agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r6 (#1693 ): Duckworth r5 B1 (confirm's result lines carry the activation's op, from, to and the rollback set's BACKUP, so from_log reads .53's log; sequence 7), B2 (MIGRATING recorded after backup_store and before migrate-schema.mjs, as TAKEN today; sequence 8), N1 marker step makes $RS, N2 gate --since, N3 apparmor.d word grep baseline, N4 item 4 under systemd-run with NoNewPrivileges, N5 plan --expect-from OLD

agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r5 (#1693 ): Duckworth r4 B1 (one result line per activation, FAILED file and --cause, marker written first, refusals log no activation, real-sequence tests), B2 per mos-1098/mos-1101 (case1-pins.sh and case1-hostcheck.sh, seven-item drift stop with apt hook and boot unit, ops-01 owner, bwrap closed on drift), N1-N4; Console on 127.0.0.1:732 with CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, tester 7333 as P10; chains on row 190 r3 and row 230 (C2-13a), node under /opt, four factory profile items for Gosalyn
agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r4 (#1693 ): Duckworth B1 (root holds only the go's values and the unit files; confirm and revert find the one open activation, AWAITING-UNITS; rollback --to checked against from_log previous; A2 failure path; root step log), B2 (confirm runs gate with --timeout; .53 runs the PM; external PM check reads launches list with ActiveEnterTimestamp, no journal; pm-on refuses), N1-N5; mos-1096 bwrap-userns-restrict from the pinned deb, dpkg-statoverride root:mosaic 0750, P9 accepted by Mos; gosalyn-0046 two units and args file; managed settings for DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER; sage-1481 C2-13a
2026-10-20 16:53:53 -05:00 · 2026-10-20 16:46:21 -05:00 · 2026-10-20 16:08:53 -05:00 · 2026-10-20 15:56:54 -05:00 · 2026-10-20 15:38:55 -05:00 · 2026-10-20 15:34:55 -05:00
60 changed files with 6465 additions and 1853 deletions
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
+| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
+| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
 | Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
 | Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Bushroot
+
+Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
+that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,872 @@
+# Row 195 design: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (r6)
+
+Darkwing, 2026-10-20. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md`, blob 45be7f09afc1 (f24f2cd40,
+sage-1439). Gitea #1693. Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190's candidate (round 3,
+df65a3d4c on `darkwing/row190-r3`, rebased on row 192; the config canon) and on row 230's candidate
+(C2-13a, #1732, Gosalyn: `scripts/case2-unit.sh` and `case2-precheck.sh`), Q177, sage-1499. Row 230's
+brief is `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` "C2-13a" at 5b8def2f1, from Gosalyn's design r11
+(eac92d956 on `gosalyn/case2-design`, approved webby-0038). It has no candidate yet, so I read that
+brief as the interface and expect a rebase. Section 2 lists what Case 1 needs from it that the brief
+doesn't give.
+
+Changes from r5 (Duckworth's REVIEW-r4.md at 62200362b on `duckworth/reviews`, duckworth-0054). This
+round changes only B1's and B2's lines, their section 7 cases and the notes:
+
+- B1. The result line `confirm` writes said op `confirm`, because `log_line` (:58) writes `$OP` and
+  `OP="$1"` (:1493). `from_log` (:169) reads only `adopt`, `activate` and `rollback`, so it would have
+  skipped every .53 activation: after adopt C0 and re-pins to C1 and C2, `from_log previous` returns
+  C0. Now A5's `ok` line and R4's line carry the op, from and to of the activation's `started` line,
+  and the backup that A3 records in the rollback set. Real sequence 7 and a mutant that writes op
+  `confirm`. Section 4.
+- B2. r5 recorded the migration after the migrate, while today's run sets TAKEN before
+  `migrate-schema.mjs` (:1004-1005). A migrate that changed the store and then exited 1 would have
+  left no record, so R2 would skip the restore and R4 would gate OLD on a half-migrated store. A3 now
+  writes `MIGRATING` after `backup_store` returns and before the migrate. Real sequence 8 and a mutant
+  that records after the migrate. Section 4.
+- N1. The marker step makes `$RS` with capture's exclusive `mkdir` (:416), and capture under
+  `--units external` makes none. N2. `gate` takes `--since T`, root's clock before its A2f start, as
+  its start floor. N3. Section 0 now has a read-only grep of `/etc/apparmor.d` for the word `bwrap`,
+  and item 3 matches the word against a list of exactly one file. N4. Item 4 runs under
+  `systemd-run` with the units' `NoNewPrivileges=yes`, as 2a' does. N5. A1's plan takes
+  `--expect-from OLD` and refuses `pointer-differs`.
+- Not in this round: claude's path. gosalyn-0058 proposes that `--claude`, like `--node`, takes only a
+  root-owned path outside the home, and `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` fails that. I asked Sage to
+  rule and recommended moving claude under `/opt/mosaic-stack`. That change gets its own round.
+
+Changes from r4 (Duckworth's REVIEW-r3.md at 9f4d5556b on `duckworth/reviews`; mos-1098; mos-1101;
+gosalyn-0049):
+
+- B1. An activation now has exactly one result line, written at the end. A5's gate failure and A3's
+  failure after its capture write no log line. Each writes a `FAILED` file next to `AWAITING-UNITS` and
+  exits 1, so the activation stays open for R2 and R4, and R4 writes the result. A3 writes
+  `AWAITING-UNITS` right after `started`. Refusals by `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log no activation
+  id, so a refused `confirm` can't close one either. There are real-sequence tests on one log, and
+  mutants that put back r4's interim line, r4's marker order and a refusal that names the activation.
+  Section 4 and section 7.
+- B2. The bwrap profile has an owner and a stop. `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` checks the profile file
+  against the pin in `scripts/case1-pins.sh`, the two loaded profiles, the live label of a process
+  bwrap runs, the statoverride and mode, that no other profile names bwrap, two sysctls and the port
+  floor. It has three callers:
+  1. A1 of every re-pin refuses `profile-drift`.
+  2. A root apt hook runs it after every package run, unattended ones included.
+  3. A boot unit runs it before the bus starts.
+
+  On drift, callers 2 and 3 unload the profile and close `/usr/bin/bwrap` to `mosaic`, so every role
+  session refuses to start. They write `DRIFT` and log it, and only root clears it. ops-01 owns the host
+  side under a Mos go: it reads the log in each STATE report and, before each re-pin window, compares
+  the upstream profile to the pin. A changed upstream profile becomes a new pin, which is its own review
+  round. Section 1 has the details. The facts behind it are in section 0: unattended-upgrades runs daily
+  on .53 with the security pocket, and the pinned bubblewrap is in that pocket.
+- N1 and mos-1098 point 2. P9 has a seventh item: no `mosaic-bwrap` profile is loaded, and no profile
+  other than Ubuntu's attaches to `/usr/bin/bwrap`. r4 never installed `mosaic-bwrap`. F5 now compares
+  exact strings. P9 reads `accepted mos-1096` only while all seven items hold.
+- N2: a role session gets no capabilities, so a nested bwrap fails. Section 1. N3: A3 refuses "before
+  it logs `started`". N4: the stale-start rule and its fixtures handle `ActiveEnterTimestamp`'s whole
+  seconds.
+- The port squat (mos-1101 item 5, gosalyn-0049). It applies: role sessions share the host's network
+  namespace (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:67` unshares no net), so while the Console is down a
+  session can bind its loopback port. The Console moves to 127.0.0.1:732 with
+  `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` on its unit (row 230's line), so no session can take it. The tester port stays
+  7333, because serve refuses a tester port below 1024. That residue is P10, accepted under Mos's
+  reading. Case 1 can't meet the preview trio or the proof pair, because .53 has no proxy. Section 2
+  names the factory serve set for row 230.
+- Jason's Q9 (Vikunja #429) is still open. If install and upgrade become product commands, these
+  steps become that installer's configuration and row 195 rebases on its row (sage-1491). Section 6.
+
+## 0. What I checked on the host
+
+Read only, as `localadmin` over ssh, 2026-10-20 between 20:40Z and 21:00Z, and again at 21:27Z for the
+last seven rows (the brief allows this):
+
+| Item | 10.1.1.53 today | Needed |
+|---|---|---|
+| OS | Ubuntu 24.04.5, kernel 6.8.0-124, x86_64, 12 cores, 94 GiB, 217 GiB free on `/` | fits |
+| `mosaic` user, group, `/srv/mosaic` | absent | step 2a creates them |
+| node | `/usr/local/bin/node` v22.22.2, root-owned | 24 or later (every `packages/*/package.json` engines line); dragon-lin runs 26.8.1 |
+| bwrap | absent, no statoverride; apt candidate `bubblewrap 0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3` | every role session runs under `/usr/bin/bwrap` (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:43`) |
+| user namespaces | `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1`, apparmor 4.0.1, no bwrap profile loaded | bwrap needs a user namespace, which this setting refuses unless a profile allows it |
+| `apparmor-profiles` | not installed; candidate `4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.9`, whose `/usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/bwrap-userns-restrict` has sha256 `11d39094f044f0cda0febb3ad517b830301da6b2ce929664af09ee9e4dd264f9` (read from the deb on dragon-lin) | section 1 |
+| `fs.protected_hardlinks`, `fs.protected_symlinks` | 1, 1 | mos-1096 item 2 |
+| journald | `SplitMode=uid` (the default) | section 4, B2 |
+| `useradd` | `USERGROUPS_ENAB yes` | 2a passes `--user-group` anyway |
+| claude | not on localadmin's PATH | the factory's harness; dragon-lin runs 2.1.304 |
+| ports 7330-7333 | free (no listener) | tester |
+| `localadmin` | NOPASSWD sudo (#423 step 1, applied 20:05:47Z, mos-1066, mos-1077) | the root steps run through it |
+| `jarvis` | groups sudo, docker, lxd, adm | #423 step 4 removes all four (section 5, P5) |
+| unattended-upgrades | on: `APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1"`, `apt-daily-upgrade.timer` enabled. Allowed origins `${distro_id}:${distro_codename}`, `-security`, ESM apps-security and ESM infra-security. No `Package-Blacklist` | B2: packages change daily without a window |
+| bubblewrap's pocket | `0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3` is in both `noble-updates` and `noble-security`, so its later security updates install unattended | B2 |
+| apparmor | installed `4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.8`. The `.9` candidate is in `noble-updates` only, which unattended-upgrades doesn't take. `aa-status --json` works | B2 |
+| profiles that name bwrap | at 21:51:46Z `grep -rlw bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` and `grep -rlF /usr/bin/bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` both find nothing (exit 1). After 2a' the word grep lists only `bwrap-userns-restrict` | N1, P9 item 7, hostcheck item 3 |
+| `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` | 1024 | the port squat |
+| listeners below 1024 | 22 (sshd) and 53 (the resolver) only; 732 is free | the Console's port (section 1) |
+| other listeners | 4003, 6052, 6055, 8123, 8765, 14242, 18555, and on loopback 1933, 5905, 6085, 6379, 6380, 9119, 9225, 18554, 18789, 38147 | none in 7330-7333 |
+
+## 1. The install as inputs to the Case 2 scripts
+
+Instance. Row 190's canon with the default name, `dev`, as Case 2 uses it (Gosalyn design 9). `~` is
+`mosaic`'s home, `/srv/mosaic`, so:
+
+| Input | Value |
+|---|---|
+| user | `mosaic`, primary group `mosaic` with no other member |
+| home | `/srv/mosaic`, 0700, owner `mosaic` |
+| config dir | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev` |
+| data root | `/srv/mosaic/.mosaic-dev`, marker `instance.json` `{"instanceVersion":1,"name":"dev"}` |
+| business | `mosaic-stack`, file `<configDir>/businesses/mosaic-stack.json` (section 2) |
+| profile | `--profile factory` (row 230, C2-13b) |
+| roles | the factory set in section 2 |
+| human id | Jason's id, given in the window's go. Not `tester` (`broker.mjs:245`) |
+| model credential | `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, 0600 (row 190's `SESSION_ENV` for the default instance) |
+| token slot path | none for this row (section 2) |
+| Console port | 127.0.0.1:732, below the port floor, bound through the Console unit's `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` (row 230). The port squat below says why |
+| tester port | 127.0.0.1:7333 (P10) |
+| board | none. UNITS has no board unit, and the Console gets no `--board` |
+| harness | claude at `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude`, pinned through `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` (decision 91), which the bus unit's `@CLAUDE_ENV@` line sets (section 2) |
+| node | `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>/bin/node`, a pinned 26.x release, `root:root`. Row 230 refuses a `--node` under the home or not owned by root |
+| PM | on: the bus unit's `@PM_FLAGS@` renders ` --pm` (section 2, section 4) |
+| source | `/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack` (`mosaic`'s checkout, section 4) and `/root/mosaic-stack` (root's) |
+
+Why `dev` and not a named instance: one instance per OS user, and Case 2's rows already assume
+`/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev`. A second instance under `mosaic` on .53 would need a name, and row 190
+makes that a flag, not a move.
+
+Why node lives under `/opt/mosaic-stack`: changing `/usr/local/bin/node` would change what Hermes and
+anything else on the host runs, and Q181 keeps Hermes running. r4 put node under `/srv/mosaic`, but row
+230 requires a root-owned `--node` outside the home. Nothing else on the host puts `/opt/mosaic-stack`
+on its PATH.
+
+PATH for `mosaic`'s steps. `sudo -u mosaic -H` resets PATH to sudo's `secure_path`, which finds
+`/usr/local/bin/node`, v22. The precheck would then refuse, and `scripts/mosaic` would run v22 (it runs
+`exec node` from PATH, `scripts/mosaic:22-40`). So every `mosaic` step in the run sheet and in
+`case1-repin.sh` runs as `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin ...`, the
+list row 230 renders as the units' `@PATH@`. `case1-repin.sh` builds it from the `--node` in
+`case1-unit.args`.
+
+The units (row 230, design r11). Two system units, from the existing templates, in start order:
+`[email protected]` from `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in`, then
+`mosaic-webui.service` from `packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in`. Root stops them in the
+reverse order. `@REPO@` is the copy dir, and `%h` becomes the literal home. Row 230 adds
+`ProtectSystem=strict`, `ReadWritePaths=/srv/mosaic`, `ProtectHome=yes` and `PrivateTmp=yes` to both, and
+`AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` with `CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` to the
+Console only. The Console unit has no `[Install]`, so root starts it by hand after a reboot until Jason
+rules (mos-1097). The install call is:
+
+```
+case2-unit.sh --profile factory --user mosaic --home /srv/mosaic --business mosaic-stack --copy ID \
+  --node /opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>/bin/node --pm --claude /srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude \
+  -- --port 732 --business mosaic-stack --tester-port 7333
+```
+
+`--pm` and `--claude` are the two inputs row 230's brief doesn't have yet (section 2). A re-install
+must pass the same `--node`, flags and serve flags, and only the copy id may change (row 230's
+re-install check). So 2c writes the whole argument list, without `--copy`, to
+`/etc/mosaic-stack/case1-unit.args`, `root:root` 0644, one argument per line. Every later
+`case2-unit.sh` call in section 4 reads that file and adds `--copy`. `mosaic` can't write it. Changing
+a serve flag is a re-install with its own go, not a re-pin.
+
+The port squat (mos-1101 item 5). Role sessions share the host's network namespace:
+`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:67` unshares the user, PID and IPC namespaces and not the network. So
+while the Console is down, which A2 to A4 of every re-pin and any crash before `Restart=on-failure`
+brings it back both cause, a session can bind 127.0.0.1:7332. It would then receive Jason's `ssh -L`
+traffic, and it would answer the gate's `/healthz` (`stack-release.sh:485-487`) in the Console's place.
+At 732 that can't happen. The floor is 1024 (section 0), a session has no capabilities (below), and
+`mosaic`'s own processes outside the sandbox have none either. Only the Console unit holds
+`CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`. Its children, the human-cli and read scripts it spawns
+(`packages/webui/src/bus.mjs:31`, `reads.mjs:79`), inherit the ambient capability. No role session
+descends from the Console: sessions are children of the bus unit, which has no capability line. The
+gate needs no change, because `console_port` (`stack-release.sh:213-215`) reads the Console's `--port`
+from the pointer. Row 230's precheck refuses when the floor is at or below the Console's port, and
+`case1-hostcheck.sh` checks it after every package run (B2). The tester port can't go below 1024,
+because serve refuses that (`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:33`), so P10 records it.
+
+Node download (N4). The run sheet pins one release, its tarball name and its sha256. As root, in a
+root-owned temp dir: fetch the tarball, `SHASUMS256.txt` and `SHASUMS256.txt.asc`; `gpg --verify` the
+`.asc` against the Node release keys listed in the nodejs/release-keys repository, imported into a
+keyring under `/etc/mosaic-stack/node-keys`; check that the tarball's line in the verified file is the
+pinned sha256; then `sha256sum -c` the tarball and unpack it to `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>`,
+`root:root`, no file writable by group or other. Any mismatch stops the step. Rollback: `rm -r` that
+dir.
+
+Claude (N5). The run sheet pins the version, 2.1.304 unless the window's plan names a newer one. As
+`mosaic`: `npm install --prefix /srv/mosaic/.local @anthropic-ai/claude-code@<pin>`, with `@<pin>`
+exact. `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` is the path `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` names. The autoupdater stays off
+through `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json`, `root:root` 0644, holding
+`{"env":{"DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER":"1"}}`. Root writes it in 2a'. Why there:
+
+- `ENV_ALLOW` (`packages/seat/src/session.mjs:83-88`) doesn't pass `DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER`, so a unit
+  `Environment=` line never reaches a role session (gosalyn-0046 item 3).
+- A role session's HOME is the run's own `home/`, and the sandbox doesn't show `~/.claude`
+  (`session.mjs:92-93`, `sandbox.mjs:16`). So `mosaic`'s claude settings file doesn't reach one either.
+- The sandbox mounts `/etc` read-only (`sandbox.mjs:85`), and Claude Code reads managed settings from
+  `/etc/claude-code/` whatever HOME is. `mosaic`'s own CLI runs, like the precheck's marker prompt
+  and F6, read it too.
+
+The pinned binary is a read-only bind inside the sandbox (`sandbox.mjs:9-10`), so a session can't
+rewrite it anyway. The managed file covers `mosaic`'s runs outside the sandbox. If the installed
+version doesn't honour `env` there, F6 catches the drift. Rollback: `rm` the file.
+
+bwrap and the user namespace (mos-1091 4a, 4b; mos-1096 item 2; N1). Three root steps in 2a', in this
+order, each with its rollback. The `mosaic` group must exist first (2a).
+
+1. `apt-get install bubblewrap=0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3`, the version the run sheet pins. Then record
+   `stat -c '%U:%G %a' /usr/bin/bwrap` to `/etc/mosaic-stack/bwrap.orig` (I expect `root:root 755`).
+   Rollback: `apt-get remove bubblewrap`.
+2. Ubuntu's own `bwrap-userns-restrict`, one file, not the package. `apt-get download
+   apparmor-profiles=4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.9` into a root-owned temp dir, extract
+   `./usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/bwrap-userns-restrict` with `dpkg-deb --fsys-tarfile`, check
+   its sha256 is `11d39094f044f0cda0febb3ad517b830301da6b2ce929664af09ee9e4dd264f9`, and install it as
+   `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`, `root:root` 0644. Load it with `apparmor_parser -r
+   /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`. `aa-status` then lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in
+   enforce mode. Why one file: the package also installs 20 profiles under `/etc/apparmor.d`
+   (`usr.sbin.dnsmasq`, `bin.ping`, `usr.sbin.smbd` and more), which would load at the next boot and
+   could change services on the host that have nothing to do with Mosaic.
+   What the profile does: `bwrap` gets `userns`, `capability` and `mount` for its own setup, and
+   every program it runs is stacked under `unpriv_bwrap`, which has the same file and network rules
+   with `audit deny capability`. So a role session gets a user namespace and no capabilities in it.
+   The sysctl stays at 1, so nothing else on the host gains user namespaces.
+   One consequence (N2): a bwrap that a session starts inside its own sandbox fails, because it needs
+   capabilities in the namespace. Claude Code's own sandbox is such a bwrap, and it's off by default,
+   so a role session doesn't use it. F3 shows a session still answers under the profile.
+   Rollback: `apparmor_parser -R /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`, then `rm` it.
+3. `dpkg-statoverride --update --add root mosaic 0750 /usr/bin/bwrap` (Mos). Only root and the
+   `mosaic` group can read or run bwrap, and package upgrades keep the mode. Rollback:
+   `dpkg-statoverride --remove /usr/bin/bwrap`, then `chown` and `chmod` to the values in
+   `bwrap.orig`.
+4. The drift stop (B2, below): `case1-hostcheck.sh` and `case1-pins.sh` from `/root/mosaic-stack` to
+   `/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/`, `root:root` 0755 and 0644; the apt hook
+   `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/80mosaic-hostcheck`; the boot unit `mosaic-hostcheck.service`, enabled. Then
+   `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0. Rollback: disable and remove the unit, `rm` the hook file and
+   the dir.
+
+Full rollback runs 4, 3, 2, 1. Tests after 2a' and again in section 5: as `mosaic`, `bwrap --unshare-all
+--ro-bind / / true` exits 0 (row 230's precheck line, F4); as `jarvis`, `/usr/bin/bwrap --version`
+fails with "Permission denied" (P9); `getent group mosaic` lists no member and no other account has
+gid `mosaic` (P9); `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1 (P9). A role session running under the profile is F5.
+
+One more test runs in 2a', because I can't settle it from here. Row 230's units keep the templates'
+`NoNewPrivileges=yes`, and AppArmor limits profile changes for a task with no-new-privs set. The
+`bwrap` attach happens on exec from an unconfined task, and the child's change is a stack
+(`bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap`), which only narrows. I expect both to pass under no-new-privs, since bwrap
+sets no-new-privs on itself before it runs the child, and Ubuntu's profile works with that. But I
+haven't seen it run, and .53 is read-only to me. So as root, after step 4: `systemd-run --wait --pipe
+--uid=mosaic --gid=mosaic -p NoNewPrivileges=yes -p ProtectSystem=strict -p ProtectHome=yes -p
+PrivateTmp=yes /usr/bin/bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-pid --ro-bind / / cat /proc/self/attr/current`
+prints `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`. If it fails, the window stops at 2a' and rolls back 4 to 1,
+before any `mosaic` step. That beats finding it at F5.
+
+The drift stop (B2, Duckworth's REVIEW-r3 B2, mos-1098 point 1). r4 installed a profile file that no
+package owns, from a pinned deb, onto a host where unattended-upgrades changes packages every day
+(section 0). Three things can move under it: bubblewrap (its security updates install unattended), the
+`apparmor` package and its parser, and any new profile a package ships that attaches to
+`/usr/bin/bwrap`. Two more host values matter to this design: the user-namespace sysctl and the port
+floor. So:
+
+- `scripts/case1-pins.sh` holds the pins, sourced by the scripts below: the `apparmor-profiles` version
+  the file came from, the file's sha256, and the bubblewrap version 2a' installs. Changing a pin is a
+  reviewed commit and its own round. The bubblewrap version is an install pin, not a drift item:
+  a security update to bubblewrap keeps the statoverride, and the profile attaches by path.
+- `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` checks seven items and prints one line each:
+  1. `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` has the pinned sha256, and `dpkg -S` finds no package
+     that owns it.
+  2. `aa-status --json` lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in enforce mode, and no loaded profile named
+     `mosaic-bwrap`.
+  3. `grep -rlw bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` lists exactly `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`. The word
+     match also catches a path written as `/{usr/,}bin/bwrap`. Section 0's read found no file today.
+  4. The live label: 2a' line `systemd-run --wait --pipe --uid=mosaic --gid=mosaic -p NoNewPrivileges=yes
+     -p ProtectSystem=strict -p ProtectHome=yes -p PrivateTmp=yes /usr/bin/bwrap --unshare-user
+     --unshare-pid --ro-bind / / cat /proc/self/attr/current` prints exactly `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap
+     (enforce)`. It runs under the units' no-new-privs, so it reads the label a role session gets.
+     This catches a profile that attaches by a glob that item 3's search misses.
+  5. `dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/bin/bwrap` reads `root mosaic 0750`, and `stat` agrees.
+  6. `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns` is 1 and `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1.
+  7. `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` is above the Console's `--port` in the installed unit.
+
+  `--check` exits 0 when all hold and 1 otherwise. `--enforce` runs the same check and always exits 0.
+  On a failure, or while `/etc/mosaic-stack/DRIFT` exists, it applies the stop:
+  `apparmor_parser -R` on the profile if loaded, then `chown root:root` and `chmod 0700` on
+  `/usr/bin/bwrap`. It writes the failed items to `DRIFT` and appends a line to
+  `/var/log/mosaic-stack/hostcheck.log`. With bwrap closed to `mosaic`, every role session refuses
+  to start. That's the fail-closed state, and the stack needs no change for it. The chmod is undone by
+  the next bubblewrap upgrade, which reapplies the statoverride. But the apt hook runs again right
+  after that upgrade and finds `DRIFT`, so it closes bwrap again. Only root removes `DRIFT`, in a
+  reviewed step with a new pin or a Mos go. I don't call `dpkg-statoverride` from inside the hook,
+  because I haven't confirmed it can take dpkg's lock while apt holds the frontend lock.
+- Three callers. A1 of every re-pin runs `--check` and refuses `profile-drift` on exit 1. The apt hook
+  is `DPkg::Post-Invoke { "/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/case1-hostcheck.sh --enforce || true"; };`, so it
+  runs after every package run, unattended ones included, and can't fail one. The boot unit,
+  `mosaic-hostcheck.service` (`Type=oneshot`, `After=apparmor.service`,
+  `Before=mosaic-bus@mosaic-stack.service`, `WantedBy=multi-user.target`), runs `--enforce` before the
+  bus starts, which covers a kernel or parser change that takes effect at boot.
+- Owner. ops-01 owns the host side under a Mos go. It reads `hostcheck.log` in each STATE report and
+  sends any `DRIFT` to Mos. Before each re-pin window it also runs `--upstream`, which downloads the
+  current `apparmor-profiles` candidate into a temp dir and compares its `bwrap-userns-restrict` to the
+  pin. A difference goes to Mos as a new-pin request and refuses nothing. The pins and the scripts are
+  this row's, and later changes go through review like any other.
+
+Who runs what:
+
+| Step | Runs as | Through |
+|---|---|---|
+| 2a: `useradd --system --user-group --home-dir /srv/mosaic --shell /usr/sbin/nologin mosaic`, `/srv/mosaic` 0700, `/etc/mosaic-stack` `root:root` 0755, `/var/log/mosaic-stack` `root:root` 0750 | root | ops-01, `ssh localadmin@10.1.1.53`, `sudo` (#423 step 1) |
+| 2a': node under `/opt/mosaic-stack`; bubblewrap, the AppArmor profile, the statoverride, the drift stop and the managed settings file, each with the test and rollback above; the no-new-privs test | root | ops-01, same path, R27 (mos-1091) |
+| 2a'': a `git bundle` of the reviewed commit copied to .53; root clones it to `/root/mosaic-stack` and checks HEAD is the commit the go names; it installs the bundle as `/srv/mosaic/incoming/<sha>.bundle`, owner `mosaic`, 0600 | root | ops-01, same path |
+| 2b: claude under `~/.local` (above); `git clone` of the bundle to `/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack`; `scripts/bootstrap.sh`; `stack-copy.sh copy`; the install with the inputs above (C2-13b's `case2-install.sh --profile factory` if it has landed, else the run sheet's steps) | `mosaic` | `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=...` from `localadmin` (PATH above). `mosaic` gets no key and no login shell |
+| 2b': place `claude-session.env` | Jason, or who he names (Q173 secrets rule) | section 3 |
+| 2c: write `case1-unit.args`; `case2-unit.sh` with those arguments and `--copy <id>`, from `/root/mosaic-stack`; then `case2-precheck.sh --profile factory` as `mosaic`, which reads the Console's `--port` from the installed unit for its port-floor line, so it runs after the render; `systemctl enable` the bus unit; the first start of UNITS. The Console unit has no `[Install]` until Jason rules (C2-13a), so it isn't enabled, and after a host reboot root starts it by hand until then. The run sheet says so | root | ops-01, same path |
+| 2c': `stack-release.sh adopt mosaic-stack --units external`, which records the running copy as the pointer (`do_adopt`, `scripts/stack-release.sh:856`) | `mosaic` | `sudo -u mosaic -H` |
+| every later re-pin or rollback | root, with its `mosaic` steps through `sudo -u mosaic -H` | ops-01 runs `case1-repin.sh` (section 4) |
+| acceptance (section 5) | `localadmin`, with `sudo -u mosaic -H` for the in-instance checks | the agent the window names |
+
+No git credential lands on .53. Both checkouts come from bundles that ops-01 copies in, and a re-pin
+brings a new bundle that `mosaic` fetches into its checkout.
+
+## 2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2
+
+| Case 2 item (row 230 brief) | Case 1 | Reason |
+|---|---|---|
+| business file with the library mapping | business `mosaic-stack` with no `library` key; `--profile factory` refuses a `kind: "library"` project (`profile-library-business`) | the factory has no books repo |
+| `bean`, `chet`, persona vars and files, specialists | factory roles from `roles/`, with a chief that has a harness var | Jason names the set in the go. I haven't read his live business file and won't. The acceptance needs only the chief (F3), since a chief with no harness var answers `no-route`. Others are added later by the human with `instances.set`, no new row |
+| token slot `library-gitea` | none | the factory's per-agent git identity is row 199's credential store (Megavolt, #1697). Until it lands, git work stays on dragon-lin (Q182) |
+| precheck: `bus.tester` is not on | `bus.tester` is on; `factory` requires it | the acceptance and the Q173 test system need the tester (agents act as tester, never Jason) |
+| precheck: persona file modes and digests | skipped under `factory` | no persona files |
+| precheck: `library.sync`, `library.status` | skipped under `factory` | no library |
+| precheck: `ZAI_API_KEY` in the key file | doesn't run | no instance has provider `zai` |
+| precheck: no Discord binding | kept | the factory's Discord connector stays on dragon-lin. Two connectors on one bot token would split its events |
+| precheck: claude marker prompt with `--system-prompt-file` | runs, since the chief's harness is claude-code | |
+| precheck: `sudo -n true` fails, `id -G` one entry, run root 0700, config validates, node 24 or later, `bwrap` exits 0, free memory, HOME | kept | node and bwrap are in row 230 (gosalyn-0034) |
+| Console serve flags: `--port` 1..1023, `--business`, the preview trio, `--send`, the proof pair, no `--tester-port` | `--port 732`, `--business mosaic-stack`, `--tester-port 7333`. No preview trio, no `--send`, no proof pair | below |
+| bus: `@PM_FLAGS@` and `@CLAUDE_ENV@` render empty | ` --pm`, and `Environment=MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN=/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` | below |
+
+All of these are inputs. Nothing in the Case 2 scripts hardcodes a Case 1 value (gosalyn-0034 item 4).
+Row 230's brief says the factory profile takes the library serve set plus an optional `--tester-port`,
+and that row 195 names any other difference (gosalyn-0049). .53 can't meet the library set, and the bus
+needs two lines the brief renders empty. The factory profile I need from row 230:
+
+1. Serve flags. `--port N` with N in 1..1023 and `--business ID` are required, and `--tester-port N` in
+   1024..65535, not equal to `--port`, is optional. The preview trio (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`,
+   `--allow-user`) and the proof pair (`--proof-header`, `--proof-file`) are refused. Both exist for a
+   proxy in front of the Console: the proxy signs the user in and adds the header, and the proof shows
+   the request came through it. .53 has no proxy. Jason reaches the Console with `ssh -L` (sage-1451
+   Q3), so there is no header to trust and no proxy to hold the proof. `--send` is refused too, since
+   serve takes it only with the trio or `--sso` (`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:15`). When Q175 SSO reaches
+   .53, `--sso` with an optional `--send` (row 192) would be the factory's sign-in, and adding it is a
+   re-install with its own go. Row 230 can accept `--sso [--send]` under factory now or later. Either
+   way it needs a `console.sso` block in `mosaic`'s config, which this row doesn't write. `--checkout`
+   and `--board` stay refused, as in the library set.
+2. `--pm` (factory only) renders the bus unit's `@PM_FLAGS@` as ` --pm`. The factory's PM dispatches its
+   work on .53 as on dragon-lin (section 4). With the token empty the bus never launches the PM, and
+   A5's PM check fails every re-pin.
+3. `--claude PATH` (factory only) renders `@CLAUDE_ENV@` as `Environment=MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN=PATH`, the
+   line `scripts/bus-service.sh:79` renders today. PATH must be absolute. Without it the bus runs
+   `claude` from the unit's PATH, which is the node dir, `/usr/local/bin`, `/usr/bin` and `/bin`, and
+   holds no claude on .53. The chief's first launch would then fail. The precheck's claude marker
+   prompt should run the same binary, so it reads the path from the installed bus unit.
+4. Row 190's two template tokens, if row 190 lands before row 230. Row 190 adds `@CONFIG_ENV@` to both
+   templates and `@SESSION_ENV@` to the bus template's `EnvironmentFile=` line. For the default
+   instance, `@CONFIG_ENV@` is deleted (`scripts/instance.sh`) and `@SESSION_ENV@` is
+   `<home>/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`. Row 230's "every token has one value" list
+   and its `EnvironmentFile=` check need both. This applies to the library profile too.
+
+I've sent these to Gosalyn. If row 230's candidate lacks any of them, row 195's manifest names the
+change to `case2-unit.sh` or `case2-precheck.sh`, reviewed by Duckworth with Webby told.
+
+## 3. Model access
+
+Q185: Case 1 uses the account the factory uses today, the Claude subscription behind dragon-lin's
+`claude-session.env`. The install never copies that file from dragon-lin. In the window, Jason (or the
+person he names under the Q173 secrets rule) makes a credential for .53 from that account and writes it
+to `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env` as `mosaic`, mode 0600. Nobody prints it,
+and no script reads its value. The precheck checks only its mode, owner and that the variable name is
+present (a `grep -c` on the name, output a count).
+
+Quota: the factory on dragon-lin and on .53 share one subscription. Q185's "use existing" accepts that.
+Case 2 shares nothing with it (Mos's reading of Q185).
+
+The pi harness stays off on .53 until P19 #383 settles (mos-0865). The business file names claude only.
+
+## 4. Re-pin, rollback and backup on .53
+
+Unit form (ruled, sage-1451 Q1): system units that root writes, with `User=mosaic`. `mosaic` can't
+start or stop them, and root never runs code that `mosaic` can write. `stack-release.sh activate` today
+does everything in one run under `systemctl --user` and puts the old stack back inside that run
+(`rollback_in_run`, `scripts/stack-release.sh:561`). On .53 the same run needs two users. So one
+re-pin is one ordered list, and one root command drives all of it: `scripts/case1-repin.sh`, run by
+ops-01 from `/root/mosaic-stack`. Each `mosaic` step is `sudo -u mosaic -H` running
+`/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack/scripts/stack-release.sh` with `--units external`. Copies carry no
+`stack-release.sh` (`COPY_PATHS`, `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-30`), so the `mosaic` steps run from that
+checkout, as dragon-lin's run from the canonical one.
+
+What root holds, and where each value comes from (r4's B1):
+
+| Value | Source |
+|---|---|
+| ID, the target copy | the go |
+| TO, a rollback's target | the go, as `--to ID` |
+| `--restore ACT --events N` | the go, when the rollback restores |
+| OLD, the running copy | the `ExecStart=` of the two unit files root installed. If the bus and Console units name different copies, A1 refuses `units-disagree` |
+| the `case2-unit.sh` arguments | `/etc/mosaic-stack/case1-unit.args` (section 1) |
+| each `mosaic` step's result | its exit code |
+
+Root parses nothing `mosaic` wrote and runs nothing under `/srv/mosaic` except through `sudo -u mosaic
+-H`. It never needs the activation id: the `mosaic` steps find it themselves.
+
+One result line per activation (B1). The stack log closes an activation on the first line after
+`started` that names it, whatever the result (`interrupted`, :146-156). r4 wrote an interim
+`... rollback pending` line at A3's and A5's failures. That line closed the activation, so R2 and R4
+then refused `open-activation` against an activation the log no longer held open. The rollback could
+never run as designed, and nothing tested the steps in sequence. r5 keeps an activation open from A3's
+`started` line until its single result line, and A5 or R4 writes that line:
+
+| Activation ends at | Result line | Written by |
+|---|---|---|
+| A3 fails before its rollback set exists (marker or capture) | `refused code marker-failed` or `refused code capture-failed`, as `capture || refuse` does today (:987). Nothing has changed, so there is nothing to roll back | A3 itself, exit 3, after it removes the marker. Root runs A2f |
+| A5 passes | `ok` | A5 |
