row 210 (#1707): DESIGN.md r3, duckworth-0043 C1 (Q-J0 revoke line matches section 6), N1-N4, sage-1468 scope line (harness tool out, Q-S3) and 1.7 approval (Gizmoduck)

agents/README.md

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ not fleet seats. Keep changes in `/mnt/storage/src/mosaic-stack`; do not modify
 | Herb | Builder, a second gate lane (#1695) | T3 session (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol), started by Sage under mos-0977 | none, T3 only |
 | Bushroot | Builder, retire the control board writer on 7331 (#1696) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1008 | none, T3 only |
 | Megavolt | Builder, MVP T1 item 6 (agent credentials and git identity, #1697) | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5), started by Sage under mos-0974/0977 | none, T3 only |
+| Quackerjack | Builder, federation R5 and R2 (#414) | T3 session (Claude, claude-haiku-5-5), started by Sage under mos-1023 | none, T3 only |
+| Gizmoduck | Federation design (#414) and builder of FED R1 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 9312a896) | none, T3 only |
 | Webby | Reviewer: Case 2 designs, rows 192 and 194 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread 03086006), started by Mos (mos-0981) | none, T3 only |
 | Duckworth | Reviewer: federation designs, row 193 | T3 session (Claude, Opus 5.5, thread ffceafec), started by Mos (mos-0977) | none, T3 only |
 | Sage | Project lead: coordination, review, integration; earlier DYOR strategy records retained | T3 session (Claude Code); Pi launcher `zai/glm-5.3:high` retained | `agents/sage/launch.sh` |

agents/gizmoduck/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Gizmoduck
+
+Design and builder seat, Claude Opus 5.5, a T3 thread (9312a896). Author of the federation design
+(`agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` on `gizmoduck/federation-design`, #414). Builds FED R1, the
+access.json loader and validator, under Mos's order mos-1023 item 1.
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat works in its own worktree and has no credentials of its own; until
+the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own `gizmoduck/*` branches through the
+repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or another seat's branch.

agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-210/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+# Row 210 (#424, Gitea #1707): agent host access with sudo through the credential store
+
+Gizmoduck, 2026-10-20, r3. Design only, no code. Reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Due 2026-10-27 (Q184).
+
+- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` at 9db578ff5.
+- Base read: `origin/refactor` 9ba31b5b3. Row 199 read as DESIGN.md r6 (4d3007ec9) and its code and
+  BUILD.md at addee664a on `megavolt/row199`.
+- PRD: REQ-CRED-3 in Honker's 1.7 draft (`agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md:111-115`, 11cb0423b).
+  Jason approved PRD 1.7 (d52febb5 yes at 20:36:47Z, mos-1089), so REQ-CRED-3 is in.
+- Scope (sage-1468): this row ships the `host.run` broker op, the grant check, the executor and the receipts,
+  all testable over `broker.sock`. The `host_run` harness tool is out, as 199 left its publish tool out
+  (199 BUILD.md deviation 12). Sage files one follow-up row for the agent-facing harness tools, publish and
+  `host_run`, in `packages/harness`. Duckworth's r2 N5 (the tool help says a gated call leaves stdin under
+  4 KiB) belongs to that row.
+- Branch `gizmoduck/row210`. Row claimed in-progress (rev 2361) after Sage cleared the after (rev 2359). It
+  lands only after 199, rebased onto 199's landing (Q177).
+
+Rounds:
+- r3 (duckworth-0043, REVIEW-r2.md at 52b5fee63, approved with C1, and sage-1468, sage-1472): C1 Q-J0's revoke
+  line now matches section 6, the connection is cut and a started command may keep running. Q-S3 answered,
+  the harness tool is out (scope line above, D10). N1 the runner list takes Duckworth's whole list, and D6
+  says the per-call decision is the control. N2 numeric shorthand, unspecified and mapped addresses and
+  `*.localhost` refuse (D3, T1). N3 the pids file records each pid's start time (D7, T27). N4 the mutant
+  table is in order.
+- r2 (sage-1450): no `"any"` grant. The command boundary is an argv allowlist per host grant, and load refuses
+  a wildcard (D6, T26, M6, M28). PRD 1.7 is frozen, so `host.sudo` stays a hard wait and Jason decides each
+  call. Section 5 now holds the proposed 1.8 routing requirement. D5 is confirmed against 199's deviation 11.
+  The seat network gap is a known limit with what closes it (section 6). Cites now point at 199's code.
+- r2 (duckworth-0042, REVIEW-r1.md at 8140b7f39): B1 events name host, user and argv in clear (D5 step 6,
+  T22, M30). B2 a gated call's question shows stdin in full (D4, T9, M31). B3 the key and processes die with
+  the bus, and bus start sweeps leftovers (D7, T27, M32 to M34). B4 Q-J0 for Jason in section 10, worded to
+  stand alone (mos-1088). Notes taken: N1 (E12, runGit's kill shape), N2 (loopback refused, own-host limit),
+  N3 (process groups), N4 (stdin can make a prefix root), N5 (`-l` and a separate address), N6 (D8 framing),
+  N7 (section 7).
+
+## 1. What the code does today
+
+| # | Fact | Cite |
+|---|---|---|
+| E1 | The bus reads credentials for two kinds only, `gitea` and `vikunja` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:22`, `business/src/vocabulary.mjs:103` |
+| E2 | A credential value must match `^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$`, at least 16 and at most 16384 bytes. An OpenSSH private key fails it at the first `-----BEGIN` space | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:84-87` |
+| E3 | `assertClean` searches `JSON.stringify(result)` for each token. JSON escapes a newline, so a multi-line secret is never found: `JSON.stringify("a\nb").includes("a\nb")` is `false` (run on node here) | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:95-103` |
+| E4 | `use()` turns any exception in the operation into `service-failed`, then runs `assertClean` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:104-117` |
+| E5 | Host to bus-child IPC is serial, one request at a time, with a 10 s timeout. A slow reply breaks the channel | `cli/src/host.mjs:31`, `:270` |
+| E6 | The web verbs run in the bus child over `broker.sock`. `requestWeb` checks keys, runs `#secretCheck`, checks the grant `roles[s.role].web`, records `action.allowed` (requested), calls `onAdmit()` so the server raises the socket timeout, runs the service and records completion | `bus/src/broker.mjs:1492-1530`, `bus/src/server.mjs:87-95` |
+| E7 | `roles[role].web` comes from the resolved tool limit. A role entry in the bus holds `authority`, `web` and `credentials` | `bus/src/business.mjs:17-20` |
+| E8 | A business-file role entry takes `definition`, `holder`, `vars`, `tracker`, `credentials`. Anything else refuses at load | `business/src/business.mjs:89` |
+| E9 | The chief's `organization.set` takes only `ORGANIZATION_KEYS`. The human-only `instances.set` takes `INSTANCE_KEYS` and refuses any definition that declares a credential (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Holder, credentials and tracker stay hand edits | `bus/src/broker.mjs:145-147`, `:1248-1298`, `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:1-5`, `:22-31` |
+| E10 | An action outside ROUTED is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. No role file may grant one | `bus/src/broker.mjs:44-70`, `business/src/vocabulary.mjs:58-88`, PRD REQ-WAIT-2 and 3 |
+| E11 | The seat sandbox does not confine the network, abstract Unix sockets or the host UID | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:29-31` |
+| E12 | On refactor the bus child spawns nothing. With 199 it spawns git: `publishRemote` (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:245` at addee664a) runs `runGit`, a detached group leader that gets SIGTERM at the limit, then SIGKILL to the group after a grace period | `seat/src/checkout.mjs:95-138` at addee664a |
+| E13 | Role networks are `none`, `api-only`, `open`. The bundle carries the value, and the sandbox's own comment says the network is not confined (E11) | `business/src/vocabulary.mjs:101`, `harness/src/bundle.mjs:252` |
+
+Row 199 gives, in code at addee664a: `useFor` (`bus/src/credentials.mjs:228`), `issue` (`:156`), `revoke`
+(`:197`), `remove` (`:211`), the kind list (`:49`), the token pattern (`:19`, `:143`), the store dir's file
+regex `^(gitea|vikunja)(\.tmp)?$` (`:222`) and `withGitea` (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:233`). From its design: the store at `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>` (D1), the `{store: true}`
+reference (D2), the read path (D3, D3a), `useFor(session, kind, op)` with the call-site allowlist test (D5),
+the `publish` grant shape, a list on the role entry plus a hard-wait action whose decision binds the commit
+(D9), and the human-only lifecycle verbs with `changes.jsonl` receipts (section 6).
+
+## 2. Probe (throwaway keys, scratch sshd on 127.0.0.1:22410, OpenSSH 10.5p1)
+
+Run in `/mnt/storage/scratch/gizmo-210-probe` with keys made for the probe and deleted after. No real key or
+host was touched.
+
+| Probe | Result |
+|---|---|
+| `ssh-add -` with the private key on stdin, to an agent on a private socket | works, "Identity added: (stdin)" |
+| `IdentityAgent=<sock>` with `IdentitiesOnly=yes` and `IdentityFile=none` | refused, `Permission denied (publickey)`. With `IdentitiesOnly`, ssh offers only agent keys that match a configured identity |
+| same with `IdentityFile=<the public key file>` | works, rc 0 |
+| `-i /dev/fd/3` with the key on fd 3 | fails, "Identity file /dev/fd/3 not accessible". ssh closes inherited fds, so the fd route is out |
+| a known_hosts file pinning the wrong key under `HostKeyAlias` with `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes` | refused, "Host key verification failed", rc 255 |
+| `printf '%s|'` with `'a b'` and `'it'\''s'` single-quoted, plus an unquoted `$((1+1))` as a control | prints `a b|it's|2|`. The quoted elements arrive whole, and only the unquoted control expanded |
+| remote `exit 7` | ssh exits 7 |
+| killing the agent | its socket file is gone |
+
+## 3. Decisions
+
+### D1. The kind and its naming
+
+One key per (agent, host). The kind name is `host.<hostId>`, so the store file is
+`<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/host.<hostId>` (199 D1, unchanged). `hostId` matches
+`^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,31}$`.
+
+The closed kind set becomes `gitea`, `vikunja` and the family `host.<hostId>`. One exported helper,
+`credentialKind(name)` in `vocabulary.mjs`, answers whether a name is a kind, and each place that checks
+kinds calls it: `SERVICES` users (`role.mjs:105-118`), 199's `bus/src/credentials.mjs:49` and the store
+file regex at `:222`, the broker's service
+check, the CLI `issue` date flag and 199's remove regex. A build test greps for literal `'gitea', 'vikunja'`
+lists outside `vocabulary.mjs` and fails on a new one.
+
+Why per host and not per agent. A key that leaks, or a host that is retired, is revoked for that host alone.
+ops-01 installs one public key per host, and an `authorized_keys` line names one agent. The cost is more keys
+for Jason to issue, one per grant.
+
+A role definition declares the kind once as `{"service": "host"}` with no scopes. The business file binds the
+concrete hosts (D3). A definition can't name a host, because hosts belong to one stack instance.
+
+The date is `--rotate-by DATE`, as for gitea. An ssh key doesn't expire on its own, so `status()` reports
+`rotation-due` or `valid`, the gitea branch.
+
+### D2. The value check
+
+`checkValue(kind, text)` replaces the one regex at `credentials.mjs:84`. For `gitea` and `vikunja` it is
+today's check, unchanged. For `host.*` the value must be:
+
+- PEM framed by `-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----` and `-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----`, LF line ends,
+  at most 16384 bytes (the existing cap).
+- An `openssh-key-v1` blob with cipher `none`, kdf `none`, exactly one key, type `ssh-ed25519`. Parsed in
+  node with `Buffer`, no ssh-keygen call, so the check runs at bus start without a process.
+- The two check integers equal, and the public key in the private section equals the one in the header.
+
+Anything else refuses `credential-format`. An encrypted key refuses, because the bus has no way to ask for a
+passphrase and `BatchMode=yes` would fail at use time instead of at load. The parsed public key is kept with
+the entry so `status` and D7 can print its fingerprint without touching the private part.
+
+### D3. The grant
+
+Four layers. Each must hold, and the code checks all four on every call.
+
+1. **Role definition, reviewed commit.** `roles/<def>.json` lists `{"service": "host"}` in `credentials`. That
+   is the "reviewed role change" in the brief. Once a PRD version routes `host.sudo` (section 5), the same
+   reviewed commit puts `host.sudo` in that definition's `authority.withinRole`.
+2. **Host registry, business file, hand edit.** A new top-level key:
+   ```
+   "hosts": { "<hostId>": { "address": "10.1.1.53", "port": 22, "user": "localadmin",
+                            "hostKeys": ["ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."] } }
+   ```
+   `address` is an IPv4 or IPv6 literal or a DNS name matching `^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9.-]{0,251}[a-z0-9])?$`.
+   An address of this machine refuses at load (r2 N2, r3 N2). For an IP literal, which `net.isIP` decides,
+   that is `127.0.0.0/8`, `0.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, `::`, and an IPv4-mapped `::ffff:` form of either IPv4 range.
+   For a name, it is `localhost` and any name ending in `.localhost`. A name made only of digits and dots
+   refuses unless `net.isIP` reads it as IPv4, so the shorthand `127.1` and the integer `2130706433`, which
+   pass the DNS pattern and which the resolver reads as 127.0.0.1, refuse. A label starting `0x` refuses for
+   the same reason. `port` is 1 to 65535. `user` matches `^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}$`. `hostKeys` is a non-empty list of
+   `ssh-ed25519`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256` or `ssh-rsa` public key lines, type and base64 only, no comment.
+3. **Agent grant, business file, hand edit.** A new role-entry key beside 199's `publish`:
+   ```
+   "hosts": { "<hostId>": { "commands": [["systemctl", "status"], ["journalctl", "-u"]] } }
+   ```
+   Each `hostId` must be in the registry, and the role's definition must declare `host`. A role entry with
+   `hosts` whose definition lacks `host` refuses at load and names `roles.<agent>.hosts`. `commands` is the
+   command boundary (D6).
+4. **The key.** `credentials["host.<hostId>"] = {"store": true, "rotateBy": DATE}` with the file present
+   (199 D2, D3a). A grant without an issued key refuses `credential-unavailable` at call time, as 199 does.
+
+Who writes each layer is in section 4. Neither the chief nor any agent can reach layers 2 to 4: `hosts` is
+outside `ORGANIZATION_KEYS` and `INSTANCE_KEYS` (E9), `instances.set` already refuses a definition that
+declares credentials (E9), and 199's `issue` is human-only.
+
+### D4. The action and the decision binding
+
+`host.sudo` is a new action in ACTIONS and in neither ROUTED list. Until a PRD version routes it, it is a hard
+wait and classifies `gated` for every role (E10). Each call then needs a decision the human resolved. PRD 1.7
+is frozen (sage-1450, decision d52febb5 cites its sha256), so under 1.7 Jason decides every `host.run`.
+
+The decision binds one call, the way 199 D9 binds `pushCommit`. When the action is `host.sudo`, the
+`decision.raise` event body gets `hostRun = {host, argvSha256, stdinSha256}`, from the raise's own args. The
+question shown to the human ends with the host id, the user, the argv with each element JSON-quoted, and the
+stdin in full as one JSON string, so Jason sees all of what runs (B2). The broker appends that text itself, and
+the agent can't shape it. The whole question keeps the 4096-character cap (`broker.mjs:126`, `:1654`), so on a
+gated call stdin is as large as the cap allows and no larger. A raise that doesn't fit refuses
+`invalid-request`. `argv ["bash"]` can't be granted at all (D6), and `["tee", "/etc/x"]` with a stdin Jason
+can't see is ruled out by showing it. `#authorityFor` refuses `decision-mismatch` when the call's host, argv hash or stdin hash differs, as
+`holderRun` does at `broker.mjs:796`. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
+
+After routing, a definition that lists `host.sudo` within-role runs without a decision, and `decision` is
+optional for that class only. The grant layers in D3 still apply.
+
+### D5. The executor: a `broker.sock` verb in the bus child
+
+```
+host.run {"host", "argv": [..], "stdin"?, "timeout"?, "decision"?}
+  -> {"exit", "signal", "stdout", "stderr", "truncated": {"stdout", "stderr"}, "ms"} or a refusal
+```
+
+It runs in the bus child, shaped like `requestWeb` (E6), not as a host IPC op. A sudo command can take
+minutes and the host channel times out at 10 s and serves one request at a time (E5). The key is in the bus
+child's memory already (199 D3), so no ticket has to cross to the CLI host. Row 199's publish needs a ticket
+because git and the working repo live in the CLI host. ssh needs neither. 199's BUILD.md deviation 11
+(addee664a) keeps credential use in the bus child too: the push runs there under `withGitea`, and the host
+socket only checks and polls. Sage confirmed D5 matches that shape (sage-1450). `host.run` needs no host
+socket and no poll, because the agent calls `broker.sock` directly. The helper is `withHost(session, host,
+fn)`, beside `withGitea`, calling `useFor(session, "host." + host, fn)`.
+
+Order of checks. Each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()` and logs `action.refused`.
+
+1. `keys(args)`, then `#secretCheck(args)`, then identity from the cap.
+2. `host` is in the registry (`host-unknown`).
+3. `host` is in `roles[s.role].hosts` (`host-not-granted`). This is the REQ-CRED-3 check "a grant exists for
+   that agent and that host".
+4. `argv` shape (D6) and `commands` match (`command-not-granted`).
+5. `#checkAuthority(s, "host.sudo", {decision, target: host, context})` (D4).
+6. Record `action.allowed` phase `requested` with host, address, user and argv in clear (B1), and stdin as
+   size and sha256. Every arg already passed `#secretCheck` in step 1, as the web verbs log their url
+   (`broker.mjs:1521`). After routing, the event log is the record of what ran as root. Then `onAdmit()`, which
+   sets the socket timeout to the call's timeout plus 10 s, as the web branch does (`server.mjs:95`).
+7. `credentials.useFor(s, "host." + host, run)`, where `run` is D7.
+8. D8's leak check on the output, then `#secretCheck` on the result.
+9. Record phase `completed` with host, argv, exit, signal, ms, and size and sha256 of stdout and stderr. The
+   output itself never goes into an event. A failure records `host-failed` with the same fields.
+
+Only one `host.run` per (agent, host) runs at a time. A second refuses `host-busy`. That keeps a stuck call
+from piling up ssh processes and makes revoke (D9) simple.
+
+Spawns reuse `runGit`'s shape (E12): an argv array, never a shell, `detached: true` so each process leads its
+own group, SIGTERM to the group at the limit and SIGKILL after a grace period. If the helper can be shared, it
+is, rather than a second copy. `env` is `{PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin"}` only, plus `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` for `ssh-add`.
+Each spawn is wrapped in `setpriv --pdeathsig KILL --`, the prefix the seat sandbox already uses
+(`seat/src/sandbox.mjs:44`), so it dies when the bus child dies (B3).
+
+### D6. The command boundary
+
+`argv` is an array of 1 to 256 strings. Each is 1 to 4096 bytes of UTF-8 with no NUL, and the total is at most
+32768 bytes. `argv[0]` must not contain `/` unless it starts with `/`. `stdin` is optional, a string of at most
+65536 bytes, and goes through `#secretCheck` with the args.
+
+The remote command is built by the bus, never taken as a string:
+
+```
+sudo -n -- 'argv0' 'argv1' ...
+```
+
+Each element is POSIX single-quoted: wrap in `'`, and replace each `'` with `'\''`. The probe shows the
+remote shell gets each element back exactly (section 2). `sudo -n` fails instead of prompting, so a host
+without NOPASSWD returns sudo's error, not a hang. The host's login shell for `user` must be POSIX. That is a
+host precondition for ops-01, listed in section 7.
+
+`commands` in the grant is an argv allowlist and nothing else. It is a non-empty list of argv prefixes. An
+argv passes when its first N elements equal some prefix of length N, compared element by element as literal
+strings, with no globbing. `[["systemctl", "status"]]` admits `systemctl status nginx` and refuses
+`systemctl restart nginx`.
+
+There is no wildcard grant (sage-1450). Business-file load refuses, naming `roles.<agent>.hosts.<id>.commands`:
+
+- any value that isn't a list, including the strings `"any"` and `"*"`,
+- an empty list, an empty prefix, a non-string element, or a duplicate prefix,
+- an element containing `*`, `?` or `[`, so nobody writes a glob that the matcher would read literally,
+- a prefix whose first element, by basename, is a shell, a command runner or an interpreter. Shells: `sh`,
+  `bash`, `dash`, `zsh`, `ksh`, `fish`, `busybox`. Runners: `su`, `sudo`, `doas`, `pkexec`, `runuser`, `env`,
+  `xargs`, `nohup`, `setsid`, `timeout`, `nice`, `systemd-run`, `chroot`, `nsenter`, `unshare`, `setpriv`,
+  `capsh`, `flock`, `stdbuf`, `ionice`, `chrt`, `taskset`, `strace`, `script`, `watch`. Interpreters:
+  `python3`, `perl`, `ruby`, `node`, `awk` (Sage's ruling on duckworth-0043 N1). Each would turn the prefix
+  back into "any". T26 has one case per name.
+
+That list can't be complete, and it isn't the control. Under 1.7 the control is Jason's decision on each
+call, bound to host, argv and stdin (D4, Q-S1). The list only refuses the obvious cases at load, early. Many commands can still start a shell or an editor as root (`systemctl edit`,
+`find -exec`, interpreters). The allowlist limits mistakes and narrows what a grant means, but it is not a
+sandbox. Stdin goes to the command, so some prefixes are root on their own: `[["tee"]]` or `[["dd"]]` writes
+any file as root from stdin (N4). Section 6 says what remains.
+
+Output: stdout and stderr each capped at 1 MiB. Past the cap the bus keeps reading and drops the rest so the
+remote side doesn't block, and sets `truncated`. `timeout` defaults to 60 s, maximum 900 s. At the timeout
+the bus sends SIGTERM to the ssh process group, then SIGKILL after 5 s, and answers `signal`. ssh's own exit
+code 255 and a remote command exiting 255 can't be told apart. The result returns stderr so the agent can see
+which, and the doc says so.
+
+### D7. Handing the key to ssh
+
+Per call, inside `useFor`'s operation:
+
+1. `mkdtemp` a dir under `<configDir>/secrets/run/` with mode 0700. `<configDir>` is never bound into a sandbox
+   (199 D3). The socket path is checked against the 107-byte Unix socket limit before use, refusing
+   `host-failed` if over.
+2. Write two files in it, mode 0600: `known_hosts` with one line per pinned key, `mosaic-host-<hostId> <type>
+   <base64>`, and `id.pub` with the entry's public key (D2).
+3. Write `<dir>/pids` with the bus child's pid. Each line in it is a pid and that process's start time,
+   field 22 of `/proc/<pid>/stat`, so a reused pid never matches (duckworth-0043 N3). Start `ssh-agent -D -a <dir>/a.sock` as its own group leader,
+   append its pid, and wait for the socket. Run `ssh-add -t <timeout + 30> -` with `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` set and the
+   private key written to its stdin. The key never touches disk, argv or env. `-t` makes ssh-agent drop the key
+   at the call's timeout plus 30 s even if nothing else runs (B3). ssh is the second group leader, and its pid
+   is appended too. Timeout, revoke and the `finally` kill both groups, ssh-agent's and ssh's (N3).
+4. Run ssh with exactly these options and nothing from any config file:
+   ```
+   ssh -F /dev/null -T -p <port>
+     -o BatchMode=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o IdentityFile=<dir>/id.pub -o IdentityAgent=<dir>/a.sock
+     -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=<dir>/known_hosts -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null
+     -o HostKeyAlias=mosaic-host-<hostId> -o UpdateHostKeys=no -o CheckHostIP=no -o VerifyHostKeyDNS=no
+     -o ForwardAgent=no -o ForwardX11=no -o ClearAllForwardings=yes -o PermitLocalCommand=no
+     -o ProxyCommand=none -o ProxyJump=none -o ControlMaster=no -o ControlPath=none
+     -o ConnectTimeout=10 -o ServerAliveInterval=15 -o ServerAliveCountMax=3
+     -l <user> -- <address> <remote command from D6>
+   ```
+   The user goes in `-l` and the address is its own argument, so nothing depends on how ssh splits `@` or on
+   an IPv6 literal (N5). `-F /dev/null` stops `~/.ssh/config` from adding a ProxyCommand, a different key or forwarding. The pin is
+   `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes` against a file the bus wrote from the registry, so there is no trust on first
+   use: an unknown or changed host key refuses with rc 255 (probe, section 2) and the bus answers
+   `host-key-mismatch` when stderr has "Host key verification failed".
+5. In a `finally`: kill both groups, remove the dir. A test asserts the dir is gone after success, refusal,
+   timeout and an exception thrown inside the operation.
+6. If the bus child is killed, the `finally` never runs. `--pdeathsig` kills ssh-agent and ssh with it, and
+   `-t` drops the key anyway. At bus start, before `broker.sock` listens, the bus sweeps
+   `<configDir>/secrets/run/`. A recorded pid counts as alive only when it exists and its start time matches.
+   For each dir whose bus pid is no longer alive, it sends SIGKILL to each recorded pid that is alive and
+   whose `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` names that dir, then removes the dir. A dir whose bus pid is alive is left
+   alone. Any other entry there refuses start, as 199 refuses a stray file
+   in the store (`credentials.mjs:222`). Revoke after a restart has nothing in flight to reach.
+
+The 0600 temp key file route the brief allows is not used. The agent route keeps the private key off disk,
+and the fd route doesn't work (probe).
+
+### D8. The leak check
+
+This is defense in depth (N6). The remote never holds the private key and forwarding is off, so output can
+carry the key only if the agent already had it. `assertClean` misses a multi-line key (E3). A `host.*` entry
+in the shared token map makes its loop compare against a value that never matches, which is harmless. For a `host.*` entry, `useFor` checks the result with
+`assertCleanKey(result, entry)`, which searches the JSON text for:
+
+- each base64 body line of the PEM of 24 characters or more,
+- the whole body with line breaks removed,
+- the 32-byte ed25519 private seed as lowercase hex and as base64 at each of the three byte offsets.
+
+A match refuses `credential-leak`. The output is dropped, and the event records only sizes and hashes. The
+existing `assertClean` still runs for the token kinds. The same function runs on `stdin` before the call, so
+an agent can't round-trip a key it somehow has back through the host.
+
+### D9. Lifecycle
+
+199's verbs carry over with `KIND = host.<hostId>`. Two additions:
+
+- `issue AGENT host.<id>` checks D2, then prints the public key line and a suggested `authorized_keys` line
+  for ops-01: `from="<stack host address>",restrict <type> <base64> mosaic-<business>-<agent>-<id>`. It
+  prints only public material.
+- `revoke` also kills a `host.run` in flight for that agent and host (process group SIGKILL) before it drops
+  the key. The call answers `credential-unavailable`. Remote processes that the killed ssh started may keep
+  running (section 6).
+
+`status` shows each host entry with its fingerprint (SHA256 of the public key), the rotate date and state.
+The tester gets `status` and `revoke` only, as in 199.
+
+### D10. Where the files change
+
+| File | Change |
+|---|---|
+| `business/src/vocabulary.mjs` | `host.sudo` in ACTIONS, `credentialKind`, host id pattern |
+| `business/src/business.mjs` | top-level `hosts` registry, role-entry `hosts`, load checks from D3 |
+| `business/src/role.mjs` | `{"service": "host"}` in `checkCredentials` with no scopes |
+| `business/src/credentials.mjs` | `host.*` refs take `rotateBy` |
+| `bus/src/credentials.mjs` | kind check via `credentialKind`, `checkValue` (D2), `assertCleanKey` (D8), busy and kill map |
+| `bus/src/host-run.mjs` (new) | D6 argv and quoting, D7 ssh-agent and ssh spawn, cleanup |
+| `bus/src/broker.mjs` | `host.run` verb (D5), `host.sudo` in `#authorityFor` with `hostRun` (D4) |
+| `bus/src/server.mjs` | `host.run` branch beside the web branch with `onAdmit` |
+| `bus/src/business.mjs` | carry `hosts` onto the bus role entry |
+| `cli` | 199's `credentials issue` accepts `host.<id>`, prints D9's lines |
+
+No `packages/harness` file changes. The `host_run` tool is Sage's follow-up row (sage-1468).
+
+Row 199's own kind and regex are not changed inside row 199. This row rebases onto 199's landing and changes
+them here.
+
+## 4. Who grants (brief item, "yours to propose with reasons")
+
+Proposal: **Jason, at every layer that widens access. No agent, chief included, and not the tester.**
+
+| Layer | Who | How | Why |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Definition declares `host` (and later lists `host.sudo`) | Jason | reviewed commit to `roles/*.json`, as for any role authority (AGENTS.md invariant 7) | It decides which kinds of agent may ever hold a host key. Review puts a second seat on it |
+| Host registry and pins | Jason, with ops-01's key fingerprints | hand edit of the business file | The pin is the host identity. A wrong pin is a man-in-the-middle on root. It must come from the host side, not from a first connection |
+| Agent grant `roles.<agent>.hosts` | Jason | hand edit of the business file | Q183: "not all agents will need to have that access". The per-agent, per-host choice is his |
+| Key `issue` | Jason | 199's human-only `issue` | The key passes through the caller. The tester is an agent (199 section 6, duckworth N1) |
+| `authorized_keys` on the host | ops-01 | host side, from the line `issue` prints | ops-01 owns the hosts (brief) |
+| Revoke | Jason, Mos, or the tester | `revoke` | Taking access away should be quick and needs no new trust |
+
+Why not a reviewed commit for the agent grant too. The business file lives in `<configDir>`, outside the
+repository (AGENTS.md invariant 2), and per-instance grants already stay hand edits there (E9, 199 D9 step 2).
+Moving grants into the repo would put host addresses and the per-instance roster under review, which is a
+bigger change than this row. The definition layer is the reviewed one.
+
+Why not the chief. A chief with this power could hire an agent and grant it root. 199 already keeps hires
+uncredentialed (199 D13). `instances.set` refuses credentialed definitions today (E9), and this row keeps it
+that way.
+
+REQ-CRED-3 says the who-grants answer is set by this design and approved by Jason. The table above is that
+answer.
+
+## 5. The routing gap and a proposed 1.8 requirement
+
+PRD 1.7 routes `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote`, not `host.sudo`, and 1.7 is frozen (sage-1450).
+This row builds for 1.7 as it stands. `host.sudo` is a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, and Jason decides each
+`host.run`, bound to host, argv and stdin (D4). That is safe, and slower than Q183's "allow agents to perform
+their jobs". The routing goes in 1.8. Sage takes the line below to Mos for Jason. I don't edit the PRD.
+
+Proposed for PRD 1.8, beside REQ-CRED-3:
+
+> **REQ-CRED-4.** The action `host.sudo` is routed. A role whose definition lists it within-role may run a
+> command with sudo on a host without a decision for each call, but only when all of these hold: the
+> definition declares the host credential kind, the business file grants that agent that host, the command
+> matches the grant's argv allowlist, and the agent's key for that host is issued. A grant names exact
+> argv prefixes. A wildcard grant is refused. A role without `host.sudo` within-role still needs a decision
+> for each call. Jason adds `host.sudo` to a definition only through a reviewed role change.
+
+Routing is then one reviewed commit: `host.sudo` into both ROUTED lists and into the chosen definitions'
+`withinRole`, as 199 does for `git.push.remote`.
+
+The brief also says this row lands only after the PRD version holding REQ-CRED-3 is approved. Jason approved
+1.7 (d52febb5 yes at 20:36:47Z, mos-1089), so that holds. 1.7 doesn't route `host.sudo`, so Q-S1 stands.
+
+## 6. Limits, said plainly
+
+- **Known limit: the seat network isn't confined, so root can outlive the grant.** `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:29-31`
+  says the sandbox doesn't confine the network (E11). An agent whose allowlist admits any command that can
+  write a file as root, or start a shell, can add its own key to `authorized_keys` on the host. It can then
+  ssh straight from its sandbox, around the bus, the events and revoke. An `authorized_keys` `from=` option
+  doesn't help, because the sandbox shares the stack host's address. The allowlist (D6) narrows this but
+  doesn't close it.
+  What closes it: a seat sandbox with its own network namespace (`bwrap --unshare-net`), where the only way
+  out is the bus sockets and the model proxy, so role network `none` and `api-only` are enforced and not just
+  carried in the bundle (E13). With that in place, a planted key is useless from the sandbox. Until then,
+  ops-01's host-side audit (sudo log, `authorized_keys` changes) is the check after the fact. Sage is
+  reporting the gap to Mos as its own follow-up (sage-1450). It is not this row.
+- **The stack's own machine.** A registry entry for the machine the stack runs on, or any machine holding the
+  stack's `<configDir>`, gives an agent with a root-writing command every agent's keys and tokens, not only
+  root there (N2). Load refuses loopback addresses, but it can't know every address of the stack's machine.
+  Jason doesn't register it.
+- **Revoke stops the stack's path, not remote processes.** Killing ssh may leave a remote process running.
+  `-T` gives no tty, so there is no SIGHUP from a closing terminal.
+- **Same OS user.** Anything running as the stack's OS user outside a sandbox can read the key file, as 199 D6
+  says for every kind.
+- **Exit 255** is ssh's failure code and also a remote exit code (D6).
+- **The pin trusts the registry.** Whoever writes the business file controls which host key is trusted. That
+  is Jason (section 4).
+
+## 7. Host preconditions (ops-01, not this row)
+
+- `user` has NOPASSWD sudo and a POSIX login shell. `sudo` has no `requiretty` for that user.
+- The agent's key is in `authorized_keys` with `from="<stack host>",restrict`.
+- The host's public keys are handed to Jason for the registry.
+- Duckworth's #423 r5 condition (duckworth-0035) applies. If ops-01 changes #423 step 1 to fit this design,
+  for example per-agent `from=...,restrict` lines for localadmin, that change goes to Duckworth as a diff
+  before it runs. That is the live part, not this row (N7).
+
+## 8. Tests
+
+All tests use a scratch sshd on 127.0.0.1 started by the test, with keys made by the test, and a fake `sudo`
+on the test user's PATH that prints its argv as JSON and runs nothing as root. The sshd config sets
+`AuthorizedKeysFile` and `HostKey` in the test's `mkdtemp` dir. A helper skips the ssh tests with a visible
+reason only when `/usr/bin/sshd` is missing, and the gate fails if any of them skipped. No test reaches
+another host.
+
+| # | Test | Refusal or result |
+|---|---|---|
+| T1 | business load: `hosts` registry field checks, bad address, each own-machine form from D3 (`127.0.0.2`, `0.0.0.0`, `::1`, `::`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`, `::ffff:0.0.0.0`, `localhost`, `a.localhost`, `127.1`, `2130706433`, `0x7f.1`), with `10.1.1.53` and `host.example` as controls, port, user, empty `hostKeys`, a key line with a comment | load refuses, names the key path |
+| T2 | role entry `hosts` naming an unknown host, or on a definition without `host` | load refuses `roles.<agent>.hosts` |
+| T3 | `organization.set` and `instances.set` with `hosts` in args | `invalid-request`, and the file is unchanged |
+| T4 | value check: a valid unencrypted ed25519 key loads. An encrypted key, an RSA key, two keys, CRLF, a gitea token in a `host.*` slot, and a PEM in a `gitea` slot each refuse | `credential-format` |
+| T5 | `host.run` with an unknown host | `host-unknown` |
+| T6 | `host.run` on a host not in the caller's grant, including a host granted to another agent | `host-not-granted` |
+| T7 | argv shape: empty, a NUL, too long, too many, a relative path with `/`, non-string | `invalid-request` |
+| T8 | allowlist: a matching argv runs, a longer argv runs, a shorter one and a differing element refuse | `command-not-granted` |
+| T9 | before routing: no decision refuses, a decision for another argv, another host or another stdin refuses, a spent one refuses. The stored question carries host, user, argv and the full stdin, and a raise whose question would pass 4096 characters refuses | `gated`, `decision-mismatch`, `decision-consumed`, `invalid-request` |
+| T10 | quoting: argv with spaces, quotes, `$()`, backticks, `;`, newline and glob characters reaches fake sudo unchanged | fake sudo's JSON equals argv |
+| T11 | the remote command starts `sudo -n --` | fake sudo sees `-n` and `--` first |
+| T12 | exit code and signal pass through, timeout kills the process group and answers `signal` | result fields |
+| T13 | output cap: 2 MiB of stdout returns 1 MiB and `truncated.stdout: true`, and the call doesn't hang | result fields |
+| T14 | host key pin: the sshd presents a key not in `hostKeys` | `host-key-mismatch`, and no command ran (fake sudo's marker file absent) |
+| T15 | a registry with the right key passes on a fresh dir with no `~/.ssh/known_hosts` in HOME. A HOME with a `~/.ssh/config` setting a ProxyCommand doesn't change the call | runs, and the proxy marker is absent |
+| T16 | leak: the fake sudo prints the private key file (multi-line), and in a second case prints only one body line, and in a third the seed in hex | `credential-leak`, the event has no output |
+| T17 | `stdin` containing a body line of the key | `credential-leak` before any spawn |
+| T18 | cleanup: after success, refusal, timeout and a thrown error, the run dir is gone and no `ssh-agent` or `ssh` with that dir in argv survives | dir absent, pgrep empty |
+| T19 | the private key never appears in the argv or env of any spawned process (read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and `environ` while the fake sudo sleeps) | absent |
+| T20 | second concurrent call for the same agent and host | `host-busy` |
+| T21 | revoke during a sleeping call kills it, and the next call refuses | `credential-unavailable` |
+| T22 | events: `action.allowed` requested and completed carry host, address, user and argv in clear, and sizes and hashes of stdin, stdout and stderr. Never the output, the stdin or the key | event bodies |
+| T23 | `issue` of a `host.*` kind prints the public line and the `authorized_keys` suggestion and never the private key | stdout and stderr checked |
+| T24 | build grep: no literal `'gitea', 'vikunja'` kind list outside `vocabulary.mjs`, and 199's `credentials.use(` allowlist unchanged | grep |
+| T25 | no role file in `roles/` lists `host.sudo` while it is a hard wait (REQ-WAIT-2) | grep |
+| T27 | SIGKILL the bus child while fake sudo sleeps: the ssh and ssh-agent pids are gone within 2 s. A call with `timeout` 1 leaves an agent whose key is gone after 31 s (`ssh-add -l` on its socket, agent kept alive by the test). The next bus start removes the run dir, kills a planted live process whose cmdline names it, leaves a dir whose bus pid is alive, and leaves a live process whose pid matches but whose start time doesn't | pids, `ssh-add -l`, dir state |
+| T26 | load refuses `commands` as `"any"`, `"*"`, `{}`, `[]`, `[[]]`, a non-string element, a duplicate prefix, an element with `*`, `?` or `[`, and a prefix starting with each listed shell or runner, `/bin/bash` included | load refuses, names `roles.<agent>.hosts.<id>.commands` |
+
+## 9. Mutants
+
+One per refusal, plus the two the brief names. Each must be killed.
+
+| # | Mutant | Killed by |
+|---|---|---|
+| M1 | registry check skipped | T5 |
+| M2 | agent grant check skipped | T6 |
+| M3 | grant check reads any agent's `hosts` | T6 |
+| M4 | each argv shape check removed, one mutant each (5) | T7 |
+| M5 | prefix match compares only `argv[0]` | T8 |
+| M6 | load accepts a string `commands` (wildcard grant) | T26 |
+| M7 | `#checkAuthority` call removed | T9 |
+| M8 | `hostRun` argv hash not compared | T9 |
+| M9 | `hostRun` stdin hash not compared | T9 |
+| M10 | quoting drops the `'\''` replacement | T10 |
+| M11 | `sudo -n` loses `-n` | T11 |
+| M12 | **host key pin skipped**: `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` | T14 |
+| M13 | **pin skipped another way**: `UserKnownHostsFile` set to the user's default | T14, T15 |
+| M14 | `-F /dev/null` removed | T15 |
+| M15 | **key leaks into output**: `assertCleanKey` not called | T16 |
+| M16 | leak check uses only the joined body | T16 (one-line case) |
+| M17 | stdin leak check removed | T17 |
+| M18 | `finally` cleanup removed | T18 |
+| M19 | key passed with `-i` from a temp file left on disk | T18, T19 |
+| M20 | output cap removed | T13 |
+| M21 | timeout kill removed | T12 |
+| M22 | busy check removed | T20 |
+| M23 | revoke doesn't kill the in-flight call | T21 |
+| M24 | event records stdout | T22 |
+| M25 | each value check removed, one mutant each (encrypted, type, count, CRLF) | T4 |
+| M26 | `organization.set` accepts `hosts` | T3 |
+| M27 | load check for a definition without `host` removed | T2 |
+| M28 | shell and runner check removed, and a second mutant compares `argv[0]` without taking the basename | T26 |
+| M29 | glob character check removed | T26 |
+| M30 | `requested` event drops argv | T22 |
+| M31 | the question omits stdin | T9 |
+| M32 | `--pdeathsig` dropped from the spawns | T27 |
+| M33 | `ssh-add` without `-t` | T27 |
+| M34 | start sweep removed, a second mutant sweeps without checking the bus pid, and a third ignores the start time | T27 |
+| M35 | loopback check removed | T1 |
+
+The mutant script follows row 201's shape: copy the packages to scratch, anchor each mutant once, run each
+test file in its own process group with a timeout, control first, exit 1 on any survivor. It runs on Sage's
+slot.
+
+## 10. Questions
+
+- Q-S1, answered (sage-1450): 1.7 is frozen. Hard wait under 1.7, and section 5 holds the 1.8 proposal.
+- Q-S1 still holds after 1.7's approval, which doesn't route `host.sudo` (sage-1468).
+- Q-S2, answered (sage-1450): 199's deviation 11 keeps credential use in the bus child, so D5 stays.
+- **Q-J0 (Jason, through Mos, before landing, B4, mos-1088).** Word for word:
+
+  > Q-J0 (#424). Who may give an agent sudo on another machine?
+  > Proposal: only you. No agent can, and that includes the chief of staff and the tester.
+  > You make a grant in four steps, all yours. A reviewed change to the agent's role allows machine keys at all.
+  > You list the machine and its fingerprint. You give that agent that machine with an exact list of allowed
+  > commands. You issue the key, and ops-01 installs it. Until a later PRD says otherwise, you also approve
+  > each command before it runs. You, Mos or the tester can revoke at once. The stack drops the key and cuts
+  > its connection. A command already started on the machine may keep running. A grant of "any" command is
+  > root on that machine, so the design refuses it. Some listed commands, such as a file writer, still reach
+  > root, so grant a machine only to an agent you'd trust as root there.
+  > Do you approve: only you grant machine access, as above? Yes or no. I recommend yes.
+
+  Mos records the answer in DECISIONS.md in jason-master-restart.
+- **Q-J1 (Jason, through Mos, at the live window):** the first grants, each an argv allowlist per agent and
+  host. Not needed for the build.
+- Q-S3, answered (sage-1468): the `host_run` harness tool is out of this row. Sage files a follow-up row for
+  publish and `host_run` in `packages/harness` (scope line at the top).

agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
+# host access through the credential store
+
+Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
+It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
+decision and sends Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 53bb59462.
+
+## What it changes
+
+Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `git.push.remote`. Under
+REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
+remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
+and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
+only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
+agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
+(Vikunja #420).
+
+When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
+
+1. adds `role.hire`, `role.fire` and `git.push.remote` to `ROUTED` in
+   `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs` and in `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`.
+2. adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole, and `git.push.remote` to
+   `roles/coder.json` withinRole. No other role file gets `git.push.remote`.
+3. switches the broker's check on `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` from a cited decision to the
+   `reason` form, as `role.end` works for REQ-ROLE-2, and makes `publish`'s `decision` optional for a
+   within-role class (row 199 D9 step 1).
+4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
+   commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
+   the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
+5. adds the host credential grant check and the host access it allows (REQ-CRED-3, Vikunja #424).
+
+Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
+file commit in `roles/`.
+
+## Text for the PRD
+
+Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
+
+> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
+> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
+> <prd.approve decision id>.
+
+Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
+
+> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
+>   needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
+>   still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
+>   agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
+>   as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
+>   keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
+>   me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
+>   Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
+>   happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
+
+Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-COS-3.** The chief of staff hires and fires role instances without a decision each time. Hiring
+>   adds a role instance to the organization file and lists it for launch. Firing ends the instance's
+>   runs and removes it from the launch list. It stays in the organization file. Only the user deletes
+>   an instance. These actions are `role.hire` and `role.fire`. They leave the hard waits and route
+>   under this requirement, within these bounds:
+>   - The chief acts only in its own organization.
+>   - The chief hires only role definitions that need no credentials, until a later version adds
+>     credentialed roles.
+>   - The chief hires only the role kinds its role file lists. Changing that list is a reviewed commit.
+>   - The chief hires only a role whose every action is on a fixed list of plain work actions: sending
+>     messages, writing records, asking for review, updating its assigned tasks, and the scope and
+>     working-push actions of an assigned task. A role holding any other action, such as launch, end,
+>     organization, naming, hire, review verdict or merge authority, or any action added later, is never
+>     hired. So the chief never hires a chief, never picks its own reviewers or merge gate, and the author
+>     is never the reviewer. This holds whatever the role file's list says. Adding to that list is a PRD
+>     change.
+>   - The chief may set a hired instance's model and narrow its limits, and nothing else about it.
+>   - The user can forbid per agent. The user marks an instance so the chief can't fire it, end its runs
+>     or change its model, and marks role kinds the chief can't hire. Only the user changes these marks, through the
+>     WebUI or the CLI.
+>   - The kill switch stops every hire and fire while it is on.
+>   - Every hire and fire is logged with the chief's instance, its run and the reason.
+
+Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-LAND-2.** A coder pushes its own work to its own fork. The action is `git.push.remote`.
+>   - What it pushes: one commit, by its oid, never a ref name. That commit is the latest work commit the
+>     bus recorded for the coder's task, and the coder made that push. A decision that authorizes a push
+>     names that commit, and it doesn't authorize any other.
+>   - Where it lands: only the branch `refs/heads/<its Gitea user>/<branch>`. The host builds that
+>     name, the agent never does. A push never forces.
+>   - Which remote: the agent's own fork of the project's upstream. The business file names the upstream,
+>     and the host never contacts it. For each push the host builds the fork's address over https from
+>     the upstream's host, port and repository name and the agent's own Gitea user. The history check,
+>     the push and the credential match all use that address. So the agent's own user owns the receiving
+>     repository on every push, and the agent never names it.
+>   - The host refuses an upstream on a host or port other than the agent's Gitea, and an upstream the
+>     agent's own user owns. It refuses a fork that is missing, empty or doesn't share the project's
+>     history. Gitea's push-to-create stays off, so a push never creates a repository.
+>   - Who may: the action routes under REQ-DEC-2 and is granted within-role to the coder role only. No
+>     other role file grants it.
+>   - Before version 1.7 the action was a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3, so each push needed a decision
+>     the human resolved, and that decision named the commit.
+>
+>   Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
+
+Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
+
+> Added in version 1.7:
+>
+> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
+>   for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host
+>   before the credential is used. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value (REQ-CRED-1,
+>   REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a grant. Who
+>   grants a host credential, and how, is set by the #424 design, which Jason approves.
+
+REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
+
+> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
+> `git.push.remote` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-LAND-2 since version 1.7.
+
+## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
+
+- REQ-COS-1 (1.2) already says the chief "hires and terminates role instances". REQ-COS-3 gives that
+  sentence its actions and bounds. It doesn't widen REQ-COS-1.
+- The forbid now names what r3 called "replace": ending a kept instance's run with a reason and changing
+  its model (webby-0010 N2). A user-resolved decision still ends a kept run (row 194 D2.4).
+- The fixed list is `HIRE_ALLOWED` in row 194 D2.3, an allowlist since r4 (webby-0010 B1). r3's text
+  named the refused authorities instead, which let merge-gate and any later action through.
+- The kill switch is row 191's. If row 191 hasn't landed when this version is approved, the bound still
+  holds through row 194's chain on its candidate.
+- REQ-LAND-2 follows row 199's design r6 (4d3007ec9 on megavolt/row199, approved by Duckworth in
+  duckworth-0027: D9 to D11, D9a, D9c, Q-M1 and Q-M2, and the oid binding from mos-1034 item 5) and
+  Megavolt's wording in megavolt-0005, megavolt-0008 and megavolt-0014, through Sage (sage-1377,
+  sage-1380, sage-1387). The fork bullet answers duckworth B5 and B6 and webby-0011 N1. Commit-email
+  checks, the refusal codes and the URL parse rules (D9c) are host checks with tests in row 199, not
+  bounds, so they stay out of the text (megavolt-0008).
+- Once the routing lands and the decision is optional for the within-role class, the commit is the task's
+  latest recorded push at check time. It is still checked against the work ref tip and pushed by oid, so
+  the binding holds without a decision (megavolt-0008). Step 4 of "When this version lands" puts that in
+  the routing commit (duckworth-0022 N9, sage-1387).
+- REQ-LAND-2 and REQ-COS-3 meet at the coder. Coder declares Gitea credentials, so REQ-COS-3's
+  credentials bound keeps the chief from hiring one until a later version lifts it. `git.push.remote` isn't
+  on REQ-COS-3's fixed list either, so a coder holding it stays unhireable until a PRD version adds it
+  (row 194 D2.3).
+- Adding to the fixed action list is a PRD change (mos-1035 item 3, sage-1395). The role file's
+  `hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
+- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
+  version lifts it.
+- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). It names the outcome and the
+  check, not how the stack reaches the host. Proxying the ssh and a signing socket are both designs, and
+  the #424 design picks one (duckworth-0038 B1).
+- Open point: Q183 doesn't say who grants host access or how, so the text leaves it open and defines no
+  mechanism. The #424 design settles it, Jason approves that design, and Duckworth reviews it because it
+  gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading, duckworth-0038 B2). The build is row 210 (#1707,
+  owner Gizmoduck), a new row on top of row 199 (megavolt-0019, sage-1430).
+- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
+  paragraph never edited in place except to append.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/BUILD.md

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
-
-Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
-4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
-by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
-
-Status: in progress. The full gate has not run; it is Sage's. Only single test files have run on
-this branch, apart from one slip noted under "Runs".
-
-## Commits so far
-
-- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
-  credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
-- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
-  the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
-  git.push.remote among the hard waits.
-- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
-- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
-- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
-  D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
-  call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
-- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
-  in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
-  `detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
-- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
-
-## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
-
-1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
-   carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
-   without identity commits as E7 (T6).
-2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
-   For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
-   the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
-   nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
-3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
-   caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
-   leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
-   issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
-4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
-   `forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
-   files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
-   messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
-5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
-   checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
-   `broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
-   or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
-   also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
-   only".
-6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
-   `roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
-   fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
-   should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
-
-7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
-   `reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
-8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
-   bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
-   status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
-9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
-   agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
-   agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
-   `create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
-10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
-    the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
-    and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
-    Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
-    holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
-11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
-    the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
-    `packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
-    limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
-    host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
-    `working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
-    `withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
-    until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
-    (`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
-    when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
-    refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
-    by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
-    On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
-    goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
-    (sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
-    at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
-    publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
-    the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
-    `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
-    end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
-    publish-timeout outcome).
-12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
-    clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
-    manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
-13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
-    launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
-    `recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
-    clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
-    it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
-    equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
-14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
-    T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
-    `working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
-    (`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
-    (`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
-    oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
-    DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
-    asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
-    refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
-    refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
-
-15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
-    (`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
-    gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
-    case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
-    `cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
-    fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
-
-## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
-
-Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
-`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
-no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
-git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
-that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
-
-## R1, the backup set
-
-Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
-`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
-`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
-`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
-through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
-one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
-`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
-never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
-copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
-
-## T1 limit
-
-A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
-dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
-
-## Runs
-
-Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
-hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
-credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
-usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
-business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
-tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
-plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
-tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
-file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
-
-Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
-checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
-credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
-publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
-Hash pins: none on a changed file.
-
-Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
-which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
-minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.

agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
-# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
-
-Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
-Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
-No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
-
-r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
-and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
-
-r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
-drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
-
-r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
-and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
-
-r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
-remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
-agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
-repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
-found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
-step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
-`publish` require it (D8).
-
-r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
-has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
-and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
-N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
-
-## 0. Terms
-
-- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
-  `~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
-  instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
-- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
-  design says agent.
-- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
-- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
-
-## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
-
-| Code | Fact | Where |
-|---|---|---|
-| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
-| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
-| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
-| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
-| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
-| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
-| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
-| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
-| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
-| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
-
-So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
-the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
-share.
-
-## 2. The store (brief item 1)
-
-D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
-
-```
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/                       0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/    0700
-<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>   0600, the token only, one line
-```
-
-This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
-format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
-secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
-
-D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
-means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
-so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
-migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
-own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
-
-D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
-(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
-into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
-
-D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
-`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
-create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
-owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
-`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
-
-## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
-
-Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
-
-D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
-Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
-to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
-does for files today, extended to the dirs).
-
-D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
-verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
-frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
-there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
-host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
-`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
-`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
-`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
-`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
-
-D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
-is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
-per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
-
-## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
-
-| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
-|---|---|---|
-| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
-| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
-| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
-
-D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
-provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
-short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
-credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
-instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
-Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
-doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
-
-## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
-
-D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
-optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
-step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
-grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
-"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
-fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
-it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
-commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
-
-D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
-
-```
-publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-  -> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
-```
-
-The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
-
-1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
-   task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
-   ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
-   `broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
-   needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
-
-   **The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
-   (`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
-   `holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
-   `decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
-   raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
-   refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
-   refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
-   is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
-   refuses.
-   No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
-   reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
-   without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
-2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
-   project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
-   (`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
-   `identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
-   fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
-   the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
-   5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
-   repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
-   agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
-   push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
-   equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
-   beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
-   (`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
-3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
-   the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
-   `work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
-   if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
-   caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
-   `validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
-4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
-   (`identity-mismatch`).
-5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
-   with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
-   `checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
-   (`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
-   `protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
-   or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
-   inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
-   PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
-   defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
-   `["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
-   is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
-   `store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
-   `credential-leak`.
-6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
-
-D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
-repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
-receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
-upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
-`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
-catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
-upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
-built on them.
-Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
-`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
-ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
-network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
-parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
-network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
-until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
-
-D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
-and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
-
-- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
-- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
-  `gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
-  percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
-  each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
-  form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
-  the owner that is used.
-- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
-  REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
-- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
-  `..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
-- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
-- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
-  sides.
-- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
-  upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
-  would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
-
-D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
-(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
-`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
-
-- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
-  email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
-  same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
-- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
-  step 5. The token never leaves that call.
-- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
-
-The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
-
-D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
-branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
-
-- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
-  named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
-  Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
-  or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
-  upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
-- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
-  branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
-  A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
-  depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
-
-Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
-`all`, no admin).
-
-D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
-socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
-`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
-root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
-
-## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
-
-All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
-human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
-`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
-(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
-writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
-kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
-
-| Verb | What it does |
-|---|---|
-| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
-| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
-| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
-| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
-| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
-
-D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
-`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
-token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
-confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
-end. Row 194's fire ends them.
-
-D13. **What row 194 calls.**
-
-- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
-- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
-  is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
-  `issue`.
-- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
-  the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
-  with its credentials still live on our side.
-- `regenerate`: no credential change.
-
-## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
-
-Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
-
-- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
-  `gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
-- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
-  `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
-- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
-  (`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
-  fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
-- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
-  the token pasted into stdin.
-- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
-- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
-
-Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
-
-## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
-
-- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
-  `issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
-- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
-  Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
-- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
-  one.
-
-## 9. Questions
-
-Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
-
-- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
-- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
-  and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
-  Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
-  grants it to coder.
-- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
-  instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
-- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
-  row.
-
-Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
-
-- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account.
-- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3).
-
-## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
-
-- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
-  model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
-- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
-- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
-
-## 11. Tests and mutants
-
-All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
-127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
-
-- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
-  path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
-  status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
-- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
-  `action.refused`.
-- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
-  only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
-  the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
-  happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
-  exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
-  no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
-  spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
-  `decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
-  the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
-  and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
-  refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
-  fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
-  and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
-  agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
-  upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
-  and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
-  history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
-  neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
-  fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
-  path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
-  a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
-  sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
-  `identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
-- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
-  `changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
-- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
-  Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
-  The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
-- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
-
-Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
-the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
-check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
-ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
-`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
-check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
-oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
-the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
-D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
-check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
-
-## 12. Risks
-
-- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
-  and says what it includes.
-- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
-- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
-  Jason's network to confirm.

agents/quackerjack/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Quackerjack
+
+Builder seat, Claude Haiku 5.5 at high effort, started by Sage under mos-1023 item 1 and Q177 for federation
+rows R5 (`mosaic access list, grant, revoke`) and R2 (the `federation` config key), per Gizmoduck's design
+section 7 (#414).
+
+No launcher in this directory. The seat runs as a T3 thread and works in its own worktree. It has no
+credentials of its own; until the credentials row settles per-agent identity, it pushes only its own
+`quackerjack/*` branches through the repository credential helper (mos-0981), never `refactor`, `main` or
+another seat's branch.

docs/TOOLS.md

@@ -238,12 +238,6 @@ Exit codes: `0` ok · `2` invalid file or credential reference · `3` system
 config problem · `4` usage or a required file missing. Details:
 `packages/business/README.md`.
 
