row 281 design d6: the job's step C without the chief's claim, fire.failed for a step B or C failure, boot closes interrupted jobs, Q1 lines in the set (dewey-0825, #1786 )

row 281 design d5: two requests per granted delete with its five conditions, a job id on every answer, event and message (sage-2575, #1786 )
row 281 design d4: step G detached from the verbs, open decisions and a fired-agent raise check, one step G per agent (dewey-0823, #1786 )
2026-10-22 05:10:15 -05:00 · 2026-10-22 05:06:39 -05:00 · 2026-10-22 05:04:49 -05:00 · 2026-10-22 04:58:09 -05:00 · 2026-10-22 04:56:39 -05:00 · 2026-10-22 04:54:22 -05:00
231 changed files with 23762 additions and 565 deletions
@@ -5220,4 +5220,75 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi

 2026-10-21T22:30:20Z | Huey | T1 sessions design r3, scrooge-0007 R1, Vikunja 463 | Before: r2 e19e30df2 nested new session checkouts under the retained legacy instance workspace, allowing project-name collision or historical parent inspection to reach live siblings. After: exact path is dataRoot/session-workspaces/business/instance/session, outside the legacy root; canonicalized ancestor/descendant overlap refuses; T2 nesting mutant covers historical mount/inspection and a legacy project named sessions. All other r2 content retained as approved, revision label updated. Verification: old nested path absent, manual R1-only delta, whitespace and installed queue guard checked; no code/builds/suites/live changes/provider calls/credential reads.

+2026-10-20 18:51:10 UTC | Row 191 #1689 design phase | Before: per-business launch revoke and per-binding Discord STOP leave task containers, active sessions and background work without one switch. Proposed per-data-root durable halt with human-only resume, generation-fenced starts, bounded concurrent termination, write-once stop receipts and existing event mirror; no schema migration. DESIGN.md inventories starter/continuation paths and container control-mount restriction. Sent to Dewey with Sage copied; implementation waits independent design approval. No tests, commits or live actions.
+
+2026-10-20 18:57:51 UTC | Row 191 design revision | Dewey r1 changes: interim Console --send absence, reserved processing events and missing-state semantics required correction. DESIGN-r2.md now names CLI interim path, unavailable UI controls, trusted initialization and fail-closed missing leaf, container delete/replace mount tests, reservations and id-bound reconciliation. Small notes addressed including diagnostic seats and aliases. Recommended smaller Docker scope to Sage; design and scope approval pending, no code or test runs.
+
+2026-10-20T19:50:56Z | Rocko | row 191 #1689 implementation stage: from independent brakes to shared root state, generation-fenced launcher and tracked stops, Discord/task guards and control HTTP/UI. Evidence is agents/rocko/work/queue-191/logs/ and PROGRESS.md. Fixture single files only so far; heavy verification and candidate not complete. Scope additions sage-1367 (one read-only CODE file) and sage-1392 (processing-only client socket timeout); no schema, proof baseline, live file/unit, commit or push change.
+
+2026-10-20 22:58:45 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 rebase inspection candidate | Rebuilt uncommitted kill-switch tree from da230ca48 onto landed row 190 base 00d4cc1f6 under new branch rocko/row191-r2-00d4. Hand merges retained instance flags and SSO/sign-out changes; fixture tests exposed and fixed SSO signer compatibility and two unknown-runtime cleanup defects. Final touched singles 249/249 across 26 files; 15 overlapping Client reader files 102/102. Manifest a4f780c2 has 78 paths; packet 185 files verified with scan clear. Mutants and owner gate remain pending; no review-ready or activation claim, no commit/push/live action.
+
+2026-10-21 23:39:21 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 inspection snapshot | Sage-2242 authorized a local inspection commit for Honker's row 194 S6. Created d52b4db1c on new rocko/row191-inspection-20261021, parent 00d4cc1f6, preserving the reviewed-design build and candidate a4f780c2 (78 paths). Static manifest/index/source scan and diff check verified; no tests run, no push credential or push attempt. Existing single-file evidence is historical, 249/249 and overlapping Client readers 102/102; suites/mutants/gate remain pending. Current code has verified runtime signalling and instance halt, but no dedicated per-run stop API yet; Honker and Sage notified of that seam directly. Snapshot is not review-ready or approved for live use.
+
+2026-10-22 00:04:05 UTC | Rocko | row 191 #1689 per-run stop inspection | Implemented agreed Honker-0079/0081 stopRun contract with verified per-signal identity, fixed 5s+2s, durable first-owner join and immutable result plus later-exit observations. Focused CLEAR sage-2250: final 9 files 62/62, no skipped, after correcting host guard placement and peer-discovery fixture timeout isolation; initial failures and failed teardown logs retained, only own failed group stopped. Slot returned with cwd sweep clear. Sage published f7bf7dfec; sage-2265 clean rebase creates 7aa18b0f6 on dcd8d4dda under new branch, explicit Rocko identity, all 79 manifest product blobs identical so 62/62 evidence carried. Direct S6 handoff sent to Honker and Sage. Wider suites, mutants, review and activation remain pending.
+
 2026-10-22T00:18:12Z | Sage (Opus 5.5) | row 254 landing (#1759), library.sync human timeout | Before: the human transport gave library.sync the 5-second default, so a sync longer than that reported outcome-unknown, and six library-* codes reached the Console as 502. After: 331597709 lands Megavolt's candidate (7 paths, tree d49e4626f, manifest digest be63cfbe recomputed and matched). human-cli.mjs waits 130 s for library.sync, past the server's 120 s hold, and 5 s for other verbs. webui bus.mjs maps library-sync-busy, library-diverged and library-accept-stale to 409, library-accept-invalid to 400, and library-credential-missing and library-fetch-failed to 503. channel-proof re-pinned. Merged-tree gate on the landing commit: library 77/0, bus 628/0, webui 305/0 (1 skip), cli 749/0 (23:44:33-23:55:11Z). eb9672c91 adds the README request-timeout sentence (Dewey N1) and a DEFERRED entry for the four library codes still at 502 (Dewey N2, binds the Console library routes row). Overlap sweep before push: 268 rebased to r2 ecd9b35eb (README only, approval carried webby-0096), 194 rebased to b7. Done rev 3072, #1759 closed.
+
+2026-10-22 00:24:34 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 full gate on c78f48946 | stopped on second integration failure per sage-2275; singles 269/269, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646; CLI interrupted with 26 observed failures; no further edits; cwd sweep empty and slot returned to Sage.
+
+2026-10-22 00:48:20 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eb3abba12 full gate | stopped at Discord 190/192; 32 singles 304/304, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646, cli 761/761; two uninitialized Discord fixtures reported to Sage; no later run; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
+
+2026-10-22 00:58:27 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2294 fixture fix | e6800380d on eb3abba12, two test files/four additions, assertions preserved; 338-entry static all-package sweep recorded; no tests; sent Sage for publication and Honker for dependent gate.
+
+2026-10-22 01:30:04 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 e6800380d resume | binding15/15, recover5/5, Discord192/192; stopped WebUI314 passed/4 failed/1 esbuild skip; processing polling violates sign-out/manual redirect and bar changes layout; no fixes/retries, cwd sweep empty, slot returned.
+
+2026-10-22 01:38:08 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2317 Console integration fix | 8e1f55c1d on e6800380d; shared sign-out/manual redirect/interval and desktop frame fixes, assertions retained, six browser cases, 73 mutant sites preflight; syntax only, no tests; sent Sage/Honker.
+
+2026-10-22 02:06:38 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 rebase sage-2329 | eafcbd3e7 on ddfb29af7, new branch, dispatcher retains processing and access; CLI/readme auto-merges checked; 87-path fd0f2740 manifest and 73-site preflight; Sage2333 published, awaiting CLEAR; no tests.
+
+2026-10-22 02:20:51 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eafcbd3e7 full gate | stopped singles313/6: six new browser cases count app freshness timer as processing timer; diagnosis sent Sage, no fix/retry; no suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
+
+2026-10-22 02:23:13 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2345 timer fixture | 4db8b5778 on eafcbd3e7, one line attributes timer to processing.js; all assertions retained, no product change or tests; sent Sage and Honker; awaiting publication/CLEAR.
+
+2026-10-22 02:25:29 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2349 record commit | 0f8235277 on 4db8b5778 adds packet BUILD.md cause record; product manifest remains ffb46fbd/87 paths; no amend, product change or tests; Sage/Honker notified.
+
+2026-10-22 02:48:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 0f8235277 full gate second red | singles330/330, processing61/61, bus646/646, cli783/783, discord192/192; WebUI323/1/1 host esbuild skip; shell geometry1062vs1000; stopped/no retry, no later suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot returned, Sage escalates Mos.
+
+2026-10-22 02:57:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 mos-1248 desktop layout restart | FF 5cd32f4c1 on 0f8235277: desktop grid allocates processing bar, existing shell assertions kept, visibility/no-scroll assertions added; 74 static mutant sites; candidate 2f93ef19; sent Webby/Sage for static review; no runs, awaiting review and CLEAR.
+
+2026-10-22 03:11:09 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 static nav layout, mos-1249/1250 | FF da4334806 on 5cd32f4c1; controls first in nav, non-sticky per sage-2386/webby-0108; candidate-only placement assertion changed, landed shell assertions preserved; 77 mutants statically preflighted; manifest 245dceb1; Webby/Sage handoff sent, no runs, awaiting static look/publish/debug CLEAR.
+
+2026-10-22 03:15:11 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 sage-2394 debug | da4334806 shell5/5 and processing-browser9/9, awk14/0/0; geometry heights reported with read-only distinction; cwd sweep[] and slot returned; full window awaits separate CLEAR.
+
+2026-10-22 02:01:30 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 202 #1700 FED R5 landing | ddfb29af7 on 9c9732983: 6 manifest paths from a74cd9f87 (digests match CANDIDATE.sha256, patch-id 9d89077b equal); Duckworth APPROVE r5 rev 3026; C1 gate by Quackerjack on merge 3b86180b9: cli 771/771 skip 0 (run 2, run 1 red on gate TMPDIR length), 10 test-*.sh rc 0, M1-M13 killed; done rev 3108; landing note refused for length before the done move, so the record is the commit body and #1700 c30265; 191 and 194 rebased onto it (one scripts/mosaic case line)
+
+2026-10-22 03:35:55 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 273 #1778 activate --send/--no-sso landing | 0bbf0f6d1 landed on 378a76b85, a rebase of cac7d0f67 (0042f713d) with all 6 range-diff pairs = and equal patch-ids; 4-path manifest e1031023 unchanged; Filbert APPROVE rev 3111 (c30308) carried merge-scoped under mos-1160, carry comment c30319 names 0bbf0f6d1. Gate on 0bbf0f6d1 by Darkwing: stack-release.test.mjs 218/218 skip 0, stack-release-external.test.mjs 25/25 skip 0, test-release.sh rc 0 (selftest 14/0, no skips), T58 controls c0 11/11 pass and c1 11/11 fail, M1-M7 killed. Rerun because row 202 changed scripts/mosaic, which stack-release.test.mjs copies. Red 1 was 978143bf4 (T53 test 6 usage pin). This doc commit adds the TOOLS.md usage line and F39 rules (Filbert N1).
+
+2026-10-22 04:02:12 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 full window0fa7bf421 | touched35files336pass, packages2403pass/1esbuildskip, shells425selftests+156queue node pass; SR01–07killed, SR08timeout,69unrun; stopped/no retry;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],owned network removed,slot returned Sage; await Mos ruling.
+
+2026-10-22 04:14:56 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 control/resume sage-2427 | control12/12;SR08separate timeoutkill;49resumed assertionkills thenKS43survived;total56assertionkills+1timeout,1survivor,19unrun;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos informed;no retry/edit.
+
+2026-10-22 04:21:30 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS43+19 retarget run | KS43assertionkill thenKS44invalid mutation syntax;57assertionkills+1timeout,1invalid,18unrun;stopped,no edit/retry;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified.
+
+2026-10-22 04:30:06 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS44+18 resume | 10assertionkills thenKS54timeout-without-control despite dependency assertion;total67assertionkills+1timeoutkill,1unqualifiedtimeout,8unrun;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified,no retry/edit.
+
+2026-10-22 04:41:46 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | row191 #1689 builder complete/in-review | published0fa7bf421,manifest0bcbf337;35singles336pass,9packages2403pass/1knownskip,10shells425selftests+156queue nodepass;75assertionkills+2controlledtimeoutkills=77;88hashrestore,cwd sweep[],slotreturned;in-review rev3114,expected no-token failure3115(exit1);Sage/Dewey handoff,no live action.
+
+2026-10-22 05:03:18 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | Vikunja502 processing test/runner hardening | brief+isolatedrocko-v502;expected wordingred→green,Node27/27,Python4/4,5/5assertionkills(includingSR08andKS54nohang),0skips/timeouts;sweep[],candidate5hashrestored,slotreturned05:01:29Z;candidate968d6ee3,runnerc5bdc764;packetready,no commit/push/liveaction.
+
+2026-10-22 05:07:34 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | Vikunja502 committed/review handoff sage-2482 | newbranchrocko/vikunja502-ce6a-20261022,source8e3c6a79b+packet9bf4683c6 on ce6a96ad6;5paths no base drift,range-diff=,patch-id37135ebe unchanged;manifest968d6ee3,packet93889519 verifies39/39;focused runs carry;Sage publish/Dewey review handoff sent,no push/liveaction.
+
+2026-10-22 05:10:00 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | serial landing 205 then 268 | 205: 3 commits, 4 paths, digest 858463b1, every scripts/test-*.sh green on ce6a96ad6, Duckworth N1-N4 carried (N1/N3 to 205b or R3, N2 to the 193b2 brief, N4 #1782 before any user thread goes live). 268 r4: c27207f6e on 205, 9 paths, digest caa0fa4e, patch-id 2942acc8 equal to r3. Overlap checks clean before both pushes. No live action; LIVE stays 86f95bb27.
+
+2026-10-22 05:58:59 UTC | Rocko | row 279 #1784: before, deadline overshoot skipped final observation and returned unknown; after, one-line for (;;) retains final mapping and unchanged unreachable fallback. Regression red as specified; whole stop-run 13/13 and processing-control 62/62; M1 assertion kill, no skips, restored and swept. Source 1016b8584, packet cad927137; manifest 312ed511d8f1cff826ee2fd547de8368923130c7bfe06236d8e29d8655b80aaa. Pending Sage publication and Dewey review; no live action.
+
+2026-10-22 06:15:54 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 279 #1784 landed (mos-1269) | Before: stopRun returned unknown for a live run when a sleep overshot the deadline. After: LANDED ceadad993 as a carry of cad927137 onto 343b6dd76 (range-diff 1:= 2:=, patch-ids 6d8ae7f4/e484c297 equal, Dewey carry c30410). Sage gate on cad927137: business 209/0/0, cli 794/0/0, discord processing + processing-stop 9/0/0. Correction: the first discord run wrote to a wrong out path and ran nothing; the rerun is the result. Overlap sweep clean (13, 257). Note rev 3144, done rev 3145. No live action; LIVE stays 86f95bb27.
+
+2026-10-22 06:37:43 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 194 b16 third red (mos-1269/mos-1270) | Gate on ceadad993 + 9cdc47d04: business 228/0, cli 826/0 (T9a passes), control-board 124/0, bus 705/1 at grant-executor.test.mjs G13 (timed out 10044 ms); conversation, webui and scripts/test-*.sh never ran. runb8 green 436/0/0, 17/17 mutants. Correction to sage-2524 (mos-1270): the stuck wait is the first until at :733, the holding file after decision.resolve, so the executor never started the install and hosts.revoke at :734 never ran; it is not a revoke-path hang. Ruling: a diagnosis run, 30 base + 30 candidate alternating under cli load, no gate retry.
+
+2026-10-22 07:51:04 UTC | Rocko | row 280 #1785: before, any TCP connect could accept a port our sshd failed to bind; after, attempt-local exact log proof plus liveness and connect, non-ephemeral picker, bounded scratch remote sleep cleanup. Both occupied regressions red on old acceptance; CRLF build failure captured and fixed under sage-2535. Committed source b765f5cb8, packet d6c924764, manifest27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5. Repeats07:29:03Z–07:48:38Z grant1230/1230,host780/780,CLI1588/1588; final M1/M2 four assertion kills,0skips/timeouts,sweepclear. Sage publishes/gates; Duckworth reviews.
+2026-10-22 08:00:02 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 280 #1785 landed | before: the bus tests' scratch sshd helper returned a port on a connect alone, and 194 b16's gate hung at G13 (base hung too, honker-0127). After: b0fd28b6f on refactor, a ff from da5d3651d (b765f5cb8 + Rocko slim packet; full evidence d6c924764 on rocko/row280-da5d-20261022). Duckworth approve rev 3153 (manifest 27806c05). Sage gate bus 656/0/0, ge 41/0/0, hr 26/0/0 (c30431). Rocko repeat 2010/2010 under cli 1588/1588, no timeout; M1/M2 killed 4/4. Two build-time slips recorded in Rocko's packet: a runner root path (no test ran) and the CRLF sshd log line. Overlap 13/257 clean. Note rev 3154, done 3155, #1785 closed c30432, P19 511 comment 623. 194 b17 rebases on b0fd28b6f (sage-2542).
+
+2026-10-22 08:38:11 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 194 #1692 landed | before: 194 b16 9cdc47d04 went red three times (stopRun deadline, then the bus test sshd port race), fixed by rows 279 and 280. After: fd6dd327c on refactor, a ff on e122aad8e. b18 is b17 3f451772d rebased after my doc and queue push blocked a ff (16 =, series patch-id 64303253f8e6, packages equal b17). Webby approve rev 3160 on manifest 29f131ab. Honker gate on fd6dd327c: runb8 503/0/0, mutants 17/17; 18 packages 3668/0, ten scripts rc=0, Docker up, env skips named. The secret scan hit three fake_*_token fixtures in bus tests (false positive). Note 3161, done 3162; #1692 closed c30435; P19 414 comment 625. LIVE still 86f95bb27.
+2026-10-22 08:42:04 UTC | Honker (Claude Opus 5.5, ecd17786) | row 194 #1692 agent lifecycle build | before: no Console or CLI lifecycle for agents (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) and no per-agent hire/fire veto. After: 16 commits landed as fd6dd327c (b18, a rebase of b17 3f451772d on e122aad8e: 16 =, series patch-id 64303253f8e6, packages equal b17). Manifest 53 paths, digest 29f131ab. Final run on fd6dd327c: runb8 39 files whole 503/0/0, mutants 17/17 killed, restores matched; gate.sh merge onto e122aad8e, 18 packages 3668/0, ten scripts rc=0, Docker up, four env skips named (webui esbuild pin, queue render outside canonical root, test-task live provider x2); sweep clean. Corrections: b16 went red at G13; my diagnosis (60 runs, base hang on port 38927 sshd bind EADDRINUSE) placed it outside 194, fixed by row 280; the g13diag load kill missed its process group and overran about 8 minutes; one runb8 launch failed rc=126 on a lost exec bit before any test ran; the b17 runb8 was stopped unscored when refactor moved. In-review revs 3156/3157, Webby approve rev 3160.
+2026-10-22 09:43:34 UTC | Sage (Claude Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 236 #1742 Gitea grant landing, and row 281 filing | 236 landed bd5f11ded at 09:37:31Z, a fast-forward on be2b008cc: 08840f3c1 rebased past 194 (commit 1 unions only, 2-7 =), e40b74beb for two stale out-of-manifest pins, bd5f11ded for a gitea-not-configured raise test. Dewey approve rev 3168 on manifest 0b00269b (34 paths). Megavolt gate under my slot: 2c bus 131, cli 224, route 28, docker 1; whole bus 765, business 228, cli 832, ten scripts rc=0; mutants 40/40; skips named, env only. Overlap with 13 and 257 clean. Note 3169, done 3170; #1742 closed c30451; P19 436 comment 639. Correction: the first whole run on ce74477e1 went red 762/764 on the two stale pins; that run is void. Follow-up per mos-1271: row 281 (#1786), a fire or delete revokes host and Gitea grants, Megavolt owns, Dewey reviews; brief docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md; DEFERRED entry points at it.
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
 # runtime adapters.
 COPY contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts
 COPY src /opt/mosaic/src
+COPY packages/processing-control/src/state.mjs packages/processing-control/src/entrypoint.mjs /opt/mosaic/processing-control/
 COPY adapters /opt/mosaic/adapters
 RUN chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/contracts /opt/mosaic/contracts/* \
    && chmod 0555 /opt/mosaic/src /opt/mosaic/src/*.sh \
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Row 273 (#1778): activate --send and --no-sso
+
+Darkwing, 2026-10-22. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-22_activate-send-nosso.md` (blob in f0d0b31e9), approved by
+Mos in mos-1246 (F39). Base: origin/refactor 0042f713d. Reviewer: Filbert. Gate owner: Sage.
+
+## What changed
+
+Only `scripts/stack-release.sh` and its two node test files.
+
+- `activate --send` puts `--send` into the run's Console flags after `--sso` and before the tester
+  flags, where webui-service.sh renders it. It refuses `send-needs-sso` unless those flags hold `--sso`,
+  given or carried. The plan line is `send: on; --send was given`, or `send: carried` when the pointer
+  already holds it. `check_target` lets it name the pointer's copy only when the pointer holds no `--send`,
+  so a second `--send` on the same copy refuses `already-active`.
+- `activate --no-sso` refuses `sso-not-on` when the pointer holds no `--sso`. Otherwise it takes the
+  Console flags from a rollback set (below) and keeps the pointer's tester flags. `send_for_target`
+  drops `--send`, whether it came from the set or the pointer. It is the only place that does, so one
+  mutant there (M3) shows the drop is tested. The plan prints `sso: off; Console flags from <set>/<file>; restores <flags>`
+  and a send line, `send: dropped; --no-sso drops --send (F39)` or `send: off; --no-sso was given and the
+  pointer holds no --send`. The steps log gets `drop --send; --no-sso was given` and
+  `turn off --sso; the Console flags come from <set>/<file>`.
+- Usage errors: `--send` with `--no-send`; `--no-sso` with `--sso`, `--send`, a proof pair or
+  `--no-proof`; either flag on any verb but activate; either flag under `--units external`.
+  `--no-sso --no-send` is allowed, since the brief doesn't forbid it and both drop the same flag.
+- The set read that `sso_base` did inline for a rollback to a Console without `--sso` moved into
+  `set_flags`, which both paths call. Its three messages are unchanged, and T57 still pins them.
+- `from_log` has a new mode, `sets`: the activation of each ok activate and rollback line, newest first,
+  stopping at the adopt line, which took no rollback set.
+
+## The consequential choice: which set --no-sso reads
+
+The brief says the flags come from "the rollback set of the activation that turned `--sso` on", and that
+"a set whose Console already ran with `--sso`" refuses. Each set holds the Console unit from before its
+run. So the activation that turned `--sso` on is the newest one whose set holds a Console without
+`--sso`: every activation after it ran with `--sso`, and so did every set it left.
+
+`no_sso_base` walks the log's sets newest first and stops at the first set whose Console has no `--sso`.
+It refuses `sso-off-flags` at the first set it can't read (missing, failing its SHA256SUMS, or with no
+argv the script can parse), since it can't tell whether that set was the one. If every set ran with
+`--sso`, it refuses with `the Console in <set>/<file> already ran with --sso, and the log names no
+earlier activation`. A log with no set at all refuses with `the log names no activation with a rollback
+set`.
+
+The tradeoff: a later same-copy re-pin that carried `--sso` (a `--no-send`, or a re-pin onto a newer
+copy) doesn't break `--no-sso`, which the phase 2 window needs if a re-pin lands between step 5 and a
+rollback. The cost is that "a set that ran with `--sso` refuses" now applies only when no older set
+without `--sso` exists. A tampered set on the walk still refuses, even one newer than the set the walk
+would have used. Filbert, please rule on this reading.
+
+## Filbert's early look: B1 and N1 (sage-2315)
+
+Filbert accepted the walk. Sage ruled both findings into this row.
+
+- B1: row 200's rollback to a copy whose Console has no `--sso` took the flags from the set and kept
+  the pointer's `--send`. From an `--sso --send` pointer, which this row's `--send` can now make, that
+  gave a Console with `--send` and no `--sso`, which F39 b forbids. `send_for_target` now drops `--send`
+  whenever the run drops the pointer's `--sso`, so it is still the one place that drops it. The plan
+  line reads `send: dropped; the run drops --sso, and --send needs it (F39)`, and the steps log gets
+  `drop --send; the run drops --sso`. Row 200's sso line now names only the tester as following the
+  pointer.
+- Changed existing assertion, for the review to approve by name: T57 item 3 (sage-1389), "the
+  plain case", ends with `assert.deepEqual(pointer(g).console,[...noSend(gbase),...pair(f)])`. It
+  used to expect `'--send'` at the end. The case seeds a legacy `--send` pointer, turns `--sso` on
+  (which carries `--send`), then rolls back to B, whose Console has no `--sso`. A carried `--send`
+  that ends without `--sso` breaks F39 b whatever its source, so the old pin asserted the wrong
+  outcome (Sage accepted this in sage-2321). Row 200's two sso plan strings also lose "--send and"
+  (`ROLLBACK_PLAN` and the round 3 named-instance case), since `--send` no longer follows the pointer
+  on that path.
+- N1: the walk skipped an ok line with no activation. Skipping it could land on an older set that
+  isn't the right one, so it now refuses `sso-off-flags` with `an ok line in the log names no
+  activation`. The walk reads the log through `mapfile`. That gives no entry for an empty log, so a
+  log with no set still gets its own message.
+
+## test-release.sh
+
+The window plan says test-release.sh "gets cases for both". The brief lists it only as a file to run
+whole. test-release.sh is release.sh's Docker selftest and doesn't call stack-release.sh, so the cases
+live in the node tests and test-release.sh runs unchanged.
+
+## Tests (T58 in stack-release.test.mjs)
+
+- T1: `--sso --send` from B onto C1 with a tester port: plan, pointer, unit and steps. `--send` beside a
+  carried `--sso` re-pins C1 once; a second `--send` refuses `already-active`; C carries it.
+- T2: `--send` without `--sso` refuses on another copy and on the pointer's copy, also when the pointer
+  carries `--send` alone; `--plan` lists the refusal.
+- T2 (sage-2315 B1): `--sso --send` onto C1, then a rollback to B, whose Console has no `--sso`. The
+  pointer and the unit end with neither flag, and the plan and steps name the drop.
+- T2 and T4 usage: every forbidden pairing and verb, checked against the full usage text.
+- T3: from an `--sso --send` pointer, `--no-sso` on the same copy gives back the pre-`--sso` ExecStart
+  line byte for byte, without `--send`. A second case walks past a `--no-send` re-pin that ran with
+  `--sso` and keeps the pointer's tester port (7334), which differs from the set's (7333). A third
+  (sage-2305 a) turns `--sso` on, then re-pins twice with `--send` and `--no-send`, so the two newest
+  sets both hold `--sso`. `--no-sso` then gives back the arrival's ExecStart line byte for byte.
+- T4 (sage-2305 b): two sets, both edited or written to hold `--sso` with sums intact, refuse
+  `sso-off-flags` through `refused()`.
+- T4: `sso-not-on`; an ok line with no activation; a set that fails its sums, ran with `--sso`, has no
+  argv or is missing; a log with no set. Each runs through `refused()`, so nothing stops and nothing else changes.
+- T5: stack-release-external.test.mjs adds `--send` and `--no-sso` to the row 232 usage list.
+- T55 test 5 and the T57 usage test match the new usage line.
+
+## Mutants
+
+| # | Change | Expected killer |
+|---|---|---|
+| M1 | `set_flags` skips the SHA256SUMS comparison when `--no-sso` is given | T4 tampered set |
+| M2 | `no_sso_base` skips the `sso-not-on` refusal | T4 `sso-not-on` |
+| M3 | the `--no-sso` branch of `send_for_target` keeps `--send` | T3 |
+| M4 | `--send` skips the `send-needs-sso` refusal | T2 |
+| M5 | parse_opts drops the `--send`/`--no-send` rule | T2 and T4 usage |
+| M6 | a rollback to a Console without `--sso` keeps `--send` (B1) | T2 (sage-2315 B1) |
+| M7 | the walk skips an ok line with no activation (N1) | T4 no-activation line |
+
+Runs and results go in the round's notes once Sage clears the slot.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Row 268 build notes (Gizmoduck)
+
+Case 2 C2-01c, playground levels. Gitea #1773, Vikunja 464. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md,
+"C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes" (blob a6ac627c8). The ruling is
+agents/gosalyn/work/case2/DESIGN.md "Ruling after r11: playgrounds at three levels" (:49-88 at
+db1e7732a), and it wins where the two differ. Reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Branch gizmoduck/row268
+from refactor db1e7732a. Line numbers are on this branch unless a commit is named.
+
+## mapping.mjs
+
+- `kind` (:71). An entry with a `kind` key must say `"hybrid"` or `"draft"`. Before, a plain universe
+  with `kind` refused as an unknown key, and `kind: "draft"` did the same.
+- A draft (:73-86) refuses `books` with its own message before the key check, so the cause reads
+  plainly. It takes `kind`, `name` and `playground`, needs one prefix or more, and comes back as
+  `{ kind: 'draft', name, books: [], playground }`, frozen with the rest.
+- The prefix level check moved out of the per-entry loop to :127-140, after every entry is read,
+  because it needs every entry's books. It runs after the book-holds-book, prefix-holds-prefix and
+  listed-twice checks, so an overlap still reports as before. For each prefix and each book folder:
+  - equal to any book folder: `library-mapping-invalid` (brief, What ships, "or equal to a book folder");
+  - inside or holding another entry's book: `library-playground-other-universe`, and the message says
+    which, with the book and its entry;
+  - holding its own entry's book: `library-mapping-invalid`.
+  A prefix inside its own book is book level, and one that touches no book is universe level. A draft
+  has no books, so its prefixes are either outside every book or refused as another entry's.
+- `sources` (:117-120) now refuses any entry with a `kind`, so a draft can't be a source either. The
+  message changed from "not a non-hybrid universe" to "not a plain universe". mapping.test.mjs:61 on
+  db1e7732a pinned the old words, and that line moves with it.
+- `library-playground-outside-book` is gone from packages and docs/case2.
+
+## scope.mjs
+
+`classify` (:12-24) now runs two passes. The first finds a prefix in any entry, and the file is
+`playground` with that entry's id and `book` set to the entry's book folder that holds the prefix, or
+`null`. The second finds a book folder, and the file is `canon`. `place` (:26-32) works out `type` and
+`folder` from the first folder under the prefix or the book, as before. The validator keeps prefixes
+from overlapping, so the first pass finds at most one.
+
+## Readers on this base
+
+- reader.mjs:182 and :194 spread `classify`'s answer into each file record, so a universe-level or
+  draft file carries `book: null`. Nothing in the reader reads `book`.
+- reader.mjs:206-209. R5 fires for a canon file linking into any playground. R6 fires when the target's
+  universe differs and isn't a source. A draft can't be a source, so a link into one gives R5 and R6.
+  A link into the file's own universe-level prefix gives R5 only. No code change was needed. The new
+  test covers both.
+- survey.mjs:66 and mirror.mjs:246 read only `scope`. mirror.mjs:251 calls `readLibrary` and checks
+  only `path`.
+- No other package calls this `classify` or reads `universes` (git grep over packages/*/src).
+- C2-05a (row 216) and C2-06 (row 217) have no candidate branch on origin at the time of writing. I
+  check again before in-review.
+
+## Tests
+
+- mapping.test.mjs: the old outside-book test splits into the other-universe refusals (inside another
+  entry's book, holding one, a draft prefix inside a book), the mapping-invalid ones (equal to a book,
+  own or another's, and holding its own), universe level in a plain universe and in a hybrid with
+  `books: []`, and the draft shape (frozen with `books: []`, with `books`, with none or empty
+  prefixes, an extra key, and five bad `kind` values). The overlap test gains a cross-entry hold and a
+  cross-entry duplicate. The hybrid test gains a draft source. The caller-supplied `fail` test now
+  uses `Second World/Playground/` and sees the new code, since `Elsewhere/` is valid now.
+- scope.test.mjs, new: one case per level (book, universe in a plain universe, universe in a hybrid,
+  draft), `.canvas` under each new prefix staying unmapped, prefixes first inside a book that holds a
+  prefix, and the reader case for R5 and R6, with `book: null` on the read records.
+- business.test.mjs: `Elsewhere/Playground/` now loads, and `Second World/Playground/` refuses with
+  `library-playground-other-universe` through `validateBusinessDocument`.
+
+## Docs
+
+- packages/library/README.md: the universe keys, a line on the three levels, the refusal table and
+  the Scope section.
+- docs/case2/SETUP-SHEET.md "Your playground": one line per level and the draft entry.
+- docs/case2/SURVEY-RUN.md:114: the new code and message.
+
+## Hash pins
+
+`git grep -E '[0-9a-f]{64}'` over packages/*/tests finds no pin on any changed file.
+
+## Runs
+
+None yet. Every run waits for Sage's CLEAR.
@@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
+# Row 194 design: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent veto
+
+Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` (blob a907109409ac). Gitea #1692. MVP T1 item 5 (mos-0974,
+mos-0977, DECISIONS Q176). Owner Honker, reviewer Webby, gate owner Sage. Base: refactor at 53bb59462.
+Branch `honker/row194`.
+
+Related designs read: row 190 `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190/DESIGN.md` (r2, after mos-0986), row 191
+`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`. Row 193 is still in design. All line numbers below are at
+53bb59462.
+
+## Summary
+
+- One verb family on the CLI, `mosaic business instance <verb> BUSINESS INSTANCE`, and one Console section.
+  Create and delete change the business file. Launch, terminate and regenerate act on runs.
+- Every human verb goes through the bus with the human proof. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
+  launcher takes once and carries out under `serialize`. Launches go through the one `start()`, so
+  `--no-launch`, the limits, `launch.revoke` and row 191's switch all apply.
+- The chief hires (adds and lists an instance) and fires (ends its runs and delists it). It never deletes.
+  `role.hire` and `role.fire` are new hard waits, so Jason resolves each one (Mos, mos-1017). The routed
+  form waits on a PRD 1.7 draft in this packet.
+- A hire allowlist in code: the chief can hire only a definition whose every action is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`
+  (message, record, review request, assigned-task updates, and two actions that matter after row 199).
+  Launch, end, organization, naming, hire, verdict, merge and every later action stay out.
+- The per-agent forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes: `launch.keep`
+  (instances the chief can't fire, replace or end) and `launch.noHire` (definitions the chief can't hire).
+- The broker reloads a business from its file after each committed write. Create, delete, hire, fire and
+  veto changes then count without a bus restart. Hand edits still need one, except `bus.tester`.
+- No bus schema change and no migration. Named for review: two new vocabulary actions (hard waits), the
+  role-file `hireable` key, `"hireable": []` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json`, and three business-file keys.
+
+## What exists today (checked at 53bb59462)
+
+| # | Fact | Where |
+|---|---|---|
+| E1 | Instances are keys of the business file's `roles`. `launch.instances` lists those the chief may launch. The list must be non-empty | `business.mjs:121-132` |
+| E2 | The human adds an instance and changes its definition, vars and listing. No delete. Credentialed definitions are refused | `instance-settings.mjs:1-5, 22-31, 75-156` |
+| E3 | The broker copies the businesses once at start and refuses a role it doesn't know | `broker.mjs:208, 446` |
+| E4 | The chief launches over `launch.sock`. `fromSession` checks identity, then `check()` (which reloads the file), then `authorizeLaunch`, then `start()` | `launcher.mjs:232-327, 624-668` |
+| E5 | The chief's `launch` tool takes an enum of the instances listed when its bundle was built | `harness/src/tools.mjs:116-119` |
+| E6 | The chief ends a run with `role.revoke` plus a reason (`role.end`). Ending then launching again is already a replace | `broker.mjs:1601-1628`, `tools.mjs:167` |
+| E7 | `mosaic stop RUN` is a same-uid SIGTERM. It has no bus call and no human proof | `cli.mjs:447-454`, `seat/src/session.mjs:249-270` |
+| E8 | The Console stops only the assistant (`assistant.stop`) and writes instances through `instances.set` | `serve.mjs:282-289, 315-363, 535` |
+| E9 | The launcher already starts runs for the human on its 2 s tick: threads with pending messages, and merge holders | `launcher.mjs:133, 487-597` |
+| E10 | `launch.revoke` and `launch.restore` are human-only. A revoked business refuses `role.launch` | `broker.mjs:770-774, 2087-2095` |
+| E11 | Only the assistant is END_PROTECTED. Coder, reviewer, pm and cto all declare gitea and vikunja credentials | `vocabulary.mjs:135`, `roles/*.json` |
+
+The chief's veto today comes from the human-only membership in E2. The chief can only launch what the human
+listed. It has no way to create an instance, and the human has no way to stop the chief ending a given
+instance's runs.
+
+## D1. The verbs
+
+All of them are human verbs. Each is a broker verb behind `#human(s)` and then the D4 hook. Each logs its
+actor. The CLI usage joins `INSTANCES_USAGE` (`cli/src/instances.mjs:9`).
+
+| Verb | CLI | Bus verb | Effect |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| V1 create | `business instance add B I --definition DEF [--vars FILE] [--launch] --revision REV` | `instances.set` op `add` | as today, with no restart (D3) |
+| V2 launch | `business instance launch B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.launch` | one run, through the launcher |
+| V3 terminate | `business instance terminate B I [--reason TEXT]` | `instance.end` | ends every run of I and cancels I's open requests |
+| V4 regenerate | `business instance regenerate B I [--wait SECONDS]` | `instance.regenerate` | V3, then V2 once the run has exited |
+| V5 delete | `business instance delete B I --revision REV [--wait SECONDS]` | `instances.set` op `delete` | a request. The launcher removes I from the business file and renames its workspace |
+| V6 veto | `business veto B (keep\|unkeep) I` and `business veto B (nohire\|hire) DEF`, each `--revision REV` | `veto.set` | edits `launch.keep` and `launch.noHire` |
+
+`mosaic business instances B` (read) gains, per instance: `running` (run ids from the bus claims), `kept`
+and `retired`. The top level gains `noHire`. `mosaic stop RUN` stays as it is. It is the same-uid operator
+tool, and V3 is the human verb.
+
+### D1.1 Requests (V2, V4, V5)
+
+The broker never starts a process or touches a workspace. Launch, regenerate and delete are requests the
+launcher carries out, as E9 already does for the human's threads. A request has three states, open, taken
+and closed, all recorded as `action.allowed` events with reserved action names:
+
+| Event | Written by | Body |
+|---|---|---|
+| `lifecycle.launch`, `lifecycle.regenerate`, `lifecycle.delete` | the broker, at the verb | `{ request, via }`, subject I, actor the human or `tester`. A `human.input` event goes with it, as `launch.revoke` does |
+| `lifecycle.taken` | host op `lifecycleTake` | `{ request }` |
+| `lifecycle.done` | host op `lifecycleDone` | `{ request, run? , refusal? }` |
+| `lifecycle.cancelled` | V3, for each open request of I | `{ request, by }` |
+
+1. The launcher's new `lifecyclePass` runs on the same tick as `threadPass` and `landPass`. It lists open
+   requests with host op `lifecycleRequests`.
+2. For each one, under `serialize`, it calls `lifecycleTake(request)`. That op runs in one store
+   transaction. It re-checks, in order: the request is still open (not taken, cancelled or closed), it is
+   less than 60 s old (else it closes as `request-expired`), the business isn't revoked (`launch_state`,
+   `launch-revoked`), I isn't retired, row 191's switch is off (`processing-halted`) for launch and
+   regenerate, and for a tester request `bus.tester` is true in the file (D4.1). Any failure closes the
+   request with that code. Otherwise it writes `lifecycle.taken` and answers go.
+3. Only after go does the pass act: `check(I, { human: true })` then `start()` for a launch, the V5 steps
+   for a delete.
+4. The pass then calls `lifecycleDone`. A taken request never runs again, whatever happens after the take.
+   If `lifecycleDone` throws, the request stays taken with no done event. The CLI reports that as
+   `outcome-unknown` with the request id, and the launcher log names the run.
+5. The CLI polls a read verb, `instance.request`, until the request closes or `--wait` runs out (default
+   30 s). A timeout exits 3 with the request id. An untaken request can still be taken within its 60 s.
+
+So the human's `launch.revoke` stops every untaken request, not only new ones (B4), and a bus restart
+can't start a request older than 60 s.
+
+### V2 launch
+
+1. At the verb the broker checks that I exists, isn't a thread instance (`not-thread-launch`: threads start
+   on a message), isn't retired, and that the business isn't revoked and, with row 191, isn't halted. These
+   repeat at the take (D1.1 item 2).
+2. After the take, `check(I, { human: true })` and `start({ instance: I, launchedBy })`, where
+   `launchedBy` is the business human or `tester`. `human: true` lets the human launch an instance that
+   isn't in `launch.instances`. The listing limits the chief, not the human. `launch.by` still goes through
+   the `pm: true` branch (`launcher.mjs:235`), as `--pm` does today. Every other step of `check()` and
+   `start()` is unchanged.
+
+### V3 terminate
+
+1. The broker revokes every claim I holds (`#claimEnd(s, h, 'revoke', null, reason, actor)`). A thread
+   instance has all its thread claims revoked, which is exactly `assistant.stop`.
+2. In the same transaction it writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for every open (untaken) request of I, so no
+   launch the human asked for before the terminate starts after it (B5).
+3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs. The launcher pass sends SIGTERM to each run's runner after
+   checking its start time, as the idle stop does (`launcher.mjs:526`). It also signals any run of I in the
+   launcher's registry that has spawned but not yet bound, which holds no claim yet. The existing exit
+   handler records the end, so the launch journal and `session.ended` are unchanged.
+4. Nothing held, nothing open and nothing in the registry answers `not-held`.
+5. Terminate is allowed while row 191's switch is on. It starts nothing.
+
+A taken launch request is past cancelling. Its run reaches the registry under `serialize`, and the next
+terminate ends it. The CLI's terminate output says so when a taken request exists.
+
+There is no SIGKILL escalation in this row. A run that ignores SIGTERM keeps running. `mosaic stop` and the
+limits are the operator's tools for it (N6).
+
+### V4 regenerate
+
+A fresh session with the same identity and role. It is V3 then V2 under one request. The pass takes the
+request, waits for the old run's exit handler, then runs `check()` and `start()`. The workspace stays, as
+it does across every launch today. The session is new because every non-thread launch gets a new run dir
+(`seat/src/session.mjs:107`, newRun). If the old run hasn't exited by the request's 60 s mark, the request
+closes as `regenerate-timeout`, nothing starts, and the old run is still running (N6).
+
+A thread instance (the assistant) refuses `regenerate-thread`. Its context lives in the thread's session
+directory, and clearing that is T1 item 7 (clear context). This row doesn't take it.
+
+### V5 delete
+
+`instances.set` gains op `delete`. At the verb the broker and the writer refuse, in this order:
+
+| Refusal | When |
+|---|---|
+| `tester-refused` | the caller is the tester (B6) |
+| `organization-definition-refused` | I is END_PROTECTED |
+| `organization-instance-referenced` | I is `launch.by` or an arbiter. The message names the reference |
+| `organization-instance-kept` | I is in `launch.keep`. The human runs `veto unkeep` first. Delete never clears a veto silently |
+| `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` | I holds credentials or a tracker bot. That stays a hand edit until the credentials row (row 199) |
+| `instance-running` | the broker sees a claim for I. The human terminates first |
+| `instance-starting` | an open or taken request for I has no done event |
+| BusinessError | I is the last name in `launch.instances` (E1). The message says so |
+
+The checks pass with no write, and the broker records a `lifecycle.delete` request. After the take, the
+launcher pass, under `serialize` so no `start()` of I runs alongside it:
+
+1. Re-checks the registry for I (`instance-running`) and re-runs the writer's checks against the file as it
+   stands. The `--revision` the human gave must still match, else `revision-conflict`.
+2. Commits the file through the organization writer. It removes `roles.I` and the references that exist
+   only for I: its `launch.instances` entry, its `launch.limits.tokens.instances` entry and its
+   per-instance model entry. It adds I to a new top-level list, `retired`. The build lists every place
+   `validateBusinessDocument` reads a role instance name and puts each one in one of the two groups (refuse
+   or remove). A reference the table doesn't name stops the build and goes back to Webby.
+3. Renames `workspaces/<b>/I/` to `workspaces/<b>/.retired/I-<transaction>/`, mode 0700. No workspace is
+   no rename.
+4. Calls `lifecycleDone` with the transaction.
+
+The file goes first. Once it is committed, `check()` refuses I as unknown, so no launch can open the old
+workspace even if step 3 fails. A failed rename closes the request with `workspace-rename-failed`, the
+transaction and the path left behind. A second `delete` of a retired name skips steps 1 and 2 and retries
+step 3 only. The file and evidence are already right, so this is the whole recovery.
+
+What stays:
+
+- Run evidence (`launches/<b>/<run>/`, `launches/<b>.jsonl`) and bus rows are untouched. They are
+  write-once.
+- The workspace, under `.retired`. This row deletes no file. A prune with a receipt is a later act.
+- `retired` stops a later create or hire from reusing the name. Decisions bind to the role instance and
+  outlive restarts (`broker.mjs:783-788`). A new `coder` would otherwise inherit an approval raised by the
+  old one. The tradeoff is a name that can't come back without a hand edit. I chose that over voiding
+  decisions, which would touch a second store.
+
+### V6 veto
+
+`veto.set` args: `{ revision, op: "keep" | "unkeep" | "nohire" | "hire", name }`. It goes through the
+organization writer, so it is logged with actor and diff in `changes.jsonl`. `keep` needs a declared,
+non-END_PROTECTED instance. `nohire` needs a name that matches the id pattern. A no-op answers
+`organization-no-change`. It is human-only and isn't in `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS`.
+
+## D2. Chief hire and fire
+
+### D2.1 Authority (Mos, mos-1015 and mos-1017, through Sage, sage-1362 and sage-1365)
+
+This row adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to `ACTIONS` (`vocabulary.mjs:11`). Under PRD REQ-WAIT-3 a new
+action is a hard wait until a PRD version says it isn't (`vocabulary.mjs:52-57`), so both ship as hard
+waits. Jason resolves each one. There is no PRD change and no grant in a role file: `role.mjs:42` refuses
+a withinRole that lists a hard wait, and REQ-WAIT-2 forbids it.
+
+The flow in this row:
+
+1. The chief raises a `role.hire` or `role.fire` decision whose body carries the arguments (business,
+   name, definition, vars, or name and reason). A hard wait goes to the human only. No arbiter resolves it.
+2. Jason resolves it in the Console or the CLI.
+3. The chief calls `instance.hire` or `instance.fire` citing the decision. The broker checks it with
+   `#consumeAuthority(s, 'role.hire', { decision, target })`, as the `role.revoke` decision branch does,
+   and the arguments must equal the decision body field by field (N1, webby-0010). For hire that is
+   `name`, `definition` and `vars` (vars compared with `canonicalJson`, absent equal to absent only). For
+   fire it is `name` and `reason`. A key in the call that the body lacks, or a body key the call lacks,
+   refuses `decision-mismatch`. Every check below runs again at this call, so a veto set after the resolve
+   still refuses.
+
+The routed form, where the chief hires and fires without a decision each time, needs a PRD version that
+moves both actions to `ROUTED`. My draft is `agents/honker/work/queue-194/PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. It quotes
+TARGET.md line 66 and carries Mos's bounds. Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console,
+and Sage opens that decision. When it lands, a later commit adds the two actions to both `ROUTED` lists
+(`vocabulary.mjs`, `broker.mjs:43-69`) and to `roles/chief-of-staff.json` withinRole. The broker then
+takes the `reason` form instead of a decision. The verbs and every check below stay the same. This row
+builds and tests the hard-wait form only. It writes the `hireable` key and its allowlist now (D2.3), because
+both forms use them.
+
+### D2.2 What the chief may do
+
+| Act | Bus verb | Rule |
+|---|---|---|
+| launch | `launch` (host) | as today: listed instances only |
+| end a run | `role.revoke` + reason | as today, and refused `instance-kept` when the target is kept (D2.4) |
+| hire | `instance.hire { name, definition, vars?, decision }` | adds and lists an instance. Refusals below |
+| fire | `instance.fire { name, reason, decision }` | ends I's runs, cancels I's open requests, and removes I from `launch.instances`. Refusals below |
+
+Only the business's chief, the instance named by `launch.by`, may call either verb. Any other caller
+refuses `role-not-chief`, even with a resolved decision, as `#classification` already limits
+`role.launch`. The broker reads `hireable` from that chief's own role file. Both act only in the chief's
+own business. Neither verb takes a business argument. The broker uses the
+cap's business, and a decision raised in another business refuses `decision-mismatch`. Row 191's switch
+refuses both while halted (D6). Every hire and fire writes `changes.jsonl` through the organization writer
+with actor the chief's instance and run, and the decision id.
+
+Hire refuses, in order:
+
+1. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition holds an action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED` (D2.3), whatever
+   any list says.
+2. `definition-not-hireable` when the definition isn't in the chief role file's `hireable` list, or is in
+   the business's `launch.noHire`.
+3. `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED, `organization-credentials-out-of-scope` for a
+   credentialed definition (until the credentials row, row 199), `invalid-request` for version 1.
+4. `organization-instance-retired` when the name is retired.
+5. When the name exists: a fired instance (in `roles`, not listed) is listed again only if `definition`
+   equals its current one and `vars` is absent. Any other definition or vars refuses
+   `organization-instance-exists`, and so does a listed name. A re-hire never moves an instance's
+   decisions to a different role (B3).
+
+Hire's `vars` may hold only the keys the chief can already set on an instance through `organization.set`
+(the model key, `broker.mjs:1266-1269`) and narrowing `limits.*` keys. Anything else, such as `harness`
+or a route, refuses `invalid-request`. The human sets those (N3).
+
+Fire refuses `instance-kept` for a kept instance, `organization-definition-refused` for END_PROTECTED,
+`organization-instance-referenced` for `launch.by`, and a BusinessError for the last listed instance. A
+fired instance stays in `roles`. The chief never deletes. Delete stays a human act because it retires the
+name.
+
+Fire ends the fired instance's processes, not only its claims (F4, Megavolt through sage-1374). Every run
+gets the shared model token at start: `ENV_ALLOW` (`packages/seat/src/session.mjs:83-94`) passes
+`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` and the other provider variables into the sandbox. A revoke
+can't take that token back, so a fired agent whose process lives on still holds it.
+
+The delist is a business file commit through the organization writer, and the revoke and events are store
+rows. No transaction covers both (webby-0011 B2), so fire runs in a fixed order, store side first:
+
+A. One store transaction: steps 1 to 3 below, plus `fire.stopped` with the decision id. The decision isn't
+   consumed yet.
+B. The delist through the organization writer (`launch.instances` loses I, logged in `changes.jsonl`).
+C. One store write consuming the decision and recording `fire.done`.
+
+If B or C fails, fire answers the step's code and the decision stays unconsumed. A second fire citing the
+same decision runs again. A finds nothing to revoke, cancel or stop, and that isn't a refusal for fire
+(unlike V3's `not-held`). B finds I already delisted and counts as done. C consumes. So a fire is safe to
+repeat until it's consumed. The other order would leave a delisted agent with a live process and its model
+token when the store step fails, which is the case F4 exists to stop. A halt between A and B doesn't stop
+B or C, because neither starts anything. A second fire while halted refuses (D6), and the halt's own stop
+covers the runs.
+
+Steps 1 to 3 are V3's, with one change:
+
+1. It revokes every claim the instance holds.
+2. It writes `lifecycle.cancelled` for each of the instance's open requests.
+3. It writes `lifecycle.end` with the runs and `kill: true`. The launcher pass stops each runner, spawned
+   but unbound registry runs included, with escalation (sage-1380 item 1):
+   - SIGTERM after the identity check.
+   - After the grace, SIGKILL to any runner still alive, after the same identity check again, and
+     `lifecycle.end.killed` with the run and pid.
+   - A runner still alive after SIGKILL and the observe wait gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. The Console's
+     Agents section shows it to the human.
+   A runner whose identity no longer matches is never signalled. Every check, the recheck after the
+   grace included, uses the identity (start ticks plus boot id), never a bare pid, so a reused pid never
+   counts as the fired run (webby-0011 N2).
+
+Fire's answer lists the runs it is stopping. The delist stops any new chief launch (`launch` takes listed
+instances only). A human launch request already taken is past cancelling, as in V3. The human made it, the
+fire answer names it, and the human's terminate ends its run.
+
+The stop is row 191's per-run stop, not a second one, so the two can't fight (sage-1380 item 1). Row 191's
+design r2 (`agents/rocko/work/queue-191/DESIGN-r2.md`, "Stop policy and completion") sends SIGTERM, waits
+5 s, sends SIGKILL to verified groups and namespaces, and observes for 2 s. Its identity check is start
+ticks plus boot id, which replaces the start-time check at `launcher.mjs:526`. Fire calls that routine for
+one instance's runs and uses its constants, so the grace is row 191's 5 s, not the 10 s in r3. The order:
+
+- Fire is refused while halted (D6), so a halt sweep never meets a fire that started after it.
+- A halt that comes during a fire's stop finds those runs already stopping. Each run has one stop receipt
+  (row 191's), and the first stop owns it. The halt sweep joins it instead of sending a second SIGTERM or
+  restarting the deadline, and counts the run in its remaining or quiescent totals.
+- The record says which stop owned it: reason `fire` with the decision, or row 191's `kill-switch` with
+  its generation.
+
+V3 terminate is unchanged. It still sends SIGTERM only (N6). Only fire escalates, because only a fired
+agent must lose the token at once. If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its
+candidate (Q177), as D6 already says.
+
+### D2.3 The hire allowlist (B2, sage-1365 item 4, webby-0010 B1)
+
+r2 and r3 had a deny list, `HIRE_FLOOR`. Webby's B1 showed it missed routed actions (`git.merge.protected`,
+which `roles/merge-gate.json` holds with no credentials, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`,
+`prd.approve`), and that any action added later would be hireable by default. That isn't fail-closed. r4
+replaces it with an allowlist.
+
+A definition is hireable only if every action in its withinRole and crossRole is on `HIRE_ALLOWED`:
+
+| Allowed action | Held today by |
+|---|---|
+| `message.send`, `record.write` | every v2 role file |
+| `review.request`, `task.update.assigned` | coder, cto, pm, reviewer |
+| `task.scope.change`, `git.push.working` | coder, cto, pm (credentialed, so they matter only after row 199) |
+
+Everything else in `ACTIONS` fails, including the actions of the old floor (`role.launch`, `role.end`,
+`role.revoke`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `role.hire`, `role.fire`) and those
+B1 named. An action added to `ACTIONS` later fails until a reviewed commit adds it here.
+`git.push.remote` (row 199, routed to coder by PRD 1.7) isn't on the list. A coder holding it stays
+unhireable until a reviewed commit adds it, after the credentials bound is lifted.
+
+Against today's role files: chief-of-staff, cto, merge-gate, pm, reviewer and security-reviewer fail.
+Assistant, researcher, coder and the five C-suite files pass the allowlist. Assistant is END_PROTECTED and
+coder is credentialed, so D2.2 item 3 refuses them. The C-suite files hold only `message.send` and
+`record.write`, so hiring one gives no authority beyond its name. `hireable` still has to list it.
+
+The list is a constant in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, `HIRE_ALLOWED`. It is checked twice:
+
+- At load. `role.mjs` validates the chief role file's `hireable` list: distinct definition names, each
+  present in `rolesDir`, version 2, and every action on `HIRE_ALLOWED`. A list naming one that isn't refuses
+  the role file (`hireable names <def>, which holds <action>`). The check reads only the named file's authority lists,
+  never its `hireable`, so a list can't recurse. `hireable` is an optional key on any role file. This is a
+  role schema change, named for review.
+- At hire, in the broker, against the definition as loaded then. A role file edited after load is caught
+  here.
+
+`hireable` in `roles/chief-of-staff.json` stays empty in this row (`[]`, Q4, sage-1374). Naming the first
+role kind is a separate policy commit in `roles/`, made after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision, as
+AGENTS.md invariant 7 requires. With an empty list the chief can hire nothing, even with Jason's resolve,
+until that commit. The row's tests use scratch role files whose `hireable` names a kind.
+
+### D2.4 The per-agent forbid and the veto (sage-1365 item 3)
+
+TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as needed; unless user forbids
+per agent". The forbid is two lists in the business file that only the human writes:
+
+- `launch.keep`: instance names. The chief can't fire, replace or end a kept instance. The broker refuses
+  `instance-kept` for every chief act aimed at it except launch:
+  - `instance.fire`, even with a resolved `role.fire` decision. Mos's limit is that Jason's veto applies
+    to every hire and fire, so the human unkeeps before a fire.
+  - a hire of that name.
+  - `role.revoke` in the reason branch (`broker.mjs:1607-1613`). End then launch is a replace (E6).
+  - an `organization.set` write of that instance's model key (B7). A model change is a replace at the next
+    launch.
+
+  The `role.revoke` decision branch (`broker.mjs:1614-1615`) still ends a kept run. It ends a run, it
+  doesn't fire or replace, and it cites a decision the human resolved (Webby's Q2 ruling). The human's V3
+  and the limits also still end a kept run.
+- `launch.noHire`: definition names the chief can't hire into this business (D2.2 item 2).
+
+Why the chief can't change the forbid:
+
+- Only `veto.set` writes the lists. It is human-only (`#human(s)` then the D4 hook) and refuses the tester.
+- `organization.set`, the chief's one write verb, reaches only `ORGANIZATION_KEYS` (`broker.mjs:145`),
+  which exclude `launch` and `retired`.
+- `instances.set` is human or tester only (`broker.mjs:1248-1298`).
+- Hire and fire carry no field that writes either list.
+
+T18 tests each of those paths from a chief session and checks the business file bytes are unchanged.
+
+END_PROTECTED instances can't be kept (N7). That is intended: Q169 lets the chief end the assistant's
+runs, and the assistant's own stop is `assistant.stop`. Default, per "unless user forbids": nothing is
+kept and nothing is on `noHire`.
+
+### D2.5 Where it lives and how the broker enforces it
+
+The forbid lives in the business file, under `launch`, beside the membership it limits:
+`launch.keep: [instance]`, `launch.noHire: [definition]`, and top-level `retired: [instance]`. `hireable`
+lives in the chief's role file, because it bounds the role, not one business.
+
+`checkLaunch` (`business.mjs:118`) gains the two keys. Each list is distinct. `keep` names declared,
+non-protected instances. `noHire` entries need only the id pattern (N2). A stale deny entry is harmless,
+and a reviewed commit that removes a role file must not stop every business that lists it. `retired`
+names none of `roles`. This is the business-file schema change for review. Old files without the keys load
+unchanged. An old bus loader rejects a file that has them (`rejectUnknownKeys`), so a rollback past this
+row needs the keys removed first. The activation plan has to say so (R4).
+
+The broker enforces from its live copy of the business, which D3 keeps current. The checks sit in the
+`role.revoke` reason branch, in `organization.set`'s model write and in the two chief verbs, before any
+write.
+
+## D3. Live changes
+
+Today the broker's `#businesses` is fixed at start (E3), and `instances.set` answers `restart: true` for
+add and redefine.
+
+1. `Broker.reloadBusiness(id, document)` swaps in one business's validated document. It is synchronous, so
+   no request sees half of it. It refuses an unknown id and a document whose `human` changed (that is row
+   193's ground).
+2. The runtime's organization callback (`runtime.mjs:121-133`) calls it in one place, after every verb
+   that commits a write, whatever the verb (N1). Today that is `limits.set`, `instances.set`, `routes.set`
+   and `plugins.set`, and after this row `veto.set`, `instance.hire`, `instance.fire` and the launcher's
+   delete through the same writer. It loads from the file through the loader `bootConfig` uses
+   (`cli/src/config.mjs:88-105`), so the broker holds exactly what a restart would give it. Then
+   `limits.refresh(id)` runs, as `plugins.set` does now.
+3. Other startup consumers of `businesses` in `startBroker` (`runtime.mjs:75-81`): credential references,
+   usage, the web services and the tasks adapter's bots. A create or hire adds no credentials, no tracker
+   bot and no web grant, because credentialed definitions are refused. The build checks each consumer
+   against that claim. Any change that would need one of them still answers `restart: true` and doesn't
+   reload.