+| A3 (after capture), A4 or A5 fails, and the rollback passes | `failed code <c> rollback ok` for A3 and A4, `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok` for A5 | R4 |
+| the rollback fails at R4's gate | `rollback-failed code <c> rollbackCode <r>` | R4 |
+| R1, R2 or R3 fails, or the run dies | none. The activation stays open, and the next activate refuses `interrupted-run` (:603-606), which Jason or Mos settles as on dragon-lin | |
+
+What the result line carries (r5's B1). `log_line` (:58) writes `op "$OP"`, and `from_log` (:169)
+reads only lines whose op is `adopt`, `activate` or `rollback`. So `confirm` doesn't log under its own
+op. Before A5's `ok` line or any line R4 writes, it sets OP, FROM and TO from the open activation's
+`started` line, ACT to that activation, and BACKUP from the rollback set's `BACKUP` file, which A3
+writes when `backup_store` returns. A re-pin's lines then read `op activate`, a rollback's `op
+rollback`, each with the from, to and backup a dragon-lin run would log. `from_log previous` and
+`from_log backup` read .53's log as they read dragon-lin's. `confirm` reads only the line A3 wrote for
+that activation, which `interrupted` already names.
+
+A failing `mosaic` step after `started` writes no log line. It writes its code to `FAILED` beside
+`AWAITING-UNITS` and exits 1. R4 reads that code for the result line. Root passes R4 `--cause
+A3|A4|A5`, the step it saw fail, from its own exit codes. A4 is root's own step and has no `FAILED`
+file, so R4 writes `failed code units-start` for it. A cause with no `FAILED` file where one should be
+writes code `unrecorded`.
+
+The open activation. A3 writes `$STATE/stack-rollback/<ACT>/AWAITING-UNITS` holding the target copy
+(renamed from r3's `PENDING`, which read like the pointer's `pmPending`, `P_PENDING` at :128; N3).
+`confirm` and `revert` take the copy root passed, not an activation id. Each lists the
+`AWAITING-UNITS` files and the `interrupted` set (:146), and goes on only when there is exactly one
+file, its activation is the one `interrupted` names, and the copy in it is the copy root passed.
+Anything else refuses `open-activation` with exit 3 and the list it found, and changes nothing.
+`confirm` without `--rollback` also refuses `activation-failed` when `FAILED` exists, so a second
+confirm can't pass an activation that already failed. Whichever `confirm` writes the result line
+removes `AWAITING-UNITS` and `FAILED` after it.
+
+Refusals of the three external verbs. `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` act on an open activation by
+design, so they skip the `interrupted-run` refusal (:605). Their refusals log `result refused` with no
+activation id: they set ACT only after every check has passed. So a refused `confirm`, a wrong copy
+say, leaves the open activation open. Today's `refuse` (:62-67) adds the activation id whenever ACT is
+set, and the external verbs keep that order. A test and a mutant hold it (section 7).
+
+Root's step log. Every step `case1-repin.sh` runs appends one line to `/var/log/mosaic-stack/case1-repin.log`,
+`root:root` 0640: the time from `date -u`, the step, its argv, its exit code. `mosaic` can't write it,
+so it stays readable after a run that dies before `mosaic` logs anything.
+
+### Activate: `case1-repin.sh activate ID [--migrate] [--timeout S]`
+
+| # | Step | Runner | On failure |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| A1 | `/root/mosaic-stack` HEAD is the commit the go names. ID is 40 lowercase hex and names a copy under `/srv/mosaic/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies` that holds `scripts/mosaic` (row 230's copy-id rule). `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0, else `profile-drift` (B2). Root reads OLD from the unit files. `stack-release.sh activate ID mosaic-stack --units external --plan --expect-from OLD` exits 0. The plan refuses `pointer-differs` when the pointer's copy isn't OLD (N5), so a pointer and units that disagree stop before any stop | root; the plan as `mosaic` | refuse, exit 3. Nothing has changed |
+| A2 | `systemctl stop` UNITS in reverse order, then wait until each is inactive, within `--timeout` | root | A2f below |
+| A3 | `stack-release.sh activate ID mosaic-stack --units external [--migrate]`. Before it logs `started` (N3), it refuses `units-running` unless each of UNITS is inactive (system-manager reads, which need no privilege) and the store is stopped (`stopped`, :359), and `interrupted-run` while any activation is open. Then, in this order: logs `result started`; makes `$RS` with capture's `mkdir -p` of `stack-rollback` and exclusive `mkdir -m 0700` (:415-416), and writes `AWAITING-UNITS` in it at once (N1); captures the rollback set into that directory, making none (pointer, wrapper, and the sha256 and `ExecStart=` of each installed unit, read only); takes `backup_store` (:372) into `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>` and writes its name to `BACKUP` in the rollback set; under `--migrate`, writes `MIGRATING` in the rollback set and sets TAKEN, both before `migrate-schema.mjs` runs, where today's run sets TAKEN (:1004-1005, r5's B2), then migrates; installs the wrapper for ID. It writes no pointer | `mosaic` | a refusal before `started` exits 3 with nothing changed. A marker or capture failure, an existing `$RS` included, removes the marker if it wrote one, logs its `refused` line and exits 3. Root runs A2f for both. Any later failure writes `FAILED` with its code, logs nothing, cleans up nothing and exits 1. Root runs R1-R4 with `--cause A3` |
+| A4 | `case2-unit.sh` with `case1-unit.args` and `--copy ID`, `systemctl daemon-reload`, `systemctl start` UNITS in order | root | R1-R4 with `--cause A4` |
+| A5 | `stack-release.sh confirm ID mosaic-stack --units external --timeout S`. This is `gate` (:522), which polls `gate_once` (:471) every second until `--timeout`, with the external checks below. On a pass it writes the pointer, logs `result ok`, removes `AWAITING-UNITS`, exit 0. When the timeout runs out it writes `FAILED` with the last gate code, logs nothing and exits 1 | `mosaic` | R1-R4 with `--cause A5` |
+
+Why A3 writes the marker first and does no cleanup of its own. With the marker written last, as in r4,
+an A3 failure after `started` left an open activation with no marker, and R2 and R4 refused it. With
+the marker first, every A3 failure after the marker leaves exactly what R2 needs: the open activation,
+its marker and whatever part of the rollback set exists. R2 is then the one cleanup path, for A3, A4
+and A5 alike. Two cleanup paths, A3's own and R2, would each need their own tests for each failure point.
+
+A2f, a stop that fails or times out, or an A3 that exits 3. This run has no open activation: A2 logs nothing, and
+A3's exit 3 comes either before `started` or after its own `refused` line. Nothing of `mosaic`'s has
+changed. Root reads `date -u +%s` as T, runs `systemctl start` UNITS in order, then `stack-release.sh gate
+OLD mosaic-stack --units external --since T --timeout S`, a new verb that runs `gate` on OLD and writes no
+log line, no pointer and no file. A2f has no `started` line to take a start floor from (the first
+re-pin after adopt has none at all), so `--since` is the floor, and `gate` refuses `usage` without it
+(r5's N2). T is root's own clock, so root still parses nothing `mosaic` wrote. A unit that never
+stopped keeps its old `ActiveEnterTimestamp`, fails `stale-start` and takes the exit 2 path below.
+If that passes, root logs `A2 failed, OLD running` (or `A3 refused`) in its step log and exits
+1. If it fails, root stops UNITS, logs `OLD gate failed <code>` and exits 2. The next run's
+`interrupted` check finds nothing open either way.
+
+The external gate. `gate_once` keeps its order and codes, with these changes under `--units external`:
+
+- `systemctl` without `--user` for `is-active` and `show`. Both work unprivileged against the system
+  manager.
+- This start's time is the bus unit's `ActiveEnterTimestamp`, read with `systemctl show --timestamp=unix
+  -p ActiveEnterTimestamp`, in place of the `START_MS` that `start_both` (:451) sets on dragon-lin.
+  It is whole seconds (`@1792540800`), and the `started` line has milliseconds (N4). So the rule
+  compares seconds: the start passes when its second is at or after the floor of `started`'s second.
+  A unit that was active across A3 can't reach this check, because A3 refuses `units-running`, so the
+  equal second can only be a start after A3. An earlier second fails `gate_once` with the gate code
+  `stale-start`. It's a gate failure like any other, not a refusal (r4 had it as a refusal, which
+  would have logged against the open activation): `gate` keeps polling, since `Restart=on-failure`
+  can bring a fresh start, and at the timeout `FAILED` holds `stale-start`. The PM check's
+  `startedAt` bound uses the same second.
+- `copy-check` runs `stack-copy.sh check --units external`, which reads the system units.
+- The PM check is below.
+
+The PM (r4's B2). .53 runs the PM: the factory's PM dispatches its work, as it does on dragon-lin, and the
+serve flags carry `--pm`. The pointer's `pm` comes from the installed bus unit's `ExecStart=`, as the
+unit parse at :195 already reads it. Today's `pm_launched` (:505) takes the run id from the
+`launched ...` line in `journalctl --user -u BUS_UNIT`. On .53 that read fails twice over: the unit is
+a system unit, and under `SplitMode=uid` the logs of a system-range uid land in the system journal,
+which `mosaic` (no `adm` or `systemd-journal` group) can't read. Under `--units external` the check
+reads `launches list --json` alone. It passes when exactly one entry has business `mosaic-stack`,
+instance equal to the business file's `launch.by` (the PM's instance, the one `bus start --pm` launches
+at `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:675`), `live` true, and `startedAt` at or after this start's time.
+Zero entries, two, a stale one or one for another business fail with `pm-launch-unconfirmed` and what
+it saw, as today. A run the PM starts for another role has another instance, so it doesn't count.
+
+Why not the other reads. A regular uid for `mosaic` would put its logs in a per-user journal it can
+read, but it changes the account Case 2's install creates. Root reading the journal and passing the run id in
+would make root parse output from `mosaic`'s process, which section 4's rule forbids.
+
+Under `--units external`, `pm-on` (:1137) and `activate --pm-after-harness` refuse `external-pm`. Both
+flip the PM on dragon-lin by restarting the user bus with new arguments. On .53 the PM's state is a
+serve flag in a root-owned unit, so changing it is a re-install with its own go.
+
+### Rollback inside the run (R1-R4)
+
+| # | Step | Runner | On failure |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | `systemctl stop` UNITS, then wait as in A2 | root | rollback-failed |
+| R2 | `stack-release.sh revert ID mosaic-stack --units external`. It finds the open activation as above, puts the wrapper back from the rollback set and checks its sha256, and restores TAKEN (`restore_store`, :396) only if the rollback set holds `MIGRATING`. Each part is idempotent, so it works for an A3 that stopped partway: no `MIGRATING` means no restore, a migrate that failed partway is restored from the backup taken before it, and copying the saved wrapper over an unchanged one changes nothing. It writes no log line | `mosaic` | rollback-failed, activation left open |
+| R3 | `case2-unit.sh` with `case1-unit.args` and `--copy OLD`, `systemctl daemon-reload`, `systemctl start` UNITS | root | rollback-failed, activation left open |
+| R4 | `stack-release.sh confirm ID mosaic-stack --units external --rollback OLD --cause A3\|A4\|A5 --timeout S`. It finds the open activation, checks OLD is its `from`, gates OLD with `gate`, and writes the activation's one result line from the cause and the `FAILED` code: `failed code <c> rollback ok` (A3, A4), `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok` (A5), or `rollback-failed code <c> rollbackCode <gate>` when OLD's gate fails | `mosaic` | rollback-failed, logged |
+
+rollback-failed: root stops UNITS and exits 2, as `rollback_failed` (:587) does. When R4's gate fails,
+the log has the `rollback-failed` line and the activation is closed. When R1, R2 or R3 fails, no
+`mosaic` step writes a result, so the activation stays open with its marker. Root's step log has the
+codes, the next activate refuses `interrupted-run` until Jason or Mos settles it (:605), and status
+shows it. I chose that over a log-only verb for root to call after an R2 failure: nothing could gate
+the old stack at that point, and a closed activation would let the next activate start against a
+wrapper and store in an unknown state. Exit codes match `stack-release.sh`: 0 ok, 1 failed with the old
+stack running (rolled back, or A2f), 2 rollback-failed with UNITS stopped, 3 refused with nothing
+changed.
+
+### Rollback to the previous copy: `case1-repin.sh rollback --to ID [--restore ACT --events N]`
+
+The same list with TO in place of ID. The go names TO, from Mos's or Sage's read of `stack-release.sh
+status` as `mosaic`. Root passes it. A1's plan, `stack-release.sh rollback mosaic-stack --units external
+--to ID --plan --expect-from OLD`, refuses `pointer-differs` as in activate. It also exits 3 unless ID
+is `from_log previous` (:162), the previous distinct copy, so a
+stale or mistyped go refuses before anything stops. With `--restore`, the plan also refuses unless
+`$DATA/backups/stack/ACT` exists. `--to` is a new flag, accepted only with `--units external`;
+dragon-lin's rollback keeps reading TO from the log.
+
+The post-backup event count runs in A1's plan as `mosaic` while the bus still holds the store (the
+`heldcount` read, :1074), and again in A3 on the stopped store. A difference refuses
+`post-backup-events`, as `run_steps` does (:1013).
+
+### Migrations (N4)
+
+`--migrate` under `--units external` runs only inside A3, and A3 refuses `units-running` before it logs
+or migrates anything while any of UNITS is active. So a migration never runs against a store a live bus
+holds. The test is in section 7.
+
+### Backup
+
+A3's `backup_store` is today's. It copies the stopped store into `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>`, so
+`rollback --restore <ACT>` and row 181's guard find it. As on dragon-lin, the config dir isn't in the
+backup, and the credential isn't either. PBS backups of VM 1008 cover the disk (P4). A restore swaps
+only `bus/` and leaves `secrets/claude-session.env` in place (N6, in the run sheet).
+
+The install's adopt (2c') takes no backup. The store holds only what the acceptance wrote, and the first
+re-pin's A3 takes the first backup.
+
+### The log
+
+Every `mosaic` line goes to `$DATA/state/stack-activation-log.jsonl`, as today, with `units external`
+added. So `from_log previous` reads .53's history the same way it reads dragon-lin's. A3 writes
+`started`. A5 or R4 writes the one result line, with the op, from, to and backup of that activation,
+or A3 its `refused` line before any change. Refusals of
+`confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log no activation id. If a run dies between `started` and the result,
+the log keeps `started` with no result, the next run's `interrupted` check reports it, and root's step
+log shows the last step that ran.
+
+### Who
+
+Mos or Sage plans each re-pin. ops-01 runs `case1-repin.sh` on Jason's or Mos's go, and a STATE report
+follows. The gate and the in-run rollback have one owner, the root command, as they do on dragon-lin.
+
+### dragon-lin's path
+
+`--units external` is a new value. Without it, `stack-release.sh` and `stack-copy.sh check` run as they
+do today, `pm_launched` still reads the user journal, and rollback still takes TO from the log.
+`confirm`, `revert`, `gate` and `--to` refuse without it. Section 7 names the tests that show this.
+
+### Not taken
+
+- Row 190's user units under `mosaic`, with root running `loginctl enable-linger mosaic` once. Every
+  existing re-pin tool would work unchanged and root would be needed only once. But the unit form
+  would differ from Case 2, and a user manager would run as `mosaic`.
+- A sudoers rule that lets `mosaic` start and stop the units. P1 and row 230's precheck require that
+  `mosaic` has no sudo.
+- `confirm` and `revert` taking ACT from root. Root would have to read it from `mosaic`'s output or
+  log, which the rule above forbids (r4's B1).
+
+## 5. Acceptance checks
+
+A new script, `scripts/case1-accept.sh`, in this row's manifest. It runs on .53 as `localadmin` and prints
+one line per check: `<id> <path> <mark> <evidence>`. The marks are `closed`, `accepted Q182`,
+`accepted Q183`, `accepted mos-1096`, and `unnamed`, which means "not named in Q182, Q183 or a Mos
+ruling". The script ends with a count of each mark. It exits non-zero only when a functional check (F)
+fails. A P check never changes the exit status. Each `unnamed` line goes to Mos, who takes it to Jason
+(R8 N1).
+
+Functional checks. Any failure fails the row:
+
+| Id | Check | How |
+|---|---|---|
+| F1 | the units run as `mosaic` | `systemctl show <unit> -p User -p MainPID` for each of UNITS; each MainPID's uid in `/proc/<pid>/status` is `mosaic`'s, and each unit is active |
+| F2 | the Console listens on 127.0.0.1:732 on .53 and answers there | `curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:732/healthz` on .53 succeeds, and the listener table shows 732 bound to 127.0.0.1 only, by the Console unit's MainPID. Jason reaches it with `ssh -L 7332:127.0.0.1:732 localadmin@10.1.1.53` and his browser at 127.0.0.1:7332 as today. A LAN listener waits for Q175 SSO (sage-1451 Q3) |
+| F3 | one tester message gets a reply | as `mosaic`: `mosaic talk chief <marker> --tester`, then `mosaic follow --tester`, with a 300 s limit. A stored reply to the marked message passes. The inbox alone shows decisions only, so it isn't used (N3) |
+| F4 | the precheck passes | `case2-precheck.sh --profile factory` exits 0 as `mosaic` |
+| F5 | a role session runs under bwrap with the profile | while F3's reply is pending: a `/usr/bin/bwrap` process owned by `mosaic` has a claude process under it. `/proc/<bwrap pid>/attr/current` equals `bwrap (enforce)` and the claude process's equals `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, each compared as an exact string after the trailing newline is cut (N1). If `launches list --json` records the sandbox, the build reads that for the first part, since a short session can end before `ps` sees it |
+| F6 | claude is the pinned version | `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude --version` as `mosaic`, after F3, equals the run sheet's pin |
+| F7 | the PM run is live | `launches list --json` as `mosaic` has exactly one live entry for the PM's instance, the check `confirm` runs (section 4) |
+
+Privilege and host paths. These report and never fail the row:
+
+| Id | Path | Mark | Evidence the script prints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| P1 | `mosaic` has sudo | closed only when `sudo -l -U mosaic` prints "is not allowed to run sudo" (N2); any other output is unnamed | the `sudo -l` result |
+| P2 | `mosaic` has supplementary groups or a key | closed when `id -G mosaic` is one entry and `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty | `id`, file state |
+| P3 | `localadmin` NOPASSWD sudo, reached with the dragon-lin key | accepted Q183 (agents keep ssh to .53; localadmin from #423 step 1) | `sudo -l -U localadmin` |
+| P4 | root on pve over VM 1008, and PBS backups of VM 1008, which hold `/srv/mosaic` including the credential | accepted Q182 and Q183 (agents keep root on pve and PBS) | a fixed line; the script can't see pve from inside |
+| P5 | `jarvis`, which runs Hermes, can reach `/srv/mosaic` through sudo, or through the docker or lxd groups, which are root-equivalent | closed when `jarvis` is in none of sudo, docker and lxd; unnamed otherwise. #423 step 4 lands before the install (mos-1091 4c), and its `step4.sh` removes `jarvis` from sudo, docker, lxd and adm, so after it this reads closed (Duckworth N2) | `id jarvis` |
+| P6 | other members of sudo, docker, lxd | closed when sudo holds only `localadmin` and docker and lxd are empty. Every other member is its own unnamed line, `jarvis` included (N1) | `getent group` lines |
+| P7 | a file under `/etc/sudoers.d` naming `mosaic` | closed when none | the file names |
+| P8 | the Console or tester reachable from the LAN | closed when 732 and 7333 are bound to 127.0.0.1 only, each by the Console's MainPID, and nothing listens on 7331 | listener table |
+| P9 | a user namespace through `/usr/bin/bwrap` | accepted mos-1096 only while all seven hold, unnamed otherwise: (1) `dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/bin/bwrap` reads `root mosaic 0750`; (2) `aa-status --json` lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in enforce mode; (3) `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` has the pinned sha256 and no package owns it; (4) `sudo -u jarvis /usr/bin/bwrap --version` fails with "Permission denied"; (5) `getent group mosaic` lists no member and no other account in `/etc/passwd` has its gid; (6) `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1; (7) no `mosaic-bwrap` profile is loaded, no other file under `/etc/apparmor.d` names `bwrap`, and the live label of a process bwrap runs is exactly `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)` (N1, mos-1098 point 2). Items 1-3, 6 and 7 are `case1-hostcheck.sh --check`'s, so P9 reuses its lines | each item's line, and Mos's reason: "Case 1's agents are the factory's agents. In Q182 and Q183 Jason accepted that the factory reaches root on pve and, through it, every VM. So a user-namespace path to root on .53 gives that class no new reach." With the profile, what's left is bwrap's own setup, run by `mosaic` |
+| P10 | a session binds the tester port, 7333, while the Console is down | accepted mos-1101 while `ip_unprivileged_port_start` is above 732 and 7333 is held by the Console's MainPID at the check. Serve refuses a tester port below 1024 (`cli.mjs:33`), so the Console-port fix can't cover it. A squatter would get the tester's writes and could answer them. The tester's users are the factory's agents, the class Mos's reading covers (mos-1101 item 5). Mos can object, and then this line reads unnamed | the floor, and the owner pid of 7333 |
+
+Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs`. The script takes a fake root (`--root DIR`) for
+`/proc`, `/etc` and `getent` output, and fake `systemctl`, `curl`, `ss`, `sudo`, `bwrap`, `aa-status`,
+`dpkg-statoverride`, `sysctl` and `claude` on PATH. Cases:
+- each F check failing gives a non-zero exit with its line;
+- each P check in each of its marks, including P1 with output that grants nothing but lacks the refusal
+  text (unnamed), P9 unnamed once for each of its seven items missing, and P10 unnamed with a floor of
+  700 and with 7333 held by another pid;
+- F5 fails on a label of `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (complain)` and
+  `bwrap (enforce)` with a trailing space;
+- a run with every P check `unnamed` still exits 0;
+- the summary counts match the lines.
+
+Mutants: one per F check (the check made to pass on failure), one that maps P5 to `closed`, one that
+closes P1 on any output without a rule line, one that drops P9's jarvis item, one that drops P9's item
+7, and one that makes F5 a substring match.
+
+Nothing in the tests reaches .53 or dragon-lin's live state.
+
+## 6. Rulings
+
+sage-1451:
+
+- Q1, unit form: the brief's system unit. C2-13's `ExecStart=` check accepts a varying copy id, and
+  C2-13 took that (gosalyn-0034 item 3).
+- Q3, the Console: it listens on 127.0.0.1 on .53 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:466`; `cli.mjs` passes no
+  host), and Jason reaches it with `ssh -L`. F2 says so. A LAN listener waits for Q175 SSO.
+- Q4, the date: if C2-13's candidate is late, I build on C2-13's latest commit and rebase (Q177). Under
+  the #426(a) push rules (mos-1086) a rebase goes to a new branch name.
+
+mos-1091 (none goes to Jason):
+
+- Q2 4a: installing bubblewrap is an install step, run by ops-01 as root under R27. Rollback is
+  `apt-get remove`.
+- Q2 4b: a per-binary AppArmor profile for `/usr/bin/bwrap`, the sysctl left at 1. r4 takes Ubuntu's
+  `bwrap-userns-restrict` for it (mos-1096). Section 1 has the steps.
+- 4c: P5 ends at #423 step 4, which Mos sent to Duckworth so it lands in Jason's VM 1008 boot session,
+  before the install. The P5 check stays.
+
+mos-1096:
+
+- B1 and B2 are mine, and so is the PM answer: .53 runs the PM (section 4).
+- The `dpkg-statoverride` on `/usr/bin/bwrap`, the hardlink and group checks, the jarvis refusal and F5
+  under the profile (sections 1 and 5).
+- P9 is Mos's acceptance, with the reason quoted in section 5.
+- Jason's Q9 on install and upgrade is open. r4 goes ahead, since B1's re-pin and rollback are needed
+  whatever he answers. If his answer changes how upgrades reach .53, the change lands in section 4 and
+  the run sheet as a new round.
+
+mos-1098 and mos-1101 (on Duckworth's REVIEW-r3):
+
+- Duckworth's CHANGES stand. B1 and B2 are fixed in this round, with B1's real-sequence test, and all
+  three of B2's asks: an owner across upgrades, what fails closed, and the pins as reviewed values.
+- r4's PM, statoverride and P9 stand. mos-1098's two questions are answered in section 1: the profile's
+  owner across upgrades is ops-01 with `case1-hostcheck.sh`, and the stop is bwrap closed to `mosaic`.
+  Both profiles attach to `/usr/bin/bwrap`: `bwrap` to the binary and `unpriv_bwrap` stacked on what it
+  runs. P9 item 7 checks that no third one does.
+- P9 has seven items and F5 compares exact strings (N1).
+- The port squat applies (section 1). The Console takes Case 2's fix, a port below 1024 with
+  `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` and the floor checked. Only the tester port can't take it, and P10 records it
+  under Mos's reading that Case 1's sessions are the factory class. I've told Mos, who can object.
+- Work on r5 goes ahead while Jason's Q9 (Vikunja #429) is open. If install and upgrade become
+  product commands, these steps become that installer's configuration and row 195 rebases on its row
+  (sage-1481, sage-1491).
+
+sage-1499: C2-13a is row 230 (#1732, Gosalyn), and row 195 chains on row 230's candidate.
+
+gosalyn-0049: the factory profile is the library set plus an optional `--tester-port`, and row 195 names
+any other difference. Section 2 names four, with the reason .53 can't meet the preview trio, `--send` or
+the proof pair. The managed-settings route needs no Case 2 change.
+
+## 7. Manifest (planned)
+
+- `scripts/case1-repin.sh` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-repin.test.mjs` (new). Fake `systemctl`,
+  `sudo` and `case2-unit.sh` on PATH record their argv, with a scratch home standing in for `/srv/mosaic`,
+  a scratch dir for `/etc/mosaic-stack` and one for `/var/log/mosaic-stack`. Cases:
+  - a pass runs A1-A5 in order;
+  - a failure at A3, A4 or A5 runs R1-R4 with `--cause` set to that step, and exits 1;
+  - an A3 exit 3 runs A2f, not R1-R4;
+  - a failure at R2 or R4 exits 2 with UNITS stopped;
+  - A1 refuses `profile-drift` when a fake `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 1, before any stop;
+  - every `mosaic` step's argv carries `env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin`, with the node
+    dir from `case1-unit.args`;
+  - a HEAD mismatch, an ID that fails the copy-id rule, or unit files that name two copies refuses with
+    exit 3 before any stop;
+  - A1's plan argv carries `--expect-from` with OLD from the unit files;
+  - A2f passes `gate OLD --since T`, with T from a fake `date` that root calls before its start;
+  - A2f: a fake `systemctl` that never reports inactive. The script starts UNITS, runs `gate OLD`, exits
+    1 with OLD's gate passing and 2 with it failing, and the stack log is byte-identical before and
+    after;
+  - `rollback --to` with an ID that isn't `from_log previous` exits 3 before any stop;
+  - every exec of a path under the home goes through `sudo -u mosaic -H` (from the recorded argv);
+  - no argv root passes holds an activation id, and OLD comes from the unit files, not from anything
+    the `mosaic` steps print;
+  - every `case2-unit.sh` call carries the arguments in `case1-unit.args` and differs only in `--copy`;
+  - the step log has one line per step with its exit code.
+- `scripts/stack-release.sh`: `--units external` for `adopt`, `activate`, `rollback` and `status`, the
+  `--to` flag for an external rollback, and the new `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` verbs, which refuse
+  without it. `scripts/stack-copy.sh`: `check --units external`, which reads the system units. Tests in
+  `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-external.test.mjs` (new), against a fake system-scope `systemctl`
+  and a fake `mosaic` for `bus status` and `launches list`:
+  - `units-running` refuses while any unit is active, and `activate --migrate` with a unit active
+    leaves the store, the log and TAKEN as they were (N4);
+  - activate leaves the pointer as it was, writes `AWAITING-UNITS`, and writes a backup of the stopped
+    store under `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>`;
+  - `confirm` and `revert` refuse `open-activation` with zero `AWAITING-UNITS` files, with two, with
+    one whose copy isn't the one passed, and with one whose activation isn't in the `interrupted` set;
+  - `confirm` polls: a fake bus whose status turns good after 3 s passes with `--timeout 10` and fails
+    with `--timeout 1`;
+  - `stale-start` (N4): with `started` at 1792540800.900, an `ActiveEnterTimestamp` of `@1792540800`
+    passes and `@1792540799` fails `gate_once` with `stale-start`. A fake that turns to `@1792540805`
+    after 2 s passes with `--timeout 10`, which shows it's a gate code that polling can clear, not a
+    refusal;
+  - `confirm` on a pass writes the pointer, logs `ok` and removes `AWAITING-UNITS`. On a timeout it
+    writes `FAILED` with the gate code, leaves the pointer, the log and the marker as they were, and
+    exits 1;
+  - `confirm` without `--rollback` refuses `activation-failed` when `FAILED` exists;
+  - every line `confirm` writes has op `activate` or `rollback`, never `confirm`, and the from, to and
+    activation of its `started` line, and backup equal to the rollback set's `BACKUP`;
+  - `gate` (N2): with `--since 1792540800`, `@1792540800` passes and `@1792540799` fails `stale-start`;
+    without `--since` it refuses `usage`;
+  - `--plan --expect-from` (N5) refuses `pointer-differs` when the pointer names another copy, for
+    activate and for `rollback --to`;
+  - A3's order: a fake that fails the capture leaves the log with `started` and `refused code
+    capture-failed` for that activation, no marker and no `FAILED`, and exit 3. An existing `$RS`
+    gives `refused code marker-failed` and exit 3, and a capture under `--units external` makes no
+    directory of its own. A fake that fails the
+    wrapper install after a migration leaves `started` only, the marker, `FAILED`, TAKEN as migrated,
+    and exit 1;
+  - refusals by `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log with no activation id, and the `interrupted` set
+    is the same before and after each one;
+  - the PM check passes with one live entry for the PM's instance since the start, and fails
+    `pm-launch-unconfirmed` with none, with two, with one whose `startedAt` is before the start, with one
+    not live, and with one for another business. A second live entry for another instance doesn't
+    count. A fake `journalctl` on PATH records any call, and no external run makes one;
+  - `pm-on` and `activate --pm-after-harness` refuse `external-pm`;
+  - `revert` puts the wrapper back, and restores TAKEN only after a migration;
+  - `confirm --rollback OLD` writes the line for each `--cause` (A3 and A4 `failed`, A5 `gate-failed`,
+    with the `FAILED` code, `units-start` for A4, `unrecorded` when the file is missing), or
+    `rollback-failed` when OLD's gate fails. It removes the marker and `FAILED` after the line, and
+    refuses when OLD isn't the open activation's `from`;
+  - real sequences on one log (B1). The fake `sudo` execs the real `stack-release.sh` as the test's
+    user, so each step reads the log and state the last one wrote. Fakes stand in only for
+    `systemctl`, `mosaic` and `case2-unit.sh`. Each sequence ends with the log holding exactly one
+    `started` and one result line for its activation, an empty `interrupted` set, no marker or
+    `FAILED`, and a following `activate --plan` that doesn't refuse `interrupted-run`:
+    1. activate, confirm times out, revert, `confirm --rollback --cause A5` passes:
+       `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok`;
+    2. activate with `--migrate`, the wrapper install fails, revert restores TAKEN, `confirm --rollback
+       --cause A3`: `failed code <c> rollback ok`;
+    3. activate, root's A4 fails, revert, `confirm --rollback --cause A4`: `failed code units-start
+       rollback ok`;
+    4. activate whose capture fails: `refused code capture-failed` and nothing open, then A2f's
+       `gate OLD` writes nothing;
+    5. activate, then `confirm` with the wrong copy is refused, then revert and `confirm --rollback
+       --cause A5` still close the activation, because the refusal didn't;
+    6. activate, revert fails (a wrapper whose saved copy is missing): the activation stays open, and
+       the next `activate --plan` refuses `interrupted-run`;
+    7. adopt C0, activate C1 and confirm, activate C2 and confirm (r5's B1): both `ok` lines read
+       `op activate` with their `started` line's from and to and the backup each took. `rollback --to C1
+       --plan` exits 0 and `--to C0 --plan` refuses. A rollback to C1, confirmed, logs `op rollback`, and
+       `from_log previous` then names C2;
+    8. activate with `--migrate`, where the copy's `migrate-schema.mjs` is a fake that writes to the
+       store and exits 1 (r5's B2): `FAILED` holds `migrate-failed` and `MIGRATING` exists. revert
+       restores the store byte-identical to the backup, and `confirm --rollback --cause A3` gates OLD on
+       it: `failed code migrate-failed rollback ok`;
+  - `rollback --to` refuses when ID isn't `from_log previous`, and `rollback --restore` finds a backup
+    that an external activate took;
+  - `gate` writes nothing: the log, the pointer and the state dir are byte-identical before and after;
+  - `confirm`, `revert`, `gate` and `--to` refuse without `--units external`.
+- dragon-lin unchanged. `stack-release.test.mjs` and `stack-copy.test.mjs` run unchanged and green. A
+  new case in `stack-release-external.test.mjs` runs a default activate, rollback and check against a
+  fake `systemctl` that records argv, and every call carries `--user`. A default `activate --plan`
+  prints the same bytes on the candidate as on its base, with the base output as a fixture.
+- Mutants for the re-pin:
+  - `confirm` writes the pointer on a gate failure;
+  - `confirm` calls `gate_once` once in place of `gate`;
+  - the external PM check counts entries of any instance;
+  - the external PM check drops the `startedAt` bound;
+  - `confirm` takes the newest `AWAITING-UNITS` instead of refusing two;
+  - `rollback --to` skips the `from_log previous` comparison;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` skips R1-R4;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` exits 0 after A2f;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` runs `mosaic`'s `stack-release.sh` without `sudo -u mosaic`;
+  - the default path drops `--user` from one `systemctl` call;
+  - `confirm`'s timeout writes r4's interim `gate-failed ... rollback pending` line (B1; killed by
+    sequences 1 and 5);
+  - A3 writes `AWAITING-UNITS` last, after the wrapper (killed by sequence 2);
+  - an external verb's refusal logs with the open activation id (ACT set before the checks; killed by
+    sequence 5 and the refusal test);
+  - `stale-start` is a refusal again (killed by the polling case);
+  - `revert` restores TAKEN without `MIGRATING` (killed by the revert case);
+  - `confirm` logs with its own op, `confirm` (killed by sequence 7 and the op case);
+  - A3 writes `MIGRATING` after `migrate-schema.mjs` (killed by sequence 8);
+  - `gate` takes its floor from the newest `started` line when `--since` is missing (killed by the
+    `gate` case).
+- `scripts/case1-pins.sh` and `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` (new),
+  `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-hostcheck.service` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-hostcheck.test.mjs`
+  (new). The script takes `--root DIR` for `/etc`, `/proc/sys` and `/usr/bin/bwrap`'s stat, and fake
+  `aa-status`, `dpkg`, `dpkg-statoverride`, `apparmor_parser`, `systemd-run`, `chown` and `chmod`
+  on PATH record their argv. Cases:
+  - `--check` exits 0 with all seven items and 1 with each one failing alone, its line naming it;
+    item 3 fails on a second file naming `bwrap` as a word, one that writes `/{usr/,}bin/bwrap` included,
+    and passes with `bwrap-userns-restrict` alone. Item 4 fails on a label of `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`
+    or one with a trailing space, and its `systemd-run` argv carries `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes` and the
+    other 2a' properties. Item 7 fails with the floor at 732;
+  - `--enforce` exits 0 on a pass and on every failure. On a failure it unloads the profile, closes
+    bwrap to `root:root` 0700, writes `DRIFT` and one log line. With `DRIFT` present and every item
+    passing, it still closes bwrap;
+  - `--enforce` never calls `dpkg-statoverride` with `--update`, `--add` or `--remove`;
+  - a bubblewrap version other than the install pin is a printed line, not a failure;
+  - `--upstream` against a fake deb whose file differs prints the difference and exits 0;
+  - the service unit has `Type=oneshot`, `After=apparmor.service`,
+    `Before=mosaic-bus@mosaic-stack.service` and runs `--enforce`.
+
+  Mutants: `--enforce` exits 1 on a drift; `--enforce` ignores `DRIFT` when the items pass; item 1
+  drops the `dpkg -S` owner check; item 3 matches only the `/usr/bin/bwrap` path; item 4 matches a
+  substring; item 4 drops `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes`; item 7 compares with `>=`.
+- `scripts/case1-accept.sh` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs` (new), section 5.
+- Row 230 (C2-13a). `--profile`, the node, bwrap and port-floor precheck lines, the copy-id rule, the
+  two units and the Console's capability lines are in its brief at 5b8def2f1. Section 2's four items
+  are not. Any of them that row 230's candidate lacks becomes a named change here, reviewed by
+  Duckworth with Webby told. I told Gosalyn earlier that the settings-file route for
+  `DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER` doesn't reach a role session, and that Case 1 uses the managed settings file.
+- Docs: the Case 1 run sheet `docs/guides/case1-install.md` (new). It lists the window's steps in order,
+  each with who runs it and its go, the pinned node sha256 and claude version, a pointer to
+  `case1-pins.sh` for the bubblewrap and profile pins, the statoverride, the drift stop and the managed
+  settings file, each with its rollback, how ops-01 clears a `DRIFT`, the `ssh -L` line for port 732,
+  and a note that a restore leaves the credential in place.
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, dragon-lin's units or `~/.mosaic`.
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0977, thread ffceafec). Reviews federation designs and MVP T1 row 193.

