agents: row 195 Case 1 install design r6 (#1693): Duckworth r5 B1 (confirm's result lines carry the activation's op, from, to and the rollback set's BACKUP, so from_log reads .53's log; sequence 7), B2 (MIGRATING recorded after backup_store and before migrate-schema.mjs, as TAKEN today; sequence 8), N1 marker step makes $RS, N2 gate --since, N3 apparmor.d word grep baseline, N4 item 4 under systemd-run with NoNewPrivileges, N5 plan --expect-from OLD

agents/README.md

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
 | Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
+| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
 | Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
 | Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |

agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,872 @@
+# Row 195 design: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (r6)
+
+Darkwing, 2026-10-20. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md`, blob 45be7f09afc1 (f24f2cd40,
+sage-1439). Gitea #1693. Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190's candidate (round 3,
+df65a3d4c on `darkwing/row190-r3`, rebased on row 192; the config canon) and on row 230's candidate
+(C2-13a, #1732, Gosalyn: `scripts/case2-unit.sh` and `case2-precheck.sh`), Q177, sage-1499. Row 230's
+brief is `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` "C2-13a" at 5b8def2f1, from Gosalyn's design r11
+(eac92d956 on `gosalyn/case2-design`, approved webby-0038). It has no candidate yet, so I read that
+brief as the interface and expect a rebase. Section 2 lists what Case 1 needs from it that the brief
+doesn't give.
+
+Changes from r5 (Duckworth's REVIEW-r4.md at 62200362b on `duckworth/reviews`, duckworth-0054). This
+round changes only B1's and B2's lines, their section 7 cases and the notes:
+
+- B1. The result line `confirm` writes said op `confirm`, because `log_line` (:58) writes `$OP` and
+  `OP="$1"` (:1493). `from_log` (:169) reads only `adopt`, `activate` and `rollback`, so it would have
+  skipped every .53 activation: after adopt C0 and re-pins to C1 and C2, `from_log previous` returns
+  C0. Now A5's `ok` line and R4's line carry the op, from and to of the activation's `started` line,
+  and the backup that A3 records in the rollback set. Real sequence 7 and a mutant that writes op
+  `confirm`. Section 4.
+- B2. r5 recorded the migration after the migrate, while today's run sets TAKEN before
+  `migrate-schema.mjs` (:1004-1005). A migrate that changed the store and then exited 1 would have
+  left no record, so R2 would skip the restore and R4 would gate OLD on a half-migrated store. A3 now
+  writes `MIGRATING` after `backup_store` returns and before the migrate. Real sequence 8 and a mutant
+  that records after the migrate. Section 4.
+- N1. The marker step makes `$RS` with capture's exclusive `mkdir` (:416), and capture under
+  `--units external` makes none. N2. `gate` takes `--since T`, root's clock before its A2f start, as
+  its start floor. N3. Section 0 now has a read-only grep of `/etc/apparmor.d` for the word `bwrap`,
+  and item 3 matches the word against a list of exactly one file. N4. Item 4 runs under
+  `systemd-run` with the units' `NoNewPrivileges=yes`, as 2a' does. N5. A1's plan takes
+  `--expect-from OLD` and refuses `pointer-differs`.
+- Not in this round: claude's path. gosalyn-0058 proposes that `--claude`, like `--node`, takes only a
+  root-owned path outside the home, and `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` fails that. I asked Sage to
+  rule and recommended moving claude under `/opt/mosaic-stack`. That change gets its own round.
+
+Changes from r4 (Duckworth's REVIEW-r3.md at 9f4d5556b on `duckworth/reviews`; mos-1098; mos-1101;
+gosalyn-0049):
+
+- B1. An activation now has exactly one result line, written at the end. A5's gate failure and A3's
+  failure after its capture write no log line. Each writes a `FAILED` file next to `AWAITING-UNITS` and
+  exits 1, so the activation stays open for R2 and R4, and R4 writes the result. A3 writes
+  `AWAITING-UNITS` right after `started`. Refusals by `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log no activation
+  id, so a refused `confirm` can't close one either. There are real-sequence tests on one log, and
+  mutants that put back r4's interim line, r4's marker order and a refusal that names the activation.
+  Section 4 and section 7.
+- B2. The bwrap profile has an owner and a stop. `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` checks the profile file
+  against the pin in `scripts/case1-pins.sh`, the two loaded profiles, the live label of a process
+  bwrap runs, the statoverride and mode, that no other profile names bwrap, two sysctls and the port
+  floor. It has three callers:
+  1. A1 of every re-pin refuses `profile-drift`.
+  2. A root apt hook runs it after every package run, unattended ones included.
+  3. A boot unit runs it before the bus starts.
+
+  On drift, callers 2 and 3 unload the profile and close `/usr/bin/bwrap` to `mosaic`, so every role
+  session refuses to start. They write `DRIFT` and log it, and only root clears it. ops-01 owns the host
+  side under a Mos go: it reads the log in each STATE report and, before each re-pin window, compares
+  the upstream profile to the pin. A changed upstream profile becomes a new pin, which is its own review
+  round. Section 1 has the details. The facts behind it are in section 0: unattended-upgrades runs daily
+  on .53 with the security pocket, and the pinned bubblewrap is in that pocket.
+- N1 and mos-1098 point 2. P9 has a seventh item: no `mosaic-bwrap` profile is loaded, and no profile
+  other than Ubuntu's attaches to `/usr/bin/bwrap`. r4 never installed `mosaic-bwrap`. F5 now compares
+  exact strings. P9 reads `accepted mos-1096` only while all seven items hold.
+- N2: a role session gets no capabilities, so a nested bwrap fails. Section 1. N3: A3 refuses "before
+  it logs `started`". N4: the stale-start rule and its fixtures handle `ActiveEnterTimestamp`'s whole
+  seconds.
+- The port squat (mos-1101 item 5, gosalyn-0049). It applies: role sessions share the host's network
+  namespace (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:67` unshares no net), so while the Console is down a
+  session can bind its loopback port. The Console moves to 127.0.0.1:732 with
+  `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` on its unit (row 230's line), so no session can take it. The tester port stays
+  7333, because serve refuses a tester port below 1024. That residue is P10, accepted under Mos's
+  reading. Case 1 can't meet the preview trio or the proof pair, because .53 has no proxy. Section 2
+  names the factory serve set for row 230.
+- Jason's Q9 (Vikunja #429) is still open. If install and upgrade become product commands, these
+  steps become that installer's configuration and row 195 rebases on its row (sage-1491). Section 6.
+
+## 0. What I checked on the host
+
+Read only, as `localadmin` over ssh, 2026-10-20 between 20:40Z and 21:00Z, and again at 21:27Z for the
+last seven rows (the brief allows this):
+
+| Item | 10.1.1.53 today | Needed |
+|---|---|---|
+| OS | Ubuntu 24.04.5, kernel 6.8.0-124, x86_64, 12 cores, 94 GiB, 217 GiB free on `/` | fits |
+| `mosaic` user, group, `/srv/mosaic` | absent | step 2a creates them |
+| node | `/usr/local/bin/node` v22.22.2, root-owned | 24 or later (every `packages/*/package.json` engines line); dragon-lin runs 26.8.1 |
+| bwrap | absent, no statoverride; apt candidate `bubblewrap 0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3` | every role session runs under `/usr/bin/bwrap` (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:43`) |
+| user namespaces | `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1`, apparmor 4.0.1, no bwrap profile loaded | bwrap needs a user namespace, which this setting refuses unless a profile allows it |
+| `apparmor-profiles` | not installed; candidate `4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.9`, whose `/usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/bwrap-userns-restrict` has sha256 `11d39094f044f0cda0febb3ad517b830301da6b2ce929664af09ee9e4dd264f9` (read from the deb on dragon-lin) | section 1 |
+| `fs.protected_hardlinks`, `fs.protected_symlinks` | 1, 1 | mos-1096 item 2 |
+| journald | `SplitMode=uid` (the default) | section 4, B2 |
+| `useradd` | `USERGROUPS_ENAB yes` | 2a passes `--user-group` anyway |
+| claude | not on localadmin's PATH | the factory's harness; dragon-lin runs 2.1.304 |
+| ports 7330-7333 | free (no listener) | tester |
+| `localadmin` | NOPASSWD sudo (#423 step 1, applied 20:05:47Z, mos-1066, mos-1077) | the root steps run through it |
+| `jarvis` | groups sudo, docker, lxd, adm | #423 step 4 removes all four (section 5, P5) |
+| unattended-upgrades | on: `APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1"`, `apt-daily-upgrade.timer` enabled. Allowed origins `${distro_id}:${distro_codename}`, `-security`, ESM apps-security and ESM infra-security. No `Package-Blacklist` | B2: packages change daily without a window |
+| bubblewrap's pocket | `0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3` is in both `noble-updates` and `noble-security`, so its later security updates install unattended | B2 |
+| apparmor | installed `4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.8`. The `.9` candidate is in `noble-updates` only, which unattended-upgrades doesn't take. `aa-status --json` works | B2 |
+| profiles that name bwrap | at 21:51:46Z `grep -rlw bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` and `grep -rlF /usr/bin/bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` both find nothing (exit 1). After 2a' the word grep lists only `bwrap-userns-restrict` | N1, P9 item 7, hostcheck item 3 |
+| `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` | 1024 | the port squat |
+| listeners below 1024 | 22 (sshd) and 53 (the resolver) only; 732 is free | the Console's port (section 1) |
+| other listeners | 4003, 6052, 6055, 8123, 8765, 14242, 18555, and on loopback 1933, 5905, 6085, 6379, 6380, 9119, 9225, 18554, 18789, 38147 | none in 7330-7333 |
+
+## 1. The install as inputs to the Case 2 scripts
+
+Instance. Row 190's canon with the default name, `dev`, as Case 2 uses it (Gosalyn design 9). `~` is
+`mosaic`'s home, `/srv/mosaic`, so:
+
+| Input | Value |
+|---|---|
+| user | `mosaic`, primary group `mosaic` with no other member |
+| home | `/srv/mosaic`, 0700, owner `mosaic` |
+| config dir | `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev` |
+| data root | `/srv/mosaic/.mosaic-dev`, marker `instance.json` `{"instanceVersion":1,"name":"dev"}` |
+| business | `mosaic-stack`, file `<configDir>/businesses/mosaic-stack.json` (section 2) |
+| profile | `--profile factory` (row 230, C2-13b) |
+| roles | the factory set in section 2 |
+| human id | Jason's id, given in the window's go. Not `tester` (`broker.mjs:245`) |
+| model credential | `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, 0600 (row 190's `SESSION_ENV` for the default instance) |
+| token slot path | none for this row (section 2) |
+| Console port | 127.0.0.1:732, below the port floor, bound through the Console unit's `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` (row 230). The port squat below says why |
+| tester port | 127.0.0.1:7333 (P10) |
+| board | none. UNITS has no board unit, and the Console gets no `--board` |
+| harness | claude at `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude`, pinned through `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` (decision 91), which the bus unit's `@CLAUDE_ENV@` line sets (section 2) |
+| node | `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>/bin/node`, a pinned 26.x release, `root:root`. Row 230 refuses a `--node` under the home or not owned by root |
+| PM | on: the bus unit's `@PM_FLAGS@` renders ` --pm` (section 2, section 4) |
+| source | `/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack` (`mosaic`'s checkout, section 4) and `/root/mosaic-stack` (root's) |
+
+Why `dev` and not a named instance: one instance per OS user, and Case 2's rows already assume
+`/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev`. A second instance under `mosaic` on .53 would need a name, and row 190
+makes that a flag, not a move.
+
+Why node lives under `/opt/mosaic-stack`: changing `/usr/local/bin/node` would change what Hermes and
+anything else on the host runs, and Q181 keeps Hermes running. r4 put node under `/srv/mosaic`, but row
+230 requires a root-owned `--node` outside the home. Nothing else on the host puts `/opt/mosaic-stack`
+on its PATH.
+
+PATH for `mosaic`'s steps. `sudo -u mosaic -H` resets PATH to sudo's `secure_path`, which finds
+`/usr/local/bin/node`, v22. The precheck would then refuse, and `scripts/mosaic` would run v22 (it runs
+`exec node` from PATH, `scripts/mosaic:22-40`). So every `mosaic` step in the run sheet and in
+`case1-repin.sh` runs as `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin ...`, the
+list row 230 renders as the units' `@PATH@`. `case1-repin.sh` builds it from the `--node` in
+`case1-unit.args`.
+
+The units (row 230, design r11). Two system units, from the existing templates, in start order:
+`[email protected]` from `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in`, then
+`mosaic-webui.service` from `packages/webui/systemd/mosaic-webui.service.in`. Root stops them in the
+reverse order. `@REPO@` is the copy dir, and `%h` becomes the literal home. Row 230 adds
+`ProtectSystem=strict`, `ReadWritePaths=/srv/mosaic`, `ProtectHome=yes` and `PrivateTmp=yes` to both, and
+`AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` with `CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` to the
+Console only. The Console unit has no `[Install]`, so root starts it by hand after a reboot until Jason
+rules (mos-1097). The install call is:
+
+```
+case2-unit.sh --profile factory --user mosaic --home /srv/mosaic --business mosaic-stack --copy ID \
+  --node /opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>/bin/node --pm --claude /srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude \
+  -- --port 732 --business mosaic-stack --tester-port 7333
+```
+
+`--pm` and `--claude` are the two inputs row 230's brief doesn't have yet (section 2). A re-install
+must pass the same `--node`, flags and serve flags, and only the copy id may change (row 230's
+re-install check). So 2c writes the whole argument list, without `--copy`, to
+`/etc/mosaic-stack/case1-unit.args`, `root:root` 0644, one argument per line. Every later
+`case2-unit.sh` call in section 4 reads that file and adds `--copy`. `mosaic` can't write it. Changing
+a serve flag is a re-install with its own go, not a re-pin.
+
+The port squat (mos-1101 item 5). Role sessions share the host's network namespace:
+`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs:67` unshares the user, PID and IPC namespaces and not the network. So
+while the Console is down, which A2 to A4 of every re-pin and any crash before `Restart=on-failure`
+brings it back both cause, a session can bind 127.0.0.1:7332. It would then receive Jason's `ssh -L`
+traffic, and it would answer the gate's `/healthz` (`stack-release.sh:485-487`) in the Console's place.
+At 732 that can't happen. The floor is 1024 (section 0), a session has no capabilities (below), and
+`mosaic`'s own processes outside the sandbox have none either. Only the Console unit holds
+`CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`. Its children, the human-cli and read scripts it spawns
+(`packages/webui/src/bus.mjs:31`, `reads.mjs:79`), inherit the ambient capability. No role session
+descends from the Console: sessions are children of the bus unit, which has no capability line. The
+gate needs no change, because `console_port` (`stack-release.sh:213-215`) reads the Console's `--port`
+from the pointer. Row 230's precheck refuses when the floor is at or below the Console's port, and
+`case1-hostcheck.sh` checks it after every package run (B2). The tester port can't go below 1024,
+because serve refuses that (`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:33`), so P10 records it.
+
+Node download (N4). The run sheet pins one release, its tarball name and its sha256. As root, in a
+root-owned temp dir: fetch the tarball, `SHASUMS256.txt` and `SHASUMS256.txt.asc`; `gpg --verify` the
+`.asc` against the Node release keys listed in the nodejs/release-keys repository, imported into a
+keyring under `/etc/mosaic-stack/node-keys`; check that the tarball's line in the verified file is the
+pinned sha256; then `sha256sum -c` the tarball and unpack it to `/opt/mosaic-stack/node-<version>`,
+`root:root`, no file writable by group or other. Any mismatch stops the step. Rollback: `rm -r` that
+dir.
+
+Claude (N5). The run sheet pins the version, 2.1.304 unless the window's plan names a newer one. As
+`mosaic`: `npm install --prefix /srv/mosaic/.local @anthropic-ai/claude-code@<pin>`, with `@<pin>`
+exact. `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` is the path `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` names. The autoupdater stays off
+through `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json`, `root:root` 0644, holding
+`{"env":{"DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER":"1"}}`. Root writes it in 2a'. Why there:
+
+- `ENV_ALLOW` (`packages/seat/src/session.mjs:83-88`) doesn't pass `DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER`, so a unit
+  `Environment=` line never reaches a role session (gosalyn-0046 item 3).
+- A role session's HOME is the run's own `home/`, and the sandbox doesn't show `~/.claude`
+  (`session.mjs:92-93`, `sandbox.mjs:16`). So `mosaic`'s claude settings file doesn't reach one either.
+- The sandbox mounts `/etc` read-only (`sandbox.mjs:85`), and Claude Code reads managed settings from
+  `/etc/claude-code/` whatever HOME is. `mosaic`'s own CLI runs, like the precheck's marker prompt
+  and F6, read it too.
+
+The pinned binary is a read-only bind inside the sandbox (`sandbox.mjs:9-10`), so a session can't
+rewrite it anyway. The managed file covers `mosaic`'s runs outside the sandbox. If the installed
+version doesn't honour `env` there, F6 catches the drift. Rollback: `rm` the file.
+
+bwrap and the user namespace (mos-1091 4a, 4b; mos-1096 item 2; N1). Three root steps in 2a', in this
+order, each with its rollback. The `mosaic` group must exist first (2a).
+
+1. `apt-get install bubblewrap=0.9.0-1ubuntu0.3`, the version the run sheet pins. Then record
+   `stat -c '%U:%G %a' /usr/bin/bwrap` to `/etc/mosaic-stack/bwrap.orig` (I expect `root:root 755`).
+   Rollback: `apt-get remove bubblewrap`.
+2. Ubuntu's own `bwrap-userns-restrict`, one file, not the package. `apt-get download
+   apparmor-profiles=4.0.1really4.0.1-0ubuntu0.24.04.9` into a root-owned temp dir, extract
+   `./usr/share/apparmor/extra-profiles/bwrap-userns-restrict` with `dpkg-deb --fsys-tarfile`, check
+   its sha256 is `11d39094f044f0cda0febb3ad517b830301da6b2ce929664af09ee9e4dd264f9`, and install it as
+   `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`, `root:root` 0644. Load it with `apparmor_parser -r
+   /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`. `aa-status` then lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in
+   enforce mode. Why one file: the package also installs 20 profiles under `/etc/apparmor.d`
+   (`usr.sbin.dnsmasq`, `bin.ping`, `usr.sbin.smbd` and more), which would load at the next boot and
+   could change services on the host that have nothing to do with Mosaic.
+   What the profile does: `bwrap` gets `userns`, `capability` and `mount` for its own setup, and
+   every program it runs is stacked under `unpriv_bwrap`, which has the same file and network rules
+   with `audit deny capability`. So a role session gets a user namespace and no capabilities in it.
+   The sysctl stays at 1, so nothing else on the host gains user namespaces.
+   One consequence (N2): a bwrap that a session starts inside its own sandbox fails, because it needs
+   capabilities in the namespace. Claude Code's own sandbox is such a bwrap, and it's off by default,
+   so a role session doesn't use it. F3 shows a session still answers under the profile.
+   Rollback: `apparmor_parser -R /etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`, then `rm` it.
+3. `dpkg-statoverride --update --add root mosaic 0750 /usr/bin/bwrap` (Mos). Only root and the
+   `mosaic` group can read or run bwrap, and package upgrades keep the mode. Rollback:
+   `dpkg-statoverride --remove /usr/bin/bwrap`, then `chown` and `chmod` to the values in
+   `bwrap.orig`.
+4. The drift stop (B2, below): `case1-hostcheck.sh` and `case1-pins.sh` from `/root/mosaic-stack` to
+   `/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/`, `root:root` 0755 and 0644; the apt hook
+   `/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/80mosaic-hostcheck`; the boot unit `mosaic-hostcheck.service`, enabled. Then
+   `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0. Rollback: disable and remove the unit, `rm` the hook file and
+   the dir.
+
+Full rollback runs 4, 3, 2, 1. Tests after 2a' and again in section 5: as `mosaic`, `bwrap --unshare-all
+--ro-bind / / true` exits 0 (row 230's precheck line, F4); as `jarvis`, `/usr/bin/bwrap --version`
+fails with "Permission denied" (P9); `getent group mosaic` lists no member and no other account has
+gid `mosaic` (P9); `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1 (P9). A role session running under the profile is F5.
+
+One more test runs in 2a', because I can't settle it from here. Row 230's units keep the templates'
+`NoNewPrivileges=yes`, and AppArmor limits profile changes for a task with no-new-privs set. The
+`bwrap` attach happens on exec from an unconfined task, and the child's change is a stack
+(`bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap`), which only narrows. I expect both to pass under no-new-privs, since bwrap
+sets no-new-privs on itself before it runs the child, and Ubuntu's profile works with that. But I
+haven't seen it run, and .53 is read-only to me. So as root, after step 4: `systemd-run --wait --pipe
+--uid=mosaic --gid=mosaic -p NoNewPrivileges=yes -p ProtectSystem=strict -p ProtectHome=yes -p
+PrivateTmp=yes /usr/bin/bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-pid --ro-bind / / cat /proc/self/attr/current`
+prints `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`. If it fails, the window stops at 2a' and rolls back 4 to 1,
+before any `mosaic` step. That beats finding it at F5.
+
+The drift stop (B2, Duckworth's REVIEW-r3 B2, mos-1098 point 1). r4 installed a profile file that no
+package owns, from a pinned deb, onto a host where unattended-upgrades changes packages every day
+(section 0). Three things can move under it: bubblewrap (its security updates install unattended), the
+`apparmor` package and its parser, and any new profile a package ships that attaches to
+`/usr/bin/bwrap`. Two more host values matter to this design: the user-namespace sysctl and the port
+floor. So:
+
+- `scripts/case1-pins.sh` holds the pins, sourced by the scripts below: the `apparmor-profiles` version
+  the file came from, the file's sha256, and the bubblewrap version 2a' installs. Changing a pin is a
+  reviewed commit and its own round. The bubblewrap version is an install pin, not a drift item:
+  a security update to bubblewrap keeps the statoverride, and the profile attaches by path.
+- `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` checks seven items and prints one line each:
+  1. `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` has the pinned sha256, and `dpkg -S` finds no package
+     that owns it.
+  2. `aa-status --json` lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in enforce mode, and no loaded profile named
+     `mosaic-bwrap`.
+  3. `grep -rlw bwrap /etc/apparmor.d` lists exactly `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`. The word
+     match also catches a path written as `/{usr/,}bin/bwrap`. Section 0's read found no file today.
+  4. The live label: 2a' line `systemd-run --wait --pipe --uid=mosaic --gid=mosaic -p NoNewPrivileges=yes
+     -p ProtectSystem=strict -p ProtectHome=yes -p PrivateTmp=yes /usr/bin/bwrap --unshare-user
+     --unshare-pid --ro-bind / / cat /proc/self/attr/current` prints exactly `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap
+     (enforce)`. It runs under the units' no-new-privs, so it reads the label a role session gets.
+     This catches a profile that attaches by a glob that item 3's search misses.
+  5. `dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/bin/bwrap` reads `root mosaic 0750`, and `stat` agrees.
+  6. `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns` is 1 and `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1.
+  7. `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` is above the Console's `--port` in the installed unit.
+
+  `--check` exits 0 when all hold and 1 otherwise. `--enforce` runs the same check and always exits 0.
+  On a failure, or while `/etc/mosaic-stack/DRIFT` exists, it applies the stop:
+  `apparmor_parser -R` on the profile if loaded, then `chown root:root` and `chmod 0700` on
+  `/usr/bin/bwrap`. It writes the failed items to `DRIFT` and appends a line to
+  `/var/log/mosaic-stack/hostcheck.log`. With bwrap closed to `mosaic`, every role session refuses
+  to start. That's the fail-closed state, and the stack needs no change for it. The chmod is undone by
+  the next bubblewrap upgrade, which reapplies the statoverride. But the apt hook runs again right
+  after that upgrade and finds `DRIFT`, so it closes bwrap again. Only root removes `DRIFT`, in a
+  reviewed step with a new pin or a Mos go. I don't call `dpkg-statoverride` from inside the hook,
+  because I haven't confirmed it can take dpkg's lock while apt holds the frontend lock.
+- Three callers. A1 of every re-pin runs `--check` and refuses `profile-drift` on exit 1. The apt hook
+  is `DPkg::Post-Invoke { "/usr/local/lib/mosaic-stack/case1-hostcheck.sh --enforce || true"; };`, so it
+  runs after every package run, unattended ones included, and can't fail one. The boot unit,
+  `mosaic-hostcheck.service` (`Type=oneshot`, `After=apparmor.service`,
+  `Before=mosaic-bus@mosaic-stack.service`, `WantedBy=multi-user.target`), runs `--enforce` before the
+  bus starts, which covers a kernel or parser change that takes effect at boot.
+- Owner. ops-01 owns the host side under a Mos go. It reads `hostcheck.log` in each STATE report and
+  sends any `DRIFT` to Mos. Before each re-pin window it also runs `--upstream`, which downloads the
+  current `apparmor-profiles` candidate into a temp dir and compares its `bwrap-userns-restrict` to the
+  pin. A difference goes to Mos as a new-pin request and refuses nothing. The pins and the scripts are
+  this row's, and later changes go through review like any other.
+
+Who runs what:
+
+| Step | Runs as | Through |
+|---|---|---|
+| 2a: `useradd --system --user-group --home-dir /srv/mosaic --shell /usr/sbin/nologin mosaic`, `/srv/mosaic` 0700, `/etc/mosaic-stack` `root:root` 0755, `/var/log/mosaic-stack` `root:root` 0750 | root | ops-01, `ssh localadmin@10.1.1.53`, `sudo` (#423 step 1) |
+| 2a': node under `/opt/mosaic-stack`; bubblewrap, the AppArmor profile, the statoverride, the drift stop and the managed settings file, each with the test and rollback above; the no-new-privs test | root | ops-01, same path, R27 (mos-1091) |
+| 2a'': a `git bundle` of the reviewed commit copied to .53; root clones it to `/root/mosaic-stack` and checks HEAD is the commit the go names; it installs the bundle as `/srv/mosaic/incoming/<sha>.bundle`, owner `mosaic`, 0600 | root | ops-01, same path |
+| 2b: claude under `~/.local` (above); `git clone` of the bundle to `/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack`; `scripts/bootstrap.sh`; `stack-copy.sh copy`; the install with the inputs above (C2-13b's `case2-install.sh --profile factory` if it has landed, else the run sheet's steps) | `mosaic` | `sudo -u mosaic -H env PATH=...` from `localadmin` (PATH above). `mosaic` gets no key and no login shell |
+| 2b': place `claude-session.env` | Jason, or who he names (Q173 secrets rule) | section 3 |
+| 2c: write `case1-unit.args`; `case2-unit.sh` with those arguments and `--copy <id>`, from `/root/mosaic-stack`; then `case2-precheck.sh --profile factory` as `mosaic`, which reads the Console's `--port` from the installed unit for its port-floor line, so it runs after the render; `systemctl enable` the bus unit; the first start of UNITS. The Console unit has no `[Install]` until Jason rules (C2-13a), so it isn't enabled, and after a host reboot root starts it by hand until then. The run sheet says so | root | ops-01, same path |
+| 2c': `stack-release.sh adopt mosaic-stack --units external`, which records the running copy as the pointer (`do_adopt`, `scripts/stack-release.sh:856`) | `mosaic` | `sudo -u mosaic -H` |
+| every later re-pin or rollback | root, with its `mosaic` steps through `sudo -u mosaic -H` | ops-01 runs `case1-repin.sh` (section 4) |
+| acceptance (section 5) | `localadmin`, with `sudo -u mosaic -H` for the in-instance checks | the agent the window names |
+
+No git credential lands on .53. Both checkouts come from bundles that ops-01 copies in, and a re-pin
+brings a new bundle that `mosaic` fetches into its checkout.
+
+## 2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2
+
+| Case 2 item (row 230 brief) | Case 1 | Reason |
+|---|---|---|
+| business file with the library mapping | business `mosaic-stack` with no `library` key; `--profile factory` refuses a `kind: "library"` project (`profile-library-business`) | the factory has no books repo |
+| `bean`, `chet`, persona vars and files, specialists | factory roles from `roles/`, with a chief that has a harness var | Jason names the set in the go. I haven't read his live business file and won't. The acceptance needs only the chief (F3), since a chief with no harness var answers `no-route`. Others are added later by the human with `instances.set`, no new row |
+| token slot `library-gitea` | none | the factory's per-agent git identity is row 199's credential store (Megavolt, #1697). Until it lands, git work stays on dragon-lin (Q182) |
+| precheck: `bus.tester` is not on | `bus.tester` is on; `factory` requires it | the acceptance and the Q173 test system need the tester (agents act as tester, never Jason) |
+| precheck: persona file modes and digests | skipped under `factory` | no persona files |
+| precheck: `library.sync`, `library.status` | skipped under `factory` | no library |
+| precheck: `ZAI_API_KEY` in the key file | doesn't run | no instance has provider `zai` |
+| precheck: no Discord binding | kept | the factory's Discord connector stays on dragon-lin. Two connectors on one bot token would split its events |
+| precheck: claude marker prompt with `--system-prompt-file` | runs, since the chief's harness is claude-code | |
+| precheck: `sudo -n true` fails, `id -G` one entry, run root 0700, config validates, node 24 or later, `bwrap` exits 0, free memory, HOME | kept | node and bwrap are in row 230 (gosalyn-0034) |
+| Console serve flags: `--port` 1..1023, `--business`, the preview trio, `--send`, the proof pair, no `--tester-port` | `--port 732`, `--business mosaic-stack`, `--tester-port 7333`. No preview trio, no `--send`, no proof pair | below |
+| bus: `@PM_FLAGS@` and `@CLAUDE_ENV@` render empty | ` --pm`, and `Environment=MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN=/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude` | below |
+
+All of these are inputs. Nothing in the Case 2 scripts hardcodes a Case 1 value (gosalyn-0034 item 4).
+Row 230's brief says the factory profile takes the library serve set plus an optional `--tester-port`,
+and that row 195 names any other difference (gosalyn-0049). .53 can't meet the library set, and the bus
+needs two lines the brief renders empty. The factory profile I need from row 230:
+
+1. Serve flags. `--port N` with N in 1..1023 and `--business ID` are required, and `--tester-port N` in
+   1024..65535, not equal to `--port`, is optional. The preview trio (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`,
+   `--allow-user`) and the proof pair (`--proof-header`, `--proof-file`) are refused. Both exist for a
+   proxy in front of the Console: the proxy signs the user in and adds the header, and the proof shows
+   the request came through it. .53 has no proxy. Jason reaches the Console with `ssh -L` (sage-1451
+   Q3), so there is no header to trust and no proxy to hold the proof. `--send` is refused too, since
+   serve takes it only with the trio or `--sso` (`packages/webui/src/cli.mjs:15`). When Q175 SSO reaches
+   .53, `--sso` with an optional `--send` (row 192) would be the factory's sign-in, and adding it is a
+   re-install with its own go. Row 230 can accept `--sso [--send]` under factory now or later. Either
+   way it needs a `console.sso` block in `mosaic`'s config, which this row doesn't write. `--checkout`
+   and `--board` stay refused, as in the library set.
+2. `--pm` (factory only) renders the bus unit's `@PM_FLAGS@` as ` --pm`. The factory's PM dispatches its
+   work on .53 as on dragon-lin (section 4). With the token empty the bus never launches the PM, and
+   A5's PM check fails every re-pin.
+3. `--claude PATH` (factory only) renders `@CLAUDE_ENV@` as `Environment=MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN=PATH`, the
+   line `scripts/bus-service.sh:79` renders today. PATH must be absolute. Without it the bus runs
+   `claude` from the unit's PATH, which is the node dir, `/usr/local/bin`, `/usr/bin` and `/bin`, and
+   holds no claude on .53. The chief's first launch would then fail. The precheck's claude marker
+   prompt should run the same binary, so it reads the path from the installed bus unit.
+4. Row 190's two template tokens, if row 190 lands before row 230. Row 190 adds `@CONFIG_ENV@` to both
+   templates and `@SESSION_ENV@` to the bus template's `EnvironmentFile=` line. For the default
+   instance, `@CONFIG_ENV@` is deleted (`scripts/instance.sh`) and `@SESSION_ENV@` is
+   `<home>/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`. Row 230's "every token has one value" list
+   and its `EnvironmentFile=` check need both. This applies to the library profile too.
+
+I've sent these to Gosalyn. If row 230's candidate lacks any of them, row 195's manifest names the
+change to `case2-unit.sh` or `case2-precheck.sh`, reviewed by Duckworth with Webby told.
+
+## 3. Model access
+
+Q185: Case 1 uses the account the factory uses today, the Claude subscription behind dragon-lin's
+`claude-session.env`. The install never copies that file from dragon-lin. In the window, Jason (or the
+person he names under the Q173 secrets rule) makes a credential for .53 from that account and writes it
+to `/srv/mosaic/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env` as `mosaic`, mode 0600. Nobody prints it,
+and no script reads its value. The precheck checks only its mode, owner and that the variable name is
+present (a `grep -c` on the name, output a count).
+
+Quota: the factory on dragon-lin and on .53 share one subscription. Q185's "use existing" accepts that.
+Case 2 shares nothing with it (Mos's reading of Q185).
+
+The pi harness stays off on .53 until P19 #383 settles (mos-0865). The business file names claude only.
+
+## 4. Re-pin, rollback and backup on .53
+
+Unit form (ruled, sage-1451 Q1): system units that root writes, with `User=mosaic`. `mosaic` can't
+start or stop them, and root never runs code that `mosaic` can write. `stack-release.sh activate` today
+does everything in one run under `systemctl --user` and puts the old stack back inside that run
+(`rollback_in_run`, `scripts/stack-release.sh:561`). On .53 the same run needs two users. So one
+re-pin is one ordered list, and one root command drives all of it: `scripts/case1-repin.sh`, run by
+ops-01 from `/root/mosaic-stack`. Each `mosaic` step is `sudo -u mosaic -H` running
+`/srv/mosaic/src/mosaic-stack/scripts/stack-release.sh` with `--units external`. Copies carry no
+`stack-release.sh` (`COPY_PATHS`, `scripts/stack-copy.sh:23-30`), so the `mosaic` steps run from that
+checkout, as dragon-lin's run from the canonical one.
+
+What root holds, and where each value comes from (r4's B1):
+
+| Value | Source |
+|---|---|
+| ID, the target copy | the go |
+| TO, a rollback's target | the go, as `--to ID` |
+| `--restore ACT --events N` | the go, when the rollback restores |
+| OLD, the running copy | the `ExecStart=` of the two unit files root installed. If the bus and Console units name different copies, A1 refuses `units-disagree` |
+| the `case2-unit.sh` arguments | `/etc/mosaic-stack/case1-unit.args` (section 1) |
+| each `mosaic` step's result | its exit code |
+
+Root parses nothing `mosaic` wrote and runs nothing under `/srv/mosaic` except through `sudo -u mosaic
+-H`. It never needs the activation id: the `mosaic` steps find it themselves.
+
+One result line per activation (B1). The stack log closes an activation on the first line after
+`started` that names it, whatever the result (`interrupted`, :146-156). r4 wrote an interim
+`... rollback pending` line at A3's and A5's failures. That line closed the activation, so R2 and R4
+then refused `open-activation` against an activation the log no longer held open. The rollback could
+never run as designed, and nothing tested the steps in sequence. r5 keeps an activation open from A3's
+`started` line until its single result line, and A5 or R4 writes that line:
+
+| Activation ends at | Result line | Written by |
+|---|---|---|
+| A3 fails before its rollback set exists (marker or capture) | `refused code marker-failed` or `refused code capture-failed`, as `capture || refuse` does today (:987). Nothing has changed, so there is nothing to roll back | A3 itself, exit 3, after it removes the marker. Root runs A2f |
+| A5 passes | `ok` | A5 |
+| A3 (after capture), A4 or A5 fails, and the rollback passes | `failed code <c> rollback ok` for A3 and A4, `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok` for A5 | R4 |
+| the rollback fails at R4's gate | `rollback-failed code <c> rollbackCode <r>` | R4 |
+| R1, R2 or R3 fails, or the run dies | none. The activation stays open, and the next activate refuses `interrupted-run` (:603-606), which Jason or Mos settles as on dragon-lin | |
+
+What the result line carries (r5's B1). `log_line` (:58) writes `op "$OP"`, and `from_log` (:169)
+reads only lines whose op is `adopt`, `activate` or `rollback`. So `confirm` doesn't log under its own
+op. Before A5's `ok` line or any line R4 writes, it sets OP, FROM and TO from the open activation's