-`mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete` (row 199) goes to
-`packages/cli` and the bus's human-only credential verbs: an agent's own
-token in `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind>`, read on
-stdin, never printed. The tester may run `status` and `revoke`. Details:
-`packages/cli/README.md`.
-
 `instances` and `instance add|set` (row 165) go to `packages/cli` and the
 bus's human-only `instances` and `instances.set` verbs, so they need a live
 bus host and refuse inside an agent session. `instances` prints the revision,

docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Federation build rows R1, R2 and R5 (#414)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's orders mos-1023 item 1, mos-1028 item 2 and mos-1034 item 1. The design is
+Gizmoduck's `agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md` at a1daa3c07 on `gizmoduck/federation-design` (r4.9,
+sha256 a31cbebd070f9e3a5ca4ccb158b1747c6f5a83c3469855705b0026a581fb5c6a). Duckworth approved r4.5
+(duckworth-0012), r4.6, r4.7 (duckworth-0020) and r4.8 (duckworth-0021, 8a22d0897 on `duckworth/reviews`),
+and acked r4.9 (duckworth-0024). r4.7 applies Jason's Q181 hosts, r4.8 adds N22's R8 checks and r4.9 names who
+runs them. None of them changes R1, R2 or R5. Section 7's table
+sets each row's scope and test gate. Vikunja P19 #414. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches
+(mos-0981).
+
+The other R rows are filed when their parents have candidates: R3 after R1 and row 196, R4 after R3, R5 and
+row 193's viewer level (193a, mos-1019), R6 after #412 phase 1, R1, R2 and R3, R7 after R1-R6 and row 190.
+R8 is a live window, not a code row. Its brief is the last section here.
+
+## Brief: FED R1, the access.json loader and validator
+
+Owner Gizmoduck, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at this brief's commit. No parent.
+
+`packages/business/src/access.mjs`: the access.json loader and validator from DESIGN.md section 3.5, and the
+pure `covers`. Providers, peers and businesses come in as arguments. One read plus the file checks. The
+exported interface is what R5 and row 193a build against, so the manifest names it, and any change to it in
+review goes to Sage before it lands. Section 7 names `covers` but not the loader and validator exports or
+the context shape. Morgana's 193a (508ee4d61 on `morgana/row193a`) assumes `checkAccess(doc, {providers,
+peers, businesses})`, with `businesses` mapping an id to `{human, instances}`, throwing a `BusinessError` that
+names the key path. Use those names, or tell Morgana and Quackerjack yours before the manifest goes to
+Duckworth. Row 193a later widens the level check to `viewer` on R1's candidate (mos-1019).
+
+Tests, in `packages/business/tests/`: every rule in 3.5 refuses with the key path named. That covers a
+symlink, a non-regular file, another owner, group or other write, expiry, `*`, a grant disjoint from the given
+subjects, `human` and `tester` ids, any level other than `collaborator`, and a project entry that isn't a
+UUID. For `covers`: `*` and listed ids match, while an unlisted project, instance or business doesn't, an
+expired grant doesn't, and a level filter rejects another level. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. Tests
+use scratch roots. Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Chained on R1 (Q177). The build starts now against
+R1's exported interface as the R1 manifest names it, and R5 lands after R1 and rebases onto R1's landing.
+
+`mosaic access list`, `grant` and `revoke`: human proof, atomic write, revision bump, a receipt line. The help
+text states the `instances` limit and the provider-removal order (DESIGN.md section 7, row R5). R4 later makes
+these verbs call `access.reload`, so R5 leaves no other reload path.
+
+Context (sage-1419). `ssoSubjects` is row 192's `console.sso.providers[].subjects` flattened to `{provider,
+sub}` pairs; the design's "`console.sso.subjects`" in 3.5 is shorthand for it. `providers` is the list of
+`providers[].id`, read through `loadSystem` and row 192's `checkConsole`. `peers` is `[]` until R2 lands, so a grant
+naming a peer home refuses. R5 rebases onto row 192's landing as well as R1's.
+
+Tests, in `packages/cli/tests/`: tester and agent callers are refused, a concurrent write refuses on a
+revision conflict, the receipt line is appended, and a bad grant is refused before anything is written. One
+mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units or any live access.json. The
+human proof in tests uses the scratch stand-in pattern (a scratch bus verifies its own human-cli path).
+Single test files run freely, and suites need Sage's slot.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config
+
+Owner Quackerjack, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Chained on row 192 (#412 phase 1). The build starts when
+row 192 has a candidate, on that candidate.
+
+A `federation` key in `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs` with the shape in DESIGN.md section 3. A config with no
+`federation` key still loads as it does today. This changes the config schema, so the manifest lists every
+reader of the key.
+
+Tests, in `scripts/test-config.sh`: a valid key loads, an unknown sub-key and a bad origin refuse, and a
+config without the key loads. One mutant per refusal, each killed.
+
+Boundaries: `~/.config/mosaic-dev/config.json` is user-authored and is not touched. Tests use scratch config
+dirs only.
+
+Gate: Webby approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and
+the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: FED R8, the hub window on 10.1.1.54
+
+A live window, not a code row (DESIGN.md section 7, row R8). The brief follows r4.11, b93f098f0 on
+`gizmoduck/federation-design` (sha256 1bcee8df0a3a8628a6646535b756c936ca6d9e7bcfa7e1dd2bf1d3f01715c8e6),
+which Duckworth acked with r4.10 (duckworth-0034). Mos closed design rounds there (mos-1072). Run by Jason and
+Mos. Nothing here authorizes a step on any host; each step waits for the window's go.
+
+What changed since r4.9 (DECISIONS Q182, Q183, mos-1055, mos-1063). R8 is a recorded acceptance. It starts
+with Jason's acceptance of the factory paths to .54 on record, quoted in section 8. The privilege and host
+checks still run, and each result goes into the R8 record with the name of whoever ran it. They report and
+don't refuse. The four functional checks named at the end of section 7's R8 row still stop R8 when they fail
+(mos-1066 item 1).
+
+Order (mos-1042 item 2). R8 runs after the Case 2 install on .54 (#416, due by 2026-10-27, Jason's latest-by
+date in Q176, mos-1069), after Bean and Chet are live in Case 2, and after both Hermes gateways on 10.1.1.54
+have stopped. Case 2 go-live doesn't wait on R8. The risk, stated for 10-27: federation between the two
+instances depends on Melanie's switch-over date.
+
+Entry checks, all before anything starts:
+- R7, #412 phase 2 and Jason's #419 answer, as section 7 lists.
+- The four hub user checks on 10.1.1.54 (N22, mos-1035 item 1): `sudo -l -U mosaic` grants nothing, `id
+  mosaic` shows only its own group, `~mosaic/.ssh/authorized_keys` is absent or empty, and no file under
+  `/etc/sudoers.d` names `mosaic`. An agent or Jason runs them as localadmin (mos-1055), and the output goes
+  into the R8 record with who ran them.
+- The factory privilege checks, the key fingerprint comparison and the section 8 privilege path table, each
+  as section 7's R8 row states them.
+
+Build notes:
+- N1 (Duckworth, duckworth-0034, mos-1072). A check that fails on a path Jason didn't name in Q182 or Q183 is
+  marked "not named in Q182 or Q183" in the record, not filed under the acceptance. Examples: a factory mount
+  of hub data, another agent on .54, a provider admin token. Mos takes each one to Jason.
+- N2 (Duckworth, doc-only). The Q183 and Q4 quotes in section 8 are excerpts. When the R8 record quotes them,
+  it marks each omission with "…" and checks the full text at DECISIONS.md:1535-1541 in jason-master-restart
+  (read only).
+
+Done when every entry check has its output recorded, Jason signs in to the hub and sends one message, Melanie
+revokes, and his next request is refused.

docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Brief: agent host access with sudo through the credential store (#424)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Jason's rulings Q183 and Q184 relayed by Mos (mos-1056 item 3, mos-1067). Gitea #1707, Vikunja P19
+#424, due 2026-10-27 (Q184: "Q5: by 10.27"). Owner Gizmoduck (design and build), reviewer Duckworth, gate owner
+Sage. Chained on row 199's candidate (Q177): row 199 design r6 (4d3007ec9 on `megavolt/row199`, approved in
+duckworth-0027) is not reopened. This row lands after 199 and rebases onto its landing.
+
+## What Jason asked for
+
+Q183, through Mos: "I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works as some sort of variable for
+the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to keep the agents sandboxed with proper
+security... If we can utilize the credential store in Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with
+NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a happy man." Q183 also says not every agent needs that access.
+
+Mos's requirements (mos-1067 item 1):
+- An agent asks for a host credential by name.
+- The stack checks a grant for that agent and that host, and does the ssh and sudo for it.
+- The agent never sees the key or any secret value.
+- Only agents with a grant can do it.
+
+The PRD text is REQ-CRED-3, drafted by Honker for PRD 1.7 (sage-1422). If it misses 1.7 it goes into 1.8, and
+this row lands only after the version that holds it is approved.
+
+## What row 199 gives and what it doesn't (megavolt-0019)
+
+It builds on 199 as 199 stands: the store layout under `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/`, the
+lifecycle verbs and their `changes.jsonl` receipts, `useFor(session, service, fn)` with the D5 allowlist test,
+`assertClean` on every result, and the grant shape of `publish` (a list on the role entry, checked by the
+broker, plus a hard-wait action that isn't routed).
+
+This row's own changes:
+- A host kind in the closed kind set (vocabulary.mjs `SERVICES`, credentials.mjs, the broker's service check,
+  the CLI date flag, the remove regex), with a naming rule for one credential per host or per agent.
+- A per-kind value check. An OpenSSH private key fails today's `TOKEN` pattern.
+- Handing the key to ssh without the agent seeing it: an ssh-agent on a private socket, or a 0600 temp file
+  removed on every path, the way publish's one-shot helper works.
+- Pinned host keys per host, and no trust on first use.
+- The command boundary: what an agent may run under sudo, and how output returns without echoing the secret.
+  This is the main design work.
+- The executor: a ticket and a host op running in the bus child, the same split row 199 uses for publish
+  (Megavolt's deviation in 199's BUILD.md).
+
+## Steps
+
+1. DESIGN.md first, in `agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-ROW/`. It answers each item above, names the grant shape
+   (`roles.<agent>.hosts` and a `host.sudo` action, or a reasoned alternative), says who grants (Jason, through
+   a reviewed role change, unless REQ-CRED-3 says otherwise), and lists tests and mutants. Duckworth approves it
+   before code. Sage reads it too, because it gives agents sudo on hosts.
+2. Build on 199's candidate. Single test files run freely. Suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+3. The live part is not this row. Putting a key in the store and granting a host is a separate window with
+   Jason or Mos, after landing.
+
+## Hosts
+
+The first targets are `localadmin` with NOPASSWD sudo on 10.1.1.53 and 10.1.1.54 (#423 step 1, applied by
+ops-01 at 20:05:47Z), and the servers agents already reach as localadmin (Q172). ops-01 owns the host side.
+Tests use scratch sshd fixtures on 127.0.0.1 or fakes, never a real host.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- No change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, slot files, the live units or `~/.mosaic`. No key is
+  read, copied or printed. No ssh to any real host from a test or a seat.
+- No widening of row 199's kinds or regex inside row 199. Both rows touch them, so this row rebases after 199
+  lands.
+
+## Gate
+
+Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every
+`scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed (one per refusal, plus one that leaks
+the key into the agent's output and one that skips the host key pin).

docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Row 193 build rows: 193a, 193b1, 193b2, 193c and 193d (#1691)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-20, for Mos's go mos-1034 item 4. Row 193's design is Morgana's
+`agents/morgana/work/queue-193/DESIGN.md` at e2d161e2e on `morgana/row193` (r5, sha256
+dd7fcb419ed8510e9d8d74b569183386d0942af8b68eecc0bbb5e182e677b523), approved by Duckworth (duckworth-0018).
+Section 8 lists the tests and mutants, and section 9 the split. The brief behind them is
+`docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md`. Vikunja P19 #414/#415, Gitea #1691.
+
+Owner Morgana for every row, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage. Each row chains on its parent's candidate
+(Q177) and rebases onto the parent's landing. Seats push only their own `<seat>/*` branches (mos-0981).
+Single test files run freely, and suites and mutant batches need Sage's slot.
+
+Boundaries for every row: no change to `~/.mosaic-dev`, `~/.config/mosaic-dev`, the live units, slot files, any
+live access.json or `~/.mosaic`. No request to the live Console, mosaic.woltje.com or auth.diversecanvas.com.
+No user thread goes live before 193b1's message filter has landed (mos-1021 B2, FED R8).
+
+The owner-visible records are fixed by Mos (mos-1023 item 2) and named in one user sentence, which FED R6
+reuses word for word: "The business owner sees your thread's agent's decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks
+and project files, but not your messages."
+
+## Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer
+
+Chained on FED R1. Started early on `morgana/row193a` (508ee4d61) against R1's interface as the FED brief
+names it, with Sage's go (sage-1373). R1's level check accepts `viewer` and still refuses any other new
+level. Tests in `packages/business/tests/` (section 8, Business), with the four mutants in Morgana's
+BUILD.md. FED R4 chains on this row.
+
+Duckworth's N1 on R1 (duckworth-0033, sage-1417): with viewer added, `covers` called with no level would let a
+viewer grant cover a collaborator ask. This row makes `level` required in `covers`, with a test and a mutant that
+makes it optional again. R3 and R4 call `covers` with a level.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The business suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
+
+Chained on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. The bus gets the viewer verb list, per-grant level
+checks, board reads refused to users, and the section 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter with `#readable`
+owner-only. No schema change. The governance pin test names each item in the user sentence above. Bus tests
+and mutants 1, 3, 6, 10, 11 and 12 from section 8.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3j)
+
+Chained on 193b1. `thread_shares`, the share verbs, the share rules of `#readable` and `#threadRead`, and the
+section 5.5 share filters. Schema 3i to 3j. The table is append-only, and row 181's restore guard and
+`COUNTED` include it. Bus tests for shares and the migration, and mutants 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 from section 8.
+Going live needs a `--migrate` window with Jason. Sage takes it to Mos when this row is near.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite, the cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
+Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer
+
+Chained on FED R5. `mosaic access user add/remove` and `grant --level viewer`, only where R5 lacks them. They
+refuse tester and agent callers, write a receipt line and call `access.reload` (section 8, CLI). If R5
+already has all of them, this row records that and closes with no code.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's gate,
+and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only
+
+Chained on FED R6, row 192 and 193b2 (for share controls). A viewer has no composer or share control, and
+with each UI check removed the bus still refuses (section 8, Webui).
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The webui suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on Sage's
+gate, and the mutants are killed.

packages/bus/README.md

@@ -215,13 +215,6 @@ an operator inspect content and delivery evidence after an uncertain result.
 | `trail` | `{subject}`: task ref, decision UUID or message UUID. Linked records in broker write order. |
 | `decisions` | `{list}`: `roles` or `recent`; human and reader sessions only. Open decisions routed to a role, or the last 50 closed. |
 | `credentials` | No args; human and reader sessions only. `[{service,account,role,dateKind,date,state}]` for the capability's business, never a token, file path or variable name. |
-| `credentials.issue` | `{agent,service,token,date}`; human only (row 199, #1697). Writes the token to `<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>` (0600, dirs 0700: tmp, fsync, rename), rewrites the agent's reference in the business file to `{"store":true,<rotateBy or expires>:date}`, then holds the token in memory, with no restart. Over an issued entry it is a rotate: the old value is gone from disk and memory when it returns. `service` is `gitea` or `vikunja` and the business file must already name it for the agent (`credential-unknown`). A token the bus already holds is `credential-leak`; a bad token `credential-format`; a bad date `credential-date`. Returns `{agent,verb,service,date,state}`, `verb` `issue` or `rotate`. The tester gets `tester-refused`. |
-| `credentials.revoke` | `{agent,service?,reason}`; human, or the tester (Q173). Drops the entry from memory, then unlinks a store file; a `file` or `env` reference keeps its file and becomes `store`, so a restart loads nothing. Without `service`, every kind the agent has. Returns `{agent,verb,services:[{service,state}]}`. |
-| `credentials.delete` | `{agent,reason}`; human only. `credentials.revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's store dir; a file there other than a token is `credential-file`. While the agent or one of its threads holds a claim, `agent-running`. |
-
-Each of the three leaves one receipt in the organization's `changes.jsonl`: the actor and a
-`detail` of `{verb,agent,kind,date or reason}`, never a value. A change to the store alone writes
-a receipt with empty `changes`. A refusal is `action.refused` with its code alone.
 | `requirements` | No args; role sessions only, as `task.create` is (row 90, #1584). The approved PRD's requirement ids, `{prd,version,requirements:[{id,title}]}`, from `packages/tasks/requirements.json`, loaded when the broker starts; a bad file refuses the start. A human session refuses `agent-required`, a reader `read-only`. |
 | `state` | No args; role, human and reader sessions (row 109, #1603). `{launch:{state,at,event},tasks:{open:[{task_ref,title}],total,cap}}` for the capability's business. `launch` is the latest `launch.revoked` or `launch.restored` event: `allowed` with `at` and `event` null when none exists. `open` is the tracker snapshot's open tasks in `task_ref` order, at most `cap` (the `tasks` page size, 50); `total` counts every open task. The harness runner reads it before each turn. Writes nothing. |
 | `replies` | `{id}`: a message UUID; human and reader sessions only. The messages whose `in_reply_to` is that id, oldest first, at most 50. Writes nothing. |

packages/bus/src/broker.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { NAME as HARNESS_NAME } from '../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs';
 import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';
 import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';
-import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
+import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
 
