A2/A3 relative path kept | adapters | harness creative, skills |
## Residuals
- `ID_PATTERN` allows dots, so a human id could read like `<definition>.<instance>`. That is only cosmetic:
`creativeHumanOnly` compares the actor with `document.human`.
- TOCTOU between pi's `[ -f ] && [ -r ]` and pi's own read of the bundle's prompt file.
- The other-uid owner check in `readPersona` can't be tested without root.
- O_NOFOLLOW covers only the last path component, so a symlinked `personas/` or `personas/<business>/` is
followed (webby-0040 N2). The digest still refuses any bytes but the pinned ones. A comment in
`bundle.mjs` says so.
- The claude adapter checks the prompt file with `[ -r ]` only, and pi checks `-f` and `-r`. The brief asks
for pi's check (webby-0040 N4).
- **Launch-failed mapping.** A BundleError thrown from `buildBundle` inside `start()` becomes the Refusal
`launch-failed`, with the code's message in the log's `why`. That holds for the persona codes and for
webPlan's `web-source-not-allowed`. By then the run dir `launches/<business>/<run>/` exists with only
`session/`, and no bundle is written. Only `check()`'s readSkills preflight surfaces bundle codes. The
D2 test pins both facts. I kept the launcher change to one line, as sage-1492 asked.
## Follow-ups (not in this row)
- A persona preflight in launcher `check()`, so a bad persona refuses with its own code before a run dir
exists. Sage agreed it as a follow-up (sage-1501) and files it after this row lands.
- The webui `bus.mjs` code-to-HTTP map lacks the new codes.
- webby-0053 N1: `checkCreative` doesn't refuse `credentials`, so a later role-file commit could give a
creative instance a gitea credential. All six creative role files have `credentials: []` today. A
one-line refusal and a `role.test.mjs` case close it.
- The cli `instances.mjs` message wording for the creative refusals.
## Round 2 (webby-0040, round 1 CHANGES on bb5f4600)
- **B1**: `bus/tests/creative.test.mjs` adds "M10 through the broker". It runs on a real organization file
and writer behind `startBroker`, with a claimed chief session, a bound tester session and the human.
- The chief's `organization.set` of bean's `launch.models` key is refused with
`organization-creative-human-only`. Its `instances` key is refused with `organization-creative-instance`.
- The tester's `organization.set` and `limits.set` are refused `tester-refused` (N5: the broker refuses
first). Its `instances.set` (change bean, add an ideas instance) and `routes.set` for bean reach the
writer as `tester` and are refused with `organization-creative-human-only`.
- The file bytes are unchanged and no committed log entry exists after all of these.
- The human's `limits.set` of the same change lands, and the one committed entry names `jason`.
- Mutants K2 and K3 change the broker's actor naming for a role or tester session.
- **B2**: `instance-settings.test.mjs` asserts the mode of `writer.logFile("acme")` (0600) and that it sits
in the history dir. It lives at `.history/acme/changes.jsonl`, so the round 1 loop over that dir already
covered it, but no line named it.
- **N1**: listed under Deviations. **N2**: comment and residual. **N3**: `persona.name` now refuses U+2028
and U+2029, with two values added to the business test and mutant V1. **N4**: noted under residuals.
- Drift: `git diff --stat 088087ac9 f41729178` over the 35 manifest paths is empty. Round 2 manifest
digest b5ff0ac0e754cb1e5891417f4ab1da9597f5cf49fb2fe2d5f0fbf066f821c43a.
## Round 3 (sage-1715): rebase onto 9b5362018
Rows 199 (cb5fdb064), 237 (d7d943199) and 210 (f5753c0e8) landed on six manifest paths after the round 2
approval. Round 3 rebases the three commits onto origin/refactor 9b5362018 on a new branch,
`morgana/row213-r3`. The round 2 branch stays as it was. Nothing else changed.
- Five files conflicted. Each resolution keeps both sides:
- `bus/src/broker.mjs` and `bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs`: the vocabulary import keeps rows 199
and 210's names (forkProblem, forkUrl, credentialKind, validArgv, commandAllowed) and adds
CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS last. The pinned import line in the test carries the same list. RUNNER_FILES
is unchanged, since the import is still the vocabulary file only.
- `business/src/business.mjs`: one vocabulary import with row 199's names plus CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.
The `checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business, hosts)` signature is row 199's. `checkPersonaVars`
runs after row 199's identity and publish checks.
- `business/src/role.mjs`: the import keeps row 210's HOST_SERVICE and adds CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS and
CREATIVE_TOOLS.
- `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`: the creative constants and `END_PROTECTED = THREAD_DEFINITIONS` come
before row 199's Gitea URL parse, which is kept whole.
- `cli/src/launcher.mjs` merged without a conflict.
- `git range-diff 088087ac9..aee32d185 9b5362018..morgana/row213-r3`: commits 2 and 3 are `=`. Commit 1
differs only in the conflict hunks above.
- None of the new base's added lines name END_PROTECTED, THREAD_DEFINITION, CREATIVE_* or the creative
refusal codes, apart from docs. All 31 mutant anchors still count 1. The hash-pin grep finds no
64-hex pin on a manifest path.
- The manifest is rebuilt from the round 3 tree. It has the same 35 paths, and six digests changed: the
six drifted files. `base.txt` is 9b5362018.
- Singles of every touched test file, plus the seat sandbox and bus project-runtime tests (RUNNER_FILES
rule), wait on Sage's slot. They are recorded here when run.
## Round 4 (sage-1778, mos-1160): one commit on row 234's landing c771a36f4
Row 234 landed as c771a36f4 after the round 3 approval (webby-0053). Round 4 is one commit on c771a36f4,
on the new branch `morgana/row213-r4`. It is the round 3 change applied onto the landed blobs. The round 3
branch stays as it was.
- Overlap, `git diff --name-only 9b5362018 c771a36f4` against the round 3 paths: `business/src/business.mjs`,
`bus/src/broker.mjs` and `bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs`. Each starts from the landed blob, and the
row 213 edits are merged by hand. No landed hunk is reverted (sage-1760).
- `broker.mjs` and the pinned `project-runtime` import line: row 234's list with `HOST_ID`, then
`CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS`. The test keeps both rows' comments. The import still names only
`vocabulary.mjs`, so RUNNER_FILES is unchanged.
- `business.mjs`: row 234's import (no `HOST_PREFIX`, no `hosts.mjs`) plus `CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS`.
`checkPersonaVars` sits before row 234's `HOSTS_MOVED` and its four-argument `checkRoles`, and still
runs after the identity and publish checks.
- Check: the removed and added non-packet lines of `diff c771a36f4..r4` and `diff 9b5362018..2d2ad2760`
differ only in those three import lines. All 31 mutant anchors count 1.
- Row 234's hosts verbs: `#hostsCaller` admits the human, the tester or the chief definition
(`grant-chief-only`), so a creative role can't reach them and M1 stays as narrow.
- The manifest has the same 35 paths. The three overlap files changed digest. `base.txt` is c771a36f4.
- Singles and the 31 mutants wait on Sage's slot. They are recorded here when run.
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37cc5d74636465c592c9eb8f3d9b66c2632299be922444737b32d3d3be43c239 adapters/claude/adapter.sh
1e0487ab682ff97e974a9fed4765994f70ee362058bd0aa6aee32c2a7891e0d2 adapters/pi/adapter.sh
2cb62d90f4f52f17ca606e57d4714b872520d0224cd94fd116308becee864b71 adapters/README.md
ee5521840784d9ff3603c22cc6b5f090ac062e8575946a071972fedc089724d1 packages/business/src/business.mjs
a93b4efe213750b35730d6391594f3e26ffe667040a5d7baf5262b83341164b1 packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs
3e957579bcfdf5f88e60f7235b7ead4fb27cb455e34b7588f4e22b8ab5542bec packages/business/src/launch-settings.mjs
6b84018c202ff08e59b4e946556703d199fe75ef97e9e6ac4a390c89705ac796 packages/business/src/role.mjs
f6b15ee8dad2d985c0ae66b1f106ca46cb56ec86ac8cd5dec8a05c887596a421 packages/business/src/vars.mjs
814ba93ca7403ad77ea2e7fb7bc21c2b40846bf8a3c2eae53b32446278af061c packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs
b67917c5c7bb270b82f1cbd97071a195b79a57c9a343acbc5feae2a877fb9e8f packages/business/tests/assistant.test.mjs
b4606af3288624475e23ca506f7dea084a1e606efce4b1556d132b03230c2be1 packages/business/tests/business.test.mjs
2b80070db1e1d72b82a32cec75711c59a9383188b5a659854fd0ba8ae2dc0f5b packages/business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs
647b4835836566070c7b859b2bbcaf3fd748030fe88c8f20e990f5038ec65e88 packages/business/tests/launch-settings.test.mjs
0c9f082d8c05582382dc646c74aa60a46b89804717f828db9fadde51f2e258a8 packages/business/tests/role.test.mjs
15f530d49eaf25167113f84b743d7057c17a273e56731d8937bad26196325bfc packages/bus/src/broker.mjs
21946cdecab263ae65791977eb4599594340c8e049b3c216e3181610638f0952 packages/bus/tests/creative.test.mjs
4b1c6688beba124492cf130247a2ff93fdd6d18594990cde84709139964d0b5b packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs
a968a19d1b32416aecb2488c7fb9768db7d5160374f1b790166380d41acea894 packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs
7933f256e5f097999ff36cc7e48b0c417385c6c3727919f38437bd501aecc438 packages/cli/tests/launcher.test.mjs
2c1aad8d8be1a03be12eca93b4da36c656236ad38d09bfdc314e42a68240afc3 packages/harness/src/bundle.mjs
22f9e3c1dce25e5eb6713306ccdf22dc77a4ccf0c99e9186f2e16602f58aeb49 packages/harness/src/tools.mjs
305be35111c432a663d5671a4dac9bfe5bbb1a9b34ace77087e12c6f687602a1 packages/harness/tests/creative.test.mjs
3d68294493e41db3b647cd71cd94436c28fc531c64a8b1589be7644c3bf59f94 packages/harness/tests/skills.test.mjs
9425a319ec8966712fc38027bc62f7fbf52a216e30b9520cbd877386990c92d6 roles/companion.json
2533b3ec4dfa78cd81b254c167865b984a6edf6b00454911363012ab5ac1e4c1 roles/companion.md
cb2512590330efe4514c88eb31d09e3e3b159943803e462a224b77010c249de7 roles/continuity.json
193c82fa803a85ee4c4b2f946ce2d69e94a192c00c5093d4db91cc274a5d11ed roles/continuity.md
7a59218d903b26174c51f0118a347b0b14e187e2d0c229ca43c98dad357f3435 roles/fact-checker.json
8895fbe1d7961bbb98b272cd888250d6ef44f74986948032719b44dc3dc56579 roles/fact-checker.md
3a932eefe3af967d046d5e241d59f5b2700bd5ad4ef236d6a937011500200b5f roles/ideas.json
8ce05e198cefb29f2aea53a25a2cd6599782b34c7a0815a2b6d26272c0fdae50 roles/ideas.md
cb117d44e48f288048a4e697ee237b445b8fcea21bb95f9723e91b17ab542a3f roles/proofreader.json
a2214ab481ef27d24c20da9e5e7bbc86c6ea769cacc8a163330813e75a20ec15 roles/proofreader.md
95f5fc2bd2a0593177c21ca1898317c671ad04334e5c561c29917fe2ceae2c51 roles/research.json
7a602b0efe44669028e52fc6aca83f00bd3dd32a105d0729538f2ed357f6ecd3 roles/research.md
-91
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@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Row 213 (C2-08) mutants across the changed sources. Run from the row213 worktree root, in Sage's slot.
# Each mutant changes one anchor (count must be 1), runs the named test files alone, then restores.
import os, shutil, subprocess, sys
BAK = "/mnt/storage/scratch/morgana-r213/mutant-backups" # any scratch path outside the tree
BIZ = "packages/business/src/business.mjs"
LS = "packages/business/src/launch-settings.mjs"
IS = "packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs"
ROLE = "packages/business/src/role.mjs"
BUNDLE = "packages/harness/src/bundle.mjs"
TOOLS = "packages/harness/src/tools.mjs"
BROKER = "packages/bus/src/broker.mjs"
LAUNCHER = "packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs"
PI = "adapters/pi/adapter.sh"
CLAUDE = "adapters/claude/adapter.sh"
T_BIZ = [("business", "tests/business.test.mjs")]
T_LS = [("business", "tests/launch-settings.test.mjs")]
T_IS = [("business", "tests/instance-settings.test.mjs")]
T_ROLE = [("business", "tests/role.test.mjs")]
T_HC = [("harness", "tests/creative.test.mjs")]
T_BUS = [("bus", "tests/creative.test.mjs")]
T_LAUNCH = [("cli", "tests/launcher.test.mjs")]
T_ADAPT = [("harness", "tests/creative.test.mjs"), ("harness", "tests/skills.test.mjs")]
ABS = ' *) PROMPT_FILE="$(pwd)/$PROMPT_FILE" ;;'
MUTANTS = [
# D1 (deviation): persona vars only on a creative definition, both or neither.
("D1a persona vars check not called", BIZ, " checkPersonaVars(out[instance].vars, entry.definition, at);\n", "", T_BIZ + T_IS),
("D1b any definition may carry persona vars", BIZ, " if (!CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(definition)) refuse(", " if (false) refuse(", T_BIZ + T_IS),
("D1c one persona var alone accepted", BIZ, " if (set.length === 1) refuse(", " if (false) refuse(", T_BIZ),
# D2 (deviation): the launcher hands buildBundle the persona directory.
("D2 launcher passes no persona directory", LAUNCHER, ' personaDir: join(configDir(env), "personas"),', " personaDir: null,", T_LAUNCH),
# M10: the human's settings.
("L1 models-key change by anyone", LS, " if (was !== is) creativeHumanOnly(", " if (false) creativeHumanOnly(", T_LS),
("L2 fallback.model key not checked", LS, ' for (const key of [vars.model, vars["fallback.model"]]) {', " for (const key of [vars.model]) {", T_LS),
("L3 instances key allowed for a creative instance", LS, " if (CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(next.roles[instance].definition)) {\n throw new OrganizationError(\"organization-creative-instance\"", " if (false) {\n throw new OrganizationError(\"organization-creative-instance\"", T_LS),
("L4 setRoutes by anyone", LS, " creativeHumanOnly(old.document, actor, instance, next.roles[instance].definition);", "", T_LS),
("L5 creativeHumanOnly never refuses", LS, " if (CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(definition) && actor !== document.human) {", " if (false) {", T_LS + T_IS),
("I1 add of a creative instance by anyone", IS, " creativeHumanOnly(old, actor, instance, args.definition);\n definitionFor(rolesDir, args.definition);\n next.roles[instance] =", " definitionFor(rolesDir, args.definition);\n next.roles[instance] =", T_IS),
("I2 change of a creative instance by anyone", IS, " creativeHumanOnly(old, actor, instance, entry.definition);\n", "", T_IS),
("I3 redefine to creative by anyone", IS, " creativeHumanOnly(old, actor, instance, args.definition);\n", "", T_IS),
# M1: role files.
("R1 checkCreative not called", ROLE, "CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(role.name) ? checkCreative(role) : role", "role", T_ROLE),
("R2 wider tools accepted", ROLE, " if (wider.length > 0) refuse(", " if (false) refuse(", T_ROLE),
("R3 non-human messaging accepted", ROLE, ' if (role.messaging[key].some((entry) => entry !== "human")) {', " if (false) {", T_ROLE),
# Persona file and block.
("B1 group/other mode bits accepted", BUNDLE, " if (stat.mode & 0o077) throw", " if (false) throw", T_HC),
("B2 digest not checked", BUNDLE, " if (sha256(data) !== digest) {", " if (false) {", T_HC),
("B3 headings and end tag accepted", BUNDLE, " if (text.includes(PERSONA_END) || /^##? /m.test(text)) {", " if (false) {", T_HC),
("B4 symlink followed", BUNDLE, "constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK", "constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NONBLOCK", T_HC),
("B5 character cap off", BUNDLE, " if ([...text].length > PERSONA_CHARS) throw", " if (false) throw", T_HC),
("B6 persona block dropped", BUNDLE, " ...personaSection(resolved, persona),\n", "", T_HC),
("B7 no personaDir with a digest accepted", BUNDLE, " if (digest === undefined) return null;\n throw new BundleError(", " return null;\n throw new BundleError(", T_HC),
("B8 creative role on harness-builtin web", BUNDLE, ' if (granted && source === "harness-builtin" && CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(resolved.definition)) {', " if (false) {", T_HC),
# M6.
("T1 raise_decision offered to creative roles", TOOLS, ' if (!CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS.includes(resolved.definition)) add("raise_decision"', ' add("raise_decision"', T_HC),
("K1 broker creative raise check off", BROKER, " if (request.verb === 'decision.raise' && !s.human && !s.tester &&\n CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS", " if (false &&\n CREATIVE_DEFINITIONS", T_BUS),
# B1 (webby-0040): the broker names the writer's actor from the session.
("K2 chief session reaches the writer as the human", BROKER, 'actor = this.#business(s.business).roles[s.role].definition + "." + s.role;', 'actor = "jason";', T_BUS),
("K3 tester session reaches the writer as the human", BROKER, 'let actor = s.tester ? "tester" : s.human;', 'let actor = s.tester ? "jason" : s.human;', T_BUS),
("V1 persona.name line separators accepted (N3)", "packages/business/src/vars.mjs", "\\u007f\\u2028\\u2029]", "\\u007f]", T_BIZ),
# Prompt by file (adapters).
("A1 pi prompt check without -f", PI, '[ -f "$PROMPT_FILE" ] && [ -r "$PROMPT_FILE" ] ||', '[ -r "$PROMPT_FILE" ] ||', T_ADAPT),
("A2 pi relative prompt path kept", PI, ABS, " *) ;;", T_ADAPT),
("A3 claude relative prompt path kept", CLAUDE, ABS, " *) ;;", T_ADAPT),
]
os.makedirs(BAK, exist_ok=True)
files = sorted({m[1] for m in MUTANTS})
orig = {}
for f in files:
bak = os.path.join(BAK, f.replace("/", "__"))
shutil.copyfile(f, bak)
orig[f] = open(bak).read()
if orig[f] != open(f).read(): sys.exit(f"backup mismatch for {f}, abort")
for name, f, a, b, _ in MUTANTS:
if orig[f].count(a) != 1: sys.exit(f"{name}: anchor count {orig[f].count(a)}, abort")
killed = 0
try:
for name, f, a, b, tests in MUTANTS:
open(f, "w").write(orig[f].replace(a, b))
failing = []
for pkg, t in tests:
p = subprocess.run(["node", "--test", "--test-reporter=tap", t], cwd=f"packages/{pkg}", capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
failing += [f"{pkg}/{t.split('/')[-1]}: {l[7:]}" for l in p.stdout.splitlines() if l.startswith("not ok")]
open(f, "w").write(orig[f])
status = "KILLED" if failing else "SURVIVED"
killed += bool(failing)
print(f"{status} {name}", flush=True)
for line in failing: print(f" {line}", flush=True)
finally:
for f in files: open(f, "w").write(orig[f])
print(f"killed {killed}/{len(MUTANTS)}; restored: {all(open(f).read() == orig[f] for f in files)}")
-10
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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
# Quackerjack
Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
section 7 (#414).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
another seat's branch.