+`started` line, ACT to that activation, and BACKUP from the rollback set's `BACKUP` file, which A3
+writes when `backup_store` returns. A re-pin's lines then read `op activate`, a rollback's `op
+rollback`, each with the from, to and backup a dragon-lin run would log. `from_log previous` and
+`from_log backup` read .53's log as they read dragon-lin's. `confirm` reads only the line A3 wrote for
+that activation, which `interrupted` already names.
+
+A failing `mosaic` step after `started` writes no log line. It writes its code to `FAILED` beside
+`AWAITING-UNITS` and exits 1. R4 reads that code for the result line. Root passes R4 `--cause
+A3|A4|A5`, the step it saw fail, from its own exit codes. A4 is root's own step and has no `FAILED`
+file, so R4 writes `failed code units-start` for it. A cause with no `FAILED` file where one should be
+writes code `unrecorded`.
+
+The open activation. A3 writes `$STATE/stack-rollback/<ACT>/AWAITING-UNITS` holding the target copy
+(renamed from r3's `PENDING`, which read like the pointer's `pmPending`, `P_PENDING` at :128; N3).
+`confirm` and `revert` take the copy root passed, not an activation id. Each lists the
+`AWAITING-UNITS` files and the `interrupted` set (:146), and goes on only when there is exactly one
+file, its activation is the one `interrupted` names, and the copy in it is the copy root passed.
+Anything else refuses `open-activation` with exit 3 and the list it found, and changes nothing.
+`confirm` without `--rollback` also refuses `activation-failed` when `FAILED` exists, so a second
+confirm can't pass an activation that already failed. Whichever `confirm` writes the result line
+removes `AWAITING-UNITS` and `FAILED` after it.
+
+Refusals of the three external verbs. `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` act on an open activation by
+design, so they skip the `interrupted-run` refusal (:605). Their refusals log `result refused` with no
+activation id: they set ACT only after every check has passed. So a refused `confirm`, a wrong copy
+say, leaves the open activation open. Today's `refuse` (:62-67) adds the activation id whenever ACT is
+set, and the external verbs keep that order. A test and a mutant hold it (section 7).
+
+Root's step log. Every step `case1-repin.sh` runs appends one line to `/var/log/mosaic-stack/case1-repin.log`,
+`root:root` 0640: the time from `date -u`, the step, its argv, its exit code. `mosaic` can't write it,
+so it stays readable after a run that dies before `mosaic` logs anything.
+
+### Activate: `case1-repin.sh activate ID [--migrate] [--timeout S]`
+
+| # | Step | Runner | On failure |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| A1 | `/root/mosaic-stack` HEAD is the commit the go names. ID is 40 lowercase hex and names a copy under `/srv/mosaic/.local/share/mosaic-stack/copies` that holds `scripts/mosaic` (row 230's copy-id rule). `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 0, else `profile-drift` (B2). Root reads OLD from the unit files. `stack-release.sh activate ID mosaic-stack --units external --plan --expect-from OLD` exits 0. The plan refuses `pointer-differs` when the pointer's copy isn't OLD (N5), so a pointer and units that disagree stop before any stop | root; the plan as `mosaic` | refuse, exit 3. Nothing has changed |
+| A2 | `systemctl stop` UNITS in reverse order, then wait until each is inactive, within `--timeout` | root | A2f below |
+| A3 | `stack-release.sh activate ID mosaic-stack --units external [--migrate]`. Before it logs `started` (N3), it refuses `units-running` unless each of UNITS is inactive (system-manager reads, which need no privilege) and the store is stopped (`stopped`, :359), and `interrupted-run` while any activation is open. Then, in this order: logs `result started`; makes `$RS` with capture's `mkdir -p` of `stack-rollback` and exclusive `mkdir -m 0700` (:415-416), and writes `AWAITING-UNITS` in it at once (N1); captures the rollback set into that directory, making none (pointer, wrapper, and the sha256 and `ExecStart=` of each installed unit, read only); takes `backup_store` (:372) into `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>` and writes its name to `BACKUP` in the rollback set; under `--migrate`, writes `MIGRATING` in the rollback set and sets TAKEN, both before `migrate-schema.mjs` runs, where today's run sets TAKEN (:1004-1005, r5's B2), then migrates; installs the wrapper for ID. It writes no pointer | `mosaic` | a refusal before `started` exits 3 with nothing changed. A marker or capture failure, an existing `$RS` included, removes the marker if it wrote one, logs its `refused` line and exits 3. Root runs A2f for both. Any later failure writes `FAILED` with its code, logs nothing, cleans up nothing and exits 1. Root runs R1-R4 with `--cause A3` |
+| A4 | `case2-unit.sh` with `case1-unit.args` and `--copy ID`, `systemctl daemon-reload`, `systemctl start` UNITS in order | root | R1-R4 with `--cause A4` |
+| A5 | `stack-release.sh confirm ID mosaic-stack --units external --timeout S`. This is `gate` (:522), which polls `gate_once` (:471) every second until `--timeout`, with the external checks below. On a pass it writes the pointer, logs `result ok`, removes `AWAITING-UNITS`, exit 0. When the timeout runs out it writes `FAILED` with the last gate code, logs nothing and exits 1 | `mosaic` | R1-R4 with `--cause A5` |
+
+Why A3 writes the marker first and does no cleanup of its own. With the marker written last, as in r4,
+an A3 failure after `started` left an open activation with no marker, and R2 and R4 refused it. With
+the marker first, every A3 failure after the marker leaves exactly what R2 needs: the open activation,
+its marker and whatever part of the rollback set exists. R2 is then the one cleanup path, for A3, A4
+and A5 alike. Two cleanup paths, A3's own and R2, would each need their own tests for each failure point.
+
+A2f, a stop that fails or times out, or an A3 that exits 3. This run has no open activation: A2 logs nothing, and
+A3's exit 3 comes either before `started` or after its own `refused` line. Nothing of `mosaic`'s has
+changed. Root reads `date -u +%s` as T, runs `systemctl start` UNITS in order, then `stack-release.sh gate
+OLD mosaic-stack --units external --since T --timeout S`, a new verb that runs `gate` on OLD and writes no
+log line, no pointer and no file. A2f has no `started` line to take a start floor from (the first
+re-pin after adopt has none at all), so `--since` is the floor, and `gate` refuses `usage` without it
+(r5's N2). T is root's own clock, so root still parses nothing `mosaic` wrote. A unit that never
+stopped keeps its old `ActiveEnterTimestamp`, fails `stale-start` and takes the exit 2 path below.
+If that passes, root logs `A2 failed, OLD running` (or `A3 refused`) in its step log and exits
+1. If it fails, root stops UNITS, logs `OLD gate failed <code>` and exits 2. The next run's
+`interrupted` check finds nothing open either way.
+
+The external gate. `gate_once` keeps its order and codes, with these changes under `--units external`:
+
+- `systemctl` without `--user` for `is-active` and `show`. Both work unprivileged against the system
+  manager.
+- This start's time is the bus unit's `ActiveEnterTimestamp`, read with `systemctl show --timestamp=unix
+  -p ActiveEnterTimestamp`, in place of the `START_MS` that `start_both` (:451) sets on dragon-lin.
+  It is whole seconds (`@1792540800`), and the `started` line has milliseconds (N4). So the rule
+  compares seconds: the start passes when its second is at or after the floor of `started`'s second.
+  A unit that was active across A3 can't reach this check, because A3 refuses `units-running`, so the
+  equal second can only be a start after A3. An earlier second fails `gate_once` with the gate code
+  `stale-start`. It's a gate failure like any other, not a refusal (r4 had it as a refusal, which
+  would have logged against the open activation): `gate` keeps polling, since `Restart=on-failure`
+  can bring a fresh start, and at the timeout `FAILED` holds `stale-start`. The PM check's
+  `startedAt` bound uses the same second.
+- `copy-check` runs `stack-copy.sh check --units external`, which reads the system units.
+- The PM check is below.
+
+The PM (r4's B2). .53 runs the PM: the factory's PM dispatches its work, as it does on dragon-lin, and the
+serve flags carry `--pm`. The pointer's `pm` comes from the installed bus unit's `ExecStart=`, as the
+unit parse at :195 already reads it. Today's `pm_launched` (:505) takes the run id from the
+`launched ...` line in `journalctl --user -u BUS_UNIT`. On .53 that read fails twice over: the unit is
+a system unit, and under `SplitMode=uid` the logs of a system-range uid land in the system journal,
+which `mosaic` (no `adm` or `systemd-journal` group) can't read. Under `--units external` the check
+reads `launches list --json` alone. It passes when exactly one entry has business `mosaic-stack`,
+instance equal to the business file's `launch.by` (the PM's instance, the one `bus start --pm` launches
+at `packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs:675`), `live` true, and `startedAt` at or after this start's time.
+Zero entries, two, a stale one or one for another business fail with `pm-launch-unconfirmed` and what
+it saw, as today. A run the PM starts for another role has another instance, so it doesn't count.
+
+Why not the other reads. A regular uid for `mosaic` would put its logs in a per-user journal it can
+read, but it changes the account Case 2's install creates. Root reading the journal and passing the run id in
+would make root parse output from `mosaic`'s process, which section 4's rule forbids.
+
+Under `--units external`, `pm-on` (:1137) and `activate --pm-after-harness` refuse `external-pm`. Both
+flip the PM on dragon-lin by restarting the user bus with new arguments. On .53 the PM's state is a
+serve flag in a root-owned unit, so changing it is a re-install with its own go.
+
+### Rollback inside the run (R1-R4)
+
+| # | Step | Runner | On failure |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | `systemctl stop` UNITS, then wait as in A2 | root | rollback-failed |
+| R2 | `stack-release.sh revert ID mosaic-stack --units external`. It finds the open activation as above, puts the wrapper back from the rollback set and checks its sha256, and restores TAKEN (`restore_store`, :396) only if the rollback set holds `MIGRATING`. Each part is idempotent, so it works for an A3 that stopped partway: no `MIGRATING` means no restore, a migrate that failed partway is restored from the backup taken before it, and copying the saved wrapper over an unchanged one changes nothing. It writes no log line | `mosaic` | rollback-failed, activation left open |
+| R3 | `case2-unit.sh` with `case1-unit.args` and `--copy OLD`, `systemctl daemon-reload`, `systemctl start` UNITS | root | rollback-failed, activation left open |
+| R4 | `stack-release.sh confirm ID mosaic-stack --units external --rollback OLD --cause A3\|A4\|A5 --timeout S`. It finds the open activation, checks OLD is its `from`, gates OLD with `gate`, and writes the activation's one result line from the cause and the `FAILED` code: `failed code <c> rollback ok` (A3, A4), `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok` (A5), or `rollback-failed code <c> rollbackCode <gate>` when OLD's gate fails | `mosaic` | rollback-failed, logged |
+
+rollback-failed: root stops UNITS and exits 2, as `rollback_failed` (:587) does. When R4's gate fails,
+the log has the `rollback-failed` line and the activation is closed. When R1, R2 or R3 fails, no
+`mosaic` step writes a result, so the activation stays open with its marker. Root's step log has the
+codes, the next activate refuses `interrupted-run` until Jason or Mos settles it (:605), and status
+shows it. I chose that over a log-only verb for root to call after an R2 failure: nothing could gate
+the old stack at that point, and a closed activation would let the next activate start against a
+wrapper and store in an unknown state. Exit codes match `stack-release.sh`: 0 ok, 1 failed with the old
+stack running (rolled back, or A2f), 2 rollback-failed with UNITS stopped, 3 refused with nothing
+changed.
+
+### Rollback to the previous copy: `case1-repin.sh rollback --to ID [--restore ACT --events N]`
+
+The same list with TO in place of ID. The go names TO, from Mos's or Sage's read of `stack-release.sh
+status` as `mosaic`. Root passes it. A1's plan, `stack-release.sh rollback mosaic-stack --units external
+--to ID --plan --expect-from OLD`, refuses `pointer-differs` as in activate. It also exits 3 unless ID
+is `from_log previous` (:162), the previous distinct copy, so a
+stale or mistyped go refuses before anything stops. With `--restore`, the plan also refuses unless
+`$DATA/backups/stack/ACT` exists. `--to` is a new flag, accepted only with `--units external`;
+dragon-lin's rollback keeps reading TO from the log.
+
+The post-backup event count runs in A1's plan as `mosaic` while the bus still holds the store (the
+`heldcount` read, :1074), and again in A3 on the stopped store. A difference refuses
+`post-backup-events`, as `run_steps` does (:1013).
+
+### Migrations (N4)
+
+`--migrate` under `--units external` runs only inside A3, and A3 refuses `units-running` before it logs
+or migrates anything while any of UNITS is active. So a migration never runs against a store a live bus
+holds. The test is in section 7.
+
+### Backup
+
+A3's `backup_store` is today's. It copies the stopped store into `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>`, so
+`rollback --restore <ACT>` and row 181's guard find it. As on dragon-lin, the config dir isn't in the
+backup, and the credential isn't either. PBS backups of VM 1008 cover the disk (P4). A restore swaps
+only `bus/` and leaves `secrets/claude-session.env` in place (N6, in the run sheet).
+
+The install's adopt (2c') takes no backup. The store holds only what the acceptance wrote, and the first
+re-pin's A3 takes the first backup.
+
+### The log
+
+Every `mosaic` line goes to `$DATA/state/stack-activation-log.jsonl`, as today, with `units external`
+added. So `from_log previous` reads .53's history the same way it reads dragon-lin's. A3 writes
+`started`. A5 or R4 writes the one result line, with the op, from, to and backup of that activation,
+or A3 its `refused` line before any change. Refusals of
+`confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log no activation id. If a run dies between `started` and the result,
+the log keeps `started` with no result, the next run's `interrupted` check reports it, and root's step
+log shows the last step that ran.
+
+### Who
+
+Mos or Sage plans each re-pin. ops-01 runs `case1-repin.sh` on Jason's or Mos's go, and a STATE report
+follows. The gate and the in-run rollback have one owner, the root command, as they do on dragon-lin.
+
+### dragon-lin's path
+
+`--units external` is a new value. Without it, `stack-release.sh` and `stack-copy.sh check` run as they
+do today, `pm_launched` still reads the user journal, and rollback still takes TO from the log.
+`confirm`, `revert`, `gate` and `--to` refuse without it. Section 7 names the tests that show this.
+
+### Not taken
+
+- Row 190's user units under `mosaic`, with root running `loginctl enable-linger mosaic` once. Every
+  existing re-pin tool would work unchanged and root would be needed only once. But the unit form
+  would differ from Case 2, and a user manager would run as `mosaic`.
+- A sudoers rule that lets `mosaic` start and stop the units. P1 and row 230's precheck require that
+  `mosaic` has no sudo.
+- `confirm` and `revert` taking ACT from root. Root would have to read it from `mosaic`'s output or
+  log, which the rule above forbids (r4's B1).
+
+## 5. Acceptance checks
+
+A new script, `scripts/case1-accept.sh`, in this row's manifest. It runs on .53 as `localadmin` and prints
+one line per check: `<id> <path> <mark> <evidence>`. The marks are `closed`, `accepted Q182`,
+`accepted Q183`, `accepted mos-1096`, and `unnamed`, which means "not named in Q182, Q183 or a Mos
+ruling". The script ends with a count of each mark. It exits non-zero only when a functional check (F)
+fails. A P check never changes the exit status. Each `unnamed` line goes to Mos, who takes it to Jason
+(R8 N1).
+
+Functional checks. Any failure fails the row:
+
+| Id | Check | How |
+|---|---|---|
+| F1 | the units run as `mosaic` | `systemctl show <unit> -p User -p MainPID` for each of UNITS; each MainPID's uid in `/proc/<pid>/status` is `mosaic`'s, and each unit is active |
+| F2 | the Console listens on 127.0.0.1:732 on .53 and answers there | `curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:732/healthz` on .53 succeeds, and the listener table shows 732 bound to 127.0.0.1 only, by the Console unit's MainPID. Jason reaches it with `ssh -L 7332:127.0.0.1:732 localadmin@10.1.1.53` and his browser at 127.0.0.1:7332 as today. A LAN listener waits for Q175 SSO (sage-1451 Q3) |
+| F3 | one tester message gets a reply | as `mosaic`: `mosaic talk chief <marker> --tester`, then `mosaic follow --tester`, with a 300 s limit. A stored reply to the marked message passes. The inbox alone shows decisions only, so it isn't used (N3) |
+| F4 | the precheck passes | `case2-precheck.sh --profile factory` exits 0 as `mosaic` |
+| F5 | a role session runs under bwrap with the profile | while F3's reply is pending: a `/usr/bin/bwrap` process owned by `mosaic` has a claude process under it. `/proc/<bwrap pid>/attr/current` equals `bwrap (enforce)` and the claude process's equals `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, each compared as an exact string after the trailing newline is cut (N1). If `launches list --json` records the sandbox, the build reads that for the first part, since a short session can end before `ps` sees it |
+| F6 | claude is the pinned version | `/srv/mosaic/.local/bin/claude --version` as `mosaic`, after F3, equals the run sheet's pin |
+| F7 | the PM run is live | `launches list --json` as `mosaic` has exactly one live entry for the PM's instance, the check `confirm` runs (section 4) |
+
+Privilege and host paths. These report and never fail the row:
+
+| Id | Path | Mark | Evidence the script prints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| P1 | `mosaic` has sudo | closed only when `sudo -l -U mosaic` prints "is not allowed to run sudo" (N2); any other output is unnamed | the `sudo -l` result |
+| P2 | `mosaic` has supplementary groups or a key | closed when `id -G mosaic` is one entry and `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty | `id`, file state |
+| P3 | `localadmin` NOPASSWD sudo, reached with the dragon-lin key | accepted Q183 (agents keep ssh to .53; localadmin from #423 step 1) | `sudo -l -U localadmin` |
+| P4 | root on pve over VM 1008, and PBS backups of VM 1008, which hold `/srv/mosaic` including the credential | accepted Q182 and Q183 (agents keep root on pve and PBS) | a fixed line; the script can't see pve from inside |
+| P5 | `jarvis`, which runs Hermes, can reach `/srv/mosaic` through sudo, or through the docker or lxd groups, which are root-equivalent | closed when `jarvis` is in none of sudo, docker and lxd; unnamed otherwise. #423 step 4 lands before the install (mos-1091 4c), and its `step4.sh` removes `jarvis` from sudo, docker, lxd and adm, so after it this reads closed (Duckworth N2) | `id jarvis` |
+| P6 | other members of sudo, docker, lxd | closed when sudo holds only `localadmin` and docker and lxd are empty. Every other member is its own unnamed line, `jarvis` included (N1) | `getent group` lines |
+| P7 | a file under `/etc/sudoers.d` naming `mosaic` | closed when none | the file names |
+| P8 | the Console or tester reachable from the LAN | closed when 732 and 7333 are bound to 127.0.0.1 only, each by the Console's MainPID, and nothing listens on 7331 | listener table |
+| P9 | a user namespace through `/usr/bin/bwrap` | accepted mos-1096 only while all seven hold, unnamed otherwise: (1) `dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/bin/bwrap` reads `root mosaic 0750`; (2) `aa-status --json` lists `bwrap` and `unpriv_bwrap` in enforce mode; (3) `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` has the pinned sha256 and no package owns it; (4) `sudo -u jarvis /usr/bin/bwrap --version` fails with "Permission denied"; (5) `getent group mosaic` lists no member and no other account in `/etc/passwd` has its gid; (6) `fs.protected_hardlinks` is 1; (7) no `mosaic-bwrap` profile is loaded, no other file under `/etc/apparmor.d` names `bwrap`, and the live label of a process bwrap runs is exactly `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (enforce)` (N1, mos-1098 point 2). Items 1-3, 6 and 7 are `case1-hostcheck.sh --check`'s, so P9 reuses its lines | each item's line, and Mos's reason: "Case 1's agents are the factory's agents. In Q182 and Q183 Jason accepted that the factory reaches root on pve and, through it, every VM. So a user-namespace path to root on .53 gives that class no new reach." With the profile, what's left is bwrap's own setup, run by `mosaic` |
+| P10 | a session binds the tester port, 7333, while the Console is down | accepted mos-1101 while `ip_unprivileged_port_start` is above 732 and 7333 is held by the Console's MainPID at the check. Serve refuses a tester port below 1024 (`cli.mjs:33`), so the Console-port fix can't cover it. A squatter would get the tester's writes and could answer them. The tester's users are the factory's agents, the class Mos's reading covers (mos-1101 item 5). Mos can object, and then this line reads unnamed | the floor, and the owner pid of 7333 |
+
+Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs`. The script takes a fake root (`--root DIR`) for
+`/proc`, `/etc` and `getent` output, and fake `systemctl`, `curl`, `ss`, `sudo`, `bwrap`, `aa-status`,
+`dpkg-statoverride`, `sysctl` and `claude` on PATH. Cases:
+- each F check failing gives a non-zero exit with its line;
+- each P check in each of its marks, including P1 with output that grants nothing but lacks the refusal
+  text (unnamed), P9 unnamed once for each of its seven items missing, and P10 unnamed with a floor of
+  700 and with 7333 held by another pid;
+- F5 fails on a label of `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`, `bwrap//&unpriv_bwrap (complain)` and
+  `bwrap (enforce)` with a trailing space;
+- a run with every P check `unnamed` still exits 0;
+- the summary counts match the lines.
+
+Mutants: one per F check (the check made to pass on failure), one that maps P5 to `closed`, one that
+closes P1 on any output without a rule line, one that drops P9's jarvis item, one that drops P9's item
+7, and one that makes F5 a substring match.
+
+Nothing in the tests reaches .53 or dragon-lin's live state.
+
+## 6. Rulings
+
+sage-1451:
+
+- Q1, unit form: the brief's system unit. C2-13's `ExecStart=` check accepts a varying copy id, and
+  C2-13 took that (gosalyn-0034 item 3).
+- Q3, the Console: it listens on 127.0.0.1 on .53 (`packages/webui/src/serve.mjs:466`; `cli.mjs` passes no
+  host), and Jason reaches it with `ssh -L`. F2 says so. A LAN listener waits for Q175 SSO.
+- Q4, the date: if C2-13's candidate is late, I build on C2-13's latest commit and rebase (Q177). Under
+  the #426(a) push rules (mos-1086) a rebase goes to a new branch name.
+
+mos-1091 (none goes to Jason):
+
+- Q2 4a: installing bubblewrap is an install step, run by ops-01 as root under R27. Rollback is
+  `apt-get remove`.
+- Q2 4b: a per-binary AppArmor profile for `/usr/bin/bwrap`, the sysctl left at 1. r4 takes Ubuntu's
+  `bwrap-userns-restrict` for it (mos-1096). Section 1 has the steps.
+- 4c: P5 ends at #423 step 4, which Mos sent to Duckworth so it lands in Jason's VM 1008 boot session,
+  before the install. The P5 check stays.
+
+mos-1096:
+
+- B1 and B2 are mine, and so is the PM answer: .53 runs the PM (section 4).
+- The `dpkg-statoverride` on `/usr/bin/bwrap`, the hardlink and group checks, the jarvis refusal and F5
+  under the profile (sections 1 and 5).
+- P9 is Mos's acceptance, with the reason quoted in section 5.
+- Jason's Q9 on install and upgrade is open. r4 goes ahead, since B1's re-pin and rollback are needed
+  whatever he answers. If his answer changes how upgrades reach .53, the change lands in section 4 and
+  the run sheet as a new round.
+
+mos-1098 and mos-1101 (on Duckworth's REVIEW-r3):
+
+- Duckworth's CHANGES stand. B1 and B2 are fixed in this round, with B1's real-sequence test, and all
+  three of B2's asks: an owner across upgrades, what fails closed, and the pins as reviewed values.
+- r4's PM, statoverride and P9 stand. mos-1098's two questions are answered in section 1: the profile's
+  owner across upgrades is ops-01 with `case1-hostcheck.sh`, and the stop is bwrap closed to `mosaic`.
+  Both profiles attach to `/usr/bin/bwrap`: `bwrap` to the binary and `unpriv_bwrap` stacked on what it
+  runs. P9 item 7 checks that no third one does.
+- P9 has seven items and F5 compares exact strings (N1).
+- The port squat applies (section 1). The Console takes Case 2's fix, a port below 1024 with
+  `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` and the floor checked. Only the tester port can't take it, and P10 records it
+  under Mos's reading that Case 1's sessions are the factory class. I've told Mos, who can object.
+- Work on r5 goes ahead while Jason's Q9 (Vikunja #429) is open. If install and upgrade become
+  product commands, these steps become that installer's configuration and row 195 rebases on its row
+  (sage-1481, sage-1491).
+
+sage-1499: C2-13a is row 230 (#1732, Gosalyn), and row 195 chains on row 230's candidate.
+
+gosalyn-0049: the factory profile is the library set plus an optional `--tester-port`, and row 195 names
+any other difference. Section 2 names four, with the reason .53 can't meet the preview trio, `--send` or
+the proof pair. The managed-settings route needs no Case 2 change.
+
+## 7. Manifest (planned)
+
+- `scripts/case1-repin.sh` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-repin.test.mjs` (new). Fake `systemctl`,
+  `sudo` and `case2-unit.sh` on PATH record their argv, with a scratch home standing in for `/srv/mosaic`,
+  a scratch dir for `/etc/mosaic-stack` and one for `/var/log/mosaic-stack`. Cases:
+  - a pass runs A1-A5 in order;
+  - a failure at A3, A4 or A5 runs R1-R4 with `--cause` set to that step, and exits 1;
+  - an A3 exit 3 runs A2f, not R1-R4;
+  - a failure at R2 or R4 exits 2 with UNITS stopped;
+  - A1 refuses `profile-drift` when a fake `case1-hostcheck.sh --check` exits 1, before any stop;
+  - every `mosaic` step's argv carries `env PATH=<node dir>:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin`, with the node
+    dir from `case1-unit.args`;
+  - a HEAD mismatch, an ID that fails the copy-id rule, or unit files that name two copies refuses with
+    exit 3 before any stop;
+  - A1's plan argv carries `--expect-from` with OLD from the unit files;
+  - A2f passes `gate OLD --since T`, with T from a fake `date` that root calls before its start;
+  - A2f: a fake `systemctl` that never reports inactive. The script starts UNITS, runs `gate OLD`, exits
+    1 with OLD's gate passing and 2 with it failing, and the stack log is byte-identical before and
+    after;
+  - `rollback --to` with an ID that isn't `from_log previous` exits 3 before any stop;
+  - every exec of a path under the home goes through `sudo -u mosaic -H` (from the recorded argv);
+  - no argv root passes holds an activation id, and OLD comes from the unit files, not from anything
+    the `mosaic` steps print;
+  - every `case2-unit.sh` call carries the arguments in `case1-unit.args` and differs only in `--copy`;
+  - the step log has one line per step with its exit code.
+- `scripts/stack-release.sh`: `--units external` for `adopt`, `activate`, `rollback` and `status`, the
+  `--to` flag for an external rollback, and the new `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` verbs, which refuse
+  without it. `scripts/stack-copy.sh`: `check --units external`, which reads the system units. Tests in
+  `packages/cli/tests/stack-release-external.test.mjs` (new), against a fake system-scope `systemctl`
+  and a fake `mosaic` for `bus status` and `launches list`:
+  - `units-running` refuses while any unit is active, and `activate --migrate` with a unit active
+    leaves the store, the log and TAKEN as they were (N4);
+  - activate leaves the pointer as it was, writes `AWAITING-UNITS`, and writes a backup of the stopped
+    store under `$DATA/backups/stack/<ACT>`;
+  - `confirm` and `revert` refuse `open-activation` with zero `AWAITING-UNITS` files, with two, with
+    one whose copy isn't the one passed, and with one whose activation isn't in the `interrupted` set;
+  - `confirm` polls: a fake bus whose status turns good after 3 s passes with `--timeout 10` and fails
+    with `--timeout 1`;
+  - `stale-start` (N4): with `started` at 1792540800.900, an `ActiveEnterTimestamp` of `@1792540800`
+    passes and `@1792540799` fails `gate_once` with `stale-start`. A fake that turns to `@1792540805`
+    after 2 s passes with `--timeout 10`, which shows it's a gate code that polling can clear, not a
+    refusal;
+  - `confirm` on a pass writes the pointer, logs `ok` and removes `AWAITING-UNITS`. On a timeout it
+    writes `FAILED` with the gate code, leaves the pointer, the log and the marker as they were, and
+    exits 1;
+  - `confirm` without `--rollback` refuses `activation-failed` when `FAILED` exists;
+  - every line `confirm` writes has op `activate` or `rollback`, never `confirm`, and the from, to and
+    activation of its `started` line, and backup equal to the rollback set's `BACKUP`;
+  - `gate` (N2): with `--since 1792540800`, `@1792540800` passes and `@1792540799` fails `stale-start`;
+    without `--since` it refuses `usage`;
+  - `--plan --expect-from` (N5) refuses `pointer-differs` when the pointer names another copy, for
+    activate and for `rollback --to`;
+  - A3's order: a fake that fails the capture leaves the log with `started` and `refused code
+    capture-failed` for that activation, no marker and no `FAILED`, and exit 3. An existing `$RS`
+    gives `refused code marker-failed` and exit 3, and a capture under `--units external` makes no
+    directory of its own. A fake that fails the
+    wrapper install after a migration leaves `started` only, the marker, `FAILED`, TAKEN as migrated,
+    and exit 1;
+  - refusals by `confirm`, `revert` and `gate` log with no activation id, and the `interrupted` set
+    is the same before and after each one;
+  - the PM check passes with one live entry for the PM's instance since the start, and fails
+    `pm-launch-unconfirmed` with none, with two, with one whose `startedAt` is before the start, with one
+    not live, and with one for another business. A second live entry for another instance doesn't
+    count. A fake `journalctl` on PATH records any call, and no external run makes one;
+  - `pm-on` and `activate --pm-after-harness` refuse `external-pm`;
+  - `revert` puts the wrapper back, and restores TAKEN only after a migration;
+  - `confirm --rollback OLD` writes the line for each `--cause` (A3 and A4 `failed`, A5 `gate-failed`,
+    with the `FAILED` code, `units-start` for A4, `unrecorded` when the file is missing), or
+    `rollback-failed` when OLD's gate fails. It removes the marker and `FAILED` after the line, and
+    refuses when OLD isn't the open activation's `from`;
+  - real sequences on one log (B1). The fake `sudo` execs the real `stack-release.sh` as the test's
+    user, so each step reads the log and state the last one wrote. Fakes stand in only for
+    `systemctl`, `mosaic` and `case2-unit.sh`. Each sequence ends with the log holding exactly one
+    `started` and one result line for its activation, an empty `interrupted` set, no marker or
+    `FAILED`, and a following `activate --plan` that doesn't refuse `interrupted-run`:
+    1. activate, confirm times out, revert, `confirm --rollback --cause A5` passes:
+       `gate-failed code <c> rollback ok`;
+    2. activate with `--migrate`, the wrapper install fails, revert restores TAKEN, `confirm --rollback
+       --cause A3`: `failed code <c> rollback ok`;
+    3. activate, root's A4 fails, revert, `confirm --rollback --cause A4`: `failed code units-start
+       rollback ok`;
+    4. activate whose capture fails: `refused code capture-failed` and nothing open, then A2f's
+       `gate OLD` writes nothing;
+    5. activate, then `confirm` with the wrong copy is refused, then revert and `confirm --rollback
+       --cause A5` still close the activation, because the refusal didn't;
+    6. activate, revert fails (a wrapper whose saved copy is missing): the activation stays open, and
+       the next `activate --plan` refuses `interrupted-run`;
+    7. adopt C0, activate C1 and confirm, activate C2 and confirm (r5's B1): both `ok` lines read
+       `op activate` with their `started` line's from and to and the backup each took. `rollback --to C1
+       --plan` exits 0 and `--to C0 --plan` refuses. A rollback to C1, confirmed, logs `op rollback`, and
+       `from_log previous` then names C2;
+    8. activate with `--migrate`, where the copy's `migrate-schema.mjs` is a fake that writes to the
+       store and exits 1 (r5's B2): `FAILED` holds `migrate-failed` and `MIGRATING` exists. revert
+       restores the store byte-identical to the backup, and `confirm --rollback --cause A3` gates OLD on
+       it: `failed code migrate-failed rollback ok`;
+  - `rollback --to` refuses when ID isn't `from_log previous`, and `rollback --restore` finds a backup
+    that an external activate took;
+  - `gate` writes nothing: the log, the pointer and the state dir are byte-identical before and after;
+  - `confirm`, `revert`, `gate` and `--to` refuse without `--units external`.
+- dragon-lin unchanged. `stack-release.test.mjs` and `stack-copy.test.mjs` run unchanged and green. A
+  new case in `stack-release-external.test.mjs` runs a default activate, rollback and check against a
+  fake `systemctl` that records argv, and every call carries `--user`. A default `activate --plan`
+  prints the same bytes on the candidate as on its base, with the base output as a fixture.
+- Mutants for the re-pin:
+  - `confirm` writes the pointer on a gate failure;
+  - `confirm` calls `gate_once` once in place of `gate`;
+  - the external PM check counts entries of any instance;
+  - the external PM check drops the `startedAt` bound;
+  - `confirm` takes the newest `AWAITING-UNITS` instead of refusing two;
+  - `rollback --to` skips the `from_log previous` comparison;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` skips R1-R4;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` exits 0 after A2f;
+  - `case1-repin.sh` runs `mosaic`'s `stack-release.sh` without `sudo -u mosaic`;
+  - the default path drops `--user` from one `systemctl` call;
+  - `confirm`'s timeout writes r4's interim `gate-failed ... rollback pending` line (B1; killed by
+    sequences 1 and 5);
+  - A3 writes `AWAITING-UNITS` last, after the wrapper (killed by sequence 2);
+  - an external verb's refusal logs with the open activation id (ACT set before the checks; killed by
+    sequence 5 and the refusal test);
+  - `stale-start` is a refusal again (killed by the polling case);
+  - `revert` restores TAKEN without `MIGRATING` (killed by the revert case);
+  - `confirm` logs with its own op, `confirm` (killed by sequence 7 and the op case);
+  - A3 writes `MIGRATING` after `migrate-schema.mjs` (killed by sequence 8);
+  - `gate` takes its floor from the newest `started` line when `--since` is missing (killed by the
+    `gate` case).
+- `scripts/case1-pins.sh` and `scripts/case1-hostcheck.sh` (new),
+  `packages/cli/systemd/mosaic-hostcheck.service` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-hostcheck.test.mjs`
+  (new). The script takes `--root DIR` for `/etc`, `/proc/sys` and `/usr/bin/bwrap`'s stat, and fake
+  `aa-status`, `dpkg`, `dpkg-statoverride`, `apparmor_parser`, `systemd-run`, `chown` and `chmod`
+  on PATH record their argv. Cases:
+  - `--check` exits 0 with all seven items and 1 with each one failing alone, its line naming it;
+    item 3 fails on a second file naming `bwrap` as a word, one that writes `/{usr/,}bin/bwrap` included,
+    and passes with `bwrap-userns-restrict` alone. Item 4 fails on a label of `unpriv_bwrap (enforce)`
+    or one with a trailing space, and its `systemd-run` argv carries `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes` and the
+    other 2a' properties. Item 7 fails with the floor at 732;
+  - `--enforce` exits 0 on a pass and on every failure. On a failure it unloads the profile, closes
+    bwrap to `root:root` 0700, writes `DRIFT` and one log line. With `DRIFT` present and every item
+    passing, it still closes bwrap;
+  - `--enforce` never calls `dpkg-statoverride` with `--update`, `--add` or `--remove`;
+  - a bubblewrap version other than the install pin is a printed line, not a failure;
+  - `--upstream` against a fake deb whose file differs prints the difference and exits 0;
+  - the service unit has `Type=oneshot`, `After=apparmor.service`,
+    `Before=mosaic-bus@mosaic-stack.service` and runs `--enforce`.
+
+  Mutants: `--enforce` exits 1 on a drift; `--enforce` ignores `DRIFT` when the items pass; item 1
+  drops the `dpkg -S` owner check; item 3 matches only the `/usr/bin/bwrap` path; item 4 matches a
+  substring; item 4 drops `-p NoNewPrivileges=yes`; item 7 compares with `>=`.
+- `scripts/case1-accept.sh` (new) and `packages/cli/tests/case1-accept.test.mjs` (new), section 5.
+- Row 230 (C2-13a). `--profile`, the node, bwrap and port-floor precheck lines, the copy-id rule, the
+  two units and the Console's capability lines are in its brief at 5b8def2f1. Section 2's four items
+  are not. Any of them that row 230's candidate lacks becomes a named change here, reviewed by
+  Duckworth with Webby told. I told Gosalyn earlier that the settings-file route for
+  `DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER` doesn't reach a role session, and that Case 1 uses the managed settings file.
+- Docs: the Case 1 run sheet `docs/guides/case1-install.md` (new). It lists the window's steps in order,
+  each with who runs it and its go, the pinned node sha256 and claude version, a pointer to
+  `case1-pins.sh` for the bubblewrap and profile pins, the statoverride, the drift stop and the managed
+  settings file, each with its rollback, how ops-01 clears a `DRIFT`, the `ssh -L` line for port 732,
+  and a note that a restore leaves the credential in place.
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, dragon-lin's units or `~/.mosaic`.