 // Kept closed while S1 lands; its vocabulary is the integration authority.
 export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   'git.push.working',
   'git.push.protected',
   'git.merge.protected',
-  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): publish to the agent's fork. Not in ROUTED, so a hard wait.
-  'git.push.remote',
   'review.request',
   'review.verdict',
   'record.write',
@@ -103,11 +101,6 @@ export const TESTER_VERBS = Object.freeze(['message.send', 'message.receive', 'm
 // Row 175: the organization verbs a tester may call. Its writes run every check the human's do
 // and log actor `tester`; row 176 adds routes reads; limits.set, organization.set and organization.revision refuse it.
 export const TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS = Object.freeze(['limits', 'plugins', 'instances', 'plugins.set', 'instances.set', 'routes.set', 'routes']);
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): the credential lifecycle, human-only. Under Q173 the tester may
-// revoke; issue (rotate is an issue over an issued entry) and delete refuse it, because a token it
-// issued would pass through its session (duckworth N1). The status read stays the `credentials` verb.
-export const CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.issue', 'credentials.revoke', 'credentials.delete']);
-const TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS = Object.freeze(['credentials.revoke']);
 const SELF_KINDS = new Set(['task.created', 'task.assigned', 'task.state', 'task.closed', 'task.conflict']);
 const POLL_KINDS = new Set([
   'task.changed.external',
@@ -198,13 +191,10 @@ export class Broker {
   #received = new Set();
   // Row 137 (#1631): landings checkLand let start, by ticket, until recordLand or landRefused ends them.
   #landings = new Map();
-  // Row 199: a publish between checkPublish and recordPublish or publishRefused.
-  #publishes = new Map();
   #secretCheck;
   #credentialStatus;
   #requirements;
   #organization;
-  #credentialVerbs;
   #project;
   #usage;
   #limits;
@@ -213,15 +203,13 @@ export class Broker {
   #stops = new Map();
   #clock = 0;
   // credentialStatus is the runtime's metadata-only Credentials.status(); the broker never gets use().
-  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null }) {
+  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null }) {
     if (!object(businesses) || !Object.keys(businesses).length) fail('invalid-business');
     this.#businesses = structuredClone(businesses);
     this.#store = store;
     this.#secretCheck = secretCheck;
     this.#credentialStatus = credentialStatus;
     this.#organization = organization;
-    // Row 199: the runtime's credential lifecycle (credential-verbs.mjs); it holds the store, not the broker.
-    this.#credentialVerbs = credentialVerbs;
     this.#project = project;
     this.#usage = usage;
     this.#limits = limits;
@@ -807,12 +795,7 @@ export class Broker {
     // records `?? null` and the current holder reads undefined.
     if (action === 'role.revoke' && (context.holderRun ?? null) !== (this.#holder(s.business, target)?.holder_run ?? null))
       fail('decision-mismatch');
-    // Row 199 (r4 B4): approve at A, push B, publish refuses.
-    if (action === 'git.push.remote' && (context.pushCommit ?? null) !== (this.#latestPush(s.business, target)?.commit ?? null))
-      fail('decision-mismatch');
-    return action === 'git.push.remote'
-      ? { class: cls, decision: d.id, pushCommit: context.pushCommit ?? null }
-      : { class: cls, decision: d.id };
+    return { class: cls, decision: d.id };
   }
   // The raise's context: its target and approval option, from the decision.raise action.allowed.
   #raised(business, decision) {
@@ -875,14 +858,13 @@ export class Broker {
     if (body.commit !== push.commit) fail('verdict-stale');
   }
   // A push is the action.allowed recordPush wrote, the only one for git.push.working with a commit.
-  // role is the role that pushed (row 199, work-not-yours).
   #latestPush(business, task) {
     const r = this.#store.get(
-      "SELECT body, actor_role FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
+      "SELECT body FROM events WHERE business=? AND kind='action.allowed' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='git.push.working' AND json_type(body,'$.commit')='text' AND subject=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1",
       business,
       task,
     );
-    return r ? { ...JSON.parse(r.body), role: r.actor_role } : null;
+    return r ? JSON.parse(r.body) : null;
   }
   // Row 93: the bus host's git socket asks before it takes a push's bytes. Nothing is recorded
   // unless it refuses: the push is recorded, and its authority consumed, once the ref moved.
@@ -1016,98 +998,6 @@ export class Broker {
     this.#landings.delete(ticket);
     return code;
   }
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3, D9b): the bus host's git socket publishes a task's
-  // recorded work commit to the agent's own fork. checkPublish runs before anything touches the
-  // network. The run holds its claim; git.push.remote is a hard wait, so it cites a decision the
-  // human resolved for this task, bound to the task's latest push (#authorityFor). The project must
-  // be in the agent's publish grant with an upstream; the fork is built from that upstream and the
-  // agent's own Gitea user, never from the request. The ticket carries the session and decision to
-  // recordPublish or publishRefused. No token is in the result.
-  checkPublish(cap, args) {
-    const s = this.#session(cap);
-    return this.#store.transaction(() => {
-      keys(args, ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch', 'decision'], ['task_ref', 'project', 'branch']);
-      if (!taskRef(args.task_ref) || (args.decision !== undefined && !id(args.decision))) fail('invalid-request');
-      identifier(args.project);
-      string(args.branch, 200);
-      this.#agent(s);
-      const { task_ref, project, branch } = args;
-      const decision = args.decision ?? null;
-      const result = this.#checkAuthority(s, 'git.push.remote', { decision, target: task_ref });
-      const facts = this.#publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result);
-      const ticket = randomUUID();
-      const dst = `refs/heads/${facts.user}/${branch}`;
-      this.#publishes.set(ticket, { s, task_ref, project, decision, dst, ...facts });
-      return { ticket, task_ref, project, fork: facts.fork, user: facts.user, email: facts.email, source: facts.source, dst };
-    });
-  }
-  // Steps 2 and 3, checked again at recordPublish. After routing a within-role publish has no
-  // decision, so the commit is the latest push's (N9); the git socket still checks the work ref tip.
-  #publishFacts(s, task_ref, project, result) {
-    if (result.decision && this.#spent(s.business, result.decision)) fail('decision-consumed');
-    const b = this.#business(s.business);
-    const role = b.roles?.[s.role];
-    const upstream = b.projects?.[project]?.remote;
-    if (!role?.identity || !(role.publish ?? []).includes(project) || !upstream) fail('remote-not-granted');
-    const problem = forkProblem(upstream, role.identity);
-    if (problem) fail(problem);
-    const push = this.#latestPush(s.business, task_ref);
-    if (!push) fail('no-push');
-    if (push.role !== s.role) fail('work-not-yours');
-    if (push.project !== project) fail('work-ref');
-    const source = result.pushCommit ?? push.commit;
-    if (source !== push.commit) fail('decision-mismatch');
-    const user = role.identity.gitea.user;
-    return { fork: forkUrl(upstream, user), user, email: role.identity.email, source };
-  }
-  #publish(ticket) {
-    return (typeof ticket === 'string' && this.#publishes.get(ticket)) || fail('publish-unknown');
-  }
-  // Design D5: the only key the git socket's gitea token use gets is the agent checkPublish checked
-  // (#agent: a run holding its claim, never a tester, reader or human). Trusted host only.
-  publishSession(ticket) {
-    const { s } = this.#publish(ticket);
-    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, role: s.role });
-  }
-  // Where the bus process's git sends the push (D9 step 5): all from the ticket, none from the
-  // host's message. Trusted host only.
-  publishTarget(ticket) {
-    const { s, project, fork, user, source, dst } = this.#publish(ticket);
-    return Object.freeze({ business: s.business, project, fork, user, source, dst });
-  }
-  // Step 6: records the push the git socket made as the action.allowed for git.push.remote, which
-  // spends the decision. The checks run again; the run may have ended while git ran, so the holder
-  // check is not repeated (as recordLand). Trusted host only.
-  recordPublish(ticket, pushed) {
-    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
-    const done = this.#store.transaction(() => {
-      keys(pushed, ['ref', 'commit', 'previous'], ['ref', 'commit', 'previous']);
-      if (!oid(pushed.commit) || (pushed.previous !== null && !oid(pushed.previous))) fail('invalid-request');
-      string(pushed.ref, 260);
-      const result = this.#authorityFor(t.s, 'git.push.remote', { decision: t.decision, target: t.task_ref });
-      const facts = this.#publishFacts(t.s, t.task_ref, t.project, result);
-      if (facts.source !== t.source || pushed.commit !== t.source || facts.fork !== t.fork || pushed.ref !== t.dst) fail('ref-moved');
-      const { ref, commit, previous } = pushed;
-      this.#event(
-        t.s,
-        'action.allowed',
-        { project: t.project, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous, action: 'git.push.remote', ...result, target: t.task_ref },
-        t.task_ref,
-      );
-      return { task_ref: t.task_ref, fork: t.fork, ref, commit, previous };
-    });
-    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
-    return done;
-  }
-  // Ends a publish that didn't push: action.refused with the code on the task's trail. The git
-  // socket answers the run with the same code. Trusted host only.
-  publishRefused(ticket, { code } = {}) {
-    const t = this.#publish(ticket);
-    if (!/^[a-z-]{1,64}$/.test(code ?? '')) fail('invalid-request');
-    this.#store.transaction(() => this.#event(t.s, 'action.refused', { code }, t.task_ref));
-    this.#publishes.delete(ticket);
-    return code;
-  }
   // The outcome as a RESULT from the bus, as #notice sends: the runner takes a turn on it and sends
   // no automatic reply. It goes to the role in the thread the decision was raised in.
   #landMessage(s, decision, body) {
@@ -1355,7 +1245,6 @@ export class Broker {
         return this.#requestProject(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
       if (PROJECT_FILE_VERBS.includes(request.verb))
         return this.#requestProjectFile(s, { verb: request.verb, args: structuredClone(args) });
-      if (CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(request.verb)) return this.#requestCredential(s, request.verb, structuredClone(args));
       if (["limits", "limits.set", "organization.set", "organization.revision", "plugins", "plugins.set", "instances", "instances.set", "routes", "routes.set"].includes(request.verb)) {
         // Row 123 (#1617, REQ-COS-1, REQ-LIMIT-1): organization.set is limits.set for a role whose
         // file lists organization.change. It takes the same keys, runs the same write path and
@@ -1427,35 +1316,6 @@ export class Broker {
       throw this.#refused(s, e, request);
     }
   }
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6). The token of an issue comes in args from the human's stdin; the
-  // secret check above has refused one the bus already holds, a refusal records its code alone, and
-  // nothing returned carries it. Outside the store transaction, as the organization branch.
-  #requestCredential(s, verb, a) {
-    if (s.tester ? !TESTER_CREDENTIAL_VERBS.includes(verb) : !s.human) fail(s.tester ? 'tester-refused' : 'human-required');
-    if (!this.#credentialVerbs) fail('not-configured');
-    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') keys(a, ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date'], ['agent', 'service', 'token', 'date']);
-    else keys(a, verb === 'credentials.revoke' ? ['agent', 'service', 'reason'] : ['agent', 'reason'], ['agent', 'reason']);
-    string(a.agent, 64);
-    if (a.service !== undefined && !['gitea', 'vikunja'].includes(a.service)) fail('invalid-request');
-    if (a.token !== undefined) string(a.token, 16384);
-    if (a.date !== undefined) string(a.date, 10);
-    if (a.reason !== undefined) string(a.reason, 500);
-    if (!Object.hasOwn(this.#business(s.business).roles, a.agent)) fail('credential-unknown');
-    // A running agent keeps its tokens until its runs end: delete waits for every claim to end.
-    if (verb === 'credentials.delete' && (this.#holder(s.business, a.agent)?.op === 'claim' || this.#threadHolders(s.business, a.agent).length))
-      fail('agent-running');
-    let result;
-    try {
-      result = this.#credentialVerbs(s.business, verb, a, s.tester ? 'tester' : s.human);
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e instanceof BusError && e.code.startsWith('credential-')) throw e;
-      if (e.code === 'revision-conflict' || e.code?.startsWith('organization-')) fail(e.code);
-      if (e.name === 'BusinessError') fail('invalid-request');
-      throw new BusError('outcome-unknown');
-    }
-    this.#secretCheck(result);
-    return result;
-  }
   // Only the runner's bound session and delivered message identify a turn; no host path crosses the wire.
   // Row 156 (#1651, sage-0808): a role run's landing turn is a merge decision id instead. Its begin
   // needs the decision held for the run's role; its end needs that begin, since the landing may
@@ -1838,12 +1698,6 @@ export class Broker {
             by,
           );
         }
-        // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 1, r4 B4): a publish decision binds one commit, the task's
-        // latest recorded push now, read here and never taken from the agent. The human sees it.
-        const pushCommit =
-          a.action === 'git.push.remote' ? (this.#latestPush(s.business, a.target)?.commit ?? fail('no-push')) : null;
-        const question = pushCommit ? `${a.question} (commit ${pushCommit})` : a.question;
-        string(question);
         const did = randomUUID();
         this.#store.run(
           'INSERT INTO decisions(id,at,business,project,raised_by_role,raised_by_run,class,action,route_to,question,options,recommendation,task_ref,requirement_ref,blocking,supersedes,spec_path,spec_commit) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',
@@ -1856,7 +1710,7 @@ export class Broker {
           cls,
           a.action,
           route,
-          question,
+          a.question,
           JSON.stringify(a.options),
           a.recommendation,
           a.task_ref ?? null,
@@ -1878,7 +1732,6 @@ export class Broker {
             approvalChoice,
             holderRun:
               a.action === 'role.revoke' ? (this.#holder(s.business, a.target)?.holder_run ?? null) : null,
-            ...(pushCommit ? { pushCommit } : {}),
           },
           a.task_ref ?? (taskRef(a.target) ? a.target : did),
         );

packages/bus/src/credential-verbs.mjs

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete of one agent's credentials, for
-// the broker's human-only verbs. The broker checks the session, the keys and a running claim first.
-// Each verb leaves one receipt in the organization's changes.jsonl: the actor and a detail naming the
-// verb, agent, kinds, date or reason, never a value. Nothing here logs, and a result carries no token.
-const DATE_KEY = Object.freeze({ gitea: 'rotateBy', vikunja: 'expires' });
-const deny = (code) => {
-  throw new BusError(code);
-};
-export function credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer }) {
-  const state = (instance, service) =>
-    credentials.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service)?.state;
-  return (id, verb, args, actor) => {
-    const { agent } = args;
-    const instance = id + '/' + agent;
-    const { document, revision } = writer.read(id);
-    const current = document.roles?.[agent]?.credentials;
-    if (!current) deny('credential-unknown');
-    if (verb === 'credentials.issue') {
-      const { service, token, date } = args;
-      if (!current[service]) deny('credential-unknown');
-      // rotate is an issue over an entry the bus holds now; the old value is gone when this returns.
-      const kind = ['not-issued', 'revoked', undefined].includes(state(instance, service)) ? 'issue' : 'rotate';
-      const next = structuredClone(document);
-      next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: date };
-      const detail = { verb: kind, agent, kind: [service], date };
-      const status = credentials.issue(instance, service, token, date, () =>
-        writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail }),
-      );
-      return { agent, verb: kind, service, date: status.date, state: status.state };
-    }
-    const services = verb === 'credentials.revoke' && args.service ? [args.service] : Object.keys(current);
-    if (services.some((service) => !current[service])) deny('credential-unknown');
-    // Memory first, then the store file (Credentials.revoke), then the business file. A reference
-    // outside the store becomes `store` with its date, so a restart loads nothing for it. When that
-    // write fails, the entry stays revoked in memory and the refusal says to run the verb again.
-    if (verb === 'credentials.delete') credentials.remove(instance);
-    else for (const service of services) credentials.revoke(instance, service);
-    const detail = { verb: verb.slice('credentials.'.length), agent, kind: services, reason: args.reason };
-    const moved = services.filter((service) => current[service].store !== true);
-    if (moved.length) {
-      const next = structuredClone(document);
-      for (const service of moved)
-        next.roles[agent].credentials[service] = { store: true, [DATE_KEY[service]]: current[service][DATE_KEY[service]] };
-      writer.write(id, next, { revision, actor, detail });
-    } else writer.record(id, { actor, detail });
-    return {
-      agent,
-      verb: detail.verb,
-      services: services.map((service) => ({ service, state: state(instance, service) ?? 'not-issued' })),
-    };
-  };
-}

packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
-import {
-  openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants, mkdirSync, writeSync, fsyncSync,
-  renameSync, unlinkSync, rmdirSync, readdirSync,
-} from 'node:fs';
-import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readFileSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, constants } from 'node:fs';
+import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { BusError } from './broker.mjs';
 const deny = (code) => {
   throw new BusError(code);
@@ -16,33 +13,9 @@ const day = (value) =>
   /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(value) &&
   !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(value)) &&
   new Date(value).toISOString().slice(0, 10) === value;
-const TOKEN = /^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/;
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D4): a store dir is the stack instance's user's own and nobody else's.
-const privateDir = (path, { missing = false } = {}) => {
-  let st;
-  try {
-    st = lstatSync(path);
-  } catch (e) {
-    if (missing && e.code === 'ENOENT') return false;
-    deny('credential-file');
-  }
-  if (!st.isDirectory() || st.uid !== process.getuid() || (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) deny('credential-file');
-  return true;
-};
 export class Credentials {
   #tokens = new Map();
-  // Row 199: every reference the bus loaded, so issue, rotate, revoke and status work per entry.
-  #refs = new Map();
-  #revoked = new Set();
-  #storeRoot;
-  #repoRoots;
-  #dataRoot;
-  // storeRoot is <configDir>/secrets/agents (design D1); a reference with store: true must name the
-  // path under it for its own business, agent and service.
-  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env, storeRoot = null }) {
-    this.#storeRoot = storeRoot;
-    this.#repoRoots = repoRoots;
-    this.#dataRoot = dataRoot;
+  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env }) {
     try {
       for (const [instance, services] of Object.entries(references))
         for (const [service, ref] of Object.entries(services)) {
@@ -53,41 +26,12 @@ export class Credentials {
           if (
             (ref.service !== undefined && ref.service !== service) ||
             Object.keys(ref).some(
-              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', 'store', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
+              (k) => !['service', 'file', 'env', service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy'].includes(k),
             ) ||
-            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env) ||
-            (ref.store !== undefined && (ref.store !== true || ref.file !== this.#storePath(instance, service)))
+            Boolean(ref.file) === Boolean(ref.env)
           )
             deny('credential-reference');
-          this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref, date });
-          const token = this.#read(ref, env);
-          if (token !== null) this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
-        }
-    } catch (e) {
-      this.close();
-      throw e;
-    }
-  }
-  #storePath(instance, service) {
-    if (!this.#storeRoot) deny('credential-reference');
-    const [business, agent, ...rest] = instance.split('/');
-    if (!business || !agent || rest.length || agent.startsWith('@')) deny('credential-reference');
-    return join(this.#storeRoot, business, agent, service);
-  }
-  // One token, read and checked, or null for a store reference with no file yet (design D3a).
-  #read(ref, env) {
           let token;
-          if (ref.store) {
-            const agentDir = dirname(ref.file);
-            privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
-            if (!privateDir(dirname(agentDir), { missing: true }) || !privateDir(agentDir, { missing: true })) return null;
-            try {
-              lstatSync(ref.file);
-            } catch (e) {
-              if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return null;
-              deny('credential-file');
-            }
-          }
           if (ref.file) {
             if (!isAbsolute(ref.file)) deny('credential-location');
             let resolved, original;
@@ -99,7 +43,7 @@ export class Credentials {
             }
             if (original.isSymbolicLink() || !original.isFile()) deny('credential-file');
             if (
-              [...this.#repoRoots, this.#dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
+              [...repoRoots, dataRoot].filter(Boolean).some((root) =>
                 inside(
                   (() => {
                     try {
@@ -137,98 +81,16 @@ export class Credentials {
             if (!/^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$/.test(ref.env)) deny('credential-reference');
             token = env[ref.env];
           }
-          return Credentials.#format(token);
-  }
-  static #format(token) {
-    if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !TOKEN.test(token)) deny('credential-format');
-    token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
-    if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
-    return token;
-  }
-  #known(instance, service) {
-    const known = this.#refs.get(instance + ':' + service);
-    if (!known) deny('credential-unknown');
-    return known;
-  }
-  // Row 199 (design section 6): write the token to the agent's store path (tmp, fsync, rename), then
-  // `commit` (the business file's reference becomes store), then memory. The token comes from the
-  // caller's stdin and is never logged. Returns the entry's new status.
-  issue(instance, service, token, date, commit = () => {}) {
-    this.#known(instance, service);
-    if (!day(date)) deny('credential-date');
-    token = Credentials.#format(token);
-    const file = this.#storePath(instance, service);
-    const agentDir = dirname(file);
-    mkdirSync(this.#storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    privateDir(this.#storeRoot);
-    for (const dir of [dirname(agentDir), agentDir]) {
-      if (!privateDir(dir, { missing: true })) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
-      privateDir(dir);
-    }
-    const tmp = file + '.tmp';
-    try {
-      unlinkSync(tmp);
+          if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !/^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/.test(token))
+            deny('credential-format');
+          token = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
+          if (token.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
+          this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
+        }
     } catch (e) {
-      if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+      this.close();
+      throw e;
     }
-    let fd;
-    try {
-      fd = openSync(tmp, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
-      writeSync(fd, token + '\n');
-      fsyncSync(fd);
-    } finally {
-      if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
-    }
-    renameSync(tmp, file);
-    const dirFd = openSync(agentDir, constants.O_RDONLY);
-    try {
-      fsyncSync(dirFd);
-    } finally {
-      closeSync(dirFd);
-    }
-    commit();
-    this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref: { service, store: true, file, [service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy']: date }, date });
-    this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { token, date });
-    this.#revoked.delete(instance + ':' + service);
-    return this.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service);
-  }
-  // Memory first, then the store file (design section 6, D12). A file or env reference outside the
-  // store is never unlinked; the caller turns its reference into store, so a restart finds nothing.
-  revoke(instance, service) {
-    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
-    this.#tokens.delete(instance + ':' + service);
-    this.#revoked.add(instance + ':' + service);
-    if (ref.store) {
-      try {
-        unlinkSync(ref.file);
-      } catch (e) {
-        if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
-      }
-    }
-    return { file: Boolean(ref.store) };
-  }
-  // revoke for every service, then the agent's dir. A file other than a token or its tmp refuses.
-  remove(instance) {
-    const services = [...this.#refs.keys()].filter((k) => k.startsWith(instance + ':')).map((k) => k.slice(instance.length + 1));
-    for (const service of services) this.revoke(instance, service);
-    const agentDir = dirname(this.#storePath(instance, 'gitea'));
-    let names;
-    try {
-      names = readdirSync(agentDir);
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e.code === 'ENOENT') return { services };
-      deny('credential-file');
-    }
-    if (names.some((n) => !/^(gitea|vikunja)(\.tmp)?$/.test(n))) deny('credential-file');
-    for (const n of names) unlinkSync(join(agentDir, n));
-    rmdirSync(agentDir);
-    return { services };
-  }
-  // The agent-facing use (design D5): the key comes only from the broker's verified session.
-  async useFor(session, service, operation) {
-    if (!session || typeof session.business !== 'string' || typeof session.role !== 'string' || session.role.startsWith('@'))
-      deny('credential-not-yours');
-    return this.use(session.business + '/' + session.role, service, operation);
   }
   assertClean(value) {
     let encoded;
@@ -247,16 +109,14 @@ export class Credentials {
     let result;
     try {
       result = await operation(entry.token);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Row 199: a host step's own refusal (publish) keeps its code; anything else is the service's.
-      if (e instanceof BusError) throw e;
+    } catch {
       deny('service-failed');
     }
     this.assertClean(result);
     return result;
   }
   status() {
-    return [...this.#refs.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
+    return [...this.#tokens.entries()].map(([key, { date }]) => {
       const i = key.lastIndexOf(':'),
         service = key.slice(i + 1),
         left = Date.parse(date + 'T00:00:00Z') - Date.now();
@@ -264,11 +124,8 @@ export class Credentials {
         instance: key.slice(0, i),
         service,
         date,
-        state: !this.#tokens.has(key)
-          ? this.#revoked.has(key)
-            ? 'revoked'
-            : 'not-issued'
-          : service === 'gitea'
+        state:
+          service === 'gitea'
             ? left <= 0
               ? 'rotation-due'
               : 'valid'
@@ -282,6 +139,5 @@ export class Credentials {
   }
   close() {
     this.#tokens.clear();
-    this.#refs.clear();
   }
 }

packages/bus/src/process.mjs

@@ -14,11 +14,6 @@ const LAUNCH_OPS = new Set([
   'checkLand',
   'recordLand',
   'landRefused',
-  'checkPublish',
-  'publishPush',
-  'publishResult',
-  'recordPublish',
-  'publishRefused',
   'landHeld',
   'threadsState',
   'threadIdle',
@@ -39,12 +34,6 @@ function launchOp(m) {
   if (m.op === 'checkLand') return runtime.checkLand(m.cap, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'recordLand') return runtime.recordLand(m.ticket, m.land);
   if (m.op === 'landRefused') return runtime.landRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. No entry returns a token.
-  if (m.op === 'checkPublish') return runtime.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args);
-  if (m.op === 'publishPush') return runtime.publishPush(m.ticket);
-  if (m.op === 'publishResult') return runtime.publishResult(m.ticket);
-  if (m.op === 'recordPublish') return runtime.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed);
-  if (m.op === 'publishRefused') return runtime.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args);
   if (m.op === 'landHeld') return runtime.landHeld(m.record);
   // Row 121 (#1615): the launcher's view of the business's threads, and its idle release.
   if (m.op === 'threadsState') return runtime.threadsState(m.business);
@@ -110,8 +99,7 @@ if (!process.send) {
       booted = true;
       clearTimeout(timer);
       // `trackers` is S3's plain-data boot config; the adapter is loaded only when a business has one.
-      // Row 199: publishTls is the tests' scratch CA; no boot config sets it.
-      const { trackers, publishTls: _tls, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
+      const { trackers, ...config } = message.config ?? {};
       if (trackers) {
         const { tasksAdapter } = await import('../../tasks/src/adapter.mjs');
         config.tasks = tasksAdapter({ trackers });

packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs

@@ -8,12 +8,9 @@ import { Credentials } from './credentials.mjs';
 import { serve } from './server.mjs';
 import { launchSettings } from '../../business/src/launch-settings.mjs';
 import { readSessions } from '../../seat/src/session.mjs';
-import { publishRemote, workingRepo, WorkingError } from '../../seat/src/working.mjs';
 import { createLoader, hasModule } from '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';
 import { pluginSettings } from '../../business/src/plugin-settings.mjs';
 import { instanceSettings } from '../../business/src/instance-settings.mjs';
-import { organizationWriter } from '../../business/src/organization.mjs';
-import { credentialVerbs } from './credential-verbs.mjs';
 import { webService } from './web.mjs';
 import { verifyHuman } from './human.mjs';
 import { createUsage } from './usage.mjs';
@@ -75,9 +72,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
   repoRoots = [],
   tasks = null,
   organization = null,
-  // Row 199: the tests' scratch CA for publish's git (`-c http.sslCAInfo=...`). process.mjs drops
-  // it from the boot config, so only an in-process caller sets it.
-  publishTls = [],
 }) {
   let store, credentials, server, adapter;
   try {
@@ -92,9 +86,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
       ...repoRoots,
       ...Object.values(businesses).flatMap((b) => Object.values(b.projects ?? {}).map((p) => p.root)),
     ];
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D1): the per-agent store is <configDir>/secrets/agents.
-    const storeRoot = organization ? join(organization.dir, 'secrets', 'agents') : null;
-    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot, storeRoot });
+    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot });
     store = new Store(dataRoot);
     // vikunja:19/305: the plug-in switch through the same human-only path as the limits: the verbs
     // plugins and plugins.set, logged in changes.jsonl with the actor, a missing module refused.
@@ -141,11 +133,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
       }:null,
       secretCheck: (value) => credentials.assertClean(value),
       credentialStatus: () => credentials.status(),
-      // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete, live with no restart; each
-      // rewrites or records through the organization writer, so changes.jsonl holds the receipt.
-      credentialVerbs: organization
-        ? credentialVerbs({ credentials, writer: organizationWriter({ dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir }) })
-        : null,
       // Row 65: a new launch binds only on a harness its business switches on, read from the file
       // as it stands now; an unreadable file switches none on.
       harnessOn: (id, name) => {
@@ -225,42 +212,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
     // Row 137 (#1631): the git socket's land op. checkLand's refusal is the run's, like checkPush's.
     // A landing then ends in recordLand or landRefused under its ticket, which outlive the run's cap.
     const checkLand = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkLand(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9b): the git socket's publish op. checkPublish's refusal is the run's.
-    // The gitea token is used only under the open ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked,
-    // and the op table returns no token. A publish then ends in recordPublish or publishRefused,
-    // which files any refusal once, withGitea's included.
-    const checkPublish = (cap, args) => refusing(cap, () => broker.checkPublish(cap, args), args?.task_ref);
-    const withGitea = async (ticket, fn) => credentials.useFor(broker.publishSession(ticket), 'gitea', fn);
-    // The push itself runs here, where the token is (D9 step 5), and the git socket's host polls
-    // for its end: the host's op channel answers one op at a time within 10 s, and ls-remote and
-    // push can take longer. Fork, user, source and dst all come from the ticket. A WorkingError's
-    // code is the refusal; git's stderr stays here.
-    const remotes = new Map();
-    function publishPush(ticket) {
-      if (remotes.has(ticket)) throw new BusError('publish-busy');
-      const { business, project, fork, user, source, dst } = broker.publishTarget(ticket);
-      const entry = { state: 'running' };
-      remotes.set(ticket, entry);
-      withGitea(ticket, (token) =>
-        publishRemote({ repo: workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project), fork, user, source, dst, token, tls: publishTls }).catch((e) => {
-          throw e instanceof WorkingError ? new BusError(e.code) : e;
-        }),
-      ).then(
-        (r) => Object.assign(entry, { state: 'pushed', ...r }),
-        (e) => {
-          // Not a refusal: the error's name and code only, never a message that could carry git's output.
-          if (!(e instanceof BusError)) process.stderr.write(`bus: publish git-failed: ${JSON.stringify({ name: e?.name, code: e?.code })}\n`);
-          Object.assign(entry, { state: 'refused', code: e instanceof BusError ? e.code : 'git-failed' });
-        },
-      );
-      return { state: 'running' };
-    }
-    function publishResult(ticket) {
-      const entry = remotes.get(ticket);
-      if (!entry) throw new BusError('publish-unknown');
-      if (entry.state !== 'running') remotes.delete(ticket);
-      return { ...entry };
-    }
     // Metadata only (service, date, state); the token stays in Credentials.
     function credentialStatus(business, role) {
       return credentials
@@ -286,12 +237,6 @@ export async function startBroker({
       checkLand,
       recordLand: (ticket, land) => broker.recordLand(ticket, land),
       landRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.landRefused(ticket, args),
-      checkPublish,
-      withGitea,
-      publishPush,
-      publishResult,
-      recordPublish: (ticket, pushed) => broker.recordPublish(ticket, pushed),
-      publishRefused: (ticket, args) => broker.publishRefused(ticket, args),
       landHeld: (record) => broker.landHeld(record),
       // Row 156 (#1651): the launcher's landing pass.
       landHolders: (business) => broker.landHolders(business),

