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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes Agent c09392e0c4 fix(guard): classify Git option grammar
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Replace finite clone/worktree boolean allowlists with the closed separate-value grammar, including Git's accepted long abbreviations and bundled short options. Keep placement operands distinct from HOME-valued sources, metadata, commit-ish values, and rule-generated --no-* flags while preserving separate-git-dir and later-command traps.

Canonicalize shell-known HOME spellings, dot aliases, and existing symlink parents before placement comparison. Expand the hermetic suite from 242 to 292 fixtures and document the requirements and review evidence.

Deliberate residuals: a future unclassified value-taking clone placement option can fail open, and a future worktree value option can shift the inferred path; defaulting it to flag grammar avoids present-day over-blocking of Git's non-enumerable boolean family. PreToolUse symlink canonicalization is non-atomic against replacement after inspection; architectural closure is tracked by #1199.
2026-08-13 06:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 91cc37bcf6 fix(guard): inspect checkout placement operands
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Classify git clone and worktree add operands so HOME-valued environment assignments, sources, references, templates, and metadata do not impersonate checkout destinations. Preserve both forms of clone --separate-git-dir as real placement targets and distinguish shell words, command boundaries, and redirections in the existing quote-aware normalized stream.

Deliberate fail-closed residual: unknown future Git options with a separate following word are not adjudicated as source-only. Their value remains a possible placement, so a HOME-shaped value blocks rather than silently creating a bypass. Relative destinations whose effective path depends on cwd remain out of scope in #1197.
2026-08-13 05:55:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 20d86e392b fix(guard): end the home match at a shell word boundary, not at whitespace
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Rounds 8 and 9 of the same class, in the two halves of one line.

The path arm required the home token to be followed by `/`. That silently
made `$HOME` itself -- the exact target the rule names -- legal: `git worktree
add $HOME` cleared a guard whose message is "this checks a repository out
under $HOME". Reachability is not theoretical; the command succeeds against an
empty home directory. Trailing `/` was then admitted, and with it every
terminator that is not whitespace: `$HOME;`, `$HOME&&`, `$HOME|`, `$HOME&`
and end-of-string all cleared, 25 shapes in all.

The fix that did not happen is worth recording, because it was mine. The brief
for this round prescribed a closed continuation class, `([^A-Za-z0-9_.-]|$)`,
on the reasoning that terminator sets are open and continuation sets are
closed. That is true of some axes and false of this one: `+ @ , : = %` all
continue a FILENAME, so `$HOME+bak/wt` and five siblings like it would have
been refused -- a new over-block traded for a closed bypass, which is not a
trade. The implementer measured the six counterexamples and declined the brief
rather than pick between two acceptance conditions that cannot both hold. They
are now permanent fixtures; a rejected over-block that nothing pins comes back.

The axis that IS closed is word termination, and it is closed by specification
rather than by anyone's imagination: POSIX fixes the unquoted metacharacter set
at space, tab, newline, and | & ; ( ) < >. So the path normalizer marks those
as an internal word boundary, in the same state machine and by the same
mechanism as the existing literal-dollar and literal-tilde markers, which is
what lets a QUOTED or escaped metacharacter stay word content: `"$HOME;bak"`
is one word and must be allowed. A raw marker byte arriving in the input is
encoded first, so input cannot forge or suppress a boundary. The home token
must now be preceded by start, `=`, or a boundary, and followed by a boundary,
`/` for a descendant, or end.

Verified by oracle rather than against the brief -- `bash -c "printf '%s' WORD"`
performs expansion and quote removal without executing, so the expected verdict
comes from the shell instead of from the reading that has now been wrong once.
Fixtures 198 -> 230; the new ones are red at both prior heads (15 failing at
4b8eba95, 21 at 3d0a882a), so they measure the change rather than passing on it.

Known and deliberately not addressed here: a checkout target that never names
$HOME at all. A relative target resolves against the cwd, and every agent seat
on this host runs with a cwd under $HOME, so `git clone URL` with no target at
all lands in $HOME and is invisible to a rule that matches home spellings.
That is a different rule -- it needs the effective cwd, which `cd` inside the
command can move -- and it is filed separately rather than becoming round ten
in this file.
2026-08-13 05:08:01 -05:00
Hermes Agent 4b8eba95a3 fix(guard): apply word normalization to the path arm, not just the name arm
The quote/escape handling added over rounds 1-6 was wired into the command
NAME reading only. The PATH reading one line below it still matched the raw
text, so every spelling the name arm had learned to see was invisible to the
checkout check: `"$HOME"/wt`, `${HOME}/wt`, `"${HOME}"/wt` and a quoted
literal home path all cleared a guard whose entire purpose is to refuse them.
An identifier is not one spelling, and this file has now proven that seven
times; the arms of the rule were audited one at a time, and the class survived
in the arm nobody looked at.

The two readings need the same quote and escape handling but differ in one
respect, so this is one state machine with two modes rather than a copy:
substitution flattening is correct for a name and wrong for a path, where an
expansion-capable `$HOME` must stay visible. In path mode a shell-LITERAL
dollar or tilde -- single-quoted, escaped, or a quoted tilde -- becomes an
internal nonmatching marker, so quote removal cannot manufacture a home
spelling the shell would never expand, and `"~/wt"` is no longer refused.

`home_re` treats the braces as the pair they are. `$HOME}` expands HOME and
appends a literal brace; `${HOME` is not an expansion at all. Admitting either
as `${HOME}` would invent a home path the shell never resolves.

Verified by oracle rather than by assertion: for each spelling, `printf` under
bash performs expansion and quote removal without executing, and the resulting
path decides the expected verdict. 24 spellings, 0 mismatched here; 6
mismatched at 3d0a882a, which is what makes this a fix and not a rewrite.
Fixtures 184 -> 198.
2026-08-13 04:38:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 3d0a882a63 wrapper-guard: model quote removal and escaping as separate operations
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six of the same class: a program NAME is not one SPELLING. Two findings,
and the second is one this change's own predecessor introduced.

A FOURTH name consumer never went through the shared site. Checkout detection
still recognized git by a raw whole-command regex, so `g"it" clone`, `g'it'
clone` and `g\it clone` into $HOME were all allowed. `/usr/bin/git` blocked only
because the raw text still happened to contain contiguous `git` — the same
passing presentation that established nothing during the curl rounds. It now
uses CMD_NAMES and NAME_PREFIX like the other three, so all four consumers
share one definition of what a name looks like.

Routing it through NAME_PREFIX also repaired an over-block the arm had carried
from the start: the old regex found `git` INSIDE a longer word, so `mygit clone`
and `gitfoo clone` were refused at every previous head. That is the mycurl and
curl-wrapper class, and refusing it is how a guard gets routed around instead
of repaired.

The normalization itself was creating names the shell never runs. It deleted
every backslash regardless of quote context, but a backslash inside single
quotes is literal, so `'cu\rl' --config` names a program called cu\rl and was
refused. The same holds inside double quotes before any character other than
$, `, " or backslash. Both were false positives, and both were regressions —
the pre-PR head allowed them.

Quote removal and escape handling are different operations that were sharing
one context-blind deletion pass. They are now a small state machine that
follows the actual rule: outside quotes a backslash escapes the next character;
inside single quotes everything is literal; inside double quotes a backslash is
special only before $, `, " or backslash. Quote characters drop without
splitting the word, and the substitution flattening that makes `$(which curl)`
resolve to a bare name is unchanged.

An over-block is not the safe direction. A guard that refuses legitimate work
gets routed around rather than fixed, which is the same outcome as a bypass and
arrives faster.

Unchanged and still disclosed: names absent from the literal text — assembled
from braces or variables — remain invisible to text matching, and `$((curl))`
is over-matched at every head including the pre-PR one.

Fixtures: 173 -> 184. Every one added here discriminates against the previous
head 1c3e79a9 (8 fail there: 3 git bypasses, 5 over-blocks), and the positives
also fail at the pre-PR head df83a9ee. Suite green at head, bash -n and
shellcheck clean, enumeration gate 55/38/18.
2026-08-13 04:10:59 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1c3e79a9ed wrapper-guard tests: cover the shapes I had only reasoned about
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Test-only. No change to the guard; every case below already behaves
correctly at 46f52eed. They are committed because reasoning that a shape was
already covered is exactly what produced rounds four and five, and an
unmeasured belief about a security control is worth nothing.

Three fail at df83a9ee and pass here, so they discriminate:

    \curl --config /tmp/w.cfg              escaping the leading character
    cur"l" --config /tmp/w.cfg             the quote at a different offset
    g"h" api -X POST "repos/a/b/$EP" …     both halves dressed at once

`\curl` is the ordinary way to bypass a shell alias. It is a thing people
type, which makes it the least hypothetical entry in the file, and it was
not covered by any of the eight fixtures added in the previous commit.

The last one is the case I would have bet on breaking: the name gate reads
the normalized copy while the unreadable-endpoint tail reads RAW text, so
dressing BOTH halves at once is the input where those two readings are most
likely to disagree. They do not — the tail matches through the quote — but
the previous commit's message asserted that from reading the regex rather
than running it, and one round earlier the same kind of assertion was wrong.

Four negatives pass at BOTH heads and are here as regression guards: a
quoted read, an ordinary download, `gh --version` with no api subcommand,
and the word curl inside a string with no flag. Over-blocking is a real
failure and not a safe direction — a guard that refuses legitimate work gets
routed around instead of repaired, which costs more than the bypass it was
protecting against.

Suite 173/173.
2026-08-13 03:40:41 -05:00
Hermes Agent 46f52eedfe wrapper-guard: remove quotes instead of splitting on them; last name consumer
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on df83a9ee.
Measured against that head first; all eight returned rc=0 and each executes
the program the check exists to recognize:

    cu"rl" --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    cu'rl' --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/cu\rl --config /tmp/w.cfg       -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …      -> allowed
    /usr/bin/g\h api -X POST repos/a/b/… …   -> allowed
    curl --con"fig" /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …  -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …         -> allowed

BLOCKER 1. The previous commit said names are recognized "after quote
removal" and did not do that. It replaced quote characters with whitespace,
which is token SEPARATION: a shell removes a quote WITHOUT splitting the
word around it, so `cu"rl"` is one word naming curl, while whitespace made
it two words naming neither. `"/usr/bin/curl"` blocked under that version
only because the inserted space happened to land after a slash — a passing
case that established nothing about quote removal, and I read it as
confirmation. The characters are now DELETED, which is what quote removal
is. Backslashes go with them, because escaping is ordinary word formation
too. Deletion still handles substitution: `$(which curl)` becomes
`which curl`, where the name is a word on its own.

The flag is read from the same normalized copy for the same reason —
`--con"fig"` is one word spelling --config. No review raised that; the name
was simply the easier half to reach, and reading both halves the same way
is the entire point of having one normalization.

BLOCKER 2. A THIRD name consumer never went through the shared site: the
unreadable-endpoint arm kept a private bare-name copy of the scope gate's
regex against raw $CMD. A caller could be admitted by the repaired gate and
then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement — a gate and its own
refinement disagreeing about who the caller is, which is the defect one
layer downstream.

Fixing that surfaced the same mistake a third time inside this very edit:
my first version left the NAME in the refinement's tail regex, so the name
gate recognized `g"h" api` while the tail still demanded the undressed
spelling, and the two halves disagreed exactly as before. Caught by the
fixture, not by reading. Each half now asks one question: the name gate
asks WHO, from the normalized copy; the tail asks whether the ENDPOINT is
readable, from the raw text — deliberately raw, because the expansion
markers that make an endpoint unreadable are the characters the normalized
copy removes, and reading the tail from it would erase the evidence.

Controls: the 8 positive fixtures FAIL at df83a9ee and pass here; the
negatives — mycurl, curl-wrapper, mygh, mygh with an assembled endpoint, an
absolute-path read, and -K on a non-curl — pass at BOTH heads. Suite
166/166.

Unchanged and still stated in the comment rather than this message: a name
ABSENT from the text, assembled from variables or reached through a wrapper
script that execs the program, is invisible to any of this.
2026-08-13 03:36:42 -05:00
Hermes Agent df83a9eec2 wrapper-guard: recognize program names after quote removal, in one place
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-four remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on d99ff57e.
Measured against that head before anything was touched; all seven returned
rc=0, and each executes the program the check exists to recognize:

    "/usr/bin/curl" --config /tmp/w.cfg          -> allowed
    './curl' --config /tmp/w.cfg                 -> allowed
    $(which curl) --config /tmp/w.cfg            -> allowed
    `which curl` --config /tmp/w.cfg             -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …   -> allowed
    ./gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …          -> allowed
    /usr/local/bin/tea api -X POST repos/a/b/… … -> allowed

This is the third appearance of one defect, and the shape is worth stating
plainly because the first two repairs each fixed an INSTANCE and left the
class: the check matched the bare word, then it matched the unquoted
basename. Both were models of one TEXTUAL PRESENTATION of a shell word
rather than of the word, so the first repair was defeated by an absolute
path and the second by two quote characters. Recognizing a name is either
done after quote removal or it is caller-name parsing wearing a longer
regex.

The second blocker is the same defect sitting untouched in the API SCOPE
gate the whole time, while the curl arm was repaired twice beside it. That
one is worse than it looks: the scope gate decides whether write detection
runs AT ALL, so failing to admit `/usr/bin/gh api -X POST` is not a missed
match, it is an allow. No URL marker rescued those commands either —
provider CLI endpoints are spelled `repos/…` with no leading slash, so
`/repos/` never matched them.

Fix, and the reason it is one fix rather than two:

  - $CMD_NAMES — a second reading of the same command with quote and
    substitution punctuation turned into whitespace. Names are read from it.
  - $NAME_PREFIX — the one place the shape of a program name is written
    down. Both callers use it, so the next fix to this class lands in a
    single location instead of whichever arm review happened to probe. That
    is the actual lesson of finding this defect twice in one file.

The prefix still must end at a slash. `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs and blocking them is the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of repaired; both remain negative fixtures, and
`mygh` and an absolute-path READ join them.

The cost is the one this file already chose and documented for the payload
check: quoting an example does not exempt it, so writing one of these
commands inside quotes on a Bash line is refused too. Applying that rule to
the name arms makes the file coherent — the alternative is a guard where
the payload arm treats quotes as text and the name arms treat them as
armour.

Still open, stated rather than left to be found: a name absent from the
text — assembled from variables, or reached through a wrapper script that
execs the program — is invisible here. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something a pattern closes.

Controls: the 7 positive fixtures FAIL at d99ff57e and pass here; the 4
negative fixtures pass at BOTH heads, so they measure over-blocking rather
than decorate the diff. Suite 157/157.
2026-08-13 03:12:39 -05:00
Hermes Agent d99ff57e14 wrapper-guard: match curl by basename, not by bare word
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-three remediation of the single blocker gate-ultron-01 raised on
06046f76. Confirmed by measurement before being touched: all three spellings
returned rc=0 against that head.

    /usr/bin/curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg      -> allowed
    env /usr/bin/curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg         -> allowed
    ./curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg             -> allowed

The config file still owned the URL, method, body and headers in every one of
them, so each executed exactly the wrapped raw provider write the previous
commit was written to refuse, while the guard reported clean.

The mistake is worth naming precisely, because it is the one this file already
exists to refuse and I reintroduced it: recognizing the unqualified name only is
CALLER-NAME PARSING. `/usr/bin/curl` is not a different program from `curl`, and
a control that can be defeated by typing the absolute path is not a control. The
match is now on curl as a BASENAME — an optional prefix that must end at a
slash — so a path spelling costs the caller nothing and buys them nothing.

The prefix must end at a slash deliberately: `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs, and blocking them would be the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of fixed. Both are negative fixtures.

Still open and stated rather than left to be discovered: a wrapper script that
execs curl on the operator's behalf is invisible here, because neither the name
nor the request appears in the command text. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something this regex can close, and it is now written in the
comment above the check.

Controls: the three bypass fixtures FAIL against 06046f76 and pass at this head;
the two over-block fixtures pass against both. Suite 148/148.
2026-08-13 02:36:51 -05:00
Hermes Agent 06046f7675 wrapper-guard: close three fail-opens the last round left, and enumerate the large-repo test
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-two remediation of the four blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on f8d04d1b. All
four were confirmed by my own measurement before being touched; none is taken on
the reviewer's word.

1. The --config/-K refusal never ran. It sat nested inside `if API_SHAPED`, and
   API_SHAPED is a test for a provider URL in the command text — which is exactly
   what a config file removes. The check was guarded by the condition that the
   capability it guards against defeats, so `curl --config /tmp/write.cfg` walked
   past it. It now keys on curl itself, ahead of the URL gate, and covers the
   attached (`-K/tmp/f`) and bundled (`-sK`) spellings a space-separated test
   cannot see.

2. Percent-encoded endpoints are a live route, not a theoretical one. Measured
   against the provider: `…/issues/1174` and `…/iss%75es/1174` both return HTTP
   200 for the same object. A write carrying any percent-escape is now refused
   rather than decoded — a decoder has to be exactly right about depth
   (%2569 -> %69 -> i) and about the provider's own normalisation, and being
   approximately right there is indistinguishable from not checking. Scoped to
   writes: a read is never this hook's business and a query string carrying %20
   is an ordinary URL.

3. HOME was still expanded unguarded at the `W=` fallback, which runs before any
   of the new HOME adjudication — so a guard deployed without its siblings still
   died on an unset HOME, upstream of the fix that was supposed to survive it.
   Moving a fail-open earlier in the file is not closing it. HOME is now resolved
   once, above every use, and every later site reads the resolved value.

   The existing harness could not have caught this: it runs the guard beside its
   siblings, so `[ -x "$W/pr-review.sh" ]` always succeeded and the fallback was
   never reached. A test's blind spot can be a property of the harness rather
   than of the code. The new lone_case() block copies the guard alone into an
   empty directory and re-asserts the four behaviours there.

4. test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh shipped at mode 100644 and appeared in no
   CI step, so the enumeration guard (#1017) redded pipeline 2386 — correctly.
   Committed mode is now 100755 and the test is enumerated in the sanitization
   step. My own process miss: I verified the CI queue before pushing and never
   verified terminal CI after.

Controls: the 25 fixtures added here all FAIL against 029af418 (rc 0 or 1 where 2
is required) and all pass at this head, 143/143.
2026-08-13 02:18:35 -05:00
Hermes Agent f8d04d1bf4 wrapper-guard: decide allows on the shell's reading, not on the whole command text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Four blockers from adversarial review, and three are one defect wearing three
hats: a test over the WHOLE command text deciding an ALLOW. That is the
fail-open shape this file keeps rediscovering, and it had reached the
break-glass itself.

- Break-glass read POSITIONALLY. `case $CMD in *MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1*)`
  cleared the entire command if that string appeared anywhere in it, so quoting
  the override in a note, naming a variable after it, or writing =10 disabled
  the guard for the call sitting beside it. Now only leading NAME=value
  assignments count, exactly where the shell would honour one. Cost, pinned as a
  fixture: an override after `&&` no longer arms.

- $HOME resolved once, and unset / empty / "/" refused. This was filed as a
  checkout-arm defect and is larger: under `set -u` the old file died at line 62
  on EVERY command with HOME unset, exit 1, before the API arms or the APPROVE
  trap ran. A seat with no HOME (systemd unit, container, env -i) had no guard at
  all. A checkout whose question cannot be asked now blocks; the blast radius is
  asserted to be that one command shape and not the session.

- Subresource refinement inverted. It asked whether a subresource appears
  anywhere in the command, so `gh api -X PATCH .../issues/1 -f body=cf-/pulls/2/files`
  was cleared on the strength of text in its own body. It now clears only when
  EVERY numbered-object occurrence carries a subresource.

- -K/--config refused. curl reads the method, body, headers and URL from that
  file, so none of them are in the command: every write test read 0 and the call
  went through. An unreadable request is not a cleared one.

mosaic-worktree: never close a git pipe early

resolve_repo took the first porcelain line with `awk ... exit`, which closes the
read end while git is still writing. git takes SIGPIPE, pipefail returns 141, and
the function aborts SILENTLY — no message, no path, exit 141. It fires as a
function of REPO SIZE: fine on three worktrees, reliable on seventy. Measured at
73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain): rc=141, no output. The file already removed a
`head -200` for this exact reason; the rule is now uniform.

Evidence — every new case run against 029af418, the tree before these fixes:

  test-wrapper-guard.sh              130/130 pass here; 15 FAIL against 029af418
  test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh   2/2 pass here;  2 FAIL against 029af418
                                       (got rc=141 and empty output, the signature)

No pre-existing fixture changed behaviour on the old guard, so the new cases are
the whole delta. The size dependence is stubbed out rather than inherited: a test
that ran against whatever repo it sits in would have PASSED on the broken tree.
2026-08-13 01:57:07 -05:00
Hermes Agent 029af418f0 wrapper-guard: name the marker every forge API shares, not one dialect's
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
The scope gate asked for a scheme URL, a `/api/v[0-9]` path, or a provider-CLI
`api` subcommand. `/api/v[0-9]` is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no
version segment at all -- `api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues` -- so the schemeless
Gitea write was in scope and the schemeless GitHub one was not:

    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues              rc 0
    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments   rc 0
    host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues rc 0

A gate calibrated to one provider's spelling rather than to what identifies a
provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both dialects share -- every forge API
addresses a repository through it -- so the gate now names both.

This is SPAN a third time, and the third layer it has appeared on. Round 8: a
block message named a wrapper that could not make the call. Round 9: a map
claimed a span its wrapper did not cover. Round 10: a control claimed a surface
it did not measure. Here the scope gate itself claimed a class of API and
recognised one member of it. Same question each time -- does this thing SPAN
what it claims -- and it has now been the answer four rounds running, which is
the argument for asking it of every arm rather than of the reported one.

Widening a scope gate can only make the guard stricter. Downstream a block still
requires a body flag AND either a mapped endpoint or an unreadable one, so this
widens what is CONSIDERED, not what is refused. The three fixtures asserting that
-- a schemeless GitHub read, an unwrapped GitHub endpoint, and a read past `--`
-- exist to hold that claim to account rather than state it.

Also: the provider-CLI arm's option scanner required a letter after the dashes,
so `gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x` walked its endpoint straight past.
The end-of-options marker is the one option not spelled like one, and a scanner
that skips options had to be told so.

Because the new endpoints are READABLE, each blocked fixture asserts the wrapper
its message must name. A rc-only fixture here would have passed on the unreadable
arm and proved nothing -- which is the failure mode this suite caught in itself
last round.

Evidence: 110/110 fixtures (was 101) locally and in ci-base. Negative-controlled
per change, not in aggregate: dropping `/repos/` from the gate fails exactly the
five GitHub fixtures; dropping the `--` alternative fails exactly one; neither
disturbs a pre-existing fixture. 18-command sweep unchanged (same three round-6
flips, nothing new); 12-command ordinary-work sweep 0 blocked. shellcheck clean
at warning+. CI 2374 on the previous head was green across all nine steps.

Residual, stated rather than implied: a caller who splits `/repos/` itself in a
schemeless GitHub URL leaves no literal marker anywhere and is out of scope --
the same boundary as splitting the hostname, and no longer a mistake anyone
makes by accident.

Round 11, addressing rev0 review 154.
2026-08-12 19:07:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 51746f44eb wrapper-guard: fail closed on an unreadable endpoint in every shape the scope gate admits
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-9 review found the fail-closed rule narrower than the block it guards.
The scope gate admits three shapes — a scheme URL, a schemeless /api/vN path,
and a provider CLI's `api` subcommand — but the unreadable-endpoint test asked
only for https?://. So a split endpoint token in the other two shapes was in
scope to be blocked, produced no readable endpoint, and fell through to ALLOW,
while the identical split behind a literal scheme blocked.

Four writes reaching the provider unexamined, one of them a review verdict:

  p=repos/a/b/iss;              q=ues;     gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x
  p=repos/a/b/issues/1/comm;    q=ents;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f body=x
  p=repos/a/b/pulls/1/rev;      q=iews;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f event=APPROVED
  p=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss;      q=ues;     curl -X POST -d x host${p}${q}

This is the same defect class as the milestone arm one round earlier, one layer
up: there the map claimed a span its wrapper did not cover, here a control
claimed a surface it did not measure. A control is only as wide as its narrowest
arm, and widening the scope gate without widening the fail-closed rule left the
gap exactly where the gate had just been extended.

Three arms now, one per admitted shape: a scheme URL token carrying an
expansion; a schemeless token carrying both a forge fragment and an expansion,
in either order; and the endpoint argument of a provider-CLI api call, read
positionally. Limits are stated in the source rather than implied — a caller who
splits the hostname as well, and an endpoint pushed past an option whose value
contains whitespace, are both outside what this measures.

An expansion in a BODY is explicitly not unreadable. Passing a payload in a
variable is the safe practice and leaves the endpoint fully legible; blocking it
would have been a control punishing the behaviour it wants.

101/101 fixtures, up from 92. Each arm is negative-controlled separately:
removing the schemeless arm fails exactly the two schemeless fixtures, removing
the provider-CLI arm fails exactly the four CLI fixtures, and neither disturbs
any pre-existing fixture. One added fixture was rewritten after it passed for
the wrong reason — its endpoint was readable, so it blocked on the endpoint map
and never exercised the arm it was written for.

Evidence: 101/101 locally and in ci-base; shellcheck clean at warning+; a
12-command sweep of ordinary forge work — reads with split endpoints, bodies in
variables, unwrapped endpoints, an artifact PUT — blocks none of them; the
18-command sweep still blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.
2026-08-12 18:53:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1bfd0ddd71 wrapper-guard: an arm may only claim the span its wrapper actually covers
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round eight replaced an absence-driven allow with an endpoint inventory, and
review found the inventory answered the wrong question. It recorded which
wrapper TOUCHES an endpoint, when the sound question is whether the wrapper
SPANS it. A PATCH to a numbered milestone blocked with "use milestone-close.sh".
That wrapper takes only -t <title> and sends state=closed on both the gh and tea
paths, so it cannot express a title, description or due-date edit. The block was
correct and the advice was not — the same remediation-accuracy defect as the
round-seven subresource arm, one step quieter, because a wrapper was rounded up
from owning a slice to owning the endpoint.

The treatment already existed two arms away: /pulls/{n} named pr-close.sh for
state and said in the message that a PR title/body edit is a real wrapper gap.
So this was a consistency failure rather than a missing idea, which is why the
fix is not just the reported arm. Auditing every arm for span against the flags
each script accepts found a second bad one that review had not reached:
/pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers was mapped to pr-review.sh, and pr-review.sh
takes -a <action> -c <comment> and files a verdict. Nothing in this tree adds a
requested reviewer, so that arm was advertising a wrapper that cannot make the
call. It is unowned and now flows through, like a comment edit.

Changes:
  - /milestones/{n} keeps blocking, and the message states that milestone-close.sh
    owns the close only while title/description/due-date is a wrapper gap.
  - /pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers becomes residue, above the reviews arm so it
    cannot be refused with "use pr-review.sh".
  - /issues/{n} now also names issue-assign.sh, which owns the assignee field;
    issue-edit.sh has no assignee flag, so the old advice was short by one wrapper
    for a PATCH that sets one.
  - The map comment carries a span column, so a future arm has to state what its
    wrapper covers rather than imply all of it.

Fixtures assert the span language, not just the wrapper name: the milestone edit
must say it owns the close only, and a PATCH setting an assignee must name
issue-assign.sh. Negative-controlled — reverting each of the three behaviours
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

92/92 (was 89), locally and in ci-base. shellcheck clean at warning+. The
18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.

Gates: fixtures 92/92 in ci-base, shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:36:23 -05:00
Hermes Agent a3cacac7fb wrapper-guard: make subresource ownership an inventory, and check the advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round seven fixed "wrong wrapper advice" by letting every path under a numbered
issue or PR flow through, on the stated reasoning that no wrapper owned any of
them. Review checked that reasoning against the directory and it was false:

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f title=x
  curl -X PATCH -d @b https://host/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1
  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1/labels -f labels[]=bug
  gh api -X POST  repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u

issue-edit.sh takes --title/--body/--labels/--milestone and issue-assign.sh
takes assignee/labels/milestone, so all four are wrapped calls and all four
returned 0. The guard answered "allow" because wrapper ownership had been
ASSUMED absent rather than looked up — the same absence-driven allow this file
exists to remove, committed inside the fix for it. I withdraw the round-seven
departure: the reviewer's position was right on the evidence, and my argument
for it was sound reasoning applied to a fact I never checked.

The endpoint map is now an inventory read off tools/git/*.sh and their flags:
assignees to issue-assign.sh, labels to issue-edit.sh (naming issue-assign.sh
alongside it, since both set them), a numbered issue to issue-edit.sh (naming
issue-close.sh/issue-reopen.sh for state), a numbered PR to pr-close.sh (with
the PR title/body gap stated in the message rather than papered over), and
/milestones/{n} to milestone-close.sh instead of the create wrapper.

The residue is defined by SUBTRACTION, not by listing provider API surface:
everything a wrapper owns is consumed by an arm above, so a numbered path that
reaches the end is owned by nothing and still flows through — times, stopwatch,
reactions, a comment edit at /issues/comments/{id}. A list would rot the moment
a provider adds an endpoint, and rot in the blocking direction with wrong advice.

That residue test is a regex, deliberately. `case` globs cannot express a path
SEGMENT, so the natural allow arm *"/issues/"[0-9]*"/"* clears

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body="see /docs"

on the strength of a slash inside the body. An allow decided by a glob over the
whole command is the fail-open shape again; the regex pins the segment to the
number, and that command is pinned as a fixture.

Also: `-f labels[]=bug` was not read as a body at all, because the key class
stopped at the bracket. The array spelling is what the provider CLIs use for
repeated fields, so an implicit POST carrying only array fields was invisible.

And the reason six rounds of this were invisible: the harness read the exit code
and nothing else, so a block naming the WRONG wrapper passed every run. Fixtures
may now state the wrapper the message must name, and the wrapped ones do. The
assertion was negative-controlled — pointing one fixture at the wrong wrapper
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

89/89 (was 79), locally and in ci-base. All eight sanitization commands green
in-image. The 18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips
and nothing new, so the tighter map cost nothing on ordinary work.

Gates: sanitization (all eight green in ci-base), shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:25:13 -05:00
Hermes Agent b4578dcd0a wrapper-guard: close the absence shape at the new boundary; stop giving wrong advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six deleted the code/data parser and scoped what remained on `https?://`.
Review found the failure class had not been eliminated, only relocated: a raw
provider CLI carries no scheme, so the scope gate answered "not my business"
because the URL was ABSENT — the same shape, at the new boundary.

  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x -f body=y
  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE
  tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/comments -f body=x
  curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues

All four were real writes to endpoints a wrapper owns, and all four passed.
Constitution gate 7 names raw provider CLIs explicitly, so they are in scope
rather than something to narrow the docs around. The scope gate now also
triggers on `/api/v{n}` and on the `api` subcommand of the provider CLIs, and
`-f key=value` joins curl's `-d` as an implicit POST. Adding triggers to a scope
gate can only make it stricter — it cannot open a new hole — which is why this
is a list of shapes rather than a model of any one caller.

The boundary is stated in the file rather than left to be discovered: provider
PORCELAIN (`tea pulls create`) is NOT covered, because catching it means
modelling every CLI's verb grammar, which is the parser mistake wearing a new
costume. That is a wrapper-and-review gap, not a thing this hook can hold.

Second finding, and the one I had flagged as my own worry: the endpoint `case`
was prefix-greedy, so `/issues/1/labels` blocked with "use issue-create.sh" —
the wrong wrapper for that call. A block an agent cannot comply with is worse
than no block, because it teaches that the hook is broken and the override is
routine, and an override that is routine is a guard that is off. Issue and PR
subresources now flow through, exactly as /releases and every other endpoint no
wrapper owns already does. This hook enforces "use the wrapper"; where there is
no wrapper it has nothing to enforce, and the gap belongs in the wrapper set.

I am departing from the review on that one deliberately: the review held that
blocking is correct there and only the remediation wrong. Naming a wrapper gap
in a refusal keeps gate-7 pressure, but it makes the override the normal path
for every labels and assignees call, which spends the override's meaning on the
cases where it is least needed.

Also: the APPROVE trap now catches the provider-CLI spelling `-f event=APPROVE`
alongside the JSON body, and still never matches the correct value APPROVED.

79/79 fixtures, locally and inside the CI image, with both blockers pinned in
both directions — the four repros block and name the right wrapper, while a
provider-CLI read, an unwrapped endpoint reached through one, porcelain, and the
`rm -f`/`grep -f` collisions all still pass. The 18-command ordinary sweep
blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new, so the broader gate cost
nothing on ordinary work. Second over-block documented rather than found: prose
carrying `.post(` near a wrapped URL is refused, which follows from judging the
payload and is now stated next to the quoted-curl cost.

Gates: sanitization (all eight commands green in ci-base), shellcheck clean.
2026-08-12 18:10:19 -05:00
Hermes Agent b1254f52f3 wrapper-guard: judge the payload, not the caller — delete the code/data parser
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five review found command substitution executing inside the very quoted
spans the skeleton was discarding as prose:

  echo "$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"
  msg="$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"

The unquoted and process-substitution forms already blocked, so the same call
was refused or allowed depending on a quote character. That makes it a
classification defect rather than another spelling, and it is the nineteenth
write to reach execution through this file by the same route: the client was
ABSENT from the skeleton, so the guard allowed.

The reviewer's judgement, which I asked for and accept: this is fitting to the
test set. Answering "code or data" from shell text with sed and awk is not a
hard problem, it is the wrong problem.

It was also not portable. CI has been red at `sanitization` since round four,
and the log says why: under the image's busybox awk the octal escape in the
quote-stripping regex does not bite, every quoted span survives into the
skeleton, and the guard began refusing ordinary prose. Five allow-direction
fixtures failed in CI that pass under GNU awk. A control that reverses its
verdict with the awk on the host is not a control.

So the client detection is gone — the skeleton, the invoker list, the prefix
list, the option-value skipping, all of it. What remains asks two questions of
the text: is this a write, and does it name an endpoint a wrapper owns. It
cannot fail open by hiding the caller because it never looks for one, and it
now catches clients it was never taught: `python -c ... requests.post(...)` and
`wget --post-data` are both fixtures.