agents/gizmoduck/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Gizmoduck
+
+Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
+(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
+access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
+the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
+repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
+# host access through the credential store
+
+Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
+It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
+decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
+
+## What it changes
+
+Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
+REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
+remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
+and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
+only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
+agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
+(Vikunja #420).
+
+When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
+
+1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
+   `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
+2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
+   `roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
+3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
+   `reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
+   within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
+4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
+   commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
+   the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
+5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
+
+Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
+file commit in `roles/`.
+
+## Text for the PRD
+
+Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
+
+> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
+> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
+> <prd.approve decision id>.
+
+Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
+
+> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
+>   needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
+>   still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
+>   agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
+>   as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
+>   keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
+>   me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
+>   Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
+>   happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
+
+Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
+>   adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
+>   runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
+>   an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
+>   under this requirement, within these bounds:
+>   - The chief acts only in its own organization.
+>   - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
+>     credentialed roles.
+>   - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
+>   - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
+>     messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
+>     working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
+>     organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
+>     hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
+>     is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
+>     change.
+>   - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
+>   - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
+>     or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
+>     WebUI or the CLI.
+>   - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
+>   - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
+
+Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
+>   - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
+>     bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
+>     names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
+>   - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
+>     name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
+>   - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
+>     and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
+>     the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
+>     the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
+>     repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
+>   - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
+>     agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
+>     history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
+>   - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
+>     other role file grants it.
+>   - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
+>     the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
+>
+>   Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
+
+Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
+>   for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
+>   before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
+>   REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
+>   grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
+
+REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
+
+> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
+> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
+
+## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
+
+- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
+  sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
+- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
+  its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
+- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
+  named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
+- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
+  holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
+- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
+  duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
+  Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
+  sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
+  checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
+  bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
+- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
+  latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
+  the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
+  the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
+- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
+  credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
+  on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
+  (row 194 D2.3).
+- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
+  `hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
+- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
+  version lifts it.
+- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
+  check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
+  the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
+- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
+  mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
+  gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
+  owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
+- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
+  paragraph never edited in place except to append.

agents/megavolt/work/436b/BUILD-CARRY.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# #436b build carry items
-
-The design is approved at r5: 1be535aca, DESIGN.md sha256 68df02cdf890564c6ed0a5426204114389ba7eb0eea1cf04f1bf5938b6de45f4. Dewey gave the approval in dewey-0763 (verdict sha256 de52be1b…6b68). Section 7 is approved at fa5658941 by duckworth-0067 and is unchanged since. DESIGN.md stays as approved. The row's build takes the items below, and its BUILD.md cites this file.
-
-- N9 (dewey-0763). Revoke writes `grant.revoked`, not a `grant.step`. A restart after a revoke on an open rotation therefore still sees a `commit` with no settle after it, and settles again: no file, `grant-lost`, a wrong message to Jason, and repeated deletes that come back 404 and go to `serviceLeft`. Two fixes:
-  - The section 5 restart row "`commit`, rotation, settle-pending" takes the held row's clause "with no `grant.revoked` after it".
-  - A 404 on a delete by id counts as done, not as a `serviceLeft` entry. That applies to revoke, sweep and the settle deletes.
-  - Add a test: revoke on an open rotation, then a restart. No settle runs, no Gitea call is made, and the restart sends no message about it.
-- N10 (dewey-0763). `grant.revoked {serviceLeft}` can now hold two ids, so it is a list of ids everywhere. `sweep` reads it as one.
-- duckworth-0067 N1 is in r4 (section 5, X-G15). Nothing more is carried for it.

agents/megavolt/work/436b/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,640 +0,0 @@
-# Gitea grant path, design draft r5 (Vikunja #436b, Gitea #1697 follow-up)
-
-Author: Megavolt. Reviewer: Dewey. GitHub half: Bushroot. Base: Gizmoduck's #436a r6 (f9039682e, final,
-`agents/gizmoduck/work/machine-grant/DESIGN.md` on origin/gizmoduck/machine-grant-design) and row 199's
-DESIGN.md section 7a (e10e03f6b). Mos rulings used here: mos-1130 and mos-1136.
-
-This draft builds nothing. It says how an Approve in Jason's inbox makes an agent's Gitea user, its token and
-its forks with no manual step, and it answers mos-1130 item 3 (a to e) on the executor's admin credential.
-
-## r5 changes (dewey-0761 on r4 3e66f5acf)
-
-Section 7 is unchanged from fa5658941.
-
-- Item 1 (blocks). A revoke on an open rotation deletes both tokens. When the last `grant.step` is a
-  rotation's `commit` with no settle after it (settle-pending or `grant-token-unknown`), section 6 step 3
-  deletes `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId`, each failure to `serviceLeft`. Section 5's
-  `grant-token-unknown` text now says both (X-G5).
-- N8. Step 0 refuses `grant-token-unknown` while the agent is held, so a revoke is the only way out.
-
-## r4 changes (dewey-0759 on r3 fa5658941, sage-1578, duckworth-0067)
-
-Section 7 is unchanged from fa5658941, the text Duckworth approved and Gizmoduck cites.
-
-- Item 1 (blocks), option (b), Sage's ruling in sage-1578. A step 0 refusal leaves the decision unspent only
-  until the next start. #436a r6 X3's start reconcile spends every resolved-yes grant decision with no
-  `action.allowed` as `interrupted`, and this draft no longer claims otherwise. `grants run` works while the
-  bus that refused is still up; after a restart the chief raises again and Jason approves again. `status`
-  says so on each open decision (D5, section 4 step 0, section 5, X-G11). (a) would change #436a r6, which is
-  final. The cost is in D5.
-- Item 2 (blocks). A settle that gets 200 with an `id` that is neither token no longer leaves the file in use.
-  Memory drops the credential (199 `revoke`'s memory step), the file and both recorded tokens stay, nothing
-  is deleted at Gitea, and the step ends `grant.failed {code: 'grant-token-unknown'}` for Jason. A restart
-  keeps the credential out of memory (`Credentials` `held`, built in #436b's row like `reload`). Revoke clears
-  it (section 5, X-G6).
-- N7. 3d says the private session-less writer runs `#secretCheck` on every guarded body, as `#event` does
-  (`broker.mjs:559`). The sentence is in 3d, so section 7 doesn't change.
-- duckworth-0067 N1. Every reader of grant evidence filters on `kind = 'action.allowed'` and the grant actor
-  pair, so a `grant.*` name under another kind is not evidence (section 5, X-G15).
-
-## r3 changes (dewey-0756 on r2 6db7cc45d, gizmoduck-0081 and -0084, duckworth-0065, mos-1144)
-
-- B1 (blocks). Only `#consumeGrant`'s own record carries `decision`. Every other `grant.*` body names the
-  decision `grantDecision`, so `#spent` sees exactly one spend. A step 0 or step 1 refusal leaves the
-  decision unspent (section 7, X-G11, a mutant).
-- B2 (blocks). Settle with the seat token is proven on scratch (F13): `GET /api/v1/token` answers 200 with the
-  minted id and 401 after the token is deleted. Only a 401 ends `grant-lost`. 403, 404, 5xx, a timeout, an
-  unreachable Gitea or a failed C1 to C4 leave the step open as `settle-pending`, delete nothing, and retry
-  on the next start and in `grants sweep` (section 5, X-G6). `Credentials.reload` is built by #436b's own
-  row in `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`; row 199's candidate doesn't change.
-- B3 (blocks). Step 5 compares against the user's forks of every upstream in the agent's `publish` list, not
-  only `target.projects`. The rendered block names those other upstreams as reach the token may have. A fork
-  whose upstream has left `publish` refuses `gitea-reach-wider` with its name (section 2, step 5, X-G12).
-- Section 7, the guard (gizmoduck-0081, -0084, duckworth-0065): one pattern, `grant.*`, on `body.action` and
-  on `body.operation` (Dewey N2: the consume record's `operation: 'grant.<method>'`). #436a renames its
-  `host.enroll.step`, `host.enrolled`, `host.checked` and `host.removed` into `grant.host.*`, so row 210's
-  `host.sudo` and `host.run` stay outside. The grant actor is `actor_role NULL, actor_run 'grant'`, which no
-  session or human event can produce (answers Dewey N1, same safety as `_bus`).
-- D12 / Q-B4 closed by mos-1146 (section 8).
-- N3. Step 5 reads every page of `/user/repos` and checks the total. N4. One nonce format, and the adopt
-  check compares the lowercased login. N5. `grants run` takes the `#inflight` claim. N6. One open-decision
-  query, `openGrantDecisions`, for `status`, rotate's void count and the start reconcile (section 7).
-
-## r2 changes (from r1 714c07304, Dewey's dewey-0754, verdict sha256 20d63dfb…)
-
-- D1 (blocks). `gitea_users` records the Gitea user `id`, and every later grant, rotation and fire compares it
-  (step 2). A nonce goes in `grant.step user` before the create and in the user's `full_name`, so a restart
-  adopts a user it made and refuses anything else (section 5, X-G6). Both are proven on scratch (F8, F9).
-- D2 (blocks). The audit records are `action.allowed` bodies with reserved `grant.*` actions, plus a trigger
-  in the store migration that only `system/grant` writes them (section 7). A call and its result are two
-  records paired by `callId`, because `events` is append-only (3d). To settle once with Gizmoduck for #436a.
-- D3 (blocks). Seat-token rotation gets its own rows. After `issue` has renamed the file, the executor settles
-  by asking Gitea which token the file holds (`GET /api/v1/token`, F7), and goes forward or back on that
-  answer, never by guessing (section 5).
-- D4 (blocks). 3c and section 8 now state the real gap. Reading the admin file gives instance admin, which is
-  more than a forged Approve gives. `write:admin` resets any user's password, email and admin flag, proven on
-  scratch (F10). The separate uid is deferred on cost, and the draft says so.
-- D5. The admin checks run before `#consumeGrant`, so a predictable refusal leaves Jason's Approve unspent. A
-  human `mosaic grants run <decision>` starts it again (step 0). The raise refuses when the admin slot is past
-  its rotate-by date. r4 (sage-1578): unspent only until the next start, when #436a r6 X3's reconcile spends
-  it as `interrupted`. The cost: if a step 0 refusal is followed by a restart before Jason rotates the admin
-  token or upgrades Gitea, the chief raises again and Jason approves again.
-- D6. One list of start checks (3a, 3e). The "no organization" claim is now part of the bootstrap promise,
-  and the check is that `GET /user/repos` is empty, which catches org and collaborator repositories (F11, and
-  F12 for a site-admin token).
-- D7. Admin rotation: a timestamped name (F9: names are unique per user), `--rotate-by` required, and `setAt`
-  changes, so open approvals are voided and `status` says so.
-- D8. The restart's remote undo runs the same admin checks and writes the same call records.
-- D9 (Q-B1). On fire: `prohibit_login` (F10) and delete every token the user has, not only the recorded one.
-- D10 (Q-B2). Step 5 checks the seat token's real reach with `GET /user/repos` (F11). Section 8 says reach can
-  grow later.
-- D11. One Gitea per business, stated, and checked at `set` and at raise.
-- D12. Section 8 asks for the jason.woltje comparison. I can't check it myself.
-
-## 0. What this adds to #436a
-
-#436a section 11 left `method: "gitea"` for a later draft, because the executor needs an admin credential and
-roles may never hold the admin scope (`packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:108-112`). That rule stays. The
-admin credential here is not a role service: no `useFor` reaches it, no definition can list it, and only the
-executor reads it.
-
-Everything in #436a's sections 4 and 5 holds unless this draft says otherwise: the `credential.mint` raise
-with a `grant` body, chief only (R3), the rendered block (R4), Jason's Approve via cli (R5, X1),
-`#consumeGrant` with `operation: 'grant.gitea'`, the `#inflight` claim and abort (X5), `grant.step` records and
-restart reconcile (X3), and revoke local first (section 6).
-
-What row 199 already gives: the agent's `identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`, its
-`publish: [project]` grant and each project's `remote` (199 D8, D9), the store and `issue(instance, service,
-token, date, commit)` (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:156`), and section 7a's rule that `issue` accepts a
-resolved `credential.mint` decision as the human path. `issue` writes the file (tmp, fsync, rename), then calls
-`commit`, then fills memory (`credentials.mjs:156-193`). Section 5 depends on that order.
-
-## 1. Facts, proven on a scratch Gitea
-
-Run on gitea/gitea:1.27.1 (sha256:fe4e4b1c8b93) on 127.0.0.1, throwaway data, container removed after each
-run. Scripts and logs: `/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r199/g436b/`. No log holds a token or password value.
-F1 to F6 were reported in megavolt-0034, and Mos accepted them in mos-1136.
-
-- F1 (`run4.log`). `POST /api/v1/users/{u}/tokens` with `Authorization: Basic <admin>:<admin token>` creates a
-  token for another user: 201. The same token in a `token` or `Bearer` header gets 401 on that route, while the
-  `token` header works on `GET /api/v1/user` (200). So the executor sends Basic on the token routes and
-  `token` everywhere else.
-- F2 (`run4.log`). The child-scope cap: a child scope broader than the parent's gets 403 ("cannot create an
-  access token with a broader scope than the authenticating token"), for `write:organization` and for `all`.
-  A narrower one gets 201.
-- F3 (`run4.log`). TOTP 2FA on the admin account blocks password Basic (401) and doesn't block token Basic
-  (201).
-- F4. The route's check is `reqSelfOrAdmin`: whether the account is a site admin, not the token's scope. Any
-  `write:user` token on a site-admin account can mint a token for any user.
-- F5. `write:X` implies `read:X` under Gitea's `HasScope`.
-- F6. The cap is Gitea #38406, backported in #38426 (de4b8277e9 on release/v1.27, 2026-07-12). It first ships
-  in v1.27.0. v1.27.0-rc0 lacks it, and so does every 1.24.x, 1.25.x and 1.26.x through 1.26.4.
-- F7 (`introspect.log`). `GET /api/v1/token` with the `token` header gives 200 with `id`, `name`, `scopes`,
-  `user`, `created_at` and `last_used_at`, and no token value. With Basic it gives 404. Scopes come back
-  normalized (3b).
-- F8 (`r2probe.log` 1a-1d). `POST /admin/users` with a `full_name` gives 201 with the user's `id` and that
-  `full_name`. `GET /users/SEAT-ONE` finds `seat-one` with the same `id`: names match case-insensitively. A
-  create of `Seat-One` next to `seat-one` gets 422.
-- F9 (`r2probe.log` 2a-2c). A second token with a name already used by that user gets 400. `GET
-  /users/{u}/tokens` with Basic lists the user's tokens.
-- F10 (`r2probe.log` 4a-4f, 5a). With `write:admin`, `PATCH /admin/users/{u}` on another site admin sets a new
-  password (200; the new password then signs in, the old one gets 401) and a new email. On a plain user it sets
-  `admin: true`, then `admin: false` with `prohibit_login: true`. Without `write:admin` the same PATCH gets 403.
-- F11 (`reach.log`). With the seat token (`write:repository`, `read:user`), `GET /user/repos` lists the user's
-  own fork, then also a repository it was made collaborator on, then also an org repository after it joined an
-  org team. `GET /user/orgs` and `GET /users/{u}/orgs` need `read:organization`, which neither token holds.
-- F12 (`c4.log`). With a site-admin account's three-scope token, `GET /user/repos` is empty on an instance
-  where other users and an org it isn't in hold public and private repositories: being site admin doesn't add
-  them. It lists a repository once the account is a collaborator, and an org repository once it joins that
-  org's team. Joining an org with no repositories leaves it empty, and `GET /user/orgs` gets 403 (no
-  `read:organization`).
-- F13 (`b2.log` b1-b7). Two seat tokens minted (201, ids 2 and 3). `GET /api/v1/token` with each token in the
-  `token` header gives 200, and the `id` is the minted one for both. After `DELETE` of seat-a's token (204), the
-  same call with it gives 401. After `prohibit_login` on seat-b (200), the call with seat-b's token gives 403
-  ("This account is prohibited from signing in"), not 401. A value never issued gives 401. So 401 is the only
-  answer that means the token is gone; 403 means the account is shut, and section 5 leaves it `settle-pending`.
-
-## 2. The binding
-
-The shared part (section 10) is proposed to Bushroot in megavolt-0036. This section is the Gitea half.
-
-```
-grant: { "method": "gitea", "agent": "<instance>", "rotateBy": "YYYY-MM-DD",
-         "target": { "projects": ["<project>", ...] } }
-```
-
-Code fixes the scopes of the agent's token: `write:repository` and `read:user`, row 199 A2's set. The raise
-can't name scopes, so the chief can't widen them.
-
-Checks at raise, inside the raise transaction. Each refusal stores nothing:
-
-- `agent` is a role instance of this business, its definition declares `{"service": "gitea"}`, and it has
-  `identity` and a `publish` grant (199 D8). Otherwise `gitea-not-declared`.
-- Each project in `target.projects` is in the agent's `publish` list (`remote-not-granted`), and its
-  `remote`'s origin equals `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`), the same checks as 199 D9 step 2.
-- The business has an admin slot for `gitea` whose recorded `url` has the same origin
-  (`grant-admin-missing`), and the slot isn't past its rotate-by date (`grant-admin-rotation-due`).
-- `rotateBy` is inside 199's rotation window.
-
-The rendered block, appended by the broker as #436a R4 does: agent, Gitea user, email, Gitea URL, each fork
-URL it will make (`<url>/<user>/<repo>`), the two fixed scopes, the rotate-by date, one of "new Gitea user",
-"existing stack-made user, new token" or "token rotation" (step 2), and the line "The token can write every
-repository this user can write. Step 5 checks that this is only its forks." Then, when the agent's `publish`
-list has projects outside `target.projects`, the line "It may also reach this user's existing forks of:" and
-each such upstream. The raise makes no network call, so the block names every such upstream, not only those
-with a fork (B3). The 4096-character cap applies as in R4.
-
-The raise event body gets `grant = {method, agent, target, rotateBy, definitionSha256, identitySha256,
-adminSha256}`:
-
-- `definitionSha256` as in #436a.
-- `identitySha256` over the agent's `identity`, its `publish` list and the `remote` of every project in
-  `publish` (step 5 checks against all of them).
-- `adminSha256` over the admin slot's metadata (`url`, `account`, `setAt`), never over the token.
-
-At step 1 any of the three that differs refuses `decision-mismatch`. So a changed identity, publish list,
-upstream or admin credential between raise and Approve voids the Approve (REQ-GRANT-2).
-
-## 3. The executor's admin credential (mos-1130 item 3)
-
-### 3a. A dedicated account
-
-One Gitea account per Gitea instance, named `mosaic-grant` by default. It is a site admin and has TOTP 2FA on
-(F3: the token path still works). Its password and TOTP secret stay with Jason and never reach the stack. It
-is never jason.woltje or any other human's account. It owns no repositories, belongs to no organization and is
-no repository's collaborator.
-
-The admin checks, one list, run at `set` (3e), before every executor start (step 0) and before every remote
-undo (section 5):
-
-- C1. `GET /api/v1/version` is at least 1.27.0 (F6), compared as numbers, or `gitea-too-old`.
-- C2. `GET /api/v1/user` gives `login == account` as recorded at `set`, and `is_admin` true, or
-  `grant-admin-account`.
-- C3. `GET /api/v1/token` gives exactly the three scopes (3b), or `grant-admin-scope`.
-- C4. `GET /api/v1/user/repos` is empty, or `grant-admin-not-dedicated`. By F11 and F12 this list covers
-  owned, collaborator and org-team repositories, and site admin alone doesn't fill it.
-
-What code can't check: that nobody else uses the account, and org membership with no repositories (F11: the
-orgs routes need `read:organization`, which the admin token doesn't hold and shouldn't). Both are the bootstrap
-step's promise and go in the approval notes (section 8).
-
-### 3b. The scopes, each shown needed
-
-The admin token holds exactly `write:admin`, `write:user` and `write:repository` (mos-1136 item 1). From
-`matrix.log`, with each scope dropped in turn:
-
-| Parent token | A1 create user | A2 mint seat token | A3 fork (seat token) | A5 delete seat token |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| all four | 201 | 201 | 202 | 204 |
-| without `write:admin` | **403** | 201 | 202 | 204 |
-| without `write:user` | 201 | **403** | 202 | **403** |
-| without `write:repository` | 201 | **403** (cap, F2) | 202 | 204 |
-| without `read:user` | 201 | 201 | 202 | 204 |
-
-- `write:admin` is needed for A1, and for `prohibit_login` on fire (F10).
-- `write:user` is needed for A2 and A5.
-- `write:repository` is needed only because of the cap. The seat's token holds `write:repository`, and a
-  parent must hold at least what it mints. The executor itself never writes a repository with it.
-- `read:user` is covered by `write:user` (F5), so it is dropped.
-
-C3 reads the scopes with the `token` header (F7). Gitea reports normalized scopes, so a token made with the
-three plus `read:user` reads as the three. That is harmless, because `read:user` adds nothing to `write:user`.
-A token made with `all`, or with another category, refuses.
-
-### 3c. Where it lives, who can read it
-
-- The token: `<configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/gitea/admin`, 0600, in 0700 dirs, owned by the stack's
-  OS user. Written and checked by row 199's store code (D1: tmp, fsync, rename, the mode and owner checks).
-- The metadata: `admin.json` next to it, 0600, holding `url`, `account`, `rotateBy` and `setAt`. No secret.
-- A business grants on one Gitea. `set` refuses a second `url` while a slot exists (`grant-admin-exists`;
-  `remove` first), and the raise checks the agent's Gitea against the slot's `url` (section 2). Two businesses
-  on one Gitea each hold their own token for the same `mosaic-grant` account.
-
-Who can read the file: the stack's OS user, and root.
-
-Whether an agent process runs as that uid:
-
-- On dragon-lin, yes. The stack runs as jwoltje, and so does every agent process on the machine: 13 claude, 4
-  codex and 2 pi processes, the bwrap sandboxes and node, counted 2026-10-20. That includes the T3 dev seats,
-  which are not sandboxed and can read any jwoltje file.
-- Stack workers run in the seat sandbox, which has a private HOME and no `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.ssh`
-  (`packages/seat/src/sandbox.mjs`). A sandboxed worker can't reach the file by path. The sandbox doesn't
-  confine the network or the host uid (`sandbox.mjs:29-31`). So the file is safe from a sandboxed worker and
-  not from an unsandboxed process running as the same uid.
-- On the .53 and .54 installs (#432) the stack runs as its own OS user. Workers run sandboxed as that user.
-  The T3 seats don't run there.
-
-What a separate uid would buy. A same-uid process has two paths. It can forge a human proof (`verifyHuman` is
-a cooperative same-UID check, `packages/bus/src/human.mjs:50-52`), and an approved grant then gives it a
-two-scope token for a stack-made, non-admin user, because step 2 refuses foreign and admin users. Or it can
-read the admin file, which gives instance admin (section 8). A separate uid for the file and the executor would
-close the second path and leave the first. That is a real step up, from "a seat token for a stack user" to "no
-admin".
-
-I defer it on cost, not because it wouldn't help. It means the executor runs as its own process under its own
-uid, with an IPC path from the bus that carries the decision id and nothing the bus could forge. That is a row
-of its own, and it is cleaner after the human proof stops being same-uid (#435 behind Q175 sign-in). Jason
-approves the gap as section 8 states it.
-
-### 3d. Every use logged, and rotation
-
-Every Gitea call made with the admin token, and every call the executor makes with a seat token, writes two
-records (section 7 has where they live):
-
-```
-grant.call   { callId, reason, method: "gitea", op }        written before the call
-grant.result { callId, status }                             written after it
-```
-
-- `op` is one of `version`, `self`, `token-scopes`, `repos-check`, `user-get`, `user-create`, `user-patch`,
-  `token-list`, `token-create`, `token-delete`, `admin-rotate`, `fork-get`, `fork`, `seat-self`,
-  `seat-repos`, `token-whoami`.
-- `reason` is the decision id for a grant or its undo, the `grant.revoked` record id for a revoke, the
-  `grant.sweep` record id for a sweep, or `admin:<verb>` with the human actor for `set`, `rotate` and `remove`.
-- No body, no header, no token, no URL query. `Credentials.assertClean` (`packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs:233`,
-  the runtime's `secretCheck`) runs on both. The private session-less writer of section 7 runs `#secretCheck`
-  on every guarded body it takes, `grant.step`, `grant.applied`, `grant.failed`, `grant.revoked`,
-  `grant.sweep` and the consume record included, as `#event` does (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:559`) (N7).
-- `events` is append-only (`events_no_update`, `packages/bus/src/migrations/3b.sql:131`), so the result is its
-  own record, written in the transaction of the step's next `grant.step` where there is one. A `grant.call`
-  with no `grant.result` means the process died during the call. Reconcile lists each one in its message.
-
-Rotation of the admin token: a human-only verb, `mosaic grants admin rotate gitea --rotate-by <date>`. It never
-runs from an agent, the chief or the tester, and it doesn't need a decision because only `verifyHuman` can
-start it:
-
-1. C1 to C4 with the current token.
-2. Mint a successor for the admin account itself: `POST /users/<account>/tokens` with Basic and the same three
-   scopes, named `mosaic-grant-<UTC yyyymmddThhmmssZ>`, so a second rotation on one day doesn't collide (F9).
-   F2's cap holds it to the current token's scopes.
-3. C2 and C3 with the successor.
-4. Write it through 199's tmp, fsync and rename. Update `admin.json` with the new `rotateBy` and a new `setAt`.
-5. Delete the old token at Gitea by name, with the new token. If that fails, `status` shows
-   `adminTokenLeft: <name>` until `rotate --finish` succeeds.
-
-A new `setAt` changes `adminSha256`, so every grant decision raised before the rotation and not yet run
-refuses `decision-mismatch` (fail closed). `rotate` prints how many open grant decisions that voids, and
-`status` lists them.
-
-`status` shows the rotate-by date. Past it, the raise and the executor refuse `grant-admin-rotation-due` until
-Jason rotates. A forgotten rotation stops grants rather than letting an old token run on.
-
-If the admin token leaks, Jason deletes it in Gitea (Settings, Applications, as `mosaic-grant`) or disables
-the account, then runs `mosaic grants admin remove gitea`, which unlinks the slot. Live agent tokens keep
-working. Each one is revoked on its own (section 6).
-
-### 3e. The one bootstrap step
-
-Once per Gitea instance per stack, at #436b deploy. This is the only manual credential step left, and
-Jason's approval names it:
-
-1. In Gitea, Jason creates `mosaic-grant` as a site admin with no repositories and no organizations, turns on
-   TOTP, and as that user creates a token with `write:admin`, `write:user` and `write:repository`.
-2. On the stack host, as the stack's OS user:
-   `mosaic grants admin set gitea --url <url> --account mosaic-grant --rotate-by <date>`, with the token on
-   stdin (never argv).
-
-`set` is human-only (`verifyHuman`). It runs C1 to C4 (3a) before it writes anything, and any failure writes
-nothing.
-
-## 4. The executor's steps
-
-0. **Start and pre-checks.** X1 starts the executor on Jason's yes. It claims `(agent, "gitea")` in
-   `#inflight` (#436a X5), then runs C1 to C4 and the admin rotate-by check. A refusal here writes
-   `grant.failed {code, grantDecision}` and leaves the decision unspent (section 7's spend rule). After the
-   fix (a rotation, an upgrade), Jason runs `mosaic grants run <decision>` (human-only, `verifyHuman`), which
-   starts step 0 again, claim included. That holds only while the bus that refused is up: at the next start,
-   #436a r6 X3's reconcile spends every resolved-yes grant decision with no `action.allowed` as
-   `interrupted`, a step 0 refusal included, and the chief raises again (D5, sage-1578). `status` lists each
-   such open decision with `spentAtNextStart: true`. While the agent is held (`grant-token-unknown`, section
-   5), step 0 refuses `grant-token-unknown`, so a revoke is the only way out (N8). While a start or another `grants run` holds the claim it refuses
-   `grant-busy` before any call, as #436a X2's `host-busy` does. It refuses `decision-consumed` for a spent
-   decision. No other path starts it. The tag is #436a X2 step 2's, over business, agent and `"gitea"`.
-1. **Recheck and consume**, in one transaction: `#consumeGrant` with `operation: 'grant.gitea'`, the
-   definition still declares `gitea`, the three hashes match (section 2), no revoke of `(agent, gitea)` newer
-   than the raise. A failure rolls the transaction back, so the decision is not spent, and then writes
-   `grant.failed {code, grantDecision}`. Nothing remote has changed. `grants run` may retry it, but these
-   refusals (`decision-mismatch`, a newer revoke, the definition) recur until the chief raises again.
-2. **User.** `GET /users/{user}` (F8: case-insensitive).
-   - 404: write `grant.step {step: 'user', nonce}`, where `nonce` is 16 random lowercase hex digits. Then
-     `POST /admin/users` with the agent's `gitea.user` and `email`, `full_name` = `<identity.name> [mosaic
-     <nonce>]`, a random password that is never stored, and `must_change_password: false`. Then, in one
-     transaction, record `gitea_users {user, id, nonce}` with the `id` from the response (F8) and
-     `grant.result`.
-   - 200, and `gitea_users` has this business and agent with the same `id`: go on. That is a second grant or a
-     rotation. A user deleted at Gitea and remade by a human under the same name has a new `id`, and refuses.
-   - 200 with any other `id`, or no `gitea_users` record: refuse `gitea-user-foreign`. The executor never mints
-     a token for a user this stack didn't create. Without this check an `identity` naming a human's account,
-     jason.woltje included, would get a token minted for that account on Approve.
-   - The user is a site admin, or has `prohibit_login`: refuse `gitea-user-admin` or `gitea-user-disabled`.
-3. **Token.** Write `grant.step {step: 'mint', tokenName}`, with the name `mosaic-<tag>-<decision>`. Then
-   `POST /users/{user}/tokens` with Basic and scopes `write:repository` and `read:user`. The value is held in
-   memory only. Write `grant.step {step: 'minted', tokenId}`.
-4. **Forks.** With the new token, for each project: `GET /repos/{user}/{repo}`. If it exists, its `parent`
-   must be the project's upstream, or `fork-foreign`. If it's 404, `POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks`.
-   Push-to-create stays off on the Gitea side (199 N11).
-5. **Verify.** With the new token: `GET /api/v1/user` gives `login == user` and the recorded `id`. Then
-   `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=50&page=N` from page 1 until a page holds fewer than 50, with the count
-   equal to `X-Total-Count`. More than 20 pages, or a count that disagrees, refuses `gitea-reach-unknown`.
-   Every listed repository must be owned by this user and have as `parent` the upstream of a project in the
-   agent's `publish` list (F11). Anything else refuses `gitea-reach-wider` and names it: a repository from a
-   collaborator or org-team add, or the user's old fork of an upstream that has left `publish`. So the token
-   never reaches past the rendered block (B3).
-6. **Go live.** Write `grant.step {step: 'commit', previousTokenId}` (`null` for a first grant). Check the
-   abort signal, and with no `await` between, call 199 `issue(agent, "gitea", token, rotateBy, commit)`.
-   `commit` writes the `gitea_grants` record (tokenId, tokenName, projects, rotateBy, decision). The reference
-   is registered first (#436a X4).
-7. **Old token.** For a rotation, `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{previousTokenId}` after the new one is live.
-   A failure adds `serviceLeft: <id>`, which `sweep` clears.
-8. **Applied.** `grant.applied {grantDecision, agent, user, userId, tokenId, forks}` and a message to the human and
-   the chief. The token appears in no record, message or log.
-
-The claim is released in a `finally`.
-
-## 5. Failure and restart
-
-Ordered so a failure leaves nothing an agent can use. "Delete the token" is `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{id
-or name}` with the admin token, after C1 to C4, with `grant.call` and `grant.result` whose reason is the
-decision (D8). Best effort; a failure adds `serviceLeft`.
-
-**Settle.** Once `issue` has renamed the file, the file may hold the new token or the previous one, and the
-record may name either. The executor and the restart never guess. They read the store file and ask Gitea which
-token it is: `GET /api/v1/token` with that value in the `token` header (F7 for admin tokens, F13 for the
-two-scope seat token; op `token-whoami`). The answer is an `id`, never a value.
-
-- 200, `id` is the new token: forward. The `gitea_grants` record gets the new token (if `commit` hadn't
-  run), memory loads the file (`Credentials.reload(instance, service)`, a new method with load's checks,
-  built in #436b's row; row 199 doesn't change), and the previous token is deleted.
-- 200, `id` is the previous token: back. The new token is deleted. The record keeps or gets the previous
-  token.
-- 401: the file's token no longer exists at Gitea (F13 b4). The previous token can't be in the file, so the
-  agent holds nothing usable. Delete both by id, unregister, delete the record, unlink the file, and end
-  `grant.failed {code: 'grant-lost'}`. A new decision is needed. No file at all is the same case.
-- 200, `id` is neither token: the file holds a live token this grant didn't mint and step 5 never checked.
-  Memory drops it (199 `revoke`'s memory step) and the agent gets `credential-unavailable`. The file, the
-  record and both recorded tokens stay, and nothing is deleted at Gitea. The step ends `grant.failed {code:
-  'grant-token-unknown', grantDecision, tokenId}`, where `tokenId` is the id Gitea gave, and Jason gets a
-  message. `status` shows `tokenUnknown`. At each start, before `Credentials` loads, the reconcile passes such
-  `(agent, "gitea")` pairs as `held` (a `Credentials` option built in #436b's row, like `reload`), so memory
-  never loads that file. A revoke (section 6) clears it: it unlinks the file and deletes both recorded tokens.
-  The unknown token is Jason's to look at.
-- Anything else is `settle-pending`, and nothing is deleted: 403, 404, 5xx, a timeout, Gitea unreachable, or
-  C1 to C4 failing first. The last `grant.step` stays `commit`, the
-  `grant.call` without a `grant.result` stays listed, and `status` shows `settlePending`. The file stays as
-  it is, and the agent can use it: it holds one of the two tokens, and both passed step 5. The next start
-  and `mosaic grants sweep gitea` settle again. Only a 401 deletes.
-
-| Fails at | State left | Cleanup |
-|---|---|---|
-| 0 | nothing, the decision unspent until the next start | none. `grants run` retries while this bus is up; after a restart the reconcile spends it (`interrupted`) |
-| 1 | nothing | none |
-| 2, before the create | nothing | none |
-| 2, after the create, before the record | a user with the nonce | none here. Restart adopts it by the nonce (below) |
-| 3, before `minted` | maybe a token nobody holds | delete the token by its recorded name |
-| 4 or 5 | a token, maybe some forks | delete the token. Forks stay; they hold only upstream content |
-| 6 before the rename, first grant | a token | unregister, delete the token |
-| 6 after the rename, first grant | a store file with the new token, maybe the record | unlink the file, unregister, delete the record if written, delete the token |
-| 6 before the rename, rotation | the previous grant intact | delete the new token |
-| 6 after the rename, rotation | the file holds the new token, memory the previous | settle (forward: the new token passed step 5) |
-| 7 | both tokens live, the new one in use | `serviceLeft: <previousTokenId>` |
-
-**Restart**, before `Credentials` loads, from the last `grant.step`, as #436a X3. The local part runs first;
-the remote part runs after the bus is up, with C1 to C4.
-
-| Last step | Local | Remote |
-|---|---|---|
-| `user` | none | `GET /users/{user}`. 200 with `full_name` ending `[mosaic <nonce>]`, not admin: adopt, record `gitea_users` with its `id`. 404: none. Anything else: `gitea-user-orphan` with the name, for Jason to look at; nothing is deleted |
-| `mint` or `minted` | none | delete the token by name |
-| `commit`, first grant | unlink the file if present, delete the record if present | delete the new token |
-| `commit`, rotation | none | settle |
-| `commit`, rotation, settle-pending | none; memory loads the file as usual | none. The step stays open, and the next start or `grants sweep` settles again |
-| `grant.failed {code: 'grant-token-unknown'}` with no `grant.revoked` after it | pass `(agent, "gitea")` as `held`; memory doesn't load the file | none. Jason's message repeats until a revoke |
-
-Every reader of grant evidence (this reconcile, `status`, `openGrantDecisions`'s callers, `grants sweep`)
-reads a `grant.*` record only where `kind = 'action.allowed'` and `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS
-'grant'`, so a `grant.*` name under another kind or actor is never evidence (duckworth-0067 N1).
-
-Then `grant.failed {code: 'interrupted'}` (or `grant.applied` if a rotation settled forward) and a message to
-Jason. A `grant.call` with no `grant.result` is listed in that message. After `interrupted`, the chief raises
-again and Jason approves again.
-
-## 6. Revoke
-
-As #436a section 6, with the same revokers (the human, the assistant in its own organization, the tester on
-dev only):
-
-1. 199 `revoke`: memory, abort a use or the executor in flight, unlink the file.
-2. One store transaction deletes the `gitea_grants` record and records `grant.revoked`.
-3. After C1 to C4, `DELETE /users/{user}/tokens/{tokenId}` with the admin token. If Gitea can't be reached,
-   `grant.revoked {serviceLeft: <tokenId>}`, and `mosaic grants sweep gitea` clears it later. When the last
-   `grant.step` is a rotation's `commit` with no settle after it (settle-pending, or `grant-token-unknown`),
-   two tokens are live and the record may name either (section 5), so the revoke deletes both
-   `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId`, each failure listed in `serviceLeft` (dewey-0761). The id
-   `grant-token-unknown` named is not one this stack minted; it stays for Jason.
-
-That closes 199 D12's gap: the token is gone at Gitea without Jason's A5 step.
-
-The Gitea user and its forks stay after a revoke, so a new grant can reuse them.
-
-On `credentials delete` (a fire), after the steps above and with the recorded `id` checked first:
-
-- `GET /users/{user}/tokens` with Basic (F9), and delete every token it lists, not only the recorded one. A
-  token the record doesn't know about doesn't outlive a fire.
-- `PATCH /admin/users/{user}` with `prohibit_login: true` (F10).
-- Each step that fails is listed in `serviceLeft`, and `sweep` retries it.
-
-## 7. Store records
-
-Two tables, in #436a S1's migration if #436a row b and this row land together, otherwise a `3j-3k.sql`:
-
-- `gitea_users`: business, agent, user, id, nonce, the decision that created it.
-- `gitea_grants`: business, agent, user, tokenId, tokenName, projects, rotate-by date, decision.
-
-The executor, revoke and `sweep` are the only writers, each in the transaction of its record. The admin slot
-is a file, not a table, so a store backup holds no admin token.
-
-The audit records (`grant.step`, `grant.call`, `grant.result`, `grant.applied`, `grant.failed`,
-`grant.revoked`, `grant.sweep`) are `action.allowed` events with that name in `body.action`. They are not new
-event kinds, so `events` and its CHECK (`3b.sql:9-30`) aren't rebuilt. This section is the rule's only home
-(mos-1144). #436a r6 (f9039682e) uses it too: #436a row a's BUILD.md cites this section at the commit Duckworth
-approves and maps r6's names to `body.action` values, with these renames (gizmoduck-0084):
-`host.enroll.step` to `grant.host.enroll.step`, `host.enrolled` to `grant.host.enrolled`, `host.checked` to
-`grant.host.checked`, `host.removed` to `grant.host.removed`. Cites are origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6.
-
-**The guarded namespace** is one pattern: an `action.allowed` whose `body.action` or `body.operation` GLOBs
-`'grant.*'`. `operation` is included because `#consumeGrant`'s consume record is
-`{operation: 'grant.<method>', decision}` (#436a X1), and a forged one would spend a decision (Dewey N2). Row
-210's `host.sudo` and `host.run`, written from agent sessions, stay outside it, and no grant-path name is left
-under `host.*`.
-
-**The grant actor** is `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS 'grant'`. The only production insert into `events`
-is `#event` (`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:568`), which writes the session's role and run. Every session with a
-NULL role also has a NULL run: the human (`:537`), the reader (`:549`) and a session-less record (`:1124`). The
-tester's role is `tester`. So neither a session nor the human path can produce that pair, as no instance can
-be named `_bus` (`:166-168`). A `system` role would not be safe, because `system` matches `ID_PATTERN`
-(Dewey N1). The broker writes guarded events, the consume record included, through a private session-less
-writer added in #436a row a; `#event` is unchanged. Revoke, sweep and check run for the human, the assistant,
-the tester or the chief, and their events still go out under the grant actor, with `body.by` naming the caller
-the broker checked.
-
-**Two guards** stop a forged record:
-
-- `recordEvent`, the trusted adapters' path (`broker.mjs:1111`), refuses `reserved-event` for any
-  `action.allowed` in the guarded namespace, as it does today for `git.push.working` and the merge action.
-- The migration adds a trigger: an `action.allowed` in the guarded namespace aborts unless
-  `actor_role IS NULL AND actor_run IS 'grant'`. That covers any path that misses the first guard.
-
-**Spend rule (B1).** `#spent` (`broker.mjs:811-817`) counts any `action.allowed` that names the decision in
-`body.decision` and whose `operation` isn't `decision.raise`; a record with no `operation` counts. So the
-consume record is the only guarded body with a `decision` key. Every other `grant.*` body names the decision
-`grantDecision`. A step 0 or step 1 refusal therefore leaves the decision unspent, and the start reconcile
-for "resolved yes, unspent" keeps reading `#spent` unchanged.
-
-A wider gap sits under this one and isn't this row's: today any `recordEvent` `action.allowed` that carries
-`body.decision` spends that decision. Follow-up for Sage to file.
-
-**Open decisions (N6).** One query, `openGrantDecisions(business, method)`: `credential.mint` decisions
-resolved yes by the human whose raise body has `grant.method = method`, and for which `#spent` is false.
-`status` lists them, `grants admin rotate` counts the ones it voids (all of them, since `adminSha256`
-changes), and the start reconcile reads the same query.
-
-**No task refs.** Guarded bodies never carry `target` or `task_ref` holding a task ref, so they stay clear of
-`task-subject-required` (`broker.mjs:561-565`) on any path. No other `action.allowed` reader sees these
-events: the rest key on `decision.raise` (`:670`, `:803`), `git.push.working` (`:863`, `:2019`) or
-routine (`:2100-2102`).
-
-## 8. Approval notes for Jason
-
-Stated once, here, for the #436b approval:
-
-- **Site admin plus `write:user`, and `write:admin`.** The admin token can mint a token for any Gitea user,
-  with any scope up to its own three, including users the stack didn't create (F4). With `write:admin` it can
-  also set any user's password, email and admin flag, and disable any user (F10, proven on scratch against a
-  second site admin). Whoever holds the token can take over any account on that Gitea, jason.woltje's
-  included, make any user a site admin, and read or write any repository. The executor uses none of that
-  beyond its steps, but the token itself can.
-- **Same uid on dragon-lin.** The token is a file readable by jwoltje, and every agent process on dragon-lin,
-  T3 dev seats included, runs as jwoltje (3c). The seat sandbox keeps sandboxed workers away from it. It does
-  not keep an unsandboxed same-uid process away. Such a process gets instance admin by reading the file, which
-  is more than it could get by forging an Approve. A separate uid would close that path. It is deferred on cost
-  (3c), not because it wouldn't help.
-- **For comparison, today (D12).** Every dev seat on dragon-lin already pushes as jason.woltje through
-  `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` (mos-1106). jason.woltje is a site admin on git.mosaicstack.dev, with
-  restricted false (mos-1146: Mos read `/api/v1/users/jason.woltje` with the mos token at 23:05:29Z; Jason's
-  token wasn't used). So a same-uid process on dragon-lin can already act as a site admin there through that
-  credential, and the admin file adds little exposure on that Gitea beyond what the seats already have. It
-  still matters on any other Gitea a business grants on, and once seats stop pushing as jason.woltje (#431).
-- **A seat token's reach can grow.** Step 5 checks, at the grant, that the token reaches only its forks. If
-  someone later adds the user to an org or as a collaborator, the token reaches that too, until the next grant
-  or rotation checks again.
-- **The admin account is dedicated by promise.** Code checks that it is a site admin with these three scopes
-  and no reachable repositories (C1 to C4). It can't check that nobody else uses it or that it is in no org.
-- **The bootstrap step** (3e) is the one manual credential step: Jason creates `mosaic-grant`, its TOTP and
-  its token, and enters the token once on stdin.
-
-## 9. Tests and mutants (for the row, not built here)
-
-Unit tests use a fake Gitea over TLS, as row 199's publish tests do. Section 1's facts get a scratch
-gitea/gitea:1.27.1 test on 127.0.0.1 with throwaway data, removed after. No test contacts git.mosaicstack.dev
-or any other live service. No token value is printed.
-
-| Test | Claim |
-|---|---|
-| X-G1 | a gitea raise for an agent without `gitea`, `identity` or `publish`, or a project outside `publish`, a remote on another host, no admin slot, or a slot past rotate-by refuses and stores nothing |
-| X-G2 | `set` refuses a version below 1.27.0 (fake reports 1.26.4, 1.27.0-rc0, and 1.9.0 against 1.27.0 as a string trap), a non-admin, a login mismatch, an account that reaches a repository, a token with another scope or `all`, and a second `url`. It writes nothing on any refusal |
-| X-G3 | on scratch 1.27.1, end to end: user made with the nonce and its `id` recorded, token minted with the two scopes, forks made, step 5 passes, `issue` writes the 0600 file, `grant.applied`, then revoke deletes the token at Gitea (gone from its list) |
-| X-G4 | an existing user with no record, a recorded name whose `id` differs (deleted and remade, and a case variant of the name), a site-admin user and a disabled user each refuse before any token call |
-| X-G5 | each failure row of section 5 leaves the stated state, rotation rows included. A failed delete leaves `serviceLeft`. A revoke while a rotation's `commit` is settle-pending, and one after `grant-token-unknown`, deletes both `previousTokenId` and the minted `tokenId` at the fake, and a failure of either lands in `serviceLeft`. A new grant for a held agent refuses `grant-token-unknown` at step 0, before any Gitea call |
-| X-G6 | a restart after `user` adopts a user whose `full_name` ends with ` [mosaic <nonce>]` (16 lowercase hex), whose lowercased login equals `gitea.user` lowercased and who isn't an admin; does nothing on 404; and reports `gitea-user-orphan` for a different `full_name`, a different login or an admin. A restart after `mint`, `minted` and `commit` of a first grant leaves no token at Gitea, no file and no record. A restart after `commit` of a rotation settles forward when the file holds the new token and back when it holds the previous one, ends `grant-lost` only on a 401, and stays `settle-pending` with nothing deleted on 403, 404, 500, a timeout and an unreachable fake. On 200 with an unknown `id` it drops the credential from memory, deletes nothing at Gitea, keeps the file, ends `grant-token-unknown`, and a second restart still doesn't load the file; a revoke then clears it |
-| X-G7 | an identity, publish, upstream or admin slot change between raise and Approve refuses `decision-mismatch` before any Gitea call. An admin rotate voids open grant decisions and `status` lists them |
-| X-G8 | every admin-token and seat-token call writes `grant.call` before it and `grant.result` after it, paired by `callId`. A crash between them is listed by reconcile. No record body holds a token |
-| X-G9 | admin rotate: C1 to C4, the successor named by time, checked, written, the old token deleted. Two rotations in one second's name refuse cleanly, not half done. Past rotate-by, the raise and the executor refuse |
-| X-G10 | seat-token rotation: the new token is live before the old one is deleted |
-| X-G11 | a step 0 refusal (rotation due, too old) and a step 1 refusal leave `#spent` false, and `grants run` by the human gets past `#consumeGrant`. `grants run` from an agent, the chief or the tester refuses. A `grants run` while a start holds the claim refuses `grant-busy` before any Gitea call. No `grant.*` body other than the consume record has a `decision` key. A step 0 refusal, then a restart, then `grants run`: the reconcile has spent the decision as `interrupted` and `grants run` refuses `decision-consumed`; before the restart `status` shows `spentAtNextStart` |
-| X-G12 | step 5 refuses `gitea-reach-wider` when the user was made collaborator on another repository, when it joined an org team, and when it owns a fork of an upstream that has left `publish`, and deletes the token. It passes with an old fork of a `publish` project outside `target.projects`, which the rendered block named. A fake returning 51 forks over two pages is read in full; a total that disagrees refuses `gitea-reach-unknown` |
-| X-G13 | `recordEvent` refuses an `action.allowed` with `body.action` `grant.call` (and each `grant.*`) and one with `body.operation` `grant.gitea`. A direct store insert aborts on the trigger for `grant.step` and `grant.host.enrolled` from a session, and for `grant.step` under the human's NULL pair. `host.sudo` from an agent session still writes |
-| X-G14 | fire: every token the user has is deleted, the user gets `prohibit_login`, and a failure of either lands in `serviceLeft` |
-| X-G15 | a `grant.step {step: 'commit'}` stored under `action.refused`, and one under the human's NULL pair, are ignored by the restart reconcile: no settle runs and no Gitea call is made |
-
-Mutants, a first list: drop the version floor; compare the version as a string; accept another admin scope;
-skip `gitea-user-foreign`; compare the user by name instead of `id`; skip the admin-user refusal; adopt a user
-at restart without the nonce; create the user before writing `grant.step user`; mint before writing
-`grant.step mint`; delete the old token before `issue`; settle a rotation by the record instead of
-`token-whoami`; run C1 to C4 after `#consumeGrant` instead of before; drop the `identitySha256` compare; drop
-`adminSha256`; skip the `grant.call` write; write `grant.result` before the call; drop the `grant.` reservation
-in `recordEvent`; drop the trigger; widen the trigger to `host.*` (breaks `host.sudo`); guard `body.action` only, not
-`operation`; key the trigger on `actor_run` alone; put `decision` in step 0's `grant.failed`; delete both
-tokens on a settle 403 or 5xx; compare step 5 against `target.projects` instead of `publish`; read one page
-of `/user/repos`; let `grants run` skip the claim; send the admin token in a `token` header on the mint route; revoke the
-remote token before the local steps; skip the fork `parent` check; skip step 5's reach check; delete only the
-recorded token on fire; let `grants run` accept an agent; keep the file in use on a settle 200 with an
-unknown `id`; load a `held` pair at start; revoke only `tokenId` on an open rotation; let step 0 pass a held agent; drop the `kind` filter from the restart reconcile.
-
-## 10. Shared with Bushroot's GitHub half (proposed in megavolt-0036, answer pending)
-
-- S1. The `grant` body: `{method, agent, rotateBy, target}`, scopes fixed by code per method.
-- S2. The admin slot: `<configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/<method>/admin`, set once by
-  `mosaic grants admin set <method>`, never an agent service. One service instance per method per business.
-- S3. `grant.call` and `grant.result` (r2: two records, paired by `callId`) for every service call, as reserved
-  `action.allowed` bodies (section 7).
-- S4. The executor shape: pre-checks before consume (step 0), claim, consume, mint, verify, `issue`, applied,
-  with `grant.step` before and after the mint, and settle by asking the service which credential the file
-  holds. GitHub may not fit "mint once and store" (App installation tokens expire within an hour). If so, S4
-  becomes per method and the rest stays shared.
-- S5. Revoke local first, then the record, then the service, with `serviceLeft` and `grants sweep`.
-- S6. A capability floor per method, checked at `set`, before every start and before every remote undo.
-
-Dewey notes items 2, 3 and 5 of dewey-0754 apply to S3, S4 and S6. The r2 text above carries them.
-
-## 11. Questions
-
-- Q-B1. Answered (dewey-0754 item 9): on fire, `prohibit_login` and delete every token (section 6). The PATCH
-  route is proven (F10).
-- Q-B2. Answered (dewey-0754 item 10): no organizations. The token's real reach is checked at step 5 and
-  stated in section 8.
-- Q-B3. Bushroot's answer on S1 to S6.
-- Q-B4. Answered (mos-1146): jason.woltje is a site admin on git.mosaicstack.dev, restricted false. Section 8
-  says so.
-- Q-B5. Answered (gizmoduck-0081, -0084, mos-1144): one rule for #436a and #436b, section 7. #436a row a's
-  BUILD.md cites section 7 at the commit Duckworth approves, or carries its text in full if row a's candidate
-  comes first. Duckworth checks it with that candidate.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/BUILD.md