-8
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
n=0
for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do
c=$(tr '\0' ' ' < $p/cmdline 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$c" in *shell-snapshots*|*chrome-devtools-mcp*|*sage-busy-now*) continue;; esac
if echo "$c" | grep -qE 'node --test|gate\.sh|mutant|scripts/test-[a-z-]+\.sh|docker compose'; then echo "BUSY ${p#/proc/}: ${c:0:160}"; n=$((n+1)); fi
done
[ $n -eq 0 ] && echo CLEAR
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -o pipefail
# Landing gate template (2026-10-14): sed the G= and OUT= lines and this comment.
# Sequential suites, each teed to its own log; stops at the first failure.
G=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-wt
OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-out
cd "$G" || exit 9
mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 9 # a missing OUT failed the row 142 gate at step 1 (2026-10-15)
# test-task.sh live cases run `docker compose` from $G, so without a name the project is "wt"
# and leaves wt_default behind (row 142 gate, 2026-10-15). Name it per gate dir and remove it on exit.
export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="$(basename "$(dirname "$G")")"
trap 'docker network rm "${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "removed network ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default"' EXIT
# A gate tree without the node_modules link fails cli tests with ENOENT (2026-10-13).
[ -d "$G/node_modules" ] || { echo "STOP no node_modules in $G"; exit 8; }
echo "base $(git rev-parse --short HEAD) dirty $(git status --short | grep -vc node_modules) DOCKER_HOST=${DOCKER_HOST:-unset}"
run() { local name="$1" dir="$2" cmd="$3"
(cd "$G/$dir" && bash -c "$cmd") > "$OUT/$name.log" 2>&1; local rc=$?
echo "$name rc=$rc $(grep -E '^ℹ (pass|fail) [0-9]+' "$OUT/$name.log" | tr '\n' ' ') | $(tail -n1 "$OUT/$name.log")"
[ $rc -eq 0 ] || { echo "STOP $name"; exit $rc; }; }
# No pkg-queue step: scripts/test-queue.sh runs packages/queue/tests/ itself (same 156 tests; CI debate item 2a, Vikunja #274).
for d in packages/*/; do p=$(basename "$d"); [ -d "$d/tests" ] || continue; [ "$p" = queue ] && continue
run "pkg-$p" "packages/$p" 'node --test tests/*.test.mjs'; done
for s in scripts/test-*.sh; do n=$(basename "$s" .sh); run "script-${n#test-}" . "bash $s"; done
echo GATE_PASSED
-36
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# Row 189 gate timing (for row 197, Herb)
Sage, 2026-10-20T19:25:04Z. Gate on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), one lane. The slot was mine. Seats may have run single test files at the same time, which the slot rules allow, and I did not record that.
Start 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z, end 2026-10-20T19:20:36Z. Total wall time: 659 s.
Wall time per suite is the gap between one suite's log mtime and the one before it (the first suite starts at start.txt), so it includes node start-up. node's duration_ms is listed where the suite prints it. Scripts print no duration.
| Suite | Wall s | duration_ms s | Ended (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|
| pkg-bus | 3 | 3.8 | 19:09:40 |
| pkg-business | 3 | 2.2 | 19:09:43 |
| pkg-cli | 388 | 388.5 | 19:16:11 |
| pkg-control-board | 1 | 0.8 | 19:16:12 |
| pkg-conversation | 35 | 35.4 | 19:16:47 |
| pkg-discord | 3 | 2.6 | 19:16:50 |
| pkg-harness | 12 | 11.6 | 19:17:02 |
| pkg-ledger | 13 | 13.5 | 19:17:15 |
| pkg-mosaic | 3 | 2.3 | 19:17:18 |
| pkg-plugins | 0 | 0.3 | 19:17:18 |
| pkg-project | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:19 |
| pkg-runs | 1 | 0.8 | 19:17:20 |
| pkg-seat | 6 | 6.2 | 19:17:26 |
| pkg-tasks | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:27 |
| pkg-webui | 58 | 57.9 | 19:18:25 |
| script-auth | 1 | - | 19:18:26 |
| script-conductor | 5 | - | 19:18:31 |
| script-config | 2 | - | 19:18:33 |
| script-discord | 8 | - | 19:18:41 |
| script-extension-package | 1 | - | 19:18:42 |
| script-foundation | 40 | - | 19:19:22 |
| script-land-work | 11 | - | 19:19:33 |
| script-queue | 21 | - | 19:19:54 |
| script-release | 11 | - | 19:20:05 |
| script-task | 31 | - | 19:20:36 |
Source: /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-g189/out/*.log mtimes and gate.log. The cli suite is about 59% of the run, and webui plus conversation add about 14%.
-8
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# PRD 1.8 r7: no in-Stack raise (mos-1154)
Sage, 2026-10-21T01:20:06Z. Jason approved PRD 1.8 in T3 (thread 38bc4c81, before 2026-10-21T01:16:55Z), verbatim:
"PRD 1.8: I am preemptively approving it. Do not surface in the Mosaic Stack board. Just proceed."
Mos records it as DECISIONS Q192 (mos-1154). The [mos test] raise request drafted here was dropped
unsent, and the template is deleted. Jason closed 3a6c8fb9 himself at 01:05:45Z (no, "superseded by r7").
Scope (Mos's reading): r7 at 47c2cb33c plus 82df17347, 342 lines, sha256
de079281ff2760911039276379ec4b190287b2ce2e4e8a79c9459939727440cd, Duckworth duckworth-0073 (pass, no findings).
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
{
"seq": 22,
"id": "3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2",
"at": "2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z",
"business": "mosaic-stack",
"project": null,
"raised_by_role": "pm",
"raised_by_run": "rc9e993da24cf",
"class": "gated",
"action": "prd.approve",
"route_to": "human",
"question": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?\n\nFile: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Duckworth reviewed it (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and Mos checked it (mos-1140). The tip of branch honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb), which is not used here. This approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above. The PM copied these values from the request and did not compute or check the sha256.\n\nNotes the approval carries:\n1. Mos's reading: \"the main agent or chief of staff\" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.\n2. Mos's reading: revoke by \"you, Mos or the tester\" means the user, the assistant (\"Mos\", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.\n3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.\n4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.\n5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.\n\nSource: a tester request relayed by the chief (message 6990efb4, tester message d54a190e). It is a test request, not Jason's instruction. It takes the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): non-blocking, no task, uncited, so it goes to the human's Inbox. I recommend yes because two reviewers have passed r5 and the open points are written down above, not hidden.",
"options": [
{
"key": "yes",
"text": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted: the r5 file at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 with the sha256 below, and only that."
},
{
"key": "no",
"text": "Don't approve. Say what changes, and a new revision comes back for review."
}
],
"recommendation": "yes",
"task_ref": null,
"requirement_ref": null,
"blocking": false,
"supersedes": null,
"spec_path": null,
"spec_commit": null,
"authorization": {
"action": "prd.approve",
"target": null,
"approvalChoice": "yes"
}
}
-37
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@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
[
{
"seq": 22,
"id": "3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2",
"at": "2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z",
"business": "mosaic-stack",
"project": null,
"raised_by_role": "pm",
"raised_by_run": "rc9e993da24cf",
"class": "gated",
"action": "prd.approve",
"route_to": "human",
"question": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?\n\nFile: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Duckworth reviewed it (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and Mos checked it (mos-1140). The tip of branch honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb), which is not used here. This approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above. The PM copied these values from the request and did not compute or check the sha256.\n\nNotes the approval carries:\n1. Mos's reading: \"the main agent or chief of staff\" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.\n2. Mos's reading: revoke by \"you, Mos or the tester\" means the user, the assistant (\"Mos\", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.\n3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.\n4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.\n5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.\n\nSource: a tester request relayed by the chief (message 6990efb4, tester message d54a190e). It is a test request, not Jason's instruction. It takes the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): non-blocking, no task, uncited, so it goes to the human's Inbox. I recommend yes because two reviewers have passed r5 and the open points are written down above, not hidden.",
"options": [
{
"key": "yes",
"text": "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted: the r5 file at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 with the sha256 below, and only that."
},
{
"key": "no",
"text": "Don't approve. Say what changes, and a new revision comes back for review."
}
],
"recommendation": "yes",
"task_ref": null,
"requirement_ref": null,
"blocking": false,
"supersedes": null,
"spec_path": null,
"spec_commit": null,
"authorization": {
"action": "prd.approve",
"target": null,
"approvalChoice": "yes"
}
}
]
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
[mos test] Please have the PM raise a prd.approve decision for PRD 1.8, the same route as PRD 1.7 (decision d52febb5): blocking false, no task_ref, recommendation yes, gated to the human. The PM must not compute or change the sha256; it copies the values below.
Question: "Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted?"
File: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit 762a6711ff7ed049aa73dfde98b75ebf326bdd99 (revision 5), 319 lines, sha256 8eee52470b1d7df139164e3ba5cc128dc469457b2b52f298c12685c3483011a8. Reviewed by Duckworth (duckworth-0061, confirmed duckworth-0062) and checked by Mos (mos-1140). The branch tip of honker/row194-b2 holds a later r6 (aba3cbdeb) that is not used; the approval covers only the r5 commit and sha256 above.
The decision notes must carry these five items:
1. Mos's reading: "the main agent or chief of staff" in Q10 is one role under two names, the chief of staff. Only the chief raises a grant request; the assistant passes the user's request to the chief. To change it, say so at approval and REQ-GRANT-1 changes first.
2. Mos's reading: revoke by "you, Mos or the tester" means the user, the assistant ("Mos", Jason's assistant) for grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance.
3. N5: host.sudo keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for git.push.remote. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, not to the user. In manual mode it comes to the user.
4. B7 residual: only an Approve creates a grant, but an agent running as the stack's OS user can still write the stack's own store (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54). This version doesn't close it.
5. N6: the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and role contracts, not a broker check.
Reply with the decision id once raised. Do not resolve it.
-8
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
sent d54a190e to chief
chief (RESULT, re d54a190e) cc46a7b4:
I passed your request to the pm without changing any of it, and launched the pm so it can act on it. No decision id yet, because the pm hasn't raised the decision.
- **Message to pm:** 6990efb4-8321-4d0e-9b8a-771f65625b83. It says the request comes from a tester and authorizes nothing, and it carries your PRD 1.8 values and the five notes as you wrote them.
- **pm launch:** run rc9e993da24cf.
When the pm answers with the decision id, I'll send it to you.
-5
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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
trail 3a6c8fb9-a5ab-42f8-9755-902a88375ca2: 4 row(s)
2026-10-20T22:40:47.949Z events#1550 session.launched pm
2026-10-20T22:40:47.969Z role_claims#102 claim pm by rc9e993da24cf
2026-10-20T22:41:14.444Z decisions#22 gated prd.approve → human: Approve PRD 1.8 exactly as drafted? File: agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.8-DRAFT.md on mosaicstack/stack at commit …
2026-10-20T22:41:14.445Z events#1553 action.allowed pm decision.raise decision 3a6c8fb9
+95 -321
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@@ -1,42 +1,8 @@
# Q175 design: the Console verifies SSO itself (Vikunja #412)
Author Sage, 2026-10-20, r3. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at
refactor 4ca8d6e94 unless a line says otherwise. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345
and 353). #385 stays open until the Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
## Changes from r2 (Filbert's r2 review, CHANGES)
- C1: the `console` key goes into the shared loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, which today refuses any
unknown top-level key (:113). Section 4 names the blast radius. Jason step 4 moves inside the phase 2
window, after the pin and before the Console starts. The phase 2 rollback removes `console` first. A
test-config.sh case covers it (test 25). Mos confirms the sequence before phase 1 (section 5).
- C2: under `--sso` the page treats a 401 `sign-in required` as signed out and links to
`/auth/login?return=<path>` (section 5 phase 1, test 24).
- Notes: tests 7 and 15 are built so that only the record rule refuses; test 9a is an alg test; Q-B's two
classes are defined, and test 23 adds a 200 HTML page; the phase 2 scratch Console uses a scratch config,
a dummy slot, no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
- r3 fix (Filbert r3 approve): D1, the loader checks the slot reference's shape only, and the file checks
run in the Console's `--sso` start; D2, the slot resolves from the config dir, and the scratch Console has
a scratch dataRoot and an unreachable issuer (section 5).
- Q-E: settled as Filbert ruled. The `subject-unknown` line keeps iss and sub, JSON-escaped and capped
(section 1, tests 10 and 19).
## Changes from r1 (Filbert's r1 review, CHANGES)
- B1: the provider config moves to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` (section 4). Mos agreed (mos-0973). The
Console prints provider ids, issuers and subject counts at start. The rehearse-strip follow-up is dropped.
- B2: one return-path rule, `new URL(ret, publicOrigin).origin === publicOrigin` (section 1 step 7), with
tests for `/\evil.example` and `/%09/evil.example`.
- B3: refusals log a fixed code and the provider id, never the error or its cause (section 1).
- B4: login records are capped at 32 (section 1 step 1), with a test.
- B5: test 9 splits into a forged payload under a real kid and a kid missing from the JWKS, and a try/catch
mutant joins the list. Test 2 no longer claims the signature mutant (section 9).
- B6: the phase 2 forged-header check runs on a scratch Console, or Mos or Jason runs it on live (section 5).
- Rulings: Q-B start degraded (section 4), Q-C only the public Host on 7332 (section 3), Q-D keep 1 h idle
but polls don't count as activity (section 3).
- Section 6: `startServer` throws on `tester && sso`, and `human` joins `tester` as a refused subject label.
- The missing tests and nits N1-N5 are in sections 1, 3, 7 and 9.
- Section 8: the human-cli statement stays as written (mos-0972). The recommendation is now Mos's ruling.
Author Sage, 2026-10-20. Reviewer Filbert, and the review comes before any code. Line numbers are at refactor
4ca8d6e94. This replaces Part B (row 178 proxy proof, #385 comments 345 and 353). #385 stays open until the
Console stops trusting `X-authentik-username`.
## The ruling this implements
@@ -56,9 +22,7 @@ trust with verification" and confirmed five points (mos-0970):
## What exists today
The live Console runs from copies/490e2771d3d0 with `--public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header
X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`. Row 189 (#1687, P19 #413) adds
`stack-release.sh activate --no-send`, and Mos's ruling mos-0972 takes `--send` off the live Console until
phase 2.
X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --send --tester-port 7333`.
- `previewOptions` (packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:205) builds `{ host, header, user }`.