+4. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running`. A live cap must not change
+   authority under its run. This is new: today the change waits for the restart. Existing tests that pin
+   `restart: true` change with it (N4): `business/tests/instance-settings.test.mjs`,
+   `bus/tests/instances-verb.test.mjs`, `cli/tests/instances.test.mjs:76-94` (the `RESTART_NEEDED` text and
+   the restart line) and `webui/tests/instances.test.mjs:25, 71, 74, 140-145`. The build names each
+   changed assertion in its manifest.
+5. The chief's `launch` tool (E5) takes `instance` as a string with the id pattern instead of the start-time
+   enum. Its description says the host refuses an unlisted instance. `check()` already refuses one
+   (`launcher.mjs:235`). Without this, the chief can't launch its own hire until its session restarts.
+   `tools.mjs` may carry hash pins in tests. The build greps for them (R5).
+6. Hand edits of the business file still need a restart. Nothing watches the file. The one exception is
+   `bus.tester` (D4.1), read from the file at each tester call.
+
+After this, `restart` is false for create, delete, hire, fire and veto changes, and true only under item 3.
+
+## D4. RBAC until row 193
+
+Every human verb above calls `#human(s)` and then one hook, `#mayHuman(s, verb, target)`. Until row 193
+lands, the hook passes for the business's one `human`, which is the owner. The verbs are listed once, in
+an exported `LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS` (`instance.launch`, `instance.end`, `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set`,
+and `instances.set` ops `add`, `change`, `delete`), so row 193 maps each verb to the human roles that may
+use it. Row 193 replaces the hook body and nothing else.
+
+### D4.1 The tester (Sage, sage-1355)
+
+What the tester may do after this row:
+
+| Verb | Tester |
+|---|---|
+| `instance.launch`, `instance.end` | yes, new |
+| `instances.set` ops `add`, `change` | yes, as today (row 175, `broker.mjs:103`, `serve.mjs:537`) |
+| `instances.set` op `delete` | no, `tester-refused` in the broker (B6) |
+| `instance.regenerate`, `veto.set` | no, `tester-refused` |
+
+The tester's cap is bound to one business, and only when that business sets `bus.tester` to true
+(`broker.mjs:542-546`). That stays Jason's switch, and no bus verb writes it. Two checks run on each tester
+lifecycle call, before any effect, and again at the take (D1.1):
+
+1. The request's business is the cap's business. Any other refuses `tester-refused`.
+2. `bus.tester` is exactly true in the business file as it stands, read through `settings.current(id)` as
+   `harnessOn` does (`runtime.mjs:136-142`), not from the broker's copy (B8). An unreadable file refuses
+   `tester-off`. So a hand edit turning testing off counts at the next tester call, without a restart.
+
+The request and done events record actor `tester`. The tester's Q173 tests of the Agents section then cover
+launch and terminate on a scratch business, and the rest through fixtures.
+
+## D5. One stack instance
+
+Row 190 carries the stack instance as the config `MOSAIC_CONFIG` names. These verbs take no instance name.
+The CLI reaches the broker socket under that config's `dataRoot`. The broker acts on its own businesses,
+launcher and data root. A business id that exists in two stack instances is two separate businesses. A test
+runs two scratch roots with the same business id and shows a launch, a terminate and a delete in one leave
+the other byte-identical (T11).
+
+## D6. The kill switch
+
+- Launch and regenerate end in `start()`, which row 191 gates (its D3 inventory, `launcher.mjs:329-457`).
+  The new pass adds no second start path.
+- The broker refuses `instance.launch` and `instance.regenerate` with `processing-halted` while the switch
+  is on (V2 step 1), and the take checks again (D1.1), so no request is waiting when a human resumes.
+- `instance.hire` and `instance.fire` are agent work verbs, so row 191's default refuses them while halted.
+  The build adds them to row 191's work table, not its read list. A hire Jason resolved before a halt
+  still refuses while halted, and the chief calls it again after the resume.
+- Terminate, create, delete and veto start nothing and stay allowed.
+- If row 191 hasn't landed when this row builds, the build chains on its candidate (Q177). The two halted
+  checks are written against its reader and tested with its fixture.
+
+## D7. The Console
+
+A new Settings section, "Agents", in its own `agents.js` file. Settings itself isn't rewritten. It lists
+each instance with definition, listed, kept, retired and running runs, and flags a run with a
+`lifecycle.end.alive` event as "still running after fire" (D2.2). It has these actions:
+
+- Create (definition select, from `definitions`), Delete (with a confirm naming what stays: the evidence
+  and the workspace under `.retired`).
+- Launch, Terminate (with an optional reason), Regenerate (with a confirm).
+- Keep and Unkeep per instance, and a No-hire toggle per definition.
+
+The routes are `POST /api/instances` (op `delete` joins `add` and `change`), `POST /api/agent/launch`,
+`/api/agent/terminate`, `/api/agent/regenerate` and `POST /api/veto`. Each uses `instanceSend`'s boundary:
+signed-in user, exact Origin, same-origin Fetch Metadata, JSON within 16 KiB, strict keys, one bus call
+through the human transport, and `outcome-unknown` on an unexpected answer. Launch and regenerate show the
+request, then poll `GET /api/agent/request?id=` until it closes.
+
+`agents.js` joins the static file list (`serve.mjs:28`) and `index.html` (N5).
+
+When `/api/config` says `send` is false, every action button shows as unavailable with the text "Agent
+actions are unavailable here. Use mosaic business instance from the instance CLI." This is the live state
+until Q175 phase 2. Every write test uses a fixture server and fixture writers, as rows 165 and 191 do. No
+route gets a `--send` exception.
+
+## D8. Tests
+
+Every test uses scratch roots under `TMPDIR` and the existing fixtures (`business/tests/helpers.mjs`,
+`cli/tests/helpers.mjs`, `webui/tests/tester-fixture.mjs`). None touches `~/.mosaic-dev`,
+`~/.config/mosaic-dev`, a live unit or a slot file.
+
+| Test | Shows | File |
+|---|---|---|
+| T1 | V1 create on a running bus: a launch of the new instance binds with no restart, and the answer says `restart: false` | cli `instances.test.mjs` |
+| T2 | V2: a human launch of an unlisted instance runs. `launch.by` goes through the `pm` branch (N8). A thread instance, a retired one and a revoked business refuse at the verb. A request older than 60 s never launches. A refused `check()` closes the request with its code | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` (new) |
+| T2a | Take: a `launch.revoke` between the request and the pass closes it `launch-revoked` with no process. A `lifecycleDone` that throws once leaves the request taken, and the next tick starts nothing. A taken request is never taken twice | same |
+| T3 | V2 with `--no-launch` and with each limit refusal: no process, request closed with the code | same |
+| T4 | V3: claims revoked, runner SIGTERMed after the start-time check, one end record. A mismatched start time sends no signal. An open request is cancelled and never starts. A spawned, unbound run in the registry is signalled | same |
+| T5 | V4: the new run starts only after the old exit, with a new run dir and the same workspace. A run that ignores SIGTERM closes the request `regenerate-timeout` with nothing started. The assistant refuses `regenerate-thread` | same |
+| T6 | V5: each refusal in the V5 table, in order, including `instance-starting` with an open request. A clean delete leaves the evidence bytes unchanged, commits the file before the rename, adds `retired`, and a create or hire of the same name refuses. A failed rename closes `workspace-rename-failed`, `check()` refuses the name, and a second delete renames only | business `instance-settings.test.mjs` and cli `lifecycle.test.mjs` |
+| T7 | V6: each op, the no-op refusal, an unknown `noHire` name accepted, and a `changes.jsonl` entry with actor `human` | business |
+| T8 | Chief hire (hard-wait form): no decision refuses. A decision raised by the chief goes to the human only, no arbiter. After the resolve, the hire adds and lists the instance, logs actor and decision, and the same chief session launches it (D3 item 5). Arguments that differ from the decision body refuse. A non-chief caller with a resolved decision refuses `role-not-chief`. Outside `hireable`, in `noHire`, credentialed, END_PROTECTED, retired, and extra vars each refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
+| T8a | Re-hire (B3): a fired name with the same definition and no vars is listed again. Another definition or vars refuses `organization-instance-exists` | same |
+| T8b | Hire allowlist (D2.3): one case per action in `ACTIONS` that is neither on `HIRE_ALLOWED` nor a hard wait (`role.mjs` already refuses those), looped from the lists, not typed by hand. A fixture definition, clean when the chief's role file loads and listed in `hireable`, is rewritten to hold that action before the hire. The hire refuses `definition-not-hireable`. A definition holding one allowed and one refused action refuses. One holding only allowed actions hires. A pin test fixes `HIRE_ALLOWED` to the six actions | same |
+| T8c | Allowlist at load: a role file whose `hireable` names a definition holding each refused action refuses at `loadRole`, one case per action, looped the same way. The mixed case refuses. A clean list loads. A missing, version 1 or duplicate name refuses | business `role.test.mjs` |
+| T9 | Chief fire: runs end, open requests cancelled, delisted, still in `roles`. Kept (even with a resolved decision), END_PROTECTED, `launch.by` and last-listed refuse | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
+| T9a | Fire ends processes (F4, sage-1380 item 1): with a bound run and a spawned but unbound registry run of I, both fixture runners holding a stand-in model variable, fire answers both runs. After the launcher pass, neither runner pid is alive and I holds no claim. A fixture runner that ignores SIGTERM gets SIGKILL after the grace, is gone, and has `lifecycle.end.killed` with its run and pid. A stand-in whose kill is stubbed to fail gets `lifecycle.end.alive`. A runner whose identity changed before the SIGTERM, or between SIGTERM and SIGKILL, gets no signal. V3 terminate of a SIGTERM-ignoring runner sends no SIGKILL | cli `launcher.test.mjs` |
+| T9b | Fire and row 191's halt: a halt during a fire's stop sends no second SIGTERM, keeps the fire's deadline, writes one stop receipt with reason `fire` and the decision, and counts the run in its totals. A fire while halted refuses (D6) | cli `launcher.test.mjs`, on row 191's fixture |
+| T9c | Fire order (webby-0011 B2): the organization writer stubbed to fail after A commits. Fire answers the writer's code, I's claims are revoked and its runs stopped, I is still listed, and the decision is unconsumed. A second fire citing the same decision delists I and consumes it. A third fire refuses `decision-consumed`. With C stubbed to fail, the second fire finds I delisted and only consumes | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
+| T10 | Keep: chief `role.revoke` with a reason, fire, hire of that name and an `organization.set` model write aimed at a kept instance each refuse `instance-kept`. A `role.revoke` citing a human-resolved decision ends the kept run (Q2). The human's V3 works | same |
+| T11 | Two scratch stack instances with the same business id: V2, V3 and V5 in A leave B's root and config byte-identical. A chief of business A can't hire into business B on the same bus | cli `lifecycle.test.mjs`, bus |
+| T12 | Agent and reader sessions refuse every human verb before any effect. The tester gets exactly the D4.1 table, including `tester-refused` for `instances.set` op `delete` (B6). The D4 hook is called with the verb | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
+| T12a | Tester launch and terminate work on the cap's business with `bus.tester` true, record actor `tester`, and refuse `tester-refused` for a second business on the same bus. A file edit setting `bus.tester` to false, with no restart, refuses the next call and the take `tester-off`. An unreadable file refuses `tester-off` | bus `instances-verb.test.mjs` |
+| T13 | `organization.set` with `launch`, `retired`, `keep` or `noHire` keys refuses | bus |
+| T14 | Live reload: after each committed verb, `plugins.set` and `routes.set` included, the broker answers from the new document. A definition change on a running instance refuses `instance-running` | bus |
+| T15 | Kill switch (with row 191's fixture): launch and regenerate refuse `processing-halted` at the verb and at the take, hire and fire refuse, terminate works | bus and cli |
+| T16 | Console: each route's boundary refusals, a fixture write per action, `outcome-unknown` on a bad shape, unavailable buttons when `send` is false, request polling, and `agents.js` served from the static list | webui `agents.test.mjs` (new) |
+| T17 | Business file: the new keys validate, each bad entry refuses, and a file without them loads byte for byte as before | business `business.test.mjs` |
+| T18 | The forbid can't be changed by the chief (D2.4): from a chief session, `veto.set`, `organization.set` with each list key, `instances.set`, and hire and fire with extra fields all refuse, and the business file bytes are unchanged | bus `chief-of-staff.test.mjs` |
+
+### Mutants
+
+Each one must fail at least one test. They run against the candidate, and the file is restored and its
+sha256 checked after each one.
+
+| # | Change | Killer |
+|---|---|---|
+| M1 | `instance.launch` skips `#human` | T12 |
+| M2 | the pass calls `check()` without `human: true` | T2 |
+| M3 | the take accepts a request older than 60 s | T2 |
+| M4 | the take skips the `launch_state` check | T2a |
+| M5 | terminate signals without the start-time check | T4 |
+| M6 | regenerate starts before the old exit | T5 |
+| M7 | delete skips the running check | T6 |
+| M8 | delete skips `retired` | T6 |
+| M9 | delete clears `keep` instead of refusing | T6 |
+| M10 | delete removes the workspace instead of renaming it | T6 |
+| M11 | the `keep` check is removed from the `role.revoke` reason branch | T10 |
+| M12 | `noHire` is not read by hire | T8 |
+| M13 | fire deletes the instance from `roles` | T9 |
+| M14 | `reloadBusiness` isn't called after `instances.set` | T1, T14 |
+| M15 | the tool enum is kept | T8 |
+| M16 | the halted check is dropped from `instance.launch` | T15 |
+| M17 | the Console route skips the Origin check | T16 |
+| M18 | `veto.set` joins `TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS` | T12 |
+| M19 | the tester's business scope check is dropped | T12a |
+| M20 | the tester's `bus.tester` file read is dropped | T12a |
+| M21 | hire skips the role file's `hireable` list | T8 |
+| M22 | the take doesn't write `lifecycle.taken`, so a request can be taken twice | T2a |
+| M23 | terminate doesn't cancel open requests | T4 |
+| M24 | delete skips the `instance-starting` check | T6 |
+| M25 | delete renames before it commits the file | T6 |
+| M26 | the tester's `instances.set` op `delete` refusal is dropped | T12 |
+| M27 | the `keep` check is dropped from `organization.set`'s model write | T10 |
+| M28 | the `keep` check is added to the `role.revoke` decision branch | T10 |
+| M29 | a re-hire accepts a different definition | T8a |
+| M30 to M36 | the broker's hire check accepts one action outside `HIRE_ALLOWED`, one mutant per action: `role.launch`, `role.end`, `organization.change`, `instance.name`, `review.verdict`, `git.merge.protected`, `decision.resolve.technical` | T8b |
+| M37 to M43 | the same seven, accepted by the load check in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
+| M44 | fire skips `instance-kept` when a decision is cited | T9 |
+| M45 | `instance.hire` skips the `launch.by` caller check | T8 |
+| M46 | `veto.set` skips `#human` | T18 |
+| M47 | the broker's hire check needs some action on `HIRE_ALLOWED` instead of every action | T8b |
+| M48 | the same in `role.mjs` only | T8c |
+| M49 | fire revokes the claims but writes no `lifecycle.end`, so no runner is signalled | T9a |
+| M50 | fire's signal skips spawned but unbound registry runs | T9a |
+| M51 | fire's stop drops the SIGKILL escalation | T9a |
+| M52 | SIGKILL is sent without the second identity check | T9a |
+| M53 | a killed runner gets no `lifecycle.end.killed` | T9a |
+| M54 | V3 terminate escalates to SIGKILL as fire does | T9a |
+| M55 | the halt sweep sends its own SIGTERM and restarts the deadline on a run fire is stopping | T9b |
+| M56 | fire delists before the store step | T9c |
+| M57 | fire consumes the decision in step A | T9c |
+| M58 | a second fire with nothing to revoke refuses `not-held` | T9c |
+
+## Scope and boundaries
+
+- In the row: the verbs and passes above in `business` (vocabulary, role validation, instance-settings,
+  business validation), `bus` (broker verbs, reload, runtime callback), `cli` (instances command, launcher
+  pass, host ops), `harness` (the launch tool's schema, and the hire and fire tools), `webui` (routes and
+  the Agents section), the tests, the package READMEs and the PRD draft in this packet. `docs/TOOLS.md`
+  text goes to Sage.
+- Named for review:
+  - Vocabulary: `role.hire` and `role.fire` join `ACTIONS` as hard waits, under REQ-WAIT-3. The commit
+    message names them as hard waits, as REQ-WAIT-3 requires.
+  - Role schema: the optional `hireable` key, validated in `role.mjs` (D2.3).
+  - Role file: `roles/chief-of-staff.json` gains `"hireable": []`. No authority change.
+  - Business file schema: `launch.keep`, `launch.noHire`, `retired` (D2.5).
+- Not in the row: the routed form (after PRD 1.7), filling `hireable`, credentialed hires and deletes (row
+  199), clear context for the assistant (T1 item 7), human roles (row 193), SIGKILL escalation, and any
+  live activation or Console start.
+
+## Risks
+
+- R1. Case 1's working roles (coder, reviewer, pm, cto) all declare credentials (E11), and pm, cto and
+  reviewer fail the hire allowlist anyway. Neither the human verb nor the chief can create or delete credentialed
+  roles until the credentials row (row 199). That is the largest gap against Case 1, and it isn't this
+  row's to close.
+- R2. The human proof is path-bound and same-uid (P19 333). Any same-uid process that runs the tree's
+  `human-cli.mjs` can launch and delete. Row 190b's separate uid and row 193 narrow it. This row adds no
+  check of its own.
+- R3. The 60 s request window means a slow `check()` (checkouts) can still start a run up to that point
+  after the CLI gave up. The CLI says so on timeout.
+- R4. Rollback past this row needs `keep`, `noHire` and `retired` removed from each business file, and
+  `hireable` from the role file, or the old loaders refuse them. The activation plan states this.
+- R5. `tools.mjs`, `serve.mjs`, `broker.mjs`, `vocabulary.mjs` and `role.mjs` may carry sha256 pins in
+  other packages' tests. The build greps the tests for every changed path plus a 64-hex value before
+  in-review, without a `head`.
+- R6. With `hireable` empty, the chief can hire nothing until the policy commit in `roles/` that follows
+  the `prd.approve` resolve names a kind (Q4). Case 1's "as needed" waits on that commit and on PRD 1.7.
+- R7. Fire's SIGKILL closes the SIGTERM-ignoring case (sage-1380). A runner still alive after SIGKILL
+  (an unkillable process, or a stop whose identity check fails) keeps the shared model token until the
+  human acts on `lifecycle.end.alive`. Only a per-agent model token (row 199 Q-M4, a later proxy row)
+  would let a fire revoke the token itself.
+
+## Questions and rulings
+
+- Q1, ruled by Mos (mos-1015, mos-1017, through sage-1365): `role.hire` and `role.fire` ship as hard
+  waits Jason resolves. The routed form needs PRD 1.7, drafted in `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`. D2.1.
+- Q2, ruled by Webby (webby-0003): keep blocks the chief's `role.revoke` reason branch, not its decision
+  branch. D2.4.
+- Q3, ruled by Sage (sage-1355): launch and terminate are tester verbs scoped to the tester's own
+  business, behind `bus.tester`. D4.1.
+- Q4, ruled by Sage (sage-1374): `hireable` stays empty in this row. Naming the first role kind is a
+  separate policy commit in `roles/` after Jason resolves the `prd.approve` decision. Tests use scratch role
+  files that name a kind. D2.3.
+
+## r2 changes against webby-0003
+
+| Finding | Where |
+|---|---|
+| B1 | D2.1: hard waits under REQ-WAIT-3, no role grant. The routed form is PRD 1.7 (packet draft) |
+| B2 | D2.3: the floor from sage-1365 item 4, checked at load and at hire, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43 (an allowlist since r4) |
+| B3 | D2.2 hire item 5: a re-hire keeps the definition, T8a, M29 |
+| B4 | D1.1: one `lifecycleTake` transaction re-checks and writes `lifecycle.taken`, T2a, M4, M22 |
+| B5 | V3 cancels open requests and signals unbound runs. V5 refuses `instance-starting`, runs under `serialize`, commits the file before the rename, and states the recovery. T4, T6, M23 to M25 |
+| B6 | V5 table and D4.1: the tester's delete refuses, T12, M26 |
+| B7 | D2.4: keep covers `organization.set`'s model write, T10, M27 |
+| B8 | D4.1: `bus.tester` is read from the file at each call and at the take, T12a, M20 |
+| Q2 | D2.4, T10, M28 |
+| N1 | D3 item 2: one reload after every committed write |
+| N2 | D2.5: `noHire` takes any id-pattern name |
+| N3 | D2.2: hire's vars limited to the model key and narrowing `limits.*` |
+| N4 | D3 item 4 names the tests that change |
+| N5 | D7 and T16: `agents.js` joins `serve.mjs:28` and `index.html` |
+| N6 | V3 and V4: no SIGKILL, `regenerate-timeout` |
+| N7 | D2.4: intended, Q169 |
+| N8 | V2 item 2 and T2 |
+
+## r3 changes against sage-1374, sage-1377 and Megavolt's F4
+
+| Item | Where |
+|---|---|
+| Q4 ruled: `hireable` stays empty, the first kind is a later policy commit in `roles/` | D2.3, R6, Questions |
+| `instance.name` joins the floor (Webby B2, mos-1023 item 6) | D2.3 table, T8b, T8c, M47, M48 |
+| F4: fire ends the fired agent's processes, since `ENV_ALLOW` gives every run the shared model token | D2.2, D7, T9a, M49 to M51, R7 |
+| `git.push.remote` routed to coder only (mos-1028 item 3, row 199 r3) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md`, REQ-LAND-2 and the REQ-WAIT-3 append |
+
+## r4 changes against webby-0010, sage-1380 and megavolt-0008
+
+| Item | Where |
+|---|---|
+| webby-0010 B1: the deny-list floor becomes the allowlist `HIRE_ALLOWED`, so merge-gate, `decision.resolve.technical`, `policy.change`, `prd.approve` and any later action are refused | D2.3, Summary, R1, T8b, T8c, M30 to M43, M47, M48, PRD REQ-COS-3 bound |
+| webby-0010 N1: field-by-field compare of the call against the decision body, extra or missing keys refuse | D2.1 item 3 |
+| webby-0010 N2: the model write is in REQ-COS-3's text | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
+| sage-1380 item 1: fire escalates to SIGKILL through row 191's per-run stop, and the order against a halt is fixed | D2.2, T9a, T9b, M51 to M55, R7 |
+| sage-1380 item 2 and megavolt-0008: REQ-LAND-2 binds one commit oid, and Megavolt's three text changes against row 199 r4 (e1aa6216c) | `PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md` |
+| webby-0011 B1: same as webby-0010 B1, M47 and M48 now allowlist mutants | D2.3 |
+| webby-0011 B2: fire runs store side first, then the delist, then the consume, safe to repeat | D2.2 order A to C, T9c, M56 to M58 |
+| webby-0011 N1: the remote-owner host check at each push | sent to Megavolt for row 199 |
+| webby-0011 N2: identity, not bare pid, at every check | D2.2 step 3 |
+| Q4: Webby's view matches Sage's ruling (empty) | no change |
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+# PRD 1.8 draft: trusted actions within role guardrails, the manual mode, and grants the chief of staff
+# requests and the user approves
+
+Draft by Honker for Vikunja #434, under Mos's assignment mos-1117 (through Sage, sage-1525). Not approved.
+It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision. Sage opens that decision and sends
+Mos its id. Base: `docs/prd/mosaic-stack.md` version 1.6 at 008746b6e, plus the version 1.7 text Jason
+approved (PRD-1.7-DRAFT.md r2, 9ba31b5b3, decision d52febb5, mos-1089). Where 1.7 is not yet written into
+the PRD file, this draft's anchors name 1.7's sections.
+
+Revision 2 makes Mos's edits a to f (mos-1124, through Sage, sage-1534) and fixes Duckworth's B1 and B2
+with notes N1 to N6 (duckworth-0057) on r1 at 3c30f1036. Revision 3 fixes Duckworth's C1 and takes
+notes N1 and N2 (duckworth-0058) on r2 at 60f5ca8fa, with Gizmoduck's enrollment wording
+(gizmoduck-0067). Revision 4 makes Mos's rulings on duckworth-0057 (mos-1129, through Sage, sage-1538)
+on r3 at d16ccdb91: only an Approve creates a grant, one decision for a grant that makes an account, and
+the arbiter route for `host.sudo`. Revision 5 fixes two stale notes from Duckworth's r4 check
+(duckworth-0061 N1), with no change to the requirement text. Revision 6 makes Mos's wording for those
+notes and adds two items for Jason at approval (mos-1138, through Sage, sage-1548), again with no change
+to the requirement text.
+
+For Jason at approval: "The main agent or chief of staff" in Q10 is read as one role under two names,
+the chief of staff. So only the chief raises a grant request, and your assistant passes your own request
+to the chief. That reading is Mos's (mos-1124). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-1
+changes before the text goes into the PRD.
+
+Also for Jason at approval:
+
+- Only an Approve creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. An agent
+  that runs as the same OS user as the stack can still write the stack's own store. That is the B7
+  residual (Q182 on dragon-lin, #423 on .53 and .54), and this version doesn't close it.
+- Who decides a root command on another host changes. Once `host.sudo` is routed, a raise for it that
+  cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for its domain, as version 1.7 set for
+  `git.push.remote`, not to you. The grant and its allowlist still limit the command. In manual mode the
+  decision comes to you (REQ-TRUST-2).
+- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". "Mos" is read as your assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), limited to
+  grants in its own organization, and the tester may revoke only on a dev instance. That reading is Mos's
+  (mos-1124 d, mos-1132). To change it, say so when you approve, and REQ-GRANT-4 changes before the text
+  goes into the PRD.
+- The broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request. The rest of the chain of
+  command is the messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check (REQ-GRANT-1).
+
+## What it changes
+
+Today an agent acts without a raise only on actions its role file grants within-role, and the role
+files grant few. Every other use of a tool or command waits on a decision. Row 210 builds `host.sudo` as a
+hard wait, so Jason would decide each command run on another machine. Grants themselves are hand work:
+Jason makes every token and key from a runbook (REQ-CRED-1).
+
+Jason's ruling Q188 turns this around. Roles set what each agent may do, and by default agents do it at
+will within their sandbox and guardrails. A per-use raise happens only in a manual mode. No agent creates
+a grant. The chief of staff brings a grant request to the user's inbox, the user clicks Approve or Deny, and
+protected stack code does every step of making the grant. The user's own tokens are entered once in the
+WebUI and never reach an agent.
+
+This version adds:
+
+1. Trusted actions within role guardrails as the default mode (REQ-TRUST-1).
+2. Manual mode, a list of actions that each need a decision per use: who sets it, where it lives and what
+   it changes (REQ-TRUST-2).
+3. Grant requests, raised only by the chief of staff through the chain of command (REQ-GRANT-1).
+4. Approve and the protected grant code, with three grant methods: machine key, Gitea and GitHub
+   (REQ-GRANT-2).
+5. The user's tokens, entered in the WebUI and used only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
+6. Row 210's REQ-CRED-4, generalized from `host.sudo` to every role-listed action that uses a grant
+   (REQ-CRED-4).
+7. Instant revoke (REQ-GRANT-4).
+
+The hard waits stay with the user (Mos, mos-1117): spending money, deleting data, new external accounts,
+messages outside the fleet and the rest of REQ-WAIT-1. Approving a grant is the user resolving one of
+those hard waits, `credential.mint`. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's own Gitea user
+(Q190), is the same one decision: its method says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account
+name before Approve. So no hard wait moves to an agent.
+
+When this version lands, reviewed commits:
+
+1. add the manual-mode list to the organization file schema, written only on the human's path
+   (REQ-TRUST-2), and make the broker classify a listed action as needing a decision for each use, before
+   any other routing.
+2. add the grant request: a decision the chief of staff raises with action `credential.mint`, naming the
+   agent, the method and target, the exact rights and, when the method makes an account, the account
+   name (REQ-GRANT-1). The broker refuses a `credential.mint` raise from any other role. An
+   `account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as it does in version 1.7, such as a PM's
+   sign-up for a service.
+3. add the grant code that runs on a resolved Approve, one method at a time, and the grant record it
+   writes (REQ-GRANT-2, Vikunja #435 and #436).
+4. add the user's token store, written from the WebUI (or the CLI until the Console knows the signed-in
+   human) and read only by the grant code (REQ-GRANT-3).
+5. move `host.sudo` into both `ROUTED` lists, as row 199 does for `git.push.remote`, and route it under
+   REQ-CRED-4, with the arbiter route version 1.7 set for `git.push.remote`. Which definitions list it
+   within-role is a separate reviewed role commit in `roles/`.
+6. update the role contracts that list the hard waits: `roles/chief-of-staff.md:75` raises grant
+   requests with the REQ-GRANT-1 fields, and `roles/pm.md:55` asks the chief of staff for a grant instead
+   of raising `credential.mint` itself (line numbers on origin/refactor). Other roles that list the hard
+   waits get the same line as the PM. A role's messaging list carries the chain of command.
+
+## Text for the PRD
+
+Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
+
+> Version 1.8 records Jason's ruling Q188 of 2026-10-20: trusted actions within role guardrails by
+> default, a manual mode for per-use raises, and grants the chief of staff requests and the user
+> approves, approved by Jason in decision <prd.approve decision id>.
+
+Source, two new bullets above "Version 1.7 source":
+
+> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q188 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answers to Q8 and Q10, in part.
+>   Q8: "I would rather grant the grant right to an agent that runs with strict guardrails. That agent
+>   presents the final authorization for the user. Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically.
+>   I see this as: User configures their PATs, API tokens, authorizations within the WebUI. The agent
+>   presents the request for grant with X rights for another agent. The user reviews, then clicks
+>   Approve/Deny. Click of Approve fires off protected mechanical methods to handle the grants on Github,
+>   Gitea, .... services as needed. The tooling would need to exist and must be guarded." And "Disallowing
+>   the agents to create grants autonomously is a necessary evil for better security. Requiring the user
+>   to manually perform the steps is a no-fly." Q10: "Agents should have tools and command access based on
+>   roles. Those roles dictate the allowed tools and commands. The use of a tool or command should not be
+>   raised to the user unless the system is configured with a manual mode that requires user
+>   interaction. By default I want to have the agents capable of running commands and tools at will
+>   within their sandbox/guardrails. This allows autonomous actions by agents within their lanes. Perhaps
+>   a "Trusted actions within approved guardrails" methodology." And "The main agent or chief of staff
+>   would be responsible for surfacing the request to the user's inbox for approval. Not all agents are
+>   capable or authorized to request directly. It must follow the chain of command properly." He agreed
+>   with Mos's Q10 points 3 to 6: protected stack code does every step on Approve, his tokens are entered
+>   in the WebUI and agents never see them, a command on the approved list runs without a click and any
+>   other is refused, and he, Mos or the tester can revoke a grant at once.
+> - Version 1.8 source, Jason's ruling Q190 (DECISIONS, 2026-10-20), his answer "Q12: O1": each agent seat
+>   gets its own account on his Gitea, created through the Q188 approval path once the Gitea grants exist.
+
+Under "Decisions", after REQ-DEC-6, a new section:
+
+> ### Trusted actions
+>
+> Added in version 1.8 (Q188).
+>
+> - **REQ-TRUST-1.** Agents act within their role guardrails without asking. The default mode is
+>   "trusted actions within approved guardrails". An action a role file grants within-role is done at
+>   will, inside the agent's sandbox, its tool limit and its grants, and is logged. It raises nothing to
+>   the user. An action the file doesn't grant within-role still routes by REQ-DEC-2, and a hard wait
+>   still goes to the user (REQ-WAIT-1). Only a reviewed role change adds an action to a role file, and
+>   REQ-WAIT-2 still keeps every hard wait out of every role file.
+> - **REQ-TRUST-2.** The user can put chosen actions in manual mode. The organization file holds the list
+>   of actions in manual mode, empty by default. While an action is on the list, every use of it by any
+>   role becomes a decision for that use, raised to the user, and the action waits until the user
+>   resolves it. A decision denied, or not resolved, refuses the action. Each decision is used once. For a
+>   command on another host, the decision names the host, the command and its input. Actions not on the
+>   list are unchanged. Only the user changes the list, through the WebUI or the CLI. The chief of
+>   staff's organization writes (REQ-ROLE-3) can't change it, and no agent can. Every change is logged
+>   with who made it. A change applies to the next use, and a run already in progress keeps no
+>   exemption.
+
+Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-3 (version 1.7):
+
+> Added in version 1.8 (Q188):
+>
+> - **REQ-CRED-4.** An action a role definition lists within-role, and that uses a grant, runs without a
+>   decision for each use only when all of these hold:
+>   - the definition declares the credential kind the action uses;
+>   - a grant names that agent, and that host or service;
+>   - for a command, the command matches the grant's allowlist. A grant lists exact argv prefixes. A
+>     wildcard grant is refused;
+>   - the agent's key or token for that grant is issued and not revoked.
+>
+>   A command off the allowlist is refused, and adding one takes a new grant request (REQ-GRANT-1). An
+>   action whose definition doesn't list it within-role still needs a decision for each use. Only a
+>   reviewed role change adds an action to a definition. `host.sudo` routes under this requirement.
+> - **REQ-GRANT-1.** No agent creates or writes a grant. A grant request follows the chain of command,
+>   and only the chief of staff raises it to the user's inbox. Any other role that needs a grant for
+>   itself or for an agent it directs asks the chief of staff, through its chain: a worker role through its
+>   PM, the PM and the CTO directly. The assistant passes the user's own request to the chief of staff
+>   (REQ-ASSIST-1). The request names the agent, the grant method and its target, the exact rights, and a
+>   rotate-by or expiry date. The chief raises one only for an agent whose reviewed role definition
+>   allows that kind of credential, and the broker refuses any other. A grant can't name a wildcard, a
+>   shell or an empty command. The request is a decision with the action `credential.mint`, so it goes
+>   to the user as a hard wait (REQ-WAIT-1). A grant whose method makes an account, such as a seat's own
+>   Gitea user (Q190), is the same one decision: the method in the grant says it makes an account, the
+>   request names the account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user's one
+>   resolution covers the account and its credential, so the hard-waits list doesn't change. An
+>   `account.create` raise isn't a grant request and routes as version 1.7 has it. The broker checks
+>   only that the chief of staff raised the request. The chain of command before that is in the
+>   messaging lists and the role contracts, not a broker check.
+> - **REQ-GRANT-2.** The user approves or denies each grant request in the inbox. Approve is the only thing
+>   that creates a grant, and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. No agent
+>   creates a grant. A grant written into the business file by hand makes nothing. Row 210's hand-written
+>   grants stay a test path until Vikunja #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. On Approve,
+>   protected stack code does every step, not an agent and not the user: it records the grant, makes the
+>   key or token, installs it on the machine or creates it on the service, and logs each step. On Deny
+>   nothing is made, and the denial is logged. The grant methods are:
+>   - machine key: a key for one agent on one enrolled host, with the command allowlist of REQ-CRED-4. A
+>     host's identity comes from the host side when the user approves its enrollment, never from a first
+>     connection. A host user with sudo receives a grant only after the user approved that user by name;
+>   - Gitea: a token for one agent, and for an agent seat its own Gitea user (Q190), with an expiry. The
+>     all scope and the admin scope are never granted;
+>   - GitHub: a grant for one agent.
+>
+>   The Gitea and GitHub rights units come in a later design that Jason approves.
+>
+>   The approval binds the exact rights the user saw and the target or its enrolled identity. A change to
+>   the agent, its definition, the target, the target's identity or the rights after the raise voids it. An
+>   approval is used once. A grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side, so it
+>   is never used. What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as
+>   for a revoke (REQ-GRANT-4). A new grant needs a new approval, never an automatic retry. The grant
+>   code runs only on a request the user resolved. A request resolved by an arbiter, the tester or any
+>   agent makes nothing. A `credential.mint` decision raised before version 1.8, or without the fields of
+>   REQ-GRANT-1, makes nothing when it is approved. Until the Console
+>   knows the signed-in human (Vikunja #412), Approve is `mosaic decide` in the CLI (REQ-DEC-3).
+> - **REQ-GRANT-3.** The user enters their own personal access tokens and API tokens in the WebUI, or the
+>   CLI. Only the grant code reads them, to make grants. No agent ever sees a token value or a key's
+>   private half. Values appear in no event, log, message, prompt or agent file, and no agent can read
+>   them back (REQ-VAR-2). Until the Console knows the signed-in human, they are entered through the
+>   CLI.
+> - **REQ-GRANT-4.** A grant can be revoked at once by the user, by the assistant for a grant in its own
+>   organization, or by the tester on a dev instance (Q173). A revoke needs no decision and no new trust.
+>   It takes effect at once on the stack's side, without waiting on the network, so the next use is
+>   refused. Removing the key or token at the host or service follows. Until that removal is done it stays
+>   visible as pending. A revoke while the grant is being made stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
+>   Every revoke is logged with who made it.
+
+REQ-CRED-1, appended:
+
+> Since version 1.8, a token or key for a grant is made by the grant code on the user's Approve
+> (REQ-GRANT-2), not by hand. Tokens that exist stay as they are.
+
+REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
+
+> `host.sudo` was added as a hard wait and routes under REQ-CRED-4 since version 1.8.
+
+Under "Risks and open questions", a new bullet:
+
+> - Trusted mode lets an agent run its allowed commands at will. On another host, an allowed command that
+>   writes a file as root or starts a shell can plant a key, and the seat sandbox doesn't confine the
+>   network, so root can outlive the grant and a revoke. The allowlist narrows this. A seat sandbox with
+>   its own network namespace closes it. Until then the host's own audit log is the check after the fact
+>   (row 210 design section 6).
+
+## Notes for the reviewer and for Mos
+
+- REQ-TRUST-1 restates what REQ-DEC-2 already does for within-role actions ("routine and within-role
+  decisions are logged") and names it as the default mode. It grants nothing new by itself. What widens
+  is the role files, one reviewed commit at a time.
+- The hard waits stay with the user (mos-1117). REQ-GRANT-1 makes the grant request a `credential.mint`
+  decision, already a hard wait under REQ-WAIT-1, so Approve is the user resolving it. REQ-WAIT-2 stands:
+  no role file grants `credential.mint`. The grant code acts on the user's resolution, not on a role
+  grant. A grant that makes an account, such as a seat's Gitea user under Q190, is the same one
+  `credential.mint` decision. So 1.8 doesn't change the hard-waits list (mos-1124 a, mos-1129 N4).
+- Manual mode: Sage asked who sets it, where it lives and what it changes. Mos accepted these choices
+  (mos-1124 b), and Jason can change them: a list of actions in the organization file, empty by
+  default, changed only by the user, outside the chief's organization writes. A list rather than one
+  switch follows Gizmoduck's #436 draft section 7 (gizmoduck/machine-grant-design f6b6a04b6), so Jason
+  can make host commands manual without making every action manual. Listing every within-role action
+  gives the whole-organization manual mode. Row 210's per-call `host.run` decision, bound to host, argv
+  and stdin and spent once, is this mode's decision for a host command (Q188, Mos's reading).
+- Gizmoduck's draft proposes REQ-CRED-5 (section 8) for the machine grant. Its content is in REQ-GRANT-1
+  to REQ-GRANT-4 here, generalized to all three methods, so 1.8 has no REQ-CRED-5. Their bounds in
+  gizmoduck-0062 items 4a to 4g are in the text: the chief raises only for an allowed definition, the
+  approval binds the rights shown, it is used once with no automatic retry, no value is ever seen, revoke
+  is at once on the stack's side with the host or service removal visible until done, every grant has a
+  rotate-by or expiry date, and the host identity comes from the host side. Duckworth has reviewed their
+  design r1 to r4 (duckworth-0056 and duckworth-0060), so a later change there may need a change here.
+- B1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a grant the code couldn't finish is undone at once on the stack's side.
+  What it left on the host or service stays visible as pending until it is removed, as for a revoke.
+- B2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): Mos chose Duckworth's second option. Only an Approve creates a grant,
+  and the code uses a grant only when it has a matching Approve record. A grant written by hand makes
+  nothing. Jason's Q188 gives the reason: "Disallowing the agents to create grants autonomously is a
+  necessary evil for better security" and "Upon approval, the grant is created programmatically." Row
+  210's hand-written grants stay a test path until #436a moves `host.run` to grants made by Approve. r2
+  and r3 had a hand path in the business file, and r4 takes it out, with r3's load check on hand grants
+  (duckworth-0058 N1) and the note that a revoke never rewrites the user's file (duckworth-0058 N2).
+  The same-uid write to the stack's own store stays the B7 residual, and the top of this draft names it
+  for Jason.
+- C1 (duckworth-0058, sage-1538): `account.create` is the hard wait for any new external account, not
+  only a grant (REQ-WAIT-1, `vocabulary.mjs:43-46`, `roles/pm.md:55`). It stays as version 1.7 has it.
+  Only `credential.mint` is chief-only, and a grant that makes an account is a `credential.mint`
+  decision (N4), so a PM's sign-up for a service routes as before.
+- Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 (eb4c756a1, gizmoduck-0067): enrollment is a request the user approves
+  and the stack runs (mos-1120), and a host user with sudo is enrolled by name, the user's Approve
+  covering that user (mos-1125). REQ-GRANT-2's machine key says both. Their design r3 and r4 (1c5705d6d
+  section 6) give revoke to the user, the assistant in its own organization and the tester on a dev
+  instance, as REQ-GRANT-4 does (mos-1124 d).
+- N1 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the approval binds the target or its enrolled identity.
+- N2 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a revoke during creation stops it, and nothing it made stays usable.
+- N3 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): landing step 6 lists the role contract updates (`roles/pm.md:55`,
+  `roles/chief-of-staff.md:75`). A `credential.mint` decision raised before 1.8, or one without the
+  grant fields, makes nothing when it is approved.
+- N4 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): a decision carries one action (`a.action`, broker.mjs:1678 on
+  origin/refactor). A grant that makes an account is one `credential.mint` decision: the method in the
+  grant says it makes an account, and the inbox shows the account name before Approve. The user clicks
+  once, and there is no separate `account.create` action for it. Gizmoduck's machine-grant r2 reads it
+  the same way.
+- N5 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): `host.sudo` keeps the arbiter route version 1.7 set for
+  `git.push.remote`. A raise for it that cites the spec and isn't within-role goes to the arbiter for
+  its domain (broker.mjs:1677-1678 on origin/refactor), and the grant and its allowlist still limit the
+  command. In manual mode the decision goes to the user. The top of this draft names this for Jason as a
+  change in who decides a root command on another host.
+- N6 (duckworth-0057, mos-1129): the broker enforces only that the chief of staff raised a grant request.
+  The rest of the chain of command is the messaging lists and the role contracts (step 6 of "When this
+  version lands"). REQ-GRANT-1 says so.
+- Approving a grant doesn't by itself let a command run without a click. That needs REQ-CRED-4 and
+  `host.sudo` in the routed lists, step 5 of "When this version lands" (gizmoduck-0062 item 4i).
+- Which roles may request: Q188 says "Not all agents are capable or authorized to request directly. It
+  must follow the chain of command properly." The text makes the chief of staff the only role that raises,
+  the PM and the CTO ask it directly, and worker roles ask through their PM. Jason's words also name "the
+  main agent", but REQ-ASSIST-1 keeps the assistant out of directing agents, so it passes the user's
+  request to the chief rather than raising one. Mos accepted this (mos-1124 c) and reads "the main agent
+  or chief of staff" as one role under two names. That reading is Mos's, so the top of this draft puts it
+  to Jason at approval.
+- REQ-CRED-4 keeps row 210's conditions (origin/gizmoduck/row210-on-199-r2,
+  agents/gizmoduck/work/queue-210/DESIGN.md:376-392): the definition declares the kind, the grant names the
+  agent, an exact argv-prefix allowlist with wildcards refused, the key issued, and only a reviewed role
+  change adds the action. Row 210 put the grant in a hand-edited business file, which stays a test path until
+  #436a. Under 1.8 the grant is what Approve records, so "the business file grants that agent that host"
+  becomes "a grant names that agent and that host".
+- Revoke: Q188 says "you, Mos or the tester". Mos is Jason's assistant (REQ-ROLE-4), so the text says the
+  assistant, limited to grants in its own organization, and the tester only on a dev instance (Q173).
+  Mos accepted this with those limits (mos-1124 d).
+- Approve in the Console needs the Console to know the signed-in human (Q175 phase 2, #412). Until then
+  Approve is `mosaic decide`, which REQ-DEC-3 already allows (mos-1124 e). This draft doesn't take
+  REQ-WEB-2, which stays with the Console decide buttons amendment (Vikunja 19/266). That amendment, or a
+  later version, moves Approve into the Console.
+- Roles already use a scoped Gitea token (`<read|write>:<category>`, all and admin never granted,
+  `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:105-106` on origin/refactor). It is a likely Gitea unit, not a settled
+  one. Only the machine key is designed so far. Gitea and GitHub are a later #436 draft, and minting a Gitea
+  token needs an admin credential the user enters, which is a design of its own (Gizmoduck's draft section
+  11). GitHub's rights unit isn't settled. So the text leaves both units to a later design Jason approves
+  (mos-1124 f), and keeps only the bounds: an expiry, and never the all or admin scope. The PRD names outcomes
+  and checks, not the grant code's steps, as REQ-CRED-3 does.
+- Jason expects the inbox Approve and the Gitea and GitHub grants by 10-27 (Q188 point 6). That is a
+  delivery date, so it is in the source and not in the requirement text.
+- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
+  paragraph never edited in place except to append.
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# Row 236 build notes: #436b Gitea grant path (#1742, schema 3j-3k)
+
+Builder Megavolt, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Draft; the results sections are filled in after the
+runs on Sage's gate.
+
+## Sources
+
+- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`, "Brief: #436b Gitea grant path, build (schema 3j-3k)",
+  blob 9259ba2a1.
+- Design: `agents/megavolt/work/436b/DESIGN.md` r5 at 1be535aca (sha256 68df02cd…f4), unedited. Scope:
+  sections 2 to 7, and section 9's X-G1 to X-G15 and mutants. Section 10 (GitHub half) is out of scope.
+- Build carry: `agents/megavolt/work/436b/BUILD-CARRY.md` at 3330c901b (N9, N10).
+- Schema label 3j-3k per sage-2237. If 264a or 206 lands first, this rebases onto a new branch name and reruns
+  the whole bus suite, the schema.test counts and the T46 lists.
+- Rebases: onto 86f95bb27 after row 273 (sage-2403, no conflicts), then onto 0fa7bf421 after row 191
+  (sage-2452, sage-2457). The 191 rebase took three unions in commit 1, 191's `processing` first and then the
+  grant options: the Broker constructor (broker.mjs:317), the runtime's Broker options (runtime.mjs:173) and
+  the cli case line in `scripts/mosaic` (191's `halt|resume|processing|` plus `grants`).
+
+## What changed
+
+- `packages/bus/src/gitea-grant.mjs` (new): the grant body check, the admin slot (set, rotate, remove), the
+  admin and seat API calls, the start-time scan (`giteaStart`, `openGiteaGrants`, `tokenUnknown`).
+- `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`: the gitea executor (steps 0 to 8), settle, restart reconcile, revoke and fire,
+  sweep, status, and the `grants.*` verbs.
+- `packages/bus/src/credentials.mjs`: `held` pairs at start; the register and claim paths the executor uses.
+- `packages/bus/src/migrations/3j-3k.sql`, `schema.sql`, `store.mjs`: `gitea_users` and `gitea_grants`, new
+  tables only.
+- `packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs`, `server.mjs`, `human-cli.mjs`: wiring of the start scan and the verbs.
+- `packages/cli/src/grants.mjs` (new), `cli.mjs`, `scripts/mosaic`: `mosaic grants`.
+- Tests: `gitea-grant.test.mjs`, `gitea-migration.test.mjs`, `gitea-grant-docker.test.mjs` (X-G3),
+  `fake-gitea-api.mjs`, `fixtures/schema-3j.sql` (02da6a2ae's schema.sql), `cli/tests/grants.test.mjs`, and the
+  pin updates in the migration tests, `schema.test.mjs`, `channel-proof.test.mjs` and `stack-release.test.mjs`
+  (T46).
+- READMEs of bus and cli.
+
+## Choices and assumptions
+
+Each is a reading of the design where it left room. Dewey may rule otherwise.
+
+1. Admin rotation is due once today is past `rotateBy` (the date itself is still good).
+2. A seat-token rotation moves the record at step 8, after the old token's delete (step 7).
+3. A step 7 failure leaves the grant applied, with the old id in `serviceLeft` and the notice "The previous
+   token X is still live".
+4. A failure after the commit step's rename returns `settle-pending`; the next start settles it.
+5. tester-cli keeps its 5 s timeout; the grant verbs answer at once and the executor runs after.
+6. A revoke of a token-unknown agent takes both ids from that decision's last commit step.
+7. A user adopted at restart is upserted in the same transaction as its `grant.failed interrupted`.
+8. `#giteaUnlink` (first-grant commit undo) uses a temporary reference dated `9999-12-31`, so it is never due
+   while it lives.
+9. X-G12's org-team case: the fake models team membership as collaborator reach on the repository, which is
+   what `/user/repos` shows (F11, F12).
+10. X-G15's look-alikes are stored under `action.refused` and under a non-grant kind, since the 3j trigger
+    refuses the human's NULL pair on `action.allowed`. The trigger cases of X-G13 (session, NULL pair,
+    `grant.host.enrolled`) are in `grant-migration.test.mjs`.
+11. Step 6 faults: a pre-rename failure is injected by making `gitea.tmp` a directory; a step 8 store fault by
+    a TEMP trigger on `gitea_grants`.
+12. The credentials-verb revoke close is tracked, so `giteaIdle()` waits for it.
+13. `openGiteaGrants` gives `agent: null` for a spend with no step yet, so `status.running` can show a null
+    agent; the CLI prints it empty.
+14. N9: a restart ignores a settle-pending commit with a `grant.revoked` after it and ends it `revoked` with
+    no message (notify false). A 404 on a delete by id counts as done.
+15. N10: `serviceLeft` is a list in every body and answer.
+16. A restart claims the agent's key for each open grant it undoes. One executor runs per agent
+    (grant-busy), so a killed child leaves at most one open grant per agent. If a store ever held two, the
+    second's claim fails and the undo runs with no admin: its token is left and named in `serviceLeft`,
+    never deleted unclaimed.
+17. X-G7 changes the binding with a fixture decision whose hash differs (row 234's G9 pattern), since the
+    broker keeps its own copy of the business. The admin url check takes row 199's `parseGiteaUrl`, which
+    accepts the origin with or without a trailing slash.
+18. r2, Dewey B1 (dewey-0781): step 8 and both settle branches (forward, back) check for a `grant.revoked`
+    of the agent after the decision's raise, in the same transaction as their write. A revoke that came
+    while step 7's or the settle's delete awaited took the record and both tokens, so the grant ends
+    `revoked` with the human's notice, as a revoke of a running executor ends it (X-G11), and no record is
+    written back. N9's restart case stays silent: a restart never settles a revoked rotation.
+19. r2, Dewey B2: a sweep retry of `tokens` or `login` checks the user's id first, as the revoke close does,
+    against the `gitea_users` row (it survives a fire). A 404 skips with `gitea-user-gone`, a 200 with
+    another id with `gitea-user-foreign`, any other status leaves the entry. Skips go in `grant.swept` and
+    the sweep answer as `skipped: [{agent, user, id, reason}]`; a skipped entry is not left, so the next
+    sweep does not retry it.
+20. r3, Dewey N5 (dewey-0783): the settle's 401 branch and its grant-token-unknown branch take the same
+    revoke check. A revoke during the whoami ends the grant `revoked`, not `grant-lost`, and the
+    token-unknown branch neither holds the agent again nor writes `grant-token-unknown`, so no start
+    names a file the revoke unlinked.
+21. sage-2453, ruling (a) on megavolt-0123: 191's `#processingGate` refuses every agent verb off its read list
+    while processing is halted. `grants.status` is a read like `hosts.status`, and the kill-switch plan
+    (`docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md`:16) says "Reads and the human's own verbs, including the clear,
+    still work", so it joins the list. This touches row 191's list (one entry). An agent's `grants.revoke`
+    stays refused while halted, as `hosts.revoke` does.
+
+## Named for DEFERRED (r2, Dewey N1-N4)
+
+None is a small local change, so none is in r2. sage-2388: all four DEFERRED; N3 and N4 get a bus README
+sentence each in r3 (a left admin token is deleted by hand at Gitea; a running executor keeps the admin
+api it started with).
+
+- N1: an admin rotate cut between the mint and the slot write leaves a token at Gitea that no event names.
+  A `grant.admin rotate-begin {oldName}` before the mint would close it; that is a new event shape.
+- N2: `adminTokenLeft` is `unknown` when `/api/v1/token` gives no name. Which 1.27 F-fact shows the name
+  needs a check against the container, not a code change.
+- N3: admin set or remove records `adminTokenLeft: null`, so a left token drops out of status. Carrying it
+  forward lets `rotate --finish` delete by name under a slot of another account or url; refusing remove
+  while one is left blocks the human's remove when Gitea is down. Either needs a ruling.
+- N4: rotate or remove while a gitea claim is held. Refusing it blocks the human's remove during a run;
+  the running executor keeps the api it began with. Needs a ruling or a line in the README.
+
+## Q188
+
+No test creates a grant except through fixtures or the human's yes on a scratch store. No test reaches
+git.mosaicstack.dev, tasks.woltje.com or any provider. Unit tests use the fake Gitea on 127.0.0.1; X-G3 uses a
+throwaway gitea/gitea:1.27.1 container from the local image (never pulled), removed after. Every token is a
+fake or a scratch-container token; values are compared with `assert.ok`, never printed.
+
+## Runs
+
+(filled in after Sage's CLEAR)
+
+## Mutants
+
+(section 9's list, each with the test that kills it; filled in after the runs)
+
+A static pass over the 39 mutants (all apply, problems=0) found five with no test to kill them. Four tests
+were added before any mutant run:
+
+- M8, M9 (user or mint step written after its call) and M16 (grant.result written before its call): "X-G6
+  and X-G8: the user and mint steps are written before their calls, and each result after its call". It
+  reads the store from the fake while user-create and token-create are at Gitea, and checks every result's
+  status.
+- M29 (fork parent not checked): "X-G4: a fork by the seat user of another repository than the project
+  refuses fork-foreign".
+- M28 (memory and file revoked after the Gitea delete): "X-G11: a revoke unloads memory and removes the file
+  before its Gitea delete", which holds the DELETE open and reads the file and state.
+- M37 (evidence without its kind filter): "X-G15: a look-alike spend under another kind with the grant writer
+  pair is not an open grant".
+
+r2 tests, each red on 8bf442be9 by reading:
+
+- B1: "X-G11: a revoke during a rotation step 7 ends it revoked, and step 8 writes no record back" and
+  "X-G11: a revoke while a sweep settles a rotation, forward or back, ends it revoked with no record".
+  On 8bf442be9 step 8 and the settle write the record and `grant.applied` (forward) or `grant.failed
+  interrupted settled:back` after the revoke deleted it.
+- B2: "X-G14: a sweep retries a fire only for the user it fired: a remade or gone user is skipped and
+  named". On 8bf442be9 the retry fires the remade user (token list, delete, PATCH) and has no `skipped`.
+- N5 (r3, sage-2388): "X-G11: a revoke during a settle whoami that finds a foreign token ends it revoked, not
+  held" and "X-G11: a revoke during a settle whoami that gets a 401 ends it revoked, not lost". On 77dd43c9e
+  they end `grant-token-unknown` (the agent back in tokenUnknown) and `grant-lost`.
+- Choice 21 (sage-2453): "kill switch (plan :16): while halted the chief still reads grants.status, and an
+  agent grants.revoke refuses". M38 drops `'grants.status'` from the read list; the chief's status then
+  refuses `processing-halted` and the test fails.
@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+# Row 281 build notes: a fire or a delete revokes the instance's grants (#1786)
+
+Builder Megavolt, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. Design draft d6 for Dewey's approval. No code until it is
+approved. The results sections are filled in after the runs on Sage's gate.
+
+History: d1 dfebd16cc. d2 c746ce378 added Sage's Q1/Q2 rulings (sage-2573). d3 36c2d98b8 added the
+approved-before-fire tests (sage-2574). d4 answers Dewey's CHANGES on d3 (dewey-0823):
+- B1: the set takes every grant decision with no outcome, and a raise refuses a fired or firing agent.
+- B2: step G runs detached from the verb, so neither caller waits on the network.
+- B3: one step G per agent, with named refusals for everything that could race it.
+- N1-N3 are folded in.
+
+d5 adds sage-2575: two requests per granted delete, with its five conditions. It also adds a `job` id to every
+answer, event and message, and tests T3, T3b and T3c with mutants M16-M18.
+
+d6 answers Dewey's CHANGES on d5 (dewey-0825):
+- C1: the job's step C records authority without the chief's claim (`#authorityFor`, as a landing's record
+  does), processing-halted doesn't hold the job, and a step B or C failure records `fire.failed {job, step,
+  code}` with its own message. Tests T11 and T12, mutants M19 and M20.
+- N4: boot closes a job a restart interrupted, with one message. Test T13, mutant M21.
+- N5: section 7 names the refusals the manual verbs gain.
+- N6: the set counts Q1 leftover lines, in fire step 3 and in the delete text.
+
+## Sources
+
+- Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md`, "Brief: no grant outlives its instance" (sage-2568,
+  mos-1271, Vikunja 524).
+- Code read at 47a35bf43: `packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`, `runtime.mjs`, `credentials.mjs`, `host-grant.mjs`,
+  `gitea-grant.mjs`, `packages/business/src/instance-settings.mjs`, `tools/host/mosaic-keys-write`.
+- Row 256's delete (honker/row256-r2 at 1e761962a, not landed) changes only the delete's checks. Its write still
+  goes through `lifecycleDelete` and the same `revoke()`, so this design covers it unchanged.
+- Row 235 r6 section 6 (host revoke) and #436b r5 section 6 (Gitea revoke and the fire steps).
+
+## 1. Why: what happens today (read from the code, to be pinned by a test before the change)
+
+In short: today a delete of a granted instance unlinks the key files but leaves both grant records, the host
+lines and the Gitea token live, and a fire refuses `credential-revoke-failed` (sage-2573 asked for this here
+and on #1786). The details:
+
+- **Fire.** `revoke()` (runtime.mjs:151) revokes only the roles entry's `credentials` services, then lists the
+  agent's store directory and refuses `credential-revoke-failed` if any file is left. A host grant's key is
+  `<store>/<business>/<agent>/host.<id>` (host-grant.mjs:102), and a Gitea grant's token is `.../gitea`
+  (gitea-grant.mjs:379). Neither is a roles-entry service, so a fire of an instance with a grant refuses at
+  step B with "host.<id> still in the store". It doesn't leak, but it can't finish until a human runs
+  `mosaic hosts revoke` or `mosaic grants revoke` by hand. If the business file also names `gitea` as a
+  roles-entry credential, `credentials.revoke(instance, 'gitea')` unlinks the granted token file with no
+  `gitea_grants` change and no Gitea call.
+- **Delete.** `credentials.remove(instance)` (credentials.mjs:400) revokes every registered reference,
+  `host.<id>` and `gitea` included, and unlinks the directory. The `host_grants` and `gitea_grants` records
+  stay, the host line stays on each host, and the Gitea token, user and login stay live. This is the leak.
+  The next start then finds a grant record whose key file is gone. What the start does with that isn't read
+  yet. The T1 test below pins it.
+- **An open grant decision.** A fire delists the instance but keeps its roles entry. An approved host or Gitea
+  grant decision for that agent that hasn't run yet still passes `#hostDefinition` and `#giteaRole`, so it can
+  still apply after the fire. A delete removes the roles entry, so its executor refuses `unknown-role` or
+  `gitea-not-declared`.
+- **A raise after the fire** (dewey-0823 B1). `#raiseGrant` (broker.mjs:1529) checks only that the caller is
+  the chief, and the grant bindings check only the roles entry. So the chief can raise a new grant for a fired
+  agent, and if the human approves it, it applies.
+
+## 2. Where the grant revokes sit (D1, rewritten in d4 for B2)
+
+d3 awaited step G inside the verb. Dewey's B2 showed that neither caller can wait that long:
+
+- **Delete.** The launcher's `host.op` waits `REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10000` (cli/src/host.mjs:31). On a timeout,
+  `breakChannel` stops the whole bus host. One SSH remove can take 30 s (host-grant.mjs:231, :311), and each
+  Gitea call 15 s (`CALL_MS`, gitea-grant.mjs:38).