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
-
-Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
-4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
-by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
-
-Status: in progress. The full gate has not run; it is Sage's. Only single test files have run on
-this branch, apart from one slip noted under "Runs".
-
-## Commits so far
-
-- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
-  credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
-- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
-  the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
-  git.push.remote among the hard waits.
-- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
-- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
-- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
-  D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
-  call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
-- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
-  in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
-  `detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
-- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
-
-## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
-
-1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
-   carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
-   without identity commits as E7 (T6).
-2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
-   For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
-   the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
-   nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
-3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
-   caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
-   leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
-   issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
-4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
-   `forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
-   files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
-   messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
-5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
-   checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
-   `broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
-   or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
-   also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
-   only".
-6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
-   `roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
-   fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
-   should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
-
-7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
-   `reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
-8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
-   bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
-   status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
-9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
-   agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
-   agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
-   `create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
-10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
-    the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
-    and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
-    Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
-    holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
-11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
-    the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
-    `packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
-    limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
-    host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
-    `working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
-    `withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
-    until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
-    (`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
-    when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
-    refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
-    by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
-    On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
-    goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
-    (sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
-    at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
-    publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
-    the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
-    `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
-    end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
-    publish-timeout outcome).
-12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
-    clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
-    manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
-13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
-    launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
-    `recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
-    clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
-    it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
-    equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
-14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
-    T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
-    `working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
-    (`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
-    (`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
-    oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
-    DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
-    asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
-    refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
-    refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
-
-15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
-    (`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
-    gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
-    case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
-    `cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
-    fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
-
-## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
-
-Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
-`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
-no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
-git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
-that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
-
-## R1, the backup set
-
-Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
-`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
-`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
-`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
-through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
-one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
-`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
-never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
-copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
-
-## T1 limit
-
-A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
-dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
-
-## Runs
-
-Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
-hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
-credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
-usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
-business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
-tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
-plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
-tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
-file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
-
-Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
-checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
-credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
-publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
-which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
-minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
-
-Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
-Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
-No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
-
-r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
-and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
-
-r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
-drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
-
-r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
-and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
-
-r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
-remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
-agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
-repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
-found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
-step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
-`publish` require it (D8).
-
-r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
-has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
-and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
-N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
-
-## 0. Terms
-
-- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
-  `~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
-  instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
-- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
-  design says agent.
-- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
-- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
-
-## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
-
-| Code | Fact | Where |
-|---|---|---|
-| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
-| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
-| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
-| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
-| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
-| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
-| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
-| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
-| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
-| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
-
-So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
-the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
-share.
-
-## 2. The store (brief item 1)
-
-D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
-
-```
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/                       0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/    0700
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>   0600, the token only, one line
-```
-
-This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
-format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
-secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
-
-D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
-means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
-so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
-migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
-own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
-
-D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
-(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
-into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
-
-D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
-`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
-create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
-owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
-`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
-
-## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
-
-Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
-
-D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
-Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
-to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
-does for files today, extended to the dirs).
-
-D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
-verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
-frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
-there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
-host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
-`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
-`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
-`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
-`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
-
-D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
-is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
-per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
-
-## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
-
-| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
-|---|---|---|
-| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
-| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
-| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
-
-D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
-provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
-short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
-credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
-instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
-Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
-doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
-
-## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
-
-D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
-optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
-step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
-grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
-"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
-fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
-it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
-commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
-
-D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
-
-```
-publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-  -> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
-```
-
-The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
-
-1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
-   task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
-   ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
-   `broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
-   needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
-
-   **The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
-   (`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
-   `holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
-   `decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
-   raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
-   refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
-   refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
-   is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
-   refuses.
-   No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
-   reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
-   without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
-2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
-   project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
-   (`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
-   `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
-   fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
-   the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
-   5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
-   repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
-   agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
-   push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
-   equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
-   beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
-   (`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
-3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
-   the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
-   `work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
-   if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
-   caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
-   `validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
-4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
-   (`identity-mismatch`).
-5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
-   with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
-   `checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
-   (`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
-   `protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
-   or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
-   inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
-   PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
-   defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
-   `["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
-   is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
-   `store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
-   `credential-leak`.
-6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
-
-D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
-repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
-receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
-upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
-`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
-catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
-upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
-built on them.
-Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
-`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
-ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
-network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
-parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
-network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
-until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
-
-D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
-and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
-
-- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
-- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
-  `gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
-  percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
-  each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
-  form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
-  the owner that is used.
-- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
-  REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
-- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
-  `..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
-- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
-- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
-  sides.
-- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
-  upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
-  would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
-
-D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
-(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
-`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
-
-- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
-  email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
-  same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
-- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
-  step 5. The token never leaves that call.
-- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
-
-The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
-
-D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
-branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
-
-- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
-  named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
-  Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
-  or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
-  upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
-- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
-  branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
-  A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
-  depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
-
-Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
-`all`, no admin).
-
-D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
-socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
-`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
-root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
-
-## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
-
-All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
-human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
-`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
-(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
-writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
-kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
-
-| Verb | What it does |
-|---|---|
-| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
-| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
-| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
-| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
-| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
-
-D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
-`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
-token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
-confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
-end. Row 194's fire ends them.
-
-D13. **What row 194 calls.**
-
-- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
-- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
-  is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
-  `issue`.
-- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
-  the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
-  with its credentials still live on our side.
-- `regenerate`: no credential change.
-
-## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
-
-Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
-
-- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
-  `gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
-- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
-  `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
-- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
-  (`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
-  fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
-- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
-  the token pasted into stdin.
-- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
-- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
-
-Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
-
-## 7a. The grant path (mos-1124, Q188, Q190)
-
-Q188: no agent creates a grant. The chief raises the request, Jason approves it in the inbox, and protected
-stack code creates the grant. Jason called manual grant steps a no-fly, so A1 to A4 above are the fallback only.
-
-- a. `credentials.issue`, and so `rotate`, accepts a resolved `credential.mint` decision, Jason's Approve, as
-  the human path. #436b's executor calls it with that decision and nothing pasted. #436b adds that path and
-  the decision kind. Row 199 ships the verbs with today's human check only.
-- b. Under Q190 ("Q12: O1"), each agent seat gets its own Gitea account. On the Approve, #436b's executor does
-  A1 to A3: the seat's Gitea user, its token and its forks. Until #436b lands, pushes stay as jason.woltje.
-- c. Q185 settles Q-J1 and Q190 settles Q-J2.
-
-No code in 07141966e changes for this section. The executor and the decision route are #436b's.
-
-## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
-
-- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
-  `issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
-- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
-  Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
-- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
-  one.
-
-## 9. Questions
-
-Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
-
-- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
-- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
-  and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
-  Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
-  grants it to coder.
-- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
-  instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
-- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
-  row.
-
-Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
-
-- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account. Settled by Q185 (7a).
-- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3). Settled by Q190 (7a).
-
-## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
-
-- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
-  model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
-- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
-- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
-
-## 11. Tests and mutants
-
-All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
-127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
-
-- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
-  path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
-  status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
-- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
-  `action.refused`.
-- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
-  only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
-  the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
-  happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
-  exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
-  no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
-  spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
-  `decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
-  the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
-  and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
-  refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
-  fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
-  and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
-  agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
-  upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
-  and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
-  history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
-  neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
-  fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
-  path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
-  a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
-  sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
-  `identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
-- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
-  `changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
-- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
-  Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
-  The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
-- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
-
-Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
-the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
-check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
-ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
-`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
-check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
-oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
-the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
-D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
-check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
-
-## 12. Risks
-
-- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
-  and says what it includes.
-- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
-- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
-  Jason's network to confirm.

agents/quackerjack/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quackerjack
+
+Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
+rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
+section 7 (#414).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
+`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
+another seat's branch.

docs/TOOLS.md

@@ -238,12 +238,6 @@ Exit codes: `0` ok · `2` invalid file or credential reference · `3` system
 config problem · `4` usage or a required file missing. Details:
 `packages/business/README.md`.
 
-`mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete` (row 199) goes to
-`packages/cli` and the bus's human-only credential verbs: an agent's own
-token in `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>`, read on
-stdin, never printed. The tester may run `status` and `revoke`. Details:
-`packages/cli/README.md`.
-
 `instances` and `instance add|set` (row 165) go to `packages/cli` and the
 bus's human-only `instances` and `instances.set` verbs, so they need a live
 bus host and refuse inside an agent session. `instances` prints the revision,

docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Federation build rows R1, R2 and R5 (#414)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's orders mos-1023 item 1, mos-1028 item 2 and mos-1034 item 1. The design is
+Gizmoduck's `agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` at a1daa3c07 on `gizmoduck/federation-design` (r4.9,
+sha256 a31cbebd070f9e3a5ca4ccb158b1747c6f5a83c3469855705b0026a581fb5c6a). Duckworth approved r4.5
+(duckworth-0012), r4.6, r4.7 (duckworth-0020) and r4.8 (duckworth-0021, 8a22d0897 on `duckworth/reviews`),
+and acked r4.9 (duckworth-0024). r4.7 applies Jason's Q181 hosts, r4.8 adds N22's R8 checks and r4.9 names who
+runs them. None of them changes R1, R2 or R5. Section 7's table
+sets each row's scope and test gate. Vikunja P19 #414. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches
+(mos-0981).
+
+The other R rows are filed when their parents have candidates: R3 after R1 and row 196, R4 after R3, R5 and
+row 193's viewer level (193a, mos-1019), R6 after #412 phase 1, R1, R2 and R3, R7 after R1-R6 and row 190.
+R8 is a live window, not a code row. Its brief is the last section here.
+
+## Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator
+
+Owner Gizmoduck, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. No parent.
+
+`packages/business/src/access.mjs`: the access.json loader and validator from DESIGN.md section 3.5, and the
+pure `covers`. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks. The
+exported interface is what R5 and row 193a build against, so the manifest names it, and any change to it in
+review goes to Sage before it lands. Section 7 names `covers` but not the loader and validator exports or
+the context shape. Morgana's 193a (508ee4d61 on `morgana/row193a`) assumes `checkAccess(doc, {providers,
+peers, businesses})`, with `businesses` mapping an id to `{human, instances}`, throwing a `BusinessError` that
+names the key path. Use those names, or tell Morgana and Quackerjack yours before the manifest goes to
+Duckworth. Row 193a later widens the level check to `viewer` on R1's candidate (mos-1019).
+
+Tests, in `packages/business/tests/`: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named. That covers a
+symlink, a non-regular file, another owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, a grant disjoint from the given
+subjects, `human` and `tester` ids, any level other than `collaborator`, and a project entry that isn't a
+UUID. For `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, while an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an
+expired grant doesn't, and a level filter rejects another level. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. Tests
+use scratch roots. Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on R1 (Q177). The build starts now against
+R1's exported interface as the R1 manifest names it, and R5 lands after R1 and rebases onto R1's landing.
+
+`mosaic access list`, `grant` and `revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, a receipt line. The help
+text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order (DESIGN.md section 7, row R5). R4 later makes
+these verbs call `access.reload`, so R5 leaves no other reload path.
+
+Context (sage-1419). `ssoSubjects` is row 192's `console.sso.providers[].subjects` flattened to `{provider,
+sub}` pairs; the design's "`console.sso.subjects`" in 3.5 is shorthand for it. `providers` is the list of
+`providers[].id`, read through `loadSystem` and row 192's `checkConsole`. `peers` is `[]` until R2 lands, so a grant
+naming a peer home refuses. R5 rebases onto row 192's landing as well as R1's.
+
+Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/`: tester and agent callers are refused, a concurrent write refuses on a
+revision conflict, the receipt line is appended, and a bad grant is refused before anything is written. One
+mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. The
+human proof in tests uses the scratch stand-in pattern (a scratch bus verifies its own human-cli path).
+Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192 (#412 phase 1). The build starts when
+row 192 has a candidate, on that candidate.
+
+A `federation` key in `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` with the shape in DESIGN.md section 3. A config with no
+`federation` key still loads as it does today. This changes the config schema, so the manifest lists every
+reader of the key.
+
+Tests, in `scripts/test-config.sh`: a valid key loads, an unknown sub-key and a bad origin refuse, and a
+config without the key loads. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is user-authored and is not touched. Tests use scratch config
+dirs only.
+
+Gate: Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and
+the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54
+
+A live window, not a code row (DESIGN.md section 7, row R8). The brief follows r4.11, b93f098f0 on
+`gizmoduck/federation-design` (sha256 1bcee8df0a3a8628a6646535b756c936ca6d9e7bcfa7e1dd2bf1d3f01715c8e6),
+which Duckworth acked with r4.10 (duckworth-0034). Mos closed design rounds there (mos-1072). Run by Jason and
+Mos. Nothing here authorizes a step on any host; each step waits for the window's go.
+
+What changed since r4.9 (DECISIONS Q182, Q183, mos-1055, mos-1063). R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts
+with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. The privilege and host
+checks still run, and each result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and
+don't refuse. The four functional checks named at the end of section 7's R8 row still stop R8 when they fail
+(mos-1066 item 1).
+
+Order (mos-1042 item 2). R8 runs after the Case 2 install on .54 (#416, due by 2026-10-27, Jason's latest-by
+date in Q176, mos-1069), after Bean and Chet are live in Case 2, and after both Hermes gateways on 10.1.1.54
+have stopped. Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The risk, stated for 10-27: federation between the two
+instances depends on Melanie's switch-over date.
+
+Entry checks, all before anything starts:
+- R7, #412 phase 2 and Jason's #419 answer, as section 7 lists.
+- The four hub user checks on 10.1.1.54 (N22, mos-1035 item 1): `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id
+  mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under
+  `/etc/sudoers.d` names `mosaic`. An agent or Jason runs them as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes
+  into the R8 record with who ran them.
+- The factory privilege checks, the key fingerprint comparison and the section 8 privilege path table, each
+  as section 7's R8 row states them.
+
+Build notes:
+- N1 (Duckworth, duckworth-0034, mos-1072). A check that fails on a path Jason didn't name in Q182 or Q183 is
+  marked "not named in Q182 or Q183" in the record, not filed under the acceptance. Examples: a factory mount
+  of hub data, another agent on .54, a provider admin token. Mos takes each one to Jason.
+- N2 (Duckworth, doc-only). The Q183 and Q4 quotes in section 8 are excerpts. When the R8 record quotes them,
+  it marks each omission with "…" and checks the full text at DECISIONS.md:1535-1541 in jason-master-restart
+  (read only).
+
+Done when every entry check has its output recorded, Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie
+revokes, and his next request is refused.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_force-push-guard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's order mos-1078 (Vikunja P19 #426) and its go mos-1083 item 1. Owner Rocko,
+reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. Starts after row 191.
+
+## Why
+
+Morgana force-pushed a seat branch on 2026-10-20 (morgana-0016). Mos took it to Jason. Force-push is a
+Q173 exclusion, and canon says never force-push, but nothing mechanical stops one. Mos: "Done means a
+force-push from a seat worktree is refused, with a test that shows it."
+
+Earlier the same day, a busy check chained as `| tail -1 &&` passed while the slot was BUSY. The script it
+called prints BUSY or CLEAR, but it exits 0 either way.
+
+The guard has two layers:
+- (a) Gitea protection with force-push off on seat branch patterns and on refactor, next and main. ops-01
+  sets it up, through Mos (mos-1082). That part isn't this row.
+- (b) The client hook below. It can be bypassed with `--no-verify`, so (a) is the real guard and (b) is the
+  early refusal.
+
+## What ships
+
+1. `scripts/git-hooks/pre-push` (new). For each ref line git passes on stdin:
+   - It refuses when the remote sha isn't all zeros and isn't an ancestor of the local sha (`git
+     merge-base --is-ancestor`). The refusal names the ref and both shas, and the hook exits 1.
+   - A new branch passes. A delete (local sha all zeros) is refused.
+   - Any failure of the check refuses too, for example an unknown remote object. The hook fetches nothing.
+     If the remote tip isn't present locally, it refuses and says to fetch first.
+2. Install, following `scripts/queue-commit.sh --install-hook`. Either add a `--install-push-hook` there or
+   ship a small `scripts/install-git-hooks.sh`, whichever fits the existing code better. Say which in BUILD.md.
+   - The install copies the hook into the common `.git/hooks`, which every seat worktree shares.
+   - It refuses when `core.hooksPath` is set (the husky trap, 2026-10-09). It refuses when an installed
+     pre-push differs from the repository copy, unless `--force-install` is given.
+   - It never edits the installed copy in place.
+3. `scripts/slot-busy.sh` (new), the shared busy check.
+   - It prints one BUSY line per matching process, or CLEAR.
+   - It exits 0 on CLEAR, 1 on BUSY and 2 on its own error.
+   - It matches `node --test`, `gate.sh`, `mutant`, `scripts/test-*.sh` and `docker compose` command lines.
+     It skips its own process and shell snapshots.
+   - It reads `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and the cwd link only, never file contents under another seat's
+     directory.
+   - Usage in `docs/TOOLS.md`: `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh > LOG && gate`, with `set -o pipefail` in any
+     script that pipes it. Never `| tail -1 &&`.
+
+## Tests
+
+Add them to `scripts/test-land-work.sh` or a new `scripts/test-git-guard.sh` (say which). Run against a scratch
+bare remote and a scratch clone with a worktree, never against origin:
+- A rewritten branch pushed with `--force` from a worktree is refused, and the remote ref is unchanged.
+- A `+refspec` push is refused.
+- A fast-forward push passes.
+- A new branch passes.
+- A delete is refused.
+- A remote tip that's missing locally is refused.
+- The install refuses with `core.hooksPath` set, and refuses a differing installed hook.
+- `slot-busy.sh` exits 1 with a fake `node --test` process running (a sleeping stand-in with that argv),
+  and 0 without one.
+- `slot-busy.sh | tail -1 && false` doesn't apply here. The test runs `bash scripts/slot-busy.sh >/dev/null
+  && echo ran`, and asserts it doesn't print `ran` while BUSY.
+
+Mutants, each killed:
+- drop the ancestor check
+- treat an unknown remote object as passing
+- let a delete pass
+- install over a set `core.hooksPath`
+- `slot-busy.sh` exits 0 on BUSY
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Install the hook in the canonical checkout only after landing, as its own step with Sage. Tests use
+  scratch repositories.
+- No push to origin from a test. No change to Gitea config. That's ops-01's.
+- Don't touch `~/.mosaic`, `~/.mosaic-dev` or `~/.config/mosaic-dev`.
+
+## Gate
+
+Dewey approves the manifest. The new or changed `scripts/test-*.sh` file and every other `scripts/test-*.sh`
+are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. Done when the hook is installed in the canonical
+checkout and a scripted force-push from a seat worktree to a scratch remote is refused there. ops-01's
+server proof (a refused force-push, plus a fast-forward push and a new branch that go through) is recorded
+in Vikunja #426 by Mos.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Jason's rulings Q183 and Q184 relayed by Mos (mos-1056 item 3, mos-1067). Gitea #1707, Vikunja P19
+#424, due 2026-10-27 (Q184: "Q5: by 10.27"). Owner Gizmoduck (design and build), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
+Sage. Chained on row 199's candidate (Q177): row 199 design r6 (4d3007ec9 on `megavolt/row199`, approved in
+duckworth-0027) is not reopened. This row lands after 199 and rebases onto its landing.
+
+## What Jason asked for
+
+Q183, through Mos: "I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works as some sort of variable for
+the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to keep the agents sandboxed with proper
+security... If we can utilize the credential store in Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with
+NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a happy man." Q183 also says not every agent needs that access.
+
+Mos's requirements (mos-1067 item 1):
+- An agent asks for a host credential by name.
+- The stack checks a grant for that agent and that host, and does the ssh and sudo for it.
+- The agent never sees the key or any secret value.
+- Only agents with a grant can do it.
+
+The PRD text is REQ-CRED-3, drafted by Honker for PRD 1.7 (sage-1422). If it misses 1.7 it goes into 1.8, and
+this row lands only after the version that holds it is approved.
+
+## What row 199 gives and what it doesn't (megavolt-0019)
+
+It builds on 199 as 199 stands: the store layout under `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/`, the
+lifecycle verbs and their `changes.jsonl` receipts, `useFor(session, service, fn)` with the D5 allowlist test,
+`assertClean` on every result, and the grant shape of `publish` (a list on the role entry, checked by the
+broker, plus a hard-wait action that isn't routed).
+
+This row's own changes:
+- A host kind in the closed kind set (vocabulary.mjs `SERVICES`, credentials.mjs, the broker's service check,
+  the CLI date flag, the remove regex), with a naming rule for one credential per host or per agent.
+- A per-kind value check. An OpenSSH private key fails today's `TOKEN` pattern.
+- Handing the key to ssh without the agent seeing it: an ssh-agent on a private socket, or a 0600 temp file
+  removed on every path, the way publish's one-shot helper works.
+- Pinned host keys per host, and no trust on first use.
+- The command boundary: what an agent may run under sudo, and how output returns without echoing the secret.
+  This is the main design work.
+- The executor: a ticket and a host op running in the bus child, the same split row 199 uses for publish
+  (Megavolt's deviation in 199's BUILD.md).
+
+## Steps
+
+1. DESIGN.md first, in `agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-ROW/`. It answers each item above, names the grant shape
+   (`roles.<agent>.hosts` and a `host.sudo` action, or a reasoned alternative), says who grants (Jason, through
+   a reviewed role change, unless REQ-CRED-3 says otherwise), and lists tests and mutants. Duckworth approves it
+   before code. Sage reads it too, because it gives agents sudo on hosts.
+2. Build on 199's candidate. Single test files run freely. Suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+3. The live part is not this row. Putting a key in the store and granting a host is a separate window with
+   Jason or Mos, after landing.
+
+## Hosts
+
+The first targets are `localadmin` with NOPASSWD sudo on 10.1.1.53 and 10.1.1.54 (#423 step 1, applied by
+ops-01 at 20:05:47Z), and the servers agents already reach as localadmin (Q172). ops-01 owns the host side.
+Tests use scratch sshd fixtures on 127.0.0.1 or fakes, never a real host.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files, the live units or `~/.mosaic`. No key is
+  read, copied or printed. No ssh to any real host from a test or a seat.
+- No widening of row 199's kinds or regex inside row 199. Both rows touch them, so this row rebases after 199
+  lands.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed (one per refusal, plus one that leaks
+the key into the agent's output and one that skips the host key pin).

docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md

@@ -1,77 +1,66 @@
-# Brief: Melanie's hub instance on its own host (row 195, was 190b)
+# Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195)
 
-Sage, 2026-10-20. Rewritten for Mos's rulings mos-0998 and mos-1005 (Vikunja #418, #419). The first version
-put the hub under its own Linux user on dragon-lin. That form can't pass Duckworth's B7 there, because the
-factory uid's `sudo -n` succeeds on dragon-lin (Mos's recon, brain-redux
-`projects/mosaic-mvp/MELANIE-HOST-RECON.md`). Melanie's own server is ruled out too: it has 1.2 GiB RAM free
-with her two Hermes bots running, and co-tenancy would share her user and her passwordless sudo. The hub runs
-on a separate host. Which host is Jason's decision (#419): hardware outside the cluster, a cluster VM with
-factory PVE root removed, or a cluster VM with that residual accepted. This row is written so the host choice
-doesn't change it. Gitea #1693. On the 10-27 MVP path. Federation R8 (Gizmoduck's design r4, 04a6112be) needs
-this row or nothing.
+Sage, 2026-10-20, third version, for Darkwing's rewrite request and sage-1439. Gitea #1693.
 
-Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5 and B7), gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190
-(Q177): the hub runs under row 190's config canon. Design first. The first deliverable is
-`agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
+Why it changed:
+- The first two versions put Melanie's hub on its own Linux user, then on its own host, Jason's choice under
+  #419.
+- Q181 settled the hosts: Case 1 (Jason's software factory) runs on 10.1.1.53 and Case 2 (Melanie's hub) on
+  10.1.1.54.
+- Q182 and Q183 made the hub's privilege checks a recorded acceptance. They report and don't refuse
+  (federation R8, mos-1055, mos-1063, mos-1066).
+- The Case 2 install on .54 is Gosalyn's C2-13 plus its window (#416, due by 2026-10-27). It is not this row.
+
+This row now installs Case 1 on .53. On the 10-27 MVP path (mos-0974, T1 item 1).
+
+Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190's candidate (the config
+canon) and on C2-13's candidate (the install script), Q177. It reuses C2-13's `case2-install.sh`,
+`case2-precheck.sh` and `case2-unit.sh` by input, not by copy. A gap in them goes to Gosalyn as a C2-13
+change, or into this row's manifest as a named, reviewed change to those files. Design first:
+`agents/darkwing/work/queue-195/DESIGN.md`.
 
 ## Goal
 
-Melanie's hub instance (Case 2, C2-13) runs on its own host. No factory agent can read or write the hub's
-config, data root or secrets, reach its bus socket, or log in to the hub host. Her writing reaches the hub only
-through the existing git.mosaicstack.dev remotes, books repo only.
+Jason's software factory runs on 10.1.1.53 as `mosaic` under `/srv/mosaic`, in the same unit form as Case 2
+(design 9, Q181). It uses row 190's config canon and the model account the factory uses today (Q185,
+mos-1081 item 1). No new provider account.
 
-## Provision (blank until Jason answers #419)
+## Provision
 
-Who provisions the host and how is left open. Sizing from Mos (mos-0998): 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 64 GB disk,
-internal network only. Each agent process measures 300 to 390 MB RSS on dragon-lin. The design takes the host
-as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying seat while the row runs.
+- ops-01 runs the root steps over ssh as `localadmin`: `useradd mosaic`, `/srv/mosaic` and the unit through
+  `case2-unit.sh` from a root-owned checkout. #423 step 1 (localadmin with NOPASSWD sudo on .53 and .54) was
+  applied at 20:05:47Z (mos-1066, mos-1077), and nothing else in #423 gates this row.
+- #423 step 4 (jarvis sudo) waits until Case 1 is live on .53.
+- The host list comes from Q181. Agents may run read-only checks on .53 as `localadmin`.
 
 ## The design must state
 
-1. The deploy. Exactly what Darkwing installs on the hub host and how: the stack copy, node, the units, the
-   config dir and data root under row 190's canon (O1: `~/.config/mosaic-NAME`, and "`~` is the home of the OS
-   user that runs the instance"). Which commands run as which user on the hub host, and which need its root.
-2. Re-pin, rollback and backup on the hub host, and who runs them after the deploy key is gone.
-3. How the hub gets model access without a copy of jwoltje's `claude-session.env` or any factory credential.
-   If that needs the credentials row (T1 item 6), say so and name the interim. If it needs a new subscription
-   or a new provider account, flag it for Jason and don't pick one (mos-1008).
-4. The books repo path. Which git.mosaicstack.dev remote, which credential the hub holds for it, and that it
-   can't read or push any other repository.
-5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
-   admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
-   holds it.
-6. The acceptance script, as code Duckworth can read. It takes Gizmoduck's list of infrastructure gate items
-   as its input (mos-1011), not a fixed set of checks. Each item names a path, its closed form and its
-   accepted form, and the script reports which form holds for each, or fails. The list covers at least:
-   - federation R8's separate-host form: the hub's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the
-     factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the hub's, and no factory agent holds a login or key
-     for the hub host
-   - B7: from the factory uid, `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub
-     host all fail
-   - the hypervisor and backup paths ops-01 measured (mos-1011: one PVE node the factory key has root on,
-     PBS on that node with unencrypted backups, a flat /16 LAN), each closed or accepted by Jason
-7. The identity provider and TLS front end (B8, mos-1008, mos-1011). Either the factory holds no credential
-   that can create users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub
-   uses an issuer the factory can't administer. A brand, tenant or app inside the same Authentik does not
-   count as separate. The same holds for the TLS front end that serves the hub. The proof is a failed admin
-   call from every token the factory's root can read. No credential value is printed in that proof.
+1. The install as input values to C2-13's scripts: user, home, business file, roles, the human id, the
+   token slot path. Which commands run as `mosaic` through `sudo -u mosaic -H`, and which as root through
+   ops-01.
+2. Where Case 1 differs from Case 2: the factory roles in place of the library business, no library sync,
+   and any precheck item that doesn't apply, each with a reason.
+3. Model access through the existing factory account (Q185). Placing the credential on .53 is a step under
+   the Q173 secrets rule, done in the window. It is never copied by the script, and its value is never
+   printed.
+4. Re-pin, rollback and backup on .53, and who runs them.
+5. The acceptance checks, as code Duckworth can read. Each check names a path and gives it one of three
+   marks: closed, accepted under Q182 or Q183, or "not named in Q182 or Q183". An accepted path doesn't
+   fail the row. An unnamed one is reported to Mos, who takes it to Jason (the R8 N1 rule). The functional
+   checks fail the row when they fail: the unit runs as `mosaic`, the Console answers on its port on the
+   internal network only, and one tester message gets a reply.
 
 ## Boundaries
 
-- Provisioning, hypervisor access and any infra or k3s change are Jason's (Q173 exclusions). Mos takes the
-  hypervisor residual (factory root on the PVE nodes, Q172) to Jason. It doesn't block this row.
-- Melanie's server (`[email protected]`) is reference only, read only, under Jason's authorization in
-  mos-0995. Nothing on it changes, and her Hermes bots keep running.
-- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
-- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
-  the acceptance script proves it.
-- The admin-call proof in point 7 and any call to the issuer or the TLS front end run only in a window Mos
-  approves, never as a test or an anonymous probe (Q175).
-- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
-  host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.
+- Infra and k3s changes, exposure outside the internal network, and spend stay Jason's (Q173 exclusions).
+- No change to dragon-lin's `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, its live units or `~/.mosaic`.
+- No credential value is printed, logged or committed.
+- Tests use scratch roots and stand-ins. Nothing in a test reaches .53.
+- The run on .53 is a window with Jason's or Mos's go, a backup first where state exists, and a STATE report
+  after.
 
 ## Gate
 
 Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
-every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the acceptance script passes
-on the hub host from the factory uid, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.
+every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the window's acceptance
+run passes on .53, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Row 193 build rows: 193a, 193b1, 193b2, 193c and 193d (#1691)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's go mos-1034 item 4. Row 193's design is Morgana's
+`agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md` at e2d161e2e on `morgana/row193` (r5, sha256
+dd7fcb419ed8510e9d8d74b569183386d0942af8b68eecc0bbb5e182e677b523), approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0018).
+Section 8 lists the tests and mutants, and section 9 the split. The brief behind them is
+`docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md`. Vikunja P19 #414/#415, Gitea #1691.
+
+Owner Morgana for every row, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Each row chains on its parent's candidate
+(Q177) and rebases onto the parent's landing. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches (mos-0981).
+Single test files run freely, and suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+
+Boundaries for every row: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, any
+live access.json or `~/.mosaic`. No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+No user thread goes live before 193b1's message filter has landed (mos-1021 B2, FED R8).
+
+The owner-visible records are fixed by Mos (mos-1023 item 2) and named in one user sentence, which FED R6
+reuses word for word: "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks
+and project files, but not your messages."
+
+## Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer
+
+Chained on FED R1. Started early on `morgana/row193a` (508ee4d61) against R1's interface as the FED brief
+names it, with Sage's go (sage-1373). R1's level check accepts `viewer` and still refuses any other new
+level. Tests in `packages/business/tests/` (section 8, Business), with the four mutants in Morgana's
+BUILD.md. FED R4 chains on this row.
+
+Duckworth's N1 on R1 (duckworth-0033, sage-1417): with viewer added, `covers` called with no level would let a
+viewer grant cover a collaborator ask. This row makes `level` required in `covers`, with a test and a mutant that
+makes it optional again. R3 and R4 call `covers` with a level.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
+
+Chained on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. The bus gets the viewer verb list, per-grant level
+checks, board reads refused to users, and the section 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter with `#readable`
+owner-only. No schema change. The governance pin test names each item in the user sentence above. Bus tests
+and mutants 1, 3, 6, 10, 11 and 12 from section 8.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j)
+
+Chained on 193b1. `thread_shares`, the share verbs, the share rules of `#readable` and `#threadRead`, and the
+section 5.5 share filters. Schema 3i to 3j. The table is append-only, and row 181's restore guard and
+`COUNTED` include it. Bus tests for shares and the migration, and mutants 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 from section 8.
+Going live needs a `--migrate` window with Jason. Sage takes it to Mos when this row is near.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite, the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
+Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer
+
+Chained on FED R5. `mosaic access user add/remove` and `grant --level viewer`, only where R5 lacks them. They
+refuse tester and agent callers, write a receipt line and call `access.reload` (section 8, CLI). If R5
+already has all of them, this row records that and closes with no code.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only
+
+Chained on FED R6, row 192 and 193b2 (for share controls). A viewer has no composer or share control, and
+with each UI check removed the bus still refuses (section 8, Webui).
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The webui suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.

docs/plans/QUEUE.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->
 
-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2361 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
 
 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -225,9 +225,29 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 2247 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 186 | stack-release --plan: the backup line says what the run will do (P19 404, row 185 N1/N2) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1684 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the three brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_plan-backup-line.md` § Brief: the activate plan's backup line says what the run will do | Landed 269134d8d (author Darkwing) on 3c5da3a91. Patch-id c97b9f6e25cd matches the r1 candidate (manifest 449e9121, Filbert approve 29419). Sage gate on b367f5730+patch 09:00:20Z-09:08:59Z: node 2681/0, scripts 422/0, queue 156, network removed; 3c5da3a91 adds only a SESSIONS line. Not live: the stack runs copy 490e2771d3d0. Follow-ups on P19 404: Filbert M6 gap, store-unclean reading. |
 | 187 | stack-release activate carries the row 178 proof pair (mos-0928 Part B A0) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1685 | done | 186 done | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-proof-pair.md` § Brief: activate carries the row 178 proof pair | Landed 9a71e4e80 (author Darkwing) on d17328a55; patch-id 6b57c47bc661 matches candidate 52a5ecc1d143 and Filbert's r1 reading. Sage gate passed 10:21:55Z: cli 446/446 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29424, rev 2204; follow-ups N1-N4 filed on P19. |
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
-| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | in-review, round 1, request posted | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | — |
-| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
+| 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | done | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | Landed ace27dc5e on refactor (cherry-pick of candidate d6116771f onto a4a42dbac). Gate GATE_PASSED on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z-19:20:36Z, 25 suites rc=0. patch-id ce89378718f6 for both 0c177e9ef and ace27dc5e; range-diff differs only in the message. Landed manifest hashes to 67af69bd (Dewey approve 29485). Base drift 0217b71c8..a4a42dbac: 7 doc/README files, none on manifest paths, no test reads them. Brief re-pinned to blob 29a9e6d2d. |
+| 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | — |
 | 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
+| 192 | Q175 phase 1: the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso), OIDC RP with oauth4webapi 3.8.8, no live change (MVP T1.2, #412) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1690 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest; webui and cli suites, scripts/test-config.sh and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; design section 9 mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md` § Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso) | — |
+| 193 | many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads, one access.json store (MVP T1.3, Vikunja #414/#415) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1691 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, business, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md` § Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads | — |
+| 194 | agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) with a per-agent hire/fire veto (MVP T1.5, Vikunja #414/#415) | honker; reviewers webby | #1692 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, cli, business and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto | — |
+| 195 | row 195: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 as mosaic under /srv/mosaic, reusing C2-13's scripts by input under row 190's canon (Q181, Q182/Q183, Q185; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1) | darkwing; reviewers duckworth | #1693 | briefed | 190 done | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md` § Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195) | sage-1439: rewritten to Case 1 on .53 (f24f2cd40). Chains on C2-13's candidate too once C2-13 is queued. Darkwing starts DESIGN.md after row 190's mutants. |
+| 196 | the human boundary across uids and humans: Console, tester listener, broker.sock and the path-bound human proof (P19 333, before federation R3, mos-0989) | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1694 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md` § Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333) | — |
+| 197 | a second gate lane: two full gates at once on dragon-lin, design first (mos-0977 item 6) | herb; reviewers webby | #1695 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate, singly and in the two-lane proof (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md` § Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin | Order with row 198 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. After B1 the shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review. |
+| 198 | retire the control board writer on 7331 (unauthenticated loopback writer, Q175; mos-1008) | bushroot; reviewers webby | #1696 | in-progress | 192 done, 197 done | Webby approves INVENTORY.md then the manifest; control-board, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_retire-control-board.md` § Brief: retire the control board writer on 7331 | Order with row 197 (Sage, mos-1040 N1): 197 lands first. Row 198 rebases onto 197's landing before its manifest review; shared tests are packages/webui/tests/serve.test.mjs:100 and preview.test.mjs:208. |
+| 199 | MVP T1 item 6: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote (G11, G13; mos-0974) | megavolt; reviewers duckworth | #1697 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md; Mos rules on the authority model; Duckworth approves the manifest; bus, business, cli and tasks suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote | — |
+| 200 | stack-release.sh activate --sso for the Q175 phase 2 window (row 192 F3; chained on 192) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1698 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md` § Brief: stack-release.sh activates a Console with --sso (Q175 phase 2 prerequisite) | — |
+| 201 | FED R1: access.json loader and validator, and covers (#414) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1699 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator | — |
+| 202 | FED R5: mosaic access list, grant and revoke (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers duckworth | #1700 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
+| 203 | FED R2: the federation key in the system config (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers webby | #1701 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config | Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): starts on 192's candidate, lands after 192 (Sage) |
+| 204 | 193a: access level check widened to viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1702 | in-review, round 1, request posted | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
+| 205 | 193b1: viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter (#1691; also after FED R3 and R4 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1703 | queued | 196 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter | — |
+| 206 | 193b2: thread shares, schema 3j (#1691; live needs a --migrate window with Jason) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1704 | queued | 205 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite, cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j) | — |
+| 207 | 193c: mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1705 | queued | 202 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer | — |
+| 208 | 193d: Console shared list, share controls and viewer read-only (#1691; also after FED R6 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1706 | queued | 192 done, 206 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; webui suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only | — |
+| 209 | FED R8: the hub window on 10.1.1.54, a recorded acceptance (#414, r4.11 b93f098f0; live window run by Jason and Mos, after the Case 2 install #416, Bean and Chet live and both Hermes gateways stopped) | sage; reviewers duckworth | — | queued | — | Every entry check's output is in the R8 record with who ran it; Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie revokes, his next request is refused; Duckworth checks the record (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54 | Stays queued until its entry gates near: Case 2 install on .54 (#416, by 2026-10-27), Bean and Chet live, both Hermes gateways on .54 stopped, R7, #412 phase 2, #419 answer. Filed per mos-1073 after duckworth-0034 (Sage) |
+| 210 | Agent host access with sudo through the credential store: grant per agent and host, the stack does ssh and sudo, the agent never sees the key (#1707, Vikunja #424, Q183/Q184, due 10-27; chained on row 199's candidate) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1707 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest; bus, business, cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` § Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424) | Design runs before 199 lands (Q177 chain on 199's candidate). after cleared so Gizmoduck can claim; lands only after 199 and rebases onto it. |
+| 211 | Force-push guard: scripts/git-hooks/pre-push refuses non-fast-forward and delete pushes from every worktree, and scripts/slot-busy.sh exits 1 on BUSY (#1709, Vikunja #426, mos-1078/1083) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1709 | briefed | — | Dewey approves the manifest; the new or changed scripts/test-*.sh and every other scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed; hook installed in the canonical checkout with a scripted refused force-push (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_force-push-guard.md` § Brief: a pre-push hook that refuses force-pushes, and a busy check that fails on BUSY (#426) | — |
 
 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->
 

packages/bus/README.md

@@ -215,13 +215,6 @@ an operator inspect content and delivery evidence after an uncertain result.
 | `trail` | `{subject}`: task ref, decision UUID or message UUID. Linked records in broker write order. |
 | `decisions` | `{list}`: `roles` or `recent`; human and reader sessions only. Open decisions routed to a role, or the last 50 closed. |
 | `credentials` | No args; human and reader sessions only. `[{service,account,role,dateKind,date,state}]` for the capability's business, never a token, file path or variable name. |
-| `credentials.issue` | `{agent,service,token,date}`; human only (row 199, #1697). Writes the token to `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>` (0600, dirs 0700: tmp, fsync, rename), rewrites the agent's reference in the business file to `{"store":true,<rotateBy or expires>:date}`, then holds the token in memory, with no restart. Over an issued entry it is a rotate: the old value is gone from disk and memory when it returns. `service` is `gitea` or `vikunja` and the business file must already name it for the agent (`credential-unknown`). A token the bus already holds is `credential-leak`; a bad token `credential-format`; a bad date `credential-date`. Returns `{agent,verb,service,date,state}`, `verb` `issue` or `rotate`. The tester gets `tester-refused`. |
-| `credentials.revoke` | `{agent,service?,reason}`; human, or the tester (Q173). Drops the entry from memory, then unlinks a store file; a `file` or `env` reference keeps its file and becomes `store`, so a restart loads nothing. Without `service`, every kind the agent has. Returns `{agent,verb,services:[{service,state}]}`. |
-| `credentials.delete` | `{agent,reason}`; human only. `credentials.revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's store dir; a file there other than a token is `credential-file`. While the agent or one of its threads holds a claim, `agent-running`. |
-
-Each of the three leaves one receipt in the organization's `changes.jsonl`: the actor and a
-`detail` of `{verb,agent,kind,date or reason}`, never a value. A change to the store alone writes
-a receipt with empty `changes`. A refusal is `action.refused` with its code alone.
 | `requirements` | No args; role sessions only, as `task.create` is (row 90, #1584). The approved PRD's requirement ids, `{prd,version,requirements:[{id,title}]}`, from `packages/tasks/requirements.json`, loaded when the broker starts; a bad file refuses the start. A human session refuses `agent-required`, a reader `read-only`. |
 | `state` | No args; role, human and reader sessions (row 109, #1603). `{launch:{state,at,event},tasks:{open:[{task_ref,title}],total,cap}}` for the capability's business. `launch` is the latest `launch.revoked` or `launch.restored` event: `allowed` with `at` and `event` null when none exists. `open` is the tracker snapshot's open tasks in `task_ref` order, at most `cap` (the `tasks` page size, 50); `total` counts every open task. The harness runner reads it before each turn. Writes nothing. |
 | `replies` | `{id}`: a message UUID; human and reader sessions only. The messages whose `in_reply_to` is that id, oldest first, at most 50. Writes nothing. |

packages/bus/src/broker.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { NAME as HARNESS_NAME } from '../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs';
 import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';
 import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';
-import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
+import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
 
 // Kept closed while S1 lands; its vocabulary is the integration authority.
 export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   'git.push.working',
   'git.push.protected',
   'git.merge.protected',
-  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): publish to the agent's fork. Not in ROUTED, so a hard wait.
-  'git.push.remote',
   'review.request',
   'review.verdict',
   'record.write',
@@ -103,11 +101,6 @@ export const TESTER_VERBS = Object.freeze(['message.send', 'message.receive', 'm
 // Row 175: the organization verbs a tester may call. Its writes run every check the human's do
 // and log actor `tester`; row 176 adds routes reads; limits.set, organization.set and organization.revision refuse it.
 export const TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS = Object.freeze(['limits', 'plugins', 'instances', 'plugins.set', 'instances.set', 'routes.set', 'routes']);
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): the credential lifecycle, human-only. Under Q173 the tester may
-// revoke; issue (rotate is an issue over an issued entry) and delete refuse it, because a token it
-// issued would pass through its session (duckworth N1). The status read stays the `credentials` verb.
-export const CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.issue', 'credentials.revoke', 'credentials.delete']);
-const TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.revoke']);
 const SELF_KINDS = new Set(['task.created', 'task.assigned', 'task.state', 'task.closed', 'task.conflict']);
 const POLL_KINDS = new Set([
   'task.changed.external',
@@ -198,13 +191,10 @@ export class Broker {
   #received = new Set();
   // Row 137 (#1631): landings checkLand let start, by ticket, until recordLand or landRefused ends them.
   #landings = new Map();
-  // Row 199: a publish between checkPublish and recordPublish or publishRefused.
-  #publishes = new Map();
   #secretCheck;
   #credentialStatus;
   #requirements;
   #organization;
-  #credentialVerbs;
   #project;
   #usage;
   #limits;
@@ -213,15 +203,13 @@ export class Broker {
   #stops = new Map();
   #clock = 0;
   // credentialStatus is the runtime's metadata-only Credentials.status(); the broker never gets use().
-  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null }) {
+  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null }) {
     if (!object(businesses) || !Object.keys(businesses).length) fail('invalid-business');
     this.#businesses = structuredClone(businesses);
     this.#store = store;
     this.#secretCheck = secretCheck;
     this.#credentialStatus = credentialStatus;
     this.#organization = organization;
-    // Row 199: the runtime's credential lifecycle (credential-verbs.mjs); it holds the store, not the broker.
-    this.#credentialVerbs = credentialVerbs;
     this.#project = project;
     this.#usage = usage;
     this.#limits = limits;
@@ -807,12 +795,7 @@ export class Broker {
     // records `?? null` and the current holder reads undefined.
     if (action === 'role.revoke' && (context.holderRun ?? null) !== (this.#holder(s.business, target)?.holder_run ?? null))
       fail('decision-mismatch');
-    // Row 199 (r4 B4): approve at A, push B, publish refuses.
-    if (action === 'git.push.remote' && (context.pushCommit ?? null) !== (this.#latestPush(s.business, target)?.commit ?? null))
-      fail('decision-mismatch');
-    return action === 'git.push.remote'
-      ? { class: cls, decision: d.id, pushCommit: context.pushCommit ?? null }
-      : { class: cls, decision: d.id };
+    return { class: cls, decision: d.id };
   }
   // The raise's context: its target and approval option, from the decision.raise action.allowed.
   #raised(business, decision) {
@@ -875,14 +858,13 @@ export class Broker {
     if (body.commit !== push.commit) fail('verdict-stale');
   }
   // A push is the action.allowed recordPush wrote, the only one for git.push.working with a commit.
-  // role is the role that pushed (row 199, work-not-yours).
   #latestPush(business, task) {
     const r = this.#store.get(
-      "SELECT body, actor_role FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
+      "SELECT body FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
       business,
       task,
     );
-    return r ? { ...JSON.parse(r.body), role: r.actor_role } : null;
+    return r ? JSON.parse(r.body) : null;
   }
   // Row 93: the bus host's git socket asks before it takes a push's bytes. Nothing is recorded
   // unless it refuses: the push is recorded, and its authority consumed, once the ref moved.
@@ -1016,98 +998,6 @@ export class Broker {
     this.#landings.delete(ticket);
     return code;
   }
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3, D9b): the bus host's git socket publishes a task's
-  // recorded work commit to the agent's own fork. checkPublish runs before anything touches the
-  // network. The run holds its claim; git.push.remote is a hard wait, so it cites a decision the
-  // human resolved for this task, bound to the task's latest push (#authorityFor). The project must
-  // be in the agent's publish grant with an upstream; the fork is built from that upstream and the
-  // agent's own Gitea user, never from the request. The ticket carries the session and decision to
-  // recordPublish or publishRefused. No token is in the result.
-  checkPublish(cap, args) {
-    const s = this.#session(cap);
-    return this.#store.transaction(() => {
-      keys(args, ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch', 'decision'], ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch']);
-      if (!taskRef(args.task_ref) || (args.decision !== undefined && !id(args.decision))) fail('invalid-request');
-      identifier(args.project);
-      string(args.branch, 200);
-      this.#agent(s);
-      const { task_ref, project, branch } = args;
-      const decision = args.decision ?? null;
-      const result = this.#checkAuthority(s, 'git.push.remote', { decision, target: task_ref });
-      const facts = this.#publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result);
-      const ticket = randomUUID();
-      const dst = `refs/heads/${facts.user}/${branch}`;
-      this.#publishes.set(ticket, { s, task_ref, project, decision, dst, ...facts });
-      return { ticket, task_ref, project, fork: facts.fork, user: facts.user, email: facts.email, source: facts.source, dst };
-    });
-  }
-  // Steps 2 and 3, checked again at recordPublish. After routing a within-role publish has no
-  // decision, so the commit is the latest push's (N9); the git socket still checks the work ref tip.
-  #publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result) {
-    if (result.decision && this.#spent(s.business, result.decision)) fail('decision-consumed');
-    const b = this.#business(s.business);
-    const role = b.roles?.[s.role];
-    const upstream = b.projects?.[project]?.remote;
-    if (!role?.identity || !(role.publish ?? []).includes(project) || !upstream) fail('remote-not-granted');
-    const problem = forkProblem(upstream, role.identity);
-    if (problem) fail(problem);
-    const push = this.#latestPush(s.business, task_ref);
-    if (!push) fail('no-push');
-    if (push.role !== s.role) fail('work-not-yours');
-    if (push.project !== project) fail('work-ref');
-    const source = result.pushCommit ?? push.commit;
-    if (source !== push.commit) fail('decision-mismatch');
-    const user = role.identity.gitea.user;
-    return { fork: forkUrl(upstream, user), user, email: role.identity.email, source };
-  }
-  #publish(ticket) {
-    return (typeof ticket === 'string' && this.#publishes.get(ticket)) || fail('publish-unknown');
-  }
-  // Design D5: the only key the git socket's gitea token use gets is the agent checkPublish checked
-  // (#agent: a run holding its claim, never a tester, reader or human). Trusted host only.
-  publishSession(ticket) {
-    const { s } = this.#publish(ticket);
-    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, role: s.role });
-  }
-  // Where the bus process's git sends the push (D9 step 5): all from the ticket, none from the
-  // host's message. Trusted host only.
-  publishTarget(ticket) {
-    const { s, project, fork, user, source, dst } = this.#publish(ticket);
-    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, project, fork, user, source, dst });
-  }
-  // Step 6: records the push the git socket made as the action.allowed for git.push.remote, which
-  // spends the decision. The checks run again; the run may have ended while git ran, so the holder
-  // check is not repeated (as recordLand). Trusted host only.
-  recordPublish(ticket, pushed) {
-    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
-    const done = this.#store.transaction(() => {
-      keys(pushed, ['ref', 'commit', 'previous'], ['ref', 'commit', 'previous']);
-      if (!oid(pushed.commit) || (pushed.previous !== null && !oid(pushed.previous))) fail('invalid-request');
-      string(pushed.ref, 260);
-      const result = this.#authorityFor(t.s, 'git.push.remote', { decision: t.decision, target: t.task_ref });
-      const facts = this.#publishFacts(t.s, t.task_ref, t.project, result);
-      if (facts.source !== t.source || pushed.commit !== t.source || facts.fork !== t.fork || pushed.ref !== t.dst) fail('ref-moved');
-      const { ref, commit, previous } = pushed;
-      this.#event(
-        t.s,
-        'action.allowed',
-        { project: t.project, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous, action: 'git.push.remote', ...result, target: t.task_ref },
-        t.task_ref,
-      );
-      return { task_ref: t.task_ref, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous };
-    });
-    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
-    return done;
-  }
-  // Ends a publish that didn't push: action.refused with the code on the task's trail. The git
-  // socket answers the run with the same code. Trusted host only.
-  publishRefused(ticket, { code } = {}) {
-    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
-    if (!/^[a-z-]{1,64}$/.test(code ?? '')) fail('invalid-request');
-    this.#store.transaction(() => this.#event(t.s, 'action.refused', { code }, t.task_ref));
-    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
-    return code;
-  }
   // The outcome as a RESULT from the bus, as #notice sends: the runner takes a turn on it and sends
   // no automatic reply. It goes to the role in the thread the decision was raised in.
   #landMessage(s, decision, body) {
@@ -1355,7 +1245,6 @@ export class Broker {
         return this.#requestProject(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
       if (PROJECT_FILE_VERBS.includes(request.verb))
         return this.#requestProjectFile(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
-      if (CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(request.verb)) return this.#requestCredential(s, request.verb, structuredClone(args));
       if (["limits", "limits.set", "organization.set", "organization.revision", "plugins", "plugins.set", "instances", "instances.set", "routes", "routes.set"].includes(request.verb)) {
         // Row 123 (#1617, REQ-COS-1, REQ-LIMIT-1): organization.set is limits.set for a role whose
         // file lists organization.change. It takes the same keys, runs the same write path and
@@ -1427,35 +1316,6 @@ export class Broker {
       throw this.#refused(s, e, request);
     }
   }
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6). The token of an issue comes in args from the human's stdin; the
-  // secret check above has refused one the bus already holds, a refusal records its code alone, and
-  // nothing returned carries it. Outside the store transaction, as the organization branch.
-  #requestCredential(s, verb, a) {
-    if (s.tester ? !TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(verb) : !s.human) fail(s.tester ? 'tester-refused' : 'human-required');
-    if (!this.#credentialVerbs) fail('not-configured');
-    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') keys(a, ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date'], ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date']);
-    else keys(a, verb === 'credentials.revoke' ? ['agent', 'service', 'reason'] : ['agent', 'reason'], ['agent', 'reason']);
-    string(a.agent, 64);
-    if (a.service !== undefined && !['gitea', 'vikunja'].includes(a.service)) fail('invalid-request');
-    if (a.token !== undefined) string(a.token, 16384);
-    if (a.date !== undefined) string(a.date, 10);
-    if (a.reason !== undefined) string(a.reason, 500);
-    if (!Object.hasOwn(this.#business(s.business).roles, a.agent)) fail('credential-unknown');
-    // A running agent keeps its tokens until its runs end: delete waits for every claim to end.
-    if (verb === 'credentials.delete' && (this.#holder(s.business, a.agent)?.op === 'claim' || this.#threadHolders(s.business, a.agent).length))
-      fail('agent-running');
-    let result;
-    try {
-      result = this.#credentialVerbs(s.business, verb, a, s.tester ? 'tester' : s.human);
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e instanceof BusError && e.code.startsWith('credential-')) throw e;
-      if (e.code === 'revision-conflict' || e.code?.startsWith('organization-')) fail(e.code);
-      if (e.name === 'BusinessError') fail('invalid-request');
-      throw new BusError('outcome-unknown');
-    }
-    this.#secretCheck(result);
-    return result;
-  }
   // Only the runner's bound session and delivered message identify a turn; no host path crosses the wire.
   // Row 156 (#1651, sage-0808): a role run's landing turn is a merge decision id instead. Its begin
   // needs the decision held for the run's role; its end needs that begin, since the landing may
@@ -1838,12 +1698,6 @@ export class Broker {
             by,
           );
         }
-        // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 1, r4 B4): a publish decision binds one commit, the task's
-        // latest recorded push now, read here and never taken from the agent. The human sees it.
-        const pushCommit =
-          a.action === 'git.push.remote' ? (this.#latestPush(s.business, a.target)?.commit ?? fail('no-push')) : null;
-        const question = pushCommit ? `${a.question} (commit ${pushCommit})` : a.question;
-        string(question);
         const did = randomUUID();
         this.#store.run(
           'INSERT INTO decisions(id,at,business,project,raised_by_role,raised_by_run,class,action,route_to,question,options,recommendation,task_ref,requirement_ref,blocking,supersedes,spec_path,spec_commit) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',
@@ -1856,7 +1710,7 @@ export class Broker {
           cls,
           a.action,
           route,
-          question,
+          a.question,
           JSON.stringify(a.options),
           a.recommendation,
           a.task_ref ?? null,
@@ -1878,7 +1732,6 @@ export class Broker {
             approvalChoice,
             holderRun:
               a.action === 'role.revoke' ? (this.#holder(s.business, a.target)?.holder_run ?? null) : null,
-            ...(pushCommit ? { pushCommit } : {}),
           },
           a.task_ref ?? (taskRef(a.target) ? a.target : did),
         );

packages/bus/src/credential-verbs.mjs

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete of one agent's credentials, for
-// the broker's human-only verbs. The broker checks the session, the keys and a running claim first.
-// Each verb leaves one receipt in the organization's changes.jsonl: the actor and a detail naming the
-// verb, agent, kinds, date or reason, never a value. Nothing here logs, and a result carries no token.
-const DATE_KEY = Object.freeze({ gitea: 'rotateBy', vikunja: 'expires' });
-const deny = (code) => {
-  throw new BusError(code);
-};
-export function credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer }) {
-  const state = (instance, service) =>
-    credentials.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service)?.state;
-  return (id, verb, args, actor) => {
-    const { agent } = args;
-    const instance = id + '/' + agent;
-    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
-    const current = document.roles?.[agent]?.credentials;
-    if (!current) deny('credential-unknown');
-    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') {
-      const { service, token, date } = args;
-      if (!current[service]) deny('credential-unknown');
-      // rotate is an issue over an entry the bus holds now; the old value is gone when this returns.
-      const kind = ['not-issued', 'revoked', undefined].includes(state(instance, service)) ? 'issue' : 'rotate';
-      const next = structuredClone(document);
-      next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: date };
-      const detail = { verb: kind, agent, kind: [service], date };
-      const status = credentials.issue(instance, service, token, date, () =>
-        writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail }),
-      );
-      return { agent, verb: kind, service, date: status.date, state: status.state };
-    }
-    const services = verb === 'credentials.revoke' && args.service ? [args.service] : Object.keys(current);
-    if (services.some((service) => !current[service])) deny('credential-unknown');
-    // Memory first, then the store file (Credentials.revoke), then the business file. A reference
-    // outside the store becomes `store` with its date, so a restart loads nothing for it. When that
-    // write fails, the entry stays revoked in memory and the refusal says to run the verb again.
-    if (verb === 'credentials.delete') credentials.remove(instance);
-    else for (const service of services) credentials.revoke(instance, service);
-    const detail = { verb: verb.slice('credentials.'.length), agent, kind: services, reason: args.reason };
-    const moved = services.filter((service) => current[service].store !== true);
-    if (moved.length) {
-      const next = structuredClone(document);
-      for (const service of moved)
-        next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: current[service][DATE_KEY[service]] };
-      writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail });
-    } else writer.record(id, { actor, detail });
-    return {
-      agent,
-      verb: detail.verb,
-      services: services.map((service) => ({ service, state: state(instance, service) ?? 'not-issued' })),
-    };
-  };
-}

packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
-import {
-  openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants, mkdirSync, writeSync, fsyncSync,
-  renameSync, unlinkSync, rmdirSync, readdirSync,
-} from 'node:fs';
-import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants } from 'node:fs';
+import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
 const deny = (code) => {
   throw new BusError(code);
@@ -16,33 +13,9 @@ const day = (value) =>
   /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(value) &&
   !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(value)) &&
   new Date(value).toISOString().slice(0, 10) === value;
-const TOKEN = /^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/;
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D4): a store dir is the stack instance's user's own and nobody else's.
-const privateDir = (path, { missing = false } = {}) => {
-  let st;
-  try {
-    st = lstatSync(path);
-  } catch (e) {
-    if (missing && e.code === 'ENOENT') return false;
-    deny('credential-file');
-  }
-  if (!st.isDirectory() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) deny('credential-file');
-  return true;
-};
 export class Credentials {
   #tokens = new Map();
-  // Row 199: every reference the bus loaded, so issue, rotate, revoke and status work per entry.
-  #refs = new Map();
-  #revoked = new Set();
-  #storeRoot;
-  #repoRoots;
-  #dataRoot;
-  // storeRoot is <configDir>/secrets/agents (design D1); a reference with store: true must name the
-  // path under it for its own business, agent and service.
-  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env, storeRoot = null }) {
-    this.#storeRoot = storeRoot;
-    this.#repoRoots = repoRoots;
-    this.#dataRoot = dataRoot;
+  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env }) {
     try {
       for (const [instance, services] of Object.entries(references))
         for (const [service, ref] of Object.entries(services)) {
@@ -53,41 +26,12 @@ export class Credentials {
           if (
             (ref.service !== undefined && ref.service !== service) ||
             Object.keys(ref).some(
-              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', 'store', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
+              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
             ) ||
-            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env) ||
-            (ref.store !== undefined && (ref.store !== true || ref.file !== this.#storePath(instance, service)))
+            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env)
           )
             deny('credential-reference');
-          this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref, date });
-          const token = this.#read(ref, env);
-          if (token !== null) this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
-        }
-    } catch (e) {
-      this.close();
-      throw e;
-    }
-  }
-  #storePath(instance, service) {
-    if (!this.#storeRoot) deny('credential-reference');
-    const [business, agent, ...rest] = instance.split('/');
-    if (!business || !agent || rest.length || agent.startsWith('@')) deny('credential-reference');
-    return join(this.#storeRoot, business, agent, service);
-  }
-  // One token, read and checked, or null for a store reference with no file yet (design D3a).
-  #read(ref, env) {
           let token;
-          if (ref.store) {
-            const agentDir = dirname(ref.file);
-            privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
-            if (!privateDir(dirname(agentDir), { missing: true }) || !privateDir(agentDir, { missing: true })) return null;
-            try {
-              lstatSync(ref.file);
-            } catch (e) {
-              if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null;
-              deny('credential-file');
-            }
-          }
           if (ref.file) {
             if (!isAbsolute(ref.file)) deny('credential-location');
             let resolved, original;
@@ -99,7 +43,7 @@ export class Credentials {
             }
             if (original.isSymbolicLink() || !original.isFile()) deny('credential-file');
             if (
-              [...this.#repoRoots, this.#dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
+              [...repoRoots, dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
                 inside(
                   (() => {
                     try {
@@ -137,98 +81,16 @@ export class Credentials {
             if (!/^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$/.test(ref.env)) deny('credential-reference');
             token = env[ref.env];
           }
-          return Credentials.#format(token);
-  }
-  static #format(token) {
-    if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !TOKEN.test(token)) deny('credential-format');
-    token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
-    if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
-    return token;
-  }
-  #known(instance, service) {
-    const known = this.#refs.get(instance + ':' + service);
-    if (!known) deny('credential-unknown');
-    return known;
-  }
-  // Row 199 (design section 6): write the token to the agent's store path (tmp, fsync, rename), then
-  // `commit` (the business file's reference becomes store), then memory. The token comes from the
-  // caller's stdin and is never logged. Returns the entry's new status.
-  issue(instance, service, token, date, commit = () => {}) {
-    this.#known(instance, service);
-    if (!day(date)) deny('credential-date');
-    token = Credentials.#format(token);
-    const file = this.#storePath(instance, service);
-    const agentDir = dirname(file);
-    mkdirSync(this.#storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
-    for (const dir of [dirname(agentDir), agentDir]) {
-      if (!privateDir(dir, { missing: true })) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
-      privateDir(dir);
-    }
-    const tmp = file + '.tmp';
-    try {
-      unlinkSync(tmp);
+          if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !/^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/.test(token))
+            deny('credential-format');
+          token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
+          if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
+          this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
+        }
     } catch (e) {
-      if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+      this.close();
+      throw e;
     }
-    let fd;
-    try {
-      fd = openSync(tmp, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
-      writeSync(fd, token + '\n');
-      fsyncSync(fd);
-    } finally {
-      if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
-    }
-    renameSync(tmp, file);
-    const dirFd = openSync(agentDir, constants.O_RDONLY);
-    try {
-      fsyncSync(dirFd);
-    } finally {
-      closeSync(dirFd);
-    }
-    commit();
-    this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref: { service, store: true, file, [service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy']: date }, date });
-    this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
-    this.#revoked.delete(instance + ':' + service);
-    return this.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service);
-  }
-  // Memory first, then the store file (design section 6, D12). A file or env reference outside the
-  // store is never unlinked; the caller turns its reference into store, so a restart finds nothing.
-  revoke(instance, service) {
-    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
-    this.#tokens.delete(instance + ':' + service);
-    this.#revoked.add(instance + ':' + service);
-    if (ref.store) {
-      try {
-        unlinkSync(ref.file);
-      } catch (e) {
-        if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
-      }
-    }
-    return { file: Boolean(ref.store) };
-  }
-  // revoke for every service, then the agent's dir. A file other than a token or its tmp refuses.
-  remove(instance) {
-    const services = [...this.#refs.keys()].filter((k) => k.startsWith(instance + ':')).map((k) => k.slice(instance.length + 1));
-    for (const service of services) this.revoke(instance, service);
-    const agentDir = dirname(this.#storePath(instance, 'gitea'));
-    let names;
-    try {
-      names = readdirSync(agentDir);
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return { services };
-      deny('credential-file');
-    }
-    if (names.some((n) => !/^(gitea|vikunja)(\.tmp)?$/.test(n))) deny('credential-file');
-    for (const n of names) unlinkSync(join(agentDir, n));
-    rmdirSync(agentDir);
-    return { services };
-  }
-  // The agent-facing use (design D5): the key comes only from the broker's verified session.
-  async useFor(session, service, operation) {
-    if (!session || typeof session.business !== 'string' || typeof session.role !== 'string' || session.role.startsWith('@'))
-      deny('credential-not-yours');
-    return this.use(session.business + '/' + session.role, service, operation);
   }
   assertClean(value) {
     let encoded;
@@ -247,16 +109,14 @@ export class Credentials {
     let result;
     try {
       result = await operation(entry.token);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Row 199: a host step's own refusal (publish) keeps its code; anything else is the service's.
-      if (e instanceof BusError) throw e;
+    } catch {
       deny('service-failed');
     }
     this.assertClean(result);
     return result;
   }
   status() {
-    return [...this.#refs.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
+    return [...this.#tokens.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
       const i = key.lastIndexOf(':'),
         service = key.slice(i + 1),
         left = Date.parse(date + 'T00:00:00Z') - Date.now();
@@ -264,11 +124,8 @@ export class Credentials {
         instance: key.slice(0, i),
         service,
         date,
-        state: !this.#tokens.has(key)
-          ? this.#revoked.has(key)
-            ? 'revoked'
-            : 'not-issued'
-          : service === 'gitea'
+        state:
+          service === 'gitea'
             ? left <= 0
               ? 'rotation-due'
               : 'valid'
@@ -282,6 +139,5 @@ export class Credentials {
   }
   close() {
     this.#tokens.clear();
-    this.#refs.clear();
   }
 }

packages/bus/src/process.mjs

@@ -14,11 +14,6 @@ const LAUNCH_OPS = new Set([
   'checkLand',
   'recordLand',
   'landRefused',
-  'checkPublish',
-  'publishPush',
-  'publishResult',
-  'recordPublish',
-  'publishRefused',
   'landHeld',
   'threadsState',
   'threadIdle',
@@ -39,12 +34,6 @@ function launchOp(m) {
   if (m.op === 'checkLand') return runtime.checkLand(m.cap, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'recordLand') return runtime.recordLand(m.ticket, m.land);
   if (m.op === 'landRefused') return runtime.landRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. No entry returns a token.
-  if (m.op === 'checkPublish') return runtime.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args);
-  if (m.op === 'publishPush') return runtime.publishPush(m.ticket);
-  if (m.op === 'publishResult') return runtime.publishResult(m.ticket);
-  if (m.op === 'recordPublish') return runtime.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed);
-  if (m.op === 'publishRefused') return runtime.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'landHeld') return runtime.landHeld(m.record);
   // Row 121 (#1615): the launcher's view of the business's threads, and its idle release.
   if (m.op === 'threadsState') return runtime.threadsState(m.business);
@@ -110,8 +99,7 @@ if (!process.send) {
       booted = true;
       clearTimeout(timer);
       // `trackers` is S3's plain-data boot config; the adapter is loaded only when a business has one.
-      // Row 199: publishTls is the tests' scratch CA; no boot config sets it.
-      const { trackers, publishTls: _tls, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
+      const { trackers, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
       if (trackers) {
         const { tasksAdapter } = await import('../../tasks/src/adapter.mjs');
         config.tasks = tasksAdapter({ trackers });

packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs

@@ -8,12 +8,9 @@ import { Credentials } from './credentials.mjs';
 import { serve } from './server.mjs';
 import { launchSettings } from '../../business/src/launch-settings.mjs';
 import { readSessions } from '../../seat/src/session.mjs';
-import { publishRemote, workingRepo, WorkingError } from '../../seat/src/working.mjs';
 import { createLoader, hasModule } from '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';
 import { pluginSettings } from '../../business/src/plugin-settings.mjs';
 import { instanceSettings } from '../../business/src/instance-settings.mjs';
-import { organizationWriter } from '../../business/src/organization.mjs';
-import { credentialVerbs } from './credential-verbs.mjs';
 import { webService } from './web.mjs';
 import { verifyHuman } from './human.mjs';
 import { createUsage } from './usage.mjs';
@@ -75,9 +72,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
   repoRoots = [],
   tasks = null,
   organization = null,
-  // Row 199: the tests' scratch CA for publish's git (`-c http.sslCAInfo=...`). process.mjs drops
-  // it from the boot config, so only an in-process caller sets it.
-  publishTls = [],
 }) {
   let store, credentials, server, adapter;
   try {
@@ -92,9 +86,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
       ...repoRoots,
       ...Object.values(businesses).flatMap((b) => Object.values(b.projects ?? {}).map((p) => p.root)),
     ];
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D1): the per-agent store is <configDir>/secrets/agents.
-    const storeRoot = organization ? join(organization.dir, 'secrets', 'agents') : null;
-    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot, storeRoot });
+    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot });
     store = new Store(dataRoot);
     // vikunja:19/305: the plug-in switch through the same human-only path as the limits: the verbs
     // plugins and plugins.set, logged in changes.jsonl with the actor, a missing module refused.
@@ -141,11 +133,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
       }:null,
       secretCheck: (value) => credentials.assertClean(value),
       credentialStatus: () => credentials.status(),
-      // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete, live with no restart; each
-      // rewrites or records through the organization writer, so changes.jsonl holds the receipt.
-      credentialVerbs: organization
-        ? credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) })
-        : null,
       // Row 65: a new launch binds only on a harness its business switches on, read from the file
       // as it stands now; an unreadable file switches none on.
       harnessOn: (id, name) => {
@@ -225,42 +212,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
     // Row 137 (#1631): the git socket's land op. checkLand's refusal is the run's, like checkPush's.
     // A landing then ends in recordLand or landRefused under its ticket, which outlive the run's cap.
     const checkLand = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkLand(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. checkPublish's refusal is the run's.
-    // The gitea token is used only under the open ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked,
-    // and the op table returns no token. A publish then ends in recordPublish or publishRefused,
-    // which files any refusal once, withGitea's included.
-    const checkPublish = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkPublish(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
-    const withGitea = async (ticket, fn) => credentials.useFor(broker.publishSession(ticket), 'gitea', fn);
-    // The push itself runs here, where the token is (D9 step 5), and the git socket's host polls
-    // for its end: the host's op channel answers one op at a time within 10 s, and ls-remote and
-    // push can take longer. Fork, user, source and dst all come from the ticket. A WorkingError's
-    // code is the refusal; git's stderr stays here.
-    const remotes = new Map();
-    function publishPush(ticket) {
-      if (remotes.has(ticket)) throw new BusError('publish-busy');
-      const { business, project, fork, user, source, dst } = broker.publishTarget(ticket);
-      const entry = { state: 'running' };
-      remotes.set(ticket, entry);
-      withGitea(ticket, (token) =>
-        publishRemote({ repo: workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project), fork, user, source, dst, token, tls: publishTls }).catch((e) => {
-          throw e instanceof WorkingError ? new BusError(e.code) : e;
-        }),
-      ).then(
-        (r) => Object.assign(entry, { state: 'pushed', ...r }),
-        (e) => {
-          // Not a refusal: the error's name and code only, never a message that could carry git's output.
-          if (!(e instanceof BusError)) process.stderr.write(`bus: publish git-failed: ${JSON.stringify({ name: e?.name, code: e?.code })}\n`);
-          Object.assign(entry, { state: 'refused', code: e instanceof BusError ? e.code : 'git-failed' });
-        },
-      );
-      return { state: 'running' };
-    }
-    function publishResult(ticket) {
-      const entry = remotes.get(ticket);
-      if (!entry) throw new BusError('publish-unknown');
-      if (entry.state !== 'running') remotes.delete(ticket);
-      return { ...entry };
-    }
     // Metadata only (service, date, state); the token stays in Credentials.
     function credentialStatus(business, role) {
       return credentials
@@ -286,12 +237,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
       checkLand,
       recordLand: (ticket, land) => broker.recordLand(ticket, land),
       landRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.landRefused(ticket, args),
-      checkPublish,
-      withGitea,
-      publishPush,
-      publishResult,
-      recordPublish: (ticket, pushed) => broker.recordPublish(ticket, pushed),
-      publishRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.publishRefused(ticket, args),
       landHeld: (record) => broker.landHeld(record),
       // Row 156 (#1651): the launcher's landing pass.
       landHolders: (business) => broker.landHolders(business),

packages/bus/tests/credential-store.test.mjs

@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D3a, D4, section 6, T1 and T5): the per-agent credential store under
-// <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Credentials } from '../src/credentials.mjs';
-
-const TOKEN = 'fake_store_token_0123456789';
-const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
-const AGENT = { business: 'acme', role: 'coder' };
-
-function setup(t) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-store-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const storeRoot = join(root, 'secrets', 'agents');
-  mkdirSync(storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
-  const file = join(storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'gitea');
-  const references = { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { service: 'gitea', store: true, file, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } };
-  const open = (extra = {}) => new Credentials({ references, storeRoot, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data', ...extra });
-  const state = (c) => c.status().find((e) => e.instance === 'acme/coder' && e.service === 'gitea').state;
-  const read = (c, session = AGENT) => c.useFor(session, 'gitea', async (token) => ({ same: token === TOKEN, rotated: token === ROTATED }));
-  return { root, storeRoot, file, references, open, state, read };
-}
-
-test('T1: a store reference with no file yet starts, and the agent is not-issued until issue', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-  const status = c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  assert.equal(status.state, 'valid');
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
-  assert.equal(statSync(s.file).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
-  for (const dir of [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')]) assert.equal(statSync(dir).mode & 0o777, 0o700);
-  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
-  // A restart reads the issued file.
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(s.open()), { same: true, rotated: false });
-});
-
-test('T1: a store path the reference does not own, or no store root, refuses the reference', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const other = join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'pm', 'gitea');
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { store: true, file: other, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-reference/);
-  assert.throws(() => new Credentials({ references: s.references, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data' }), /credential-reference/);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/@tester': { gitea: { store: true, file: join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', '@tester', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }),
-    /credential-reference/);
-});
-
-test('T1: a wrong mode on the store root, a business dir, an agent dir or the file refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  s.open().issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  for (const [path, bad, good] of [
-    [s.storeRoot, 0o750, 0o700],
-    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o705, 0o700],
-    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), 0o770, 0o700],
-    [s.file, 0o640, 0o600],
-  ]) {
-    chmodSync(path, bad);
-    assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/, path);
-    chmodSync(path, good);
-  }
-  s.open();
-});
-
-test('T1: a missing store root refuses start; a missing {file} reference still refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  rmSync(s.storeRoot, { recursive: true });
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { coder: { gitea: { file: join(s.root, 'absent'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-file/);
-});
-
-test('T1: a store file that is a directory or a symlink refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  mkdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o700);
-  mkdirSync(s.file, { mode: 0o700 });
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-  rmSync(s.file, { recursive: true });
-  const target = join(s.root, 'target');
-  writeFileSync(target, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-  symlinkSync(target, s.file);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-});
-
-test('T2: useFor keys from the session only', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: 'pm' }), /credential-unavailable/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: '@tester' }), /credential-not-yours/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, null), /credential-not-yours/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme' }), /credential-not-yours/);
-});
-
-test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live with no restart, and revoke holds across one', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  let committed = 0;
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => committed++);
-  assert.equal(committed, 1);
-  // Rotate is a second issue: the new token is used at once, with no tmp file left.
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', ROTATED + '\n', '2099-06-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: false, rotated: true });
-  assert.equal(c.status()[0].date, '2099-06-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
-  // Revoke: memory first, then the file.
-  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: true });
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'revoked');
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-  const restarted = s.open();
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(restarted), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(s.state(restarted), 'not-issued');
-  // Delete removes the agent's dir.
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.remove('acme/coder'), { services: ['gitea'] });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), false);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory, and a bad token or date writes nothing', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', 'short', '2099-01-01'), /credential-format/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-13-01'), /credential-date/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/pm', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01'), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => { throw new Error('commit failed'); }), /commit failed/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), true);
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: revoke of a {file} reference forgets the token and never unlinks the file', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const path = join(s.root, 'outside-token');
-  writeFileSync(path, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-  const c = s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { file: path, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } });
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: false });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(path), true);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: delete refuses an agent dir holding anything but tokens', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  writeFileSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes'), 'x', { mode: 0o600 });
-  assert.throws(() => c.remove('acme/coder'), /credential-file/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes')), true);
-});
-
-// Design D5: the name-keyed use() is the host's own, for @sync and the tracker's start check of each
-// role's token. Every other credential use goes through useFor, keyed from the broker's session. A
-// new use( call site outside this list fails here.
-test('D5: every credentials use( call site is on the allowlist', () => {
-  const packages = new URL('../../', import.meta.url);
-  const allowed = new Map([
-    ['bus/src/credentials.mjs', 1], // useFor's own call
-    ['tasks/src/adapter.mjs', 1], // the host's use(instance) for @sync and probe
-  ]);
-  const found = new Map();
-  const walk = (dir, rel) => {
-    for (const name of readdirSync(dir)) {
-      if (name === 'node_modules' || name === 'tests') continue;
-      const path = join(dir, name);
-      if (statSync(path).isDirectory()) walk(path, `${rel}${name}/`);
-      else if (name.endsWith('.mjs') || name.endsWith('.js')) {
-        const code = readFileSync(path, 'utf8').split('\n').filter((line) => !/^\s*\/\//.test(line)).join('\n');
-        const n = (code.match(/(?:credentials|this)\.use\(/g) ?? []).length;
-        if (n) found.set(`${rel}${name}`, n);
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  for (const pkg of readdirSync(packages)) if (statSync(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages), { throwIfNoEntry: false })?.isDirectory())
-    walk(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages).pathname, `${pkg}/src/`);
-  assert.deepEqual(Object.fromEntries([...found].sort()), Object.fromEntries([...allowed].sort()));
-});

packages/bus/tests/credential-verbs.test.mjs

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and
-// credentials.delete through the runtime. Human-only; the tester revokes and never issues. Each verb
-// is live with no restart and leaves one receipt in changes.jsonl with no value in it. Fake tokens in a
-// scratch root only.
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
-import { Broker, CREDENTIAL_VERBS } from '../src/broker.mjs';
-import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
-
-const TOKEN = 'fake_issued_token_0123456789';
-const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
-const OTHER = 'fake_other_token_5555555555';
-const DATE = '2099-01-01';
-const role = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } };
-
-async function setup(t) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-verbs-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  const doc = { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } };
-  doc.roles.coder.credentials.gitea = { store: true, rotateBy: DATE };
-  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), doc);
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  const store = (agent, service) => join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', agent, service);
-  // The bus's resolved business carries the same references; a store one names its derived file.
-  const demo = {
-    id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true },
-    roles: {
-      coder: { ...role, credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: store('coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: doc.roles.coder.credentials.vikunja } },
-      reviewer: { ...role, credentials: doc.roles.reviewer.credentials },
-    },
-  };
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) } });
-  t.after(() => bus.close());
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const tester = bus.broker.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
-  const ask = (cap, verb, args) => bus.broker.request(cap, { verb, args });
-  const file = () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'));
-  const receipts = () => {
-    const log = join(root, 'businesses/.history/demo/changes.jsonl');
-    return existsSync(log) ? readFileSync(log, 'utf8').trim().split('\n').map(JSON.parse) : [];
-  };
-  const committed = () => receipts().filter((r) => r.state === 'committed');
-  const status = (agent) => Object.fromEntries(bus.credentialStatus('demo', agent).map((e) => [e.service, e.state]));
-  return { root, bus, human, tester, ask, file, receipts, committed, status, store };
-}
-
-test('row 199: the lifecycle verbs refuse every session but the human, and the tester revokes only', (t) => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-gate-'));
-  const s = new Store(root);
-  t.after(() => { s.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
-  const calls = [];
-  const b = new Broker({
-    store: s,
-    businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true }, roles: { coder: role } } },
-    credentialVerbs: (id, verb, args, actor) => (calls.push([verb, actor]), { ok: true }),
-  });
-  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const tester = b.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
-  const reader = b.bindReader({ business: 'demo' });
-  const coder = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
-  const args = {
-    'credentials.issue': { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE },
-    'credentials.revoke': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
-    'credentials.delete': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(CREDENTIAL_VERBS, Object.keys(args));
-  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) {
-    assert.throws(() => b.request(reader, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
-    assert.throws(() => b.request(coder, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
-  }
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: args['credentials.issue'] }), /tester-refused/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /tester-refused/);
-  // Keys: a token on revoke, a missing reason, an unknown service, an unknown agent, an @ agent.
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { ...args['credentials.revoke'], token: TOKEN } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: 'coder' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], service: 'model' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], file: '/x' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], agent: 'pm' } }), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: '@sync', reason: 'x' } }), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
-  // A refusal records its code alone, never the token.
-  const refused = s.all("SELECT body FROM events WHERE kind='action.refused'");
-  assert.ok(refused.length >= 10);
-  for (const { body } of refused) assert.equal(body.includes(TOKEN), false);
-  // delete waits for the agent's claim to end.
-  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim' });
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /agent-running/);
-  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.release' });
-  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) b.request(human, { verb, args: args[verb] });
-  b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] });
-  assert.deepEqual(calls, [['credentials.issue', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'jason'], ['credentials.delete', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'tester']]);
-  // No lifecycle without the runtime's store.
-  const bare = new Broker({ store: s, businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, roles: { coder: role } } } });
-  const h2 = bare.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  assert.throws(() => bare.request(h2, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] }), /not-configured/);
-});
-
-test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live, rewrite the business file and leave one receipt each, with no value anywhere', async (t) => {
-  const c = await setup(t);
-  const coder = { business: 'demo', role: 'coder' };
-  const read = (service) => c.bus.credentials.useFor(coder, service, async (token) => token === TOKEN ? 'issued' : token === ROTATED ? 'rotated' : 'other');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.status('coder'), { gitea: 'not-issued', vikunja: 'valid' });
-  // issue: the file, then the business file's reference, then memory.
-  const issued = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN + '\n', date: DATE });
-  assert.deepEqual(issued, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'issue', service: 'gitea', date: DATE, state: 'valid' });
-  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'issued');
-  assert.equal(statSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: DATE });
-  let last = c.committed().at(-1);
-  assert.equal(last.actor, 'jason');
-  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'issue', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: DATE });
-  // The same token again is one the bus holds: the secret check refuses it before any write.
-  const count = c.receipts().length;
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE }), /credential-leak/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: 'short', date: DATE }), /credential-format/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: '2099-02-30' }), /credential-date/);
-  assert.equal(c.receipts().length, count);
-  // rotate: an issue over an issued entry, used at once.
-  const rotated = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: ROTATED, date: '2099-06-01' });
-  assert.equal(rotated.verb, 'rotate');
-  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'rotated');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: '2099-06-01' });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'rotate', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: '2099-06-01' });
-  // revoke of a store entry by the tester: memory and file, no document change, a receipt.
-  const bytes = readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8');
-  const revoked = c.ask(c.tester, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', reason: 'test' });
-  assert.deepEqual(revoked, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'revoke', services: [{ service: 'gitea', state: 'revoked' }] });
-  await assert.rejects(read('gitea'), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')), false);
-  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'), bytes);
-  last = c.committed().at(-1);
-  assert.equal(last.actor, 'tester');
-  assert.deepEqual(last.changes, []);
-  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'revoke', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], reason: 'test' });
-  // revoke of a {file} reference: memory, the outside file kept, the reference becomes store.
-  const outside = c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.file;
-  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'vikunja', reason: 'moved' });
-  await assert.rejects(read('vikunja'), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(outside), true);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja, { store: true, expires: DATE });
-  assert.ok(c.committed().at(-1).changes.some((e) => e.path === 'roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.store' && e.new === true));
-  // delete: every kind revoked, the agent's dir gone, both references store.
-  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'reviewer', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: DATE });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('reviewer', 'gitea')), true);
-  const deleted = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.delete', { agent: 'reviewer', reason: 'fired' });
-  assert.deepEqual(deleted.services.map((e) => e.state), ['revoked', 'revoked']);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(c.root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'reviewer')), false);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.reviewer.credentials, { gitea: { store: true, rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: { store: true, expires: DATE } });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'delete', agent: 'reviewer', kind: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], reason: 'fired' });
-  // The status read never carries a value.
-  assert.deepEqual(c.ask(c.human, 'credentials', {}).map((e) => e.state).sort(), ['revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked']);
-  // T4: no token in any file under the root (receipts, business file, events, logs).
-  const walk = (dir) => readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true }).flatMap((e) => e.isDirectory() ? walk(join(dir, e.name)) : e.isFile() ? [join(dir, e.name)] : []);
-  for (const path of walk(c.root))
-    for (const token of [TOKEN, ROTATED, OTHER]) assert.equal(readFileSync(path).includes(token), false, path);
-});

packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { fixture } from './spec-fixtures.mjs';
 
 // PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1, REQ-WAIT-2 and REQ-DEC-2 (row 139, #1633).
 const WAITS = ['spend', 'data.delete', 'network.expose', 'account.create', 'credential.mint', 'message.external',
-  'git.push.protected', 'git.push.remote', 'deploy'];
+  'git.push.protected', 'deploy'];
 const LEFT = ['git.merge.protected', 'policy.change', 'prd.approve', 'role.revoke'];
 const cite = f => ({ project: 'stack', spec_path: 'spec/north-star.md', spec_commit: f.commit });
 const routed = (f, d) => ({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) });
@@ -36,14 +36,10 @@ test('REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; th
 });
 
 test('REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it', async t => {
-  const f = await fixture(t, { roles: { coder: { definition: 'coder',
-    authority: { withinRole: ['message.send', 'record.write', 'git.push.working'], crossRole: [] } } } });
-  // Row 199: a git.push.remote raise binds the task's latest push, so the task has one.
-  f.broker.recordPush(f.coder, { task_ref: 'vikunja:1/2', project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2',
-    commit: 'a'.repeat(40), previous: null });
+  const f = await fixture(t);
   for (const action of WAITS) {
     for (const args of [{}, cite(f), { ...cite(f), domain: 'technical' }]) {
-      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...(action === 'git.push.remote' ? { target: 'vikunja:1/2' } : {}), ...args });
+      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...args });
       assert.deepEqual(routed(f, d), { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' }, `${action} ${JSON.stringify(args)}`);
     }
   }

packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ test('Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure: only the listed imports, n
     "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';",
     // Row 141 (#1635): the business ID_PATTERN for instance names. The vocabulary is already in
     // RUNNER_FILES and imports nothing. Row 155 (#1649) reads THREAD_DEFINITION and END_PROTECTED
-    // from it too. Row 199 (#1697) reads the D9c fork parse, forkProblem and forkUrl, from it.
-    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
+    // from it too.
+    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
   ]);
   assert.doesNotMatch(source, /\bimport\s*\(/);
   assert.doesNotMatch(readFileSync(new URL('../src/landing.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8'), /\bimport\b/);

packages/bus/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3 and 6, D9b): the broker side of publish. git.push.remote
-// is a hard wait; its decision binds the task's latest push (pushCommit). checkPublish builds the
-// agent's fork from the project's upstream and the agent's own Gitea user; recordPublish spends the
-// decision; publishRefused files the refusal.
-
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { fork } from 'node:child_process';
-import { once } from 'node:events';
-import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
-
-const TASK = 'vikunja:1/2';
-const A = 'a'.repeat(40);
-const B = 'b'.repeat(40);
-const C = 'c'.repeat(40);
-const identity = (user) => ({ name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: 'https://git.example', user } });
-const pusher = { withinRole: ['git.push.working', 'message.send'], crossRole: [] };
-function businesses(upstream = 'https://git.example/mosaic/stack') {
-  return {
-    demo: {
-      id: 'demo',
-      human: 'jason',
-      arbiters: { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' },
-      projects: { stack: { root: '/nonexistent', remote: upstream }, books: { root: '/nonexistent-books' } },
-      roles: {
-        coder: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-coder'), publish: ['stack'] },
-        second: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-second'), publish: ['stack'] },
-        plain: { authority: pusher },
-        reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } },
-      },
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function setup(t, upstream) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-'));
-  const store = new Store(root);
-  const b = new Broker({ store, businesses: businesses(upstream) });
-  t.after(() => {
-    store.close();
-    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-  const caps = {};
-  for (const role of ['coder', 'second', 'plain', 'reviewer']) {
-    caps[role] = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: 'pi' });
-    b.request(caps[role], { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
-  }
-  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const call = (cap, verb, args) => b.request(cap, { verb, args });
-  const push = (commit, previous = null, role = 'coder', project = 'stack') => {
-    b.checkPush(caps[role], TASK);
-    return b.recordPush(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project, branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit, previous });
-  };
-  const raise = (role = 'coder') =>
-    call(caps[role], 'decision.raise', {
-      action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-      options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
-    });
-  const approve = (role = 'coder') => {
-    const d = raise(role);
-    call(human, 'decision.resolve', { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' });
-    return d;
-  };
-  const publish = (decision, role = 'coder', extra = {}) =>
-    b.checkPublish(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ...(decision ? { decision: decision.id } : {}), ...extra });
-  const events = (kind) => store.all('SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? ORDER BY seq', kind).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
-  return { b, store, caps, human, call, push, raise, approve, publish, events };
-}
-
-test('a raise with no recorded push refuses no-push; a raise binds the latest push and shows it', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  assert.throws(() => f.raise(), /no-push/);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.raise();
-  assert.match(d.question, new RegExp(`commit ${A}\\)$`));
-  const raised = f.events('action.allowed').find((e) => e.body.operation === 'decision.raise');
-  assert.equal(raised.body.pushCommit, A);
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) }, { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' });
-});
-
-test('happy path: the fork is the upstream repo under the agent\'s own user, the destination is host-built', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  const r = f.publish(d);
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...r, ticket: typeof r.ticket }, {
-    ticket: 'string', task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', fork: 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack',
-    user: 'acme-coder', email: '[email protected]', source: A, dst: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat',
-  });
-  const done = f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
-  assert.deepEqual(done, { task_ref: TASK, fork: r.fork, ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
-  const allowed = f.events('action.allowed').filter((e) => e.body.action === 'git.push.remote' && e.body.operation !== 'decision.raise');
-  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].subject, TASK);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.decision, d.id);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, r.fork);
-  // Spent once.
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-consumed/);
-  assert.throws(() => f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-test('a hard wait: no decision refuses, and a decision for another task refuses', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(null), /decision-required/);
-  const other = f.call(f.caps.coder, 'decision.raise', {
-    action: 'deploy', target: 'vikunja:1/3', question: 'Ship?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
-  });
-  f.call(f.human, 'decision.resolve', { id: other.id, choice: 'yes' });
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(other), /decision-mismatch/);
-  const d = f.raise();
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-not-approved/);
-});
-
-test('r4 B4: approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish refuses decision-mismatch', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  f.push(B, A);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-mismatch/);
-  // And a push between checkPublish and recordPublish refuses the record.
-  const f2 = setup(t);
-  f2.push(A);
-  const d2 = f2.approve();
-  const r = f2.publish(d2);
-  f2.push(C, A);
-  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
-  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: C, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
-});
-
-test('grant and fork refusals', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A, null, 'plain');
-  // plain has no identity and no grant; its raise still binds the push, the publish refuses.
-  const d = f.approve('plain');
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain'), /remote-not-granted/);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain', { project: 'books' }), /remote-not-granted|decision-mismatch/);
-  // work-not-yours: second publishes a push coder made.
-  const g = setup(t);
-  g.push(A);
-  const d2 = g.approve('second');
-  assert.throws(() => g.publish(d2, 'second'), /work-not-yours/);
-});
-
-test('remote-not-fork, compared without case, and remote-host-mismatch, at push', (t) => {
-  for (const [upstream, code] of [
-    ['https://git.example/acme-coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
-    ['https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
-    ['https://other.example/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
-    ['https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
-  ]) {
-    const f = setup(t, upstream);
-    f.push(A);
-    const d = f.approve();
-    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), code, upstream);
-  }
-});
-
-test('two agents granted one project each get their own fork', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const r1 = f.publish(f.approve());
-  assert.equal(r1.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack');
-  const g = setup(t);
-  g.push(A, null, 'second');
-  const r2 = g.publish(g.approve('second'), 'second');
-  assert.equal(r2.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-second/stack');
-  assert.equal(r2.dst, 'refs/heads/acme-second/feat');
-});
-
-test('the request cannot name the fork, the user or the destination', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  for (const extra of [{ fork: 'https://git.example/x/stack' }, { dst: 'refs/heads/main' }, { user: 'x' }, { remote: 'https://x' }])
-    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'coder', extra), /invalid-request/);
-});
-
-test('publishRefused files the code on the task\'s trail and drops the ticket', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const r = f.publish(f.approve());
-  assert.equal(f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'remote-unrelated' }), 'remote-unrelated');
-  const refused = f.events('action.refused').filter((e) => e.subject === TASK);
-  assert.deepEqual(refused.at(-1).body, { code: 'remote-unrelated' });
-  assert.throws(() => f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'x' }), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-test('git.push.remote is in neither ROUTED list and no shipped role grants it', async () => {
-  const { ACTIONS, HARD_WAITS } = await import('../src/broker.mjs');
-  const vocabulary = await import('../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs');
-  assert.ok(ACTIONS.includes('git.push.remote') && HARD_WAITS.includes('git.push.remote'));
-  assert.ok(!vocabulary.ROUTED.includes('git.push.remote'));
-  const { readdirSync, readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');
-  const dir = new URL('../../../roles/', import.meta.url);
-  for (const name of readdirSync(dir).filter((n) => n.endsWith('.json')))
-    assert.ok(!readFileSync(new URL(name, dir), 'utf8').includes('git.push.remote'), name);
-});
-
-// D1 and D9b through the real startBroker: the store is <configDir>/secrets/agents, and the gitea
-// token is used only under an open publish ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked.
-test('runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket only, and the store root is the organization dir', async (t) => {
-  const { startBroker } = await import('../src/runtime.mjs');
-  const { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } = await import('../../business/tests/helpers.mjs');
-  const { chmodSync, mkdirSync } = await import('node:fs');
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-rt-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  // The runtime reads the harness switch from the organization file as it stands.
-  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
-  const demo = businesses().demo;
-  demo.roles.coder.credentials = { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } };
-  const organization = { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) };
-  // No organization, no store root: a store reference refuses the start.
-  await assert.rejects(startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo } }), /credential-reference/);
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization });
-  t.after(() => bus.close());
-  assert.deepEqual(bus.credentialStatus('demo', 'coder'), [{ service: 'gitea', date: '2099-01-01', state: 'not-issued' }]);
-  const coder = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
-  bus.checkPush(coder, TASK);
-  bus.recordPush(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit: A, previous: null });
-  const d = bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'decision.raise', args: {
-    action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }] } });
-  bus.broker.request(human, { verb: 'decision.resolve', args: { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' } });
-  assert.throws(() => bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }), /decision-required/);
-  const ticket = bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', decision: d.id }).ticket;
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /credential-unavailable/);
-  bus.credentials.issue('demo/coder', 'gitea', 'fake_publish_token_0123456789', '2099-01-01');
-  assert.equal(await bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => token === 'fake_publish_token_0123456789'), true);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => ({ echo: token })), /credential-leak/);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea('not-a-ticket', async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(coder, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-  bus.recordPublish(ticket, { ref: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat', commit: A, previous: null });
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-// Row 199 (D9b, deviation 11): the bus process answers the socket's five publish ops from their own
-// launchOp lines. A LAUNCH_OPS name without one would get launch-op-refused. A boot config that
-// carries publishTls still boots; process.mjs drops it before startBroker.
-test('the bus process answers the publish ops from their own lines, not launch-op-refused', async (t) => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-ops-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const child = fork(new URL('../src/process.mjs', import.meta.url), [], { stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore', 'ipc'] });
-  t.after(() => {
-    if (child.exitCode === null) child.kill('SIGKILL');
-  });
-  const ask = async (m) => {
-    const reply = once(child, 'message');
-    child.send(m);
-    return (await reply)[0];
-  };
-  const config = { dataRoot: root, businesses: businesses(), launches: [], readers: [], publishTls: ['-c', 'http.sslCAInfo=/nonexistent'] };
-  assert.equal((await ask({ op: 'boot', config })).ok, true);
-  const unknown = 'not-a-ticket';
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishPush', ticket: unknown, id: 1 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 1 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishResult', ticket: unknown, id: 2 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 2 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'recordPublish', ticket: unknown, pushed: { ref: 'refs/heads/x/y', commit: A, previous: null }, id: 3 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 3 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishRefused', ticket: unknown, args: { code: 'x' }, id: 4 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 4 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'checkPublish', cap: 'not-a-cap', args: { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }, id: 5 }), { ok: false, error: 'unauthenticated', id: 5 });
-  const exit = once(child, 'exit');
-  child.send({ op: 'close' });
-  assert.equal((await exit)[0], 0);
-});

packages/business/src/business.mjs

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import { checkVars } from "./vars.mjs";
 import { parseCredentialRef } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { loadRole } from "./role.mjs";
 import { checkPlugins } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
-import { forkProblem, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import {
   requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireId, requirePositiveInt, requireString, requireDistinctList, readJsonFile, deepFreeze,
 } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function checkBot(tracker, where) {
   return { bot: tracker.bot, botId: tracker.botId };
 }
 