- A request is `named` when its Host equals the public name (:493). A named request passes sign-in when it
@@ -81,73 +45,41 @@ New module `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs`, used only by the human listener (7332).
| Route | Method | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. A provider whose discovery hasn't succeeded gets 503 (section 4). |
| `/auth/login` | GET | One provider configured: start its flow. Several: a plain page listing them, each a link to `/auth/login?provider=ID`. |
| `/auth/callback` | GET | Finish the flow, create the session, 303 to the saved return path. |
| `/auth/logout` | POST | Same-origin checks, delete the session, 303 to the provider's `end_session_endpoint`. |
| `/auth/signed-out` | GET | Static "signed out" page with a sign-in link. |
Every URL the Console hands a provider is built from the configured `publicOrigin`: `redirect_uri` is
`publicOrigin + '/auth/callback'` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` is `publicOrigin + '/auth/signed-out'`. No
code path reads the request's Host to build them (N2).
The flow per provider:
1. Start. Generate a state, a nonce and a PKCE verifier (`generateRandomState`, `generateRandomNonce`,
`generateRandomCodeVerifier`), and a challenge with `calculatePKCECodeChallenge` (S256 only). Put them, the
provider id, the return path and an expiry 10 minutes out in a server-side login record keyed by a random
id. The store holds at most 32 login records; a new one evicts the oldest (B4). Set `__Host-mosaic_login` to
that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`, `scope=openid profile email`,
`code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
provider id and the return path in a server-side login record keyed by a random id. Set
`__Host-mosaic_login` to that id. 303 to `authorization_endpoint` with `response_type=code`,
`scope=openid profile email`, `code_challenge_method=S256`, `redirect_uri`, `state` and `nonce`.
2. Callback. Read exactly one `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie, then take and delete its record (single use, so a
replayed callback finds nothing). Expire the cookie in the response. The provider comes from the record,
never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers. Two tabs signing in at once each set the
cookie, so the later one wins and the earlier tab's callback finds no record and gets the 403 page with a
sign-in link (N5). That costs one retry and keeps one cookie per browser.
never from the query, which stops a mix-up between providers.
3. `validateAuthResponse(as, client, url, record.state)` checks state, refuses an error response, and checks
the `iss` parameter when the provider advertises RFC 9207.
4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)` returns a
`Response`. Keep that object. `processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce:
record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })` checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and
nonce, and checks `alg` against `client.id_token_signed_response_alg`. That field gets the provider's whole
`algs` array, which the library's `checkSigningAlgorithm` accepts, so a provider listing RS256 and ES256
takes either and nothing else (N1). Test 16 pins this.
4. `authorizationCodeGrantRequest(as, client, clientAuth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier)`, then
`processAuthorizationCodeResponse(as, client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true })`.
That checks iss, aud (and azp when aud has several values), exp, iat and nonce, and checks `alg` against
`client.id_token_signed_response_alg`.
5. Signature. oauth4webapi does not verify the signature of an ID token that came straight from the token
endpoint over TLS (OIDC Core 3.1.3.7 allows that, and the library docs for
`validateApplicationLevelSignature` say so). Point 2 asks for the JWKS check, so the callback always calls
`validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` with the same `Response` object from step 4. It fetches
the JWKS from the discovered `jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kty`, `kid`, `alg` and `use`, and refuses HS*
outright. On a `kid` it doesn't have, it refetches the JWKS once if the cache is at least 60 s old, which
covers key rotation (test 18). The call is not wrapped in a catch that continues; its throw ends the
callback.
6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's `algs`, the token's `iss` equals
the configured issuer as a raw string compare, with no URL normalising (N3; the library's discovery check
compares normalised hrefs, so this one is stricter), and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list.
7. Create the session (section 3), then 303 to the return path. The rule (B2): resolve
`u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin)`, and use `u.pathname + u.search` only when
`u.origin === publicOrigin`; otherwise use `/`. A missing or unparsable `ret` gives `/`.
`validateApplicationLevelSignature(as, response)` after step 4. It fetches the JWKS from the discovered
`jwks_uri`, picks the key by `kid` and `alg`, and refuses HS* outright.
6. Our own checks on top of the library: `header.alg` is in the provider's configured `algs`, the token's
`iss` equals the configured issuer exactly, and `(iss, sub)` is in the provider's `subjects` list. Anything
else is a 403 that logs `refused sign-in iss=... sub=...` (never a token, code or cookie).
7. Create the session (section 3) and 303 to the return path. The return path must start with one `/` and
is otherwise replaced with `/`.
Every refusal in steps 2-6 ends at a 403 page saying sign-in failed, with a link back to `/auth/login`. No
step falls back to a header.
Logging (B3). A refusal logs one line: a fixed code from a closed list (`login-record-missing`,
`state-mismatch`, `auth-error-response`, `grant-failed`, `id-token-invalid`, `signature-invalid`,
`alg-refused`, `issuer-mismatch`, `subject-unknown`, `discovery-failed`, `jwks-failed`) and the provider id.
It never logs the exception, its message or its `cause`. oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims
in `cause`, so even a message can leak. The one extra field is on `subject-unknown`: it logs `iss` and `sub`,
because Jason step 3 reads his `sub` from that line (Q-E, Filbert's ruling). Authentik's default subject mode
is a hashed user id that its admin view doesn't show, so the line is the practical source. Neither value is a
credential. Three conditions hold:
- Only a token that passed steps 3-6 up to the subject check reaches this line. Every earlier refusal logs
its own code and the provider id only.
- Both values are written with `JSON.stringify` and each is cut to 255 characters first. Any account at the
provider can get a signed token, so a `sub` may hold a newline, and an unescaped one would let a sign-in
forge a log line.
- Test 10 uses a `sub` holding `\n` and a fake `refused sign-in` suffix and asserts one escaped line.
Test 19 asserts that no log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id.
It exempts only the `iss` and `sub` fields of the `subject-unknown` line.
### 2. Library: oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly
Mos's steer (mos-0971) was to prefer oauth4webapi over hand-rolled verification on `node:crypto` unless I
@@ -171,78 +103,34 @@ entry. Root is right because `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-31` copies only the root
webui's first runtime dependency. The root dependency rule (exact pins, never unversioned) applies to it.
Upgrades are reviewed commits.
### 3. Sessions, cookies, Host and logout
### 3. Sessions, cookies and logout
- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256 and holds no raw id, so a heap dump
doesn't hold usable ids. Test 20 checks that the store's keys and values never contain the cookie value.
- Cookie, exactly: `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax`, no Domain, no
Max-Age (a browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over
https on this exact host. Test 21 asserts the whole Set-Cookie value, and a mutant drops `HttpOnly`.
- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, the same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires
at 10 minutes server-side.
- Session id: 32 random bytes, base64url. The store keys on its sha256, so a heap dump doesn't hold usable ids.
- Cookie `__Host-mosaic_session=<id>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/`, no Domain, no Max-Age (a
browser-session cookie). The `__Host-` prefix makes the browser refuse it unless it was set over https on
this exact host.
- Login cookie `__Host-mosaic_login`, same attributes plus `Max-Age=600`. The login record also expires at
10 minutes server-side.
- Lax, not Strict, because the callback is a top-level navigation from the provider's site, and a Strict
cookie set there would be missing on the redirect to `/`. Lax still keeps the session off cross-site POSTs.
The write routes keep their exact `Origin` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` checks (:171, :250, :297, :340,
:387, :425), so cross-site writes are refused twice.
- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side (Q-D, Filbert's ruling). The store is in memory with a
cap of 64 sessions (oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one
human and keeps sessions off disk.
- Activity (Q-D). Only a page load (a GET outside `/api/`) or a write (a POST) refreshes `seen`. The page's
background reads don't: `refresh` re-reads the board every 10 s (packages/webui/src/public/app.js:346) and
the 5 s timer at :301 redraws the age label. Without this rule an open tab would never go idle. Test 13
covers it.
- Lifetime: 8 h absolute, 1 h idle, both server-side. The store is in memory with a cap of 64 sessions
(oldest goes first), so a Console restart signs everyone out. That's acceptable for one human and keeps
sessions off disk.
- The session holds `{ provider, iss, sub, name, idToken, created, seen }`. `name` is the subject entry's
label. It goes where `preview.user` goes today (send logs, settings, seat routes), so the downstream writer
shape stays as it is. `idToken` is kept only as the logout hint and never leaves the server.
- Host (Q-C, Filbert's ruling). Under `--sso`, 7332 serves only requests whose Host is the public host.
Any other Host, loopback included, gets 403 `public Host required`, except `GET /healthz`. The loopback read
path at :509-512 is gone under `--sso`. Today's readers of 127.0.0.1:7332 and where they go:
- `scripts/webui-service.sh status` (:406), the stack-release gate (scripts/stack-release.sh:484) and the
rehearse gate (:1369) read only `/healthz`, which stays open on loopback.
- The webui README (:83) describes the loopback path. It changes in phase 1.
- Agent reads of the board go to the tester listener on 7333, which already serves reads. I found no other
code that reads 7332 on loopback. A person opening http://127.0.0.1:7332 in a local browser gets the 403
and uses the public URL instead.
Test 22 covers a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write, and `/healthz` passing.
- Every request on 7332 except `/healthz` and `/auth/*` needs a valid session. Without one, `/api/*` gets
401 JSON and other GETs get a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`.
- Logout: `POST /auth/logout` with the same-origin checks. It deletes the session, expires the cookie, and
303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=<publicOrigin>/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
303s to `end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=...&post_logout_redirect_uri=https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out&client_id=...`.
If the provider has no `end_session_endpoint`, it goes straight to `/auth/signed-out`.
- Limit: signing out at the provider does not end a Console session until idle or absolute expiry. Back-channel
logout is a follow-up, not phase 1.
### 4. Provider config: shape and location
Location (B1, Filbert's ruling, Mos agreed in mos-0973): a `console.sso` key in
`~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`. The reason is who can write it. The business file is writable by agents
through `organizationWriter` (the tester verbs and the chief's `organization.set`), so a provider entry there
could be changed by the agents the Console is meant to keep out. config.json is user-authored and never
auto-written: `scripts/bootstrap.sh` creates it and nothing overwrites it. Adding the key is a Jason step
(section 10).
The loader (C1). Every tool reads config.json through one loader, scripts/mosaic-config.mjs. Its `validate`
refuses any top-level key other than `configVersion`, `environment`, `dataRoot` and `execution` with
`unsupported configuration key` (:113). The business, seat, cli, discord, bootstrap, land-work, stack-copy and
conductor-apply code all use it. So phase 1 changes the shared loader, not a Console-only reader:
- mosaic-config.mjs accepts an optional `console` key, and the strict `console.sso` shape validator (the
config checks below, except the slot file checks) runs inside the loader. The fail-closed canon holds for
every reader. The loader checks shape only and never touches a slot file: `clientSecret` must be
`{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}`. The file checks and the read run only in the
Console's `--sso` start (D1), so a missing slot or a 0640 slot stops the Console, not the stack.
- The blast radius is the whole stack. A typo in `console.sso` makes every tool refuse the config, not just
the Console. That's the price of one loader, and the reason step 4 writes the key inside a window with a
backup first.
- The other direction breaks too. A copy older than phase 1 refuses a config that has the key. If the key
went in before the phase 2 pin, the live copy (490e2771d3d0 or later) would refuse its own config on the
next read, and the bus, seats and host would stop. After phase 2, a rollback to a pre-phase-1 copy fails
the same way until the key is removed. This is the same trap as the plug-in kind before a rollback.
- Files without the key still load, on old and new copies.
Test 25 in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads, a malformed one fails with
the bad key path named, and a config without `console` loads.
No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
```json
@@ -263,54 +151,38 @@ No secret value goes in this file. The client secret is a slot reference.
}
```
At start, `--sso` prints one line per provider: its id, its issuer and the number of subjects. No client id
value beyond that, no secret, no `sub`.
Location: a new optional `console` key in the business file (`~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/<id>.json`). The
Console already serves one business (`--business`), the identities map to that business's human, and Q173
lets agents edit the test business with a backup first. Adding the key means adding `console` to `TOP_KEYS`
(packages/business/src/business.mjs:21) with a strict validator. It's additive, and existing files without
it still load. The alternative is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, which is user-authored and never
auto-written. That fits a deployment setting well, but it puts per-business identity in system config.
**Filbert, rule on this one.**
The slot is `<configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, where `configDir` is the directory of the config file
the loader read (`MOSAIC_CONFIG`, default `~/.config/mosaic-dev`), so a scratch config gets a scratch slot
(D2). The Console's `--sso` start reads it. The Console refuses to start if
the file is a symlink, isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode
bits (0640 refuses as well as 0644), or resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or
put in a refusal message.
The slot is `~/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`, read at start. The Console refuses to start if
the file isn't a regular file, isn't owned by the Console's uid, has any group or other mode bits, or
resolves under the repo or a stack copy. The value is never logged or put in a refusal message.
`stack-release.sh rehearse` starts its Console with `serve --port N --business B` and no `--sso`, so a
rehearsed Console never reads `console.sso` and never uses the live redirect URI. No rehearse change is
needed; r1's follow-up is dropped.
`stack-release.sh rehearse` copies a backup onto a scratch root. A rehearsed Console must not use the live
redirect URI, so rehearse strips `console.sso` from the scratch business file and the rehearsed Console runs
without SSO (tester listener only). That's a row 163 follow-up, named in the build brief.
Config checks, run at start without the network. Any failure refuses the start, and the message names the
provider and the check:
Startup checks for each provider, all fail-closed (the Console doesn't start, and the message names the
provider and the check):
- `publicOrigin` is an https origin with no path, query or fragment.
- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment.
- `algs` is non-empty and holds only asymmetric algs from the library's list. `HS256`, any `HS*` and `none`
refuse.
- `subjects` is non-empty, each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters, and no `name` is `tester` or `human`.
- `clientSecret` is `{ slot: <name> }` with the name matching `[a-z0-9-]{1,64}` (shape only, in the loader).
- In the Console's `--sso` start only, the slot file passes the file checks above.
Discovery checks, run per provider when its discovery succeeds:
- Discovery returns `issuer` exactly.
- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`. mosaic-preview advertises HS256
only, so it fails here.
- `issuer` is https with no query or fragment. Discovery returns that issuer exactly.
- `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` shares at least one alg with `algs`, and `algs` holds only
asymmetric algs from the library's list. mosaic-preview advertises HS256 only, so the Console refuses it at
start.
- `code_challenge_methods_supported` includes `S256`.
- `jwks_uri` returns at least one key usable for one of `algs`. The empty mosaic-preview JWKS fails here too.
- `subjects` is non-empty, and each `sub` is 1..255 visible characters.
- `client.id_token_signed_response_alg` is set to `algs[0]`, so the library enforces it per token.
- Provider ids are unique and `[a-z0-9-]{1,32}`.
Unreachable provider (Q-B, Filbert's ruling). Config errors still refuse the start. Each fetch of the
discovery document or the JWKS lands in one of two classes:
- Unreachable: a network error, a timeout, a status other than 200, or a body that doesn't parse as JSON. An
Authentik maintenance page served as 200 HTML is unreachable, not refused, so it can't block a restart.
- Refused: a JSON document that fails the issuer, alg, S256 or JWKS check.
An unreachable provider doesn't stop the Console. It starts, that provider's `/auth/login` gets 503
`sign-in unavailable`, and a retry runs with backoff (5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes). `/healthz` stays
200 and adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable" | "refused" }`, so the gates still pass and an operator
can see the state. A refused provider at start refuses the start, because it's a configuration problem. On a
later retry it stays disabled with the `discovery-failed` code until a restart. Sessions already made keep
working while a provider is unreachable, since a session check needs no network. Test 23 covers the degraded
start, a 200 HTML page, and the recovery.
Starting while the provider is unreachable refuses the start. A Console with no working sign-in serves
nothing, so refusing loudly costs nothing, and the unit restarts it. The tradeoff is that an IdP outage
keeps the Console down until the IdP is back. With every route behind a session, it would be unusable anyway.
Several providers: Pocket ID, WorkOS and other compliant OPs use the same entry shape. The login page lists
them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session records which provider made it.
@@ -318,48 +190,13 @@ them. Each entry has its own issuer, client, algs and subjects, and a session re
### 5. Retiring `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` and the proof header
1. **Phase 1 (code row).** Add `--sso` to `cli.mjs serve` and `webui-service.sh`. It reads `console.sso` from
config.json. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
the business file. `--sso` cannot be combined with `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`. Under
`--sso`, `named` means "has a session", and `writer` comes from the session. `--send` needs `--sso` or the
old preview set. Phase 1 also carries the loader change and its test-config.sh case (section 4, test 25).
Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
The page (C2). Today app.js signs out only on `res.type === 'opaqueredirect'` (packages/webui/src/public/
app.js:111 and :305), which is the outpost's redirect. Under `--sso` the Console answers an `/api/*`
request without a session with 401 `sign-in required`, so the page would show an error on every 10 s
refresh and never offer a way back. Phase 1 makes both fetch paths treat a 401 whose body has
`error: 'sign-in required'` as signed out, and the signed-out notice links to
`/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`. Other 401s stay errors. The opaqueredirect branch stays
until phase 3, because the preview flags still run behind the outpost until then. Test 24 covers it.
Before phase 1 starts, Mos confirms the config.json sequence in phase 2 (C1).
old preview set. Nothing live changes until the re-pin.