packages/bus/tests/credential-store.test.mjs

@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D1, D3a, D4, section 6, T1 and T5): the per-agent credential store under
-// <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Credentials } from '../src/credentials.mjs';
-
-const TOKEN = 'fake_store_token_0123456789';
-const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
-const AGENT = { business: 'acme', role: 'coder' };
-
-function setup(t) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-store-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const storeRoot = join(root, 'secrets', 'agents');
-  mkdirSync(storeRoot, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
-  const file = join(storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'gitea');
-  const references = { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { service: 'gitea', store: true, file, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } };
-  const open = (extra = {}) => new Credentials({ references, storeRoot, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data', ...extra });
-  const state = (c) => c.status().find((e) => e.instance === 'acme/coder' && e.service === 'gitea').state;
-  const read = (c, session = AGENT) => c.useFor(session, 'gitea', async (token) => ({ same: token === TOKEN, rotated: token === ROTATED }));
-  return { root, storeRoot, file, references, open, state, read };
-}
-
-test('T1: a store reference with no file yet starts, and the agent is not-issued until issue', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-  const status = c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  assert.equal(status.state, 'valid');
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
-  assert.equal(statSync(s.file).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
-  for (const dir of [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')]) assert.equal(statSync(dir).mode & 0o777, 0o700);
-  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
-  // A restart reads the issued file.
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(s.open()), { same: true, rotated: false });
-});
-
-test('T1: a store path the reference does not own, or no store root, refuses the reference', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const other = join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'pm', 'gitea');
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { store: true, file: other, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-reference/);
-  assert.throws(() => new Credentials({ references: s.references, repoRoots: [], dataRoot: '/nonexistent-data' }), /credential-reference/);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { 'acme/@tester': { gitea: { store: true, file: join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', '@tester', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }),
-    /credential-reference/);
-});
-
-test('T1: a wrong mode on the store root, a business dir, an agent dir or the file refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  s.open().issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  for (const [path, bad, good] of [
-    [s.storeRoot, 0o750, 0o700],
-    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o705, 0o700],
-    [join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), 0o770, 0o700],
-    [s.file, 0o640, 0o600],
-  ]) {
-    chmodSync(path, bad);
-    assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/, path);
-    chmodSync(path, good);
-  }
-  s.open();
-});
-
-test('T1: a missing store root refuses start; a missing {file} reference still refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  rmSync(s.storeRoot, { recursive: true });
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open({ references: { coder: { gitea: { file: join(s.root, 'absent'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } }), /credential-file/);
-});
-
-test('T1: a store file that is a directory or a symlink refuses start', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  mkdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme'), 0o700);
-  mkdirSync(s.file, { mode: 0o700 });
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-  rmSync(s.file, { recursive: true });
-  const target = join(s.root, 'target');
-  writeFileSync(target, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-  symlinkSync(target, s.file);
-  assert.throws(() => s.open(), /credential-file/);
-});
-
-test('T2: useFor keys from the session only', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: 'pm' }), /credential-unavailable/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme', role: '@tester' }), /credential-not-yours/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, null), /credential-not-yours/);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c, { business: 'acme' }), /credential-not-yours/);
-});
-
-test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live with no restart, and revoke holds across one', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  let committed = 0;
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => committed++);
-  assert.equal(committed, 1);
-  // Rotate is a second issue: the new token is used at once, with no tmp file left.
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', ROTATED + '\n', '2099-06-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: false, rotated: true });
-  assert.equal(c.status()[0].date, '2099-06-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), ['gitea']);
-  // Revoke: memory first, then the file.
-  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: true });
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'revoked');
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-  const restarted = s.open();
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(restarted), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(s.state(restarted), 'not-issued');
-  // Delete removes the agent's dir.
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.remove('acme/coder'), { services: ['gitea'] });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder')), false);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory, and a bad token or date writes nothing', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', 'short', '2099-01-01'), /credential-format/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-13-01'), /credential-date/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/pm', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01'), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), false);
-  assert.throws(() => c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01', () => { throw new Error('commit failed'); }), /commit failed/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(s.file), true);
-  assert.equal(s.state(c), 'not-issued');
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: revoke of a {file} reference forgets the token and never unlinks the file', async (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const path = join(s.root, 'outside-token');
-  writeFileSync(path, TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-  const c = s.open({ references: { 'acme/coder': { gitea: { file: path, rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } } } });
-  assert.deepEqual(await s.read(c), { same: true, rotated: false });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.revoke('acme/coder', 'gitea'), { file: false });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(path), true);
-  await assert.rejects(s.read(c), /credential-unavailable/);
-});
-
-test('T5: delete refuses an agent dir holding anything but tokens', (t) => {
-  const s = setup(t);
-  const c = s.open();
-  c.issue('acme/coder', 'gitea', TOKEN, '2099-01-01');
-  writeFileSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes'), 'x', { mode: 0o600 });
-  assert.throws(() => c.remove('acme/coder'), /credential-file/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(s.storeRoot, 'acme', 'coder', 'notes')), true);
-});
-
-// Design D5: the name-keyed use() is the host's own, for @sync and the tracker's start check of each
-// role's token. Every other credential use goes through useFor, keyed from the broker's session. A
-// new use( call site outside this list fails here.
-test('D5: every credentials use( call site is on the allowlist', () => {
-  const packages = new URL('../../', import.meta.url);
-  const allowed = new Map([
-    ['bus/src/credentials.mjs', 1], // useFor's own call
-    ['tasks/src/adapter.mjs', 1], // the host's use(instance) for @sync and probe
-  ]);
-  const found = new Map();
-  const walk = (dir, rel) => {
-    for (const name of readdirSync(dir)) {
-      if (name === 'node_modules' || name === 'tests') continue;
-      const path = join(dir, name);
-      if (statSync(path).isDirectory()) walk(path, `${rel}${name}/`);
-      else if (name.endsWith('.mjs') || name.endsWith('.js')) {
-        const code = readFileSync(path, 'utf8').split('\n').filter((line) => !/^\s*\/\//.test(line)).join('\n');
-        const n = (code.match(/(?:credentials|this)\.use\(/g) ?? []).length;
-        if (n) found.set(`${rel}${name}`, n);
-      }
-    }
-  };
-  for (const pkg of readdirSync(packages)) if (statSync(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages), { throwIfNoEntry: false })?.isDirectory())
-    walk(new URL(`${pkg}/src`, packages).pathname, `${pkg}/src/`);
-  assert.deepEqual(Object.fromEntries([...found].sort()), Object.fromEntries([...allowed].sort()));
-});

packages/bus/tests/credential-verbs.test.mjs

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and
-// credentials.delete through the runtime. Human-only; the tester revokes and never issues. Each verb
-// is live with no restart and leaves one receipt in changes.jsonl with no value in it. Fake tokens in a
-// scratch root only.
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
-import { Broker, CREDENTIAL_VERBS } from '../src/broker.mjs';
-import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
-
-const TOKEN = 'fake_issued_token_0123456789';
-const ROTATED = 'fake_rotated_token_9876543210';
-const OTHER = 'fake_other_token_5555555555';
-const DATE = '2099-01-01';
-const role = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } };
-
-async function setup(t) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-verbs-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  const doc = { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } };
-  doc.roles.coder.credentials.gitea = { store: true, rotateBy: DATE };
-  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), doc);
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  const store = (agent, service) => join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', agent, service);
-  // The bus's resolved business carries the same references; a store one names its derived file.
-  const demo = {
-    id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true },
-    roles: {
-      coder: { ...role, credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: store('coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: doc.roles.coder.credentials.vikunja } },
-      reviewer: { ...role, credentials: doc.roles.reviewer.credentials },
-    },
-  };
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) } });
-  t.after(() => bus.close());
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const tester = bus.broker.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
-  const ask = (cap, verb, args) => bus.broker.request(cap, { verb, args });
-  const file = () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'));
-  const receipts = () => {
-    const log = join(root, 'businesses/.history/demo/changes.jsonl');
-    return existsSync(log) ? readFileSync(log, 'utf8').trim().split('\n').map(JSON.parse) : [];
-  };
-  const committed = () => receipts().filter((r) => r.state === 'committed');
-  const status = (agent) => Object.fromEntries(bus.credentialStatus('demo', agent).map((e) => [e.service, e.state]));
-  return { root, bus, human, tester, ask, file, receipts, committed, status, store };
-}
-
-test('row 199: the lifecycle verbs refuse every session but the human, and the tester revokes only', (t) => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-cred-gate-'));
-  const s = new Store(root);
-  t.after(() => { s.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
-  const calls = [];
-  const b = new Broker({
-    store: s,
-    businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true }, roles: { coder: role } } },
-    credentialVerbs: (id, verb, args, actor) => (calls.push([verb, actor]), { ok: true }),
-  });
-  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const tester = b.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
-  const reader = b.bindReader({ business: 'demo' });
-  const coder = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
-  const args = {
-    'credentials.issue': { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE },
-    'credentials.revoke': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
-    'credentials.delete': { agent: 'coder', reason: 'fired' },
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(CREDENTIAL_VERBS, Object.keys(args));
-  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) {
-    assert.throws(() => b.request(reader, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
-    assert.throws(() => b.request(coder, { verb, args: args[verb] }), /human-required/, verb);
-  }
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: args['credentials.issue'] }), /tester-refused/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /tester-refused/);
-  // Keys: a token on revoke, a missing reason, an unknown service, an unknown agent, an @ agent.
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { ...args['credentials.revoke'], token: TOKEN } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: 'coder' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], service: 'model' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], file: '/x' } }), /invalid-request/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.issue', args: { ...args['credentials.issue'], agent: 'pm' } }), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: { agent: '@sync', reason: 'x' } }), /credential-unknown/);
-  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
-  // A refusal records its code alone, never the token.
-  const refused = s.all("SELECT body FROM events WHERE kind='action.refused'");
-  assert.ok(refused.length >= 10);
-  for (const { body } of refused) assert.equal(body.includes(TOKEN), false);
-  // delete waits for the agent's claim to end.
-  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim' });
-  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'credentials.delete', args: args['credentials.delete'] }), /agent-running/);
-  b.request(coder, { verb: 'role.release' });
-  for (const verb of CREDENTIAL_VERBS) b.request(human, { verb, args: args[verb] });
-  b.request(tester, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] });
-  assert.deepEqual(calls, [['credentials.issue', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'jason'], ['credentials.delete', 'jason'], ['credentials.revoke', 'tester']]);
-  // No lifecycle without the runtime's store.
-  const bare = new Broker({ store: s, businesses: { demo: { id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'coder', delivery: 'coder' }, roles: { coder: role } } } });
-  const h2 = bare.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  assert.throws(() => bare.request(h2, { verb: 'credentials.revoke', args: args['credentials.revoke'] }), /not-configured/);
-});
-
-test('T5: issue, rotate, revoke and delete are live, rewrite the business file and leave one receipt each, with no value anywhere', async (t) => {
-  const c = await setup(t);
-  const coder = { business: 'demo', role: 'coder' };
-  const read = (service) => c.bus.credentials.useFor(coder, service, async (token) => token === TOKEN ? 'issued' : token === ROTATED ? 'rotated' : 'other');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.status('coder'), { gitea: 'not-issued', vikunja: 'valid' });
-  // issue: the file, then the business file's reference, then memory.
-  const issued = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN + '\n', date: DATE });
-  assert.deepEqual(issued, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'issue', service: 'gitea', date: DATE, state: 'valid' });
-  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'issued');
-  assert.equal(statSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: DATE });
-  let last = c.committed().at(-1);
-  assert.equal(last.actor, 'jason');
-  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'issue', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: DATE });
-  // The same token again is one the bus holds: the secret check refuses it before any write.
-  const count = c.receipts().length;
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: DATE }), /credential-leak/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: 'short', date: DATE }), /credential-format/);
-  assert.throws(() => c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: '2099-02-30' }), /credential-date/);
-  assert.equal(c.receipts().length, count);
-  // rotate: an issue over an issued entry, used at once.
-  const rotated = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: ROTATED, date: '2099-06-01' });
-  assert.equal(rotated.verb, 'rotate');
-  assert.equal(await read('gitea'), 'rotated');
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.gitea, { store: true, rotateBy: '2099-06-01' });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'rotate', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], date: '2099-06-01' });
-  // revoke of a store entry by the tester: memory and file, no document change, a receipt.
-  const bytes = readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8');
-  const revoked = c.ask(c.tester, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', reason: 'test' });
-  assert.deepEqual(revoked, { agent: 'coder', verb: 'revoke', services: [{ service: 'gitea', state: 'revoked' }] });
-  await assert.rejects(read('gitea'), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('coder', 'gitea')), false);
-  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(c.root, 'businesses/demo.json'), 'utf8'), bytes);
-  last = c.committed().at(-1);
-  assert.equal(last.actor, 'tester');
-  assert.deepEqual(last.changes, []);
-  assert.deepEqual(last.detail, { verb: 'revoke', agent: 'coder', kind: ['gitea'], reason: 'test' });
-  // revoke of a {file} reference: memory, the outside file kept, the reference becomes store.
-  const outside = c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.file;
-  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.revoke', { agent: 'coder', service: 'vikunja', reason: 'moved' });
-  await assert.rejects(read('vikunja'), /credential-unavailable/);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(outside), true);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.coder.credentials.vikunja, { store: true, expires: DATE });
-  assert.ok(c.committed().at(-1).changes.some((e) => e.path === 'roles.coder.credentials.vikunja.store' && e.new === true));
-  // delete: every kind revoked, the agent's dir gone, both references store.
-  c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.issue', { agent: 'reviewer', service: 'gitea', token: OTHER, date: DATE });
-  assert.equal(existsSync(c.store('reviewer', 'gitea')), true);
-  const deleted = c.ask(c.human, 'credentials.delete', { agent: 'reviewer', reason: 'fired' });
-  assert.deepEqual(deleted.services.map((e) => e.state), ['revoked', 'revoked']);
-  assert.equal(existsSync(join(c.root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'reviewer')), false);
-  assert.deepEqual(c.file().roles.reviewer.credentials, { gitea: { store: true, rotateBy: DATE }, vikunja: { store: true, expires: DATE } });
-  assert.deepEqual(c.committed().at(-1).detail, { verb: 'delete', agent: 'reviewer', kind: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], reason: 'fired' });
-  // The status read never carries a value.
-  assert.deepEqual(c.ask(c.human, 'credentials', {}).map((e) => e.state).sort(), ['revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked', 'revoked']);
-  // T4: no token in any file under the root (receipts, business file, events, logs).
-  const walk = (dir) => readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true }).flatMap((e) => e.isDirectory() ? walk(join(dir, e.name)) : e.isFile() ? [join(dir, e.name)] : []);
-  for (const path of walk(c.root))
-    for (const token of [TOKEN, ROTATED, OTHER]) assert.equal(readFileSync(path).includes(token), false, path);
-});

packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import { fixture } from './spec-fixtures.mjs';
 
 // PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1, REQ-WAIT-2 and REQ-DEC-2 (row 139, #1633).
 const WAITS = ['spend', 'data.delete', 'network.expose', 'account.create', 'credential.mint', 'message.external',
-  'git.push.protected', 'git.push.remote', 'deploy'];
+  'git.push.protected', 'deploy'];
 const LEFT = ['git.merge.protected', 'policy.change', 'prd.approve', 'role.revoke'];
 const cite = f => ({ project: 'stack', spec_path: 'spec/north-star.md', spec_commit: f.commit });
 const routed = (f, d) => ({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) });
@@ -36,14 +36,10 @@ test('REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; th
 });
 
 test('REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it', async t => {
-  const f = await fixture(t, { roles: { coder: { definition: 'coder',
-    authority: { withinRole: ['message.send', 'record.write', 'git.push.working'], crossRole: [] } } } });
-  // Row 199: a git.push.remote raise binds the task's latest push, so the task has one.
-  f.broker.recordPush(f.coder, { task_ref: 'vikunja:1/2', project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2',
-    commit: 'a'.repeat(40), previous: null });
+  const f = await fixture(t);
   for (const action of WAITS) {
     for (const args of [{}, cite(f), { ...cite(f), domain: 'technical' }]) {
-      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...(action === 'git.push.remote' ? { target: 'vikunja:1/2' } : {}), ...args });
+      const d = await f.raise({ action, ...args });
       assert.deepEqual(routed(f, d), { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' }, `${action} ${JSON.stringify(args)}`);
     }
   }

packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ test('Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure: only the listed imports, n
     "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';",
     // Row 141 (#1635): the business ID_PATTERN for instance names. The vocabulary is already in
     // RUNNER_FILES and imports nothing. Row 155 (#1649) reads THREAD_DEFINITION and END_PROTECTED
-    // from it too. Row 199 (#1697) reads the D9c fork parse, forkProblem and forkUrl, from it.
-    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED, forkProblem, forkUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
+    // from it too.
+    "import { ID_PATTERN, THREAD_DEFINITION, END_PROTECTED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';",
   ]);
   assert.doesNotMatch(source, /\bimport\s*\(/);
   assert.doesNotMatch(readFileSync(new URL('../src/landing.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8'), /\bimport\b/);

packages/bus/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 steps 1 to 3 and 6, D9b): the broker side of publish. git.push.remote
-// is a hard wait; its decision binds the task's latest push (pushCommit). checkPublish builds the
-// agent's fork from the project's upstream and the agent's own Gitea user; recordPublish spends the
-// decision; publishRefused files the refusal.
-
-import test from 'node:test';
-import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { fork } from 'node:child_process';
-import { once } from 'node:events';
-import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
-
-const TASK = 'vikunja:1/2';
-const A = 'a'.repeat(40);
-const B = 'b'.repeat(40);
-const C = 'c'.repeat(40);
-const identity = (user) => ({ name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: 'https://git.example', user } });
-const pusher = { withinRole: ['git.push.working', 'message.send'], crossRole: [] };
-function businesses(upstream = 'https://git.example/mosaic/stack') {
-  return {
-    demo: {
-      id: 'demo',
-      human: 'jason',
-      arbiters: { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' },
-      projects: { stack: { root: '/nonexistent', remote: upstream }, books: { root: '/nonexistent-books' } },
-      roles: {
-        coder: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-coder'), publish: ['stack'] },
-        second: { authority: pusher, identity: identity('acme-second'), publish: ['stack'] },
-        plain: { authority: pusher },
-        reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } },
-      },
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function setup(t, upstream) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-'));
-  const store = new Store(root);
-  const b = new Broker({ store, businesses: businesses(upstream) });
-  t.after(() => {
-    store.close();
-    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-  const caps = {};
-  for (const role of ['coder', 'second', 'plain', 'reviewer']) {
-    caps[role] = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: 'pi' });
-    b.request(caps[role], { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
-  }
-  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  const call = (cap, verb, args) => b.request(cap, { verb, args });
-  const push = (commit, previous = null, role = 'coder', project = 'stack') => {
-    b.checkPush(caps[role], TASK);
-    return b.recordPush(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project, branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit, previous });
-  };
-  const raise = (role = 'coder') =>
-    call(caps[role], 'decision.raise', {
-      action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-      options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
-    });
-  const approve = (role = 'coder') => {
-    const d = raise(role);
-    call(human, 'decision.resolve', { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' });
-    return d;
-  };
-  const publish = (decision, role = 'coder', extra = {}) =>
-    b.checkPublish(caps[role], { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ...(decision ? { decision: decision.id } : {}), ...extra });
-  const events = (kind) => store.all('SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? ORDER BY seq', kind).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
-  return { b, store, caps, human, call, push, raise, approve, publish, events };
-}
-
-test('a raise with no recorded push refuses no-push; a raise binds the latest push and shows it', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  assert.throws(() => f.raise(), /no-push/);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.raise();
-  assert.match(d.question, new RegExp(`commit ${A}\\)$`));
-  const raised = f.events('action.allowed').find((e) => e.body.operation === 'decision.raise');
-  assert.equal(raised.body.pushCommit, A);
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...f.store.get('SELECT class, route_to FROM decisions WHERE id=?', d.id) }, { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' });
-});
-
-test('happy path: the fork is the upstream repo under the agent\'s own user, the destination is host-built', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  const r = f.publish(d);
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...r, ticket: typeof r.ticket }, {
-    ticket: 'string', task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', fork: 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack',
-    user: 'acme-coder', email: '[email protected]', source: A, dst: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat',
-  });
-  const done = f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
-  assert.deepEqual(done, { task_ref: TASK, fork: r.fork, ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null });
-  const allowed = f.events('action.allowed').filter((e) => e.body.action === 'git.push.remote' && e.body.operation !== 'decision.raise');
-  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].subject, TASK);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.decision, d.id);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, r.fork);
-  // Spent once.
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-consumed/);
-  assert.throws(() => f.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-test('a hard wait: no decision refuses, and a decision for another task refuses', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(null), /decision-required/);
-  const other = f.call(f.caps.coder, 'decision.raise', {
-    action: 'deploy', target: 'vikunja:1/3', question: 'Ship?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }],
-  });
-  f.call(f.human, 'decision.resolve', { id: other.id, choice: 'yes' });
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(other), /decision-mismatch/);
-  const d = f.raise();
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-not-approved/);
-});
-
-test('r4 B4: approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish refuses decision-mismatch', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  f.push(B, A);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), /decision-mismatch/);
-  // And a push between checkPublish and recordPublish refuses the record.
-  const f2 = setup(t);
-  f2.push(A);
-  const d2 = f2.approve();
-  const r = f2.publish(d2);
-  f2.push(C, A);
-  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: A, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
-  assert.throws(() => f2.b.recordPublish(r.ticket, { ref: r.dst, commit: C, previous: null }), /decision-mismatch/);
-});
-
-test('grant and fork refusals', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A, null, 'plain');
-  // plain has no identity and no grant; its raise still binds the push, the publish refuses.
-  const d = f.approve('plain');
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain'), /remote-not-granted/);
-  assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'plain', { project: 'books' }), /remote-not-granted|decision-mismatch/);
-  // work-not-yours: second publishes a push coder made.
-  const g = setup(t);
-  g.push(A);
-  const d2 = g.approve('second');
-  assert.throws(() => g.publish(d2, 'second'), /work-not-yours/);
-});
-
-test('remote-not-fork, compared without case, and remote-host-mismatch, at push', (t) => {
-  for (const [upstream, code] of [
-    ['https://git.example/acme-coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
-    ['https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack', /remote-not-fork/],
-    ['https://other.example/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
-    ['https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack', /remote-host-mismatch/],
-  ]) {
-    const f = setup(t, upstream);
-    f.push(A);
-    const d = f.approve();
-    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d), code, upstream);
-  }
-});
-
-test('two agents granted one project each get their own fork', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const r1 = f.publish(f.approve());
-  assert.equal(r1.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-coder/stack');
-  const g = setup(t);
-  g.push(A, null, 'second');
-  const r2 = g.publish(g.approve('second'), 'second');
-  assert.equal(r2.fork, 'https://git.example/acme-second/stack');
-  assert.equal(r2.dst, 'refs/heads/acme-second/feat');
-});
-
-test('the request cannot name the fork, the user or the destination', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const d = f.approve();
-  for (const extra of [{ fork: 'https://git.example/x/stack' }, { dst: 'refs/heads/main' }, { user: 'x' }, { remote: 'https://x' }])
-    assert.throws(() => f.publish(d, 'coder', extra), /invalid-request/);
-});
-
-test('publishRefused files the code on the task\'s trail and drops the ticket', (t) => {
-  const f = setup(t);
-  f.push(A);
-  const r = f.publish(f.approve());
-  assert.equal(f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'remote-unrelated' }), 'remote-unrelated');
-  const refused = f.events('action.refused').filter((e) => e.subject === TASK);
-  assert.deepEqual(refused.at(-1).body, { code: 'remote-unrelated' });
-  assert.throws(() => f.b.publishRefused(r.ticket, { code: 'x' }), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-test('git.push.remote is in neither ROUTED list and no shipped role grants it', async () => {
-  const { ACTIONS, HARD_WAITS } = await import('../src/broker.mjs');
-  const vocabulary = await import('../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs');
-  assert.ok(ACTIONS.includes('git.push.remote') && HARD_WAITS.includes('git.push.remote'));
-  assert.ok(!vocabulary.ROUTED.includes('git.push.remote'));
-  const { readdirSync, readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');
-  const dir = new URL('../../../roles/', import.meta.url);
-  for (const name of readdirSync(dir).filter((n) => n.endsWith('.json')))
-    assert.ok(!readFileSync(new URL(name, dir), 'utf8').includes('git.push.remote'), name);
-});
-
-// D1 and D9b through the real startBroker: the store is <configDir>/secrets/agents, and the gitea
-// token is used only under an open publish ticket, keyed from the agent checkPublish checked.
-test('runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket only, and the store root is the organization dir', async (t) => {
-  const { startBroker } = await import('../src/runtime.mjs');
-  const { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } = await import('../../business/tests/helpers.mjs');
-  const { chmodSync, mkdirSync } = await import('node:fs');
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-rt-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  // The runtime reads the harness switch from the organization file as it stands.
-  writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets'), 0o700);
-  const demo = businesses().demo;
-  demo.roles.coder.credentials = { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', 'coder', 'gitea'), rotateBy: '2099-01-01' } };
-  const organization = { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) };
-  // No organization, no store root: a store reference refuses the start.
-  await assert.rejects(startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo } }), /credential-reference/);
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo }, organization });
-  t.after(() => bus.close());
-  assert.deepEqual(bus.credentialStatus('demo', 'coder'), [{ service: 'gitea', date: '2099-01-01', state: 'not-issued' }]);
-  const coder = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'coder', run: 'coder-run', harness: 'pi' });
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
-  bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'role.claim', args: {} });
-  bus.checkPush(coder, TASK);
-  bus.recordPush(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', ref: 'work/vikunja-stack-2', commit: A, previous: null });
-  const d = bus.broker.request(coder, { verb: 'decision.raise', args: {
-    action: 'git.push.remote', target: TASK, task_ref: TASK, question: 'Publish?', blocking: false, recommendation: 'yes',
-    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }] } });
-  bus.broker.request(human, { verb: 'decision.resolve', args: { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' } });
-  assert.throws(() => bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }), /decision-required/);
-  const ticket = bus.checkPublish(coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat', decision: d.id }).ticket;
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /credential-unavailable/);
-  bus.credentials.issue('demo/coder', 'gitea', 'fake_publish_token_0123456789', '2099-01-01');
-  assert.equal(await bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => token === 'fake_publish_token_0123456789'), true);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async (token) => ({ echo: token })), /credential-leak/);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea('not-a-ticket', async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(coder, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-  bus.recordPublish(ticket, { ref: 'refs/heads/acme-coder/feat', commit: A, previous: null });
-  await assert.rejects(bus.withGitea(ticket, async () => 1), /publish-unknown/);
-});
-
-// Row 199 (D9b, deviation 11): the bus process answers the socket's five publish ops from their own
-// launchOp lines. A LAUNCH_OPS name without one would get launch-op-refused. A boot config that
-// carries publishTls still boots; process.mjs drops it before startBroker.
-test('the bus process answers the publish ops from their own lines, not launch-op-refused', async (t) => {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-publish-ops-'));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const child = fork(new URL('../src/process.mjs', import.meta.url), [], { stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore', 'ipc'] });
-  t.after(() => {
-    if (child.exitCode === null) child.kill('SIGKILL');
-  });
-  const ask = async (m) => {
-    const reply = once(child, 'message');
-    child.send(m);
-    return (await reply)[0];
-  };
-  const config = { dataRoot: root, businesses: businesses(), launches: [], readers: [], publishTls: ['-c', 'http.sslCAInfo=/nonexistent'] };
-  assert.equal((await ask({ op: 'boot', config })).ok, true);
-  const unknown = 'not-a-ticket';
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishPush', ticket: unknown, id: 1 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 1 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishResult', ticket: unknown, id: 2 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 2 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'recordPublish', ticket: unknown, pushed: { ref: 'refs/heads/x/y', commit: A, previous: null }, id: 3 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 3 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'publishRefused', ticket: unknown, args: { code: 'x' }, id: 4 }), { ok: false, error: 'publish-unknown', id: 4 });
-  assert.deepEqual(await ask({ op: 'checkPublish', cap: 'not-a-cap', args: { task_ref: TASK, project: 'stack', branch: 'feat' }, id: 5 }), { ok: false, error: 'unauthenticated', id: 5 });
-  const exit = once(child, 'exit');
-  child.send({ op: 'close' });
-  assert.equal((await exit)[0], 0);
-});

packages/business/src/business.mjs

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import { checkVars } from "./vars.mjs";
 import { parseCredentialRef } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { loadRole } from "./role.mjs";
 import { checkPlugins } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
-import { forkProblem, giteaName, parseGiteaUrl } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import {
   requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireId, requirePositiveInt, requireString, requireDistinctList, readJsonFile, deepFreeze,
 } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ function checkBot(tracker, where) {
   return { bot: tracker.bot, botId: tracker.botId };
 }
 