 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `duckworth/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Gander
+
+Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for the human
+boundary row (P19 333, #1694, mos-0989).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gander/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Gizmoduck
+
+Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
+(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
+access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
+the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
+repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Herb
+
+Builder seat, Codex gpt-6.1-sol, started by Sage under mos-0977 item 5 (more Codex Sol rows) for a second gate lane
+design row (#1695, mos-0977 item 6).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `herb/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle, #1692) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.

 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `honker/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
+# host access through the credential store
+
+Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
+It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
+decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
+
+## What it changes
+
+Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
+REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
+remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
+and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
+only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
+agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
+(Vikunja #420).
+
+When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
+
+1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
+   `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
+2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
+   `roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
+3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
+   `reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
+   within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
+4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
+   commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
+   the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
+5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
+
+Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
+file commit in `roles/`.
+
+## Text for the PRD
+
+Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
+
+> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
+> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
+> <prd.approve decision id>.
+
+Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
+
+> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
+>   needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
+>   still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
+>   agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
+>   as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
+>   keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
+>   me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
+>   Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
+>   happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
+
+Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
+>   adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
+>   runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
+>   an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
+>   under this requirement, within these bounds:
+>   - The chief acts only in its own organization.
+>   - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
+>     credentialed roles.
+>   - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
+>   - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
+>     messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
+>     working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
+>     organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
+>     hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
+>     is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
+>     change.
+>   - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
+>   - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
+>     or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
+>     WebUI or the CLI.
+>   - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
+>   - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
+
+Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
+>   - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
+>     bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
+>     names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
+>   - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
+>     name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
+>   - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
+>     and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
+>     the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
+>     the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
+>     repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
+>   - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
+>     agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
+>     history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
+>   - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
+>     other role file grants it.
+>   - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
+>     the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
+>
+>   Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
+
+Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
+>   for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
+>   before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
+>   REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
+>   grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
+
+REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
+
+> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
+> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
+
+## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
+
+- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
+  sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
+- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
+  its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
+- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
+  named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
+- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
+  holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
+- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
+  duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
+  Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
+  sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
+  checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
+  bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
+- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
+  latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
+  the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
+  the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
+- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
+  credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
+  on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
+  (row 194 D2.3).
+- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
+  `hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
+- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
+  version lifts it.
+- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
+  check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
+  the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
+- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
+  mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
+  gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
+  owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
+- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
+  paragraph never edited in place except to append.
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1, #1690) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.

 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `launchpad/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
-# Row 192: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies sign-in itself (`--sso`)
-
-Launchpad, 2026-10-20. Author Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Issue #1690. Brief
-`docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md`. Design `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` (blob 9e3eadb15c80).
-Rulings sage-1340 (F1 to F6) and sage-1347 (F7, F8). Plan launchpad-0001.
-
-Base 53bb59462 (`base.txt`). Candidate: branch `launchpad/row192`, r1 83b32d8d8 and the round 2 commit on it.
-`candidate-manifest.sha256` lists the 18 changed code, test and doc paths; the packet files are not in it. Drift
-check at the r2 commit: `git log 53bb59462..origin/refactor` (origin/refactor ae3c36f24) touches none of the 18 paths.
-
-No request in any test goes to auth.diversecanvas.com, mosaic.woltje.com or 127.0.0.1:7332. Every provider
-is the fake OP in `tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs`: https on 127.0.0.1 with a throwaway self-signed certificate,
-and a fetch that refuses any other origin. The public Host in the tests is `console.example.test`, sent as a
-header to the test's own loopback listener. No test reads or writes `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`,
-`~/.mosaic`, a slot file outside its temp dir, or a live unit.
-
-## Files
-
-| Path | Change |
-| --- | --- |
-| `package.json`, `package-lock.json` | `oauth4webapi` 3.8.8, exact, at the root (design: the copy runs `npm ci` there). No other dependency. |
-| `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` | Accepts an optional `console.sso` key and checks it with `checkConsole`. Without the key, output is byte-identical (F2). |
-| `scripts/test-config.sh` | Test 25: a good `console.sso` passes; each refusal class refuses. 31/31. |
-| `packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs` (new) | `checkConsole`: shape, `publicOrigin`, 1 to 8 providers, issuer https with a trailing slash, slot names, `ALGS` (asymmetric only), 1 to 64 subjects. |
-| `packages/webui/src/sso.mjs` (new) | The relying party: `readSlot`, discovery and JWKS with retry, `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`, sessions, `health()`, `summary()`, `formTargets()`. |
-| `packages/webui/src/serve.mjs` | Under `sso`: public Host only on the human listener (F4), `/auth/*` routes, session check before every page and API route, CSP `form-action` adds the end-session origins, tester listener refusals (F8). |
-| `packages/webui/src/cli.mjs` | `--sso`, its refusals, slot reads, the start lines, `close()` on stop. |
-| `packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs` | Under `--sso` the session check already ran, so the header-user check is skipped; the Origin check uses `publicOrigin`. |
-| `packages/webui/src/public/app.js`, `bus.js`, `index.html` | 401 `sign-in required` signs the page out with a link to `/auth/login?return=...` (design test 24, F1). The Sign out form shows only when `/api/config` says `sso` (F7). |
-| `scripts/webui-service.sh` | Passes `--sso` through; `--send` refusal text names `--sso`. |
-| `packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs` | The `--send` refusal regex follows the new text. |
-| `packages/webui/README.md` | New section "Sign-in in the Console (Q175 phase 1, #1690)". |
-| `packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs` (new) | The fake OP. |
-| `packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs` (new) | 28 tests: three positives and design tests 1 to 23 (some split in parts). |
-| `packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs` (new) | 2 tests: design test 24 with F1, and F7. |
-
-## Tests run (single files, this worktree, final tree)
-
-| File | Pass | Fail |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| sso | 28 | 0 |
-| sso-browser | 2 | 0 |
-| pinned-copy | 10 | 0 |
-| serve | 4 | 0 |
-| preview | 11 | 0 |
-| proof | 4 | 0 |
-| proof-cli | 3 | 0 |
-| send | 13 | 0 |
-| service | 31 | 0 |
-| tester-listener | 10 | 0 |
-| tester-cli | 2 | 0 |
-| board-held | 3 | 0 |
-| send-browser | 2 | 0 |
-| docs-browser | 1 | 0 |
-| chat | 23 | 0 |
-| chat-browser | 11 | 0 |
-| bus-browser | 2 | 0 |
-| settings-write | 4 | 0 |
-| project-file | 10 | 0 |
-| instances | 5 | 0 |
-| routes | 5 | 0 |
-| `scripts/test-config.sh` | 31 | 0 |
-
-The first singles pass failed `pinned-copy` 1 of 10: `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND: Cannot find package
-'oauth4webapi'` from a copy's `sso.mjs`. The test's fixture repo writes an empty package.json and lock, so the
-copy's `npm ci` installs nothing, and `sso.mjs` imported oauth4webapi at module load. `cli.mjs` imports
-`sso.mjs` on every start, so plain `serve` broke. Fix: `sso.mjs` loads oauth4webapi inside `createSso`
-(`oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi')`). A Console without `--sso` never resolves the package. A real copy
-still has it from the root lock. Mutant 21 restores the static import and `pinned-copy` kills it. After the
-fix: pinned-copy, sso, sso-browser and serve rerun green (counts above).
-
-Not run by me (slot work, busy at the time): the full webui package suite, the cli suite, and
-`scripts/test-*.sh` other than test-config. `packages/cli/tests/stack-copy.test.mjs` and
-`stack-release.test.mjs` also build copies with an empty lock and are the ones to watch for the same
-failure. They need Sage's gate.
-
-## Mutants (`mutants.py`, run as `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`)
-
-Each mutant edits one source file, runs one test file filtered to one test name, and restores the file
-checked by sha256. Final run on the final tree: `/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-final.log`.
-
-| # | Mutant | Test | Result |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| 1 | drop validateApplicationLevelSignature | sso 9 | KILLED |
-| 2 | wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch | sso 9 | KILLED |
-| 3 | drop the subjects check | sso 10 | KILLED |
-| 4 | accept HS256 and none in ALGS | sso 11 start | KILLED |
-| 5 | take the provider from the query | sso 15 | KILLED |
-| 6 | tester listener reads sign-in cookies (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
-| 7 | tester listener takes Authorization (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
-| 8 | tester listener takes x-authentik-* (F8) | sso 12 | KILLED |
-| 9 | skip the login record delete | sso 7 | KILLED |
-| 10 | drop HttpOnly from the session cookie | sso 20 and 21 | KILLED |
-| 11 | refresh last-seen on every request | sso 13 idle | KILLED |
-| 12 | build redirect_uri from the request Host | sso 22 | KILLED |
-| 13 | serve the loopback read path under --sso (F4) | sso 22 | KILLED |
-| 14 | bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
-| 15 | bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1) | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
-| 16 | app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
-| 17 | app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
-| 18 | signInRequired takes any 401 | sso-browser 1 | KILLED |
-| 19 | Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7) | sso-browser 2 | KILLED |
-| 20 | CSP form-action without the end-session origins | sso 13 CSP | KILLED |
-| 21 | import oauth4webapi at module load | pinned-copy | KILLED |
-| 22 | restore the r1 relative returnPath (round 2, B1) | sso 14 | KILLED |
-| 23 | drop the second origin check (round 2, sage-1403) | sso 14 | SURVIVED, equivalent, guard kept (sage-1407) |
-
-Mutant 16 survived its first run: test 1 had no `getJSON` path. The History click on
-`/api/conversations` was added and it is now killed.
-
-## Deviations from the design
-
- **F1 (sage-1340).** `bus.js` `fetchRead` and `fetchApi` apply the same 401 `sign-in required` rule as
-  `app.js`, even when `/api/config` has no `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 1, mutants 14 and 15.
- **F7 (sage-1347).** A Sign out form (`POST /auth/logout`) in the command bar, hidden unless `/api/config`
-  says `sso`. Tested in sso-browser 2, mutant 19.
-
- **Proof header on 7333 under `--sso` (webby-0019 N2).** `cli.mjs` passes `testerProofHeader: null` under
-  `--sso`, since `--sso` refuses the proof pair and there is no header name to refuse. A request to 7333 that
-  still carries the old proof header is not refused for it. It gains nothing: under `--sso` no listener
-  reads a proof header (`proof` is null in `startServer`). Left as is.
-
-## Assumptions and choices
-
- **F8 (sage-1347).** Under `--sso` the tester listener refuses a request carrying `Authorization`, either
-  `__Host-mosaic` cookie or any `x-authentik-*` header, case-insensitive (Node lower-cases header names).
-  sso 12 sends one of each; mutants 6 to 8.
- **oauth4webapi loads lazily** inside `createSso` (see the pinned-copy failure above).
- **Client authentication** is `ClientSecretBasic`; the fake OP's token endpoint checks Basic auth.
- **Caps**: 1 to 8 providers, 1 to 64 subjects per provider, 64 sessions, 32 pending logins. The 33rd login
-  drops the oldest record (sso 17).
- **CSP**: under `--sso`, `form-action` adds each provider's end-session origin. Chrome applies
-  `form-action` to the redirect after the Sign out POST, so without it the logout stops at the Console.
-  Tested in sso 13 CSP, mutant 20. Without `--sso` the CSP string is unchanged.
- **`--send` refusal text** in cli.mjs and webui-service.sh now ends "or --sso".
- **Start lines**: one `Sign-in provider:` line per provider with id, issuer, subject count and state
-  (`ready`, `refused` or `unreachable`). No client id, secret or sub.
- **Test 1** uses `console.example.test` as the public Host, not mosaic.woltje.com (no request goes there).
- **Test 11 slot files**: the owner check is not tested; the test can't create a file owned by another uid
-  without privilege. Symlink, 0644, 0640 and a file under the repository are tested.
- **Test 23** covers a provider down at start: the Console starts, `/auth/login` is 503, loopback `/healthz`
-  is 200 with `sso: { a: 'unreachable' }`, one `discovery-failed` line, and the retry makes sign-in work. An
-  HS-only discovery at start refuses the start (in test 23 and in test 11 start).
- **Test 22**: a Host of bare `localhost` without a port is not in the table. It hits the older
-  `non-local Host refused` check before the sso check; a comment in the test says so.
-
-## Round 2 (webby-0019)
-
- **B1, open redirect after sign-in.** `returnPath` took any URL on `publicOrigin`, and dot segments can
-  normalize to a pathname of `//evil.example`, which a browser reads as scheme-relative in a relative
-  Location. Fix per sage-1403: `returnURL` (renamed) builds an absolute URL, `publicOrigin + pathname +
-  search`, checks its origin again, and returns its href. Anything else is `publicOrigin/`. The callback's
-  Location is now always absolute on the Console. Test 14 asserts the exact Location and its origin for each
-  case. It adds Webby's three rows (`/.//evil.example`, `/x/..//evil.example`,
-  `https://console.example.test//evil.example`), each now `https://console.example.test//evil.example`, a path
-  on the Console. It also adds `/board/./x`, which lands on `/board/x`. The positive test expects
-  `https://console.example.test/board?x=1`.
- **Mutant 22** restores the r1 relative `returnPath`; test 14 kills it.
- **Mutant 23** drops the second origin check. It SURVIVES, and I read it as equivalent: `checkConsole`
-  holds `publicOrigin` to a bare https origin, and a parsed https pathname always starts with `/`, so
-  `publicOrigin + pathname` can't parse to another origin. Webby agrees (webby-0022). Sage's ruling
-  (sage-1407): the check stays as an unreachable guard, and 23 is listed here as equivalent. That is a packet
-  note, not a candidate change.
- **N1.** The design cite is now blob 9e3eadb15c80 (`git rev-parse 83b32d8d8:agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`).
- **N2.** Listed under Deviations.
- **N3.** `SIGN_IN_COOKIE` has its own comment, above the row 177 comment and `TESTER_CHAT_WRITE`.
- **N4.** Row 200 (#1698) covers it: `stack-release.sh` refuses `config-console-key` before any stop when the
-  target's loader refuses the key, on activate and rollback.
- **N5.** No change.
-
-Round 2 runs, this worktree, final tree: `sso.test.mjs` 28/28 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/sso-r2.log`);
-mutants 22 and 23 (`/mnt/storage/scratch/launchpad-r192/mutants-r2.log`).
-
-## Not done here
-
- Row 200 (#1698, `stack-release.sh activate --sso`) is chained on this candidate and starts only after the
-  manifest is with Webby (sage-1369).
- Full suites are for Sage's gate.
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-53bb59462120a03a9f54b02881895e3f575e501c
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-95d9a48812eebc415e3605239788e5b0746f1457a3bf0f9b9651a8c745e8b0f6  package.json
-390cbb0ef88de6cbc6d8f43b9e212abfdf0ef0e1c88fa02f5ab790caabc53eed  package-lock.json
-726b71bcfdb4d9409cefc86bed2fbe8e678c6efb50bcf5bb22344aeda1eee201  packages/webui/README.md
-f7b6b68906f13a644854b8083287dfa2936e8defc6207d05739e89763cc91440  packages/webui/src/chat-http.mjs
-4a2d226bdbfee98b180103f71b3cb8122303cfac4aeece42bd30ce167ba6ff55  packages/webui/src/cli.mjs
-41ee8798c34ee491b80ae1b42c3e96cd5d12fb1603b1ab88ac2dd10b5fb27964  packages/webui/src/public/app.js
-e6c8f838eb7cdc2ae556c04451ca4c8f2d433117a17f285a144cfc7dff03e2a4  packages/webui/src/public/bus.js
-f276fa440ec938638cb3e0f1b812fafa929460a6b96f1dab4cf1076a7c0c18ea  packages/webui/src/public/index.html
-333d474b1c7e753938aedc639c08f9db0e787faf56aa8068d013fd304a0b3b7e  packages/webui/src/serve.mjs
-37b01ab0479d5f2a7ab9aac790931c6d88c790465392d9c0b65a105513f3e36b  packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs
-b624f044d361c648cefa161abe5f2b96e0cd8a83bc7816c9d501a2cd840988ca  packages/webui/src/sso.mjs
-84e31d4beba0de5ed6d192921bd7b016296c8b2a42b3fcf1176663e182320d9e  packages/webui/tests/helpers/fake-oidc.mjs
-ac01037743fcbf1efa641794d3878f113b6206033d2f66cde072a52ccfae1a51  packages/webui/tests/service.test.mjs
-9358e3755e174b61532e2c528e733ffcdb48941cbadb825f1b0254bc55d1920e  packages/webui/tests/sso-browser.test.mjs
-3f8527fd7ae1ffb2bffce3450971f125bd616954b534577ef54249c87f36e248  packages/webui/tests/sso.test.mjs
-f8307d4bd998634467fbed8748157754132b76affac051f320196161ce385e4a  scripts/mosaic-config.mjs
-3301c1fabf616bb961d62f6decd0a46dadb0f399b8ba7f3c2ca60023d2b24c78  scripts/test-config.sh
-7678bb6b45861c3dc6d775fc99269b1db7350ced60b89517d6ebeb4cc161781c  scripts/webui-service.sh
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# Row 192 (#1690) mutants: `python3 mutants.py <tree> [N ...]`. Each applies to the tree's source, runs one
-# test file (optionally one name pattern) and restores the file from a saved copy, checked by sha256.
-# Killed = test exit != 0.
-import hashlib, os, subprocess, sys, signal
-W = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[1]), 'packages', 'webui')
-if not os.path.isfile(os.path.join(W, 'src', 'sso.mjs')): sys.exit(f'ABORT no packages/webui/src/sso.mjs under {sys.argv[1]}')
-S, B, C, F = 'src/sso.mjs', 'src/serve.mjs', 'src/sso-config.mjs', 'src/public/'
-T, P = 'tests/sso.test.mjs', 'tests/sso-browser.test.mjs'
-M = [
- ('drop validateApplicationLevelSignature (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
- ('wrap the signature call in a continuing try/catch (9b)', S, [("try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {", "try { try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch {} } catch (err) {")], T, '^9:'),
- ('drop the subjects check (10)', S, [("if (name === undefined) {", "if (false) {")], T, '^10:'),
- ('accept HS* in algs (11)', C, [("export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['PS256',", "export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['HS256', 'none', 'PS256',")], T, '^11: start'),
- ('take the provider from the query (15)', S, [("const entry = record && providers.get(record.provider);", "const entry = record && providers.get(query.get('provider') ?? record.provider);")], T, '^15:'),
- ('let the tester listener read cookies (12, F8)', B, [("SIGN_IN_COOKIE.test(req.headers.cookie ?? '') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
- ('tester listener takes Authorization (12, F8)', B, [("Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'authorization') ||", "")], T, '^12:'),
- ('tester listener takes x-authentik-* (12, F8)', B, [(" || Object.keys(req.headers).some(h => h.startsWith('x-authentik-'))", "")], T, '^12:'),
- ('skip the login record delete (7)', S, [("if (key !== null) logins.delete(key);\n    // The provider", "// The provider")], T, '^7:'),
- ('drop HttpOnly from the session cookie (21)', S, [("`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}`", "`${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax`")], T, '^20 and 21'),
- ('refresh seen on every request (13)', B, [("sso.session(req, { touch: req.method === 'POST' || (req.method === 'GET' && !path.startsWith('/api/')) })", "sso.session(req, { touch: true })")], T, '^13: idle'),
- ('build redirect_uri from the request Host (22)', S, [("const redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;", "let redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;"), ("    const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n", "    const query = new URLSearchParams(search);\n    redirectUri = `https://${req.headers.host}/auth/callback`;\n")], T, '^22:'),
- ('serve the loopback read path under --sso (22)', B, [("if (sso !== null && !named && !(path === '/healthz' && req.method === 'GET')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'public Host required' });", "")], T, '^22:'),
- ('bus.js fetchRead ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n    if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))", "    if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows))")], P, '^a 401'),
- ('bus.js fetchApi ignores 401 sign-in required (F1)', F+'bus.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }\n    if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'", "    if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object'")], P, '^a 401'),
- ('app.js getJSON ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n    return { ok: res.ok, body };", "    return { ok: res.ok, body };")], P, '^a 401'),
- ('app.js api() ignores 401 sign-in required (24)', F+'app.js', [("    if (signInRequired(res, result)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }\n", "")], P, '^a 401'),
- ('signInRequired takes any 401 (24)', F+'app.js', [("res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required'", "res.status === 401")], P, '^a 401'),
- ('Sign out shown without the sso condition (F7)', F+'app.js', [("if (config.sso === true) { sso = true; $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }", "{ $('sign-out').hidden = out(); }")], P, '^the Sign out'),
- ('form-action without the end-session origins (CSP)', B, [("form-action 'self'${sso ? sso.formTargets().map(o => ` ${o}`).join('') : ''}`", "form-action 'self'`")], T, '^13: the CSP'),
- ('import oauth4webapi at module load (copies)', S, [("let oauth;\n", "import * as oauth from 'oauth4webapi';\n"), ("  oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi');\n", "")], 'tests/pinned-copy.test.mjs', '^serve runs from a copy'),
- ('restore the r1 relative returnPath (14, webby-0019 B1)', S, [("      if (u.origin !== publicOrigin) return home;\n      const out = new URL(`${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`);\n      return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", "      return u.origin === publicOrigin ? u.pathname + u.search : '/';")], T, '^14:'),
- ('drop the second origin check (14, sage-1403)', S, [("      return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;", "      return `${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`;")], T, '^14:'),
-]
-sha = lambda b: hashlib.sha256(b).hexdigest()
-only = sys.argv[2:]
-os.chdir(W)
-survived = []
-for i, (name, path, pairs, test, pat) in enumerate(M, 1):
-    if only and str(i) not in only: continue
-    orig = open(path, 'rb').read(); h = sha(orig)
-    src = orig.decode()
-    for a, b in pairs:
-        if src.count(a) != 1: sys.exit(f'ABORT {i} {name}: pattern found {src.count(a)} times')
-        src = src.replace(a, b)
-    try:
-        open(path, 'w').write(src)
-        p = subprocess.Popen(['node', '--test', f'--test-name-pattern={pat}', test], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, start_new_session=True)
-        try: out, _ = p.communicate(timeout=240)
-        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-            os.killpg(p.pid, signal.SIGKILL); out, _ = p.communicate(); out += b'\nTIMEOUT'
-        text = out.decode(errors='replace')
-        ran = [l for l in text.splitlines() if l.startswith('ℹ tests ')]
-        verdict = 'KILLED' if p.returncode != 0 else 'SURVIVED'
-        if verdict == 'SURVIVED': survived.append(name)
-        print(f'{i:2} {verdict} {name} [{ran[0] if ran else "no count"}]', flush=True)
-    finally:
-        open(path, 'wb').write(orig)
-        if sha(open(path, 'rb').read()) != h: sys.exit(f'ABORT restore failed for {path}')
-print('survived:', survived or 'none')
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Megavolt
+
+Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage under mos-0974 and mos-0977 item 5 for MVP T1 item 6, the
+credential store per agent with its own git identity (#1697).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `megavolt/*`
+branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Sage for MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC, #1691) under mos-0974 and mos-0977.

 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `morgana/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quackerjack
+
+Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
+rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
+section 7 (#414).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
+`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
+another seat's branch.
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+n=0
+for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do
+  c=$(tr '\0' ' ' < $p/cmdline 2>/dev/null) || continue
+  case "$c" in *shell-snapshots*|*chrome-devtools-mcp*|*sage-busy-now*) continue;; esac
+  if echo "$c" | grep -qE 'node --test|gate\.sh|mutant|scripts/test-[a-z-]+\.sh|docker compose'; then echo "BUSY ${p#/proc/}: ${c:0:160}"; n=$((n+1)); fi
+done
+[ $n -eq 0 ] && echo CLEAR
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -o pipefail
+# Landing gate template (2026-10-14): sed the G= and OUT= lines and this comment.
+# Sequential suites, each teed to its own log; stops at the first failure.
+G=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-wt
+OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/SET-ME-out
+cd "$G" || exit 9
+mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 9  # a missing OUT failed the row 142 gate at step 1 (2026-10-15)
+# test-task.sh live cases run `docker compose` from $G, so without a name the project is "wt"
+# and leaves wt_default behind (row 142 gate, 2026-10-15). Name it per gate dir and remove it on exit.
+export COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME="$(basename "$(dirname "$G")")"
+trap 'docker network rm "${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "removed network ${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME}_default"' EXIT
+# A gate tree without the node_modules link fails cli tests with ENOENT (2026-10-13).
+[ -d "$G/node_modules" ] || { echo "STOP no node_modules in $G"; exit 8; }
+echo "base $(git rev-parse --short HEAD) dirty $(git status --short | grep -vc node_modules) DOCKER_HOST=${DOCKER_HOST:-unset}"
+run() { local name="$1" dir="$2" cmd="$3"
+  (cd "$G/$dir" && bash -c "$cmd") > "$OUT/$name.log" 2>&1; local rc=$?
+  echo "$name rc=$rc $(grep -E '^ℹ (pass|fail) [0-9]+' "$OUT/$name.log" | tr '\n' ' ') | $(tail -n1 "$OUT/$name.log")"
+  [ $rc -eq 0 ] || { echo "STOP $name"; exit $rc; }; }
+# No pkg-queue step: scripts/test-queue.sh runs packages/queue/tests/ itself (same 156 tests; CI debate item 2a, Vikunja #274).
+for d in packages/*/; do p=$(basename "$d"); [ -d "$d/tests" ] || continue; [ "$p" = queue ] && continue
+  run "pkg-$p" "packages/$p" 'node --test tests/*.test.mjs'; done
+for s in scripts/test-*.sh; do n=$(basename "$s" .sh); run "script-${n#test-}" . "bash $s"; done
+echo GATE_PASSED
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Row 189 gate timing (for row 197, Herb)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20T19:25:04Z. Gate on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), one lane. The slot was mine. Seats may have run single test files at the same time, which the slot rules allow, and I did not record that.
+Start 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z, end 2026-10-20T19:20:36Z. Total wall time: 659 s.
+
+Wall time per suite is the gap between one suite's log mtime and the one before it (the first suite starts at start.txt), so it includes node start-up. node's duration_ms is listed where the suite prints it. Scripts print no duration.
+
+| Suite | Wall s | duration_ms s | Ended (UTC) |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| pkg-bus | 3 | 3.8 | 19:09:40 |
+| pkg-business | 3 | 2.2 | 19:09:43 |
+| pkg-cli | 388 | 388.5 | 19:16:11 |
+| pkg-control-board | 1 | 0.8 | 19:16:12 |
+| pkg-conversation | 35 | 35.4 | 19:16:47 |
+| pkg-discord | 3 | 2.6 | 19:16:50 |
+| pkg-harness | 12 | 11.6 | 19:17:02 |
+| pkg-ledger | 13 | 13.5 | 19:17:15 |
+| pkg-mosaic | 3 | 2.3 | 19:17:18 |
+| pkg-plugins | 0 | 0.3 | 19:17:18 |
+| pkg-project | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:19 |
+| pkg-runs | 1 | 0.8 | 19:17:20 |
+| pkg-seat | 6 | 6.2 | 19:17:26 |
+| pkg-tasks | 1 | 1.2 | 19:17:27 |
+| pkg-webui | 58 | 57.9 | 19:18:25 |
+| script-auth | 1 | - | 19:18:26 |
+| script-conductor | 5 | - | 19:18:31 |
+| script-config | 2 | - | 19:18:33 |
+| script-discord | 8 | - | 19:18:41 |
+| script-extension-package | 1 | - | 19:18:42 |
+| script-foundation | 40 | - | 19:19:22 |
+| script-land-work | 11 | - | 19:19:33 |
+| script-queue | 21 | - | 19:19:54 |
+| script-release | 11 | - | 19:20:05 |
+| script-task | 31 | - | 19:20:36 |
+
+Source: /mnt/storage/scratch/sage-g189/out/*.log mtimes and gate.log. The cli suite is about 59% of the run, and webui plus conversation add about 14%.
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Row 189: `stack-release.sh activate --no-send`
+
+Gitea #1687. Vikunja P19 #413 (Q175 interim, #412). Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md.
+Rulings: mos-0972 (the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2), mos-0973 (go; Sage builds,
+Dewey reviews; gate is the cli suite plus every scripts/test-*.sh). Base: def2e7932 (refactor, the
+brief commit on 9ae8c73ac).
+
+## What it does
+
+`activate ID BUSINESS --no-send` drops `--send` from `RUN_CONSOLE` in a new `send_for_target`, which
+`console_for_target` calls after `proof_for_target`. `install_stack` renders the unit from
+`RUN_CONSOLE` and `write_pointer` writes the pointer from it, so both lose the flag and `flags_drift`
+stays quiet afterwards. Only `activate` takes the flag; the parser sends every other op to usage
+(exit 4).
+
+`check_target` lets a `--no-send` activate name the pointer's copy only when the pointer's Console
+flags hold `--send`. That run is a live-copy re-pin, the same path row 187 uses for the proof pair:
+the plan prints the live-copy note, the run stops both units, backs up the stopped store and starts
+them again. A plain same-copy activate, or a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, still
+refuses `already-active`.
+
+`--plan` prints one `send:` line after the `proof:` line, for activate and rollback:
+
+- `send: dropped; --no-send was given`
+- `send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send`
+- `send: carried` (the pointer's `--send` goes on unchanged)
+- `send: off`
+
+The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-send was given`, or `--no-send was given and the pointer holds no
+--send, so there is nothing to drop`.
+
+Rollback and pm-on carry the pointer's flags as they are, so once `--no-send` has run, nothing adds
+`--send` back. There is no re-enable flag (mos-0973). Q175 phase 2 changes the Console flags in its
+own row.
+
+docs/TOOLS.md: `[--no-send]` in the usage block and one paragraph after the proof paragraph.
+
+## Tests (packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs, T55)
+
+1. Seeded preview pointer with `--send --tester-port 7333`: a same-copy `activate B acme --no-send`
+   passes. The pointer and the unit ExecStart lack `--send` and keep the other flags in order, status
+   says the unit flags match, the steps log has the drop line, the log line has from = to = B and the
+   backup sum equals the stopped store's, and the units stop and start in order.
+2. Plain same-copy activate, with `--tester-port` and with `--no-proof`, refuses `already-active`. So does
+   a same-copy `--no-send` once `--send` is gone, and on a pointer that never held it.
+3. The four `send:` lines, the live-copy note on the same-copy plan only, and the Console line right
+   after `send:` without `--send`. The run on a pointer with no `--send` logs the nothing-to-drop line
+   and no drop line.
+4. After `--no-send` on C1, a rollback to B leaves `--send` out of the pointer and the unit, the steps
+   log never names `--send`, and status matches. pm-on after `activate --pm-after-harness --no-send`
+   keeps it off.
+5. `--no-send` on rollback (with and without `--plan`), pm-on, status, adopt and rehearse is a usage
+   error with the usage text, nothing written, started or logged. The usage text shows `[--no-send]`.
+6. A pointer holding both the proof pair and `--send`: the plans for `--no-proof`, `--no-send` and both
+   name what each drops and carries. `--no-send` keeps the pair, `--no-send` with a new pair replaces it,
+   `--no-proof` keeps `--send`, and both together leave neither. Status matches after each.
+
+`planTail` gains `'send: off'` after `'proof: off'`, because every plan now prints the line. T36 takes
+`out.slice(-n)` around `planTail`, so its four slice counts grow by one.
+
+## Mutants
+
+mutants.sh in this packet, run on the candidate. Each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh and runs T55
+plus T1 and T2.
+
+- M1: the same-copy exception ignores `--no-send`.
+- M2: the same-copy exception allows `--no-send` without `--send` in the pointer.
+- M3: with `--no-send`, the pointer is written from `P_CONSOLE`, so it keeps `--send` while the unit
+  drops it.
+- M4: rollback re-adds `--send`.
+- M5: the parser accepts `--no-send` for rollback.
+
+Results: mutants-run.log, all five killed (M1 5 failures, M2 2, M3 7, M4 2, M5 2).
+
+## Deviations from the brief
+
+- The brief's line numbers were taken before row 163 landed. The candidate corrects them to the
+  9ae8c73ac lines (check_target :249-256, flags_drift :646-657, console_for_target :664-693, adopt
+  :828).
+- Test 5 also covers rehearse and `rollback --plan`, which the brief did not list.
+
+## Outbound calls
+
+None. The change edits an array before the existing unit render and pointer write. Every test uses
+the stand-in systemctl, units, stores and data root the file already builds; no test touches
+`~/.mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file.
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+M1 KILLED fail=5
+M2 KILLED fail=2
+M3 KILLED fail=7
+M4 KILLED fail=2
+M5 KILLED fail=2
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Row 189 mutants M1-M5: each mutates scripts/stack-release.sh in the sage-b189 worktree, runs T55 and
+# the plan-tail tests, and restores the file from a checked backup.
+set -uo pipefail
+WT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189
+OUT=/mnt/storage/scratch/sage-b189-mut/out
+S=$WT/scripts/stack-release.sh
+mkdir -p "$OUT" || exit 1
+cp -p "$S" "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" || { echo "backup failed"; exit 1; }
+ORIG=$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)
+[ "$(sha256sum "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "backup differs"; exit 1; }
+restore() { cp -p "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S"; [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ] || { echo "RESTORE FAILED"; exit 1; }; }
+trap restore EXIT
+
+mutate() {
+    case "$1" in
+        M1) sed -i '/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/d' "$S" ;;
+        M2) sed -i 's/{ \[ "\$NO_SEND" = 1 \] && \[\[ " \${P_CONSOLE\[\*\]} " == \*" --send "\* \]\]; } ||/{ [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; } ||/' "$S" ;;
+        M3) sed -i 's/^    write_pointer "\$TO" "\$RUN_PM" "\$RUN_PENDING" "\$P_CLAUDE" "\$T_SCHEMA" "\${RUN_CONSOLE\[@\]}"$/    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${P_CONSOLE[@]}"; else write_pointer "$TO" "$RUN_PM" "$RUN_PENDING" "$P_CLAUDE" "$T_SCHEMA" "${RUN_CONSOLE[@]}"; fi/' "$S" ;;
+        M4) sed -i 's/^        SEND_PLAN="send: off"$/        SEND_PLAN="send: off"; [ "$OP" != rollback ] || RUN_CONSOLE+=(--send)/' "$S" ;;
+        M5) sed -i 's/--no-send) \[ "\$OP" = activate \] || usage;/--no-send) { [ "$OP" = activate ] || [ "$OP" = rollback ]; } || usage;/' "$S" ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+for m in M1 M2 M3 M4 M5; do
+    restore
+    mutate "$m"
+    if [ "$(sha256sum "$S" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$ORIG" ]; then echo "$m NOT-APPLIED"; continue; fi
+    bash -n "$S" || { echo "$m SYNTAX"; continue; }
+    diff "$OUT/stack-release.sh.orig" "$S" > "$OUT/$m.diff"
+    (cd "$WT" && TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/t189 timeout 900 node --test --test-reporter=tap --test-name-pattern='T55|T1 |T2 ' packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs) > "$OUT/$m.log" 2>&1
+    fails=$(awk '/^# fail /{print $3}' "$OUT/$m.log")
+    if [ "${fails:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then echo "$m KILLED fail=$fails"; else echo "$m SURVIVED"; fi
+done
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Reviewer seat, Claude Opus 5.5, started by Mos (mos-0981, thread 03086006). Reviews Case 2 designs and MVP T1 rows 192 and 194.