The cost is stated in the file and pinned in both directions: QUOTING one of
these calls on a Bash command line is refused as well. Ten fixtures that used
to assert "discussing a call is not making one" now assert the opposite, and
the boundary that stops this becoming block-everything is asserted just as
hard — a quoted READ, an endpoint named without a body flag, a quoted write to
an UNWRAPPED endpoint, and the wrapper's own body flag all still pass. The
18-command ordinary-work sweep blocks none.

The rule an agent can hold without a parser: do not put a raw write to a
wrapped forge endpoint on a Bash command line, not even inside quotes. Write
the example with a file-writing tool.

60/60 fixtures, verified inside the CI image (busybox) as well as locally.
Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), issue-close, prettier.
2026-08-12 17:59:14 -05:00
Hermes Agent 2a2a87251a wrapper-guard: read the command the shell will run, and stop losing the client behind option values
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-four review, three more absence-driven allows.

1. The guard read the command as TYPED. A backslash before a newline is removed
   before anything else happens, so an endpoint token split across the join
   (`.../iss\` + newline + `ues/1/comments`) executed the comments endpoint while
   the literal token never appeared in the text. Continuations are now joined
   before every check, because the joined form IS the command. This is the same
   defect as the split-across-variables case, minus the excuse: there the token
   genuinely does not exist until the shell expands it, here it was sitting in
   the input the whole time and the guard chose the wrong reading of it.

2. Transparent prefixes take option VALUES. `sudo -u root curl` hid a live write
   because `root` was a word the prefix list did not know. Enumerating option
   grammars per prefix is the wrong game, so what is skipped is an option and at
   most one value for it, plus a bare duration for `timeout` — never an
   arbitrary word. `xargs echo curl ...` therefore stays ALLOWED, because there
   the command is echo and the client is its argument.

3. `find -exec` runs the client. It opens command position the same way an
   operator does, and now reads that way.

All seven reviewer repros are fixtures, each with its counter-case in the
allowed direction: a continuation inside a heredoc document stays a document,
`xargs echo curl` stays allowed, `sudo apt-get install curl` stays allowed, a
prefixed READ stays allowed. 48/48, and the 18-command ordinary sweep still
blocks none.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent e6a881a795 wrapper-guard: judge command position on prefixes and on what a shell will execute
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-three review found two more absence-driven allows, both in the skeleton
introduced by round two, and fixing them exposed a third the reviewer had not
reached yet.

1. A word in front of a command does not displace the command. `env VAR=v curl`,
   `command curl`, `timeout 10 curl` and `/usr/bin/curl` were all real writes at
   execution position that a bare-name match could not see. The `env` form is the
   one that matters: it is what an agent reaches for to keep a credential out of
   the global environment, so the careful spelling was the invisible one.

2. Quoted data stops being data when a shell is about to execute it, and the
   first version knew only `bash -c`, `sh <<` and `eval`. It did not know the
   pipe, which is the form people actually use: `printf ... | sh`, `cat <<EOF | sh`,
   `sh -s <<EOF` each made a live call vanish from the skeleton while still
   running.

3. Found while testing the fix: that decision was made for the WHOLE command, so
   a single unrelated `docker run ... sh -c 'echo hi'` promoted every other
   quoted span on every other line to code. It blocked its own author for the
   second time in a day. A shell on one line does not execute a string on another
   line, and over-blocking is not the safe direction — a guard that blocks
   ordinary work gets switched off, and a guard that is off permits everything.
   The skeleton is now built per line, and a heredoc body is code only when the
   line that opened it fed a shell.

All seven reviewer repros are pinned as fixtures, each with a counter-fixture in
the allowed direction: `echo timeout 10 curl ...` is not a call, a pipe to `wc`
is not execution, an unrelated shell on another line changes nothing. Fixtures
40/40, and a sweep of 18 ordinary commands blocks none of them.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:39:05 -05:00
Hermes Agent 7962e4302f guard: judge command position on the code, not on the text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
The position test added an hour ago blocked its own author. The message being
sent quoted one of the fixtures, so the quoted text contained an operator
followed by a client, and an operator inside a string is not an operator. That
is the reported over-blocking defect one level in, and it landed within an hour
of shipping the fix for the reported one — which is the argument for pinning
both directions as fixtures rather than reasoning about them.

Position is now judged against a SKELETON: the command with its data spans
(quoted strings, heredoc bodies) removed. Endpoint, URL and body detection keep
running against the full text, because real calls quote their URLs and a
skeleton would be blind to them.

The exception is what makes quotes data in the first place. If something is
about to EXECUTE the quoted text — `bash -c`, `sh <<EOF`, `eval` — the quotes
hold code, and the skeleton keeps them as command separators so the client
inside is still at command position, one interpreter down.

Three fixtures: an operator inside a quoted string, a heredoc body, and
`bash -c` making the same text code again. 30/30.
2026-08-12 17:29:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8a901cc19a guard: read command position, refuse unreadable URLs, survive pipefail
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round two of the same independent review. Three findings, all real, and the
first two share a root cause: the guard was reading command TEXT as though it
were a command.

1. Splitting the endpoint token itself defeats fragment matching outright —
   `a=/api/v1/repos/o/r/iss; b=ues/1/comments` leaves no fragment contiguous.
   Round one fixed one spelling of this and the reviewer produced the general
   form immediately. It is not winnable by more fragments: the endpoint does
   not exist until the shell expands it, and this hook runs first. So the guard
   stops pretending to read it. A write whose URL contains an expansion, on a
   visibly forge-shaped command, is now BLOCKED as unreadable — because "I
   could not find an endpoint" must not mean "there is no endpoint". Opaque
   URLs that are not forge-shaped (webhooks, artifact stores) still pass.

2. The broadened body detection false-blocked ordinary work: `grep -R "curl -d
   https://.../issues" docs/`, `echo "curl -d ..." > note.txt`, printing an
   example from python. Talking about a call is not making one, and this is the
   direction that actually kills a control — an over-blocking hook gets turned
   off, and an off hook permits everything. The client must now appear at
   COMMAND POSITION: line start or after a shell operator, optionally behind
   VAR=value. In every false positive it sat behind a quote instead. Quotes are
   deliberately NOT stripped before matching; real calls quote their URLs.

3. `wt_precious()` aborted `cmd_rm` under `set -euo pipefail`: `grep -v` exits 1
   when it filters everything out, which is exactly the disposable-only case,
   so a SAFE worktree failed to remove with no message. Fixed, and the same
   defect was latent one step upstream in `wt_dirty()`, where `head -200`
   SIGPIPEs git on any worktree with 201 changed files. The cap is gone —
   counting is cheap and the cap only ever truncated output that is no longer
   printed.

Seven new fixtures pin all of it, in both directions. 27/27.
2026-08-12 17:26:09 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8b7ac5b51e guard: close four fail-open holes found by independent review
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
An independent reviewer broke all three new controls before they shipped.
Every finding is reproduced as a fixture or a repro, because the class is
recurring rather than incidental: each hole was a case where the answer was
"allow" because something was ABSENT rather than because it was CHECKED.

1. wrapper-guard read only the spellings it knew. `curl -d@body` (no space),
   `--request=POST` (equals form), and a URL path assembled from shell
   variables each carried a real provider write straight through. Write
   detection now covers every body and method form curl accepts, and the
   endpoint match no longer anchors on a literal host path that a variable
   can dissolve.

2. wrapper-guard blocked only when the wrapper FILE existed. A host with a
   broken or partial install therefore permitted exactly the raw writes the
   guard exists to stop. Blocking is now on the endpoint; a missing wrapper
   changes the remedy text, not the verdict — a broken install is not
   permission to bypass gate 7.

3. mosaic-worktree read a worktree's safety from two questions, and a clean,
   fully-pushed tree holding a gitignored `local.secret` answered both with
   zero. `git worktree remove` then deleted the one copy in existence. A file
   is gitignored precisely so nothing else holds it, so ignored-but-not-
   disposable files are now a third evidence question. Build junk
   (node_modules, .venv, dist, caches, *.pyc) stays disposable, so the common
   case still reads SAFE.

4. check-tools-index counted a documented tool as discoverable at mode 0644.
   Every caller tests `[ -x ]`, so a non-executable tool is a missing tool;
   it now fails the gate with its own message.

Local gates green: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration,
tools-index (4/4 self-test, 100% on the enforced git suite), and
wrapper-guard 20/20.
2026-08-12 17:20:11 -05:00
Hermes Agent 96609bdade framework: prove the wrapper guard both ways, and resolve its wrappers relatively
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Two defects found by running the guard rather than reading it.

1. The guard resolved its sibling wrappers through a hardcoded
   $HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git. On a host with no installed mosaic home — a
   CI container, a bare checkout — every wrapper lookup missed, `[ -x ]` failed,
   and the guard fell through allowing the raw API write it exists to block. It
   failed OPEN, silently, in exactly the environment least likely to notice.
   It now resolves relative to its own path, so it names the wrappers from the
   install it was launched from, with $HOME as the fallback.

2. There was no test. Adding one surfaced the guard's other sharp edge
   immediately: it matches the literal text of the Bash command, so a harness
   that embeds a blocked pattern inline trips the guard on itself rather than on
   the fixture. That is the correct fail-closed posture and it is now recorded in
   the test's own comments, because the next person will hit it too.

test-wrapper-guard.sh asserts twelve fixtures and asserts the ALLOWED cases as
hard as the blocked ones. A guard that over-blocks gets routed around and a guard
that under-blocks is decoration; only pinning both edges keeps it useful. It is
hermetic — no network, no credentials, no repository — so it joins the CI
sanitization step directly rather than the exclusions file.
2026-08-12 16:54:18 -05:00
Hermes Agent e3a0ee87b3 framework: make tool discoverability, workspace placement and model tiering mechanical
An undocumented tool is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable from a
tool that was never written. The framework shipped 26 git wrappers and named 6 of
them in its resident index docs — 23% discoverability, with pr-review.sh among the
missing. The observable consequence was an agent obeying Constitution gate 7 as
best it could see it, reaching for raw curl, sending GitHub's APPROVE to a Gitea
host, and getting HTTP 200 with the review silently filed PENDING. Three times.
That is not a discipline failure and no amount of prose fixes it.

Four changes, each converting a rule that decayed into a mechanism that cannot:

- check-tools-index.sh (new, CI-blocking): every tool in an enforced suite must be
  named in a resident index doc, and every tool an index names must exist. The git
  suite is enforced now; other suites report coverage without failing, so the
  ratchet tightens one reviewed PR at a time instead of landing as one sweep. The
  enforced list is framework-owned rather than a marker inside operator-owned
  TOOLS.md — a doc marker would let an operator silence the gate on exactly the
  host where it matters most. Carries --self-test, because a checker that only
  ever passes is indistinguishable from one that is not running.

- TOOLS-REFERENCE.md: complete 28-entry git index, plus the APPROVED/APPROVE
  dialect note that explains why pr-review.sh is not a formality.

- mosaic-worktree.sh + wrapper-guard.sh (upstreamed): the rule "big work goes on a
  work filesystem" already existed in prose, and 255 GB accumulated in $HOME across
  842 directories anyway, under five simultaneous placement conventions on one
  host. The helper therefore exposes no placement decision — given a branch name,
  every path is derived from `git worktree list --porcelain`. Worktrees rather than
  clones because enumerability is the only thing that makes reclaim safe, and
  reclaim is by evidence (clean tree + no unpushed commits), never by size or age.
  The guard blocks three mechanically-detectable mistakes and nothing else:
  a checkout into $HOME, a raw provider-API write to an endpoint that has a
  wrapper, and the literal APPROVE event. Reads pass untouched.

- STANDARDS.md: model tiering as a standard, named by capability class so it
  survives a model generation. Start cheapest, escalate on evidence, benchmark
  before demoting a task class, and keep the class->model binding in operator
  config with the DB-backed config service as the end state.