-function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where, store = null) {
+function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where) {
   requireObject(map, where);
   const names = Object.keys(map).sort();
   const wanted = [...services].sort();
@@ -49,37 +48,10 @@ function checkCredentialMap(map, services, where, store = null) {
     refuse(`${where} must reference exactly the services its role definition needs (${wanted.join(", ") || "none"}; got ${names.join(", ") || "none"})`);
   }
   const out = {};
-  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`, { store });
+  for (const service of names) out[service] = parseCredentialRef(map[service], service, `${where}.${service}`);
   return out;
 }
 
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D8): the agent's own git identity. The email is the one its Gitea user
-// has, so Gitea links the commits to that user; gitea.url is the instance its pushes go to.
-const EMAIL = /^[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]{1,64}@[A-Za-z0-9.-]{1,190}\.[A-Za-z]{2,24}$/;
-const NAME = /^[^\0\n\r<>]{1,100}$/;
-
-// Row 199 (design D9c): the parse is vocabulary.mjs's, where the broker reads it; this wraps it with
-// the loader's refusals. Returns {url, owner, repo}.
-export function httpsUrl(value, where, { repo = false } = {}) {
-  const parsed = parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo });
-  if (parsed.problem === "form") refuse(`${where} must be a normalized https URL with no user, query or fragment`);
-  if (parsed.problem === "instance") refuse(`${where} must name the Gitea instance only, https://HOST[:PORT]`);
-  if (parsed.problem === "repository") refuse(`${where} must name a repository, https://HOST/OWNER/REPO`);
-  return parsed;
-}
-
-function checkIdentity(identity, where) {
-  requireObject(identity, where);
-  rejectUnknownKeys(identity, ["name", "email", "gitea"], where);
-  if (typeof identity.name !== "string" || !NAME.test(identity.name)) refuse(`${where}.name must be 1 to 100 characters with no <, > or line break`);
-  if (typeof identity.email !== "string" || !EMAIL.test(identity.email)) refuse(`${where}.email must be an email address`);
-  requireObject(identity.gitea, `${where}.gitea`);
-  rejectUnknownKeys(identity.gitea, ["url", "user"], `${where}.gitea`);
-  httpsUrl(identity.gitea.url, `${where}.gitea.url`);
-  if (!giteaName(identity.gitea.user)) refuse(`${where}.gitea.user must be a Gitea user name`);
-  return { name: identity.name, email: identity.email, gitea: { url: identity.gitea.url, user: identity.gitea.user } };
-}
-
 function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   const where = `${file} tracker`;
   requireObject(tracker, where);
@@ -102,7 +74,7 @@ function checkTracker(tracker, file) {
   return { sync, labels };
 }
 
-function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
+function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir) {
   const where = `${file} roles`;
   requireObject(roles, where);
   if (Object.keys(roles).length === 0) refuse(`${where} must declare at least one role instance`);
@@ -114,7 +86,7 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
     requireId(instance, `${where} instance name`);
     const at = `${where}.${instance}`;
     requireObject(entry, at);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials", "identity", "publish"], at);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["definition", "holder", "vars", "tracker", "credentials"], at);
     requireId(entry.definition, `${at}.definition`);
     const definition = Object.hasOwn(definitions, entry.definition) ? definitions[entry.definition] : loadRole(rolesDir, entry.definition);
     definitions[entry.definition] = definition;
@@ -136,18 +108,8 @@ function checkRoles(roles, file, rolesDir, business) {
       holder: entry.holder === undefined ? null : requireId(entry.holder, `${at}.holder`),
       vars: checkVars(entry.vars ?? {}, "agent", `${at}.vars`),
       tracker,
-      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`,
-        { configDir: dirname(dirname(file)), business, agent: instance }),
+      credentials: checkCredentialMap(entry.credentials ?? {}, services, `${at}.credentials`),
     };
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D8, D9 step 2): identity and publish are optional, so today's files
-    // load unchanged. publish needs both an identity and a gitea credential; the project ids it
-    // names are checked against projects once those are read.
-    if (entry.identity !== undefined) out[instance].identity = checkIdentity(entry.identity, `${at}.identity`);
-    if (entry.publish !== undefined) {
-      // N10: one message for both, naming the grant.
-      if (!out[instance].identity || !services.includes("gitea")) refuse(`${at}.publish needs identity and a gitea definition`);
-      out[instance].publish = requireDistinctList(entry.publish, `${at}.publish`, (p) => requireId(p, `${at}.publish entry`), { nonEmpty: true });
-    }
   }
   return { roles: out, definitions };
 }
@@ -197,7 +159,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   }
   const human = requireId(document.human, "business human");
   const vars = checkVars(document.vars ?? {}, "business", `${file} vars`);
-  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir, document.id);
+  const { roles, definitions } = checkRoles(document.roles, file, rolesDir);
 
   requireObject(document.arbiters, `${file} arbiters`);
   rejectUnknownKeys(document.arbiters, ["delivery", "technical"], `${file} arbiters`);
@@ -221,7 +183,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
   for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(document.projects)) {
     requireId(id, `${file} project id`);
     requireObject(entry, `${file} projects.${id}`);
-    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo", "remote"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
+    rejectUnknownKeys(entry, ["root", "repo"], `${file} projects.${id}`);
     if (typeof entry.root !== "string" || !isAbsolute(entry.root) || normalize(entry.root) !== entry.root || entry.root.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.root must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
@@ -229,18 +191,7 @@ export function validateBusinessDocument(document, file, { rolesDir }) {
         normalize(entry.repo) !== entry.repo || entry.repo.includes("\0"))) {
       refuse(`${file} projects.${id}.repo must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
-    // Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 2): the upstream; a granted agent's work goes to its fork.
-    if (Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote")) httpsUrl(entry.remote, `${file} projects.${id}.remote`, { repo: true });
-    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}),
-      ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "remote") ? { remote: entry.remote } : {}) };
-  }
-  for (const [instance, role] of Object.entries(roles)) {
-    for (const project of role.publish ?? []) {
-      if (!Object.hasOwn(projects, project)) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which the business file doesn't declare`);
-      if (!projects[project].remote) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}, which has no "remote"`);
-      const problem = forkProblem(projects[project].remote, role.identity);
-      if (problem) refuse(`${file} roles.${instance}.publish names ${project}: ${problem}`);
-    }
+    projects[id] = { root: entry.root, ...(Object.hasOwn(entry, "repo") ? { repo: entry.repo } : {}) };
   }
 
   const tracker = checkTracker(document.tracker, file);

packages/business/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // lstat and realpath only; nothing in this package opens a token file.
 
 import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
-import { isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
+import { isAbsolute, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
 import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { SERVICES } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
 import { requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireDate } from "./util.mjs";
@@ -14,35 +14,21 @@ const WARN_DAYS = 7;
 const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 
 // Shape check for one reference. Returns a frozen { service, file | env,
-// rotateBy | expires }. Row 199 (#1697, design D1 and D2): `store` is the
-// file at <configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<service>, derived
-// here and never written, so an entry can't name another agent's file. A
-// reference with no agent (the tracker's sync bot) passes store = null and
-// can't use the form. A `file` reference into the agents' store must be the
-// agent's own path (`credential-not-yours`).
-export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
+// rotateBy | expires }.
+export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where) {
   if (!SERVICES.includes(service)) refuse(`${where}: unknown credential service ${JSON.stringify(service)}`);
   requireObject(ref, where);
   const dateKey = DATE_KEY[service];
-  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", "store", dateKey], where);
+  rejectUnknownKeys(ref, ["file", "env", dateKey], where);
   const hasFile = ref.file !== undefined;
   const hasEnv = ref.env !== undefined;
-  const hasStore = ref.store !== undefined;
-  if (Number(hasFile) + Number(hasEnv) + Number(hasStore) !== 1) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file", "env" or "store"`);
+  if (hasFile === hasEnv) refuse(`${where} must name exactly one of "file" or "env"`);
   const out = { service };
-  if (hasStore) {
-    if (ref.store !== true) refuse(`${where}.store must be true`);
-    if (!store) refuse(`${where}: a "store" reference needs an agent`);
-    out.store = true;
-    out.file = storePath(store, service);
-  } else if (hasFile) {
+  if (hasFile) {
     if (typeof ref.file !== "string" || !isAbsolute(ref.file) || normalize(ref.file) !== ref.file || ref.file.includes("\0")) {
       refuse(`${where}.file must be a normalized absolute path`);
     }
     out.file = ref.file;
-    if (store && inside(join(store.configDir, "secrets", "agents"), ref.file) && ref.file !== storePath(store, service)) {
-      refuse(`${where}.file credential-not-yours: ${ref.file} is in the agents' store but not this agent's path`);
-    }
   } else {
     if (typeof ref.env !== "string" || !ENV_NAME.test(ref.env)) refuse(`${where}.env must match ${ENV_NAME}`);
     out.env = ref.env;
@@ -52,11 +38,6 @@ export function parseCredentialRef(ref, service, where, { store = null } = {}) {
   return Object.freeze(out);
 }
 
-// The store path for one agent and service (design D1).
-export function storePath({ configDir, business, agent }, service) {
-  return join(configDir, "secrets", "agents", business, agent, service);
-}
-
 function inside(root, path) {
   const rel = relative(root, path);
   return rel === "" || (!rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && rel !== ".." && !isAbsolute(rel));
@@ -74,10 +55,8 @@ export function checkCredentialRef(ref, { forbiddenRoots = [], now = new Date(),
     let stat = null;
     try {
       stat = lstatSync(ref.file);
-    } catch (e) {
-      // Row 199 (design D3a): a store reference with no file is an agent not issued yet.
-      if (ref.store && e.code === "ENOENT") warnings.push(`${label}: not issued`);
-      else problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
+    } catch {
+      problems.push(`${label}: not found`);
     }
     if (stat) {
       if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isFile()) problems.push(`${label}: must be a regular file, not a symbolic link`);

packages/business/src/organization.mjs

@@ -174,9 +174,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     }
   }
 
-  // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): `detail` says what a credential verb did (verb, agent, kind,
-  // date, reason), never a value; the other setters pass none.
-  function write(id, document, { revision, actor, detail }) {
+  function write(id, document, { revision, actor }) {
     requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
     requireId(id, "organization id");
     return withLock(id, ({ home, parent }) => {
@@ -203,7 +201,7 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
       syncDir(tx);
       const event = {
         transaction, actor, business: id, before, after,
-        changes: changes(old, written), ...(detail === undefined ? {} : { detail }), at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        changes: changes(old, written), at: new Date().toISOString(),
       };
       log(id, { ...event, state: "prepared" });
       syncDir(home);
@@ -221,22 +219,5 @@ export function organizationWriter({ dir, rolesDir, barrier = () => {} }) {
     });
   }
 
-  // Row 199: a receipt with no document change, for a credential verb that changes only the agents'
-  // store (a revoke or delete of store references). Committed at once; there is nothing to recover.
-  function record(id, { actor, detail }) {
-    requireId(actor, "authenticated actor");
-    requireId(id, "organization id");
-    return withLock(id, () => {
-      recover(id);
-      const hash = sha256(regular(businessFilePath(id, dir)));
-      const transaction = randomUUID();
-      log(id, {
-        transaction, actor, business: id, before: hash, after: hash, changes: [], detail,
-        at: new Date().toISOString(), state: "committed",
-      });
-      return { revision: hash, transaction };
-    });
-  }
-
-  return { logFile, read, write, record, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
+  return { logFile, read, write, recover: id => withLock(id, () => recover(id)) };
 }

packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs

@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@ export const ACTIONS = Object.freeze([
   "git.push.working",
   "git.push.protected",
   "git.merge.protected",
-  // Row 199 (#1697, mos-1027 Q-M2): the host pushes an agent's recorded work commit to the fork its
-  // business grants it. A hard wait under REQ-WAIT-3 until a PRD version routes it.
-  "git.push.remote",
   "review.request",
   "review.verdict",
   "record.write",
@@ -86,8 +83,8 @@ export const ROUTED = Object.freeze([
 // The hard waits (PRD 1.5 REQ-WAIT-1): always gated, always the human's,
 // cited spec or not. A role file may not list these under withinRole or
 // crossRole (REQ-WAIT-2). Today this is spend, data.delete, network.expose,
-// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected,
-// git.push.remote and deploy; a test pins the list.
+// account.create, credential.mint, message.external, git.push.protected and
+// deploy; a test pins the list.
 export const GATED_ONLY = Object.freeze(ACTIONS.filter((action) => !ROUTED.includes(action)));
 
 // pi's documented built-in tools; the same list scripts/mosaic-task.mjs
@@ -136,50 +133,3 @@ export const THREAD_DEFINITION = "assistant";
 // the human resolved through the CLI, may end or revoke. Row 155 moves the list here, and no
 // organization write may give an instance one of them.
 export const END_PROTECTED = Object.freeze([THREAD_DEFINITION]);
-
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9c): the Gitea URL parse. It lives here because the broker reads it and
-// this file imports nothing. Gitea's name rule for users and repositories: letters, digits, "_", "."
-// and "-", not "." or "..".
-export const giteaName = (name) =>
-  typeof name === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/.test(name) && name !== "." && name !== "..";
-
-// An https URL that is already its own normalized form, so a dot segment, an encoded dot, userinfo, a
-// query, a fragment, an upper-case host or an explicit :443 each fail, and the path checked is the
-// path used. With repo, the path is exactly /OWNER/REPO (one ".git" stripped); without, it is "/".
-// Returns {url, owner, repo}, or {problem} naming the rule that failed: form, instance or repository.
-export function parseGiteaUrl(value, { repo = false } = {}) {
-  let url = null;
-  try {
-    url = typeof value === "string" ? new URL(value) : null;
-  } catch {
-    url = null;
-  }
-  const normal = url && (repo ? [url.origin + url.pathname] : [url.origin, url.origin + "/"]);
-  if (!url || url.protocol !== "https:" || !normal.includes(value)) return { problem: "form" };
-  if (!repo) return url.pathname === "/" ? { url } : { problem: "instance" };
-  const segments = url.pathname.split("/").slice(1);
-  const name = segments[1]?.endsWith(".git") ? segments[1].slice(0, -4) : segments[1];
-  if (segments.length !== 2 || !giteaName(segments[0]) || !giteaName(name)) return { problem: "repository" };
-  return { url, owner: segments[0], repo: name };
-}
-
-// Design D9 step 2: the agent's fork of an upstream, https://HOST[:PORT]/<user>/REPO, or null for an
-// upstream that doesn't parse. The owner is always the agent's own Gitea user; nothing else names it.
-// URL.host drops a default port, so 443 counts the same on both sides.
-export function forkUrl(upstream, user) {
-  const { url, repo } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
-  return url ? `https://${url.host}/${user}/${repo}` : null;
-}
-
-// The refusal code for publishing `upstream` as an agent with `identity`, or null. Gitea compares
-// names without case (lower_name), so the owner check does too. An upstream or gitea.url that doesn't
-// parse is remote-not-granted: the business loader refuses both, so only a hand-built business gets
-// here.
-export function forkProblem(upstream, identity) {
-  const { url, owner } = parseGiteaUrl(upstream, { repo: true });
-  const instance = parseGiteaUrl(identity?.gitea?.url).url;
-  if (!url || !instance || typeof identity.gitea.user !== "string") return "remote-not-granted";
-  if (url.host !== instance.host) return "remote-host-mismatch";
-  if (owner.toLowerCase() === identity.gitea.user.toLowerCase()) return "remote-not-fork";
-  return null;
-}

packages/business/tests/agent-identity.test.mjs

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697): an agent's own git identity, its publish grant, the project's upstream and the
-// credential store reference. Design D1, D8, D9 step 2 and D9c.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { BusinessError, parseCredentialRef, validateBusinessDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
-import { forkProblem, forkUrl } from "../src/vocabulary.mjs";
-import { businessDoc, FAR_DATE, REPO_ROLES, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
-
-function refuses(fn, pattern) {
-  assert.throws(fn, (error) => {
-    assert.ok(error instanceof BusinessError, `expected BusinessError, got ${error}`);
-    assert.equal(error.exitCode, 2);
-    assert.match(error.message, pattern);
-    return true;
-  });
-}
-
-const IDENTITY = { name: "Coder", email: "[email protected]", gitea: { url: "https://git.example", user: "acme-coder" } };
-
-// The fixture with coder granted publish on stack, whose upstream is mosaic/stack.
-function check(mutate) {
-  const root = tmp();
-  const doc = businessDoc(root);
-  doc.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack";
-  doc.roles.coder.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY);
-  doc.roles.coder.publish = ["stack"];
-  mutate?.(doc, root);
-  return validateBusinessDocument(doc, join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
-}
-
-test("today's files load unchanged: identity, publish and remote are optional", () => {
-  const root = tmp();
-  const business = validateBusinessDocument(businessDoc(root), join(root, "businesses", "acme.json"), { rolesDir: REPO_ROLES });
-  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.identity, undefined);
-  assert.equal(business.roles.coder.publish, undefined);
-  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, undefined);
-});
-
-test("a granted agent loads with its identity, grant and the project's upstream", () => {
-  const business = check();
-  assert.deepEqual({ ...business.roles.coder.identity, gitea: { ...business.roles.coder.identity.gitea } }, IDENTITY);
-  assert.deepEqual([...business.roles.coder.publish], ["stack"]);
-  assert.equal(business.projects.stack.remote, "https://git.example/mosaic/stack");
-});
-
-test("N10: publish needs identity and a gitea definition, and the error names the grant", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.roles.coder.identity; }), /roles\.coder\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.chief.identity = structuredClone(IDENTITY); d.roles.chief.publish = ["stack"]; }),
-    /roles\.chief\.publish needs identity and a gitea definition/);
-});
-
-test("publish names declared projects that have a remote, each once", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["books"]; }), /publish names books, which the business file doesn't declare/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { delete d.projects.stack.remote; }), /publish names stack, which has no "remote"/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = []; }), /publish/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.publish = ["stack", "stack"]; }), /publish/);
-});
-
-test("identity fields are checked", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.email = "coder"; }), /identity\.email/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.name = "a\nb"; }), /identity\.name/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.extra = 1; }), /identity/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = ".."; }), /gitea\.user/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.user = "a/b"; }), /gitea\.user/);
-});
-
-test("D9c: the upstream must be its own normalized form, exactly /OWNER/REPO", () => {
-  const bad = {
-    "a dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/../mosaic/stack",
-    "an encoded dot segment": "https://git.example/acme-coder/%2e%2e/mosaic/stack",
-    "an extra segment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/more",
-    "a missing segment": "https://git.example/stack",
-    "a trailing slash": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack/",
-    userinfo: "https://u:[email protected]/mosaic/stack",
-    "a query": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack?x=1",
-    "a fragment": "https://git.example/mosaic/stack#f",
-    "an explicit :443": "https://git.example:443/mosaic/stack",
-    "an upper-case host": "https://GIT.example/mosaic/stack",
-    "a backslash": "https://git.example\\mosaic\\stack",
-    "a name outside Gitea's rule": "https://git.example/mosaic/st%41ck",
-    "a dot-dot repo": "https://git.example/mosaic/...git",
-    http: "http://git.example/mosaic/stack",
-  };
-  for (const [what, remote] of Object.entries(bad)) {
-    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = remote; }), BusinessError, what);
-  }
-});
-
-test("D9c: one .git is stripped, and the fork is built from the stripped name", () => {
-  assert.equal(check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git"; }).projects.stack.remote,
-    "https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git");
-  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example/mosaic/stack.git", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack");
-  assert.equal(forkUrl("https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack", "acme-coder"), "https://git.example:3000/acme-coder/stack");
-});
-
-test("D9c: gitea.url names the instance only", () => {
-  for (const url of ["https://git.example/gitea", "https://git.example/gitea/", "https://git.example/?x", "https://git.example:443", "http://git.example"]) {
-    assert.throws(() => check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = url; }), BusinessError, url);
-  }
-  check((d) => { d.roles.coder.identity.gitea.url = "https://git.example/"; });
-});
-
-test("the upstream's host and port must be the agent's Gitea's", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://other.example/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example:3000/mosaic/stack"; }), /remote-host-mismatch/);
-  assert.equal(forkProblem("https://git.example/mosaic/stack", { gitea: { url: "https://git.example/", user: "u" } }), null);
-});
-
-test("remote-not-fork: an upstream the agent's own user owns, compared without case", () => {
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/acme-coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
-  refuses(() => check((d) => { d.projects.stack.remote = "https://git.example/ACME-Coder/stack"; }), /remote-not-fork/);
-});
-
-test("store references: own path only (design D1, D3a)", () => {
-  const store = { configDir: "/cfg", business: "acme", agent: "coder" };
-  const ref = parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store });
-  assert.equal(ref.file, "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
-  assert.equal(ref.store, true);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r"), /store/);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ store: true, file: "/a", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }), /exactly one/);
-  refuses(() => parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/pm/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }),
-    /credential-not-yours/);
-  assert.equal(parseCredentialRef({ file: "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea", rotateBy: FAR_DATE }, "gitea", "r", { store }).file,
-    "/cfg/secrets/agents/acme/coder/gitea");
-});

packages/business/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { validateRoleDocument } from "../src/index.mjs";
 import { tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
 
 const WAITS = ["spend", "data.delete", "network.expose", "account.create", "credential.mint", "message.external",
-  "git.push.protected", "deploy", "git.push.remote"];
+  "git.push.protected", "deploy"];
 const LEFT = ["git.merge.protected", "policy.change", "prd.approve", "role.revoke"];
 const role = (authority) => {
   const dir = tmp();

packages/cli/README.md

@@ -1009,19 +1009,6 @@ names no one; the restart itself needs Mos's go or Jason's hand. A vars or launc
 prints `no restart`, because the launcher reads it at its next launch check.
 The Console Settings page has the same read and write (`packages/webui`).
 
-## credentials (row 199)
-
-`mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester]` lists each agent's
-credential kinds with date and state, never a value. `issue AGENT gitea
---rotate-by DATE` and `issue AGENT vikunja --expires DATE` read the token on
-stdin (pipe it, or paste it and end input) and send it once to the bus's
-`credentials.issue`; it is never an argument. `rotate` is the same over an
-entry the bus holds now, and refuses before reading stdin when there is none.
-`revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT` and `delete AGENT --reason TEXT` drop the
-entries; `delete` refuses `agent-running` while the agent holds a claim. With
-`--tester` only `status` and `revoke` run. After a rotate or revoke, delete
-the old token in Gitea or Vikunja yourself; the bus only forgets it.
-
 ## Token usage
 
 `mosaic usage [--business ID] [--json] [--tester]` reads the bus's accounting, without

packages/cli/src/cli.mjs

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import { projectBusCommand, projectCommand, PROJECT_BUS_USAGE, PROJECT_USAGE } f
 import { resolveThread, threadCommand, threadMembers, threadsCommand, THREAD_TALK_USAGE, THREAD_USAGE, THREADS_USAGE } from "./thread.mjs";
 import { limitsCommand, LIMITS_USAGE } from "./limits.mjs";
 import { pluginsCommand, PLUGINS_USAGE } from "./plugins.mjs";
-import { credentialsCommand, CREDENTIALS_USAGE } from "./credentials.mjs";
 import { instancesCommand, INSTANCES_USAGE } from "./instances.mjs";
 import { createChannelCaller } from "../../plugins/src/channel.mjs";
 import { PluginError } from "../../plugins/src/kinds.mjs";
@@ -39,7 +38,6 @@ export const USAGE = `usage:
   ${USAGE_USAGE}
   ${LIMITS_USAGE}
   ${PLUGINS_USAGE}
-  ${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}
   ${INSTANCES_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_USAGE}
   ${PROJECT_BUS_USAGE}
@@ -578,8 +576,6 @@ export async function main(argv, io = { env: process.env, stdin: process.stdin,
   if (verb === "limits") return limitsCommand(rest,io,p=>callFor(p,io,deps));
   if (verb === "usage") return usageCommand(rest, io, p => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "plugins") return pluginsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
-  // Row 199 (#1697): issue and rotate read the token on stdin.
-  if (verb === "credentials") return credentialsCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   // Row 165 (#1662): scripts/mosaic sends only `business instances` and `business instance` here.
   if (verb === "business") return instancesCommand(rest, io, (p) => callFor(p, io, deps));
   if (verb === "talk") return talk(rest, io, deps);

packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-// `mosaic credentials` (row 199, #1697, design section 6): an agent's per-agent credentials through
-// the broker's credentials, credentials.issue, credentials.revoke and credentials.delete. Every verb
-// is the human's; with --tester (Q173) only status and revoke. issue and rotate read the token on
-// stdin, never argv, and nothing here prints it: the broker's answer carries the kind, date and state.
-import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
-
-export const CREDENTIALS_USAGE = "mosaic credentials [status [AGENT]] [--json] [--tester] | issue|rotate AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE | " +
-  "issue|rotate AGENT vikunja --expires DATE | revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason TEXT [--tester] | delete AGENT --reason TEXT [--business ID]";
-const DATE_FLAG = Object.freeze({ gitea: "--rotate-by", vikunja: "--expires" });
-const MAX_TOKEN = 16384;
-
-function parse(args) {
-  const out = { positional: [], flags: new Set(), values: {} };
-  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
-    const arg = args[i];
-    if (arg === "--json" || arg === "--tester") out.flags.add(arg);
-    else if (["--business", "--rotate-by", "--expires", "--reason"].includes(arg)) {
-      if (!args[i + 1] || Object.hasOwn(out.values, arg)) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-      out.values[arg] = args[++i];
-    } else if (arg.startsWith("--")) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-    else out.positional.push(arg);
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-// The whole of stdin, one token; a terminal shows what is typed, so a pipe or a paste then EOF.
-async function readToken(stdin) {
-  let text = "";
-  for await (const chunk of stdin) {
-    text += chunk;
-    if (text.length > MAX_TOKEN + 2) throw new CliError("refused: the token on stdin is too long", 2);
-  }
-  if (!text.trim()) throw new CliError("refused: no token on stdin; pipe or paste it, then end input", 4);
-  return text;
-}
-
-// The states the bus's status() gives a held token: gitea is valid or rotation-due, vikunja valid,
-// expiring or expired. not-issued and revoked hold none.
-const ISSUED = new Set(["valid", "rotation-due", "expiring", "expired"]);
-
-export async function credentialsCommand(args, io, callFor) {
-  const parsed = parse(args);
-  const [verb = "status", agent, kind, ...extra] = parsed.positional;
-  const v = parsed.values;
-  const shape = {
-    status: () => kind === undefined && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"] && !v["--reason"],
-    issue: () => agent && DATE_FLAG[kind] && v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] && !v[kind === "gitea" ? "--expires" : "--rotate-by"] && !v["--reason"],
-    revoke: () => agent && (kind === undefined || DATE_FLAG[kind]) && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
-    delete: () => agent && kind === undefined && v["--reason"] && !v["--rotate-by"] && !v["--expires"],
-  };
-  shape.rotate = shape.issue;
-  if (extra.length || !shape[verb]?.()) throw new CliError(CREDENTIALS_USAGE, 4);
-  // Q173 (duckworth N1): a token the tester issued would pass through its session.
-  if (parsed.flags.has("--tester") && !["status", "revoke"].includes(verb)) {
-    throw new CliError(`--tester takes only status and revoke\n${CREDENTIALS_USAGE}`, 4);
-  }
-  try {
-    const call = callFor(parsed);
-    let result;
-    if (verb === "status") {
-      const rows = await call("credentials", {});
-      result = agent ? rows.filter((r) => r.role === agent) : rows;
-      if (!parsed.flags.has("--json")) {
-        io.stdout.write(result.map((r) => `${r.role}\t${r.service}\t${r.state}\t${r.dateKind} ${r.date}`).join("\n") + (result.length ? "\n" : ""));
-        return;
-      }
-    } else if (verb === "issue" || verb === "rotate") {
-      // rotate names an entry the bus holds now; checked before stdin is read.
-      if (verb === "rotate") {
-        const held = (await call("credentials", {})).find((r) => r.role === agent && r.service === kind);
-        if (!ISSUED.has(held?.state)) throw new CliError(`refused: ${agent} has no issued ${kind} credential to rotate; use issue`, 2);
-      }
-      const token = await readToken(io.stdin);
-      result = await call("credentials.issue", { agent, service: kind, token, date: v[DATE_FLAG[kind]] });
-    } else if (verb === "revoke") {
-      result = await call("credentials.revoke", { agent, ...(kind ? { service: kind } : {}), reason: v["--reason"] });
-    } else result = await call("credentials.delete", { agent, reason: v["--reason"] });
-    io.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
-  } catch (error) {
-    if (error instanceof CliError) throw error;
-    throw new CliError(error.message, 2);
-  }
-}

packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs

@@ -26,19 +26,6 @@
 //          squash that will land. The gate runs after the answer, and its
 //          outcome is the broker's: recordLand or landRefused, each on the
 //          task's trail and told to the role as a RESULT message.
-//   publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
-//          (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D11). The host answers {"ok": true,
-//          "result": {fork, ref, commit, previous}} or a refusal. The broker's
-//          checkPublish names the fork, the agent's email, the source commit
-//          and the destination; the request names none of them. publish
-//          (working.mjs) checks the work ref and the commits' identity under
-//          the repository's lock, then the bus process runs ls-remote and the
-//          push with the agent's gitea token (publishPush), and the host polls
-//          publishResult every publishPollMs: the host's op channel answers
-//          one op at a time within 10 s. The poll ends at publishDeadlineMs
-//          (publish-timeout), past git's own limit on each of the four git
-//          runs. recordPublish files the push; any refusal after checkPublish
-//          is filed once, by publishRefused.
 //
 // A refusal is {"ok": false, "error": "<code>"}, and the connection ends.
 // The host checks, in order: identity (a role of this business), the request
@@ -77,10 +64,9 @@ import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, createReadStream, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, statSync, symlinkSync, writeSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
 import { createServer } from "node:net";
 import { join } from "node:path";
-import { GIT_GRACE_MS, GIT_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
 import { gitSocketPath } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
 import { gateEnv, isMosaicStack, rootHits, runGate } from "../../seat/src/landing.mjs";
-import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, publish, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
+import { BUNDLE_MAX, dropLand, finishLand, FSCK, HAVE_MAX, prepareLand, push, review, validBranch, workRef, WorkingError } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
 import { CliError } from "./errors.mjs";
 
 const HEADER_MAX = 4096;
@@ -98,11 +84,6 @@ export const bodyDeadline = (size) => BODY_IDLE_MS + Math.ceil(size / BODY_MIN_R
 const MAX_ACTIVE = 8;
 // The longest close() waits for its host-closing answers to leave.
 export const CLOSE_WAIT_MS = 2000;
-// How often the host asks the bus process whether a publish's push ended.
-const PUBLISH_POLL_MS = 200;
-// The longest the host polls: publishRemote runs at most four git commands
-// (ls-remote, cat-file, merge-base, push), each ended by git's own limit.
-const PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS = 4 * (GIT_TIMEOUT_MS + GIT_GRACE_MS) + 30_000;
 const CAP = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
 const OID = /^[0-9a-f]{40}([0-9a-f]{24})?$/;
 