 No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
-credentials of its own; until row 195 settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `webby/*` branches
 through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
@@ -1361,3 +1361,5 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-20T18:34:53Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r2 (DESIGN.md blob 3eb718b5e131 at 1a268249e), static | changes: C1 config.json console key fails old loaders (mosaic-config.mjs:113 rejects unknown keys; key add inside phase 2 window, rollback removes it, loader test), C2 app.js signs out only on opaqueredirect so 401 never shows sign-in; notes on tests 15/7/9a, Q-B 200-HTML classification, scratch Console flags; Q-E keep iss/sub escaped and capped; verdict sent to Sage, no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:40:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design review r3 (DESIGN.md blob a152fd58e18e at 817e8f51b), static | approve on condition D1 (slot file checks stay out of shared loader, shape-only there) as a line edit; D2 notes: slot root from configDir, scratch dataRoot, name discovery GETs for Mos; C1/C2 and notes verified; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
 2026-10-20T18:41:20Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | Q175 SSO design D1/D2 check (DESIGN.md blob eba861f5d2bb at d55d86bb0), static git diff 817e8f51b..d55d86bb0 | ack: D1 and D2 match; design approved; Mos C1 sequence confirm still open; no Gitea/queue record
+2026-10-20T18:57:10Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r2 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 5493c9df3ec0) | CHANGES to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 claim check on MOSAIC_CONFIG-only selection, B2 shared prefix drop-in dirs; N1-N7 notes; static read, no slot, no Gitea or queue record
+2026-10-20T19:00:04Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, 048f3c63) | row 190 design review r3 (#1688, DESIGN.md sha256 98236a1aff98) | APPROVE to Darkwing, cc Sage: B1 and B2 closed with M13 and M14, N7 settled by Sage's 48ebee0ff; static read, no slot; manifest round gets a queue review record (sage-1337)
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ reports checkout or copy identity and refactor drift, and writes nothing.
 ```
 scripts/stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
 scripts/stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
 scripts/stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -480,6 +480,14 @@ copies. It checks the file with `stat` and `realpath` and never reads the value.
 or `off`. On the live copy it also notes that the run re-pins the pointer's copy
 and only the Console flags change.

+`activate ... --no-send` (row 189, mos-0972) drops `--send` from the pointer's
+Console flags and the unit, so the Console serves reads and no human sends. It
+may name the live copy while the pointer holds `--send`; once `--send` is gone a
+same-copy `--no-send` refuses `already-active`. Later activates, `pm-on` and
+rollbacks carry the pointer, so send stays off. No flag puts `--send` back.
+`--plan` prints one `send:` line: `dropped`, `off` with or without the
+`--no-send` note, or `carried`.
+
 #### A target past c216f47db: the PM after the harness kind

 From c216f47db on, the bus launches the PM only with a `harness` kind in the
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send

 Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-0972 (Q175 interim, Vikunja #412). Owner Sage, reviewer Dewey, gate owner
-Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit.
+Sage. Base: refactor 9ae8c73ac (row 163 landed). Line numbers are at that commit. The candidate corrects them;
+the first draft took them before row 163.

 This row builds the tool only. The live restart without `--send` is a separate step afterwards, a same-copy
 activate under Q173 with a backup first and a STATE report after. No test here touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, the
@@ -14,11 +15,11 @@ Mos ruled that the Console runs without `--send` until Q175 phase 2, because wit
 process can forge `X-authentik-username` on 127.0.0.1:7332 and send as Jason (design section 8). On the pinned
 stack, the Console flags live in the pointer (`~/.mosaic-dev/state/stack-active.json`):

- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:658-687) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
+- `console_for_target` (scripts/stack-release.sh:664-693) carries the pointer's flags unchanged. Only
  `--tester-port` and the row 187 proof pair can change.
- `check_target` (:247-249) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:822).
- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:640-651) refuse
+- `check_target` (:249-256) lets an activate name the pointer's copy only for a proof-pair change.
+- `adopt` refuses once a pointer exists (:828).
+- A hand `webui-service.sh install` without `--send` makes `flags_drift` (:646-657) refuse
  `unit-flags-drift` on every later activate, pm-on and rollback.

 So the tool can't drop `--send` today. This row adds that one path.
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for mos-0974 (MVP T1 item 6) and the MVP plan
+(`jason-master-restart/projects/mosaic-mvp/PLAN.md` item 6, GAP-MAP G11 and G13; TARGET.md: "credentials store
+available for all agents; secrets protected with RLS equivalent" and "Agent uses own credentials for git and
+other actions"). Gitea #1697. Owner Megavolt (Opus 5.5, a new builder seat), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
+Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
+`agents/megavolt/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+This row draws a security boundary. Sage reviews the design's authority model, and Mos rules on it before any
+code is written.
+
+## What exists today (GAP-MAP, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
+
+- G11. Credential references exist per instance for Gitea and Vikunja only
+  (`packages/business/src/credentials.mjs`, `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs:103`). One
+  Claude env file is shared by every seat.
+- G13. Agents use their own Vikunja token (`packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs`). Git goes through the host
+  socket (`packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs`). Gitea tokens are loaded but never used.
+- The development repository's helper (`scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs`, wired in `.git/config` for
+  git.mosaicstack.dev) pushes as one identity. Until this row lands, seats push only their own `<seat>/*`
+  branches through it (mos-0981).
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. The store. Where each agent's credentials live, per instance, under the row 190 config canon. File modes,
+   ownership and the read path. Which process may read which entry, and how the bus enforces that (the "RLS
+   equivalent"). A process asking for another agent's entry is refused and logged.
+2. Kinds. Gitea (git over HTTPS, and the API), Vikunja, and the model provider. Say which kinds 10-27 needs
+   and which wait. The model provider entry must not copy jwoltje's `claude-session.env`. If it needs a new
+   provider account or subscription, flag it for Jason and don't pick one.
+3. Git identity and push. Each agent commits with its own name and email and pushes with its own token to a
+   remote it is granted. Which refs an agent may push (its own branches, never the default branch or another
+   agent's), and where that's enforced: the Gitea side (branch protection, token scopes) and our side. How
+   this fits the host git socket, or replaces it.
+4. Lifecycle. Issue, rotate (`rotateBy`, `expires`), revoke and delete, and what row 194 (agent lifecycle) calls
+   when an agent is hired or fired. A fired agent's credentials stop working at once.
+5. Who does what. Creating a Gitea user or token, or any account outside the fleet, is Jason's (Q173
+   exclusions). The design lists each such step as a command or UI action for Jason. Agents never mint
+   accounts.
+6. Migration. Today's seats (jarvis helper, seat tokens) keep working until each moves. The mos-0981 push
+   rule ends only when Mos says so.
+7. What this row closes in G11 and G13, and what stays open.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No credential value is read, printed, logged or committed. Tests use fake tokens in scratch roots and a
+  fake Gitea.
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, `~/.mosaic` or the live
+  `.git/config` of the canonical checkout.
+- No request to git.mosaicstack.dev, tasks.woltje.com or any provider from a test.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, Mos rules on the authority model, then Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus,
+business, cli and tasks suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the design's
+mutants are killed.
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Federation build rows R1, R2 and R5 (#414)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's orders mos-1023 item 1, mos-1028 item 2 and mos-1034 item 1. The design is
+Gizmoduck's `agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` at a1daa3c07 on `gizmoduck/federation-design` (r4.9,
+sha256 a31cbebd070f9e3a5ca4ccb158b1747c6f5a83c3469855705b0026a581fb5c6a). Duckworth approved r4.5
+(duckworth-0012), r4.6, r4.7 (duckworth-0020) and r4.8 (duckworth-0021, 8a22d0897 on `duckworth/reviews`),
+and acked r4.9 (duckworth-0024). r4.7 applies Jason's Q181 hosts, r4.8 adds N22's R8 checks and r4.9 names who
+runs them. None of them changes R1, R2 or R5. Section 7's table
+sets each row's scope and test gate. Vikunja P19 #414. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches
+(mos-0981).
+
+The other R rows are filed when their parents have candidates: R3 after R1 and row 196, R4 after R3, R5 and
+row 193's viewer level (193a, mos-1019), R6 after #412 phase 1, R1, R2 and R3, R7 after R1-R6 and row 190.
+R8 is a live window, not a code row. Its brief is the last section here.
+
+## Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator
+
+Owner Gizmoduck, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. No parent.
+
+`packages/business/src/access.mjs`: the access.json loader and validator from DESIGN.md section 3.5, and the
+pure `covers`. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks. The
+exported interface is what R5 and row 193a build against, so the manifest names it, and any change to it in
+review goes to Sage before it lands. Section 7 names `covers` but not the loader and validator exports or
+the context shape. Morgana's 193a (508ee4d61 on `morgana/row193a`) assumes `checkAccess(doc, {providers,
+peers, businesses})`, with `businesses` mapping an id to `{human, instances}`, throwing a `BusinessError` that
+names the key path. Use those names, or tell Morgana and Quackerjack yours before the manifest goes to
+Duckworth. Row 193a later widens the level check to `viewer` on R1's candidate (mos-1019).
+
+Tests, in `packages/business/tests/`: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named. That covers a
+symlink, a non-regular file, another owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, a grant disjoint from the given
+subjects, `human` and `tester` ids, any level other than `collaborator`, and a project entry that isn't a
+UUID. For `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, while an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an
+expired grant doesn't, and a level filter rejects another level. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. Tests
+use scratch roots. Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on R1 (Q177). The build starts now against
+R1's exported interface as the R1 manifest names it, and R5 lands after R1 and rebases onto R1's landing.
+
+`mosaic access list`, `grant` and `revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, a receipt line. The help
+text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order (DESIGN.md section 7, row R5). R4 later makes
+these verbs call `access.reload`, so R5 leaves no other reload path.
+
+Context (sage-1419). `ssoSubjects` is row 192's `console.sso.providers[].subjects` flattened to `{provider,
+sub}` pairs; the design's "`console.sso.subjects`" in 3.5 is shorthand for it. `providers` is the list of
+`providers[].id`, read through `loadSystem` and row 192's `checkConsole`. `peers` is `[]` until R2 lands, so a grant
+naming a peer home refuses. R5 rebases onto row 192's landing as well as R1's.
+
+Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/`: tester and agent callers are refused, a concurrent write refuses on a
+revision conflict, the receipt line is appended, and a bad grant is refused before anything is written. One
+mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. The
+human proof in tests uses the scratch stand-in pattern (a scratch bus verifies its own human-cli path).
+Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192 (#412 phase 1). The build starts when
+row 192 has a candidate, on that candidate.
+
+A `federation` key in `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` with the shape in DESIGN.md section 3. A config with no
+`federation` key still loads as it does today. This changes the config schema, so the manifest lists every
+reader of the key.
+
+Tests, in `scripts/test-config.sh`: a valid key loads, an unknown sub-key and a bad origin refuse, and a
+config without the key loads. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is user-authored and is not touched. Tests use scratch config
+dirs only.
+
+Gate: Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and
+the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54
+
+A live window, not a code row (DESIGN.md section 7, row R8). The brief follows r4.11, b93f098f0 on
+`gizmoduck/federation-design` (sha256 1bcee8df0a3a8628a6646535b756c936ca6d9e7bcfa7e1dd2bf1d3f01715c8e6),
+which Duckworth acked with r4.10 (duckworth-0034). Mos closed design rounds there (mos-1072). Run by Jason and
+Mos. Nothing here authorizes a step on any host; each step waits for the window's go.
+
+What changed since r4.9 (DECISIONS Q182, Q183, mos-1055, mos-1063). R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts
+with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. The privilege and host
+checks still run, and each result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and
+don't refuse. The four functional checks named at the end of section 7's R8 row still stop R8 when they fail
+(mos-1066 item 1).
+
+Order (mos-1042 item 2). R8 runs after the Case 2 install on .54 (#416, due by 2026-10-27, Jason's latest-by
+date in Q176, mos-1069), after Bean and Chet are live in Case 2, and after both Hermes gateways on 10.1.1.54
+have stopped. Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The risk, stated for 10-27: federation between the two
+instances depends on Melanie's switch-over date.
+
+Entry checks, all before anything starts:
+- R7, #412 phase 2 and Jason's #419 answer, as section 7 lists.
+- The four hub user checks on 10.1.1.54 (N22, mos-1035 item 1): `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id
+  mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under
+  `/etc/sudoers.d` names `mosaic`. An agent or Jason runs them as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes
+  into the R8 record with who ran them.
+- The factory privilege checks, the key fingerprint comparison and the section 8 privilege path table, each
+  as section 7's R8 row states them.
+
+Build notes:
+- N1 (Duckworth, duckworth-0034, mos-1072). A check that fails on a path Jason didn't name in Q182 or Q183 is
+  marked "not named in Q182 or Q183" in the record, not filed under the acceptance. Examples: a factory mount
+  of hub data, another agent on .54, a provider admin token. Mos takes each one to Jason.
+- N2 (Duckworth, doc-only). The Q183 and Q4 quotes in section 8 are excerpts. When the R8 record quotes them,
+  it marks each omission with "…" and checks the full text at DECISIONS.md:1535-1541 in jason-master-restart
+  (read only).
+
+Done when every entry check has its output recorded, Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie
+revokes, and his next request is refused.
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-1078 (Vikunja P19 #426) and its go mos-1083 item 1. Owner Rocko,
+reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. Starts after row 191.
+
+## Why
+
+Morgana force-pushed a seat branch on 2026-10-20 (morgana-0016). Mos took it to Jason. Force-push is a
+Q173 exclusion, and canon says never force-push, but nothing mechanical stops one. Mos: "Done means a
+force-push from a seat worktree is refused, with a test that shows it."
+
+Earlier the same day, a busy check chained as `| tail -1 &&` passed while the slot was BUSY. The script it
+called prints BUSY or CLEAR, but it exits 0 either way.
+
+The guard has two layers:
+- (a) Gitea protection with force-push off on seat branch patterns and on refactor, next and main. ops-01
+  sets it up, through Mos (mos-1082). That part isn't this row.
+- (b) The client hook below. It can be bypassed with `--no-verify`, so (a) is the real guard and (b) is the
+  early refusal.
+
+## What ships
+
+1. `scripts/git-hooks/pre-push` (new). For each ref line git passes on stdin:
+   - It refuses when the remote sha isn't all zeros and isn't an ancestor of the local sha (`git
+     merge-base --is-ancestor`). The refusal names the ref and both shas, and the hook exits 1.
+   - A new branch passes. A delete (local sha all zeros) is refused.
+   - Any failure of the check refuses too, for example an unknown remote object. The hook fetches nothing.
+     If the remote tip isn't present locally, it refuses and says to fetch first.
+2. Install, following `scripts/queue-commit.sh --install-hook`. Either add a `--install-push-hook` there or
+   ship a small `scripts/install-git-hooks.sh`, whichever fits the existing code better. Say which in BUILD.md.
+   - The install copies the hook into the common `.git/hooks`, which every seat worktree shares.
+   - It refuses when `core.hooksPath` is set (the husky trap, 2026-10-09). It refuses when an installed
+     pre-push differs from the repository copy, unless `--force-install` is given.
+   - It never edits the installed copy in place.
+3. `scripts/slot-busy.sh` (new), the shared busy check.
+   - It prints one BUSY line per matching process, or CLEAR.
+   - It exits 0 on CLEAR, 1 on BUSY and 2 on its own error.
+   - It matches `node --test`, `gate.sh`, `mutant`, `scripts/test-*.sh` and `docker compose` command lines.
+     It skips its own process and shell snapshots.
+   - It reads `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and the cwd link only, never file contents under another seat's
+     directory.
+   - Usage in `docs/TOOLS.md`: `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh > LOG && gate`, with `set -o pipefail` in any
+     script that pipes it. Never `| tail -1 &&`.
+
+## Tests
+
+Add them to `scripts/test-land-work.sh` or a new `scripts/test-git-guard.sh` (say which). Run against a scratch
+bare remote and a scratch clone with a worktree, never against origin:
+- A rewritten branch pushed with `--force` from a worktree is refused, and the remote ref is unchanged.
+- A `+refspec` push is refused.
+- A fast-forward push passes.
+- A new branch passes.
+- A delete is refused.
+- A remote tip that's missing locally is refused.
+- The install refuses with `core.hooksPath` set, and refuses a differing installed hook.
+- `slot-busy.sh` exits 1 with a fake `node --test` process running (a sleeping stand-in with that argv),
+  and 0 without one.
+- `slot-busy.sh | tail -1 && false` doesn't apply here. The test runs `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh >/dev/null
+  && echo ran`, and asserts it doesn't print `ran` while BUSY.
+
+Mutants, each killed:
+- drop the ancestor check
+- treat an unknown remote object as passing
+- let a delete pass
+- install over a set `core.hooksPath`
+- `slot-busy.sh` exits 0 on BUSY
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Install the hook in the canonical checkout only after landing, as its own step with Sage. Tests use
+  scratch repositories.
+- No push to origin from a test. No change to Gitea config. That's ops-01's.
+- Don't touch `~/.mosaic`, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`.
+
+## Gate
+
+Dewey approves the manifest. The new or changed `scripts/test-*.sh` file and every other `scripts/test-*.sh`
+are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. Done when the hook is installed in the canonical
+checkout and a scripted force-push from a seat worktree to a scratch remote is refused there. ops-01's
+server proof (a refused force-push, plus a fast-forward push and a new branch that go through) is recorded
+in Vikunja #426 by Mos.
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Jason's rulings Q183 and Q184 relayed by Mos (mos-1056 item 3, mos-1067). Gitea #1707, Vikunja P19
+#424, due 2026-10-27 (Q184: "Q5: by 10.27"). Owner Gizmoduck (design and build), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
+Sage. Chained on row 199's candidate (Q177): row 199 design r6 (4d3007ec9 on `megavolt/row199`, approved in
+duckworth-0027) is not reopened. This row lands after 199 and rebases onto its landing.
+
+## What Jason asked for
+
+Q183, through Mos: "I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works as some sort of variable for
+the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to keep the agents sandboxed with proper
+security... If we can utilize the credential store in Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with
+NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a happy man." Q183 also says not every agent needs that access.
+
+Mos's requirements (mos-1067 item 1):
+- An agent asks for a host credential by name.
+- The stack checks a grant for that agent and that host, and does the ssh and sudo for it.
+- The agent never sees the key or any secret value.
+- Only agents with a grant can do it.
+
+The PRD text is REQ-CRED-3, drafted by Honker for PRD 1.7 (sage-1422). If it misses 1.7 it goes into 1.8, and
+this row lands only after the version that holds it is approved.
+
+## What row 199 gives and what it doesn't (megavolt-0019)
+
+It builds on 199 as 199 stands: the store layout under `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/`, the
+lifecycle verbs and their `changes.jsonl` receipts, `useFor(session, service, fn)` with the D5 allowlist test,
+`assertClean` on every result, and the grant shape of `publish` (a list on the role entry, checked by the
+broker, plus a hard-wait action that isn't routed).
+
+This row's own changes:
+- A host kind in the closed kind set (vocabulary.mjs `SERVICES`, credentials.mjs, the broker's service check,
+  the CLI date flag, the remove regex), with a naming rule for one credential per host or per agent.
+- A per-kind value check. An OpenSSH private key fails today's `TOKEN` pattern.
+- Handing the key to ssh without the agent seeing it: an ssh-agent on a private socket, or a 0600 temp file
+  removed on every path, the way publish's one-shot helper works.
+- Pinned host keys per host, and no trust on first use.
+- The command boundary: what an agent may run under sudo, and how output returns without echoing the secret.
+  This is the main design work.
+- The executor: a ticket and a host op running in the bus child, the same split row 199 uses for publish
+  (Megavolt's deviation in 199's BUILD.md).
+
+## Steps
+
+1. DESIGN.md first, in `agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-ROW/`. It answers each item above, names the grant shape
+   (`roles.<agent>.hosts` and a `host.sudo` action, or a reasoned alternative), says who grants (Jason, through
+   a reviewed role change, unless REQ-CRED-3 says otherwise), and lists tests and mutants. Duckworth approves it
+   before code. Sage reads it too, because it gives agents sudo on hosts.
+2. Build on 199's candidate. Single test files run freely. Suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+3. The live part is not this row. Putting a key in the store and granting a host is a separate window with
+   Jason or Mos, after landing.
+
+## Hosts
+
+The first targets are `localadmin` with NOPASSWD sudo on 10.1.1.53 and 10.1.1.54 (#423 step 1, applied by
+ops-01 at 20:05:47Z), and the servers agents already reach as localadmin (Q172). ops-01 owns the host side.
+Tests use scratch sshd fixtures on 127.0.0.1 or fakes, never a real host.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files, the live units or `~/.mosaic`. No key is
+  read, copied or printed. No ssh to any real host from a test or a seat.
+- No widening of row 199's kinds or regex inside row 199. Both rows touch them, so this row rebases after 199
+  lands.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed (one per refusal, plus one that leaks
+the key into the agent's output and one that skips the host key pin).
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, third version, for Darkwing's rewrite request and sage-1439. Gitea #1693.
+
+Why it changed:
+- The first two versions put Melanie's hub on its own Linux user, then on its own host, Jason's choice under
+  #419.
+- Q181 settled the hosts: Case 1 (Jason's software factory) runs on 10.1.1.53 and Case 2 (Melanie's hub) on
+  10.1.1.54.
+- Q182 and Q183 made the hub's privilege checks a recorded acceptance. They report and don't refuse
+  (federation R8, mos-1055, mos-1063, mos-1066).
+- The Case 2 install on .54 is Gosalyn's C2-13 plus its window (#416, due by 2026-10-27). It is not this row.
+
+This row now installs Case 1 on .53. On the 10-27 MVP path (mos-0974, T1 item 1).
+
+Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190's candidate (the config
+canon) and on C2-13's candidate (the install script), Q177. It reuses C2-13's `case2-install.sh`,
+`case2-precheck.sh` and `case2-unit.sh` by input, not by copy. A gap in them goes to Gosalyn as a C2-13
+change, or into this row's manifest as a named, reviewed change to those files. Design first:
+`agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## Goal
+
+Jason's software factory runs on 10.1.1.53 as `mosaic` under `/srv/mosaic`, in the same unit form as Case 2
+(design 9, Q181). It uses row 190's config canon and the model account the factory uses today (Q185,
+mos-1081 item 1). No new provider account.
+
+## Provision
+
+- ops-01 runs the root steps over ssh as `localadmin`: `useradd mosaic`, `/srv/mosaic` and the unit through
+  `case2-unit.sh` from a root-owned checkout. #423 step 1 (localadmin with NOPASSWD sudo on .53 and .54) was
+  applied at 20:05:47Z (mos-1066, mos-1077), and nothing else in #423 gates this row.
+- #423 step 4 (jarvis sudo) waits until Case 1 is live on .53.
+- The host list comes from Q181. Agents may run read-only checks on .53 as `localadmin`.
+
+## The design must state
+
+1. The install as input values to C2-13's scripts: user, home, business file, roles, the human id, the
+   token slot path. Which commands run as `mosaic` through `sudo -u mosaic -H`, and which as root through
+   ops-01.
+2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2: the factory roles in place of the library business, no library sync,
+   and any precheck item that doesn't apply, each with a reason.
+3. Model access through the existing factory account (Q185). Placing the credential on .53 is a step under
+   the Q173 secrets rule, done in the window. It is never copied by the script, and its value is never
+   printed.
+4. Re-pin, rollback and backup on .53, and who runs them.
+5. The acceptance checks, as code Duckworth can read. Each check names a path and gives it one of three
+   marks: closed, accepted under Q182 or Q183, or "not named in Q182 or Q183". An accepted path doesn't
+   fail the row. An unnamed one is reported to Mos, who takes it to Jason (the R8 N1 rule). The functional
+   checks fail the row when they fail: the unit runs as `mosaic`, the Console answers on its port on the
+   internal network only, and one tester message gets a reply.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Infra and k3s changes, exposure outside the internal network, and spend stay Jason's (Q173 exclusions).
+- No change to dragon-lin's `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, its live units or `~/.mosaic`.
+- No credential value is printed, logged or committed.
+- Tests use scratch roots and stand-ins. Nothing in a test reaches .53.
+- The run on .53 is a window with Jason's or Mos's go, a backup first where state exists, and a STATE report
+  after.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the window's acceptance
+run passes on .53, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0989 (P19 333, MOSAICSTA-173, is now on the 10-27 path: federation R3 and
+row 193 need it). Gitea #1694. Owner Gander (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat under mos-0977 item 5),
+reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Latest-by: DESIGN.md approved by 2026-10-22, landed by 2026-10-24, and in
+any case before federation R3 lands. R3 and row 193 may chain on this row's candidate (Q177). Base: refactor at
+the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/gander/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## The problem, as filed and as it now matters
+
+P19 333 as filed (row 87, mos-0657): the Console listens on a loopback TCP port, and any host process that
+reaches it, under any uid, acts as Jason. Jason accepted that as a documented limit for a one-user host
+(mos-0787, row 161). Two things change that:
+
+- Row 190b (#1693, mos-0986) puts Melanie's hub under its own Linux user. Factory processes then sit on another
+  uid, on the same host, next to the hub's ports and socket. The other-uid reach is now the Case 2 threat.
+- Federation r2 (gizmoduck-0004, 60b9b112a) binds a bus user only from a user-cli whose proof passes the human
+  walk, whose direct parent is the bus's own Console, and which holds a live grant. That rule rests on the
+  path-bound human proof (#225): today a same-uid process that runs the tree's `human-cli.mjs` acts as the
+  human, without touching the Console. The Q175 design (section 8) names that limit and leaves it here.
+
+## What already settles part of it
+
+- Q175 phase 2 (#412) settles the Console-ingress part on the main port. Under `--sso`, 7332 answers any
+  non-public Host with 403 except `GET /healthz`, and every other request needs a verified OIDC session. A
+  process on another uid that reaches the port gets only `/healthz`. Phase 1 (row 192) builds it; it is live
+  only after the phase 2 window.
+- Row 189 (`--no-send`) is interim only. Until phase 2 the Console takes no human writes, so the reach is
+  read-only. It settles nothing.
+- Row 190b separates files and units by uid. Whether the hub's `broker.sock` refuses the factory uid depends on
+  its directory and socket modes, which this row checks and tests rather than assumes.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Inventory every listener and entry point per instance: the Console port, the tester listener (7333 today),
+   `broker.sock`, the human CLI wrapper, the Discord connector and anything row 190 adds. For each: who can
+   reach it today from the same uid and from another uid, with and without `--sso`.
+2. The tester listener. It serves reads and the row 175 tester writes to anything that reaches it, on any uid.
+   Close the other-uid reach (for example a unix socket with 0600 modes, or a peer-uid check on loopback), or
+   bring Mos a concrete reason it must stay open. bus.tester stays Jason's switch.
+3. The bus human boundary. How the bus tells the human's own verified call from a same-uid process that runs
+   `human-cli.mjs`. State what federation R3's direct-parent rule needs from the bus (peer credentials on
+   `broker.sock`, the parent check, how it can't be forged by a child of an agent), and what stays possible for
+   a same-uid process after this row. Say it plainly where a residual limit remains.
+4. Fit with row 193 (Morgana, human users and roles; Mos's B1 rule: a principal comes only from something the
+   bus verifies) and with federation R3. One mechanism, not three.
+5. Migration: the live single-user Console and bus keep working until each instance re-pins.
+6. Which parts of P19 333 this row closes, which parts Q175 phase 2 closes, and what P19 333 says when it is
+   closed.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Who can reach the Console from outside stays Jason's. This row changes what a host process can do once it
+  reaches a local port or socket.
+- No test touches `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or a slot file. No test creates a real
+  second uid; use stand-ins as rows 190 and 190b do, and name any part only a Q173 window can prove.
+- No request to the live 127.0.0.1:7332 or 7333, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, webui and cli suites and every `scripts/test-*.sh`
+are green on Sage's gate, and the design's mutants are killed.
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Row 193 build rows: 193a, 193b1, 193b2, 193c and 193d (#1691)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's go mos-1034 item 4. Row 193's design is Morgana's
+`agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md` at e2d161e2e on `morgana/row193` (r5, sha256
+dd7fcb419ed8510e9d8d74b569183386d0942af8b68eecc0bbb5e182e677b523), approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0018).
+Section 8 lists the tests and mutants, and section 9 the split. The brief behind them is
+`docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md`. Vikunja P19 #414/#415, Gitea #1691.
+
+Owner Morgana for every row, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Each row chains on its parent's candidate
+(Q177) and rebases onto the parent's landing. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches (mos-0981).
+Single test files run freely, and suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+
+Boundaries for every row: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, any
+live access.json or `~/.mosaic`. No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+No user thread goes live before 193b1's message filter has landed (mos-1021 B2, FED R8).
+
+The owner-visible records are fixed by Mos (mos-1023 item 2) and named in one user sentence, which FED R6
+reuses word for word: "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks
+and project files, but not your messages."
+
+## Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer
+
+Chained on FED R1. Started early on `morgana/row193a` (508ee4d61) against R1's interface as the FED brief
+names it, with Sage's go (sage-1373). R1's level check accepts `viewer` and still refuses any other new
+level. Tests in `packages/business/tests/` (section 8, Business), with the four mutants in Morgana's
+BUILD.md. FED R4 chains on this row.
+
+Duckworth's N1 on R1 (duckworth-0033, sage-1417): with viewer added, `covers` called with no level would let a
+viewer grant cover a collaborator ask. This row makes `level` required in `covers`, with a test and a mutant that
+makes it optional again. R3 and R4 call `covers` with a level.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
+
+Chained on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. The bus gets the viewer verb list, per-grant level
+checks, board reads refused to users, and the section 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter with `#readable`
+owner-only. No schema change. The governance pin test names each item in the user sentence above. Bus tests
+and mutants 1, 3, 6, 10, 11 and 12 from section 8.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j)
+
+Chained on 193b1. `thread_shares`, the share verbs, the share rules of `#readable` and `#threadRead`, and the
+section 5.5 share filters. Schema 3i to 3j. The table is append-only, and row 181's restore guard and
+`COUNTED` include it. Bus tests for shares and the migration, and mutants 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 from section 8.
+Going live needs a `--migrate` window with Jason. Sage takes it to Mos when this row is near.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite, the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
+Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer
+
+Chained on FED R5. `mosaic access user add/remove` and `grant --level viewer`, only where R5 lacks them. They
+refuse tester and agent callers, write a receipt line and call `access.reload` (section 8, CLI). If R5
+already has all of them, this row records that and closes with no code.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only
+
+Chained on FED R6, row 192 and 193b2 (for share controls). A viewer has no composer or share control, and
+with each UI check removed the bus still refuses (section 8, Webui).
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The webui suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ before any code, as Q175 did. Then the build follows the design, with tests and

 Two or more instances run side by side on dragon-lin. Each one has its own config file, data root (store,
 broker.sock, host.lock, state, runs, sessions, workspaces), businesses, bus unit, Console unit and port,
-tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. Nothing one
-instance does can read or change another's state. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
+tester port, Discord unit, Claude session env file, stack-active pointer and activation log. No instance's
+commands, units or tools address another instance's state by default or by mistake. On one uid this is
+addressing only, not a security boundary: a same-uid process can still read another instance's files.
+Isolation against that is row 190b (#1693, mos-0986), one Linux user per instance. The current instance keeps working unchanged: its
 config path, data root, unit names and ports stay as they are, and no re-pin is needed for it.

 ## Known single-instance points (GAP-MAP.md, measured at 9ae8c73ac)
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's ruling mos-1008 item 2. Gitea #1696. MVP 10-27 work. Owner Bushroot (Haiku 5.5, a
+low-level model under Q177), reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit.
+
+## Why
+
+`packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs` is a loopback HTTP service on 7331 with no authentication. It reads
+transcripts and writes through `/api/reply`. Any host process that reaches the port can do both. That fails
+Q175 ("zero trust with verification"). Gander found it in the row 196 inventory (gander-0004). Nothing listens
+on 7331 now (`ss -ltnp`, 2026-10-20T19:05:09Z), so retiring it costs the least.
+
+## Steps, in order
+
+1. Inventory first. List every reference to the control board and to 7331: scripts, units, `scripts/mosaic`
+   and other CLI dispatch, docs (AGENTS.md, READMEs, TOOLS.md), package.json scripts, tests, and the Console
+   (`packages/webui`). For each, say whether it starts the writer, reads its code, or only mentions it.
+   Commit the list as `agents/bushroot/work/queue-ROW/INVENTORY.md` and send it to Sage and Webby.
+2. Stop if something depends on it. If a reference shows a live dependency (the Console or another package
+   imports code that only the control board has, or a unit or script still starts it), stop. Sage takes it to
+   Mos before anything is removed.
+3. Otherwise retire the writer. Either remove the `serve` entry point, or make it refuse to start with a
+   message that points to the Console. Keep any read-only code another package imports, and say which.
+   Update the docs that tell people to start it. The AGENTS.md text about the control-board reply convention
+   is a separate matter. Change it only if it tells someone to start 7331.
+
+## Mos's call on the Console dependency (mos-1019)
+
+The inventory (004f133bd) found that the Console proxies `/api/board`, `/api/seen`, `/api/reply` and the
+conversation routes to `DEFAULT_BOARD` on 7331 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:12`), so the board view returns
+502 today. Mos took Sage's recommendation: retire the 7331 listener and its README start commands, and have
+the Console call the board's read code in-process, behind the Console's own auth (Q175 SSO on 7332).
+`/api/reply` stays only under `--send`. The DESIGN.md for that change comes before code, and Webby approves
+it.
+
+## Acceptance
+
+Nothing in the stack can start a writer on 7331. A test proves it: the entry point refuses (or is gone), no
+script or unit starts it, and a grep check finds no starter. Each change gets a mutant that brings the writer
+back and the test kills it. Mos added three items (mos-1019):
+
+- The board view answers from the Console with nothing listening on 7331.
+- Every board route sits behind the Console's auth.
+- A test proves `/api/reply` refuses without `--send`.
+
+Test fixtures that bind port 0 may stay if they only test the code in-process.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files or `~/.mosaic`.
+- No request to any live port.
+- Single test files run freely. Suites need Sage's slot.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves INVENTORY.md, then DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The control-board and webui package suites, the cli suite and
+every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-0977 item 6 ("put the design for a second gate lane on the list now")
+and the MVP push (mos-0974). Gitea #1695. Owner Herb (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, a new builder seat), reviewer
+Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at the brief commit. Design first. The first deliverable is
+`agents/herb/work/queue-ROW/DESIGN.md`.
+
+## Why
+
+Every full run shares one slot today. A full gate (cli suite plus every `scripts/test-*.sh`) takes about 13
+minutes or more, reviewers' runs and mutants take the same slot, and with eight or more seats building for
+10-27 the slot is the bottleneck. The slot exists because concurrent runs broke each other. The busy check is
+`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/busy-now.sh` (a copy of Sage's), and the gate is
+`agents/sage/work/gate-lane/gate-template.sh` (a copy of Sage's template). The host has 16 cores and 62 GB.
+
+## What the design must settle
+
+1. Every shared resource two concurrent runs can collide on, found from the code and tests, not guessed:
+   Docker compose project names and networks (`scripts/test-task.sh` and others), fixed TCP ports in tests,
+   unix socket paths and their 107-byte limit under TMPDIR, the sandbox's private `/tmp`, shared caches,
+   scratch and worktree paths, the queue lock, and any test that reads host-wide state (process lists,
+   `pgrep`, `/proc`). For each: how a lane gets its own copy, or why it is safe to share.
+2. Timing. Which tests have time limits that a doubled CPU load could break, measured, and what changes (a
+   bound, or a lane rule that keeps those suites apart).
+3. The lane mechanism: lane ids, a lock per lane that a run takes and releases even on a crash, the busy
+   check that reports per lane, and how a seat asks for a lane. Sage still grants it.
+4. The gate template takes a lane id and isolates everything from point 1 by it.
+5. Proof: two full gates on different candidates at once, three times, with zero cross-failures, plus the
+   wall time of each against a single-lane run. Any flake found is named with its cause.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live units, `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev` or slot files. The proof runs use
+  scratch roots only, and it needs Sage's grant of the whole slot while it runs.
+- Test code changes that only isolate a resource are in scope. A change to what a test checks is not, and
+  goes to its owner.
+- Docker networks and containers a run makes are removed by the run (trap), and nothing else is touched.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, both singly and in the two-lane proof.
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Launchpad's finding F3 on row 192 (launchpad-0001) and Q175 (#412). Gitea #1698. Owner
+Launchpad, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): it lands after row 192 and
+before the phase 2 window. Base: row 192's candidate.
+
+## Why
+
+The phase 2 window re-pins the Console to the phase 1 commit with `--sso --send --tester-port 7333`
+(`agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`, section 5). `scripts/stack-release.sh` doesn't know `--sso` today.
+Its `proof_checks` (`:751`) requires `--public-host`, `--auth-header` and `--allow-user` whenever a proof pair is
+carried, and the pointer's Console flags still hold the forward-auth pair (`--auth-header X-authentik-username
+--allow-user jason.woltje`) that `--sso` refuses to start with. So the window can't run through the script, and
+a hand-edited pointer is not an option.
+
+## What the row does
+
+1. `activate ID BUSINESS --sso` writes Console flags with `--sso` and without `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`
+   and any proof pair, and `--plan` names each flag it drops and carries, in the style of row 189's `send:`
+   line. The design names the full flag set the phase 2 Console starts with and checks it against row 192's
+   refusals.
+2. Before anything stops, the script refuses a target copy whose Console doesn't support `--sso`, and refuses
+   when the config's `console` key or its slot file fails the checks row 192's `--sso` start runs. It reads
+   neither value and only uses the same stat and shape checks.
+3. Rollback from an `--sso` pointer to a pre-phase-1 copy follows the design's phase 2 rollback order (remove
+   the `console` key first). The script refuses a rollback that would start a Console on a config it can't
+   read, and says which step comes first.
+4. `docs/TOOLS.md` gets the flag.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to the live pointer, units, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`. Tests use scratch roots
+  and seeded pointers, as rows 187 and 189 do.
+- No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+
+## Gate
+
+Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the
+mutants are killed (one per refusal, and one that keeps `--auth-header` in the written flags).
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.

 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->

-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2361 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.

 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -225,9 +225,29 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
 | 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
-| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
-| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
+| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | done | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | Landed ace27dc5e on refactor (cherry-pick of candidate d6116771f onto a4a42dbac). Gate GATE_PASSED on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z-19:20:36Z, 25 suites rc=0. patch-id ce89378718f6 for both 0c177e9ef and ace27dc5e; range-diff differs only in the message. Landed manifest hashes to 67af69bd (Dewey approve 29485). Base drift 0217b71c8..a4a42dbac: 7 doc/README files, none on manifest paths, no test reads them. Brief re-pinned to blob 29a9e6d2d. |
+| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
 | 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
+| 192 | Q175 phase 1: the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso), OIDC RP with oauth4webapi 3.8.8, no live change (MVP T1.2, #412) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1690 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest; webui and cli suites, scripts/test-config.sh and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; design section 9 mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md` § Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso) | — |
+| 193 | many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads, one access.json store (MVP T1.3, Vikunja #414/#415) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1691 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, business, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md` § Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads | — |
+| 194 | agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) with a per-agent hire/fire veto (MVP T1.5, Vikunja #414/#415) | honker; reviewers webby | #1692 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, cli, business and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto | — |
+| 195 | row 195: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 as mosaic under /srv/mosaic, reusing C2-13's scripts by input under row 190's canon (Q181, Q182/Q183, Q185; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1) | darkwing; reviewers duckworth | #1693 | briefed | 190 done | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md` § Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195) | sage-1439: rewritten to Case 1 on .53 (f24f2cd40). Chains on C2-13's candidate too once C2-13 is queued. Darkwing starts DESIGN.md after row 190's mutants. |
+| 196 | the human boundary across uids and humans: Console, tester listener, broker.sock and the path-bound human proof (P19 333, before federation R3, mos-0989) | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1694 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md` § Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333) | — |
+| 197 | a second gate lane: two full gates at once on dragon-lin, design first (mos-0977 item 6) | herb; reviewers webby | #1695 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate, singly and in the two-lane proof (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md` § Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin | Order with row 198 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. After B1 the shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review. |
+| 198 | retire the control board writer on 7331 (unauthenticated loopback writer, Q175; mos-1008) | bushroot; reviewers webby | #1696 | in-progress | 192 done, 197 done | Webby approves INVENTORY.md then the manifest; control-board, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_retire-control-board.md` § Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331 | Order with row 197 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review; shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. |
+| 199 | MVP T1 item 6: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote (G11, G13; mos-0974) | megavolt; reviewers duckworth | #1697 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md; Mos rules on the authority model; Duckworth approves the manifest; bus, business, cli and tasks suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote | — |
+| 200 | stack-release.sh activate --sso for the Q175 phase 2 window (row 192 F3; chained on 192) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1698 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md` § Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite) | — |
+| 201 | FED R1: access.json loader and validator, and covers (#414) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1699 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator | — |
+| 202 | FED R5: mosaic access list, grant and revoke (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers duckworth | #1700 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
+| 203 | FED R2: the federation key in the system config (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers webby | #1701 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config | Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): starts on 192's candidate, lands after 192 (Sage) |
+| 204 | 193a: access level check widened to viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1702 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
+| 205 | 193b1: viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter (#1691; also after FED R3 and R4 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1703 | queued | 196 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter | — |
+| 206 | 193b2: thread shares, schema 3j (#1691; live needs a --migrate window with Jason) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1704 | queued | 205 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite, cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j) | — |
+| 207 | 193c: mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1705 | queued | 202 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer | — |
+| 208 | 193d: Console shared list, share controls and viewer read-only (#1691; also after FED R6 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1706 | queued | 192 done, 206 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; webui suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only | — |
+| 209 | FED R8: the hub window on 10.1.1.54, a recorded acceptance (#414, r4.11 b93f098f0; live window run by Jason and Mos, after the Case 2 install #416, Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways stopped) | sage; reviewers duckworth | — | queued | — | Every entry check's output is in the R8 record with who ran it; Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie revokes, his next request is refused; Duckworth checks the record (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54 | Stays queued until its entry gates near: Case 2 install on .54 (#416, by 2026-10-27), Bean and Chet live, both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped, R7, #412 phase 2, #419 answer. Filed per mos-1073 after duckworth-0034 (Sage) |
+| 210 | Agent host access with sudo through the credential store: grant per agent and host, the stack does ssh and sudo, the agent never sees the key (#1707, Vikunja #424, Q183/Q184, due 10-27; chained on row 199's candidate) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1707 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest; bus, business, cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` § Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424) | Design runs before 199 lands (Q177 chain on 199's candidate). after cleared so Gizmoduck can claim; lands only after 199 and rebases onto it. |
+| 211 | Force-push guard: scripts/git-hooks/pre-push refuses non-fast-forward and delete pushes from every worktree, and scripts/slot-busy.sh exits 1 on BUSY (#1709, Vikunja #426, mos-1078/1083) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1709 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest; the new or changed scripts/test-*.sh and every other scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed; hook installed in the canonical checkout with a scripted refused force-push (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_force-push-guard.md` § Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426) | — |

 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->

@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@
      "version": "0.0.3",
      "license": "UNLICENSED",
      "dependencies": {
-        "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1",
-        "oauth4webapi": "3.8.8"
+        "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1"
      }
    },
    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/sdk": {
@@ -1934,15 +1933,6 @@
        "url": "https://opencollective.com/node-fetch"
      }
    },
-    "node_modules/oauth4webapi": {
-      "version": "3.8.8",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/oauth4webapi/-/oauth4webapi-3.8.8.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-8N28E+a/oxfXWBgOMt+ZP/JUf/XR+IFbvkAEPP3gznXOMv9BpAAwiIj0TFNz3tGTPc0ZQ8zmWBNgN1nAys0gng==",
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "funding": {
-        "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/panva"
-      }
-    },
    "node_modules/openai": {
      "version": "6.40.0",
      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/openai/-/openai-6.40.0.tgz",
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
  "description": "Minimal Mosaic Stack container proof of concept: one Pi agent, four local contract files, one real model request returning MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.",
  "license": "UNLICENSED",
  "dependencies": {
-    "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1",
-    "oauth4webapi": "3.8.8"
+    "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.85.1"
  }
 }
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ async function seed(e,{copy=B,pm=false,store='3g',pointer:how='adopt'}={}){
 const rolledBack=(code,to=B)=>`stack-release: ${code}; rolled back to ${to}, which passed the gate\n`;
 const planBackup=(e)=>`backup: the run backs up the stopped store to ${e.data}/backups/stack/<activation>/ before any migration`;
 const planNoBackup='backup: none; the run rolls back before the backup';
-const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];
+const planTail=(e,to,pm=false)=>[`bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES}${pm?' --pm':''} --claude ${e.claude}`,'proof: off','send: off',`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --port ${e.port} --business acme`,`CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper ${to} --copies ${COPIES} --bin ${e.bin}`];

 // --- The T table ---

@@ -1030,17 +1030,17 @@ test('T36 --plan shows the pending state and lists the row 169 refusals it can s
  return r.out.split('\n');
 };
 let out=await quiet(0,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,C1),'']);
 biz(e,HARNESS);
 out=await quiet(3,'activate',A,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the bus starts without --pm and the PM stays pending; next: Jason\'s plugins set of harness, then pm-on',...planTail(e,A),`refuses unknown-kind-for-target: the business file names plug-in kind(s) harness, which ${A} does not know`,'']);
 out=await quiet(3,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--plan');
 assert.equal(out.at(-2),'refuses pm-after-harness-set: the business file already sets harness ["claude-code"]; use --pm');
 biz(e);assert.equal((await run(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness')).code,0);
 out=await quiet(3,'activate',C,'acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-8),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,C,true),`refuses pm-pending: ${PENDING_MSG}`,'']);
 out=await quiet(0,'rollback','acme','--plan');
- assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-6),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
+ assert.deepEqual(out.slice(-7),['pm: the pointer is pending (activate --pm-after-harness); the bus runs without its PM',...planTail(e,B,true),'']);
 });

 // Row 176 test 11: supported and older Console copies deliberately differ from the checkout.
@@ -1706,6 +1706,113 @@ test('T54 row 188: a carried pair gets the proof file checks, and a proof file i
 });
 });

+// Row 189 (#1687, mos-0972/0973): activate --no-send drops the pointer's --send; nothing turns it back on.
+const sendLines=(out)=>out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('send:'));
+const noSend=(c)=>c.filter((x)=>x!=='--send');
+const LIVE_NOTE=`note: ${B} is the pointer's copy; the run re-pins it and only the Console flags change`;
+test('T55 row 189: activate --no-send drops --send, and rollback and pm-on carry it off',async(t)=>{
+ await t.test('test 1: a live-copy --no-send drops --send from the pointer and the unit, keeps the rest in order, logs the step and backs up the stopped store',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send','--tester-port','7333']),want=noSend(base);
+  assert.deepEqual(want.slice(-2),['--tester-port','7333']);
+  const sum=createHash('sha256').update(readFileSync(e.store)).digest('hex'),n=calls(e).length;
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,want);
+  assert.ok(conExec(e).endsWith(` --checkout ${repo} ${want.join(' ')}`),conExec(e));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  const act=pointer(e).activation,l=logLines(e).at(-1);
+  assert.deepEqual([l.op,l.from,l.to,l.result,l.backup],['activate',B,B,'ok',act]);assert.equal(backupSum(e,act),sum);
+  assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[`stop ${CON}`,`stop ${BUS}`,`start ${BUS}`,`start ${CON}`]);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 2: a plain live-copy activate still refuses already-active, and so does --no-send once --send is gone',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--tester-port','7333'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-proof'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  const r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  await refused(e,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  const g=await mk(t);await seedPreview(g);
+  await refused(g,['activate',B,'acme','--no-send'],'already-active',`${B} is the pointer's copy`);
+  for(const x of [e,g])await noLeak(x);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 3: --plan prints one send: line in each case, with the live-copy note on a same-copy run',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[LIVE_NOTE]);
+  assert.equal(out[out.indexOf('send: dropped; --no-send was given')+1],`Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy ${B} --copies ${COPIES} ${noSend(base).join(' ')}`);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme');
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(out),['send: carried']);assert.deepEqual(out.filter((l)=>l.startsWith('note: ')),[]);
+  assert.ok(out.find((l)=>l.startsWith('Console: ')).endsWith(' --send'));
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send')),['send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.match(stepText(e),/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send')),['send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send']);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme')),['send: off']);
+  assert.deepEqual(sendLines(await planOnly(e,0,'rollback','acme')),['send: off']);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.match(stepText(e),/Z --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop\n/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/drop --send/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 4: after --no-send, a rollback to the earlier copy leaves --send out of the pointer and the unit',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(e,'rollback','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).copy,B);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(stepText(e),/--send/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 4: pm-on after --no-send keeps --send off',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,{pm:true},['--send']);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--pm-after-harness','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  biz(e,HARNESS);
+  r=await prun(e,'pm-on','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.equal(pointer(e).pm,true);assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,noSend(base));assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(e),/ --send( |$)/);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 5: --no-send on rollback, pm-on, status, adopt or rehearse is a usage error',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t);await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']);
+  const usageText=(await prun(e,'--help')).err,n=calls(e).length,logs=logLines(e).length,before=fp(e);
+  for(const args of [['rollback','acme','--no-send'],['rollback','acme','--plan','--no-send'],['pm-on','acme','--no-send'],['status','acme','--no-send'],['adopt','acme','--no-send'],
+   ['rehearse','acme','--backup','/tmp/x','--port','7400','--no-send']]){
+   const r=await prun(e,...args);assert.equal(r.code,4,args.join(' '));assert.equal(r.out,'');assert.equal(r.err,usageText);
+  }
+  assert.match(usageText,/\| --no-proof\] \[--no-send\]/);
+  assert.deepEqual(fp(e),before);assert.deepEqual(startsStops(e,n),[]);assert.equal(logLines(e).length,logs);
+  await noLeak(e);
+ });
+ await t.test('test 6: with both a pair and --send in the pointer, --no-send and --no-proof each drop what they name and keep the rest',async(t)=>{
+  const e=await mk(t),base=await seedPreview(e,undefined,['--send']),pre=noSend(base),f=await proofFile(e),g=await proofFile(e,'proof2.189',0o400);
+  let r=await prun(e,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(f));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f),'--send']);
+  let out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: carried']);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: carried, header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  out=await planOnly(e,0,'activate',B,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');
+  assert.deepEqual([...proofLines(out),...sendLines(out)],['proof: dropped; --no-proof drops header x-console-proof','send: dropped; --no-send was given']);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(f)]);
+  r=await prun(e,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send',...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two'));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(e).console,[...pre,...pair(g,'X-Proof-Two')]);
+  r=await prun(e,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  const h=await mk(t),hbase=await seedPreview(h,undefined,['--send']),hpre=noSend(hbase),k=await proofFile(h);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',B,'acme',...pair(k));assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,[...hpre,'--send']);
+  r=await prun(h,'activate',C1,'acme','--no-send','--no-proof');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.out+r.err);
+  assert.deepEqual(pointer(h).console,hpre);assert.doesNotMatch(conExec(h),/--proof-| --send( |$)/);
+  const steps=stepText(h);
+  assert.match(steps,/Z --no-proof was given and the pointer holds no proof pair, so there is nothing to drop\n/);assert.match(steps,/Z drop --send; --no-send was given\n/);
+  r=await prun(h,'status','acme');assert.equal(r.code,0,r.err);assert.match(r.out,/unit flags: match the pointer/);
+  for(const x of [e,h])await noLeak(x);
+ });
+});
+
 // --- rehearse (D2, row 163; the brief's "Stack rehearsal on a scratch root") ---
 // Copies of their own in RCOPIES: the real scripts/mosaic, config loader, business loader, roles and
 // mosaic-config.mjs, with stand-ins for the bus host (cli.mjs), the Console, the Store and
@@ -129,45 +129,6 @@ Switching the Console, bus or wrapper, changing any unit, and starting or
 stopping either service requires Mos's go for that live step. Agents build
 and test fixtures; they stop before the live sequence.

-## Sign-in in the Console (Q175 phase 1, #1690)
-
-`serve --sso [--send] [--tester-port N]` makes the Console an OpenID Connect
-relying party. It reads `console.sso` from the system config (`publicOrigin`
-and one or more providers, each with its issuer, client id, a client secret
-slot, the signing algorithms it accepts and the subjects allowed in). The
-design is `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md`. `--sso` can't be combined
-with `--public-host`, `--auth-header`, `--allow-user` or `--proof-*`; `--send`
-takes `--sso` in place of the preview set.
-
- The client secret is read once at start from
-  `<config dir>/secrets/mosaic-stack/<slot>`. The start refuses a slot that is
-  a symbolic link, not a regular file, owned by another user, has any group or
-  other mode bit, or sits in the repository, the `--checkout` directory or a
-  stack copy. The value is never printed.
- At start the Console fetches each provider's discovery document and JWKS. A
-  provider that can't be reached (a network error, a timeout, a status other
-  than 200, or a body that isn't JSON) leaves the Console up with that
-  provider's `/auth/login` at 503 and a retry every 5 s, doubling, capped at 5
-  minutes. A document that fails a check (issuer, algorithms, S256, a usable
-  key) refuses the start. `/healthz` adds `sso: { <id>: "ready" | "unreachable"
-  | "refused" }`.
- The Console listener serves only the Host of `publicOrigin`, whatever port
-  it listens on. Any other Host, a loopback one included, gets 403 `public
-  Host required`, except `GET /healthz`, which stays open on loopback for the
-  status and release gates. The loopback operator path in the preview section
-  above does not exist under `--sso`.
- Without a session, `/api/*` gets 401 `sign-in required` and a page load gets
-  a 303 to `/auth/login?return=<path>`. The page then shows the signed-out line
-  with a link back to sign-in. A session lasts at most 8 hours and ends after 1
-  hour without a page load or a write; a restart ends every session.
- The page shows Sign out only under `--sso`. It posts to `/auth/logout`, which
-  ends the session and goes to the provider's end-session endpoint when it has
-  one, or to `/auth/signed-out`.
- With `--tester-port`, the tester listener refuses any request carrying an
-  `Authorization` header, a `__Host-mosaic_session` or `__Host-mosaic_login`
-  cookie, or an `x-authentik-*` header (403 `tester listener takes no
-  sign-in`). It never serves `/auth/*`.
-
 ## Message a role (row 76, #1570)