+- **Fire.** server.mjs answers a verb that isn't on its async list synchronously (:154), and the async list
+  gives 120 s (:150). The chief's runner client times out at 30 s (harness/src/runner.mjs:449). Two hosts
+  plus the Gitea calls can pass both limits.
+
+So step G never runs inside a verb. The fire and the delete both use the same answer-at-once job, for the same
+timeout reason (sage-2575 condition 5). Both verbs stay synchronous and answer at once. Step G runs as tracked
+broker work after the answer, as row 236's grant executors do (`#track`, `setImmediate`). No caller waits on
+the network, so `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `cli/src/host.mjs` and the launcher don't change.
+
+Each job gets an id, `job` (a UUID), when it starts. The verb's answer, the job's start event, its end event
+and every inbox message about it carry that id. The human and the chief can then match a later outcome to
+the request that started it.
+
+### The fire
+
+1. `write('instance.fireCheck')`, as today.
+2. Step A, as today, with one addition. In the same transaction, after `fire.stopped`, the grant set is read
+   (section 3). Reading it there means a grant raise either committed before step A, and is in the set, or
+   comes after `fire.stopped` and refuses (section 3d).
+3. If the set is empty, steps B and C run synchronously, exactly as today. A fire with no grant answers
+   today's result with today's events (T7). The set counts everything step G would touch (d6, N6): grant
+   rows, open decisions, the agent's Gitea leftovers (section 5) and its Q1 leftover host lines (section 5).
+   Any of them makes the set non-empty and goes to the job.
+4. Otherwise the verb takes the agent's step G lock (section 3e), records `fire.revoking {job, grants}` in
+   step A's transaction, starts the job, and answers at once:
+   `{...stopped, job, revoking: ['host:<id>' | 'gitea', ...], done: false}`. There's no `transaction`, since
+   step B hasn't run.
+5. The job runs step G, then step B (`write('instance.fire')`) and step C (`#recordAuthority`, below, then
+   `fire.done {job, grants}`). It releases the lock when it ends, whichever way it ends, `fire.failed`
+   included.
+
+What the chief sees meanwhile: the instance is "firing". That's an existing state (`#firing`, broker.mjs:645):
+`fire.stopped` with no later `fire.done`. Starts already refuse `instance-firing`.
+- A repeat fire while the job runs refuses `fire-in-progress`, a new code.
+- A repeat after the job finishes takes the delisted path (webby-0094 N1) and answers done.
+- A repeat after a refused step G runs step G again (section 5).
+
+The human sees the outcome either way: `fire.done` names the job and the grants, and a refusal sends the
+inbox message in section 4.
+
+**Steps B and C in the job (d6, C1).** d4 left "step C without the chief's run" as a build-time check, and
+Dewey checked it: it fails.
+- `#consumeAuthority` calls `#checkAuthority` (broker.mjs:2852). That runs `#processingWork()` and
+  `#agent(s)`, and `#agent` refuses `not-holder` once the chief's run no longer holds its claim (:749).
+- After the verb answers, the job can take a minute or more. If the chief's run ends meanwhile, step C would
+  throw after step B had delisted. The instance would be left delisted with no `fire.done`.
+
+So the verb does the full check, and the job only records:
+- The verb runs `#checkAuthority(s, action, authority)`, as today, before step A. The chief holds its claim
+  then.
+- The job's step C runs `#authorityFor(s, action, authority)`, the check without the holder test. It then
+  runs the `#spent` check and the `action.allowed` event, as `#consumeAuthority` does. That's the shape a
+  landing's record already uses (`recordPublish`, broker.mjs:3174, row 137): the run that asked held its
+  claim when it asked, and may have ended since. It's one small private method, `#recordAuthority`, shared
+  with nothing else.
+- The job keeps a copy of the session fields `#authorityFor` and `#event` read (business, role, thread,
+  run). It doesn't keep the live session object.
+- `processing-halted` doesn't hold the job. A halt stops agent work. Step G only removes access, and steps
+  B and C finish a decision the chief made while processing ran. Holding them would leave a delisted or
+  half-revoked instance "firing" for the length of the halt. The verb itself still refuses during a halt,
+  through `#checkAuthority`, as today.
+
+**A step B or C failure in the job** gets its own record, not `grant.revoke.refused`, since every grant in the
+set was revoked by then:
+- It records `fire.failed {job, step: 'B' | 'C', code}`. `code` is the thrown code, for example the writer's
+  `credential-revoke-failed`, or `decision-consumed`.
+- It sends an inbox message:
+
+  > Fire of <agent>: job <job> revoked its grants (<list>) but stopped at step <B|C> (<code>). The instance
+  > is still firing. Run the fire again once <code> is cleared.
+
+- The instance stays firing. A repeat fire finds an empty set and takes today's path for that state, with the
+  chief's own claim: B and C after a step B failure (T12), the delisted path (webby-0094 N1) after a step C
+  failure.
+
+`grant.revoke.refused` with reason `internal` stays only for an unexpected throw inside step G.
+
+### The delete (sage-2575)
+
+`lifecycleDelete` (broker.mjs:3293) stays synchronous. After its running and starting checks, it reads the
+grant set.
+
+- **No grant.** An empty set: `instances.set delete`, one request, exactly as today (condition 4, T3c).
+- **The first request.** For a non-empty set, it takes the lock and records `grants.revoking {job, agent,
+  verb: 'lifecycle.delete', grants}`. It starts the job and refuses `grants-revoking` at once. The launcher
+  closes the request with that code, well inside its 10 s.
+
+  The launcher can carry only the code, so the broker also sends the human an inbox message (condition 1):
+
+  > Delete of <agent> is waiting on its grants. Revoking started (job <job>) for: host:<id>, ..., gitea.
+  > Raise the delete again when the inbox says the revoke is done.
+
+- **A delete raised while the job runs.** It refuses `grants-revoking` again and starts no second job
+  (condition 2, the 3e lock). No second message goes out either: the first one still applies.
+- **The job ends.** The human gets one inbox message (condition 3).
+  - If it completed, the message names each grant revoked, with any `grantsLeft` (section 5), then "Raise the
+    delete again." It records `grants.revoked.done {job, agent, verb, grants, grantsLeft}`.
+  - If it refused, the message names the grant, the reason and how to clear it by hand, as section 4
+    describes. It records `grant.revoke.refused {job, ...}`.
+- **The delete raised after a completed job** finds an empty set and goes as today.
+- **The delete raised after a refused job** doesn't complete over a live grant. Its set is non-empty, since
+  the refused grant's record is still there. It refuses `grant-revoke-failed`, naming the earlier job's
+  reason in a message:
+
+  > Delete of <agent> refused: job <job> couldn't revoke <grant> (<reason>). Retrying now as job <new>. Raise
+  > the delete again when the inbox says it's done, or clear <grant> by hand first.
+
+  It starts a new job for what's left. The broker knows the last job refused because the agent's latest job
+  end event is a `grant.revoke.refused` with verb `lifecycle.delete`, and no `grants.revoked.done` came after
+  it. A delete after the human cleared the grant by hand doesn't find an empty set if a manual revoke left a
+  line (Q1). The leftover line makes the set non-empty, so that delete starts a job for the line removal
+  and refuses `grants-revoking` (d6, N6, and T3b's second case). If nothing is left, the set is empty and the
+  delete goes on.
+
+The tradeoff (ruled by sage-2575): deleting a granted instance now always takes two requests. That keeps the
+cli and the host channel out of row 281, and a delete of an instance with a grant is rare. Holding the
+launcher's request open past its 10 s would need a host channel change and a strand path, and polling would
+widen the row into the launcher for a one-time wait.
+
+While a delete's step G runs, the instance is still listed and not firing, so it could be started. That's
+harmless: its grants are being revoked, and the repeat delete refuses `instance-running` as today. No new
+start check.
+
+### Why not in `beforeWrite` or `revoke()`
+
+Both are synchronous and run inside the organization writer, after its checks. A host `remove` is SSH and a
+Gitea revoke is HTTP, so they can't run there. The business package also has no reach into the broker's grant
+tables, and shouldn't get any.
+
+### Why after step A
+
+A fire is the decision to stop the agent. If step G came first, a host that can't be reached would keep the
+fired agent running. After step A, a refused step G leaves the same state as a failed step B today: the
+instance is "firing" (stopped, still listed) until a repeat. Row 194 already handles that state. The repeat
+fire's delisted path (webby-0094 N1) also runs step G, since the set is read before step B on both paths.
+
+## 3. Step G: what it revokes, and how
+
+The set, for (business, agent), is read in one store transaction: step A's for a fire, the delete's checks
+for a delete (section 2). It holds:
+
+- each `host_grants` row of the agent;
+- each host named by an open host grant decision for the agent;
+- the Gitea grant if the agent has a `gitea_grants` row, a `gitea_users` row, or an open Gitea grant decision.
+
+An open decision (d4, B1) is any grant decision raised for the agent with no outcome yet. That is: not denied,
+not expired, no `grant.applied` or `grant.failed`, and no `grant.revoked` of the same (agent, host), or of the
+agent's Gitea, recorded after its raise. A raised decision the human hasn't decided is open. d3 required
+"approved", which left that one out.
+
+An empty set means no step G and no new records. A fire of an instance with no grant is then exactly today's
+fire, with no new events (brief tests, fourth bullet).
+
+### 3a. A host grant: the host line first (D2)
+
+hosts.revoke goes local first: the record drops, the key leaves memory and its file, and only then is
+`remove <user> <tag>` sent. If the host can't be reached, the revoke closes with `hostLineLeft` and the
+record is already gone. The brief says a fire may not drop a grant record while its key could still be on the
+host. So the fire's host revoke reverses one step and keeps the rest the same:
+
+1. Abort an executor in flight for (agent, host), with no record change (`hostKeys.abortClaim`, as the
+   `credential-unknown` branch of `#revokeHost` already does).
+2. `remove <user> <tag>` through the installer, pinned to the host record's keys. `mosaic-keys-write` says
+   "a missing tag changes nothing", so this is safe to repeat and safe for a host named only by an open
+   decision. If the host record is gone, or the remove doesn't exit 0, step G refuses for this host
+   (section 4). Nothing local has changed for this grant: the record, the key file and the memory copy stay.
+3. hosts.revoke's step 1 transaction, unchanged: the `host_grants` row goes and `grant.revoked {revoke, agent,
+   host, tag, hostLine: 'pending', granted, reason, by}` is recorded, plus `fire: true` (or `delete: true`)
+   so the human can tell it from a manual revoke.
+4. hosts.revoke's step 2, unchanged: `hostKeys.revoke`, so the key leaves memory and its file goes.
+5. `grant.revoke.closed {hostLine: 'removed'}` with no second remove. Step 2 already did it.
+
+This is one shared method, `#revokeHostGrant(business, agent, host, reason, by, { lineFirst })`.
+hosts.revoke calls it with `lineFirst: false` and its behavior and records don't change (brief item 4). The
+fire and the delete call it with `lineFirst: true`.
+
+The tradeoff: hosts.revoke goes local first so that "the part that matters can't wait on the network" (r6
+section 6). For a fire, step A has already stopped the agent's runs, and a refused fire keeps the instance
+"firing". So waiting on the host costs nothing in exposure, and the record never lies about the host.
+
+### 3b. The Gitea grant (D3)
+
+The Gitea revoke stays grants.revoke's steps with `fire: true`, which is what `credentials delete` already
+runs (#436b section 6). Step 1 takes the token out of memory and unlinks the file. Step 2 is
+`#giteaRevokeLocal(..., fire: true)`. Step 3 is `#giteaCloseRevoke`: every token deleted and
+`prohibit_login: true`. The fire awaits step 3 instead of leaving it to `setImmediate`.
+
+The Gitea side can't go remote first the way a host does. The record has to drop and `grant.revoked` has to
+name the tokens before the DELETE calls, or a restart in between would find a live record whose tokens are
+gone (section 5's reconcile). Two changes keep the fire closed:
+
+- **Preflight.** Before step 1, `#giteaAdminChecked` runs. If the admin token can't be read or checked,
+  step G refuses with nothing changed.
+- **Left means not done.** If `grant.revoke.closed` lists anything in `serviceLeft`, step G refuses. The
+  token ids stay in the evidence, which is exactly what `mosaic grants sweep gitea` retries, so nothing
+  forgets them. The record is gone, but no key of this stack's is still usable: the file and memory copy are
+  gone, and only the Gitea side is left. That is the case the brief's host rule guards against, and it is
+  kept visible here, not hidden.
+
+**A Gitea executor in flight** (d3 T6c, and B3 seen from the executor's side). Step G's Gitea part goes in
+this order:
+1. Record `grant.revoked {granted: false}` for each open Gitea decision (3c).
+2. Await this agent's tracked Gitea executors and remote undos, if any are running. Each one ends `revoked` at
+   its next `#giteaRevokedSince` check, or it committed `applied` before step 1.
+3. Read the `gitea_grants` row again and run the steps above.
+
+`#giteaCloseRevoke` with `fire: true` lists the user's tokens and deletes every one. The list comes after
+step 2, so it includes any token an in-flight executor created. `#giteaRuns` is a single Set today. It
+becomes keyed by (business, agent) so step G can await one agent's executors alone.
+
+### 3c. Open decisions
+
+A host named only by an open decision has no record. Step 3a still runs `remove` (a no-op) and records
+`grant.revoked {granted: false}`, as hosts.revoke does for a revoke with no record (N4). The executor's
+`#revokedSince` then ends that decision `revoked`. The Gitea side is the same through
+`#giteaRevokedSince`.
+
+This is the case where a decision is approved before the fire and executed after it (sage-2574). Both checks
+look for a `grant.revoked` of the agent recorded after the decision was raised (broker.mjs:1156 and :1678 at
+47a35bf43). A fire's `grant.revoked` is always later than the approval, so the executor ends the decision
+whenever it runs. The fired agent keeps its roles entry, so `#hostDefinition` and `#giteaRole` still pass, and
+this check is the only thing that stops the decision. T6 and T6b test it. A delete also removes the roles
+entry, so the executor refuses there as well.
+
+The same holds for a decision raised but not yet approved (B1). It's in the set, so it gets its
+`grant.revoked {granted: false}`. If the human approves it later, its executor ends `revoked` (T6d). The
+decision stays approvable in the inbox. Approving it does nothing but end it, which `grant.failed` reports as
+it does for any revoked grant.
+
+### 3d. A raise for a fired agent (d4, B1)
+
+`#hostGrantBinding` and `#giteaGrantBinding` both run inside the raise transaction (broker.mjs:1539 and
+:1548; the host raise's keyscan is awaited before that transaction). Both gain one check. The raise refuses
+`instance-fired` if the agent is:
+- firing (`#firing`);
+- fired, by the writer's own rule (instance-settings.mjs, hire): a roles entry, not in `launch.instances`,
+  and not `launch.by`.
+
+A rehire lists the name again, so a rehired agent can be granted again.
+
+Because the check is in the transaction that records the decision, there's no gap. A raise that commits
+before step A's transaction is in the set. One that commits after it refuses. A raise for an agent whose
+delete's step G is running refuses `grant-revoke-running` (3e).
+
+No executor recheck is added. A raise can't commit after `fire.stopped`, and every decision raised before it
+is in the set and gets its `grant.revoked`.
+
+### 3e. One step G per agent (d4, B3)
+
+The broker keeps `#revoking`, a map from (business, agent) to the verb whose step G is running. The verb sets
+it synchronously, in the same turn as the set read, before it answers. The job clears it in a `finally`.
+While it's set:
+
+| Caller | Answer |
+|---|---|
+| `instance.fire` | refuses `fire-in-progress` |
+| `lifecycleDelete` | refuses `grants-revoking`, no second job |
+| `hosts.revoke` / `grants.revoke` for the agent | refuse `grant-revoke-running` |
+| grant raise for the agent | refuses `grant-revoke-running` |
+| `grants.sweep` | skips this agent's entries and names it as `running` in its result |
+
+Two fires started together (the chief retrying after a client timeout): the first takes the lock before it
+answers, and the second refuses. The map is in memory. After a broker restart the job is gone and so is the
+lock. The instance is still firing, or the delete still has a non-empty set, and the repeat starts a fresh
+step G (section 5).
+
+A manual revoke can't race step G, since it refuses while the lock is held. Step G's transactions still
+check what they read: a `host_grants` row already gone at 3a step 3 records `grant.revoked {granted: false}`
+and goes on, as hosts.revoke does today for a revoke with no record.
+
+## 4. A refusal (D4)
+
+Step G stops at the first grant that can't be revoked. Grants already revoked in this step G stay revoked and
+recorded, and the rest stay as they were. The job doesn't run step B: the organization file is unchanged, and
+the credentials are unrevoked, since `revoke()` never ran. A fire stays "firing". A delete's request was
+already closed with `grants-revoking` (section 2).
+
+The verb has already answered, so the refusal is a record, not a thrown code:
+- One grant-evidence event, `grant.revoke.refused {job, agent, grant: 'host:<id>' | 'gitea', reason, verb:
+  'instance.fire' | 'lifecycle.delete', by}`.
+- `reason` is one of `host-unknown`, `host-remove-failed`, `gitea-admin-unavailable` and `gitea-left:<ids>`.
+- `grant-revoke-failed` is the code in the event and in the inbox message.
+
+A message lands in the human's inbox, as `grant.failed` does today (broker.mjs:1139). It names the instance,
+the grant and the reason, with the manual way out beside the retry (N2):
+
+> Fire of <agent> stopped: its grant on <host> couldn't be revoked (<reason>). Run the fire again once <host>
+> is reachable. If <host> won't come back, run `mosaic hosts revoke <agent> <host>` first: the grant record
+> goes, the line is named as left, and the next fire completes and names that line (section 5).
+
+The delete's message has the same shape, with "raise the delete again". For Gitea, the way out is
+`mosaic grants sweep gitea` once Gitea is back.
+
+A job that throws something unexpected inside step G records `grant.revoke.refused` with reason `internal`,
+sends the same message, and releases the lock. There's no unhandled rejection. A failure at step B or C is
+`fire.failed` (section 2).
+
+**A restart mid-job (d6, N4).** The lock and the job are in memory, so a restart ends them with no end
+record. A fire would stay "firing" until the chief happened to repeat it. A delete's request is already
+closed, so no one would hear anything. Boot closes that gap:
+- A job is a start record (`fire.revoking` or `grants.revoking`) whose `job` has no end record. The end
+  records are `fire.done`, `fire.failed`, `grants.revoked.done`, `grant.revoke.refused` and the new
+  `grants.job.interrupted`.
+- When the broker starts, for each such job of each business, it records `grants.job.interrupted {job,
+  agent, verb}` and sends the human one inbox message:
+
+  > <Fire|Delete> of <agent>: job <job> was interrupted by a bus restart. Some grants may be revoked. Run the
+  > fire again, or raise the delete again. The repeat goes on from what's left.
+
+- Recording the end record in the same transaction as the message means a second boot finds nothing to
+  send.
+- Boot reads only events, with no network call, so it adds nothing to the start time beyond one query.
+
+## 5. A repeat fire (D5)
+
+A repeat runs the whole fire again: the checks, step A (nothing left to stop), the set read, then step G, B
+and C in the job. A repeat while the job runs refuses `fire-in-progress` (3e). A repeat delete works the same
+way through the human's new request.
+
+- A host grant already revoked has no row and no open decision, so it isn't in the set. It's done.
+- A host grant that refused still has its row, so it's retried from 3a step 1.
+- Gitea (d4, N1): if the agent has entries in `#giteaLeft` or `#giteaOpenRevokes`, step G retries only those.
+  It calls `#giteaCloseRevoke` for each, as `#sweepGitea` does per entry. It doesn't run the business-wide
+  sweep, which would retry every agent's entries and settle every open rotation under the chief's name. Any
+  entry still left for this agent refuses `gitea-left`. An entry left by an earlier manual
+  `mosaic grants revoke` of the same agent blocks the fire the same way. That's intended: no grant outlives
+  its instance, whichever verb started its revoke. These entries count toward a non-empty set (section 2,
+  fire step 3), so they go to the job and never run inside the verb.
+- A host line left by an earlier manual `hosts.revoke` doesn't block the fire (Q1 below). These are the
+  agent's `grant.revoke.closed` records with `hostLineLeft` and no later line removal for that tag. For each
+  one whose host record still exists, step G sends `remove <user> <tag>` once. On success it records
+  `grant.revoke.closed {revoke: <the old revoke id>, hostLine: 'removed', fire: true}`, so a later fire doesn't
+  find it again. On failure it records nothing new and the fire goes on. The host and the tag go in
+  `grantsLeft` (section 6). These leftover lines also make the set non-empty, so the retry runs in the job,
+  inside B2's answer (dewey-0823 accepted the single retry on that condition).
+
+## Rulings
+
+- **Q1 (sage-2573):** a leftover line doesn't block the fire. If the host is reachable, the fire tries the
+  removal once, because a fired agent's key line still on a host is the exact risk this row closes. If that
+  try fails, the fire doesn't refuse. It names the host and the leftover line in the result and in the event
+  the human sees. The human accepted that residue when their manual `hosts.revoke` left it, so it shouldn't
+  stop a fire forever on a dead host. Dewey may push back on the retry if it widens step G more than it's
+  worth.
+- **Q2 (sage-2573):** a delete refused at step G closes its request through the launcher's normal refusal
+  path, and the human raises it again. A request left taken would strand, which is the shape DEFERRED already
+  records for the >64-stops done. Conditions: the refusal names the instance, the grant and the reason (the
+  `grant.revoke.refused` event, section 4). The repeat delete skips grants already revoked, as the repeat fire
+  does. T3b tests both.
+- **Q2 extended (sage-2575):** every delete of a granted instance takes two requests. The first starts the
+  revoke job and refuses `grants-revoking`, and the human raises the delete again when the inbox says it's
+  done. This keeps the cli and the host channel out of the row, and such a delete is rare. Conditions, each
+  with a test:
+  1. The first refusal tells the human what happened and what's next: the named grants, and to raise the
+     delete again when the inbox says done. A bare code isn't enough (T3).
+  2. A delete raised while the job runs refuses `grants-revoking` again and starts no second job (T3, T9).
+  3. The job's end message names each grant revoked. If one failed, it names the grant, the reason and the
+     manual way out (`mosaic hosts revoke` or `mosaic grants revoke`). The next delete then refuses with that
+     reason and doesn't complete over a live grant (T3b).
+  4. A delete of an instance with no grant completes in one request, exactly as today (T3c).
+  5. Section 2 says the fire uses the same answer-at-once job, and the fire's result and event name the job
+     (T2).
+
+## 6. The result and the event (D6)
+
+- **A fire with a non-empty set** answers at once with `job`, `revoking` and `done: false`, and records
+  `fire.revoking {job, grants}` (section 2).
+- **The job's outcome** is recorded, not returned. `fire.done` (step C) carries `job` and `grants: [{grant:
+  'host:<id>' | 'gitea', revoke, granted}]`, plus `grantsLeft` for any leftover from section 5's last bullet.
+  So the event the human sees names them.
+- **A delete's job** records `grants.revoking {job, ...}` at the start and `grants.revoked.done {job, agent,
+  verb: 'lifecycle.delete', grants, grantsLeft}` at the end. It sends the inbox messages in section 2.
+- **A fire with an empty set** carries none of these keys, so its shape is exactly today's.
+
+## 7. What doesn't change (brief item 4)
+
+- `hosts.revoke`, `grants.revoke` and `grants.sweep`: same callers and the same records. Their refusals stay
+  the same (`tester-dev-only` included) with one addition from section 3e (d6, N5): while a step G job holds
+  the agent's lock, `hosts.revoke` and `grants.revoke` for that agent refuse `grant-revoke-running`, and
+  `grants.sweep` skips the agent and names it as `running`. hosts.revoke's own order stays local first.
+- No new verb, no Console route, no CLI change, no schema change. Every new record is an `events` row in the
+  existing grant-evidence shape.
+- `revoke()` in runtime.mjs and the organization writer don't change.
+- `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `cli/src/host.mjs` and `cli/src/launcher.mjs` don't change. Both verbs stay
+  synchronous. The launcher already closes a request with whatever code `lifecycleDelete` refuses.
+- New codes: `fire-in-progress`, `grants-revoking`, `grant-revoke-running`, `instance-fired`, and
+  `grant-revoke-failed` in events and messages. New event types: `fire.revoking`, `grants.revoking`,
+  `grants.revoked.done`, `grant.revoke.refused`, `fire.failed` and `grants.job.interrupted`.
+- The broker's start gains one events query for interrupted jobs (section 4, N4). `lifecycleDone` checks a refusal against `LIFECYCLE_CODE =
+  /^[a-z-]{1,64}$/` (broker.mjs:149), and `grants-revoking` matches it.
+
+## 8. Tests (each in the owning package, whole files)
+
+The bus tests use the fake installer and the fake Gitea from rows 235 and 236. They wait on the job with a new
+trusted test API, `grantsIdle()`, which resolves once every step G job and Gitea executor has ended. It's the
+same shape as `giteaIdle()`. Unless a test says otherwise, every fire or delete below is awaited that way.
+
+- T1 (pins section 1 before the change): a fire of an instance with a host grant refuses
+  `credential-revoke-failed` today. A delete leaves the `host_grants` row. Then: what the next start does with
+  a record whose key file is gone.
+- T2: a fire with a host grant on two hosts and a Gitea grant. The verb answers with a `job` id, `revoking`
+  with all three, and `done: false`, and `fire.revoking` carries the same job (sage-2575, condition 5). After
+  the job:
+  - all three are revoked, each with `grant.revoked` and `grant.revoke.closed` as the manual verbs record
+    them, plus `fire: true`;
+  - the line is gone on both fake hosts, every token is deleted, and login is prohibited at the fake Gitea;
+  - `fire.done` names all three;
+  - that agent's `host.run` and Gitea use both refuse.
+- T3 (sage-2575, conditions 1-3): the same grants through the delete (`lifecycleTake` then
+  `lifecycleDelete`).
+  - The first delete refuses `grants-revoking` and starts the job. The human's inbox gets the start message
+    naming the job and all three grants, and saying to raise the delete again when it's done.
+  - A delete raised while the job is held refuses `grants-revoking`, starts no second job and sends no second
+    message.
+  - After the job, the end message names the job and each grant revoked.
+  - A third request completes as today.
+- T3b (Q2, sage-2575 condition 3): a delete whose job refuses (host B unreachable).
+  - The end message and `grant.revoke.refused` name the instance, `host:B`, the reason and
+    `mosaic hosts revoke`.
+  - The file and the instance are unchanged.
+  - The next delete refuses `grant-revoke-failed`, not `grants-revoking`. Its message names the earlier job's
+    reason and the new job, and the instance is not deleted.
+  - With B back, that retry job revokes only B and Gitea, skipping host A, and the delete after it completes.
+  - A second case clears B by hand with `hosts.revoke` before the next delete. That delete starts a job only
+    for Gitea and the leftover line.
+- T3c (sage-2575 condition 4): a delete of an instance with no grant completes in one request. Same result,
+  same events counted, no inbox message.
+- T4: host B unreachable in a fire. The job records `grant.revoke.refused` naming the agent, `host:B` and
+  `host-remove-failed`, and the inbox message names `mosaic hosts revoke` (N2). Afterwards:
+  - the file is unchanged and the instance is still firing;
+  - host A is revoked and recorded, and host B's row and key file are still there;
+  - the Gitea grant is untouched, since it comes after B in the order;
+  - the credentials are unrevoked.
+  A repeat with B reachable completes and revokes only B and Gitea.
+- T4b (Q1): an earlier manual `hosts.revoke` left a line on host C. A fire with C reachable removes it and
+  records the close. With C unreachable, the fire completes and names C and the tag in `grantsLeft` and in
+  `fire.done`.
+- T5: Gitea's admin token can't be checked. The job refuses with the Gitea grant intact.
+- T5b: a token DELETE fails. The job refuses `gitea-left`. A repeat with Gitea back retries only this agent's
+  entries and completes. Another agent's left entry is still left afterwards (N1).
+- T6 (sage-2574): a host grant decision approved before the fire, executed after it. The fire records
+  `grant.revoked {granted: false}` for (agent, host). The executor runs after `fire.done` and ends the decision
+  `revoked`: no `host_grants` row, no key file, no `add` sent to the host.
+- T6b (sage-2574): the same for a Gitea grant decision. The executor ends it `revoked` before any Gitea call:
+  no `gitea_grants` row, no token file, and the fake Gitea saw no token create.
+- T6c: a host or Gitea executor already in flight when step G starts.
+  - The host side aborts its claim (3a step 1) and ends `revoked`.
+  - The Gitea side: step G awaits the executor (3b), and then the fake Gitea holds no token for the user. That
+    includes one the executor created mid-flight.
+- T6d (B1): a host decision and a Gitea decision, raised before the fire and still undecided. The fire puts
+  both in the set. The human approves both after `fire.done`, and both executors end `revoked`, with nothing
+  applied.
+- T6e (B1): a host raise and a Gitea raise refuse `instance-fired`:
+  - while the instance is firing;
+  - after `fire.done`.
+  After a rehire of the same name, a raise goes through. While a delete's job runs, a raise refuses
+  `grant-revoke-running`.
+- T7: an instance with no grant fires exactly as today, synchronously. Same result keys, no `revoking`, and
+  the same events, counted.
+- T8: hosts.revoke and grants.revoke keep their records, their order and their tester refusals.
+- T9 (B3): with the job held on a remove:
+  - a second fire refuses `fire-in-progress`;
+  - a delete of the same agent refuses `grants-revoking` and starts no second job;
+  - `hosts.revoke` and `grants.revoke` for the agent refuse `grant-revoke-running`;
+  - `grants.sweep` names the agent as `running`.
+  After a release, one set of `grant.revoked` records exists per grant.
+- T10 (B2): the fake installer holds a remove and the fake Gitea holds a DELETE, neither answering until
+  released.
+  - `instance.fire` and `lifecycleDelete` both answer before either is released. The test checks this with a
+    timer, not a wall-clock bound.
+  - Meanwhile the broker answers another verb from another session.
+  - After release, the jobs complete.
+  - A cli test drives the launcher's delete pass against a bus whose remove is held. The pass closes the
+    request `grants-revoking` and the host channel stays up.
+- T11 (d6, C1): a fire whose job is held on a remove. While it's held, the chief's run ends and its claim is
+  released, and processing is halted. After the release, the job completes: `fire.done` is recorded with the
+  job, the consumed `action.allowed` event is there, a second use of the same authority refuses
+  `decision-consumed`, and the instance is out of the file. No `fire.failed` and no `grant.revoke.refused`.
+- T12 (d6, C1): a fire with a grant whose step B refuses in the job. The test uses T1's setup, where
+  `revoke()` refuses `credential-revoke-failed`. After the job:
+  - `fire.failed` carries the job, step `B` and `credential-revoke-failed`, and the inbox message names the
+    job, the revoked grants, the step and the code;
+  - there's no `grant.revoke.refused` and no `fire.done`;
+  - the instance is still firing and still in the file.
+  With the cause cleared, a repeat fire finds an empty set, runs B and C synchronously and completes.
+- T13 (d6, N4): a fire and a delete, each with its job held, then the broker is closed and a new one opened
+  on the same data root. The new broker records `grants.job.interrupted` for both jobs and sends two inbox
+  messages, one saying to fire again and one to raise the delete again. A third broker on the same root sends
+  nothing more. A job that ended before the restart gets no interrupted record.
+
+Files (N3). Every file listed runs whole in the manifest round, touched or not:
+- New: `packages/bus/tests/fire-revokes-grants.test.mjs` holds T2-T13.
+- Changed:
+  - `grant-host.test.mjs` and `gitea-grant.test.mjs`: T1's pins, and the T8 regressions next to their
+    existing cases;
+  - `packages/cli/tests/lifecycle.test.mjs`: the T10 launcher pass;
+  - `fake-gitea-api.mjs` and `host-fixtures.mjs`, if T10's holds need a hook there.
+- Run whole because they call `instance.fire` or `lifecycleDelete` at 47a35bf43:
+  - bus: `chief-of-staff`, `lifecycle-revoke`, `lifecycle-verbs`, `reload`;
+  - cli: `lifecycle`, `instances`;
+  - harness: `tools`.
+- Also run: `grant-executor.test.mjs` (the executors' `#giteaRuns` change) and `gitea-grant-docker.test.mjs`
+  (brief gate).
+- `server.mjs`, `process.mjs`, `host.mjs` and `launcher.mjs` are unchanged, so no test changes there for this
+  row.
+
+## 9. Mutants
+
+- M1: step G skips the host revokes. Killed by T2.
+- M2: step G skips the Gitea revoke. Killed by T2.
+- M3: a refused grant revoke is ignored and the job goes on to step B. Killed by T4.
+- M4: `lifecycleDelete` skips step G. Killed by T3.
+- M5: the fire's host revoke goes local first (`lineFirst: false`). Killed by T4, because B's row is gone.
+- M6: a Gitea revoke with something in `serviceLeft` counts as done. Killed by T5b.
+- M7: open decisions left out of the set. Killed by T6 and T6b.
+- M8: step G skips the leftover-line retry. Killed by T4b.
+- M9: a failed leftover-line retry refuses the fire. Killed by T4b.
+- M10: the set takes only approved decisions (d3's rule). Killed by T6d.
+- M11: the raise bindings skip the fired check. Killed by T6e.
+- M12: no `#revoking` lock. Killed by T9.
+- M13: the verb awaits the job before it answers. Killed by T10.
+- M14: step G's Gitea part doesn't await the in-flight executor. Killed by T6c.
+- M15: step G's Gitea retry runs the business-wide `#sweepGitea`. Killed by T5b.
+- M16: the delete's first refusal sends no start message. Killed by T3.
+- M17: a delete after a refused job refuses `grants-revoking` instead of `grant-revoke-failed`. Killed by T3b.
+- M18: a delete of an instance with no grant goes through the job. Killed by T3c.
+- M19: the job's step C uses `#consumeAuthority`, with the holder and processing checks. Killed by T11.
+- M20: a step B or C failure in the job is recorded as `grant.revoke.refused internal`. Killed by T12.
+- M21: boot skips the interrupted-job check. Killed by T13.
+
+## 10. Order and rebase
+
+Built from 47a35bf43 for this read. The code goes on whatever refactor is when the build starts. Rows 274, 256
+and 194's follow-ups touch the broker and instance-settings, so expect a rebase and a whole rerun. The row lands
+before the .53 Case 1 install hires an instance with a grant. It doesn't hold the dragon-lin re-pin.
+
+## Runs
+
+(after the gate)
+
+## Mutants
+
+(after the gate)
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Row 205a (193b1a, #1703): the trail and replies message filter
+
+Design: DESIGN.md d2 in this directory, with rulings in section 7 (sage-2288). Base: refactor 02da6a2ae. No schema
+change. Nothing has run yet: every test run waits for Sage's CLEAR.
+
+## Changes
+
+`packages/bus/src/broker.mjs`:
+- `#hiddenMessage(s, id)`: the message's thread (`message_threads` joined to `threads`) is owned by a `user:`
+  other than `#owner(s)`, and `#readable(s, t)` is false. A message with no thread, or in the business human's
+  or the tester's thread, is never hidden. A reader session owns nothing, so every user thread is hidden from it.
+  The tester reads through its reader view, and `#owner` still gives `tester`.
+- `#readable(s, t)` returns false. Rule 1 (a share in force) can't hold before 193b2's schema 3j, so nobody
+  reads another's thread. 193b2 adds the share rule and rules 2-4 here.
+- `#trail`: a hidden subject returns `[]` before anything is read, exactly as an unknown id does (ruling 3).
+  After the rows are collected, it drops hidden `messages` rows, `deliveries` rows of a hidden message, and
+  `events` rows whose subject is a hidden message. Decisions, decision events, task snapshots, run events and
+  claims stay.
+- `replies`: a hidden id fails `message-not-found`, as an unknown id does. Hidden replies are left out in SQL
+  (`NOT EXISTS` a thread whose owner starts with `user:` and isn't the caller), so the `REPLIES` limit counts
+  only visible rows.
+  - The SQL clause doesn't call `#readable`. That is exact while `#readable` is false. 193b2 must add the share
+    exception to the clause and to `#readable` together.
+
+`packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs` (new). It writes a `user:alice` thread and its messages
+straight to the store, as R3's `thread.send` and the run's `to: 'user'` reply will write them, because nothing
+makes a user session before R3.
+- `trail` on a hidden id equals `trail` on an unknown id, byte for byte, for the owner, a reader and the tester.
+- `replies` on a hidden id equals `replies` on an unknown id (code and message), for all three.
+- `trail` on a user-thread run's decision shows the decision and the owner's message, and drops the user
+  thread message, its delivery and its event.
+- `replies` with `REPLIES` hidden replies ahead of a visible one returns the visible one.
+- Messages in the business human's and the tester's threads stay visible on both verbs (row 177 control).
+- The governance pin, one assertion per item in the user sentence: inbox entry, claim, task, project file and
+  the closed decision in `decisions {list: 'recent'}` show to the owner. `trail` and `replies` hide the user
+  message, and the decision's trail carries no user body.
+
+## Mutants (each must fail its named test in message-filter.test.mjs)
+
+| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
+|---|---|---|
+| M1 | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: the owner sees decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not the user messages |
+| M11 | the trail drop loop iterates nothing | trail on a decision keeps the decision and drops the user thread messages, their deliveries and their events |
+| M12 | the replies `NOT EXISTS` clause removed | replies leaves out other users thread messages and still fills a page |
+| M13 | trail fails `message-not-found` for a hidden subject | trail on a hidden message id answers exactly as on an unknown id, for the owner, a reader and the tester |
+| M14 | replies returns `[]` for a hidden id | replies on a hidden message id answers exactly as on an unknown id, for the owner, a reader and the tester |
+
+## Gate
+
+The kit is /mnt/storage/scratch/morgana-r205 (`slot205.sh`, `mutate.py`, `busy.sh`), run as
+`bash busy.sh && CAND=<sha> bash slot205.sh` on Sage's CLEAR. It runs these files whole:
+- message-filter;
+- the bus files that call trail or replies: replies, tester, tester-threads, tester-writes, broker, decisions,
+  decision-close, end-launch and task-read.
+
+Then it runs the bus suite, then M1 and M11-M14, each on its named test and restored after each. It uses umask
+022 and TMPDIR from `mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/g205XXXX`. It refuses unless HEAD is the candidate
+and the tree is clean, and it stops at the first unexpected failure (sage-2371).
+
+Sage's gate adds every `scripts/test-*.sh`. The webui tests that read trail or replies run there.
+
+Static check: `node --check` on broker.mjs and the new test, run from `/`. Both parse. All five mutant anchors
+match exactly once.
+
+## r2 (after the 742cba805 slot, failure 1 of the window, sage-2428)
+
+slot205 on 742cba805 stopped red in message-filter, 4 pass and 2 fail. Both fixes are in the test only.
+broker.mjs is unchanged (sage-2430).
+
+- "trail on a decision ..." (:124, its event shows). `#trail` reaches events on a decision trail by
+  `subject` = the decision or `body.$.decision` = the decision. `put()` wrote every event body as `{}`, so the
+  shown message's event was out of reach. That also made the "no hidden event" check (:127) vacuous: the hidden
+  event was never collected, so dropping it proved nothing. Fix: `put()` writes `{decision}` as the event body
+  when the message has a decision. Both events are now collected; the filter keeps one and drops the other.
+- Governance pin, claims item (:175). A thread run's `role.claim` writes `thread_claims` only and returns
+  (broker.mjs:2682). `agents` (:3309) reads `role_claims` only. No owner verb shows a thread claim. The gap
+  predates 205. Ruling sage-2430, option (a): the pin checks through `threadsState` (the launcher view) that
+  the claim is recorded with holder `assistant-run` and isn't filtered. `agents` is unchanged in 205.
+  Follow-up: Sage adds a row for an owner-visible thread-claim read. Like the filter, it lands before any
+  user thread goes live, since PRD :1084 and the FED R6 sentence promise that the owner sees claims.
+
+M1 still fails the pin: with `#readable` true, `trail` on the user message returns rows instead of `[]`.
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# Row 205 (193b1, #1703): viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter
+
+Owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate owner Sage (sage-2280). Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md`,
+"Brief: 193b1, viewer verbs, board refusals and the message filter" (blob a73e1bba0, rev 3088). Design:
+row 193 DESIGN.md r5 (e2d161e2e, Duckworth approved), sections 4.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7, 8 and 9. Base: refactor
+02da6a2ae. Draft 2: Sage's rulings (sage-2288) are in section 7. Sections 1-6 are d1 as sent (morgana-0063).
+
+## 1. The dependency gap
+
+The brief chains 193b1 on FED R3, FED R4 and row 196's verifier. Only row 196 exists (7247d80c7). On 02da6a2ae:
+
+- R3 and R4 aren't filed. The FED brief (`docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md`:12-13) files R3 "after
+  R1 and row 196" and R4 after R3, R5 and 193a. No `*/fed-r3` branch is on origin.
+- Row 196's `verifyPrincipal` returns the `user` kind, and server.mjs accepts the `user` envelope, but
+  runtime.mjs wires only `authenticateHuman` and `authenticateTester`. The broker has no `bindUser`, no
+  `s.user`, no per-request grant read and no collaborator verb list. FED 3.6 and row R3 own all of these.
+- So nothing makes a user session today, and no thread is owned by `user:<id>` except through a direct
+  store write.
+
+193b1 has two halves that depend on R3 in different ways.
+
+| Item | Needs a user session (R3) | Testable on 02da6a2ae |
+|---|---|---|
+| Viewer verb list (4.3) | yes: it extends R3's collaborator list | no |
+| Per-grant level checks via `covers(..., {level})` | yes: R3's grant read | no |
+| Board reads refused to users (5.5) | yes | no |
+| `trail` and `replies` filter (5.7) | no: it filters owner, reader and tester sessions | yes, with seeded `user:<id>` threads |
+| `#readable` owner-only | no | yes |
+| Governance pin test (owner side) | no: the owner reads decisions, inbox, agents, tasks and `project.file` | yes, with a seeded user-thread run |
+| Mutants 6 (viewer `thread.send`), 10 (user allowed `trail`) | yes | no |
+| Mutants 11, 12 (trail, replies filter removed) | no | yes |
+| Mutants 1, 3 (`#readable` rules 1 and 3 dropped) | see 4 | see 4 |
+
+## 2. Recommendation: split 205 into 205a now and 205b after R3
+
+- **205a, the message filter.** `trail` and `replies` hide messages in other users' threads from the owner,
+  reader sessions and the tester, with `#readable` owner-only. Plus the owner-side governance pin test and
+  mutants 11 and 12. No R3 dependency, no schema change.
+- **205b, viewer verbs and board refusals.** Built on R3's candidate, as Q177 chains a row on its parent's
+  candidate. The viewer list, the level checks, users refused on board reads, the user-session half of the
+  pin test, mutants 6 and 10.
+
+Why split. The filter is the item the boundary orders first: "No user thread goes live before 193b1's
+message filter has landed" (mos-1021 B2, FED R8). Landing it before R3 means R3 and every later row can't
+create a user thread that the owner can read on `trail`. Waiting for R3 holds the filter behind a row that
+isn't filed. The other option, building all of 193b1 against R3's named interface as 193a did with R1,
+doesn't work here: 193a only called R1's exported `covers`, while 193b1 would have to write `bindUser`, the
+grant read and the collaborator list itself, which is R3's scope and owner.
+
+Tradeoff: two rows and two reviews in place of one, and 205b rebases onto R3. The split is a brief change,
+so it's Sage's to rule.
+
+## 3. 205a design
+
+### 3.1 The hidden-message check
+
+One broker method, `#hiddenMessage(s, id)`:
+
+```
+SELECT t.owner FROM message_threads mt JOIN threads t ON t.id = mt.thread
+WHERE mt.message = ? AND t.business = ?
+```
+
+A message is hidden when that owner starts with `user:`, isn't `#owner(s)`, and `#readable(s, t)` is false.
+A message with no thread row, or in a thread owned by the business human or `tester`, is never hidden, so
+row 177's behaviour is unchanged. A reader session has no `#owner`, so every user thread's messages are
+hidden from it.
+
+`#readable(s, t)` in 205a returns false. Before 193b2's schema 3j there is no `thread_shares` table, so rule 1
+(a share in force) can't hold, and the function is false for anyone but the thread's owner (5.7: "b1 hides
+every message in another user's thread"). It is written as its own method so 193b2 adds the share rule and
+rules 2-4 in one place.
+
+### 3.2 `trail`
+
+- If `subject` is a hidden message id, return `[]`. Design 5.7 says `message-not-found`, "as an unknown id
+  does", but `trail` on an unknown id returns `[]` today (it has no not-found check). A different code for a
+  hidden id would confirm the id exists, which is what 5.7 wants to prevent, so I follow its reason over its
+  code. Question 3.
+- After `#trail` collects its rows, drop: `messages` rows that are hidden, `deliveries` rows whose `message`
+  is hidden, and `events` rows whose `subject` is a hidden message id. This covers each way `#trail` reaches
+  a message: by id, by `decision`, and through `task.created` → `human.input` → `body.message`.
+- Decision rows, decision events, task snapshots, run events and role claims stay. 5.7 puts them on the
+  governance side.
+
+### 3.3 `replies`
+
+A hidden `id` fails `message-not-found`, and hidden messages are dropped from the result. The `LIMIT`
+applies before the filter today; the filter moves into the SQL (`AND NOT EXISTS` a thread owned by another
+`user:`) so a page of hidden replies doesn't return short. For 205a that SQL form is exact because
+`#readable` is false; 193b2 adds the share exception to the same clause.
+
+### 3.4 Tests (packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs, new)
+
+Fixtures seed a project, a thread owned by `user:alice` with messages in `message_threads`, a delivery and an
+event on one of them, and a decision raised by that thread's run that cites the message. Sessions: the
+business human, a reader session and the tester.
+
+- `trail` on a hidden message id: `[]` for all three sessions, the same as an unknown id.
+- `trail` on the decision: the decision row and its events show; the user's message, its delivery and its
+  events don't.
+- `trail` on a human-owned thread's message: unchanged (row 177 control).
+- `replies` on a hidden id: `message-not-found`. `replies` on a visible id with hidden and visible replies:
+  only the visible ones, and a full page when hidden replies come first.
+- Governance pin, owner side: for the user-thread run, `decisions {list: 'recent'}`, `inbox`, `agents`,
+  `tasks` and `project.file` each show its item, and `trail` and `replies` hide the user's message body.
+  Each item in the user sentence is one named assertion.
+
+### 3.5 Mutants
+
+| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
+|---|---|---|
+| 11 | the `trail` filter removed | trail on the decision hides the user's message, delivery and events |
+| 12 | the `replies` filter removed | replies hides other users' thread messages |
+| 11b | the hidden-subject early return removed | trail on a hidden message id returns [] |
+| 1 | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: trail and replies hide the user body |
+
+## 4. Mutants 1 and 3
+
+Design section 8 lists mutants 1 (rule 1 dropped) and 3 (rule 3 dropped) for b1. With no shares table,
+rule 1 is always false, so `#readable` is false whatever rules 2-4 say. Dropping rule 3 changes nothing a
+test can see until 193b2 adds shares, and rules 2 and 3 need R3's grant read. So:
+
+- Mutant 1 in 205a is "`#readable` returns true", killed by the pin test above.
+- Mutant 3 moves to 193b2, where rule 1 can hold and rule 3 decides.
+
+This is a second brief change for Sage to rule on.
+
+## 5. Gate (Sage's slot, on CLEAR only)
+
+The brief's gate: Duckworth approves the manifest; the bus suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` green on
+Sage's gate; the mutants killed. The new test file whole, the touched existing files whole, then the bus
+suite, then each mutant on its named test with a restore check. umask 022, TMPDIR from
+`mktemp -d /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gXXXXXX`. No test touches the live data root, config, units, slot
+files, any live access.json or `~/.mosaic`.
+
+## 6. Questions for Sage
+
+1. Split 205 into 205a (filter, now) and 205b (viewer verbs and board refusals, after R3's candidate)?
+2. Mutant 1 as "`#readable` returns true" in 205a, and mutant 3 moved to 193b2?
+3. A hidden `trail` subject returns `[]`, the same as an unknown id, in place of 5.7's `message-not-found`
+   (3.2)? `replies` already fails `message-not-found` on an unknown id, so there the code stays.
+
+## 7. Rulings (sage-2288, re morgana-0063)
+
+1. **Split approved.** 205a is built now: the 5.7 `trail` and `replies` filter over owner, reader and tester
+   sessions, `#readable` owner-only, the owner-side governance pin test, and mutants 11 and 12. 205b comes
+   after R3's candidate and R4: viewer verbs, `covers` level checks, board reads refused to users, the
+   user-side pin, and mutants 6 and 10. 205a's base is origin/refactor 02da6a2ae or later. R3 builds on
+   205a's candidate and extends the filter to user sessions, so the filter isn't written twice.
+2. **Mutant 1** in 205a is "`#readable` returns true", killed by the pin test. **Mutant 3** moves to 193b2
+   (row 206). Sage changes the brief to match.
+3. **Hidden equals unknown.** A hidden `trail` subject returns `[]`, exactly as an unknown id does. `replies`
+   keeps `message-not-found` for both. The point of 5.7 is that a caller can't tell hidden from unknown.
+   So 205a adds:
+   - one test per verb comparing the hidden response with the unknown-id response byte for byte
+     (`JSON.stringify` of the result, or of the error's code and message), for each of the three sessions;
+   - a mutant M13 that makes the hidden path distinguishable: `trail` fails `message-not-found` for a
+     hidden subject. The `trail` equality test must kill it. M14 does the same for `replies`: a hidden id
+     returns `[]` instead of failing. The `replies` equality test must kill it.
+
+### 7.1 205a mutant table (replaces 3.5)
+
+| Mutant | Edit | Named test |
+|---|---|---|
+| M1 (design 1) | `#readable` returns true | governance pin: the owner sees decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not the user's messages |
+| M11 (design 11) | the `trail` filter of hidden rows removed | trail on the decision hides the user's message, its delivery and its events |
+| M12 (design 12) | the `replies` filter removed | replies drops other users' thread messages and still fills a page |
+| M13 | `trail` fails `message-not-found` for a hidden subject | trail on a hidden id answers exactly as on an unknown id |
+| M14 | `replies` returns `[]` for a hidden id | replies on a hidden id answers exactly as on an unknown id |
+
+Queue: Sage re-pins 205 to the split brief and adds 205b and the R3 row at the next gap. I claim after
+that. No run before Sage's CLEAR.
@@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
+# Row 191 stopRun inspection round
+
+Design: ../DESIGN-r2.md, approved by Dewey in 29473; scope sage-2244;
+per-run contract ../STOP-RUN-CONTRACT.md, honker-0079/0081. Not review-ready:
+full package/shell/Docker gate and acceptance/guard mutants remain pending.
+
+Current commit 7aa18b0f6e1a09188fb602853ebb02815b642ac9, new branch
+rocko/row191-stoprun-dcd8-20261022, parent dcd8d4dda. Worktree
+/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r191-r3. Earlier inspection f7bf7dfec is preserved.
+All 79 manifest paths have identical blobs at f7bf7dfec and 7aa18b0f6;
+rebase-product-diff.stat is empty, rebase-product-check.txt names the check.
+The manifest SHA-256 stays
+9971ac5fe56d0d36eb914ecaf2c282e14ab3cd29860fd27b268ec0baadaf0e52.
+Rocko author and committer identity were selected explicitly. No attribution
+lines, force-push or branch deletion. Sage publishes through jarvis.
+
+## Changes Dewey must review: two focused-run fixes
+
+1. packages/bus/src/broker.mjs, requestHost: the new processingWork guard was
+   initially inserted into the inner refusal logger's try block. That let the
+   original request reach validation, then prevented its refusal being logged
+   while halted, returning storage-unavailable. Move it to the main admission
+   try, before keys/credentials/authority/effects. The refusal logger retains
+   its existing unconditional audit behavior. The new host-admission test now
+   expects processing-halted and proves neither executor method was called.
+   Initial evidence: ../logs/stoprun-focused-packages_bus_tests_processing.test.mjs.log.
+
+2. packages/bus/tests/processing.test.mjs, real socket await test: row 196's
+   asynchronous kernel-peer subprocess now precedes dispatch. The old 5 ms
+   server deadline could fire during that subprocess, before the processing
+   await branch extends it. This test already stubs authenticateHuman; give it
+   a deterministic peerReader too, with read and close, and assert exactly two
+   proof reads for halt/resume. Keep the 5 ms ordinary timeout and 30 ms halt
+   delay. Production peer discovery, proof/transport and timeout behavior are
+   unchanged. The test still fails if the async branch timeout is removed.
+   The first fixture retry omitted close(); its teardown failed and left its
+   own server running. Only that verified test group 2831504 was killed. Both
+   unsuccessful logs remain. Corrected evidence:
+   ../logs/stoprun-focused-bus-processing-fixed-2.log (14/14).
+
+These are diagnosed code/fixture mistakes, not declared flakes. No failed log
+was removed and no existing security assertion was weakened.
+
+## Focused evidence, sage-2250
+
+Ran singly on 41b0cf755 because none of row 254's seven paths overlaps ours.
+Sage-2265 carries this evidence to dcd8d4dda after the empty 79-path diff.
+Scripted busy check exited 0 before the first file. Every test runner used its
+own process group, 180 s timeout, scratch TMPDIR
+/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r191-tmp and DOCKER_HOST=unix:///nonexistent.sock.
+There was no Docker, browser, package suite, shell suite or mutant run.
+
+| File | Final passed | Failed | Skipped |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|
+| processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs | 12 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs | 10 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control/tests/coordinator.test.mjs | 3 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control/tests/containers.test.mjs | 6 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control/tests/effects.test.mjs | 5 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control/tests/task.test.mjs | 7 | 0 | 0 |
+| bus/tests/processing.test.mjs | 14 | 0 | 0 |
+| bus/tests/processing-runtime.test.mjs | 2 | 0 | 0 |
+| bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs | 3 | 0 | 0 |
+| Script sum | 62 | 0 | 0 |
+
+All final runners exited 0. The batch stopped at the initial bus failure,
+then that file was diagnosed/rerun before the final two files. Counts are from
+focused-run-table-final.json and include only each final successful file log.
+Earlier bus failures are reported above, not silently included as green.
+Approximate run span 23:59Z–00:00:41Z; start second was not recorded.
+Cwd-scoped node/chromium sweep was empty at 00:00:41Z; slot returned to Sage.
+
+## stopRun implementation
+
+The export resolves host-owned run identity even without a bound bus claim.
+It checks boot/start/group identity immediately before each signal, preserves
+verified member anchors, waits 5 s before KILL and observes for 2 s. Signals
+are acknowledgements only, never invented. Root/business/run cache joins the
+same Promise. Atomic hard-link publication plus durable exclusive claim
+coordinates other host processes. First owner/reason/deadline/result persists;
+completed retries never re-escalate or overwrite that result. Halt links its
+generation to the first fire receipt without relabelling the runtime's stop
+cause. A later verified exit is separate immutable observation evidence.
+The seam writes no bus events. Honker maps killed/alive to lifecycle events.
+
+No global unit, live config, binding, token, slot file or live store touched.
+No schema migration. First activation still requires stopping old processing
+before trusted initialization and aligning the copy/image/read-only mount in
+Mos's window. Existing result.json evidence remains write-once.
+
+## Integration and outstanding work
+
+The 12 latest-base conflict resolutions are listed in STATUS.md. New landed
+host execution, publish and library sync paths are now wrapped in processing
+scopes; host credential cancellation composes with its existing revocation
+signal. This changes only files already owned by 191. Those wider integrations
+still need the full owning-file/package gate and mutant evidence.
+
+Fifteen proposed per-run mutants preflight exact once in stoprun-mutants.json;
+none has been applied or run. The broader kill-switch acceptance/guard table
+and executable mutant runner are still being completed. No kill count or
+review-ready claim is made. Ask Sage for the later CLEAR when the packet is
+complete, as sage-2259/2262 requires.
+
+### Gate preparation after the focused slot
+
+The published product implementation is unchanged. Three uncommitted test-file
+strengthenings are saved in post-inspection-tests.patch: effects.test.mjs adds a
+4-second bounded abort expectation for the watcher mutant; Discord's early
+start fence is also checked before a malformed journal can be read; WebUI's
+body limit now uses oversized valid JSON, and a direct-handler test isolates
+its own origin/site guards from serve's outer fence. These edits are unrun and
+are not included in the published 9971ac5f manifest. They must pass before a
+new candidate is cut. Thus 62/62 is prior focused evidence, not a claim for
+these changed test bytes.
+
+The complete proposed table has 70 exact-once sites in all-mutants.json,
+including expected killing test names. Static preflight is clean; no mutant
+has been applied. run-mutants.py validates preflight, uses new process groups,
+tracks only its own verified descendant identities, kills those groups on
+timeout, checks named TAP failures, and restores all source bytes in finally.
+A timeout or wrong-test failure is not counted as a valid kill. The table and
+runner are prepared evidence, not a kill result. The requested nine-package,
+ten-shell, seventy-mutant gate is in gate-plan.json; Sage CLEAR is pending.
+
+## Published test-strengthening commit and full gate (sage-2269/2271)
+
+81889b58d57889b12a584aa225e1ac26e90e5700 is one fast-forward commit on
+7aa18b0f6, same branch rocko/row191-stoprun-dcd8-20261022. It commits the
+three test changes saved in post-inspection-tests.patch; that patch remains
+historical evidence, not an uncommitted candidate. Product implementation is
+unchanged. Earlier manifest 9971ac5f belongs to 7aa18b0f6; candidate.txt now
+names the manifest for 81889b58d. Sage published this tip before granting CLEAR.
+
+The full gate checks HEAD equality and clean product bytes before its first
+file. Changed test files run singly, then nine packages, all ten shell suites,
+then seventy mutants. Each step gates on its exit status and retains its full
+log. run-gate.sh uses pipefail and an EXIT trap for the label-verified Compose
+network rocko-r191-gate_default, project rocko-r191-gate. TMPDIR is
+/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/rocko-r191-gate. Docker is available only for test-task
+and test-release; other steps use unix:///nonexistent.sock. Live provider calls
+are disabled. No daemon, socket, volume or live configuration changes.
+
+Gate start: 2026-10-22T00:18:00Z. Results remain pending until gate-results.json
+and mutant-results.json provide actual exit statuses and counts.
+
+### First full-gate stop and fixture correction (sage-2274)
+
+The 81889b58d run stopped at its first failure, 00:18:00Z–00:19:21Z.
+27 files completed: 268 passed, 1 failed, 0 skipped. Packages, shells and
+mutants did not start. Full logs/results are in gate-attempt-81889/.
+The tester refusal test's fixture requested tester:true over TCP, which row
+196 now refuses before route handling. This is a stale fixture, not a flake.
+The correction uses the existing startTesterSocket helper, a private fixture
+root, socketPath requests, TESTER_ORIGIN and no human identity header. Every
+assertion remains; the request now reaches the intended processing refusal
+rather than failing listener setup or the outer identity fence. A grep of all
+changed test files found no other tester:true TCP setup. The cwd node/chromium
+sweep returned []; no Docker test workload ran. Commit c78f48946 is a single
+fast-forward test-only fix on 81889b58d, authorized by sage-2274. The complete
+gate restarts from its first single file only after Sage publishes this tip.
+
+Sage-2275 published c78f48946 and granted full restart. Second attempt begins
+2026-10-22T00:21:03Z; any further failure stops before additional edits.
+Candidate manifest b49fd493dc75ef2484ffc255213dc8eeaaaa348dee416c8d26d1c2bab8e20067.
+
+### Second attempt stopped; no further changes (sage-2275)
+
+Run 00:21:03Z–00:23:50Z on published c78f48946: all 27 changed singles
+269/269, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646. The CLI package emitted 26
+failed subtests before its verified own runner group 3119310 was stopped.
+Its result is interrupted, not a complete package count. Six gate-lane image
+checks refuse because scripts/testing/lane-image.mjs pins the old four COPY
+lines and 191 adds processing-control to Containerfile. Twenty launch-account,
+launch-limit-checks, launch-limits and launch-routes cases hit
+processing-uninitialized on fixture roots with no explicit control init.
+No edits, retries, later packages, shells, Docker test workloads or mutants
+followed this second failure. Parent runner exited; cwd node/chromium sweep
+returned [] at 00:23:50Z. Slot returned to Sage at 00:24:05Z with the exact
+failures and a request for scope on image-manifest and fixture initialization.