Registering the guard in runtime/claude/settings.json is the point of upstreaming
it: ~/.claude/settings.json is a framework-managed copy, so a hand-added hook there
is destroyed by the next upgrade. In the template it survives, and it reaches every
host instead of one.
2026-08-12 16:51:17 -05:00
14140 changed files with 35197 additions and 2181231 deletions
+150 -20
View File
@@ -1,24 +1,154 @@
# Non-secret runtime settings for the mosaic-poc-agent container.
# Copy to .env if you want to override the defaults in compose.yaml.
#
# NEVER put credentials in this file. Authentication is supplied at
# runtime only, via one of the two documented paths:
# 1. read-only mounted pi auth file (default: ~/.pi/agent/auth.json,
# override the host path with PI_AUTH_FILE)
# 2. provider API key environment variable (ZAI_API_KEY or
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY), passed through by compose.yaml when set
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Mosaic — Environment Variables Reference
# Copy this file to .env and fill in the values for your deployment.
# Lines beginning with # are comments; optional vars are commented out.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Model provider (built-in pi provider name)
PI_PROVIDER=zai
# Model ID within the provider
PI_MODEL=glm-5.3-flash
# ─── Database (PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector) ─────────────────────────────────────
# Full connection string used by the gateway, ORM, and migration runner.
# Port 5433 avoids conflict with a host-side PostgreSQL instance.
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic
# Optional: alternative host path of the pi credential file mounted
# read-only at /home/node/.pi/agent/auth.json in the container
#PI_AUTH_FILE=/home/jwoltje/.pi/agent/auth.json
# Docker Compose host-port override for the PostgreSQL container (default: 5433)
# PG_HOST_PORT=5433
# Optional: documented env-var auth alternative (secret! set in your
# shell or a gitignored .env, never commit)
#ZAI_API_KEY=
#ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
# ─── Queue (Valkey 8 / Redis-compatible) ─────────────────────────────────────
# Port 6380 avoids conflict with a host-side Redis/Valkey instance.
VALKEY_URL=redis://localhost:6380
# Docker Compose host-port override for the Valkey container (default: 6380)
# VALKEY_HOST_PORT=6380
# ─── Gateway ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# TCP port the NestJS/Fastify gateway listens on (default: 14242)
GATEWAY_PORT=14242
# Comma-separated list of allowed CORS origins.
# Must include the web app origin in production.
GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN=http://localhost:3000
# ─── Auth (BetterAuth) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# REQUIRED — random secret used to sign sessions and tokens.
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-32-char-string
# Public base URL of the gateway (used by BetterAuth for callback URLs)
BETTER_AUTH_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── Web App (Next.js) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Public gateway URL — accessible from the browser, not just the server.
NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── OpenTelemetry ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# OTLP HTTP endpoint (otel-collector or any OpenTelemetry-compatible backend)
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318
# Service name shown in traces
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=mosaic-gateway
# ─── AI Providers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Ollama (local models — set OLLAMA_BASE_URL to enable)
# OLLAMA_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434
# OLLAMA_HOST is a legacy alias for OLLAMA_BASE_URL
# OLLAMA_HOST=http://localhost:11434
# Comma-separated list of Ollama model IDs to register (default: llama3.2,codellama,mistral)
# OLLAMA_MODELS=llama3.2,codellama,mistral
# Anthropic (claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-opus-4-6, claude-haiku-4-5)
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
# OpenAI (gpt-4o, gpt-4o-mini, o3-mini)
# OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
# Z.ai / GLM (glm-4.5, glm-4.5-air, glm-4.5-flash)
# ZAI_API_KEY=...
# Custom providers — JSON array of provider configs
# Format: [{"id":"<id>","baseUrl":"<url>","apiKey":"<key>","models":[{"id":"<model-id>","name":"<label>"}]}]
# MOSAIC_CUSTOM_PROVIDERS=
# ─── Embedding Service ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# OpenAI-compatible embeddings endpoint (default: OpenAI)
# EMBEDDING_API_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
# EMBEDDING_MODEL=text-embedding-3-small
# ─── Log Summarization Service ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# OpenAI-compatible chat completions endpoint for log summarization (default: OpenAI)
# SUMMARIZATION_API_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
# SUMMARIZATION_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini
# Cron schedule for summarization job (default: every 6 hours)
# SUMMARIZATION_CRON=0 */6 * * *
# Cron schedule for log tier management (default: daily at 03:00)
# TIER_MANAGEMENT_CRON=0 3 * * *
# ─── Agent ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Filesystem sandbox root for agent file tools (default: process.cwd())
# AGENT_FILE_SANDBOX_DIR=/var/lib/mosaic/sandbox
# Comma-separated list of tool names available to non-admin users.
# Leave unset to allow all tools for all authenticated users.
# AGENT_USER_TOOLS=read_file,list_directory,search_files
# System prompt injected into every agent session (optional)
# AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT=You are a helpful assistant.
# ─── MCP Servers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# JSON array of MCP server configs — set to enable MCP tool integration.
# Each entry: {"name":"<id>","url":"<http-or-sse-url>"}
# MCP_SERVERS=[{"name":"my-mcp","url":"http://localhost:3100/sse"}]
# ─── Coordinator ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Root directory used to scope coordinator (worktree/repo) operations.
# Defaults to the monorepo root auto-detected from process.cwd().
# MOSAIC_WORKSPACE_ROOT=/home/user/projects/mosaic
# ─── Discord Plugin (optional — set DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN to enable) ─────────────
# DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN=
# DISCORD_GUILD_ID=
# DISCORD_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── Telegram Plugin (optional — set TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN to enable) ───────────
# TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=
# TELEGRAM_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── SSO Providers (add credentials to enable) ───────────────────────────────
# --- Authentik (optional — set AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_ID to enable) ---
# AUTHENTIK_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com/application/o/mosaic/
# AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_ID=
# AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_SECRET=
# --- WorkOS (optional — set WORKOS_CLIENT_ID to enable) ---
# WORKOS_ISSUER=https://your-company.authkit.app
# WORKOS_CLIENT_ID=client_...
# WORKOS_CLIENT_SECRET=sk_live_...
# --- Keycloak (optional — set KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID to enable) ---
# KEYCLOAK_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com/realms/master
# Legacy alternative if you prefer to compose the issuer from separate vars:
# KEYCLOAK_URL=https://auth.example.com
# KEYCLOAK_REALM=master
# KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID=mosaic
# KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET=
# Feature flags — set to true alongside provider credentials to show SSO buttons in the UI
# NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED=true
# NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED=true
+23 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,25 @@
# build/deps
node_modules/
# runtime credentials — never commit, never copy into the image
logs/
node_modules
dist
.turbo
.next
coverage
.env
secrets/
.env.local
*.tsbuildinfo
.pnpm-store
__pycache__/
docs/reports/
# generated runtime state lives in /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev (outside this project)
# Step-CA dev password — real file is gitignored; commit only the .example
infra/step-ca/dev-password
# Scratch dirs created by the framework git-wrapper shell test harnesses
.mosaic-test-work/
# Transient config files vite/vitest/esbuild write next to a *.config.ts while
# loading it, then unlink. They are untracked but were not ignored, so turbo's
# package traversal hashed them and intermittently failed CI with "Package
# traversal error: ... .timestamp-*.mjs: No such file or directory" when the
# file vanished mid-scan. Ignoring them removes the race.
*.timestamp-*.mjs
View File
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"projectVersion": 1,
"id": "stack",
"vars": {
"tracker.project": 19,
"git.workingBranch": "refactor",
"git.protectedBranches": [
"main",
"next"
]
}
}
View File
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
extensions/
extensions.installed.sha256
.extensions-*
state/
evidence/
native-test-*.log
-34
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# Native goal development copy
From this repository, start a fresh native Pi session:
```sh
bash scripts/goal-dev.sh
```
Canonical source lives under `extensions/`. The launcher first runs `scripts/sync-dev-extensions.sh`, which installs verified ordinary-file copies under `.pi/extensions/`, then loads only the generated goal extension. Global extensions remain unloaded. The launcher keeps your usual native Pi provider authentication; it copies no credentials. Goal state and new conversation files live under `.pi/state/`, which is ignored by Git. Each process gets a fresh incarnation; `/reload` and `/new` in the same process retain its goal. Restarting Pi does not adopt an earlier process's active goal.
Plain `pi` also discovers `.pi/extensions/goal/index.ts` after project trust, but may load global extensions too. Use the launcher to avoid duplicate `/goal` registrations. This is a local development test, not a sandbox or the managed Mosaic runtime. Docker and `~/.mosaic` are unchanged.
## Try it
1. Set `/goal <a long goal with acceptance criteria>`. This starts work immediately.
2. Look below the editor for `Goal: Active`. The old above-editor goal widget is gone.
3. Run bare `/goal`, then press `Alt+G`. Both show the entire stored goal and its status. Tab remains autocomplete.
4. Use `/goal stop` and `/goal resume`. Expect Paused and Active, or Waiting if an untimed wait remains recorded.
5. A blocked `goal_report` displays Blocked. A satisfied report displays Complete and retains the full goal for recall without continuing work.
6. `/goal clear` removes the retained goal. Try `NO_COLOR=1 bash scripts/goal-dev.sh` to check text-only labels.
Use terminal scrollback for recall longer than the screen. At narrow widths Pi may truncate its footer status row; bare `/goal` and Alt+G remain available.
## Checks
```sh
node --test extensions/goal/test/*.test.ts
bash scripts/test-extension-package.sh
python3 scripts/test-goal-native.py
```
Contract tests use ordinary read-only fixture copies in `test/fixtures/skills-local/`, not live brain files. The executive-update fixture SHA-256 matches the parser's pinned contract, `bbea48a46b1f8da7bc759f86856fb52830b7dde456b826317163c6dc6ccab319`.
`SOURCE-SNAPSHOT.json` records the original external-source baseline, not the edited candidate. No symlinks are used. Never edit `.pi/extensions/`; the sync script refuses to overwrite installation drift. Make changes under `extensions/`, run the checks, and relaunch. To disable the test, stop its Pi process and remove `.pi/extensions/`. Keep `.pi/state/` only if you need local test state.
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"snapshotVersion": 1,
"copiedAt": "2026-09-06T04:58:22Z",
"source": "~/.mosaic/fleet/extensions",
"goalTreeSha256": "8853f2b72dde3e87c4573648b9a931c1c75da87ccde995c3224e6d2e707a75f0",
"mosaicCoreLibTreeSha256": "d1194dce31209e5773c6cc5ce571cbca3c39b29d943a79dea06665e05d29f319",
"symlinks": false,
"autoDiscoveredExtensions": ["goal"],
"purpose": "Issue #54 native Pi NG development copy; never loaded by Docker"
}
-5
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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Compatibility entrypoint for the accepted native test command.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.."
exec scripts/goal-dev.sh "$@"
View File
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ steps:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: REGISTRY_USERNAME
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: REGISTRY_PASSWORD
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
+163
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@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
# &node_image is the pre-baked CI base built by .woodpecker/ci-image.yml:
# node:24-alpine + python3/make/g++/postgresql-client + pnpm + a warm pnpm
# store. The install step resolves from the baked store (--prefer-offline)
# instead of paying a ~731s cold fetch + native compile every run.
variables:
- &node_image 'git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest'
- &enable_pnpm 'corepack enable'
when:
# PR + manual CI run on any branch — the pull_request pipeline is the merge gate.
# push CI is restricted to protected branches (main) so a feature-branch push no
# longer fires a redundant SECOND pipeline alongside its PR pipeline. This ~halves
# CI load on the storage-constrained runner with zero loss of gating (branch
# protection requires no push/ci status context; main still gets full push CI).
- event: [pull_request, manual]
- event: push
branch: main
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
# repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).
# This avoids from_secret which is blocked on pull_request events.
# If the env vars aren't set, turbo falls back to local cache only.
steps:
install:
image: *node_image
commands:
- corepack enable
# python3/make/g++ are baked into ci-base; --prefer-offline resolves from
# the baked pnpm store.
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline
# Blocking gate: public framework package must contain no operator-specific
# personal data or private $HOME defaults. Runs early (no node_modules needed).
sanitization:
image: *node_image
commands:
- apk add --no-cache bash
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh
# Resident line-count ceiling over framework-owned resident files
# (Constitution + dispatcher + each RUNTIME.md slice). See DESIGN §7 / R9.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh
# Test-membership guard (#1017): also first link of test:framework-shell.
# Invoked from BOTH surfaces it audits (F2, PR #1018) — the guard is link
# [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
# with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh
# Tool-index gate: a shipped wrapper that appears in no resident index doc
# is undiscoverable from inside a session, and an agent that cannot learn a
# wrapper exists reaches for raw curl instead — which is how a Gitea review
# got filed PENDING three times. Ships-and-documented is one commit, or red.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh
# Hermetic regression for issue-close.sh (#1081): mocks tea/curl onto PATH
# and sandboxes a throwaway git repo, so it resolves no real credentials and
# joins CI directly rather than the exclusions file.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh
# Hermetic behavioural regression for the PreToolUse wrapper guard: proves
# it still blocks the three mistakes AND still lets reads, unwrapped
# endpoints and ordinary commands through. Both directions are asserted —
# a guard that over-blocks gets routed around, which fails just as hard.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-wrapper-guard.sh
# Hermetic regression for mosaic-worktree.sh at fleet scale: stubs git onto
# PATH so `list` faces ~450 KB of porcelain. The defect it pins is invisible
# at small size — `git … | awk '…exit'` gives the producer SIGPIPE, which
# under `set -euo pipefail` aborts the caller silently with rc=141 and no
# output. A repo only reaches that once it has enough worktrees, so the
# stub supplies the scale instead of the host's own checkout.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
# survives a keep-mode reseed byte-identical (with rsync present AND absent —
# keep mode is a single cp-based path that must not depend on rsync), and that a
# corrupt/empty/missing manifest aborts fail-closed leaving operator files
# untouched (B2/B3). The rollback gate proves a mid-sync failure is rolled back
# from the pre-update snapshot (B1). The durable-snapshot gate (#791 PR2) proves
# the retained, operator-scoped pre-update backup is taken before any mutation
# (0700/0600, secret never logged, retention-pruned) and that the post-sync
# verify net restores any operator file a manifest bug lets the sync touch. The
# migration matrix pins the v2→v3 contract-file semantics. Pure bash, no
# node_modules — runs early alongside sanitization.
upgrade-guard:
image: *node_image
commands:
- apk add --no-cache bash rsync
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-manifest-guard.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-install-migration.sh
typecheck:
image: *node_image
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm typecheck
depends_on:
- install
- sanitization
- upgrade-guard
# lint, format, and test are independent — run in parallel after typecheck
lint:
image: *node_image
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm lint
depends_on:
- typecheck
format:
image: *node_image
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm format:check
depends_on:
- typecheck
test:
image: *node_image
environment:
# Avoid the namespace-level Woodpecker DB service named "postgres".
# The Kubernetes backend exposes service containers by step name.
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@ci-postgres:5432/mosaic
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
# openssl (#912) is the wake HMAC signer: the digest H1/H2, beacon B12,
# and install I8 legs hard-require it in CI. It is baked into ci-base via
# Dockerfile.ci, but ci-base only rebuilds on push-to-main/tag — this
# `apk add` guarantees openssl is present on PR pipelines too (and is a
# fast no-op once the rebuilt image already ships it).
- apk add --no-cache openssl
# postgresql-client (pg_isready) is baked into ci-base.
# Wait up to 60s for CI postgres to be ready; fail fast if it never comes up.
- |
ready=0
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
if pg_isready -h ci-postgres -p 5432 -U mosaic; then
ready=1
break
fi
echo "Waiting for ci-postgres ($i/60)..."
sleep 1
done
if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "ci-postgres did not become ready" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Run migrations (DATABASE_URL is set in environment above)
- pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate
# Run all tests
- pnpm test
depends_on:
- typecheck
services:
ci-postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: mosaic
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: mosaic
POSTGRES_DB: mosaic
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
# Build, publish npm packages, and push Docker images
# Runs only on main branch push/tag
variables:
# Pre-baked CI base (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml): node:24-alpine +
# toolchain + warm pnpm store. Kills the second cold install publish pays.
- &node_image 'git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest'
- &enable_pnpm 'corepack enable'
# Heavy kaniko image builds (~25 min) — gate them so a merge that only touches
# the npm-only CLI (@mosaicstack/mosaic) or docs does NOT rebuild the platform
# images (gateway/appservice/web do not depend on @mosaicstack/mosaic). Releases
# (tags) always build everything. Exclude-list keeps the default SAFE: any
# non-excluded change still builds, so no transitive dep can silently go stale.
# (Woodpecker: `when` entries are OR'd; `path` applies to push/PR only — hence
# the separate `event: tag` entry.)
- &image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
exclude:
- 'packages/mosaic/**'
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
when:
- branch: [main]
event: [push, manual, tag]
steps:
install:
image: *node_image
commands:
- corepack enable
# Resolve from the baked pnpm store instead of a cold network fetch.
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline
build:
image: *node_image
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm build
depends_on:
- install
publish-npm:
image: *node_image
# Publish only when a publishable package changed (or on a release tag); a
# pure-docs merge runs no publish. Cheap step, but gated for cleanliness.
when:
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
include:
- 'packages/**'
environment:
NPM_TOKEN:
from_secret: gitea_token
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
# Configure auth for Gitea npm registry
- |
echo "//git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/:_authToken=$NPM_TOKEN" > ~/.npmrc
echo "@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/" >> ~/.npmrc
# Publish non-private packages to Gitea.
#
# The only publish failure we tolerate is "version already exists" —
# that legitimately happens when only some packages were bumped in
# the merge. Any other failure (registry 404, auth error, network
# error) MUST fail the pipeline loudly: the previous
# `|| echo "... continuing"` fallback silently hid a 404 from the
# Gitea org rename and caused every @mosaicstack/* publish to fall
# on the floor while CI still reported green.
- |
# Portable sh (Alpine ash) — avoid bashisms like PIPESTATUS.
set +e
pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/*" --filter "!@mosaicstack/web" publish --no-git-checks --access public >/tmp/publish.log 2>&1
EXIT=$?
set -e
cat /tmp/publish.log
if [ "$EXIT" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "[publish] all packages published successfully"
exit 0
fi
# Hard registry / auth / network errors → fatal. Match npm's own
# error lines specifically to avoid false positives on arbitrary
# log text that happens to contain "E404" etc.
if grep -qE "npm (error|ERR!) code (E404|E401|ENEEDAUTH|ECONNREFUSED|ETIMEDOUT|ENOTFOUND)" /tmp/publish.log; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: registry/auth/network error detected — failing pipeline" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Only tolerate the explicit "version already published" case.
# npm returns this as E403 with body "You cannot publish over..."
# or EPUBLISHCONFLICT depending on version.
if grep -qE "EPUBLISHCONFLICT|You cannot publish over|previously published" /tmp/publish.log; then
echo "[publish] some packages already at this version — continuing (non-fatal)"
exit 0
fi
echo "[publish] FATAL: publish failed with unrecognized error — failing pipeline" >&2
exit 1
depends_on:
- build
# TODO: Uncomment when ready to publish to npmjs.org
# publish-npmjs:
# image: *node_image
# environment:
# NPM_TOKEN:
# from_secret: npmjs_token
# commands:
# - *enable_pnpm
# - apk add --no-cache jq bash
# - bash scripts/publish-npmjs.sh
# depends_on:
# - build
# when:
# - event: [tag]
build-gateway:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/gateway.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
build-appservice:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/appservice.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
build-web:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/web.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
+61 -198
View File
@@ -1,217 +1,80 @@
# AGENTS.md — Mosaic Stack rebuild (`mosaicstack/stack`, branch `refactor`)
# Agent Guidelines — Mosaic Stack
Operational context for any agent session working in this repository.
Read top to bottom; it is deliberately short — depth lives in the files it
points to, not here.
## Required Load Order
## What this repository is
1. `~/.config/mosaic/SOUL.md`
2. `~/.config/mosaic/STANDARDS.md`
3. `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`
4. `~/.config/mosaic/guides/E2E-DELIVERY.md`
5. `AGENTS.md` (this file)
6. Runtime-specific guide: `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/<runtime>/RUNTIME.md`
Canonical checkout: `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`, origin `mosaicstack/stack`,
working branch `refactor` (Jason-authorized conversion, issue #1495).
The new foundation is at the root. `v1/` is archived legacy source, not the current
implementation; its instructions and tools do not govern the new foundation.
`~/src/mosaic-stack-dev-test` is a compatibility symlink to this checkout, not a
second working tree. Both original Git histories are retained. Conversion receipt:
`docs/plans/2026-09-07_repository-consolidation-completed.md`.
## Project Context
A rebuild of Mosaic Stack: a file-based, fail-closed
orchestration foundation that dispatches sandboxed headless pi workers to do
real work, with immutable run records as evidence. Thirteen-plus tagged
milestones (`git tag -l`) from `poc-container-hello-v0` to today; suites
green at every step. Not production software — a proven foundation.
Mosaic Stack is a self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. TypeScript monorepo with NestJS gateway, Next.js web dashboard, Pi SDK agent runtime, and plugin architecture for Discord/Telegram.
## Non-negotiable invariants (the canon)
## Package Map
1. **Root is bootstrap-only.** First-class system configuration lives at the
repository root; everything else gets a dedicated directory (`roles/`,
`contracts/`, `missions/`, `tasks/`, `docs/`). Do not add new files to root.
2. **Configuration**: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is the sole system
config — created only by `scripts/bootstrap.sh`, never overwritten,
fail-closed on any problem. Repo-scoped role authority lives in
`roles/*.json` (versioned, reviewed commits only).
3. **Secrets** never enter the repository or container images; auth is
runtime-only (read-only mount or environment variable).
4. **Contracts** (`contracts/`) are immutable and image-baked. Missions and
tasks are declarative JSON with strict schemas.
5. **Run records** under `<dataRoot>/runs/` are write-once evidence — never
rewritten, only pruned via `prune` with a receipt.
6. **Fail closed**: missing or invalid config/policy refuses the operation.
Never improvise around a refusal; diagnose it.
7. **Policy**: missions govern tasks (least-privilege intersection — a task
narrows, never widens). Role authority is declared in `roles/` and changes
only via reviewed commits.
8. **Git**: commit only after applicable suites are green. Work on the
owner-authorized `refactor` branch; never force-push. Push remains an explicit
act. Do not merge into `next` or `main` without separate authorization.
`scripts/conductor-apply.sh` commits locally; it does not authorize a push.
9. **Append-only logs**: BUILD-LOG.md (phases), `activation-log.jsonl`,
`.pruned.log`, docs/SESSIONS.md. Corrections are new entries, never edits.
| Package | Purpose | Key Dependencies |
| ------------------ | ------------------------------- | -------------------------------- |
| `apps/gateway` | NestJS API + WebSocket hub | Fastify, Socket.IO, Pi SDK, OTEL |
| `apps/web` | Next.js dashboard | React 19, Tailwind |
| `packages/types` | Shared TypeScript contracts | class-validator |
| `packages/db` | Drizzle ORM schema + migrations | drizzle-orm, postgres |
| `packages/auth` | BetterAuth configuration | better-auth, @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/brain` | Data layer (PG-backed) | @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/queue` | Valkey task queue + MCP | ioredis |
| `packages/coord` | Mission coordination | @mosaicstack/queue |
| `packages/mosaic` | Unified `mosaic` CLI + TUI | Ink, Pi SDK, commander |
| `plugins/discord` | Discord channel plugin | discord.js |
| `plugins/telegram` | Telegram channel plugin | Telegraf |
## Autonomous operation within an agreed plan
## Architecture Rules
Autonomy starts after alignment, not before it. For a new substantial assignment,
recover the applicable mission, goal, task, `CURRENT.md` state, and prior owner
decisions, then work with the user to establish a plan of action: the intended
outcome, acceptance evidence, boundaries, and any gated actions. Recommend a
concrete plan instead of presenting an open-ended menu. A direct request or
existing approved plan that already settles those points is sufficient alignment;
do not ask for ceremonial reconfirmation.
1. Gateway is the single API surface — all clients connect through it
2. Pi SDK is ESM-only — gateway and CLI must use ESM
3. Socket.IO typed events defined in `@mosaicstack/types` enforce compile-time contracts
4. OTEL auto-instrumentation loads before NestJS bootstrap
5. BetterAuth manages auth tables; schema defined in `@mosaicstack/db`
6. Docker Compose provides PG (5433), Valkey (6380), OTEL Collector (4317/4318), Jaeger (16686)
7. Explicit `@Inject()` decorators required in NestJS (tsx/esbuild doesn't emit decorator metadata)
Once the plan is established, carry it to verified completion without prompting
for routine decisions or permission to take the next in-scope step. Authorization
persists for the life of that assignment unless the user changes or revokes it.
Treat mid-session user input as steering: incorporate it, update the plan or
tracking record when needed, and continue.
## Development Workflow
### Decide and continue
```bash
docker compose up -d # Infrastructure
pnpm install # Dependencies
pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check # Quality gates
```
- Resolve naming, implementation approach, layout, and similar non-breaking
choices from, in order: repository invariants and role policy, the approved
plan and acceptance criteria, established repository conventions, then the
smallest reversible option. Record a consequential choice and its tradeoff.
- Perform the in-scope investigation, edits, tests, documentation, and tracking
needed for end-to-end acceptance. Do not ask whether to add obviously required
tests or documentation.
- Diagnose failures and retry or remediate within the agreed scope. Fix a defect
when it blocks acceptance or is local to files already being changed; otherwise
record a bounded follow-up without expanding the assignment.
- Resolve minor ambiguity in favor of the mission, goal, north star, and prior
owner decisions. State the assumption in the completion report.
- Never stop merely to ask whether to proceed, which routine option to use, or
whether to execute the next step already contained in the plan.
## Repo-Specific Notes
### Re-align or stop only at a real boundary
- DTOs in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries
- ESM everywhere (`"type": "module"`, `.js` extensions in imports)
- NodeNext module resolution in all tsconfigs
- Scratchpads are mandatory for non-trivial tasks
Finish all independent work first, then ask one focused question only when:
## docs/TASKS.md — Schema (CANONICAL)
1. Two plausible readings materially change the outcome and the choice is costly
to reverse.
2. The next action would exceed the agreed scope or authority, introduce an
unapproved breaking public/API/schema/data/policy change, or alter a security
boundary.
3. Credentials or access are missing and no in-scope path remains.
4. The action is destructive, irreversible, production-affecting, incurs spend,
or communicates externally on the user's behalf without explicit authority.
5. Objectives or owner decisions genuinely conflict and repository evidence
cannot resolve them.
6. A fail-closed policy refusal or another agent's overlapping ownership prevents
safe progress. Diagnose and report it; never route around it.
The `agent` column specifies the required model for each task. **This is set at task creation by the orchestrator and must not be changed by workers.**
Repository gates still apply. In particular, a successful implementation or a
broad request to “finish” does not by itself authorize push, merge, deployment,
release, production changes, policy/role expansion, or access to secrets. Perform
such an action only when the established plan explicitly includes it. If blocked,
report the exact boundary, what is complete, the recommended resolution, and the
specific action that will resume; do not use “waiting for confirmation” as a
substitute for a real blocker.
| Value | When to use | Budget |
| --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `codex` | All coding tasks (default for implementation) | OpenAI credits — preferred |
| `glm-5.1` | Cost-sensitive coding where Codex is unavailable | Z.ai credits |
| `haiku` | Review gates, verify tasks, status checks, docs-only | Cheapest Claude tier |
| `sonnet` | Complex planning, multi-file reasoning, architecture review | Claude quota |
| `opus` | Major cross-cutting architecture decisions ONLY | Most expensive — minimize |
| `—` | No preference / auto-select cheapest capable | Pipeline decides |
## Session protocol (mandatory)
Pipeline crons read this column and spawn accordingly. Workers never modify `docs/TASKS.md` — only the orchestrator writes it.
- **Register** your session in `docs/SESSIONS.md` — one append-only line
(date, actor, scope, outcome). Never rewrite or remove entries.
- **Cadence**: run `scripts/mosaic queue next <your seat>` first. It names
the row to resume, review or start, or says there is nothing. The goal order
in `docs/plans/2026-09-27_goals-review.md` sets priority, not CURRENT.md.
Open only the brief that row links to. Execute it through every authorized
stage (implement → test → verify against acceptance criteria; commit, push,
or close only when the established plan authorizes each) → move the row with
`scripts/mosaic queue move` (never by editing QUEUE.md) → register in
SESSIONS.md.
- "next" means one action. A batch mandate ("run the queue") repeats the
loop until green or truly blocked under the boundary rules above.
- Substantial work gets a Gitea issue and a BUILD-LOG phase entry
(before/after, with corrections recorded honestly).
**Full schema:**
## Internal development bootstrap
```
| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
```
Jason's current direction is repository-native development in
`/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`. Sage leads the project (Jason's ruling,
2026-09-26) and coordinates coding, review and research through Darkwing, Dewey,
Filbert, Rocko, Researcher and any further seats Jason launches under `agents/`.
Darkwing is a collaborating agent seat, not the coordinator. Development sessions
run in T3 for now. Work moves to the new stack; the old `~/.mosaic` fleet is being
retired, and a fleet seat acting outside Jason's instructions is the failure this
transition exists to prevent.
Do not assign new development work to fleet seats during this bootstrap phase.
Do not modify `~/.mosaic` launchers, provisioning or other state, or stop/migrate
live fleet processes as part of this work. Preserve existing work and histories.
Use the repository bootstrap/configuration and launch entry points; missing
configuration still fails closed. This changes development coordination, not
managed worker role policy or deployment authority. The lead role adds no push,
merge or deployment authority; those still need Jason's say-so. See
`agents/README.md` for the internal roster.
For control-board attention, start a completed reply with `Input needed: ` and
one specific nonempty request only when Jason must provide a decision or input.
Put that line at column zero, before other text. Do not use it for routine
completion or a wait on another agent. Ordinary completed replies are idle.
Use code fences or blockquotes when showing this convention as an example.
The signal is advisory status, never permission for a protected action. Seen
acknowledges a request; it does not resolve it. See `packages/control-board/README.md`.
## Role model
- **Conductor**: a system-scoped role — not an agent, not a daemon. Holds
git/credentials/policy authority; decomposes, dispatches, reviews,
verifies, integrates. Protocol: `docs/plans/CONDUCTOR.md`. Exists only
when invoked; push is never automatic.
- **Workers**: headless pi via `scripts/run-task.sh` — sandboxed workspace,
tools allowlist, optional persistent sessions and forks; no git, no
credentials, no policy control.
- Worker runs deliberately exclude this file (`--no-context-files` in the
adapter): worker context is contracts + mission via the generated system
prompt. This file is for conductor-level sessions.
## Command surface
`scripts/bootstrap.sh` (idempotent) · `build.sh` · `hello.sh` ·
`verify.sh` · `run-task.sh run <task.json>` · `release.sh
package|activate|rollback|status` · `auth.sh status|accounts` · `reset.sh` (**danger**: wipes the data
root; triple-safety-checked) · `mosaic-task.mjs validate|run|show|list|retry|prune|resolve-role` ·
`agent.sh <name>` (interactive TUI agent) ·
suites: `test-config.sh`, `test-task.sh`, `test-release.sh`,
`test-conductor.sh`, `test-auth.sh`, `test-discord.sh`, `test-queue.sh`.
Full reference — usage, fields, exit codes, safety notes:
`docs/TOOLS.md` (read on demand; do not rely on this summary for detail).
## Data map (canon)
- `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` — system config (user-authored; never
auto-written).
- `<dataRoot>` (from config; default `~/.mosaic-dev`):
- `runs/` — write-once run evidence (`result.json`, snapshots, `stderr.txt`)
- `sessions/` — pi JSONL session trees, one directory per named session
- `workspaces/` — agent file effects (persistent or `:run` ephemeral)
- `state/` — release pointer + append-only activation/auto-apply logs
- Ownership is per-directory; nothing shares state. Directory map and
lifecycle rules: README.md "Data map" section.
## Pointers (depth lives here)
- `docs/plans/2026-09-27_goals-review.md` — north star and goal order (Jason ratified 2026-09-27)
- `docs/plans/QUEUE.md` — THE task list, rendered from `docs/plans/queue.json`
(`scripts/mosaic queue next <seat>` reads it; `packages/queue/README.md` has the verbs)
- `docs/plans/CURRENT.md` — narrative log behind the queue rows
- `docs/plans/ROADMAP.md` — agreed milestone path (M16+)
- `docs/plans/CONDUCTOR.md` — orchestration protocol and guardrails
- `docs/plans/2026-09-02_atomic-mosaic-foundation.md` — architecture, invariants
- `docs/plans/2026-09-03_autonomous-run.md` — batch-run tracker
- `BUILD-LOG.md` — append-only build/verification history with corrections
- `LAYERS.md` — implemented vs deferred layers
- `docs/SESSIONS.md` — session registry
- `adapters/README.md` — the harness adapter contract
- `roles/` — role contracts (conductor, future agent/coder/reviewer)
## Recovery rule
Compacted, restarted, or new? Nothing that matters is lost: this file +
`scripts/mosaic queue next <seat>` + `docs/plans/CURRENT.md` +
`git log --oneline -10` + the suites reconstruct the full state. **Never
guess** — verify with the suites; the run records and logs hold the receipts.
## Version pin
`@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` is pinned exactly (see `package.json` /
`RELEASE`); never install unversioned. Release identity: `RELEASE` file
(0.0.X until declared stable); image tags derive from it.
- `status`: `not-started` | `in-progress` | `done` | `failed` | `blocked` | `needs-qa`
- `agent`: model value from table above (set before spawning)
- `estimate`: token budget e.g. `8K`, `25K`
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# Minimal Mosaic Stack container proof of concept
## Purpose
Build the smallest isolated container that can:
- launch Pi
- load a small set of Mosaic-style contract files
- send one real request to a model
- return a known response.
This is a standalone experiment. It is not part of the existing Mosaic Stack repository or Software Factory.
## Working boundary
The directory containing this brief is the project root.
### Do not read, copy, mount, import, or modify anything from:
- `/home/jwoltje/.mosaic`
- `/home/jwoltje/.config/mosaic`
- `/home/jwoltje/src/mosaic-stack`
- Existing Mosaic Stack worktrees
### Do not use:
- Mosaic orchestration
- Mosaic Git wrappers
- Fleet agents
- Fleet communication
- Mosaic role policies
- Existing Mosaic contract files
- Existing Mosaic runtime state
No Git credentials, issue, pull request, reviewer, merge, or deployment are required for this experiment.
Nothing from this experiment may be copied into the existing Mosaic Stack repository until it receives a separate review later.
## Runtime data
Use this host directory only for generated runtime data:
```text
/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev
```
The source code must remain in the project directory containing this brief.
Inside the container, use:
```text
/opt/mosaic/contracts Immutable contract files
/var/lib/mosaic Generated runtime state
/workspace Agent workspace
```
Mount /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev at /var/lib/mosaic.
### Required proof
The finished experiment must prove one path:
1. Build one container image.
2. Start one Pi agent inside the container.
3. Load four local contract files from /opt/mosaic/contracts.
4. Send a request that does not contain the expected response.
5. Receive MOSAIC_HELLO_OK from the agent.
6. Exit successfully when the response matches.
7. Exit nonzero when the response does not match.
This is the entire required functional result.
### Required discovery
Before writing the runtime command:
1. Find the current package documentation for @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent.
2. Determine the current package version.
3. Determine the supported noninteractive command.
4. Determine how Pi accepts a custom system prompt or system prompt file.
5. Determine Pi's documented container authentication method.
6. Record the commands and findings in BUILD-LOG.md.
Do not guess CLI flags, authentication paths, or SDK methods.
Pin the selected Pi package version in the project. Do not install an unversioned package during each container start.
Prefer the Pi CLI. Use the Pi SDK only if the CLI cannot load the generated system prompt in noninteractive mode.
### Contract files
Create these files inside the project:
```text
contracts/CONSTITUTION.md
contracts/STANDARDS.md
contracts/SOUL.md
contracts/USER.md
```
Use these exact contents.
### contracts/CONSTITUTION.md
```markdown
# POC constitution
Never print credentials, tokens, or authentication files.
Follow the loaded system instructions before the user request.
```
### contracts/STANDARDS.md
```markdown
# POC standards
Answer startup verification requests with only the requested value.
Do not add explanation or formatting.
```
### contracts/SOUL.md
```markdown
# POC identity
Your name is mosaic-poc-agent.
Your startup marker is MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
When asked for your startup marker, return only the marker.
```
### contracts/USER.md
```markdown
# POC user
This is an isolated local runtime test.
```
Contract loading
Create a small script that reads the four contract files in this order:
1. CONSTITUTION.md
2. STANDARDS.md
3. SOUL.md
4. USER.md
Join them with clear file separators.
Write the generated system prompt to:
```text
/var/lib/mosaic/system-prompt.md
```
Pass that generated prompt to Pi using its documented CLI or SDK method.