 ```sh
@@ -58,9 +58,8 @@ export async function chatHTTP(req, res, { path, search, chat, named, send, prev
      if (one(req, 'origin') !== preview.origin) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
    } else {
      if (!send || !named || !preview) return refuse(403, 'read-only');
-      // Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the session was checked before this route.
-      if (preview.sso !== true && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return refuse(401, 'unauthenticated');
-      if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
+      if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return refuse(401, 'unauthenticated');
+      if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin');
    }
    if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site');
  }
@@ -7,23 +7,20 @@ import { views } from '../../bus/src/views.mjs';
 import { loadSystem, socketPath, REPO, rolesDir } from '../../cli/src/config.mjs';
 import { configDir } from '../../business/src/business.mjs';
 import { consoleReads, redactor } from './reads.mjs';
-import { createSso, readSlot } from './sso.mjs';
 import { statSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { ID_PATTERN } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
 const args = process.argv.slice(2);
-const usage = 'node packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve [--port N] [--tester-port N] [--checkout PATH] [--board http://127.0.0.1:7331] [--business ID] [--sso [--send]] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]]';
+const usage = 'node packages/webui/src/cli.mjs serve [--port N] [--tester-port N] [--checkout PATH] [--board http://127.0.0.1:7331] [--business ID] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]]';
 try {
  if (args.length === 1 && ['--help', '-h'].includes(args[0])) { console.log(usage); process.exit(0); }
  if (args.shift() !== 'serve') throw new Error(usage);
  const options = { board: DEFAULT_BOARD, port: 7330 }, preview = {}, proofFlags = {};
-  let sendOn = false, ssoOn = false, testerPort = null;
+  let sendOn = false, testerPort = null;
  while (args.length) {
    const flag = args.shift();
    // Row 76 (#1570): the one flag without a value.
    if (flag === '--send') { sendOn = true; continue; }
-    // Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the Console signs people in itself, from console.sso in config.json.
-    if (flag === '--sso') { ssoOn = true; continue; }
    const value = args.shift();
    if (!value) throw new Error(`missing value for ${flag}`);
    if (flag === '--port') {
@@ -54,10 +51,9 @@ try {
    else throw new Error(`unknown option: ${flag}`);
  }
  if (testerPort !== null && (testerPort === options.port || testerPort === 7332)) throw new Error('--tester-port must differ from --port and cannot be the forwarded port 7332');
-  if (ssoOn && (Object.keys(preview).length || Object.keys(proofFlags).length)) throw new Error('--sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*');
  options.preview = previewOptions(preview);
  const proof = proofOptions(proofFlags, options.preview);
-  if (sendOn && !options.preview && !ssoOn) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso');
+  if (sendOn && !options.preview) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)');
  // The bus views (slice 1 S5) need the system config. Without it the
  // board still serves and the bus routes answer not-configured.
  // The Queue, Business and Settings reads (row 54) need no bus; without
@@ -81,46 +77,31 @@ try {
    busLine = `Bus: ${options.business ?? 'the running bus host\'s business'}`;
  } catch (err) {
    const why = redactor({ configDir: configDir() })(err.message);
-    if (ssoOn) throw new Error(`--sso needs the system config (${why})`);
    if (sendOn) throw new Error(`--send needs the bus configured (${why})`);
    if (testerPort !== null) throw new Error(`--tester-port needs the bus configured (${why})`);
    busLine = `Bus: not configured (${why})`;
  }
  const reads = consoleReads({ root: REPO, queueRoot: options.checkout ?? REPO, system, configDir: configDir(), rolesDir: rolesDir(), business: options.business ?? null });
-  // The sign-in config is checked again here, then each slot file, before anything listens. A
-  // provider that can't be reached starts degraded; one whose discovery is refused stops the start.
-  let sso = null;
-  if (ssoOn) {
-    if (!system.console?.sso) throw new Error('--sso needs console.sso in the system config');
-    const secrets = new Map(system.console.sso.providers.map(p => [p.id, readSlot(configDir(), p, { repo: REPO, checkout: options.checkout ?? null })]));
-    sso = await createSso(system.console.sso, { secrets });
-  }
-  let server;
-  try {
-    server = await startServer({ board: options.board, port: options.port, bus, reads, preview: options.preview, sso, proof, send, settingsWrite, projectFiles, projectFile, projectSave, chat, nameWrite, assistantStop, instancesWrite, routesWrite });
-  } catch (err) { sso?.close(); throw err; }
+  const server = await startServer({ board: options.board, port: options.port, bus, reads, preview: options.preview, proof, send, settingsWrite, projectFiles, projectFile, projectSave, chat, nameWrite, assistantStop, instancesWrite, routesWrite });
  let testerServer = null;
  if (testerPort !== null) {
    const call = busCaller({ dataRoot: system.dataRoot, socket: socketPath(system.dataRoot), business: options.business ?? null, cli: TESTER_CLI });
    const testerBus = { ...views({ call }), names: () => call('names'), instances: () => call('instances'), routes: () => call('routes') };
    try {
      testerServer = await startServer({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: testerPort, board: options.board,
-        tester: true, testerNoSignIn: ssoOn, testerProofHeader: proof?.header ?? null, testerAuthHeader: options.preview?.header ?? null, bus: testerBus, reads,
+        tester: true, testerProofHeader: proof?.header ?? null, testerAuthHeader: options.preview?.header ?? null, bus: testerBus, reads,
        projectFiles: args => call('project.files', args), projectFile: args => call('project.file', args),
        instancesWrite: args => call('instances.set', args), routesWrite: args => call('routes.set', args), nameWrite: args => call('name.set', args),
        // Row 177 (#1675): the tester's own chat, through the tester CLI; 7332's stays the human's.
        chat: createChat({ call }),
      });
-    } catch (err) { sso?.close(); await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); throw err; }
+    } catch (err) { await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); throw err; }
  }
  const previewLine = options.preview ? `\nPreview: https://${options.preview.host}/ through the proxy, signed-in user from ${options.preview.header}, ${send ? 'reads and human messages to roles (--send); one line per send below' : 'read-only'}` : '';
  const proofLine = `\nProxy: proxy proof ${proof ? 'on' : 'off'}`;
-  // One line per provider: id, issuer, subject count and state. No client id, secret or sub.
-  const health = sso?.health() ?? {};
-  const ssoLines = sso ? `\nSign-in: ${sso.publicOrigin}/ (--sso), ${send ? 'reads and human writes (--send)' : 'read-only'}` + sso.summary().map(p => `\nSign-in provider: ${p.id} issuer ${p.issuer} subjects ${p.subjects} (${health[p.id]})`).join('') : '';
  const queueLine = options.checkout ? '\nQueue: read from the --checkout directory' : '';
-  console.log(`Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/\nBoard: ${options.board}\n${busLine}${queueLine}${previewLine}${ssoLines}${proofLine}${testerServer ? `\nTester Console: http://127.0.0.1:${testerServer.address().port}/ (binds the tester)` : ''}\nCtrl-C stops this server.`);
-  for (const signal of ['SIGINT', 'SIGTERM']) process.once(signal, () => { sso?.close(); server.close(); testerServer?.close(); });
+  console.log(`Mosaic Console: http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/\nBoard: ${options.board}\n${busLine}${queueLine}${previewLine}${proofLine}${testerServer ? `\nTester Console: http://127.0.0.1:${testerServer.address().port}/ (binds the tester)` : ''}\nCtrl-C stops this server.`);
+  for (const signal of ['SIGINT', 'SIGTERM']) process.once(signal, () => { server.close(); testerServer?.close(); });
 } catch (err) {
  console.error(`refused: ${err.message}`);
  process.exitCode = 2;
@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@
  // The first one sets body.signed-out (the listener below); after that no Console fetch is made.
  const out = () => document.body.classList.contains('signed-out');
  const signOut = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new Event('mosaic-signed-out')); };
-  // Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the Console itself answers a read without a session with 401
-  // `sign-in required`; that signs the page out too, and the line links to the Console's sign-in.
-  // Any other 401 stays an error. `sso` comes from /api/config.
-  let sso = false;
-  const signInRequired = (res, body) => res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required';
  const signedOut = () => Object.assign(new Error('the sign-in proxy redirected it, so it never reached the Console'), { signedOut: true });
  const labels = { registration: 'registered', 'first-user-message': 'first message', 'tmux-pane': 'tmux pane', 'session-cwd': 'session cwd', 'workspace-git-root': 'git root' };
  const source = value => value ? `<span class="source">${esc(labels[value] || value)}</span>` : '';
@@ -115,7 +110,6 @@
    const res = await fetch(path, { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' });
    if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    let body; try { body = await res.json(); } catch { body = { error: `HTTP ${res.status}` }; }
-    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    return { ok: res.ok, body };
  }
  function blockNode(b) {
@@ -310,7 +304,6 @@
    const res = await fetch(path, value === undefined ? { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' } : { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify(value), redirect: 'manual' });
    if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    const result = await res.json();
-    if (signInRequired(res, result)) { sso = true; signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    if (!res.ok) throw Object.assign(new Error(result.error || `HTTP ${res.status}`), { status: res.status });
    return result;
  }
@@ -459,7 +452,7 @@
  });
  // Signed out: everything drawn from a Console read goes, because none of it can be refreshed. The
  // line says so once; the send form (bus.js) keeps its draft and receipt. Reload is the way back.
-  document.addEventListener('mosaic-signed-out', e => {
+  document.addEventListener('mosaic-signed-out', () => {
    if (out()) return;
    document.body.classList.add('signed-out');
    clearTimeout(timer); convGen++;
@@ -468,13 +461,9 @@
    for (const id of ['projects', 'waiting', 'seen', 'sessions']) $(id).replaceChildren();
    $('refresh').disabled = $('pause').disabled = true;
    const line = $('signed-out');
-    line.innerHTML = sso || e.detail?.signIn
-      ? `<p><b>Signed out.</b> <a href="/auth/login?${esc(new URLSearchParams({ return: location.pathname + location.search }))}">Sign in again</a>.</p>`
-      : '<p><b>Signed out.</b> Reload the page to sign in.</p>';
-    line.hidden = false; $('sign-out').hidden = true;
+    line.innerHTML = '<p><b>Signed out.</b> Reload the page to sign in.</p>'; line.hidden = false;
    // Focus moves to the line only if what had it is gone or disabled, never out of a form being typed in.
    setTimeout(() => { const a = document.activeElement; if (!a || a === document.body || a.disabled || !a.getClientRects().length) line.focus(); });
  });
-  // Sign out (sage-1347, F7): a plain same-origin form POST to /auth/logout, shown only under --sso.
-  api('/api/config').then(config => { board = config.board; $('board-url').textContent = `Board: ${board}`; if (config.sso === true) { sso = true; $('sign-out').hidden = out(); } }).catch(err => { if (machine) error(err); }).finally(refresh);
+  api('/api/config').then(config => { board = config.board; $('board-url').textContent = `Board: ${board}`; }).catch(err => { if (machine) error(err); }).finally(refresh);
 })();
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
  const out = () => document.body.classList.contains('signed-out');
  const signOut = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new Event('mosaic-signed-out')); };
  const signedOut = () => new ReadError('signed-out', 'The sign-in proxy redirected the read.', 0);
-  // Q175 phase 1 (#1690, sage-1340 F1): under --sso a read without a session gets 401 `sign-in
-  // required` from the Console itself. That signs out the same way; any other 401 stays an error.
-  const signInRequired = (res, body) => res.status === 401 && body?.error === 'sign-in required';
-  const signOutSso = () => { if (!out()) document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('mosaic-signed-out', { detail: { signIn: true } })); };
  // `replies` takes a message id as `id`; trail takes `subject`.
  async function fetchRead(verb, subject) {
    if (out()) throw signedOut();
@@ -42,7 +38,6 @@
    catch { throw new ReadError('unreachable', 'The Console server did not answer.', 0); }
    if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    try { body = await res.json(); } catch { throw new ReadError('unreachable', 'The Console server did not answer.', 0); }
-    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }
    if (!res.ok || !body || !Array.isArray(body.rows)) throw new ReadError(typeof body?.error === 'string' ? body.error : 'invalid-response', typeof body?.message === 'string' ? body.message : `HTTP ${res.status}`, res.status);
    return { ...body, rows: body.rows, at: body.at };
  }
@@ -55,7 +50,6 @@
    try { res = await fetch(`/api/${path}`, { cache: 'no-store', redirect: 'manual' }); } catch { throw unreachable(); }
    if (res.type === 'opaqueredirect') { signOut(); throw signedOut(); }
    try { body = await res.json(); } catch { throw unreachable(); }
-    if (signInRequired(res, body)) { signOutSso(); throw signedOut(); }
    if (!res.ok || !body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) throw Object.assign(new ReadError(typeof body?.error === 'string' ? body.error : 'invalid-response', typeof body?.message === 'string' ? body.message : `HTTP ${res.status}`, res.status), { module: true });
    return body;
  }
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 <header class="cmdbar"><a href="/" class="wordmark"><svg class="mark" viewBox="0 0 16 17" aria-hidden="true"><use href="/icons.svg#mark"/></svg>Mosaic<small>Console</small></a>
 <button type="button" class="cmdk" id="cmdk" aria-haspopup="dialog" aria-controls="cmdk-dialog"><svg class="i" aria-hidden="true"><use href="/icons.svg#i-search"/></svg><span>Go to a view, decision or task</span><kbd>Ctrl K</kbd></button>
 <p class="fresh" id="fresh"><span id="fresh-board"></span><span id="fresh-bus"></span></p>
-<div class="cmd-right"><label>Palette<select id="palette"></select></label><label>Appearance<select id="mode"><option value="system">system</option><option value="light">light</option><option value="dim">dim</option><option value="dark">dark</option></select></label><button class="btn" id="refresh" type="button">Refresh</button><button class="btn" id="pause" type="button" aria-pressed="false">Pause</button><form id="sign-out" method="post" action="/auth/logout" hidden><button class="btn" type="submit">Sign out</button></form></div></header>
+<div class="cmd-right"><label>Palette<select id="palette"></select></label><label>Appearance<select id="mode"><option value="system">system</option><option value="light">light</option><option value="dim">dim</option><option value="dark">dark</option></select></label><button class="btn" id="refresh" type="button">Refresh</button><button class="btn" id="pause" type="button" aria-pressed="false">Pause</button></div></header>
 <div class="frame">
 <nav class="tree" aria-label="Console"><h2 class="tree-title">Console</h2><ul class="s1-sections" id="sections"></ul><div id="board-tree"><h2 class="tree-title">Projects</h2><div id="projects"><p class="muted">Loading projects…</p></div><p class="small muted">Select a project to filter sessions. Waiting on you always shows all projects.</p></div></nav>
 <main id="main" class="content" tabindex="-1"><div id="signed-out" class="banner ref" role="alert" tabindex="-1" hidden></div><div id="bus-down" class="banner err" role="alert" hidden></div><div class="page-head" id="board-head"><div><h1>Control board</h1><p id="status" class="small muted" role="status">Loading board…</p></div><div class="filters"><label><input id="show-machine" type="checkbox">Show machine sessions</label></div></div>
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ async function body(req, max = 4096) {
 // Row 65 (mos-0840) adds `routes`: each instance's harness, model, thinking and fallback.
 const BUS_VERBS = ['inbox', 'tasks', 'agents', 'trail', 'decisions', 'credentials', 'replies', 'messages', 'usage', 'limits', 'names', 'instances', 'routes'];
 const DECISION_LISTS = ['roles', 'recent'];
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, F8): either sign-in cookie, which the tester listener refuses under --sso.
-const SIGN_IN_COOKIE = /(?:^|;)\s*__host-mosaic_(?:session|login)\s*=/i;
 // Row 177 (#1675): the chat writes the tester listener lets through, exactly the four chatHTTP routes.
 const TESTER_CHAT_WRITE = /^\/api\/chat\/(?:projects|threads|threads\/[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\/(?:messages|open))$/i;
 async function busRead(res, bus, verb, search) {
@@ -162,18 +160,14 @@ async function busRead(res, bus, verb, search) {
 // broker's to refuse. Nothing retries; an outcome the bus can't confirm is reported as unknown.
 const SEND_KEYS = ['to', 'body', 'in_reply_to'];
 const one = (req, name) => (req.headersDistinct[name]?.length === 1 ? req.headersDistinct[name][0] : null);
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): under --sso the writer comes from a session the handler already checked,
-// so it carries `sso: true` and the public origin; the preview writer still checks its header.
-const signedIn = (req, p) => p.sso === true || one(req, p.header) === p.user;
-const ownOrigin = p => p.origin ?? `https://${p.host}`;
 async function busSend(req, res, { send, preview, log }) {
-  if (!signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
+  if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
  let to = null;
  // `to` is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line.
  const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} send user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} to=${typeof to === 'string' ? JSON.stringify(to.slice(0, 64)) : 'none'} ${outcome}`);
  // `sent` tells the page which it was: false, nothing was written; 'unknown', it may have been.
  const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a send needs the Console\'s own Origin');
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a send needs the Console\'s own Origin');
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'a send needs Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin');
  let value;
  try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
@@ -247,10 +241,10 @@ export function proofOptions({ proofHeader, proofFile } = {}, preview = null) {
 // REQ-WEB-1: same signed-in send boundary, a distinct strict settings payload.
 async function settingsSend(req, res, { settingsWrite, preview, log }) {
  const refuse = (status, error, message) => json(res, status, { error, message, sent: false });
-  if (!signedIn(req, preview)) {
+  if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) {
    return refuse(401, 'sign-in required', 'sign in again');
  }
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) {
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) {
    return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'settings need the Console origin');
  }
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') {
@@ -298,8 +292,8 @@ async function seatSend(req, res, { route, write, preview, log }) {
  // The instance is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line.
  const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} ${route.kind} user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instance=${quoted(instance)} ${outcome}`);
  const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
-  if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
+  if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
  let value;
  try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
@@ -341,8 +335,8 @@ async function instanceSend(req, res, { instancesWrite, preview, log }) {
  // The instance is quoted and cut short so a crafted value can't forge a log line. Vars are never logged.
  const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} instance user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instance=${quoted(instance)} ${outcome}`);
  const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
-  if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
+  if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
  let value;
  try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
@@ -388,8 +382,8 @@ async function routesSend(req, res, { routesWrite, preview, log }) {
  let names = [];
  const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} routes user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} instances=${quoted(names.join(','))} ${outcome}`);
  const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
-  if (!preview.tester && !signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
+  if (!preview.tester && one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== (preview.origin ?? `https://${preview.host}`)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'this needs the Console\'s own Origin');
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'this needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
  let value;
  try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, 16384)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
@@ -426,8 +420,8 @@ async function projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview, log }) {
  const line = outcome => log(`${new Date().toISOString()} project-file user=${JSON.stringify(preview.user)} project=${quoted(target?.project)} path=${quoted(target?.path)} ${outcome}`);
  // `sent` tells the page which it was: false, nothing was written; 'unknown', it may have been.
  const refuse = (status, error, message, sent = false) => { line(`error=${error}`); return json(res, status, { error, message, sent }); };
-  if (!signedIn(req, preview)) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
-  if (one(req, 'origin') !== ownOrigin(preview)) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a save needs the Console\'s own Origin');
+  if (one(req, preview.header) !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required', message: 'sign in again', sent: false });
+  if (one(req, 'origin') !== `https://${preview.host}`) return refuse(403, 'cross-origin request refused', 'a save needs the Console\'s own Origin');
  if (one(req, 'sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') return refuse(403, 'cross-site request refused', 'a save needs same-origin Fetch Metadata');
  let value;
  try { value = JSON.parse((await body(req, FILE_SAVE_MAX)).toString('utf8')); } catch (err) { return refuse(400, 'invalid-request', err.message); }
@@ -466,17 +460,13 @@ async function projectFileRead(res, read, path, search) {
    return json(res, busStatus(code), { error: code, message: err instanceof BusReadError ? err.message : code });
  }
 }
-// `send` is the bus write (row 76): `args => Promise<{id}>`, only with the preview mode or `sso`.
-// `sso` is createSso() from sso.mjs (Q175 phase 1): the human listener signs people in itself.
-// `testerNoSignIn` makes the tester listener refuse anything that looks like a sign-in (--sso). `log`
+// `send` is the bus write (row 76): `args => Promise<{id}>`, only with the preview mode. `log`
 // takes one line per send attempt that got past sign-in; never the body. `fieldsFile` is for
 // tests; the field table is otherwise the committed packages/tasks/fields.json.
-export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEFAULT_BOARD, timeout = 20000, bus = null, reads = null, preview = null, sso = null, tester = false, testerNoSignIn = false, testerAuthHeader = null, proof = null, testerProofHeader = null, send = null, settingsWrite = null, projectFiles = null, projectFile = null, projectSave = null, chat = null, nameWrite = null, assistantStop = null, instancesWrite = null, routesWrite = null, log = line => console.log(line), fieldsFile = undefined } = {}) {
+export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEFAULT_BOARD, timeout = 20000, bus = null, reads = null, preview = null, tester = false, testerAuthHeader = null, proof = null, testerProofHeader = null, send = null, settingsWrite = null, projectFiles = null, projectFile = null, projectSave = null, chat = null, nameWrite = null, assistantStop = null, instancesWrite = null, routesWrite = null, log = line => console.log(line), fieldsFile = undefined } = {}) {
  if (!isLoopback(host)) throw new Error('refusing to bind to non-loopback host');
  if (host === 'localhost') host = '127.0.0.1';
  if (tester && preview !== null) throw new Error('tester listener cannot use preview mode');
-  if (tester && sso !== null) throw new Error('tester listener cannot use sso');
-  if (sso !== null && (preview !== null || proof !== null)) throw new Error('--sso cannot be combined with --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*');
  if (tester && host !== '127.0.0.1') throw new Error('tester listener must bind 127.0.0.1');
  // Row 177 (#1675): chat is allowed. The tester listener's chat binds the tester, so the bus keeps it on tester threads.
  if (tester && [send, settingsWrite, projectSave, assistantStop].some(value => value !== null)) throw new Error('tester listener permits only instance, route, name and chat writes');
@@ -486,26 +476,21 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
    throw new Error('preview mode needs --public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user together');
  }
  if (proof !== null && (preview === null || tester)) throw new Error('proxy proof needs preview mode');
-  if (send !== null && ((preview === null && sso === null) || typeof send !== 'function')) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso');
+  if (send !== null && (preview === null || typeof send !== 'function')) throw new Error('--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)');
  const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
    res.setHeader('x-content-type-options', 'nosniff');
    res.setHeader('referrer-policy', 'no-referrer');
-    // Under --sso the Sign out form's POST is redirected to the provider's end-session endpoint, and
-    // browsers apply form-action to that redirect, so those origins (from discovery) are allowed too.
-    res.setHeader('content-security-policy', `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'${sso ? sso.formTargets().map(o => ` ${o}`).join('') : ''}`);
+    res.setHeader('content-security-policy', "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'");
    // Presence, even with an empty value: never turn the public listener into a tester ingress.
    if (!tester && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'x-mosaic-tester')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'tester listener required' });
    if (tester && testerAuthHeader && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, testerAuthHeader.toLowerCase())) return json(res, 403, { error: 'proxy header refused' });
    if (tester && testerProofHeader && Object.hasOwn(req.headers, testerProofHeader.toLowerCase())) return json(res, 403, { error: 'proxy proof header refused' });
-    // Under --sso the tester listener reads no cookie and takes no sign-in of any kind (design section 6).
-    if (tester && testerNoSignIn && (Object.hasOwn(req.headers, 'authorization') || SIGN_IN_COOKIE.test(req.headers.cookie ?? '') || Object.keys(req.headers).some(h => h.startsWith('x-authentik-'))))
-      return json(res, 403, { error: 'tester listener takes no sign-in' });
    let path, search;
    // Node keeps the first of repeated Host headers; a second one (a loopback Host, then NAME) is
    // never legitimate, so it is refused before any check reads the Host.
    if ((req.headersDistinct.host?.length ?? 0) > 1) return json(res, 400, { error: 'repeated Host refused' });
    // Preview mode: a request for the public name, exactly, as the proxy forwards it.
-    const named = preview !== null ? (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === preview.host : sso !== null && (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === sso.publicHost;
+    const named = preview !== null && (req.headers.host ?? '').toLowerCase() === preview.host;
    // The proof precedes every auth-header read, including the wrong-Host fence.
    if (proof !== null) {
      const values = req.headersDistinct[proof.header];
@@ -527,34 +512,19 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
      }
      ({ pathname: path, search } = new URL(req.url, 'http://localhost'));
    } catch { return json(res, 400, { error: 'invalid URL' }); }
-    // Under --sso the human listener serves only the public Host, whatever its port; GET /healthz
-    // alone stays open on a loopback Host for the status and release gates (Q-C).
-    if (sso !== null && !named && !(path === '/healthz' && req.method === 'GET')) return json(res, 403, { error: 'public Host required' });
    // No CORS. JSON content type and same-origin checks keep browser forms out.
-    if (req.headers.origin && req.headers.origin !== (named ? (sso ? sso.publicOrigin : `https://${preview.host}`) : `http://${req.headers.host}`)) return json(res, 403, { error: 'cross-origin request refused' });
-    let signer = preview;
-    if (sso !== null && named) {
-      if (path.startsWith('/auth/')) return sso.handle(req, res, path, search);
-      // Only a page load or a write keeps a session alive; the page's background reads don't (Q-D).
-      const session = path === '/healthz' ? null : sso.session(req, { touch: req.method === 'POST' || (req.method === 'GET' && !path.startsWith('/api/')) });
-      if (!session && path !== '/healthz') {
-        if (path.startsWith('/api/') || req.method !== 'GET') return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
-        res.writeHead(303, { location: `/auth/login?return=${encodeURIComponent(path + search)}`, 'cache-control': 'no-store' });
-        return res.end();
-      }
-      if (session) signer = { sso: true, user: session.name, host: sso.publicHost, origin: sso.publicOrigin };
-    }
-    if (named && preview !== null) {
+    if (req.headers.origin && req.headers.origin !== (named ? `https://${preview.host}` : `http://${req.headers.host}`)) return json(res, 403, { error: 'cross-origin request refused' });
+    if (named) {
      // One value, equal to the user id; the proxy strips client copies and sets it after sign-in.
      const values = req.headersDistinct[preview.header];
      if (!values || values.length !== 1 || values[0] !== preview.user) return json(res, 401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
    }
-    const writer = tester ? { tester: true, user: 'tester', origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}` } : signer;
+    const writer = tester ? { tester: true, user: 'tester', origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}` } : preview;
    if (tester && !['GET', 'HEAD'].includes(req.method) && !['/api/instances', '/api/routes', '/api/name'].includes(path) && !TESTER_CHAT_WRITE.test(path))
      return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', sent: false });
    if(path==='/api/settings'&&req.method==='POST'){
      if(!send||!settingsWrite||!named)return json(res,403,{error:'read-only',sent:false});
-      return settingsSend(req,res,{settingsWrite,preview:signer,log});
+      return settingsSend(req,res,{settingsWrite,preview,log});
    }
    if (Object.hasOwn(SEAT_ROUTES, path)) {
      if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
@@ -574,18 +544,18 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
    }
    if (path === '/api/project-file' && req.method === 'POST') {
      if (!send || !projectSave || !named) return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', sent: false });
-      return projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview: signer, log });
+      return projectFileSend(req, res, { projectSave, preview, log });
    }
    // Message sending has its own bounded payload and repeats the identity check.
    if (send && path === '/api/bus/message') {
      if (req.method !== 'POST') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
-      return busSend(req, res, { send, preview: signer, log });
+      return busSend(req, res, { send, preview, log });
    }
    if (path === '/api/chat' || path.startsWith('/api/chat/')) {
      return chatHTTP(req, res, { path, search, chat, named, send, preview: writer, log });
    }
    // Nothing else but GET and HEAD gets past here in preview mode, whatever the Host.
-    if ((preview !== null || sso !== null) && req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', message: 'the Console preview is read-only' });
+    if (preview !== null && req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 403, { error: 'read-only', message: 'the Console preview is read-only' });
    // The conversation routes (#1507, CHAT-02) keep their query; the board validates it.
    const conversation = path === '/api/conversations' || path === '/api/conversation';
    const allowed = path === '/api/board' || conversation ? 'GET' : ['/api/seen', '/api/reply'].includes(path) ? 'POST' : null;
@@ -637,8 +607,8 @@ export async function startServer({ host = '127.0.0.1', port = 7330, board = DEF
    if (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return json(res, 405, { error: 'method not allowed' });
    // `send`: the page shows the composer only where a send can pass (the public name, --send on).
    // `edit`: the editor shows Save only where a save can pass, the same test as the route's.
-    if (path === '/api/config') return json(res, 200, { board: upstream, ...(tester ? { tester: true } : {}), ...(sso ? { sso: true } : {}), send: !tester && Boolean(send) && named, edit: !tester && Boolean(send) && Boolean(projectSave) && named });
-    if (path === '/healthz') return json(res, 200, { ok: true, ...(sso ? { sso: sso.health() } : {}) });
+    if (path === '/api/config') return json(res, 200, { board: upstream, ...(tester ? { tester: true } : {}), send: !tester && Boolean(send) && named, edit: !tester && Boolean(send) && Boolean(projectSave) && named });
+    if (path === '/healthz') return json(res, 200, { ok: true });
    if (path === '/favicon.ico') { res.writeHead(204); return res.end(); }
    const file = files.get(path);
    if (!file) return json(res, 404, { error: 'not found' });
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the shape of config.json's optional `console` key. The one loader,
-// scripts/mosaic-config.mjs, runs this on every read, so a bad key refuses the config for every
-// tool (design section 4, C1). The Console's --sso start runs it again before it uses the value.
-// Shape only: nothing here touches the network or a slot file. A refusal names the key path and