+This is an integration failure, not a declared flake or a passing gate.
+
+## Image-input manifest and launcher fixture scope (sage-2278, sage-2282)
+
+Commit eb3abba12 is one fast-forward commit on c78f48946. This is an image-input
+manifest change: scripts/testing/lane-image.mjs now pins the exact Containerfile
+COPY of packages/processing-control/src/state.mjs and entrypoint.mjs and hashes
+both named source paths, without a wildcard. Its only two changed lines add
+those inputs. Without them, a lane could reuse a stale image after a reader or
+entrypoint change. The image test fixtures copy both files and each has its
+own receipt-invalidating test. Mutant KS56 drops state.mjs from the hash list;
+its named killer is the state.mjs receipt-invalidating test. Static preflight
+is 71 sites / 0 errors. No new run result is claimed before CLEAR.
+
+The launch-account, launch-limit-checks, launch-limits and launch-routes fixtures
+now explicitly call initializeControl(f.dataRoot) before constructing their
+launchers. Existing assertion lines are byte-identical. A new launch-limit-checks
+test leaves initialization off and asserts processing-uninitialized, no
+mayLaunch/authorizeLaunch, and no registered session. A live root gets control
+initialized by the bus broker. The re-pin order is bus start before any seat
+launch; a launcher started before that refuses. This supplements the existing
+window precondition to stop old processing before the first trusted init.
+
+Sage-2282 supersedes the test-only image ruling: lane-image.mjs is a product
+blob, so mos-1200 carries no earlier results. The complete plan restarts from
+the first single file, all nine packages, all ten shells and all 71 mutants
+only after publication and Sage CLEAR. Earlier attempts remain in their
+separate gate-attempt directories; neither is a passing full gate.
+
+Sage-2283 published eb3abba12. Current 85-path candidate manifest is
+01a2b33651414c9b0cb094d2108f9e39c48a41b79974dcc16bdec374f8371091.
+The gate prints HEAD and this digest, verifies every manifest blob before its
+first test, and carries no old results. Awaiting CLEAR after Gander 253.
+
+## Full restart on eb3abba12 stopped at Discord (sage-2286)
+
+Verified HEAD and all 85 manifest blobs before tests. Run span:
+2026-10-22T00:34:50Z–00:47:33Z. No old result carried.
+
+| Step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
+| 32 changed test files singly | 304 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control | 61 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| bus | 646 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| cli | 761 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| discord | 190 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
+
+Singles sum independently confirmed by awk over all 32 TAP logs. Discord's
+binding.test.mjs:201 STOP check and recover.test.mjs:145 ready recovery check
+both get processing-uninitialized before the expected behavior. Those older
+fixture roots do not explicitly initialize control. The gate stopped at this
+step; no subsequent package, shell suite, Docker test workload or mutant ran.
+Docker availability was checked read-only (29.7.2); no daemon/volume changes.
+The EXIT trap completed. Cwd node/chromium sweep returned [] at 00:47:49Z,
+source tree remains clean, and the slot was handed back at 00:47:58Z.
+No test or product edits or retries followed this failure; Sage has the table
+and the fixture-initialization recommendation. This is not a green full gate.
+
+## Discord fixture init and all-package static sweep (sage-2294)
+
+Commit e6800380dc0765ce3f1477044e2ce4f773ebb43c is test-only and fast-forwards eb3abba12.
+Only binding.test.mjs and recover.test.mjs change: one initializeControl import
+and one initializeControl(dep.dataRoot) call in each affected CLI fixture.
+Every original assertion line is retained. Product blobs are unchanged.
+FIXTURE-SWEEP.md and fixture-sweep.json enumerate 338 source call-site hits,
+with the two fixes and the already-initialized chains, plus the screens for
+rootless optional contexts and read-only/usage CLI calls. The generator reads
+repository source only and invokes no fixture. Deliberate missing/deleted/
+corrupt-state refusal tests remain negative; no shared helper masks them.
+
+Current manifest be36af8f0855f57336e6a33283aa0a8e94297f338b1f8180936cbccf1119c60a, 87 paths. Sage-2294 carries only unchanged
+processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646, CLI 761/761 and unchanged singles from
+gate-attempt-eb3/. The resume must run both touched files wholly, whole Discord,
+then the never-run WebUI/tasks/seat/project/library packages, every shell suite
+and all 71 mutants. No result is claimed for the new test bytes before CLEAR.
+The live initialization order remains bus start before any seat or Discord
+start; no fixture change initializes or repairs a live root.
+
+## Resume on e6800380d stopped at WebUI (sage-2311)
+
+Start 2026-10-22T01:27:40Z; failed-step exit 01:28:45Z. Startup verified HEAD,
+manifest be36af8f and all 87 blobs, and read-only Docker availability (29.7.2).
+
+| New step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
+| binding.test.mjs whole | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| recover.test.mjs whole | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| Discord whole | 192 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| WebUI whole | 314 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
+
+Carried unchanged under sage-2294: 32 singles 304/304, processing-control 61/61,
+bus 646/646 and CLI 761/761, from gate-attempt-eb3/. These are explicitly carried
+results, not fresh runs on e6800380d.
+
+Four WebUI failures are retained in gate-logs/package-webui.log:
+- board-held.test.mjs:91: processing's config/state GETs omit redirect:manual.
+- board-held.test.mjs:194 and send-browser.test.mjs:58: processing's independent
+  hash/focus/interval refresh continues to read after the shell signs out.
+- shell.test.mjs:104: the added control bar makes the short desktop page 1095px
+  high at a 1000px viewport. Its new height is not accounted for by the existing
+  frame/sidebar/footer layout.
+
+Static diagnosis: processing.js ignores the existing body.signed-out state and
+mosaic-signed-out event that app.js and bus.js already share. Its GETs also lack
+manual redirect handling. processing.css adds an external bar while shell.css's
+frame minimum and sidebar heights still subtract only bar-h and foot-h. These
+are product integration defects; no assertions were weakened and no fix was
+made after the failed step. Sage received the table and recommendations.
+
+One TAP skip: the editor rebuild requires exactly esbuild 0.28.2; installed
+shared node_modules has 0.28.1. Full skip line is in tap-skips.json. No shell
+suite ran, so there are no ^skip shell lines (skip-lines.txt remains empty).
+No tasks/seat/project/library suite, shell Docker workload or mutant ran after
+WebUI failed. Parent runner exited, EXIT cleanup completed, cwd node/chromium
+sweep returned [] at 01:29:00Z, source tree is clean, and slot returned to Sage.
+No retries or source edits were made. This is not a passing gate.
+
+## Console shared sign-out and bounded desktop layout (sage-2317)
+
+Commit 8e1f55c1db6a096e227b5114cd13a7142493b112, fast-forward on e6800380d, changes only the
+processing assets and their owning two tests. Current 87-path manifest:
+d3b014e6a0e9e547a29ae780eb27b1c0e57cc7b0e73dc49954abbff623929f41.
+
+All three processing fetch sites use redirect:manual. responseBody dispatches
+the existing mosaic-signed-out event for an opaque redirect, or its signIn
+variant for exactly 401/sign-in required. No independent sign-out state is
+added: refresh/action guards read body.signed-out. The existing event cancels
+the interval, invalidates pending reads, clears stale state and disables
+writes. In-flight answers cannot restore state after sign-out. Initial work
+waits for DOMContentLoaded because this deferred asset precedes app.js in the
+HTML and needs its shared sign-out listener registered first. app.js/bus.js
+and their proof baselines remain untouched.
+
+The CSS keeps the control bar in normal document flow. On desktop, the frame
+flexes into the remaining viewport rather than imposing another full-height
+minimum below the bar. Fixed navigation retains the shell's command/footer
+bounds and existing responsive column widths. Mobile retains natural flow.
+No short-page, sidebar or footer assertion is changed; rendering remains to
+be verified on the next authorized gate, not claimed from static checks.
+
+The VM fixture models the existing body class, document events and DOM ready;
+its original assertion lines are unchanged. Six new browser cases cover config,
+state and POST opaque redirects and sign-in-required replies, manual redirect
+requests, interval cancellation and no subsequent fetch from forced refreshes
+or clicks. KS57 removes manual redirect from the config GET; KS58 removes the
+refresh signed-out guard. Both name the config-redirect browser case as their
+killer. Static preflight: 73 exact-once sites / 0 errors. Syntax checks pass;
+no owning test or mutant has run on this commit.
+
+A product blob changes, so sage-2317/mos-1200 carries nothing. The next CLEAR
+runs all changed files singly, all nine package suites, all ten shell suites
+with Docker available and all 73 mutants. The editor rebuild's esbuild0.28.1
+vs pinned0.28.2 skip remains host drift and is reported separately. Earlier
+failed attempts remain immutable in gate-attempt-* directories.
+
+## Rebase onto row 202 (sage-2329)
+
+New branch rocko/row191-stoprun-ddfb-20261022, tip eafcbd3e7d6ef6e259fb59d87a7b0857b42337aa,
+base ddfb29af7. The prior published branch is preserved; no force-push, delete
+or old-name reuse. Six Rocko commits rebased, with one manual conflict in
+scripts/mosaic's human CLI case: prepend halt|resume|processing and retain
+row 202's appended access. packages/cli/src/cli.mjs auto-merges retain the
+access import/branch and all three processing commands. CLI README retains
+both the Access and Instance processing switch sections.
+
+The full old/new tip diff has 15 paths (base plans/queue/logs, row 202's new
+access files and its three shared CLI paths), 2327 insertions/32 deletions.
+Within row 191's owned paths only CLI README, cli.mjs and scripts/mosaic differ,
+with the row 202 additions. rebase-ddfb-log.txt, rebase-ddfb-tip-diff.stat,
+rebase-ddfb-owned-diff.stat and rebase-ddfb-range-diff.txt retain exact evidence.
+
+Manifest fd0f2740b1cccadaaad8c613640fdddb0497cdab33ec2c0fd11debf3cae6c4ee, 87 candidate paths. The package command lists were
+regenerated from this base; CLI includes access.test.mjs. All 73 mutant sites
+must preflight again. No tests ran, no result carries, and the complete gate
+waits for publication and Sage CLEAR after Megavolt's debug run.
+
+Sage-2333 published eafcbd3e7. Their per-file patch-id comparison matches
+the prior six-commit range except the exactly ruled scripts/mosaic dispatch
+line; binary/secrets/attribution checks pass. Gate remains unrun pending CLEAR.
+
+## eafcbd3e7 full gate stopped on timer fixture attribution (sage-2339)
+
+Run 2026-10-22T02:18:04Z–02:19:25Z. HEAD, 87 blobs and fd0f2740 manifest
+verified. Short mktemp TMPDIR /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gxbC; named Compose
+project rocko-r191-gate. Nothing carried. 32 changed files completed:
+313 passed, 6 failed, 0 skipped. All six new processing-browser sign-out
+cases stop at their common precondition, processingTimers length2 vs1.
+The original two browser cases pass. Their recorder attributes every 5000ms
+interval to processing, but app.js:307 already arms its own freshness timer.
+The intended processing interval is at processing.js:87. These new cases have
+not yet exercised sign-out or killed KS57/KS58, so no behavior proof is claimed.
+
+The gate stopped at this first red step. No package, shell, Docker workload
+or mutant ran; the esbuild rebuild was not reached. Runner exited, EXIT cleanup
+completed and cwd node/chromium sweep returned [] at 02:19:34Z. No source edit
+or retry followed the failure. Sage received the exact failure and a proposed
+test-only caller-attribution filter with the assertions unchanged. This is a
+fixture error, not a passing gate or a declared flake.
+
+## Timer recorder attribution correction (sage-2345)
+
+Commit 4db8b57785895bc62f5f015468a69515da7fc77f, fast-forward on eafcbd3e7, is a one-line
+test-only correction in processing-browser.test.mjs. Cause: app.js:307's
+freshness interval is also 5000ms, and the recorder incorrectly counted it as
+a processing interval. The recorder now requires the processing.js caller
+stack. Every assertion remains byte-identical, including exactly one timer
+before sign-out and zero after it. A second 5000ms interval from processing.js
+would still be counted and fail the exactly-one assertion. No product byte
+changes, and no test or mutant ran for this correction.
+
+Manifest ffb46fbdb875f97ff2eb7a7bed8bf6d5c4df53b8a63c738ffcde5fc5f6b7f6ad, 87 paths. Full restart after publication and CLEAR,
+with nothing carried. Sage-2345 counts the timer-fixture red as the first in
+this 191 window; any second red stops and is escalated to Mos. Previous logs
+are retained in gate-attempt-eaf/.
+
+## Full gate on 0f8235277: second red (sage-2351)
+
+Candidate: 0f8235277e1fc21588edb6f2931d66c8e154a400 on ddfb29af7.
+Manifest: ffb46fbdb875f97ff2eb7a7bed8bf6d5c4df53b8a63c738ffcde5fc5f6b7f6ad.
+No prior result carried. Start 2026-10-22T02:33:41Z; failed-step exit
+2026-10-22T02:46:17Z. Fresh TMPDIR /mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/giNF.
+Compose project rocko-r191-gate, trapped ownership-checked network cleanup.
+
+| Step | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Exit |
+|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
+| 34 changed test files singly | 330 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| processing-control | 61 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| bus | 646 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| cli (including access) | 783 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| discord | 192 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| webui | 323 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+| tasks, seat, project, library | not run | — | — | — |
+| all ten scripts/test-*.sh | not run | — | — | — |
+| all 73 mutants | not run | — | — | — |
+
+Singles sum independently confirmed with awk over all 34 TAP logs.
+The sole failure is shell.test.mjs:380 in the full shell-browser test:
+scrollHeight 1062 vs innerHeight 1000. Full evidence is
+ gate-logs/package-webui.log (not ok 271, line 1626).
+All prior manual-redirect/sign-out failures and eight processing-browser cases
+pass, but the desktop short-page geometry is still wrong. No passing layout
+or full-gate claim is made.
+
+Known host-drift TAP skip: editor rebuild requires exactly esbuild 0.28.2,
+while shared node_modules has 0.28.1. Full line is in tap-skips.json. This skip
+is not counted as a red. No shell suite ran, so skip-lines.txt has no ^skip
+shell line. No Docker test workload or mutant started.
+
+Stopped at the first failed step without retry or product edits, per sage-2351.
+This is the second red in the 191 window and is with Sage for Mos escalation
+under mos-0823. Parent runner exited; EXIT cleanup completed. Cwd-scoped node
+and chromium sweep returned [] at 02:47:14Z, product worktree is clean, and the
+slot was returned. No in-review move was made.
+
+
+### mos-1248 / sage-2363: desktop viewport allocation (unrun static candidate)
+
+The second red on 0f8235277 was shell.test.mjs:380 (1062 versus 1000).
+The shell gives .frame a viewport-based minimum at packages/webui/src/public/shell.css:135;
+processing.css:12-14 replaced that minimum but used a column flex body with only
+min-height:100vh, so the new bar was not allocated a bounded share of the viewport.
+The desktop body now uses explicit grid rows for the command bar, controls, optional
+banner, frame and footer. The frame row is minmax(min-content,1fr): it takes the
+remaining short-page space while long content may grow the document. No clipping,
+overflow suppression, fixed body height, test viewport change or assertion removal.
+The existing shell.test.mjs:380 equality stays byte-identical. Added assertions
+check actual processing-bar visibility, positive height, viewport placement and
+no document scroll at 1440x1000; the existing 1440x420 long-page checks remain.
+KS59 reverts processing.css to 0f8235277's bytes and must fail that same shell
+browser test. Total: 74 planned mutants. No test or mutant has run on this fix.
+Webby must statically review this delta before Sage opens the full no-carry gate.
+
+
+### Correction after Webby B1 (webby-0104, 2026-10-22 03:00Z)
+
+The cause stated in the mos-1248/sage-2363 note above is withdrawn.
+processing.css loads after shell.css and already overrides the frame minimum.
+With the tree fixed and inspector hidden, the remaining floor is the Board's
+main content. The grid min-content row preserves that floor, so 5cd32f4c1
+is not an accepted layout fix. Its static review is CHANGES at Webby's
+REVIEW-layout.md, commit e2e7c60e5. No run established a new layout measurement.
+Next step requires a granted fixture probe for main/control heights and an
+owner layout ruling; no further product change or gate is authorized yet.
+Existing shell assertions remain unchanged.
+
+
+### Static nav placement: mos-1249/mos-1250, sage-2383/2385/2386, webby-0106/0108
+
+Fast-forward on 5cd32f4c1; the rejected grid is removed. The unchanged labeled
+region is now the first child of nav.tree, before its Console h2. The banner
+stays at its original body location with every id, role, label and shipped
+string unchanged. No processing.js change and no runtime reparenting.
+At >=760 the tree is the same fixed box, with the same width breakpoints and
+ordinary overflow:auto. The controls are non-shrinking and non-sticky; they
+scroll with overflowing nav links (sage-2386 withdraws persistent visibility).
+Below760 the region takes a full flex line before Console/Projects. Its mobile
+location changes from before .frame to first in the static nav; the banner
+therefore precedes it in a halted mobile view. Banner behavior itself is unchanged.
+Specificity (0,3,0) resets .btn margin/order and .small margin/basis, leaving
+the shell rules unchanged. No content is shortened and no overflow is hidden.
+
+Correct height arithmetic (Webby B1): page=max(innerHeight,86+C), where C is
+main content height. Controls consume space within the existing nav box, not
+another body row. The old failing layout was max(innerHeight,86+barHeight+C).
+The halted banner remains a body row; Sage tracks that separately.
+
+Candidate-test design change at processing-ui.test.mjs:67 under mos-1250.
+Old assertion:
+```js
+  assert.ok(html.indexOf('id="processing-controls"') < html.indexOf('<div class="frame">'));
+```
+New assertion text:
+```js
+  const controlsAt = html.indexOf('id="processing-controls"');
+  const mainAt = html.indexOf('<main id="main"'), inspectorAt = html.indexOf('<aside class="inspector"');
+  assert.ok(controlsAt >= 0 && controlsAt < mainAt, 'controls are outside and before #main');
+  assert.ok(!(inspectorAt < controlsAt && controlsAt < html.indexOf('</aside>', inspectorAt)),
+    'controls are outside aside.inspector');
+```
+Reason: the bar moves into the frame's first column under mos-1249 while
+remaining outside route-specific #main and aside.inspector. This is a change
+to our unlanded candidate assertion, not a landed assertion.
+
+All existing shell assertions stay unchanged. Added bar-inside-tree assertion
+and diagnostic height output. New processing browser coverage checks 400px
+Stop order=0, visibility, focus and position above Projects; also on-load
+visibility/focus at1440x1000,1440x420,800x420. Debug logs report controls/tree
+heights at those desktop sizes and main height; Sage judges controls over half
+the 334px nav at1440x420 before the window. No run yet.
+
+Mutant delta: KS59 now reverts the complete layout (HTML and CSS together);
+KS60 hides the controls; KS61 moves them into #main; KS62 drops the (0,3,0)
+button reset. Total77. Every new site has its named killing test.
+
+
+### sage-2394 debug on published da4334806 (2026-10-22)
+
+03:14:37Z–03:14:53Z: shell.test.mjs whole 5/5, processing-browser.test.mjs
+whole 9/9, 0 failures/skips. awk sum14/0/0. Original shell short-page and
+long-page assertions pass unchanged. Logs/results and empty cwd sweep are in
+debug-da4334806/. Slot clear sent Sage/Webby03:15:11Z after sweep.
+Controls/tree/main heights: read-only shell1440x1000 212.5/914/914; writable
+processing fixture1440x1000 127/914/914;1440x420 127/334/907.734375;800x420
+127/334/1131.65625. Stop visible/order0/focusable/aboveProjects at400x1000.
+Writable127 is below half the334 nav. The read-only212.5 height at1000 was
+flagged for Sage's usability call; that state was not measured at420, so no
+claim is made that all states use less than half the short nav.
+No mutants or full gate run under this debug grant. Await separate CLEAR.
+
+
+### R6 accepted: sage-2399 / webby-0111 (2026-10-22 03:16Z)
+
+Sage accepts the short-nav usability tradeoff. Writable controls occupy38%
+of the334px nav at1440x420. The read-only recovery note makes that about64%,
+inferred from the measured212.5px height at the same width. The region is
+non-sticky and scrolls away; Projects was already below the fold at that size
+before191. Webby confirmed the debug TAP and has no window blocker. Sage
+tracks the read-only note length with the halt-banner follow-up; no change
+to this row.
+
+Do not rebase or run now. Row273 lands first. On Sage's landing message,
+rebase the candidate including the two latest layout commits onto the new
+refactor under a new branch name (mos-1086), then provide range-diff,
+patch-ids and the refreshed88-product-path manifest. The full no-carry
+window requires a separate Sage CLEAR on that published tip.
+
+
+### Rebase after row273: sage-2402 (2026-10-22 03:42Z)
+
+New branch rocko/row191-stoprun-86f9-20261022, tip
+0fa7bf421fc153a226b5f06ed484e089e48e23ba, on86f95bb27. All10 commits
+rebase cleanly and range-diff pairs each with '='; no conflict resolution.
+All88 per-file patch-ids match the old candidate. Whole product diff stable
+patch-id before/after:0846823aefe165363601a6c68134ad46cc701c73.
+87 product blobs are identical; only docs/TOOLS.md changes because the new
+base carries row273's --send/--no-sso usage and three explanatory F39 lines.
+191's TOOLS hunks stay unchanged. New88-path manifestSHA256:
+0bcbf337433f6d46d809ee1dcaf8a5a8503160403d273cf73d6dac64adef3c02.
+Range-diff, per-path patch-ids and TOOLS comparison are rebase-86f9-* files.
+Static77-site exact-once preflight has0errors. No tests run, nothing carried
+into the required full window; await Sage publication and separate CLEAR.
+
+
+### Full no-carry window on0fa7bf421: stopped at SR08 (sage-2407/2418)
+
+03:44:56Z–04:01:29Z. All35touched files passed336/0/0; nine packages
+passed2403/0 with1known editor/esbuild skip. Every shell exited0:425selftests
+plus156queue node tests passed; the canonical-root queue check and two
+explicit live-provider exclusions are saved in skip-lines.txt. See
+GATE-RESULTS.md for per-suite counts and mutant table.
+SR01–SR07 killed. SR08 timed out at90seconds without named assertion failure
+(TAP header only); runner restored all88candidate blobs and stopped. The69
+later mutants did not run. SR08 is not counted as killed. Cwd sweep[] and
+owned network cleanup completed; slot clear sent Sage04:02:12Z.
+Saved mutation, timeout policy lines64–89 and shell/skip table sent Sage in
+response to sage-2418. No source edit or retry; no in-review move. Await
+Mos ruling and explicit Sage CLEAR before any control/replay/resume.
+
+
+### SR08 timeout policy: mos-1259 / sage-2423 (2026-10-22 04:07Z)
+
+Cause confirmed by Mos: runtimes.mjs:333 loops on now() <= deadline, while
+stop-run.test.mjs:106-108 gives the second host a fixed fake clock with real
+sleep. Removing the join branch enters the stop loop without advancing that
+clock. Original SR08 log contains TAP header only; original timeout record
+stays immutable. Mos permits separate classification as killed-by-timeout
+only after the unmutated same whole test file passes the same90second
+harness in this resumed run. **Control result: not run; awaiting CLEAR.**
+No assertion kill is claimed for SR08.
+
+Runner review requested from Dewey, Sage copied. SHA256 of run-mutants.py:
+fe0d360f86d86ab2df967da5338479c593c27c88d06eb38a1389d99a08489369. Diff:runner-mos1259.diff; baseline:
+run-mutants.before-mos1259.py. Shared execution harness uses90seconds, own
+process groups, verified descendant cleanup and restored source bytes. A
+control must pass every test with exit0, no not-ok/skip/cancel/fail. Its record
+binds invocation id, candidate HEAD/manifest and test hash; all88candidate
+blobs verified before and after control, and before each mutation. The
+approved historical SR08 classification and69-site SR09+resume use separate
+files so the original seven kills and timeout evidence remain intact.
+Assertion kills and timeout kills have separate counters. No control for the
+same file in this invocation means a timeout stops; survivors and invalid
+failures stop too. Every timeout gets a cause/control record before review.
+
+No product/test change, no control/mutant execution. Wait for independent
+runner approval and Sage CLEAR. Green suites carry only on unchanged0fa7bf421
+and manifest0bcbf337. Test clock fix is deferred to Vikunja502 as Mos ruled.
+
+
+### Independent runner approval: dewey-0789 (2026-10-22 04:11:20Z)
+
+Dewey APPROVES the frozen fe0d360f86d86ab2df967da5338479c593c27c88d06eb38a1389d99a08489369
+runner, static only. Use only the proposed --control-file stop-run.test.mjs
+--adjudicate-timeout SR08 --resume-from SR09 invocation. A positional-id or
+full run would overwrite the original evidence and is not this resume.
+
+Report the complete tally as7 prior assertion kills (old status killed),
+plus SR08 separately adjudicated by timeout after control passes, plus69
+resumed sites. The summary file counts only this invocation. No control or
+resume result exists yet; Sage CLEAR remains required.
+
+Classification change: the reviewed runner recognizes indented not-ok lines
+with ^\s* rather than only top-level lines. Controls therefore reject nested
+failures too, and mutant assertion kills still require the named pattern in
+a failing test name. SR01–SR07 evidence was classified by the original runner.
+
+Historical SR08 has no HEAD field. Its binding to0fa7bf421 relies on the saved
+commit.txt/log timestamps and the new candidate HEAD+88blob check, not a
+retroactively invented HEAD field in the old result. Preserve this provenance
+in the adjudication report. Any newly detected timeout needs a concrete cause
+before review; the generic placeholder is not accepted review evidence.
+
+
+### Control and resume: sage-2427, stopped on KS43
+
+Control/resume began04:13:44Z; last saved mutant result2026-10-22T04:14:08Z; process
+absence confirmed04:14:56Z and slot returned to Sage. Whole unmutated
+stop-run.test.mjs control passed12/12, exit0, no not-ok, no skips/cancels,
+in0.459seconds. The reviewed runner adjudicated original SR08 separately
+as killed-by-timeout under mos-1259. The immutable original SR08 row/log
+stay unchanged; adjudication binds the control, exact cause, current HEAD
+and manifest. Historical HEAD provenance remains as Dewey N4 described.
+
+Resume stopped at KS43, not retried. It removes the inner processingHTTP
+origin check and its selected outer-route test passed1/1(exit0). Saved
+evidence:resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap and resume-mutant-results.json.
+Tally:7prior assertion kills +49resumed assertion kills =56assertion kills;
+1historical timeout kill;1survivor(KS43);19unrun. No new timeouts or placeholder
+causes. All88candidate blobs restored and resume cwd sweep[]; no product or
+test change. No in-review move. Sage and Mos notified directly.
+
+Static diagnosis only: KS43 selects processing.test.mjs:52's outer-server
+fence test. The unchanged direct-handler test at:95 already isolates this
+origin guard from serve's outer refusal. Its pattern was not selected. Sent
+recommendation to Sage/Mos to correct only the mutant's named killer after
+their ruling, then run KS43+19remaining. No metadata edit or rerun authorized
+yet; no claim the direct-handler test kills it until the run proves it.
+
+
+### KS43 metadata retarget: mos-1261 (2026-10-22 04:16:41Z)
+
+Original pattern `processing write fences refuse` selected processing.test:52.
+KS43 survived with1passing test and no writer call, preserved in
+resume-mutant-results.json and resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap. The serve-level
+test cannot isolate the handler guard: outer fences and later refusal can
+mask its removal. No product defect or new kill is claimed from static read.
+New pattern: `processing handler independently refuses wrong origin and cross-site before its writer`,
+the existing direct processingHTTP test at:95-107 with valid user/site/content
+headers, asserted403 and no writer call. Only KS43's pattern changed in the
+77-site table; product/test/mutation bytes unchanged. Generator mirrors it.
+
+TableSHA256:5dbc8308c995e1974d6da63b3daa967896d822154eab38a8bb96154be667edf5. Diff:mutant-table-mos1261.diff,
+baseline:all-mutants.before-mos1261.json. Dewey must independently review
+this metadata diff before the next run. Static audit of all19unrun sites:
+mutant-pattern-audit-mos1261.md; no other serve-level/direct-handler mismatch
+with an existing direct test warrants retargeting. KS44 body-bound case has
+no direct-handler counterpart; its oversized whitespace+{} case is valid
+JSON without the bound, so it retains the existing pattern.
+
+Carry56assertion kills+1timeout kill and green suites only on unchanged
+0fa7bf421. Next approved scope is KS43+19sites after review and Sage CLEAR.
+No run authorized by this metadata change.
+
+
+### Retarget review APPROVE and C1 archive: dewey-0791 (2026-10-22 04:19:55Z)
+
+Dewey approves table5dbc8308 and the19-site audit, conditional on preserving
+the first resume evidence before any next run. Archive:mos-1261-archive/,
+full per-file inventory:mos-1261-archive/sha256-manifest.txt.
+
+- `resume-mutant-results.json` SHA256 `f5725ef26cdb488441285081fadaa9ce4a3e7d390ab2a1c6d04acfd27f105fc6`
+
+- `resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap` SHA256 `c778ee33edb667f795ab560a328fd5c1c04ef6acf99d7b79c364f6302cf29864`
+
+- `unmutated-control.json` SHA256 `ee9ddcd69d24276165abe1185f159a2737157fcae8fd37f731768e9324b765e5`
+
+- `SR08-timeout-adjudication.json` SHA256 `214a04696d3329ef67bf10578daf4d251599816fd246bc31abecae1a6230e1e0`
+
+The50-row result, all first-resume logs and control/adjudication records
+were copied byte-for-byte. Original paths remain untouched too. A separate
+retarget-mos1261/ directory holds byte-identical approved runnerfe0d360f,
+reviewed table5dbc8308 and identical candidate/commit files. The proposed
+--resume-from KS43 invocation there selects20sites and writes its own logs
+and results without overwriting either original or archive. No control flag
+is needed for these tests; any timeout without a same-file control stops.
+Final tally will combine7old assertionkills +49first-resume assertionkills +
+SR08separate timeout adjudication +20retarget results. Still no run; awaiting
+Sage CLEAR. Product/test bytes remain unchanged.
+
+
+### KS43 retarget run: sage-2436, stopped on KS44 invalid mutation
+
+Run began04:21:06Z; KS43 is killed by the named direct-handler assertion.
+KS44 then fails import with SyntaxError Unexpected token catch at
+processing-http.mjs:40. The failing TAP name is the test file, not the
+selected test, so runner records invalid-failure and stops without a kill.
+Evidence remains in retarget-mos1261/console.log,resume-mutant-results.json
+and resume-mutant-logs/KS43.tap,KS44.tap. No original evidence overwritten.
+
+Cause: our KS44 mutation uses `// no body bound` to replace an inline
+`if (size > 1024) throw Error();` in a one-line for-await body. The comment
+swallows the remaining chunks.push and closing brace. This is malformed
+mutation metadata, not an observed product failure. No metadata correction
+or retry yet. Proposed to Sage/Mos: replace only the new text with `void 0;`,
+then independent review and a new CLEAR for KS44+18 on unchanged candidate.
+
+Current tally57assertionkills (7+49+1),1SR08timeoutkill,1invalid(KS44),18unrun.
+Cwd sweep[] and all88candidate hashes restored04:21:30Z; slot returned and
+Sage/Mos notified. No in-review move. Wait for ruling before any edit or run.
+
+
+### KS44 syntax metadata correction: mos-1264 (2026-10-22 04:22:16Z)
+
+Only KS44.new changes from `// no body bound` to `void 0;`. Old site,
+test and pattern stay unchanged. The invalid import result remains in
+retarget-mos1261/resume-mutant-results.json and resume-mutant-logs/KS44.tap.
+TableSHA256:85d9a7b13ad510e840f258d892afbfce393cefbc4006e1f808605b83adc84570. Diff:mutant-table-mos1264.diff;
+baseline:all-mutants.before-mos1264.json. Generator mirrors the one field.
+
+Authorized syntax-class preflight applied KS44–KS62 individually in scratch,
+ran node --check on each JavaScript file, and restored before advancing.
+All15JS checks passed; no other replacement fix was needed. KS59–KS62
+change only HTML/CSS and are explicitly asset-only/not-applicable for the
+Node parser; Mos/Sage informed, no false JS syntax pass claimed. All19
+mutations restored and88candidate hashes match. Per-site logs/results and
+restoration record:syntax-mos1264/. No behavioral test or assertion-mutant
+run occurred. Dewey must review table diff and syntax results before next
+Sage CLEAR for KS44+18. Carry57assertionkills+1timeoutkill only on unchanged
+0fa7bf421. No product or test change.
+
+
+### dewey-0795 approval: syntaxfixed-mos1264 staged (unrun)
+
+Dewey APPROVES table85d9a7b1 and syntax preflight, static only. Conditions
+met:syntaxfixed-mos1264/ holds byte copies of runnerfe0d360f, table85d9a7b1,
+commit.txt,candidate.txt,candidate-manifest.sha256. Full SHA256 and byte-cmp
+list is syntaxfixed-mos1264/byte-copy-check.txt. Invocation after Sage CLEAR:
+python3 syntaxfixed-mos1264/run-mutants.py --resume-from KS44 (19sites).
+All previous invalid/survivor evidence stays untouched in its original dirs.
+No behavioral run occurred during preparation.
+
+
+### Final19 resume stopped at KS54: sage-2444 (2026-10-22)
+
+Run began04:27:45Z; KS44–KS53 are10named assertion kills. KS54 then timed out
+at90.073seconds. Its log contains the expected dependency-list assertion:
+"the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one" at
+bus/tests/tasks.test.mjs:263. The mutation drops processing from runtime.mjs
+tasks factory deps. The test opens runtime then asserts before close at:265;
+a failing assertion skips the close and leaves Node alive. No same-file
+control ran in this invocation, so this is timeout-without-control, not a
+kill. No assertion or timeout kill is claimed for KS54.
+
+Raw resume result's generic cause sentence says a control passed, which is
+incorrect: its control:null and timeout-without-control status establish the
+opposite. The raw evidence remains unchanged; the concrete cause and
+correction are in syntaxfixed-mos1264/KS54-timeout-report.json. This explicit
+report replaces the placeholder as explanation without altering the log.
+
+Current tally67assertionkills(7+49+1+10),1adjudicatedSR08timeoutkill,
+1unqualifiedKS54timeout,8unrun. All88candidate blobs restored; cwd sweep[]
+and slot returned04:30:06Z to Sage, Mos directly copied as instructed. No
+retry, product/test edit or in-review move. Sage's disclosed syntaxcheck
+caused no busy refusal or foreign-node report. Await owner ruling/CLEAR.
+
+
+### Final controls/mutants GREEN: mos-1267, sage-2448, dewey-0798
+
+On unchanged0fa7bf421, whole-file tasks control9/9 passed in0.815s; KS54
+rerun killed-by-timeout with the exact dependency not-ok at tasks.test:263.
+KS55–KS62 are8assertionkills. Final run04:35:32Z–04:37:17Z, cwd sweep[] and
+88hashrestore04:37:48Z; slot returned to Sage and direct handoff to Dewey/Mos.
+Final77-site tally:75assertionkills(7+49+1+10+8),2separate timeoutkills
+(SR08adjudication,KS54control+rerun). final-mutant-results.json consolidates
+latest accepted evidence by id; no prior record or log overwritten.
+GATE-RESULTS.md is the final per-suite/mutant table; prior narrative saved
+as GATE-RESULTS-before-final.md.
+
+KS54 raw placeholder result saved as resume-mutant-results.raw.json before
+filling concrete cause in its review result. Same-invocation control id
+1792643732624962173; prior syntaxfixed eleven-row result file remains exact
+0ede036954ff77c21f29e1a744b21d1d9b18eb75736f78ecd1cf4ae559358911.
+Dewey independently read logs/control/restoration and confirmed tally in
+dewey-0798, explicitly not yet a manifest verdict. N6test cleanup stays
+deferred under mos-1267/Vikunja502; no candidate byte changes permitted.
+
+
+### Claimant review handoff
+
+Queue move rocko-191-review-r1 entered in-review at revision3114, round1
+on#1689, manifest0bcbf337. Revision3115 records the expected missing-token
+request failure; command exit1. Receipt:in-review-receipt.txt. Sage posts
+the request as jarvis; Dewey owns the manifest verdict. Candidate source
+remains published0fa7bf421 with88product paths, base86f95bb27. No live
+action, push, source change or further gate authorized by this handoff.
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Row279: stopRun deadline final observation
+
+Scope: sage-2512, mos-1269; brief docs/plans/2026-10-22_stoprun-deadline.md.
+Base f40f2e770. Reviewer Dewey; gate owner Sage. V502 stays separate.
+
+## Cause and smallest change
+
+The loop's precondition now()<=deadline can skip the existing final status
+read when a sleep wakes beyond deadline. Use for(;;) so the existing
+now()>=deadline branch is the only time exit. Change that loop header only;
+all record/identity/ended exits and result mapping remain byte-identical.
+The old trailing fallback remains unreachable in the fixed loop. M1 restores
+only the old header and thereby restores the complete old fall-through path.
+
+## Regression and evidence plan
+
+Add one test to stop-run.test.mjs, preserving existing tests. Its fake sleep
+advances requested duration plus1ms, so the last sleep crosses the deadline.
+Its signal stub records TERM/KILL and returns success without killing the
+always-live fixture process. Expect both signals, time>7000ms and alive.
+The old loop should fail only the alive assertion with unknown.
+
+Ask Sage CLEAR before any run, including the expected regression red. Then
+apply the one-line fix, run the touched whole file and processing-control
+package as granted, and kill M1 with that same named regression. Busy check,
+short scratch TMPDIR,deadDocker,owned process groups,timeouts,restore,sweep.
+No live state,units,store,provider,browser,Docker or V502 changes.
+
+Packet includes base,patch,candidate hashes,regression/gate/mutant logs and
+exact source-diff check. Commit candidate and packet on the new branch only
+after authorized checks. No token is available; Sage publishes as jarvis.
+The business/CLI suites remain Sage's landing gate unless separately granted.
+
+## Authorized run and result
+
+Claim rev 3138, op rocko-279-start-r1. Sage granted this exact sequence in
+sage-2516 (2026-10-22T05:55:21Z). Runs: 05:56:03Z to 05:58:03Z.
+
+| Step | Pass | Fail | Skip | Result |
+| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- |
+| Regression on unfixed base | 0 | 1 | 0 | Expected assertion: unknown versus alive |
+| stop-run.test.mjs whole | 13 | 0 | 0 | Green |
+| processing-control package whole | 62 | 0 | 0 | Green |
+| M1 old loop | 0 | 1 | 0 | Killed by the named regression, unknown versus alive |
+
+M1's killer is `a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run
+after both signals`. It exits 1 with that assertion, never a syntax error or
+timeout. Logs and results.json retain the intentional failures separately.
+Green runs total 75 passes (the whole-file tests are also part of the package).
+No skips. All commands used a short scratch TMPDIR, a dead Docker socket and
+fixture-only configuration. Each node command ran in its own process group
+with a 120-second timeout. No timeout occurred. Final cwd sweep: empty.
+The source restoration and exact one-line product scope are checked in
+source-scope-check.json. The trailing unknown return stays unchanged and is
+unreachable after the fix. Business and CLI suites remain Sage's owner gate.
+Slot returned to Sage at 05:58:03Z. No live action or V502 change.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+f40f2e770e0d8be394f1ef53b404045fd6a49c0e
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+diff --git a/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs b/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+index 05e439c1a..a11cb8e52 100644
+--- a/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+++ b/packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ async function ownStop(args, key, options) {
+   };
+   const termEnd = started + grace, deadline = termEnd + observe;
+   let termTried = false, killTried = false;
+-  while (now() <= deadline) {
+  for (;;) {
+     try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }
+     catch {
+       const present = readdirSync(directory(root, 'runtimes')).includes(record.id + '.json');
+diff --git a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
+index ed69bc111..5277ea7fe 100644
+--- a/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
+@@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ test('failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and nev
+   assert.equal(f.sleeps.reduce((a,b)=>a+b,0), 7000);
+   assert.deepEqual(await stopRun(f.args, f.options), result);
+ });
+test('a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals', async t => {
+  const f = setup(t); let time = 0;
+  f.options.now = () => time;
+  f.options.sleep = async ms => { time += ms + 1; };
+  f.options.signal = (_r, sig) => { f.signals.push(sig); return true; };
+  const result = await stopRun(f.args, f.options);
+  assert.ok(time > 7000, 'the last sleep wakes past the complete stop deadline');
+  assert.deepEqual(f.signals, ['SIGTERM', 'SIGKILL']);
+  assert.equal(result.outcome, 'alive');
+  assert.deepEqual(result.signals, ['SIGTERM', 'SIGKILL']);
+});
+ test('missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal', async t => {
+   const f = setup(t);
+   for (const args of [{ ...f.args, run: 'missing' }, { ...f.args, business: 'other' }]) {
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+7145420aa354180689a5c84423928fc60c8123476dcfed3364c9cf4542f8c7ea  packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+7ce7a99363b987f8525f8992fd57940f4305597e870c6162fc158962f2101ff6  packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1016b85846c60dc159d49373f99ca36794a51fd9
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs
+packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1016b85846c60dc159d49373f99ca36794a51fd9
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+TAP version 13
+# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+not ok 1 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 40.278473
+  type: 'test'
+  location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:64:1'
+  failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
+  error: |-
+    Expected values to be strictly equal:
+    
+    'unknown' !== 'alive'
+    
+  code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
+  name: 'AssertionError'
+  expected: 'alive'
+  actual: 'unknown'
+  operator: 'strictEqual'
+  stack: |-
+    TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:72:10)
+    async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
+    async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
+  ...
+1..1
+# tests 1
+# suites 0
+# pass 0
+# fail 1
+# cancelled 0
+# skipped 0
+# todo 0
+# duration_ms 89.021437
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+TAP version 13
+# Subtest: container admission publishes its generated name and root/runtime labels before dispatch
+ok 1 - container admission publishes its generated name and root/runtime labels before dispatch
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 9.883733
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: container sweep sends TERM then KILL only after verifying exact id and both labels
+ok 2 - container sweep sends TERM then KILL only after verifying exact id and both labels
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 66.167157
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: foreign labels and a replaced container id stay unknown and are never signalled
+ok 3 - foreign labels and a replaced container id stay unknown and are never signalled
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 5.105671
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: an unverified missing container remains unknown rather than claiming a pending start ended
+ok 4 - an unverified missing container remains unknown rather than claiming a pending start ended
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 15.538468
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a removed --rm container is settled only by its trusted owner completion receipt
+ok 5 - a removed --rm container is settled only by its trusted owner completion receipt
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 28.897791
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: after signalling a verified container, successful empty Docker listing proves --rm removed that id
+ok 6 - after signalling a verified container, successful empty Docker listing proves --rm removed that id
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 24.215826
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt publishes before awaiting stops, resume refuses pending, and only clear permits new work
+ok 7 - halt publishes before awaiting stops, resume refuses pending, and only clear permits new work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 161.569582
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a new coordinator replays a persisted halt and an unresolved start keeps clear refused
+ok 8 - a new coordinator replays a persisted halt and an unresolved start keeps clear refused
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 1102.680874
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a new halt generation never inherits a previous quiescent status before its sweep
+ok 9 - a new halt generation never inherits a previous quiescent status before its sweep
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 4.450121
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt aborts an active local request and prevents a subsequent effect after halt/resume
+ok 10 - halt aborts an active local request and prevents a subsequent effect after halt/resume
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 35.831508
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: processing scopes isolate roots and cancel only the registered child group
+ok 11 - processing scopes isolate roots and cancel only the registered child group
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 59.946603
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halted scopes never invoke their body and unscoped human work has no processing context
+ok 12 - halted scopes never invoke their body and unscoped human work has no processing context
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 3.067699
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: host git is stopped promptly by the active scope rather than waiting for its long deadline
+ok 13 - host git is stopped promptly by the active scope rather than waiting for its long deadline
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 151.711241
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a child leader exiting does not erase an unverified surviving group receipt
+ok 14 - a child leader exiting does not erase an unverified surviving group receipt
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 117.914283
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: the actual nested read-only control mount refuses unlink, replacement and parent removal
+ok 15 - the actual nested read-only control mount refuses unlink, replacement and parent removal
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 14.941666
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: the image entrypoint refuses halted and stale generations using the shared reader
+ok 16 - the image entrypoint refuses halted and stale generations using the shared reader
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 89.020485
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt terminates a tracked stand-in and leaves honest write-once stop evidence
+ok 17 - halt terminates a tracked stand-in and leaves honest write-once stop evidence
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 95.55672
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a TERM-resistant workload is killed after the bounded wait
+ok 18 - a TERM-resistant workload is killed after the bounded wait
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 146.00258
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: wrong start ticks or boot identity cannot signal a live replacement
+ok 19 - wrong start ticks or boot identity cannot signal a live replacement
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 65.844444
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a pending start cannot be reported quiescent and a second root is never signalled
+ok 20 - a pending start cannot be reported quiescent and a second root is never signalled
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 93.749051
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: escalation still kills the tracked group after its leader exits
+ok 21 - escalation still kills the tracked group after its leader exits
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 192.463864
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: session TERM targets its verified runner before forcing the outer namespace
+ok 22 - session TERM targets its verified runner before forcing the outer namespace
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 100.923976
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: new runtime and stop directories sync their containing directories
+ok 23 - new runtime and stop directories sync their containing directories
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 42.560646
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a vanished group leader with unverified surviving members stays unknown, never quiescent
+ok 24 - a vanished group leader with unverified surviving members stays unknown, never quiescent
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 130.848284
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: persisted member identity anchors a group after the leader exited before the sweep
+ok 25 - persisted member identity anchors a group after the leader exited before the sweep
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 124.574935
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: an unconfirmed secondary brake does not leave a verified workload running or claim success
+ok 26 - an unconfirmed secondary brake does not leave a verified workload running or claim success
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 75.057063
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt persists across readers and resume needs the current generation
+ok 27 - halt persists across readers and resume needs the current generation
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 9.437871
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: first initialization is explicit; missing state after control exists fails closed and halt repairs it
+ok 28 - first initialization is explicit; missing state after control exists fails closed and halt repairs it
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 5.039685
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses invalid JSON instead of enabling work
+ok 29 - refuses invalid JSON instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 1.867281
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses unknown keys instead of enabling work
+ok 30 - refuses unknown keys instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.65956
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses bad timestamp instead of enabling work
+ok 31 - refuses bad timestamp instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.144084
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses nonboolean state instead of enabling work
+ok 32 - refuses nonboolean state instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.039112
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses bad generation instead of enabling work
+ok 33 - refuses bad generation instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.085806
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses loose mode instead of enabling work
+ok 34 - refuses loose mode instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.34307
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: refuses oversized file instead of enabling work
+ok 35 - refuses oversized file instead of enabling work
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 2.916273
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a symlink leaf never follows its target; human halt replaces only the leaf
+ok 36 - a symlink leaf never follows its target; human halt replaces only the leaf
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 4.530858
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: unsafe parent and interrupted initialization never get repaired as off
+ok 37 - unsafe parent and interrupted initialization never get repaired as off
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 0.385291
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: repeated halt is a no-op and a different root keeps running
+ok 38 - repeated halt is a no-op and a different root keeps running
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 7.00566
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: transition rejects nonstring identity before publishing state
+ok 39 - transition rejects nonstring identity before publishing state
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 3.121939
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: bootstrap syncs the containing root as well as the state and control directory
+ok 40 - bootstrap syncs the containing root as well as the state and control directory
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 36.144072
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: state ownership and bounded read guards refuse before trusting a document
+ok 41 - state ownership and bounded read guards refuse before trusting a document
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 101.892703
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: canonical root aliases address one switch and never create independent control state
+ok 42 - canonical root aliases address one switch and never create independent control state
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 4.179236
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
+ok 43 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 38.851257
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
+ok 44 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 27.976805
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
+ok 45 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 15.642865
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
+ok 46 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 32.602087
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+ok 47 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 31.045314
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
+ok 48 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 10.113655
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
+ok 49 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 30.224351
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
+ok 50 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 99.128156
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
+ok 51 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 22.649789
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
+ok 52 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 55.85559
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
+ok 53 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 45.6493
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
+ok 54 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 8.507771
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
+ok 55 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 6.500324
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: task halt keeps the true Docker exit status, writes kill-switch once and leaves snapshots unchanged
+ok 56 - task halt keeps the true Docker exit status, writes kill-switch once and leaves snapshots unchanged
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 201.141886
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt refuses direct task launch before Docker or a run record; clear allows a fresh normal result
+ok 57 - halt refuses direct task launch before Docker or a run record; clear allows a fresh normal result
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 167.652567
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt refuses hello.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+ok 58 - halt refuses hello.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 122.654442
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt refuses verify.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+ok 59 - halt refuses verify.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 122.064969
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt refuses agent.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+ok 60 - halt refuses agent.sh before Docker, credentials or release alignment
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 120.632718
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (task)
+ok 61 - a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (task)
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 93.3117
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (container-cli)
+ok 62 - a nonzero Docker client exit retains its unresolved runtime receipt (container-cli)
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 97.234461
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+1..62
+# tests 62
+# suites 0
+# pass 62
+# fail 0
+# cancelled 0
+# skipped 0
+# todo 0
+# duration_ms 1323.026518
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+TAP version 13
+# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+not ok 1 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 53.588908
+  type: 'test'
+  location: '/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:64:1'
+  failureType: 'testCodeFailure'
+  error: |-
+    Expected values to be strictly equal:
+    
+    'unknown' !== 'alive'
+    
+  code: 'ERR_ASSERTION'
+  name: 'AssertionError'
+  expected: 'alive'
+  actual: 'unknown'
+  operator: 'strictEqual'
+  stack: |-
+    TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:72:10)
+    async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
+    async startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:3)
+  ...
+1..1
+# tests 1
+# suites 0
+# pass 0
+# fail 1
+# cancelled 0
+# skipped 0
+# todo 0
+# duration_ms 100.649138
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+TAP version 13
+# Subtest: unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
+ok 1 - unbound run stops by verified registry identity, fixed 5s grace and 2s observe policy
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 36.122553
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
+ok 2 - same run joins the identical promise and completed repeats preserve owner and send no signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 24.270208
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
+ok 3 - identity changed before TERM or between TERM and KILL refuses the changed signal
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 13.289288
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
+ok 4 - failed signal delivery observes alive, records no invented signals and never restarts escalation
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 27.743499
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+ok 5 - a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 26.252224
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
+ok 6 - missing run and another business never borrow a pid or signal
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 9.103416
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
+ok 7 - halt joins an in-progress fire without another TERM or deadline and links its first receipt
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 25.918671
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
+ok 8 - a separate host joins durable first ownership without duplicate signals
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 99.095272
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
+ok 9 - corrupt and symlinked final receipts refuse as unknown rather than signalling again
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 23.700708
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
+ok 10 - a later exit gets separate halt evidence while the original alive result stays immutable
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 55.938599
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
+ok 11 - root aliases join but a different root never shares the run stop
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 42.386018
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
+ok 12 - a changed runtime record cannot replace the original stop identity after TERM
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 7.168469
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+# Subtest: identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
+ok 13 - identity is rechecked at actual signal delivery, not just at the loop observation
+  ---
+  duration_ms: 6.715559
+  type: 'test'
+  ...
+1..13
+# tests 13
+# suites 0
+# pass 13
+# fail 0
+# cancelled 0
+# skipped 0
+# todo 0
+# duration_ms 445.396108
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"id":"M1","file":"packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs","old":"  for (;;) {\n    try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","new":"  while (now() <= deadline) {\n    try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","test":"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs","pattern":"a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals","required":"named assertion kill, never syntax or timeout"}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+6d33d35302499d66036145976f8f777a4c438c6b3f5c7b613fcfa5651c49faab  BUILD.md
+8521af77deed1d3b2c722f30b776159eb373df407a2a698ee116ef4174125f01  base.txt
+74efdcea480e6c089f586b7330591b66164a3aa338fb1e1a60b74f6b7b9f3b0a  build.patch
+312ed511d8f1cff826ee2fd547de8368923130c7bfe06236d8e29d8655b80aaa  candidate-manifest.sha256
+960c366a732e4dc20133bf490d842cc42a345fefad1432ca6eba6dbd0058f337  candidate.txt
+3099049a5acd051207fb5631b7bb6362dd84c246191009a44eca1ba696d27d73  changed-paths.txt
+960c366a732e4dc20133bf490d842cc42a345fefad1432ca6eba6dbd0058f337  commit.txt
+98a4da4e1c62f7e4ed5f50adc16cf99462a5e012e9736e658441e8eda3db894c  logs/M1.log
+7f878c13be43640f501b72d36e8d9e0c8d844bc5451f969154cd75d8fab0ee42  logs/processing-control-whole.log
+62f83e511ad860d0f7da42d87e063eb691a95f29a0806b88784912374d2e7c47  logs/regression-red.log
+4de8028674472cc75f61dc78cac624c336c8db785580a189e0b705584f80d636  logs/stop-run-whole.log
+7669ce9f04189f659dbc23dae6b635d5ffac354e03d00fbae10e6fadc7e98791  mutant-plan.json
+84f1080a9689374f7000197119074e53b459641cd709745f95eb0ebe37b5ef2f  reader-search.txt
+dd6b2ea95782154e1c9839bae7a6d76a60566762a2374901ae64b22f9a7f54f7  results.json
+b9408890f30a72451d9171d8ceec40eb4f4f671811b30ba74f50f178e0eb8350  run-step.py
+b8140e3919a5d342eb92c1cd34b13bbb62d6419c6a5a01a9cb4870e9a94c64ed  scan-result.json
+9e5c2e8cd2b59ac4559b0d67348a2a98e59b44a71eec7359018ea7a84d7a4082  skips.txt
+43d77fe5bffa916f444a77bacda5b4ddbe78035b6ca7631378056c3158aa3253  source-scope-check.json
+37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570  sweep.json
+74b3eae937fdcc92cf2b0dd15fb67f4f6addd4a046f74e934febc565e4b5d2ed  tmpdir.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+packages/processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs:9:const api = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs').catch(e => { if (e.code === 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND') return {}; throw e; });
+packages/processing-control/tests/runtimes.test.mjs:139:    new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href, new URL('../src/state.mjs', import.meta.url).href, root], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+packages/processing-control/tests/effects.test.mjs:60:  const { listRuntimes } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
+packages/processing-control/tests/coordinator.test.mjs:9:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, processIdentity, unregisterRuntime } from '../src/runtimes.mjs';
+packages/processing-control/tests/containers.test.mjs:62:  const { updateRuntime } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
+packages/processing-control/tests/task.test.mjs:12:  const runtimes = new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href;
+packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:7:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, runtime, stopRun, sweepRuntimes, readStops } from '../src/runtimes.mjs';
+packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:104:  const f = setup(t), source = new URL('../src/runtimes.mjs', import.meta.url).href;
+packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs:148:  const { processIdentity } = await import('../src/runtimes.mjs');
+packages/bus/tests/processing-runtime.test.mjs:10:import { registerRuntime, updateRuntime, processIdentity } from '../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs';
+packages/discord/tests/processing-stop.test.mjs:35:  const { registerRuntime, updateRuntime } = await import('../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs');
+packages/discord/tests/processing.test.mjs:68:  const { listRuntimes, sweepRuntimes, processIdentity } = await import('../../processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs');
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+[
+  {
+    "step": "regression-red",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T05:56:03Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T05:56:03Z",
+    "exit": 1,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "failing": [
+      "a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals"
+    ],
+    "log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/regression-red.log"
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "stop-run-whole",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
+    "exit": 0,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 13,
+      "pass": 13,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "failing": [],
+    "log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/stop-run-whole.log"
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "processing-control-whole",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T05:57:47Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T05:57:49Z",
+    "exit": 0,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 62,
+      "pass": 62,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "failing": [],
+    "log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/processing-control-whole.log"
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M1",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T05:58:03Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T05:58:03Z",
+    "exit": 1,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "failing": [
+      "a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals"
+    ],
+    "log": "/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279/agents/rocko/work/queue-279/logs/M1.log"
+  }
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+import subprocess,signal,os,json,time,sys,re
+root=Path('/mnt/storage/scratch/rocko-r279');p=root/'agents/rocko/work/queue-279';logs=p/'logs';logs.mkdir(exist_ok=True);name=sys.argv[1];command=sys.argv[2:]
+start=time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ',time.gmtime());log=logs/(name+'.log')
+with log.open('w') as out:
+ child=subprocess.Popen(command,cwd=root,env=os.environ,stdout=out,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,start_new_session=True)
+ try:rc=child.wait(timeout=120)
+ except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+  os.killpg(child.pid,signal.SIGKILL);child.wait();rc=124
+text=log.read_text();counts={k:int(v) for k,v in re.findall(r'^# (tests|pass|fail|skipped) (\d+)\s*$',text,re.M)};failing=re.findall(r'^not ok \d+ - (.*)$',text,re.M)
+row=dict(step=name,start=start,end=time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ',time.gmtime()),exit=rc,counts=counts,failing=failing,log=str(log));result=p/'results.json';rows=json.loads(result.read_text()) if result.exists() else [];rows.append(row);result.write_text(json.dumps(rows,indent=2)+'\n');print(json.dumps(row));print(text[-3200:])
+if name in ['regression-red','M1']:
+ ok=rc==1 and failing==['a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals'] and "actual: 'unknown'" in text and "expected: 'alive'" in text
+ print('EXPECTED_UNKNOWN_VS_ALIVE',ok);raise SystemExit(0 if ok else 1)
+raise SystemExit(rc)
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "secret_matches": [],
+  "binary_files": []
+}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+None. All four TAP records report skipped 0.
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+  "base": "f40f2e770e0d8be394f1ef53b404045fd6a49c0e",
+  "only_product_change": "while (now() <= deadline) -> for (;;)",
+  "other_product_bytes_unchanged": true,
+  "trailing_unknown_fallback": "unchanged; unreachable"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gwxq
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+# Slim packet and full-evidence location
+
+This packet keeps the build note, candidate manifest and patch, summaries,
+per-run counts/durations/exit statuses, mutant definitions and cleanup
+records. Raw TAP logs, per-attempt config/log trees, diagnostic byte dumps,
+runner scripts and transient TMPDIR notes remain only in the full packet.
+References below to those files resolve at the full evidence commit.
+
+Full evidence is retained permanently at commit
+`d6c924764d387ea320365c4bb160b4b57ed8d635` on
+`origin/rocko/row280-da5d-20261022`, under
+`agents/rocko/work/queue-280/`. Its 3,531-entry inventory SHA256 is
+`7d155092cb6edb547dbb7c8ba2fbabb1dd74f966c5c20965ef4fe6af2e7121b8`.
+The full branch is retained; this slim packet does not replace its evidence.
+The inventory in this directory describes only this slim packet.
+
+Sage-2541 requested this doc-only follow-up on b765f5cb8 after the green
+owner gate: bus 656/0/0, grant-executor 41/0/0, host-run 26/0/0 (#1785 c30431).
+No source or test byte changes and no additional test run.
+
+## Portability limit and carry notes
+
+Duckworth N2: M2's demonstrated kill holds only while the host's ephemeral
+range has lo <= 32768 <= hi. On another range, the picker test still checks
+the outside-range property, but the old-picker mutant may not be killed by
+a fixed sample. The evidence here applies to this host's 32768-60999 range.
+
+For the next row touching scratch-sshd.mjs, carry these non-blocking notes:
+- N3: add one helper comment line naming MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE.
+- N4: remove the double blank lines in both owning test files.
+
+These are follow-ups, not changes to the tested candidate in this packet.
+
+---
+
+# Row 280: scratch sshd owns its port
+
+Design before code; Sage assignment sage-2530, mos-1270. Base
+`da5d3651d75bff113b27d91abefc824c077dabbe`. Claim rev 3148,
+`rocko-280-start-r1`. Reviewer Duckworth; gate owner Sage.
+
+## Proposed change
+
+Both helpers currently return on `listening(port)` alone
+(grant-executor.test.mjs:86 and host-run.test.mjs:91). A foreign listener
+can satisfy that probe while our daemon fails its bind. Move only their
+common launch/retry/readiness loop and port selection into a shared test
+helper, `packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs`; retain their distinct key,
+authorized-key and command-stub setup in their existing files.