2. **Phase 2 (Jason-gated window).** Re-pin to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
instead of the preview flags, after Jason steps 1 to 3. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). The order
inside the window:
1. Back up the store, the pointer, the unit and config.json.
2. Pin the phase 1 copy with the Console stopped. The copy's loader accepts a config with or without
`console`, so the bus and seats keep reading the old config.
3. Straggler check (Mos's C1 condition, mos-0977): list every running process, unit and timer that
still runs from the old copy and reads config.json. Each one is restarted on the new copy or shown
not to re-read config. The old loader refuses the key, so a straggler would fail on its next read.
Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
4. Jason step 4: the `console.sso` key goes into config.json, written by Jason or by an agent on his go
for that one key. The new loader reads it back (`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` validate) before anything
starts.
5. Start the Console with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`.
Acceptance: Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message and signs out. The forged-header
check (a request with `X-authentik-username` and no cookie gets 401) runs either on a scratch Console or
on live by Mos or Jason (B6). No agent sends the auth header to the live 7332 (section 8). The scratch
Console runs from the same copy as `serve --sso --port <scratch port>`, with `MOSAIC_CONFIG` pointing at a
scratch config in a scratch dir. That config has a scratch `dataRoot`, and any business it serves comes
from the scratch config dir; neither points at live. Its dummy client secret sits in the scratch slot
(`<scratch configDir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`). Its issuer is an unreachable loopback host, not
Authentik, so the scratch Console sends nothing outbound (D2, mos-0971). It comes up in the degraded
state (Q-B), and the 401 check needs no sign-in. It has no `--send` and no `--tester-port`.
Rollback for phase 2: remove the `console` key from config.json first (restore the step 1 backup), then
roll the pointer back. An older copy's loader refuses a config holding the key (section 4), so the other
order stops the bus and seats. The window plan lists that order, and the STATE check after a rollback
reads config.json for the key's absence.
instead of the preview flags, after the Jason steps below. Backup first, STATE after (Q173). Acceptance:
Jason signs in through the Console flow, sends one message, signs out, and a forged-header request with no
cookie gets 401.
3. **Phase 3 (code row).** Remove `previewOptions`, `proofOptions` and their tests. `cli.mjs` and
`webui-service.sh` refuse the old flags with `--auth-header was retired by Q175; use --sso`. Close #385
with the phase 2 STATE and the phase 3 commit.
@@ -374,15 +211,13 @@ The tester listener exists so agents can test as the tester and never as Jason (
- It never mounts `/auth/*` (404), never reads a cookie, and refuses any request carrying `Authorization` or a
`__Host-mosaic_session` / `__Host-mosaic_login` cookie (403 `tester listener takes no sign-in`). The same
goes for `X-authentik-jwt` and the old auth and proof header names.
- `startServer` throws when its options hold both `tester` and `sso`, so the SSO module can't be mounted on
the tester listener by a wiring mistake. A unit test calls it with both.
- Its writer stays the fixed `{ tester: true, user: 'tester' }`, and it allows only the row 175 writes, as
today. No session or header can change it.
- Its bus calls stay on `TESTER_CLI`. The bus checks the tester proof and refuses human verbs from it, and the
broker refuses a business whose human is `tester` and any role named `tester`. So nothing that reaches 7333
can become the human.
- 7332 keeps refusing `x-mosaic-tester` for every Host (:485).
- `subjects` validation refuses a `name` of `tester` or `human`.
- `subjects` validation refuses an entry named `tester`.
### 7. Point 5, the proxy-forwarded token
@@ -390,9 +225,7 @@ Not in phase 1. Point 5 makes it optional and the code flow covers the ruling. I
- Verify with jose (MIT, exact pin), against the JWKS from the configured issuer's own discovery. Never use
the `X-authentik-meta-jwks` header, because it arrives with the request and the forger controls it.
- Use the same alg allow list, iss, exp and subject list. `aud` is the proxy provider's client id, and the
config check refuses it if it equals any code-flow `clientId`, so an ID token issued to the Console can't be
replayed as a proxy token or the other way round (N4).
- Use the same alg allow list, iss, aud (the proxy provider's client id), exp and subject list.
- The mosaic-preview provider signs with HS256 and has an empty JWKS, so its `X-authentik-jwt` fails every
check until Jason gives it an RSA or EC key (Jason step 1).
@@ -404,11 +237,9 @@ Today, with `--send` live, any same-uid process on dragon-lin can connect to 127
strips client copies of the header, so a remote forger needs local code execution first. Users on other uids
can reach the loopback port too (P19 333).
Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path
stops carrying writes, and Jason sends piece 1 with `mosaic talk pm` instead. Row 189 (`stack-release.sh
activate --no-send`, #1687) makes that change through the pointer so the unit and stack-active.json stay in
step; the restart follows its landing. Until phase 2, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332.
The tests use fixture servers.
Recommendation: Mos restarts the Console without `--send` until phase 2. Reads stay up, the header path stops
carrying writes, and only Jason's sends through the Console stop. That's a Mos call (Console start belongs to
Jason or Mos). Until then, no agent sends a request with the auth header to 7332. The tests use fixture servers.
To be clear about the limit: SSO protects Console ingress. It doesn't protect the bus's human boundary. The
human proof is path-bound (#225), so a same-uid process can already run the tree's `human-cli.mjs` and act
@@ -418,11 +249,11 @@ as the human without touching the Console. Q175 doesn't change that. P19 333 own
All tests run against a fake OP in `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`. It's a loopback https
server with a self-signed cert. Each test passes the library a `customFetch` that trusts only that cert, so
production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a JWKS, and authorization, token
and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an HMAC secret for the
forgeries). It can serve two issuers at once and rotate its keys. No test reaches a real provider. Each
refusal test asserts the status, that no `__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was
never called. Each test also passes once unmutated, as the control.
production code needs no insecure-request flag. The fake OP has discovery, a
JWKS, and authorization, token and end-session endpoints, with keys made by `node:crypto` (RSA 2048, P-256, and an
HMAC secret for the forgeries). No test reaches a real provider. Each refusal test asserts the status, that no
`__Host-mosaic_session` was set, and that the bus send stub was never called. Each test also passes once
unmutated, as the control.
Refusals Mos named:
@@ -430,87 +261,35 @@ Refusals Mos named:
Fetch Metadata, and no cookie: 401 on `/api/bus/message`, `/api/settings` and `/api/config`, and a 303 to
login on `/`.
2. HS256 ID token. The fake OP signs the ID token with HS256, using the client secret as the key (the classic
confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback. The library's alg check refuses it
before any signature check, so this test proves the alg rule, not the signature check. Test 9 covers that.
3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused. Also an `aud`
array holding our client id and another, with no `azp`: refused.
4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's 30 s clock
tolerance): refused.
confusion) and `kid` set to a real RSA kid: refused at the callback.
3. Wrong aud. A correctly signed RS256 token with `aud` set to another client id: refused.
4. Expired token. A correctly signed token with `exp` 10 minutes ago (beyond the library's clock tolerance):
refused.
More refusals:
5. Wrong `iss`, both a different issuer and a trailing-slash variant.
6. Nonce mismatch or missing nonce.
7. State mismatch, a missing login cookie, a replayed callback (record already taken), an expired login record,
and two login cookies. For the replay, the fake OP is set to accept the same code twice, so the second
callback reaches the record lookup and only the take-and-delete rule refuses it.
and two login cookies.
8. A provider that demands no PKCE. The token request must carry `code_verifier`, and the fake OP refuses a
wrong one.
9. The signature check (B5), three cases: (a) `alg: none`; (b) an RS256 token whose header names a real kid in
the JWKS, with a changed payload and the original signature; (c) an RS256 token signed by a key whose kid
isn't in the JWKS, even after the refetch. (a) is refused by the alg check in step 4, so it's an alg test
like test 2. Only (b) and (c) reach step 5, and (b) is the case only the signature check catches.
10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one `subject-unknown` log line with the provider id,
iss and sub only.
11. Start refusals: `algs` holding `HS256` or `none`, HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty
JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a subject named `tester` or `human`, `--sso` together with
`--auth-header`, and slot files that are a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640, or under the repo. The owner
check has no test: making a file owned by another uid needs root, which the suite doesn't have. The
review reads that branch instead.
9. `alg: none`, and an RS256 token signed by a key not in the JWKS.
10. A valid token for a `sub` not in `subjects`: 403 and one log line with iss and sub only.
11. Startup refusals: HS-only discovery (the mosaic-preview shape), an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch,
a slot with mode 0644, and `--sso` together with `--auth-header`.
12. Tester port: a valid session cookie (taken from a 7332 sign-in), `Authorization: Bearer <valid id token>`,
and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404. `startServer` with `tester` and `sso`
throws.
and `X-authentik-jwt` each get 403. `/auth/login` on 7333 gets 404.
13. Session: idle expiry, absolute expiry, a logout followed by reuse of the old cookie, and logout without
same-origin (refused, session kept). Background `/api/` GETs every 10 s for over an hour don't keep the
session alive; a page load does.
14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example`, `return=https://evil.example`, `return=/\evil.example` and
`return=/%09/evil.example` all land on `/`, and `return=/board?x=1` lands there.
15. Provider mix-up. Two providers, A and B. A login started for A whose callback carries B's `iss` and a
code from B is refused, and a `provider=` query on the callback is ignored. B's code is issued against
A-record's PKCE challenge, so the verifier matches and only the record rule (the callback belongs to A)
refuses it.
16. Several algs: a provider with `algs: ["RS256", "ES256"]` takes a token signed with either, and refuses
PS256 even when the JWKS holds a usable PS256 key.
17. Login record cap: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first login's callback finds no record.
18. JWKS rotation: the fake OP rotates to a new key with a new kid. A sign-in after the rotation succeeds
through the one refetch, and a token under the removed kid is refused.
19. Logs: across every test in this file, captured log lines hold none of the tokens, codes, states, nonces,
verifiers, the client secret or a session id that the test produced.
20. The session store holds no raw session id (keys are sha256 values, and no value holds the cookie).
21. Set-Cookie: the exact session and login cookie strings, including the expiry of the login cookie at
callback.
22. Host: under `--sso`, a loopback Host on `/`, `/api/board` and a write each get 403; `/healthz` on
loopback gets 200.
23. Degraded start: the fake OP is down at start; the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, `/healthz` reports
`unreachable`; the OP comes up and the next retry makes sign-in work. A discovery URL that answers 200
with an HTML page also counts as `unreachable` and the Console starts. A provider that answers with
HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
24. Signed-out page (C2). A page test in the board-held.test.mjs style stubs fetch to answer 401
`{ error: 'sign-in required' }`: the page shows the signed-out notice, its link is
`/auth/login?return=<current path and query>`, and the refresh stops. A 401 with another error stays an
error. The existing opaqueredirect case still signs out.
25. Loader (C1), in scripts/test-config.sh: a config with a valid `console.sso` loads; a malformed one (an HS
alg, a missing `slot` field, a slot name outside the pattern, an unknown key under `console`) fails and
names the bad key path, and no case reads a slot file (the file cases stay in test 11); a config without
`console` loads.
same-origin (refused, session kept).
14. Open redirect: `return=//evil.example` and `return=https://evil.example` both land on `/`.
Positive paths: an RS256 and an ES256 provider each complete sign-in and one send, and two providers configured
together each work with their own subjects.
Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
- drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (9b);
- wrap that call in a try/catch that continues (9b);
- drop the `subjects` check (10);
- accept HS* in `algs` (11);
- take the provider from the query (15);
- let the tester listener read cookies (12);
- skip the login record delete (7);
- drop `HttpOnly` from the session cookie (21);
- refresh `seen` on every request (13);
- build `redirect_uri` from the request Host (a test with a different Host on `/auth/login` checks the
`redirect_uri` sent to the fake OP);
- serve the loopback read path under `--sso` (22).
Mutants for the gate: drop the `validateApplicationLevelSignature` call (test 2 or 9 must fail), drop the
`subjects` check, accept HS* in `algs`, take the provider from the query, let the tester listener read
cookies, and skip the login record delete.
### 10. Jason-gated steps
@@ -521,21 +300,16 @@ Mutants for the gate, each killed by the named test:
post-logout URI `https://mosaic.woltje.com/auth/signed-out`, keep RS256, and give the client id. Put the
client secret into slot `console-sso-authentik` (or say an agent may create the slot file from a value he
puts in place, per the Q173 secrets rule). Agents never see the value.
3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one `subject-unknown` log line on his
first sign-in attempt.
4. The `console.sso` entry in `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json`, inside the phase 2 window, after the pin
and before the Console starts (section 5). He writes it, or he gives an agent the go to write that one
key from the values in steps 2 and 3, with a backup of the file first. config.json is user-authored, so
this isn't covered by Q173. Writing it earlier stops every tool on the live copy, whose loader refuses
the key.
5. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
3. His `sub` for that provider, or a go to read it from the Console's one refusal log line on his first
sign-in attempt.
4. Any Traefik or outpost change. None is needed while the outpost stays in front. Dropping the outpost
later, so the Console is the only gate, changes who can reach the Console from outside and is his call.
6. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
5. The phase 2 re-pin window go.
## Questions for review
Q-A to Q-E are settled (Filbert r1 and r2, Mos mos-0973). One open point, for Mos:
- The config.json sequence (C1): the key goes in only inside the phase 2 window, after the pin and before
the Console starts, with a backup first, and a rollback removes it before the pointer moves (section 5).
Mos confirms this before phase 1 starts.
- Q-A: the config location, business file `console` key or config.json (section 4).
- Q-B: refuse to start when the IdP is unreachable, or start and refuse sign-ins (section 4).
- Q-C: should the loopback-Host read path on 7332 also go behind the session, as proposed? Public traffic
arrives from 127.0.0.1 too, and only Host keeps it off that path today.
- Q-D: 8 h absolute and 1 h idle, or shorter.
-86
View File
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
# Row 189: `stack-release.sh activate --no-send`
Gitea #1687. Vikunja P19 #413 (Q175 interim, #412). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md.
Rulings: mos-0972 (the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2), mos-0973 (go; Sage builds,
Dewey reviews; gate is the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh). Base: def2e7932 (refactor, the
brief commit on 9ae8c73ac).
## What it does
`activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE` in a new `send_for_target`, which
`console_for_target` calls after `proof_for_target`. `install_stack` renders the unit from
`RUN_CONSOLE` and `write_pointer` writes the pointer from it, so both lose the flag and `flags_drift`
stays quiet afterwards. Only `activate` takes the flag; the parser sends every other op to usage
(exit 4).
`check_target` lets a `--no-send` activate name the pointer's copy only when the pointer's Console
flags hold `--send`. That run is a live-copy re-pin, the same path row 187 uses for the proof pair:
the plan prints the live-copy note, the run stops both units, backs up the stopped store and starts
them again. A plain same-copy activate, or a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, still
refuses `already-active`.
`--plan` prints one `send:` line after the `proof:` line, for activate and rollback:
- `send: dropped; --no-send was given`
- `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`
- `send: carried` (the pointer's `--send` goes on unchanged)
- `send: off`
The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
--send, so there is nothing to drop`.
Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer's flags as they are, so once `--no-send` has run, nothing adds
`--send` back. There is no re-enable flag (mos-0973). Q175 phase 2 changes the Console flags in its
own row.
docs/TOOLS.md: `[--no-send]` in the usage block and one paragraph after the proof paragraph.
## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs, T55)
1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send --tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the other flags in order, status
says the unit flags match, the steps log has the drop line, the log line has from = to = B and the
backup sum equals the stopped store's, and the units stop and start in order.
2. Plain same-copy activate, with `--tester-port` and with `--no-proof`, refuses `already-active`. So does
a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, and on a pointer that never held it.
3. The four `send:` lines, the live-copy note on the same-copy plan only, and the Console line right
after `send:` without `--send`. The run on a pointer with no `--send` logs the nothing-to-drop line
and no drop line.
4. After `--no-send` on C1, a rollback to B leaves `--send` out of the pointer and the unit, the steps
log never names `--send`, and status matches. pm-on after `activate --pm-after-harness --no-send`
keeps it off.
5. `--no-send` on rollback (with and without `--plan`), pm-on, status, adopt and rehearse is a usage
error with the usage text, nothing written, started or logged. The usage text shows `[--no-send]`.
6. A pointer holding both the proof pair and `--send`: the plans for `--no-proof`, `--no-send` and both
name what each drops and carries. `--no-send` keeps the pair, `--no-send` with a new pair replaces it,
`--no-proof` keeps `--send`, and both together leave neither. Status matches after each.
`planTail` gains `'send: off'` after `'proof: off'`, because every plan now prints the line. T36 takes
`out.slice(-n)` around `planTail`, so its four slice counts grow by one.
## Mutants
mutants.sh in this packet, run on the candidate. Each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh and runs T55
plus T1 and T2.
- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
- M3: with `--no-send`, the pointer is written from `P_CONSOLE`, so it keeps `--send` while the unit
drops it.
- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
- M5: the parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
Results: mutants-run.log, all five killed (M1 5 failures, M2 2, M3 7, M4 2, M5 2).
## Deviations from the brief
- The brief's line numbers were taken before row 163 landed. The candidate corrects them to the
9ae8c73ac lines (check_target :249-256, flags_drift :646-657, console_for_target :664-693, adopt
:828).