-function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where, store = null) {
+function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where) {
   requireObject(map, where);
   const names = Object.keys(map).sort();
   const wanted = [...services].sort();
@@ -49,37 +48,10 @@ function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where, store = null) {
     refuse(`${where} must reference exactly the services its role definition needs (${wanted.join(", ") || "none"}; got ${names.join(", ") || "none"})`);
   }
   const out = {};
-  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`, { store });
+  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`);
   return out;
 }
 
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D8): the agent's own git identity. The email is the one its Gitea user
-// has, so Gitea links the commits to that user; gitea.url is the instance its pushes go to.
-const EMAIL = /^[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]{1,64}@[A-Za-z0-9.-]{1,190}\.[A-Za-z]{2,24}$/;
-const NAME = /^[^\0\n\r<>]{1,100}$/;
-
-// Row 199 (design D9c): the parse is vocabulary.mjs's, where the broker reads it; this wraps it with
-// the loader's refusals. Returns {url, owner, repo}.
-export function httpsUrl(value, where, { repo = false } = {}) {
-  const parsed = parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo });
-  if (parsed.problem === "form") refuse(`${where} must be a normalized https URL with no user, query or fragment`);
-  if (parsed.problem === "instance") refuse(`${where} must name the Gitea instance only, https://HOST[:PORT]`);
-  if (parsed.problem === "repository") refuse(`${where} must name a repository, https://HOST/OWNER/REPO`);
-  return parsed;
-}
-
-function checkIdentity(identity, where) {
-  requireObject(identity, where);
-  rejectUnknownKeys(identity, ["name", "email", "gitea"], where);
-  if (typeof identity.name !== "string" || !NAME.test(identity.name)) refuse(`${where}.name must be 1 to 100 characters with no <, > or line break`);
-  if (typeof identity.email !== "string" || !EMAIL.test(identity.email)) refuse(`${where}.email must be an email address`);
-  requireObject(identity.gitea, `${where}.gitea`);
-  rejectUnknownKeys(identity.gitea, ["url", "user"], `${where}.gitea`);
-  httpsUrl(identity.gitea.url, `${where}.gitea.url`);
-  if (!giteaName(identity.gitea.user)) refuse(`${where}.gitea.user must be a Gitea user name`);
-  return { name: identity.name, email: identity.email, gitea: { url: identity.gitea.url, user: identity.gitea.user } };
-}
-
 function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   const where = `${file} tracker`;
   requireObject(tracker, where);
@@ -102,7 +74,7 @@ function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   return { sync, labels };
 }
 
-function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
+function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir) {
   const where = `${file} roles`;
   requireObject(roles, where);
   if (Object.keys(roles).length === 0) refuse(`${where} must declare at least one role instance`);
@@ -114,7 +86,7 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
     requireId(instance, `${where} instance name`);
     const at = `${where}.${instance}`;
     requireObject(entry, at);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials", "identity", "publish"], at);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials"], at);
     requireId(entry.definition, `${at}.definition`);
     const definition = Object.hasOwn(definitions, entry.definition) ? definitions[entry.definition] : loadRole(rolesDir, entry.definition);
     definitions[entry.definition] = definition;
@@ -136,18 +108,8 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
       holder: entry.holder === undefined ? null : requireId(entry.holder, `${at}.holder`),
       vars: checkVars(entry.vars ?? {}, "agent", `${at}.vars`),
       tracker,
-      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`,
-        { configDir: dirname(dirname(file)), business, agent: instance }),
+      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`),
     };
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D8, D9 step 2): identity and publish are optional, so today's files
-    // load unchanged. publish needs both an identity and a gitea credential; the project ids it
-    // names are checked against projects once those are read.
-    if (entry.identity !== undefined) out[instance].identity = checkIdentity(entry.identity, `${at}.identity`);
-    if (entry.publish !== undefined) {
-      // N10: one message for both, naming the grant.
-      if (!out[instance].identity || !services.includes("gitea")) refuse(`${at}.publish needs identity and a gitea definition`);
-      out[instance].publish = requireDistinctList(entry.publish, `${at}.publish`, (p) => requireId(p, `${at}.publish entry`), { nonEmpty: true });
-    }
   }
   return { roles: out, definitions };
 }
@@ -197,7 +159,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   }
   const human = requireId(document.human, "business human");
   const vars = checkVars(document.vars ?? {}, "business", `${file} vars`);
-  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir, document.id);
+  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir);
 
   requireObject(document.arbiters, `${file} arbiters`);
   rejectUnknownKeys(document.arbiters, ["delivery", "technical"], `${file} arbiters`);
@@ -221,7 +183,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(document.projects)) {
     requireId(id, `${file} project id`);
     requireObject(entry, `${file} projects.${id}`);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo", "remote"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
     if (typeof entry.root !== "string" || !isAbsolute(entry.root) || normalize(entry.root) !== entry.root || entry.root.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.root must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
@@ -229,18 +191,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
         normalize(entry.repo) !== entry.repo || entry.repo.includes("\0"))) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.repo must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 2): the upstream; a granted agent's work goes to its fork.
-    if (Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote")) httpsUrl(entry.remote, `${file} projects.${id}.remote`, { repo: true });
-    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}),
-      ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote") ? { remote: entry.remote } : {}) };
-  }
-  for (const [instance, role] of Object.entries(roles)) {
-    for (const project of role.publish ?? []) {
-      if (!Object.hasOwn(projects, project)) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which the business file doesn't declare`);
-      if (!projects[project].remote) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which has no "remote"`);
-      const problem = forkProblem(projects[project].remote, role.identity);
-      if (problem) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}: ${problem}`);
-    }
+    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}) };
   }
 
   const tracker = checkTracker(document.tracker, file);

packages/business/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // lstat and realpath only; nothing in this package opens a token file.
 
 import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
-import { isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
+import { isAbsolute, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
 import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { SERVICES } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireDate } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -14,35 +14,21 @@ const WARN_DAYS = 7;
 const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
 // Shape check for one reference. Returns a frozen { service, file | env,
-// rotateBy | expires }. Row 199 (#1697, design D1 and D2): `store` is the
-// file at <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>, derived
-// here and never written, so an entry can't name another agent's file. A
-// reference with no agent (the tracker's sync bot) passes store = null and
-// can't use the form. A `file` reference into the agents' store must be the
-// agent's own path (`credential-not-yours`).
-export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
+// rotateBy | expires }.
+export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where) {
   if (!SERVICES.includes(service)) refuse(`${where}: unknown credential service ${JSON.stringify(service)}`);
   requireObject(ref, where);
   const dateKey = DATE_KEY[service];
-  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", "store", dateKey], where);
+  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", dateKey], where);
   const hasFile = ref.file !== undefined;
   const hasEnv = ref.env !== undefined;
-  const hasStore = ref.store !== undefined;
-  if (Number(hasFile) + Number(hasEnv) + Number(hasStore) !== 1) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file", "env" or "store"`);
+  if (hasFile === hasEnv) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file" or "env"`);
   const out = { service };
-  if (hasStore) {
-    if (ref.store !== true) refuse(`${where}.store must be true`);
-    if (!store) refuse(`${where}: a "store" reference needs an agent`);
-    out.store = true;
-    out.file = storePath(store, service);
-  } else if (hasFile) {
+  if (hasFile) {
     if (typeof ref.file !== "string" || !isAbsolute(ref.file) || normalize(ref.file) !== ref.file || ref.file.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${where}.file must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
     out.file = ref.file;
-    if (store && inside(join(store.configDir, "secrets", "agents"), ref.file) && ref.file !== storePath(store, service)) {
-      refuse(`${where}.file credential-not-yours: ${ref.file} is in the agents' store but not this agent's path`);
-    }
   } else {
     if (typeof ref.env !== "string" || !ENV_NAME.test(ref.env)) refuse(`${where}.env must match ${ENV_NAME}`);
     out.env = ref.env;
@@ -52,11 +38,6 @@ export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
   return Object.freeze(out);
 }
 
-// The store path for one agent and service (design D1).
-export function storePath({ configDir, business, agent }, service) {
-  return join(configDir, "secrets", "agents", business, agent, service);
-}
-
 function inside(root, path) {
   const rel = relative(root, path);
   return rel === "" || (!rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && rel !== ".." && !isAbsolute(rel));
@@ -74,10 +55,8 @@ export function checkCredentialRef(ref, { forbiddenRoots = [], now = new Date(),
     let stat = null;
     try {
       stat = lstatSync(ref.file);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Row 199 (design D3a): a store reference with no file is an agent not issued yet.
-      if (ref.store && e.code === "ENOENT") warnings.push(`${label}: not issued`);
-      else problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
+    } catch {
+      problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
     }
     if (stat) {
       if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) problems.push(`${label}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`);

packages/business/src/organization.mjs

@@ -174,9 +174,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     }
   }
 
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): `detail` says what a credential verb did (verb, agent, kind,
-  // date, reason), never a value; the other setters pass none.
-  function write(id, document, { revision, actor, detail }) {
+  function write(id, document, { revision, actor }) {
     requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
     requireId(id, "organization id");
     return withLock(id, ({ home, parent }) => {
@@ -203,7 +201,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
       syncDir(tx);
       const event = {
         transaction, actor, business: id, before, after,
-        changes: changes(old, written), ...(detail === undefined ? {} : { detail }), at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        changes: changes(old, written), at: new Date().toISOString(),
       };
       log(id, { ...event, state: "prepared" });
       syncDir(home);
@@ -221,22 +219,5 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     });
   }
 
-  // Row 199: a receipt with no document change, for a credential verb that changes only the agents'
-  // store (a revoke or delete of store references). Committed at once; there is nothing to recover.
-  function record(id, { actor, detail }) {
-    requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
-    requireId(id, "organization id");
-    return withLock(id, () => {
-      recover(id);
-      const hash = sha256(regular(businessFilePath(id, dir)));
-      const transaction = randomUUID();
-      log(id, {
-        transaction, actor, business: id, before: hash, after: hash, changes: [], detail,
-        at: new Date().toISOString(), state: "committed",
-      });
-      return { revision: hash, transaction };
-    });
-  }
-
-  return { logFile, read, write, record, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
+  return { logFile, read, write, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
 }

packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs

@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   "git.push.working",
   "git.push.protected",
   "git.merge.protected",
-  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): the host pushes an agent's recorded work commit to the fork its
-  // business grants it. A hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3 until a PRD version routes it.
-  "git.push.remote",
   "review.request",
   "review.verdict",
   "record.write",
@@ -86,8 +83,8 @@ export const ROUTED = Object.freeze([
 // The hard waits (PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1): always gated, always the human's,
 // cited spec or not. A role file may not list these under withinRole or
 // crossRole (REQ-WAIT-2). Today this is spend, data.delete, network.expose,
-// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected,
-// git.push.remote and deploy; a test pins the list.
+// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected and
+// deploy; a test pins the list.
 export const GATED_ONLY = Object.freeze(ACTIONS.filter((action) => !ROUTED.includes(action)));
 
 // pi's documented built-in tools; the same list scripts/mosaic-task.mjs
@@ -136,50 +133,3 @@ export const THREAD_DEFINITION = "assistant";
 // the human resolved through the CLI, may end or revoke. Row 155 moves the list here, and no
 // organization write may give an instance one of them.
 export const END_PROTECTED = Object.freeze([THREAD_DEFINITION]);
-
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9c): the Gitea URL parse. It lives here because the broker reads it and
-// this file imports nothing. Gitea's name rule for users and repositories: letters, digits, "_", "."
-// and "-", not "." or "..".
-export const giteaName = (name) =>
-  typeof name === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/.test(name) && name !== "." && name !== "..";
-
-// An https URL that is already its own normalized form, so a dot segment, an encoded dot, userinfo, a
-// query, a fragment, an upper-case host or an explicit :443 each fail, and the path checked is the
-// path used. With repo, the path is exactly /OWNER/REPO (one ".git" stripped); without, it is "/".
-// Returns {url, owner, repo}, or {problem} naming the rule that failed: form, instance or repository.
-export function parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo = false } = {}) {
-  let url = null;
-  try {
-    url = typeof value === "string" ? new URL(value) : null;
-  } catch {
-    url = null;
-  }
-  const normal = url && (repo ? [url.origin + url.pathname] : [url.origin, url.origin + "/"]);
-  if (!url || url.protocol !== "https:" || !normal.includes(value)) return { problem: "form" };
-  if (!repo) return url.pathname === "/" ? { url } : { problem: "instance" };
-  const segments = url.pathname.split("/").slice(1);
-  const name = segments[1]?.endsWith(".git") ? segments[1].slice(0, -4) : segments[1];
-  if (segments.length !== 2 || !giteaName(segments[0]) || !giteaName(name)) return { problem: "repository" };
-  return { url, owner: segments[0], repo: name };
-}
-
-// Design D9 step 2: the agent's fork of an upstream, https://HOST[:PORT]/<user>/REPO, or null for an
-// upstream that doesn't parse. The owner is always the agent's own Gitea user; nothing else names it.
-// URL.host drops a default port, so 443 counts the same on both sides.
-export function forkUrl(upstream, user) {
-  const { url, repo } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
-  return url ? `https://${url.host}/${user}/${repo}` : null;
-}
-
-// The refusal code for publishing `upstream` as an agent with `identity`, or null. Gitea compares
-// names without case (lower_name), so the owner check does too. An upstream or gitea.url that doesn't
-// parse is remote-not-granted: the business loader refuses both, so only a hand-built business gets
-// here.
-export function forkProblem(upstream, identity) {
-  const { url, owner } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
-  const instance = parseGiteaUrl(identity?.gitea?.url).url;
-  if (!url || !instance || typeof identity.gitea.user !== "string") return "remote-not-granted";
-  if (url.host !== instance.host) return "remote-host-mismatch";
-  if (owner.toLowerCase() === identity.gitea.user.toLowerCase()) return "remote-not-fork";
-  return null;
-}

packages/business/tests/agent-identity.test.mjs

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697): an agent's own git identity, its publish grant, the project's upstream and the
-// credential store reference. Design D1, D8, D9 step 2 and D9c.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { BusinessError, parseCredentialRef, validateBusinessDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
-import { forkProblem, forkUrl } from "../src/vocabulary.mjs";
-import { businessDoc, FAR_DATE, REPO_ROLES, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
-
-function refuses(fn, pattern) {
-  assert.throws(fn, (error) => {
-    assert.ok(error instanceof BusinessError, `expected BusinessError, got ${error}`);
-    assert.equal(error.exitCode, 2);
-    assert.match(error.message, pattern);
-    return true;
-  });
-}
-
-const IDENTITY = { name: "Coder", email: "[email protected]", gitea: { url: "https://git.example", user: "acme-coder" } };
-
-// The fixture with coder granted publish on stack, whose upstream is mosaic/stack.
-function check(mutate) {
-  const root = tmp();
-  const doc = businessDoc(root);
-  doc.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack";
-  doc.roles.coder.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY);
-  doc.roles.coder.publish = ["stack"];
-  mutate?.(doc, root);
-  return validateBusinessDocument(doc, join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
-}
-
-test("today's files load unchanged: identity, publish and remote are optional", () => {
-  const root = tmp();
-  const business = validateBusinessDocument(businessDoc(root), join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
-  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.identity, undefined);
-  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.publish, undefined);
-  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, undefined);
-});
-
-test("a granted agent loads with its identity, grant and the project's upstream", () => {
-  const business = check();
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...business.roles.coder.identity, gitea: { ...business.roles.coder.identity.gitea } }, IDENTITY);
-  assert.deepEqual([...business.roles.coder.publish], ["stack"]);
-  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, "https://git.example/mosaic/stack");
-});
-
-test("N10: publish needs identity and a gitea definition, and the error names the grant", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.roles.coder.identity; }), /roles\.coder\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.chief.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY); d.roles.chief.publish = ["stack"]; }),
-    /roles\.chief\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
-});
-
-test("publish names declared projects that have a remote, each once", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["books"]; }), /publish names books, which the business file doesn't declare/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.projects.stack.remote; }), /publish names stack, which has no "remote"/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = []; }), /publish/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["stack", "stack"]; }), /publish/);
-});
-
-test("identity fields are checked", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.email = "coder"; }), /identity\.email/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.name = "a\nb"; }), /identity\.name/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.extra = 1; }), /identity/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = ".."; }), /gitea\.user/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = "a/b"; }), /gitea\.user/);
-});
-
-test("D9c: the upstream must be its own normalized form, exactly /OWNER/REPO", () => {
-  const bad = {
-    "a dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/../mosaic/stack",
-    "an encoded dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/%2e%2e/mosaic/stack",
-    "an extra segment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/more",
-    "a missing segment": "https://git.example/stack",
-    "a trailing slash": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/",
-    userinfo: "https://u:[email protected]/mosaic/stack",
-    "a query": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack?x=1",
-    "a fragment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack#f",
-    "an explicit :443": "https://git.example:443/mosaic/stack",
-    "an upper-case host": "https://GIT.example/mosaic/stack",
-    "a backslash": "https://git.example\\mosaic\\stack",
-    "a name outside Gitea's rule": "https://git.example/mosaic/st%41ck",
-    "a dot-dot repo": "https://git.example/mosaic/...git",
-    http: "http://git.example/mosaic/stack",
-  };
-  for (const [what, remote] of Object.entries(bad)) {
-    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = remote; }), BusinessError, what);
-  }
-});
-
-test("D9c: one .git is stripped, and the fork is built from the stripped name", () => {
-  assert.equal(check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git"; }).projects.stack.remote,
-    "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git");
-  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack");
-  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example:3000/acme-coder/stack");
-});
-
-test("D9c: gitea.url names the instance only", () => {
-  for (const url of ["https://git.example/gitea", "https://git.example/gitea/", "https://git.example/?x", "https://git.example:443", "http://git.example"]) {
-    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = url; }), BusinessError, url);
-  }
-  check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = "https://git.example/"; });
-});
-
-test("the upstream's host and port must be the agent's Gitea's", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://other.example/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
-  assert.equal(forkProblem("https://git.example/mosaic/stack", { gitea: { url: "https://git.example/", user: "u" } }), null);
-});
-
-test("remote-not-fork: an upstream the agent's own user owns, compared without case", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
-});
-
-test("store references: own path only (design D1, D3a)", () => {
-  const store = { configDir: "/cfg", business: "acme", agent: "coder" };
-  const ref = parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store });
-  assert.equal(ref.file, "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
-  assert.equal(ref.store, true);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r"), /store/);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, file: "/a", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }), /exactly one/);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/pm/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }),
-    /credential-not-yours/);
-  assert.equal(parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }).file,
-    "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
-});

packages/business/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { validateRoleDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
 import { tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
 
 const WAITS = ["spend", "data.delete", "network.expose", "account.create", "credential.mint", "message.external",
-  "git.push.protected", "deploy", "git.push.remote"];
+  "git.push.protected", "deploy"];
 const LEFT = ["git.merge.protected", "policy.change", "prd.approve", "role.revoke"];
 const role = (authority) => {
   const dir = tmp();

packages/cli/README.md

@@ -1009,19 +1009,6 @@ names no one; the restart itself needs Mos's go or Jason's hand. A vars or launc
 prints `no restart`, because the launcher reads it at its next launch check.
 The Console Settings page has the same read and write (`packages/webui`).
 
-## credentials (row 199)
-
-`mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester]` lists each agent's
-credential kinds with date and state, never a value. `issue AGENT gitea
---rotate-by DATE` and `issue AGENT vikunja --expires DATE` read the token on
-stdin (pipe it, or paste it and end input) and send it once to the bus's
-`credentials.issue`; it is never an argument. `rotate` is the same over an
-entry the bus holds now, and refuses before reading stdin when there is none.
-`revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT` and `delete AGENT --reason TEXT` drop the
-entries; `delete` refuses `agent-running` while the agent holds a claim. With
-`--tester` only `status` and `revoke` run. After a rotate or revoke, delete
-the old token in Gitea or Vikunja yourself; the bus only forgets it.
-
 ## Token usage
 
 `mosaic usage [--business ID] [--json] [--tester]` reads the bus's accounting, without

packages/cli/src/cli.mjs

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import { projectBusCommand, projectCommand, PROJECT_BUS_USAGE, PROJECT_USAGE } f
 import { resolveThread, threadCommand, threadMembers, threadsCommand, THREAD_TALK_USAGE, THREAD_USAGE, THREADS_USAGE } from "./thread.mjs";
 import { limitsCommand, LIMITS_USAGE } from "./limits.mjs";
 import { pluginsCommand, PLUGINS_USAGE } from "./plugins.mjs";
-import { credentialsCommand, CREDENTIALS_USAGE } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { instancesCommand, INSTANCES_USAGE } from "./instances.mjs";
 import { createChannelCaller } from "../../plugins/src/channel.mjs";
 import { PluginError } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
@@ -39,7 +38,6 @@ export const USAGE = `usage:
   ${USAGE_USAGE}
   ${LIMITS_USAGE}
   ${PLUGINS_USAGE}
-  ${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}
   ${INSTANCES_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_BUS_USAGE}
@@ -578,8 +576,6 @@ export async function main(argv, io = { env: process.env, stdin: process.stdin,
   if (verb === "limits") return limitsCommand(rest,io,p=>callFor(p,io,deps));
   if (verb === "usage") return usageCommand(rest, io, p => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "plugins") return pluginsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
-  // Row 199 (#1697): issue and rotate read the token on stdin.
-  if (verb === "credentials") return credentialsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   // Row 165 (#1662): scripts/mosaic sends only `business instances` and `business instance` here.
   if (verb === "business") return instancesCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "talk") return talk(rest, io, deps);

packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-// `mosaic credentials` (row 199, #1697, design section 6): an agent's per-agent credentials through
-// the broker's credentials, credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and credentials.delete. Every verb
-// is the human's; with --tester (Q173) only status and revoke. issue and rotate read the token on
-// stdin, never argv, and nothing here prints it: the broker's answer carries the kind, date and state.
-import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
-
-export const CREDENTIALS_USAGE = "mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester] | issue|rotate AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE | " +
-  "issue|rotate AGENT vikunja --expires DATE | revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT [--tester] | delete AGENT --reason TEXT [--business ID]";
-const DATE_FLAG = Object.freeze({ gitea: "--rotate-by", vikunja: "--expires" });
-const MAX_TOKEN = 16384;
-
-function parse(args) {
-  const out = { positional: [], flags: new Set(), values: {} };
-  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
-    const arg = args[i];
-    if (arg === "--json" || arg === "--tester") out.flags.add(arg);
-    else if (["--business", "--rotate-by", "--expires", "--reason"].includes(arg)) {
-      if (!args[i + 1] || Object.hasOwn(out.values, arg)) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-      out.values[arg] = args[++i];
-    } else if (arg.startsWith("--")) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-    else out.positional.push(arg);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-// The whole of stdin, one token; a terminal shows what is typed, so a pipe or a paste then EOF.
-async function readToken(stdin) {
-  let text = "";
-  for await (const chunk of stdin) {
-    text += chunk;
-    if (text.length > MAX_TOKEN + 2) throw new CliError("refused: the token on stdin is too long", 2);
-  }
-  if (!text.trim()) throw new CliError("refused: no token on stdin; pipe or paste it, then end input", 4);
-  return text;
-}
-
-// The states the bus's status() gives a held token: gitea is valid or rotation-due, vikunja valid,
-// expiring or expired. not-issued and revoked hold none.
-const ISSUED = new Set(["valid", "rotation-due", "expiring", "expired"]);
-
-export async function credentialsCommand(args, io, callFor) {
-  const parsed = parse(args);
-  const [verb = "status", agent, kind, ...extra] = parsed.positional;
-  const v = parsed.values;
-  const shape = {
-    status: () => kind === undefined && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"] && !v["--reason"],
-    issue: () => agent && DATE_FLAG[kind] && v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] && !v[kind === "gitea" ? "--expires" : "--rotate-by"] && !v["--reason"],
-    revoke: () => agent && (kind === undefined || DATE_FLAG[kind]) && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
-    delete: () => agent && kind === undefined && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
-  };
-  shape.rotate = shape.issue;
-  if (extra.length || !shape[verb]?.()) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-  // Q173 (duckworth N1): a token the tester issued would pass through its session.
-  if (parsed.flags.has("--tester") && !["status", "revoke"].includes(verb)) {
-    throw new CliError(`--tester takes only status and revoke\n${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}`, 4);
-  }
-  try {
-    const call = callFor(parsed);
-    let result;
-    if (verb === "status") {
-      const rows = await call("credentials", {});
-      result = agent ? rows.filter((r) => r.role === agent) : rows;
-      if (!parsed.flags.has("--json")) {
-        io.stdout.write(result.map((r) => `${r.role}\t${r.service}\t${r.state}\t${r.dateKind} ${r.date}`).join("\n") + (result.length ? "\n" : ""));
-        return;
-      }
-    } else if (verb === "issue" || verb === "rotate") {
-      // rotate names an entry the bus holds now; checked before stdin is read.
-      if (verb === "rotate") {
-        const held = (await call("credentials", {})).find((r) => r.role === agent && r.service === kind);
-        if (!ISSUED.has(held?.state)) throw new CliError(`refused: ${agent} has no issued ${kind} credential to rotate; use issue`, 2);
-      }
-      const token = await readToken(io.stdin);
-      result = await call("credentials.issue", { agent, service: kind, token, date: v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] });
-    } else if (verb === "revoke") {
-      result = await call("credentials.revoke", { agent, ...(kind ? { service: kind } : {}), reason: v["--reason"] });
-    } else result = await call("credentials.delete", { agent, reason: v["--reason"] });
-    io.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
-  } catch (error) {
-    if (error instanceof CliError) throw error;
-    throw new CliError(error.message, 2);
-  }
-}

packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs

@@ -26,19 +26,6 @@
 //          squash that will land. The gate runs after the answer, and its
 //          outcome is the broker's: recordLand or landRefused, each on the
 //          task's trail and told to the role as a RESULT message.
-//   publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-//          (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D11). The host answers {"ok": true,
-//          "result": {fork, ref, commit, previous}} or a refusal. The broker's
-//          checkPublish names the fork, the agent's email, the source commit
-//          and the destination; the request names none of them. publish
-//          (working.mjs) checks the work ref and the commits' identity under
-//          the repository's lock, then the bus process runs ls-remote and the
-//          push with the agent's gitea token (publishPush), and the host polls
-//          publishResult every publishPollMs: the host's op channel answers
-//          one op at a time within 10 s. The poll ends at publishDeadlineMs
-//          (publish-timeout), past git's own limit on each of the four git
-//          runs. recordPublish files the push; any refusal after checkPublish
-//          is filed once, by publishRefused.
 //
 // A refusal is {"ok": false, "error": "<code>"}, and the connection ends.
 // The host checks, in order: identity (a role of this business), the request
@@ -77,10 +64,9 @@ import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, createReadStream, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
 import { createServer } from "node:net";
 import { join } from "node:path";
-import { GIT_GRACE_MS, GIT_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
 import { gitSocketPath } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
 import { gateEnv, isMosaicStack, rootHits, runGate } from "../../seat/src/landing.mjs";
-import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, publish, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
+import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
 import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
 
 const HEADER_MAX = 4096;
@@ -98,11 +84,6 @@ export const bodyDeadline = (size) => BODY_IDLE_MS + Math.ceil(size / BODY_MIN_R
 const MAX_ACTIVE = 8;
 // The longest close() waits for its host-closing answers to leave.
 export const CLOSE_WAIT_MS = 2000;
-// How often the host asks the bus process whether a publish's push ended.
-const PUBLISH_POLL_MS = 200;
-// The longest the host polls: publishRemote runs at most four git commands
-// (ls-remote, cat-file, merge-base, push), each ended by git's own limit.
-const PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS = 4 * (GIT_TIMEOUT_MS + GIT_GRACE_MS) + 30_000;
 const CAP = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
 const OID = /^[0-9a-f]{40}([0-9a-f]{24})?$/;
 
@@ -291,7 +272,7 @@ Applied-under: git socket land (bus host)
 // host: startHost()'s handle; business: loadBusiness() output. bundleMax,
 // bodyDeadline, bodyIdle, maxActive, fsck and gate (LAND_GATE's shape) are
 // for the tests.
-export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE, publishPollMs = PUBLISH_POLL_MS, publishDeadlineMs = PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS }) {
+export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE }) {
   const path = gitSocketPath(dataRoot);
   const dir = join(dataRoot, "bus-host");
   let server = null;
@@ -405,55 +386,6 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
     })();
   }
 
-  async function doPublish(socket, cap, req) {
-    const { task_ref, branch, decision } = req;
-    const p = project(req.project);
-    if (!p || !validBranch(branch) || (decision !== undefined && typeof decision !== "string")) throw new Refusal("invalid-request");
-    workRef(task_ref);
-    const facts = await op({ op: "checkPublish", cap, args: { task_ref, project: req.project, branch, ...(decision === undefined ? {} : { decision }) } });
-    const { ticket } = facts;
-    // From the ticket on, a refusal is the publish's own, filed once by publishRefused.
-    const refused = async (e) => {
-      const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof Recorded || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";
-      if (code === "git-failed") log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${code}: ${e.message}`);
-      await host.op({ op: "publishRefused", ticket, args: { code } }).catch((x) => log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: refusal ${code} not recorded: ${x.code ?? x.message}`));
-      return new Recorded(code);
-    };
-    let pushed;
-    try {
-      pushed = await publish({
-        dataRoot, business: b.id, project: req.project, root: p.root, taskRef: task_ref, source: facts.source, email: facts.email, env,
-        remote: async () => {
-          await op({ op: "publishPush", ticket });
-          const until = Date.now() + publishDeadlineMs;
-          for (;;) {
-            // The bus's git may still finish after this; the fork could then hold the commit with
-            // no record, as when recordPublish refuses after a push.
-            if (Date.now() >= until) {
-              log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: publish-timeout; the bus process's push may still reach the fork`);
-              throw new Refusal("publish-timeout");
-            }
-            await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, publishPollMs));
-            const r = await op({ op: "publishResult", ticket });
-            if (r.state === "pushed") return { ref: r.ref, commit: r.commit, previous: r.previous };
-            if (r.state === "refused") throw new Recorded(r.code);
-          }
-        },
-      });
-    } catch (e) {
-      throw await refused(e);
-    }
-    // The commit is on the fork now; a record the broker refuses is filed as that refusal.
-    let result;
-    try {
-      result = await op({ op: "recordPublish", ticket, pushed });
-    } catch (e) {
-      log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${pushed.commit} is on ${facts.fork} but wasn't recorded: ${e.code}`);
-      throw await refused(e);
-    }
-    socket.end(`${JSON.stringify({ ok: true, result: { fork: result.fork, ref: result.ref, commit: result.commit, previous: result.previous } })}\n`);
-  }
-
   async function serve(socket) {
     let cap = null;
     let subject = null;
@@ -478,8 +410,7 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
       if (req.op === "push") await doPush(socket, cap, req, rest, file);
       else if (req.op === "fetch") await doFetch(socket, cap, req, file);
       else if (req.op === "land") await doLand(socket, cap, req);
-      else if (req.op === "publish") await doPublish(socket, cap, req);
-      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch, land or publish");
+      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch or land");
     } catch (e) {
       if (e instanceof Recorded) return fail(e.code);
       const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";

packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs

@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@
 // launchedBy = the business's human and no caller capability.
 //
 // listen() also serves the git socket (src/git-socket.mjs, row 93), which
-// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working,
-// review.verdict or git.push.remote (row 199), or a merge decision to land
-// (landHeld, row 137);
+// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working or
+// review.verdict, or a merge decision to land (landHeld, row 137);
 // session.json names it as gitSocket.
 //
 // Thread sessions (row 121, #1615). A thread instance (an instance whose
@@ -398,9 +397,8 @@ export function createLauncher({
     const transcript = call(model.harness, "transcript", () => harness.transcript({ runDir, store }));
     const harnessMounts = call(model.harness, "mounts", () => harness.mounts({ env }));
     // Row 93: the git socket, for a role that pushes work or reviews it. Row 137: or lands it.
-    // Row 199 (D11): or publishes it, once a reviewed commit routes git.push.remote within-role.
     const held = [...resolved.limits.authority.withinRole, ...resolved.limits.authority.crossRole];
-    const git = land || ["git.push.working", "review.verdict", "git.push.remote"].some((a) => held.includes(a)) ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
+    const git = land || held.includes("git.push.working") || held.includes("review.verdict") ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
     writeSessionFile(runDir, {
       ...sessionDefaults,
       business: b.id,