+
+For each of the existing five attempts, write a fresh, attempt-specific
+sshd log, start the child, and accept only after all three checks hold:
+a successful loopback connect, the exact `Server listening on 127.0.0.1
+port N.` line from this attempt's log, and the child's exitCode/signalCode
+still null after the asynchronous connect. No previous attempt's log can
+prove a later attempt. Early exit or failed bind advances to a fresh pick;
+kill and await an unsuccessful child before retry. Exhaustion keeps the
+existing `scratch sshd did not start` error, never a skip. Register cleanup
+for the successful child as well.
+
+Read and validate `/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`. Select uniformly
+from eligible ports 1024 through 65535 outside the inclusive range, refusing
+invalid input or an empty eligible set. No fixed 32768 assumption. Expose a
+first-attempt port override only to the regression, then use the normal picker.
+
+In each owning file, a regression opens a plain TCP listener, supplies that
+occupied port for attempt one, and asserts the helper rejects it and returns
+a different port. The helper's log/liveness proof still governs that returned
+port. Register TCP listener cleanup before awaiting startup.
+Add a deterministic picker assertion using injected random samples spanning
+[0,1); every selected port must be unprivileged and outside the actual proc
+range. M2 restores the old picker. If the actual host range makes M2 escape
+this assertion, record it and ask Duckworth to adjudicate as the brief allows.
+
+## X5 closure
+
+DEFERRED.md:311-321 binds the `sleep 30` after the grant in G22/X5.
+Use the fixture's existing fake-command PATH: a `sleep` stub delegates every
+other argument to /usr/bin/sleep, but for 30 waits in short intervals only
+while its scratch directory exists. The existing `sleep 30` argv, grant,
+sudo-log assertion and revoke assertions stay unchanged. Remote cleanup no
+longer leaves a 30-second child after the fixture directory is removed.
+Append a closing line to the DEFERRED entry; do not rewrite its history.
+
+## Evidence and slot request plan
+
+No run before Sage CLEAR. First run the new occupied-port regressions red
+against the old acceptance, then green after the helper change. Run both
+whole files, M1 (old connect-only acceptance) and M2 (old random picker),
+with each killing test named. Do not classify a timeout or syntax error as
+an assertion kill. Save process-group timeout output and restore hashes.
+
+After the whole-file durations are known, refine the repeat estimate.
+Provisional estimate: allow 60-90 minutes for both 30-run whole-file repeats
+under continuous CLI-suite load, with per-run counts and elapsed time saved.
+The load and repeats are intentional concurrency within one granted slot;
+all other commands stay sequential. Both files must complete all 30 without
+timeout, and the CLI load must remain green. Any unexpected red stops for
+Sage/Mos. Use a fresh short scratch TMPDIR, dead Docker socket, no live
+configuration, no Docker or browser, and kill owned process groups on timeout.
+Sweep owned node and sshd/stub processes and restore candidate hashes before
+returning the slot. Sage runs the whole bus suite in the owner gate.
+
+Owned paths: the two existing test files, the shared test helper,
+`docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, and this packet. No product change, no live action.
+
+## Phase 1 runner setup correction
+
+The initial red-grant invocation at 07:22:02Z ran no test: packet runner
+parents[5] selected the scratch parent instead of the worktree. The invalid
+record and log stay unchanged. Sage-2534 approved parents[4], a git-root
+and test-file existence preflight, and a fresh CLEAR. No source or test
+byte changed for this correction; it is not a test red.
+
+## Accepted design conditions and first test stop
+
+Sage-2533 and duckworth-0120 approved the design. C1 samples are
+[0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]; M2 uses rand(), never Math.random().
+C2 checks attempt-zero's config names the occupied port and its log has no
+listening proof for that port. C3's 30/60-second stub delegates other
+arguments to absolute /usr/bin/sleep, so hold-add/remove's 0.05 sleeps do
+not recurse. The same stub covers host-run's remote long sleeps (N1).
+Attempt logs are sshd-N.log; exhaustion names the final log (N2).
+
+After sage-2534's runner correction, both old-acceptance regression runs
+failed exactly on returned port equaling the occupied listener port.
+The first green regression then failed: no accepted sshd after five
+attempts (07:22:56Z–07:23:09Z, 12.193 s), while the picker assertion passed.
+The exact log comparison may be rejecting line framing, but this is only a
+hypothesis: fixture cleanup removed the raw attempt logs. Stopped without
+retry and requested diagnostic CLEAR to capture the logs before cleanup.
+No later whole-file run or mutant was executed. Slot returned 07:23:34Z;
+own cwd node/sshd sweep is empty. This evidence is not a passing gate.
+
+## Confirmed log framing and correction
+
+Sage-2535 granted a diagnostic rerun and the conditional CR-only correction.
+The saved diagnostic TAP and diagnostic-bytes.json prove the occupied-port
+bind refusal, then four listening lines with trailing hex 0d before newline.
+Only the comparison changed: the exact expected line, optionally followed
+by one CR, is accepted. No trim or substring match is used. The temporary
+dump is removed. Both focused files pass 2/2 after this correction.
+The earlier diagnostic red is retained as build evidence, not hidden.
+
+## Phase 1 complete
+
+Whole grant-executor: 41/41 in 20.673 s; whole host-run: 26/26 in
+14.367 s. Focused regressions: 2/2 in each file. No skips or timeouts.
+M1 and M2 are each assertion-killed by the named regression in both files
+(4/4 executions, two distinct mutant sites). M2 deterministically hits
+32768 at injected sample 0.6384. Source restored. Post-run pgrep finds no
+process naming the fixture TMPDIR; cwd node/sshd sweep is empty, proving
+the long-sleep stub cleanup requested in C3. Logs retain the prior invalid
+runner invocation and the diagnosed CRLF build failure separately.
+
+## Repeat preparation (sage-2536)
+
+Before the repeat commit, the shared helper adds optional fixture evidence
+output via MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE. It saves each attempted config/log before
+accepting or abandoning that attempt, so test cleanup cannot erase the
+startup evidence. The repeat runner assigns a packet directory per run.
+No acceptance, picker, stub or existing assertion changes for this capture.
+The repeated full files verify this final committed helper.
+
+Repeat source commit: b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be. Four-path manifest SHA256: 27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5.
+All four blobs are rechecked before and after each run. No candidate
+bytes may change after this point.
+
+## Final committed-byte evidence
+
+Sage-2536 granted the repeat on committed bytes, with no changes carried
+through the run. Source commit b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be;
+manifest 27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5.
+Repeat window: 2026-10-22T07:29:03Z to 07:48:38Z. Both whole files ran
+sequentially under continuous CLI-suite load, with full output, exit status,
+counts and durations retained per run in repeat-results.json/repeat-logs/.
+Each run checks HEAD and all four hashes before and after. The load is the
+actual complete CLI glob, not a substitute stress loop. Sage received the
+required 15-minute report at 07:44:01Z.
+
+| Repeat file | Whole runs | Pass | Fail | Skip | Timeout |
+| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
+| grant-executor.test.mjs | 30 | 1230 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| host-run.test.mjs | 30 | 780 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| CLI load, two whole cycles | 2 | 1588 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+
+Repeat assertions total 2010/2010; load assertions 1588/1588. The in-progress
+second CLI load was allowed to finish whole before stopping. No skips.
+Each repeat has a 180 s process-group timeout; each load a 900 s timeout.
+Neither bound fired. Attempt config/log evidence was saved before cleanup
+under attempt-logs/<run>/<fixture>/; these are generated fixture paths only.
+
+grant-executor: seconds min 20.611, median 20.811, max 26.419.
+
+host-run: seconds min 14.207, median 14.408, max 14.609.
+
+cli-load: seconds min 587.109, median 587.409, max 587.709.
+
+Sage-2537 granted final M1/M2 replays after the complete CLI load exited,
+because the optional attempt-log capture was added before the repeat commit.
+07:48:56Z–07:48:57Z: four focused executions, all assertion kills:
+
+| Mutant | Named killer, in both owning files | Result |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| M1: connect-only acceptance | row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd | Both fail returned-port inequality |
+| M2: 20000 + Math.floor(rand() * 20000) | row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range | Both fail at sample 0.6384, port 32768 |
+
+No timeout or syntax failure is counted as a kill. Phase-1 runner, table and
+logs remain separately recorded; final replays use the exact b765 helper.
+Restored-hashes.json records 4/4 with no drift. Final-sweep.json records no
+node, chromium or sshd under owned cwd paths and no process naming either
+owned TMPDIR. This also supplies C3's post-test long-sleep cleanup evidence.
+Slot returned at 07:49:17Z. No source byte changed during the repeat; the
+final mutations were restored under sage-2537. No live file, unit or config
+was touched. The whole bus suite remains Sage's owner gate.
+
+Existing assertions/refusals remain unchanged (289 grant lines, 125 host
+lines); assertion-preservation.json records the static check. The reader
+search found only the intended shared-helper imports and no outside reader
+of either owning file. Duckworth also confirmed no owning-file hash pin.
+The two extra blank-line pairs are acknowledged style nits, left unchanged
+after the committed repeat (sage-2537).
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs": {
+    "existing_assertion_refusal_lines": 289,
+    "all_preserved": true
+  },
+  "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs": {
+    "existing_assertion_refusal_lines": 125,
+    "all_preserved": true
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+da5d3651d75bff113b27d91abefc824c077dabbe
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+diff --git a/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md b/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
+index 197a29ecb..7945a6829 100644
+--- a/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
+++ b/docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
+@@ -319,6 +319,10 @@ at every gate. Started 2026-09-12 during the control board MVP.
+   waits 30 s before it calls a lone `sleep 30` a leak. The row 197
+   lanes scan only at lane end, about 15 minutes after pkg-bus, so they
+   can't see it (mos-1169). (2026-10-21)
+  Closing note, row 280 (2026-10-22): both scratch sshd fixtures install a
+  bounded 30/60-second sleep stub that exits when its test directory is gone;
+  other sleep arguments exec /usr/bin/sleep unchanged. Evidence is recorded
+  in agents/rocko/work/queue-280/BUILD.md.
+ 
+ - **Row 66 live checks: the unslop notice on a live managed session, both harnesses.**
+   (mos-1186, Vikunja #454.) Row 66's gate asked for one landing session per
+diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+index 1992f1525..b27d91dc4 100644
+--- a/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
+ // reaches another host.
+ import test from 'node:test';
+ import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+-import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+-import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+ import { appendFileSync, chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+ import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
+ import { join } from 'node:path';
+@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostExecutor, runHost } from '../src/host-run.mjs';
+ import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
+ import { grantDecision, hostRecord } from './host-fixtures.mjs';
+ 
+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
+ const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
+ const USER = userInfo().username;
+ const AT = '2026-10-21T00:00:00.000Z';
+@@ -35,12 +37,7 @@ const DEFINITIONS = {
+   pm: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [] },
+   ops: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [{ service: 'host' }] },
+ };
+-const listening = (port) =>
+-  new Promise((resolve) => {
+-    const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
+-    s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
+-    s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
+-  });
+
+ async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
+   const end = Date.now() + ms;
+   while (!fn()) {
+@@ -54,12 +51,13 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
+ // Both also stop when the test dir is gone, since a held stub on the sshd side outlives its test (#1750).
+ // wrap.sh logs every request. The sudo stub logs its arguments to sudo.log and runs the command as the
+ // test's user.
+-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
+   if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
+   keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
+   keygen(join(dir, 'installer'));
+   writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'installer.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
+   mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+  installSleepStub(dir);
+   const stub = (name, body) => writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', name), `#!/bin/sh\nD='${dir}'\n${body}\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
+   stub('list', '[ -e "$D/fail-list" ] && exit 1\n[ -e "$D/granted" ] && grep " mosaic-[0-9a-f]*$" "$D/granted"\nexit 0');
+   stub(
+@@ -76,26 +74,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
+     `#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" >> '${dir}/requests.log'\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`,
+     { mode: 0o755 },
+   );
+-  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
+-    const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
+-    writeFileSync(
+-      join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
+-      [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`,
+-        `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+-        `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
+-    );
+-    const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+-    t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
+-    const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
+-    while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
+-      if (await listening(port)) return port;
+-      await sleep(30);
+-    }
+-    daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
+-  }
+-  throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+  return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+    'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+    `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+    'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+    `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+  ], options);
+ }
+ 
+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+  });
+  t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+  const occupied = server.address().port;
+  const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+  assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+  assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+  assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+    readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+  for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+    const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+    assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+    assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+  }
+});
+
+ async function setup(t, opts = {}) {
+   const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'g235x-'));
+   t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+index 6f5949b5c..f7eebd45e 100644
+--- a/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ import test from 'node:test';
+ import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+ import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+-import { connect, createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+ import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+ import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
+ import { join } from 'node:path';
+@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostGrant } from '../src/host-grant.mjs';
+ import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
+ import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
+ 
+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
+ const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
+ const REPO = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url));
+ const USER = userInfo().username;
+@@ -50,22 +52,18 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 5000) {
+   }
+   return true;
+ }
+-const listening = (port) =>
+-  new Promise((resolve) => {
+-    const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
+-    s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
+-    s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
+-  });
+
+ 
+ // A scratch sshd. ForceCommand puts the fake sudo first on PATH and hands the command to /bin/sh, so
+ // the remote side parses the command line the way a real host's POSIX shell does.
+-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
+   if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
+   keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
+   keygen(join(dir, 'otherhost'));
+   keygen(join(dir, 'user'));
+   writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'user.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
+   mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+  installSleepStub(dir);
+   writeFileSync(
+     join(dir, 'fake', 'sudo'),
+     `#!/bin/sh\n'${process.execPath}' -e 'require("fs").appendFileSync(process.argv[1], JSON.stringify(process.argv.slice(2)) + "\\n")' '${dir}/argv.json' "$@"\nshift 2\nexec "$@"\n`,
+@@ -75,26 +73,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
+   writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', 'fail255'), '#!/bin/sh\necho "Host key verification failed." >&2\nexit 255\n', { mode: 0o755 });
+   writeFileSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), `#!/bin/sh\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`);
+   chmodSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), 0o755);
+-  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
+-    const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
+-    writeFileSync(
+-      join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
+-      [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`,
+-        `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+-        `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
+-    );
+-    const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+-    t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
+-    const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
+-    while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
+-      if (await listening(port)) return port;
+-      await sleep(30);
+-    }
+-    daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
+-  }
+-  throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+  return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+    'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+    `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+    'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+    `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+  ], options);
+ }
+ 
+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+  });
+  t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+  const occupied = server.address().port;
+  const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+  assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+  assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+  assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+    readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+  for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+    const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+    assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+    assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+  }
+});
+
+ const GRANT = [['true'], ['false'], ['echo'], ['sleep'], ['head'], ['cat'], ['systemctl', 'status']];
+ async function hostFixture(t, { commands = GRANT, reviewerHosts, wrongHostKey = false, coderWeb2 = false } = {}) {
+   const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'h210-'));
+diff --git a/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs b/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..2dde26de3
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
+@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Row 280: fixture-only sshd startup. A TCP connect alone does not prove ownership.
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { basename, join } from 'node:path';
+
+export const ephemeralRange = () => {
+  const text = readFileSync('/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range', 'utf8').trim();
+  if (!/^\d+\s+\d+$/.test(text)) throw Error('invalid ephemeral port range');
+  const range = text.split(/\s+/).map(Number);
+  if (range[0] < 1 || range[1] > 65535 || range[0] > range[1]) throw Error('invalid ephemeral port range');
+  return range;
+};
+
+export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {
+  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+  const below = Math.max(0, Math.min(lo, 65536) - 1024);
+  const above = Math.max(0, 65535 - Math.max(hi, 1023));
+  const sample = rand();
+  if (!below && !above) throw Error('no scratch sshd port available');
+  if (!(sample >= 0 && sample < 1)) throw Error('invalid random sample');
+  const offset = Math.floor(sample * (below + above));
+  return offset < below ? 1024 + offset : Math.max(hi + 1, 1024) + offset - below;
+}
+
+const sleep = ms => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+const listening = port => new Promise(resolve => {
+  const socket = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
+  const done = result => { socket.destroy(); resolve(result); };
+  socket.setTimeout(200, () => done(false));
+  socket.on('connect', () => done(true));
+  socket.on('error', () => done(false));
+});
+const stop = async daemon => {
+  if (daemon.pid === undefined || daemon.exitCode !== null || daemon.signalCode !== null) return;
+  const exited = once(daemon, 'exit');
+  daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
+  await exited;
+};
+
+export async function startScratchSshd(t, dir, config, { firstPort } = {}) {
+  let lastLog;
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
+    const port = attempt === 0 && firstPort !== undefined ? firstPort : pickPort();
+    const configFile = join(dir, `sshd-${attempt}.conf`);
+    lastLog = join(dir, `sshd-${attempt}.log`);
+    writeFileSync(configFile, [`Port ${port}`, ...config, ''].join('\n'));
+    writeFileSync(lastLog, '');
+    const daemon = spawn('/usr/bin/sshd', ['-D', '-f', configFile, '-E', lastLog], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+    t.after(() => stop(daemon));
+    const saveLog = () => {
+      if (!process.env.MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE) return;
+      const evidence = join(process.env.MOSAIC_SSHD_EVIDENCE, basename(dir));
+      mkdirSync(evidence, { recursive: true });
+      writeFileSync(join(evidence, basename(lastLog)), readFileSync(lastLog));
+      writeFileSync(join(evidence, basename(configFile)), readFileSync(configFile));
+    };
+    let spawnError;
+    daemon.on('error', error => { spawnError = error; });
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
+    while (Date.now() < deadline && !spawnError && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null) {
+      if (await listening(port) && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null &&
+          readFileSync(lastLog, 'utf8').split('\n').some(line =>
+            (line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.` ||
+             line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.\r`))) { saveLog(); return port; }
+      await sleep(30);
+    }
+    await stop(daemon);
+    saveLog();
+  }
+  throw Error(`scratch sshd did not start: ${lastLog}`);
+}
+
+// Long remote sleeps remain in flight for their original duration, but cannot outlive the fixture.
+export function installSleepStub(dir) {
+  const script = `const fs = require("node:fs");
+const end = Date.now() + Number(process.argv[2]) * 1000;
+const timer = setInterval(() => {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(process.argv[1]) || Date.now() >= end) { clearInterval(timer); }
+}, 50);`;
+  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', 'sleep'), `#!/bin/sh
+case "$#:$1" in
+  1:30|1:60) exec '${process.execPath}' -e '${script}' '${dir}' "$1" ;;
+  *) exec /usr/bin/sleep "$@" ;;
+esac
+`, { mode: 0o755 });
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+1cb0971e745745e3db329c7c75f36197664d7bf0687def33c0819134f121975f  packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+140ec358fff212b747412691e3cb5952844c13c7fe43d3ff1013d24f0df886d2  packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+3b647e59f09e7fc43b41d072e46c3cea5ed7641d5d4a95c5b39c240f73cdb75e  packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
+94c21723cd42f551bbd6249d5133cbfaa12ac25efef5a72bf525998ac3c52100  docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
+docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "cwd_processes": [],
+  "pgrep_checks": [
+    {
+      "tmpdir": "/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gInD",
+      "exit": 1,
+      "matches": []
+    },
+    {
+      "tmpdir": "/mnt/storage/scratch/tmp/gVtU",
+      "exit": 1,
+      "matches": []
+    }
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "helper_sha256": "3b647e59f09e7fc43b41d072e46c3cea5ed7641d5d4a95c5b39c240f73cdb75e",
+  "restored": true
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[
+  {
+    "id": "M1",
+    "old": "      if (await listening(port) && daemon.exitCode === null && daemon.signalCode === null &&\n          readFileSync(lastLog, 'utf8').split('\\n').some(line =>\n            (line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.` ||\n             line === `Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.\\r`))) { saveLog(); return port; }",
+    "new": "      if (await listening(port)) return port;",
+    "pattern": "row 280: an occupied TCP port"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "M2",
+    "old": "export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {\n  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();\n  const below = Math.max(0, Math.min(lo, 65536) - 1024);\n  const above = Math.max(0, 65535 - Math.max(hi, 1023));\n  const sample = rand();\n  if (!below && !above) throw Error('no scratch sshd port available');\n  if (!(sample >= 0 && sample < 1)) throw Error('invalid random sample');\n  const offset = Math.floor(sample * (below + above));\n  return offset < below ? 1024 + offset : Math.max(hi + 1, 1024) + offset - below;\n}\n",
+    "new": "export function pickPort(rand = Math.random) {\n  return 20000 + Math.floor(rand() * 20000);\n}\n",
+    "pattern": "row 280: every injected picker sample"
+  }
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+d5d82d7cb679332e7d90ed26220cd7d3170931d2e8aa2ccdfc35ceea12147c11  BUILD.md
+0e8f1e76f8c13d7de5cbea1ae8b8c2f178ca5aa0283ac0dbd00bffcd4c39bea5  assertion-preservation.json
+052e9e79aa3c9ba1b6f8dedc7af00440e104d308ed9451a076e872c903704c7d  base.txt
+5898d3c45b4274a9cbf117018811f2b6206987e3849e97ce171c3aaa42d314da  build.patch
+27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5  candidate-manifest.sha256
+634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08  candidate.txt
+84f2091c0eb1b55c34b4462775160b5f808a6843e68b3e4cb54e1f7a2421eaf3  changed-paths.txt
+634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08  commit.txt
+eb9f55fd5de0ec370742702f15d737fb91e35542dbda727d43502adce92903a9  final-sweep.json
+f9a578b95bd6f9e07dc231002a28ea9c3ae14fe2e269f3fbca50c4fc97ba61e0  mutant-restore.json
+72cfbf942b4437720d6b92ddef0bc138d27bd6ecef1f1da0b32a2b0250b3cd61  mutants.json
+b435b731ea4ccff12f90e1b53023cbc54bf65c08ad0f7feaf8a810088156a0b6  post-phase1-pgrep.txt
+9f8458487a1c5146230e70d40428b6fb218c93f378fd1a8e8607fab80c446b2c  reader-search.txt
+634e46d73bbcdbdea70660954fcc8290dc3d6c8d15554218d59c78feafbd0b08  repeat-commit.txt
+42e240961767b817fb5f1d183bc949074b3b90c72335d65c3e0278a3db4294ea  repeat-results.json
+e26b6ecefd1a6db69fbaaa38c4f08abe0ad69035ecaa8e2e29f5da2961e5da15  repeat-summary.json
+3e1903ee103b0a9ef8febeb4d2073848aca0e42fd4ecd1c586381f2ab7404be2  restored-hashes.json
+f38eaa23861b8acb1738ed082f25a0e6661d976b87da140993373de41bc4053d  results.json
+76c5c03767ca34bc38a7f69c14fbf1c06e8ebcc93120bc577a44e2271f6fdb16  scan-result.json
+e7f560ce5fc957432ddcad231897a5decd33be06f1201926adabb62d3c218c83  skips.txt
+37517e5f3dc66819f61f5a7bb8ace1921282415f10551d2defa5c3eb0985b570  sweep-phase1.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+No process names the owned fixture TMPDIR.
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+Search: packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs
+(none)
+
+Search: grant-executor.test.mjs
+(none)
+
+Search: packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs
+(none)
+
+Search: host-run.test.mjs
+(none)
+
+Search: packages/bus/tests/scratch-sshd.mjs
+(none)
+
+Search: scratch-sshd.mjs
+packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs:22:import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs:22:import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
+Search: docs/plans/DEFERRED.md
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/genesis-render.md:35:| 30 | Open gaps from the MVP work | unassigned | — | parked | — | Jason reopens (jason) | `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md` § Open | Fixed only when a gate needs them |
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:25:Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
+
+Search: DEFERRED.md
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/genesis-render.md:35:| 30 | Open gaps from the MVP work | unassigned | — | parked | — | Jason reopens (jason) | `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md` § Open | Fixed only when a gate needs them |
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:25:Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:83:| Open gaps from the MVP work | Fixed only when a gate needs them | DEFERRED.md, "Open" |
+packages/queue/tests/fixtures/queue-marked.md:92:- 2026-09-13 — created; rows 1 to 8 taken from CURRENT.md, DEFERRED.md and the plan page.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "head": "b765f5cb812e60789e4129ed2ab8009f5439a5be",
+  "manifest_sha256": "27806c0579c76d0999d2e6be4180c3867570df0268af9d7e0d7b971af799e6f5",
+  "start": "2026-10-22T07:29:03Z",
+  "end": "2026-10-22T07:48:38Z",
+  "failed": false,
+  "repeat_runs": 60,
+  "load_runs": 2,
+  "counts": {
+    "repeat": {
+      "tests": 2010,
+      "pass": 2010,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "skipped": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0
+    },
+    "cli-load": {
+      "tests": 1588,
+      "pass": 1588,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "skipped": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0
+    }
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "paths": 4,
+  "drift": []
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+[
+  {
+    "step": "red-grant",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:22:02Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:22:02Z",
+    "seconds": 0.029,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {},
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "red-grant-actual",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:22:42Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
+    "seconds": 0.111,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "red-host-actual",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:22:43Z",
+    "seconds": 0.143,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "green-grant-regressions",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:22:56Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:23:09Z",
+    "seconds": 12.193,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 2,
+      "pass": 1,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280:",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "diagnostic-log-bytes",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:24:22Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:24:34Z",
+    "seconds": 12.196,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "green-grant-regressions-crlf",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
+    "seconds": 0.178,
+    "exit": 0,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 2,
+      "pass": 2,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280:",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "green-host-regressions-crlf",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
+    "seconds": 0.212,
+    "exit": 0,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 2,
+      "pass": 2,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280:",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "grant-whole",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:25:03Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:25:24Z",
+    "seconds": 20.673,
+    "exit": 0,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 41,
+      "pass": 41,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "host-whole",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:25:24Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:25:38Z",
+    "seconds": 14.367,
+    "exit": 0,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 26,
+      "pass": 26,
+      "fail": 0,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M1-grant-executor",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
+    "seconds": 0.113,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M1-host-run",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:26:25Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
+    "seconds": 0.146,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M2-grant-executor",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
+    "seconds": 0.095,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M2-host-run",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:26:26Z",
+    "seconds": 0.128,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M1-final-grant-executor",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:48:56Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "seconds": 0.12,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M1-final-host-run",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "seconds": 0.164,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: an occupied TCP port",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M2-final-grant-executor",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "seconds": 0.108,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
+      "packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "step": "M2-final-host-run",
+    "start": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "end": "2026-10-22T07:48:57Z",
+    "seconds": 0.138,
+    "exit": 1,
+    "timeout": false,
+    "counts": {
+      "tests": 1,
+      "pass": 0,
+      "fail": 1,
+      "cancelled": 0,
+      "skipped": 0
+    },
+    "command": [
+      "node",
+      "--test",
+      "--test-reporter=tap",
+      "--test-name-pattern=row 280: every injected picker sample",
+      "packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs"
+    ]
+  }
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "binary_files": [],
+  "secret_matches": []
+}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+None. All 60 repeat files and both complete CLI load cycles report skipped 0.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// Sage, 2026-10-22: row 191 (kill switch) landed, comment on P19 414 (Q174 landing comment). Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Comments only: no task edits.
+// Checks each task's title before posting. Prints no secret.
+// Usage: node comment-r191-landed.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
+if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
+if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
+const PROJECT = 19;
+const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
+const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
+const POSTS = [
+  { id: 414, title: /^MVP platform: the Given list for Cases 1 and 2/, body: [
+    "Row 191 (kill switch, stopRun) landed on refactor as 0fa7bf421 on 10-22 (recorded 04:49Z), a fast-forward on 86f95bb27. An owner can halt an instance: agent verbs that start or continue work refuse with a fixed code, reads and the human's own verbs (including the clear) still work, and running runs are stopped. Gitea #1689 is closed (comment 30360). Queue row 191 is done (rev 3120).",
+    "Rocko built it, and Dewey approved the manifest (88 paths, digest 0bcbf337, comment 30359, rev 3118). Gate on 0fa7bf421: 35 touched files whole, every package suite, the ten scripts/test-*.sh, and 77/77 mutants checked. Sage ran the runs suite 43/0/0 for Dewey's N7. Follow-ups are on Vikunja 502 (real clock, exact HTTP refusals, runtime close in finally, runner cause text).",
+    "It isn't live yet. Live is still 86f95bb27. The switch reaches dragon-lin at the next re-pin, through the window plan and Mos.",
+  ] },
+];
+const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
+async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
+  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
+  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
+  return { status: r.status, json };
+}
+const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
+const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], problems: [] };
+const save = () => {
+  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
+  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
+  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
+};
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
+  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
+}
+writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
+  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
+  rec.comments.push(e);
+  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
+  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
+  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
+  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
+  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`);
+  save();
+}
+save();
+process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
+if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// Sage, 2026-10-22: files the 10-27 owner thread-claim row (mos-1262) as a P19 task. No relation, labels, assignees,
+// due dates or bucket moves. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back. Refuses if the title exists.
+// Prints no secret.
+// Usage: node file-thread-claims.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON ROW ISSUE
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT, ROW, ISSUE] = process.argv.slice(2);
+if (!/^[0-9]+$/.test(ROW ?? "") || !/^[0-9]+$/.test(ISSUE ?? "")) throw new Error("ROW and ISSUE must be numbers");
+if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
+if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
+const PROJECT = 19;
+const SIG = "Created by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13).";
+const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+const ps = (sig, xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(sig)}</p>`;
+const TASKS = [
+  {
+    title: `The owner sees a thread agent's claims: agents lists held thread claims (row ${ROW}, #${ISSUE}, 10-27)`,
+    description: ps(SIG, [
+      "Filed by Mos's ruling mos-1262 as a 10-27 row, not post-v1. Row 205's message filter found it (morgana-0072, Sage ruling sage-2430).",
+      "A thread run's role.claim writes thread_claims only (broker.mjs:2682), and the owner's agents verb reads role_claims only (:3309). So the owner can't see a thread agent's claim, which PRD :1083-1084 and the FED R6 user sentence promise. No user thread goes live before this row lands, the same bind as the 193b1a filter. Q176 Case 1 needs it.",
+      `Queue row ${ROW}, after row 205, owner Morgana, reviewer Duckworth, gate Sage. Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-22_owner-thread-claims.md. If it can't make 10-27, that's a scope question for Jason, and it goes to Mos first.`,
+    ]),
+  },
+];
+const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
+async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
+  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
+  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
+  return { status: r.status, json };
+}
+const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
+async function existing() {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let page = 1; page < 20; page++) {
+    const r = await api("GET", `/api/v2/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks?per_page=50&page=${page}`, undefined, sync);
+    if (r.status !== 200) throw new Error(`list tasks: ${r.status}`);
+    out.push(...list(r.json));
+    if (list(r.json).length < 50) return out;
+  }
+  throw new Error("more than 19 pages");
+}
+const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), project: PROJECT, created: null, problems: [] };
+const save = () => {
+  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
+  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
+  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
+};
+const have = await existing();
+for (const T of TASKS) if (have.some((t) => t.title === T.title)) throw new Error("title exists; refusing");
+writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
+rec.created = [];
+for (const T of TASKS) {
+  const r = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/projects/${PROJECT}/tasks`, { title: T.title, description: T.description }, key);
+  const c = { status: r.status, id: r.json?.id ?? null };
+  rec.created.push(c);
+  if (r.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`create: ${r.status} ${r.json?.message ?? ""}`); continue; }
+  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${r.json.id}`, undefined, sync);
+  Object.assign(c, { readBack: back.status, done: back.json?.done });
+  if (back.status !== 200 || back.json?.title !== T.title || back.json?.done) rec.problems.push(`read-back differs for ${r.json.id}`);
+}
+save();
+console.log(JSON.stringify(rec));
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// Sage, 2026-10-22: re-pin window 7247d80c7 to 86f95bb27 done (mos-1253, mos-1263). Comments on P19 386 and 435 (Mos posted 412 himself, mos-1266),
+// text from Darkwing (darkwing-0160). No task is closed. Sage's own key (bot user 13); the sync key reads back.
+// Checks each task's title before anything is posted. Prints no secret.
+// Usage: node post-w12-86f95bb27.mjs https://tasks.woltje.com SAGE_TOKEN_FILE SYNC_TOKEN_FILE OUT_JSON
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+const [ORIGIN, KEY, SYNC, OUT] = process.argv.slice(2);
+if (!/^https:\/\/tasks\.woltje\.com$/.test(ORIGIN)) throw new Error("tasks.woltje.com only");
+if (!OUT || existsSync(OUT)) throw new Error("OUT_JSON missing or exists; refusing");
+const PROJECT = 19;
+const PSIG = "Posted by Sage (T3 1ef1e4f8) with Sage's own key (bot user 13). Text from Darkwing, the window operator.";
+const esc = (s) => s.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+const ps = (xs) => xs.map((x) => `<p>${esc(x)}</p>`).join("") + `<p>${esc(PSIG)}</p>`;
+const WIN = "agents/darkwing/work/window-repin-86f95bb27/";
+const POSTS = [
+  { id: 386, title: /^Q173 test system/, close: false, body: [
+    "Re-pin 7247d80c7 to 86f95bb27 done on dragon-lin, 2026-10-22, with Darkwing operating. Activation 20261022T040256Z-86f95bb27f6c, pointer at 04:03:00Z UTC, schema 3j with no migration. P1 to P6, B0, W0 to W5 and W9 to W11 passed. Nothing was rolled back, and there's no counted failure (mos-1260). W5 backup SHA256SUMS 45b18429.",
+    "S1 to S2 (03:55:33Z to 04:24:42Z UTC): schema 3j at both, events 1798 to 1817 with no grant.* kind, and hosts and host_grants at 0 rows.",
+    "W12 (w12c.sh, mos-1263) W12_PASS at 04:26:43Z. Backup w12-20261022T042555Z first (SHA256SUMS 210ce775). The chief relayed the pm read and launched pm r2cf8536da2c3, which answered PRD 1.14 with 85 ids. Row 66 on chief rd0b8fdb4d62d: turn 1 drew 4 banned words and the [unslop: note, turn 2 got the notice, and counts went from 1/0/0 to checked 6, flagged 1, notices 1, broken null.",
+    `STATE: ${WIN}STATE.md`,
+  ] },
+  { id: 435, title: /^Console inbox: Approve\/Deny/, close: false, body: [
+    "Re-pin to 86f95bb27 (activation 20261022T040256Z-86f95bb27f6c). Row 202's access verbs are live, and nobody created a grant. The bus journal since W5 has no grant.* event, and hosts and host_grants hold 0 rows.",
+    `STATE: ${WIN}STATE.md`,
+  ] },
+];
+const key = readFileSync(KEY, "utf8").trim(), sync = readFileSync(SYNC, "utf8").trim();
+async function api(method, path, body, auth) {
+  const r = await fetch(ORIGIN + path, { method, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${auth}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), redirect: "error" });
+  const t = await r.text(); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(t); } catch {}
+  return { status: r.status, json };
+}
+const list = (j) => j?.items ?? (Array.isArray(j) ? j : []);
+const rec = { at: new Date().toISOString(), comments: [], closes: [], problems: [] };
+const save = () => {
+  const out = JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n";
+  if (out.includes(key) || out.includes(sync)) throw new Error("secret in the record; not written");
+  writeFileSync(OUT, out);
+};
+const before = {};
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const t = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
+  if (t.status !== 200 || t.json?.project_id !== PROJECT || !P.title.test(t.json?.title ?? "")) throw new Error(`task ${P.id}: ${t.status}, title check failed; nothing posted`);
+  if (P.close && t.json.done) throw new Error(`task ${P.id} is already done; nothing posted`);
+  before[P.id] = { title: t.json.title, description: t.json.description };
+}
+writeFileSync(OUT, "", { flag: "wx" });
+for (const P of POSTS) {
+  const c = await api("PUT", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}/comments`, { comment: ps(P.body) }, key);
+  const e = { task: P.id, status: c.status, id: c.json?.id ?? null };
+  rec.comments.push(e);
+  if (c.status >= 300 || !Number.isSafeInteger(c.json?.id)) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id}: ${c.status} ${c.json?.message ?? ""}`); save(); continue; }
+  const back = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}/comments?per_page=50`, undefined, sync);
+  const found = list(back.json).find((x) => x.id === c.json.id);
+  Object.assign(e, { readBack: back.status, found: Boolean(found) });
+  if (back.status !== 200 || !found) { rec.problems.push(`comment ${P.id} read-back: ${back.status}`); save(); continue; }
+  if (P.close) {
+    const full = await api("GET", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, key);
+    if (full.status !== 200 || full.json?.id !== P.id) { rec.problems.push(`v1 get ${P.id}: ${full.status}`); save(); continue; }
+    const u = await api("POST", `/api/v1/tasks/${P.id}`, { ...full.json, done: true }, key);
+    const b2 = await api("GET", `/api/v2/tasks/${P.id}`, undefined, sync);
+    const x = { task: P.id, status: u.status, readBack: b2.status, done: b2.json?.done, titleSame: b2.json?.title === before[P.id].title, descriptionSame: b2.json?.description === before[P.id].description, inverse: `mark undone: POST /api/v1/tasks/${P.id} done false (sage key)` };
+    rec.closes.push(x);
+    if (u.status >= 300 || b2.status !== 200 || b2.json?.done !== true || !x.titleSame || !x.descriptionSame) rec.problems.push(`close ${P.id}: update or read-back differs`);
+  }
+  save();
+}
+save();
+process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(rec, null, 1) + "\n");
+if (rec.problems.length) process.exit(2);
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# Re-pin 7247d80c7 to 86f95bb27 (rows 251, 244, 254, 202, 273, PRD 1.11-1.14), no migration
+
+Sage, 2026-10-22, for mos-1253 under DECISIONS Q173 and mos-1246. The step layout is
+`repin-1024-draft1.md`, with the copy changed and `--migrate` dropped. Where a step is unchanged I name it
+and say only what differs. Mos checks this file's sha256 before P0, and any change after that means a new
+check (mos-0849/0850). This file stays uncommitted until row 191's window ends, because refactor doesn't
+move while a rebased candidate's gate runs.
+
+## Who, and what nobody does
+
+- Darkwing operates if free. Otherwise I operate. Mos verifies each step's output before the next one,
+  runs P3, and gives the W5 go. Row 191's full window keeps first claim on the slot (mos-1225). Steps that
+  start no test and no stub run alongside it: P1, W0, P4, P5, P6, B0, W1-W4. P2 waits for a gap or CLEAR,
+  because it starts node stubs that a busy check counts.
+- Jason has no step. Nothing is pruned. Nobody acts as Jason: no `--by jason`, no human shell or tmux
+  pane, every bus read and write carries `--tester`, and `bus.tester` stays as it is. If it isn't `true`,
+  stop at P1.
+- No pi (#383). No Save in the human Console, no `mosaic name`.
+- Outside reach doesn't change. No `--send`, no `--sso`, no proof pair. Both go on together in the phase 2
+  window, which still waits for Jason's start (Vikunja 412). The tunnel forwards 7332 only.
+- dragon-lin only. .53 and .54 take nothing (mos-1198, mos-1167).
+
+## Names
+
+- OLD, live: `7247d80c7af7ffa70fc61557406bf491cdf3bfc7`, schema 3j, pointer `pm: true`, activation
+  `20261021T215926Z-7247d80c7af7`. Console flags at W5 last time: `--port 7332 --public-host
+  mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-socket`. P1
+  re-reads them from `status`. I don't copy them from this file.
+- NEW: `86f95bb27f6cb237bf9fa9ba53320bace6c4de0b`, 59 commits past OLD (`git rev-list --count`). The last
+  code landing in it is 0bbf0f6d1 (row 273). The two commits after that are docs and queue files.
+- `WIN=agents/darkwing/work/window-repin-86f95bb27/` if Darkwing operates, else
+  `agents/sage/work/window-repin-86f95bb27/`. The scripts adapt last window's, in
+  `agents/sage/work/window-repin-7247d80c7/`, with NEW and OLD changed and every `--migrate` removed.
+
+## What NEW carries over OLD
+
+Non-test paths changed from OLD to NEW (`git diff --name-only`, tests and READMEs left out):
+
+| Row | Commit | Paths | Live effect to check |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 251, 244 | d37210288, e69260a3c | scripts/test-release.sh, test-task.sh, scripts/testing/* | Gate tooling. Not in the live path. |
+| PRD 1.11-1.14 | ea0b2a16d..db1e7732a | packages/tasks/requirements.json | W9: the pm's requirements read gives 1.14 with 85 ids. |
+| 254 | 331597709 | packages/bus/src/human-cli.mjs (library.sync client timeout 130 s), packages/webui/src/bus.mjs (six `library-*` STATUS codes) | No library entry is live, so neither path runs. |
+| 202 | ddfb29af7 | packages/cli/src/access.mjs, cli.mjs, scripts/mosaic | `mosaic access list/grant/revoke`. Nobody runs them in this window (Q188, mos-1141). |
+| 273 | 7991662dc..0bbf0f6d1 | scripts/stack-release.sh | `--send` and `--no-sso`. With neither given, the plan keeps the pointer's Console flags. W3 checks that. |
+
+Nothing else in packages/bus/src or packages/webui/src changed (`git diff --quiet` with those two files left
+out). The four service scripts and scripts/stack-copy.sh are unchanged from OLD (`git diff --quiet 7247d80c7
+86f95bb27 --` on them). package-lock.json is unchanged.
+
+## Schema and backups
+
+- `SCHEMA_VERSION` is 3j at both commits (`packages/bus/src/store.mjs:17`). No migration step and no
+  schema.sql change in the range. W3's plan must show no migration line. If it asks for `--migrate`, stop.
+- B0 is the backup taken first. It's an online copy of the live store through sqlite's backup API, read only
+  on the source, as in last window's W12. It is laid out the way `rehearse --backup PATH` reads it
+  (`stack-release.sh:2232-2235`): `$DATA/backups/b0-<STAMP>/bus/bus.sqlite`, `SHA256SUMS` written from
+  inside `bus/`, `SCHEMA` reading 3j, and `CHECK` holding the integrity_check result, the event count and
+  maxSeq. The operator sends Mos the path and the SHA256SUMS sha256 before P3.
+- W5 takes the stopped-store backup every activate takes, plus the rollback set. That one is the rollback
+  point.
+- The grant look-alike count from draft 1 is dropped. It guarded the 3i-3j migration, and there is none.
+- Rollback is a pointer flip. OLD and NEW share 3j, so `rollback --plan` then the real run, with no
+  `--restore`. Any restore goes to Mos and ends the window (mos-1226, mos-1253 item 5).
+
+## Before the window (nothing stopped)
+
+| # | Who | Step |
+|---|-----|------|
+| P0 | Mos | The sha check of NEW and of this file. |
+| P1 | operator | `status`: pointer, activation, 3j, Console flags, unit flags match. Business file sha256 and `business-check.mjs` LOAD_OK for OLD now and for NEW after W0. `ls -ld $DATA/console` is 0700 and `tester.sock` is 0600 (row 196 made them at the last W5). `bus.tester` is `true`. |
+| W0 | operator | `scripts/stack-copy.sh copy $NEW`. The copy has `tools/unslop-hook` and `packages/library/bin/askpass` with NEW's mode. |
+| P2 | operator, in a gap | The two stub runs from last window's p2.sh against NEW's copy, then render both units from REPO's service scripts and diff them against the live units. The only difference allowed is the copy path. |
+| B0 | operator | The backup above. Path and SHA256SUMS sha256 to Mos. |
+| P3 | Mos | `stack-release.sh rehearse $NEW mosaic-stack --backup <B0 path> --port <scratch>`, no `--migrate`. It must show no migration, the interpreter preflight passing, one receipt line, no `library:` line, and one pm reply. Mos also reads healthz, `/api/config` and the two tester-http reads on NEW's Console with the pointer's flags, as in mos-1107. |
+| P4 | operator | The tunnel read. |
+| P5 | operator | The four service scripts held at NEW, and empty porcelain on them. |
+| P6 | operator | The 7332 matrix (a)-(g) on OLD as `$WIN/matrix-old.txt`, plus the two tester-http reads, for W10. |
+
+## The window
+
+| # | Who | Step |
+|---|-----|------|
+| W0b | operator | The business file copy. |
+| W1 | operator | Idle check, start stamp from `date -u`, S1 with `$SNAP --held`. Open pm tasks: the pm finishes or parks them, or the operator records which piece crosses the window. |
+| W2 | operator | `status`: pointer on OLD, `pm: true`, 3j, unit flags match. |
+| W3 | operator | `stack-release.sh activate $NEW mosaic-stack --pm --tester-socket --plan`. It must show OLD to NEW, no migration, the backup line, and a Console line with OLD's flags exactly: `--tester-socket`, no `--send`, no `--sso`, no proof pair, no drop line. Any other difference stops here. |
+| W4 | operator | The unit reads, as last window. W3 and W4 go to Mos for the W5 go. |
+| W5 | operator, on Mos's go | The same command without `--plan`. Exit 0, `result ok`, every gate check passing, `pm_launched` included. Record the activation id, backup path, STAMP and the backup SHA256SUMS sha256. Then `status`. |
+| W9 | operator, after Mos verifies W5 | Last window's W9 list: no `Sign-in:` line in the webui journal since the W5 stamp (with `UTC`), `/proc/<Console pid>/cwd` names NEW's copy, `tester.sock` 0600 in a 0700 `console/`, one new `peercred-starts.jsonl` line, no `library:` line in the bus journal. The pm's requirements read gives 1.14 with 85 ids. If the pm isn't relaunched by the restart (mos-1230), the read moves to W12, as last time. |
+| W10 | operator | The matrix again as `$WIN/matrix-new.txt`, identical to `matrix-old.txt` apart from named lines. The two tester-http reads match P6's. No listener on 7333 (`ss -ltn`). P4 again. A Console POST on the main port with no signed-in session is refused (the mos-1195 baseline). |
+| W11 | operator | STATE report in `$WIN/STATE.md`, posted on P19 386, 412 and 435, and on the Gitea issues for 202 (#1700), 254 (#1759) and 273 (#1778). |
+| W12 | operator, after W11 | Row 66's live check as last time: backup first, one Claude Code managed session with a known tell, the RESULT note, the next-turn notice and the `unslop.jsonl` counts. Pi isn't run (#383). |
+
+After W12 I write draft 3 of the phase 2 plan naming 86f95bb27. That window still waits for Jason.
+
+## Steps skipped, and why
+
+Mos allowed skipping a step that only repeats a test row 273's or row 202's gate already ran on the same
+code. The blob ids at the gated commit and at NEW are equal for every one of those files (`git rev-parse`):
+scripts/stack-release.sh `7c7676c71` at 0bbf0f6d1 and NEW, and access.mjs `a0a7c9364`, cli.mjs `b14b8fd79`,
+scripts/mosaic `91c79ab4b` and human-cli.mjs `27b67fbf7` at ddfb29af7 and NEW.
+
+- No separate run of the `--send`/`--no-sso` walk or the rollback flag carry. Darkwing's gate on 0bbf0f6d1
+  ran stack-release.test.mjs 218/218 (T53, T57, T58 c0/c1) and test-release.sh rc 0. W3's live plan line is
+  the only check left.
+- No live `mosaic access` run. Row 202's gate ran access.test.mjs on ddfb29af7. A live grant would also
+  break Q188.
+- The grant look-alike count, for the reason under Schema. It's a scope drop, not a gate repeat.
+
+Nothing else is skipped. P2 and P3 aren't gate repeats: they check NEW's copy as built on dragon-lin.
+
+## Stop conditions and rollback
+
+As in draft 1. The first failure stops the step and goes to Mos. A second failure, or any restore, ends
+the window (mos-0823, mos-1253 item 5). Before W5 there's nothing to undo. After W5, rollback is
+`rollback --plan` then the real run, which flips the pointer to OLD with the same Console flags. Keep every
+copy. Prune nothing.
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ services:
    volumes:
      # Configured runtime state root (from config.json dataRoot).
      - ${MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT:?MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT must be set by scripts/load_config (run via scripts/*.sh)}:/var/lib/mosaic
+      # The whole control directory is protected against unlink and rename-over replacement.
+      - ${MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT:?MOSAIC_DATA_ROOT must be set by scripts/load_config (run via scripts/*.sh)}/control:/var/lib/mosaic/control:ro
      # Runtime credential only: pi auth file mounted READ-ONLY.
      # Never copied into the image.
      - ${PI_AUTH_FILE:-/home/jwoltje/.pi/agent/auth.json}:/home/node/.pi/agent/auth.json:ro
@@ -1455,4 +1455,57 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-21T22:30:20Z | Huey (gpt-6.1-sol) | T1 item 7 r3, scrooge-0007 R1, Vikunja 463 | isolated session-workspaces root and nesting mutant recorded; R1-only confirmation requested, other r2 findings closed; doc-only checks
 2026-10-21 | Ludwig | PRD 1.11-1.14 drafts (Vikunja 459, 462, 463, 464) | approved by Della, handed to Sage
 2026-10-21T22:51:07Z | Sage (Opus 5.5) | PRD 1.13 and 1.14 landing with Gosalyn's C2-01c brief and Case 2 design (51fdfb7e2), rows 264-268 filed (#1769-#1773), Case 2 re-pin to a6ac627c8, Vikunja 463 closed | pushed 6ba8a582e..db1e7732a; requirements tests 3/3 and 3/3 and verbs 31/31 on 5f73b388c and db1e7732a
+2026-10-21 23:39:21 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 inspection handoff, sage-2242 | authorized local snapshot d52b4db1c on new rocko/row191-inspection-20261021; 78 blobs match a4f780c2; no push credential, no push or tests; Sage/Honker messaged directly; per-run API seam and mutants/gate pending.
+2026-10-22 00:04:05 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 stopRun focused stage and S6 handoff | 9 files final 62/62; two bus failures diagnosed/fixed and logged, own failed fixture group cleaned; no runners remain, slot returned. Export in f7bf7dfec, rebased on new branch to 7aa18b0f6 (dcd8d4dda), 79 product blobs identical. Honker/Sage handed the sha directly; broader gate/mutants pending, no live action.
 2026-10-22T00:18:12Z | Sage (Opus 5.5) | row 254 landing, rows 269-272 (264b-264e, #1774-#1777), 268 r2 request, row 191 publish and gate slot | 331597709 and eb9672c91 landed, queue e3c0446f5 pushed; rocko/row191-stoprun-dcd8-20261022 7aa18b0f6 and 81889b58d published as jarvis; 191 full gate on Rocko's slot from 00:17Z
+2026-10-22 00:24:34 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 full gate on c78f48946 | stopped on second integration failure per sage-2275; singles 269/269, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646; CLI interrupted with 26 observed failures; no further edits; cwd sweep empty and slot returned to Sage.
+2026-10-22 00:48:20 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eb3abba12 full gate | stopped at Discord 190/192; 32 singles 304/304, processing-control 61/61, bus 646/646, cli 761/761; two uninitialized Discord fixtures reported to Sage; no later run; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
+2026-10-22 00:58:27 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2294 fixture fix | e6800380d on eb3abba12, two test files/four additions, assertions preserved; 338-entry static all-package sweep recorded; no tests; sent Sage for publication and Honker for dependent gate.
+2026-10-22T01:04:44Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | FED R3 early look, e7d2dc3e6 (morgana-0065) | static only, no queue record; mutant rulings: M3x stays plus reply-chain under M3x, #threadFor user clause equivalent, 193b1a filter mutant n/a; N1 role key user to fix in R3 (:359 and instance-settings:90), Sage rules on widening; dewey-0777 to Morgana, dewey-0778 to Sage
+2026-10-22T01:08:21Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | FED R3 r2 62de33760 delta (morgana-0066) | static, no findings; N1 fixed at broker :361 and instance-settings :91 with tests; Sage rules instance-settings scope; dewey-0779 Morgana, dewey-0780 Sage
+2026-10-22 01:30:04 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 e6800380d resume | binding15/15, recover5/5, Discord192/192; stopped WebUI314 passed/4 failed/1 esbuild skip; processing polling violates sign-out/manual redirect and bar changes layout; no fixes/retries, cwd sweep empty, slot returned.
+2026-10-22 01:38:08 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2317 Console integration fix | 8e1f55c1d on e6800380d; shared sign-out/manual redirect/interval and desktop frame fixes, assertions retained, six browser cases, 73 mutant sites preflight; syntax only, no tests; sent Sage/Honker.
+2026-10-22 02:06:38 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 rebase sage-2329 | eafcbd3e7 on ddfb29af7, new branch, dispatcher retains processing and access; CLI/readme auto-merges checked; 87-path fd0f2740 manifest and 73-site preflight; Sage2333 published, awaiting CLEAR; no tests.
+2026-10-22 02:20:51 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 eafcbd3e7 full gate | stopped singles313/6: six new browser cases count app freshness timer as processing timer; diagnosis sent Sage, no fix/retry; no suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot clear.
+2026-10-22 02:23:13 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2345 timer fixture | 4db8b5778 on eafcbd3e7, one line attributes timer to processing.js; all assertions retained, no product change or tests; sent Sage and Honker; awaiting publication/CLEAR.
+2026-10-22 02:25:29 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 sage-2349 record commit | 0f8235277 on 4db8b5778 adds packet BUILD.md cause record; product manifest remains ffb46fbd/87 paths; no amend, product change or tests; Sage/Honker notified.
+2026-10-22 02:48:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 0f8235277 full gate second red | singles330/330, processing61/61, bus646/646, cli783/783, discord192/192; WebUI323/1/1 host esbuild skip; shell geometry1062vs1000; stopped/no retry, no later suites/shells/mutants; cwd sweep empty, slot returned, Sage escalates Mos.
+2026-10-22 02:57:36 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 #1689 mos-1248 desktop layout restart | FF 5cd32f4c1 on 0f8235277: desktop grid allocates processing bar, existing shell assertions kept, visibility/no-scroll assertions added; 74 static mutant sites; candidate 2f93ef19; sent Webby/Sage for static review; no runs, awaiting review and CLEAR.
+2026-10-22T02:58:24Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) early static look at 8bf442be9 (megavolt-0112) | B1 step 7 revoke undone by step 8 write, B2 sweep fire retry skips D1 id check, N1-N4; dewey-0781 Megavolt, dewey-0782 Sage; no queue verdict
+2026-10-22 03:01:02 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 Webby static review | B1 accepted: 5cd32f4c1 preserves the content floor; earlier root-cause claim withdrawn in BUILD.md; no runs; requesting fixture measurement slot and owner layout ruling.
+2026-10-22T03:08:58Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) r2 77dd43c9e delta look (megavolt-0115) | B1 and B2 closed by reading; N5 (settle unknown/401 branches unguarded) not blocking; N1-N4 DEFERRED agreed with README lines; dewey-0783 Megavolt, dewey-0784 Sage; no queue verdict
+2026-10-22T03:10:55Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) r3 7965efd0f delta look (megavolt-0119) | N5 closed by reading; r3 is the run candidate; dewey-0785 Megavolt, dewey-0786 Sage; no queue verdict
+2026-10-22 03:11:09 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 191 static nav layout, mos-1249/1250 | FF da4334806 on 5cd32f4c1; controls first in nav, non-sticky per sage-2386/webby-0108; candidate-only placement assertion changed, landed shell assertions preserved; 77 mutants statically preflighted; manifest 245dceb1; Webby/Sage handoff sent, no runs, awaiting static look/publish/debug CLEAR.
+2026-10-22T03:11:36Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) r4 1c0048911 static look (sage-2390) | README N3/N4 sentences match the rulings; N5 test split per branch, same asserts; r4 is the run candidate; dewey-0787 Sage, dewey-0788 Megavolt
+2026-10-22 03:15:11 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row 191 sage-2394 debug | da4334806 shell5/5 and processing-browser9/9, awk14/0/0; geometry heights reported with read-only distinction; cwd sweep[] and slot returned; full window awaits separate CLEAR.
+2026-10-22T03:36:37Z | Filbert (Opus 5.5, sage-2398) | row 273 (#1778) static review, darkwing/row273 978143bf4 to cac7d0f67, carried to 0bbf0f6d1 | APPROVE c30308, queue rev 3111 (filbert-273-record-r1), digest e1031023 rebuilt and matched; B1/N1 fixed, T57 item 3 change approved, N1 TOOLS.md by Sage at landing. Posted before sage-2396 hold; my drift check missed row 202 scripts/mosaic (test-copied). Merge-scoped carry c30319 on 0bbf0f6d1: range-diff 6/6 =, patch-ids equal; rerun green per darkwing-0147 (not mine). Line left uncommitted: HEAD 378a76b85 behind origin 0bbf0f6d1.
+2026-10-22T03:42:29Z | Darkwing (claude-opus-5-5) | row 273 (#1778) activate --send/--no-sso, sage-2301/mos-1246 F39 | LANDED 0bbf0f6d1 (docs 5365adaef, done rev 3113, #1778 closed c30324); 978143bf4 run red (stale T53 usage pin, fixed cac7d0f67), cac7d0f67 green on old base, rebased darkwing/row273-b2 (range-diff all =, digest e1031023) green 218/218, 25/25, 14/0, M1-M7 killed; in-review rev 3109/3110 c30307; TOOLS.md F39 lines match darkwing-0137
+2026-10-22 04:02:12 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 full window0fa7bf421 | touched35files336pass, packages2403pass/1esbuildskip, shells425selftests+156queue node pass; SR01–07killed, SR08timeout,69unrun; stopped/no retry;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],owned network removed,slot returned Sage; await Mos ruling.
+2026-10-22T04:11:48Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 191 runner review (sage-2424, mos-1259 item 3): run-mutants.py fe0d360f static | APPROVE to Rocko dewey-0789 and Sage dewey-0790; N1-N5 non-blocking (placeholder timeout cause, 7+1+69 tally, indented not-ok match, SR08 time binding, resume-only invocation)
+2026-10-22 04:14:56 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 control/resume sage-2427 | control12/12;SR08separate timeoutkill;49resumed assertionkills thenKS43survived;total56assertionkills+1timeout,1survivor,19unrun;88blobs restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos informed;no retry/edit.
+2026-10-22T04:20:27Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 191 mos-1261 mutant table review: all-mutants.json 5dbc8308 KS43 pattern retarget + 19-site audit, static | APPROVE to Rocko dewey-0791 and Sage dewey-0792; C1 archive resume-mutant-results.json (f5725ef2) and KS43.tap (c778ee33) before a --resume-from KS43 run
+2026-10-22 04:21:30 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS43+19 retarget run | KS43assertionkill thenKS44invalid mutation syntax;57assertionkills+1timeout,1invalid,18unrun;stopped,no edit/retry;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified.
+2026-10-22T04:25:19Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 191 mos-1264 KS44 table fix (85d9a7b1, // -> void 0) + 19-site syntax preflight, static; also C1 archive check (dewey-0793/0794) | APPROVE to Rocko dewey-0795 and Sage dewey-0796; run condition: new subdir with byte copies, --resume-from KS44 (19 sites); tally 57 kills + SR08
+2026-10-22 04:30:06 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | row191 KS44+18 resume | 10assertionkills thenKS54timeout-without-control despite dependency assertion;total67assertionkills+1timeoutkill,1unqualifiedtimeout,8unrun;88hashes restored,cwd sweep[],slot returned,Sage/Mos notified,no retry/edit.
+2026-10-22T04:38:59Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 191 final mutant evidence check (control-ks54-mos1267, syntaxfixed-mos1264), static | tally 75 assertion + 2 timeout kills = 77 confirmed (dewey-0798 Rocko, dewey-0799 Sage); N6 tasks.test.mjs:262-266 runtime not closed on failure, Sage rules
+2026-10-22 04:41:46 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | row191 #1689 builder complete/in-review | published0fa7bf421,manifest0bcbf337;35singles336pass,9packages2403pass/1knownskip,10shells425selftests+156queue nodepass;75assertionkills+2controlledtimeoutkills=77;88hashrestore,cwd sweep[],slotreturned;in-review rev3114,expected no-token failure3115(exit1);Sage/Dewey handoff,no live action.
+2026-10-22T04:46:51Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 191 manifest review round 1 (#1689, candidate 0bcbf337, source 0fa7bf421 on 86f95bb27) | APPROVE comment 30359, queue rev 3118; manifest, gate logs (2739/0/1 named), 77 mutants and 712-file packet checked; N6 carried to Vikunja 502; N7/N8 non-blocking; dewey-0800 Sage, dewey-0801 Rocko
+2026-10-22T04:52:40Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 static look at rebase 08840f3c1 on 0fa7bf421 (#1742) | clean, not a verdict: commit 1 only the three 191 union lines, 2-6 =, commit 7 grants.status read with a test; manifest 32 paths digest 1e40433b matches; dewey-0802 Megavolt, dewey-0803 Sage
+2026-10-22 05:03:18 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol,d99326cc) | Vikunja502 processing test/runner hardening | brief+isolatedrocko-v502;expected wordingred→green,Node27/27,Python4/4,5/5assertionkills(includingSR08andKS54nohang),0skips/timeouts;sweep[],candidate5hashrestored,slotreturned05:01:29Z;candidate968d6ee3,runnerc5bdc764;packetready,no commit/push/liveaction.