-// never quotes a value, so a refusal can't print a client id or a subject.
-
-// The asymmetric algorithms oauth4webapi 3.8.8 verifies (its supported(), build/index.js). No HS*
-// and no none, so a client secret can never be a signing key.
-export const ALGS = Object.freeze(['PS256', 'ES256', 'RS256', 'PS384', 'ES384', 'RS384', 'PS512', 'ES512', 'RS512', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA', 'ML-DSA-44', 'ML-DSA-65', 'ML-DSA-87']);
-const PROVIDER_ID = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;
-const SLOT = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,64}$/;
-const SUB = /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,255}$/;
-const CLIENT_ID = /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,255}$/;
-// The name goes where the preview's --allow-user went (serve.mjs USER): visible ASCII, no comma.
-const NAME = /^[\x21-\x2b\x2d-\x7e]{1,64}$/;
-// The bus keeps these for the tester and the human role (section 6), so no subject can sign in as one.
-const RESERVED_NAMES = ['tester', 'human'];
-
-const object = v => typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
-function refuse(where, why) {
-  throw new Error(`${where} ${why}`);
-}
-function keys(value, where, allowed, required = allowed) {
-  if (!object(value)) refuse(where, 'must be a JSON object');
-  for (const key of Object.keys(value)) if (!allowed.includes(key)) refuse(`${where}.${key}`, 'is not a supported key');
-  for (const key of required) if (!Object.hasOwn(value, key)) refuse(`${where}.${key}`, 'is required');
-}
-function httpsURL(value, where) {
-  let url;
-  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length > 512) refuse(where, 'must be an https URL of at most 512 characters');
-  try { url = new URL(value); } catch { refuse(where, 'must be an https URL'); }
-  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash || value.includes('?') || value.includes('#')) {
-    refuse(where, 'must be https with no credentials, query or fragment');
-  }
-  return url;
-}
-
-// Returns the value unchanged when it passes; throws an Error naming the bad key path otherwise.
-export function checkConsole(value, where = 'console') {
-  keys(value, where, ['sso']);
-  const sso = value.sso, at = `${where}.sso`;
-  keys(sso, at, ['publicOrigin', 'providers']);
-  const origin = httpsURL(sso.publicOrigin, `${at}.publicOrigin`);
-  if (origin.origin !== sso.publicOrigin) refuse(`${at}.publicOrigin`, 'must be an https origin with no path, query, fragment or trailing slash');
-  if (!Array.isArray(sso.providers) || sso.providers.length === 0 || sso.providers.length > 8) refuse(`${at}.providers`, 'must be a list of 1 to 8 providers');
-  const ids = new Set();
-  sso.providers.forEach((p, i) => {
-    const pat = `${at}.providers[${i}]`;
-    keys(p, pat, ['id', 'issuer', 'clientId', 'clientSecret', 'algs', 'subjects']);
-    if (typeof p.id !== 'string' || !PROVIDER_ID.test(p.id)) refuse(`${pat}.id`, 'must match [a-z0-9-]{1,32}');
-    if (ids.has(p.id)) refuse(`${pat}.id`, 'repeats an earlier provider id');
-    ids.add(p.id);
-    httpsURL(p.issuer, `${pat}.issuer`);
-    if (typeof p.clientId !== 'string' || !CLIENT_ID.test(p.clientId)) refuse(`${pat}.clientId`, 'must be 1 to 255 visible characters');
-    keys(p.clientSecret, `${pat}.clientSecret`, ['slot']);
-    if (typeof p.clientSecret.slot !== 'string' || !SLOT.test(p.clientSecret.slot)) refuse(`${pat}.clientSecret.slot`, 'must match [a-z0-9-]{1,64}');
-    if (!Array.isArray(p.algs) || p.algs.length === 0) refuse(`${pat}.algs`, 'must be a non-empty list');
-    p.algs.forEach((alg, j) => {
-      if (!ALGS.includes(alg)) refuse(`${pat}.algs[${j}]`, `must be one of ${ALGS.join(', ')}; HS* and none are refused`);
-    });
-    if (new Set(p.algs).size !== p.algs.length) refuse(`${pat}.algs`, 'repeats an algorithm');
-    if (!Array.isArray(p.subjects) || p.subjects.length === 0 || p.subjects.length > 64) refuse(`${pat}.subjects`, 'must be a list of 1 to 64 subjects');
-    const subs = new Set();
-    p.subjects.forEach((s, j) => {
-      const sat = `${pat}.subjects[${j}]`;
-      keys(s, sat, ['sub', 'name']);
-      if (typeof s.sub !== 'string' || !SUB.test(s.sub)) refuse(`${sat}.sub`, 'must be 1 to 255 visible characters');
-      if (subs.has(s.sub)) refuse(`${sat}.sub`, 'repeats an earlier subject');
-      subs.add(s.sub);
-      if (typeof s.name !== 'string' || !NAME.test(s.name)) refuse(`${sat}.name`, 'must be 1 to 64 visible characters');
-      if (RESERVED_NAMES.includes(s.name.toLowerCase())) refuse(`${sat}.name`, `must not be ${RESERVED_NAMES.join(' or ')}`);
-    });
-  });
-  return value;
-}
@@ -1,347 +0,0 @@
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md): the Console as an OIDC relying
-// party. Used only by the human listener under --sso; startServer refuses it on the tester listener.
-// Every URL handed to a provider is built from the configured publicOrigin, never from a request's
-// Host. A refusal logs one fixed code and the provider id, never an exception, its message or its
-// cause: oauth4webapi's errors carry token bodies and claims there.
-import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
-import { closeSync, constants, fstatSync, lstatSync, openSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { join, relative, isAbsolute, resolve } from 'node:path';
-import { checkConsole } from './sso-config.mjs';
-
-// oauth4webapi loads in createSso, not here: cli.mjs imports this module on every start, and a
-// Console without --sso must not need the package (pinned-copy.test.mjs builds copies whose lock
-// installs nothing). A real copy installs it from the root lock.
-let oauth;
-
-export const SESSION_COOKIE = '__Host-mosaic_session';
-export const LOGIN_COOKIE = '__Host-mosaic_login';
-const ATTRS = 'Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax';
-const LOGIN_MAX_AGE = 600;
-const SESSION_ABSOLUTE = 8 * 3600 * 1000, SESSION_IDLE = 3600 * 1000;
-const MAX_SESSIONS = 64, MAX_LOGINS = 32;
-const FETCH_TIMEOUT = 10000;
-const RETRY_CAP = 300000;
-const CODES = new Set(['login-record-missing', 'state-mismatch', 'auth-error-response', 'grant-failed', 'id-token-invalid', 'signature-invalid', 'alg-refused', 'issuer-mismatch', 'subject-unknown', 'discovery-failed', 'jwks-failed']);
-
-const sha256 = value => createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex');
-const escape = text => String(text).replace(/[&<>"']/g, c => `&#${c.charCodeAt(0)};`);
-const under = (parent, child) => { const rel = relative(parent, child); return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(rel)); };
-
-// The slot file holding a provider's client secret (design section 4, D1). Only the Console's --sso
-// start calls this. A refusal names the provider and the check, never the path's contents.
-export function readSlot(configDir, provider, { repo, checkout = null, copies = join(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME || join(homedir(), '.local', 'share'), 'mosaic-stack', 'copies') } = {}) {
-  const where = `console.sso provider ${provider.id} client secret slot`;
-  const file = join(resolve(configDir), 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', provider.clientSecret.slot);
-  let st;
-  try { st = lstatSync(file); } catch { throw new Error(`${where} is missing`); }
-  if (st.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error(`${where} must not be a symbolic link`);
-  let fd, real, text;
-  try {
-    fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
-    st = fstatSync(fd);
-    if (!st.isFile()) throw new Error(`${where} must be a regular file`);
-    if (st.uid !== process.getuid()) throw new Error(`${where} must be owned by the Console's user`);
-    if (st.mode & 0o077) throw new Error(`${where} must have no group or other permission bits`);
-    real = realpathSync(file);
-    for (const root of [repo, checkout, copies].filter(Boolean)) {
-      let base;
-      try { base = realpathSync(root); } catch { base = resolve(root); }
-      if (under(base, real)) throw new Error(`${where} must not be inside the repository or a stack copy`);
-    }
-    text = readFileSync(fd, 'utf8');
-  } catch (err) {
-    throw err.message?.startsWith(where) ? err : new Error(`${where} is not readable`);
-  } finally {
-    if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
-  }
-  const secret = text.endsWith('\n') ? text.slice(0, -1) : text;
-  if (!secret || /[\r\n]/.test(secret)) throw new Error(`${where} must hold one non-empty line`);
-  return secret;
-}
-
-export function cookies(req, name) {
-  const found = [];
-  for (const part of (req.headers.cookie ?? '').split(';')) {
-    const at = part.indexOf('=');
-    if (at > 0 && part.slice(0, at).trim() === name) found.push(part.slice(at + 1).trim());
-  }
-  return found;
-}
-
-// The JWKS check at discovery, the same filter the library's key selection uses (kty, alg, use,
-// key_ops, crv; RSA at least 2048 bits), without a kid since no token is at hand yet.
-function usableKey(jwk, alg) {
-  const kty = { RS: 'RSA', PS: 'RSA', ES: 'EC', Ed: 'OKP', ML: 'AKP' }[alg.slice(0, 2)];
-  if (jwk === null || typeof jwk !== 'object' || jwk.kty !== kty) return false;
-  if (jwk.alg !== undefined && jwk.alg !== alg) return false;
-  if (jwk.use !== undefined && jwk.use !== 'sig') return false;
-  if (Array.isArray(jwk.key_ops) && !jwk.key_ops.includes('verify')) return false;
-  const crv = { ES256: 'P-256', ES384: 'P-384', ES512: 'P-521', Ed25519: 'Ed25519', EdDSA: 'Ed25519' }[alg];
-  if (crv && jwk.crv !== crv) return false;
-  if (kty === 'RSA' && (typeof jwk.n !== 'string' || Buffer.from(jwk.n, 'base64url').length * 8 < 2048)) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-class Unreachable extends Error {}
-class Refused extends Error {}
-const https = value => { try { return new URL(value).protocol === 'https:'; } catch { return false; } };
-
-// One provider's discovery and JWKS. Throws Unreachable (network, timeout, a status other than 200,
-// a body that isn't JSON) or Refused (a JSON document that fails a check). Q-B, design section 4.
-async function discover(p, fetchOptions) {
-  let response, text;
-  const options = () => ({ ...fetchOptions, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
-  try {
-    response = await oauth.discoveryRequest(new URL(p.issuer), options());
-    if (response.status !== 200 || !/^application\/json\b/i.test(response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '')) throw new Error();
-    text = await response.text();
-    JSON.parse(text);
-  } catch { throw new Unreachable(); }
-  let as;
-  try {
-    as = await oauth.processDiscoveryResponse(new URL(p.issuer), new Response(text, { status: 200, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } }));
-  } catch { throw new Refused(); }
-  if (as.issuer !== p.issuer) throw new Refused();
-  if (!Array.isArray(as.id_token_signing_alg_values_supported) || !p.algs.some(a => as.id_token_signing_alg_values_supported.includes(a))) throw new Refused();
-  if (!Array.isArray(as.code_challenge_methods_supported) || !as.code_challenge_methods_supported.includes('S256')) throw new Refused();
-  if (![as.authorization_endpoint, as.token_endpoint, as.jwks_uri].every(https)) throw new Refused();
-  if (as.end_session_endpoint !== undefined && !https(as.end_session_endpoint)) throw new Refused();
-  let jwks;
-  try {
-    const fetcher = fetchOptions[oauth.customFetch] ?? fetch;
-    const res = await fetcher(as.jwks_uri, { method: 'GET', headers: { accept: 'application/json, application/jwk-set+json' }, redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
-    if (res.status !== 200) throw new Error();
-    jwks = JSON.parse(await res.text());
-  } catch { throw new Unreachable(); }
-  if (jwks === null || typeof jwks !== 'object' || !Array.isArray(jwks.keys)) throw new Refused();
-  const usable = p.algs.filter(alg => jwks.keys.some(k => usableKey(k, alg)));
-  if (!usable.length) throw new Refused();
-  return as;
-}
-
-// `config` is console.sso, checked again here; `secrets` maps provider id to its client secret
-// (readSlot). `fetch` is for tests: a fetch that trusts only the fake OP's certificate.
-// `retryFirst` is for tests too; production waits 5 s, doubling, capped at 5 minutes.
-export async function createSso(config, { secrets, fetch: customFetch = null, log = line => console.log(line), retryFirst = 5000 } = {}) {
-  checkConsole({ sso: config });
-  oauth ??= await import('oauth4webapi');
-  const publicOrigin = config.publicOrigin;
-  const publicHost = new URL(publicOrigin).host;
-  const redirectUri = `${publicOrigin}/auth/callback`;
-  const fetchOptions = customFetch ? { [oauth.customFetch]: customFetch } : {};
-  const sessions = new Map(), logins = new Map();
-  const timers = new Set();
-  let closed = false;
-  const refuse = (code, provider, extra = '') => {
-    if (!CODES.has(code)) throw new Error(`unknown sso log code ${code}`);
-    log(`${new Date().toISOString()} sso refused code=${code} provider=${provider}${extra}`);
-  };
-
-  const providers = new Map(config.providers.map(p => {
-    if (typeof secrets?.get(p.id) !== 'string') throw new Error(`console.sso provider ${p.id} has no client secret`);
-    return [p.id, {
-      config: p, state: 'unreachable', as: null, jwks: {},
-      client: { client_id: p.clientId, id_token_signed_response_alg: [...p.algs] },
-      auth: oauth.ClientSecretBasic(secrets.get(p.id)),
-      subjects: new Map(p.subjects.map(s => [s.sub, s.name])),
-    }];
-  }));
-
-  async function attempt(entry, atStart) {
-    try {
-      entry.as = await discover(entry.config, fetchOptions);
-      entry.jwks = {};
-      entry.state = 'ready';
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err instanceof Refused) {
-        entry.state = 'refused';
-        refuse('discovery-failed', entry.config.id);
-        if (atStart) throw new Error(`console.sso provider ${entry.config.id} refused at discovery: the issuer, algorithms, S256 or JWKS check failed`);
-        return;
-      }
-      entry.state = 'unreachable';
-      refuse('discovery-failed', entry.config.id);
-      throw err;
-    }
-  }
-  function retry(entry, delay) {
-    if (closed) return;
-    const timer = setTimeout(async () => {
-      timers.delete(timer);
-      try { await attempt(entry, false); } catch { retry(entry, Math.min(delay * 2, RETRY_CAP)); }
-    }, delay);
-    timer.unref();
-    timers.add(timer);
-  }
-  for (const entry of providers.values()) {
-    try { await attempt(entry, true); } catch (err) {
-      if (!(err instanceof Unreachable)) throw err;
-      retry(entry, retryFirst);
-    }
-  }
-
-  const page = (res, status, title, html, headers = {}) => {
-    res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8', 'cache-control': 'no-store', ...headers });
-    res.end(`<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>${escape(title)}</title><main style="font-family:sans-serif;max-width:32rem;margin:4rem auto"><h1>${escape(title)}</h1>${html}</main>\n`);
-  };
-  const redirect = (res, location, setCookie = []) => {
-    res.writeHead(303, { location, 'cache-control': 'no-store', ...(setCookie.length ? { 'set-cookie': setCookie } : {}) });
-    res.end();
-  };
-  const failed = (res, setCookie = []) => page(res, 403, 'Sign-in failed', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in again</a></p>', setCookie.length ? { 'set-cookie': setCookie } : {});
-  const expire = name => `${name}=; ${ATTRS}; Max-Age=0`;
-  const remember = (map, key, value, cap) => {
-    while (map.size >= cap) map.delete(map.keys().next().value);
-    map.set(key, value);
-  };
-
-  // B2: only a URL on publicOrigin itself; anything else, or nothing, is publicOrigin's `/`. The
-  // Location is absolute and its origin checked again: dot segments can leave a pathname of `//host`,
-  // which as a relative Location a browser reads as another origin (webby-0019 B1, sage-1403).
-  function returnURL(ret) {
-    const home = `${publicOrigin}/`;
-    try {
-      if (typeof ret !== 'string' || !ret) return home;
-      const u = new URL(ret, publicOrigin);
-      if (u.origin !== publicOrigin) return home;
-      const out = new URL(`${publicOrigin}${u.pathname}${u.search}`);
-      return out.origin === publicOrigin ? out.href : home;
-    } catch { return home; }
-  }
-
-  async function start(res, entry, ret) {
-    const state = oauth.generateRandomState(), nonce = oauth.generateRandomNonce(), verifier = oauth.generateRandomCodeVerifier();
-    const challenge = await oauth.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(verifier);
-    const id = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
-    remember(logins, sha256(id), { provider: entry.config.id, state, nonce, verifier, ret: typeof ret === 'string' ? ret.slice(0, 2048) : '/', expires: Date.now() + LOGIN_MAX_AGE * 1000 }, MAX_LOGINS);
-    const url = new URL(entry.as.authorization_endpoint);
-    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries({ client_id: entry.config.clientId, response_type: 'code', scope: 'openid profile email', redirect_uri: redirectUri, state, nonce, code_challenge: challenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' })) url.searchParams.set(k, v);
-    return redirect(res, url.href, [`${LOGIN_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}; Max-Age=${LOGIN_MAX_AGE}`]);
-  }
-
-  function login(res, query) {
-    const asked = query.get('provider');
-    const ret = query.get('return');
-    if (asked === null && providers.size > 1) {
-      const items = [...providers.values()].map(e => `<li><a href="/auth/login?${escape(new URLSearchParams({ provider: e.config.id, ...(ret ? { return: ret } : {}) }))}">${escape(e.config.id)}</a></li>`).join('');
-      return page(res, 200, 'Sign in', `<ul>${items}</ul>`);
-    }
-    const entry = asked === null ? [...providers.values()][0] : providers.get(asked);
-    if (!entry) return page(res, 404, 'Unknown sign-in provider', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in</a></p>');
-    if (entry.state !== 'ready') return page(res, 503, 'sign-in unavailable', '<p>The sign-in provider can\'t be reached. Try again shortly.</p>');
-    return start(res, entry, ret);
-  }
-
-  // Design section 1, steps 2-7. Each refusal ends here with one log line and the 403 page.
-  async function callback(res, query, req) {
-    const clear = [expire(LOGIN_COOKIE)];
-    const ids = cookies(req, LOGIN_COOKIE);
-    const key = ids.length === 1 ? sha256(ids[0]) : null;
-    const record = key === null ? undefined : logins.get(key);
-    if (key !== null) logins.delete(key);
-    // The provider comes from the record, never from the query.
-    const entry = record && providers.get(record.provider);
-    if (!record || record.expires <= Date.now() || !entry) {
-      refuse('login-record-missing', record?.provider ?? 'none');
-      return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    const pid = entry.config.id;
-    if (entry.state !== 'ready') { refuse('discovery-failed', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
-    let params;
-    try { params = oauth.validateAuthResponse(entry.as, entry.client, query, record.state); } catch (err) {
-      refuse(err instanceof oauth.AuthorizationResponseError ? 'auth-error-response' : 'state-mismatch', pid);
-      return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    const options = () => ({ ...fetchOptions, [oauth.jwksCache]: entry.jwks, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT) });
-    let response;
-    try { response = await oauth.authorizationCodeGrantRequest(entry.as, entry.client, entry.auth, params, redirectUri, record.verifier, options()); } catch {
-      refuse('grant-failed', pid); return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    let result, claims;
-    try {
-      result = await oauth.processAuthorizationCodeResponse(entry.as, entry.client, response, { expectedNonce: record.nonce, requireIdToken: true });
-      claims = oauth.getValidatedIdTokenClaims(result);
-    } catch (err) {
-      refuse(err instanceof oauth.ResponseBodyError ? 'grant-failed' : 'id-token-invalid', pid);
-      return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    // Step 5: the library skips this for a token-endpoint ID token; point 2 needs it, on the same
-    // Response object. Its throw ends the callback.
-    try { await oauth.validateApplicationLevelSignature(entry.as, response, options()); } catch (err) {
-      const fetching = !(err instanceof oauth.OperationProcessingError || err instanceof oauth.UnsupportedOperationError) || [oauth.RESPONSE_IS_NOT_CONFORM, oauth.RESPONSE_IS_NOT_JSON].includes(err.code);
-      refuse(fetching ? 'jwks-failed' : 'signature-invalid', pid);
-      return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    // Step 6: our own checks on top of the library's.
-    let header;
-    try { header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(result.id_token.split('.')[0], 'base64url').toString('utf8')); } catch { header = null; }
-    if (!header || !entry.config.algs.includes(header.alg)) { refuse('alg-refused', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
-    if (claims.iss !== entry.config.issuer) { refuse('issuer-mismatch', pid); return failed(res, clear); }
-    const name = typeof claims.sub === 'string' ? entry.subjects.get(claims.sub) : undefined;
-    if (name === undefined) {
-      refuse('subject-unknown', pid, ` iss=${JSON.stringify(String(claims.iss).slice(0, 255))} sub=${JSON.stringify(String(claims.sub).slice(0, 255))}`);
-      return failed(res, clear);
-    }
-    // Step 7: the session, then the return path.
-    const id = randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'), now = Date.now();
-    remember(sessions, sha256(id), { provider: pid, iss: claims.iss, sub: claims.sub, name, idToken: result.id_token, created: now, seen: now }, MAX_SESSIONS);
-    return redirect(res, returnURL(record.ret), [...clear, `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${id}; ${ATTRS}`]);
-  }
-
-  // The session for this request, or null. `touch` is true only for a page load or a write (Q-D).
-  function session(req, { touch = false } = {}) {
-    const ids = cookies(req, SESSION_COOKIE);
-    if (ids.length !== 1) return null;
-    const key = sha256(ids[0]);
-    const s = sessions.get(key);
-    if (!s) return null;
-    const now = Date.now();
-    if (now - s.created >= SESSION_ABSOLUTE || now - s.seen >= SESSION_IDLE) { sessions.delete(key); return null; }
-    if (touch) s.seen = now;
-    return s;
-  }
-
-  function logout(req, res) {
-    const one = name => (req.headersDistinct[name]?.length === 1 ? req.headersDistinct[name][0] : null);
-    if (one('origin') !== publicOrigin || one('sec-fetch-site') !== 'same-origin') {
-      return page(res, 403, 'Sign-out refused', '<p>Sign out from the Console page.</p>');
-    }
-    const ids = cookies(req, SESSION_COOKIE);
-    const key = ids.length === 1 ? sha256(ids[0]) : null;
-    const s = key === null ? undefined : sessions.get(key);
-    if (key !== null) sessions.delete(key);
-    const entry = s && providers.get(s.provider);
-    let location = `${publicOrigin}/auth/signed-out`;
-    if (entry?.as?.end_session_endpoint) {
-      const url = new URL(entry.as.end_session_endpoint);
-      url.searchParams.set('id_token_hint', s.idToken);
-      url.searchParams.set('post_logout_redirect_uri', `${publicOrigin}/auth/signed-out`);
-      url.searchParams.set('client_id', entry.config.clientId);
-      location = url.href;
-    }
-    return redirect(res, location, [expire(SESSION_COOKIE)]);
-  }
-
-  // `/auth/*` on the human listener; the caller has already checked the Host.
-  async function handle(req, res, path, search) {
-    const query = new URLSearchParams(search);
-    if (path === '/auth/logout') {
-      if (req.method !== 'POST') return page(res, 405, 'Method not allowed', '');
-      return logout(req, res);
-    }
-    if (req.method !== 'GET') return page(res, 405, 'Method not allowed', '');
-    if (path === '/auth/login') return login(res, query);
-    if (path === '/auth/callback') return callback(res, query, req);
-    if (path === '/auth/signed-out') return page(res, 200, 'Signed out', '<p><a href="/auth/login">Sign in</a></p>');
-    return page(res, 404, 'Not found', '');
-  }
-
-  return {
-    publicOrigin, publicHost, sessions, logins, handle, session, returnURL,
-    health: () => Object.fromEntries([...providers].map(([id, e]) => [id, e.state])),
-    formTargets: () => [...new Set([...providers.values()].filter(e => e.as?.end_session_endpoint).map(e => new URL(e.as.end_session_endpoint).origin))],
-    summary: () => config.providers.map(p => ({ id: p.id, issuer: p.issuer, subjects: p.subjects.length })),
-    close() { closed = true; for (const t of timers) clearTimeout(t); timers.clear(); },
-  };
-}
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design section 9): a fake OpenID provider for the --sso tests. A loopback
-// https server with a self-signed certificate made in a temp dir; `op.fetch` is a fetch that trusts
-// only that certificate, so the code under test needs no insecure flag. It serves any number of
-// issuers (`/<name>/`) at once, each with discovery, a JWKS, authorization, token and end-session
-// endpoints. Keys come from node:crypto. Nothing here reaches any other host.
-import { constants, createHash, createHmac, generateKeyPairSync, randomBytes, sign } from 'node:crypto';
-import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
-import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { createServer, request } from 'node:https';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-
-export const b64url = value => Buffer.from(typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)).toString('base64url');
-
-export function rsaKey(kid = `rsa-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`, bits = 2048) {
-  const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: bits });
-  return { kid, alg: 'RS256', privateKey, jwk: { ...publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' }), kid, use: 'sig', alg: 'RS256' } };
-}
-export function ecKey(kid = `ec-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`) {
-  const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' });
-  return { kid, alg: 'ES256', privateKey, jwk: { ...publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' }), kid, use: 'sig', alg: 'ES256' } };
-}
-export function psKey(kid = `ps-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`) {
-  const k = rsaKey(kid);
-  return { ...k, alg: 'PS256', jwk: { ...k.jwk, alg: 'PS256' } };
-}
-
-// A compact JWS. `alg` HS256 uses `hmac` as the key, `none` has an empty signature.
-export function jwt(header, payload, { key = null, hmac = null } = {}) {
-  const input = `${b64url(header)}.${b64url(payload)}`;
-  let sig = '';
-  if (header.alg === 'HS256') sig = createHmac('sha256', hmac).update(input).digest('base64url');
-  else if (header.alg === 'RS256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), key).toString('base64url');
-  else if (header.alg === 'PS256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), { key, padding: constants.RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, saltLength: 32 }).toString('base64url');
-  else if (header.alg === 'ES256') sig = sign('sha256', Buffer.from(input), { key, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }).toString('base64url');
-  return `${input}.${sig}`;
-}
-
-function certificate() {
-  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'fake-oidc-'));
-  try {
-    const r = spawnSync('openssl', ['req', '-x509', '-newkey', 'ec', '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:P-256', '-nodes', '-days', '1',
-      '-subj', '/CN=127.0.0.1', '-addext', 'subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1', '-keyout', join(dir, 'key.pem'), '-out', join(dir, 'cert.pem')], { encoding: 'utf8' });
-    if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl failed: ${r.stderr}`);
-    return { key: readFileSync(join(dir, 'key.pem')), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, 'cert.pem')) };
-  } finally { rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
-}
-
-// One issuer's state. `discovery` is merged over the defaults; `mode` is 'ok', 'down' (the socket is
-// destroyed) or 'html' (200 with an HTML page) for discovery.
-function issuerState(name, base, opts) {
-  const keys = opts.keys ?? [rsaKey()];
-  return {
-    name, issuer: `${base}/${name}/`, keys, retired: [], clientId: opts.clientId ?? `client-${name}`, clientSecret: opts.clientSecret ?? `secret-${name}-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`,
-    discovery: opts.discovery ?? {}, mode: 'ok', jwksOverride: null, codes: new Map(), acceptTwice: false, requirePkce: true,
-    tokenRequests: [], authorizeRequests: [], jwksFetches: 0, discoveryFetches: 0,
-  };
-}
-
-export async function fakeOidc() {
-  const { key, cert } = certificate();
-  const issuers = new Map();
-  const server = createServer({ key, cert }, (req, res) => {
-    const url = new URL(req.url, 'https://127.0.0.1');
-    const [, name, ...rest] = url.pathname.split('/');
-    const iss = issuers.get(name);
-    const route = rest.join('/');
-    const json = (status, body, type = 'application/json') => { res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': type }); res.end(typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)); };
-    if (!iss) return json(404, { error: 'no issuer' });
-    if (route === '.well-known/openid-configuration') {
-      iss.discoveryFetches++;
-      if (iss.mode === 'down') return req.socket.destroy();
-      if (iss.mode === 'html') return json(200, '<!doctype html><title>Sign in</title>', 'text/html');
-      return json(200, discovery(iss));
-    }
-    if (route === 'jwks') {
-      iss.jwksFetches++;
-      return json(200, iss.jwksOverride ?? { keys: iss.keys.map(k => k.jwk) });
-    }
-    if (route === 'authorize') { iss.authorizeRequests.push(Object.fromEntries(url.searchParams)); return json(200, { ok: true }); }
-    if (route === 'end-session') return json(200, { ok: true });
-    if (route === 'token' && req.method === 'POST') {
-      let text = '';
-      req.on('data', c => (text += c));
-      req.on('end', () => {
-        const form = new URLSearchParams(text);
-        const basic = Buffer.from((req.headers.authorization ?? '').replace(/^Basic /, ''), 'base64').toString();
-        const [id, secret] = basic.split(':').map(decodeURIComponent);
-        iss.tokenRequests.push({ form: Object.fromEntries(form), clientId: id });
-        if (id !== iss.clientId || secret !== iss.clientSecret) return json(401, { error: 'invalid_client' });
-        const grant = iss.codes.get(form.get('code'));
-        if (!grant) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant' });
-        if (!iss.acceptTwice) iss.codes.delete(form.get('code'));
-        if (form.get('redirect_uri') !== grant.redirectUri) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'redirect_uri' });
-        if (iss.requirePkce && createHash('sha256').update(form.get('code_verifier') ?? '').digest('base64url') !== grant.challenge) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'pkce' });
-        return json(200, { access_token: randomBytes(16).toString('hex'), token_type: 'Bearer', expires_in: 300, id_token: grant.idToken });
-      });
-      return;
-    }
-    return json(404, { error: 'not found' });
-  });
-  await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
-  const base = `https://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
-
-  const discovery = iss => ({
-    issuer: iss.issuer, authorization_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}authorize`, token_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}token`, jwks_uri: `${iss.issuer}jwks`,
-    end_session_endpoint: `${iss.issuer}end-session`, response_types_supported: ['code'], subject_types_supported: ['public'],
-    id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [...new Set(iss.keys.map(k => k.alg))], code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
-    ...iss.discovery,
-  });
-
-  // A fetch over node:https that trusts only this certificate. oauth4webapi passes a Headers object
-  // and a string or URLSearchParams body.
-  const opFetch = (input, init = {}) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const url = new URL(typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.href ?? input.url);
-    if (url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.hostname !== '127.0.0.1' || url.port !== String(server.address().port)) return reject(new TypeError(`fake OP fetch refuses ${url.origin}`));
-    const headers = Object.fromEntries(new Headers(init.headers ?? {}));
-    const body = init.body === undefined || init.body === null ? undefined : String(init.body);
-    if (body !== undefined) headers['content-length'] = Buffer.byteLength(body);
-    const req = request(url, { method: init.method ?? 'GET', headers, ca: cert, signal: init.signal }, res => {
-      const chunks = [];
-      res.on('data', c => chunks.push(c));
-      res.on('end', () => {
-        const h = new Headers();
-        for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(res.headers)) h.set(k, Array.isArray(v) ? v.join(', ') : v);
-        const response = new Response(res.statusCode === 204 ? null : Buffer.concat(chunks), { status: res.statusCode, headers: h });
-        Object.defineProperty(response, 'url', { value: url.href });
-        resolve(response);
-      });
-      res.on('error', reject);
-    });
-    req.on('error', reject);
-    req.end(body);
-  });
-
-  return {
-    base, fetch: opFetch, cert,
-    issuer(name, opts = {}) { const iss = issuerState(name, base, opts); issuers.set(name, iss); return iss; },
-    // A code for `iss` whose ID token is built from the start redirect's nonce, the claims and header
-    // overrides. `challenge` defaults to the start redirect's; `idToken` replaces the token outright.
-    grant(iss, authorizeUrl, { sub = `user-${iss.name}`, claims = {}, header = {}, key = iss.keys[0], idToken = null, challenge = null, redirectUri = null } = {}) {
-      const q = new URL(authorizeUrl).searchParams;
-      const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-      const payload = { iss: iss.issuer, sub, aud: iss.clientId, iat: now, exp: now + 300, nonce: q.get('nonce'), ...claims };
-      for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(payload)) if (v === undefined) delete payload[k];
-      const token = idToken ?? jwt({ alg: key.alg, kid: key.kid, typ: 'JWT', ...header }, payload, { key: key.privateKey, hmac: iss.clientSecret });
-      const code = randomBytes(12).toString('base64url');
-      iss.codes.set(code, { idToken: token, challenge: challenge ?? q.get('code_challenge'), redirectUri: redirectUri ?? q.get('redirect_uri') });
-      return { code, idToken: token, payload };
-    },
-    rotate(iss, next = rsaKey()) { iss.retired.push(...iss.keys); iss.keys = [next]; return next; },
-    close: () => new Promise(r => { server.close(r); server.closeAllConnections(); }),
-  };
-}
-
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ function fakeCopy(dir) {
  writeFileSync(join(copyRoot(dir), 'packages', 'webui', 'src', 'cli.mjs'), '');
  return copyRoot(dir);
 }
-const SEND_REFUSAL = /^webui-service: --send needs the preview mode \(--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user\) or --sso$/m;
+const SEND_REFUSAL = /^webui-service: --send needs the preview mode \(--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user\)$/m;
 const TEMPLATE = readFileSync(join(REPO, 'packages', 'webui', 'systemd', 'mosaic-webui.service.in'), 'utf8');