packages/cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): `mosaic credentials`. issue and rotate read the token on
-// stdin and pass it once to credentials.issue; nothing printed carries it. --tester takes status and
-// revoke only. A fake transport records the calls; no bus runs here.
-import test from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { main } from "../src/cli.mjs";
-import { io, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
-
-const TOKEN = "fake_cli_token_0123456789";
-const MOSAIC = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../../scripts/mosaic", import.meta.url));
-const ROWS = [
-  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "valid" },
-  { service: "vikunja", account: "bot", role: "coder", dateKind: "expires", date: "2099-01-01", state: "not-issued" },
-  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "reviewer", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "revoked" },
-];
-
-function deps(calls, rows = ROWS) {
-  const answer = (who) => (business) => async (verb, args) => {
-    calls.push({ who, business, verb, args });
-    if (verb === "credentials") return rows;
-    if (verb === "credentials.issue") return { agent: args.agent, verb: "issue", service: args.service, date: args.date, state: "valid" };
-    return { agent: args.agent, verb: verb.slice(12), services: [] };
-  };
-  return { system: { dataRoot: "/nonexistent" }, transport: answer("human"), testerTransport: answer("tester") };
-}
-const withStdin = (x, text) => {
-  x.stdin.end(text);
-  return x;
-};
-
-test("row 199: issue and rotate send the stdin token once to credentials.issue and print no value", async () => {
-  const calls = [];
-  const d = deps(calls);
-  const x = withStdin(io(), TOKEN + "\n");
-  await main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls, [{ who: "human", business: "acme", verb: "credentials.issue", args: { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", token: TOKEN + "\n", date: "2099-01-01" } }]);
-  assert.equal(x.out.text.includes(TOKEN), false);
-  assert.equal(JSON.parse(x.out.text).state, "valid");
-  // rotate checks the entry is issued before it reads stdin.
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials", "credentials.issue"]);
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "vikunja", "--expires", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /no issued vikunja credential to rotate; use issue/);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
-  // No token on stdin, the date flag of the other kind, a token in argv: refused before any write.
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "\n"), d), /no token on stdin/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--expires", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "x".repeat(17000)), d), /too long/);
-  assert.equal(calls.filter((c) => c.verb === "credentials.issue").length, 0);
-  // From inside an agent run, the human's verbs refuse before any call.
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io({ CLAUDECODE: "1" }), TOKEN), d), /outside any agent run/);
-});
-
-// gizmoduck-0050: a gitea key past its rotate-by date is rotation-due, and rotate is how a human
-// clears it. Every state the bus's status() gives a held token rotates; the other two refuse.
-test("row 199: rotate goes ahead on each held state, rotation-due included, and refuses not-issued, revoked and an unknown entry", async () => {
-  const states = { valid: true, "rotation-due": true, expiring: true, expired: true, "not-issued": false, revoked: false };
-  for (const [state, held] of Object.entries(states)) {
-    const calls = [];
-    const d = deps(calls, [{ service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2020-01-01", state }]);
-    const run = main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
-    if (held) await run;
-    else await assert.rejects(run, /no issued gitea credential to rotate; use issue/);
-    assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), held ? ["credentials", "credentials.issue"] : ["credentials"], state);
-  }
-  const calls = [];
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "tester", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), deps(calls)), /no issued gitea credential/);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
-});
-
-test("row 199: status, revoke and delete; the tester runs status and revoke only", async () => {
-  const calls = [];
-  const d = deps(calls);
-  const x = io();
-  await main(["credentials", "status", "coder", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
-  assert.equal(x.out.text, "coder\tgitea\tvalid\trotateBy 2099-01-01\ncoder\tvikunja\tnot-issued\texpires 2099-01-01\n");
-  const j = io();
-  await main(["credentials", "--json", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], j, d);
-  assert.equal(JSON.parse(j.out.text).length, 3);
-  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], io(), d);
-  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
-  await main(["credentials", "delete", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => [c.who, c.verb, c.args]), [
-    ["human", "credentials", {}],
-    ["tester", "credentials", {}],
-    ["tester", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", reason: "fired" }],
-    ["human", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
-    ["human", "credentials.delete", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
-  ]);
-  calls.length = 0;
-  for (const args of [
-    ["issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
-    ["rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
-    ["delete", "coder", "--reason", "x", "--tester"],
-  ]) await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /--tester takes only status and revoke/);
-  for (const args of [["revoke", "coder"], ["delete", "coder"], ["delete", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "x"], ["revoke", "coder", "model", "--reason", "x"], ["purge", "coder"]])
-    await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], io(), d), /mosaic credentials/, args.join(" "));
-  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("row 199: scripts/mosaic sends credentials to packages/cli, not the seat CLI", (t) => {
-  const root = tmp(t, "mosaic-cli-cred-route-");
-  const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: join(root, "home"), MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(root, "none.json") };
-  const r = spawnSync(MOSAIC, ["credentials", "purge"], { env, encoding: "utf8" });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 4);
-  assert.match(r.stderr, /^mosaic: mosaic credentials \[status \[AGENT\]\]/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /mosaic launch </);
-});

packages/cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9, D9b, D11, T3): the git socket's publish op end to end. The socket,
-// working.mjs, the bus runtime (in this process, so its publishTls can name the scratch CA), the
-// per-agent store and a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1. The host stand-in answers the socket's ops
-// the way packages/bus/src/process.mjs does. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { chmodSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { connect } from "node:net";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
-import { startBroker } from "../../bus/src/runtime.mjs";
-import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from "../../business/tests/helpers.mjs";
-import { pushWorking } from "../../harness/src/git-tools.mjs";
-import { gitEnv } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
-import { workRef } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
-import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "../../seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs";
-import { createGitSocket } from "../src/git-socket.mjs";
-
-const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
-const TASK2 = "vikunja:1/3";
-const TOKEN = "fake_socket_token_0123456789";
-const TOKEN2 = "fake_second_token_0123456789";
-
-function git(cwd, ...args) {
-  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  return r.stdout.trim();
-}
-function commit(dir, text, email) {
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
-  git(dir, "add", "README");
-  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
-  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
-}
-function raw(path, req) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const s = connect(path);
-    let buf = "";
-    s.on("connect", () => s.write(`${JSON.stringify(req)}\n`));
-    s.on("data", (b) => (buf += b));
-    s.on("end", () => resolve(JSON.parse(buf.split("\n")[0])));
-    s.on("error", reject);
-  });
-}
-// The socket's ops, answered as process.mjs's launchOp answers them.
-const OPS = {
-  identity: (r, m) => r.identity(m.cap),
-  refuse: (r, m) => r.refuse(m.cap, m.code, m.subject),
-  checkPush: (r, m) => r.checkPush(m.cap, m.task_ref),
-  recordPush: (r, m) => r.recordPush(m.cap, m.push),
-  checkPublish: (r, m) => r.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args),
-  publishPush: (r, m) => r.publishPush(m.ticket),
-  publishResult: (r, m) => r.publishResult(m.ticket),
-  recordPublish: (r, m) => r.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed),
-  publishRefused: (r, m) => r.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args),
-};
-
-async function setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs } = {}) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "cli-publish-"));
-  const down = [];
-  t.after(async () => {
-    for (const fn of down) await fn();
-    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-  const ca = scratchCa(join(root, "ca"));
-  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(root, "gitea"), tls: ca, users: { coder: TOKEN, second: TOKEN2 } });
-  down.push(() => gitea.close());
-  const project = join(root, "project");
-  mkdirSync(project);
-  git(project, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  commit(project, "one", "[email protected]");
-  // Each agent's fork and the upstream, mosaic/stack, all clones of the root.
-  for (const owner of ["coder", "second", "mosaic"]) {
-    mkdirSync(join(gitea.repo(owner, "stack"), ".."), { recursive: true });
-    git(root, "clone", "-q", "--bare", project, gitea.repo(owner, "stack"));
-  }
-  const forkRepo = gitea.repo("coder", "stack");
-
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  writeJson(join(root, "businesses/demo.json"), { ...businessDoc(root, "demo"), plugins: { harness: ["pi"] } });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, "data"), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, "secrets", "agents"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, "secrets"), 0o700);
-  const agent = (user) => ({
-    authority: { withinRole: ["git.push.working", "message.send"], crossRole: [] },
-    identity: { name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: gitea.origin, user } },
-    publish: ["stack"],
-    credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", user, "gitea"), rotateBy: "2099-01-01" } },
-  });
-  const demo = {
-    id: "demo", human: "jason", arbiters: { technical: "reviewer", delivery: "reviewer" },
-    projects: { stack: { root: project, remote: `${gitea.origin}/mosaic/stack` } },
-    roles: {
-      coder: agent("coder"),
-      second: agent("second"),
-      reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send"], crossRole: [] } },
-    },
-  };
-  const dataRoot = join(root, "data");
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot, businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) }, publishTls: ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`] });
-  down.unshift(() => bus.close());
-  // A test sets hooks[op] to act around one op: hook(message, next), where next() answers it.
-  const hooks = {};
-  const host = { op: async (m) => (hooks[m.op] ? hooks[m.op](m, () => OPS[m.op](bus, m)) : OPS[m.op](bus, m)) };
-  const logs = [];
-  mkdirSync(join(dataRoot, "bus-host"), { mode: 0o700 });
-  const sock = createGitSocket({ host, business: demo, dataRoot, env: process.env, log: (l) => logs.push(l), publishPollMs: 20, ...(publishDeadlineMs ? { publishDeadlineMs } : {}) });
-  down.unshift(() => sock.close());
-  await sock.listen();
-
-  const caps = {};
-  for (const role of ["coder", "second"]) {
-    caps[role] = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: "demo", role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: "pi" });
-    bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "role.claim", args: {} });
-  }
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: "demo", human: "jason", via: "cli", outsideAgent: true });
-  // Each agent's workspace: a clone of the root with one commit of its own on feat, pushed to the
-  // working repo for its task.
-  const work = async (role, task) => {
-    const workspace = join(root, `ws-${role}`);
-    const tmp = join(root, `tmp-${role}`);
-    mkdirSync(workspace);
-    mkdirSync(tmp);
-    git(workspace, "clone", "-q", project, "stack");
-    const clone = join(workspace, "stack");
-    git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
-    const commitId = commit(clone, `work by ${role}`, `${role}@example.com`);
-    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps[role], workspace, tmp, task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
-    return commitId;
-  };
-  // A second commit on the coder's feat, pushed to the working repo through the socket.
-  const again = async () => {
-    const workspace = join(root, "ws-coder");
-    const commitId = commit(join(workspace, "stack"), "more work", "[email protected]");
-    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps.coder, workspace, tmp: join(root, "tmp-coder"), task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
-    return commitId;
-  };
-  const approve = (role = "coder", task = TASK) => {
-    const d = bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "decision.raise", args: {
-      action: "git.push.remote", target: task, task_ref: task, question: "Publish?", blocking: false, recommendation: "yes",
-      options: [{ key: "yes", text: "Yes" }, { key: "no", text: "No" }] } });
-    bus.broker.request(human, { verb: "decision.resolve", args: { id: d.id, choice: "yes" } });
-    return d.id;
-  };
-  const publish = (decision, extra = {}, role = "coder", task = TASK) =>
-    raw(sock.path, { cap: caps[role], op: "publish", task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat", decision, ...extra });
-  // The bus holds the writer lock; the test reads its events through a read-only handle.
-  const events = (kind, task = TASK) => {
-    const db = new DatabaseSync(join(dataRoot, "bus", "bus.sqlite"), { readOnly: true });
-    try {
-      return db.prepare("SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? AND subject=? ORDER BY seq").all(kind, task).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
-    } finally {
-      db.close();
-    }
-  };
-  return { root, bus, gitea, forkRepo, work: await work("coder", TASK), more: work, again, hooks, caps, approve, publish, logs, events };
-}
-
-test("T3 end to end: publish under an approved decision sends the work commit to the agent's own fork and records it once", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  // Nothing issued: the store has no token, and the refusal is filed once.
-  const first = w.approve();
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "credential-unavailable" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["credential-unavailable"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  const reply = await w.publish(first);
-  assert.deepEqual(reply, { ok: true, result: { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null } });
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
-  // Every request went to the agent's fork; the upstream, mosaic/stack, received none.
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path === "/coder/stack/git-receive-pack" && r.user === "coder"));
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
-  const allowed = w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise");
-  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.commit, w.work);
-  // The decision is spent.
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "decision-consumed" });
-  // T4: no token in any answer, event or log line, nor in any file under the scratch root but the
-  // agent's own store file.
-  assert.equal(JSON.stringify([reply, w.events("action.allowed"), w.events("action.refused"), w.logs]).includes(TOKEN), false);
-  const store = join(w.root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", "coder", "gitea");
-  const holding = readdirSync(w.root, { recursive: true })
-    .map((name) => join(w.root, name))
-    .filter((file) => lstatSync(file).isFile() && readFileSync(file).includes(TOKEN));
-  assert.deepEqual(holding, [store]);
-});
-
-test("T3 end to end: a fork the token can't reach is fork-unavailable, filed once, and nothing is recorded as allowed", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", "fake_wrong_token_0123456789", "2099-01-01");
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "fork-unavailable" });
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["fork-unavailable"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-});
-
-test("a bad branch or project refuses before the broker; a fork, user or ref in the request is ignored", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  const d = w.approve();
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { branch: "../main" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { project: "nope" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
-  // Filed through the socket's refuse op, as a bad push request is; no publish ticket opened.
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["invalid-request", "invalid-request"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-  // The broker builds the fork and the destination; the request's own are never read.
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  const reply = await w.publish(d, { fork: "https://127.0.0.1:1/other/stack", user: "other", dst: "refs/heads/main", ref: "refs/heads/main" });
-  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null });
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
-  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "-q", "--verify", "refs/heads/other/feat"], { env: gitEnv() }).status, 1);
-});
-
-test("T3 end to end: two agents, one project, each lands on its own fork only; the upstream receives nothing", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  const second = await w.more("second", TASK2);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/second", "gitea", TOKEN2, "2099-01-01");
-  assert.equal((await w.publish(w.approve())).ok, true);
-  const coderRequests = w.gitea.requests.length;
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "coder"], ["coder", "coder"]);
-  const reply = await w.publish(w.approve("second", TASK2), {}, "second", TASK2);
-  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/second/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/second/feat", commit: second, previous: null });
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests.slice(coderRequests)) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "second"], ["second", "second"]);
-  const refs = (owner) => git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.gitea.repo(owner, "stack")}`, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname) %(objectname)");
-  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes(`refs/heads/coder/feat ${w.work}`), true);
-  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes("refs/heads/second/"), false);
-  assert.equal(refs("second").includes(`refs/heads/second/feat ${second}`), true);
-  assert.equal(refs("second").includes("refs/heads/coder/"), false);
-  assert.equal(refs("mosaic").split("\n").length, 1, "the upstream holds only main");
-});
-
-// sage-1440 on BUILD.md 14: a push between checkPublish and the git push refuses, with one code
-// for each place it can come in, and the fork never receives a commit the decision didn't bind.
-test("T3: a push after checkPublish and before the lock refuses ref-moved; the fork receives nothing", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  w.hooks.checkPublish = async (m, next) => {
-    const facts = await next();
-    await w.again();
-    return facts;
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "ref-moved" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["ref-moved"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", "refs/heads/coder/"), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a push recorded while the bus process pushes refuses decision-mismatch; only the decision's commit reached the fork", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  // The working repo's lock is held through the git push, so a socket push would wait for it; the
-  // broker's record of a newer push is what a push that won the lock leaves.
-  w.hooks.publishPush = async (m, next) => {
-    w.bus.checkPush(w.caps.coder, TASK);
-    w.bus.recordPush(w.caps.coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat", ref: workRef(TASK), commit: "c".repeat(40), previous: w.work });
-    return next();
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "decision-mismatch" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["decision-mismatch"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
-  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("wasn't recorded")));
-});
-
-test("sage-1440: the publishResult poll is bounded: publish-timeout, filed once, and nothing recorded", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs: 150 });
-  let polls = 0;
-  w.hooks.publishResult = async () => {
-    polls++;
-    return { state: "running" };
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "publish-timeout" });
-  assert.ok(polls > 0);
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["publish-timeout"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("publish-timeout")));
-});

packages/seat/src/checkout.mjs

@@ -101,10 +101,8 @@ export function gitEnv(env = process.env) {
 // consequence: a Ctrl-C at the terminal of a host run by hand no longer
 // reaches its git, though a systemd stop still does (it kills the cgroup).
 // `stdin` names a file git reads as its input (row 137: patch-id); without
-// it git gets none. `pass` (row 199, publish) is written once to a pipe on
-// fd 3, which git and what it starts inherit; publish's credential helper
-// reads its token there, so the token is in no argv, env, URL or file.
-export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) {
+// it git gets none.
+export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null } = {}) {
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     let input = "ignore";
     try {
@@ -112,10 +110,8 @@ export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null, pass = nu
     } catch (e) {
       return resolve({ ok: false, out: "", err: "", why: e.code ?? e.message });
     }
-    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe", ...(pass === null ? [] : ["pipe"])] });
+    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe"] });
     if (typeof input === "number") closeSync(input);
-    // A git that never asked for it closes the pipe unread: EPIPE is no fault.
-    if (pass !== null) child.stdio[3].on("error", () => {}).end(pass);
     let out = "";
     let err = "";
     let signalled = false;

packages/seat/src/working.mjs

@@ -63,22 +63,6 @@
 //     compare and swap (base-moved), then record() runs; when it throws, main
 //     goes back, and a main that can't go back refuses rollback-failed.
 // dropLand removes the worktree; the caller runs it on every path.
-//
-// publish (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D9b) sends a recorded work commit to
-// the agent's own fork. It runs in two processes, because the gitea token
-// lives in the bus process and the lock in the host's:
-//   publish, in the host, under the lock: the seed; the work ref is at the
-//     source commit (ref-moved); every commit in main..source has author and
-//     committer email equal to the agent's (identity-mismatch); then
-//     remote(), which the caller wires to publishRemote in the bus process.
-//   publishRemote, in the bus process, with the token on fd 3 only:
-//     `ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD <dst>`; a non-zero exit refuses
-//     fork-unavailable. The fork's HEAD must be a commit this repository has
-//     and an ancestor of main (remote-unrelated, an empty fork included).
-//     Then `push <fork> <source>:<dst>` by oid, with no `+`. Only https
-//     crosses (protocol.https.allow), redirects are refused, and output
-//     holding the token refuses credential-leak. Git's stderr is never
-//     returned: it can carry the URL.
 
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -117,7 +101,7 @@ export const FSCK = ["-c", "transfer.fsckObjects=true"];
 
 // `limits` is { timeoutMs, graceMs }; the tests shorten them. runGit
 // (checkout.mjs) runs git in its own process group and signals the group.
-const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin, pass });
+const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin });
 // git with this call's env and limits, for the helpers below.
 const bound = (env, limits) => (args, opts = {}) => git(args, env, { ...opts, limits });
 
@@ -418,75 +402,3 @@ async function removeWorktree(repo, worktree, g) {
   if (!r.ok) rmSync(worktree, { recursive: true, force: true });
   await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "worktree", "prune"]);
 }
-
-// await publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env, limits })
-// Resolves what remote() resolves; rejects with WorkingError.
-export function publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
-  if (!PROJECT.test(project ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || typeof email !== "string" || !email) refuse("invalid-request");
-  const ref = `refs/heads/${workRef(taskRef)}`;
-  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project);
-  const g = bound(env, limits);
-  return locked(repo, async () => {
-    try {
-      if (!lstatSync(repo).isDirectory()) refuse("working-repo-invalid");
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e instanceof WorkingError) throw e;
-      refuse("working-repo-invalid", `${repo} can't be read: ${e.code}`);
-    }
-    await seed(repo, root, g);
-    const at = `--git-dir=${repo}`;
-    if ((await tip(repo, ref, g)) !== source) refuse("ref-moved", `${ref} isn't at ${source}`);
-    const range = await g([at, "log", "--format=%ae%x00%ce", `refs/heads/main..${source}`]);
-    if (!range.ok) refuse("working-repo-invalid", range.why);
-    for (const line of range.out.split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
-      if (line !== `${email}\0${email}`) refuse("identity-mismatch", `a commit in main..${source.slice(0, 12)} isn't by ${email}`);
-    }
-    return remote();
-  });
-}
-
-const HOST = /^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}(:[0-9]{1,5})?$/;
-const NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/;
-// The one-shot helper: for a `get` on https at exactly the fork's host and
-// port, it answers the user and the line it reads from fd 3. Anything else,
-// and `store` and `erase`, gets no answer. HOST and NAME keep both shell-safe.
-const helper = (host, user) =>
-  `!f() { test "$1" = get || exit 0; p=; h=; while IFS= read -r l; do case "$l" in protocol=*) p=\${l#protocol=};; host=*) h=\${l#host=};; "") break;; esac; done; ` +
-  `test "$p" = https && test "$h" = '${host}' || exit 0; IFS= read -r t <&3 || exit 0; printf 'username=%s\\npassword=%s\\n' '${user}' "$t"; }; f`;
-
-// await publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls, env, limits })
-// Resolves { ref, commit, previous }, previous being dst's tip on the fork
-// before the push, or null. `tls` is for the tests' scratch CA only.
-export async function publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls = [], env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
-  let url;
-  try {
-    url = new URL(fork);
-  } catch {
-    refuse("invalid-request");
-  }
-  if (url.protocol !== "https:" || !HOST.test(url.host) || !NAME.test(user ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || !dst?.startsWith(`refs/heads/${user}/`)) refuse("invalid-request");
-  const secret = String(token).trim();
-  const net = async (args) => {
-    const pre = [...tls, "-c", "protocol.https.allow=always", "-c", "http.followRedirects=false", "-c", "credential.helper=", "-c", `credential.helper=${helper(url.host, user)}`];
-    const r = await git([`--git-dir=${repo}`, ...args], env, { pre, limits, pass: `${secret}\n` });
-    if (r.out.includes(secret) || r.err.includes(secret)) refuse("credential-leak");
-    return r;
-  };
-  const g = bound(env, limits);
-  const listed = await net(["ls-remote", "--symref", fork, "HEAD", dst]);
-  if (!listed.ok) refuse("fork-unavailable");
-  let head = null;
-  let previous = null;
-  for (const line of listed.out.split("\n")) {
-    const [oid, name] = line.split("\t");
-    if (!OID.test(oid ?? "")) continue;
-    if (name === "HEAD") head = oid;
-    else if (name === dst) previous = oid;
-  }
-  if (!head) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork is empty");
-  const known = await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "cat-file", "-e", `${head}^{commit}`]);
-  if (!known.ok || !(await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", head, "refs/heads/main"])).ok) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork's HEAD isn't in main's history");
-  const pushed = await net(["push", "--porcelain", "--no-follow-tags", fork, `${source}:${dst}`]);
-  if (!pushed.ok) refuse(/\((non-fast-forward|fetch first)\)/.test(pushed.out) ? "non-fast-forward" : "push-failed");
-  return { ref: dst, commit: source, previous };
-}

packages/seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design T3): a fake Gitea for publish, on 127.0.0.1 over TLS with a scratch CA,
-// serving bare repositories under `<dir>/repos/<user>/<repo>.git` through git http-backend. Every
-// request needs Basic auth with the user and token it was made with, or with any pair in `users`,
-// as a private repository on Gitea does. It records each request's method, path and user, never the password. `redirect`
-// makes every request a 302 to `redirect`. A repository's own hooks run on a push, so a test can
-// make the fork echo something back as `remote:` lines. Nothing here leaves 127.0.0.1.
-import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { createServer } from "node:https";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-
-// A CA and a server certificate for IP 127.0.0.1, made once per directory with openssl.
-export function scratchCa(dir) {
-  mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  const ssl = (...args) => {
-    const r = spawnSync("openssl", args, { cwd: dir, encoding: "utf8" });
-    if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl ${args[0]}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  };
-  ssl("req", "-x509", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "ca.key", "-out", "ca.pem", "-days", "2", "-subj", "/CN=mosaic test CA");
-  ssl("req", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "server.key", "-out", "server.csr", "-subj", "/CN=127.0.0.1");
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "san.ext"), "subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1\n");
-  ssl("x509", "-req", "-in", "server.csr", "-CA", "ca.pem", "-CAkey", "ca.key", "-CAcreateserial", "-out", "server.pem", "-days", "2", "-extfile", "san.ext");
-  return { ca: join(dir, "ca.pem"), key: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.key")), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.pem")) };
-}
-
-export async function fakeGitea({ dir, tls, user, token, users = { [user]: token }, redirect = null }) {
-  const root = join(dir, "repos");
-  mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
-  const requests = [];
-  const server = createServer({ key: tls.key, cert: tls.cert }, (req, res) => {
-    const url = new URL(req.url, "https://127.0.0.1");
-    const auth = /^Basic (.+)$/.exec(req.headers.authorization ?? "");
-    const [who, pass] = auth ? Buffer.from(auth[1], "base64").toString().split(":") : [null, null];
-    requests.push({ method: req.method, path: url.pathname, user: who });
-    if (redirect) {
-      res.writeHead(302, { location: redirect + req.url });
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    if (!who || !Object.hasOwn(users, who) || pass !== users[who]) {
-      res.writeHead(401, { "www-authenticate": 'Basic realm="Gitea"' });
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    // /<owner>/<repo>/info/refs and the like, on <root>/<owner>/<repo>.git.
-    const m = /^\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+?)(?:\.git)?(\/.*)$/.exec(url.pathname);
-    if (!m) {
-      res.writeHead(404);
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    const cgi = spawn("git", ["http-backend"], {
-      env: {
-        PATH: process.env.PATH,
-        GIT_PROJECT_ROOT: root,
-        GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL: "1",
-        GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM: "1",
-        GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: "/dev/null",
-        HOME: "/nonexistent",
-        PATH_INFO: `/${m[1]}/${m[2]}.git${m[3]}`,
-        REQUEST_METHOD: req.method,
-        QUERY_STRING: url.search.slice(1),
-        CONTENT_TYPE: req.headers["content-type"] ?? "",
-        HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING: req.headers["content-encoding"] ?? "",
-        GIT_PROTOCOL: req.headers["git-protocol"] ?? "",
-        REMOTE_USER: who,
-        REMOTE_ADDR: "127.0.0.1",
-      },
-      stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"],
-    });
-    req.pipe(cgi.stdin);
-    const chunks = [];
-    cgi.stdout.on("data", (c) => chunks.push(c));
-    cgi.on("close", () => {
-      const out = Buffer.concat(chunks);
-      const split = out.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
-      const head = out.subarray(0, split).toString().split("\r\n");
-      const headers = {};
-      let status = 200;
-      for (const line of head) {
-        const [k, ...v] = line.split(":");
-        if (k.toLowerCase() === "status") status = Number.parseInt(v.join(":").trim(), 10);
-        else headers[k] = v.join(":").trim();
-      }
-      res.writeHead(status, headers);
-      res.end(out.subarray(split + 4));
-    });
-  });
-  await new Promise((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
-  const port = server.address().port;
-  return {
-    port,
-    origin: `https://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
-    requests,
-    repo: (owner, name) => join(root, owner, `${name}.git`),
-    close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(r)),
-  };
-}

packages/seat/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 3 to 5, D9a, T3): publish and publishRemote (src/working.mjs)
-// against a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1 (fake-gitea.mjs) with a scratch CA, passed only through
-// the `tls` parameter. Fake tokens in a scratch root. Each refusal that should reach the network
-// checks the fake saw the request, so no case passes because git refused https first.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { gitEnv } from "../src/checkout.mjs";
-import { publish, publishRemote, push, workingRepo } from "../src/working.mjs";
-import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "./fake-gitea.mjs";
-
-const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
-const TOKEN = "fake_publish_token_0123456789";
-const USER = "coder";
-const EMAIL = "[email protected]";
-const DST = "refs/heads/coder/feat";
-
-function git(cwd, ...args) {
-  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  return r.stdout.trim();
-}
-function commit(dir, text, email = EMAIL) {
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
-  git(dir, "add", "README");
-  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
-  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
-}
-const rejects = (p, code) => assert.rejects(p, (e) => e.code === code || assert.fail(`${e.code}: ${e.message}, wanted ${code}`));
-
-// A root, a coder's clone with work on feat pushed to the working repo, and a fake Gitea whose
-// coder/stack fork is a bare clone of the root.
-async function world(t, { fork = true, redirect = null } = {}) {
-  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "mosaic-publish-"));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const root = join(dir, "root");
-  mkdirSync(root);
-  git(root, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  const first = commit(root, "one", "[email protected]");
-  const clone = join(dir, "clone");
-  git(dir, "clone", "-q", root, clone);
-  git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
-  const work = commit(clone, "work");
-  const dataRoot = join(dir, "data");
-  mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 });
-  const file = join(dir, "b.bundle");
-  git(clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
-  await push({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
-  const ca = scratchCa(join(dir, "ca"));
-  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(dir, "gitea"), tls: ca, user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect });
-  t.after(() => gitea.close());
-  const forkRepo = gitea.repo(USER, "stack");
-  if (fork) {
-    mkdirSync(join(forkRepo, ".."), { recursive: true });
-    git(dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", root, forkRepo);
-  }
-  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`];
-  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, "acme", "stack");
-  const remote = (extra = {}) => publishRemote({ repo, fork: `${gitea.origin}/${USER}/stack`, user: USER, source: work, dst: DST, token: TOKEN + "\n", tls, ...extra });
-  const go = (extra = {}) => publish({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, source: work, email: EMAIL, remote: () => remote(), ...extra });
-  return { dir, root, first, clone, work, dataRoot, repo, gitea, forkRepo, tls, remote, go };
-}
-
-test("T3: publish pushes the work commit by oid to <user>/<branch> on the fork, with the token only through the helper", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: null });
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), w.work);
-  // Every request went to the fork's path, and each one that carried auth carried the agent's user.
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\/(info\/refs|git-receive-pack|git-upload-pack)$/);
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.user === USER && r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")));
-  // A second publish of the same commit is a no-op push and names the previous tip.
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: w.work });
-  // The working repo holds no remote and no credential config.
-  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.repo}`, "config", "--get-regexp", "^(remote|credential)\\."], { env: gitEnv() }).stdout.toString(), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a moved fork branch refuses non-fast-forward; no + and no force", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
-  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.root, other);
-  const elsewhere = commit(other, "elsewhere");
-  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${elsewhere}:${DST}`);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "non-fast-forward");
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), elsewhere);
-});
-
-test("T3: D9a: an empty fork and an unrelated fork refuse remote-unrelated; a missing fork refuses fork-unavailable", async (t) => {
-  const empty = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  git(empty.dir, "init", "-q", "--bare", empty.forkRepo);
-  await rejects(empty.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-  assert.ok(empty.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(empty.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
-
-  const unrelated = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  const alone = join(unrelated.dir, "alone");
-  mkdirSync(alone);
-  git(alone, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  commit(alone, "unrelated");
-  git(unrelated.dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", alone, unrelated.forkRepo);
-  await rejects(unrelated.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-  assert.equal(unrelated.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
-
-  const missing = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  await rejects(missing.go(), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(missing.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-});
-
-test("T3: a fork past main refuses remote-unrelated until root catches up", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
-  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.forkRepo, other);
-  const ahead = commit(other, "ahead");
-  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${ahead}:refs/heads/main`);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-});
-
-test("T3: a wrong token refuses fork-unavailable; git's stderr isn't in the refusal", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await assert.rejects(w.remote({ token: "fake_wrong_token_0123456789" }), (e) => e.code === "fork-unavailable" && e.message === "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", DST), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a 302 is not followed: fork-unavailable, and the target sees no request", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const target = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "target"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca2")), user: USER, token: TOKEN });
-  t.after(() => target.close());
-  const bounce = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "bounce"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca3")), user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect: target.origin });
-  t.after(() => bounce.close());
-  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${join(w.dir, "ca3", "ca.pem")}`];
-  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `${bounce.origin}/${USER}/stack`, tls }), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(bounce.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(target.requests.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("T3: the helper answers only the fork's host and port: a fork on another port gets no token", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  // The fork names port 1; insteadOf (through the tests' tls parameter) sends git to the fake's
-  // port. The helper was told port 1, so it answers nothing and no password goes out.
-  const before = w.gitea.requests.length;
-  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `https://127.0.0.1:1/${USER}/stack`, tls: [...w.tls, "-c", `url.https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/.insteadOf=https://127.0.0.1:1/`] }), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > before, "the rewritten URL reached the fake");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.slice(before).some((r) => r.user !== null), false, "no credential went to a host the helper wasn't told");
-});
-
-test("T3: a fork that echoes the token refuses credential-leak", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const hook = join(w.forkRepo, "hooks", "pre-receive");
-  writeFileSync(hook, `#!/bin/sh\necho ${TOKEN} >&2\nexit 0\n`);
-  chmodSync(hook, 0o755);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "credential-leak");
-});
-
-test("T3: no tls parameter, no trust: the scratch CA reaches git only through it", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await rejects(w.remote({ tls: [] }), "fork-unavailable");
-});
-
-test("D9 steps 3 and 4: ref-moved and identity-mismatch refuse before any request", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await rejects(w.go({ source: w.first }), "ref-moved");
-  const other = commit(w.clone, "by someone else", "[email protected]");
-  const file = join(w.dir, "b2.bundle");
-  git(w.clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
-  await push({ dataRoot: w.dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root: w.root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
-  await rejects(w.go({ source: other }), "identity-mismatch");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("publishRemote refuses a fork, user or destination that isn't shell- and ref-safe before any git", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  for (const extra of [
-    { fork: `http://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/${USER}/stack` },
-    { fork: `https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}'/${USER}/stack` },
-    { user: "co'der" },
-    { dst: "refs/heads/main" },
-    { dst: "refs/heads/pm/feat" },
-    { source: "HEAD" },
-  ]) await rejects(w.remote(extra), "invalid-request");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-});

packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs

@@ -80,11 +80,7 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         tree: null,
         bots: new Set([businesses[name].tracker.sync.botId, ...Object.values(s.roles).map((r) => r.botId)]),
         sync: use('@sync'),
-        // Row 199 (#1697, design D5): a request's call keys from the broker's session for its cap,
-        // never from a role name. probe is the host's own start check of each role's token.
-        as: (session, method, path, opts) =>
-          credentials.useFor(session, 'vikunja', (token) => call(token, method, path, opts)),
-        probe: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
+        as: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
         state: 'starting',
         refused: null,
         queue: Promise.resolve(),
@@ -100,7 +96,7 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         timers: [],
       };
       ctx.syncCall = (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.sync(method, path, opts);
-      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.probe(role, method, path, opts);
+      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.as(role, method, path, opts);
       ctx.handle = verbs(ctx);
       contexts.set(name, ctx);
     }

packages/tasks/src/startup.mjs

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
   if (probe.status === 404 || probe.status === 403 || outcome(probe) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
   expect(probe, 401, 'tracker-unexpected');
   for (const [role, r] of Object.entries(ctx.roles)) {
-    const control = await ctx.probe(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
+    const control = await ctx.as(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
     if (control.status !== 404 || control.json?.code !== 4002) {
       expect(control, 404, 'tracker-unexpected');
       refuse('tracker-unexpected');
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
     const probes = [['DELETE', `/tasks/${MISSING}`, undefined]];
     if (r.definition !== 'pm') probes.push(['POST', `/tasks/${MISSING}/labels`, { label_id: 1 }]);
     for (const [method, path, body] of probes) {
-      const p = await ctx.probe(role, method, path, { body });
+      const p = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
       if (p.status === 404 || p.status === 403 || outcome(p) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
       if (p.status !== 401) refuse(p.status === 0 || p.status >= 500 ? 'tracker-unavailable' : 'tracker-unexpected');
     }

packages/tasks/src/verbs.mjs

@@ -122,9 +122,8 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
   const relatedTo = (task, kind, other) =>
     Array.isArray(task.related_tasks?.[kind]) && task.related_tasks[kind].some((t) => t?.id === other);
   // One write with the acting role's token. An uncertain answer is settled by a re-read.
-  // `me` is the broker's session for the caller's cap (design D5).
-  async function step(me, method, path, body, at, done) {
-    const r = await ctx.as(me, method, path, { body });
+  async function step(role, method, path, body, at, done) {
+    const r = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
     const o = outcome(r);
     if (o === 'ok') return r;
     if (o === 'uncertain' && at !== null && done) {
@@ -145,7 +144,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     if (!mine) fail('tracker-role');
     if (PM_VERBS.has(verb) && mine.definition !== 'pm') fail('field-writer');
     const plan = prepare(verb, args, role, mine);
-    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, me, plan);
+    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, role, plan);
     const at = target(args.task_ref);
     const before = await read(at);
     if (args.expect !== undefined && args.expect !== before.digest) {
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let landed = 0;
     try {
       for (const [method, path, body, done] of work.steps) {
-        await step(me, method, path, body, at, done);
+        await step(role, method, path, body, at, done);
         landed++;
       }
     } catch (e) {
@@ -386,12 +385,12 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
         fail('unknown-verb');
     }
   }
-  async function create(cap, me, plan) {
+  async function create(cap, role, plan) {
     if (!ctx.broker.taskView(ctx.business, 'input', plan.request)) fail('request-not-found');
     await located(plan.others);
     ctx.broker.authorize(cap, 'task.create', { decision: plan.decision, target: null });
     // No re-read can find a create whose answer was lost, so an uncertain create is reported as such.
-    const r = await step(me, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
+    const r = await step(role, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
     if (r.status !== 201 && r.status !== 200) fail('tracker-unexpected');
     checkTask(r.json);
     const id = r.json.id;
@@ -400,9 +399,9 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let failure = null;
     try {
       for (const l of plan.labels)
-        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
+        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
       for (const x of plan.relations)
-        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
+        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
           relatedTo(a.task, x.kind, x.other),
         );
     } catch (e) {

roles/chief-of-staff.md

@@ -73,8 +73,7 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
-moves them.
+`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

roles/pm.md

@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
-moves them.
+`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

scripts/mosaic

@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ if [ "${1:-}" = business ]; then
   exec node "$REPO/packages/business/src/cli.mjs" "$@"
 fi
 case "${1:-}" in
-  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|credentials|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
+  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
 esac
 exec node "$REPO/packages/seat/src/cli.mjs" "$@"