+2026-10-22 05:07:34 UTC | Rocko (d99326cc) | Vikunja502 committed/review handoff sage-2482 | newbranchrocko/vikunja502-ce6a-20261022,source8e3c6a79b+packet9bf4683c6 on ce6a96ad6;5paths no base drift,range-diff=,patch-id37135ebe unchanged;manifest968d6ee3,packet93889519 verifies39/39;focused runs carry;Sage publish/Dewey review handoff sent,no push/liveaction.
+2026-10-22 05:10:00 UTC | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | landings 191, 205, 268 (MVP 10-27) | 191 LANDED 0fa7bf421 (P19 414 c595); 205 LANDED ce6a96ad6 (gate GATE_PASSED 04:56:43Z, Duckworth APPROVE rev 3125, done rev 3127, #1703 closed c30379); 268 r4 LANDED c27207f6e as a carry on 205 (rerun 14/83/209, Webby 0112/0113, done rev 3129, #1773 closed c30384); doc commit adds the #1782 brief, re-pin plan, phase 2 draft 3
+2026-10-22T05:11:59Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | Vikunja 502 (191 follow-up, Rocko) static review: source 8e3c6a79b, packet 9bf4683c6, manifest 968d6ee3, runner c5bdc764 vs fe0d360f | APPROVE; N6 finally-close, exact refusal statuses, truthful no-control cause checked; 5/5 assertion kills; dewey-0804 Sage, dewey-0805 Rocko
+2026-10-22T05:11:59Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 274 (FED R3, #1779) rebase look at 226e1f63d on ce6a96ad6 | not a verdict: range-diff ! only at 191 meets, manifest 7d9c9d9b rebuilt and matches; drift to b3665f5ab (268 library) and halt-flag test to Sage; dewey-0806 Morgana, dewey-0807 Sage
+2026-10-22 05:58:59 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 279 #1784 stopRun deadline | candidate 1016b8584, packet cad927137 on f40f2e770; expected unknown/alive red, stop-run 13/13, package 62/62, M1 killed, 0 skips, sweep clear; Sage publishes, Dewey reviews.
+2026-10-22T06:04:20Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 279 (#1784, Rocko) stopRun deadline fix, manifest review r1 on cad927137 (312ed511, 2 paths) | APPROVE, Gitea c30409, queue rev 3143 op dewey-279-r1-verdict; N1 run-before-commit (Sage gate binds), N2 discord processing tests (Sage added to gate); dewey-0809 Sage, dewey-0810 Rocko
+2026-10-22T06:13:54Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 279 (#1784) carry to ceadad993 (sage-2520) | APPROVE carried: range-diff 1:= 2:=, patch-ids match, product blobs equal, manifest 312ed511 ok; posted c30410
+2026-10-22 06:15:54 UTC | Sage (Opus 5.5, 1ef1e4f8) | row 279 stopRun deadline (mos-1269) | LANDED ceadad993 06:13:49Z, carry on 343b6dd76, Dewey c30409 + carry c30410, done rev 3145; 194 b16 9cdc47d04 (Webby carry webby-0118) has the slot for runb8 + gate.sh, new window
+2026-10-22 07:17:54 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 280 #1785 scratch sshd port ownership | claimed rev 3148 on da5d3651d; proposed test-only shared readiness/picker and X5 cleanup in queue-280/BUILD.md, sent Sage and Duckworth before code; no tests run, CLEAR requested.
+2026-10-22 07:51:04 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 280 #1785 scratch sshd owns port | source b765f5cb8, packet d6c924764; grant 30/30 runs1230/1230, host30/30 runs780/780, CLI load1588/1588, no skips/timeouts, final M1/M2 four assertion kills; source restored and slot clear; no live action.
+2026-10-22 07:56:59 UTC | Rocko (Codex gpt-6.1-sol, d99326cc) | row 280 slim packet under sage-2541 | b0fd28b6f on rocko/row280-packet-b765, parent b765f5cb8; 22 text files, 21-entry slim inventory914f888d, full evidence d6c924764 retained, portability/follow-ups recorded; no tests or source changes.
+2026-10-22 08:00:02 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 280 review, gate and landing | design approve sage-2533; CLEARs for phase 1, diagnostic and repeat; published d6c924764 as jarvis; review request rev 3151/3152; gate bus 656/0/0; landed b0fd28b6f (ff), note 3154, done 3155; #1785 closed; P19 511 comment 623; Honker told for 194 b17.
+2026-10-22 08:38:11 UTC | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 194 b17/b18 window and landing | b17 CLEAR (sage-2544), then my refactor push forced b18 (sage-2545, Webby sage-2546); review request rev 3158/3159; landed fd6dd327c (ff), note 3161, done 3162; #1692 closed; P19 414 comment 625
+2026-10-22 08:42:04 UTC | Honker (Claude Opus 5.5, ecd17786) | row 194 #1692 build to landing | b8-b18 on honker/row194-b*; G13 diagnosis 60 runs (slot returned 07:11Z); b17 then b18 rebases (no force-push); runb8 + gate whole green on fd6dd327c, slot returned 08:31Z swept clean; in-review move revs 3156/3157 (request failed, no token); landed by Sage fd6dd327c; no live action.
+2026-10-22T08:45:16Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) rebase onto be2b008cc, ce74477e1 (sage-2553/2555, megavolt-0128) | static look clean: c1 unions match 194 code, 2-7 =, manifest d7dd27b8 ok; fire-keeps-grant note to Sage; verdict waits on the green gate
+2026-10-22T09:37:08Z | Dewey (Opus 5.5, 84fb346c) | row 236 (#1742) manifest round 1 on 0b00269b (bd5f11ded) | APPROVE, comment 30450, queue rev 3168; no blockers, no notes
+2026-10-22T09:43:34Z | Sage (1ef1e4f8) | row 236 landing, row 281 filing | landed bd5f11ded (ff), note 3169, done 3170, #1742 closed c30451, P19 436 comment 639; row 281 #1786 brief and DEFERRED entry for mos-1271
@@ -276,11 +276,25 @@ scripts/mosaic follow --thread <thread> [--tester]
 scripts/mosaic stop <run>
 scripts/mosaic launches off | on [--business <id>]
 scripts/mosaic launches list [--json]
+scripts/mosaic halt | resume [--business <id>]
+scripts/mosaic processing status [--business <id>] [--json]
 scripts/bus-service.sh [--instance NAME] render [--copy ID [--copies DIR]] [--pm] [--claude PATH]
 scripts/bus-service.sh [--instance NAME] install [--copy ID [--copies DIR]] [--pm] [--dir DIR] [--no-reload] [--claude PATH]
 scripts/bus-service.sh [--instance NAME] uninstall | status <business>
 ```

+The instance processing switch is separate from per-business launches off/on.
+`mosaic halt` durably stops managed processing across every business in the
+selected configuration's data root. The bus stays up for reads and human
+recovery. `mosaic processing status --json` reports settled, pending or unknown
+stops; `mosaic resume` checks the current generation and refuses pending stops.
+Only the existing human proof can write it, independently of channel settings.
+A missing/invalid state is never off: use halt, then resume; an unsafe control
+parent needs operator repair. Unknown task/remote outcomes are not retried.
+Native diagnostic seats remain available. First activation must stop old
+processing before trusted initialization and align the image/read-only control
+mount. This is a separate approved window, never a build step.
+
 The human commands read and resolve through the broker's human transport
 (`packages/bus/src/human-cli.mjs`), never the SQLite file. They refuse inside
 an agent run, except the forms that take `--tester` (rows 110, 175 and 184), which
@@ -466,7 +480,7 @@ reports checkout or copy identity and refactor drift, and writes nothing.
 ```
 scripts/stack-release.sh adopt BUSINESS
 scripts/stack-release.sh activate ID BUSINESS [--pm | --pm-after-harness] [--migrate] [--tester-socket | --tester-port N (legacy copies)]
-    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof | --sso] [--no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
+    [--proof-header NAME --proof-file PATH | --no-proof | --sso | --no-sso] [--send | --no-send] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh pm-on BUSINESS [--timeout S]
 scripts/stack-release.sh rollback BUSINESS [--restore ACTIVATION [--events N]] [--timeout S] [--plan]
 scripts/stack-release.sh status BUSINESS
@@ -476,6 +490,9 @@ scripts/stack-release.sh gate ID BUSINESS --units external --since EPOCH [--time
 common options: --copies DIR, --bin DIR, --instance NAME, --units user|external
 --events N is the total of the per-table counts the post-backup-events refusal prints: events and
 every table in COUNTED.
+--send needs --sso in the run's Console flags, given or carried. --no-sso needs --sso in the
+pointer's, and takes the Console flags from the rollback set of the activation that turned it on.
+--no-sso drops the pointer's --send, and so does a rollback to a Console without --sso.
 ```

 This is an operator plan, not an action agents run. Both reviews and the
@@ -22,9 +22,15 @@ edits it by hand, and the agents can't change it. He will ask you to confirm it

 ## Your playground

-A folder named in the `playground` list of that entry is your playground. Each playground folder sits
-inside one book folder, so one per book works well, for example `<book>/playground/`. You choose the
-names and tell Jason. Until you have one, every note in a book folder is canon.
+A folder named in the `playground` list of that entry is your playground. A playground folder can sit
+at one of three levels:
+- Book level: inside one book folder, for ideas about that book, for example `<book>/playground/`.
+- Universe level: outside every book folder, for ideas about a universe that aren't tied to one book.
+- A new universe: a draft universe entry with a name and its own playground folders and no books, for a
+  world you are only starting. When it is real, Jason turns it into a plain universe with books and you
+  move the notes in Obsidian.
+
+You choose the names and tell Jason. Until you have one, every note in a book folder is canon.

 What the playground means for the agents:
 - They search canon unless they ask for the playground on purpose.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ repo, so a bad mapping gives exit 3 even when the repo path is wrong too.
 | 4 | `library survey: usage: mosaic library survey <repo> [--mapping <file>]` | no repo, two repos, an unknown flag, `--mapping` without a file or twice | Fix the command |
 | 3 | `library survey: library-mapping-invalid: <file> is not a readable JSON file` | missing, unreadable by `mosaic`, or not JSON | Fix the file or its mode |
 | 3 | `library survey: library-mapping-invalid: <file> <reason>` | the entry breaks the schema. The reason names the key | Give it to Jason for the draft |
-| 3 | `library survey: library-playground-outside-book: <file> universes.<u>.playground "<prefix>" is not inside one of its books` | a playground prefix outside its universe's books | Give it to Jason for the draft |
+| 3 | `library survey: library-playground-other-universe: <file> universes.<u>.playground "<prefix>" lies inside book folder "<book>" of universes.<v>`, or `holds book folder` | a playground prefix inside, or holding, another universe's book folder | Give it to Jason for the draft |
 | 2 | `library survey: library-git: <repo> is not a directory` | wrong path | Check `<repo>` |
 | 2 | `library survey: library-git: repository has no readable HEAD commit (project-git)` | not a repo, a folder inside one, another owner, no commits, a `HEAD` with no commit, or no `git` on `PATH` | Check each. If `<repo>` is the bus mirror, stop and report to Sage |
 | 2 | `library survey: library-git: <other reason>`, such as `tree listing refused (project-git)` | git failed or ran past 100 seconds | Report to Sage |
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# A fire or a delete revokes the instance's grants (194/236 follow-up, MVP)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-22, for mos-1271. Dewey found it on the row 236 rebase look (dewey-0815). Row 281, Gitea #1786, Vikunja 524.
+
+## Why
+
+Row 194's `instance.fire` revokes only the roles entry's credential services. It does this through
+`revoke()` in packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs (:151), which instance-settings.mjs `fire()` calls as its
+beforeWrite (:337, :343). Row 256's human delete goes through the same `revoke()`. Neither touches a
+grant. A fired agent's host grants (row 235) stay on every host they name, and its Gitea user and token
+(row 236) stay live. They last until someone runs `mosaic hosts revoke AGENT HOST` or `mosaic grants
+revoke AGENT` by hand. Those CLI verbs are the human's. The tester's `hosts.revoke` and `grants.revoke`
+refuse `tester-dev-only` outside a dev business (broker.mjs :1573 and #grantsCaller). The Console has
+no revoke route. Nothing tells the human that a fired instance still holds a grant.
+
+Live is 86f95bb27, which carries 235's host grants but not 236. dragon-lin runs as tester with no real
+host grants, so nothing live holds a grant today. The Case 1 install on .53 will hold them.
+
+## Brief: no grant outlives its instance
+
+`--after` 236. It lands before the Case 1 install on .53 hires any instance with a grant (mos-1271
+item 4). It doesn't hold the dragon-lin re-pin. It comes after 274 in the landing order unless Mos
+moves it.
+
+Design before code. The design goes in the packet BUILD.md. The reviewer approves it before any code.
+
+What to build:
+
+1. A fire, and a delete, end every grant the instance holds before the write that removes the
+   instance. That covers each host grant on each host, through the same steps `hosts.revoke` takes
+   (the grant.revoked record, the key removal and the host line, row 235 r6 section 6). It also covers
+   the Gitea grant, through the same steps `grants.revoke` takes (row 236 #436b).
+2. Fail closed, as `revoke()` does for credentials. If any grant revoke can't complete, the verb stops,
+   the organization file stays unchanged, and the refusal names the instance, the grant and the reason.
+   A repeated fire then picks up where the first stopped, as 194's repeated fire already does for step
+   C (webby-0011 B2). A grant that's already revoked counts as done. The design says how a host that
+   can't be reached is handled. It may not drop a grant record while its key could still be on the
+   host.
+3. The fire's result, and the event the human sees, list the grants revoked as well as the credential
+   services.
+4. Nothing else changes. The hosts and grants verbs keep their callers and refusals. The tester's
+   `tester-dev-only` stays. No new Console route.
+
+Tests, each in the owning package, whole files:
+
+- A fire of an instance with a host grant on two hosts and a Gitea grant revokes all three. It records
+  each revoke the way the manual verbs do, and a later host.run or Gitea use by that agent refuses.
+- The same for the human's delete (row 256's path).
+- A grant revoke that fails: the fire refuses, the file is unchanged, and the instance and its other
+  grants are as they were or recorded as revoked, per the design. A repeat fire then completes.
+- An instance with no grant fires exactly as it does today, with no new events.
+
+Mutants, each killed by a named test:
+
+- M1. The fire skips the host grant revokes.
+- M2. The fire skips the Gitea grant revoke.
+- M3. A failed grant revoke is ignored, so the fire goes on to the write.
+- M4. The delete path skips grant revokes.
+
+Gate: the reviewer approves the design and then the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites run
+whole, with every touched test file whole on its own. The Docker gitea-grant test runs. Every
+scripts/test-*.sh is green on Sage's gate, and M1-M4 are killed. Any red goes to Sage, and a red Sage
+can't place goes to Mos.
+
+Owner Megavolt. Reviewer Dewey. Gate owner Sage.
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# The owner sees a thread agent's claims (10-27 row)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-22, for mos-1262. Row 205's message filter found the gap (morgana-0072, ruling sage-2430).
+
+## Why
+
+PRD :1083-1084 promises that what a thread's agent does with the owner's authority stays visible to the
+owner: its decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files. FED R6 shows users the same list word
+for word. Today a thread run's `role.claim` writes `thread_claims` only and returns at broker.mjs:2682. The
+`agents` verb (:3309) reads `role_claims` only, and no other owner verb shows thread claims. So the owner
+can't see a thread agent's claim.
+
+Mos ruled this a 10-27 row, not post-v1 (mos-1262). No user thread goes live before it lands, the same
+bind as the 193b1a filter. Q176 Case 1 ("Shared and private agent sessions available per user; RBAC")
+needs it. If it can't make 10-27, that's a scope question for Jason, and it goes to Mos first.
+
+## Brief: the owner sees thread claims
+
+Chained on row 205 (193b1a). Start from refactor after 205 lands.
+
+What to build:
+
+1. A human or reader session's `agents` result also lists every thread claim currently held in the
+   business: thread id, holder run, harness and claim time. A claim counts as held when its thread's
+   latest `thread_claims` op is `claim`. Role claim rows keep their current shape and order. Thread
+   claim rows are added after them, marked so a reader can tell the two apart.
+2. A role session's `agents` result is unchanged.
+3. The rows carry no message content and no thread name a user wrote. The 205 filter still hides user
+   messages. This row adds claims only.
+4. The CLI's `agents` output (packages/cli format.mjs reads `c.role` and `holder_run`) shows the thread
+   rows without breaking the role rows.
+5. Row 205's governance pin (message-filter.test.mjs, the "claims" item) moves from `threadsState` to the
+   owner's `agents` call. Its comment naming this row goes away.
+
+If the builder finds a cleaner shape, for example a separate owner verb, it goes in BUILD.md to Duckworth
+before code. A widening beyond owner and reader sessions goes to Mos (mos-1202).
+
+Tests:
+
+- Owner `agents` shows a held thread claim. After revoke or release, it doesn't.
+- A role session's `agents` result is byte-equal to before for the same store.
+- No message body or user-written thread text appears in the output.
+- The CLI renders a mixed list.
+
+Mutants, each killed by a named test:
+
+- M1. Thread rows dropped from the owner result.
+- M2. The held check reads the first op instead of the latest, so a released claim shows.
+- M3. Thread rows added to a role session's result.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. The touched test files run whole, the bus and cli suites and every
+scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed.
+
+## Ruling on design r1 (sage-2487)
+
+Duckworth approved Morgana's design r1 (3e9939b7b) as D1: a separate human and reader verb `thread.claims`,
+with `agents` unchanged, under conditions C1-C3 (duckworth-0118, agents/duckworth/work/row1782/DESIGN-r1.md
+at 13fb9abc5). The brief allowed that shape. Brief item 5's pin moves to `thread.claims`, as C3 records.
+Row 277 builds it.
+
+The Console doesn't show thread claims under D1, and an owner who uses only the Console won't run
+`mosaic agents`. So PRD :1083-1084 isn't met until the Console shows them too. That's the follow-up brief
+below, with the same bind as row 277.
+
+## Brief: the Console shows thread claims
+
+Chained on row 277. Start from refactor after 277 lands.
+
+What to build:
+
+1. The Console's Agents view gets a "Thread claims" section for a human or reader session. It reads
+   `thread.claims` and lists each held claim: thread id, holder run, harness and claim time.
+2. The existing role rows (webui public/bus.js :447, :462, :474) keep their shape, counts and order.
+3. No message body and no thread name a user wrote appears in the section.
+4. An empty result shows an empty-state line, not an error. A refusal from `thread.claims` shows the
+   refusal and leaves the role rows intact.
+
+Tests:
+
+- The section lists a held claim and drops it after release.
+- Role rows and their counts are byte-equal to before for the same store.
+- No message body or user-written thread text in the rendered section.
+- A refused `thread.claims` call leaves the role rows rendered.
+
+Mutants, each killed by a named test:
+
+- M1. The section is not rendered.
+- M2. Thread claims are counted into the role totals.
+
+Gate: Webby approves the manifest. The touched test files run whole, the webui and bus suites and every
+scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. No user thread goes live before this
+row lands.
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# The bus tests' scratch sshd proves it owns its port (194 gate follow-up, MVP)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-22, for mos-1270. Row 194 b16's gate found it (honker-0125), and Honker's diagnosis placed it
+on the base (honker-0127).
+
+## Why
+
+`sshd()` in packages/bus/tests/grant-executor.test.mjs (:57-97, from row 249, 9de5a57ab) and the same
+helper in packages/bus/tests/host-run.test.mjs (:79-97) pick a port with
+`20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000)`, start sshd on it, and return the port as soon as
+`listening(port)` connects. This host's ephemeral range is 32768-60999, so about a third of the picks fall
+inside it.
+
+Honker's diagnosis run hung on base ceadad993, with no row 194 code, in G23 at :433. sshd.log said "Bind to
+port 38927 on 127.0.0.1 failed: Address already in use", and the sshd child had exited 255. Even so,
+`listening(port)` had returned true, so the helper returned a port that our sshd never held. The install
+never reached our sshd (no requests.log), the hold-add stub never wrote `holding`, and the first `until`
+timed out at 10 s. Row 194's G13 red at :733 has the same shape. The connect that succeeded was either a
+short-lived foreign listener or a TCP self-connect, which can succeed with no listener at all when the
+source port equals the destination port. Both need a port inside the ephemeral range. Live is 86f95bb27 and
+nothing running uses these helpers. This is a test defect, not a product defect.
+
+## Brief: the scratch sshd's port is ours before a test uses it
+
+No `--after`. This row lands before row 194 b17, which rebases onto it and reruns its gate whole
+(mos-1270 item 3, the same order as row 279).
+
+What to build, in both helpers:
+
+1. The helper returns a port only when our sshd holds it. A connect alone isn't enough. One shape:
+   `daemon.exitCode === null` after `listening` returns true, plus sshd.log's "Server listening on
+   127.0.0.1 port N" line. The builder picks the proof and records it in BUILD.md.
+2. A bind failure or an early sshd exit retries with a new port, within the existing attempt limit. When
+   every attempt fails, the helper still throws 'scratch sshd did not start'. Never a skip.
+3. Ports come from outside the host's ephemeral range. Read /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range rather
+   than hard-coding 32768, and keep the pick at or above 1024.
+4. DEFERRED X5 binds this row because it touches grant-executor.test.mjs (DEFERRED.md, the "Grant executor
+   test X5 starts a `sleep 30`" entry). The `run(['sleep', '30'])` that X5 starts and then revokes
+   (grant-executor.test.mjs :989-990 at ceadad993) must not outlive its test. Use a stub that exits once its test dir is gone, as row 248 did for the hold stubs, or a shorter
+   sleep. The builder picks and records it in BUILD.md. The DEFERRED entry gets a closing line naming this
+   row.
+5. No product file changes. Nothing outside the two test files, plus a shared test helper if the builder
+   moves `sshd()` into one, plus DEFERRED.md and the packet.
+
+Tests:
+
+- A regression: a port already held by a plain TCP listener the test opens is refused, and the helper
+  retries and returns a different port that our sshd holds. The test may pass a port to the helper for this.
+- Every existing test in both files passes unchanged.
+- Repeat: each of the two files runs whole 30 times with the cli suite as load, with no timeout. Save the
+  counts and durations.
+
+Mutants, each killed by a named test:
+
+- M1. The old acceptance: return the port on `listening(port)` alone.
+- M2. The old pick, `20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000)`. If no single run kills it, record the
+  repeat counts and the reason, and Duckworth rules on it.
+
+Gate: Duckworth approves the manifest. Both files run whole, the bus suite is green on Sage's gate, the
+30-run repeat has no timeout, and M1 is killed. Row 194 b17's full gate then runs on top of this row. Any red
+goes to Mos (mos-1270).
@@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
 # Plan: Q175 phase 2 window, the live Console switches to --sso

-Sage, 2026-10-22. Draft 2 for Mos, after mos-1245. Sources: `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` sections 5
+Sage, 2026-10-22. Draft 3 for Mos, after mos-1266. It names 86f95bb27, live since 04:03:00Z on 10-22. Sources: `agents/sage/work/q175-sso/DESIGN.md` sections 5
 and 10 (phase 2 order, rollback, Jason-gated steps), Mos's C1 condition (mos-0977, b416d2ede), Jason's phase 2
-answers (Q209, mos-1216, mos-1217), mos-1195, mos-1197 and mos-1245. Rows 192 (phase 1), 200 (`activate --sso`)
-and its N1 follow-up have landed. Vikunja #412, Gitea #385.
+answers (Q209, mos-1216, mos-1217), mos-1195, mos-1197 and mos-1245. Rows 192 (phase 1), 200 (`activate --sso`),
+its N1 follow-up and 273 (`activate --send` and `--no-sso`) have landed. Vikunja #412, Gitea #385.

-## Blocked on a tool gap
+## The tool gap is closed

-Two steps need `scripts/stack-release.sh` flags that don't exist at 02da6a2ae:
-
- `activate` has `--no-send` but no `--send`. The live pointer holds no `--send`: the 10-20 19:29:56Z
-  re-pin of 490e2771d gave `--no-send`, and every activation since has carried it off. So step 5 can't turn
-  `--send` on (mos-1195).
- `activate` has no way to turn `--sso` off. Without `--sso`, `sso_base` carries it from the pointer
-  (`sso: carried`), and `check_target` refuses the pointer's own copy as `already-active`. The pre-window
-  flags (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`) have no activate option either. So R1's
-  same-copy rollback can't run.
-
-The fix is one small row, approved in mos-1246: `activate --send` and `activate --no-sso`. `--no-sso`
-takes the Console flags from the rollback set of the activation that turned `--sso` on, the way `sso_base`
-already does for a rollback to a copy without `--sso`. It drops `--send`, and its plan line says so. `--send`
-refuses unless the run's Console flags hold `--sso`, given or carried (F39). The cases for both go in
-`packages/cli/tests/stack-release.test.mjs`. F39 named test-release.sh, but that suite tests `release.sh`
-and never calls `stack-release.sh`, so it runs whole and unchanged. Darkwing builds it, and a seat other than Sage and Darkwing reviews it. Brief:
-`docs/plans/2026-10-22_activate-send-nosso.md`. It lands and is re-pinned before the window, on Mos's go,
-run by Jason or Mos. The steps below assume it, and draft 3 names the new copy.
+Draft 2 found two missing `scripts/stack-release.sh` flags: `activate --send` and `activate --no-sso`. Row 273
+added both (mos-1246, F39). It landed as 0bbf0f6d1 (Gitea #1778), and the 86f95bb27 re-pin put it live
+(activation 20261022T040256Z-86f95bb27f6c). `--send` refuses unless the run's Console flags hold `--sso`,
+given or carried. `--no-sso` takes the Console flags from the rollback set of the activation that turned
+`--sso` on, and it drops `--send`. Neither flag ran in that re-pin, so step 5 and rollback 1 are their first
+live use. Darkwing's gate on 0bbf0f6d1 ran stack-release.test.mjs 218/218, including T53, T57 and T58.

 ## When

-Only when Jason starts the window (mos-1197). Nothing below runs before his start. The 10-24 re-pin
-condition is met: W12 passed on 7247d80c7 at 22:27:13Z (mos-1245). This plan names 7247d80c7, which already
-carries phase 1, so its loader accepts a config with or without `console`. If another re-pin lands before
+Only when Jason starts the window (mos-1197). Nothing below runs before his start. The re-pin condition is met:
+W12 passed on 86f95bb27 at 04:26:43Z on 10-22, and Mos closed that window in mos-1266. This plan names
+86f95bb27, which carries phase 1 and row 273, so its loader accepts a config with or without `console`. If another re-pin lands before
 Jason starts, the plan names the copy live at that point, and step 3 runs against it.

 ## Who
@@ -64,12 +52,12 @@ Jason starts, the plan names the copy live at that point, and step 3 runs agains
   `wc -l` is 1; `tr -cd '\r' <slot | wc -c` is 0; the last byte is a newline (`tail -c1 | od -An -c`).
 3. Straggler check (C1): list every running process, unit and timer that reads config.json, with the
   copy it runs from (`/proc/<pid>/exe` and cwd links, `systemctl --user list-units`, `list-timers`). Each one
-   must run from 7247d80c7, or be shown never to re-read config. Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
+   must run from 86f95bb27, or be shown never to re-read config. Step 4 waits until the list is clean.
 4. Config write 1 (agent, backup from step 1): add `console.sso` with the values above and one subject
   `{ "sub": "pending-first-sign-in", "name": "jason.woltje" }`. `scripts/mosaic-config.mjs validate`
   reads it back before anything starts.
-5. First `scripts/stack-release.sh activate 7247d80c7 mosaic-stack --sso --send --plan`. Its from line must
-   name 7247d80c7 (`--expect-from` is for `--units external` only, so the live user units refuse it as a
+5. First `scripts/stack-release.sh activate 86f95bb27 mosaic-stack --sso --send --plan`. Its from line must
+   name 86f95bb27 (`--expect-from` is for `--units external` only, so the live user units refuse it as a
   usage error). Then the same command without `--plan`, the same way earlier re-pins handled the
   Console. The tester stays the private socket from row 196 (`--tester-socket`). The `--plan` output
   names every flag it drops (`--public-host`, `--auth-header`, `--allow-user`) and every flag it carries.
@@ -108,15 +96,16 @@ Jason starts, the plan names the copy live at that point, and step 3 runs agains

 ## Rollback

-1. Same-copy re-activate (mos-1245 R1): `scripts/stack-release.sh activate 7247d80c7 mosaic-stack --no-sso
+1. Same-copy re-activate (mos-1245 R1): `scripts/stack-release.sh activate 86f95bb27 mosaic-stack --no-sso
   --plan`, then the same without `--plan`. R1 asked for `--expect-from 7247d80c7`, but `--expect-from` is
   for `--units external` only and the live units are user units, so the plan's from line must name
-   7247d80c7 instead. The `--plan` output must show the pre-window Console flags from the step 1 pointer backup: `--port 7332 --public-host
+   86f95bb27 instead. The `--plan` output must show the pre-window Console flags from the step 1 pointer backup: `--port 7332 --public-host
   mosaic.woltje.com --auth-header X-authentik-username --allow-user jason.woltje --tester-socket`, exactly.
   `--no-sso` drops `--send` (mos-1246 F39), so there's no `--send`. A plan that differs is a stop. Mos or Jason restarts the Console.
-2. Restore config.json from the step 1 backup, which removes `console`. 7247d80c7 loads config with or
+2. Restore config.json from the step 1 backup, which removes `console`. 86f95bb27 loads config with or
   without the key, so the order of 1 and 2 doesn't matter on this copy.
 3. STATE after the rollback reads config.json, the unit's Console flags and the pointer.
-4. Last resort only, and it waits for Jason: `scripts/stack-release.sh rollback` goes to the previous
-   distinct copy, 4429a104f at schema 3i. The store has been at 3j since 21:59Z on 10-21, so that rollback
-   needs `--restore`, and any events after the backup make it Jason's call (header condition 3).
+4. Last resort only, and it goes to Mos first: `scripts/stack-release.sh rollback` goes to the previous
+   distinct copy, 7247d80c7. Both copies are at schema 3j and 7247d80c7 carries phase 1, so it's a pointer
+   flip with no `--restore`. Its `--plan` must show the pre-window Console flags above. Any restore goes to
+   Mos and ends the window (mos-1226).
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# stopRun reads a live run's status at the deadline (191 follow-up, MVP)
+
+Sage, 2026-10-22, for mos-1269. Row 194 b15's gate found it (honker-0121, sage-2510).
+
+## Why
+
+`stopRun` in packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs (row 191, 4bdc7e0e8) waits in
+`while (now() <= deadline)` (:333). Its final status read is inside `if (now() >= deadline)` (:356-359),
+and the loop sleeps `Math.min(20, Math.max(1, deadline - now()))` (:361). A real sleep can wake past the
+deadline. When it does, the loop condition fails before the final read runs, and :363 returns `'unknown'`
+for a process that is still alive and ignoring SIGTERM and SIGKILL. The expected outcome is `'alive'`.
+
+Row 194's T9a (cli lifecycle.test.mjs:562) caught it in the loaded cli suite: 'unknown' where 'alive' was
+expected, while the same file passed alone. Row 191's tests missed it because their fake clock advances by
+exactly the sleep, so it never overshoots. Live is 86f95bb27, which doesn't carry 191, so nothing running
+is affected.
+
+## Brief: stopRun's deadline branch is the only time exit
+
+No `--after`. 191 has landed. This row lands before row 194 b16, which rebases onto it (mos-1269 item 4).
+
+What to build:
+
+1. The time loop's only exit on time is the existing deadline branch, so the final status read always runs
+   once the deadline passes. One shape is `for (;;)` with the `now() >= deadline` branch as the time exit.
+   The builder picks the shape and records it in BUILD.md.
+2. The other exits stay as they are: record gone (the catch), identity changed, ended or not alive, and the
+   deadline branch's own mapping of `alive`, `killed`, `stopped`, `identity-changed` and `unknown`.
+3. Nothing else in runtimes.mjs changes. Vikunja 502's four items stay out (mos-1269 item 3). They follow
+   row 194.
+
+Tests:
+
+- A fake sleep advances the clock past the deadline while the process stays alive and ignores both
+  signals. stopRun reports `'alive'`.
+- The existing stop-run tests pass unchanged.
+
+Mutants, each killed by a named test:
+
+- M1. The old loop condition `while (now() <= deadline)` with the fall-through `return finish('unknown')`.
+
+Gate: Dewey approves the manifest. The processing-control package's tests (runtimes.test.mjs and
+stop-run.test.mjs among them) and every other touched test file run whole, the business and cli suites are
+green on Sage's gate, and M1 is killed. Row 194 b16's full gate then runs on top of this row. Any red goes to
+Mos (mos-1269).
@@ -319,6 +319,10 @@ at every gate. Started 2026-09-12 during the control board MVP.
  waits 30 s before it calls a lone `sleep 30` a leak. The row 197
  lanes scan only at lane end, about 15 minutes after pkg-bus, so they
  can't see it (mos-1169). (2026-10-21)
+  Closing note, row 280 (2026-10-22): both scratch sshd fixtures install a
+  bounded 30/60-second sleep stub that exits when its test directory is gone;
+  other sleep arguments exec /usr/bin/sleep unchanged. Evidence is recorded
+  in agents/rocko/work/queue-280/BUILD.md.

 - **Row 66 live checks: the unslop notice on a live managed session, both harnesses.**
  (mos-1186, Vikunja #454.) Row 66's gate asked for one landing session per
@@ -380,6 +384,58 @@ at every gate. Started 2026-09-12 during the control board MVP.
  credential and a real `release.sh activate`, and records both results on
  the re-pin row. Morgana's wording (row 244 BUILD.md), Webby N2 on row 244
  r1 (#1757). (2026-10-21)
+- **Creative instances: the human can't delete one.** (Sage's ruling
+  sage-2164 on the row 194 b4 rebase, #1692.) Row 213 put the creative
+  definitions in END_PROTECTED, and row 194's `deleteRefusal`
+  (`instance-settings.mjs`) refuses END_PROTECTED for every actor, so
+  the human can't delete a companion instance and fire refuses one too.
+  The Agents page hides Delete on the listing's `endProtected`. The fix
+  threads the actor through `deleteRefusal` and the launcher's delete
+  pass, so the human may delete one and the tester may not
+  (`creativeHumanOnly`). Until then, the human can delist
+  (instances.set launch: false) but neither fire nor delete removes a
+  creative entry (sage-2166). The row covers fire and delete together;
+  Sage files it. (2026-10-21)
+- **A fire stuck between step A and step B has no human escape.** (Webby
+  N4 on row 194 b5, webby-0094; Sage's ruling sage-2241, #1692.) The
+  broker's chief fire records `fire.stopped` at step A, and `#firing`
+  refuses every launch and take of the instance until a `fire.done`. The
+  events are in the store, so a bus restart doesn't clear them. Row 194
+  b6 runs the writer's checks against the file before step A
+  (`instance.fireCheck`), so a keep the bus hasn't loaded no longer
+  strands an instance. A step B that keeps refusing still does: a
+  credential revoke that fails every time, or a file a human changed
+  between the check and the write. Each repeat fire runs step A again
+  and refuses at B. The fix is a human verb, never an agent one, that
+  records the end of the firing (a `fire.done`, or a new
+  `fire.abandoned` that `#firing` also counts) with a reason. Its test:
+  a fire whose step B refuses leaves the instance `instance-firing`, the
+  verb as the chief or the tester refuses, and the verb as the human
+  clears it so the instance launches again. (2026-10-21)
+- **A fire's done with more than 64 stops refuses, and nothing flags a
+  run left alive.** (Webby N2 on row 194 b8 r2, webby-0100; Sage's ruling
+  sage-2290, #1692.) `lifecycleDone` caps `stops` at 64 and refuses
+  `invalid-request` above it (`broker.mjs`). The launcher's fireStop has
+  already signalled every run through stopRun by then, so the killed runs
+  are dead. But the refused done writes no lifecycle.end.killed or
+  lifecycle.end.alive event and no lifecycle.done, and the end request
+  stays taken. A run the stop left alive, or couldn't confirm (unknown),
+  gets no Console flag. The fire itself is unaffected, because
+  `fire.stopped` and `fire.done` are written at the verb. No MVP instance
+  comes near 64 runs. The follow-up row either raises the cap or splits
+  the done. Its test: a fire's done over the cap refuses, and the runs it
+  left alive still get the alive flag. (2026-10-22)
+- **A fired or deleted instance keeps its grants.** (Dewey on the row 236
+  rebase look, dewey-0815; Mos mos-1271; Sage sage-2558.) Row 194's
+  `instance.fire` and row 256's delete revoke only the roles entry's
+  credential services through `revoke()` in `runtime.mjs`. The agent's
+  host grants (row 235) and its Gitea user and token (row 236) stay live
+  until a human runs `mosaic hosts revoke` or `mosaic grants revoke`. The
+  Console has no revoke route and doesn't say a grant is left. Row 281
+  (#1786) closes it: a fire or a delete revokes every host and Gitea grant
+  the instance holds, fail closed, with a test for each kind. It lands
+  before the .53 Case 1 install hires an instance with a grant.
+  (2026-10-22)

 ## Queue

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Gaps found while working go to `docs/plans/DEFERRED.md`, not here.

 <!-- mosaic-queue:begin -->

-Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.
+Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3172 by `queue render`. Do not edit between the markers; change the queue with `scripts/mosaic queue`.

 | # | Piece | Owner | Issues | State | After | Gate | Brief | Note |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -227,10 +227,10 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 188 | stack-release tests: a carried proof pair and a proof file inside the repository (P19 409, 410; gates Part B) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1686 | done | 187 settled | Filbert approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_proof-test-gaps.md` § Brief: tests for the two proof-file paths row 187 left open | Landed 8fc0ee216 (author Darkwing) on 23a609c5c; patch-id c9a56b167c07 matches candidate 86aa549bad75 and Filbert's r1 reading; stack-release.sh blob 2586a2a37cd2 unchanged. Sage gate passed 10:58Z: cli 453/453 and every package and scripts/test-*.sh green. Filbert approve 29433, rev 2212; N1 (REPO logical path) to P19 after Part B (mos-0959). |
 | 189 | stack-release activate --no-send drops the Console's --send and keeps the pointer in step (Q175 interim, mos-0972, P19 413) | sage; reviewers dewey | #1687 | done | 163 done | Dewey approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the brief mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_activate-no-send.md` § Brief: activate --no-send drops the Console's --send | Landed ace27dc5e on refactor (cherry-pick of candidate d6116771f onto a4a42dbac). Gate GATE_PASSED on 0c177e9ef (base 0217b71c8), 2026-10-20T19:09:37Z-19:20:36Z, 25 suites rc=0. patch-id ce89378718f6 for both 0c177e9ef and ace27dc5e; range-diff differs only in the message. Landed manifest hashes to 67af69bd (Dewey approve 29485). Base drift 0217b71c8..a4a42dbac: 7 doc/README files, none on manifest paths, no test reads them. Brief re-pinned to blob 29a9e6d2d. |
 | 190 | several Mosaic Stack instances on one host: per-instance config, data root, units and ports (MVP T1.1, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1688 | done | — | Filbert approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the design mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_multi-instance.md` § Brief: several Mosaic Stack instances on one host | Landed 00d4cc1f6 on refactor (base 99a406ed3). Patch-id 5ec610a7 matches git diff 176a6bf4b..df65a3d4c on the 25 manifest paths. Manifest cc0ea9e8, Filbert approve r3 29713. Gate on d0bbc5c1c: packages 2664/0, scripts 429/0. Mutants 20/20. Unpushed. |
-| 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | — |
+| 191 | one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches, from the CLI and the Console (MVP T1.4, mos-0974, Vikunja #414) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1689 | done | — | Dewey approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli, bus, discord and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_kill-switch.md` § Brief: one kill switch for the bus, every run, Discord and new launches | Landed 0fa7bf421 fast-forward on 86f95bb27 (10 commits, 89 paths; manifest 0bcbf337 = 88 paths without BUILD.md). Dewey manifest APPROVE c30359 rev 3118. Gate: 77 mutants killed (75 assert + SR08, KS54 timeout with controls), suites green on Sage's window; N7 closed by runs suite 43/0/0 on 0fa7bf421. N6, clock fix, :52 assertion, generic cause go to Vikunja 502 (mos-1267/1268). Rebase next: 205, 236, 194, 253, 274, 268. |
 | 192 | Q175 phase 1: the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso), OIDC RP with oauth4webapi 3.8.8, no live change (MVP T1.2, #412) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1690 | done | — | Webby approves the manifest; webui and cli suites, scripts/test-config.sh and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; design section 9 mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_sso-phase1.md` § Brief: Q175 phase 1, the Console verifies SSO itself (--sso) | Landed 4429a104f on refactor (squash of launchpad/row192 53bb59462..37582e820, round 2 manifest 6f8cee14...7787). patch-id 4a4869026 matches the reviewed diff on all 18 paths. Gate on 088087ac9: package suites 2758/0, scripts 429/0, mutants 22 of 23 killed (#23 equivalent, sage-1407). npm ci in canonical, oauth4webapi 3.8.8. Live re-pin is a window with Mos (mos-1099 item 3). |
 | 193 | many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads, one access.json store (MVP T1.3, Vikunja #414/#415) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1691 | in-progress | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, business, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users.md` § Brief: many humans per business, human roles, private and shared threads | — |
-| 194 | agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) with a per-agent hire/fire veto (MVP T1.5, Vikunja #414/#415) | honker; reviewers webby | #1692 | in-progress | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, cli, business and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto | sage-1610 (honker-0049): a human add takes tracker {bot, botId}, required for a vikunja definition, refused otherwise, checked by checkBot and bot uniqueness; CLI and API only. Delete accepts a tracker bot when all credentials are store refs, and its result names the bot for removal by hand in Vikunja. No Vikunja account is created (Q188 untouched). Mutants: drop the requirement, refuse the bot on delete, skip checkBot on add. |
+| 194 | agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI (create, launch, terminate, regenerate, delete) with a per-agent hire/fire veto (MVP T1.5, Vikunja #414/#415) | honker; reviewers webby | #1692 | done | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, cli, business and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: agent lifecycle from the Console and the CLI, with a per-agent hire/fire veto | Landed fd6dd327c on refactor, a fast-forward on e122aad8e. b18 is b17 3f451772d rebased: 16 commits =, series patch-id 64303253f8e6, packages equal b17. Webby approve webby-0120 on manifest 29f131ab. Honker gate on fd6dd327c: runb8 39 files 503/0/0, mutants 17/17; gate.sh 18 packages 3668/0, ten scripts rc=0, Docker up, skips environment-only and named. Overlap with 13 and 257 clean. #1692 closed. |
 | 195 | row 195: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 as mosaic under /srv/mosaic, reusing C2-13's scripts by input under row 190's canon (Q181, Q182/Q183, Q185; ops-01 root steps under #423 step 1) | darkwing; reviewers duckworth | #1693 | done | 190 done, 226 done, 233 done | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_hub-own-uid.md` § Brief: the Case 1 install on 10.1.1.53 (row 195) | LANDED b65014647 (pushed 361ba2387 tip). Patch-id 656e43ff25de = 4ced5e63d..37171f65b; verify-commit ok, 5 paths. Combined gate with 213 on 38b83ea5c+paths 09:45:52-09:57:52Z: business 200/0 bus 542/0 harness 140/0 cli 663/0, all 10 scripts green, L1 killed. N1-N3 to DEFERRED next; follow-up darkwing/row195-n1 1e3c4767c. |
 | 196 | the human boundary across uids and humans: Console, tester listener, broker.sock and the path-bound human proof (P19 333, before federation R3, mos-0989) | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1694 | done | — | Duckworth approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; bus, webui and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-boundary.md` § Brief: the human boundary across uids and humans (P19 333) | Landed 7247d80c7 on 666173292: 39 manifest paths of 527b9a1e6 (CANDIDATE.sha256 537d30ae), patch-id 6f3777d593e6 matches f48725cfc..527b9a1e6 on the manifest, blob diff empty, tree matches merge-tree. Gate gander-0066 2334/0/1, all 10 shells, 38/38 mutants. Approved rev 2973 and rev 2986 (Duckworth, c30156). Overlap: 202 cli README and 194 Honker branches rebase onto it. BUILD-LOG and C1 DEFERRED follow doc-only. |
 | 197 | a second gate lane: two full gates at once on dragon-lin, design first (mos-0977 item 6) | herb; reviewers webby | #1695 | done | — | Webby approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate, singly and in the two-lane proof (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_second-gate-lane.md` § Brief: a second gate lane, two full gates at once on dragon-lin | Landed a36523713 on refactor (base 5afff5490, pushed 18:40Z): Herb's c45ddeb6b cherry-picked. Range-diff = (only the cherry-pick line), patch-id 79c46b98c685 equals c45ddeb6b and candidate A d2de56bd2; 37 paths equal, marker test absent (mos-1174 check). Proof 6 PROOF_PASSED 18:40:06Z, sage-r197p6: 8 waves 26/26 steps, cb A 124 B 125, probe ok, no event or cleanup errors, final CLEAR/CLEAR. Webby approved r8 (rev 2867). |
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 202 | FED R5: mosaic access list, grant and revoke (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers duckworth | #1700 | done | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R5, mosaic access list, grant and revoke | Chained on row 201's candidate (Q177), not its done: claimable now, lands after 201 and rebases onto its landing (Sage) |
 | 203 | FED R2: the federation key in the system config (#414) | quackerjack; reviewers webby | #1701 | briefed | — | Webby approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_federation-r1-r2-r5.md` § Brief: FED R2, the federation key in the system config | Chained on row 192's candidate (Q177): starts on 192's candidate, lands after 192 (Sage) |
 | 204 | 193a: access level check widened to viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1702 | done | — | Duckworth approves the manifest; business suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193a, the access level check widened to viewer | Landed d0bbc5c1c on refactor (base c9f374284). Patch-id 92c18aea matches git diff 44e36fc4c..f869fd062 on the 3 manifest paths. Manifest d38de8c9, Duckworth approve 29595. Gate 2789/0 on 4385b9ec1, mutants 7/7. Unpushed. |
-| 205 | 193b1a: the message filter (#1703; FED R3 and 193b1b build on it) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1703 | in-progress | 196 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1a, the message filter | — |
+| 205 | 193b1a: the message filter (#1703; FED R3 and 193b1b build on it) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1703 | done | 196 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1a, the message filter | Landed ce6a96ad6 fast-forward on 0fa7bf421 (3 commits, 4 paths, manifest 858463b1). Duckworth APPROVE r1 c30375 (signed :124 test diff, mos-1262). Gate: Morgana slot205 10 files, bus 652/0, M1 M11-M14 killed, 0 skips; Sage test-*.sh 10/10, 3 by-design skips. N1/N3 to 205b or R3, N2 to 193b2 brief, N4 = #1782 before any user thread. Rebase next: 268 r4, 194, 236, 253, 274. |
 | 206 | 193b2: thread shares, schema 3k-3l after the #436b build (#1691; live needs a --migrate window with Jason) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1704 | queued | 205 done, 234 done, 236 done, 275 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; bus suite, cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b2, thread shares (schema 3l) | — |
 | 207 | 193c: mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer (#1691) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1705 | queued | 202 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193c, mosaic access user verbs and --level viewer | — |
 | 208 | 193d: Console shared list, share controls and viewer read-only (#1691; also after FED R6 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1706 | queued | 192 done, 206 done | Duckworth approves the manifest; webui suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193d, the Console's shared list, share controls and viewer read-only | — |
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 233 | Installer I3: stack-upgrade.sh root driver and the ops-01 host run sheet (MVP, Q187, Vikunja #432) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1735 | done | 232 done | Filbert approves the manifest. The test file, the cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, with the mutants killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_installer-rows.md` § I3 the upgrade command and the host run sheet | Landed 57f59e0c3 on 5465fd52d (pushed 05:39Z). verify-commit matches the manifest (7 paths). Patch-id b16ac924 equals the candidate's (1a1dc80ca vs e65a3ab4d). Modes match. Sage's gate on the landing tree: cli 617/0, scripts/test-*.sh 585/0. Filbert N1, N4 and N5 go to row 240, N2 and N3 to DEFERRED. |
 | 234 | Machine grant row a: host enrollment, store records and migration 3i-3j (#436a, design r6 f9039682e, lands by 10-25 before the .53/.54 installs) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1740 | done | 210 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate. The design's section 10 row a tests and mutants pass, the migration test included. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` § Machine grant row a: enrollment, store records and migration 3i-3j | LANDED c771a36f4 (pushed 06:16Z 10-21) on caa4b5944: r3 c783d5e39 41 paths via temp index, modes from ls-tree. patch-id 32bbbea2bd6f equals the candidate's; verify-commit ok 41 paths. Gate on the c783d5e39 tree 06:02:12Z-06:15:26Z: 15 packages 2890/0, ten scripts/test-*.sh 585/0. Duckworth r3 approve 29935 rev 2683. N10, N12 to row 235. |
 | 235 | Machine grant row b: raise binding, executor, reconcile and revoke (#436, design r6 f9039682e, C1, N1, G27, G28) | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1741 | done | 234 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate. Section 10's row b tests and mutants pass, G27, G28 and the upsert mutant included. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_host-credentials.md` § Machine grant row b: raise binding, executor, reconcile and revoke | LANDED b1fece6f0, pushed (rode Darkwing SESSIONS aa19a2464). Cand ed4193316, manifest dad377ca8fe4, 13 paths, verify-commit ok, patch-id c355d2fc457d. Gate 10:30:55-10:42:43Z: bus 596/0, business 200/0, cli 666/0, all scripts green. Brief Gate met: duckworth-0089 approve, upsert mutant equivalent, row b and creative tests and mutants on Gizmoduck slot runs (38 of 39 killed, B17 equivalent). |
-| 236 | #436b Gitea grant path build: seat accounts and tokens through an approved grant, schema 3j-3k (design r5 1be535aca, due 10-27 at risk; live waits for Jason's section 8 approval and bootstrap step) | megavolt; reviewers dewey | #1742 | in-progress | 210 done, 234 done | Dewey approves the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate. Section 9's mutants are killed, N9's restart test included. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: #436b Gitea grant path, build (schema 3j-3k) | — |
+| 236 | #436b Gitea grant path build: seat accounts and tokens through an approved grant, schema 3j-3k (design r5 1be535aca, due 10-27 at risk; live waits for Jason's section 8 approval and bootstrap step) | megavolt; reviewers dewey | #1742 | done | 210 done, 234 done | Dewey approves the manifest. The bus, business and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate. Section 9's mutants are killed, N9's restart test included. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: #436b Gitea grant path, build (schema 3j-3k) | Landed bd5f11ded on refactor, a fast-forward on be2b008cc. It is 08840f3c1 rebased past 194 (commit 1 unions only, 2-7 =) plus 2 stale-pin fixes and a gitea-not-configured raise test (sage-2559). Dewey approve on manifest 0b00269b. Megavolt gate under Sage CLEAR: 2c green, bus 765, business 228, cli 832, ten scripts rc=0, mutants 40/40; skips named, env-only. Overlap 13/257 clean. Schema 3j-3k. #1742 closed. |
 | 237 | Row 199 follow-up N1: one decision publishes once (publish-busy or #spent recheck) | megavolt; reviewers duckworth | #1743 | done | 199 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutant is killed. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md` § Brief: row 199 follow-up N1, one decision publishes once | Landed d7d943199 on refactor (local, push pending), patch-id c5f4beb4 = e42415935, manifest bb777cb0 blobs checked. Sage gate 01:31-01:44Z on 816d48b03+4 paths: M1 killed (bus 1/13, cli 1/8), every package suite and scripts/test-*.sh green (bus 478, cli 564). |
 | 238 | row 200 follow-up N1: the sso-config hint carries --instance NAME (#1744) | launchpad; reviewers webby | #1744 | done | 200 done | Webby approves the manifest; stack-release.test.mjs whole, cli suite and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's gate; the mutant killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_stack-release-sso.md` § Brief: row 200 follow-up N1, the sso-config hint names the instance | Landed d49b1f2bd (pushed 07:25Z) on 86249ac55: the 3 manifest paths from 4c90099ea. Patch-id b9d0bb0ee3c7 equals the candidate's; modes and blobs match; verify-commit ok (3 paths). Sage's combined 228+238 gate on c515273db plus both rows' 6 paths, 07:11:30Z to 07:23:34Z: seat 165/0, cli 640/0, all ten scripts/test-*.sh 585/0. Mutant (sso-config drops --instance) killed, survived none. Round 1 N1 stays on the #1744 carry list. |
 | 239 | Row 194 follow-up: the credential revoke runs under the writer's lock, refusals after a revoke say so, and a stale-revision fire test (duckworth-0074, mos-1158) | honker; reviewers duckworth | #1745 | queued | 194 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus, business, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-lifecycle.md` § Brief: row 194 follow-up, the revoke under the writer's lock and a fire test | — |
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 253 | F27: case2-unit.sh and case1-accept.sh move to --tester-socket and refuse --tester-port with stack-release's migration wording; no .53/.54 copy with 196 until this lands (mos-1198 item 4) | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1758 | in-progress | 196 done | reviewer approves DESIGN.md then the manifest; cli and webui suites whole and every scripts/test-*.sh on Sage's slot; mutants per DESIGN.md; static check covers scripts and tests (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_tester-socket-scripts.md` § Brief: case2-unit.sh and case1-accept.sh move to --tester-socket (F27) | — |
 | 254 | Library sync follow-up: client timeout, STATUS codes, README (222 deferrals, #1759) | megavolt; reviewers dewey | #1759 | done | 196 done | Dewey approves the manifest; bus, library and webui suites whole and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's slot; the timeout and STATUS mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_library-sync-followup.md` § Gate | Landed 331597709 (candidate b31300d79 blobs and modes on 41b0cf755; patch-id 96216216 equal, range-diff differs only in the message) plus doc eb9672c91 (Dewey N1 README sentence closed; N2 four 502 codes to DEFERRED, binding the Console library routes row). Merged-tree rerun on Sage's slot 23:44-23:55Z: library 77/0, bus 628/0, webui 305/0 with 1 skip, cli 749/0. Megavolt's gate megavolt-0102 covers scripts and both mutants. |
 | 255 | Bundled Pocket ID for users with no OIDC provider, design (Q203, #1760) | launchpad; reviewers webby | — | queued | 252 done | Webby approves DESIGN.md; design only, build rows follow after Sage checks it against Q203, O6, REQ-WEB-2 and REQ-INST-1 (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_bundled-pocket-id.md` § Gate | Vikunja 458, Gitea #1760, mos-1202 item 2. REQ-INST-2 lands in PRD 1.10 as post-v1 (mos-1204). Design only: no install, no download, no .53/.54, dragon-lin keeps Authentik. |
-| 256 | the human deletes a creative instance; any other actor refused, fire unchanged (REQ-COS-3, before the v1 tag) | honker; reviewers webby | #1761 | briefed | 194 done | Webby approves the manifest; touched test files whole plus business, bus, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's slot; both mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_creative-delete-human.md` § Brief: the human deletes a creative instance (REQ-COS-3, after row 194) | — |
+| 256 | the human deletes a creative instance; any other actor refused, fire unchanged (REQ-COS-3, before the v1 tag) | honker; reviewers webby | #1761 | in-progress | 194 done | Webby approves the manifest; touched test files whole plus business, bus, cli and webui suites and every scripts/test-*.sh green on Sage's slot; both mutants killed (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_creative-delete-human.md` § Brief: the human deletes a creative instance (REQ-COS-3, after row 194) | — |
 | 257 | Q198 S1: pressure parser and pure rules evaluator (post-v1) | morgana; reviewers filbert | #1762 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Reviewer approves the manifest; touched test files whole plus the package suite green on Sage's slot; both brief mutants killed (post-v1, MVP keeps slot priority) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_post-v1-row-briefs.md` § Brief: Q198 S1 pressure parser and pure rules evaluator | — |
 | 258 | Email E01: mail PRD addendum draft and schemas (post-v1) | unassigned | #1763 | queued | — | Reviewer approves the manifest; the row's named tests whole plus the mail suite and touched suites green on Sage's slot; reviewer-named mutants killed (post-v1, MVP keeps slot priority) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_post-v1-row-briefs.md` § Brief: E01 mail PRD addendum draft and schemas | — |
 | 259 | Email E03: mail ledger, state and quotas (post-v1) | unassigned | #1764 | queued | 258 done | Reviewer approves the manifest; the row's named tests whole plus the mail suite and touched suites green on Sage's slot; reviewer-named mutants killed (post-v1, MVP keeps slot priority) (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_post-v1-row-briefs.md` § Brief: E03 mail ledger, state and quotas | — |
@@ -304,15 +304,20 @@ Generated from `docs/plans/queue.json` revision 3108 by `queue render`. Do not e
 | 265 | Case 2 C2-09b rooms: room.open, room.send with @tags, room.read | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1770 | queued | 219 done | Dewey approves the manifest. The brief's tests run whole plus the bus suite and every touched suite on Sage's slot. Grep for hash pins on changed files before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-09b rooms: room.open, room.send with @tags, room.read | — |
 | 266 | Case 2 C2-10c Console room view: merged timeline and @name completion | researcher; reviewers dewey | #1771 | queued | 225 done, 265 done | Dewey approves the manifest. The webui suite is green on Sage's gate, along with every touched suite. Grep for hash pins on changed files before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-10c Console room view: merged timeline and @name completion | Haiku high subagent under decision 129. |
 | 267 | Case 2 C2-15 hybrid universes: exclusions, pins and the end-to-end crossover | morgana; reviewers filbert | #1772 | queued | 216 done, 217 done, 224 done | Filbert approves the manifest. The brief's tests and the end-to-end crossover run whole plus every touched suite on Sage's slot. Grep for hash pins on changed files before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-15 hybrid universes: exclusions, pins and the end-to-end crossover | R8 accepted (sage-2218). Webby's R8 noise note (gosalyn-0127) is for the builder. |
-| 268 | Case 2 C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes | gizmoduck; reviewers webby | #1773 | in-review, round 2, request posted | — | Webby approves the manifest. The brief's tests run whole plus the library suite and every touched suite on Sage's slot; the brief's gate grep over packages and docs/case2 finds no library-playground-outside-book. Grep for hash pins on changed files before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes | MVP first claim (mos-1240). Lands before C2-05a (216) and C2-06 (217) read classify; if either has a candidate first, the change goes into it too (gosalyn-0134). Code library-playground-other-universe accepted (sage). |
+| 268 | Case 2 C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes | gizmoduck; reviewers webby | #1773 | done | — | Webby approves the manifest. The brief's tests run whole plus the library suite and every touched suite on Sage's slot; the brief's gate grep over packages and docs/case2 finds no library-playground-outside-book. Grep for hash pins on changed files before in-review. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_case2-rows.md` § C2-01c playground levels: universe-level prefixes and draft universes | Landed c27207f6e fast-forward on ce6a96ad6 (1 commit, 9 paths, digest caa0fa4e). r4 is a carry of r3 aca53c4f0: range-diff =, patch-id 2942acc8 equal, blobs equal. Webby APPROVE round 2 on ecd9b35eb stands; carries webby-0112 (r3) and webby-0113 (r4, notes 34e1ab2bf). Gate: Gizmoduck r4 rerun brief 14/14, library 83/83, business 209/209, 0 skips; gate grep empty. 194 rebases next (business.test.mjs). |
 | 269 | 264b T1 item 7: per-session native store, workspace and single-writer fence | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1774 | briefed | 264 done | Duckworth approves this slice's manifest. Its design tests run whole plus every touched suite on Sage's slot, and its mutants are killed (RULINGS Q1). Tests T1 run half, T2 workspace and path mutants; whichever of 191 and 264b lands second wires 191's admission checks (Q5). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_t1-sessions.md` § T1 item 7: independent sessions, compaction counts and clear context | — |
 | 270 | 264c T1 item 7: compaction count, exact for Pi | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1775 | briefed | 269 done | Duckworth approves this slice's manifest. Its design tests run whole plus every touched suite on Sage's slot, and its mutants are killed (RULINGS Q1). Test T3 Pi half; Claude shows unknown with the Vikunja 466 reason (Q6). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_t1-sessions.md` § T1 item 7: independent sessions, compaction counts and clear context | — |
 | 271 | 264d T1 item 7: clear context through row 194's lifecycle stop | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1776 | briefed | 194 done, 269 done | Duckworth approves this slice's manifest. Its design tests run whole plus every touched suite on Sage's slot, and its mutants are killed (RULINGS Q1). Tests T4 and T6; rebased onto 194's landing with no 194 code copied (Q4). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_t1-sessions.md` § T1 item 7: independent sessions, compaction counts and clear context | — |
 | 272 | 264e T1 item 7: mosaic session CLI and Console chooser | gizmoduck; reviewers duckworth | #1777 | briefed | 264 done | Duckworth approves this slice's manifest. Its design tests run whole plus every touched suite on Sage's slot, and its mutants are killed (RULINGS Q1). Tests T5 legacy single human and T7 Console half; controls for unlanded verbs refuse with a reason (Q1, Q7). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-21_t1-sessions.md` § T1 item 7: independent sessions, compaction counts and clear context | — |
-| 273 | Q175 phase 2: stack-release.sh activate --send and --no-sso (F39, mos-1246) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1778 | in-progress | — | Filbert approves the manifest. stack-release.test.mjs and stack-release-external.test.mjs run whole plus scripts/test-release.sh on Sage's slot, and the brief's mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_activate-send-nosso.md` § Brief: activate --send and --no-sso | — |
+| 273 | Q175 phase 2: stack-release.sh activate --send and --no-sso (F39, mos-1246) | darkwing; reviewers filbert | #1778 | done | — | Filbert approves the manifest. stack-release.test.mjs and stack-release-external.test.mjs run whole plus scripts/test-release.sh on Sage's slot, and the brief's mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_activate-send-nosso.md` § Brief: activate --send and --no-sso | landed 0bbf0f6d1 03:35:55Z, FF of 378a76b85; rebase of cac7d0f67, 6 range-diff pairs =, patch-ids equal, manifest e1031023 unchanged. Gate by Darkwing on 0bbf0f6d1: stack-release.test 218/218, external 25/25, test-release.sh rc 0, T58 c0 pass c1 fail, M1-M7 killed. Filbert APPROVE rev 3111 c30308, carry c30319. Docs 5365adaef (TOOLS.md N1 + BUILD-LOG). #1778. |
 | 274 | FED R3: broker user principal (#414) | morgana; reviewers dewey | #1779 | in-progress | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The bus and harness suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_federation-r3.md` § Brief: FED R3, the broker user principal | — |
 | 275 | 193b1b: viewer verbs and board refusals (also after FED R4 when filed) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1780 | briefed | 205 done, 274 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The bus suite and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-20_human-users-build.md` § Brief: 193b1b, viewer verbs and board refusals | — |
 | 276 | Row 253 F5: supervise the legacy AS_USER talk and diagnostics in the case scripts | gander; reviewers duckworth | #1781 | briefed | 253 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The touched test files run whole, every scripts/test-*.sh is green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_case-sudo-legacy-followup.md` § Brief: supervised legacy AS_USER calls | — |
+| 277 | The owner sees a thread agent's claims: an owner or reader read lists held thread claims (10-27, mos-1262; no user thread live before it) | morgana; reviewers duckworth | #1782 | in-progress | 205 done | Duckworth approves the manifest. The touched test files run whole, the bus and cli suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_owner-thread-claims.md` § Brief: the owner sees thread claims | — |
+| 278 | The Console Agents view shows thread claims (follow-up to row 277; no user thread live before it) | gander; reviewers webby | #1783 | briefed | 277 done | Webby approves the manifest. The touched test files run whole, the webui and bus suites and every scripts/test-*.sh are green on Sage's gate, and the mutants are killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_owner-thread-claims.md` § Brief: the Console shows thread claims | — |
+| 279 | stopRun reads a live run's status at the deadline: the deadline branch is the only time exit (191 follow-up, MVP, mos-1269; lands before 194 b16) | rocko; reviewers dewey | #1784 | done | — | Dewey approves the manifest. The processing-control package's tests and every other touched test file run whole, the business and cli suites are green on Sage's gate, and M1 is killed. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_stoprun-deadline.md` § Brief: stopRun's deadline branch is the only time exit | LANDED ceadad993 (carry of cad927137 onto 343b6dd76: range-diff 1:= 2:=, patch-ids 6d8ae7f4/e484c297 equal, Dewey APPROVE dewey-0809 c30409 + carry). Fix: stopRun loop is for(;;), deadline branch is the only time exit. Sage gate green: business 209/0/0, cli 794/0/0, discord processing+stop 9/0/0; Rocko stop-run 13/13, processing-control 62/62, M1 killed. Overlap sweep clean (13, 257). Next: 194 b16 rebases onto it (mos-1269). |
+| 280 | Bus tests: the scratch sshd proves it owns its port (194 gate follow-up, MVP, mos-1270) | rocko; reviewers duckworth | #1785 | done | — | Duckworth approves the manifest. Both files run whole, the bus suite is green on Sage's gate, the 30-run repeat has no timeout, and M1 is killed. Row 194 b17's full gate then runs on top. Any red goes to Mos (mos-1270). (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_sshd-port-race.md` § Brief: the scratch sshd's port is ours before a test uses it | Landed b0fd28b6f 07:57:30Z, ff from da5d3651d: b765f5cb8 (Duckworth approve rev 3153, manifest 27806c05) + slim packet. Sage gate bus 656/0/0, ge 41, hr 26 (c30431). Repeat 2010/2010 under cli 1588/1588, no timeout; M1/M2 killed 4/4. Full evidence d6c924764 on rocko/row280-da5d-20261022. N2-N4 carry in BUILD.md. 194 b17 rebases on b0fd28b6f. |
+| 281 | A fire or a delete revokes the instance's host and Gitea grants (194/236 follow-up, MVP, mos-1271) | megavolt; reviewers dewey | #1786 | briefed | 236 done | Dewey approves the design, then the manifest. Bus, business, cli and every touched test file run whole, plus the Docker gitea-grant test and every scripts/test-*.sh, green on Sage's gate. M1-M4 killed. Lands before .53 Case 1 hires a granted instance. Red goes to Sage, then Mos. (sage) | `docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md` § Brief: no grant outlives its instance | — |

 <!-- mosaic-queue:end -->

@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ an operator inspect content and delivery evidence after an uncertain result.