- Test 5 also covers rehearse and `rollback --plan`, which the brief did not list.
## Outbound calls
None. The change edits an array before the existing unit render and pointer write. Every test uses
the stand-in systemctl, units, stores and data root the file already builds; no test touches
`~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
70dbc89c0282fa063514317262d8926d16b8b8aaab4a1e47379303918495fc2c agents/sage/work/queue-189/BUILD.md
4bd216cce2b40b39998725daa8989f6e3acb3ccd81a7017f6b09026af3965584 agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants-run.log
ddbdddf03abf4aa91aa62f52e468be7af3c6b2f5d7bec2ee99b11e315471f18c agents/sage/work/queue-189/mutants.sh
5d7b2da84d994f4f93d1212e349b4e4c19c5c00780e6cfcde91edb3ca08c014e docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md
38e410c4cb731390f96747646eb7f6caa7a587fca9024ccbe901aab5ac19c7cf docs/TOOLS.md
fe430969cc669515e348fced1a22cbe839a12023f7ac67cfba905b7afd29872f packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs
16f77305e558f4fb953accc6d09f1f7b408aba363851d8ca79216ffce41bed9f scripts/stack-release.sh
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
M1 KILLED fail=5
M2 KILLED fail=2
M3 KILLED fail=7
M4 KILLED fail=2
M5 KILLED fail=2
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Row 189 mutants M1-M5: each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh in the sage-b189 worktree, runs T55 and
# the plan-tail tests, and restores the file from a checked backup.
set -uo pipefail
WT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189
OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189-mut/out
S=$WT/scripts/stack-release.sh
mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 1
cp -p "$S" "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" || { echo "backup failed"; exit 1; }
ORIG=$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)
[ "$(sha256sum "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "backup differs"; exit 1; }
restore() { cp -p "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S"; [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "RESTORE FAILED"; exit 1; }; }
trap restore EXIT
mutate() {
case "$1" in
M1) sed -i '/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/d' "$S" ;;
M2) sed -i 's/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/{ [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; } ||/' "$S" ;;
M3) sed -i 's/^ write_pointer "\$TO" "\$RUN_PM" "\$RUN_PENDING" "\$P_CLAUDE" "\$T_SCHEMA" "\${RUN_CONSOLE\[@\]}"$/ if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${P_CONSOLE[@]}"; else write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${RUN_CONSOLE[@]}"; fi/' "$S" ;;
M4) sed -i 's/^ SEND_PLAN="send: off"$/ SEND_PLAN="send: off"; [ "$OP" != rollback ] || RUN_CONSOLE+=(--send)/' "$S" ;;
M5) sed -i 's/--no-send) \[ "\$OP" = activate \] || usage;/--no-send) { [ "$OP" = activate ] || [ "$OP" = rollback ]; } || usage;/' "$S" ;;
esac
}
for m in M1 M2 M3 M4 M5; do
restore
mutate "$m"
if [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ]; then echo "$m NOT-APPLIED"; continue; fi
bash -n "$S" || { echo "$m SYNTAX"; continue; }
diff "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S" > "$OUT/$m.diff"
(cd "$WT" && TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/t189 timeout 900 node --test --test-reporter=tap --test-name-pattern='T55|T1 |T2 ' packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs) > "$OUT/$m.log" 2>&1
fails=$(awk '/^# fail /{print $3}' "$OUT/$m.log")
if [ "${fails:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then echo "$m KILLED fail=$fails"; else echo "$m SURVIVED"; fi
done
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Row 66 round 3: rebase only
Sage, 2026-10-20. Round 2 (candidate 0f4a57956, manifest cee63e06fdea) was approved by Filbert (29442) and
Dewey (29443). Its base 5487ed39d is now far behind refactor, and rows 190 and 192 changed four of its paths.
Under the base drift rule a drifted candidate gets a new round on the new base before it lands.
- Candidate: branch `sage/row66-r3`, commit 2369c00e36874e1100b301e0d01cbd105c0c5d4f, two cherry-picks of 8ec03b45a and 0f4a57956 onto c40d846cb.
No conflicts and no hand edits.
- `git patch-id --stable` of the r3 diff (c40d846cb..2369c00e36874e1100b301e0d01cbd105c0c5d4f) equals the r2 diff's (5487ed39d..0f4a57956):
6d085621fd355d43ccaf0efaefe7e74179888ff2.
- Manifest `candidate-manifest-r3.sha256`, sha256 42e3876ca1689719f0e07e66fc9fbd6e4faf3c07678da024accb54c58caef0d1. Same 23 paths as r2. Four hashes differ, and only
because the base moved: `docs/TOOLS.md`, `scripts/stack-copy.sh`, `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs`,
`packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs`. The other 19 are byte-identical to r2.
- Singles on the new base (`singles-r3.log`): every touched test file plus the unslop selftest, all green.
`packages/bus/tests/channel-proof.test.mjs` pins plug-in hashes and names `index.mjs`; it reads only channel
plug-ins, not the two harness files this row changes, and it passes (2/0).
- Still to do: the full gate on my slot after the MVP gates, then the landing sessions on both harnesses that
the row's gate names.
What I ask the reviewers: confirm the rebase. In the four drifted files, check that row 66's hunks sit correctly
next to rows 190 and 192 (`stack-copy.sh` COPY_PATHS in particular). Nothing else changed.
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
b99e7f4bf58ac68c8f5fa58eb7b90c0f85b15ca9a80fd093f6aaeafeac931608 adapters/README.md
c32d2a3276db92433d4e3c4f4b45fab048d9a46119d9f69cead6a11cfacfeadb agents/sage/work/queue-66/BUILD.md
ac318150f5e6193adf3750d76b64c643c29f324310c4004b0bdde8caef863b53 docs/TOOLS.md
64a2d00ba57b8673c0905f322711023c10d4dfdc0ccc7e6daa2c440b4d57e34e packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs
b027dc74583217b4151173ecbabfcfbfc7b108ac6b7a8e93dd21a2834051714f packages/harness/README.md
bfb2156c609eeaf87c9e209c562576a5ef47535eaeee61d841bb0bd75a76a69d packages/harness/src/runner.mjs
0a27f2c8de7b9191f9c0d4a209331c63ff7630923e669838b41715924b0a64b0 packages/harness/tests/bundle.test.mjs
81d0352f2dcd41eb2e2ef962365d9b97515d7e8d9668a35bb9ce9dce4f1451ea packages/harness/tests/claude-session.test.mjs
b16f33442cefd5b5ae2af85edab33250ee6b31025e437edf0e4eba9fe0afa793 packages/harness/tests/fixtures/fake-adapter.mjs
1e187a2e23a197640d139e6975dfaf83dd7e337c360d128833678dc60f3e2046 packages/harness/tests/pi-session.test.mjs
37ca6ad6467573658c1ac6807b6cd00e3f9da289107fb689190a1872bff9b89c packages/harness/tests/runner.test.mjs
04c24058f37260c9192d5036c8cf28b50faba8e3e3bf57f198d233485d0d57e6 packages/plugins/harness/claude-code/index.mjs
2c1252e8e8db3ba4551bf1e34156ddf4e933cc664fc157105bef9a2705d6ce3b packages/plugins/harness/pi/index.mjs
7e0bea27d4360a39874fa64b3506a85f83888613a285ec0b087d74bf22b76421 packages/plugins/README.md
ec4ec9502ee8e766e3abd04d9f724c0d8ff4ef114394a0f76d5320c2dc715c5c packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs
f6141dac9a8c61573e4198480fed85e093992ee9c19fb55e9bc2752381b7b07a packages/seat/tests/sandbox.test.mjs
09c6cadaf2e27677c95ba5bcb6a359cb6b3ce596ba1db6171b26586d4f9834a8 packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs
e9ff91cd073a1b784f9ea440b18db913ce8107df6246e3b0b0e962eda43f046b scripts/stack-copy.sh
7ee6ed6e6ac55b1348d40a358372e66c86fdebacd90001d447040133e1187882 tools/unslop-hook/claude-hook.js
ce1dfb11d0a8e8efd3d6dae67cc259c2e7443a62c7416bdedd4c71306d8c6df1 tools/unslop-hook/extension.ts
f07d67806f40763b4be87d31c2976448b5cfc34d7328519fae2d8313b1ca3e20 tools/unslop-hook/README.md
dbe3d5c9ae654d2401e3c496a6b03757a438e4a551fd8e460df8c82902bb80a7 tools/unslop-hook/test-unslop-check.js
76be78178a0703b9d20a7df2278ecb13f429dea90cea45180f22302e267ea25e tools/unslop-hook/unslop-check.js
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 14 ℹ fail 0
packages/harness/tests/bundle.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 22 ℹ fail 0
packages/harness/tests/claude-session.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0
packages/harness/tests/pi-session.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0
packages/harness/tests/runner.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 39 ℹ fail 0
packages/plugins/tests/harness.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 9 ℹ fail 0
packages/seat/tests/sandbox.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0
packages/webui/tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs rc=0 ℹ pass 10 ℹ fail 0
unslop rc=0 28/28 passed
SINGLES_DONE
2026-10-20T23:15:14Z
@@ -196,37 +196,3 @@ a piece. It passed, so the "pm doesn't answer" branch does not apply and
no defect is filed.
Piece 1 is Jason's next real Mosaic Stack request to pm. It is not open yet.
## 2026-10-21T01:14Z dates (sage-1622, Mos mos-1148, Vikunja #442)
Mos accepted the plan with changes C1 and C2. The dates are latest-by markers (Q111).
1. Pieces 1-5 open by 2026-10-23 23:59Z. Mos gives Jason the plain command after tonight's open items with him
(Q13 on PRD 1.8, the 1012 and 1008 boot). I don't ask again.
2. C1: no piece is pinned to a copy. A piece runs on whatever copy is live when Jason sends it. For each piece
this log records the activation id at send. A piece still open across a window gets the new activation id
recorded too.
3. C2: neither the Q175 phase 2 window (10-23) nor the 10-24 re-pin window rolls back or restores while a piece
has history, unless that window has failed. If a restore happens anyway, this log names the pieces to redo.
4. All five closed and reviewed by 2026-10-26 18:00Z. Jason reads the five trails at his gate on 10-26 or
10-27. A pass starts merge plan step 1 under decision 146, and step 4 stays his.
5. Fallback: if fewer than five pieces are open by 10-23, the gate moves to 10-28. No agent opens a piece in
Jason's place.
When Jason sends a piece, I tell Mos its message id.
Correction (2026-10-21T01:06Z): the heading above says 01:14Z. The clock read 2026-10-21T01:05:56Z when I wrote that entry, so 01:06Z is the right time.
## 2026-10-21T01:20Z Jason's pre-S7 checks (mos-1154)
Between 01:11:06Z and 01:13:03Z Jason sent pm five requests with `mosaic talk pm`: ed9e1e14, 51c19692,
94f5d62c, 0645a3b7, f75449c0 (bus seq 1583 to 1591). pm run rc9e993da24cf answered each in 4 to 16 s. They were
two jokes, the sandwich, the purpose of Mosaic Stack and pm's mission. pm made no task and raised no decision
for any of them, and said so each time. Mos's reading, which I take: none is a piece, because a piece has to
become work that gets closed and reviewed. They are recorded as Jason's pre-S7 checks. The five pieces are
still open, latest-by 10-23 23:59Z. Activation at send: copy 4429a104f, as in the 01:06Z entry (C1). Source: Mos
(mos-1154) read the bus. I didn't read the message bodies.
pm also told Jason that its state snapshot lists only the first 50 of 198 open tasks and that it pages the rest
with list_tasks. That is the row 109 (#1603) design: broker.mjs `state` returns `cap: TASK_PAGE` (50) with
`total`, and list_tasks pages up to TASK_PAGE_MAX (200).
-48
View File
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# Common start for Sage's MVP T1 builder seats (mos-0974, mos-0977)
You are a builder seat on Mosaic Stack, repository /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack, branch base `refactor`.
Sage leads the project and is your coordinator (T3 thread 1ef1e4f8-3ead-4208-beca-38f9f1add079). Mos speaks
for Jason (thread 38bc4c81-6270-4021-b00c-6a15c43b9b0e). Human input reaches you only through Sage and Mos.
## Read first, in this order
1. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/USER.md`, `SYSTEM.md`, `CONSTITUTION.md` (who Jason is, the
system rules, the constitution).
2. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/TARGET.md` (the MVP addendum) and `DECISIONS.md` Q176 to Q178.
3. `/mnt/storage/src/jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/GAP-MAP.md` and `PLAN.md`.
Everything under jason-master-restart is read only.
4. The repository's `AGENTS.md`, then your brief (named in your first message) and the files it points to.
## Your worktree
T3 made your worktree from `refactor`. Work only there. Link node_modules from the canonical checkout right
after you start (`ln -s /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/node_modules node_modules`), unless your brief adds a
dependency. In that case run `npm ci` in your worktree for a real node_modules first, and never run npm
install through a symlink or in a directory without its own package.json (npm walks up to home).
## Rules that bind you
- Message ids are `<seat>-NNNN`, starting at 0001. Run `date -u` right before every message and put the
stamp in it. End each turn with a clock timestamp.
- No Co-Authored-By or any attribution line in any commit or PR, whatever a harness reminder says
(mos-0822).
- Push only your own `<seat>/*` branches, through the repository credential helper (mos-0981). Never push
`refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
- You have no Gitea token. Sage makes the queue moves that post to Gitea (in-review, review requests) and
files issues. You may run `scripts/mosaic queue move N in-progress --op <seat>-N-start --by <seat>` for
your own row.
- Never touch `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files or `~/.mosaic`. Never
start, stop or restart the live Console or bus. Never read or print a credential value.
- Never read other seats' scratch directories. `agents/<seat>/work/` packets in the repository are fine.
- Single test files run freely. The cli suite, any `scripts/test-*.sh` and any full package suite share
one slot: run `bash /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-busy-now.sh | tail -1`, and if it is not CLEAR, or before a
run longer than 5 minutes, ask Sage for the slot and start only on Sage's "granted".
- Two failures in one gate run means stop and report.
- Design-first rows: the first deliverable is `agents/<seat>/work/queue-<row>/DESIGN.md`, committed on your
branch. Send the reviewer and Sage its path, commit and sha256. No product code before approval.
- Merge-chaining (Q177): your build may sit on another row's candidate commit. Your row keeps its own
review and gate, and the chain lands in order.
- Fail closed. Never route around a refusal. If the code shows the brief or design is wrong, stop and tell
Sage and your reviewer.
- Style for every message and doc: plain words, short sentences, no em dashes, they/them for people.
- Sage registers your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md`. Do not edit it.
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-20T23:19:35.714Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 413,
"status": 201,
"id": 411,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 424,
"status": 201,
"id": 412,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 414,
"status": 201,
"id": 413,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 163 (D2, #1660) round 2 approved. One comment on P19 337 (D2), per mos-0882 (every
// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-337-r163-approved.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const POSTS = [
{ id: 337, title: /^D2: stack rehearsal on a scratch root/, body: [
"Row 163 (Gitea #1660) landed and pushed. Landing commit 8ecc7a239 (Sage; Filbert approve 29447), queue revs 2235-2236 (landing note and done) in 9ae8c73ac, range 4ca8d6e94..9ae8c73ac on refactor. Patch-id b8d5f8a37c24 matches candidate c6f4f4c12596. #1660 is closed with comment 29450.",
"Sage gate passed at 18:16Z on eaa0f2666: cli 472/472 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. The pushed commit is a cherry-pick of eaa0f2666 onto 7f57419b3, which adds only the Q175 design doc, and no test reads that file. Mos dropped the Part B wait when Q175 replaced Part B (mos-0971).",
"Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. Rehearse and bus start --no-launch go live at the next re-pin, where the Q173 backup and STATE report apply.",
] },
{ id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
"Design r1 is committed: agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md in 7f57419b3 (blob 91e5b1b5e737), pushed in 9ae8c73ac. The Console becomes an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. It always calls validateApplicationLevelSignature, because the library skips the signature check on a token-endpoint ID token. Identity is an (iss, sub) pair, and only asymmetric algs are accepted.",
"Filbert's r1 review asks for changes in the doc before any code (B1-B6). B1 moves the provider config to config.json, because agents have write paths into the business file. B2 closes an open-redirect hole. B3 keeps the library's error causes out of logs. B4 caps login records. B5 fixes the signature mutant test. B6 removes a live forged-header probe from the phase 2 acceptance. Their rulings: Q-B start degraded when the IdP is unreachable, Q-C yes (7332 accepts only the public Host under --sso), Q-D keep idle expiry but don't refresh it on poll GETs. r2 follows.",
"Interim (mos-0972): the Console runs without --send until phase 2. stack-release.sh has no way to drop --send that keeps stack-active.json and the unit in step, so a small tool row comes first, through review.",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-20: row 192 (Q175 phase 1, #1690) landed. One comment on P19 412, per mos-0882 (every
// landing or decision gets a Vikunja comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only:
// no task edits, labels, assignees or bucket moves. Checks the task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-412-r192-landed.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const POSTS = [
{ id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
"Row 192 (Q175 phase 1, Gitea #1690) landed and pushed. Landing commit 4429a104f (Launchpad's launchpad/row192 53bb59462..37582e820, manifest round 2, 18 paths; Webby approved). Patch-id 4a486902614d matches the reviewed diff. Queue revs 2429-2430 (landing note and done) are in 305857c8f, range 32b54ac3b..305857c8f on refactor. #1690 is closed.",
"Sage gate on 088087ac9: package suites 2758 pass 0 fail, scripts/test-*.sh 429 pass 0 fail, mutants 22 of 23 killed (#23, the second origin check, ruled equivalent). The Console now verifies SSO itself under --sso as an OIDC relying party on oauth4webapi 3.8.8, pinned exactly. mosaic-config.mjs load is now async, so in-flight rows that call it rebase and await it (row 190 round 3 is doing this).",
"Not live. The live stack still runs copies/490e2771d3d0. The new dependency needs npm ci in a new stack copy, so the live re-pin is a window with Mos (mos-1099 item 3); Sage sends Mos the plan. Row 200 (phase 2) follows.",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-20: catch-up landing and status comments on P19 413 (row 189), 424 (row 210) and 414 (rows 201
// and 204), per mos-0882. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits.
// Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-catchup-2026-10-20.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const POSTS = [
{ id: 413, title: /^stack-release\.sh activate --no-send/, body: [
"Row 189 landed on refactor as ace27dc5e (Gitea #1687): stack-release.sh activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer and the unit in step. Dewey approved (comment 29485), and Sage's gate passed.",
"The stack activation log shows the same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 after the landing: activation 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0, result ok at 19:30:00Z, with backup 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0. Since then the live Console runs without --send. The re-pin to 4429a104f at 22:02Z (row 192) carried the pointer's flags, no --send and no --sso, as its W3 plan check required.",
] },
{ id: 424, title: /^Credential store: per-agent host access/, body: [
"Status, 2026-10-20 23:20Z. Row 210 (Gizmoduck) builds this task. Its design r3 is approved, and the machine-grant design final r6 f9039682e is approved for code once row 210 lands (mos-1141, mos-1143). Every grant name sits under grant.* behind one guard (mos-1144). No agent creates a grant: the chief requests, Jason approves, and protected code creates it (Q188).",
"Order (mos-1135, mos-1137): row 210 lands only after row 199, the per-agent credential store. Row 199's gate is green on c6868ba41. Megavolt fixed five surviving mutants and is rerunning all 28 now on 7c3cdd940, before the Duckworth review. Rows 190, 199 and 210 go live together in the one 10-24 window with the 3i-3j migration (mos-1145 line 9), backup first, under Q173.",
] },
{ id: 414, title: /^MVP platform: the Given list for Cases 1 and 2/, body: [
"RBAC rows landed (Given list, RBAC enforcement). Row 201, FED R1: access.json loader and validator with covers, afad4993f (Gitea #1699), Gizmoduck, Duckworth approved (comment 29581). Gate: business 173/0, scripts/test-*.sh 422/0, mutants 44 of 44 killed.",
"Row 204, 193a: the access level check widened to viewer, d0bbc5c1c (Gitea #1702), Morgana, Duckworth approved (comment 29595). LEVELS gains collaborator and viewer, covers() takes a required least level, and an unknown grant level covers nothing. Gate: packages and scripts 2789/0, mutants 7 of 7 killed.",
"Neither changes the live stack. Rows 205-208 (193b1 to 193d) follow, and 206 adds a schema step, so it goes live only in a --migrate window.",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-21: re-plan comments on P19 405-408 and 411 (due 10-22). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits.
// Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-p19-405-411-replan.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const POSTS = [
{ id: 405, title: /^stack-release --plan: no test plans a missing store/, body: [
"Re-plan (Sage, 2026-10-21, due 10-22). Tasks 405, 406, 407, 408 and 411 become one queue row, a stack-release follow-up row. All five touch scripts/stack-release.sh, scripts/webui-service.sh or docs/TOOLS.md, and rows 232 (Darkwing) and 238 (Launchpad) are changing stack-release.sh now. So I brief the row after 232 and 238 land, from their landing, which avoids base drift (the row 68 rule). It lands after the 10-24 window, because that window holds the four service scripts at NEW (P5). 411's hold was the Part B window, and Part B is superseded (Q175, mos-0970), so that hold is gone. Each item keeps the test and mutant its task names. I'll name the owner when I brief it, either the seat that frees up first of Darkwing and Launchpad, or me.",
] },
{ id: 406, title: /^stack-release --plan: backup line printed/, body: [
"Re-plan (Sage, 2026-10-21, due 10-22). Tasks 405, 406, 407, 408 and 411 become one queue row, a stack-release follow-up row. All five touch scripts/stack-release.sh, scripts/webui-service.sh or docs/TOOLS.md, and rows 232 (Darkwing) and 238 (Launchpad) are changing stack-release.sh now. So I brief the row after 232 and 238 land, from their landing, which avoids base drift (the row 68 rule). It lands after the 10-24 window, because that window holds the four service scripts at NEW (P5). 411's hold was the Part B window, and Part B is superseded (Q175, mos-0970), so that hold is gone. Each item keeps the test and mutant its task names. I'll name the owner when I brief it, either the seat that frees up first of Darkwing and Launchpad, or me.",
] },
{ id: 407, title: /^stack-release\.sh: the proof_for_target comment/, body: [
"Re-plan (Sage, 2026-10-21, due 10-22). Tasks 405, 406, 407, 408 and 411 become one queue row, a stack-release follow-up row. All five touch scripts/stack-release.sh, scripts/webui-service.sh or docs/TOOLS.md, and rows 232 (Darkwing) and 238 (Launchpad) are changing stack-release.sh now. So I brief the row after 232 and 238 land, from their landing, which avoids base drift (the row 68 rule). It lands after the 10-24 window, because that window holds the four service scripts at NEW (P5). 411's hold was the Part B window, and Part B is superseded (Q175, mos-0970), so that hold is gone. Each item keeps the test and mutant its task names. I'll name the owner when I brief it, either the seat that frees up first of Darkwing and Launchpad, or me.",
] },
{ id: 408, title: /^docs\/TOOLS\.md: the row 178 paragraph/, body: [
"Re-plan (Sage, 2026-10-21, due 10-22). Tasks 405, 406, 407, 408 and 411 become one queue row, a stack-release follow-up row. All five touch scripts/stack-release.sh, scripts/webui-service.sh or docs/TOOLS.md, and rows 232 (Darkwing) and 238 (Launchpad) are changing stack-release.sh now. So I brief the row after 232 and 238 land, from their landing, which avoids base drift (the row 68 rule). It lands after the 10-24 window, because that window holds the four service scripts at NEW (P5). 411's hold was the Part B window, and Part B is superseded (Q175, mos-0970), so that hold is gone. Each item keeps the test and mutant its task names. I'll name the owner when I brief it, either the seat that frees up first of Darkwing and Launchpad, or me.",
] },
{ id: 411, title: /^stack-release\.sh and webui-service\.sh: the proof file repository check/, body: [
"Re-plan (Sage, 2026-10-21, due 10-22). Tasks 405, 406, 407, 408 and 411 become one queue row, a stack-release follow-up row. All five touch scripts/stack-release.sh, scripts/webui-service.sh or docs/TOOLS.md, and rows 232 (Darkwing) and 238 (Launchpad) are changing stack-release.sh now. So I brief the row after 232 and 238 land, from their landing, which avoids base drift (the row 68 rule). It lands after the 10-24 window, because that window holds the four service scripts at NEW (P5). 411's hold was the Part B window, and Part B is superseded (Q175, mos-0970), so that hold is gone. Each item keeps the test and mutant its task names. I'll name the owner when I brief it, either the seat that frees up first of Darkwing and Launchpad, or me.",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-21: landing comments on P19 412 (row 200) and 424 (row 199), per mos-0882. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits.
// Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-r200-r199-landed.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const POSTS = [
{ id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
"Row 200 landed on refactor as 9e1085816 (Gitea #1698, closed): stack-release.sh activate --sso, the phase 2 prerequisite. Launchpad built it and Webby approved r3. Sage's run killed 13 of 14 mutants (M12 is the equivalent ruled in round 2). Gate: 15 package suites and 10 scripts/test-*.sh suites, all green, at 00:07:57Z.",
"Follow-up N1 is row 238 (Gitea #1744, Launchpad, Webby). The sso-config hint will carry --instance NAME for a named instance. Nothing is live until a window activates a copy that includes 9e1085816.",
] },
{ id: 424, title: /^Credential store: per-agent host access/, body: [
"Row 199 landed on refactor as cb5fdb064 (Gitea #1697, closed). It adds the per-agent credential store, the agent's own git identity and pushes to a remote. Megavolt built it and Duckworth approved r1 (comment 29779). Gate on 9e1085816 plus the patch: packages 2735/0, scripts 429/0.",
"Row 210 (Gizmoduck) now rebases onto cb5fdb064 on a new branch (mos-1135, mos-1137). Rows 234 and 235 follow it. Rows 190, 199 and 210 go live together in the 10-24 window with the 3i-3j migration, backup first, under Q173 (mos-1145).",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-20: W11 of the re-pin window 490e2771d to 4429a104f (STATE.md in commit 99a406ed3) on P19 386, 412
// and 393, and the row 190 landing (00d4cc1f6, #1688) on P19 414, per mos-0882. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the
// sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits. Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node comment-w11-r190-2026-10-20.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
const STATE = "agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/STATE.md in commit 99a406ed3 (pushed), sha256 a4d0a7b12f431f15";
const POSTS = [
{ id: 386, title: /^Q173 test system: tester writes/, body: [
"Q173 re-pin window, 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192), done. STATE report: " + STATE + ".",
"Activation 20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 with --pm, exit 0, every gate check including pm_launched. Store stays on 3i, migration none. Backup ~/.mosaic-dev/backups/stack/20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6 (SHA256SUMS b61d6484), rollback set beside it; rollback would go to 490e2771d. Business file unchanged (sha256 1e49bdf0). Console flags unchanged: no --send, no --sso, --tester-port 7333.",
"W0 to W10 passed, nothing rolled back. W10 stopped once on two browser checks; both were checks written before row 192 (the hidden #sign-out link, and a chat check that read only the first project list). Mos passed them (mos-1135) and the corrected checks are in the plan. Matrix line g is 6575 bytes, not 6454, because row 192 grows index.html by 121 bytes; Mos passed it (mos-1137).",
"S1 to S2 store deltas include task_snapshots +7 and task_comment_cursors +5. The writer is the bus's Vikunja poll (packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs tick, sync.mjs recordTask), source 'poll', not the window. Nobody acted as Jason: no --by jason, no pi, no Save, no mosaic name, bus.tester untouched.",
] },
{ id: 412, title: /^Console SSO: zero-trust OIDC verification/, body: [
"Row 192 (Q175 phase 1) is live in copy 4429a104f since activation 20261020T220206Z (Q173 window with Mos). The sign-in code is in the copy but dormant: the Console runs without --sso, and the proof pair stays unset. The new oauth4webapi 3.8.8 dependency came in through npm ci in the new copy and imports cleanly from it.",
"STATE report: " + STATE + ". The webui journal since activation shows one 'Proxy: proxy proof off' line and no 'Sign-in:' line, as expected without --sso.",
] },
{ id: 393, title: /^dragon-lin: seven legacy user units in failed state/, body: [
"Current failure times read during the Q173 re-pin window W11 (systemctl --user show, CDT with UTC): mosaic-standup-pm.service failed 2026-10-19 19:00:28 CDT (10-20 00:00:28Z), exit 1. mosaic-install-drift.service failed 2026-10-20 00:12:54 CDT (05:12:54Z), exit 9. [email protected] failed 2026-10-20 13:16:12 CDT (18:16:12Z), exit 4.",
"The marker's journal at 18:16:12Z says its tmux send to jarvis failed ('tmux target not found', socket mosaic-fleet), so that page never arrived; the record is in ~/.local/state/mosaic-unit-failures/20261020.jsonl. mosaic-reconcile.service itself last ran OK at 17:16:27 CDT (22:16:27Z), so the marker is stale until reset.",
"All three predate the re-pin at 22:02Z and come from the legacy ~/.mosaic and jarvis-brain setup. The window changed none of them. Disabling or resetting any still needs Jason or ops-01's charter. Details: " + STATE + ", section 'Failed user units'.",
] },
{ id: 414, title: /^MVP platform: the Given list for Cases 1 and 2/, body: [
"Row 190 (several Mosaic Stack instances on one host, MVP T1.1, Gitea #1688) landed and pushed: 00d4cc1f6 on refactor (99a406ed3..00d4cc1f6). Squash of Darkwing's darkwing/row190-r3 176a6bf4b..df65a3d4c, 25 paths, manifest cc0ea9e8, Filbert approved round 3; patch-id matches the branch diff.",
"Sage gate on d0bbc5c1c with the patch: 15 package suites 2664 pass 0 fail, 10 scripts/test-*.sh suites 429 pass 0 fail. Mutants 20 of 20 killed. Not live: the stack runs copy 4429a104f until a re-pin. Row 230 (C2-13a) now carries row 190's @CONFIG_ENV@ and @SESSION_ENV@ tokens (gosalyn-0058 item 4).",
] },
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
for (const P of POSTS) {
const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
}
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
for (const P of POSTS) {
const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
rec.comments.push(e);
if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
save();
}
save();
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-20: files the activate --no-send row (mos-0972, mos-0973) as one P19 task, owner Sage, no due date.
// Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. No labels, assignees, due dates or bucket moves. Refuses if
// the title exists. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node file-no-send-row.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
const T = {
title: "stack-release.sh activate --no-send: drop the Console's --send and keep the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972)",
description: ps(SIG, [
"Mos ruled (mos-0972) that the Console runs without --send until Q175 phase 2 (P19 #412), because with --send live any same-uid process can forge X-authentik-username on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason.",
"stack-release.sh has no path that drops --send and keeps ~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json and the unit in step: console_for_target (:658-687) carries the pointer's flags, check_target (:247-249) allows a same-copy activate only for the proof pair, and adopt refuses once a pointer exists. A hand reinstall makes flags_drift refuse every later activate, pm-on and rollback.",
"The row adds activate --no-send, modeled on row 187's --no-proof. It drops --send from the pointer and the unit. A same-copy activate is allowed when the pointer holds --send. Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer as they do now. There is no re-enable flag. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md. Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh (mos-0973 go).",
"After landing: a same-copy activate on 490e2771d3d0 with --no-send under Q173, with the plan output sent to Mos first, a backup first and a STATE report after. Then row 66 lands.",
]),
};
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
async function existing() {
const out = [];
for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
out.push(...list(r.json));
if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
}
throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
}
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
if ((await existing()).some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
rec.created = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`);
else {
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
Object.assign(rec.created, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done, inverse: `mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/${r.json.id} with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's` });
if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push("create read-back differs");
}
save();
console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-21: files row 237's review follow-ups N1 and N3 (duckworth-0069, #1743 comment 29810) as two P19 tasks.
// Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. No labels, assignees, due dates or bucket moves. Refuses if
// the title exists. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node file-r237-followups.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
const PROJECT = 19;
const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
const TASKS = [
{
title: "Bus publish: a retry after publish-timeout can push a second fork ref while the first push still runs (row 237 N1)",
description: ps(SIG, [
"Duckworth's row 237 review N1 (#1743 comment 29810, duckworth-0069). Row 237 makes checkPublish refuse publish-busy while an open ticket holds the same business and decision. publishRefused drops the ticket on publish-timeout, but the bus process's push may still be running, so a retry to another branch can push a second ref to the fork.",
"The fix belongs in packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs, in `remotes`: either keep the ticket until the push process exits, or kill the push on timeout and wait for it. A test should start a slow push, time it out, retry to another branch, and expect one ref on the fork. Not in row 237's scope. Megavolt's BUILD.md residual 2 (agents/megavolt/work/queue-237/BUILD.md). Needs a queue row once 237 lands.",
]),
},
{
title: "Bus land: check whether checkLand has the same open-ticket race that row 237 fixed in checkPublish (row 237 N3)",
description: ps(SIG, [
"Row 237 residual 3 (Megavolt's BUILD.md) and Duckworth's N3 (#1743 comment 29810): checkLand has the same ticket shape as checkPublish had before row 237. Two lands on the same decision may both pass the check before either records. Duckworth didn't check it.",
"First step: read checkLand and its ticket code in packages/bus/src/broker.mjs against row 237's fix (broker.mjs:1038-1043). If the race exists, file a queue row with a race test like publish-socket.test.mjs's; if not, record why and close this task.",
]),
},
];
const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
return { status: r.status, json };
}
const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
async function existing() {
const out = [];
for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
out.push(...list(r.json));
if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
}
throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
}
const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
const save = () => {
const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
writeFileSync(OUT, out);
};
const have = await existing();
for (const T of TASKS) if (have.some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
rec.created = [];
for (const T of TASKS) {
const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
const c = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
rec.created.push(c);
if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`); continue; }
const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
Object.assign(c, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done });
if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push(`read-back differs for ${r.json.id}`);
}
save();
console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-20T18:21:15.323Z",
"project": 19,
"created": {
"status": 201,
"id": 413,
"readBack": 200,
"done": false,
"inverse": "mark done: POST /api/v1/tasks/413 with the whole task, done true (sage key); delete is Jason's or ops-01's"
},
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-21T01:06:25.071Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 405,
"status": 201,
"id": 416,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 406,
"status": 201,
"id": 417,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 407,
"status": 201,
"id": 418,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 408,
"status": 201,
"id": 419,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 411,
"status": 201,
"id": 420,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-20T18:19:36.544Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 337,
"status": 201,
"id": 372,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 412,
"status": 201,
"id": 373,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-20T21:35:49.240Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 412,
"status": 201,
"id": 395,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-21T00:28:32.038Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 412,
"status": 201,
"id": 414,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 424,
"status": 201,
"id": 415,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-21T00:38:47.170Z",
"project": 19,
"created": [
{
"status": 201,
"id": 440,
"readBack": 200,
"done": false
},
{
"status": 201,
"id": 441,
"readBack": 200,
"done": false
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
// Sage, 2026-10-21: read-only. Prints id, done, title, the last update and the description as plain text for the
// given P19 tasks, with the sync key. Writes nothing. Prints no secret.