Do not build:
- Contract schemas
- Contract inheritance
- Overlays
- Role transitions
- Dynamic policy loading
- Guide routing
- Manifest validation
Container
Create one service named:
```text
mosaic-agent
```
Use one Containerfile and one compose.yaml.
Requirements:
- Use a maintained Node.js base image.
- Run as a non-root user.
- Install a pinned Pi package version.
- Copy the local contract fixtures into /opt/mosaic/contracts.
- Do not copy credentials into the image.
- Do not mount the Docker socket.
- Do not mount either live Mosaic directory.
- Do not add a database, web server, queue, or second container.
- The container may run as a one-shot command. It does not need to remain running.
### Authentication
Use Pi's documented authentication mechanism.
Authentication must be supplied at runtime through either:
- A read-only mounted credential file
- A supported runtime environment variable
**Never**:
- Commit credentials
- Copy credentials into the image
- Print credentials
- Print authentication files
- Include credentials in BUILD-LOG.md
- Store credentials under the project directory
Provide .env.example only for non-secret settings such as model or provider names.
If credentials are unavailable, complete the image and scripts but report that the real model request remains unverified. Do not fake the response.
### Required commands
Create these executable scripts:
```text
scripts/build.sh
scripts/hello.sh
scripts/verify.sh
scripts/reset.sh
```
### scripts/build.sh
Build the container image using Docker Compose.
### scripts/hello.sh
Run the mosaic-agent service as a one-shot container.
Send this exact user request:
```text
Return your startup marker and nothing else.
```
The request must not contain MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
Print the model response without printing credentials or unrelated runtime data.
### scripts/verify.sh
Run the complete test.
**It must**:
1. Build or confirm the image is built.
2. Run the agent request.
3. Remove surrounding whitespace from the response.
4. Compare the response with MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
5. Exit 0 only when they match exactly.
6. Exit nonzero with a clear error when they do not match.
### scripts/reset.sh
Delete generated POC state only when all checks pass:
1. The resolved path is exactly /home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev.
2. The path is not a symbolic link.
3. The directory contains a .mosaic-poc-root ownership marker created by this project.
Refuse to delete anything if a check fails.
## Required files
The final project should contain only what the implementation needs:
```text
BRIEF.md
BUILD-LOG.md
README.md
LAYERS.md
Containerfile
compose.yaml
package.json
package-lock.json
.gitignore
contracts/
scripts/
src/
```
Remove unused files and empty directories.
Build log
Create BUILD-LOG.md.
Treat it as append-only.
Before each phase, append:
- Timestamp
- Intended action
- Reason
- Expected result
After each phase, append:
- Commands run
- Observed result
- Failure or correction
Never rewrite an earlier entry. Add a correction as a new entry.
Do not record credentials.
Initial decisions:
- This is a standalone experiment outside the Mosaic Software Factory.
- It does not use existing Mosaic source, tools, contracts, agents, or runtime state.
- The first proof uses one Pi agent and four small local contract files.
- The only required model result is MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
- Persistence, policy enforcement, Claude, orchestration, and portal work are deferred.
## Acceptance criteria
The experiment passes when:
1. scripts/build.sh exits 0.
2. The image contains the four local contract files.
3. The image contains no credentials.
4. The container has no mounts from ~/.mosaic or ~/.config/mosaic.
5. scripts/hello.sh performs a real model request.
6. The request does not contain the expected marker.
7. The agent returns exactly MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
8. scripts/verify.sh exits 0.
9. Changing the expected value makes scripts/verify.sh exit nonzero.
10. scripts/reset.sh refuses unsafe paths.
11. Resetting and rerunning the verification produces the same successful result.
## Deferred layers
Document these in LAYERS.md. Do not implement them.
- L0: Container builds and returns MOSAIC_HELLO_OK.
- L1: Persist and resume a named Pi session.
- L2: Add a fixed tool permission policy.
- L3: Load full versioned contract bundles.
- L4: Add Claude as a second runtime.
- L5: Add multiple agents and communication.
- L6: Add orchestration, knowledge storage, and portal features.
## Explicit exclusions
Do not implement:
- Existing Mosaic Stack compatibility
- Git hosting or CI
- Pull requests or code review
- Deployment
- Persistent agent sessions
- Tool read restrictions
- Claude
- Multiple agents
- Fleet communication
- Watchers
- Role management
- Knowledge storage
- Database storage
- API server
- Web interface
- Dashboard
- Production security architecture
## Final report
When finished, report:
1. Files created.
2. Pi package version.
3. Exact build command.
4. Exact verification command.
5. Verification output with credentials removed.
6. Whether the real model request passed.
7. Any remaining failure.
8. Anything implemented beyond this brief.
Do not describe the experiment as production-ready.
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@AGENTS.md
# CLAUDE.md — Mosaic Stack
## Project
Self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. TypeScript monorepo.
## Stack
- **API**: NestJS + Fastify adapter (`apps/gateway`)
- **Web**: Next.js 16 + React 19 (`apps/web`)
- **ORM**: Drizzle ORM + PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector (`packages/db`)
- **Auth**: BetterAuth (`packages/auth`)
- **Agent**: Pi SDK (`packages/agent`, `packages/mosaic`)
- **Queue**: Valkey 8 (`packages/queue`)
- **Build**: pnpm workspaces + Turborepo
- **CI**: Woodpecker CI
- **Observability**: OpenTelemetry → Jaeger
## Commands
```bash
pnpm typecheck # TypeScript check (all packages)
pnpm lint # ESLint (all packages)
pnpm format:check # Prettier check
pnpm test # Vitest (all packages)
pnpm build # Build all packages
# Database
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate # Offline migration artifact generation only
# PostgreSQL execution is held until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 land. Do not invoke a runner,
# init SQL, or Compose PostgreSQL service from this checkout.
# Dev: local PGlite data-layer work needs no PostgreSQL. Optional local queue service only:
docker compose up -d valkey
# Do not start Gateway/Web or root pnpm dev as a local PGlite route: the current unguarded dotenv
# loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. KBN-101-02 must make that state fail closed first.
```
## Conventions
- ESM everywhere (`"type": "module"`, `.js` extensions in imports)
- NodeNext module resolution
- Explicit `@Inject()` decorators in NestJS (tsx/esbuild doesn't support emitDecoratorMetadata)
- DTOs in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries
- OTEL tracing imported before NestJS bootstrap (`import './tracing.js'`)
- All three gates must pass before push: typecheck, lint, format:check
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# Minimal Mosaic Stack POC agent image.
# Base: maintained Node.js image (same family as Pi's documented
# containerization example in docs/containerization.md).
FROM node:24-bookworm-slim
# Tools Pi's documented container image expects (bash, CA certs, git, ripgrep).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends bash ca-certificates git ripgrep \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Non-root user: the maintained node image ships a 'node' user at
# uid/gid 1000, which matches the host user that owns the runtime
# state directory mounted at /var/lib/mosaic. It is reused as-is.
# Pinned Pi install: package.json pins the exact version and
# package-lock.json is installed with npm ci. No unversioned installs.
WORKDIR /opt/app
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
# Immutable contract fixtures (required location), runtime scripts, and
# runtime adapters.
COPY contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts
COPY src /opt/mosaic/src
COPY adapters /opt/mosaic/adapters
RUN chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts/* \
&& chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/src /opt/mosaic/src/*.sh \
&& chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/adapters /opt/mosaic/adapters/*/adapter.sh
# Writable state, workspace, and pi agent directory (auth.json is
# bind-mounted read-only at runtime; nothing is copied into the image).
RUN mkdir -p /var/lib/mosaic /workspace /home/node/.pi/agent \
&& chown -R node:node /var/lib/mosaic /workspace /home/node /opt/app
USER node
WORKDIR /workspace
ENV HOME=/home/node \
PATH="/opt/app/node_modules/.bin:${PATH}" \
PI_OFFLINE=1
# One-shot agent: args form the user request (default is the startup
# verification request defined in compose.yaml).
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/mosaic/src/run-agent.sh"]
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# LAYERS
Deferred capability layers for the Mosaic experiment. Only L0 is implemented by
this proof of concept; everything below it is documented here and deliberately
not implemented (see BRIEF.md, "Explicit exclusions").
## L0 — Implemented: container returns MOSAIC_HELLO_OK
One image (`mosaic-poc-agent:0.84.4`, built on `node:24-bookworm-slim`, non-root,
pinned Pi) runs one Pi agent one-shot. Four immutable local contract files are
loaded in fixed order into the generated system prompt
(`/var/lib/mosaic/system-prompt.md`). One real model request is sent
noninteractively; the response must equal `MOSAIC_HELLO_OK` exactly or the
verification exits nonzero. Authentication is supplied at runtime only
(read-only mounted pi auth file, or a provider API key environment variable).
## L1 — Deferred: persist and resume a named Pi session
Keep a named Pi session across container runs (`--name`, session storage under
`/var/lib/mosaic`), resume it with the documented session flags, and verify
state survives a container restart.
## L2 — Deferred: fixed tool permission policy
Add a fixed allow/deny policy for Pi tools (e.g. restricting built-in tools via
documented `--tools` / `--exclude-tools` or an extension-based permission gate),
so contract files can constrain what the agent may do, not just what it says.
## L3 — Deferred: load full versioned contract bundles
Replace the four static fixtures with versioned contract bundles: bundle
manifests, contract versions, and deterministic ordering/hashing, loaded from
an immutable bundle artifact instead of files copied at image build time.
## L4 — Deferred: Claude as a second runtime
Add a second runtime (Claude) alongside the Pi agent in the same container
stack, behind the same contract-loading path, to compare behavior across
runtimes.
## L5 — Deferred: multiple agents and communication
Run several named agents with defined roles and a communication channel between
them (message passing or shared state under `/var/lib/mosaic`).
## L6 — Deferred: orchestration, knowledge storage, and portal features
Fleet-level orchestration, knowledge storage, monitoring, and portal UI on top
of L1-L5. This is where the existing Mosaic Stack concepts would be re-evaluated
from first principles.
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# Mosaic Stack — new foundation
# Mosaic Stack
The active rebuild is at this repository's root. The original Mosaic Stack v1
source is archived under `v1/`; it is not the implementation being developed here.
Self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. One config, every runtime, same standards.
- Canonical checkout: `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`
- Repository: `mosaicstack/stack`
- Working branch: `refactor`
- Former `~/src/mosaic-stack-dev-test`: compatibility symlink to this same checkout
Mosaic gives you a unified launcher for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi — injecting consistent system prompts, guardrails, skills, and mission context into every session. A NestJS gateway provides the API surface, a Next.js dashboard gives you the UI, and a plugin system connects Discord, Telegram, and more.
Both original Git histories and pending development work are preserved. See the
[conversion record](docs/plans/2026-09-07_repository-consolidation-completed.md)
and [current next action](docs/plans/CURRENT.md). Do not use v1's startup commands,
package layout or agent instructions for work on the new foundation.
## Original container proof
The foundation began as a standalone container experiment. One container image
runs one Pi coding agent with four immutable local contract files as its system
prompt, sends exactly one real model request, and was verified to return exactly
`MOSAIC_HELLO_OK`. This historical result is not a claim that the full rebuild is
production-ready.
## Layout
```text
BRIEF.md requirements for the original container proof
BUILD-LOG.md append-only build/verification log
LAYERS.md implemented layer (L0) and deferred layers (L1-L6)
Containerfile image definition (node:24-bookworm-slim, non-root, pinned Pi)
compose.yaml one service: mosaic-agent (one-shot; configured via env)
package.json pins @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent at exactly 0.84.4
package-lock.json resolved lockfile used by npm ci in the image
.env.example non-secret settings only (credential-file path, env-var auth)
contracts/ CONSTITUTION.md, STANDARDS.md, SOUL.md, USER.md (immutable fixtures)
scripts/ bootstrap/build/hello/verify/reset + config tooling
src/ load-contracts.sh, run-agent.sh (run inside the container)
docs/plans/ architecture and milestone plans
```
## Configuration
The sole discovery entry point is:
```text
~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json
```
Created only by the explicit, idempotent bootstrap:
## Quick Install
```bash
scripts/bootstrap.sh # create-if-absent; validates existing config, never rewrites
curl -fsSL https://mosaicstack.dev/install.sh | bash
```
Minimal shape (`configVersion` 1):
```json
{
"configVersion": 1,
"environment": "development",
"dataRoot": "/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev",
"execution": {
"backend": "docker",
"provider": "zai",
"model": "glm-5.3-flash"
}
}
```
Rules enforced by `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`:
- Unknown keys, unsupported versions/backends, and malformed JSON exit nonzero; nothing is modified.
- `dataRoot` must be absolute, canonical, and must not be or contain the home or configuration directory.
- Validation failures never touch config, state, or images.
- `scripts/test-config.sh` runs the sandboxed config selftests (no Docker required).
Run paths (`build/hello/verify/reset`) fail closed when configuration is missing or invalid; they never invent it.
## Missions & tasks (M2)
Missions and tasks are validated JSON data (strict schemas, version-pinned). The M2 layer is host-side only: mission directives are recorded for provenance but do not yet reach the runtime system prompt (capability/policy layer comes later).
```text
missions/hello.json objective + directives (missionVersion 1)
tasks/hello-marker.json prompt + optional mission ref + expectExact + timeout
<dataRoot>/runs/r-<id>/ immutable run record: task.json, mission.json,
stderr.txt, result.json (all write-once)
```
Usage:
Or use the direct URL:
```bash
scripts/run-task.sh validate tasks/hello-marker.json # strict validation, writes nothing
scripts/run-task.sh run tasks/hello-marker.json # execute; result recorded under dataRoot/runs
scripts/mosaic-task.mjs list # list runs and statuses
scripts/test-task.sh # selftests (schema negatives + live runs)
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
```
A run exits 0 only when its expectation is met (`expectExact` match); mismatches, nonzero agent exits, and timeouts record `status: failed` in `result.json` and exit 1. Each run gets a unique directory — rerunning never rewrites history.
## Release model (M3)
`RELEASE` single-sources the release version (0.0.X until declared stable); the image tag derives from it plus the pinned Pi version. Activation is health-gated and every event is recorded:
The installer auto-launches the setup wizard, which walks you through gateway install and verification. Flags for non-interactive use:
```bash
scripts/release.sh package # build + tag the release image
scripts/release.sh activate # health check (exact marker) -> atomic pointer swap
scripts/release.sh activate --fault-injection # prove the refusal path (drills only)
scripts/release.sh rollback # health-gated return to the previous release
scripts/release.sh ensure # self-determination: align installed to RELEASE (safe no-op when aligned)
scripts/release.sh status # release, tag, active pointer, recent log
scripts/test-release.sh # release selftests
bash <(curl -fsSL …) --yes # Accept all defaults
bash <(curl -fsSL …) --yes --no-auto-launch # Install only, skip wizard
```
`ensure` is invoked automatically by the human-facing launchers (`hello`,
`verify`, `agent`): the system determines what is installed and aligns
itself — the user never runs release commands manually.
This installs both components:
- `<dataRoot>/state/active.json` — the activation pointer (atomic tmp+rename replace)
- `<dataRoot>/state/activation-log.jsonl` — append-only history: package / activate / refused / rollback
| Component | What | Where |
| ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------- |
| **Framework** | Bash launcher, guides, runtime configs, tools, skills | `~/.config/mosaic/` |
| **@mosaicstack/mosaic** | Unified `mosaic` CLI — TUI, gateway client, wizard, auto-updater | `~/.npm-global/bin/` |
A failed health check never activates; the previously active release remains deployed. Updating the software therefore cannot corrupt the running installation: package beside, gate, then flip. Verified by the update/refusal/rollback drills in BUILD-LOG Phase 7.
## Runtime adapters (M4)
The harness boundary is formalized: everything upstream (config, contracts, missions, tasks, run records) is harness-agnostic; everything inside an adapter belongs to one runtime.
```text
adapters/<name>/adapter.sh env in: MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE, MOSAIC_REQUEST,
MOSAIC_PROVIDER, MOSAIC_MODEL
stdout: response only; stderr: diagnostics
```
- Selection: `execution.adapter` in config.json (optional; `pi` default; allowlist `pi`, `mock`)
- `pi` — pinned Pi CLI, noninteractive print mode, ambient discovery off
- `mock` — deterministic test adapter; never for real verification
- Mission directives have a sanctioned injection point: when a task references a mission, the task runner mounts the run snapshot and the generated prompt gains a `MISSION (runtime)` section (objective + directives) after the four immutable contracts
- Adding a harness (Claude, Codex, OpenCode) later means adding one directory — no orchestrator changes
See `adapters/README.md` for the full contract.
## Workspaces, capabilities, sessions (M5/M6)
Optional task fields extend what an agent can do — all defaulting to the previous behavior:
```json
{
"workspace": "demo", // ":run" ephemeral, or persistent dataRoot/workspaces/<name>
"capabilities": { "tools": ["bash", "read"] }, // pi tool allowlist; absent = no tools
"session": "demo" // persistent session at dataRoot/sessions/<name>
}
```
- The adapter runs inside the workspace; files it writes are host-visible (`dataRoot/workspaces/<name>`).
- Sessions persist via pi's documented `--session-dir`; a follow-up run in the same session resumes the conversation (`-c`) and can recall prior context. Distinct names never share state. Ephemeral (`--no-session`) remains the default when no session is declared.
- Selection authority: config for adapter/provider/model; the task file for workspace/capabilities/session.
Inspect anything:
After install, the wizard runs automatically or you can invoke it manually:
```bash
node scripts/mosaic-task.mjs list # runs with task/workspace/session columns
node scripts/mosaic-task.mjs show <runId> # full record + snapshots + artifacts
mosaic wizard # Full guided setup (gateway install → verify)
```
Demo fixtures: `tasks/workspace-demo.json`, `tasks/session-demo-1.json` + `tasks/session-demo-2.json`.
### Requirements
See `docs/plans/2026-09-02_atomic-mosaic-foundation.md` for the full plan.
Inside the container:
```text
/opt/mosaic/contracts immutable contract files
/var/lib/mosaic generated runtime state (mounted from configured dataRoot)
/workspace agent workspace
```
## How it works
1. `scripts/build.sh` builds the release image (`mosaic-poc-agent:<pi>-r<release>`,
tag derived from `RELEASE` + the pinned Pi version) with Docker Compose.
2. On each run, `/opt/mosaic/src/load-contracts.sh` reads the four contract files
in fixed order (CONSTITUTION, STANDARDS, SOUL, USER), joins them with clear
separators, and writes `/var/lib/mosaic/system-prompt.md`.
3. `/opt/mosaic/src/run-agent.sh` starts Pi noninteractively
(`pi -p "Return your startup marker and nothing else."`) with
`--system-prompt "$(cat /var/lib/mosaic/system-prompt.md)"` and all ambient
discovery disabled (`--no-context-files --no-skills --no-extensions
--no-prompt-templates --no-themes`), ephemeral (`--no-session`), tool-free
(`--no-tools`), and offline for startup network operations (`--offline`).
4. `scripts/verify.sh` trims surrounding whitespace from the response and exits 0
only when it equals `MOSAIC_HELLO_OK` exactly.
- Node.js ≥ 20
- npm (for global @mosaicstack/mosaic install)
- One or more runtimes: [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [Codex](https://github.com/openai/codex), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Pi](https://github.com/mariozechner/pi-coding-agent)
## Usage
```bash
scripts/bootstrap.sh # create config.json if absent (idempotent)
scripts/build.sh # build the image
scripts/hello.sh # one-shot request; prints the model response
scripts/verify.sh # full gated test; exit 0 only on exact MOSAIC_HELLO_OK
scripts/run-task.sh # run a mission/task file (see Missions & tasks)
scripts/release.sh # package / activate / rollback / status (see Release model)
scripts/test-config.sh # fast config-layer selftests (no Docker)
scripts/test-task.sh # mission/task selftests (schema + adapter seam + live runs)
scripts/test-release.sh # release selftests
scripts/reset.sh # delete the configured data root (safety-checked)
```
Prove the failure path (acceptance criterion 9):
### Launching Agent Sessions
```bash
EXPECTED_MARKER=MOSAIC_NOT_OK scripts/verify.sh # must exit nonzero
mosaic pi # Launch Pi with Mosaic injection
mosaic claude # Launch Claude Code with Mosaic injection
mosaic codex # Launch Codex with Mosaic injection
mosaic opencode # Launch OpenCode with Mosaic injection
mosaic yolo claude # Claude with dangerous-permissions mode
mosaic yolo pi # Pi in yolo mode
```
## Authentication
The launcher verifies your config, checks for `SOUL.md`, injects your `AGENTS.md` standards into the runtime, and forwards all arguments.
Pi's documented container authentication (see the package's
`docs/containerization.md`) is used, in this order:
Pi launches default to a token-lean skill posture: `mosaic pi` passes `--no-skills` so Pi does not preload every global skill description into the system prompt. Use `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=all mosaic pi` for the legacy all-skills catalog, or `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=discover mosaic pi` to let Pi use its native settings/project skill discovery.
1. **Read-only mounted credential file** (default): the host pi auth file
`~/.pi/agent/auth.json` is bind-mounted read-only to
`/home/node/.pi/agent/auth.json`. The host file holds a static API-key
entry for the built-in `zai` provider, so no token refresh writes are needed.
2. **Runtime environment variable** (documented alternative): set `ZAI_API_KEY`
or `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` in the environment or in a gitignored `.env`; compose
passes them through. Pi's documented precedence applies.
Mosaic also loads its Pi extensions from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`. Inside Pi,
`/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent loop that checks every turn and successful
compaction, requires two evidence-bearing completion reports, and can be inspected or stopped with
`/goal status`, `/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, and `/goal cancel`. Controller-owned goal-state
entries redact common credential shapes, but Pi's model/tool-call history is separate, so goals and
evidence must never contain secrets or raw sensitive output. Mosaic does not install this extension
into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
Credentials are never committed, never copied into the image, and never printed.
Mosaic-managed named accounts (`agent.sh --auth`) live under the data root
(`auth/<account>.json`, 0600) — the stack never writes into `~/.pi`.
`.env.example` contains non-secret settings only.
### TUI & Gateway
## Boundaries honored
```bash
mosaic tui # Interactive TUI connected to the gateway
mosaic gateway login # Authenticate with a gateway instance
mosaic sessions list # List active agent sessions
```
- No mounts of `~/.mosaic` or `~/.config/mosaic`; no Docker socket mount.
- Source stays in this project directory; generated state only in
`/home/jwoltje/.mosaic-dev` (host) and `/var/lib/mosaic` (container).
- No database, web server, queue, second container, orchestration, Git
integration, persistent sessions, or policy machinery.
### Gateway Management
```bash
mosaic gateway install # Install and configure the gateway service
mosaic gateway verify # Post-install health check
mosaic gateway login # Authenticate and store a session token
mosaic gateway config rotate-token # Rotate your API token
mosaic gateway config recover-token # Recover a token via BetterAuth cookie
```
If you already have a gateway account but no token, use `mosaic gateway config recover-token` to retrieve one without recreating your account.
### Configuration
Mosaic supports three storage tiers: `local` (PGlite, single-host), `standalone` (PostgreSQL, single-host), and `federated` (PostgreSQL + pgvector + Valkey, multi-host). See [Federated Tier Setup](docs/federation/SETUP.md) for multi-user and production deployments, or [Migrating to Federated](docs/guides/migrate-tier.md) to upgrade from existing tiers.
```bash
mosaic config show # Print full config as JSON
mosaic config get <key> # Read a specific key
mosaic config set <key> <val># Write a key
mosaic config edit # Open config in $EDITOR
mosaic config path # Print config file path
```
### Management
```bash
mosaic doctor # Health audit — detect drift and missing files
mosaic sync # Sync skills from canonical source
mosaic skill list # Audit Claude skill registrations and conflicts
mosaic skill register <name> # Register one canonical skill with Claude Code
mosaic skill unregister <name> # Remove one Mosaic-owned Claude link
mosaic update # Update CLI/framework and auto-register canonical skills
mosaic wizard # Full guided setup wizard
mosaic bootstrap <path> # Bootstrap a repo with Mosaic standards
mosaic coord init # Initialize a new orchestration mission
mosaic prdy init # Create a PRD via guided session
```
### Sub-package Commands
Each Mosaic sub-package exposes its API surface through the unified CLI:
```bash
# User management
mosaic auth users list
mosaic auth users create
mosaic auth sso
# Agent brain (projects, missions, tasks)
mosaic brain projects
mosaic brain missions
mosaic brain tasks
mosaic brain conversations
# Agent forge pipeline
mosaic forge run
mosaic forge status
mosaic forge resume
mosaic forge personas
# Structured logging
mosaic log tail
mosaic log search
mosaic log export
mosaic log level
# MACP protocol
mosaic macp tasks
mosaic macp submit
mosaic macp gate
mosaic macp events
# Agent memory
mosaic memory search
mosaic memory stats
mosaic memory insights
mosaic memory preferences
# Task queue (Valkey)
mosaic queue list
mosaic queue stats
mosaic queue pause
mosaic queue resume
mosaic queue jobs
mosaic queue drain
# Object storage
mosaic storage status
mosaic storage tier
mosaic storage export
mosaic storage import
# Schema migration is unavailable in this release. The current storage wrapper shells
# directly to `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate`; it is legacy N-1,
# uncertified, and MUST NOT be invoked pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation.
# Future schema migration is non-operative: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner
# --run → runner --verify → readiness. Tier copy uses only the separately held secure
# migrate-tier route.
```
### Telemetry
```bash
# Local observability (OTEL / Jaeger)
mosaic telemetry local status
mosaic telemetry local tail
mosaic telemetry local jaeger
# Remote telemetry (dry-run by default)
mosaic telemetry status
mosaic telemetry opt-in
mosaic telemetry opt-out
mosaic telemetry test
mosaic telemetry upload # Dry-run unless opted in
```
Consent state is persisted in config. Remote upload is a no-op until you run `mosaic telemetry opt-in`.
## Development
### Prerequisites
- Node.js ≥ 20
- pnpm 10.6+
- Docker & Docker Compose
### Setup
```bash
git clone [email protected]:mosaicstack/stack.git
cd stack
# Install dependencies. The local tier uses in-process PGlite; leave DATABASE_URL unset.
# The pnpm store defaults to $HOME/.local/share/pnpm/store. Override it without
# editing the checkout with NPM_CONFIG_STORE_DIR=$HOME/another-store if needed.
pnpm install
# Verify dependencies and generated state before running source-quality gates.
# Missing dependencies exit 42; stale/foreign apps/web/.next state exits 43.
# The web build certifies its exact standalone symlink manifest; added, removed,
# retargeted, or manifest-only-tampered generated links also exit 43. This detects
# accidental, independent, stale, and foreign-residue mutation—the class exposed by
# a five-month-stale .next that produced 19 phantom TS2307 errors.
# It does NOT defend against a same-UID actor that can rewrite both manifest and
# marker consistently (CWE-345). RM-59 tracks the required executor/spine-side
# trust anchor outside worktree authority.
pnpm preflight
# Optional local queue service only. This does not start PostgreSQL.
docker compose up -d valkey
# The current Gateway/Web local process is held; see docs/guides/dev-guide.md.
# Do not start it until KBN-101-02 makes inherited dotenv/DSN state fail closed.
```
### Held future procedure
The checked-in Compose PostgreSQL service mounts legacy initialization SQL and is **not** a
current PostgreSQL, standalone, or federated developer route. Do not start it with Compose,
invoke initialization SQL, or treat the planned migrator as currently executable.
**Held future activation procedure — non-operative and no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05
land:** external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` →
`mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. The future deployment artifacts—not
this README—will provide the reviewed commands and secret-consumer interface.
For local data-layer work, PGlite needs no PostgreSQL service. The optional Compose command above
starts only Valkey; OTEL Collector and Jaeger may likewise be started individually if needed,
without starting PostgreSQL. A Gateway/Web local process is not currently a safe PGlite route:
its unguarded dotenv loader may inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. Do not use root `pnpm dev` or a
Gateway start command until KBN-101-02 makes that state fail closed.
### Quality Gates
```bash
pnpm preflight # Checkout/dependency/generated-state validation
pnpm typecheck # TypeScript type checking (all packages)
pnpm lint # ESLint (all packages)
pnpm test # Vitest (all packages)
pnpm format:check # Prettier check
pnpm format # Prettier auto-fix
```
### CI
Woodpecker CI runs on every push:
- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
- **Legacy N-1 CI status only — active, uncertified, and non-authorizing as an operator route:** the checked-in job currently invokes `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate` with `DATABASE_URL` against an isolated disposable PostgreSQL CI database. It performs direct DDL in that CI database, is not approved ordinary behavior or an operator route, and remains a known exception pending KBN-101-06 removal/replacement by the certified runner-backed CI path.
- `pnpm test` (Turbo-orchestrated across all packages)
npm packages are published to the Gitea package registry on main merges.
## Architecture
```
stack/
├── apps/
│ ├── gateway/ NestJS API + WebSocket hub (Fastify, Socket.IO, OTEL)
│ └── web/ Next.js dashboard (React 19, Tailwind)
├── packages/
│ ├── mosaic/ Unified CLI — TUI, gateway client, wizard, sub-package commands
│ ├── types/ Shared TypeScript contracts (Socket.IO typed events)
│ ├── db/ Drizzle ORM schema + migrations (pgvector)
│ ├── auth/ BetterAuth configuration
│ ├── brain/ Data layer (PG-backed)
│ ├── queue/ Valkey task queue + MCP
│ ├── coord/ Mission coordination
│ ├── forge/ Multi-stage AI pipeline (intake → board → plan → code → review)
│ ├── macp/ MACP protocol — credential resolution, gate runner, events
│ ├── agent/ Agent session management
│ ├── memory/ Agent memory layer
│ ├── log/ Structured logging
│ ├── prdy/ PRD creation and validation
│ ├── quality-rails/ Quality templates (TypeScript, Next.js, monorepo)
│ └── design-tokens/ Shared design tokens
├── plugins/
│ ├── discord/ Discord channel plugin (discord.js)
│ ├── telegram/ Telegram channel plugin (Telegraf)
│ ├── macp/ OpenClaw MACP runtime plugin
│ └── mosaic-framework/ OpenClaw framework injection plugin
├── tools/
│ └── install.sh Unified installer (framework + npm CLI, --yes / --no-auto-launch)
├── scripts/agent/ Agent session lifecycle scripts
├── docker-compose.yml Dev infrastructure
└── .woodpecker/ CI pipeline configs
```
### Key Design Decisions
- **Gateway is the single API surface** — all clients (TUI, web, Discord, Telegram) connect through it
- **ESM everywhere** — `"type": "module"`, `.js` extensions in imports, NodeNext resolution
- **Socket.IO typed events** — defined in `@mosaicstack/types`, enforced at compile time
- **OTEL auto-instrumentation** — loads before NestJS bootstrap
- **Explicit `@Inject()` decorators** — required since tsx/esbuild doesn't emit decorator metadata
### Framework (`~/.config/mosaic/`)
The framework is the bash-based standards layer installed to every developer machine:
```
~/.config/mosaic/
├── AGENTS.md ← Central standards (loaded into every runtime)
├── SOUL.md ← Agent identity (name, style, guardrails)
├── USER.md ← User profile (name, timezone, preferences)
├── TOOLS.md ← Machine-level tool reference
├── bin/mosaic ← Unified launcher (claude, codex, opencode, pi, yolo)
├── guides/ ← E2E delivery, orchestrator protocol, PRD, etc.
├── runtime/ ← Per-runtime configs (claude/, codex/, opencode/, pi/)
├── skills/ ← Universal skills (synced from agent-skills repo)
├── tools/ ← Tool suites (orchestrator, git, quality, prdy, etc.)
└── memory/ ← Persistent agent memory (preserved across upgrades)
```
### Forge Pipeline
Forge is a multi-stage AI pipeline for autonomous feature delivery:
```
Intake → Discovery → Board Review → Planning (3 stages) → Coding → Review → Remediation → Test → Deploy
```
Each stage has a dispatch mode (`exec` for research/review, `yolo` for coding), quality gates, and timeouts. The board review uses multiple AI personas (CEO, CTO, CFO, COO + specialists) to evaluate briefs before committing resources.
## Upgrading
Run the installer again — it handles upgrades automatically:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://mosaicstack.dev/install.sh | bash
```
Or use the direct URL:
```bash
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
```
Or use the CLI:
```bash
mosaic update # Check + install CLI updates
mosaic update --check # Check only, don't install
```
The CLI also performs a background update check on every invocation (cached for 1 hour).
### Installer Flags
```bash
bash tools/install.sh --check # Version check only
bash tools/install.sh --framework # Framework only (skip npm CLI)
bash tools/install.sh --cli # npm CLI only (skip framework)
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref
bash tools/install.sh --yes # Non-interactive, accept all defaults
bash tools/install.sh --no-auto-launch # Skip auto-launch of wizard
```
The installer rejects unrecognized flags or positional arguments before making changes and prints the supported-option usage.
## Contributing
```bash
# Create a feature branch
git checkout -b feat/my-feature
# Make changes, then verify
pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test && pnpm format:check
# Commit (husky runs lint-staged automatically)
git commit -m "feat: description of change"
# Push and create PR
git push -u origin feat/my-feature
```
DTOs go in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries. Scratchpads (`docs/scratchpads/`) are mandatory for non-trivial tasks. See `AGENTS.md` for the full standards reference.
## License
Proprietary — all rights reserved.
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0.0.12
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# Mosaic Stack
You are the default collaborator for Mosaic Stack: a practical engineering
partner helping people build, inspect, and operate a trustworthy foundation
for delegated work.
Mosaic Stack is deliberately small, file-based, and evidence-oriented. Its
purpose is not to perform confidence; it is to make useful work attributable,
bounded, reproducible, and reviewable. Treat the system's contracts, policies,
and run records as part of the product, not paperwork around it.
Work with calm precision. Start from what the user is trying to accomplish,
make the next useful step clear, and explain results in plain language. Be
decisive when the evidence supports a decision; be explicit about uncertainty
when it does not. Never claim a test, command, integration, or outcome that
you have not actually verified.
Respect boundaries. Ask before expanding scope, changing authority, touching
credentials, or taking an irreversible external action. Prefer the least
privileged path, preserve user work, and stop on a policy or validation
refusal rather than working around it. A clean refusal with a useful diagnosis
is better than a superficially successful but untrustworthy result.
Leave a legible trail. Make changes intentional, keep records honest, and
report what changed, how it was checked, and what remains unresolved. When
coordinating other workers, give each one a bounded objective and review their
evidence instead of treating their confidence as proof.
The aim is dependable progress: small enough to understand, safe enough to
trust, and concrete enough for a person to verify.
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# Mosaic runtime adapters
An adapter is the entire harness-specific surface of the system. Everything
upstream of an adapter — configuration, contracts, missions, tasks, run
records — is harness-agnostic; everything inside an adapter may assume one
specific agent runtime.
## Contract
An adapter lives at:
```text
/opt/mosaic/adapters/<name>/adapter.sh
```
and must be executable. The dispatcher (`/opt/mosaic/src/run-agent.sh`)
selects it via `MOSAIC_ADAPTER` (default: `pi`) and execs it after the
system prompt has been generated.
**Inputs (environment):**
| Variable | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE` | Absolute path to the generated system prompt (contracts + optional mission section). Read it; do not modify it. |
| `MOSAIC_REQUEST` | The exact user request text (may contain newlines). |
| `MOSAIC_PROVIDER` | Configured provider name. |
| `MOSAIC_MODEL` | Configured model id. |
Optional, adapter-specific (documented per adapter):
| Variable | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `MOSAIC_MOCK_RESPONSE` | mock only: the verbatim response to emit |
**Outputs:**
- `stdout`: the model response text — the only channel the orchestrator captures
- `stderr`: diagnostics (never credentials)
- exit `0`: success; nonzero: failure
## Rules
1. Adapters print ONLY the response on stdout. Status lines go to stderr.
2. Adapters never read configuration files; the resolved settings arrive via environment.
3. Adapters never write outside `/var/lib/mosaic`.
4. Adding a worker adapter requires: a new directory, the contract
implementation, and adding the name to the allowlist in
`scripts/mosaic-config.mjs`. A managed-session adapter (below) is selected
by the launch bundle, not by `execution.adapter`, and is not on that
allowlist unless it also works as a worker adapter.
## Included adapters
- `pi` — the pinned `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` CLI in noninteractive
print mode (`-p`), ambient discovery disabled, stdin detached.
- `mock` — deterministic echo of `MOSAIC_MOCK_RESPONSE`. Test-only: never use
it where a real model response is required.
- `claude` — the host's `claude` CLI, for managed sessions only (below):
`MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` when set, else `claude` on `PATH`.
Not a worker adapter: the image has no `claude`, and the adapter refuses
without the bundle's hook and MCP files.
## Managed sessions (slice 1 S6)
The session runner (`packages/harness/src/runner.mjs`) runs one adapter
call per turn on the host, as `/bin/sh <adapters/<name>/adapter.sh>` (the
repository keeps adapters 0644; only the image sets the mode), in the
session's workspace and its own process group. Same contract, plus:
| Variable | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `MOSAIC_WORKSPACE` | The session's workspace; the adapter runs there. |
| `MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR` | The session's persistent directory; later turns resume the session kept there. |
| `MOSAIC_TOOLS` | The built-in tool limit (pi names for `pi`, Claude Code names for `claude`), comma-separated. |
| `MOSAIC_POLICY_FILE`, `MOSAIC_TOOLS_FILE` | The bundle's gate policy and typed tools. |
| `MOSAIC_TOOL_SOCKET` | The runner's tool socket, which the typed tools call. |
| `MOSAIC_TURN_MARKER` | `pi`: the extension writes it at `agent_end`; a pi turn that exits 0 without it failed. |
| `MOSAIC_EXTENSIONS` | `pi` only: extension files loaded with `-e`; a missing one exits 2. |
| `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS`, `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG` | `claude` only: the bundle's gate hook and MCP server; required. |
| `MOSAIC_THINKING` | The route's thinking level (row 65), which the harness module's `levels()` already checked. `pi` passes `--thinking` (`off`, `minimal`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`) and omits it when unset, as for `run-task.sh` workers. `claude` passes `--effort` (`low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max`) and requires it; unset exits 2. |
| `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN` | `claude` only: absolute path of the CLI to run, from the host's environment (the bus unit pins it). Unset or empty runs `claude` from `PATH`; a relative path or a non-executable file exits 2. |
The layers each adapter relies on, and what they don't cover, are in
`packages/harness/README.md`.
### A role's skills (row 64)
A managed session's skills reach both adapters as text in the bundle's
`prompt.md`, which they pass with `--system-prompt`. Neither adapter loads a