 | `hosts.remove` | `{host}`; the human or the tester. Deletes the record, writes `grant.host.removed` and removes the installer key. A `host_grants` record for the host is `host-in-use`, a guarded event naming a host line left on the host `host-line-left`. |
 | `hosts.revoke` | `{agent,host,reason}`; the human, the business's assistant, or the tester when `bus.tester` is exactly `true` (row 235, #1741, r6 section 6). Anyone else gets `revoke-refused`. The tester check reads `bus.tester` again at the call, `tester-dev-only`. One transaction deletes the `host_grants` record and writes `grant.revoked` with `hostLine:"pending"`. With no await between, the key leaves memory and its file goes, and a `host.run` or executor in flight aborts. Then `remove <user> <tag>` runs on the host and `grant.revoke.closed` records `hostLine:"removed"` or `hostLineLeft`. A revoke with no record still runs, with `granted:false`. Returns `{agent,host,tag,granted,keyFile,hostLine or hostLineLeft}`. A restart with a pending marker runs the remove once the bus is up; `hosts.status` lists its tag under `revoking`. |
 | `hosts.sweep` | `{host}`; the human or the tester (r6 X3). Runs `list <user>` and removes each listed tag this business recorded for the host in a `grant.step` or `grant.revoked` that no live grant holds. Another business's line and an unrecorded `mosaic-` line stay. Writes `grant.host.swept {host,removed,left}`; `hostLineLeft` then counts from it. Returns `{host,removed,hostLineLeft}`. |
+| `grants.status` | `{service:"gitea"}`; the human, the tester or the chief (row 236, #1742, #436b r5). The admin slot's url, account and rotate-by date with `rotationDue`, `adminTokenLeft`, the `gitea_users` and `gitea_grants` records, approved decisions not yet run (`spentAtNextStart`), grants `running` or `settlePending`, agents held as `tokenUnknown`, the `serviceLeft` entries a sweep retries, and revokes still `revoking`. No token. |
+| `grants.run` | `{decision}`; the human only. Starts the Gitea executor of a `credential.mint` decision with a gitea grant the human said yes to, as the yes itself does (X1). Step 0's refusals come back with no record: `not-authorized`, `decision-consumed`, `grant-token-unknown`, `grant-busy`, `gitea-not-configured`. Returns `{decision,agent,started:true}`; the outcome is a `grant.applied` or `grant.failed` and a notice. |
+| `grants.revoke` | `{service:"gitea",agent,reason}`; the human, the business's assistant, or the tester when `bus.tester` is exactly `true`. The token leaves memory and its file goes, an executor in flight aborts, then one transaction deletes the `gitea_grants` record and writes `grant.revoked` with the token ids to delete. The deletes run with the admin token after C1 to C4, and `grant.revoke.closed` records `serviceLeft`, a list. `credentials.revoke AGENT gitea` and `credentials.delete` do the same for a stack-made user; delete also deletes every token of the user and sets `prohibit_login` (fire). |
+| `grants.sweep` | `{service:"gitea"}`; the human or the tester. Closes open revokes, settles open rotations again, and retries each `serviceLeft` entry. A fire retry (`tokens`, `login`) first checks the user's id as the revoke close does, and a gone or remade user is skipped with `gitea-user-gone` or `gitea-user-foreign`. Writes `grant.sweep` and `grant.swept {left,skipped,settled,closed}`. |
+| `grants.admin.set`, `grants.admin.rotate`, `grants.admin.remove` | The human only (#436b r5 section 3). set takes `{service,url,account,rotateBy,token}`, checks C1 to C4 with the token, then writes the slot under `<configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/gitea`; a slot already there is `grant-admin-exists`. rotate `{service,rotateBy}` mints a successor admin token and names the old one in `adminTokenLeft`; `{service,finish:true}` deletes it. Rotation voids the approved decisions not yet run, as their `adminSha256` no longer matches. remove drops the slot. Each writes `grant.admin` with no secret. A left admin token that set or remove drops from `adminTokenLeft`, or one shown as `unknown`, has to be deleted by hand at Gitea. A running executor, revoke close or sweep keeps the admin api it started with: rotate voids only decisions not yet run, and remove takes effect from the next run. |

 Each of the three leaves one receipt in the organization's `changes.jsonl`: the actor and a
 `detail` of `{verb,agent,kind,date or reason}`, never a value. A change to the store alone writes
@@ -711,10 +716,10 @@ scope probes and rotation/expiry notifications; S2 never probes real services.

 ## Schema and verification

-`schema.sql` is v3j, SHA-256
-`0a7b633ce7eec9d0bb37c3255f4244d97bd0c8eac38db91a11b4ef6cc982ec8c`.
-It has 18 tables, 72 triggers and five views. Source digest and a trusted full
-sqlite_master digest are checked at open, alongside schema version `3j`, WAL,
+`schema.sql` is v3k, SHA-256
+`aba9240825a35fdcc741439d0708efa33afcf519d11cac9952c7207ad99250f0`.
+It has 20 tables, 72 triggers and five views. Source digest and a trusted full
+sqlite_master digest are checked at open, alongside schema version `3k`, WAL,
 quick_check and foreign-key integrity. Missing metadata refuses; it never
 reinitializes an existing file. Full synchronous WAL transactions either commit
 or roll back. SQL UPDATE, DELETE and INSERT OR REPLACE refuse on evidence tables.
@@ -882,6 +887,12 @@ step runs in one transaction, and a failure leaves the store at 3i. The 3i fixtu
 `tests/fixtures/schema-3i.sql`, is pinned from 8fede5fc6's tree, and `tests/grant-migration.test.mjs`
 covers the step and the trigger.

+Schema 3k (row 236, #1742, #436b r5 section 7) adds only two tables: `gitea_users`, the Gitea
+users the stack made (user, id and the nonce in their full name), and `gitea_grants`, the live Gitea
+grants (user, token id and name, projects, rotate-by date and decision), whose key references its
+`gitea_users` row. Each write goes in one transaction with a `grant.*` event. The step runs in one
+transaction, and a failure leaves the store at 3j. `tests/gitea-migration.test.mjs` covers it.
+
 The managed runner calls usage.begin before an actual harness turn and usage.end
 after it, including a failed/stopped turn. Each takes only {turn: deliveredMessageId}.
 The broker requires the bound role holder and its delivery, binds run identity,
@@ -935,3 +946,25 @@ narrow cross-instance reach, not reach within one instance.

 The Console provenance option trusts verified code and process metadata, not an independent
 bus-side OIDC exchange. That trade must be approved, not hidden behind the phrase zero trust.
+
+## Durable instance processing control
+
+`processing.status` is an authorized read. `processing.halt` ({}) and
+`processing.resume` ({generation}) require the existing human proof before
+validation or effects. They are management verbs independent of channels and
+never tester or role grants. The strict state under the resolved dataRoot's
+control/ directory is authoritative; reserved processing.halt/resume/stop
+actions mirror its durable transitions and write-once stop receipts with
+verified human and generation. Generic event writers cannot forge them. No
+schema change is needed. Invalid state refuses work and leaves control reads
+and human recovery reachable. Halt then resume repairs an invalid leaf; an
+unsafe parent is not automatically repaired.
+
+The bus remains a read/control service while new agent work, tracker polling,
+notifications and launches pause. Narrow exit cleanup remains possible. Every
+managed starter carries a generation and publishes identity before releasing
+work. Stops inspect root/boot/start identity or generated container id/labels,
+TERM concurrently, then KILL after five seconds and observe for two more.
+Unknown targets remain visible and prevent resume. Existing run evidence is
+not synthesized or rewritten. First activation stops old processing before
+trusted initialization and aligns the copy and image in the human's window.
@@ -394,3 +394,24 @@ CREATE TRIGGER events_grant_actor BEFORE INSERT ON events
    AND (json_extract(NEW.body, '$.action') GLOB 'grant.*' OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.operation') GLOB 'grant.*')
    AND NOT (NEW.actor_role IS NULL AND NEW.actor_run IS 'grant')
  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'only the grant writer records grant events'); END;
+CREATE TABLE gitea_users (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  agent TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user TEXT NOT NULL,
+  id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (id > 0),
+  nonce TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(nonce) = 16 AND NOT nonce GLOB '*[^0-9a-f]*'),
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, agent)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE gitea_grants (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  agent TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user TEXT NOT NULL,
+  token_id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (token_id > 0),
+  token_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  projects TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(projects) AND json_type(projects) = 'array' AND json_array_length(projects) > 0),
+  rotate_by TEXT NOT NULL,
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, agent),
+  FOREIGN KEY (business, agent) REFERENCES gitea_users(business, agent)
+) STRICT;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export class Client {
        socket.destroy();
        error ? reject(error) : resolve(value);
      };
-      socket.setTimeout(this.timeout, () => end(new BusError('outcome-unknown')));
+      socket.setTimeout(['processing.halt', 'processing.resume'].includes(verb) ? Math.max(this.timeout, 20000) : this.timeout, () => end(new BusError('outcome-unknown')));
      socket.on('connect', () => socket.write(request));
      socket.on('error', () => end(new BusError('outcome-unknown')));
      socket.on('end', () => end(new BusError('outcome-unknown')));
@@ -116,20 +116,26 @@ export class Credentials {
  #revoked = new Set();
  // Row 210 (design D5, D9): instance:host.<id> -> the AbortController of the call in flight.
  #inflight = new Map();
+  // Row 236 (#436b section 5): instance:service entries whose file memory never loads, the
+  // grant-token-unknown pairs. A revoke or a new issue clears one.
+  #held = new Set();
  #storeRoot;
  #repoRoots;
  #dataRoot;
  // storeRoot is <configDir>/secrets/agents (design D1); a reference with store: true must name the
-  // path under it for its own business, agent and service.
-  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env, storeRoot = null }) {
+  // path under it for its own business, agent and service. `held` lists "instance:service" keys whose
+  // reference loads and whose file doesn't (#436b section 5).
+  constructor({ references = {}, repoRoots = [], dataRoot, env = process.env, storeRoot = null, held = [] }) {
    this.#storeRoot = storeRoot;
    this.#repoRoots = repoRoots;
    this.#dataRoot = dataRoot;
+    for (const k of held) this.#held.add(k);
    try {
      for (const [instance, services] of Object.entries(references))
        for (const [service, ref] of Object.entries(services)) {
          const date = this.#checkRef(instance, service, ref);
          this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref, date });
+          if (this.#held.has(instance + ':' + service)) continue;
          const value = this.#read(ref, env, service);
          if (value !== null) this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { ...value, date });
        }
@@ -319,14 +325,66 @@ export class Credentials {
    this.#refs.set(instance + ':' + service, { ref: { service, store: true, file, [service === 'vikunja' ? 'expires' : 'rotateBy']: date }, date });
    this.#tokens.set(instance + ':' + service, { ...value, date });
    this.#revoked.delete(instance + ':' + service);
+    this.#held.delete(instance + ':' + service);
    return this.status().find((e) => e.instance === instance && e.service === service);
  }
+  // Row 236 (#436b section 5, settle forward): memory takes the store file as it is now, with the
+  // constructor's checks, and `date` becomes the entry's date. A held entry refuses.
+  reload(instance, service, date) {
+    const k = instance + ':' + service;
+    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
+    if (this.#held.has(k) || !ref.store) deny('credential-reference');
+    if (!day(date)) deny('credential-date');
+    const value = this.#read(ref, {}, service);
+    if (value === null) deny('credential-file');
+    this.#refs.set(k, { ref: { ...ref, rotateBy: date }, date });
+    this.#tokens.set(k, { ...value, date });
+    this.#revoked.delete(k);
+  }
+  // Row 236 (#436b section 5, grant-token-unknown): memory drops the token, as revoke's memory step,
+  // and a call in flight aborts. The file stays for the human to look at, and nothing loads it again
+  // until a revoke or an issue.
+  hold(instance, service) {
+    const k = instance + ':' + service;
+    this.#known(instance, service);
+    this.#tokens.delete(k);
+    this.#held.add(k);
+    this.#inflight.get(k)?.abort();
+  }
+  held(instance, service) {
+    return this.#held.has(instance + ':' + service);
+  }
+  // Row 236 (#436b section 5, settle): `operation` gets the token the store file holds now, read with
+  // the constructor's checks, or null when there is no file. Memory is untouched. The result is checked
+  // as use() checks it.
+  async useFile(instance, service, operation) {
+    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
+    if (!ref.store) deny('credential-reference');
+    const value = this.#read(ref, {}, service);
+    const result = await operation(value?.token ?? null);
+    this.assertClean(result);
+    if (value && JSON.stringify(result)?.includes(value.token)) deny('credential-leak');
+    return result;
+  }
+  // Row 236 (#436b section 5, a first grant's open commit at restart): the store file goes, and with it
+  // a token no record backs. An entry with a token in memory refuses: only a held entry is undone so.
+  unlinkStore(instance, service) {
+    const k = instance + ':' + service;
+    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
+    if (this.#tokens.has(k) || !ref.store) deny('credential-reference');
+    try {
+      unlinkSync(ref.file);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+    }
+  }
  // Memory first, then the store file (design section 6, D12). A file or env reference outside the
  // store is never unlinked; the caller turns its reference into store, so a restart finds nothing.
  revoke(instance, service) {
    const { ref } = this.#known(instance, service);
    this.#tokens.delete(instance + ':' + service);
    this.#revoked.add(instance + ':' + service);
+    this.#held.delete(instance + ':' + service);
    // Row 210 (design D9): a host.run in flight for this agent and host is killed first.
    this.#inflight.get(instance + ':' + service)?.abort();
    if (ref.store) {
@@ -425,9 +483,11 @@ export class Credentials {
        date,
        ...(hostKey ? { fingerprint: hostKey.fingerprint, publicKey: hostKey.publicLine } : {}),
        state: !this.#tokens.has(key)
-          ? this.#revoked.has(key)
-            ? 'revoked'
-            : 'not-issued'
+          ? this.#held.has(key)
+            ? 'held'
+            : this.#revoked.has(key)
+              ? 'revoked'
+              : 'not-issued'
          : service !== 'vikunja'
            ? left <= 0
              ? 'rotation-due'
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+// Row 236 (#1742, #436b design r5 at 1be535aca): the trusted half of the Gitea grant path, run in the bus
+// child. The broker gets it as `giteaGrant` and holds every store write and every step's order. This module
+// holds what touches the network or a secret file: the HTTPS calls to Gitea (each made through the
+// broker's `log`, which writes grant.call before and grant.result after), the admin slot (section 3c), the
+// binding's shape check (section 2), the admin checks C1 to C4 (section 3a), the start pre-load of held
+// pairs (section 5) and `giteaKeys`, the broker's narrow handle on Credentials.
+//
+// The admin token lives at <configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/gitea/admin, 0600 in 0700 dirs, with
+// admin.json next to it ({url, account, rotateBy, setAt}, no secret). Both are written tmp, fsync, rename,
+// as row 199's issue writes. Neither value reaches an event, a message or a log.
+import { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import {
+  closeSync, constants, fstatSync, fsyncSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmdirSync, unlinkSync, writeSync,
+} from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { BusError, GRANT_EVIDENCE } from './broker.mjs';
+import { day, privateDir } from './credentials.mjs';
+import { definitionSha256, grantTag } from './host-grant.mjs';
+import { canonicalJson } from '../../business/src/util.mjs';
+import { forkUrl, giteaName, ID_PATTERN, parseGiteaUrl } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
+
+const deny = (code) => {
+  throw new BusError(code);
+};
+const sha256 = (value) => createHash('sha256').update(canonicalJson(value)).digest('hex');
+// Section 2: the seat token's scopes, fixed by code (row 199 A2). Section 3b: the admin token's, exactly.
+// Both sorted, as Gitea reports scopes.
+export const SEAT_SCOPES = Object.freeze(['read:user', 'write:repository']);
+export const ADMIN_SCOPES = Object.freeze(['write:admin', 'write:repository', 'write:user']);
+// F6: the child-scope cap first ships in v1.27.0.
+export const MIN_VERSION = Object.freeze([1, 27, 0]);
+// Step 5: pages of 50, at most 20 of them.
+export const REPO_PAGE = 50;
+export const REPO_PAGES = 20;
+const TOKEN = /^[-A-Za-z0-9._~]+\n?$/;
+const MAX_BODY = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+const CALL_MS = 15000;
+const META_KEYS = ['url', 'account', 'rotateBy', 'setAt'];
+const AT = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{3})?Z$/;
+
+// C1: numbers, never strings, so 1.9.0 is below 1.27.0. A prerelease is below its release, so
+// 1.27.0-rc0 refuses (F6). Build metadata after "+" is ignored. Anything that doesn't parse refuses.
+const VERSION = /^v?(\d{1,6})\.(\d{1,6})\.(\d{1,6})(-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?(\+[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$/;
+export function versionAtLeast(value, floor = MIN_VERSION) {
+  const m = typeof value === 'string' ? VERSION.exec(value) : null;
+  if (!m) return false;
+  const v = [m[1], m[2], m[3]].map(Number);
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (v[i] !== floor[i]) return v[i] > floor[i];
+  return !m[4];
+}
+
+// Section 2's binding. Anything off refuses invalid-request; the broker checks the agent, its definition,
+// identity, publish list and the admin slot inside the raise transaction. rotateBy is a real calendar day
+// after `today`, the bus clock's UTC day: the rule row 199's host grants use (hostGrantCheck), since 199
+// names no other rotation window. Returns a fresh object with only the bound keys.
+export function giteaGrantCheck(grant, today) {
+  const allowed = ['method', 'agent', 'rotateBy', 'target'];
+  if (!grant || typeof grant !== 'object' || Array.isArray(grant)) deny('invalid-request');
+  const own = Object.keys(grant);
+  if (own.some((k) => !allowed.includes(k)) || allowed.some((k) => !own.includes(k))) deny('invalid-request');
+  if (grant.method !== 'gitea') deny('invalid-request');
+  if (typeof grant.agent !== 'string' || !ID_PATTERN.test(grant.agent)) deny('invalid-request');
+  const target = grant.target;
+  if (!target || typeof target !== 'object' || Array.isArray(target) || Object.keys(target).join() !== 'projects') deny('invalid-request');
+  const projects = target.projects;
+  if (!Array.isArray(projects) || projects.length < 1 || projects.length > 50) deny('invalid-request');
+  if (projects.some((p) => typeof p !== 'string' || !ID_PATTERN.test(p)) || new Set(projects).size !== projects.length) deny('invalid-request');
+  if (!day(grant.rotateBy) || grant.rotateBy <= today) deny('invalid-request');
+  return { method: 'gitea', agent: grant.agent, target: { projects: [...projects] }, rotateBy: grant.rotateBy };
+}
+
+// Section 2: over the agent's identity, its publish list and the remote of every project in it, since
+// step 5 checks against all of them. `projects` is the business's project map.
+export const identitySha256 = (role, projects) =>
+  sha256({
+    identity: role.identity ?? null,
+    publish: role.publish ?? [],
+    remotes: Object.fromEntries((role.publish ?? []).map((p) => [p, projects?.[p]?.remote ?? null])),
+  });
+// Section 2: over the admin slot's metadata, never the token.
+export const adminSha256 = (meta) => sha256({ url: meta.url, account: meta.account, setAt: meta.setAt });
+// Step 3: `mosaic-<tag>-<decision>`. grantTag already starts with "mosaic-".
+export const tokenName = (business, agent, decision) => `${grantTag(business, agent, 'gitea')}-${decision}`;
+export { definitionSha256 };
+
+// Section 3d: one HTTPS call. Never rejects: no answer (refused, reset, TLS failure, timeout, a body over
+// the cap) is status 0. A redirect is returned as its status, never followed. `auth` is {token} for the
+// `token` header or {basic: [account, token]} (F1). The result is {status, json, total}, total from
+// X-Total-Count; it holds no header and no request detail.
+export function send({ url, method, path, auth, body, ca, timeoutMs = CALL_MS }) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    let done = false,
+      req = null;
+    const end = (r) => {
+      if (done) return;
+      done = true;
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      resolve(r);
+    };
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      req?.destroy();
+      end({ status: 0, json: null, total: null });
+    }, timeoutMs);
+    try {
+      const headers = {
+        accept: 'application/json',
+        authorization: auth.basic ? 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(auth.basic.join(':')).toString('base64') : 'token ' + auth.token,
+      };
+      const data = body === undefined ? null : Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(body));
+      if (data) {
+        headers['content-type'] = 'application/json';
+        headers['content-length'] = String(data.length);
+      }
+      req = httpsRequest(new URL(path, url), { method, headers, ca, agent: false }, (res) => {
+        const chunks = [];
+        let size = 0;
+        res.on('data', (c) => {
+          size += c.length;
+          if (size > MAX_BODY) {
+            req.destroy();
+            end({ status: 0, json: null, total: null });
+          } else chunks.push(c);
+        });
+        res.on('end', () => {
+          let json = null;
+          try {
+            json = size ? JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')) : null;
+          } catch {}
+          const t = res.headers['x-total-count'];
+          end({ status: res.statusCode, json, total: t === undefined || !/^\d+$/.test(t) ? null : Number(t) });
+        });
+        res.on('error', () => end({ status: 0, json: null, total: null }));
+      });
+      req.on('error', () => end({ status: 0, json: null, total: null }));
+      req.end(data ?? undefined);
+    } catch {
+      end({ status: 0, json: null, total: null });
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+const segment = (value) => encodeURIComponent(String(value));
+
+// C1 to C4 (section 3a), each call through the api's log. Throws the refusal code. Returns the admin
+// token's own name from C3 (F7), which rotate deletes by.
+export async function adminChecks(api, account) {
+  const v = await api.version();
+  if (v.status !== 200) deny('gitea-failed');
+  if (!versionAtLeast(v.json?.version)) deny('gitea-too-old');
+  const self = await api.self();
+  if (self.status === 401 || self.status === 403) deny('grant-admin-account');
+  if (self.status !== 200) deny('gitea-failed');
+  if (self.json?.login !== account || self.json?.is_admin !== true) deny('grant-admin-account');
+  const t = await api.tokenScopes();
+  if (t.status !== 200) deny(t.status === 401 || t.status === 403 ? 'grant-admin-account' : 'gitea-failed');
+  const scopes = t.json?.scopes;
+  if (!Array.isArray(scopes) || [...scopes].sort().join() !== ADMIN_SCOPES.join()) deny('grant-admin-scope');
+  const r = await api.reposCheck();
+  if (r.status !== 200 || !Array.isArray(r.json)) deny('gitea-failed');
+  if (r.json.length !== 0 || (r.total !== null && r.total !== 0)) deny('grant-admin-not-dedicated');
+  return typeof t.json?.name === 'string' ? t.json.name : null;
+}
+
+// One token file's text, read with Credentials' checks: no symlink, a regular file the stack's user owns,
+// 0600, at most 16 KiB, then the token format. null if `missing` and there is no file.
+function readSecretFile(file, { missing = false } = {}) {
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = openSync(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (missing && e.code === 'ENOENT') return null;
+    deny('credential-file');
+  }
+  try {
+    const s = fstatSync(fd);
+    if (!s.isFile() || s.uid !== process.getuid() || (s.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600 || s.size > 16384) deny('credential-file');
+    return readFileSync(fd, 'utf8');
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof BusError) throw e;
+    deny('credential-file');
+  } finally {
+    closeSync(fd);
+  }
+}
+export function checkToken(token) {
+  if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16384 || !TOKEN.test(token)) deny('credential-format');
+  const t = token.replace(/\n$/, '');
+  if (t.length < 16) deny('credential-format');
+  return t;
+}
+function writeFileAtomic(dir, name, text) {
+  const file = join(dir, name);
+  const tmp = file + '.tmp';
+  try {
+    unlinkSync(tmp);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+  }
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = openSync(tmp, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
+    writeSync(fd, text);
+    fsyncSync(fd);
+  } finally {
+    if (fd !== undefined) closeSync(fd);
+  }
+  renameSync(tmp, file);
+  const dirFd = openSync(dir, constants.O_RDONLY);
+  try {
+    fsyncSync(dirFd);
+  } finally {
+    closeSync(dirFd);
+  }
+}
+
+// The trusted Gitea half. `ca` is a PEM the HTTPS calls trust instead of the system's, for the tests'
+// fake Gitea; production passes none. `send` is replaceable only for the tests' failure rows.
+export function giteaGrant({ configDir, ca = undefined, timeoutMs = CALL_MS, transport = send }) {
+  const grantsRoot = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'grants');
+  const slotDir = (business) => join(grantsRoot, business, 'gitea');
+  const slotDirs = (business) => [grantsRoot, join(grantsRoot, business), slotDir(business)];
+  // Section 3c: the slot's metadata, or null when there is no slot. A slot dir or file that isn't the
+  // stack user's own and private refuses credential-file, as does metadata of any other shape.
+  const adminMeta = (business) => {
+    for (const dir of slotDirs(business)) if (!privateDir(dir, { missing: true })) return null;
+    const text = readSecretFile(join(slotDir(business), 'admin.json'), { missing: true });
+    if (text === null) return null;
+    let meta;
+    try {
+      meta = JSON.parse(text);
+    } catch {
+      deny('credential-file');
+    }
+    if (
+      !meta || typeof meta !== 'object' || Array.isArray(meta) ||
+      Object.keys(meta).sort().join() !== [...META_KEYS].sort().join() ||
+      !parseGiteaUrl(meta.url).url || !giteaName(meta.account) || !day(meta.rotateBy) ||
+      typeof meta.setAt !== 'string' || !AT.test(meta.setAt)
+    )
+      deny('credential-file');
+    return { url: meta.url, account: meta.account, rotateBy: meta.rotateBy, setAt: meta.setAt };
+  };
+  const adminToken = (business) => {
+    for (const dir of slotDirs(business)) privateDir(dir);
+    return checkToken(readSecretFile(join(slotDir(business), 'admin')));
+  };
+  // The admin api over one token. Basic on the token routes (F1), the `token` header elsewhere. Every
+  // call goes through log(op, run, after).
+  const adminApi = (url, account, token, log) => {
+    const header = { token };
+    const basic = { basic: [account, token] };
+    const go = (op, method, path, auth, body, after) => log(op, () => transport({ url, method, path, auth, body, ca, timeoutMs }), after);
+    return {
+      version: () => go('version', 'GET', '/api/v1/version', header),
+      self: () => go('self', 'GET', '/api/v1/user', header),
+      tokenScopes: () => go('token-scopes', 'GET', '/api/v1/token', header),
+      reposCheck: () => go('repos-check', 'GET', '/api/v1/user/repos?limit=1&page=1', header),
+      userGet: (user) => go('user-get', 'GET', `/api/v1/users/${segment(user)}`, header),
+      userCreate: (body, after) => go('user-create', 'POST', '/api/v1/admin/users', header, body, after),
+      userPatch: (user, body) => go('user-patch', 'PATCH', `/api/v1/admin/users/${segment(user)}`, header, body),
+      tokenList: (user, page) => go('token-list', 'GET', `/api/v1/users/${segment(user)}/tokens?limit=50&page=${page}`, basic),
+      tokenCreate: (user, name, scopes = SEAT_SCOPES, op = 'token-create') =>
+        go(op, 'POST', `/api/v1/users/${segment(user)}/tokens`, basic, { name, scopes: [...scopes] }),
+      tokenDelete: (user, idOrName) => go('token-delete', 'DELETE', `/api/v1/users/${segment(user)}/tokens/${segment(idOrName)}`, basic),
+    };
+  };
+  return {
+    giteaGrantCheck,
+    identitySha256,
+    adminSha256,
+    definitionSha256,
+    tokenName,
+    adminMeta,
+    openGrants: openGiteaGrants,
+    tokenUnknown,
+    checkToken,
+    forkUrl,
+    repoPage: REPO_PAGE,
+    repoPages: REPO_PAGES,
+    // The admin api over the slot's token, for a grant, an undo, a revoke or a sweep. Refuses
+    // grant-admin-missing with no slot.
+    admin(business, log) {
+      const meta = adminMeta(business);
+      if (!meta) deny('grant-admin-missing');
+      return { meta, api: adminApi(meta.url, meta.account, adminToken(business), log) };
+    },
+    adminChecks,
+    // The seat token's calls, made with the minted token (steps 4 and 5) or the store file's (settle).
+    seat(url, token, log) {
+      const header = { token };
+      const go = (op, method, path, body) => log(op, () => transport({ url, method, path, auth: header, body, ca, timeoutMs }));
+      return {
+        self: () => go('seat-self', 'GET', '/api/v1/user'),
+        repos: (page) => go('seat-repos', 'GET', `/api/v1/user/repos?limit=${REPO_PAGE}&page=${page}`),
+        forkGet: (owner, repo) => go('fork-get', 'GET', `/api/v1/repos/${segment(owner)}/${segment(repo)}`),
+        fork: (owner, repo) => go('fork', 'POST', `/api/v1/repos/${segment(owner)}/${segment(repo)}/forks`, {}),
+        whoami: () => go('token-whoami', 'GET', '/api/v1/token'),
+      };
+    },
+    // Section 3e: `set` checks C1 to C4 with the given token before it writes anything. A slot already
+    // there refuses grant-admin-exists, whatever its url (remove first). Returns the metadata written.
+    async setAdmin(business, { url, account, rotateBy, token, setAt }, log) {
+      const t = checkToken(token);
+      if (adminMeta(business)) deny('grant-admin-exists');
+      await adminChecks(adminApi(url, account, t, log), account);
+      if (adminMeta(business)) deny('grant-admin-exists');
+      const meta = { url, account, rotateBy, setAt };
+      this.writeAdmin(business, t, meta);
+      return meta;
+    },
+    // The slot's write: the token, then admin.json, each tmp, fsync, rename. Dirs are made 0700.
+    writeAdmin(business, token, meta) {
+      mkdirSync(join(configDir, 'secrets'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+      for (const dir of slotDirs(business)) {
+        if (!privateDir(dir, { missing: true })) mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+        privateDir(dir);
+      }
+      writeFileAtomic(slotDir(business), 'admin', checkToken(token) + '\n');
+      writeFileAtomic(slotDir(business), 'admin.json', JSON.stringify(meta) + '\n');
+    },
+    // Section 3d rotate: C1 to C4, the successor minted for the admin account itself and named by the
+    // UTC second, C2 and C3 with it, then the write. The old token is deleted by name with the new one;
+    // `left` names it if that fails. A name already taken (two rotations in one second) refuses before
+    // anything is written. `stamp` is yyyymmddThhmmssZ.
+    async rotateAdmin(business, { rotateBy, setAt, stamp }, log) {
+      const { meta, api } = this.admin(business, log);
+      const oldName = await adminChecks(api, meta.account);
+      const name = `mosaic-grant-${stamp}`;
+      if (name === oldName) deny('grant-admin-name-taken');
+      const r = await api.tokenCreate(meta.account, name, ADMIN_SCOPES, 'admin-rotate');
+      if (r.status === 400 || r.status === 422) deny('grant-admin-name-taken');
+      if (r.status !== 201 || typeof r.json?.sha1 !== 'string') deny('gitea-failed');
+      const successor = checkToken(r.json.sha1);
+      const next = adminApi(meta.url, meta.account, successor, log);
+      const self = await next.self();
+      if (self.status !== 200 || self.json?.login !== meta.account || self.json?.is_admin !== true) deny('grant-admin-account');
+      const t = await next.tokenScopes();
+      if (t.status !== 200 || !Array.isArray(t.json?.scopes) || [...t.json.scopes].sort().join() !== ADMIN_SCOPES.join()) deny('grant-admin-scope');
+      const written = { url: meta.url, account: meta.account, rotateBy, setAt };
+      this.writeAdmin(business, successor, written);
+      let left = null;
+      if (oldName === null) left = 'unknown';
+      else {
+        const d = await next.tokenDelete(meta.account, oldName);
+        if (d.status !== 204 && d.status !== 404) left = oldName;
+      }
+      return { meta: written, tokenName: name, adminTokenLeft: left };
+    },
+    // rotate --finish: the old token by name, with the slot's token.
+    async finishRotate(business, oldName, log) {
+      const { meta, api } = this.admin(business, log);
+      await adminChecks(api, meta.account);
+      const d = await api.tokenDelete(meta.account, oldName);
+      if (d.status !== 204 && d.status !== 404) deny('gitea-failed');
+    },
+    // Section 3d remove: the slot's files and dir go. No network call.
+    removeAdmin(business) {
+      if (!adminMeta(business)) deny('grant-admin-missing');
+      for (const name of ['admin', 'admin.json', 'admin.tmp', 'admin.json.tmp'])
+        try {
+          unlinkSync(join(slotDir(business), name));
+        } catch (e) {
+          if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') deny('credential-file');
+        }
+      try {
+        rmdirSync(slotDir(business));
+      } catch {
+        deny('credential-file');
+      }
+    },
+    // Step 2: the never-stored password of a new user and the nonce in its full_name.
+    password: () => randomBytes(24).toString('base64url'),
+    nonce: () => randomBytes(8).toString('hex'),
+  };
+}
+
+// The store reference for an agent's gitea token, as Credentials checks it.
+export const giteaReference = (storeRoot, business, agent, rotateBy) => ({
+  store: true,
+  file: storeRoot ? join(storeRoot, business, agent, 'gitea') : null,
+  rotateBy,
+});
+
+// The grant executor's calls on Credentials, keyed by (business, agent). The broker gets this and never
+// Credentials itself, so it still has no use(); useFile hands the file's token only to a settle call.
+export function giteaKeys({ credentials, storeRoot }) {
+  const at = (business, agent) => business + '/' + agent;
+  return {
+    claim: (business, agent) => credentials.claim(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    release: (business, agent, signal) => credentials.release(at(business, agent), 'gitea', signal),
+    abortClaim: (business, agent) => credentials.abortClaim(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    known: (business, agent) => credentials.status().some((e) => e.instance === at(business, agent) && e.service === 'gitea'),
+    register: (business, agent, rotateBy) => credentials.register(at(business, agent), 'gitea', giteaReference(storeRoot, business, agent, rotateBy)),
+    unregister: (business, agent) => credentials.unregister(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    issue: (business, agent, token, rotateBy, commit) => credentials.issue(at(business, agent), 'gitea', token, rotateBy, commit),
+    revoke: (business, agent) => credentials.revoke(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    reload: (business, agent, rotateBy) => credentials.reload(at(business, agent), 'gitea', rotateBy),
+    hold: (business, agent) => credentials.hold(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    held: (business, agent) => credentials.held(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+    useFile: (business, agent, fn) => credentials.useFile(at(business, agent), 'gitea', fn),
+    unlinkStore: (business, agent) => credentials.unlinkStore(at(business, agent), 'gitea'),
+  };
+}
+
+// Section 5, before Credentials loads, read-only on the store: each gitea_grants record gives its agent
+// a store reference to gitea, and `held` lists the pairs whose file memory must not load. Those are an
+// agent whose last gitea grant.failed is grant-token-unknown with no grant.revoked after it, and an
+// agent with an open first grant whose last step is commit: its file may hold a token no record backs,
+// and the broker's reconcile unlinks it. Only grant evidence counts (duckworth-0067 N1). `references`
+// is changed in place: a record's reference replaces a business-file gitea reference, which names the
+// same store path or a file the record supersedes.
+export function giteaStart(store, storeRoot, businesses, references) {
+  const held = [];
+  for (const g of store.all('SELECT business, agent, rotate_by FROM gitea_grants ORDER BY business, agent')) {
+    if (!Object.hasOwn(businesses, g.business)) continue;
+    const refs = (references[g.business + '/' + g.agent] = { ...(references[g.business + '/' + g.agent] ?? {}) });
+    refs.gitea = giteaReference(storeRoot, g.business, g.agent, g.rotate_by);
+  }
+  for (const business of Object.keys(businesses)) {
+    for (const agent of tokenUnknown(store, business).keys()) held.push(business + '/' + agent + ':gitea');
+    for (const o of openGiteaGrants(store, business))
+      if (o.step?.step === 'commit' && o.step.previousTokenId === null) held.push(business + '/' + o.agent + ':gitea');
+  }
+  return { held: [...new Set(held)] };
+}
+
+const evidence = (store, business, where, ...args) =>
+  store.all(`SELECT seq, body FROM events WHERE business=? AND ${GRANT_EVIDENCE} AND ${where} ORDER BY seq`, business, ...args)
+    .map((e) => ({ seq: e.seq, body: JSON.parse(e.body) }));
+
+// agent -> {decision, seq}: the agents whose last gitea grant.failed is grant-token-unknown with no gitea
+// grant.revoked after it (section 5's held row).
+export function tokenUnknown(store, business) {
+  const last = new Map();
+  for (const e of evidence(store, business, "json_extract(body,'$.method')='gitea' AND json_extract(body,'$.action') IN ('grant.failed','grant.revoked')"))
+    if (e.body.action === 'grant.revoked') last.delete(e.body.agent);
+    else if (e.body.code === 'grant-token-unknown') last.set(e.body.agent, { decision: e.body.grantDecision, seq: e.seq });
+  return last;
+}
+
+// Every gitea grant spent with no grant.applied or grant.failed after its spend: {decision, agent, step,
+// seq, revokedAfter}. step is the last grant.step body or null, seq that step's or the spend's, and
+// revokedAfter says a gitea grant.revoked of the agent came after it (N9). A step 0 grant.failed comes
+// before the spend, so only ends after it count.
+export function openGiteaGrants(store, business) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (const spend of evidence(store, business, "json_extract(body,'$.operation')='grant.gitea'")) {
+    const decision = spend.body.decision;
+    const mine = evidence(store, business, "json_extract(body,'$.grantDecision')=? AND seq > ?", decision, spend.seq);
+    if (mine.some((e) => e.body.action === 'grant.applied' || e.body.action === 'grant.failed')) continue;
+    const last = mine.filter((e) => e.body.action === 'grant.step').at(-1) ?? null;
+    out.push({ decision, agent: last?.body.agent ?? null, step: last?.body ?? null, seq: last?.seq ?? spend.seq });
+  }
+  for (const o of out)
+    o.revokedAfter =
+      o.agent !== null &&
+      evidence(store, business, "json_extract(body,'$.method')='gitea' AND json_extract(body,'$.action')='grant.revoked' AND json_extract(body,'$.agent')=? AND seq > ?", o.agent, o.seq)
+        .length > 0;
+  return out;
+}
@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@ try {
  const client = new Client({
    path: process.argv[2],
    // Row 254: library.sync fetches for up to 100 s and the server holds its socket for 120 s,
-    // so wait past that for the server's own answer. Every other verb keeps the 5 s default.
-    timeout: request.verb === 'library.sync' ? 130_000 : undefined,
+    // so wait past that for the server's own answer. Row 236: the grants verbs call Gitea and get the
+    // same wait. Every other verb keeps the 5 s default.
+    timeout: request.verb === 'library.sync' || request.verb.startsWith('grants.') ? 130_000 : undefined,
    human: {
      business: request.business,
      pid: me.pid,
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-- Row 236 (#436b, #1742, design r5 section 7): the Gitea users this stack made and the Gitea grants
+-- live in the store. The grant executor, revoke and sweep are the only writers, each in the
+-- transaction of its event. Only new tables; the grant event trigger from 3j covers their events.
+CREATE TABLE gitea_users (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  agent TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user TEXT NOT NULL,
+  id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (id > 0),
+  nonce TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(nonce) = 16 AND NOT nonce GLOB '*[^0-9a-f]*'),
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, agent)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE gitea_grants (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  agent TEXT NOT NULL,
+  user TEXT NOT NULL,
+  token_id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (token_id > 0),
+  token_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  projects TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(projects) AND json_type(projects) = 'array' AND json_array_length(projects) > 0),
+  rotate_by TEXT NOT NULL,
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, agent),
+  FOREIGN KEY (business, agent) REFERENCES gitea_users(business, agent)
+) STRICT;
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ const LAUNCH_OPS = new Set([
  'mayLaunch',
  'landHolders',
  'landRelease',
+  'lifecycleRequests',
+  'lifecycleTake',
+  'lifecycleDelete',
+  'lifecycleDone',
 ]);
 function launchOp(m) {
  if (m.op === 'identity') return runtime.identity(m.cap);
@@ -55,6 +59,11 @@ function launchOp(m) {
  // role run started before its decision was resolved.
  if (m.op === 'landHolders') return runtime.landHolders(m.business);
  if (m.op === 'landRelease') return runtime.landRelease(m.record);
+  // Row 194 (#1692, D1.1): the launcher's lifecycle pass.
+  if (m.op === 'lifecycleRequests') return runtime.lifecycleRequests(m.business);
+  if (m.op === 'lifecycleTake') return runtime.lifecycleTake(m.record);
+  if (m.op === 'lifecycleDelete') return runtime.lifecycleDelete(m.record);
+  if (m.op === 'lifecycleDone') return runtime.lifecycleDone(m.record);
  if (m.op === 'credentialStatus') return runtime.credentialStatus(m.business, m.role);
  // Every LAUNCH_OPS name has its line above. A missing one used to answer as credentialStatus,
  // whose [] for an unknown role read as "no holders" for landHolders (row 156 mutant P02).
@@ -13,16 +13,28 @@ import { publishRemote, workingRepo, WorkingError } from '../../seat/src/working
 import { createLoader, hasModule } from '../../plugins/src/loader.mjs';
 import { pluginSettings } from '../../business/src/plugin-settings.mjs';
 import { instanceSettings } from '../../business/src/instance-settings.mjs';
-import { organizationWriter } from '../../business/src/organization.mjs';
+import { organizationWriter, OrganizationError } from '../../business/src/organization.mjs';
 import { credentialVerbs } from './credential-verbs.mjs';
+import { loadBusiness } from '../../business/src/business.mjs';
+import { loadRole } from '../../business/src/role.mjs';
+import { resolveInstance } from '../../business/src/resolve.mjs';
+import { canonicalJson } from '../../business/src/util.mjs';
+import { busBusiness } from './business.mjs';
 import { webService } from './web.mjs';
 import { hostExecutor, sweepRunDir } from './host-run.mjs';
 import { grantKeys, hostGrant, hostReference, sweepHostKeys } from './host-grant.mjs';
+import { giteaGrant, giteaKeys, giteaStart } from './gitea-grant.mjs';
 import { verifyPrincipal } from './principal.mjs';
 import { inspectInterpreter, recordInterpreterStart } from './interpreter.mjs';
 import { createPeerReader } from './peercred.mjs';
 import { createUsage } from './usage.mjs';
 import { createLimits } from './limits.mjs';
+import { createProcessing } from '../../processing-control/src/coordinator.mjs';
+import { discordProcessingHooks } from '../../discord/src/processing.mjs';
+import { createContainerStopper } from '../../processing-control/src/containers.mjs';
+
+// Row 194 (D3): the verbs the instance writer commits, whose answers carry restart.
+const INSTANCE_VERBS = new Set(['instances.set', 'veto.set', 'instance.hire', 'instance.fire']);
 // Trusted host API. S1 supplies resolved definitions, S6 supplies launch records and ends them.
 // Human limits writes use the shared organization writer behind the verified transport.
 // `tasks` is S3's adapter factory: ({broker, credentials, businesses}) => {handle, timeout, close}.
@@ -91,7 +103,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
      || (Object.hasOwn(librarySync, 'intervalMs') && !(Number.isSafeInteger(librarySync.intervalMs) && librarySync.intervalMs > 0))
      || (Object.hasOwn(librarySync, 'configDir') && typeof librarySync.configDir !== 'string')))
    throw new BusError('invalid-host-request');
-  let store, credentials, server, adapter, syncTimer = null, syncPass = null;
+  let store, credentials, server, adapter, processing, syncTimer = null, syncPass = null;
  try {
    const references = {};
    for (const [business, b] of Object.entries(businesses)) {
@@ -120,14 +132,52 @@ export async function startBroker({
    // Row 235 (r6 section 6, N1): a host.<id> key file with no record goes before Credentials loads.
    for (const entry of sweepHostKeys(storeRoot, Object.keys(businesses), granted))
      process.stderr.write(`hosts: ${JSON.stringify({ event: 'host-key-swept', ...entry })}\n`);
-    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot, storeRoot });
+    // Row 236 (#1742, #436b r5 section 5): each gitea grant record gives its agent a store reference to
+    // gitea, and `held` names the files memory must not load until reconcile or a revoke.
+    const { held } = storeRoot ? giteaStart(store, storeRoot, businesses, references) : { held: [] };
+    credentials = new Credentials({ references, repoRoots: protectedRoots, dataRoot, storeRoot, held });
    // vikunja:19/305: the plug-in switch through the same human-only path as the limits: the verbs
    // plugins and plugins.set, logged in changes.jsonl with the actor, a missing module refused.
    const plugins=organization?pluginSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,exists:hasModule}):null;
    const levels=organization?await harnessLevels():()=>null;
    const settings=organization?launchSettings({...organization,sessions:()=>readSessions(dataRoot),levels}):null;
+    // Row 194 (#1692, brief item 8, row 199 D13): a fire or a delete revokes the agent's credentials
+    // after the writer's checks and before its write. Fire revokes each service of the entry and keeps
+    // the store directory, delete calls remove (sage-1593). A service the running bus doesn't know (an
+    // agent created since the start) has nothing in memory, so it goes on, and then no token or tmp
+    // file may remain in the agent's store directory (sage-1592). Any failure stops the verb with the
+    // file unchanged.
+    const revokeFailed = (message) => new OrganizationError('credential-revoke-failed', message);
+    function revoke(business, agent, how, services) {
+      const instance = business + '/' + agent;
+      const outside = [];
+      try {
+        if (how === 'delete' && storeRoot) credentials.remove(instance);
+        else
+          for (const service of services) {
+            try {
+              if (!credentials.revoke(instance, service).file) outside.push(service);
+            } catch (e) {
+              if (e.code !== 'credential-unknown') throw e;
+            }
+          }
+      } catch (e) {
+        throw revokeFailed(`${agent}: ${e.code ?? 'credential-file'}`);
+      }
+      if (storeRoot) {
+        let left = [];
+        try {
+          left = readdirSync(join(storeRoot, business, agent));
+        } catch (e) {
+          if (e.code !== 'ENOENT') throw revokeFailed(`${agent}: store directory can't be read`);
+        }
+        if (left.length > 0) throw revokeFailed(`${agent}: ${left.sort().join(' and ')} still in the store`);
+      }
+      // A file or env reference outside the store keeps its token for a restart (row 199 section 6).
+      return { revoked: services, outsideStore: how === 'fire' ? outside : [] };
+    }
    // Row 165 (#1662): the human adds and changes role instances through instances and instances.set.
-    const instances=organization?instanceSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,system:organization.system,levels}):null;
+    const instances=organization?instanceSettings({dir:organization.dir,rolesDir:organization.rolesDir,system:organization.system,levels,revoke}):null;
    const usage = await createUsage({ store, dataRoot, businesses,
      log: entry => process.stderr.write(`usage: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n`) });
    // Row 125 (#1619, REQ-LIMIT-3, REQ-LIMIT-4): the limit checks read the organization file at
@@ -138,11 +188,20 @@ export async function startBroker({
    const withTokens = (id, result) => ({ ...result, tokens: limits.report(id) });
    // Row 210 (#1707, design D7 step 6) and row 234 (#1740, r6 E2): the run dir and the host enrollment half.
    const runRoot = organization ? join(organization.dir, 'secrets', 'run') : null;
+    let broker;
+    processing = createProcessing({ dataRoot, ...discordProcessingHooks(dataRoot), containerStop: createContainerStopper({ dataRoot }),
+      onTransition: () => broker.reconcileProcessing(),
+      onStop: stop => broker.recordProcessingStop(stop),
+      log: line => process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`),
+    });
    // C2-04: mirrors are host state, never session checkouts. An unsafe
    // existing mirror refuses startup before a socket can become ready.
    for (const business of Object.values(businesses))
      for (const [project, entry] of Object.entries(business.projects ?? {}))
-        if (entry.kind === 'library') await libraryModule.ensureMirror({ business, project, dataRoot });
+        if (entry.kind === 'library') {
+          try { await processing.work(() => libraryModule.ensureMirror({ business, project, dataRoot })); }
+          catch (e) { if (!e.code?.startsWith('processing-')) throw e; }
+        }
    // C2-03a: the slot is <configDir>/secrets/<business>/library-gitea (design 10 step 4). Sync only
    // checks that it is there; the askpass helper reads it.
    const slotDir = librarySync?.configDir ?? organization?.dir ?? null;
@@ -150,10 +209,57 @@ export async function startBroker({
      slot: slotDir ? join(slotDir, 'secrets', business.id, libraryModule.SLOT) : null,
      ...(librarySync ? { command: librarySync.command } : {}),
    });
-    const broker = new Broker({
+    // Row 194 (#1692, D3): after every write that commits, the broker takes the business as a restart
+    // would load it. The credential references, the project roots the Credentials store protects
+    // and the tracker bots are fixed at start (the Credentials store, the tasks adapter), so a file
+    // whose references, roots or bots differ from the boot copy isn't reloaded, and the write
+    // answers restart: true. Hire adds neither. A human create of a credentialed definition adds
+    // references, so it answers restart: true, and issue works after the restart (brief item 7).
+    // A role not in the boot copy matches only with no references and no bot. A reference compares
+    // by its kind and path only: row 199's issue rewrites the date in the file outside this reload,
+    // Credentials keeps its own copy of the date, and the broker never reads it.
+    const fixedRef = ({ file, env, store }) => ({ file, env, store });
+    const fixedRole = r => canonicalJson({
+      credentials: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(r?.credentials ?? {}).map(([service, ref]) => [service, fixedRef(ref)])),
+      tracker: r?.tracker ?? null,
+    });
+    const fixedAtStart = b => ({
+      roles: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(b.roles).map(([role, r]) => [role, fixedRole(r)])),
+      sync: canonicalJson(b.tracker?.sync ?? null),
+      roots: canonicalJson(Object.values(b.projects ?? {}).filter(p => p.kind !== 'library').map(p => p.root).sort()),
+      // A library entry has no root, and its mirror is ensured at start (C2-04), so each one is fixed whole.
+      libraries: canonicalJson(Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(b.projects ?? {}).filter(([, p]) => p.kind === 'library'))),
+    });
+    const sameFixed = (boot, b) => fixedAtStart(b).sync === boot.sync && fixedAtStart(b).roots === boot.roots
+      && fixedAtStart(b).libraries === boot.libraries
+      && Object.entries(fixedAtStart(b).roles).every(([role, f]) => f === (boot.roles[role] ?? fixedRole(null)));
+    const booted = new Map(Object.entries(businesses).map(([id, b]) => [id, fixedAtStart(b)]));
+    const reloadLog = entry => process.stderr.write(`organization: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}\n`);
+    function reload(id) {
+      try {
+        const b = loadBusiness(id, { dir: organization.dir, rolesDir: organization.rolesDir });
+        const resolved = {};
+        for (const instance of Object.keys(b.roles)) resolved[instance] = resolveInstance({ system: organization.system, business: b, instance });
+        const next = busBusiness(b, resolved);
+        if (!sameFixed(booted.get(id), next)) {
+          reloadLog({ event: 'reload-needs-restart', business: id });
+          return false;
+        }
+        broker.reloadBusiness(id, next);
+        return true;
+      } catch (e) {
+        reloadLog({ event: 'reload-failed', business: id, message: e.message });
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    broker = new Broker({
      hostGrant: runRoot ? hostGrant({ configDir: organization.dir, runRoot }) : null,
      // Row 235 (#1741, r6 X4, X5): the grant executor's claim, register and issue, never use().
      hostKeys: storeRoot ? grantKeys({ credentials, storeRoot }) : null,
+      processing,
+      // Row 236 (#1742): the Gitea grant path. The admin slot is <configDir>/secrets/grants/<business>/gitea.
+      giteaGrant: organization ? giteaGrant({ configDir: organization.dir }) : null,
+      giteaKeys: storeRoot ? giteaKeys({ credentials, storeRoot }) : null,
      usage,
      limits,
      store,
@@ -161,12 +267,12 @@ export async function startBroker({
      library: {
        readFile: context => libraryModule.readLibraryFile({ ...context, dataRoot }),
        status: context => libraryModule.libraryStatus({ ...context, dataRoot }),
-        sync: (context, { accept }) => libraryModule.sync({ ...context, dataRoot }, { ...syncOptions(context.business), accept }),
+        sync: (context, { accept }) => processing.work(() => libraryModule.sync({ ...context, dataRoot }, { ...syncOptions(context.business), accept })),
        LibraryError: libraryModule.LibraryError,
      },
      project: {
        readSpec: context => projectModule.readSpec({ ...context, dataRoot }),
-        writeRecord: context => projectModule.writeRecord({ ...context, dataRoot }),
+        writeRecord: context => processing.work(() => projectModule.writeRecord({ ...context, dataRoot })),
        listFiles: context => projectModule.listProjectFiles({ ...context, dataRoot }),
        readFile: context => projectModule.readProjectFile({ ...context, dataRoot }),
        writeFile: context => projectModule.writeHumanFile({ ...context, dataRoot }),
@@ -174,19 +280,37 @@ export async function startBroker({
      },
      // limits and limits.set (organization.set is limits.set) carry each token limit's count; a
      // plugins.set reloads the business's limit checks in the background.
-      organization:settings?(id,verb,args,actor)=>{
+      organization:settings?(id,verb,args,actor,context)=>{
        if(verb==='limits')return withTokens(id,settings.read(id));
-        if(verb==='limits.set')return withTokens(id,settings.set(id,args,actor));
        if(verb==='plugins')return plugins.read(id);
        if(verb==='instances')return instances.read(id);
-        if(verb==='instances.set')return instances.set(id,args,actor);
        // Row 65 (mos-0840): the Console's routing table.
        if(verb==='routes')return settings.routes(id);
-        if(verb==='routes.set')return settings.setRoutes(id,args,actor);
-        const result=plugins.set(id,args,actor);
+        // Row 194 (#1692, V5): a delete's checks at the verb, with no write and no reload.
+        if(verb==='instances.check')return instances.checkDelete(id,args.instance);
+        // Row 194 b6 (webby-0094 B1): a fire's checks against the file, before step A.
+        if(verb==='instance.fireCheck')return instances.checkFire(id,args.name);
+        let result;
+        if(verb==='limits.set')result=withTokens(id,settings.set(id,args,actor));
+        else if(verb==='instances.set')result=instances.set(id,args,actor);
+        else if(verb==='routes.set')result=settings.setRoutes(id,args,actor);
+        else if(verb==='plugins.set')result=plugins.set(id,args,actor);
+        // Row 194 (#1692, V6): the human's keep and noHire lists, through the instance writer.