 // The unit as the base script renders it (row 75): the template with its four
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design test 24, sage-1340 F1, sage-1347 F7): the page under --sso. A read
-// the Console answers 401 `sign-in required` signs the page out the way a proxy redirect does, and
-// the line links to /auth/login with the current path and query; any other 401 stays an error. Both
-// fetch paths in app.js and both in bus.js (fetchRead and fetchApi) do it. The Sign out form shows
-// only when /api/config says sso. The board-held.test.mjs stub, with two lists of paths: those in
-// window.__signIn answer 401 `sign-in required`, those in window.__other 401 `unauthenticated`. A
-// page URL holding `sso` gets `sso: true` added to /api/config. Poll timers fire after 150 ms.
-import { test } from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Store } from '../../bus/src/store.mjs';
-import { Broker } from '../../bus/src/broker.mjs';
-import { views } from '../../bus/src/views.mjs';
-import { startServer } from '../src/serve.mjs';
-import { browser } from './browser.mjs';
-import { fixture, close } from './fixture.mjs';
-
-const businesses = { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'cto', delivery: 'pm' }, roles: { pm: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } }, cto: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } } } } };
-
-const stub = `(() => {
-  const real = window.fetch.bind(window);
-  window.__reqs = []; window.__signIn = []; window.__other = [];
-  const timeout = window.setTimeout.bind(window);
-  window.setTimeout = (f, ms, ...rest) => timeout(f, ms === 10000 ? 150 : ms, ...rest);
-  const answer = (status, body) => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
-  window.fetch = async (url, init = {}) => {
-    const path = String(url).split('?')[0];
-    window.__reqs.push(path);
-    if (window.__signIn.includes(path)) return answer(401, { error: 'sign-in required' });
-    if (window.__other.includes(path)) return answer(401, { error: 'unauthenticated' });
-    if (path === '/api/config' && /sso/.test(location.search)) return answer(200, { ...(await (await real(url, init)).json()), sso: true });
-    return real(url, init);
-  };
-})();`;
-
-async function setup() {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'webui-sso-browser-'));
-  const store = new Store(root), b0 = new Broker({ store, businesses });
-  b0.request(b0.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'pm', run: 'pm-run', harness: 'pi', address: 'pm-run' }), { verb: 'role.claim' });
-  const reader = b0.bindReader({ business: 'demo' });
-  const bus = views({ call: async (verb, args = {}) => structuredClone(b0.request(reader, { verb, args })) });
-  const f = await fixture(), b = await browser({ machine: true });
-  const web = await startServer({ port: 0, board: f.boardURL, bus }), base = `http://127.0.0.1:${web.address().port}/`;
-  await b.call('Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument', { source: stub });
-  await b.viewport(1280);
-  const wait = expr => b.evaluate(`(async()=>{for(let i=0;i<100;i++){if(${expr})return true;await new Promise(r=>setTimeout(r,50))}throw new Error('Condition timed out: '+${JSON.stringify(expr)})})()`);
-  const text = sel => b.evaluate(`document.querySelector(${JSON.stringify(sel)})?.textContent ?? null`);
-  const shown = sel => b.evaluate(`(()=>{const e=document.querySelector(${JSON.stringify(sel)});return !!e && !e.hidden && getComputedStyle(e).display !== 'none' && !!e.getClientRects().length})()`);
-  const reqs = () => b.evaluate('window.__reqs.length');
-  const settle = () => new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 600));
-  const done = async () => { await b.close(); await close(web); await f.close(); store.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); };
-  return { b, base, wait, text, shown, reqs, settle, done };
-}
-
-const LOADED = 'document.querySelector("table.sessions [data-open=\'proj/agent1\']")';
-const LINE = 'Signed out. Sign in again.';
-
-test('a 401 sign-in required on each fetch path signs the page out with a sign-in link and stops the refresh; another 401 stays an error', { timeout: 120000 }, async () => {
-  const { b, base, wait, text, shown, reqs, settle, done } = await setup();
-  // The line, its link back to this page, the Sign out form gone, and no further fetch.
-  const out = async ret => {
-    await wait('!document.querySelector("#signed-out").hidden');
-    assert.equal(await text('#signed-out'), LINE);
-    assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#signed-out a").getAttribute("href")'), `/auth/login?return=${encodeURIComponent(ret)}`);
-    assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), false);
-    assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#refresh").disabled'), true);
-    const n = await reqs();
-    await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#refresh").click(), true');
-    await settle();
-    assert.equal(await reqs(), n, 'the page fetched after signing out');
-  };
-  try {
-    // app.js api(): the Board read, with sso on from /api/config.
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&x=1`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/board'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
-    await out('/?sso&x=1');
-
-    // app.js getJSON: the conversation catalogue behind History.
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&conv`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/conversations'), document.querySelector('table.sessions [data-history="proj/agent1"]').click(), true`);
-    await out('/?sso&conv');
-
-    // app.js api(): the board POST behind Seen.
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&seen`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`document.querySelector('table.sessions [data-open="proj/agent1"]').click(), true`);
-    await wait('document.querySelector("#inspection [data-seen]")');
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/seen'), document.querySelector('#inspection [data-seen]').click(), true`);
-    await out('/?sso&seen');
-
-    // bus.js fetchRead and fetchApi, on a page whose /api/config has no sso: the link comes from
-    // the 401 itself (F1).
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?read#/inbox`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/bus/inbox'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
-    await out('/?read');
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?module`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__signIn.push('/api/queue'), location.hash = '#/queue', true`);
-    await out('/?module');
-
-    // Any other 401 is an error: no sign-out, and the polls go on.
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?sso&other`);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await b.evaluate(`window.__other.push('/api/board', '/api/bus/inbox', '/api/queue'), document.querySelector('#refresh').click(), true`);
-    await settle();
-    assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.querySelector("#signed-out").hidden'), true);
-    assert.equal(await b.evaluate('document.body.classList.contains("signed-out")'), false);
-    const n = await reqs();
-    await settle();
-    assert.ok(await reqs() > n, 'the refresh stopped on another 401');
-    assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), true);
-  } finally { await done(); }
-});
-
-test('the Sign out form shows only when /api/config says sso, and posts to /auth/logout', { timeout: 120000 }, async () => {
-  const { b, base, wait, shown, done } = await setup();
-  try {
-    await b.navigate(base);
-    await wait(LOADED);
-    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));
-    assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), false);
-    await b.navigate(`${base}?sso`);
-    await wait(`${LOADED} && !document.querySelector("#sign-out").hidden`);
-    assert.equal(await shown('#sign-out'), true);
-    assert.deepEqual(await b.evaluate('(() => { const f = document.querySelector("#sign-out"); return [f.method, f.getAttribute("action"), f.querySelector("button").textContent, f.querySelector("button").type]; })()'), ['post', '/auth/logout', 'Sign out', 'submit']);
-  } finally { await done(); }
-});
@@ -1,589 +0,0 @@
-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690, design agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md section 9): the Console as an
-// OIDC relying party (--sso). Every provider is the fake OP in helpers/fake-oidc.mjs on loopback;
-// no test reaches a real provider, the live Console or a real config or slot file. The public name
-// is console.example.test, sent only as a Host header to the test's own loopback listener. Each
-// refusal checks the status, that no session cookie was set and that the send stub never ran.
-import { test } from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { request } from 'node:http';
-import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
-import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { startServer } from '../src/serve.mjs';
-import { createSso, readSlot, SESSION_COOKIE, LOGIN_COOKIE } from '../src/sso.mjs';
-import { close } from './fixture.mjs';
-import { b64url, ecKey, fakeOidc, jwt, psKey, rsaKey } from './helpers/fake-oidc.mjs';
-
-const HOST = 'console.example.test', ORIGIN = `https://${HOST}`;
-const CLI = fileURLToPath(new URL('../src/cli.mjs', import.meta.url));
-const MSG = JSON.stringify({ to: 'coder', body: 'Please look at row 192.' });
-// Test 19: every log line any test here captured, and every token, code, state, nonce, verifier,
-// client secret and session id any test produced. The last test checks the one against the other.
-const ALL_LINES = [], PRODUCED = new Set();
-
-// node:http, not fetch: fetch can't set Host, Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site.
-function call(port, { method = 'GET', path = '/', headers = {}, body, host = HOST } = {}) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const length = body === undefined ? {} : { 'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(body) };
-    const req = request({ host: '127.0.0.1', port, method, path, headers: { host, ...length, ...headers } }, res => {
-      let text = '';
-      res.on('data', c => (text += c));
-      res.on('end', () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode, headers: res.headers, body: text && (res.headers['content-type'] ?? '').startsWith('application/json') ? JSON.parse(text) : text }));
-    });
-    req.on('error', reject);
-    req.end(body);
-  });
-}
-const setCookies = r => [r.headers['set-cookie'] ?? []].flat();
-const sessionOf = r => setCookies(r).find(c => c.startsWith(`${SESSION_COOKIE}=`) && !c.includes('Max-Age=0'))?.split(';')[0] ?? null;
-const writeHeaders = cookie => ({ ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}), origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin', 'content-type': 'application/json' });
-
-function providerFor(iss, extra = {}) {
-  return { id: iss.name, issuer: iss.issuer, clientId: iss.clientId, clientSecret: { slot: iss.name }, algs: [...new Set(iss.keys.map(k => k.alg))], subjects: [{ sub: `user-${iss.name}`, name: `person-${iss.name}` }], ...extra };
-}
-
-// A fake OP with `issuers`, createSso over them, and the human listener with a counting send.
-async function setup(t, { issuers = [{ name: 'a' }], provider = {}, before = null, retryFirst = 5000, server = {} } = {}) {
-  const op = await fakeOidc();
-  t.after(() => op.close());
-  const iss = issuers.map(o => op.issuer(o.name, o));
-  for (const i of iss) PRODUCED.add(i.clientSecret);
-  before?.(op, iss);
-  const config = { publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: iss.map(i => providerFor(i, provider[i.name] ?? {})) };
-  const lines = [];
-  const log = line => { lines.push(line); ALL_LINES.push(line); };
-  const sso = await createSso(config, { secrets: new Map(iss.map(i => [i.name, i.clientSecret])), fetch: op.fetch, log, retryFirst });
-  t.after(() => sso.close());
-  const sends = [];
-  const bus = Object.fromEntries(['inbox', 'tasks', 'agents', 'trail', 'decisions'].map(v => [v, async () => [{ verb: v }]]));
-  const web = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9', bus, sso, send: async args => { sends.push(args); return { id: 'msg-0001' }; }, log, ...server });
-  t.after(() => close(web));
-  return { op, iss, sso, port: web.address().port, lines, sends, config, bus };
-}
-
-// GET /auth/login; returns the authorize URL and the login cookie (name=value).
-async function begin(env, { provider = null, ret = null, query = null, host = HOST } = {}) {
-  const q = query ?? new URLSearchParams({ ...(provider ? { provider } : {}), ...(ret !== null ? { return: ret } : {}) }).toString();
-  const r = await call(env.port, { path: `/auth/login${q ? `?${q}` : ''}`, host });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 303, `login start: ${r.status} ${r.body}`);
-  const cookie = setCookies(r)[0].split(';')[0];
-  const location = r.headers.location;
-  const params = new URL(location).searchParams;
-  PRODUCED.add(cookie.split('=')[1]);
-  for (const k of ['state', 'nonce', 'code_challenge']) PRODUCED.add(params.get(k));
-  for (const record of env.sso.logins.values()) PRODUCED.add(record.verifier);
-  return { r, cookie, location, params };
-}
-function callback(env, begun, { code, state = begun.params.get('state'), extra = {}, cookie = begun.cookie } = {}) {
-  const q = new URLSearchParams({ ...(code !== undefined ? { code } : {}), state, ...extra });
-  return call(env.port, { path: `/auth/callback?${q}`, headers: cookie ? { cookie } : {} });
-}
-function grant(env, begun, iss, opts = {}) {
-  const g = env.op.grant(iss, begun.location, opts);
-  PRODUCED.add(g.code);
-  PRODUCED.add(g.idToken);
-  return g;
-}
-// A whole sign-in: start, a code at the OP, the callback. Returns the callback answer and the
-// session cookie (name=value) when one was set.
-async function signIn(env, { iss = env.iss[0], ret = null, opts = {} } = {}) {
-  const begun = await begin(env, { provider: env.iss.length > 1 ? iss.name : null, ret });
-  const g = grant(env, begun, iss, opts);
-  const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code });
-  const session = sessionOf(r);
-  if (session) PRODUCED.add(session.split('=')[1]);
-  return { begun, g, r, session };
-}
-function refused(env, r, code) {
-  assert.equal(r.status, 403, `expected 403, got ${r.status}`);
-  assert.equal(sessionOf(r), null, 'a session cookie was set');
-  assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0, 'the send stub ran');
-  assert.ok(setCookies(r).includes(`${LOGIN_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`), 'the login cookie was not expired');
-  if (code) assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), new RegExp(` sso refused code=${code} provider=`), env.lines.at(-1));
-}
-
-test('positive: an RS256 provider signs in and sends one message, and the session reads', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  assert.notEqual(env.port, 7332);
-  const { r, session } = await signIn(env, { ret: '/board?x=1' });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 303);
-  assert.equal(r.headers.location, `${ORIGIN}/board?x=1`);
-  assert.ok(session);
-  const send = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/api/bus/message', headers: writeHeaders(session), body: MSG });
-  assert.equal(send.status, 200, JSON.stringify(send.body));
-  assert.deepEqual(env.sends, [{ to: 'coder', body: 'Please look at row 192.' }]);
-  assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), / send user="person-a" to="coder" id=msg-0001$/);
-  const read = await call(env.port, { path: '/api/bus/inbox', headers: { cookie: session } });
-  assert.equal(read.status, 200);
-  const config = await call(env.port, { path: '/api/config', headers: { cookie: session } });
-  assert.equal(config.body.sso, true);
-  assert.equal(config.body.send, true);
-});
-
-test('positive: an ES256 provider signs in and sends', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'e', keys: [ecKey()] }] });
-  assert.deepEqual(env.config.providers[0].algs, ['ES256']);
-  const { session } = await signIn(env);
-  assert.ok(session);
-  assert.equal((await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/api/bus/message', headers: writeHeaders(session), body: MSG })).status, 200);
-  assert.equal(env.sends.length, 1);
-});
-
-test('positive: two providers each sign in their own subjects, and one provider\'s subject is unknown to the other', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a' }, { name: 'b', keys: [ecKey()] }] });
-  const list = await call(env.port, { path: '/auth/login?return=%2Fboard' });
-  assert.equal(list.status, 200);
-  assert.match(list.body, /provider=a&#38;return=%2Fboard/);
-  assert.match(list.body, /provider=b&#38;return=%2Fboard/);
-  const [a, b] = env.iss;
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env, { iss: a })).session);
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env, { iss: b })).session);
-  const names = [...env.sso.sessions.values()].map(s => s.name);
-  assert.deepEqual(names, ['person-a', 'person-b']);
-  const cross = await signIn(env, { iss: b, opts: { sub: 'user-a' } });
-  refused({ ...env, sends: [] }, cross.r, 'subject-unknown');
-});
-
-test('1: a forged x-authentik header without a cookie is 401 on the API and a sign-in redirect on a page', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const forged = { 'x-authentik-username': 'jason.woltje', origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin', 'content-type': 'application/json' };
-  for (const [method, path, body] of [['POST', '/api/bus/message', MSG], ['POST', '/api/settings', '{}'], ['GET', '/api/config', undefined]]) {
-    const r = await call(env.port, { method, path, headers: forged, body });
-    assert.equal(r.status, 401, `${method} ${path}`);
-    assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'sign-in required' });
-  }
-  const page = await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: forged });
-  assert.equal(page.status, 303);
-  assert.equal(page.headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2F');
-  const deep = await call(env.port, { path: '/board?x=1' });
-  assert.equal(deep.headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2Fboard%3Fx%3D1');
-  assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0);
-});
-
-test('2: an HS256 ID token keyed with the client secret and a real RSA kid is refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  const { r } = await signIn(env, { opts: { header: { alg: 'HS256', kid: iss.keys[0].kid } } });
-  refused(env, r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('3: a wrong aud, and an aud list holding another client with no azp, are refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { aud: 'another-client' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { aud: [env.iss[0].clientId, 'another-client'] } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('4: a token that expired 10 minutes ago is refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iat: now - 900, exp: now - 600 } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('5: another issuer, and the issuer without its trailing slash, are refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iss: `${env.op.base}/other/` } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { iss: iss.issuer.slice(0, -1) } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('6: a nonce mismatch and a missing nonce are refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { nonce: 'not-the-nonce' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { claims: { nonce: undefined } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('7: state mismatch, no login cookie, a replay, an expired record and two login cookies are refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  let begun = await begin(env);
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, state: 'wrong-state' }), 'state-mismatch');
-  begun = await begin(env);
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, cookie: null }), 'login-record-missing');
-  // Replay: the OP takes the code twice, so only the take-and-delete rule refuses the second callback.
-  iss.acceptTwice = true;
-  begun = await begin(env);
-  const g = grant(env, begun, iss);
-  const first = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code });
-  assert.equal(first.status, 303);
-  PRODUCED.add(sessionOf(first).split('=')[1]);
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code }), 'login-record-missing');
-  iss.acceptTwice = false;
-  begun = await begin(env);
-  for (const record of env.sso.logins.values()) record.expires = Date.now() - 1;
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code }), 'login-record-missing');
-  begun = await begin(env);
-  const other = await begin(env);
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss).code, cookie: `${begun.cookie}; ${other.cookie}` }), 'login-record-missing');
-});
-
-test('8: the token request carries the PKCE verifier, and the OP refuses a wrong one', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  const { r, begun } = await signIn(env);
-  assert.equal(r.status, 303);
-  const { form } = iss.tokenRequests.at(-1);
-  assert.equal(begun.params.get('code_challenge_method'), 'S256');
-  const { createHash } = await import('node:crypto');
-  assert.equal(createHash('sha256').update(form.code_verifier).digest('base64url'), begun.params.get('code_challenge'));
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { challenge: 'not-the-challenge' } })).r, 'grant-failed');
-});
-
-test('9: alg none, a changed payload under a real kid, and an unknown kid even after the refetch are refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  // (a) alg none: the alg rule, before any signature check.
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { header: { alg: 'none' } } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-  // (b) a real kid's signature over another payload: only the signature check catches it.
-  let begun = await begin(env);
-  const real = env.op.grant(iss, begun.location);
-  PRODUCED.add(real.idToken);
-  const [h, , s] = real.idToken.split('.');
-  const forged = `${h}.${b64url({ ...real.payload, name: 'changed' })}.${s}`;
-  refused(env, await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, iss, { idToken: forged }).code }), 'signature-invalid');
-  // (c) a key the JWKS never held, again after the cache is old enough to refetch.
-  t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.now() });
-  const stranger = rsaKey('not-in-jwks');
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: stranger } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
-  const fetches = iss.jwksFetches;
-  t.mock.timers.tick(61000);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: stranger } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
-  assert.equal(iss.jwksFetches, fetches + 1, 'no refetch');
-});
-
-test('10: a valid token for a subject not configured is 403 with one subject-unknown line', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const before = env.lines.length;
-  const { r } = await signIn(env, { opts: { sub: 'stranger' } });
-  refused(env, r, 'subject-unknown');
-  const added = env.lines.slice(before);
-  assert.equal(added.length, 1);
-  assert.match(added[0], new RegExp(`^\\S+ sso refused code=subject-unknown provider=a iss=${JSON.stringify(env.iss[0].issuer).replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\/]/g, '\\$&')} sub="stranger"$`));
-});
-
-test('11: start refusals: HS or none algs, reserved names, HS-only discovery, an empty JWKS, no S256, an issuer mismatch, a short RSA key', async t => {
-  const op = await fakeOidc();
-  t.after(() => op.close());
-  const start = (iss, extra = {}) => createSso({ publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: [providerFor(iss, extra)] }, { secrets: new Map([[iss.name, iss.clientSecret]]), fetch: op.fetch, log: l => ALL_LINES.push(l) });
-  const a = op.issuer('a');
-  PRODUCED.add(a.clientSecret);
-  for (const [extra, why] of [
-    [{ algs: ['HS256'] }, /algs\[0\] must be one of .*HS\* and none are refused/],
-    [{ algs: ['none'] }, /algs\[0\] must be one of/],
-    [{ subjects: [{ sub: 'u', name: 'tester' }] }, /subjects\[0\]\.name must not be tester or human/],
-    [{ subjects: [{ sub: 'u', name: 'Human' }] }, /subjects\[0\]\.name must not be tester or human/],
-  ]) await assert.rejects(start(a, extra), why);
-  const refusedAtDiscovery = /console\.sso provider \w+ refused at discovery/;
-  // The mosaic-preview shape: HS256 only.
-  const hs = op.issuer('hs', { discovery: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['HS256'] } });
-  await assert.rejects(start(hs, { algs: ['RS256'] }), refusedAtDiscovery);
-  const empty = op.issuer('empty');
-  empty.jwksOverride = { keys: [] };
-  await assert.rejects(start(empty), refusedAtDiscovery);
-  const plain = op.issuer('plain', { discovery: { code_challenge_methods_supported: ['plain'] } });
-  await assert.rejects(start(plain), refusedAtDiscovery);
-  const moved = op.issuer('moved');
-  moved.discovery = { issuer: `${op.base}/elsewhere/` };
-  await assert.rejects(start(moved), refusedAtDiscovery);
-  const small = op.issuer('small', { keys: [rsaKey('small', 1024)] });
-  await assert.rejects(start(small), refusedAtDiscovery);
-  // The control: the same OP and provider start.
-  const sso = await start(a);
-  assert.deepEqual(sso.health(), { a: 'ready' });
-  sso.close();
-  await assert.rejects(startServer({ port: 0, sso, preview: { host: HOST, header: 'remote-user', user: 'jason' } }), /--sso cannot be combined/);
-});
-
-test('11: slot files: a symlink, mode 0644, mode 0640 and a file under the repository are refused, and no message holds the value', t => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'webui-sso-slot-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const dir = join(root, 'config'), slots = join(dir, 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack');
-  mkdirSync(slots, { recursive: true });
-  const provider = slot => ({ id: 'a', clientSecret: { slot } });
-  const value = 'slot-value-do-not-print';
-  const opts = { repo: join(root, 'repo'), copies: join(root, 'copies') };
-  writeFileSync(join(slots, 'good'), `${value}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-  assert.equal(readSlot(dir, provider('good'), opts), value);
-  writeFileSync(join(root, 'target'), value, { mode: 0o600 });
-  symlinkSync(join(root, 'target'), join(slots, 'link'));
-  for (const [slot, mode] of [['wide', 0o644], ['group', 0o640]]) { writeFileSync(join(slots, slot), value); chmodSync(join(slots, slot), mode); }
-  writeFileSync(join(slots, 'two'), `${value}\nmore\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-  writeFileSync(join(slots, 'empty'), '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-  const cases = [
-    ['missing', /slot is missing$/, opts],
-    ['link', /must not be a symbolic link$/, opts],
-    ['wide', /must have no group or other permission bits$/, opts],
-    ['group', /must have no group or other permission bits$/, opts],
-    ['two', /must hold one non-empty line$/, opts],
-    ['empty', /must hold one non-empty line$/, opts],
-    // The config dir itself under the repository, and under a --checkout.
-    ['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, repo: root }],
-    ['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, checkout: dir }],
-    ['good', /must not be inside the repository or a stack copy$/, { ...opts, copies: dir }],
-  ];
-  for (const [slot, why, o] of cases) {
-    let err = null;
-    try { readSlot(dir, provider(slot), o); } catch (e) { err = e; }
-    assert.ok(err, `${slot} was read`);
-    assert.match(err.message, /^console\.sso provider a client secret slot /);
-    assert.match(err.message, why, slot);
-    assert.equal(err.message.includes(value), false);
-    assert.equal(err.message.includes(root), false);
-  }
-});
-
-test('11: the CLI refuses --sso with the old flags and without console.sso, and starts with a good one', async t => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wsso-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const env = { ...process.env, MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(root, 'cfg', 'config.json'), XDG_DATA_HOME: join(root, 'xdg') };
-  for (const flags of [['--auth-header', 'remote-user'], ['--public-host', HOST], ['--allow-user', 'jason'], ['--proof-header', 'x-proof']]) {
-    const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso', ...flags], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
-    assert.equal(r.status, 2, flags.join(' '));
-    assert.match(r.stderr, /^refused: --sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-\*$/m);
-  }
-  const missing = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
-  assert.equal(missing.status, 2);
-  assert.match(missing.stderr, /^refused: --sso needs the system config \(/);
-  const op = await fakeOidc();
-  t.after(() => op.close());
-  const a = op.issuer('a');
-  PRODUCED.add(a.clientSecret);
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack'), { recursive: true });
-  writeFileSync(join(root, 'ca.pem'), op.cert);
-  const base = { configVersion: 1, environment: 'development', dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), execution: { backend: 'docker', provider: 'zai', model: 'm' } };
-  writeFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG, JSON.stringify(base));
-  const noKey = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
-  assert.equal(noKey.status, 2);
-  assert.match(noKey.stderr, /^refused: --sso needs console\.sso in the system config$/m);
-  writeFileSync(env.MOSAIC_CONFIG, JSON.stringify({ ...base, console: { sso: { publicOrigin: ORIGIN, providers: [providerFor(a)] } } }));
-  writeFileSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'a'), `${a.clientSecret}\n`, { mode: 0o644 });
-  const wide = spawnSync(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 10000, env });
-  assert.equal(wide.status, 2);
-  assert.match(wide.stderr, /^refused: console\.sso provider a client secret slot must have no group or other permission bits$/m);
-  chmodSync(join(root, 'cfg', 'secrets', 'mosaic-stack', 'a'), 0o600);
-  // The child trusts the fake OP's certificate through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS; the code under test has no flag for it.
-  const child = spawn(process.execPath, [CLI, 'serve', '--port', '0', '--sso'], { env: { ...env, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: join(root, 'ca.pem') } });
-  t.after(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'));
-  let out = '', err = '';
-  child.stderr.on('data', c => (err += c));
-  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`no start line: ${out} ${err}`)), 15000);
-    child.stdout.on('data', c => { out += c; if (out.includes('Ctrl-C')) { clearTimeout(timer); resolve(); } });
-    child.on('exit', () => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(new Error(`exited: ${err}`)); });
-  });
-  assert.match(out, new RegExp(`^Sign-in: ${ORIGIN}/ \\(--sso\\), read-only$`, 'm'));
-  assert.match(out, new RegExp(`^Sign-in provider: a issuer ${a.issuer.replace(/[.]/g, '\\.')} subjects 1 \\(ready\\)$`, 'm'));
-  assert.equal(out.includes(a.clientSecret) || err.includes(a.clientSecret), false);
-  assert.equal(out.includes(a.clientId), false);
-  const port = Number(out.match(/^Mosaic Console: http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)\//m)[1]);
-  const health = await call(port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${port}` });
-  assert.deepEqual(health.body, { ok: true, sso: { a: 'ready' } });
-  child.kill('SIGTERM');
-});
-
-test('12: under --sso the tester listener refuses each kind of sign-in, has no /auth, and startServer refuses tester with sso', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const tester = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9', bus: env.bus, tester: true, testerNoSignIn: true, log: () => {} });
-  t.after(() => close(tester));
-  const port = tester.address().port, host = `127.0.0.1:${port}`;
-  const { session, g, begun } = await signIn(env);
-  assert.ok(session);
-  const plain = await call(port, { path: '/api/config', host });
-  assert.equal(plain.status, 200, 'control: a request with no sign-in is served');
-  for (const headers of [
-    { cookie: session },
-    { cookie: `theme=dark; ${begun.cookie}` },
-    { cookie: `${SESSION_COOKIE.toLowerCase()}=x` },
-    { authorization: `Bearer ${g.idToken}` },
-    { 'x-authentik-jwt': g.idToken },
-    { 'X-Authentik-Username': 'jason.woltje' },
-  ]) {
-    const r = await call(port, { path: '/api/config', host, headers });
-    assert.equal(r.status, 403, JSON.stringify(Object.keys(headers)));
-    assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'tester listener takes no sign-in' });
-  }
-  assert.equal((await call(port, { path: '/auth/login', host })).status, 404);
-  await assert.rejects(startServer({ port: 0, tester: true, sso: env.sso }), /tester listener cannot use sso/);
-});
-
-test('13: idle and absolute expiry, logout then reuse, a cross-origin logout, and background reads that don\'t keep a session', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const read = cookie => call(env.port, { path: '/api/bus/inbox', headers: { cookie } });
-  const record = () => [...env.sso.sessions.values()].at(-1);
-  // Background reads don't move `seen`; a page load does.
-  let { session } = await signIn(env);
-  const old = Date.now() - 59 * 60 * 1000;
-  record().seen = old;
-  assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
-  assert.equal(record().seen, old, 'a background read refreshed the session');
-  assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: { cookie: session } })).status, 200);
-  assert.ok(record().seen > old, 'a page load did not refresh the session');
-  // Idle: 59 minutes of background reads, then one more past the hour.
-  record().seen = Date.now() - 61 * 60 * 1000;
-  assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 401);
-  // Absolute.
-  ({ session } = await signIn(env));
-  record().created = Date.now() - 8 * 3600 * 1000;
-  assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/', headers: { cookie: session } })).headers.location, '/auth/login?return=%2F');
-  // Logout needs same-origin; refused, the session stays.
-  ({ session } = await signIn(env));
-  const cross = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' } });
-  assert.equal(cross.status, 403);
-  assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
-  const noOrigin = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } });
-  assert.equal(noOrigin.status, 403);
-  assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 200);
-  const out = await call(env.port, { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session, origin: ORIGIN, 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' } });
-  assert.equal(out.status, 303);
-  const end = new URL(out.headers.location);
-  assert.equal(`${end.origin}${end.pathname}`, `${env.iss[0].issuer}end-session`);
-  assert.equal(end.searchParams.get('post_logout_redirect_uri'), `${ORIGIN}/auth/signed-out`);
-  assert.equal(end.searchParams.get('client_id'), env.iss[0].clientId);
-  assert.ok(end.searchParams.get('id_token_hint'));
-  assert.deepEqual(setCookies(out), [`${SESSION_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`]);
-  assert.equal((await read(session)).status, 401);
-  assert.equal((await call(env.port, { method: 'GET', path: '/auth/logout', headers: { cookie: session } })).status, 405);
-});
-
-test('13: the CSP lets the Sign out form reach the provider\'s end-session origin, and only under --sso', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const r = await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${env.port}` });
-  assert.match(r.headers['content-security-policy'], new RegExp(`; form-action 'self' ${env.op.base.replace(/[.]/g, '\\.')}$`));
-  const plain = await startServer({ port: 0, board: 'http://127.0.0.1:9' });
-  t.after(() => close(plain));
-  const p = await call(plain.address().port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${plain.address().port}` });
-  assert.match(p.headers['content-security-policy'], /; form-action 'self'$/);
-});
-
-test('14: open redirects land on /, and a path on the Console lands there', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  for (const [query, where] of [
-    ['return=%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
-    ['return=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
-    ['return=%2F%5Cevil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
-    ['return=/%09/evil.example', `${ORIGIN}/`],
-    // Dot segments that leave a pathname of //evil.example stay on the Console (webby-0019 B1).
-    ['return=%2F.%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
-    ['return=%2Fx%2F..%2F%2Fevil.example', `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
-    [`return=${encodeURIComponent(`${ORIGIN}//evil.example`)}`, `${ORIGIN}//evil.example`],
-    ['return=%2Fboard%2F.%2Fx', `${ORIGIN}/board/x`],
-    ['return=%2Fboard%3Fx%3D1', `${ORIGIN}/board?x=1`],
-    ['', `${ORIGIN}/`],
-  ]) {
-    const begun = await begin(env, { query });
-    const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, env.iss[0]).code });
-    assert.equal(r.status, 303);
-    assert.equal(r.headers.location, where, query);
-    assert.equal(new URL(r.headers.location).origin, ORIGIN, query);
-    PRODUCED.add(sessionOf(r).split('=')[1]);
-  }
-});
-
-test('15: a callback for A carrying B\'s code and iss, and a provider= query, is refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a' }, { name: 'b' }] });
-  const [, b] = env.iss;
-  for (const extra of [{ iss: b.issuer, provider: 'b' }, { provider: 'b' }]) {
-    const begun = await begin(env, { provider: 'a' });
-    // B's code against A's PKCE challenge and nonce, for B's own subject: only the record rule
-    // (this callback belongs to A) stands in the way.
-    const g = grant(env, begun, b, { sub: 'user-b' });
-    const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: g.code, extra });
-    refused(env, r);
-  }
-  assert.equal(b.tokenRequests.length, 0, 'B\'s token endpoint was called');
-});
-
-test('16: a provider with RS256 and ES256 takes either, and refuses PS256 with a usable PS256 key in the JWKS', async t => {
-  const rsa = rsaKey(), ec = ecKey(), ps = psKey();
-  const env = await setup(t, { issuers: [{ name: 'a', keys: [rsa, ec, ps] }], provider: { a: { algs: ['RS256', 'ES256'] } } });
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env, { opts: { key: rsa } })).session);
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env, { opts: { key: ec } })).session);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: ps } })).r, 'id-token-invalid');
-});
-
-test('17: 33 started logins leave 32 records, and the first one\'s callback finds none', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const first = await begin(env);
-  for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) await begin(env);
-  assert.equal(env.sso.logins.size, 32);
-  refused(env, await callback(env, first, { code: grant(env, first, env.iss[0]).code }), 'login-record-missing');
-});
-
-test('18: after a key rotation a sign-in works through one refetch, and the removed kid is refused', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const [iss] = env.iss;
-  t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.now() });
-  const old = iss.keys[0];
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
-  const fetches = iss.jwksFetches;
-  env.op.rotate(iss);
-  t.mock.timers.tick(61000);
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
-  assert.equal(iss.jwksFetches, fetches + 1);
-  refused(env, (await signIn(env, { opts: { key: old } })).r, 'signature-invalid');
-});
-
-test('20 and 21: the store holds no raw session id, and the cookie strings are exact', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const begun = await begin(env);
-  assert.match(setCookies(begun.r)[0], new RegExp(`^${LOGIN_COOKIE}=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=600$`));
-  for (const key of env.sso.logins.keys()) assert.match(key, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
-  const r = await callback(env, begun, { code: grant(env, begun, env.iss[0]).code });
-  const set = setCookies(r);
-  assert.equal(set.length, 2);
-  assert.equal(set[0], `${LOGIN_COOKIE}=; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`);
-  assert.match(set[1], new RegExp(`^${SESSION_COOKIE}=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax$`));
-  const id = set[1].split(';')[0].split('=')[1];
-  PRODUCED.add(id);
-  for (const [key, value] of env.sso.sessions) {
-    assert.match(key, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
-    assert.notEqual(key, id);
-    assert.equal(JSON.stringify(value).includes(id), false);
-  }
-});
-
-test('22: a loopback Host is 403 on a page, a read and a write; /healthz on loopback is 200; a redirect_uri never comes from the Host', async t => {
-  const env = await setup(t);
-  const { session } = await signIn(env);
-  const loop = `127.0.0.1:${env.port}`;
-  for (const [method, path, body] of [['GET', '/', undefined], ['GET', '/api/board', undefined], ['GET', '/api/bus/inbox', undefined], ['POST', '/api/bus/message', MSG]]) {
-    // A loopback Host on this listener's port; any other Host is already the older non-local refusal.
-    for (const host of [loop, `localhost:${env.port}`]) {
-      const r = await call(env.port, { method, path, host, body, headers: { cookie: session, 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
-      assert.equal(r.status, 403, `${method} ${path} ${host}`);
-      assert.deepEqual(r.body, { error: 'public Host required' });
-    }
-  }
-  const health = await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: loop });
-  assert.equal(health.status, 200);
-  assert.deepEqual(health.body, { ok: true, sso: { a: 'ready' } });
-  assert.equal(env.sends.length, 0);
-  const begun = await begin(env, { host: HOST.toUpperCase() });
-  assert.equal(begun.params.get('redirect_uri'), `${ORIGIN}/auth/callback`);
-});
-
-test('23: a provider down at start leaves the Console up and 503, and the retry makes sign-in work', async t => {
-  let env = await setup(t, { retryFirst: 50, before: (op, [a]) => { a.mode = 'down'; } });
-  assert.equal((await call(env.port, { path: '/auth/login' })).status, 503);
-  assert.deepEqual((await call(env.port, { path: '/healthz', host: `127.0.0.1:${env.port}` })).body.sso, { a: 'unreachable' });
-  assert.match(env.lines.at(-1), / sso refused code=discovery-failed provider=a$/);
-  env.iss[0].mode = 'ok';
-  for (let i = 0; i < 100 && env.sso.health().a !== 'ready'; i++) await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 20));
-  assert.deepEqual(env.sso.health(), { a: 'ready' });
-  assert.ok((await signIn(env)).session);
-  // A 200 HTML page at the discovery URL is unreachable too, and the Console starts.
-  env = await setup(t, { before: (op, [a]) => { a.mode = 'html'; } });
-  assert.deepEqual(env.sso.health(), { a: 'unreachable' });
-  // HS-only discovery at start refuses the start.
-  await assert.rejects(setup(t, { before: (op, [a]) => { a.discovery = { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['HS256'] }; } }), /refused at discovery/);
-});
-
-test('19: no captured log line holds a token, code, state, nonce, verifier, client secret or session id', () => {
-  assert.ok(ALL_LINES.length > 20, `only ${ALL_LINES.length} lines`);
-  assert.ok(PRODUCED.size > 50, `only ${PRODUCED.size} values`);
-  for (const line of ALL_LINES) {
-    for (const value of PRODUCED) if (value) assert.equal(line.includes(value), false, `a log line holds a produced value: ${line.slice(0, 80)}`);
-    assert.match(line, /^\S+ (sso refused code=[a-z-]+ provider=[a-z0-9-]+( iss="[^"]*" sub="[^"]*")?|send user="[^"]+" to="[^"]*" (id=msg-0001|error=[a-z -]+))$/, line);
-  }
-});
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 import process from "node:process";
-import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";