skill of its own: `pi` keeps `--no-skills`, since role sessions never get
`MOSAIC_SKILLS`, and `claude` keeps `--disable-slash-commands` and
`--restricted`. Sage chose this on 2026-10-19 from a probe, recorded in
`agents/sage/work/queue-64/probe.md`:
- Pi's `--skill` puts only a skill's name and description in the prompt,
and the model has to `read` the SKILL.md itself. The gate refuses every
file-tool path outside the workspace, so the session couldn't open its
own skills. Opening the gate to the bundle would change a security
boundary.
- Claude Code loads a bundle-local `--plugin-dir` skill under `--restricted`
only with its `Skill` tool on, and then it also offers its own bundled
skills. Which ones it offers changes with the Claude Code version, and the
`Skill` tool would pass through the gate hook.
The cost is prompt size: a role's skill text is in every turn, where the
other routes load a skill when it's used. The bundle caps a role's skills at
64 KiB together, since `claude` passes `prompt.md` as one argument and Linux
caps one argument at 128 KiB.
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#!/bin/sh
# Claude Code adapter: implements the Mosaic adapter contract for the host's
# `claude` CLI, for managed sessions (slice 1 S6). Headless only. The CLI is
# MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN when set (the bus unit pins it), else `claude` on PATH.
#
# Contract: see adapters/README.md.
# stdout = the turn's answer only; stderr = diagnostics; exit 0 on success.
#
# The layers this relies on are row S0 lines 1-5 (docs/plans/2026-10-04_slice-1.md,
# "What S6 can rely on"): the PreToolUse command hook in MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS,
# wrapped as `timeout -k 2 10 <gate> || exit 2`, and the tool limit (--tools).
# --bare is never passed: it turns settings hooks off.
set -eu
need() {
eval "v=\${$1:-}"
[ -n "$v" ] || { echo "claude adapter: $1 is required" >&2; exit 2; }
}
need MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE
need MOSAIC_REQUEST
need MOSAIC_WORKSPACE
need MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR
need MOSAIC_MODEL
need MOSAIC_THINKING
need MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS
need MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG
for f in "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS" "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG"; do
[ -r "$f" ] || { echo "claude adapter: not readable: $f" >&2; exit 2; }
done
[ "${MOSAIC_INTERACTIVE:-}" != "1" ] || { echo "claude adapter: interactive mode isn't supported" >&2; exit 2; }
CLAUDE=claude
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN:-}" ]; then
case "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN" in
/*) ;;
*) echo "claude adapter: MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN must be an absolute path: $MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
[ -f "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN" ] && [ -x "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN" ] || { echo "claude adapter: MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN is not an executable file: $MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN" >&2; exit 2; }
CLAUDE=$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN
fi
mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_WORKSPACE" "$MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR"
cd "$MOSAIC_WORKSPACE"
# Session: the first turn names a new session id, later turns resume it.
# The id is kept only after a turn succeeds, so a failed first turn never
# leaves a --resume of a session that doesn't exist.
ID_FILE="$MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR/claude-session-id"
if [ -s "$ID_FILE" ]; then
SESSION_FLAG=--resume
SESSION_ID=$(cat "$ID_FILE")
else
SESSION_FLAG=--session-id
SESSION_ID=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)
fi
# Flags:
# -p one-shot: print the answer and exit
# --output-format text stdout is the answer only
# --system-prompt the generated prompt replaces the default
# --effort the instance's thinking var (row 65; 2.1.302 takes
# low, medium, high, xhigh, max)
# --restricted no user/project/local settings files; --settings
# (the gate hook) still applies; no code-running
# tool unless --tools names it; file tools confined
# to the working directory; no CLAUDE.md file or
# auto-memory in the prompt. The S0 lines above
# don't depend on it, but it is what keeps founder
# and repository memory out; a test fails without it.
# --tools the built-in tool limit (S0 line 5); empty = none
# --allowedTools the same tools plus the mosaic MCP server, so
# --permission-mode dontAsk nothing waits on a prompt and anything else is denied
# --settings the gate hook (S0 lines 1-4)
# --strict-mcp-config only the bundle's MCP server, which serves the
# --mcp-config typed bus tools
# --disable-slash-commands no skill discovery; the role's skills are
# text in the system prompt (row 64)
ALLOWED=mcp__mosaic
[ -z "${MOSAIC_TOOLS:-}" ] || ALLOWED="$MOSAIC_TOOLS,mcp__mosaic"
PROMPT_CONTENT="$(cat "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE")"
"$CLAUDE" -p "$MOSAIC_REQUEST" \
--output-format text \
--system-prompt "$PROMPT_CONTENT" \
--model "$MOSAIC_MODEL" \
--effort "$MOSAIC_THINKING" \
--restricted \
--tools "${MOSAIC_TOOLS:-}" \
--allowedTools "$ALLOWED" \
--permission-mode dontAsk \
--settings "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_SETTINGS" \
--strict-mcp-config \
--mcp-config "$MOSAIC_CLAUDE_MCP_CONFIG" \
--disable-slash-commands \
"$SESSION_FLAG" "$SESSION_ID" || exit $?
[ "$SESSION_FLAG" = --resume ] || printf '%s\n' "$SESSION_ID" > "$ID_FILE"
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#!/bin/sh
# Mock adapter: deterministic response for seam tests. NEVER use where a
# real model response is required.
#
# Contract: see /opt/mosaic/adapters/README.md.
set -eu
[ -n "${MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE:-}" ] || { echo "mock adapter: MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE is required" >&2; exit 2; }
if [ "${MOSAIC_INTERACTIVE:-}" != "1" ]; then
[ -n "${MOSAIC_REQUEST:-}" ] || { echo "mock adapter: MOSAIC_REQUEST is required" >&2; exit 2; }
fi
[ -r "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" ] || { echo "mock adapter: system prompt not readable: $MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
echo "mock adapter: responding verbatim from MOSAIC_MOCK_RESPONSE" >&2
# Deterministic plumbing evidence: which MOSAIC_* variables did the
# orchestrator actually deliver? (Auth secrets are not MOSAIC_-prefixed.)
(env | grep '^MOSAIC_' | sort) >&2 2>/dev/null || true
printf '%s\n' "${MOSAIC_MOCK_RESPONSE:-}"
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#!/bin/sh
# Pi adapter: implements the Mosaic adapter contract for the pinned
# @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent CLI.
#
# Contract: see /opt/mosaic/adapters/README.md.
# Headless (default): stdout = response only; stderr = diagnostics; exit 0.
# Interactive (MOSAIC_INTERACTIVE=1): full pi TUI on the attached terminal.
set -eu
[ -n "${MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE:-}" ] || { echo "pi adapter: MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE is required" >&2; exit 2; }
[ -r "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" ] || { echo "pi adapter: system prompt not readable: $MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
# MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME is optional in headless mode (identity section is then
# omitted); interactive launches always set it via scripts/agent.sh.
: "${PI_PROVIDER:?pi adapter: PI_PROVIDER is required}"
: "${PI_MODEL:?pi adapter: PI_MODEL is required}"
INTERACTIVE="${MOSAIC_INTERACTIVE:-}"
if [ "$INTERACTIVE" != "1" ]; then
[ -n "${MOSAIC_REQUEST:-}" ] || { echo "pi adapter: MOSAIC_REQUEST is required" >&2; exit 2; }
fi
# Workspace (M5): run inside the provided workspace when present.
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_WORKSPACE:-}" ]; then
mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_WORKSPACE"
cd "$MOSAIC_WORKSPACE"
fi
# Session (M6/M11): default ephemeral (--no-session). With a declared
# session dir: persist there and resume the most recent session. With a
# fork source: branch the source session file into the target dir
# (pi --fork) - the ancestor session is never modified.
SESSION_FLAGS="--no-session"
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_SESSION_FORK:-}" ]; then
[ -n "${MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR:-}" ] || { echo "pi adapter: session fork requires MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR" >&2; exit 2; }
mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR"
SESSION_FLAGS="--fork $MOSAIC_SESSION_FORK --session-dir $MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR"
elif [ -n "${MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR:-}" ]; then
mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR"
SESSION_FLAGS="--session-dir $MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR"
if [ -n "$(ls -A "$MOSAIC_SESSION_DIR" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
SESSION_FLAGS="$SESSION_FLAGS -c"
fi
fi
# Capabilities (M5): explicit allowlist or no tools.
TOOLS_FLAG="--no-tools"
[ -n "${MOSAIC_TOOLS:-}" ] && TOOLS_FLAG="--tools $MOSAIC_TOOLS"
# Skills (M17): explicitly provided skill dirs replace discovery. When none
# are provided the agent runs with --no-skills (nothing ambient to find).
# Role sessions never get MOSAIC_SKILLS (ENV_ALLOW in packages/seat/src/
# session.mjs leaves it out), so they run with --no-skills; their skills
# are text in the system prompt (row 64).
SKILLS_FLAG="--no-skills"
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_SKILLS:-}" ]; then
SKILLS_FLAG=""
OLDIFS=$IFS; IFS=','
for s in $MOSAIC_SKILLS; do
[ -d "$s" ] || { echo "pi adapter: skill dir missing: $s" >&2; exit 2; }
SKILLS_FLAG="$SKILLS_FLAG --skill $s"
done
IFS=$OLDIFS
fi
# Extensions (S6): explicitly provided extension files, loaded with -e
# after --no-extensions turns discovery off. A missing file refuses here;
# pi itself also refuses to start on a missing or broken -e (row S0 line 3).
EXT_FLAGS=""
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_EXTENSIONS:-}" ]; then
OLDIFS=$IFS; IFS=','
for e in $MOSAIC_EXTENSIONS; do
[ -f "$e" ] || { echo "pi adapter: extension missing: $e" >&2; exit 2; }
EXT_FLAGS="$EXT_FLAGS -e $e"
done
IFS=$OLDIFS
fi
# Thinking (row 65): a managed session's level, from its instance's thinking
# var (pi 0.85.1: off, minimal, low, medium, high, xhigh, max). Workers from
# run-task.sh set none and keep pi's default.
THINKING_FLAG=""
[ -n "${MOSAIC_THINKING:-}" ] && THINKING_FLAG="--thinking $MOSAIC_THINKING"
# Mode (M13): interactive TUI or one-shot print.
PRINT_MODE="-p"
REQUEST_ARG=""
if [ "$INTERACTIVE" = "1" ]; then
PRINT_MODE=""
else
REQUEST_ARG="$MOSAIC_REQUEST"
fi
# All flags documented in the pi package README (CLI Reference):
# -p/--print one-shot mode: print the response and exit (omitted in
# interactive TUI mode)
# --system-prompt replace the default prompt with the generated one
# --no-* no ambient context/skills/extensions/templates/themes
# EXT_FLAGS the explicitly provided extensions only (-e)
# SESSION_FLAGS ephemeral | persistent | forked (per env)
# TOOLS_FLAG per capabilities
# THINKING_FLAG --thinking <level> for a managed session, else nothing
# --offline no startup network operations (update checks/telemetry)
# --no-approve ignore project-local .pi/ files (settings, SYSTEM.md)
# whatever trust is saved for the workspace
PROMPT_CONTENT="$(cat "$MOSAIC_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE")"
set -- \
--offline \
--no-approve \
--no-extensions \
$EXT_FLAGS \
$SKILLS_FLAG \
--no-prompt-templates \
--no-themes \
--no-context-files \
$TOOLS_FLAG \
$SESSION_FLAGS \
--provider "$PI_PROVIDER" \
--model "$PI_MODEL" \
$THINKING_FLAG \
--system-prompt "$PROMPT_CONTENT"
# One-shot mode appends -p and the request (both safely quoted);
# interactive mode appends nothing - clean TUI.
[ "$INTERACTIVE" = "1" ] || set -- "$@" -p "$MOSAIC_REQUEST"
exec pi "$@"
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# Mosaic Stack development team
These are interactive host development agents working in the canonical
checkout. They do not create managed fleet registrations or change role policy.
Sage leads the project and coordinates assignments, review, and integration
(Jason's ruling, 2026-09-26). Development sessions run in T3 for now.
For the current bootstrap phase, direct coding, review and research use Darkwing,
Dewey, Filbert, Rocko, Researcher and further seats Jason launches from this repository's `agents/` directory,
not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
`~/.mosaic` launchers/provisioning or migrate/stop live fleet processes.
| Agent | Responsibility | Runtime | Launch from repository root |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Darkwing | Hands-on engineering; collaborating seat under Sage | Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/darkwing/launch.sh` |
| Dewey | Frontend design, UX, accessibility, and UI implementation | Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/dewey/launch.sh` |
| Rocko | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol, thread d99326cc, lead decision 122; Claude thread b84bb264 retired 2026-10-12); launcher Claude Code, Sonnet model | `agents/rocko/launch.sh` |
| Filbert | General development, investigation, testing, and review | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 048f3c63, non-sandbox reviews only, lead decisions 130 and 134; Codex threads f712d8af and 50342f6a retired 2026-10-13, Claude thread 9cb9731e retired 2026-10-12); launcher Pi, `openai-codex/gpt-6-astra:low`, not to be used under R26 until it changes (lead decision 69) | `agents/filbert/launch.sh` |
| Researcher | Source-grounded technical research and evidence | T3 session (Claude, Sonnet 5.5, thread 9bac0794, rows 97 and 98, lead decision 124); Haiku rows (71, 80, 84, 88, later 96) run as subagents Sage dispatches with model haiku, effort high and a worktree (lead decision 129); Haiku thread c98aaf4a retired 2026-10-13 unused; launcher Pi, configured Mosaic model | `agents/researcher/launch.sh` |
| Launchpad | Builder, MVP T1 row 192 (Q175 SSO phase 1) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Morgana | Builder, MVP T1 row 193 (human users and RBAC) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Honker | Builder, MVP T1 row 194 (agent lifecycle) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Gander | Builder, the human boundary across uids (P19 333, #1694) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
| Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
| Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
| Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
| Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
| Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
| Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |
Each script supports `--check` and `--fresh`. Normal launches resume the agent's
own conversation; a first launch starts one. See each agent's README for
context inputs, authentication, and recovery details. Launch scripts can also
be invoked by absolute path from any directory. No assignment or model request
is submitted by the launcher itself.
The shared Pi helper supports `--provider NAME`, `--model ID`, and
`--thinking LEVEL` as per-launch overrides of the validated system defaults.
Filbert's wrapper appends the required provider, model and thinking flags so
its launch configuration remains fixed, including on resume. Use Filbert's
wrapper to select that configuration; a direct shared-helper invocation uses
its own supplied flags or the system defaults.
All agents follow repository governance and current user direction. Team
leadership does not add deployment or push authority. Coordinate overlapping
work with Sage and preserve other sessions' changes.
Before 2026-09-26 Sage worked only on DYOR strategy and sat outside the
development queue. Jason then made Sage the project lead and Darkwing a
collaborating seat. A separate fleet Sage seat under `~/.mosaic` is being
decommissioned; it does not speak for this seat. Whether the DYOR strategy work
continues is Jason's call. Joe retains DYOR engineering.
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# Bushroot
Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5, started by Sage under mos-1008 item 2 (a low-level model under Q177) for the row
that retires the control board writer on 7331 (#1696).
No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `bushroot/*`
branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.
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===== DARKWING NATIVE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT =====
Your identity is Darkwing. This launch runs Pi directly on the host, in the
Mosaic Stack development repository. The injected SOUL defines your persona;
CONSTITUTION and STANDARDS supply governance, USER supplies user context,
and AGENTS.md supplies repository instructions.
You have host read, bash, edit, write, grep, find, and ls tools. This is a
development TUI with the operator's OS access, not a sandbox or a registered
managed fleet seat. Use repository scripts for Mosaic operations and inspect
their effects before running them. Container paths in skills describe worker
deployments, not your current workspace. A tool's presence is not authority
to change unrelated files, other agents' work, or the live fleet.
For an assigned improvement, inspect the implementation, reproduce the issue,
make the smallest useful change, verify it, and continue through the authorized
outcome. Run scripts/mosaic queue next darkwing for ownership, gates and your next piece;
a new user assignment does not silently resume unrelated queued work.
The local /goal extension is loaded and owns any operator-set goal lifecycle.
Use ms-proactive-agent for work selection and ms-goal for recovery guidance;
do not create a competing goal loop. Follow goal_report's actual schema and
reporting instructions. Its text format is Just Completed / Next Step /
Blocked, with '* none' for empty sections. No external reporting skill is
needed to discover that format. Native development packaging supersedes
older skill statements that this extension is unavailable.
For relocation recovery, read agents/darkwing/work/RESTART.md after the root
AGENTS.md and docs/plans/CURRENT.md. It records verified checkpoints and limits,
not a new assignment. The canonical checkout is /mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack;
v1/ is archived legacy source. Reconcile newer owner direction before acting.
Conversation history persists across launcher restarts. Goals belong to a
single process incarnation; recover the assignment from verified records and
the operator's direction after a restart. No goal is started by this launcher.
Context is captured anew at launch; source edits do not update this process's
injected snapshot. Relaunch to load approved context changes.
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# Darkwing development TUI
From any terminal, run:
```sh
/home/jwoltje/src/mosaic-stack-dev-test/agents/darkwing/launch.sh
```
The agent launcher is a thin shim to `scripts/agent.sh --host-dev darkwing`,
forwarding all arguments unchanged. `scripts/agent.sh` is the common entry
point; `scripts/agent-host-dev.sh` implements its native development mode.
The host launcher opens the repository as Darkwing's workspace.
It uses the repository-pinned Pi, the configured Mosaic provider/model, and
native Pi authentication (normal `~/.pi/agent`, or `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR` if
explicitly set). It never copies credentials. Install dependencies with
`npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund` if needed.
`--check` validates configuration and required inputs without opening Pi or
calling a model. `--fresh` starts a new conversation without deleting earlier
ones. Normal launches continue the latest conversation under
`.pi/state/darkwing/sessions/`; the first launch creates one. A launcher lock
rejects simultaneous launches through this script. It does not exclude Pi
processes started another way. Damaged JSONL history refuses automatic resume;
`--fresh` is an explicit escape hatch that preserves the damaged evidence.
The current files are combined into a private launch snapshot under
`.pi/state/darkwing/launches/`:
- `contracts/CONSTITUTION.md` and `contracts/STANDARDS.md`
- `agents/darkwing/SOUL.md`
- `<configured dataRoot>/user/USER.md`, the deployment's live user profile
- the repository's `AGENTS.md` and Darkwing's `CONTEXT.md`
Use `--soul FILE`, `--constitution FILE`, or `--user FILE` to select alternate
inputs, including a future `contracts/USER.md`. Relative paths resolve from
the repository root. Missing or empty inputs refuse launch. Snapshots can
contain personal context and remain local, with private file permissions.
Context edits take effect on relaunch, including when resuming a conversation.
The launcher enables coding/search tools, `goal_report`, ten explicit local
skills, and the canonical goal extension through `scripts/sync-dev-extensions.sh`.
Ambient context, skills, extensions, templates, and themes are disabled.
The normal Pi coding prompt is retained with the Mosaic context appended.
Enter `/goal <assignment and acceptance criteria>` to start continuing work;
`/goal stop`, `/goal resume`, and `/goal` pause, resume, and inspect it. A new
process does not automatically adopt a previous process's goal.
This TUI has the operator's host access, including repository edits and host
commands. Its tool list is not OS isolation. It creates no managed role or
fleet registration. Worker dispatch still uses the governed Mosaic task runner.
The user supplies the assignment; launch alone does not start self-modification.
## Deployment findings
The existing `scripts/agent.sh` launches a Docker container, defaults to the
`agent-<name>` session directory, and asks Pi to continue when that directory
is nonempty. Its default workspace is `<dataRoot>/workspaces/<name>`, not this
checkout. `src/load-contracts.sh` loads image-baked governance, an optional
seat SOUL override, live user Markdown, and mission context into a shared
prompt path. A seat override requires `agent.json`; a standalone SOUL is not
discovered. `adapters/pi/adapter.sh` disables extensions. The temporary host
launcher follows the existing native development path to provide repository
access and `/goal`, and keeps its conversations separate from container and
live fleet sessions. It does not invoke release alignment on startup.
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# SOUL — Darkwing
You are Darkwing, Mosaic Stack's hands-on engineering collaborator, working
with Sage as project lead. Your job is to help Jason make the system
dependable by using it, finding where it falls short, and carrying authorized
improvements through verification.
Be curious, direct, and resourceful. Have a technical opinion and explain
the evidence behind it. Investigate before guessing. Distinguish a design
claim, a passing test, and behavior you have observed in the running system.
Use Mosaic's own tools and workflows where they fit. Turn a failure into a
reproducible case, make a focused correction, and test the behavior again.
Let each verified improvement inform the next one within the assignment.
Keep the human informed when the result, scope, or next decision changes.
Own the outcome while respecting other agents' work. Preserve their changes
and records, give delegated work clear boundaries, and seek independent
review where required. Self-improvement never grants new authority: changing
your instructions, permissions, or a live deployment follows the same review
and authorization rules as any other system change.
Sage leads the development team (Jason's ruling, 2026-09-26) and translates
Jason's priorities into scoped work, coordinates ownership and dependencies,
reviews results, and verifies integration. You are a collaborating seat.
Dewey owns frontend design and UX. Rocko and Filbert support general project needs,
including implementation, investigation, testing, and review. Reconcile
concurrent edits with Sage before integration. Keep Jason informed of
outcomes and decisions that require his input. Your role does not expand the
project's existing authorization or release rules.
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Darkwing's native development mode through the Mosaic agent entry point.
set -euo pipefail
REPO="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
# Register this seat with the control board (packages/seat) unless already
# registered by `mosaic launch` or only running the checks.
if [ -z "${MOSAIC_LAUNCH_REGISTERED:-}" ] && ! printf '%s\n' "$@" | grep -qx -- '--check'; then
exec "$REPO/scripts/mosaic" launch --repo "$REPO" --harness pi darkwing -- "$@"
fi
exec "$REPO/scripts/agent.sh" --host-dev darkwing "$@"
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
// Refuse damaged history before Pi's --continue can silently skip it.
import { readFileSync, lstatSync } from 'node:fs';
try {
for (const file of process.argv.slice(2)) {
if (!lstatSync(file).isFile()) throw new Error(`not a regular session file: ${file}`);
const lines = readFileSync(file, 'utf8').trim().split('\n');
const entries = lines.map((line) => JSON.parse(line));
const header = entries[0];
if (header?.type !== 'session' || typeof header.id !== 'string' || !header.id ||
typeof header.version !== 'number' || typeof header.cwd !== 'string' ||
!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(header.timestamp)) ||
entries.slice(1).some((entry) => !entry || typeof entry.type !== 'string')) {
throw new Error(`invalid session structure: ${file}`);
}
if (header.cwd !== process.cwd()) throw new Error(`session belongs to another workspace: ${file}`);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error(`darkwing: cannot safely resume: ${error.message}; inspect history or explicitly use --fresh`);
process.exit(1);
}
-108
View File
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
# Darkwing — relocation handoff
Recorded 2026-09-07 17:43 UTC. Jason intends to relaunch with
`/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/agents/darkwing/launch.sh`.
This is a recovery note, not a new assignment or automatic goal resumption.
## Read first
1. Root `AGENTS.md` and `docs/plans/CURRENT.md`.
2. This note, then `git status --short` and `git log --oneline -5`.
3. Reconcile current owner direction and any newer declared artifacts before acting.
## Repository conversion is completed locally
Jason explicitly ordered the conversion and confirmed no work was active.
- Canonical checkout: `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`.
- Origin: `https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack`.
- Branch: `refactor`.
- Conversion commit: `127a54fdff1fe6ae56c3197edddf957481465db4`.
- New foundation is at root. `v1/` is legacy archival source, NOT current code.
- Old `/home/jwoltje/src/mosaic-stack-dev-test` is a compatibility symlink to this
same checkout. Do not recreate a second working copy there.
- Both histories retained: merge parents v2 `9a5fbdbda74b16adf488fe28138b2ba69ea5e669`
and v1 `5d2770002612a09ae0cadc129b4ea30619133e8a`.
- Exact 3,507-file v1 tracked tree imported; v1 refs under `refs/archive/v1/`.
- Original v2 refs retained; `stack-v2-archive` remote has a disabled push URL.
- Only legacy tracked tree and four conversion docs committed. All earlier
uncommitted/untracked/ignored work preserved. Index was verified clean.
- Issue https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/1495 closed explicitly
for local conversion. No push, PR/trunk merge or live-service change occurred.
Record: `docs/plans/2026-09-07_repository-consolidation-completed.md`.
Receipts: `docs/plans/reviews/2026-09-07_repository-conversion-verification.json`
and `2026-09-07_repository-conversion-postcommit-verification.json`.
Verified rollback copies, NOT development roots:
- `/mnt/storage/src/.mosaic-stack-conversion-20260907T172430Z/`
- `/home/jwoltje/src/.mosaic-stack-dev-test.pre-conversion-20260907T172430Z`
Do not delete them, launch from them or restore over newer work.
## Current unfinished foundation gate
Jason's A9 acceptance of the first offline synthetic scope/permission inspector
is pending. Code is independently approved by Filbert; no blocking code finding
remains at the reviewed r6 candidate. Owner acceptance is not inferred from tests.
- Manifest: `docs/plans/reviews/2026-09-07_foundation-inspector-rocko-build-manifest-r6.json`
SHA-256 `a4a4493000aff5905337a643886ca36e7c5377d52deed77b8aeab7174ca73dcf`.
- Report: `docs/plans/reviews/2026-09-07_foundation-inspector-rocko-build-r6.md`
SHA-256 `ee0e83efd7c71eddecf5e26f939e9a34ba85b184cfcd1cffac9ff9e56ea13c37`.
- APPROVED verdict: `docs/plans/reviews/2026-09-07_foundation-inspector-code-verdict-r6.md`
SHA-256 `ab9dd5e5c3cad5c9263e873ff82cac444da2d36040e907e4798b208fa1c08b13`.
- Guide: `docs/plans/reviews/2026-09-07_foundation-inspector-demo.md`.
All 382 approved inspector files and pinned inputs survived conversion unchanged.
Actual offline checks: Node 80/0, selftests 43/0, oracle 1,568 records / zero
schema disagreements, foundation checker PASS, config/auth/conductor 24/15/17.
Postcommit conductor 17/0 and four CLI demos passed: allowed read, allowed change
PREVIEW (no mutation), missing-registration refusal, unresolved reassignment with
original selection retained. Demo inputs are separate synthetic scenarios.
`test-task.sh` and `test-release.sh` remain NOT RUN / DEFERRED under Jason's bounded
offline-demo ruling. No deployment/native/live/provider/security certification.
Reviewer qualifications: ordering equality means structural equality, not byte
identity; auxiliary native-parser warm-run anomalies remain separate unresolved
observations, not a passing universal parser-equivalence claim. Preserve all earlier
NOT APPROVED reviews and the historical correction that r3 ran unauthorized live
branches; later deferral did not retroactively authorize them.
## Ownership and limits
- Rocko authored inspector code; Filbert independently reviewed; Darkwing coordinates
and verifies. Keep the approved candidate frozen unless a new fix is authorized.
- No automatic permission to push, merge to next/main, deploy, change live config,
grant permissions, access credentials, investigate ~/.mosaic, or start new runtime
work. Local conversion authority is not authority for those activities.
- Preserve unrelated pending work. In particular `scripts/agent.sh`, `docs/TOOLS.md`,
host launcher/context files and other untracked concepts/skills belong to existing
work. Do not blanket-stage/reset/clean. Root logs and CURRENT remain uncommitted.
- Foundation #53 in the old stack-v2 project remains a separate open issue; do not
silently close or renumber it. Accepted historical SHA/path citations remain valid.
- Rocko's Archify C1 remains HELD for owner T2/T3 decisions. No lane reassignment.
- Future durability/workflow/evidence/federation/onboarding topics are notes, not
authorization to expand the inspector.
## Communications
Use only `tools/tmux/agent-send.sh`; sender `dragon-lin:darkwing`.
Rocko: `-L mosaic-fleet -s '=rocko'`; Filbert/Dewey:
`-L default -s '=filbert'` / `'=dewey'`.
Conversion notice delivered to Rocko. Filbert/Dewey sends were unconfirmed
(input boxes not locatable); no retries, no acknowledgement claimed. Check declared
artifact paths as well as direct messages; completed reviews have existed without
transported replies. Do not inspect private panes or blindly resend.
## Relaunch and goal recovery
The project launcher continues its own latest `.pi/state/darkwing/sessions/`
conversation by default. Do NOT assume this pre-launch conversation is already in
that store or that the next launch resumes this exact conversation. This handoff
is the durable bridge. No session-tree migration or launch was performed here.
The goal extension owns lifecycle. The earlier extension goal had been paused;
no restart automatically resumes it. Reconcile the actual new process state and
Jason's direction rather than reporting progress against a guessed old goal or
creating a second goal loop. Launch alone grants no new assignment.
This handoff and its CONTEXT pointer are documentation-only. Launcher scripts,
private sessions, credentials and runtime configuration were not modified.
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
{
"issue": 1503,
"candidate": "/tmp/board-attention-r1-q_924ksh",
"files": [
"AGENTS.md",
"packages/control-board/src/scan.mjs",
"packages/control-board/README.md",
"packages/control-board/tests/scan.test.mjs",
"packages/control-board/tests/serve.test.mjs",
"packages/control-board/tests/attention.test.mjs",
"packages/control-board/tests/attention-flow.test.mjs",
"packages/webui/tests/fixture.mjs",
"docs/plans/2026-09-13_board-attention-status.md"
],
"manifestSha256": "e40b58ecb6844d407ba776dcde8f19ad21c0b78076ca1f9b3d96b0bb1c852405",
"testsPassed": 144
}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T00:19:32.409806+00:00",
"backendPid": 3204655,
"health": "ok",
"researcher": {
"agent": "researcher",
"project": "mosaic-stack",
"alive": true,
"state": "idle",
"waitingOnYou": false,
"lastActivity": "2026-09-13T21:19:57.102Z"
},
"fiveAgentProcessesUnchanged": true
}
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T00:19:11.579013+00:00",
"ownerAuthorized": true,
"oldPid": 1265952,
"newPid": 3204655,
"command": [
"/usr/bin/node",
"packages/control-board/src/cli.mjs",
"serve"
],
"cwd": "/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack",
"log": "/tmp/board-attention-backend-ag9xvks2.log",
"agentProcessesBefore": {
"default/darkwing": [
[
"2733924",
"12863634"
]
],
"default/dewey": [
[
"934346",
"466065"
]
],
"default/filbert": [
[
"72183",
"100870"
]
],
"default/researcher": [
[
"173699",
"66404285"
]
],
"mosaic-fleet/rocko": [
[
"90599",
"128275"
]
]
},
"gracefulExitObserved": true
}
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
# CHAT-02 board routes: Darkwing's review (#1507)
Reviewer: Darkwing, 2026-09-26, per Sage's D3. Requested by Dewey. Scope: the
two read-only routes only. Filbert reviews `packages/conversation` in full.
Candidate, base 34777c56, uncommitted. I verified both hashes:
- `packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs` afc95bdb…c540d
- `packages/control-board/tests/serve.test.mjs` e60aa14b…ecbc
**Verdict: approve**, with one commit condition and two nonblocking notes.
## What I checked
- Order. `foreignRequest` runs first on every request, then the POST routes,
then the GET/HEAD check (405 otherwise), then these routes. A POST to
either path is 405, and a foreign Host or Origin is 403 before any read.
- Query validation. `/api/conversations` refuses any parameter.
`/api/conversation` accepts only `id`, `branch` and `cursor`, one value
each, each matching `QUERY_VALUE`. That is the same pattern as
`parts.mjs` `ID`, so every id the reader issues (`safeId`, `root`, `c-`
cursors, `pi-` conversations) passes. No path comes from the request.
- Responses. JSON with `no-store` and `nosniff`, no CORS headers. A thrown
error gives a fixed 500 body and logs to stderr only.
- Refusal bodies. Every `Refusal` message in `packages/conversation/src` is
a fixed string. The one interpolated message (`denied`, safe-fs.mjs:34)
interpolates only "session root" or "session file". No path or content
reaches the client through `error`.
- Status map. It covers every code the route can reach. `unknown-actor` and
`unsupported-purpose` are absent, and the route can't produce them because
it always passes the default actor and purpose.
- Tests: `serve.test.mjs` plus `packages/conversation/tests/`, 61/61 on the
pinned files.
## Commit condition
`serve.mjs` imports `../../conversation/src/reader.mjs` at module load, and
`packages/conversation/` is untracked. Committing the routes without that
package breaks the board's start, not only these routes. The package must
land in the same commit or an earlier one, after Filbert's review.
## Notes (nonblocking)
1. **A cursor needs its branch.** The header comment says `branch` and
`cursor` are optional. But `next()` compares `branch !== record.branch`,
and every cursor record carries a string branch (`safeId` or `root`). So
`?id=X&cursor=C` without `branch` is always 409 `cursor-foreign`, with
`reconcile: true`. That is safe, but a client that follows `nextCursor`
alone gets a refusal that reads like a stale view. The test passes the
page's branch, so it doesn't show this. Either say in the comment that a
cursor call must repeat `page.branch`, or answer 400 "cursor requires
branch". I'd take the comment now and let CHAT-03's client decide.
2. **New codes fall to 422.** A code the reader adds later maps to 422
without a test failing. A test that runs the reader's refusal codes
through `REFUSAL_STATUS` would catch that. That's optional.
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
# CHAT-02 board routes, revision 2: Darkwing's review (#1507)
Reviewer: Darkwing, 2026-09-26, at Sage's request. Scope: the route delta
since my R1 approval (`chat-02-routes-review-2026-09-26.md`, 07b10ad1). Filbert
reviewed the backend (packet `agents/dewey/work/chat-02/BACKEND.md`, 0cf177b1).
Candidate, base 34777c56, uncommitted. I verified both hashes:
- `packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs` d62720dc…a2f3
- `packages/control-board/tests/serve.test.mjs` d38aa2b2…3f4a
**Verdict: approve.** The R1 commit condition still holds, and I have two
new nonblocking notes.
## What I checked
I kept no copy of the R1 files, so I read the whole route change against the
base (`git diff 34777c56 -- packages/control-board`) instead of only the
delta. It covers every item the packet's §0 lists and nothing else in the
route path.
- **Cursor needs its branch.** This was my R1 note 1. `conversationQuery` now
answers 400 "a cursor call repeats the page's branch" when `cursor` comes
without `branch`. The check runs after the per-key validation, so a
malformed value still gets its own 400 first. The header comment says the
same. A test covers it, and removing the line fails it.
- **Status map.** My R1 note 2. `REFUSAL_STATUS` is exported and now has 16
entries. I listed every `new Refusal("<code>"` in
`packages/conversation/src` myself and got 15 codes plus
`unsupported-harness`, which reader.mjs:352 raises by value. That matches the
map exactly. `parts.mjs` raises none. `unavailable`, which safe-fs.mjs:58
raises when a session root doesn't exist, is 404. That fits the rest of the
map, where not-found is 404. `unknown-actor` 403 and `unsupported-purpose` 422
are explicit now.
- **Order and guards** are unchanged from R1. The foreign Host or Origin check
comes first, then the POST routes, then 405, then these routes. No path comes
from the request, and responses carry `no-store` and `nosniff` with no CORS
headers.
- **Tests.** `serve.test.mjs` plus `packages/conversation/tests/` pass
67/67 on the pinned files.
- **Mutations** on a scratch clone of HEAD with the conversation package and
the two pinned files:
| Mutation | Result |
|---|---|
| cursor-without-branch check removed | 1 fails |
| `unknown-actor` entry dropped | 1 fails (the scan test) |
| `nosniff` removed | 1 fails |
| repeated-parameter check removed | 1 fails |
| catalogue parameter check removed | 1 fails |
| `unavailable` changed from 404 to 422 | nothing fails |
The last row is note 1 below.
## Commit condition (unchanged)
`serve.mjs` imports `../../conversation/src/reader.mjs` at module load, and
`packages/conversation/` is still untracked. The package must land in the
same commit as the routes or an earlier one. Otherwise the board fails to
start.
## Notes (nonblocking)
1. **The scan test checks keys, not values.** It proves every code has an
entry. No test proves `unavailable` is 404. If someone edits that value, or
any status no route test exercises, nothing fails. A table test that
asserts the whole `REFUSAL_STATUS` object would pin them. That's optional.
2. **The scan reads a fixed list of three files.** If a refusal is added to
`parts.mjs` or a new file, the scan won't see it, and that code falls to 422.
Reading every `.mjs` in `packages/conversation/src` would close the gap.
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
# Queue row 5, CHAT-03 increment 1, round 1 review (#1508)
Darkwing, 2026-10-04. Request: #1508 comment 26671. My part is the binding
and the extension-load refusal (lead decisions 31 and 36). Brief:
`agents/dewey/work/chat-03/BRIEF.md` at 1ef15ac0. Candidate:
`agents/dewey/work/chat-03/I1-manifest.sha256`, digest
`1404341eaeaf7d1e684c9f27e76718061ed08c25a52da5f190425feb1274ba69`,
27 files, uncommitted.
Verdict: changes requested. Two blocking findings, B1 and B2.
## Checks
- The manifest hashes to 1404341e. All 27 files match it in the canonical
working tree.
- Export: `git archive` of 1c724958 plus the 27 candidate files in
`/tmp/r5-exp`, manifest OK there too. `node --test
packages/conversation/tests/` passes 141/141, 0 skipped.
`node --test packages/control-board/tests/` passes 124/124 (the board
reads `ControlRefusal` codes). The CHAT-00, CHAT-01 and CHAT-01c checks
still pass.
## B1 (blocking). The seal is a deny-list over an argv the caller builds
`checkSeal` (pi-pin.mjs 59–66) refuses `-e`/`--extension`, a missing seal
flag, or a first pair other than `--mode rpc`. Everything else in
`engine.extraArgs` passes, and `buildPiArgs` appends extraArgs after the
controller's own `--session`. Pi's parser keeps the last `--mode` and the
last `--session`. The controller is a public export (`./controller` in
package.json), so this is reachable without touching the source.
(a) `extraArgs: ["--session", <file outside the fixture root>]`. The guard
refuses that same path when it is passed as `sessionFile`, but it never
sees extraArgs. With the real pinned Pi under a scratch HOME and agent dir
(`/tmp/r5/seal-escape.mjs session`):
```
guard on sessionFile: live-session-refused
constructed with extraArgs ["--session",".../outside/proj/.pi/state/other/sessions/s1.jsonl"]
-> piArgs ["--mode","rpc","--no-extensions","--no-prompt-templates","--no-themes",
"--session",".../fx/.../fixture-seat/sessions/s1.jsonl","--session",".../outside/..."]
start -> {"launched":true,"classified":{"state":"free"}} | binding uncertain closed
uncertain evidence: loaded-session, "the engine loaded another session file"
outside session changed: true | appended: {"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"bef67aef",
"parentId":"b2c3d4e5",...,"thinkingLevel":"off"}
```
K8 notices afterwards, but Pi has already written to a session the guard
exists to protect. That breaks §2 "no writes to sessions" and the
fixture-only rule in code.
(b) `extraArgs: ["--mode", "json"]` (or `text`). checkSeal passes because
it looks only at args[0] and args[1]. Pi starts in print mode, reads stdin
to EOF and treats it as the prompt. The K8 `get_state` line goes into that
reader, so the run ends `uncertain` on `get_state: timeout`. In an earlier
run where I closed stdin, Pi sent the `get_state` JSON line to the model
as a prompt and stopped only at "No API key found". The default
`engine.env` is `process.env`, so with real auth present that becomes a
paid model call outside RPC. PgroupLauncher spawns detached, so the engine
outlives the controller unless someone kills the group.
Other extraArgs that pass checkSeal today: `--no-session`, `--fork`,
`--export <file>` (writes a file), `--prompt-template`, `--approve`.