// Usage: node read-tasks.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SYNC_TOKEN_FILE ID...
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
const [ORIGIN, SYNC, ...IDS] = process.argv.slice(2);
if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
const sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
const text = (h) => (h ?? "").replace(/<\/p>|<br\s*\/?>|<\/li>/g, "\n").replace(/<[^>]+>/g, "").replace(/&lt;/g, "<").replace(/&gt;/g, ">").replace(/&amp;/g, "&").trim();
for (const id of IDS) {
const r = await fetch(`${ORIGIN}/api/v2/tasks/${id}`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sync}` }, redirect: "error" });
const j = await r.json().catch(() => null);
if (r.status !== 200 || j?.project_id !== 19) { console.log(`== ${id}: status ${r.status}, not P19`); continue; }
const out = `== ${id} done=${j.done} updated=${j.updated}\n${j.title}\n${text(j.description)}\n`;
if (out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in output");
console.log(out);
}
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-20T22:51:44.218Z",
"comments": [
{
"task": 386,
"status": 201,
"id": 406,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 412,
"status": 201,
"id": 407,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 393,
"status": 201,
"id": 408,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
},
{
"task": 414,
"status": 201,
"id": 409,
"readBack": 200,
"found": true
}
],
"problems": []
}
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
# 10-24 window: re-pin 4429a104f to the row 234 landing, with the 3i-3j migration (draft 0)
Sage, 2026-10-21T01:05Z, draft 0, for mos-1145 under DECISIONS Q173. This is the skeleton. NEW isn't fixed yet,
so Mos doesn't check this draft. Draft 1 names NEW and goes to Mos for the P0 check. The step layout follows
`repin-4429a104f.md`. Steps that match are named, not copied.
## Scope (mos-1145, mos-1134)
- One window carries the code of rows 190, 199 and 210, plus row 234 (row a) with its schema step 3i to 3j
through `activate --migrate`, agent-run under Q173, backup first.
- Row a lands before the .53 and .54 installs, by 10-25 (mos-1134). If row 234 hasn't landed by 10-24 12:00Z,
I ask Mos whether to run the window without it (no migration) or to move it.
- Jason has no step. Nobody acts as Jason. No pi (P19 383). No Save, no `mosaic name`. Nothing is pruned.
- `--sso` stays off. Row 200's `activate --sso` is in NEW as a tool. Turning it on changes who reaches the Console
from outside, so that's Jason's (Q173 exclusion). It has its own window, the Q175 phase 2 window on 10-23
(mos-1148). That window runs first, so this window's OLD may be the phase 2 copy, and P1 reads it from
`status`.
## Names
- OLD, live: `4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0`, schema 3i, pointer `pm: true` (record 99a406ed3).
P1 re-reads the activation id and the Console flags from `status`. I don't copy them from the last window.
- NEW: `c771a36f4bd0b6c359282425c668996a90072f93`, the row 234 landing (2026-10-21 06:16Z), unless Mos rules a
later code landing. 194 is the open candidate. 210, 237, 232, 241, 242, 233 and 234 have landed.
- REPO, `P`, `WIN=agents/sage/work/window-repin-<NEW12>/`, `SNAP`: as in `repin-4429a104f.md`, with the
sha checks at P0 and before S1, S2 and any D3.
## What NEW carries over OLD (refactor c771a36f4)
`git log --first-parent 4429a104f..HEAD`, path-limited to packages, scripts, roles, contracts, adapters, skills
and the package files:
| Row | Commit | Live effect to check |
|---|---|---|
| 201 | afad4993f | business: access.json loader. Check: the live business has no access.json, and load stays LOAD_OK (P1). |
| 204 | d0bbc5c1c | business: 193a viewer level. Same check. |
| 190 | 00d4cc1f6 | Several instances per host. Touches `stack-release.sh`, `webui-service.sh`, `bus-service.sh`, `stack-copy.sh`. The default instance must render the same units: P2 diffs the rendered units OLD vs NEW for `mosaic-stack`, and any difference stops the window until it's explained. |
| 200 | 9e1085816 | Tool: `activate --sso`. Off here. `--plan` must show no `--sso` line. |
| 199 | cb5fdb064 | Credential store per agent. Check: bus start with no store entries for the live agents changes nothing, and the chief's and pm's launches still pass. The P3 rehearsal covers start. |
| N3 | 390ea5261 | README only. |
| 230 | c8bc5cf4c | Case 2 scripts, tools only. Not run live. |
| 210 | f5753c0e8 | Host access. The live business has no `hosts`, so nothing is granted. Bus start runs the host-run sweep (M34d). P3 must show it removes nothing. |
| 237 | d7d943199 | Publish busy check (199 N1). |
| 232 | e65a3ab4d | Installer I1: `stack-release.sh --units external` and `stack-copy.sh copy --bundle`, `wrapper --create`. Both are opt-in, and this window uses neither. The default units path must render the same units, so the P2 unit diff covers it with row 190. P0 checks that no window command line carries `--units external`. |
| 241 | 5d4a61776 | Test only (bus land.test.mjs). No live effect. |
| 242 | 5fb736b92 | Bus publish hold: after publish-timeout the bus holds the decision until its push ends, then records a late push. The live business has no publish in flight at W1, and P3 shows none open. Its follow-up fc1cb856b is comments only (git-socket.mjs). |
| 233 | 57f59e0c3 | Installer I3: new tool `scripts/stack-upgrade.sh` and a `stack-release.sh` change. This window doesn't run `stack-upgrade.sh`. The P2 unit diff covers the `stack-release.sh` change with rows 190 and 232. |
| 234 | c771a36f4 | Machine grant row a and the 3i to 3j schema step (new tables `hosts` and `host_grants`). `--plan` must say `migration: 3i -> 3j`. |
| PRD 1.7+1.8 | 0adf8ddfe | `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` and `packages/tasks/requirements.json` move to version 1.8 (mos-1154, mos-1156, DECISIONS Q192). The live pm cites 1.6 until this window. Check after: the pm's requirements read answers version 1.8. |
Service script drift OLD to HEAD is 415+/91- over the four scripts, mostly row 190. P5 holds them at NEW.
## Backups and the migration
- W5: the stopped store backup that every activate takes (row 185), with SHA256SUMS, SCHEMA 3i and STAMP,
plus the rollback set. Before `--migrate` writes, I check that SCHEMA reads 3i and the backup SHA256SUMS hash.
- W0b: the business file copy, as in the last window.
- Rollback after a migration isn't the plain rollback. OLD is 3i and the store is 3j, so going back needs
`--restore <W5 activation>`, and that loses the events written after W5. The row 181 restore guard counts
11 tables, and the untimed ones need the D3 snapshot. Row 234 adds `hosts` and `host_grants` to the untimed
list (T46), so at 3j the D3 snapshot covers them too. Draft 1 recounts the list from NEW. Mos decides any restore past W5, as before.
- Grant look-alikes (row 234 A22b, gizmoduck-0107). `3i-3j.sql` adds `events_grant_actor` but doesn't check
rows already in the store, so after the migration only the actor filter in `GRANT_EVIDENCE` (actor_role NULL,
actor_run 'grant') ignores an old session-written row. P3, and again just before `--migrate`: on the
backup copy, count the `action.allowed` events whose body.action or body.operation starts with `grant.`, or
whose body has `hostLineLeft`. Expect 0, since no grant code has run live. Any nonzero count stops the window
until I've read those rows.
- P3 is the rehearsal with `--migrate` on a copy of the live backup. It must show the 3j step and the row
counts before and after.
## Row 42 (S7) interaction
Row 42's pieces may be in flight at window start (sage-1622, mos-1148 C1 and C2). W1 adds: list open pm tasks, and either pm
finishes or parks them before W5, or I record which piece crosses the window. No restore while a piece has
history unless the window fails.
## Open before draft 1
- Q1, ruled by mos-1161: draft 1 doesn't wait for 194. NEW is the latest code landing when I cut draft 1. If
194 has landed with a green full gate (15 packages, ten script suites), NEW is the 194 landing and P3 also runs
the lifecycle verbs once on the backup copy and gets one pm reply under the new roles/chief-of-staff files. A
P3 failure that traces to 194 drops NEW back to c771a36f4 before anything touches live, and the window goes on.
Otherwise NEW is c771a36f4 and 194 rides a later window.
- Q2, settled by mos-1148: phase 2 is its own window on 10-23. Draft 1 takes OLD and the Console flags,
`--sso` included, from `status` after that window.
- Q3: who operates. If Darkwing is free, Darkwing operates and I check. Otherwise I operate as in the last
window.
- The P-step evidence list for rows 199 and 210 at bus start. Both have landed (cb5fdb064, f5753c0e8), so
it's due in draft 1. I take each log line and exit code from a P3 rehearsal run, not from the code.
- Rows 241 and 242 (bus): P3 shows no publish or land decision open before W5.
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
# Re-pin 490e2771d to 4429a104f (row 192, Q175 phase 1), with npm ci in the new copy
Sage, 2026-10-20, draft 1, for mos-1099 item 3 under DECISIONS Q173. Mos checks this file at its commit before
P0. Any change to this file or to NEW after the check means Mos checks again (mos-0849/0850).
This is a smaller window than `repin-rows-177-185.md` (draft 2, which Mos checked in mos-0929). Where a step is
the same, this file names that file's step and says what differs. The 7332 matrix, the snapshot, the W9 list and
the rollback compare are reused unchanged.
## Who, and what nobody does
- Sage operates, as the tester. Darkwing holds the gate lane for row 190 round 3 tonight, so I take the
operator seat. Mos verifies each step's output before the next one and runs `rehearse` (P3), which reads the
live config and a live backup (`docs/TOOLS.md` `rehearse`: Jason or Mos runs it).
- Jason has no step. Q173 covers a re-pin of this test system with a backup first and a STATE report after.
Nothing is pruned.
- Nobody acts as Jason: no `--by jason`, no human shell or tmux pane, every bus read and write carries
`--tester`, and no request carries `jason.woltje`. `bus.tester` stays as it is; if it isn't `true`, stop at P1.
- No pi (mos-0865 D2, P19 #383). No Save in the human Console, no `mosaic name`.
- Outside reach doesn't change. The Console keeps its current flags. `--sso` stays off: row 192's sign-in code is
dormant without the flag, and `cli.mjs:57` refuses `--sso` with the preview flags the pointer carries anyway.
The proof pair stays unset. The tunnel still forwards 7332 only (P4 and W10 check it).
## Names
- OLD, live: `490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c`, activation `20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0`, pointer
`pm: true`, schema 3i, Console `--port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username
--allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333` (no `--send`, read from `stack-release.sh status` between 21:36Z and 21:39Z).
- NEW: `4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0`, row 192's landing, 103 commits past OLD (`git rev-list --count 490e2771d..4429a104f`).
The 106 that `status` showed is OLD to HEAD 305857c8f, so it also counts the three record commits below.
The commits after it (5b8def2f1 plans, 176a6bf4b sessions, 305857c8f queue) are records and don't move NEW. If
another code row lands before W0 (row 190 is the likely one), NEW stays here unless Mos rules otherwise.
- REPO: the canonical checkout. `activate` runs REPO's `webui-service.sh`, so the four service scripts are held
at NEW for the window (P5).
- `P=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-pin-de352dfaf` (`business-check.mjs`, `console-check.sh`, checked against
`agents/sage/work/window-plan/repin-de352dfaf/SCRIPTS.sha256`).
- `WIN=agents/sage/work/window-repin-4429a104f/`, where every transcript goes.
- `SNAP=$WIN/snapshot.mjs`, a copy of `agents/darkwing/work/window-rows-177-185/snapshot.mjs`, sha256
`639fd28a2674aaa03ce824e3394b4052f21cdef7d6fa49bae61a9927ed341e67` (mos-0899). I check the sha before S1, S2
and any D3.
## What NEW carries over OLD
The path-limited log over `packages`, `scripts`, `roles`, `contracts`, `adapters`, `skills` and the package files:
| Row | Commit | Live effect |
|---|---|---|
| 186 | 269134d8d | Tool only: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do. |
| 187 | 9a71e4e80 | Tool: activate sets, carries and drops the proof pair. The pointer has no pair, so nothing changes. |
| 188 | 8fc0ee216 | Tool: proof file checks on a carried pair. No pair, no effect. |
| 163 | 8ecc7a239 | Tool: `rehearse`, which P3 uses, and `bus start --no-launch`. CLI `cli.mjs` and `launcher.mjs` gain the `--no-launch` path; the default start is unchanged. |
| 189 | ace27dc5e | Tool: `activate --no-send`. Live already runs without `--send`; the pointer carries that. |
| 192 | 4429a104f | Console `--sso` (off here), `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` load becomes async, `webui-service.sh` renders `--sso` only when given, and a new dependency, oauth4webapi 3.8.8. `cli.mjs` imports `sso.mjs` at the top, so the Console won't start from a copy without that module. |
No schema step: `SCHEMA_VERSION` (`packages/bus/src/store.mjs:17`) is 3i at OLD and NEW, and no migration was
added. `--plan` must say `migration: none`. No roles, skills, contracts, adapters or plug-in kinds changed. So: no
harness set, no skill carry, no `pm-on`. One `activate --pm`.
## npm ci in the new copy
mos-1099 asks for npm ci in the new copy. `stack-copy.sh copy` already does it: it extracts the archive to a temp
dir, refuses without `package.json` and `package-lock.json` (:55), runs `npm ci --no-audit --no-fund` there and
writes no copy if it fails (:56). W0 checks the result: `node_modules/oauth4webapi/package.json` in the copy reads
3.8.8, and `node --input-type=module -e "await import('oauth4webapi')"` from the copy exits 0. The live copy is
163M; `/home` has 30G free (94% used), enough for one more.