 const SUPPORTED_CONFIG_VERSION = 1;
 const SUPPORTED_ENVIRONMENTS = new Set(["development", "production"]);
@@ -107,30 +106,13 @@ function isAncestorOf(ancestor, candidate) {
  return rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(rel);
 }

-// Q175 phase 1 (#1690): the optional `console` key, checked for shape only by the Console's own
-// checker. It is imported only when the key is there, so a config without it never needs the
-// Console's code, and a copy of this file alone still reads one.
-async function validateConsole(value) {
-  let checkConsole;
-  try {
-    ({ checkConsole } = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..", "packages", "webui", "src", "sso-config.mjs")).href));
-  } catch {
-    fail(2, 'the "console" key needs packages/webui/src/sso-config.mjs beside this loader');
-  }
-  try {
-    return checkConsole(value);
-  } catch (error) {
-    fail(2, error.message);
-  }
-}
-
-async function validate(document, file) {
+function validate(document, file) {
  if (!isPlainObject(document)) {
    fail(2, "configuration must be a JSON object");
  }
  rejectUnknownKeys(
    document,
-    ["configVersion", "environment", "dataRoot", "execution", "console"],
+    ["configVersion", "environment", "dataRoot", "execution"],
    "configuration",
  );

@@ -164,10 +146,6 @@ async function validate(document, file) {
    fail(2, `unsupported execution.adapter: ${JSON.stringify(adapter)} (supported: ${[...SUPPORTED_ADAPTERS].join(", ")})`);
  }

-  // Last, so the older checks keep their order. The key is in the output only when the file has
-  // it, so a config without it prints what it always printed.
-  const consoleKey = Object.hasOwn(document, "console") ? await validateConsole(document.console) : undefined;
-
  return {
    configVersion: document.configVersion,
    environment: document.environment,
@@ -178,11 +156,10 @@ async function validate(document, file) {
      model: document.execution.model,
      adapter,
    },
-    ...(consoleKey === undefined ? {} : { console: consoleKey }),
  };
 }

-async function load(file) {
+function load(file) {
  const raw = readRaw(file);
  if (raw === null) {
    fail(3, `configuration not found: ${file} (run scripts/bootstrap.sh to create it)`);
@@ -193,7 +170,7 @@ async function load(file) {
  } catch (error) {
    fail(2, `configuration is not valid JSON (${file}): ${error.message}`);
  }
-  return await validate(document, file);
+  return validate(document, file);
 }

 function shellQuote(value) {
@@ -217,7 +194,7 @@ const file = configPath();
 switch (operation) {
  case "bootstrap": {
    if (fs.existsSync(file)) {
-      await load(file); // validate only; never rewrite
+      load(file); // validate only; never rewrite
      process.stderr.write(`mosaic-config: configuration already present, validated without changes: ${file}\n`);
      process.exit(0);
    }
@@ -229,26 +206,26 @@ switch (operation) {
      fs.writeFileSync(fd, `${JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_CONFIG, null, 2)}\n`);
    } catch (error) {
      if (error.code === "EEXIST") {
-        await load(file);
+        load(file);
        process.exit(0);
      }
      fail(1, `unable to create configuration: ${error.message}`);
    } finally {
      if (fd !== undefined) fs.closeSync(fd);
    }
-    await load(file);
+    load(file);
    process.stderr.write(`mosaic-config: created default configuration: ${file}\n`);
    process.exit(0);
  }

  case "validate": {
-    const resolved = await load(file);
+    const resolved = load(file);
    process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify(resolved, null, 2)}\n`);
    process.exit(0);
  }

  case "env": {
-    const resolved = await load(file);
+    const resolved = load(file);
    process.stdout.write(
      [
        `MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT=${shellQuote(resolved.dataRoot)}`,
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # Moves the bus, the Console and the human CLI from the pointer's copy to another copy together,
 # behind a health gate, and puts the old stack back inside the same run when the gate fails.
 # Console tester listener flags follow target support (row 176, #1674); so does the row 178 proof
-# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685).
+# pair, which activate sets or drops (row 187, #1685). activate --no-send drops --send (row 189, #1687).
 # Design and tests: agents/darkwing/work/queue-162/BUILD.md.
 #
 # Who runs it. Decision 96 (Mos, mos-0716) lets this script stop and start the live units under
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ BIN="$HOME/.npm-global/bin"
 UNIT_DIR="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/systemd/user"
 CONSOLE_UNIT=mosaic-webui.service
 TIMEOUT=60 WANT_PM=0 AFTER_HARNESS=0 MIGRATE=0 PLAN=0 RESTORE="" EVENTS="" TESTER_PORT=""
-PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""
+PROOF_HEADER="" PROOF_FILE="" NO_PROOF=0 NO_SEND=0 R_BACKUP="" R_PORT=""

 usage() {
    cat >&2 <<'USAGE'
 usage: stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
       stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-port N]
-           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+           [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
       stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
       stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
       stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ parse_opts() {
            --proof-header) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_HEADER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
            --proof-file) [ "$OP" = activate ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [ -n "$2" ] || usage; PROOF_FILE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
            --no-proof) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_PROOF=1; shift ;;
+            --no-send) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; NO_SEND=1; shift ;;
            --migrate) [ "$OP" = activate ] || usage; MIGRATE=1; shift ;;
            --restore) [ "$OP" = rollback ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || usage; RESTORE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
            --backup) [ "$OP" = rehearse ] && [ $# -ge 2 ] && { [[ "$2" =~ ^[0-9]{8}T[0-9]{6}Z-[0-9a-f]{12}(-[1-9])?$ ]] || [[ "$2" =~ ^/[A-Za-z0-9/._+-]*$ ]]; } || usage; R_BACKUP="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@@ -244,14 +245,16 @@ target_schema() {
 in_chain() { local v; for v in "${T_CHAIN[@]}"; do [ "$v" != "$1" ] || return 0; done; return 1; }

 # The item 3 checks on the target copy, in order: copy, schema, already-active. An activate that
-# sets a proof pair, or drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, may name the pointer's copy: it
-# re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187, Part B's B3 and B-R1).
+# sets a proof pair, drops the pointer's pair with --no-proof, or drops the pointer's --send with
+# --no-send, may name the pointer's copy: it re-pins the live copy with new Console flags (row 187,
+# Part B's B3 and B-R1; row 189, mos-0972).
 check_target() {
    copy_exists "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-missing "no copy $TO in $COPIES"
    copy_ok "$TO" 2>/dev/null || refuse copy-unreachable "$TO is not reachable from refactor and origin/refactor"
    target_schema "$TO" || refuse copy-schema-unknown "cannot read SCHEMA_VERSION and its chain from $COPIES/$TO/packages/bus/src/store.mjs"
    [ "$TO" != "$P_COPY" ] || [ -n "$PROOF_HEADER" ] ||
        { [ "$NO_PROOF" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --proof-header "* ]]; } ||
+        { [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ] && [[ " ${P_CONSOLE[*]} " == *" --send "* ]]; } ||
        refuse already-active "$TO is the pointer's copy"
 }

@@ -690,6 +693,33 @@ console_for_target() {
        DROP_TESTER="--tester-port $inherited"
    fi
    proof_for_target
+    send_for_target
+}
+
+# Row 189 (mos-0972): --no-send drops --send from RUN_CONSOLE, so the unit and the pointer both lose
+# it; without the flag the pointer's --send goes on unchanged. Rollback and pm-on never take it, so
+# they carry the pointer as it is. Sets SEND_PLAN (the plan's send: line) and SEND_STEP.
+send_for_target() {
+    local had=0 i
+    local -a without_send=()
+    for ((i = 0; i < ${#RUN_CONSOLE[@]}; i++)); do
+        if [ "${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}" = --send ]; then had=1; else without_send+=("${RUN_CONSOLE[i]}"); fi
+    done
+    SEND_STEP=""
+    if [ "$NO_SEND" = 1 ]; then
+        RUN_CONSOLE=("${without_send[@]}")
+        if [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
+            SEND_PLAN="send: dropped; --no-send was given"
+            SEND_STEP="drop --send; --no-send was given"
+        else
+            SEND_PLAN="send: off; --no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send"
+            SEND_STEP="--no-send was given and the pointer holds no --send, so there is nothing to drop"
+        fi
+    elif [ "$had" = 1 ]; then
+        SEND_PLAN="send: carried"
+    else
+        SEND_PLAN="send: off"
+    fi
 }

 # Row 187: the row 178 proof pair in RUN_CONSOLE. A new pair replaces the pointer's and goes last;
@@ -943,6 +973,7 @@ plan() {
    echo "bus: scripts/bus-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES$([ "$RUN_PM" = 0 ] || echo ' --pm') --claude $P_CLAUDE"
    [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || echo "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
    echo "$PROOF_PLAN"
+    echo "$SEND_PLAN"
    echo "Console: scripts/webui-service.sh install --copy $TO --copies $COPIES${RUN_CONSOLE[*]:+ ${RUN_CONSOLE[*]}}"
    echo "CLI: scripts/stack-copy.sh wrapper $TO --copies $COPIES --bin $BIN"
    local r
@@ -956,6 +987,7 @@ run_steps() {
    capture || refuse capture-failed "could not write the rollback set $RS; nothing was stopped"
    [ -z "$DROP_TESTER" ] || say "drop $DROP_TESTER; the target Console does not support it"
    [ -z "$PROOF_STEP" ] || say "$PROOF_STEP"
+    [ -z "$SEND_STEP" ] || say "$SEND_STEP"
    trap 'after_fail signal' INT TERM HUP
    stop_both || rollback_in_run stop-timeout
    if [ -e "$STORE" ]; then
@@ -1478,7 +1510,7 @@ STORE="$DATA/bus/bus.sqlite"
 BUS_UNIT="mosaic-bus@$BUSINESS.service"
 FROM="" TO="" ACT="" RS="" POST="" BACKUP="" TAKEN="" RESTORED="" STEPS="" COUNT="" UNCLEAN="" FAIL=""
 STORE_SCHEMA="" START_EPOCH="" START_MS=0 GATE="" GATE_WHY="" S_CHANGED=""
-P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
+P_COPY="" P_PM=0 P_PENDING=0 P_SCHEMA="" P_CLAUDE="" P_CONSOLE=() RUN_PM=0 RUN_PENDING=0 RUN_CONSOLE=() DROP_TESTER="" PROOF_PLAN="" PROOF_STEP="" SEND_PLAN="" SEND_STEP="" PLAN_REFUSE=()
 R="" R_RC=0 R_EARLY=() R_BK="" R_HOST_PID="" R_CONSOLE_PID="" R_STARTED="" LIVE_CFG="" LIVE_BIZ=""
 case "$OP" in
    adopt) do_adopt ;;
@@ -151,52 +151,6 @@ else
    FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); echo "${C_FAIL}FAIL${C_RESET} env exports resolve correctly"
 fi

-# --- Q175 phase 1 (#1690), design test 25: the optional console key ---
-# Shape only. The slot path is a FIFO, so a loader that opened the slot would block and the
-# timeout would fail the case; no case reads a slot file.
-mkdir -p "$SANDBOX/secrets/mosaic-stack"
-mkfifo "$SANDBOX/secrets/mosaic-stack/console-sso-test"
-sso_body() {
-    printf '{"configVersion":1,"environment":"development","dataRoot":"%s","execution":{"backend":"docker","provider":"zai","model":"m"},"console":%s}' "$DATA_ROOT" "$1"
-}
-# provider [ALGS] [CLIENT_SECRET]: one provider entry; an empty argument takes the valid value.
-provider() {
-    local algs='["RS256"]' secret='{"slot":"console-sso-test"}'
-    [ -n "${1:-}" ] && algs="$1"
-    [ -n "${2:-}" ] && secret="$2"
-    printf '{"id":"fake","issuer":"https://op.test/app/","clientId":"client-1","clientSecret":%s,"algs":%s,"subjects":[{"sub":"user-1","name":"jason.woltje"}]}' "$secret" "$algs"
-}
-cfg sso-valid.json "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider)"']}}')"
-OUT="$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/sso-valid.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate 2>&1)"
-[ $? -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' "$OUT" | grep -q '"publicOrigin": "https://console.test"'
-check "valid console.sso loads and is in the output" $?
-
-# expect_refusal NAME PATH-IN-MESSAGE BODY: exit 2, and the message names the bad key path.
-expect_refusal() {
-    cfg sso-bad.json "$2"
-    local err rc
-    err="$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/sso-bad.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate 2>&1 >/dev/null)"
-    rc=$?
-    [ "$rc" -eq 2 ] && printf '%s' "$err" | grep -qF -- "$3"
-    check "$1 (exit $rc)" $?
-}
-expect_refusal "console.sso HS256 alg exits 2 naming the path" \
-    "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '["HS256"]')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].algs[0] must be one of'
-expect_refusal "console.sso alg none exits 2 naming the path" \
-    "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '["RS256","none"]')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].algs[1] must be one of'
-expect_refusal "console.sso missing slot field exits 2 naming the path" \
-    "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '' '{}')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].clientSecret.slot is required'
-expect_refusal "console.sso slot name outside the pattern exits 2 naming the path" \
-    "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider '' '{"slot":"../x"}')"']}}')" 'console.sso.providers[0].clientSecret.slot must match'
-expect_refusal "unknown key under console exits 2 naming the path" \
-    "$(sso_body '{"sso":{"publicOrigin":"https://console.test","providers":['"$(provider)"']},"extra":1}')" 'console.extra is not a supported key'
-
-# Without the key: the output is exactly what the loader printed before phase 1 (sage-1340, F2).
-cfg no-console.json '{"configVersion":1,"environment":"development","dataRoot":"'$DATA_ROOT'","execution":{"backend":"docker","provider":"zai","model":"m"}}'
-EXPECTED="$(printf '{\n  "configVersion": 1,\n  "environment": "development",\n  "dataRoot": "%s",\n  "execution": {\n    "backend": "docker",\n    "provider": "zai",\n    "model": "m",\n    "adapter": "pi"\n  }\n}' "$DATA_ROOT")"
-[ "$(MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/no-console.json" timeout 20 $CONFIG_OP validate)" = "$EXPECTED" ]
-check "config without console loads with unchanged output" $?
-
 # --- validation must not modify the file ---
 SUM_INVALID_BEFORE=$(sha256sum "$SANDBOX/invalid.json" | cut -d' ' -f1)
 MOSAIC_CONFIG="$SANDBOX/invalid.json" $CONFIG_OP validate >/dev/null 2>&1
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@
 # character set and refused otherwise. --proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH
 # go together under preview; only the path is carried here, never the secret.
 # render checks ownership, mode and location without opening the proof file.
-# --sso (Q175 phase 1, #1690): the Console signs people in itself from
-# console.sso in config.json. It refuses the preview set and the proof pair,
-# and --send takes it in place of the preview set. Nothing secret is carried.
 #
 # There is no start, stop, enable or restart verb. The Console reads the
 # main listener's bus through the human transport; the optional loopback
@@ -71,7 +68,7 @@ REPO="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
 TEMPLATE="$REPO/packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in"
 UNIT_NAME="mosaic-webui.service"
 USAGE="usage: scripts/webui-service.sh copy COMMIT [--copies DIR] [--allow-worktree] | render [--copy ID [--copies DIR]] [FLAGS] | install --copy ID [--copies DIR] [--dir DIR] [--no-reload] [--allow-worktree] [FLAGS] | uninstall [--dir DIR] [--no-reload] | status [--dir DIR]
-  FLAGS: [--port N] [--business ID] [--board URL] [--sso [--send] | --public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send]] [--tester-port N] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]
+  FLAGS: [--port N] [--business ID] [--board URL] [--public-host NAME --auth-header HEADER --allow-user ID [--send]] [--tester-port N] [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH]
  --tester-port: 1024..65535, different from --port and never 7332; loopback tester listener.
  --allow-worktree is for the tests only: copy and install otherwise refuse outside the canonical checkout."

@@ -94,7 +91,6 @@ PUBLIC_HOST=""
 AUTH_HEADER=""
 ALLOW_USER=""
 SEND=0
-SSO=0
 PROOF_HEADER=""
 PROOF_FILE=""
 PROOF_SET=0
@@ -118,7 +114,6 @@ parse_flags() {
            --proof-header) [ $# -ge 2 ] || usage; PROOF_HEADER="$2"; PROOF_SET=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift 2 ;;
            --proof-file) [ $# -ge 2 ] || usage; PROOF_FILE="$2"; PROOF_SET=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift 2 ;;
            --send) SEND=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift ;;
-            --sso) SSO=1; SERVE_SET=1; shift ;;
            *) usage ;;
        esac
    done
@@ -171,13 +166,9 @@ serve_flags() {
    [ -z "$PUBLIC_HOST" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
    [ -z "$AUTH_HEADER" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
    [ -z "$ALLOW_USER" ] || preview=$((preview + 1))
-    # serve refuses --sso with the preview set or the proof pair, and --send
-    # without --sso or the preview set; refuse them here first, so no unit is
-    # written that would only exit 2 at start.
-    if [ "$SSO" = 1 ] && { [ "$preview" -ne 0 ] || [ "$PROOF_SET" = 1 ]; }; then
-        die "--sso cannot be combined with --public-host, --auth-header, --allow-user or --proof-*"
-    fi
-    [ "$SEND" = 0 ] || [ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || [ "$SSO" = 1 ] || die "--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user) or --sso"
+    # serve refuses --send without the preview set; refuse it here first,
+    # so no unit is written that would only exit 2 at start.
+    [ "$SEND" = 0 ] || [ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || die "--send needs the preview mode (--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user)"
    if [ "$preview" -ne 0 ]; then
        [ "$preview" -eq 3 ] || die "--public-host, --auth-header and --allow-user go together: all three or none"
        case "$PUBLIC_HOST" in [A-Za-z0-9]*) ;; *) die "public host must be a hostname, no port or scheme: $PUBLIC_HOST" ;; esac
@@ -210,7 +201,6 @@ serve_flags() {
        { [ "$proof_mode" = 600 ] || [ "$proof_mode" = 400 ]; } && [ "$proof_uid" = "$(id -u)" ] || die "invalid proxy proof file metadata"
        flags="$flags --proof-header $PROOF_HEADER --proof-file $PROOF_FILE"
    fi
-    [ "$SSO" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --sso"
    [ "$SEND" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --send"
    [ "$TESTER_SET" = 0 ] || flags="$flags --tester-port $TESTER_PORT"
    echo "$flags"
@@ -395,17 +385,14 @@ status_unit() {
    else
        echo "copy: none; the unit runs from $wd"
    fi
-    # render puts --send after the allowed user and optional proof pair, or
-    # after --sso, before the tester port. The allowed user
+    # render puts --send after the allowed user and optional proof pair,
+    # before the tester port. The allowed user
    # starts with a letter or digit (N5), so it is never the value --send.
-    if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.*( --allow-user [^ ][^ ]*( --proof-header [^ ]+ --proof-file /[^ ]+)?| --sso) --send( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
+    if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.* --allow-user [^ ][^ ]*( --proof-header [^ ]+ --proof-file /[^ ]+)? --send( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
        echo "send: on (--send; human messages to roles)"
    else
        echo "send: off (read-only)"
    fi
-    if grep -Eq '^ExecStart=.* --sso( --send)?( --tester-port [0-9]+)?$' "$target"; then
-        echo "sign-in: the Console's own (--sso)"
-    fi
    local tester_port
    tester_port="$(sed -n 's/^ExecStart=.* --tester-port \([0-9][0-9]*\)$/\1/p' "$target")"
    if [ -n "$tester_port" ]; then
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jason.woltje	b7239bb66e	agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r6 (#1693 ): Duckworth r5 B1 (confirm's result lines carry the activation's op, from, to and the rollback set's BACKUP, so from_log reads .53's log; sequence 7), B2 (MIGRATING recorded after backup_store and before migrate-schema.mjs, as TAKEN today; sequence 8), N1 marker step makes $RS, N2 gate --since, N3 apparmor.d word grep baseline, N4 item 4 under systemd-run with NoNewPrivileges, N5 plan --expect-from OLD	2026-10-20 16:53:53 -05:00
jason.woltje	0b6d29e909	agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r5 (#1693 ): Duckworth r4 B1 (one result line per activation, FAILED file and --cause, marker written first, refusals log no activation, real-sequence tests), B2 per mos-1098/mos-1101 (case1-pins.sh and case1-hostcheck.sh, seven-item drift stop with apt hook and boot unit, ops-01 owner, bwrap closed on drift), N1-N4; Console on 127.0.0.1:732 with CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, tester 7333 as P10; chains on row 190 r3 and row 230 (C2-13a), node under /opt, four factory profile items for Gosalyn	2026-10-20 16:46:21 -05:00
jason.woltje	0075be3581	agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r4 (#1693 ): Duckworth B1 (root holds only the go's values and the unit files; confirm and revert find the one open activation, AWAITING-UNITS; rollback --to checked against from_log previous; A2 failure path; root step log), B2 (confirm runs gate with --timeout; .53 runs the PM; external PM check reads launches list with ActiveEnterTimestamp, no journal; pm-on refuses), N1-N5; mos-1096 bwrap-userns-restrict from the pinned deb, dpkg-statoverride root:mosaic 0750, P9 accepted by Mos; gosalyn-0046 two units and args file; managed settings for DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER; sage-1481 C2-13a	2026-10-20 16:08:53 -05:00
jason.woltje	9a16d7795d	agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r3 (#1693 ): Duckworth B1, one ordered .53 activate with a runner per step (case1-repin.sh, stack-release --units external with confirm and revert), stopped-store backup under $DATA/backups/stack; N1-N6; mos-1091 4a-4c with the bwrap AppArmor profile; gosalyn-0034 C2-13 items	2026-10-20 15:56:54 -05:00
jason.woltje	818b79696d	agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r2 (#1693 , brief blob `45be7f09af`, Sage rulings sage-1451)	2026-10-20 15:38:55 -05:00
jason.woltje	088087ac96	queue: revs 2248-2361+. Sage: rows 210 (#424 host access, Gizmoduck) and 211 (#426 force-push guard, Rocko) added and briefed; row 195 re-briefed to the Case 1 install on .53; review requests for 200 r1/r2 and 202; plus earlier Sage revs. Other seats' revs: Launchpad 2254, 2283-2284, 2286, 2311-2313, 2328-2329, 2344, 2347-2348 (rows 192/200); Honker 2255; Morgana 2257, 2320, 2326-2327 (row 204); Gander 2262; Herb 2265; Dewey 2268; Bushroot 2273; Megavolt 2276; Webby 2303, 2316, 2339, 2355 (row 192/200 verdicts); Gizmoduck 2304, 2318-2319 and the row 210 claim (rows 201/210); Quackerjack 2317, 2341-2342 (row 202); Duckworth 2323, 2335, 2353 (rows 201/204/202 verdicts); Darkwing 2354, 2357 (row 190 in-review)	2026-10-20 15:34:55 -05:00
jason.woltje	a0fbefd48d	plans: pre-push force-push hook and failing busy check brief (Vikunja #426 , mos-1078, mos-1083; owner Rocko, reviewer Dewey)	2026-10-20 15:31:17 -05:00
jason.woltje	f24f2cd40d	plans: row 195 brief becomes the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (Q181 hosts, Q182/Q183 recorded acceptance, Q185 existing account, chained on rows 190 and C2-13; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1; sage-1439)	2026-10-20 15:24:33 -05:00
jason.woltje	9ba31b5b3f	agents: Honker's PRD 1.7 draft r2 on refactor for the prd.approve raise (`11cb0423b`, sha256 e896746df595d1b5155130ca163fbf63b0dc38a87a8dd154af77f1a6d1328647, Duckworth approved duckworth-0039, Vikunja #420 )	2026-10-20 15:20:37 -05:00
jason.woltje	9db578ff54	plans: agent host access with sudo through the credential store brief (#1707 , Vikunja #424 , Q183/Q184, chained on row 199)	2026-10-20 15:09:59 -05:00
jason.woltje	8eb9ddd12c	plans: FED R8 brief to r4.11 (`b93f098f0`, recorded acceptance, Duckworth N1/N2, #416 date), R5 context source (sage-1419), 193a makes covers level required (duckworth-0033 N1)	2026-10-20 15:06:22 -05:00
jason.woltje	ae3c36f248	agents: Gizmoduck seat dir and roster row (FED R1 owner, #414 )	2026-10-20 14:42:15 -05:00
jason.woltje	a2af7ab495	plans: FED R1, R5, R2 and R8 briefs (#414 , r4.9 `a1daa3c07`) and row 193a-d build briefs (#1691 ); Quackerjack seat dir and roster row	2026-10-20 14:41:03 -05:00
jason.woltje	aa1bd209e3	gate-lane: row 189 gate timing table for row 197 (Herb)	2026-10-20 14:25:17 -05:00
jason.woltje	ace27dc5eb	row 189 (#1687 ): stack-release.sh activate --no-send drops the Console's --send (Sage; Dewey approve 29485; Sage gate passed)	2026-10-20 14:21:56 -05:00
jason.woltje	a4a42dbac2	plans: stack-release --sso brief (#1698 , Launchpad, reviewer Webby, row 192 F3; chained on 192)	2026-10-20 14:18:08 -05:00
jason.woltje	a31f1a0f8b	plans: row 198 brief records Mos's call, in-process board reads behind the Console's auth (mos-1019)	2026-10-20 14:17:03 -05:00
jason.woltje	992650232f	plans: agent credentials and git identity brief (MVP T1 item 6, #1697 , Megavolt, reviewer Duckworth); Megavolt seat dir	2026-10-20 14:14:33 -05:00
jason.woltje	a7661ada06	plans: row 195 acceptance script takes Gizmoduck's gate item list; B8 issuer and TLS front end (mos-1011)	2026-10-20 14:12:19 -05:00
jason.woltje	f871cb3096	plans: retire the control board writer on 7331 brief (#1696 , Bushroot, reviewer Webby, mos-1008 item 2); Bushroot seat dir	2026-10-20 14:11:21 -05:00
jason.woltje	0bbd23c619	plans: row 195 brief adds the identity provider check and flags any new model account for Jason (mos-1008)	2026-10-20 14:10:28 -05:00
jason.woltje	0217b71c8f	plans: row 195 brief rewritten as the hub on its own host, host left to Jason (#1693 , mos-0998, mos-1005)	2026-10-20 14:07:57 -05:00
jason.woltje	c6f528a32f	plans: second gate lane brief (#1695 , Herb, reviewer Webby, mos-0977 item 6); Herb seat dir; gate template and busy check copies for the row	2026-10-20 14:03:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	96f243fafc	plans: human boundary row brief (P19 333, #1694 , Gander, reviewer Duckworth, mos-0989); Gander seat dir; seat READMEs name the credentials row, not row 195 (now 190b)	2026-10-20 14:00:58 -05:00
jason.woltje	c862699352	sessions: Filbert row 190 design review r3, approved	2026-10-20 14:00:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	48ebee0ffe	plans: row 190 brief scopes isolation to addressing on one uid, points to row 190b (Filbert N7, mos-0986)	2026-10-20 13:58:07 -05:00
jason.woltje	66bdd84b8f	sessions: Filbert row 190 design review r2, changes requested	2026-10-20 13:57:10 -05:00
jason.woltje	6966164f0c	plans: row 190b brief, Melanie's hub under its own Linux user (#1693 , Darkwing, reviewer Duckworth), mos-0986	2026-10-20 13:56:34 -05:00