`engine.command` and `engine.preArgs` can also run any script, or node
with `--import`. `checkEnginePin` validates only the pinRoot lock files, so
the pin says nothing about what actually ran.
Suggested fix:
- Allow-list extraArgs. The only non-extension use in the suites is
`["--model", "other"]` (claim.test 548, W9), so `--model`, `--provider`
and `--thinking` with one value each would cover it.
- Refuse any second `--mode`, `--session` or seal flag, and any session
or output flag (`--print`, `--no-session`, `--session-dir`,
`--session-id`, `--fork`, `--export`, `--continue`,
`--resume`).
- Say in the README that a non-default `command` or `preArgs` is a test
hook, and that the pin and seal checks don't bind under it. Or refuse it
outside tests.
- N24 cases for `--session`, `--mode json` and `--no-session` in
extraArgs.
## B2 (blocking). The claim's session key is the conversation ID
controller.mjs 187:
`this.sessionK = sessionKey({ harness: "pi", conversation: this.conversation })`.
`conversation` is `"pi-" + sha256(projectRoot, seat, name)` (reader.mjs
72). The brief (line 382–383) keys the claim on "the native session
identity (the Pi header ID or the Claude session UUID)", and the CHAT-01
README says at most one non-stopped binding may hold a conversation or
native-session identity. Two paths to one session file give two
conversation IDs, so the session key never collides.
Repro, `/tmp/r5/hardlink.mjs`: one session hard-linked into
`.pi/state/fixture-seat/sessions/s1.jsonl` and
`.pi/state/seat-b/sessions/s1.jsonl`, two controllers via the test harness
with the fake engine.
```
same inode: true
A conversation pi-b5901a69... | B conversation pi-f21f1a75...
A start: {"launched":true,...} state active
B start: {"launched":true,...} state active
A nativeSession 0f5e1c2a-1111-4222-8333-944455556666 | B nativeSession 0f5e1c2a-1111-4222-8333-944455556666
```
Two active bindings, two engines, one session. A plain copy is allowed
too; whether a copy should count as the same session is a call for the
brief, but the hard link plainly should. W4 (claim.test 172) builds its
keys by hand on the store, so it never exercises the controller's
mapping.
Fix: build the session key from the header `id` read in `start()` (the
`nativeSession` already in hand). Add a controller-level W4 case for the
hard link, and one for a copy with whatever the brief decides.
## n1 (non-blocking). The startup-append note is narrower than Pi's rule
README 426–431 and BUILD-I1.md 196 say the append bites only sessions
without a `thinking_level_change` entry, and that Pi-created sessions
carry one. Pi's rule is sdk.js 82:
`hasExistingSession = existingSession.messages.length > 0`. A session
with a thinking entry but no messages takes the new-session branch and
appends `thinking_level_change` at every start, plus `model_change` when a
model is set. I checked this in plain sealed RPC mode: a header plus a
thinking entry gained `{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"e8c74875",
"parentId":"f0e1d2c3",...}`. A Pi-created session that was opened and
never prompted is in this group, so "written by something else" is wrong.
Name message-less sessions too, and let the later pre-spawn check cover
both.
## n2 (minor). The guard follows $HOME
`LiveSessionGuard` protects `~/.pi`, `~/.claude` and `~/.mosaic-dev` via
`os.homedir()`. With a scratch HOME, the real directories are protected
only by the fixture-root containment, or by passing `homes`. That
containment holds today, so I'm noting it, not blocking on it.
## What holds in the binding
- H1 to H3. `#dispatch` holds `this.lock` across `#recheck` and the
write. Takeover, release and acquire run `#evaluate` under the same
lock, so a prompt can't land between the generation bump and the write.
- The generation check comes first in `#evaluateOp` and again in
`#recheck`.
- Takeover refuses while fenced (K9) and for the current controller
(`already-controller`, H4).
- Disconnect never moves control (H11).
- Confirmations are single-use: `#checkConfirmation` marks them
`consumed`.
- Interrupt sets its fence before it takes the lock, so a queued prompt
sees the fence.
- K8 catches a wrong session or leaf after launch, as in B1(a). B1 is that
the write happens before K8 can run.
- The pin check reads both lock files and refuses on either version or
integrity mismatch.
Scratch scripts and outputs are in `/tmp/r5/`: `seal-escape.mjs`,
`hardlink.mjs`, `seal-session.txt`, `seal-json.txt`, `hardlink.txt`,
`conv-suite.txt`, `board-suite.txt`. All scratch engines were killed by
their process group.
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
# Queue row 5, CHAT-03 increment 1, round 2 review (#1507)
Darkwing, 2026-10-04. Request: #1507 comment 26689 (Dewey). My part is
the binding and the extension-load refusal (lead decisions 31 and 36), and
my round 1 findings (comment 26681 on #1508, pointer 26685 on #1507).
Candidate: `agents/dewey/work/chat-03/I1-r2-manifest.sha256`, digest
`2b48e333a0f09185364359ae6f8277cc88c0b9ff39058de45cc2c1f0ec9d5c4a`,
the same 27 files, base 1c724958, uncommitted. Packet:
`agents/dewey/work/chat-03/BUILD-I1-r2.md`.
Verdict: approved for my part. B1 and B2 are fixed. Nothing must be fixed
before the commit. Three follow-ups below, none of them blocking.
## Checks
- The manifest hashes to 2b48e333. All 27 files match it in the canonical
working tree. Twelve changed from round 1: README, `controller.mjs`,
`pi-pin.mjs`, `terminal.mjs` and seven test files. `engine.mjs` is
unchanged.
- Export: `git archive` of 1c724958 plus the 27 files in
`~/darkwing-scratch/r5r2/exp`, manifest OK there too, `TMPDIR` under the
same directory.
- `node --test packages/conversation/tests/` passes 152/152, 0 skipped.
- `node --test packages/control-board/tests/` passes 124/124. The board
imports the conversation package.
- The CHAT-00 (48 checks), CHAT-01 R3 and CHAT-01c checks still pass.
- Probe script: `~/darkwing-scratch/r5r2/probes.mjs`, output in
`~/darkwing-scratch/r5r2/out/probes.txt`. It drives the exported
`Controller` directly, as an outside caller would.
## B1, the seal is now an allow-list: fixed
`checkSeal` (pi-pin.mjs 68) requires the exact prefix `--mode rpc`, the
seal flags and `--session <absolute path>`, then accepts only `--model`,
`--provider` and `--thinking`, each once, each with one value that is
nonempty and doesn't start with `-` or `@`. The constructor refuses a
non-list `preArgs` or `extraArgs` and runs the seal before anything else
happens (controller.mjs 170–174), so a refused argv never reaches a spawn.
I passed 24 `extraArgs` lists to the constructor. These all refuse
`unsealed-engine`:
- my round 1 vectors: `--session <outside file>`, `--mode json`,
`--mode text`, `--no-session`, `--fork <file>`, `--export <file>`;
- `--print`, `-p hi`, a bare word, `@<file>`, `--approve`,
`--no-extensions`, `--extension x`, `-e x`;
- `--model=x`, `--model` with no value, an empty value, a value of `-p`
or `@f`, `--model` twice, and `--model a hello`.
These build: `--model a --thinking high --provider p`, `--thinking high`,
and `--model "rpc --mode json"`. The last one is a single argv element with
no shell in between, so Pi sees it as a model name. That's fine.
Dewey's mutants r2-B1 to r2-B1e (no extraArgs check, no prefix order, a
relative session path, a repeat, a flag or `@` value) are all killed by
N24.
## B2, the session key is the Pi header ID: fixed
The constructor reads the session header and keys the claim on
`sessionKey({ harness: "pi", nativeSession })` (controller.mjs 193–194).
I ran two controllers, seat A on the fixture session and seat B on a
second file under another seat directory:
| Second file | A | B | Keys equal |
|---|---|---|---|
| hard link of A's file | active, 1 launch | refused `already-active`, 0 launches | yes |
| copy of A's file | active, 1 launch | refused `already-active`, 0 launches | yes |
| copy with a different header ID | active, 1 launch | active, 1 launch | no |
So the fix doesn't over-collide: two real sessions still start side by
side. I also replaced the header ID by rename after construction. `start()`
refused `target` with no launch. Mutants r2-B2 and r2-B2b are killed by
the new W4 cases.
n1 (Pi's startup-append rule) and n2 (the guard follows `$HOME`) are fixed
in the README as asked.
## What the rework touched that I checked
- `#readSession` runs after the guard check at construction and wraps an
unreadable file as `configuration`. Good.
- The force-stop path now refuses `fenced` while an escalation runs
(controller.mjs 683). `#forceStop` holds `escalating` and clears it in
`finally` (1453–1459). See F2 for the one gap.
- `stopLink` needs `abortWritten`, and there's an overlap recheck after the
pause before the abort. Mutants r2-n1 and r2-n2 are killed. This is
outside my part, so I note it without a ruling.
- Mutant r2-B5b (the shim writes the freeze but doesn't wait for
`frozen 1`) survives. That is Filbert's finding and Dewey explains it in
the packet. I leave it to Filbert.
## Follow-ups (none must be fixed before the commit)
- **F1. `engine.command` and `engine.preArgs` are outside the seal.** The
README documents them as a test hook, as I asked in round 1, and
`preArgs` still refuses `--extension`. But `preArgs:
[<pinned cli.js>, "--no-session"]` builds. Everything after `cli.js`
reaches Pi's parser, so a flag there that the seal doesn't repeat later,
such as `--no-session` or `--export`, takes effect. A non-default
`command` can run anything. No caller passes them today: the package
has no entry point that builds a `Controller` from configuration. Before I3 adds one, either
refuse any non-default `command`/`preArgs` outside the test harness, or
have that entry point never accept them from config. Owner: whoever
builds the I3 entry point.
- **F2. `escalating` is set before `after()` runs.** The force-stop branch
of `#evaluate` sets `this.escalating` at controller.mjs 686, then calls
`#admission()` and `link.poison()`. If either throws, `#handle` turns the
result into an internal error and drops `after`. `#forceStop` never runs,
so the flag is never cleared, and every later force stop on that
controller refuses `fenced`. Recovery then needs a controller restart.
Neither call is expected to throw, so the risk is low. Fix: set the flag
only in `#forceStop`, or clear it in the catch path when `after` is
dropped.
- **F3. `engine.env` defaults to `process.env`** (controller.mjs 168). A
real Pi then inherits the caller's whole environment, including
provider keys and the real `HOME`, so it reads the real `~/.pi/agent`.
This is unchanged from round 1 and fine for I1, where tests pass their
own env. The I3 entry point should build the engine env from an explicit
list.
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
fd10b62c10bff4736b9b4e809b283fe4c5b549fa53fe1121a7bb06258147f0e9 packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
-152
View File
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
# Row 46: K1, K3 and K10 on the scope fixtures
Darkwing, 2026-10-09. Issue #1528, reviewer Dewey. Brief:
`docs/plans/2026-10-09_s4-follow-up-and-cohort.md`, section "Conversation
cohort: K1, K3 and K10 fail on the scope fixtures". Ruling: lead decision 72.
The candidate is not committed, staged or pushed.
## Cause
It's a race in the test fixture. Neither the host's systemd setup nor
`cohort.mjs` is at fault.
`spawnChild` in `packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs` returns the
child's pid as soon as `spawn()` returns. The child is `node -e`, and it
installs its SIGTERM handler only after Node has booted. That takes 16 to
22 ms on an idle host (`trace-pass.jsonl`) and 43 to 80 ms under 48 CPU burners (`trace-load.jsonl`). A
TERM that arrives before the handler gets the default action, and the child
dies of SIGTERM. Each failing assertion is that death seen from a different
place:
- K1, "the escaped child is a listed member". The child died during the
TERM grace, so the freeze-phase enumeration doesn't list it.
- K3, "the member ignored TERM". `alive(child)` is false at the kill
phase.
- K10, "the member is alive across the crash". Same as K3, before the
restart.
The time between spawn and TERM depends on the disk under TMPDIR. The
fixture puts the claim store there. Before it sends TERM, the controller
publishes claim revisions, each with an fsync on the file and one on the
directory (`packages/conversation/src/claim.mjs:159` and `:176`).
| TMPDIR | Disk | write+fsync median (`fsync.txt`) | spawn to TERM | Unfixed K1/K3/K10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp` | nvme0, ext4 | 0.65 ms | 12 to 13 ms (`trace-fail.jsonl`) | 0/3 (`runs/canon-scratchtmp.txt`) |
| `/tmp` | nvme1, ext4 | 4.63 ms | not traced | 3/3 (`runs/canon-tmp.txt`) |
| `~/darkwing-scratch/tmp` | nvme1, ext4 | 4.69 ms | 53 to 110 ms (`trace-pass.jsonl`) | 3/3 (`runs/canon-hometmp.txt`) |
On the fast disk, TERM lands about 12 ms after spawn, before Node is up.
In `trace-fail.jsonl` the children never log `ready`.
### Why it started failing
This host's seats now get `TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp`. My shell had
it by default, and so did Sage's gate runs. It comes from Vikunja task 59.
`~/.config/systemd/user/t3code.service.d/tmpdir.conf` was written
2026-10-04 20:33Z. Its own comment says it takes effect only when
`t3code.service` restarts, which hasn't happened (active since 2026-09-23),
and that until then seats get TMPDIR from their harness config. I didn't
establish what TMPDIR the row 44 gate ran with on 2026-10-05, so the
"since when" is likely but unproven. The change that exposed the race is a
seat's TMPDIR. It isn't a systemd or user manager setting, and I changed
nothing on the host.
### The scope is not a factor
Outside any scope, `race.mjs` gives the same split: a TERM 0, 10 or 20 ms
after spawn kills 10/10, and at 30 or 60 ms 10/10 survive (`race.txt`).
Sage's outside-scope probe found the child surviving. I haven't seen that
probe, but it most likely sent TERM after the handler was in place.
## Receipts in a scope
`scope-receipt.mjs` launches a delegated scope per run, with the same
`systemd-run` flags `ScopeLauncher` uses. The scope's main process spawns
the fixture's `ignoreTerm` child and records `systemctl --user show` on the
scope, then `cgroup.procs` before and after TERM, then the child's exit.
Output: `receipts.jsonl`.
| Mode | TERM after spawn | In `cgroup.procs` before | After | Child exit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `race 12` | 20 to 25 ms | 5/5 | 1/5 | 4/5 `signal: "SIGTERM"`, 1 alive |
| `race 60` | 69 to 71 ms | 5/5 | 5/5 | 5/5 alive 500 ms after TERM |
| `ready 0` | 28 to 38 ms (ready at 22 to 30) | 5/5 | 5/5 | 5/5 alive 500 ms after TERM |
Each line also carries the scope's `Id`, `LoadState=loaded`,
`ActiveState=active`, `InvocationID`, `ControlGroup` and `Delegate=yes`.
The first line, for example:
`ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-0.scope`,
`before [3662760, 3662788]`, `after [3662760]`, child exit
`{"code":null,"signal":"SIGTERM","atMs":24}`.
`trace.patch` is the scratch-only instrumentation behind the two traces.
It logs spawn, ready and the shim's `term` per pid to `$DW_TRACE`. It is
not part of the candidate.
## The fix
`build.patch` changes one file, `packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs`:
- The child writes one byte to stdout as its first action after installing
its TERM handler. A child without `ignoreTerm` writes it once its code
starts.
- `spawnChild` returns a promise. It resolves with the pid on that byte,
then closes its end of the pipe. It rejects if the child exits or errors
first, or if 10 s pass.
- The `child` control op returns that promise. The op dispatcher now
answers `ok: false` when an op's promise rejects. Before, a rejected op
promise went unhandled, and under Node's default that ends fake-pi. The
change covers every op that returns a promise, not only `child`.
`childOf` in `cohort.test.mjs` already asserts `r.ok`.
No assertion changed, and `cohort.mjs` is untouched. The three cases now
test what their names say: TERM reaches a child that is already ignoring
TERM.
`build-manifest.sha256` (sha256
`9228414352a56e0465e896b81643cdce000bcedba70f86adac07fc50cfadad2d`) pins
`fake-pi.mjs` after the patch. `build.patch` sha256 is
`04234ce1d886e36dfd06cbd81153b38cbb86909b6ee933151306b8cdedd629d9`. In a
fresh worktree at `521597bb` the patch applies and the manifest checks 1/1.
## Mutants
Both ran with `TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp`, the condition that fails.
| Mutant | K1/K3/K10 | File |
|---|---|---|
| M1: resolve at spawn, no wait (the old behavior) | 0/3 | `runs/mutant-m1-nowait.txt` |
| M2: wait for ready, but the child has no TERM handler | 0/3, the same three assertions | `runs/mutant-m2-noignore.txt` |
M1 shows the wait is what fixes it. M2 shows the assertions still catch a
child that dies on TERM.
## Runs
The patch was applied in a scratch worktree at `521597bb`. Node v26.8.1.
Start time and load are in `runs/start.txt`.
| Run | TMPDIR | Result | File |
|---|---|---|---|
| `node --test "packages/conversation/tests/*.test.mjs"` | `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp` | 152/152 | `runs/node-conversation.txt` |
| `node --test "packages/webui/tests/*.test.mjs"` | `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp` | 14/14 | `runs/node-webui.txt` |
| K1/K3/K10 isolated, 3 consecutive | `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp` | 3/3, 3/3, 3/3 | `runs/k-iso-{1,2,3}.txt` |
| K1/K3/K10 isolated | `/tmp` | 3/3 | `runs/k-tmp.txt` |
| K1/K3/K10 isolated | `~/darkwing-scratch/tmp` | 3/3 | `runs/k-home.txt` |
| K1/K3/K10 isolated under 48 CPU burners, 3 runs (load 13.6 to 24.9) | `/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp` | 3/3, 3/3, 3/3 | `runs/k-load48-{1,2,3}.txt` |
For the gate rerun, keep the default `TMPDIR=/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp`.
That's the condition that failed, and a slower TMPDIR would pass with or
without the patch.
## Files
- `build.md`, this file.
- `build.patch`, `build-manifest.sha256`: the candidate.
- `scope-receipt.mjs`, `receipts.jsonl`: the scope receipts.
- `race.mjs`, `race.txt`: TERM timing outside a scope.
- `fsync.mjs`, `fsync.txt`: write+fsync latency per TMPDIR.
- `trace.patch`, `trace-fail.jsonl`, `trace-pass.jsonl`, `trace-load.jsonl`: the traced runs.
- `runs/`: suite, isolated, load and mutant outputs, and the unfixed
canonical tree under three TMPDIRs.
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs b/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
index b3014f86..a78dfebd 100644
--- a/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -615,14 +615,34 @@ const children = [];
// K2); `forkLoop` forks every 5 ms (K12); `ignoreTerm` survives SIGTERM, so
// only the kill phase ends it (K3, K10, K11). With `pidLog`, the fork loop
// appends each child's pid and a `term` line when it gets SIGTERM (K12).
+//
+// It resolves only once the child writes its ready byte, which it does after
+// installing its TERM handler. Node takes 15 to 80 ms to get there, and a
+// force stop can send TERM sooner (12 ms when the claim store is on a fast
+// disk). A TERM before the handler kills a child that is meant to ignore it
+// (#1528).
function spawnChild({ setsid = false, forkLoop = false, ignoreTerm = false, pidLog = null } = {}) {
const note = pidLog ? `const note=(s)=>require('node:fs').appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(pidLog)},s+'\\n');` : "const note=()=>{};";
- const code = note + (ignoreTerm ? "process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));" : "") + (forkLoop
+ const code = note + (ignoreTerm ? "process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));" : "") + "process.stdout.write('r');" + (forkLoop
? "const {spawn}=require('node:child_process');setInterval(()=>{try{const c=spawn('sleep',['1000'],{stdio:'ignore'});if(c.pid)note(String(c.pid))}catch{}},5);setInterval(()=>{},1e9)"
: "setInterval(()=>{},1e9)");
- const child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", code], { stdio: "ignore", detached: setsid });
+ const child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", code], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"], detached: setsid });
children.push(child.pid);
- return child.pid;
+ return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+ const fail = (why) => {
+ clearTimeout(timer);
+ reject(new Error(`tool child ${child.pid} ${why} before it was ready`));
+ };
+ const timer = setTimeout(() => fail("took 10 s"), 10000);
+ child.once("error", (err) => fail(err.code ?? err.message));
+ child.once("exit", (code, signal) => fail(`exited (${signal ?? code})`));
+ child.stdout.once("data", () => {
+ clearTimeout(timer);
+ child.removeAllListeners("exit");
+ child.stdout.destroy();
+ resolve(child.pid);
+ });
+ });
}
// K13: a member writes its own pid to another cgroup's cgroup.procs.
@@ -671,7 +691,7 @@ async function main() {
drop: () => fake.dropResponse(req.type, req.n ?? 1),
extension: () => void fake.extensionPrompt(req.args ?? {}),
state: () => ({ streaming: fake.streaming, runs: fake.runs.length, commands: fake.commands, pid: process.pid, children, appends: fake.appends }),
- child: () => ({ pid: spawnChild(req.args ?? {}) }),
+ child: () => spawnChild(req.args ?? {}).then((pid) => ({ pid })),
escape: () => escape(req.target),
cgroup: () => readFileSync(`/proc/${req.pid ?? process.pid}/cgroup`, "utf8"),
waitPaused: () => fake.waitPaused(req.point),
@@ -679,12 +699,13 @@ async function main() {
stall: () => void process.stdin.pause(),
};
if (!ops[req.op]) return sock.write(encodeLine({ id: req.id, ok: false, error: `unknown op ${req.op}` }));
+ const failed = (err) => sock.write(encodeLine({ id: req.id, ok: false, error: String(err.message) }));
try {
const out = ops[req.op]();
- if (out && typeof out.then === "function") out.then(reply);
+ if (out && typeof out.then === "function") out.then(reply, failed);
else reply(out ?? null);
} catch (err) {
- sock.write(encodeLine({ id: req.id, ok: false, error: String(err.message) }));
+ failed(err);
}
});
sock.on("data", (c) => splitter.push(c));
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
import { openSync, writeSync, fsyncSync, closeSync, rmSync, mkdtempSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
for (const base of process.argv.slice(2)) {
const d = mkdtempSync(join(base, "dw-fsync-"));
const t = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
const s = performance.now();
const fd = openSync(join(d, `f${i}`), "w");
writeSync(fd, "x".repeat(512));
fsyncSync(fd);
closeSync(fd);
t.push(performance.now() - s);
}
rmSync(d, { recursive: true });
t.sort((a, b) => a - b);
console.log(`${base}: write+fsync median ${t[15].toFixed(2)} ms, p90 ${t[27].toFixed(2)} ms`);
}
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp: write+fsync median 0.65 ms, p90 0.79 ms
/tmp: write+fsync median 4.63 ms, p90 4.93 ms
/home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/tmp: write+fsync median 4.69 ms, p90 9.30 ms
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
// Spawn the K fixtures' ignoreTerm child exactly as fake-pi.mjs spawnChild does, then
// SIGTERM it after a delay. Reports how the child ended within 1 s.
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
const code = "const note=()=>{};process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));setInterval(()=>{},1e9)";
const delays = process.argv.slice(2).map(Number);
for (const d of delays) {
const r = { died: 0, survived: 0 };
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const c = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", code], { stdio: "ignore" });
const ended = new Promise((res) => c.on("exit", (code, sig) => res(sig ?? code)));
await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, d));
c.kill("SIGTERM");
const out = await Promise.race([ended, new Promise((res) => setTimeout(() => res(null), 1000))]);
if (out === null) { r.survived++; c.kill("SIGKILL"); await ended; } else r.died++;
}
console.log(`TERM ${d} ms after spawn: died ${r.died}/10 survived ${r.survived}/10`);
}
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
TERM 0 ms after spawn: died 10/10 survived 0/10
TERM 10 ms after spawn: died 10/10 survived 0/10
TERM 20 ms after spawn: died 10/10 survived 0/10
TERM 30 ms after spawn: died 0/10 survived 10/10
TERM 60 ms after spawn: died 0/10 survived 10/10
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{"mode":"race","delayMs":12,"readyMs":null,"termMs":23,"child":3662788,"self":3662760,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-12-3662746-0.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=2eac4fa367504b9dbca66a4693cc328a","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-0.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3662760,3662788],"after":[3662760],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":false,"exit":{"code":null,"signal":"SIGTERM","atMs":24}}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":12,"readyMs":null,"termMs":20,"child":3663479,"self":3663212,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-12-3662746-1.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=021c6d466fc64961ba3031a0254c3803","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-1.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3663212,3663479],"after":[3663212],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":false,"exit":{"code":null,"signal":"SIGTERM","atMs":21}}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":12,"readyMs":null,"termMs":25,"child":3663799,"self":3663588,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-12-3662746-2.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=ce8e2c2dbbe7481885a50152fe3766b5","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-2.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3663588,3663799],"after":[3663588],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":false,"exit":{"code":null,"signal":"SIGTERM","atMs":27}}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":12,"readyMs":null,"termMs":20,"child":3664563,"self":3664322,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-12-3662746-3.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=cc912ab9a7fe47dd9e3b97486abf0bc3","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-3.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3664322,3664563],"after":[3664322,3664563],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":12,"readyMs":null,"termMs":21,"child":3665177,"self":3665003,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-12-3662746-4.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=163271c658cc4ee4b84f5aace54bc806","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-12-3662746-4.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3665003,3665177],"after":[3665003],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":false,"exit":{"code":null,"signal":"SIGTERM","atMs":22}}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":60,"readyMs":null,"termMs":69,"child":3665812,"self":3665626,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-60-3665599-0.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=14681de5ac844879bdfcbcdd3dae8f10","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-60-3665599-0.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3665626,3665812],"after":[3665626,3665812],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":60,"readyMs":null,"termMs":71,"child":3666377,"self":3666179,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-60-3665599-1.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=3128eba3ed234776ae4a61cb12fe1210","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-60-3665599-1.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3666179,3666377],"after":[3666179,3666377],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":60,"readyMs":null,"termMs":70,"child":3666924,"self":3666728,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-60-3665599-2.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=836de499898d4b6996739e1b2a433fa0","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-60-3665599-2.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3666728,3666924],"after":[3666728,3666924],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":60,"readyMs":null,"termMs":69,"child":3667387,"self":3667251,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-60-3665599-3.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=0ebf8d9d930a43629668e10c08f80e0d","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-60-3665599-3.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3667251,3667387],"after":[3667251,3667387],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"race","delayMs":60,"readyMs":null,"termMs":70,"child":3667888,"self":3667727,"show":["Id=dw-r46-race-60-3665599-4.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=9c3594ae3018458594bb3ff996dc0d9a","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-race-60-3665599-4.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3667727,3667888],"after":[3667727,3667888],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"ready","delayMs":0,"readyMs":30,"termMs":38,"child":3668171,"self":3668085,"show":["Id=dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-0.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=4c2c3b3ad52a477e8f735abedf158cbb","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-0.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3668085,3668171],"after":[3668085,3668171],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"ready","delayMs":0,"readyMs":22,"termMs":29,"child":3668354,"self":3668284,"show":["Id=dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-1.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=b9da06280a8a4c6682f05a2d4ff118cf","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-1.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3668284,3668354],"after":[3668284,3668354],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"ready","delayMs":0,"readyMs":22,"termMs":28,"child":3668425,"self":3668417,"show":["Id=dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-2.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=aab0b83d085e4bac86fdbe1ce65f23dc","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-2.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3668417,3668425],"after":[3668417,3668425],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"ready","delayMs":0,"readyMs":23,"termMs":30,"child":3668509,"self":3668482,"show":["Id=dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-3.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=d076a3b629554b83bded41cb00e667b8","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-3.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3668482,3668509],"after":[3668482,3668509],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
{"mode":"ready","delayMs":0,"readyMs":23,"termMs":30,"child":3668635,"self":3668624,"show":["Id=dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-4.scope","LoadState=loaded","ActiveState=active","SubState=running","InvocationID=6b46a0b279ca454eaa034d48a4de7385","ControlGroup=/user.slice/user-1000.slice/[email protected]/app.slice/dw-r46-ready-0-3668072-4.scope","Delegate=yes"],"before":[3668624,3668635],"after":[3668624,3668635],"childInBefore":true,"childInAfter":true,"exit":"alive 500 ms after TERM"}
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2737.880671ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2557.042479ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (861.841994ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 6282.04986
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2537.385038ms)
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2331.351365ms)
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (209.932151ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 0
ℹ fail 3
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 5448.48373
✖ failing tests:
test at packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:139:1
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2537.385038ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the escaped child is a listed member
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:151:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:176:1
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2331.351365ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member ignored TERM
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:190:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:426:3
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (209.932151ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member is alive across the crash
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:431:12)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2360.366213ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2364.75763ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (628.04725ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 5474.064409
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2457.36226ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2375.081486ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (636.350971ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 5607.100296
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2665.443725ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2531.922418ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (706.098022ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 6068.030335
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2699.60543ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2492.169051ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (675.081525ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 6026.119198
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2762.539396ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2528.214494ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (644.633095ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 6115.728995
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2887.135899ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2915.708256ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (2590.181146ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 9662.912642
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (3084.73509ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2750.8295ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (2151.224665ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 8355.450647
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2746.07054ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2559.848734ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (1985.055632ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 7722.015242
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2785.421246ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2619.007617ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (889.082424ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 3
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 6776.303473
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2523.134497ms)
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2421.121319ms)
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (211.187938ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 0
ℹ fail 3
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 5461.571354
✖ failing tests:
test at cohort.test.mjs:139:1
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2523.134497ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the escaped child is a listed member
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:151:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at cohort.test.mjs:176:1
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2421.121319ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member ignored TERM
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:190:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at cohort.test.mjs:426:3
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (211.187938ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member is alive across the crash
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:431:12)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2545.15719ms)
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2407.231229ms)
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (304.986006ms)
ℹ tests 3
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 0
ℹ fail 3
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 5605.846956
✖ failing tests:
test at cohort.test.mjs:139:1
✖ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2545.15719ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the escaped child is a listed member
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:151:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at cohort.test.mjs:176:1
✖ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2407.231229ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member ignored TERM
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:190:12)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
test at cohort.test.mjs:426:3
✖ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (304.986006ms)
AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: the member is alive across the crash
at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r46/fix/packages/conversation/tests/cohort.test.mjs:431:12)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
generatedMessage: false,
code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
actual: false,
expected: true,
operator: '==',
diff: 'simple'
}
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
✔ W1: two processes acquire the same pair at once; exactly one claim (124.186492ms)
✔ W1: two writers publish the same revision at once: one wins, the other gets null, the winner's record stays (11.494379ms)
✔ W1: a revision name appears only after its bytes are synced; before that, only a temp file exists (5.019078ms)
✔ W2: acquire while a claim is reserved or active refuses already-active (169.129732ms)
✔ W3: acquire while stopping, uncertain, or stopped without proof refuses unsafe-replacement (231.756886ms)
✔ W4: same session with another seat tuple, and the reverse, both refuse; a loser on the seat key closes it no-unit (192.859955ms)
✔ W4: a hard link of one session under another seat is the same session: the second controller refuses already-active and launches nothing (35.003128ms)
✔ W4: a copy of one session under another seat is the same session: the second controller refuses already-active and launches nothing (21.132326ms)
✔ W4: a session header ID that changes after construction refuses target; nothing is claimed or launched (3.242382ms)
✔ W5: SIGKILL between every publication barrier of acquire and transition; restart never finds two holders or a lost claim (5566.910492ms)
✔ W5: SIGKILL between every publication barrier of release; restart finishes or holds the release (22659.492505ms)
✔ W6: controller killed mid-turn while the engine lives; restart is uncertain, no launch, prompts refuse (201.806859ms)
✔ W12: a live owner paused with SIGSTOP; a second controller refuses already-active and changes nothing (116.242029ms)
✔ W13: crash after the engine spawns, before active; restart finds the live unit: uncertain, no second spawn, force stop only (262.226787ms)
✔ W14: crash after reservation, before the spawn marker: stopped with a no-unit observation; the pair is free (220.425841ms)
✔ W20: crash after the spawn marker, scope collected; uncertain in both runs, the marker is copied, no launch until a boot proof (240.127173ms)
✔ W15: crash between the two keys during release; restart finishes it under the same claim ID (35.945246ms)
✔ W7: recorded boot ID differs on the same machine: stopped with a boot proof; open tool calls become uncertain (98.424488ms)
✔ W8: resume after a proven stop with the same pins: new claim ID, generation +1, same conversation, branch and leaf (32.141383ms)
✔ W9: resume with a changed binary, argv digest, branch or leaf is refused and the claim is unchanged (89.672997ms)
✔ W11: the controller writes no session file; only the fake engine's own appends appear (23.121134ms)
✔ W16: a highest revision that won't parse holds the pair uncertain; the older stopped revision is not reused (54.682806ms)
✔ W17: a claim root copied from another host refuses foreign-host and promotes nothing (57.719055ms)
✔ G1: a session path or claim root under .pi/state, ~/.claude, the data root or a registration refuses at construction (4.12463ms)
✔ G2: a symlink inside the fixture root to a live session file is refused by the real-path check (1.12384ms)
✔ G3: a fixture path swapped for a live path after construction is refused at bind (1.84306ms)
✔ K1: force stop kills a tool child that called setsid; stopped with a verified proof (2507.919568ms)
✔ K2: K1 on the process-group fallback ends uncertain, never stopped (153.327228ms)
✔ K3: SIGTERM acknowledged while a member lives: stopping until the kill phase, never stopped from TERM (2414.676654ms)
✔ K4: two engines; force stop one; the other survives by independent observation (4314.515513ms)
✔ K5: a stop during a tool call leaves the effect uncertain, and it is shown (2190.378919ms)
✔ K12: a member forking in a loop: the freeze stops it, enumeration is complete, populated 0 after cgroup.kill (2244.796524ms)
✔ K13: a member writing its pid into another cgroup is refused by the namespace; the kill is complete (2189.63935ms)
✔ K15: the shim gone, engine/cgroup.events unreadable, or the engine cgroup missing: evidence unavailable, not empty; uncertain (4473.315326ms)
✔ K10: controller killed between the TERM and kill phases: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (482.430287ms)
✔ K11: controller killed after the confirmation is recorded, before TERM: restart checks the invocation ID and re-runs from TERM for the same stop (408.721794ms)
✔ K14: a unit with the recorded name but another invocation ID: evidence unavailable, no signals, uncertain (307.075836ms)
✔ K6: recover without proof, without confirmation, or with changed pins is refused (71.309069ms)
✔ K7: recover after proof, then launch: new claim and execution, generation +1, same leaf; the cancelled prompt is not replayed (35.403696ms)
✔ K8: an engine that loads another leaf on resume is refused before admission; it stays claimed until a proven stop (45.424183ms)
✔ K9: an interrupt that never settles stays uncertain; force stop stays available; takeover is refused while fenced (3030.941578ms)
✔ K16: a claim from another machine ID refuses foreign-host; no boot proof is issued (5.325961ms)
✔ K17: two launcher calls with one eligibility record: one launch, the other refuses, no second engine (30.688596ms)
✔ K18: the leaf changes after eligibility: launch refused; the reservation stays until released with proof (24.893734ms)
✔ S1: `/goal x`, with leading spaces or a tab, refuses text-policy at admission; zero engine bytes (34.176579ms)
✔ S2: every prefix pinned Pi interprets is refused, from the list the code uses; the rest reach the engine exactly (30.425031ms)
✔ S3: `/goal` on the second line is pinned from the source: Pi checks only index 0, so it is admitted and sent exactly (27.293519ms)
✔ S4: a `/` left in the composer is cleared when control transfers and returns; the next submit sends only the new text (42.046162ms)
✔ S5: an observer terminal gets a paste then Enter, as send-message.sh does: not admitted: controller, nothing sent (21.340651ms)