@@ -291,7 +272,7 @@ Applied-under: git socket land (bus host)
 // host: startHost()'s handle; business: loadBusiness() output. bundleMax,
 // bodyDeadline, bodyIdle, maxActive, fsck and gate (LAND_GATE's shape) are
 // for the tests.
-export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE, publishPollMs = PUBLISH_POLL_MS, publishDeadlineMs = PUBLISH_DEADLINE_MS }) {
+export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env, log = () => {}, bundleMax = BUNDLE_MAX, bodyDeadline: deadlineOf = bodyDeadline, bodyIdle = BODY_IDLE_MS, maxActive = MAX_ACTIVE, fsck = FSCK, gate = LAND_GATE }) {
   const path = gitSocketPath(dataRoot);
   const dir = join(dataRoot, "bus-host");
   let server = null;
@@ -405,55 +386,6 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
     })();
   }
 
-  async function doPublish(socket, cap, req) {
-    const { task_ref, branch, decision } = req;
-    const p = project(req.project);
-    if (!p || !validBranch(branch) || (decision !== undefined && typeof decision !== "string")) throw new Refusal("invalid-request");
-    workRef(task_ref);
-    const facts = await op({ op: "checkPublish", cap, args: { task_ref, project: req.project, branch, ...(decision === undefined ? {} : { decision }) } });
-    const { ticket } = facts;
-    // From the ticket on, a refusal is the publish's own, filed once by publishRefused.
-    const refused = async (e) => {
-      const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof Recorded || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";
-      if (code === "git-failed") log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${code}: ${e.message}`);
-      await host.op({ op: "publishRefused", ticket, args: { code } }).catch((x) => log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: refusal ${code} not recorded: ${x.code ?? x.message}`));
-      return new Recorded(code);
-    };
-    let pushed;
-    try {
-      pushed = await publish({
-        dataRoot, business: b.id, project: req.project, root: p.root, taskRef: task_ref, source: facts.source, email: facts.email, env,
-        remote: async () => {
-          await op({ op: "publishPush", ticket });
-          const until = Date.now() + publishDeadlineMs;
-          for (;;) {
-            // The bus's git may still finish after this; the fork could then hold the commit with
-            // no record, as when recordPublish refuses after a push.
-            if (Date.now() >= until) {
-              log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: publish-timeout; the bus process's push may still reach the fork`);
-              throw new Refusal("publish-timeout");
-            }
-            await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, publishPollMs));
-            const r = await op({ op: "publishResult", ticket });
-            if (r.state === "pushed") return { ref: r.ref, commit: r.commit, previous: r.previous };
-            if (r.state === "refused") throw new Recorded(r.code);
-          }
-        },
-      });
-    } catch (e) {
-      throw await refused(e);
-    }
-    // The commit is on the fork now; a record the broker refuses is filed as that refusal.
-    let result;
-    try {
-      result = await op({ op: "recordPublish", ticket, pushed });
-    } catch (e) {
-      log(`git socket: publish ${task_ref}: ${pushed.commit} is on ${facts.fork} but wasn't recorded: ${e.code}`);
-      throw await refused(e);
-    }
-    socket.end(`${JSON.stringify({ ok: true, result: { fork: result.fork, ref: result.ref, commit: result.commit, previous: result.previous } })}\n`);
-  }
-
   async function serve(socket) {
     let cap = null;
     let subject = null;
@@ -478,8 +410,7 @@ export function createGitSocket({ host, business: b, dataRoot, env = process.env
       if (req.op === "push") await doPush(socket, cap, req, rest, file);
       else if (req.op === "fetch") await doFetch(socket, cap, req, file);
       else if (req.op === "land") await doLand(socket, cap, req);
-      else if (req.op === "publish") await doPublish(socket, cap, req);
-      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch, land or publish");
+      else throw new Refusal("invalid-request", "op is push, fetch or land");
     } catch (e) {
       if (e instanceof Recorded) return fail(e.code);
       const code = e instanceof Refusal || e instanceof WorkingError ? e.code : "git-failed";

packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs

@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@
 // launchedBy = the business's human and no caller capability.
 //
 // listen() also serves the git socket (src/git-socket.mjs, row 93), which
-// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working,
-// review.verdict or git.push.remote (row 199), or a merge decision to land
-// (landHeld, row 137);
+// the sandbox binds for a role that holds git.push.working or
+// review.verdict, or a merge decision to land (landHeld, row 137);
 // session.json names it as gitSocket.
 //
 // Thread sessions (row 121, #1615). A thread instance (an instance whose
@@ -398,9 +397,8 @@ export function createLauncher({
     const transcript = call(model.harness, "transcript", () => harness.transcript({ runDir, store }));
     const harnessMounts = call(model.harness, "mounts", () => harness.mounts({ env }));
     // Row 93: the git socket, for a role that pushes work or reviews it. Row 137: or lands it.
-    // Row 199 (D11): or publishes it, once a reviewed commit routes git.push.remote within-role.
     const held = [...resolved.limits.authority.withinRole, ...resolved.limits.authority.crossRole];
-    const git = land || ["git.push.working", "review.verdict", "git.push.remote"].some((a) => held.includes(a)) ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
+    const git = land || held.includes("git.push.working") || held.includes("review.verdict") ? gitSocketPath(dataRoot) : null;
     writeSessionFile(runDir, {
       ...sessionDefaults,
       business: b.id,

packages/cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design section 6, T4, T5): `mosaic credentials`. issue and rotate read the token on
-// stdin and pass it once to credentials.issue; nothing printed carries it. --tester takes status and
-// revoke only. A fake transport records the calls; no bus runs here.
-import test from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-import { main } from "../src/cli.mjs";
-import { io, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
-
-const TOKEN = "fake_cli_token_0123456789";
-const MOSAIC = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../../scripts/mosaic", import.meta.url));
-const ROWS = [
-  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "valid" },
-  { service: "vikunja", account: "bot", role: "coder", dateKind: "expires", date: "2099-01-01", state: "not-issued" },
-  { service: "gitea", account: null, role: "reviewer", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2099-01-01", state: "revoked" },
-];
-
-function deps(calls, rows = ROWS) {
-  const answer = (who) => (business) => async (verb, args) => {
-    calls.push({ who, business, verb, args });
-    if (verb === "credentials") return rows;
-    if (verb === "credentials.issue") return { agent: args.agent, verb: "issue", service: args.service, date: args.date, state: "valid" };
-    return { agent: args.agent, verb: verb.slice(12), services: [] };
-  };
-  return { system: { dataRoot: "/nonexistent" }, transport: answer("human"), testerTransport: answer("tester") };
-}
-const withStdin = (x, text) => {
-  x.stdin.end(text);
-  return x;
-};
-
-test("row 199: issue and rotate send the stdin token once to credentials.issue and print no value", async () => {
-  const calls = [];
-  const d = deps(calls);
-  const x = withStdin(io(), TOKEN + "\n");
-  await main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls, [{ who: "human", business: "acme", verb: "credentials.issue", args: { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", token: TOKEN + "\n", date: "2099-01-01" } }]);
-  assert.equal(x.out.text.includes(TOKEN), false);
-  assert.equal(JSON.parse(x.out.text).state, "valid");
-  // rotate checks the entry is issued before it reads stdin.
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials", "credentials.issue"]);
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "vikunja", "--expires", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /no issued vikunja credential to rotate; use issue/);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
-  // No token on stdin, the date flag of the other kind, a token in argv: refused before any write.
-  calls.length = 0;
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "\n"), d), /no token on stdin/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--expires", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /mosaic credentials/);
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), "x".repeat(17000)), d), /too long/);
-  assert.equal(calls.filter((c) => c.verb === "credentials.issue").length, 0);
-  // From inside an agent run, the human's verbs refuse before any call.
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io({ CLAUDECODE: "1" }), TOKEN), d), /outside any agent run/);
-});
-
-// gizmoduck-0050: a gitea key past its rotate-by date is rotation-due, and rotate is how a human
-// clears it. Every state the bus's status() gives a held token rotates; the other two refuse.
-test("row 199: rotate goes ahead on each held state, rotation-due included, and refuses not-issued, revoked and an unknown entry", async () => {
-  const states = { valid: true, "rotation-due": true, expiring: true, expired: true, "not-issued": false, revoked: false };
-  for (const [state, held] of Object.entries(states)) {
-    const calls = [];
-    const d = deps(calls, [{ service: "gitea", account: null, role: "coder", dateKind: "rotateBy", date: "2020-01-01", state }]);
-    const run = main(["credentials", "rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d);
-    if (held) await run;
-    else await assert.rejects(run, /no issued gitea credential to rotate; use issue/);
-    assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), held ? ["credentials", "credentials.issue"] : ["credentials"], state);
-  }
-  const calls = [];
-  await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", "rotate", "tester", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-06-01", "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), deps(calls)), /no issued gitea credential/);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => c.verb), ["credentials"]);
-});
-
-test("row 199: status, revoke and delete; the tester runs status and revoke only", async () => {
-  const calls = [];
-  const d = deps(calls);
-  const x = io();
-  await main(["credentials", "status", "coder", "--business", "acme"], x, d);
-  assert.equal(x.out.text, "coder\tgitea\tvalid\trotateBy 2099-01-01\ncoder\tvikunja\tnot-issued\texpires 2099-01-01\n");
-  const j = io();
-  await main(["credentials", "--json", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], j, d);
-  assert.equal(JSON.parse(j.out.text).length, 3);
-  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme", "--tester"], io(), d);
-  await main(["credentials", "revoke", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
-  await main(["credentials", "delete", "coder", "--reason", "fired", "--business", "acme"], io(), d);
-  assert.deepEqual(calls.map((c) => [c.who, c.verb, c.args]), [
-    ["human", "credentials", {}],
-    ["tester", "credentials", {}],
-    ["tester", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", service: "gitea", reason: "fired" }],
-    ["human", "credentials.revoke", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
-    ["human", "credentials.delete", { agent: "coder", reason: "fired" }],
-  ]);
-  calls.length = 0;
-  for (const args of [
-    ["issue", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
-    ["rotate", "coder", "gitea", "--rotate-by", "2099-01-01", "--tester"],
-    ["delete", "coder", "--reason", "x", "--tester"],
-  ]) await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], withStdin(io(), TOKEN), d), /--tester takes only status and revoke/);
-  for (const args of [["revoke", "coder"], ["delete", "coder"], ["delete", "coder", "gitea", "--reason", "x"], ["revoke", "coder", "model", "--reason", "x"], ["purge", "coder"]])
-    await assert.rejects(main(["credentials", ...args, "--business", "acme"], io(), d), /mosaic credentials/, args.join(" "));
-  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("row 199: scripts/mosaic sends credentials to packages/cli, not the seat CLI", (t) => {
-  const root = tmp(t, "mosaic-cli-cred-route-");
-  const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: join(root, "home"), MOSAIC_CONFIG: join(root, "none.json") };
-  const r = spawnSync(MOSAIC, ["credentials", "purge"], { env, encoding: "utf8" });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 4);
-  assert.match(r.stderr, /^mosaic: mosaic credentials \[status \[AGENT\]\]/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(r.stderr, /mosaic launch </);
-});

packages/cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9, D9b, D11, T3): the git socket's publish op end to end. The socket,
-// working.mjs, the bus runtime (in this process, so its publishTls can name the scratch CA), the
-// per-agent store and a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1. The host stand-in answers the socket's ops
-// the way packages/bus/src/process.mjs does. Fake tokens in a scratch root only.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { chmodSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { connect } from "node:net";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
-import { startBroker } from "../../bus/src/runtime.mjs";
-import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from "../../business/tests/helpers.mjs";
-import { pushWorking } from "../../harness/src/git-tools.mjs";
-import { gitEnv } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
-import { workRef } from "../../seat/src/working.mjs";
-import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "../../seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs";
-import { createGitSocket } from "../src/git-socket.mjs";
-
-const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
-const TASK2 = "vikunja:1/3";
-const TOKEN = "fake_socket_token_0123456789";
-const TOKEN2 = "fake_second_token_0123456789";
-
-function git(cwd, ...args) {
-  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  return r.stdout.trim();
-}
-function commit(dir, text, email) {
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
-  git(dir, "add", "README");
-  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
-  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
-}
-function raw(path, req) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const s = connect(path);
-    let buf = "";
-    s.on("connect", () => s.write(`${JSON.stringify(req)}\n`));
-    s.on("data", (b) => (buf += b));
-    s.on("end", () => resolve(JSON.parse(buf.split("\n")[0])));
-    s.on("error", reject);
-  });
-}
-// The socket's ops, answered as process.mjs's launchOp answers them.
-const OPS = {
-  identity: (r, m) => r.identity(m.cap),
-  refuse: (r, m) => r.refuse(m.cap, m.code, m.subject),
-  checkPush: (r, m) => r.checkPush(m.cap, m.task_ref),
-  recordPush: (r, m) => r.recordPush(m.cap, m.push),
-  checkPublish: (r, m) => r.checkPublish(m.cap, m.args),
-  publishPush: (r, m) => r.publishPush(m.ticket),
-  publishResult: (r, m) => r.publishResult(m.ticket),
-  recordPublish: (r, m) => r.recordPublish(m.ticket, m.pushed),
-  publishRefused: (r, m) => r.publishRefused(m.ticket, m.args),
-};
-
-async function setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs } = {}) {
-  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "cli-publish-"));
-  const down = [];
-  t.after(async () => {
-    for (const fn of down) await fn();
-    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-  const ca = scratchCa(join(root, "ca"));
-  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(root, "gitea"), tls: ca, users: { coder: TOKEN, second: TOKEN2 } });
-  down.push(() => gitea.close());
-  const project = join(root, "project");
-  mkdirSync(project);
-  git(project, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  commit(project, "one", "[email protected]");
-  // Each agent's fork and the upstream, mosaic/stack, all clones of the root.
-  for (const owner of ["coder", "second", "mosaic"]) {
-    mkdirSync(join(gitea.repo(owner, "stack"), ".."), { recursive: true });
-    git(root, "clone", "-q", "--bare", project, gitea.repo(owner, "stack"));
-  }
-  const forkRepo = gitea.repo("coder", "stack");
-
-  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
-  writeJson(join(root, "businesses/demo.json"), { ...businessDoc(root, "demo"), plugins: { harness: ["pi"] } });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, "data"), { mode: 0o700 });
-  mkdirSync(join(root, "secrets", "agents"), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  chmodSync(join(root, "secrets"), 0o700);
-  const agent = (user) => ({
-    authority: { withinRole: ["git.push.working", "message.send"], crossRole: [] },
-    identity: { name: user, email: `${user}@example.com`, gitea: { url: gitea.origin, user } },
-    publish: ["stack"],
-    credentials: { gitea: { store: true, file: join(root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", user, "gitea"), rotateBy: "2099-01-01" } },
-  });
-  const demo = {
-    id: "demo", human: "jason", arbiters: { technical: "reviewer", delivery: "reviewer" },
-    projects: { stack: { root: project, remote: `${gitea.origin}/mosaic/stack` } },
-    roles: {
-      coder: agent("coder"),
-      second: agent("second"),
-      reviewer: { authority: { withinRole: ["message.send"], crossRole: [] } },
-    },
-  };
-  const dataRoot = join(root, "data");
-  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot, businesses: { demo }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) }, publishTls: ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`] });
-  down.unshift(() => bus.close());
-  // A test sets hooks[op] to act around one op: hook(message, next), where next() answers it.
-  const hooks = {};
-  const host = { op: async (m) => (hooks[m.op] ? hooks[m.op](m, () => OPS[m.op](bus, m)) : OPS[m.op](bus, m)) };
-  const logs = [];
-  mkdirSync(join(dataRoot, "bus-host"), { mode: 0o700 });
-  const sock = createGitSocket({ host, business: demo, dataRoot, env: process.env, log: (l) => logs.push(l), publishPollMs: 20, ...(publishDeadlineMs ? { publishDeadlineMs } : {}) });
-  down.unshift(() => sock.close());
-  await sock.listen();
-
-  const caps = {};
-  for (const role of ["coder", "second"]) {
-    caps[role] = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: "demo", role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: "pi" });
-    bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "role.claim", args: {} });
-  }
-  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: "demo", human: "jason", via: "cli", outsideAgent: true });
-  // Each agent's workspace: a clone of the root with one commit of its own on feat, pushed to the
-  // working repo for its task.
-  const work = async (role, task) => {
-    const workspace = join(root, `ws-${role}`);
-    const tmp = join(root, `tmp-${role}`);
-    mkdirSync(workspace);
-    mkdirSync(tmp);
-    git(workspace, "clone", "-q", project, "stack");
-    const clone = join(workspace, "stack");
-    git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
-    const commitId = commit(clone, `work by ${role}`, `${role}@example.com`);
-    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps[role], workspace, tmp, task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
-    return commitId;
-  };
-  // A second commit on the coder's feat, pushed to the working repo through the socket.
-  const again = async () => {
-    const workspace = join(root, "ws-coder");
-    const commitId = commit(join(workspace, "stack"), "more work", "[email protected]");
-    await pushWorking({ path: sock.path, cap: caps.coder, workspace, tmp: join(root, "tmp-coder"), task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat" });
-    return commitId;
-  };
-  const approve = (role = "coder", task = TASK) => {
-    const d = bus.broker.request(caps[role], { verb: "decision.raise", args: {
-      action: "git.push.remote", target: task, task_ref: task, question: "Publish?", blocking: false, recommendation: "yes",
-      options: [{ key: "yes", text: "Yes" }, { key: "no", text: "No" }] } });
-    bus.broker.request(human, { verb: "decision.resolve", args: { id: d.id, choice: "yes" } });
-    return d.id;
-  };
-  const publish = (decision, extra = {}, role = "coder", task = TASK) =>
-    raw(sock.path, { cap: caps[role], op: "publish", task_ref: task, project: "stack", branch: "feat", decision, ...extra });
-  // The bus holds the writer lock; the test reads its events through a read-only handle.
-  const events = (kind, task = TASK) => {
-    const db = new DatabaseSync(join(dataRoot, "bus", "bus.sqlite"), { readOnly: true });
-    try {
-      return db.prepare("SELECT * FROM events WHERE kind=? AND subject=? ORDER BY seq").all(kind, task).map((e) => ({ ...e, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
-    } finally {
-      db.close();
-    }
-  };
-  return { root, bus, gitea, forkRepo, work: await work("coder", TASK), more: work, again, hooks, caps, approve, publish, logs, events };
-}
-
-test("T3 end to end: publish under an approved decision sends the work commit to the agent's own fork and records it once", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  // Nothing issued: the store has no token, and the refusal is filed once.
-  const first = w.approve();
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "credential-unavailable" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["credential-unavailable"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  const reply = await w.publish(first);
-  assert.deepEqual(reply, { ok: true, result: { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null } });
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
-  // Every request went to the agent's fork; the upstream, mosaic/stack, received none.
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path === "/coder/stack/git-receive-pack" && r.user === "coder"));
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
-  const allowed = w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise");
-  assert.equal(allowed.length, 1);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.fork, `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`);
-  assert.equal(allowed[0].body.commit, w.work);
-  // The decision is spent.
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(first), { ok: false, error: "decision-consumed" });
-  // T4: no token in any answer, event or log line, nor in any file under the scratch root but the
-  // agent's own store file.
-  assert.equal(JSON.stringify([reply, w.events("action.allowed"), w.events("action.refused"), w.logs]).includes(TOKEN), false);
-  const store = join(w.root, "secrets", "agents", "demo", "coder", "gitea");
-  const holding = readdirSync(w.root, { recursive: true })
-    .map((name) => join(w.root, name))
-    .filter((file) => lstatSync(file).isFile() && readFileSync(file).includes(TOKEN));
-  assert.deepEqual(holding, [store]);
-});
-
-test("T3 end to end: a fork the token can't reach is fork-unavailable, filed once, and nothing is recorded as allowed", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", "fake_wrong_token_0123456789", "2099-01-01");
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "fork-unavailable" });
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["fork-unavailable"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-});
-
-test("a bad branch or project refuses before the broker; a fork, user or ref in the request is ignored", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  const d = w.approve();
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { branch: "../main" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(d, { project: "nope" }), { ok: false, error: "invalid-request" });
-  // Filed through the socket's refuse op, as a bad push request is; no publish ticket opened.
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["invalid-request", "invalid-request"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-  // The broker builds the fork and the destination; the request's own are never read.
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  const reply = await w.publish(d, { fork: "https://127.0.0.1:1/other/stack", user: "other", dst: "refs/heads/main", ref: "refs/heads/main" });
-  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/coder/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/coder/feat", commit: w.work, previous: null });
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\//);
-  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "-q", "--verify", "refs/heads/other/feat"], { env: gitEnv() }).status, 1);
-});
-
-test("T3 end to end: two agents, one project, each lands on its own fork only; the upstream receives nothing", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  const second = await w.more("second", TASK2);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/second", "gitea", TOKEN2, "2099-01-01");
-  assert.equal((await w.publish(w.approve())).ok, true);
-  const coderRequests = w.gitea.requests.length;
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "coder"], ["coder", "coder"]);
-  const reply = await w.publish(w.approve("second", TASK2), {}, "second", TASK2);
-  assert.deepEqual(reply.result, { fork: `${w.gitea.origin}/second/stack`, ref: "refs/heads/second/feat", commit: second, previous: null });
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests.slice(coderRequests)) assert.deepEqual([r.path.split("/")[1], r.user ?? "second"], ["second", "second"]);
-  const refs = (owner) => git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.gitea.repo(owner, "stack")}`, "for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname) %(objectname)");
-  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes(`refs/heads/coder/feat ${w.work}`), true);
-  assert.equal(refs("coder").includes("refs/heads/second/"), false);
-  assert.equal(refs("second").includes(`refs/heads/second/feat ${second}`), true);
-  assert.equal(refs("second").includes("refs/heads/coder/"), false);
-  assert.equal(refs("mosaic").split("\n").length, 1, "the upstream holds only main");
-});
-
-// sage-1440 on BUILD.md 14: a push between checkPublish and the git push refuses, with one code
-// for each place it can come in, and the fork never receives a commit the decision didn't bind.
-test("T3: a push after checkPublish and before the lock refuses ref-moved; the fork receives nothing", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  w.hooks.checkPublish = async (m, next) => {
-    const facts = await next();
-    await w.again();
-    return facts;
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "ref-moved" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["ref-moved"]);
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", "refs/heads/coder/"), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a push recorded while the bus process pushes refuses decision-mismatch; only the decision's commit reached the fork", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t);
-  w.bus.credentials.issue("demo/coder", "gitea", TOKEN, "2099-01-01");
-  // The working repo's lock is held through the git push, so a socket push would wait for it; the
-  // broker's record of a newer push is what a push that won the lock leaves.
-  w.hooks.publishPush = async (m, next) => {
-    w.bus.checkPush(w.caps.coder, TASK);
-    w.bus.recordPush(w.caps.coder, { task_ref: TASK, project: "stack", branch: "feat", ref: workRef(TASK), commit: "c".repeat(40), previous: w.work });
-    return next();
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "decision-mismatch" });
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["decision-mismatch"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.root, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", "refs/heads/coder/feat"), w.work);
-  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("wasn't recorded")));
-});
-
-test("sage-1440: the publishResult poll is bounded: publish-timeout, filed once, and nothing recorded", async (t) => {
-  const w = await setup(t, { publishDeadlineMs: 150 });
-  let polls = 0;
-  w.hooks.publishResult = async () => {
-    polls++;
-    return { state: "running" };
-  };
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.publish(w.approve()), { ok: false, error: "publish-timeout" });
-  assert.ok(polls > 0);
-  assert.deepEqual(w.events("action.refused").map((e) => e.body.code), ["publish-timeout"]);
-  assert.equal(w.events("action.allowed").filter((e) => e.body.action === "git.push.remote" && e.body.operation !== "decision.raise").length, 0);
-  assert.ok(w.logs.some((l) => l.includes("publish-timeout")));
-});

packages/seat/src/checkout.mjs

@@ -101,10 +101,8 @@ export function gitEnv(env = process.env) {
 // consequence: a Ctrl-C at the terminal of a host run by hand no longer
 // reaches its git, though a systemd stop still does (it kills the cgroup).
 // `stdin` names a file git reads as its input (row 137: patch-id); without
-// it git gets none. `pass` (row 199, publish) is written once to a pipe on
-// fd 3, which git and what it starts inherit; publish's credential helper
-// reads its token there, so the token is in no argv, env, URL or file.
-export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) {
+// it git gets none.
+export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null } = {}) {
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     let input = "ignore";
     try {
@@ -112,10 +110,8 @@ export function runGit(argv, env, limits = GIT_LIMITS, { stdin = null, pass = nu
     } catch (e) {
       return resolve({ ok: false, out: "", err: "", why: e.code ?? e.message });
     }
-    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe", ...(pass === null ? [] : ["pipe"])] });
+    const child = spawn("git", argv, { env, detached: true, stdio: [input, "pipe", "pipe"] });
     if (typeof input === "number") closeSync(input);
-    // A git that never asked for it closes the pipe unread: EPIPE is no fault.
-    if (pass !== null) child.stdio[3].on("error", () => {}).end(pass);
     let out = "";
     let err = "";
     let signalled = false;

packages/seat/src/working.mjs

@@ -63,22 +63,6 @@
 //     compare and swap (base-moved), then record() runs; when it throws, main
 //     goes back, and a main that can't go back refuses rollback-failed.
 // dropLand removes the worktree; the caller runs it on every path.
-//
-// publish (row 199, #1697, design D9 to D9b) sends a recorded work commit to
-// the agent's own fork. It runs in two processes, because the gitea token
-// lives in the bus process and the lock in the host's:
-//   publish, in the host, under the lock: the seed; the work ref is at the
-//     source commit (ref-moved); every commit in main..source has author and
-//     committer email equal to the agent's (identity-mismatch); then
-//     remote(), which the caller wires to publishRemote in the bus process.
-//   publishRemote, in the bus process, with the token on fd 3 only:
-//     `ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD <dst>`; a non-zero exit refuses
-//     fork-unavailable. The fork's HEAD must be a commit this repository has
-//     and an ancestor of main (remote-unrelated, an empty fork included).
-//     Then `push <fork> <source>:<dst>` by oid, with no `+`. Only https
-//     crosses (protocol.https.allow), redirects are refused, and output
-//     holding the token refuses credential-leak. Git's stderr is never
-//     returned: it can carry the URL.
 