## Backups
| Before | Backup | Taken by |
|---|---|---|
| W5 | the stopped store, `$DATA/backups/stack/<W5 activation id>/` with SHA256SUMS, DATA_ROOT, SCHEMA 3i, STAMP | `stack-release.sh` (row 185: every activate) |
| W5 | the rollback set (units, wrapper, pointer) | `stack-release.sh` |
| W9 | the business file, `cp -p` to `~/.config/mosaic-dev/businesses/mosaic-stack.json.pre-window-<stamp>` with its sha256, as evidence nothing wrote it | Sage, in W0b |
## Before the window (nothing stopped)
| # | Who | Step |
|---|-----|------|
| P0 | Mos | The `$P` sha check, as in the 177-185 plan P0. |
| P1 | Sage | The business file, read only, the same values as the 177-185 plan P1. I report its sha256 now rather than assume the 06:15Z value. `business-check.mjs` for OLD now and for NEW after W0: LOAD_OK both. |
| W0 | Sage | `cd $REPO && scripts/stack-copy.sh copy $NEW`, in a gap between gate-lane runs, since npm ci is heavy. Then the two npm checks above, and `diff <(git -C $REPO show $NEW:package-lock.json) $COPIES/$NEW/package-lock.json` empty. W0 writes only under `copies/` and changes nothing live, so it moves before P2 and P3, which need the copy. |
| P2 | Sage | `console-check.sh $NEW` against a stub Console of NEW on a scratch port, once without and once with `--tester-port` on a second scratch port. CONSOLE_PASS both. |
| P3 | Mos | `scripts/stack-release.sh rehearse $NEW mosaic-stack --backup 20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0 --port <scratch>`. It must pass every gate check but the PM's. It stops no unit and writes no pointer. Transcript in `$WIN/p3/`. Correction (mos-1107): `rehearse` starts NEW's Console with only `--port` and `--business`, not the pointer's flags. So Mos also starts NEW's Console by hand with the pointer's flags on two scratch ports and reads healthz and `/api/config` on both, then stops it (`$WIN/p3/flags-check.txt`, `flags-console.log`). |
| P4 | Sage | The tunnel read, as in the 177-185 plan P4. |
| P5 | Sage | `git -C $REPO diff --quiet $NEW HEAD -- scripts/stack-release.sh scripts/webui-service.sh scripts/bus-service.sh scripts/stack-copy.sh` and an empty `git status --porcelain` on the same four. Row 190 round 3 touches `webui-service.sh`; if it lands before W5, P5 fails and the window waits for Mos's ruling. |
| P6 | Sage | The 7332 matrix (a)-(g) on OLD, as in the 177-185 plan, saved as `$WIN/matrix-old.txt`. |
## The window
| # | Who | Step |
|---|-----|------|
| W0b | Sage | The business file copy. |
| W1 | Sage | Idle check (`mosaic agents --business mosaic-stack --tester`, `mosaic launches list`), the start stamp from `date -u`, then S1 `node $SNAP --store "$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite" --held`. |
| W2 | Sage | `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack`: pointer on OLD, `pm: true`, 3i, last line ok, unit flags match. |
| W3 | Sage | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm --plan`. Must show from OLD to NEW, `migration: none`, the backup line, and the Console line with OLD's flags exactly: no `--send`, no `--sso`, no proof pair, `--tester-port 7333`. Any other difference stops here. |
| W4 | Sage | The unit reads, as in the 177-185 plan W4. |
| W5 | Sage, on Mos's go | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm`. Exit 0, `result ok`, every gate check including `pm_launched`. Record the activation id, the backup path and STAMP, and the backup SHA256SUMS sha256. Then `status`. |
| W9 | Sage, after Mos verifies W5 | The 177-185 plan's W9 list unchanged, the chief turn and the one `assistant` thread turn included (mos-0929 Q3), plus two lines: the webui journal since the W5 stamp (with `UTC`) has one `Proxy: proxy proof off` and no `Sign-in:` line, and `ls -l /proc/<Console pid>/cwd` names the NEW copy. |
| W10 | Sage | The browser check on 127.0.0.1:7333 and the matrix again as `$WIN/matrix-new.txt`, identical to `matrix-old.txt`. Then P4 again. Corrections after the window (mos-1135, mos-1137): the matrix line for a file the pin changes isn't "identical". Line (g) serves `index.html`, which row 192 grows by 121 bytes (6470 to 6591), so (g) is 200 non-json at 6575 bytes, not 6454. The two browser checks come from the 177-185 window, before row 192 and before a second thread project. "Only tester forms" now allows `#sign-out` while it is `hidden` and `/api/config` has no `sso: true`. "Chat lists the W9 thread" now reads every `.chat-projects section.panel` list (chat.js:93 renders one per project), not the first. |
| W11 | Sage | STATE report in `$WIN/STATE.md`, posted on P19 386 and P19 412 and on Gitea #1690. |
## Stop conditions and rollback
The same as the 177-185 plan. Two failures in one window: stop and report (mos-0823).
Rollback: `stack-release.sh rollback mosaic-stack --plan`, then the real run. The previous distinct copy in the
log is 490e2771d, both are 3i, so no `--restore` and no data loss. OLD takes the same Console flags. The R1 and
R1post compares are as in the 177-185 plan. A restore past W5 follows that plan's D3 steps, with Mos deciding.
Keep every copy. Prune nothing.
## Questions for the plan check
- Q1: NEW is row 192 alone, not bundled with row 190. Row 190 (several instances) changes `stack-release.sh`
and `webui-service.sh` and deserves its own window. I recommend running this one first.
- Q2: Sage operates instead of Darkwing, who is on the row 190 gate. OK?
- Q3: W0 before P2 and P3. It writes a copy only. OK?
## What Sage ran for this plan
Read only, 2026-10-20 between 21:36Z and 21:39Z (clock read 21:39:50Z at the commit): `stack-release.sh status mosaic-stack` (pointer, last five log
lines, unit flags match, 106 commits of drift), `git rev-list --count`, `SCHEMA_VERSION` at both ends, the
path-limited log, `git diff --stat` on the service scripts, CLI and config loader, `stack-copy.sh:23-56`,
`webui/src/cli.mjs:15-120`, `docs/TOOLS.md` on `rehearse`, `du -sh` of the live copy and `df -h /home`. Nothing
live was changed.
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
chief rbb708846b605 claude-code since 2026-10-20T19:29:59.053Z
pm rc36b17ef3788 claude-code since 2026-10-20T20:20:56.278Z
# exit 0
@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
{
"settings loaded": {
"pass": true
},
"settings": {
"banner": "Tester Console. Changes are recorded as tester, never as the human.",
"h1": "Settings",
"forms": [
"sign-out",
"conv-form",
"routes-form",
"instance-add-form",
"instance-change-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form"
],
"convFormHidden": true,
"panels": [
"Routing",
"Role instances",
"Seat names"
],
"instancesTable": true,
"nameForms": 6,
"routesForm": true,
"routesSubmitEnabled": true,
"forbidden": [],
"tokenLimitsPanel": false
},
"tester banner": {
"pass": true,
"detail": "Tester Console. Changes are recorded as tester, never as the human."
},
"instance, routes and name editors present": {
"pass": true
},
"only tester forms (conv-form is index.html:21, global and hidden)": {
"pass": false,
"detail": [
"sign-out",
"conv-form",
"routes-form",
"instance-add-form",
"instance-change-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form",
"tester-name-form"
]
},
"no launch settings, assistant, limit reset or send": {
"pass": true,
"detail": []
},
"no Token limits panel (plan W10 item 2, amended)": {
"pass": true
},
"board": {
"busViewHidden": true,
"banner": true,
"headings": [
"Waiting on you –",
"All sessions –"
],
"unavailable": false,
"length": 179,
"forms": [
"sign-out",
"conv-form"
]
},
"board reads": {
"pass": true,
"detail": {
"busViewHidden": true,
"banner": true,
"headings": [
"Waiting on you –",
"All sessions –"
],
"unavailable": false,
"length": 179,
"forms": [
"sign-out",
"conv-form"
]
}
},
"chat": {
"hash": "#/chat",
"banner": true,
"threads": [
{
"href": "#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28",
"name": "w9",
"instance": "assistant"
}
],
"conversationOpen": false,
"forms": [
"sign-out",
"conv-form",
"chat-project-form"
]
},
"chat lists the W9 thread": {
"pass": false,
"detail": [
{
"href": "#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28",
"name": "w9",
"instance": "assistant"
}
]
},
"W9 thread page not opened": {
"pass": true,
"detail": "#/chat"
},
"tester banner on chat": {
"pass": true
},
"requests": [
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/config",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/config",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/messages",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus-status",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/messages",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/settings",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/usage",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/settings",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/usage",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/names",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/names",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/instances",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/instances",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/routes",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/routes",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/limits",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/limits",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/inbox",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/agents",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/messages",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/chat/projects",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/chat/threads",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/business",
"refused": false
}
],
"no write through the listener": {
"pass": true,
"detail": []
},
"no request to the W9 thread messages or open": {
"pass": true,
"detail": []
}
}
W10 browser: FAIL
# exit 1
@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
{
"config": {
"sso": null
},
"forms": [
{
"id": "sign-out",
"hidden": true,
"action": "/auth/logout",
"method": "post"
},
{
"id": "conv-form",
"hidden": true,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "routes-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "instance-add-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "instance-change-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
},
{
"id": "tester-name-form",
"hidden": false,
"action": null,
"method": null
}
],
"chat": {
"hash": "#/chat",
"open": false,
"projects": [
{
"project": "window-20261020-0801",
"threads": [
"#/chat/threads/d0ba7a66-aa3f-4918-9518-94132bce6b28"
]
},
{
"project": "window-20261020-2205",
"threads": [
"#/chat/threads/446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899"
]
}
]
},
"requests": [
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/config",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/config",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/messages",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus-status",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/messages",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/settings",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/usage",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/settings",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/usage",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/names",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/names",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/instances",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/instances",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/routes",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/routes",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/limits",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/bus/limits",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/config",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/chat/projects",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/chat/threads",
"refused": false
},
{
"method": "GET",
"url": "/api/business",
"refused": false
}
]
}
sign-out hidden true, sso null; W9 thread listed true; thread page open false; writes 0
# exit 0
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
a 200 ok=true
b 401 error="sign-in required"
c 401 error="sign-in required"
d 403 error="proxy Host refused"
e 403 error="tester listener required"
f 403 error="proxy header refused"
g 200 non-json 6575 bytes
# exit 0
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# P4 2026-10-20T22:31:29Z
DropInPaths=
ExecStart={ path=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel ; argv[]=/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/chisel client --fingerprint ce+ISFvMAhuoCRDuc7riIf+hYz87TLHk/C9C/H8QsUg= --keepalive 25s --max-retry-interval 10s http://10.1.1.227:8080 R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332 ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[n/a] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=0 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
# exit 0
# R: specs (1): R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332
P4 PASS: one R: spec R:0.0.0.0:7332:127.0.0.1:7332, DropInPaths empty
# exit 0
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
ActiveState=active
DropInPaths=
MainPID=2950923
ExecStart={ path=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/scripts/mosaic ; argv[]=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/scripts/mosaic bus start mosaic-stack --pm ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[Tue 2026-10-20 17:02:08 CDT] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=2950923 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
WorkingDirectory=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
# exit 0
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
● jarvis-curation-gate.service loaded failed failed Jarvis curation-gate liveness check (wake the agent if staged pulls sit uncurated)
● jarvis-retro-check.service loaded failed failed Jarvis weekly retrospective ARTIFACT check (did Sunday's tick produce a retro?)
● jarvis-retro.service loaded failed failed Jarvis weekly retrospective tick
● mosaic-install-drift.service loaded failed failed Assert the installed Mosaic binaries still match the committed source (drift, not failure)
● mosaic-standup-pm.service loaded failed failed Coordinator standup trigger (evening)
● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-curation-gate.service to the local agent seat
● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-retro-check.service to the local agent seat
● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit jarvis-retro.service to the local agent seat
● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit mosaic-install-drift.service to the local agent seat
● [email protected] loaded failed failed Escalate failed Mosaic unit mosaic-reconcile.service to the local agent seat
● setspark-tmp-guard.service loaded failed failed SetSpark: /tmp and scratch guard
# exit 0
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
ActiveState=active
SubState=running
ActiveEnterTimestamp=Tue 2026-10-13 08:40:19 CDT
MainPID=1317
# exit 0
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
ActiveState=active
DropInPaths=
MainPID=2950925
ExecStart={ path=/usr/bin/node ; argv[]=/usr/bin/node /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0/packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve --checkout /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack --port 7332 --public-host mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-port 7333 ; ignore_errors=no ; start_time=[Tue 2026-10-20 17:02:08 CDT] ; stop_time=[n/a] ; pid=2950925 ; code=(null) ; status=0/0 }
WorkingDirectory=/home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
# exit 0
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
chief r097436c91816 claude-code since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.951Z
# exit 0
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
PASS markdown-preview.js is served and equals the copy's
PASS /api/config on loopback: send=false edit=false
PASS project.files through the Console: head=ae0b17c9586e51da7bc1b7e548c6acf913a55665 files=2 spec=true error=none
PASS project.file spec/north-star.md through the Console: commit=ae0b17c9586e51da7bc1b7e548c6acf913a55665 length=99 error=none
PASS loopback save refused: HTTP 403 error=read-only sent=false
CONSOLE_PASS
# exit 0
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
[
{
"business": "mosaic-stack",
"instance": "chief",
"run": "r097436c91816",
"launchedBy": "jason",
"harness": "claude-code",
"model": "claude-opus-5-5",
"provider": "anthropic",
"modelKey": "opus",
"pid": 2951160,
"startTime": "63491912",
"runnerPid": 2951161,
"runnerStartTime": "63491912",
"runDir": "/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/launches/mosaic-stack/r097436c91816",
"startedAt": "2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z",
"live": true
}
]
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
r097436c91816 mosaic-stack/chief claude-code claude-opus-5-5 by jason since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z running
# exit 0
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
[]
# exit 0
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
created project window-20261020-2205 id 77e7b45f-8c34-49a3-b2fa-9cf565177c30
# exit 0
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
1792533965
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
pointer: /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json
{"copy":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","business":"mosaic-stack","pm":true,"claude":"/home/jwoltje/.local/bin/claude","console":["--port","7332","--public-host","mosaic.woltje.com","--auth-header","X-authentik-username","--allow-user","jason.woltje","--tester-port","7333"],"schema":"3i","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z"}
log (last five lines):
{"at":"2026-10-20T07:58:02Z","op":"activate","from":"89af38a83afa22a8a4f0d368a0a4030ad15a0efa","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T075800Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
{"at":"2026-10-20T19:29:56Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"started"}
{"at":"2026-10-20T19:30:00Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","backup":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","activation":"20261020T192956Z-490e2771d3d0","result":"ok"}
{"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:06Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":null,"activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"started"}
{"at":"2026-10-20T22:02:09Z","op":"activate","from":"490e2771d3d057ab76991e2c7859cd251857e64c","to":"4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0","backup":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","activation":"20261020T220206Z-4429a104f6d6","result":"ok"}
check:
bus: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
Console: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
CLI: /home/jwoltje/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies/4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0
result: pass
bus status:
host: mosaic-stack, pid 2950923, running, since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.133Z, notifier off
socket: present
writer.lock: pid 2950981
boot: organization file loaded at 2026-10-20T22:02:08.125Z
unit flags: match the pointer
drift: 6 commit(s) on refactor since the pointer's copy
# exit 0
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
sent c5b43f04 to chief
chief (RESULT, re c5b43f04) c3e236d7:
Got the re-pin of 4429a104f6d65ccf165f6c83b5d1dce3147dfde0 from the tester; I took no action because a tester message authorizes nothing, and I launched and changed nothing.
# exit 0
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
sent b4b66ced to window-20261020-2205/w9
assistant (RESULT, re b4b66ced) cfa7ea99:
Assistant (run r497f1c817d4d) got the [mos test] message and is replying in one line as asked, without treating it as Jason's instruction or acting on it.
# exit 0
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
[
{
"seq": 570,
"id": "b4b66ced-d088-4b9c-a944-306f164028f9",
"at": "2026-10-20T22:05:58.283Z",
"business": "mosaic-stack",
"from_role": "tester",
"from_run": "tester-cli",
"to_role": "assistant",
"class": "REQUEST",
"in_reply_to": null,
"decision": null,
"corrects": null,
"body": "[mos test] reply with one line, then stop",
"to_name": null
},
{
"seq": 571,
"id": "cfa7ea99-7ccb-4225-80a6-9a903540e337",
"at": "2026-10-20T22:06:04.247Z",
"business": "mosaic-stack",
"from_role": "assistant",
"from_run": "r497f1c817d4d",
"to_role": "tester",
"class": "RESULT",
"in_reply_to": "b4b66ced-d088-4b9c-a944-306f164028f9",
"decision": null,
"corrects": null,
"body": "Assistant (run r497f1c817d4d) got the [mos test] message and is replying in one line as asked, without treating it as Jason's instruction or acting on it.",
"to_name": null
}
]
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
created window-20261020-2205/w9 id 446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899 instance assistant
# exit 0
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
window-20261020-0801/w9 assistant d0ba7a66
window-20261020-2205/w9 assistant 446201de
# exit 0
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
446201de-e8b5-4df3-9356-d0d5422cc899
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
{
"total": {
"input": 62,
"output": 9623,
"cacheWrite": 186650,
"cacheRead": 404132,
"unknownTurns": 1
},
"byRun": [
{
"run": "r8fba7e598156",
"input": 0,
"output": 0,
"cacheWrite": 0,
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"unknownTurns": 1
},
{
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"input": 2,
"output": 52,
"cacheWrite": 11750,
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},
{
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"input": 14,
"output": 1519,
"cacheWrite": 18187,
"cacheRead": 89559,
"unknownTurns": 0
},
{
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"input": 2,
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"cacheWrite": 18595,
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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"output": 120,
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},
{
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"input": 12,
"output": 2089,
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},
{
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},
{
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"input": 2,
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},
{
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"input": 2,
"output": 80,
"cacheWrite": 9856,
"cacheRead": 0,
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}
],
"byInstance": [
{
"instance": "chief",
"input": 36,
"output": 4114,
"cacheWrite": 85486,
"cacheRead": 177689,
"unknownTurns": 1
},
{
"instance": "coder",
"input": 2,
"output": 44,
"cacheWrite": 18595,
"cacheRead": 0,
"unknownTurns": 0
},
{
"instance": "assistant",
"input": 4,
"output": 124,
"cacheWrite": 19714,
"cacheRead": 0,
"unknownTurns": 0
},
{
"instance": "pm",
"input": 20,
"output": 5341,
"cacheWrite": 62855,
"cacheRead": 226443,
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}
],
"byProvider": [
{
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"output": 9623,
"cacheWrite": 186650,
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}
],
"byModel": [
{
"provider": "anthropic",
"model": "claude-opus-5-5",
"input": 62,
"output": 9623,
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}
],
"byAccount": [
{
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"input": 62,
"output": 9623,
"cacheWrite": 186650,
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}
]
}
# exit 0
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
r097436c91816 mosaic-stack/chief claude-code claude-opus-5-5 by jason since 2026-10-20T22:02:08.941Z running
# exit 0

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