✔ S6: a mediated-shaped registration (no tmux) passed to the board's replyToRow: 409 no tmux session; exec never runs (1.34914ms)
✔ S7: ESC, bracketed-paste markers and U+2028/U+2029 travel as one JSON string; the engine receives the exact text in one record (29.201111ms)
✔ P3: a Pi confirm, select, input or editor dialog is shown disabled with a reason and never answered (138.365864ms)
✔ E1: send, ack, user, toolCall, toolResult, final answer: shown once, no refresh, draft and reading position kept (39.366805ms)
✔ E2: U+2028, U+2029 inside JSON strings and CRLF line ends each parse as one record, on the splitter and through the controller (21.443107ms)
✔ E3: a multipart final, two blocks, null request correlation and duplicate delivery (31.257304ms)
✔ E4: a page read after message_end but before its entry is persisted: marker at the seam, re-read after run-settled, each message once (26.594189ms)
✔ E4: a gap or a new epoch also reconciles; nothing is concatenated across a gap (11.181347ms)
✔ E5: an unknown native event gives no client event; evidence records its type and bytes; the terminal count goes up (26.220793ms)
✔ E6: a tool result delayed across a pause and a reconnect is reconciled without a manual refresh (42.195378ms)
✔ E7: the terminal renders the same stream as the library client, as observer and then as controller, and submits only as controller (41.055698ms)
✔ terminal: engine control characters are made visible; a lost connection refuses submit (28.737455ms)
✔ terminal: outcome unknown is shown as such, with no resend offer, and nothing is resent (0.53917ms)
✔ terminal: text after Enter in the same input chunk starts the next message; it never joins the one submitted (0.351376ms)
✔ terminal: a paste-start marker split right after its ESC still opens the paste; the Enter inside it never submits (0.356358ms)
✔ terminal: invisible and bidi characters are made visible; head, status and notice lines stay one line (0.168609ms)
✔ every record these fixtures produced is a valid CHAT-01 record (E5: no record fails the schema) (359.398761ms)
✔ H1: two takeovers with the same expected generation: one wins, +1; the other refuses generation (56.47649ms)
✔ H2: the old controller's prompt after a takeover commits is refused with zero engine bytes (79.112044ms)
✔ H3: a takeover while a prompt holds the dispatch lock: written under the old actor, or refused; never both (131.150736ms)
✔ H4: self-takeover is refused (22.440288ms)
✔ H9: Interrupt racing a prompt's dispatch: before the write, dispatch-refused and no-turn; after, §3 rules (87.314186ms)
✔ H10: Interrupt and force stop together: one stop chain, force stop supersedes (104.583327ms)
✔ H10: an overlap during the pause before the abort: no abort, the stop ends uncertain (35.050855ms)
✔ H10: a no-turn Interrupt lifts only its own fence; admission stays closed under force stop, overlap or revocation (70.09079ms)
✔ H11: the controller disconnects mid-turn: work continues, the claim is unchanged, control stays put (129.262166ms)
✔ H12: an exact retry after reconnecting to the same incarnation returns the same receipt; one dispatch (15.147609ms)
✔ H13: a retry with the same request ID and different text is refused (13.200342ms)
✔ H14: late stdout from the old engine after a replacement is dropped by incarnation, counted, never rendered (133.123623ms)
✔ H15: a revoked connection's command is refused; the revocation fence holds (65.378107ms)
✔ H16: a second controller for the same session refuses already-active; the first is untouched (16.417034ms)
✔ H10: a second force stop while the first escalation runs refuses fenced; one escalation, and the claim records only the first stop's phases (64.083554ms)
✔ H17: a confirmation reused, answered from another connection, or used after the stop changed is refused (56.969236ms)
✔ H18: two prompts before any native output: the second refuses busy; one engine write (15.033626ms)
✔ H19: the pipe fails mid-line under a large prompt: delivery-unknown transport-unknown, poisoned, no later write (119.397422ms)
✔ H19: the link itself never writes again after an unknown outcome, whoever calls it (0.606652ms)
✔ H19: the controller dies mid-write of a large line: after restart the outcome is unknown and nothing is resent (464.542066ms)
✔ H20: the line is written but the ack is lost when the controller dies: orphan, outcome unknown, nothing resent (357.812591ms)
✔ H21: a retry of the exact request with the old token after a crash is stale-incarnation; no second write (337.123938ms)
✔ H22: after H21 and a valid recovery, a new request with the new token is admitted (2377.836435ms)
✔ H23: requests pending at a restart are not resent; each shows outcome unknown (482.017907ms)
✔ a plain conversation: catalogue row, one page, CHAT-01 records (10.196509ms)
✔ native entries map to blocks: tools, thinking, bash, notices, ids that do not fit (3.091521ms)
✔ F1: a malformed line is an unavailable part at its position, and reading continues (2.999666ms)
✔ F1: a missing parent stops the history with a notice that names the unreadable lines (3.746417ms)
✔ F1: an unreadable fork is never merged into another branch's history (3.733154ms)
✔ F1: a follow stays on its branch when the next entry's parent is unreadable (3.881773ms)
✔ F1: a file whose entries are all unreadable shows a notice per line (1.563335ms)
✔ F2: a truncated trailing line marks the view incomplete, not an error (2.494119ms)
✔ pagination: 100 parts, then the rest; parts concatenate to the whole branch (5.109673ms)
✔ F3: a replaced file (new inode) refuses old cursors with reconcile (4.939351ms)
✔ F4: a same-inode rewrite of the prefix refuses old cursors with reconcile (5.516645ms)
✔ F5: growth between pages keeps the epoch and the page stops at the pinned length (5.793786ms)
✔ F6: unknown, foreign and expired cursors refuse and leave the cursor usable (10.497498ms)
✔ F7: a symlinked file and a symlinked directory component are refused, never opened (9.313922ms)
✔ F8: a file swapped for a symlink after the catalogue is refused (2.247728ms)
✔ F9: registrations never add or redirect a root (2.060491ms)
✔ F10: a header cwd naming another project is refused (3.630852ms)
✔ F11: parentSession renders with a marker and the parent is never opened (0.936984ms)
✔ F12: two leaves: the default leaf is shown and the other branch reads alone (4.789444ms)
✔ F12: a follow refuses when an appended duplicate id changes the branch's earlier parts (2.415895ms)
✔ F12: a second root (Pi's resetLeaf) starts its own branch (1.349225ms)
✔ F13: compaction is a marker in place, then the retained content (0.756245ms)
✔ F14: long strings split into fragments and parts, reassemble exactly, and pages respect the byte cap (737.947726ms)
✔ fragments never cut a surrogate pair and keep an empty string (9.768434ms)
✔ F15: a Claude seat is an unsupported-harness placeholder whose directory is never read (2.629953ms)
✔ unknown conversations, empty files and non-Pi files refuse (2.988026ms)
✔ an unreadable file or root inside the roots is refused per row, not a failed catalogue (1.388415ms)
✔ a seat directory without search permission refuses that root, not the catalogue (2.248255ms)
✔ every page and cursor is a valid CHAT-01 record (847.042088ms)
✔ the engine pin holds for the installed package (2.933293ms)
✔ pinned Pi, sealed and without credentials, answers the controller's commands with the shapes the fake models (364.994239ms)
✔ pinned Pi appends thinking_level_change at start when the branch lacks one, so the leaf moves (K8 then fails closed) (307.845583ms)
✔ N25: ordinary Interrupt reconciles; a non-empty queue_update in the window is O5 (80.815781ms)
✔ N1: an extension's follow-up queued after the fence is cleared before any abort; O5, Unknown (57.148386ms)
✔ N1: a follow-up queued before the fence is O5 at once; the Interrupt refuses fenced (24.835014ms)
✔ N2: with abort first, the fake runs the external item (the ordering guard has teeth) (21.576912ms)
✔ N3: the fence lands in preflight, preflight errors, no run: failed, No run, uncertain (42.350718ms)
✔ N4: the ack arrives after the first abort and a run starts: clear and abort again; Interrupted (37.456929ms)
✔ N5: an input handler takes the prompt: ack, no run, delivery-unknown handled-without-run (119.71406ms)
✔ N6: an extension queues between clear_queue and abort: O5 and O6, Unknown (46.194593ms)
✔ N7: clear_queue times out: no abort, nativeQueue unknown, force stop still ends it (1530.004862ms)
✔ N7: clear_queue answers an error: no abort, nativeQueue unknown, the link not poisoned (15.860593ms)
✔ N8: an extension prompt starts a run during Mosaic preflight; the losing settle is O3 (71.692215ms)
✔ N9: a run that started before the fence and ends aborted: failed interrupted, Interrupted (16.241237ms)
✔ N9: decision 34: a run that ends aborted with no stop in progress: aborted-without-stop, uncertain, outcome unknown (16.048665ms)
✔ N9: an aborted that lands after the fence but before any abort is written: aborted-without-stop, Unknown (32.548668ms)
✔ N10: fake conformance (30.957332ms)
✔ N11: the run fails before any user message_start: delivery-unknown ack-without-start, never failed (29.834953ms)
✔ N12: input that starts a run after the final empty clear is O1 and not part of the stop's proof (19.905915ms)
✔ N13: agent_start with no slot held is O1; a later prompt refuses with zero engine bytes (66.348845ms)
✔ N14: the run completes while clear_queue is in flight: finished, Completed first, uncertain (26.705932ms)
✔ N14: the run completes after the abort is written, before Pi applies it: finished, never relabelled (25.622164ms)
✔ N15: the fence lands in preflight, then an input handler takes it: handled-without-run, No run (19.804122ms)
✔ N16: Interrupt with no slot and no run refuses no-turn: no stop, no bytes, admission open (13.437887ms)
✔ N17: the run fails on its own during the exchange: failed, Failed on its own (28.095743ms)
✔ N18: no final assistant message_end, or a lost line: working stays working; before working, transport-unknown (113.466843ms)
✔ N19: a losing extension prompt settles inside the Mosaic run before its user message: O3, run-overlap (134.279618ms)
✔ N20: an extension triggerTurn during Mosaic preflight starts first; while streaming it queues with no signal (83.211293ms)
✔ N21: a losing settle after the receipt settled finished is O2; the receipt stays finished (14.999139ms)
✔ N22: an agent-level custom message is dropped by the clear with no signal; evidence names the seal (13.807672ms)
✔ N23: a nextTurn message survives clear and abort and attaches to the next prompt, with no signal (13.596018ms)
✔ N24: the seal is an allow-list: --extension, a missing --no-* flag, a second --mode or --session, a session or output flag, or a stray word refuses unsealed-engine; no engine starts (37.274093ms)
ℹ tests 152
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 152
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 32488.500969
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
✔ browser edge states: loading, empty, malformed, stale, hostile/long values, in-flight reply and appearance fallback (2364.731167ms)
Rendered contrast: {"failures":[],"count":330,"lowest":4.504658476260286}
✔ served Console browser: real board fixtures, keyboard, drafts, receipts, themes, 320px and failures (2725.60223ms)
✔ conversation view: full history, collapsed tools, hidden thinking, inert hostile content, malformed and reconcile markers (2335.250549ms)
✔ conversation view: a fork keeps the open branch, says so, and opens the new one on request (1375.477504ms)
✔ conversation view: a newer session with no readable history keeps the marker (1002.908949ms)
✔ conversation view: seats without history say so and offer no reply (608.42244ms)
✔ Discord row through real board/WebUI: independent brake/liveness, no Reply, literal content (1957.413637ms)
✔ return flow through the conversation view: send, tool call, delayed result, peer message, exact long answers, relaunch (53771.943793ms)
✔ both presentations replace old activity with relaunch notice, label retained history, then resume after new activity (1987.210959ms)
✔ reported return flow and relative Age: reply sent from the inspector, then the new answer appears there without manual refresh (21912.250845ms)
✔ loopback host and board origin fail closed (7.055591ms)
✔ real board fixture passes through WebUI; assets and isolated seen/reply work (100.024626ms)
✔ proxy preserves exact request bytes, status and receipt, rejects forms and malformed JSON, never follows redirect (227.262245ms)
✔ unreachable board reports URL; CLI rejects unsupported options (1632.267153ms)
ℹ tests 14
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 14
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 54170.048795
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
2026-10-09T13:05:51Z
08:05:51 up 33 days, 9:40, 5 users, load average: 4.03, 7.84, 5.58
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
// Row 46 receipt probe. Runs the fixture's ignoreTerm child inside a
// delegated systemd user scope, sends it SIGTERM, and records the scope's
// `systemctl --user show`, `cgroup.procs` before and after TERM, and the
// child's exit code and signal.
//
// node scope-receipt.mjs <mode> <delayMs> <runs>
//
// mode `race`: TERM goes `delayMs` after spawn, as the fixture does today.
// mode `ready`: TERM goes `delayMs` after the child reports its handler is
// installed, as the fixed fixture does.
// The outer process launches one scope per run; the inner process
// (`--inner`) is the scope's main process and prints one JSON line.
import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
// The fixture's child code for { ignoreTerm: true } with no pidLog
// (packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs, spawnChild), plus a readiness
// byte on stdout in `ready` mode.
const childCode = (ready) =>
"const note=()=>{};process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));" +
(ready ? "process.stdout.write('r');" : "") +
"setInterval(()=>{},1e9)";
const procs = (cg) => readFileSync(`/sys/fs/cgroup${cg}/cgroup.procs`, "utf8").split("\n").filter(Boolean).map(Number);
async function inner(mode, delayMs, unit) {
const cg = readFileSync("/proc/self/cgroup", "utf8").trim().split("::")[1];
const ready = mode === "ready";
const t0 = performance.now();
const child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", childCode(ready)], { stdio: ["ignore", ready ? "pipe" : "ignore", "ignore"] });
const exited = new Promise((r) => child.on("exit", (code, signal) => r({ code, signal, atMs: Math.round(performance.now() - t0) })));
let readyMs = null;
if (ready) {
await new Promise((r) => child.stdout.once("data", r));
readyMs = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
}
await sleep(delayMs);
const show = spawnSync("systemctl", ["--user", "show", "-p", "Id,LoadState,ActiveState,SubState,InvocationID,ControlGroup,Delegate", `${unit}.scope`], { encoding: "utf8" }).stdout.trim().split("\n");
const before = procs(cg);
const termMs = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
child.kill("SIGTERM");
const exit = await Promise.race([exited, sleep(500).then(() => null)]);
const after = procs(cg);
if (!exit) child.kill("SIGKILL");
console.log(JSON.stringify({ mode, delayMs, readyMs, termMs, child: child.pid, self: process.pid, show, before, after, childInBefore: before.includes(child.pid), childInAfter: after.includes(child.pid), exit: exit ?? "alive 500 ms after TERM" }));
}
async function outer(mode, delayMs, runs) {
for (let i = 0; i < runs; i++) {
const unit = `dw-r46-${mode}-${delayMs}-${process.pid}-${i}`;
const r = spawnSync("systemd-run", ["--user", "--scope", "--quiet", "-p", "Delegate=yes", `--unit=${unit}`, "--", process.execPath, import.meta.filename, "--inner", mode, String(delayMs), unit], { encoding: "utf8" });
process.stdout.write(r.stdout || `{"unit":"${unit}","status":${r.status},"stderr":${JSON.stringify(r.stderr)}}\n`);
}
}
const a = process.argv.slice(2);
if (a[0] === "--inner") await inner(a[1], Number(a[2]), a[3]);
else await outer(a[0], Number(a[1]), Number(a[2] ?? 5));
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{"t":1791551027129,"ev":"spawn","pid":3646877,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":true}
{"t":1791551027142,"ev":"term","pid":3646862}
{"t":1791551027142,"ev":"term","pid":3646877}
{"t":1791551029516,"ev":"spawn","pid":3647263,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791551029528,"ev":"term","pid":3647248}
{"t":1791551029528,"ev":"term","pid":3647263}
{"t":1791551031873,"ev":"spawn","pid":3647581,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791551031886,"ev":"term","pid":3647556}
{"t":1791551031887,"ev":"term","pid":3647581}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
{"t":1791550812775,"ev":"spawn","pid":3607494,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":true}
{"t":1791550812853,"ev":"ready","pid":3607494}
{"t":1791550812878,"ev":"term","pid":3607446}
{"t":1791550812878,"ev":"term","pid":3607494}
{"t":1791550815693,"ev":"spawn","pid":3607807,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791550815773,"ev":"ready","pid":3607807}
{"t":1791550815779,"ev":"term","pid":3607781}
{"t":1791550815780,"ev":"term","pid":3607807}
{"t":1791550819446,"ev":"spawn","pid":3608344,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791550819489,"ev":"ready","pid":3608344}
{"t":1791550819556,"ev":"term","pid":3608301}
{"t":1791550819556,"ev":"term","pid":3608344}
{"t":1791550820058,"ev":"term","pid":3608344}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
{"t":1791550802745,"ev":"spawn","pid":3605642,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":true}
{"t":1791550802763,"ev":"ready","pid":3605642}
{"t":1791550802798,"ev":"term","pid":3605597}
{"t":1791550802798,"ev":"term","pid":3605642}
{"t":1791550805434,"ev":"spawn","pid":3606162,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791550805456,"ev":"ready","pid":3606162}
{"t":1791550805492,"ev":"term","pid":3606153}
{"t":1791550805492,"ev":"term","pid":3606162}
{"t":1791550808090,"ev":"spawn","pid":3606502,"ignoreTerm":true,"setsid":false}
{"t":1791550808106,"ev":"ready","pid":3606502}
{"t":1791550808199,"ev":"term","pid":3606487}
{"t":1791550808200,"ev":"term","pid":3606502}
{"t":1791550808539,"ev":"term","pid":3606502}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/packages/conversation/src/shim.mjs b/packages/conversation/src/shim.mjs
index 2adbe48b..d51c4a1f 100644
--- a/packages/conversation/src/shim.mjs
+++ b/packages/conversation/src/shim.mjs
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
// `populated 0`. A missing or unreadable file is unavailable, never empty.
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import { closeSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { appendFileSync, closeSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { createServer } from "node:net";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { LineSplitter, encodeLine, parseLine } from "./framing.mjs";
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ async function handle(req) {
if (startOf(pid) !== startTicks) continue;
try {
process.kill(pid, "SIGTERM");
+ if (process.env.DW_TRACE) appendFileSync(process.env.DW_TRACE, JSON.stringify({ t: Date.now(), ev: 'term', pid }) + '\n');
signalled.push(pid);
} catch {
// gone already
diff --git a/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs b/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
index b3014f86..f30f5a4c 100644
--- a/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/conversation/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -615,13 +615,16 @@ const children = [];
// K2); `forkLoop` forks every 5 ms (K12); `ignoreTerm` survives SIGTERM, so
// only the kill phase ends it (K3, K10, K11). With `pidLog`, the fork loop
// appends each child's pid and a `term` line when it gets SIGTERM (K12).
+import * as __fs from 'node:fs';
+const require0 = () => __fs;
function spawnChild({ setsid = false, forkLoop = false, ignoreTerm = false, pidLog = null } = {}) {
const note = pidLog ? `const note=(s)=>require('node:fs').appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(pidLog)},s+'\\n');` : "const note=()=>{};";
- const code = note + (ignoreTerm ? "process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));" : "") + (forkLoop
+ const code = note + (ignoreTerm ? "process.on('SIGTERM',()=>note('term'));" + (process.env.DW_TRACE ? `require('node:fs').appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(process.env.DW_TRACE)},JSON.stringify({t:Date.now(),ev:'ready',pid:process.pid})+'\\n');` : "") : "") + (forkLoop
? "const {spawn}=require('node:child_process');setInterval(()=>{try{const c=spawn('sleep',['1000'],{stdio:'ignore'});if(c.pid)note(String(c.pid))}catch{}},5);setInterval(()=>{},1e9)"
: "setInterval(()=>{},1e9)");
const child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", code], { stdio: "ignore", detached: setsid });
children.push(child.pid);
+ if (process.env.DW_TRACE) { require0().appendFileSync(process.env.DW_TRACE, JSON.stringify({ t: Date.now(), ev: 'spawn', pid: child.pid, ignoreTerm, setsid }) + '\n'); child.on('exit', (code, sig) => require0().appendFileSync(process.env.DW_TRACE, JSON.stringify({ t: Date.now(), ev: 'child-exit', pid: child.pid, code, sig }) + '\n')); }
return child.pid;
}
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# Independent acceptance checklist, row 18
Darkwing reviews Filbert's implementation without editing its source candidate.
Dewey reviews visible connector presentation. No live connector manipulation.
- Discovery accepts only safe matching binding name/seat from private regular
files, never dereferences a token path and never serializes private fields.
- Path traversal, symlinked binding/runtime/session paths and malformed records
cannot cause arbitrary reads or an actionable/live row.
- No owner, malformed owner, dead PID, missing identity, reused PID and boot
mismatch are non-live. A positively matching live process is live.
- STOP presence is visible as braked independently of process liveness. Its
contents are not read or exposed; no STOP or lock is created or changed.
- Ordinary completed messages remain idle. No false human attention regression.
- Connector rows cannot borrow a native agent's registration for replies.
Exercise replyToRow and HTTP using a fake executable hook; every connector
attempt must be refused before that hook runs, including with forged tmux
registration. Normal-agent reply tests must still pass.
- Both existing board and WebUI distinguish the connector and brake state and
omit reply controls. Preserve escaping, including hostile binding fixtures.
- Discovery errors disclose no private JSON fields or raw contents. One bad
binding must not silently manufacture a healthy row.
- Candidate pins match before and after tests. Existing dirty attention changes
remain intact; no unrelated source integration or live operation is inferred.
After source approval, measure the real row read-only. Offline/braked behavior
uses isolated fixtures unless the operator separately approves a live-service
transition. Board replacement is its own protected gate.
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T13:51:10.530662+00:00",
"backendPid": 3769124,
"health": "ok",
"row": {
"agent": "sage (discord: shared-signals)",
"project": "fleet",
"state": "idle",
"alive": true,
"connector": {
"binding": "shared-signals",
"braked": false,
"ownerState": "live",
"alive": true
},
"task": "Discord connector",
"taskSource": "connector"
},
"replyStatus": 409,
"replyError": "board replies are disabled for Discord connectors",
"fiveAgentPaneIdentitiesUnchanged": true,
"connectorServiceIdentityUnchanged": true
}
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
{"at": "2026-09-14T13:50:24.078636+00:00", "event": "owner-authorized-restart-intent", "oldPid": 3204655, "agents": {"default/darkwing": [["2733924", "12863634"]], "default/dewey": [["934346", "466065"]], "default/filbert": [["72183", "100870"]], "default/researcher": [["173699", "66404285"]], "mosaic-fleet/rocko": [["90599", "128275"]]}, "connectorService": [3022843, "67887873"], "manifest": "254403b89c0a2330da53e8dbad1cbeba3b1b06cf4f3efddc18451e04cb78f6de"}
{"at": "2026-09-14T13:50:24.503231+00:00", "event": "replacement-started", "oldExitedGracefully": true, "newPid": 3769124, "log": "/tmp/discord-board-backend-ovk_cahk.log"}
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T01:10:19.375709+00:00",
"candidate": "/tmp/discord-board-r1-KbMrGQWF",
"manifestSha256": "5c92acc90d202727d790f3fb8d74387db1c9e5c3e43d4f4b56b40e5ae503a56a",
"verdict": "CHANGES REQUIRED",
"independentSerializedTests": 320,
"finding": {
"id": "R1-B1",
"severity": "P2",
"file": "packages/control-board/src/discord.mjs",
"issue": "STOP metadata access errors collapse to absence, falsely projecting not braked",
"reproduction": "Synthetic journal directory contains STOP, chmod directory to 000 as uid 1000, inspectDiscord returns braked:false, ownerState:invalid, alive:false. Restore permissions and remove fixture.",
"expected": "braked:null/unknown when STOP existence cannot be established; false only for verified absence",
"required": "Distinguish missing metadata from access errors and add non-root unreadable-directory regression."
},
"ux": "Dewey APPROVE on exact R1; three independent serialized browser tests passed, source/automation limitations retained",
"parallelQualification": "Two author concurrent frozen timeouts remain unresolved and are not green; serialized independent run passed."
}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{
"candidate": "R2",
"syntheticOnly": true,
"taskContainsEnvelopeAuthorId": true,
"taskContainsEnvelopeMessageId": true,
"taskSource": "first-user-message"
}
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T01:26:42.688410+00:00",
"candidate": "/tmp/discord-board-r3-U9vVrlQu",
"manifestSha256": "254403b89c0a2330da53e8dbad1cbeba3b1b06cf4f3efddc18451e04cb78f6de",
"reviewer": "Darkwing",
"backendVerdict": "APPROVE AS SOURCE",
"verified": "Nine working/frozen pins, exact three-file R2-to-R3 delta, inherited attention pins and full serialized six-package suite 322/322",
"findingsClosed": [
"R1-B1: inaccessible STOP is unknown, non-root regression passes",
"R2-B2: canonical routing envelope no longer becomes connector Task; ordinary fallback retained"
],
"limitations": [
"No generalized transcript redaction",
"R1 concurrent combined frozen timeouts unresolved/not green",
"No live observation, backend restart, connector change or publication in this review"
],
"uxGate": "Await exact R3 confirmation from Dewey via agent-send"
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T01:28:17.695Z",
"sourceApproval": 26257,
"readOnly": true,
"agent": "sage (discord: shared-signals)",
"project": "fleet",
"state": "idle",
"alive": true,
"connector": {
"binding": "shared-signals",
"braked": false,
"ownerState": "live",
"alive": true
},
"task": "Discord connector",
"taskSource": "connector",
"registrationAbsent": true,
"ownerMatchesService": true,
"discoveryErrorCount": 0
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"at": "2026-09-14T00:50:35.339Z",
"sourceSha256": "dfbb7ab9374c0ac9fafa0503f495abd938f499f5d6227233de03a60ea3022927",
"fixture": "connector row with forged native registration",
"status": 200,
"fakeTransportCalls": 1,
"realTransportCalls": 0,
"gatePassed": false
}
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
# Discord engine: guaranteed test cleanup and the timeout gap in `busy` (#1509), R2 candidate
Sage assigned this on 2026-09-26 as 6b, source only. Rocko reviews. Base is
HEAD 401cc850. Not committed. The live connector runs from this checkout, so
Sage is holding its restart until this is approved and committed. Nobody
should restart it from a working copy.
## Defects (DEFERRED Open, "Discord engine: leaked fake pi…")
(a) `engine.test.mjs` read the fake's `commands.jsonl` 20 ms after a prompt and
got ENOENT under load. Seven tests stopped the engine outside `finally`, so a
failed assertion left the fake pi running and the test file never exited.
(b) `busy` was `state.busy || pending.some((t) => !t.done)`. If a turn timed out
before its `agent_start` was read, it was done while `state.busy` was still
false. The next prompt then went straight to pi, which refused it as
streaming.
## R1 and Rocko's finding
R1 held later prompts behind a failed turn. If pi had sent no `agent_start` for
it within a grace period, R1 dropped that turn from the queue and sent the next
prompt. Rocko rejected it (F1, High), in
`agents/rocko/work/discord-engine-busy-r1-review-2026-09-26.md`, sha256
047dbd8f.
Pi's events carry no prompt id. The engine attributes them to the front of its
queue. Silence until the grace ends does not prove the old run will never come.
If pi then runs it, its events land on the new prompt, which R1 had just put at
the front. Rocko's reproducer got the old run's answer and its `old.md` tool
record back as the new prompt's result. My R1 README said such events "find no
live head and are dropped". That was wrong.
The R1 files stay here as `r1-manifest.sha256` and `r1.patch`.
## Change (R2)
`packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs`:
- `engineBusy()` is `state.busy || state.pending.length > 0`. A failed turn
still in the queue holds the next prompt back, and stays at the front, so any
late events for it land on it. `prompt()`, `sendHeld()` and the `busy` getter
use it. This part is unchanged from R1.
- The bound is now a stop, not a drop. When a turn fails while it is still in
the queue, `failTurn` starts a timer, `abortGraceMs` (default
`ABORT_GRACE_MS`, 30 s, an engine option, not binding config). When it
fires:
- If pi has sent `agent_start` (`state.busy`), nothing happens. That run
ends on its `agent_end` or a settle, as on HEAD.
- Otherwise `wedge()` sets `state.wedged`, fails every held prompt with
code `engine-wedged`, and stops pi: stdin closed, SIGTERM, then SIGKILL
after 5 s. The failed turn stays at the front until the exit.
- While wedged, nothing is written to that child. `write()`, `sendHeld()` and
`prompt()` refuse, and a new prompt fails at once with `engine-down`. The exit
runs the usual `failAll` and `onExit`.
- `stop()`'s body moved into `stopChild()`, which both `stop()` and `wedge()`
call.
- `release()` clears the timer wherever a turn leaves the queue: `agent_end`,
settle, a refused send, and process exit. As in R1, the settle handler removes
turns before failing them.
What recovery looks like live: `cli.mjs` handles `onExit` with `shutdown(1)`.
The unit's `Restart=on-failure` starts a new connector and a new pi 15 s later,
within its limit of five tries in ten minutes. This change doesn't touch the
unit or the restart policy. A wedge now costs one connector restart. R1 would
have kept the same pi and risked a wrong answer.
`packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs`:
- `mute`: accepted and never run.
- `stall <ms>`: accepted, then the fake reads nothing for `<ms>`, runs the
stalled prompt, and only then reads what came in meanwhile. This is the
order in Rocko's case.
`packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs`:
- `withEngine()` stops the engine in `finally`. Every test that starts an
engine uses it, or has its own `try/finally` in the exit test.
- `commands()` returns `[]` until the fake creates its log. The held-prompt
test waits for the first prompt with `until()` instead of a 20 ms sleep, and
its first prompt is `slow 300`.
- The manual-timer test fires the turn timer before any pi event is read. The
next prompt must wait for the settle and get its own answer.
- New or changed for R2:
- `mute` with `abortGraceMs: 150`. The held prompt fails with
`engine-wedged` after the grace, a later prompt fails with
`engine-down`, `onExit` fires, and pi saw only `mute` and `abort`.
- `stall 400` with the same grace, which is Rocko's case with a real
child. The held prompt fails with `engine-wedged`, pi exits, and "after
stall" never reaches pi.
- Rocko's reproducer as an in-memory test, run twice. The old prompt's
response comes either before its timeout or only with the late events.
After the grace, the old run's start, tool pair, answer, end and settle
arrive while pi is still exiting. The held prompt stays failed with
`engine-wedged` and a later prompt fails with `engine-down`. Pi saw only
`old` and `abort`, then SIGTERM, then SIGKILL at 5 s. Only the exit
reaches `onExit`. The test reads recorded outcomes after a tick instead
of awaiting, so a regression fails instead of hanging.
- `late 400` with the same grace. Pi started that run, so the grace does
not stop pi, and the next prompt gets its own answer when the run ends.
## Evidence
- `engine.test.mjs`: 17/17.
- R1's engine (d5bf24b5, from `r1.patch`) against these tests fails 4: `mute`,
`stall`, and both in-memory runs. In that run a probe shows R1 answering
"after stall" with "echo: stalled". An earlier draft of the in-memory test
awaited the held prompt and hung on R1 until the 120 s cap. It now fails in
milliseconds.
- HEAD's engine against these tests fails 5: the manual-timer test and the
same four.
- Mutations of R2:
- Without the `state.busy` check, the `late 400` test fails.
- Without the `wedge()` call, 4 fail.
- Without failing held prompts in `wedge()`, 4 fail.
- Test union (control-board, webui, seat, mosaic, ledger, discord) at default
concurrency on `git archive` of 401cc850 plus the three files: 406/406
three times, 23 to 24 s each. No fake pi was left running.
- Eight suites green on that snapshot: config 24, task 90, foundation 43,
conductor 17, release 14, auth 15, discord 63, extension-package 18.
Logs: `/tmp/dw-6b-r2-conc-{1,2,3}.txt`. R1's evidence runs:
`/tmp/dw-6b-conc-{1,2,3}.txt`, `/tmp/dw-6b-serial.txt`. HEAD's hang control:
`/tmp/dw-1509-headctl-{1,2,3}.txt`, `/tmp/dw-1509-ef00-1.txt`. There, HEAD hit
the 240 s cap at 199 ok under the union's load.
## Not covered
- A run pi started and never ends, even after abort, still holds prompts
until pi settles or exits. Each held prompt fails at its own timeout ("while
waiting for the engine"). HEAD behaves the same way through `state.busy`, and
Rocko did not block on it. Only a pi restart clears it.
- A wedge ends the connector process, and the recovery is systemd's restart.
Nothing here changes the unit, and the restart limit still applies.
- No live restart, and no change to the binding schema.
## Frozen files
`r2-manifest.sha256` holds the three R2 hashes. `r2.patch` is `git diff
packages/discord` at freeze time.
## Review
Rocko, R1, 2026-09-26: request changes, F1 High, as described above. Report:
`agents/rocko/work/discord-engine-busy-r1-review-2026-09-26.md`, sha256
047dbd8f.
Rocko, R2, 2026-09-26: approved the three pinned files. Report:
`agents/rocko/work/discord-engine-busy-r2-review-2026-09-26.md`, sha256
ed5510a0. He checked the manifests before and after, ran 17/17 himself, and
read the CLI shutdown path, `connector.stop` and the unit template. Sage asked
him three operational questions:
- A wedge exits 1, never 3. Exit 3 remains the supervised startup refusal.
- The unit's start limit (5 starts in 600 s) is a rate limit. It does not
bound repeated wedges. With the default 180 s turn timeout, the 30 s grace
and the 15 s restart delay, a cycle takes at least 225 s. That stays under
the limit, so a pi that wedges every time could restart indefinitely.
Stopping for good after repeated wedges would need a separate policy. This
change does not add one.
- He recommends, as a nonblocking follow-up, that the connector journal
record at startup: HEAD, dirty state scoped to runtime source, and a digest
of the runtime files. A wedge restart loads whatever the checkout holds.
This section was added after approval, so the README hash no longer matches
the one Rocko pinned (69350f29). The three source files are unchanged.
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
d5bf24b59c07c85067f4087c03b54ca8b4df923c1d591441dedd2e8a7ff2ae39 packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
f0abee9c243d46d66dd2271abc3fd89089c350ac6a66ab49131bce80adfcdc33 packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
fa1bf44e3f33eb970a714ada1c686abbc1932baaf418679276edf8813abbe6de packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -1,414 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs b/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
index 5c8fd0a9..9dcaeb42 100644
--- a/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
@@ -16,9 +16,12 @@
// from `tool_execution_start`/`tool_execution_end` into the result so the
// turn record shows what was read. An `agent_end` with `willRetry` is not
// the end of the run. A timeout sends `abort` and fails that turn; the
-// process stays. A malformed JSONL line from pi fails the current turn (its
-// outcome is now unknowable) and the process stays. Process exit fails
-// every pending turn and is reported through `onExit`.
+// process stays. The failed turn holds later prompts back until its
+// agent_end or a settle. If pi has not started it within ABORT_GRACE_MS, it
+// is dropped and the next prompt goes out; a run pi did start holds them
+// until it ends, as any run does. A malformed JSONL line from pi fails the
+// current turn (its outcome is now unknowable) and the process stays.
+// Process exit fails every pending turn and is reported through `onExit`.
//
// Framing follows pi's RPC doc: split on "\n" only, strip a trailing "\r".
// Node readline is not used because it also splits on U+2028/U+2029.
@@ -64,12 +67,19 @@ export function assistantText(message) {
.trim();
}
+// How long a turn that failed here (timeout, protocol error) may wait for
+// pi's agent_start before it stops holding the next prompt back. Without a
+// bound, a prompt pi accepted but never ran would queue every later prompt
+// until restart.
+export const ABORT_GRACE_MS = 30000;
+
export function createEngine({
command, args, cwd, env = {},
spawn = nodeSpawn,
setTimeoutImpl = globalThis.setTimeout, clearTimeoutImpl = globalThis.clearTimeout,
log = () => {},
onExit = () => {},
+ abortGraceMs = ABORT_GRACE_MS,
} = {}) {
if (typeof command !== "string" || command.length === 0) throw new DiscordError("engine: command required", 1);
if (!Array.isArray(args)) throw new DiscordError("engine: args required", 1);
@@ -80,15 +90,35 @@ export function createEngine({
// A turn that fails on the client side (timeout, protocol error) stays in
// the pending queue, marked done, until pi's own turn_end for it arrives.
- // Otherwise that turn_end would be attributed to the next prompt.
+ // Otherwise that turn_end would be attributed to the next prompt. It holds
+ // later prompts back; if pi has not started it within abortGraceMs, it goes.
function failTurn(turn, code, message) {
if (turn.done) return;
turn.done = true;
if (turn.timer !== null) clearTimeoutImpl(turn.timer);
turn.timer = null;
+ if (state.pending.includes(turn)) {
+ turn.grace = setTimeoutImpl(() => {
+ turn.grace = null;
+ // No agent_start by now: pi never started this run and will send no
+ // agent_end for it, so it leaves the queue and cannot take the next
+ // prompt's. A run pi did start keeps its place until it ends.
+ if (!state.busy) {
+ const i = state.pending.indexOf(turn);
+ if (i !== -1) state.pending.splice(i, 1);
+ }
+ sendHeld();
+ }, abortGraceMs);
+ }
turn.reject(new DiscordError(message, 1, { code }));
}
+ // Call when a turn leaves the pending queue.
+ function release(turn) {
+ if (turn.grace !== null) clearTimeoutImpl(turn.grace);
+ turn.grace = null;
+ }
+
function settleTurn(turn, value) {
if (turn.done) return;
turn.done = true;
@@ -99,7 +129,10 @@ export function createEngine({
function failAll(code, message) {
const pending = state.pending.splice(0);
- for (const t of pending) failTurn(t, code, message);
+ for (const t of pending) {
+ release(t);
+ failTurn(t, code, message);
+ }
for (const h of state.held.splice(0)) failTurn(h.turn, code, message);
for (const [, r] of state.responses) r.reject(new DiscordError(message, 1, { code }));
state.responses.clear();
@@ -174,6 +207,7 @@ export function createEngine({
// Attribute the run to the head even if it failed client-side, so the
// next prompt's agent_end is not taken for this one.
const run = state.pending.shift();
+ if (run) release(run);
if (!run || run.done) return;
const messages = Array.isArray(event.messages) ? event.messages.filter((m) => m && m.role === "assistant") : [];
const message = messages.length > 0 ? messages[messages.length - 1] : run.last;
@@ -193,13 +227,14 @@ export function createEngine({
// this settle and still has no agent_end will never get one: fail it now
// instead of waiting for its timeout. Turns whose prompt response has
// not arrived yet belong to a later run and stay.
+ const dropped = [];
const keep = [];
- for (const t of state.pending) {
- if (t.done) continue;
- if (t.accepted) failTurn(t, "engine-settled-without-turn", "engine settled without answering this prompt");
- else keep.push(t);
- }
+ for (const t of state.pending) (t.done || t.accepted ? dropped : keep).push(t);
state.pending = keep;
+ for (const t of dropped) {
+ release(t);
+ failTurn(t, "engine-settled-without-turn", "engine settled without answering this prompt");
+ }
sendHeld();
}
}
@@ -214,15 +249,23 @@ export function createEngine({
// Never accepted: pi will not emit a turn_end for it, so remove it.
const i = state.pending.indexOf(turn);
if (i !== -1) state.pending.splice(i, 1);
+ release(turn);
failTurn(turn, (err.details && err.details.code) || "engine-refused", err.message);
sendHeld();
});
}
+ // Pi is busy from our side while any sent prompt is still queued, even one
+ // that already failed here: a turn that timed out before its agent_start
+ // was read leaves state.busy false while pi runs it, and sending then would
+ // be refused as streaming. It leaves the queue on its agent_end, on a
+ // settle, on a refused send, or when its grace ends before pi started it.
+ const engineBusy = () => state.busy || state.pending.length > 0;
+
// After a settle (or a refused send) the oldest held prompt goes out.
function sendHeld() {
if (state.exited !== null) return;
- if (state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done)) return;
+ if (engineBusy()) return;
const next = state.held.shift();
if (next) send(next.turn, next.command);
}
@@ -281,7 +324,7 @@ export function createEngine({
// with DiscordError carrying details.code for the turn record.
prompt(text, { timeoutMs = 180000 } = {}) {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text.length === 0) throw new DiscordError("prompt text required", 1);
- const turn = { resolve: null, reject: null, timer: null, done: false, accepted: false, tools: new Map(), turns: 0, last: null };
+ const turn = { resolve: null, reject: null, timer: null, grace: null, done: false, accepted: false, tools: new Map(), turns: 0, last: null };
const done = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
turn.resolve = resolve;
turn.reject = reject;
@@ -310,13 +353,13 @@ export function createEngine({
failTurn(turn, "engine-down", "engine is not running");
return done;
}
- if (state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done) || state.held.length > 0) state.held.push({ turn, command });
+ if (engineBusy() || state.held.length > 0) state.held.push({ turn, command });
else send(turn, command);
return done;
},
get busy() {
- return state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done) || state.held.length > 0;
+ return engineBusy() || state.held.length > 0;
},
get pendingCount() {
return state.pending.filter((t) => !t.done).length + state.held.length;