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { closeSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -117,7 +101,7 @@ export const FSCK = ["-c", "transfer.fsckObjects=true"];
 
 // `limits` is { timeoutMs, graceMs }; the tests shorten them. runGit
 // (checkout.mjs) runs git in its own process group and signals the group.
-const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null, pass = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin, pass });
+const git = (args, env, { pre = [], limits = GIT_LIMITS, stdin = null } = {}) => runGit([...SAFE, ...pre, ...args], gitEnv(env), limits, { stdin });
 // git with this call's env and limits, for the helpers below.
 const bound = (env, limits) => (args, opts = {}) => git(args, env, { ...opts, limits });
 
@@ -418,75 +402,3 @@ async function removeWorktree(repo, worktree, g) {
   if (!r.ok) rmSync(worktree, { recursive: true, force: true });
   await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "worktree", "prune"]);
 }
-
-// await publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env, limits })
-// Resolves what remote() resolves; rejects with WorkingError.
-export function publish({ dataRoot, business, project, root, taskRef, source, email, remote, env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
-  if (!PROJECT.test(project ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || typeof email !== "string" || !email) refuse("invalid-request");
-  const ref = `refs/heads/${workRef(taskRef)}`;
-  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project);
-  const g = bound(env, limits);
-  return locked(repo, async () => {
-    try {
-      if (!lstatSync(repo).isDirectory()) refuse("working-repo-invalid");
-    } catch (e) {
-      if (e instanceof WorkingError) throw e;
-      refuse("working-repo-invalid", `${repo} can't be read: ${e.code}`);
-    }
-    await seed(repo, root, g);
-    const at = `--git-dir=${repo}`;
-    if ((await tip(repo, ref, g)) !== source) refuse("ref-moved", `${ref} isn't at ${source}`);
-    const range = await g([at, "log", "--format=%ae%x00%ce", `refs/heads/main..${source}`]);
-    if (!range.ok) refuse("working-repo-invalid", range.why);
-    for (const line of range.out.split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
-      if (line !== `${email}\0${email}`) refuse("identity-mismatch", `a commit in main..${source.slice(0, 12)} isn't by ${email}`);
-    }
-    return remote();
-  });
-}
-
-const HOST = /^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}(:[0-9]{1,5})?$/;
-const NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$/;
-// The one-shot helper: for a `get` on https at exactly the fork's host and
-// port, it answers the user and the line it reads from fd 3. Anything else,
-// and `store` and `erase`, gets no answer. HOST and NAME keep both shell-safe.
-const helper = (host, user) =>
-  `!f() { test "$1" = get || exit 0; p=; h=; while IFS= read -r l; do case "$l" in protocol=*) p=\${l#protocol=};; host=*) h=\${l#host=};; "") break;; esac; done; ` +
-  `test "$p" = https && test "$h" = '${host}' || exit 0; IFS= read -r t <&3 || exit 0; printf 'username=%s\\npassword=%s\\n' '${user}' "$t"; }; f`;
-
-// await publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls, env, limits })
-// Resolves { ref, commit, previous }, previous being dst's tip on the fork
-// before the push, or null. `tls` is for the tests' scratch CA only.
-export async function publishRemote({ repo, fork, user, source, dst, token, tls = [], env = process.env, limits = GIT_LIMITS }) {
-  let url;
-  try {
-    url = new URL(fork);
-  } catch {
-    refuse("invalid-request");
-  }
-  if (url.protocol !== "https:" || !HOST.test(url.host) || !NAME.test(user ?? "") || !OID.test(source ?? "") || !dst?.startsWith(`refs/heads/${user}/`)) refuse("invalid-request");
-  const secret = String(token).trim();
-  const net = async (args) => {
-    const pre = [...tls, "-c", "protocol.https.allow=always", "-c", "http.followRedirects=false", "-c", "credential.helper=", "-c", `credential.helper=${helper(url.host, user)}`];
-    const r = await git([`--git-dir=${repo}`, ...args], env, { pre, limits, pass: `${secret}\n` });
-    if (r.out.includes(secret) || r.err.includes(secret)) refuse("credential-leak");
-    return r;
-  };
-  const g = bound(env, limits);
-  const listed = await net(["ls-remote", "--symref", fork, "HEAD", dst]);
-  if (!listed.ok) refuse("fork-unavailable");
-  let head = null;
-  let previous = null;
-  for (const line of listed.out.split("\n")) {
-    const [oid, name] = line.split("\t");
-    if (!OID.test(oid ?? "")) continue;
-    if (name === "HEAD") head = oid;
-    else if (name === dst) previous = oid;
-  }
-  if (!head) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork is empty");
-  const known = await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "cat-file", "-e", `${head}^{commit}`]);
-  if (!known.ok || !(await g([`--git-dir=${repo}`, "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", head, "refs/heads/main"])).ok) refuse("remote-unrelated", "the fork's HEAD isn't in main's history");
-  const pushed = await net(["push", "--porcelain", "--no-follow-tags", fork, `${source}:${dst}`]);
-  if (!pushed.ok) refuse(/\((non-fast-forward|fetch first)\)/.test(pushed.out) ? "non-fast-forward" : "push-failed");
-  return { ref: dst, commit: source, previous };
-}

packages/seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design T3): a fake Gitea for publish, on 127.0.0.1 over TLS with a scratch CA,
-// serving bare repositories under `<dir>/repos/<user>/<repo>.git` through git http-backend. Every
-// request needs Basic auth with the user and token it was made with, or with any pair in `users`,
-// as a private repository on Gitea does. It records each request's method, path and user, never the password. `redirect`
-// makes every request a 302 to `redirect`. A repository's own hooks run on a push, so a test can
-// make the fork echo something back as `remote:` lines. Nothing here leaves 127.0.0.1.
-import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { createServer } from "node:https";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-
-// A CA and a server certificate for IP 127.0.0.1, made once per directory with openssl.
-export function scratchCa(dir) {
-  mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  const ssl = (...args) => {
-    const r = spawnSync("openssl", args, { cwd: dir, encoding: "utf8" });
-    if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl ${args[0]}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  };
-  ssl("req", "-x509", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "ca.key", "-out", "ca.pem", "-days", "2", "-subj", "/CN=mosaic test CA");
-  ssl("req", "-newkey", "ec", "-pkeyopt", "ec_paramgen_curve:P-256", "-nodes", "-keyout", "server.key", "-out", "server.csr", "-subj", "/CN=127.0.0.1");
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "san.ext"), "subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1\n");
-  ssl("x509", "-req", "-in", "server.csr", "-CA", "ca.pem", "-CAkey", "ca.key", "-CAcreateserial", "-out", "server.pem", "-days", "2", "-extfile", "san.ext");
-  return { ca: join(dir, "ca.pem"), key: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.key")), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, "server.pem")) };
-}
-
-export async function fakeGitea({ dir, tls, user, token, users = { [user]: token }, redirect = null }) {
-  const root = join(dir, "repos");
-  mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
-  const requests = [];
-  const server = createServer({ key: tls.key, cert: tls.cert }, (req, res) => {
-    const url = new URL(req.url, "https://127.0.0.1");
-    const auth = /^Basic (.+)$/.exec(req.headers.authorization ?? "");
-    const [who, pass] = auth ? Buffer.from(auth[1], "base64").toString().split(":") : [null, null];
-    requests.push({ method: req.method, path: url.pathname, user: who });
-    if (redirect) {
-      res.writeHead(302, { location: redirect + req.url });
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    if (!who || !Object.hasOwn(users, who) || pass !== users[who]) {
-      res.writeHead(401, { "www-authenticate": 'Basic realm="Gitea"' });
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    // /<owner>/<repo>/info/refs and the like, on <root>/<owner>/<repo>.git.
-    const m = /^\/([^/]+)\/([^/]+?)(?:\.git)?(\/.*)$/.exec(url.pathname);
-    if (!m) {
-      res.writeHead(404);
-      return res.end();
-    }
-    const cgi = spawn("git", ["http-backend"], {
-      env: {
-        PATH: process.env.PATH,
-        GIT_PROJECT_ROOT: root,
-        GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL: "1",
-        GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM: "1",
-        GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: "/dev/null",
-        HOME: "/nonexistent",
-        PATH_INFO: `/${m[1]}/${m[2]}.git${m[3]}`,
-        REQUEST_METHOD: req.method,
-        QUERY_STRING: url.search.slice(1),
-        CONTENT_TYPE: req.headers["content-type"] ?? "",
-        HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING: req.headers["content-encoding"] ?? "",
-        GIT_PROTOCOL: req.headers["git-protocol"] ?? "",
-        REMOTE_USER: who,
-        REMOTE_ADDR: "127.0.0.1",
-      },
-      stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"],
-    });
-    req.pipe(cgi.stdin);
-    const chunks = [];
-    cgi.stdout.on("data", (c) => chunks.push(c));
-    cgi.on("close", () => {
-      const out = Buffer.concat(chunks);
-      const split = out.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
-      const head = out.subarray(0, split).toString().split("\r\n");
-      const headers = {};
-      let status = 200;
-      for (const line of head) {
-        const [k, ...v] = line.split(":");
-        if (k.toLowerCase() === "status") status = Number.parseInt(v.join(":").trim(), 10);
-        else headers[k] = v.join(":").trim();
-      }
-      res.writeHead(status, headers);
-      res.end(out.subarray(split + 4));
-    });
-  });
-  await new Promise((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
-  const port = server.address().port;
-  return {
-    port,
-    origin: `https://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
-    requests,
-    repo: (owner, name) => join(root, owner, `${name}.git`),
-    close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(r)),
-  };
-}

packages/seat/tests/publish.test.mjs

@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-// Row 199 (#1697, design D9 step 3 to 5, D9a, T3): publish and publishRemote (src/working.mjs)
-// against a TLS fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1 (fake-gitea.mjs) with a scratch CA, passed only through
-// the `tls` parameter. Fake tokens in a scratch root. Each refusal that should reach the network
-// checks the fake saw the request, so no case passes because git refused https first.
-import { test } from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import { gitEnv } from "../src/checkout.mjs";
-import { publish, publishRemote, push, workingRepo } from "../src/working.mjs";
-import { fakeGitea, scratchCa } from "./fake-gitea.mjs";
-
-const TASK = "vikunja:1/2";
-const TOKEN = "fake_publish_token_0123456789";
-const USER = "coder";
-const EMAIL = "[email protected]";
-const DST = "refs/heads/coder/feat";
-
-function git(cwd, ...args) {
-  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: gitEnv() });
-  assert.equal(r.status, 0, `git ${args.join(" ")}: ${r.stderr}`);
-  return r.stdout.trim();
-}
-function commit(dir, text, email = EMAIL) {
-  writeFileSync(join(dir, "README"), `${text}\n`);
-  git(dir, "add", "README");
-  git(dir, "-c", `user.name=${text}`, "-c", `user.email=${email}`, "commit", "-q", "-m", text);
-  return git(dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD");
-}
-const rejects = (p, code) => assert.rejects(p, (e) => e.code === code || assert.fail(`${e.code}: ${e.message}, wanted ${code}`));
-
-// A root, a coder's clone with work on feat pushed to the working repo, and a fake Gitea whose
-// coder/stack fork is a bare clone of the root.
-async function world(t, { fork = true, redirect = null } = {}) {
-  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "mosaic-publish-"));
-  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
-  const root = join(dir, "root");
-  mkdirSync(root);
-  git(root, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  const first = commit(root, "one", "[email protected]");
-  const clone = join(dir, "clone");
-  git(dir, "clone", "-q", root, clone);
-  git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "feat");
-  const work = commit(clone, "work");
-  const dataRoot = join(dir, "data");
-  mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 });
-  const file = join(dir, "b.bundle");
-  git(clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
-  await push({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
-  const ca = scratchCa(join(dir, "ca"));
-  const gitea = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(dir, "gitea"), tls: ca, user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect });
-  t.after(() => gitea.close());
-  const forkRepo = gitea.repo(USER, "stack");
-  if (fork) {
-    mkdirSync(join(forkRepo, ".."), { recursive: true });
-    git(dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", root, forkRepo);
-  }
-  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${ca.ca}`];
-  const repo = workingRepo(dataRoot, "acme", "stack");
-  const remote = (extra = {}) => publishRemote({ repo, fork: `${gitea.origin}/${USER}/stack`, user: USER, source: work, dst: DST, token: TOKEN + "\n", tls, ...extra });
-  const go = (extra = {}) => publish({ dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root, taskRef: TASK, source: work, email: EMAIL, remote: () => remote(), ...extra });
-  return { dir, root, first, clone, work, dataRoot, repo, gitea, forkRepo, tls, remote, go };
-}
-
-test("T3: publish pushes the work commit by oid to <user>/<branch> on the fork, with the token only through the helper", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: null });
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), w.work);
-  // Every request went to the fork's path, and each one that carried auth carried the agent's user.
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  for (const r of w.gitea.requests) assert.match(r.path, /^\/coder\/stack\/(info\/refs|git-receive-pack|git-upload-pack)$/);
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.user === USER && r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")));
-  // A second publish of the same commit is a no-op push and names the previous tip.
-  assert.deepEqual(await w.go(), { ref: DST, commit: w.work, previous: w.work });
-  // The working repo holds no remote and no credential config.
-  assert.equal(spawnSync("git", [`--git-dir=${w.repo}`, "config", "--get-regexp", "^(remote|credential)\\."], { env: gitEnv() }).stdout.toString(), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a moved fork branch refuses non-fast-forward; no + and no force", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
-  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.root, other);
-  const elsewhere = commit(other, "elsewhere");
-  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${elsewhere}:${DST}`);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "non-fast-forward");
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "rev-parse", DST), elsewhere);
-});
-
-test("T3: D9a: an empty fork and an unrelated fork refuse remote-unrelated; a missing fork refuses fork-unavailable", async (t) => {
-  const empty = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  git(empty.dir, "init", "-q", "--bare", empty.forkRepo);
-  await rejects(empty.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-  assert.ok(empty.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(empty.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
-
-  const unrelated = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  const alone = join(unrelated.dir, "alone");
-  mkdirSync(alone);
-  git(alone, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
-  commit(alone, "unrelated");
-  git(unrelated.dir, "clone", "-q", "--bare", alone, unrelated.forkRepo);
-  await rejects(unrelated.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-  assert.equal(unrelated.gitea.requests.some((r) => r.path.endsWith("git-receive-pack")), false);
-
-  const missing = await world(t, { fork: false });
-  await rejects(missing.go(), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(missing.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-});
-
-test("T3: a fork past main refuses remote-unrelated until root catches up", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const other = join(w.dir, "other");
-  git(w.dir, "clone", "-q", w.forkRepo, other);
-  const ahead = commit(other, "ahead");
-  git(other, "push", "-q", w.forkRepo, `${ahead}:refs/heads/main`);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "remote-unrelated");
-});
-
-test("T3: a wrong token refuses fork-unavailable; git's stderr isn't in the refusal", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await assert.rejects(w.remote({ token: "fake_wrong_token_0123456789" }), (e) => e.code === "fork-unavailable" && e.message === "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(git(w.dir, `--git-dir=${w.forkRepo}`, "for-each-ref", DST), "");
-});
-
-test("T3: a 302 is not followed: fork-unavailable, and the target sees no request", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const target = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "target"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca2")), user: USER, token: TOKEN });
-  t.after(() => target.close());
-  const bounce = await fakeGitea({ dir: join(w.dir, "bounce"), tls: scratchCa(join(w.dir, "ca3")), user: USER, token: TOKEN, redirect: target.origin });
-  t.after(() => bounce.close());
-  const tls = ["-c", `http.sslCAInfo=${join(w.dir, "ca3", "ca.pem")}`];
-  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `${bounce.origin}/${USER}/stack`, tls }), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(bounce.requests.length > 0);
-  assert.equal(target.requests.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("T3: the helper answers only the fork's host and port: a fork on another port gets no token", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  // The fork names port 1; insteadOf (through the tests' tls parameter) sends git to the fake's
-  // port. The helper was told port 1, so it answers nothing and no password goes out.
-  const before = w.gitea.requests.length;
-  await rejects(w.remote({ fork: `https://127.0.0.1:1/${USER}/stack`, tls: [...w.tls, "-c", `url.https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/.insteadOf=https://127.0.0.1:1/`] }), "fork-unavailable");
-  assert.ok(w.gitea.requests.length > before, "the rewritten URL reached the fake");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.slice(before).some((r) => r.user !== null), false, "no credential went to a host the helper wasn't told");
-});
-
-test("T3: a fork that echoes the token refuses credential-leak", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  const hook = join(w.forkRepo, "hooks", "pre-receive");
-  writeFileSync(hook, `#!/bin/sh\necho ${TOKEN} >&2\nexit 0\n`);
-  chmodSync(hook, 0o755);
-  await rejects(w.go(), "credential-leak");
-});
-
-test("T3: no tls parameter, no trust: the scratch CA reaches git only through it", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await rejects(w.remote({ tls: [] }), "fork-unavailable");
-});
-
-test("D9 steps 3 and 4: ref-moved and identity-mismatch refuse before any request", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  await rejects(w.go({ source: w.first }), "ref-moved");
-  const other = commit(w.clone, "by someone else", "[email protected]");
-  const file = join(w.dir, "b2.bundle");
-  git(w.clone, "bundle", "create", "-q", file, "refs/heads/feat", "--not", "--remotes=origin");
-  await push({ dataRoot: w.dataRoot, business: "acme", project: "stack", root: w.root, taskRef: TASK, branch: "feat", bundle: file });
-  await rejects(w.go({ source: other }), "identity-mismatch");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-});
-
-test("publishRemote refuses a fork, user or destination that isn't shell- and ref-safe before any git", async (t) => {
-  const w = await world(t);
-  for (const extra of [
-    { fork: `http://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}/${USER}/stack` },
-    { fork: `https://127.0.0.1:${w.gitea.port}'/${USER}/stack` },
-    { user: "co'der" },
-    { dst: "refs/heads/main" },
-    { dst: "refs/heads/pm/feat" },
-    { source: "HEAD" },
-  ]) await rejects(w.remote(extra), "invalid-request");
-  assert.equal(w.gitea.requests.length, 0);
-});

packages/tasks/src/adapter.mjs

@@ -80,11 +80,7 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         tree: null,
         bots: new Set([businesses[name].tracker.sync.botId, ...Object.values(s.roles).map((r) => r.botId)]),
         sync: use('@sync'),
-        // Row 199 (#1697, design D5): a request's call keys from the broker's session for its cap,
-        // never from a role name. probe is the host's own start check of each role's token.
-        as: (session, method, path, opts) =>
-          credentials.useFor(session, 'vikunja', (token) => call(token, method, path, opts)),
-        probe: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
+        as: (role, method, path, opts) => use(role)(method, path, opts),
         state: 'starting',
         refused: null,
         queue: Promise.resolve(),
@@ -100,7 +96,7 @@ export function tasksAdapter({
         timers: [],
       };
       ctx.syncCall = (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.sync(method, path, opts);
-      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.probe(role, method, path, opts);
+      ctx.asCall = (role) => (_token, method, path, opts) => ctx.as(role, method, path, opts);
       ctx.handle = verbs(ctx);
       contexts.set(name, ctx);
     }

packages/tasks/src/startup.mjs

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
   if (probe.status === 404 || probe.status === 403 || outcome(probe) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
   expect(probe, 401, 'tracker-unexpected');
   for (const [role, r] of Object.entries(ctx.roles)) {
-    const control = await ctx.probe(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
+    const control = await ctx.as(role, 'GET', `/tasks/${MISSING}`);
     if (control.status !== 404 || control.json?.code !== 4002) {
       expect(control, 404, 'tracker-unexpected');
       refuse('tracker-unexpected');
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export async function startup(ctx) {
     const probes = [['DELETE', `/tasks/${MISSING}`, undefined]];
     if (r.definition !== 'pm') probes.push(['POST', `/tasks/${MISSING}/labels`, { label_id: 1 }]);
     for (const [method, path, body] of probes) {
-      const p = await ctx.probe(role, method, path, { body });
+      const p = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
       if (p.status === 404 || p.status === 403 || outcome(p) === 'ok') refuse('scope-too-broad');
       if (p.status !== 401) refuse(p.status === 0 || p.status >= 500 ? 'tracker-unavailable' : 'tracker-unexpected');
     }

packages/tasks/src/verbs.mjs

@@ -122,9 +122,8 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
   const relatedTo = (task, kind, other) =>
     Array.isArray(task.related_tasks?.[kind]) && task.related_tasks[kind].some((t) => t?.id === other);
   // One write with the acting role's token. An uncertain answer is settled by a re-read.
-  // `me` is the broker's session for the caller's cap (design D5).
-  async function step(me, method, path, body, at, done) {
-    const r = await ctx.as(me, method, path, { body });
+  async function step(role, method, path, body, at, done) {
+    const r = await ctx.as(role, method, path, { body });
     const o = outcome(r);
     if (o === 'ok') return r;
     if (o === 'uncertain' && at !== null && done) {
@@ -145,7 +144,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     if (!mine) fail('tracker-role');
     if (PM_VERBS.has(verb) && mine.definition !== 'pm') fail('field-writer');
     const plan = prepare(verb, args, role, mine);
-    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, me, plan);
+    if (verb === 'task.create') return create(cap, role, plan);
     const at = target(args.task_ref);
     const before = await read(at);
     if (args.expect !== undefined && args.expect !== before.digest) {
@@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let landed = 0;
     try {
       for (const [method, path, body, done] of work.steps) {
-        await step(me, method, path, body, at, done);
+        await step(role, method, path, body, at, done);
         landed++;
       }
     } catch (e) {
@@ -386,12 +385,12 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
         fail('unknown-verb');
     }
   }
-  async function create(cap, me, plan) {
+  async function create(cap, role, plan) {
     if (!ctx.broker.taskView(ctx.business, 'input', plan.request)) fail('request-not-found');
     await located(plan.others);
     ctx.broker.authorize(cap, 'task.create', { decision: plan.decision, target: null });
     // No re-read can find a create whose answer was lost, so an uncertain create is reported as such.
-    const r = await step(me, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
+    const r = await step(role, 'POST', `/projects/${plan.at.project}/tasks`, plan.body, null, null);
     if (r.status !== 201 && r.status !== 200) fail('tracker-unexpected');
     checkTask(r.json);
     const id = r.json.id;
@@ -400,9 +399,9 @@ export function verbs(ctx) {
     let failure = null;
     try {
       for (const l of plan.labels)
-        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
+        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/labels`, { label_id: l }, at, (a) => a.fields.labels.includes(l));
       for (const x of plan.relations)
-        await step(me, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
+        await step(role, 'POST', `/tasks/${id}/relations`, { other_task_id: x.other, relation_kind: x.kind }, at, (a) =>
           relatedTo(a.task, x.kind, x.other),
         );
     } catch (e) {

roles/chief-of-staff.md

@@ -73,8 +73,7 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
-moves them.
+`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

roles/pm.md

@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ business's arbiter for its domain. Pass `domain` to `raise_decision`,
 gated raise, and every hard wait, goes to the human through the inbox.
 The hard waits are `spend`, `data.delete`, `network.expose`,
 `account.create`, `credential.mint`, `message.external`,
-`git.push.protected`, `git.push.remote` and `deploy`; a citation never
-moves them.
+`git.push.protected` and `deploy`; a citation never moves them.
 A `role.revoke` raise whose target is the assistant is a hard wait too:
 it goes to the human, cited or not.
 

scripts/mosaic

@@ -35,6 +35,6 @@ if [ "${1:-}" = business ]; then
   exec node "$REPO/packages/business/src/cli.mjs" "$@"
 fi
 case "${1:-}" in
-  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|credentials|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
+  usage|project|limits|inbox|decide|tasks|agents|trail|talk|stop|launches|bus|plugins|name|names|follow|threads|thread) exec node "$REPO/packages/cli/src/cli.mjs" "$@" ;;
 esac
 exec node "$REPO/packages/seat/src/cli.mjs" "$@"