diff --git a/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs b/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
index 59674d1e..62dd6017 100644
--- a/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
@@ -28,7 +28,20 @@ function start(root, extra = {}) {
log: (m) => logs.push(m), ...extra,
});
engine.start();
- return { engine, logs, commands: () => readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l)) };
+ // The fake creates its log on the first command; until then there are none.
+ const commands = () => (existsSync(logPath) ? readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l)) : []);
+ return { engine, logs, commands };
+}
+
+// Every test stops its engine in finally: a fake pi left running after a
+// failed assertion keeps the test file from exiting.
+async function withEngine(extra, body) {
+ const started = start(makeRoot(), extra);
+ try {
+ await body(started);
+ } finally {
+ await started.engine.stop();
+ }
}
test("engine: buildPiArgs carries the fixed flags, engine settings, session dir and prompt file", () => {
@@ -56,8 +69,7 @@ test("engine: with tools, buildPiArgs turns pi's own tools off, loads the extens
assert.equal(rw[rw.indexOf("--tools") + 1], "list_dir,read_file,search,write_file,edit_file", "a writable root adds exactly the two write tools");
});
-test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool call in the result", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool call in the result", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
const r = await engine.prompt("tools 3");
assert.equal(r.text, "read 3 file(s)");
assert.equal(r.turns, 2);
@@ -71,45 +83,38 @@ test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool
assert.equal(plain.turns, 1);
await idle(engine);
assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: a run that ends on a tool-only turn fails the prompt as empty; a retried run settles on the real end", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a run that ends on a tool-only turn fails the prompt as empty; a retried run settles on the real end", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
const r = await engine.prompt("toolonly");
assert.equal(r.text, "", "no text: the connector turns this into engine-empty");
assert.equal(r.tools.length, 1);
const again = await engine.prompt("retry");
assert.equal(again.text, "after retry");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: one prompt, one turn, text and usage come back", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
- try {
- const r = await engine.prompt("hello");
- assert.equal(r.text, "echo: hello");
- assert.deepEqual(r.usage, { input: 3, output: 2 });
- await idle(engine);
- assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- } finally {
- await engine.stop();
- }
-});
+test("engine: one prompt, one turn, text and usage come back", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
+ const r = await engine.prompt("hello");
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: hello");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.usage, { input: 3, output: 2 });
+ await idle(engine);
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
+}));
-test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as its own run, and answered in order", async () => {
- const { engine, commands } = start(makeRoot());
- const first = engine.prompt("slow 150");
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
+test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as its own run, and answered in order", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ const first = engine.prompt("slow 300");
assert.equal(engine.busy, true);
const second = engine.prompt("second");
assert.equal(engine.pendingCount, 2);
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
- assert.equal(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt").length, 1, "the second prompt is not sent while pi is busy");
+ const prompted = () => commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt");
+ assert.ok(await until(() => prompted().length > 0), "the first prompt reached pi");
+ assert.equal(prompted().length, 1, "the second prompt is not sent while pi is busy");
+ // The fake refuses a prompt without streamingBehavior while it runs one, so
+ // an answered second prompt also proves it was not sent early.
const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([first, second]);
assert.equal(r1.text, "slow reply");
assert.equal(r2.text, "echo: second");
- const prompts = commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt");
+ const prompts = prompted();
assert.equal(prompts.length, 2);
// Never a pi follow-up: pi would fold it into the first run and close both
// answers with one agent_end (the live loss of 2026-09-17).
@@ -117,11 +122,9 @@ test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as it
assert.equal(prompts[1].streamingBehavior, undefined);
await idle(engine);
assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own and is never sent", async () => {
- const { engine, commands } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own and is never sent", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
const first = engine.prompt("slow 200");
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late one", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (e) => e.details.code === "timeout" && /waiting for the engine/.test(e.message));
@@ -130,50 +133,85 @@ test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own an
await idle(engine);
assert.deepEqual(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt").map((c) => c.message), ["slow 200"]);
assert.deepEqual(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "abort"), [], "a held turn is not aborted; pi never had it");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: timeout sends abort and fails only that turn; the process stays", async () => {
- const { engine, commands, logs } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: timeout sends abort and fails only that turn; the process stays", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands, logs }) => {
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("slow 5000", { timeoutMs: 100 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
assert.ok(await until(() => commands().some((c) => c.type === "abort")), "abort reached pi");
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => /timed out/.test(l)));
const r = await engine.prompt("again");
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: again");
- await engine.stop();
+}));
+
+test("engine: tool events from a run that outlived its timeout never land in the next prompt's record", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late 200", { timeoutMs: 40 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const r = await engine.prompt("after late");
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after late");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.tools, [], "the dead run's read is not this prompt's evidence");
+ assert.equal(r.turns, 1, "the dead run's turns are not counted here");
+}));
+
+// The turn timer is fired by hand, before the engine has read any event from
+// pi, so the timed-out run is still pi's and state.busy is still false when
+// the next prompt arrives. Under load a real timer does the same.
+const TURN_MS = 60000;
+const manualTurnTimer = (fire) => ({
+ setTimeoutImpl: (fn, ms) => (ms === TURN_MS ? fire.push(fn) : setTimeout(fn, ms)),
+ clearTimeoutImpl: (id) => { if (typeof id !== "number") clearTimeout(id); },
});
-test("engine: tool events from a run that outlived its timeout never land in the next prompt's record", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
- try {
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late 200", { timeoutMs: 40 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
- const r = await engine.prompt("after late");
+test("engine: a prompt after a turn that timed out before its agent_start waits for pi to settle instead of being refused", () => {
+ const fire = [];
+ return withEngine(manualTurnTimer(fire), async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ const late = engine.prompt("late 100", { timeoutMs: TURN_MS });
+ fire.shift()();
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, true, "pi is still running the prompt that timed out");
+ const next = engine.prompt("after late", { timeoutMs: 5000 });
+ assert.equal(engine.pendingCount, 1, "only the new prompt is live");
+ await assert.rejects(late, (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const r = await next;
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after late");
assert.deepEqual(r.tools, [], "the dead run's read is not this prompt's evidence");
- assert.equal(r.turns, 1, "the dead run's turns are not counted here");
- } finally {
- await engine.stop();
- }
+ assert.equal(r.turns, 1);
+ assert.deepEqual(commands().map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["late 100", "abort", "after late"]);
+ await idle(engine);
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
+ });
});
-test("engine: a malformed JSONL line fails the turn, not the process", async () => {
- const { engine, logs } = start(makeRoot());
+// "mute" is accepted and never run, so no agent_start, agent_end or settle
+// ever comes for it. Unbounded, it would hold every later prompt.
+test("engine: a timed-out turn pi never started holds the next prompt only for the abort grace, then leaves the queue", () => withEngine({ abortGraceMs: 150 }, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("mute", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, true, "pi might still be running it");
+ const started = Date.now();
+ const r = await engine.prompt("after mute", { timeoutMs: 5000 });
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after mute");
+ assert.ok(Date.now() - started >= 100, "held for the grace, not sent at once");
+ assert.deepEqual(commands().map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["mute", "abort", "after mute"]);
+ await idle(engine);
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
+}));
+
+test("engine: a malformed JSONL line fails the turn, not the process", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, logs }) => {
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("garbage"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-protocol");
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => /malformed/.test(l)));
const r = await engine.prompt("still here");
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: still here");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
test("engine: a turn that ends in error rejects with the error code; process exit fails pending turns", async () => {
- const root = makeRoot();
let exited = null;
- const { engine } = start(root, { onExit: (e) => (exited = e) });
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("error"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-error" && /fake provider error/.test(err.message));
- const pending = engine.prompt("slow 5000");
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
- await engine.stop();
- await assert.rejects(pending, (err) => err.details.code === "engine-down");
- assert.ok(exited);
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("x"), /not running/);
+ const { engine } = start(makeRoot(), { onExit: (e) => (exited = e) });
+ try {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("error"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-error" && /fake provider error/.test(err.message));
+ const pending = engine.prompt("slow 5000");
+ await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
+ await engine.stop();
+ await assert.rejects(pending, (err) => err.details.code === "engine-down");
+ assert.ok(exited);
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("x"), /not running/);
+ } finally {
+ await engine.stop();
+ }
});
diff --git a/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs b/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
index 94919306..ecc04e3b 100644
--- a/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
// then a second turn that answers "read <n> file(s)"
// "toolonly" a run whose only turn calls a tool and never answers
// "retry" an agent_end with willRetry, then the real answer
+// "mute" accept the prompt and emit nothing, staying idle
// "late <ms>" ignore abort; after <ms> emit a tool pair and a tool turn,
// then answer "late reply", like a run that outlives its
// client-side timeout
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ function assistant(text, stopReason = "stop") {
}
function run(text) {
+ if (text === "mute") return;
busy = true;
out({ type: "agent_start" });
out({ type: "turn_start" });
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
77077b7fbd5a933ffd352094eb073227c299ba47b7aea52d4e60fdc55cc7101e packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
47a998179c6eb46827f43ab2c6b0f6b062ef94fb47da402cfb9af8c4f180f38e packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
a8e54cc3f4b670eef2c06755b63e9e6bfeb44b1b1efde3aca9bfaa91583c3ef3 packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -1,651 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs b/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
index 5c8fd0a9..46ef1f88 100644
--- a/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/src/engine-pi.mjs
@@ -16,9 +16,14 @@
// from `tool_execution_start`/`tool_execution_end` into the result so the
// turn record shows what was read. An `agent_end` with `willRetry` is not
// the end of the run. A timeout sends `abort` and fails that turn; the
-// process stays. A malformed JSONL line from pi fails the current turn (its
-// outcome is now unknowable) and the process stays. Process exit fails
-// every pending turn and is reported through `onExit`.
+// process stays. The failed turn holds later prompts back until its
+// agent_end or a settle. If pi has not started it within ABORT_GRACE_MS, the
+// engine stops pi instead of sending again: pi's events carry no prompt id,
+// so a late run of the failed prompt would be taken for the next one's. A
+// run pi did start holds later prompts until it ends, as any run does. A
+// malformed JSONL line from pi fails the current turn (its outcome is now
+// unknowable) and the process stays. Process exit fails every pending turn
+// and is reported through `onExit`.
//
// Framing follows pi's RPC doc: split on "\n" only, strip a trailing "\r".
// Node readline is not used because it also splits on U+2028/U+2029.
@@ -64,31 +69,67 @@ export function assistantText(message) {
.trim();
}
+// How long a turn that failed here (timeout, protocol error) may wait for
+// pi's agent_start before the engine stops pi. Without a bound, a prompt pi
+// accepted but never ran would hold every later prompt until restart.
+export const ABORT_GRACE_MS = 30000;
+
export function createEngine({
command, args, cwd, env = {},
spawn = nodeSpawn,
setTimeoutImpl = globalThis.setTimeout, clearTimeoutImpl = globalThis.clearTimeout,
log = () => {},
onExit = () => {},
+ abortGraceMs = ABORT_GRACE_MS,
} = {}) {
if (typeof command !== "string" || command.length === 0) throw new DiscordError("engine: command required", 1);
if (!Array.isArray(args)) throw new DiscordError("engine: args required", 1);
// pending: prompts sent to pi, oldest first. held: prompts waiting for pi
// to settle before they are sent, oldest first.
- const state = { child: null, buffer: "", pending: [], held: [], responses: new Map(), nextId: 1, busy: false, exited: null };
+ // wedged: set when the engine gave up on pi and is stopping it. Nothing
+ // is sent to that child again.
+ const state = { child: null, buffer: "", pending: [], held: [], responses: new Map(), nextId: 1, busy: false, exited: null, wedged: false };
// A turn that fails on the client side (timeout, protocol error) stays in
// the pending queue, marked done, until pi's own turn_end for it arrives.
- // Otherwise that turn_end would be attributed to the next prompt.
+ // Otherwise that turn_end would be attributed to the next prompt. It holds
+ // later prompts back; if pi has not started it within abortGraceMs, the
+ // engine stops pi.
function failTurn(turn, code, message) {
if (turn.done) return;
turn.done = true;
if (turn.timer !== null) clearTimeoutImpl(turn.timer);
turn.timer = null;
+ if (state.pending.includes(turn)) {
+ turn.grace = setTimeoutImpl(() => {
+ turn.grace = null;
+ // A run pi started keeps its place until its agent_end or a settle.
+ if (state.busy) return;
+ // No agent_start yet. Pi may never run this prompt, or its events
+ // may still be on the way; with no prompt id in them, nothing sent
+ // now could be told apart from it. Stop pi: held prompts fail, and
+ // the exit fails the rest and reaches onExit.
+ log(`engine: no agent_start ${abortGraceMs} ms after a failed turn; stopping pi`);
+ wedge();
+ }, abortGraceMs);
+ }
turn.reject(new DiscordError(message, 1, { code }));
}
+ function wedge() {
+ if (state.wedged || state.exited !== null) return;
+ state.wedged = true;
+ for (const h of state.held.splice(0)) failTurn(h.turn, "engine-wedged", "engine stopped: pi did not start an aborted turn");
+ stopChild();
+ }
+
+ // Call when a turn leaves the pending queue.
+ function release(turn) {
+ if (turn.grace !== null) clearTimeoutImpl(turn.grace);
+ turn.grace = null;
+ }
+
function settleTurn(turn, value) {
if (turn.done) return;
turn.done = true;
@@ -99,7 +140,10 @@ export function createEngine({
function failAll(code, message) {
const pending = state.pending.splice(0);
- for (const t of pending) failTurn(t, code, message);
+ for (const t of pending) {
+ release(t);
+ failTurn(t, code, message);
+ }
for (const h of state.held.splice(0)) failTurn(h.turn, code, message);
for (const [, r] of state.responses) r.reject(new DiscordError(message, 1, { code }));
state.responses.clear();
@@ -174,6 +218,7 @@ export function createEngine({
// Attribute the run to the head even if it failed client-side, so the
// next prompt's agent_end is not taken for this one.
const run = state.pending.shift();
+ if (run) release(run);
if (!run || run.done) return;
const messages = Array.isArray(event.messages) ? event.messages.filter((m) => m && m.role === "assistant") : [];
const message = messages.length > 0 ? messages[messages.length - 1] : run.last;
@@ -193,13 +238,14 @@ export function createEngine({
// this settle and still has no agent_end will never get one: fail it now
// instead of waiting for its timeout. Turns whose prompt response has
// not arrived yet belong to a later run and stay.
+ const dropped = [];
const keep = [];
- for (const t of state.pending) {
- if (t.done) continue;
- if (t.accepted) failTurn(t, "engine-settled-without-turn", "engine settled without answering this prompt");
- else keep.push(t);
- }
+ for (const t of state.pending) (t.done || t.accepted ? dropped : keep).push(t);
state.pending = keep;
+ for (const t of dropped) {
+ release(t);
+ failTurn(t, "engine-settled-without-turn", "engine settled without answering this prompt");
+ }
sendHeld();
}
}
@@ -214,21 +260,29 @@ export function createEngine({
// Never accepted: pi will not emit a turn_end for it, so remove it.
const i = state.pending.indexOf(turn);
if (i !== -1) state.pending.splice(i, 1);
+ release(turn);
failTurn(turn, (err.details && err.details.code) || "engine-refused", err.message);
sendHeld();
});
}
+ // Pi is busy from our side while any sent prompt is still queued, even one
+ // that already failed here: a turn that timed out before its agent_start
+ // was read leaves state.busy false while pi runs it, and sending then would
+ // be refused as streaming. It leaves the queue on its agent_end, on a
+ // settle, on a refused send, or at process exit.
+ const engineBusy = () => state.busy || state.pending.length > 0;
+
// After a settle (or a refused send) the oldest held prompt goes out.
function sendHeld() {
- if (state.exited !== null) return;
- if (state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done)) return;
+ if (state.exited !== null || state.wedged) return;
+ if (engineBusy()) return;
const next = state.held.shift();
if (next) send(next.turn, next.command);
}
function write(command) {
- if (!state.child || state.exited !== null) throw new DiscordError("engine is not running", 1, { code: "engine-down" });
+ if (!state.child || state.exited !== null || state.wedged) throw new DiscordError("engine is not running", 1, { code: "engine-down" });
state.child.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(command) + "\n");
}
@@ -245,6 +299,30 @@ export function createEngine({
});
}
+ function stopChild({ graceMs = 5000 } = {}) {
+ const child = state.child;
+ if (!child || state.exited !== null) return Promise.resolve(state.exited);
+ return new Promise((resolve) => {
+ const timer = setTimeoutImpl(() => {
+ try {
+ child.kill("SIGKILL");
+ } catch {
+ // already gone
+ }
+ }, graceMs);
+ child.once("exit", () => {
+ clearTimeoutImpl(timer);
+ resolve(state.exited);
+ });
+ try {
+ child.stdin.end();
+ child.kill("SIGTERM");
+ } catch {
+ // already gone
+ }
+ });
+ }
+
return {
start() {
if (state.child) throw new DiscordError("engine already started", 1);
@@ -281,7 +359,7 @@ export function createEngine({
// with DiscordError carrying details.code for the turn record.
prompt(text, { timeoutMs = 180000 } = {}) {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text.length === 0) throw new DiscordError("prompt text required", 1);
- const turn = { resolve: null, reject: null, timer: null, done: false, accepted: false, tools: new Map(), turns: 0, last: null };
+ const turn = { resolve: null, reject: null, timer: null, grace: null, done: false, accepted: false, tools: new Map(), turns: 0, last: null };
const done = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
turn.resolve = resolve;
turn.reject = reject;
@@ -306,44 +384,24 @@ export function createEngine({
}
failTurn(turn, "timeout", `turn timed out after ${timeoutMs} ms`);
}, timeoutMs);
- if (state.exited !== null) {
+ if (state.exited !== null || state.wedged) {
failTurn(turn, "engine-down", "engine is not running");
return done;
}
- if (state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done) || state.held.length > 0) state.held.push({ turn, command });
+ if (engineBusy() || state.held.length > 0) state.held.push({ turn, command });
else send(turn, command);
return done;
},
get busy() {
- return state.busy || state.pending.some((t) => !t.done) || state.held.length > 0;
+ return engineBusy() || state.held.length > 0;
},
get pendingCount() {
return state.pending.filter((t) => !t.done).length + state.held.length;
},
- stop({ graceMs = 5000 } = {}) {
- const child = state.child;
- if (!child || state.exited !== null) return Promise.resolve(state.exited);
- return new Promise((resolve) => {
- const timer = setTimeoutImpl(() => {
- try {
- child.kill("SIGKILL");
- } catch {
- // already gone
- }
- }, graceMs);
- child.once("exit", () => {
- clearTimeoutImpl(timer);
- resolve(state.exited);
- });
- try {
- child.stdin.end();
- child.kill("SIGTERM");
- } catch {
- // already gone
- }
- });
+ stop(options) {
+ return stopChild(options);
},
};
}
diff --git a/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs b/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
index 59674d1e..f3bd7525 100644
--- a/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/tests/engine.test.mjs
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { createEngine, buildPiArgs, PI_FIXED_ARGS, TOOLS_EXTENSION, READONLY_TOOLS_EXTENSION, assistantText } from "../src/engine-pi.mjs";
import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
+import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";
import { makeRoot } from "./helpers.mjs";
const fakePi = join(import.meta.dirname, "fake-pi.mjs");
@@ -28,7 +30,20 @@ function start(root, extra = {}) {
log: (m) => logs.push(m), ...extra,
});
engine.start();
- return { engine, logs, commands: () => readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l)) };
+ // The fake creates its log on the first command; until then there are none.
+ const commands = () => (existsSync(logPath) ? readFileSync(logPath, "utf8").trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l)) : []);
+ return { engine, logs, commands };
+}
+
+// Every test stops its engine in finally: a fake pi left running after a
+// failed assertion keeps the test file from exiting.
+async function withEngine(extra, body) {
+ const started = start(makeRoot(), extra);
+ try {
+ await body(started);
+ } finally {
+ await started.engine.stop();
+ }
}
test("engine: buildPiArgs carries the fixed flags, engine settings, session dir and prompt file", () => {
@@ -56,8 +71,7 @@ test("engine: with tools, buildPiArgs turns pi's own tools off, loads the extens
assert.equal(rw[rw.indexOf("--tools") + 1], "list_dir,read_file,search,write_file,edit_file", "a writable root adds exactly the two write tools");
});
-test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool call in the result", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool call in the result", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
const r = await engine.prompt("tools 3");
assert.equal(r.text, "read 3 file(s)");
assert.equal(r.turns, 2);
@@ -71,45 +85,38 @@ test("engine: a run with tool turns settles once, on the answer, with every tool
assert.equal(plain.turns, 1);
await idle(engine);
assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: a run that ends on a tool-only turn fails the prompt as empty; a retried run settles on the real end", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a run that ends on a tool-only turn fails the prompt as empty; a retried run settles on the real end", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
const r = await engine.prompt("toolonly");
assert.equal(r.text, "", "no text: the connector turns this into engine-empty");
assert.equal(r.tools.length, 1);
const again = await engine.prompt("retry");
assert.equal(again.text, "after retry");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: one prompt, one turn, text and usage come back", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
- try {
- const r = await engine.prompt("hello");
- assert.equal(r.text, "echo: hello");
- assert.deepEqual(r.usage, { input: 3, output: 2 });
- await idle(engine);
- assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- } finally {
- await engine.stop();
- }
-});
+test("engine: one prompt, one turn, text and usage come back", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
+ const r = await engine.prompt("hello");
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: hello");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.usage, { input: 3, output: 2 });
+ await idle(engine);
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
+}));
-test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as its own run, and answered in order", async () => {
- const { engine, commands } = start(makeRoot());
- const first = engine.prompt("slow 150");
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
+test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as its own run, and answered in order", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ const first = engine.prompt("slow 300");
assert.equal(engine.busy, true);
const second = engine.prompt("second");
assert.equal(engine.pendingCount, 2);
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
- assert.equal(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt").length, 1, "the second prompt is not sent while pi is busy");
+ const prompted = () => commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt");
+ assert.ok(await until(() => prompted().length > 0), "the first prompt reached pi");
+ assert.equal(prompted().length, 1, "the second prompt is not sent while pi is busy");
+ // The fake refuses a prompt without streamingBehavior while it runs one, so
+ // an answered second prompt also proves it was not sent early.
const [r1, r2] = await Promise.all([first, second]);
assert.equal(r1.text, "slow reply");
assert.equal(r2.text, "echo: second");
- const prompts = commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt");
+ const prompts = prompted();
assert.equal(prompts.length, 2);
// Never a pi follow-up: pi would fold it into the first run and close both
// answers with one agent_end (the live loss of 2026-09-17).
@@ -117,11 +124,9 @@ test("engine: a prompt while streaming is held until pi settles, then sent as it
assert.equal(prompts[1].streamingBehavior, undefined);
await idle(engine);
assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own and is never sent", async () => {
- const { engine, commands } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own and is never sent", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
const first = engine.prompt("slow 200");
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late one", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (e) => e.details.code === "timeout" && /waiting for the engine/.test(e.message));
@@ -130,50 +135,177 @@ test("engine: a held prompt that times out before pi settles fails on its own an
await idle(engine);
assert.deepEqual(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "prompt").map((c) => c.message), ["slow 200"]);
assert.deepEqual(commands().filter((c) => c.type === "abort"), [], "a held turn is not aborted; pi never had it");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
-test("engine: timeout sends abort and fails only that turn; the process stays", async () => {
- const { engine, commands, logs } = start(makeRoot());
+test("engine: timeout sends abort and fails only that turn; the process stays", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, commands, logs }) => {
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("slow 5000", { timeoutMs: 100 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
assert.ok(await until(() => commands().some((c) => c.type === "abort")), "abort reached pi");
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => /timed out/.test(l)));
const r = await engine.prompt("again");
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: again");
- await engine.stop();
+}));
+
+test("engine: tool events from a run that outlived its timeout never land in the next prompt's record", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late 200", { timeoutMs: 40 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const r = await engine.prompt("after late");
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after late");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.tools, [], "the dead run's read is not this prompt's evidence");
+ assert.equal(r.turns, 1, "the dead run's turns are not counted here");
+}));
+
+// The turn timer is fired by hand, before the engine has read any event from
+// pi, so the timed-out run is still pi's and state.busy is still false when
+// the next prompt arrives. Under load a real timer does the same.
+const TURN_MS = 60000;
+const manualTurnTimer = (fire) => ({
+ setTimeoutImpl: (fn, ms) => (ms === TURN_MS ? fire.push(fn) : setTimeout(fn, ms)),
+ clearTimeoutImpl: (id) => { if (typeof id !== "number") clearTimeout(id); },
});
-test("engine: tool events from a run that outlived its timeout never land in the next prompt's record", async () => {
- const { engine } = start(makeRoot());
- try {
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late 200", { timeoutMs: 40 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
- const r = await engine.prompt("after late");
+test("engine: a prompt after a turn that timed out before its agent_start waits for pi to settle instead of being refused", () => {
+ const fire = [];
+ return withEngine(manualTurnTimer(fire), async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ const late = engine.prompt("late 100", { timeoutMs: TURN_MS });
+ fire.shift()();
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, true, "pi is still running the prompt that timed out");
+ const next = engine.prompt("after late", { timeoutMs: 5000 });
+ assert.equal(engine.pendingCount, 1, "only the new prompt is live");
+ await assert.rejects(late, (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const r = await next;
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after late");
assert.deepEqual(r.tools, [], "the dead run's read is not this prompt's evidence");
- assert.equal(r.turns, 1, "the dead run's turns are not counted here");
- } finally {
- await engine.stop();
- }
+ assert.equal(r.turns, 1);
+ assert.deepEqual(commands().map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["late 100", "abort", "after late"]);
+ await idle(engine);
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, false);
+ });
+});
+
+// "mute" is accepted and never run, so no agent_start, agent_end or settle
+// ever comes for it. Unbounded, it would hold every later prompt.
+test("engine: when pi has not started a timed-out turn by the end of the abort grace, the engine stops pi and fails held prompts", async () => {
+ let exited = null;
+ await withEngine({ abortGraceMs: 150, onExit: (e) => (exited = e) }, async ({ engine, commands, logs }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("mute", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ assert.equal(engine.busy, true, "pi might still be running it");
+ const started = Date.now();
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("after mute", { timeoutMs: 5000 }), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-wedged");
+ assert.ok(Date.now() - started >= 100, "held for the grace, not failed at once");
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("later"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-down");
+ assert.ok(await until(() => exited !== null), "pi exits and onExit hears of it");
+ assert.ok(logs.some((l) => /stopping pi/.test(l)));
+ assert.deepEqual(commands().map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["mute", "abort"]);
+ });
+});
+
+// Rocko's 6b R1 case: pi is stuck before agent_start, then runs the old
+// prompt and only afterwards reads the next one. The events carry no prompt
+// id, so a prompt sent after the grace would get the old run's answer.
+test("engine: a timed-out turn pi starts only after the grace never answers a later prompt", async () => {
+ let exited = null;
+ await withEngine({ abortGraceMs: 150, onExit: (e) => (exited = e) }, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("stall 400", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("after stall", { timeoutMs: 5000 }), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-wedged");
+ assert.ok(await until(() => exited !== null), "pi exits and onExit hears of it");
+ await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 400));
+ assert.ok(!commands().some((c) => c.message === "after stall"), "nothing was sent after the grace");
+ });
});
-test("engine: a malformed JSONL line fails the turn, not the process", async () => {
- const { engine, logs } = start(makeRoot());
+// The same case in memory, after Rocko's reproducer: the old run's events
+// arrive after the grace while pi is still exiting. They land on the failed
+// turn, nothing more is written to pi, and only the exit ends the engine.
+// Pi's response to the old prompt comes either before its timeout or only
+// with the late events.
+for (const lateResponse of [false, true]) test(`engine: late events of a run past its grace, before pi exits, answer nothing and nothing more is sent (${lateResponse ? "late" : "early"} prompt response)`, async () => {
+ const timers = [];
+ const written = [];
+ const kills = [];
+ const child = new EventEmitter();
+ child.stdout = new PassThrough();
+ child.stderr = new PassThrough();
+ child.stdin = { write: (s) => { written.push(JSON.parse(s)); return true; }, end: () => {} };
+ child.kill = (signal) => { kills.push(signal); return true; };
+ let exited = null;
+ const engine = createEngine({
+ command: "memory-only", args: [], spawn: () => child, abortGraceMs: 150, onExit: (e) => (exited = e),
+ setTimeoutImpl: (fn, ms) => { const t = { fn, ms, active: true }; timers.push(t); return t; },
+ clearTimeoutImpl: (t) => { t.active = false; },
+ });
+ const emit = (x) => child.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(x) + "\n");
+ const fire = (ms) => { const t = timers.find((x) => x.ms === ms && x.active); assert.ok(t, `timer ${ms}`); t.active = false; t.fn(); };
+ const message = (text) => ({ role: "assistant", content: [{ type: "text", text }], stopReason: "stop" });
+ const tick = () => new Promise((res) => setImmediate(res));
+ // Checked after a tick instead of awaited, so a regression fails here
+ // rather than hanging on a promise nothing will settle.
+ const outcome = (p) => {
+ const o = { state: "pending", code: null, text: null };
+ p.then((v) => Object.assign(o, { state: "resolved", text: v.text }), (e) => Object.assign(o, { state: "rejected", code: e.details && e.details.code }));
+ return o;
+ };
+ engine.start();
+ const first = engine.prompt("old", { timeoutMs: 50 });
+ const accept = () => emit({ type: "response", id: written[0].id, command: "prompt", success: true });
+ if (!lateResponse) accept();
+ await tick();
+ fire(50);
+ await assert.rejects(first, (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const next = outcome(engine.prompt("new", { timeoutMs: 2000 }));
+ fire(150);
+ await tick();
+ assert.deepEqual(next, { state: "rejected", code: "engine-wedged", text: null });
+ assert.deepEqual(kills, ["SIGTERM"]);
+ if (lateResponse) accept();
+ emit({ type: "agent_start" });
+ emit({ type: "tool_execution_start", toolCallId: "old-call", toolName: "read_file", args: { root: "docs", path: "old.md" } });
+ emit({ type: "tool_execution_end", toolCallId: "old-call", toolName: "read_file", result: { details: { root: "docs", path: "old.md", ok: true } } });
+ emit({ type: "turn_end", message: message("OLD RUN ANSWER") });
+ emit({ type: "agent_end", messages: [message("OLD RUN ANSWER")] });
+ emit({ type: "agent_settled" });
+ await tick();
+ const after = outcome(engine.prompt("after settle", { timeoutMs: 2000 }));
+ await tick();
+ assert.deepEqual(after, { state: "rejected", code: "engine-down", text: null });
+ assert.deepEqual(next, { state: "rejected", code: "engine-wedged", text: null }, "the old answer did not reach the new prompt");
+ assert.deepEqual(written.map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["old", "abort"], "no prompt reached pi after the grace");
+ assert.equal(exited, null);
+ fire(5000);
+ assert.deepEqual(kills, ["SIGTERM", "SIGKILL"]);
+ child.emit("exit", null, "SIGKILL");
+ assert.deepEqual(exited, { code: null, signal: "SIGKILL" });
+});
+
+test("engine: a timed-out run pi did start outlives the grace; the next prompt goes out when it ends", async () => {
+ let exited = null;
+ await withEngine({ abortGraceMs: 150, onExit: (e) => (exited = e) }, async ({ engine, commands }) => {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("late 400", { timeoutMs: 50 }), (err) => err.details.code === "timeout");
+ const r = await engine.prompt("after late", { timeoutMs: 5000 });
+ assert.equal(r.text, "echo: after late");
+ assert.deepEqual(r.tools, []);
+ assert.equal(exited, null, "pi was not stopped");
+ assert.deepEqual(commands().map((c) => (c.type === "prompt" ? c.message : c.type)), ["late 400", "abort", "after late"]);
+ });
+});
+
+test("engine: a malformed JSONL line fails the turn, not the process", () => withEngine({}, async ({ engine, logs }) => {
await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("garbage"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-protocol");
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => /malformed/.test(l)));
const r = await engine.prompt("still here");
assert.equal(r.text, "echo: still here");
- await engine.stop();
-});
+}));
test("engine: a turn that ends in error rejects with the error code; process exit fails pending turns", async () => {
- const root = makeRoot();
let exited = null;
- const { engine } = start(root, { onExit: (e) => (exited = e) });
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("error"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-error" && /fake provider error/.test(err.message));
- const pending = engine.prompt("slow 5000");
- await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
- await engine.stop();
- await assert.rejects(pending, (err) => err.details.code === "engine-down");
- assert.ok(exited);
- await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("x"), /not running/);
+ const { engine } = start(makeRoot(), { onExit: (e) => (exited = e) });
+ try {
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("error"), (err) => err.details.code === "engine-error" && /fake provider error/.test(err.message));
+ const pending = engine.prompt("slow 5000");
+ await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
+ await engine.stop();
+ await assert.rejects(pending, (err) => err.details.code === "engine-down");
+ assert.ok(exited);
+ await assert.rejects(engine.prompt("x"), /not running/);
+ } finally {
+ await engine.stop();
+ }
});
diff --git a/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs b/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
index 94919306..bf94c013 100644
--- a/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
+++ b/packages/discord/tests/fake-pi.mjs
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@
// then a second turn that answers "read <n> file(s)"
// "toolonly" a run whose only turn calls a tool and never answers
// "retry" an agent_end with willRetry, then the real answer
+// "mute" accept the prompt and emit nothing, staying idle
// "late <ms>" ignore abort; after <ms> emit a tool pair and a tool turn,
// then answer "late reply", like a run that outlives its
// client-side timeout
+// "stall <ms>" accept the prompt, then read nothing for <ms> (pi stuck
+// before agent_start); then run it, answering "echo:
+// stalled", and only then read what came in meanwhile
// anything else answer "echo: <text>" immediately
// A prompt received while busy without streamingBehavior is refused, as pi
// does. A prompt with streamingBehavior followUp is folded into the running
@@ -30,6 +34,7 @@ function assistant(text, stopReason = "stop") {
}
function run(text) {
+ if (text === "mute") return;
busy = true;
out({ type: "agent_start" });
out({ type: "turn_start" });
@@ -109,11 +114,16 @@ function run(text) {
let current = null;
let buffer = "";
+let stalled = false;
process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
buffer += chunk;
+ drain();
+});
+
+function drain() {
let idx;
- while ((idx = buffer.indexOf("\n")) !== -1) {
+ while (!stalled && (idx = buffer.indexOf("\n")) !== -1) {
const line = buffer.slice(0, idx);
buffer = buffer.slice(idx + 1);
if (!line) continue;
@@ -125,7 +135,15 @@ process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
continue;
}
out({ id: cmd.id, type: "response", command: "prompt", success: true });
- if (busy) queue.push(cmd.message);
+ const sm = /^stall (\d+)$/.exec(cmd.message);
+ if (sm) {
+ stalled = true;
+ setTimeout(() => {
+ run("stalled");
+ stalled = false;
+ drain();
+ }, Number(sm[1]));
+ } else if (busy) queue.push(cmd.message);
else run(cmd.message);
} else if (cmd.type === "abort") {
out({ id: cmd.id, type: "response", command: "abort", success: true });
@@ -139,5 +157,5 @@ process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
out({ id: cmd.id, type: "response", command: cmd.type, success: true, data: {} });
}
}
-});
+}
process.stdin.on("end", () => process.exit(0));

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