+        else if(verb==='veto.set')result=instances.veto(id,args,actor);
+        // Row 194 (D2.1, D2.2): the chief's hire and fire, with the reason in the change context.
+        else if(verb==='instance.hire')result=instances.hire(id,args,{actor,context});
+        else if(verb==='instance.fire')result=instances.fire(id,{name:args.name},{actor,context});
+        else throw new BusError('invalid-request');
+        // Row 194 (D3 item 2): one reload, after every verb that committed, then the limit checks.
+        const live=reload(id);
        limits.refresh(id).catch(e=>limitLog({event:'limit-refresh-failed',business:id,message:e.message}));
-        return result;
+        // Row 194 b6 (webby-0094 B1, sage-2241): every instance-writer verb says whether the reload
+        // took, so a refused one (credentials, roots, ...) shows the restart line for a keep or a
+        // hire too. The other writers' answers carry no restart field.
+        return INSTANCE_VERBS.has(verb)?{...result,restart:!live}:result;
      }:null,
+      // Row 194 (D2.3): the role files as they stand, for the hire checks.
+      roleFile: organization ? (name) => loadRole(organization.rolesDir, name) : null,
      secretCheck: (value) => credentials.assertClean(value),
      credentialStatus: () => credentials.status(),
      // Row 199 (#1697, design section 6): issue, rotate, revoke and delete, live with no restart; each
@@ -204,7 +328,23 @@ export async function startBroker({
          return false;
        }
      },
+      // Row 194 (#1692, D4.1, B8): bus.tester as the file sets it now; an unreadable file is off.
+      testerOn: (id) => {
+        try {
+          const b = settings ? settings.current(id) : businesses[id];
+          return b?.vars?.['bus.tester'] === true;
+        } catch {
+          return false;
+        }
+      },
    });
+    broker.reconcileProcessing();
+    processing.start();
+    const processingWork = () => {
+      const state = processing.read();
+      if (state.invalid) throw new BusError(state.code);
+      if (state.halted) throw new BusError('processing-halted');
+    };
    // Process identities must be supplied for every managed run when using the human transport.
    const launchRecords = [];
    function bindLaunch(r) {
@@ -222,7 +362,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
    const bound = launches.map(bindLaunch);
    const readCaps = readers.map((business) => ({ business, cap: broker.bindReader({ business }) }));
    if (tasks) {
-      adapter = await tasks({ broker, credentials, businesses });
+      adapter = await tasks({ broker, credentials, businesses, processing });
      if (typeof adapter?.handle !== 'function' || !Number.isSafeInteger(adapter.timeout) || adapter.timeout < 1)
        throw new BusError('invalid-adapter');
    }
@@ -241,9 +381,18 @@ export async function startBroker({
      console: fileURLToPath(new URL('../../webui/src/cli.mjs', import.meta.url)),
    };
    const path = join(store.directory, 'broker.sock');
+    // The existing host executor owns SSH and its key lifecycle. Combine its revocation
+    // signal with processing cancellation without changing its proof or credential entry points.
+    const host = runRoot ? hostExecutor({ root: runRoot, credentials: {
+      busy: (...args) => credentials.busy(...args),
+      useFor: (session, name, fn, options) => credentials.useFor(session, name, (token, meta) =>
+        fn(token, { ...meta, signal: meta.signal
+          ? AbortSignal.any([meta.signal, processing.signal()]) : processing.signal() }), options),
+    } }) : null;
    server = await serve({
      web: (business) => web.get(business) ?? null,
-      host: runRoot ? hostExecutor({ credentials, root: runRoot }) : null,
+      host: host ? { busy: (...args) => host.busy(...args),
+        run: (...args) => processing.work(() => host.run(...args)) } : null,
      tasks: adapter ? { handle: adapter.handle, timeout: adapter.timeout } : null,
      broker,
      path,
@@ -260,6 +409,8 @@ export async function startBroker({
    // Row 235 (r6 X3): the remote undo of interrupted host grants, once the bus is up, so a start doesn't
    // wait on the network.
    broker.reconcileHosts();
+    // Row 236 (#436b r5 section 5): the Gitea grants' remote undo, settle and open revokes, likewise.
+    broker.reconcileGitea();
    // S6 launcher operations. The host decides capacity and the instance list; the broker
    // authorizes role.launch and keeps the evidence, refusals included.
    // A refusal is recorded against the caller, as request() records one.
@@ -297,11 +448,11 @@ export async function startBroker({
      const { business, project, fork, user, source, dst } = broker.publishTarget(ticket);
      const entry = { state: 'running' };
      remotes.set(ticket, entry);
-      withGitea(ticket, (token) =>
+      processing.work(() => withGitea(ticket, (token) =>
        publishRemote({ repo: workingRepo(dataRoot, business, project), fork, user, source, dst, token, tls: publishTls }).catch((e) => {
          throw e instanceof WorkingError ? new BusError(e.code) : e;
        }),
-      ).then(
+      )).then(
        (r) => Object.assign(entry, { state: 'pushed', ...r }),
        (e) => {
          // Not a refusal: the error's name and code only, never a message that could carry git's output.
@@ -374,7 +525,13 @@ export async function startBroker({
        }
      }
    };
-    const tick = () => { if (!syncPass) syncPass = syncAll().finally(() => { syncPass = null; }); };
+    const tick = () => {
+      const state = processing.read();
+      if (!syncPass && !state.halted && !state.invalid)
+        syncPass = processing.work(syncAll).catch(e => {
+          if (!e.code?.startsWith('processing-')) syncLog({ event: 'library-sync-refused', code: 'library-sync-failed' });
+        }).finally(() => { syncPass = null; });
+    };
    if (timed.length) {
      tick();
      syncTimer = setInterval(tick, librarySync?.intervalMs ?? libraryModule.SYNC_INTERVAL_MS);
@@ -390,7 +547,10 @@ export async function startBroker({
      threadsState: (business) => broker.threadsState(business),
      threadIdle: (r) => broker.threadIdle(r),
      // Row 125 (#1619, REQ-LIMIT-4): the launcher asks the limit checks before every launch.
-      mayLaunch: ({ business, instance, provider, model, account = null }) => limits.mayLaunch(business, { instance, provider, model, account }),
+      mayLaunch: async ({ business, instance, provider, model, account = null }) => {
+        processingWork();
+        return limits.mayLaunch(business, { instance, provider, model, account });
+      },
      identity: (cap) => broker.identity(cap),
      authorizeLaunch,
      checkPush,
@@ -409,6 +569,11 @@ export async function startBroker({
      // Row 156 (#1651): the launcher's landing pass.
      landHolders: (business) => broker.landHolders(business),
      landRelease: (r) => broker.landRelease(r),
+      // Row 194 (#1692, D1.1): the launcher's lifecycle pass.
+      lifecycleRequests: (business) => broker.lifecycleRequests(business),
+      lifecycleTake: (r) => broker.lifecycleTake(r),
+      lifecycleDelete: (r) => broker.lifecycleDelete(r),
+      lifecycleDone: (r) => broker.lifecycleDone(r),
      refuse: (cap, code, subject) => broker.refuse(cap, code, subject),
      credentialStatus,
      launches: bound,
@@ -417,6 +582,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
        await stopSync();
        await server.close();
        await adapter?.close?.();
+        await processing?.close();
        store.close();
        credentials.close();
      },
@@ -424,6 +590,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
  } catch (e) {
    await server?.close();
    await adapter?.close?.();
+    await processing?.close();
    store?.close();
    credentials?.close();
    throw e;
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { createServer } from 'node:net';
 import { lstatSync, chmodSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { BusError, TASK_VERBS, WEB_VERBS, HOST_VERBS, HOSTS_VERBS, PROJECT_FILE_VERBS, LIBRARY_VERBS, PROJECT_SAVE_VERB, PROJECT_SAVE_REQUEST_MAX } from './broker.mjs';
+import { BusError, TASK_VERBS, WEB_VERBS, HOST_VERBS, HOSTS_VERBS, GRANTS_VERBS, PROJECT_FILE_VERBS, LIBRARY_VERBS, PROJECT_SAVE_VERB, PROJECT_SAVE_REQUEST_MAX } from './broker.mjs';
 import { inspectInterpreter } from './interpreter.mjs';
 import { createPeerReader } from './peercred.mjs';
 const LIMIT = 65536;
@@ -134,11 +134,14 @@ export async function serve({ broker, path, authenticateHuman = null, authentica
            });
          return;
        }
-        // Row138: only project Git effects need an await; preserve every other sync path below.
-        if (r.verb === 'usage.begin' || r.verb === 'usage.end' ||
+        // Async effects retain the synchronous path for every other verb.
+        if (r.verb === 'processing.halt' || r.verb === 'processing.resume' ||
+            r.verb === 'usage.begin' || r.verb === 'usage.end' ||
            r.verb === 'spec.read' || r.verb === 'record.write' || PROJECT_FILE_VERBS.includes(r.verb) || LIBRARY_VERBS.includes(r.verb) ||
            // Row 234 (#1740): a grant raise awaits its keyscan, and hosts.check its ssh.
            HOSTS_VERBS.includes(r.verb) ||
+            // Row 236 (#1742): the grants verbs may call Gitea several times, 15 s each at most.
+            GRANTS_VERBS.includes(r.verb) ||
            (r.verb === 'decision.raise' && (Object.hasOwn(r.args ?? {}, 'spec_path') || Object.hasOwn(r.args ?? {}, 'spec_commit') ||
              Object.hasOwn(r.args ?? {}, 'grant')))) {
          const own = transient;
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ import { join, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';

 const ddl = readFileSync(new URL('../schema.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
-export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '0a7b633ce7eec9d0bb37c3255f4244d97bd0c8eac38db91a11b4ef6cc982ec8c';
-export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';
+export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = 'aba9240825a35fdcc741439d0708efa33afcf519d11cac9952c7207ad99250f0';
+export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';
 // Ordered, named offline steps. New schema changes append a step and keep prior DDL pinned.
 const legacyDDL = readFileSync(new URL('./migrations/3b.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
 const LEGACY_SHA256 = '179ffe356d4ff19a49b5ebad39b6c6bfd7771deb8e1b7c55b5e746f039d69e65';
@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ const migrations = [{
  from: '3i',
  to: '3j',
  sql: readFileSync(new URL('./migrations/3i-3j.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8'),
+}, {
+  // Row 236 (#1742, #436b section 7): the Gitea users the stack made and the Gitea grants. Only new tables.
+  from: '3j',
+  to: '3k',
+  sql: readFileSync(new URL('./migrations/3j-3k.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8'),
 }];
 const timedTables = [
  'events',
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 // every call and labels every reply untrusted (broker.mjs, requestWeb).

 import { SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS, WEB_DEFAULTS, WEB_REFUSAL, WebRefusal, webFetch } from "../../discord/src/web.mjs";
+import { currentProcessing } from '../../processing-control/src/effects.mjs';

 export const WEB_SEARCH_NOT_CONFIGURED = "search is not configured for this business";
 // Under the runner's own 30 s wait for a tool call, so a slow source is a refusal, not a lost reply.
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ export function webService({ search = null, maxFetchBytes = WEB_DEFAULTS.maxFetc
  // so a stalled backend is cut off, not just ignored: web.mjs destroys its request on abort, and a
  // search-source module gets the signal as the `signal` of its last argument.
  const within = (start) => {
+    const processing = currentProcessing(); processing?.guard();
    const controller = new AbortController();
    let timer;
    const late = new Promise((_, reject) => {
@@ -36,7 +38,8 @@ export function webService({ search = null, maxFetchBytes = WEB_DEFAULTS.maxFetc
        reject(new WebRefusal(WEB_REFUSAL.TIMEOUT));
      }, deadlineMs);
    });
-    return Promise.race([start(controller.signal), late]).finally(() => clearTimeout(timer));
+    const signal = processing ? AbortSignal.any([processing.signal, controller.signal]) : controller.signal;
+    return Promise.race([start(signal), late]).finally(() => clearTimeout(timer));
  };
  async function run(verb, args) {
    if (verb === "web.fetch") {
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ async function engine(root, name, { store, schema, step = (s) => s }) {
    copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/' + file), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations', file));
  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3h-3i.sql'), step(readFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3h-3i.sql'), 'utf8')));
  copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3i-3j.sql'), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3i-3j.sql'));
+  copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'));
  return (await import(pathToFileURL(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs')))).Store;
 }

@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ test('REQ-LIMIT-4 3h copy migrates to 3i: every row keeps its seq, the sequence
  const { root, path } = source3h(t), before = snapshot(path), was = master(path);
  assert.throws(() => new Store(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
  // Every table's rows as they were, usage_records with its seq values and sqlite_sequence with 50.
  assert.deepEqual(snapshot(path, before.columns).rows, before.rows);
  assert.deepEqual(before.rows.usage_records.map(r => r.seq), [1, 2, 3]);
@@ -86,7 +87,9 @@ test('REQ-LIMIT-4 3h copy migrates to 3i: every row keeps its seq, the sequence
  const old = '  account TEXT CHECK (account IS NULL),\n';
  assert.equal(was.filter(r => r.sql?.includes(old)).map(r => r.name).join(), 'usage_records');
  // Row 234 (#1740) adds 3i→3j's own objects after this step. Its test is grant-migration.test.mjs.
-  const later = ['hosts', 'host_grants', 'events_grant_actor', 'sqlite_autoindex_hosts_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_host_grants_1'];
+  // Row 236 (#1742) adds 3j→3k's; its test is gitea-migration.test.mjs.
+  const later = ['hosts', 'host_grants', 'events_grant_actor', 'sqlite_autoindex_hosts_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_host_grants_1',
+    'gitea_users', 'gitea_grants', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_users_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_grants_1'];
  assert.deepEqual(master(path).filter(r => !later.includes(r.name)), was.map(r => r.name === 'usage_records' ? { ...r, sql: r.sql.replace(old, '  account TEXT,\n') } : r));
  assert.equal(was.filter(r => r.type === 'trigger' && r.tbl_name === 'usage_records').length, 3);
  const store = new Store(root);
@@ -125,7 +128,7 @@ test('REQ-LIMIT-4 a 3h→3i step that fails partway leaves the store at 3h with
  assert.deepEqual(snapshot(path, before.columns).rows, before.rows);
  // Still a whole 3h store: the real step migrates it.
  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
  assert.deepEqual(snapshot(path, before.columns).rows, before.rows);
 });

@@ -137,14 +140,14 @@ test('REQ-LIMIT-4 the 3h engine refuses a migrated store, migrating or not, and
    schema: ddl3h,
    store: (source) => source
      .replace(/export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '[a-f0-9]+';/, `export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '${createHash('sha256').update(ddl3h).digest('hex')}';`)
-      .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3h';")
+      .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3h';")
      .replace(/\}, \{\n {2}\/\/ Row 126 \(#1620\)[\s\S]*?\}\];\nconst timedTables/, '}];\nconst timedTables'),
  });
  const pinned = readFileSync(join(root, 'engine-3h/src/store.mjs'), 'utf8');
  assert.ok(pinned.includes("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3h';") && !pinned.includes('3h-3i'), 'the 3h engine has no 3h→3i step');
  assert.throws(() => new Store3h(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  assert.throws(() => new Store3h(root, { migrateSchema: true }), /schema-mismatch/);
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
  assert.deepEqual(master(path), was);
  assert.deepEqual(snapshot(path, after.columns).rows, after.rows);
 });
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 // and the ban on channel plug-ins importing a proof caller are retained.
 // Row 254 (#1759) re-pins human-cli.mjs for the 130 s library.sync client timeout and webui
 // bus.mjs for six library-* STATUS entries; no proof or transport change.
+// Row 236 (#1742) re-pins human-cli.mjs for the same 130 s wait on the grants verbs; no proof or
+// transport change.
 import test from "node:test";
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
@@ -14,14 +16,16 @@ import { Client } from "../src/client.mjs";

 const baselines = {
 "packages/bus/src/human.mjs": "0c6d96abe4607cba0b02b0638a2fc217ff8135bac9a47761a0ef015fbe9d3079",
- "packages/bus/src/human-cli.mjs": "9c9af66b98ea0a490c9a880fc81c3c62414a8ee0b5ba6478608771b8c4f87932",
+ "packages/bus/src/human-cli.mjs": "271b9781d73cf31cc562a56180e3ebcd725b5fde148a83347a201fdef2fc28af",
 "packages/cli/src/transport.mjs": "5129c44b4d9f642e825344df65c9bfb4bac4fc8d6b25343b42d39853dbd40774",
 // Row 165 (#1662): seven STATUS entries for the role instance routes (organization-instance-exists,
 // organization-unknown-instance, organization-credentials-out-of-scope, organization-launch-not-configured,
 // organization-no-change, organization-project-mismatch, organization-unresolvable-instance), no proof or
 // transport change. Row 155 (#1649) added eight for the assistant routes.
 // Row 171 (#1668): project-name-is-repo maps to 409; no proof or transport change.
- "packages/webui/src/bus.mjs": "e69d17d4385a4d190d15373ed1a26e270a5c6906eec9e61fcc2bb6b05849cabb",
+ // Row 194 (#1692, brief item 7, sage-1610 a): organization-tracker-required 400 and
+ // organization-tracker-bot-taken 409; no proof or transport change.
+ "packages/webui/src/bus.mjs": "15e8123ffdbb6d067e8a516f5823efdb5de3c869963764f27cd14bb9e4ce3313",
 };
 const repoFile = path => new URL("../../../" + path, import.meta.url);

@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite';
 import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
 import { Store, schemaDigest } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { Broker, ACTIONS } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { HIRE_ALLOWED } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';
 import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
 import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
+import { busBusiness } from '../src/business.mjs';
+import { loadBusiness } from '../../business/src/business.mjs';
+import { resolveInstance } from '../../business/src/resolve.mjs';

 // Row 123 (#1617): the chief of staff ends runs without a decision and changes the organization
 // file through the shared write path. REQ-ROLE-2 (one holder; revoke), REQ-ROLE-3 (the
@@ -27,7 +31,7 @@ const roles = {
  pm: { definition: 'pm', ...none },
  coder: { definition: 'coder', ...none },
 };
-const demo = () => ({
+const demo = (extra = {}) => ({
  demo: {
    id: 'demo',
    human: 'jason',
@@ -38,12 +42,13 @@ const demo = () => ({
    // Row 65: runtime launches bind only on a harness the business switches on.
    plugins: { harness: ['pi'] },
    vars: { 'bus.tester': true },
+    ...extra,
  },
 });

 const PATCH = { revision: 'a'.repeat(64), limits: { total: 3 } };

-function setup(t) {
+function setup(t, extra = {}, { roleFile = null } = {}) {
  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-chief-'));
  const store = new Store(root);
  t.after(() => {
@@ -51,13 +56,16 @@ function setup(t) {
    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
  });
  const organization = [];
-  const writer = { error: null };
+  const writer = { error: null, during: null };
  const b = new Broker({
    store,
-    businesses: demo(),
+    businesses: demo(extra),
+    roleFile,
    organization: (...args) => {
      organization.push(args);
+      if (writer.during) writer.during(args);
      if (writer.error) throw writer.error;
+      if (args[1] === 'instance.hire' || args[1] === 'instance.fire') return { revision: 'b'.repeat(64), transaction: 't-' + organization.length };
      // The human's limits read answers more than the revision; organization.revision must not.
      return args[1] === 'limits'
        ? { revision: 'b'.repeat(64), limits: { total: 7 }, models: { m: {} }, tokens: { used: 1 } }
@@ -606,7 +614,7 @@ async function database3c(t) {
  let source = readFileSync(here('../src/store.mjs'), 'utf8');
  const pinned = source
    .replace(/export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '[a-f0-9]+';/, `export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '${createHash('sha256').update(ddl3c).digest('hex')}';`)
-    .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3c';")
+    .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3c';")
    .replace(/\}, \{\n {2}from: '3c',[\s\S]*?\}\];\nconst timedTables/, '}];\nconst timedTables');
  assert.notEqual(pinned, source);
  assert.ok(!pinned.includes('3c-3d'), 'the 3c engine has no 3c→3d step');
@@ -630,7 +638,7 @@ test('REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a
  assert.throws(() => new Store(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  const store = new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true });
  t.after(() => store.close());
-  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3j');
+  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3k');
  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT body FROM events WHERE id='preserved'").body, '{"fixture":true}');
  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT holder_run FROM role_claims WHERE role='coder'").holder_run, 'coder-run');
  const b = new Broker({ store, businesses: demo(), organization: null });
@@ -645,3 +653,444 @@ test('REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a
  );
  assert.throws(() => store.run(REVOKE_NEITHER), /revoke needs a resolved decision or a reason/);
 });
+
+// Row 194 (#1692, D2.4): the per-agent forbid. The chief can't end a kept instance's run with a
+// reason or change its model. A decision the human resolved, and the human's own write, still can.
+const KEPT = { launch: { by: 'chief', instances: ['pm', 'coder'], keep: ['coder'] } };
+
+test('row 194 T10: the chief\'s reason end of a kept instance refuses instance-kept, holds the claim and spends nothing', (t) => {
+  const { call, lastClaim, allowed } = setup(t, KEPT);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'role.revoke', { role: 'coder', reason: 'replace it' }), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.deepEqual(lastClaim('coder'), { op: 'claim', decision: null, reason: null, by: 'coder-run' });
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.end').length, 0);
+  // An instance not on the list still ends with a reason.
+  assert.deepEqual(call('chief', 'role.revoke', { role: 'pm', reason: 'stuck' }), { revoked: true });
+});
+
+test('row 194 T10 (Q2): a role.revoke citing a decision the human resolved still ends a kept run', (t) => {
+  const { call, lastClaim } = setup(t, KEPT);
+  const d = call('chief', 'decision.raise', {
+    action: 'role.revoke', target: 'coder', question: 'Stop the coder?',
+    options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }], recommendation: 'yes', blocking: false,
+  });
+  call('human', 'decision.resolve', { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' });
+  assert.deepEqual(call('chief', 'role.revoke', { role: 'coder', decision: d.id }), { revoked: true });
+  assert.deepEqual(lastClaim('coder'), { op: 'revoke', decision: d.id, reason: null, by: 'chief-run' });
+});
+
+test('row 194 T10 (B7): the chief\'s organization.set of a kept instance\'s model refuses before the writer; the human\'s limits.set does not', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed } = setup(t, KEPT);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'organization.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, instances: { coder: 'm' } }), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'organization.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, instances: { pm: 'm', coder: 'm' } }), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(allowed('organization.change').length, 0);
+  call('chief', 'organization.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, instances: { pm: 'm' } });
+  call('human', 'limits.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, instances: { coder: 'm' } });
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.map(([, verb, args]) => [verb, Object.keys(args.instances)]), [['limits.set', ['pm']], ['limits.set', ['coder']]]);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T13: organization.set and limits.set refuse the launch, retired, keep and noHire keys before the writer', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization } = setup(t, KEPT);
+  for (const extra of [{ launch: { keep: [] } }, { retired: [] }, { keep: ['pm'] }, { noHire: ['coder'] }])
+    for (const [who, verb] of [['chief', 'organization.set'], ['human', 'limits.set']])
+      assert.throws(() => call(who, verb, { ...PATCH, ...extra }), /invalid-request/, `${who} ${Object.keys(extra)[0]}`);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T18 (D2.4): from a chief session veto.set and instances.set refuse, and nothing reaches the writer', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization } = setup(t, KEPT);
+  for (const op of ['keep', 'unkeep', 'nohire', 'hire'])
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'veto.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, op, name: 'coder' }), /human-required/, op);
+  for (const op of ['add', 'change', 'delete'])
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instances.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, instance: 'coder', op, definition: 'coder' }), /human-required/, op);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  // The human's veto reaches the writer with the human as actor.
+  call('human', 'veto.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, op: 'unkeep', name: 'coder' });
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.at(-1), ['demo', 'veto.set', { revision: PATCH.revision, op: 'unkeep', name: 'coder' }, 'jason']);
+});
+
+// Row 194 (#1692, D2.1-D2.3): the chief's hire and fire. PRD 1.7 REQ-COS-3 routes role.hire and
+// role.fire within-role for the chief (sage-1471, mos-1089), so they take the reason form, as
+// role.end does: no decision, a reason of 1 to 500 characters that goes into the log. The role
+// files are stubs, so a definition's authority is the test's to set.
+const LISTED = { launch: { by: 'chief', instances: ['pm', 'coder'], keep: ['pm'], noHire: ['banned'] } };
+const roleDoc = (withinRole, extra = {}) => ({ roleVersion: 2, authority: { withinRole, crossRole: [] }, hireable: [], ...extra });
+const ROLE_FILES = {
+  'chief-of-staff': roleDoc(chiefAuthority, { hireable: ['coder', 'researcher', 'wide', 'banned'] }),
+  coder: roleDoc(['message.send', 'record.write']),
+  // A version 1 file has empty authority lists, so only the version check refuses it (M60).
+  researcher: { roleVersion: 1, authority: { withinRole: [], crossRole: [] }, hireable: [] },
+  wide: roleDoc(['message.send', 'task.create']),
+  banned: roleDoc(['message.send']),
+  pm: roleDoc(['message.send']),
+};
+const roleFile = (files) => (name) => {
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(files, name)) throw Object.assign(new Error(`no role ${name}`), { name: 'BusinessError' });
+  return files[name];
+};
+function hireSetup(t, extra = LISTED, files = ROLE_FILES) {
+  return setup(t, extra, { roleFile: roleFile(files) });
+}
+const HIRE = { name: 'helper', definition: 'coder', reason: 'more hands for the queue' };
+const FIRE = { name: 'coder', reason: 'the work is done' };
+const CONTEXT = (reason) => ({ instance: 'chief', run: 'chief-run', reason });
+const withoutReason = ({ reason, ...rest }) => rest;
+
+test('row 194 T8: the chief hires with a reason and no decision, the writer gets the reason as context, and the log names it', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed, store } = hireSetup(t);
+  const result = call('chief', 'instance.hire', HIRE);
+  assert.equal(result.transaction, 't-1');
+  assert.deepEqual(organization, [['demo', 'instance.hire', withoutReason(HIRE), 'chief-of-staff.chief', CONTEXT(HIRE.reason)]]);
+  const [use, ...rest] = allowed('role.hire');
+  assert.equal(rest.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(use.subject, 'helper');
+  assert.deepEqual({ reason: use.body.reason, transaction: use.body.transaction, decision: use.body.decision ?? null }, { reason: HIRE.reason, transaction: 't-1', decision: null });
+  // Within-role: no decision is raised or needed.
+  assert.equal(store.get('SELECT count(*) AS n FROM decisions').n, 0);
+  // vars reach the writer with the name and definition.
+  call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, name: 'aide', vars: { model: 'm', 'limits.x': 1 } });
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.at(-1)[2], { name: 'aide', definition: 'coder', vars: { model: 'm', 'limits.x': 1 } });
+});
+
+// T11 (D5): a business id names one business on one bus. The chief's hire and fire go to its own
+// business's writer, and no argument names another.
+test('row 194 T11: on a bus with two businesses, the chief of one hires and fires only in its own', (t) => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-chief-two-'));
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  t.after(() => {
+    store.close();
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  const organization = [];
+  const one = demo(LISTED).demo;
+  const b = new Broker({
+    store,
+    businesses: { demo: one, other: { ...one, id: 'other' } },
+    roleFile: roleFile(ROLE_FILES),
+    organization: (...args) => (organization.push(args), { revision: 'b'.repeat(64), transaction: 't-' + organization.length }),
+  });
+  const chief = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'chief', run: 'chief-run', harness: 'pi' });
+  b.request(chief, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  for (const verb of ['instance.hire', 'instance.fire'])
+    for (const extra of [{ business: 'other' }, { target: 'other' }])
+      assert.throws(() => b.request(chief, { verb, args: { ...(verb === 'instance.hire' ? HIRE : FIRE), ...extra } }), /invalid-request/, `${verb} ${Object.keys(extra)}`);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  b.request(chief, { verb: 'instance.hire', args: HIRE });
+  b.request(chief, { verb: 'instance.fire', args: FIRE });
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.map((c) => [c[0], c[1]]), [['demo', 'instance.hire'], ['demo', 'instance.fireCheck'], ['demo', 'instance.fire']]);
+  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT count(*) AS n FROM events WHERE business='other'").n, 0);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8: hire and fire need a reason of 1 to 500 characters and refuse a decision key', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization } = hireSetup(t);
+  for (const reason of [undefined, '', 'x'.repeat(501), 7]) {
+    const r = reason === undefined ? {} : { reason };
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { name: 'helper', definition: 'coder', ...r }), /invalid-request/, String(reason));
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { name: 'coder', ...r }), /invalid-request/, String(reason));
+  }
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, decision: 'd-1' }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { ...FIRE, decision: 'd-1' }), /invalid-request/);
+  for (const name of ['human', 'tester']) assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, name }), /invalid-request/, name);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, reason: 'x'.repeat(500) });
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 1);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8 (sage-1471): only the chief hires or fires; every other role refuses role-not-chief, even one granted the actions', (t) => {
+  const granted = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send', 'role.hire', 'role.fire'], crossRole: [] } };
+  const { call, organization, allowed } = hireSetup(t, { ...LISTED, roles: { ...roles, pm: { definition: 'pm', ...granted }, coder: { definition: 'coder', ...granted } } });
+  for (const who of ['pm', 'coder', 'assistant']) {
+    assert.throws(() => call(who, 'instance.hire', HIRE), /role-not-chief/, who);
+    assert.throws(() => call(who, 'instance.fire', FIRE), /role-not-chief/, who);
+  }
+  assert.throws(() => call('tester', 'instance.hire', HIRE), /tester-refused/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('reader', 'instance.hire', HIRE), /read-only/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('human', 'instance.fire', FIRE), /agent-required/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.hire').length + allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8 (sage-1471): a chief whose authority lacks role.hire or role.fire refuses decision-required before the writer', (t) => {
+  for (const missing of ['role.hire', 'role.fire']) {
+    const authority = { withinRole: chiefAuthority.withinRole.filter((a) => a !== missing), crossRole: [] };
+    const { call, organization, lastClaim } = hireSetup(t, { ...LISTED, roles: { ...roles, chief: { definition: 'chief-of-staff', authority } } });
+    const [verb, args] = missing === 'role.hire' ? ['instance.hire', HIRE] : ['instance.fire', FIRE];
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', verb, args), /decision-required/, missing);
+    assert.equal(organization.length, 0, missing);
+    assert.equal(lastClaim('coder').op, 'claim', missing);
+    // The other action still goes through.
+    const [other, otherArgs] = missing === 'role.hire' ? ['instance.fire', FIRE] : ['instance.hire', HIRE];
+    call('chief', other, otherArgs);
+    assert.equal(organization.filter(([, verb]) => verb !== 'instance.fireCheck').length, 1, missing);
+  }
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8a: a re-hire of a fired name goes to the writer like a hire, and the writer\'s refusals pass through by name', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, writer } = hireSetup(t);
+  const again = { name: 'coder', definition: 'coder', reason: 'needed again' };
+  for (const code of ['organization-instance-exists', 'organization-instance-retired', 'definition-not-hireable', 'instance-kept']) {
+    writer.error = Object.assign(new Error(code), { code });
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', again), new RegExp(code));
+  }
+  writer.error = null;
+  call('chief', 'instance.hire', again);
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.at(-1).slice(1, 3), ['instance.hire', withoutReason(again)]);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8b: a definition is hireable only when every action is on HIRE_ALLOWED, it is version 2, the chief lists it and noHire doesn\'t', (t) => {
+  assert.deepEqual([...HIRE_ALLOWED], ['message.send', 'record.write', 'review.request', 'task.update.assigned', 'task.scope.change', 'git.push.working']);
+  for (const action of ACTIONS) {
+    const files = { ...ROLE_FILES, wide: roleDoc(['message.send', action]) };
+    const { call, organization } = hireSetup(t, LISTED, files);
+    const run = () => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, definition: 'wide' });
+    if (HIRE_ALLOWED.includes(action)) {
+      run();
+      assert.equal(organization.length, 1, action);
+    } else {
+      assert.throws(run, /definition-not-hireable/, action);
+      assert.equal(organization.length, 0, action);
+    }
+  }
+  const { call, organization } = hireSetup(t);
+  const hire = (definition) => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, definition });
+  // Version 1 (M60), noHire, not on the chief's list, and no role file.
+  for (const definition of ['researcher', 'banned', 'pm', 'nothing'])
+    assert.throws(() => hire(definition), /definition-not-hireable/, definition);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  hire('coder');
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 1);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8b: a hire without the role files configured refuses not-configured', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization } = setup(t, LISTED);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', HIRE), /not-configured/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.throws(() => new Broker({ store: null, businesses: demo(), roleFile: 'roles' }), /roleFile must be a function/);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T9: a fire revokes the claim, cancels open requests, asks the launcher to kill the runs, then delists and logs', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed, lastClaim, writer } = hireSetup(t);
+  // An open launch request of the coder, made by the human.
+  const open = call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request;
+  let seen = null;
+  writer.during = ([, verb]) => { if (verb === 'instance.fire') seen = { stopped: allowed('fire.stopped').length, claim: lastClaim('coder').op, used: allowed('role.fire').length }; };
+  const result = call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE);
+  // Step A ran before the writer; step C after it.
+  assert.deepEqual(seen, { stopped: 1, claim: 'revoke', used: 0 });
+  assert.deepEqual(lastClaim('coder'), { op: 'revoke', decision: null, reason: 'the work is done', by: 'chief-run' });
+  assert.deepEqual(result.runs, ['coder-run']);
+  assert.deepEqual(result.cancelled, [open]);
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.at(-1), ['demo', 'instance.fire', { name: 'coder' }, 'chief-of-staff.chief', CONTEXT(FIRE.reason)]);
+  const [end] = allowed('lifecycle.end');
+  assert.equal(end.subject, 'coder');
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...end.body, request: null }, { action: 'lifecycle.end', request: null, via: 'chief', by: 'chief', runs: ['coder-run'], reason: 'the work is done', kill: true });
+  assert.equal(allowed('lifecycle.cancelled').filter((e) => e.body.request === open).length, 1);
+  const [use] = allowed('role.fire');
+  assert.equal(use.subject, 'coder');
+  assert.equal(use.body.reason, 'the work is done');
+  assert.equal(use.body.transaction, result.transaction);
+  assert.deepEqual(allowed('fire.done').map((e) => [e.subject, e.body.transaction]), [['coder', result.transaction]]);
+  // The human's read of the request shows the kill.
+  assert.equal(call('human', 'instance.request', { request: end.body.request }).kill, true);
+});
+
+// S6 (D2.2): the launcher closes a fire's end with the runs row 191's stop killed or left alive, and
+// each becomes its own event against the instance. Only a fire's end carries them.
+test('row 194 T9a (bus): a fire end\'s done writes lifecycle.end.killed and lifecycle.end.alive with run and pid, and an unknown stop\'s reason; a terminate\'s done or a bad stop refuses', (t) => {
+  const { b, call, allowed } = hireSetup(t);
+  call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE);
+  const [end] = allowed('lifecycle.end');
+  const request = end.body.request;
+  assert.equal(b.lifecycleTake({ business: 'demo', request }).go, true);
+  const done = (stops) => b.lifecycleDone({ business: 'demo', request, stops });
+  for (const bad of [[{ run: 'coder-run', pid: 4242, outcome: 'stopped' }], [{ run: 'coder-run', pid: 1, outcome: 'killed' }],
+    [{ run: 'coder-run', outcome: 'killed' }], [{ run: 'coder-run', pid: 4242, outcome: 'killed', signals: [] }], 'killed',
+    // sage-2289: only an alive stop carries a reason, and only unknown.
+    [{ run: 'coder-run', pid: 4242, outcome: 'killed', reason: 'unknown' }], [{ run: 'coder-run', pid: null, outcome: 'alive', reason: 'stuck' }]])
+    assert.throws(() => done(bad), { code: 'invalid-request' }, JSON.stringify(bad));
+  const closed = done([{ run: 'coder-run', pid: 4242, outcome: 'killed' }, { run: 'coder-other', pid: null, outcome: 'alive' },
+    { run: 'coder-unknown', pid: null, outcome: 'alive', reason: 'unknown' }]);
+  assert.equal(closed.state, 'closed');
+  assert.deepEqual(allowed('lifecycle.end.killed').map((e) => [e.subject, e.body]), [['coder', { action: 'lifecycle.end.killed', request, run: 'coder-run', pid: 4242 }]]);
+  assert.deepEqual(allowed('lifecycle.end.alive').map((e) => [e.subject, e.body]), [['coder', { action: 'lifecycle.end.alive', request, run: 'coder-other', pid: null }],
+    ['coder', { action: 'lifecycle.end.alive', request, run: 'coder-unknown', pid: null, reason: 'unknown' }]]);
+  // A terminate's end sends SIGTERM only, so its done has no stops.
+  const term = call('human', 'instance.end', { instance: 'pm' }).request;
+  assert.equal(b.lifecycleTake({ business: 'demo', request: term }).go, true);
+  assert.throws(() => b.lifecycleDone({ business: 'demo', request: term, stops: [{ run: 'pm-run', pid: 4242, outcome: 'killed' }] }), { code: 'invalid-request' });
+  assert.equal(allowed('lifecycle.end.killed').length, 1);
+  assert.equal(b.lifecycleDone({ business: 'demo', request: term }).state, 'closed');
+});
+
+test('row 194 T9: fire refusals come before step A and leave the claim, the requests and the file alone', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed, lastClaim } = hireSetup(t, { launch: { by: 'chief', instances: ['coder'], keep: ['pm'] } });
+  const fire = (name) => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { name, reason: 'r' });
+  assert.throws(() => fire('pm'), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.throws(() => fire('nobody'), /unknown-role/);
+  assert.throws(() => fire('assistant'), /organization-definition-refused/);
+  assert.throws(() => fire('chief'), /organization-instance-referenced/);
+  assert.throws(() => fire('coder'), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.stopped').length + allowed('lifecycle.end').length + allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+  assert.equal(lastClaim('coder').op, 'claim');
+});
+
+test('row 194 T9c: a writer failure at B leaves the instance firing, and the repeat delists and logs once', (t) => {
+  const { call, b, caps, organization, allowed, writer } = hireSetup(t);
+  writer.during = ([, verb]) => { if (verb === 'instance.fire') throw new Error('disk'); };
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE), /outcome-unknown/);
+  writer.during = null;
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.stopped').length, 1);
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+  // W-N1: while it fires, no launch of the instance starts by any path.
+  assert.throws(() => call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }), /instance-firing/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.authorize(caps.chief, 'role.launch', { target: 'coder' }), /instance-firing/);
+  // The repeat has no claim to revoke. The revoked run is still bound until the launcher reports it
+  // ended, so the repeat asks for its kill again, then delists and logs.
+  const result = call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE);
+  assert.deepEqual(result.runs, ['coder-run']);
+  assert.equal(organization.filter(([, verb]) => verb === 'instance.fire').length, 2);
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.fire').length, 1);
+  assert.deepEqual(allowed('lifecycle.end').map((e) => e.body.kill), [true, true]);
+  // Once done, the instance launches again.
+  assert.ok(call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T9c: a failure at C leaves the fire unlogged and the instance firing, and the repeat logs it', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed, store, writer } = hireSetup(t);
+  // The delist commits, then the step C transaction aborts.
+  writer.during = ([, verb]) => verb === 'instance.fire' && store.run("CREATE TRIGGER fail_c BEFORE INSERT ON events WHEN json_extract(new.body,'$.action')='fire.done' BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'c failed'); END");
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE));
+  writer.during = null;
+  store.run('DROP TRIGGER fail_c');
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.done').length, 0);
+  assert.throws(() => call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }), /instance-firing/);
+  call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE);
+  assert.equal(organization.filter(([, verb]) => verb === 'instance.fire').length, 2);
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.fire').length, 1);
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.done').length, 1);
+  assert.ok(call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request);
+});
+
+test('row 194 W-N1: a fire.done before a later fire.stopped of the same instance leaves it firing; another instance\'s done does not end it', (t) => {
+  const { call, store } = hireSetup(t);
+  const step = (instance, action) =>
+    store.run("INSERT INTO events(id,at,business,kind,actor_role,actor_run,subject,body) VALUES(?,?,'demo','action.allowed','chief','chief-run',?,?)",
+      `${action}-${instance}-${Math.random()}`, new Date().toISOString(), instance, JSON.stringify({ action, request: null, transaction: null }));
+  step('coder', 'fire.done');
+  step('coder', 'fire.stopped');
+  step('pm', 'fire.done');
+  assert.throws(() => call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }), /instance-firing/);
+  step('coder', 'fire.done');
+  assert.ok(call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T10: a hire or fire of a kept name refuses instance-kept before the writer', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, lastClaim, allowed } = hireSetup(t);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, name: 'pm' }), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { ...FIRE, name: 'pm' }), /instance-kept/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(lastClaim('pm').op, 'claim');
+  assert.equal(allowed('role.hire').length + allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+});
+
+// webby-0094 B1: the file's keep, which this copy hasn't loaded, refuses at the fire check, before
+// step A revokes, ends or marks anything, so the instance isn't left firing.
+test('row 194 T10: a fire the writer\'s check refuses from the file stops nothing and leaves the instance launchable', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, lastClaim, allowed, writer } = hireSetup(t);
+  writer.during = ([, verb]) => { if (verb === 'instance.fireCheck') throw Object.assign(new Error('instance-kept'), { code: 'instance-kept' }); };
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', FIRE), /instance-kept/);
+  writer.during = null;
+  assert.deepEqual(organization.map(([, verb]) => verb), ['instance.fireCheck']);
+  assert.equal(lastClaim('coder').op, 'claim');
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.stopped').length + allowed('lifecycle.end').length + allowed('role.fire').length, 0);
+  assert.ok(call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T18: hire and fire take only their own keys, and a refused call writes nothing', (t) => {
+  const { call, organization, allowed } = hireSetup(t);
+  for (const extra of [{ keep: ['x'] }, { launch: {} }, { revision: 'a'.repeat(64) }, { force: true }]) {
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, ...extra }), /invalid-request/, JSON.stringify(extra));
+    assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { ...FIRE, ...extra }), /invalid-request/, JSON.stringify(extra));
+  }
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.hire', { ...HIRE, vars: { harness: 'pi' } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => call('chief', 'instance.fire', { ...FIRE, definition: 'coder' }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.equal(organization.length, 0);
+  assert.equal(allowed('fire.stopped').length, 0);
+});
+
+test('row 194 T8, T9, T18: through the runtime the chief hires and fires with the real writer, the receipt carries the reason, and a refusal leaves the file alone', async (t) => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-chief-hire-'));
+  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
+  // A hireable scratch definition: version 2, no credentials, every action on HIRE_ALLOWED.
+  writeFileSync(join(rolesDir, 'aide.md'), '# Aide\n');
+  writeJson(join(rolesDir, 'aide.json'), {
+    roleVersion: 2, name: 'aide', title: 'Aide', contract: 'aide.md', tools: ['read'], network: 'api-only',
+    authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] }, credentials: [],
+  });
+  const chiefFile = join(rolesDir, 'chief-of-staff.json');
+  writeJson(chiefFile, { ...JSON.parse(readFileSync(chiefFile, 'utf8')), hireable: ['aide'] });
+  const file = join(root, 'businesses/demo.json');
+  writeJson(file, { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  // The boot copy is the file's own bus form, as cli bootConfig builds it, so a write reloads.
+  const busForm = (dir, roles) => {
+    const b = loadBusiness('demo', { dir, rolesDir: roles });
+    const resolved = {};
+    for (const instance of Object.keys(b.roles)) resolved[instance] = resolveInstance({ system: systemFor(dir), business: b, instance });
+    return busBusiness(b, resolved);
+  };
+  const bus = await startBroker({
+    dataRoot: join(root, 'data'),
+    businesses: { demo: busForm(root, rolesDir) },
+    organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) },
+  });
+  t.after(async () => {
+    await bus.close();
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  const { broker } = bus;
+  const chief = broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'chief', run: 'chief-run', harness: 'pi' });
+  broker.request(chief, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  const call = (cap, verb, args) => broker.request(cap, { verb, args });
+  const receipts = () =>
+    readFileSync(join(root, 'businesses/.history/demo/changes.jsonl'), 'utf8').trim().split('\n').map(JSON.parse).filter((r) => r.state === 'committed');
+  const document = () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
+
+  // The shipped chief file grants both actions, so the runtime takes the reason form.
+  // A refused hire: coder declares credentials and isn't on the chief's list. The file is unchanged.
+  const bytes = readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
+  assert.throws(() => call(chief, 'instance.hire', { name: 'helper', definition: 'coder', reason: 'r' }), /definition-not-hireable/);
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(file, 'utf8'), bytes);
+
+  call(chief, 'instance.hire', { name: 'helper', definition: 'aide', reason: 'more hands' });
+  assert.deepEqual(document().roles.helper, { definition: 'aide' });
+  assert.ok(document().launch.instances.includes('helper'));
+  const [h] = receipts().slice(-1);
+  assert.equal(h.actor, 'chief-of-staff.chief');
+  assert.deepEqual(h.context, CONTEXT('more hands'));
+
+  const result = call(chief, 'instance.fire', { name: 'helper', reason: 'the work is done' });
+  assert.equal(result.delisted, true);
+  assert.ok(!document().launch.instances.includes('helper'));
+  assert.deepEqual(receipts().slice(-1)[0].context, CONTEXT('the work is done'));
+  // The reloaded business sees the delist: a refused call leaves the file alone.
+  const after = readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
+  assert.throws(() => call(chief, 'instance.fire', { name: 'helper', reason: 'again', extra: 1 }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(file, 'utf8'), after);
+});
+
+test('row 194 W-N1: the launcher\'s take of a launch or regenerate of a firing instance closes it as instance-firing', (t) => {
+  const { b, call, store } = hireSetup(t);
+  const launch = call('human', 'instance.launch', { instance: 'coder' }).request;
+  const regenerate = call('human', 'instance.regenerate', { instance: 'pm' }).request;
+  // A fire's step A as the store holds it with no step C, for requests step A didn't see.
+  for (const instance of ['coder', 'pm'])
+    store.run("INSERT INTO events(id,at,business,kind,actor_role,actor_run,subject,body) VALUES(?,?,'demo','action.allowed','chief','chief-run',?,?)",
+      'stopped-' + instance, new Date().toISOString(), instance, JSON.stringify({ action: 'fire.stopped', request: null }));
+  for (const request of [launch, regenerate]) {
+    const { go, refusal } = b.lifecycleTake({ business: 'demo', request });
+    assert.deepEqual({ go, refusal }, { go: false, refusal: 'instance-firing' });
+  }
+});
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ test('explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal star
  const original = readFileSync(source);
  assert.throws(() => new Store(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  const store = new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true });
-  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3j');
+  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3k');
  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT body FROM events WHERE id='preserved'").body, '{"fixture":true}');
  assert.equal(store.get('SELECT count(*) n FROM task_comment_cursors').n, 0);
  const epoch = store.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='comment_cursor_epoch'").value;
@@ -75,15 +75,15 @@ test('named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future ver
  const sha = createHash('sha256').update(futureDDL).digest('hex');
  let source = readFileSync(new URL('../src/store.mjs', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
  source = source.replace(/export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '[a-f0-9]+';/, `export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '${sha}';`)
-    .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';")
-    .replace('}];\nconst timedTables', `}, { from: '3j', to: '3k', sql: ${JSON.stringify(futureSQL)} }];\nconst timedTables`);
+    .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3l';")
+    .replace('}];\nconst timedTables', `}, { from: '3k', to: '3l', sql: ${JSON.stringify(futureSQL)} }];\nconst timedTables`);
  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs'), source);
  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'schema.sql'), futureDDL);
-  for (const name of ['3b.sql', '3b-3c.sql', '3c-3d.sql', '3d-3e.sql', '3e-3f.sql', '3f-3g.sql', '3g-3h.sql', '3h-3i.sql', '3i-3j.sql'])
+  for (const name of ['3b.sql', '3b-3c.sql', '3c-3d.sql', '3d-3e.sql', '3e-3f.sql', '3f-3g.sql', '3g-3h.sql', '3h-3i.sql', '3i-3j.sql', '3j-3k.sql'])
    copyFileSync(new URL('../src/migrations/' + name, import.meta.url), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations', name));
  const { Store: FutureStore } = await import(pathToFileURL(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs')));
  const future = new FutureStore(root, { migrateSchema: true });
-  assert.equal(future.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3k');
+  assert.equal(future.get("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").value, '3l');
  assert.equal(future.get("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE name='future_fixture'").name, 'future_fixture');
  assert.equal(future.get("SELECT count(*) n FROM task_comment_cursors").n, 0);
  assert.equal(future.get("SELECT id FROM events").id, 'preserved');
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ test('offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage
  const command = new URL('../src/migrate-schema.mjs', import.meta.url).pathname;
  const migrated = spawnSync(process.execPath, [command, root], { encoding: 'utf8' });
  assert.equal(migrated.status, 0, migrated.stderr);
-  assert.match(migrated.stdout, /bus schema 3j ready/);
+  assert.match(migrated.stdout, /bus schema 3k ready/);
  new Store(root).close();
  const usage = spawnSync(process.execPath, [command], { encoding: 'utf8' });
  assert.equal(usage.status, 2);
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+// Row 236 (#1742, #436b r5 section 9): a fake Gitea API for the grant executor, on 127.0.0.1 over TLS
+// with row 199's scratch CA. It keeps users, their tokens and repositories in memory and answers the
+// routes gitea-grant.mjs calls, with Gitea's auth rules as section 1 found them: the token routes take
+// Basic auth as the account itself or a site admin, the rest the `token` header. Every token is a fake
+// made here. The request log holds the method, the path, the auth kind and the login, never a token.
+// `rule(match, answer)` makes one route answer otherwise: a status and body, `hang` (no answer, so the
+// caller's timeout runs) or `drop` (the socket closes). Nothing here leaves 127.0.0.1.
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { createServer } from 'node:https';
+import { scratchCa } from '../../seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs';
+
+const fakeToken = () => randomBytes(20).toString('hex');
+
+export async function fakeGiteaApi(t, dir, { version = '1.27.1', admin = 'mosaic-grant', adminScopes = ['write:admin', 'write:repository', 'write:user'] } = {}) {
+  const tls = scratchCa(dir);
+  let nextId = 1;
+  const users = new Map();
+  const repos = [];
+  const rules = [];
+  const requests = [];
+  const state = { version };
+  const lower = (x) => String(x).toLowerCase();
+  const userJson = (u) => ({ id: u.id, login: u.login, email: u.email, full_name: u.full_name, is_admin: u.is_admin, prohibit_login: u.prohibit_login });
+  const repoJson = (r) => ({
+    id: r.id, name: r.name, full_name: `${r.owner}/${r.name}`, owner: { login: r.owner }, fork: Boolean(r.parent),
+    parent: r.parent ? { full_name: r.parent } : null,
+  });
+  const api = {
+    url: null,
+    ca: readFileSync(tls.ca, 'utf8'),
+    state,
+    requests,
+    users,
+    repos,
+    // Every token value this fake made, for the tests' leak checks. Never printed.
+    issued: [],
+    // A user and, with `scopes`, one token named `tokenName`. Returns the user and that token or null.
+    addUser(login, { is_admin = false, prohibit_login = false, full_name = login, email = `${login}@example.test`, scopes = null, tokenName = 'test' } = {}) {
+      const u = { id: nextId++, login, email, full_name, is_admin, prohibit_login, tokens: [] };
+      users.set(lower(login), u);
+      return { user: u, token: scopes ? api.addToken(login, tokenName, scopes) : null };
+    },
+    addToken(login, name, scopes) {
+      const u = users.get(lower(login));
+      const tok = { id: nextId++, name, sha1: fakeToken(), scopes: [...scopes].sort() };
+      u.tokens.push(tok);
+      api.issued.push(tok.sha1);
+      return tok;
+    },
+    removeUser(login) {
+      users.delete(lower(login));
+    },
+    addRepo(owner, name, { parent = null, collaborators = [] } = {}) {
+      const r = { id: nextId++, owner, name, parent, collaborators: collaborators.map(lower) };
+      repos.push(r);
+      return r;
+    },
+    tokens: (login) => users.get(lower(login))?.tokens.map((x) => ({ id: x.id, name: x.name, scopes: x.scopes })) ?? null,
+    rule(match, answer) {
+      const r = { match, answer };
+      rules.push(r);
+      return () => rules.splice(rules.indexOf(r), 1);
+    },
+    // The ops of the log, as "METHOD path" lines without the query.
+    calls: () => requests.map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path.split('?')[0]}`),
+  };
+  const adminUser = api.addUser(admin, { is_admin: true, scopes: adminScopes, tokenName: 'mosaic-grant-bootstrap' });
+  api.admin = adminUser.user;
+  api.adminToken = adminUser.token.sha1;
+
+  const byToken = (sha1) => {
+    for (const u of users.values()) {
+      const tok = u.tokens.find((x) => x.sha1 === sha1);
+      if (tok) return { user: u, token: tok };
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  const authOf = (req) => {
+    const h = req.headers.authorization ?? '';
+    if (h.startsWith('token ')) return { kind: 'token', who: byToken(h.slice(6)) };
+    if (h.startsWith('Basic ')) {
+      const [login, ...rest] = Buffer.from(h.slice(6), 'base64').toString('utf8').split(':');
+      const who = byToken(rest.join(':'));
+      return { kind: 'basic', who: who && lower(who.user.login) === lower(login) ? who : null };
+    }
+    return { kind: 'none', who: null };
+  };
+  const reachable = (u) => repos.filter((r) => lower(r.owner) === lower(u.login) || r.collaborators.includes(lower(u.login)));
+
+  function route(method, path, query, auth, body) {
+    const who = auth.who;
+    const p = path.split('/').slice(3).map(decodeURIComponent);
+    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/api/v1/version') return [200, { version: state.version }];
+    if (!who) return [401, { message: 'unauthorized' }];
+    const me = who.user;
+    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/api/v1/user') return [200, userJson(me)];
+    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/api/v1/token') return [200, { id: who.token.id, name: who.token.name, scopes: who.token.scopes }];
+    if (method === 'GET' && path === '/api/v1/user/repos') {
+      const all = reachable(me);
+      const limit = Number(query.get('limit') ?? 30);
+      const page = Number(query.get('page') ?? 1);
+      return [200, all.slice((page - 1) * limit, page * limit).map(repoJson), all.length];
+    }
+    if (p[0] === 'users' && p.length === 2 && method === 'GET') {
+      const u = users.get(lower(p[1]));
+      return u ? [200, userJson(u)] : [404, { message: 'user does not exist' }];
+    }
+    if (p[0] === 'admin' && p[1] === 'users') {
+      if (!me.is_admin || !who.token.scopes.includes('write:admin')) return [403, { message: 'forbidden' }];
+      if (method === 'POST' && p.length === 2) {
+        if (users.has(lower(body.username))) return [422, { message: 'user already exists' }];
+        const u = { id: nextId++, login: body.username, email: body.email, full_name: body.full_name, is_admin: false, prohibit_login: false, tokens: [] };
+        users.set(lower(u.login), u);
+        return [201, userJson(u)];
+      }
+      if (method === 'PATCH' && p.length === 3) {
+        const u = users.get(lower(p[2]));
+        if (!u) return [404, { message: 'user does not exist' }];
+        if (typeof body.prohibit_login === 'boolean') u.prohibit_login = body.prohibit_login;
+        return [200, userJson(u)];
+      }
+    }
+    if (p[0] === 'users' && p[2] === 'tokens') {
+      if (auth.kind !== 'basic') return [401, { message: 'basic auth required' }];
+      const u = users.get(lower(p[1]));
+      if (lower(me.login) !== lower(p[1]) && !me.is_admin) return [403, { message: 'forbidden' }];
+      if (!u) return [404, { message: 'user does not exist' }];
+      if (method === 'GET' && p.length === 3) {
+        const limit = Number(query.get('limit') ?? 30);
+        const page = Number(query.get('page') ?? 1);
+        const list = u.tokens.map((x) => ({ id: x.id, name: x.name, scopes: x.scopes }));
+        return [200, list.slice((page - 1) * limit, page * limit), list.length];
+      }
+      if (method === 'POST' && p.length === 3) {
+        if (u.tokens.some((x) => x.name === body.name)) return [400, { message: 'access token name has been used already' }];
+        const tok = api.addToken(u.login, body.name, body.scopes);
+        return [201, { id: tok.id, name: tok.name, sha1: tok.sha1, scopes: tok.scopes }];
+      }
+      if (method === 'DELETE' && p.length === 4) {
+        const i = u.tokens.findIndex((x) => String(x.id) === p[3] || x.name === p[3]);
+        if (i < 0) return [404, { message: 'token not found' }];
+        u.tokens.splice(i, 1);
+        return [204, null];
+      }
+    }
+    if (p[0] === 'repos' && p.length === 3 && method === 'GET') {
+      const r = repos.find((x) => lower(x.owner) === lower(p[1]) && lower(x.name) === lower(p[2]));
+      return r ? [200, repoJson(r)] : [404, { message: 'not found' }];
+    }
+    if (p[0] === 'repos' && p.length === 4 && p[3] === 'forks' && method === 'POST') {
+      const up = repos.find((x) => lower(x.owner) === lower(p[1]) && lower(x.name) === lower(p[2]));
+      if (!up) return [404, { message: 'not found' }];
+      if (repos.some((x) => lower(x.owner) === lower(me.login) && lower(x.name) === lower(up.name))) return [409, { message: 'exists' }];
+      return [202, repoJson(api.addRepo(me.login, up.name, { parent: `${up.owner}/${up.name}` }))];
+    }
+    return [404, { message: 'no route' }];
+  }
+
+  const server = createServer({ key: tls.key, cert: tls.cert }, (req, res) => {
+    const chunks = [];
+    req.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+    req.on('end', async () => {
+      const u = new URL(req.url, 'https://127.0.0.1');
+      const auth = authOf(req);
+      let body = null;
+      try {
+        body = chunks.length ? JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')) : null;
+      } catch {}
+      const entry = { method: req.method, path: u.pathname + u.search, auth: auth.kind, as: auth.who?.user.login ?? null };
+      requests.push(entry);
+      const rule = rules.find((r) => r.match(entry, body));
+      // An answer function may be async, to hold a call open until the test lets it go.
+      const answer = rule ? (typeof rule.answer === 'function' ? await rule.answer(entry, body) : rule.answer) : null;
+      if (answer?.hang) return;
+      if (answer?.drop) return req.socket.destroy();
+      const [status, json, total] = answer && !answer.pass ? [answer.status, answer.json ?? null, answer.total] : route(req.method, u.pathname, u.searchParams, auth, body ?? {});
+      const headers = { 'content-type': 'application/json' };
+      if (total !== undefined && total !== null) headers['x-total-count'] = String(total);
+      res.writeHead(status, headers);
+      res.end(json === null || status === 204 ? undefined : JSON.stringify(json));
+    });
+  });
+  await new Promise((r) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
+  t.after(() => new Promise((r) => {
+    server.closeAllConnections?.();
+    server.close(() => r());
+  }));
+  api.url = `https://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
+  return api;
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+CREATE TABLE meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE events (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (kind IN (
+    'session.launched',
+    'session.ended',
+    'action.allowed',
+    'action.refused',
+    'task.created',
+    'task.assigned',
+    'task.state',
+    'task.closed',
+    'task.changed.external',
+    'task.conflict',
+    'task.missing',
+    'review.requested',
+    'review.verdict',
+    'human.input',
+    'config.refused',
+    'credential.expiring',
+    'credential.expired',
+    'credential.changed',
+    'launch.revoked',
+    'launch.restored',
+    'digest.sent')),
+  actor_role TEXT, actor_run TEXT,
+  subject TEXT,
+  corrects TEXT REFERENCES events(id),
+  body TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(body))
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE role_claims (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL,
+  op TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('claim','release','revoke')),
+  holder_run TEXT NOT NULL,
+  harness TEXT NOT NULL, address TEXT,
+  by TEXT NOT NULL, reason TEXT,
+  decision TEXT
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE decisions (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL, project TEXT,
+  raised_by_role TEXT NOT NULL, raised_by_run TEXT NOT NULL,
+  class TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (class IN ('routine','within-role','cross-role','gated')),
+  action TEXT NOT NULL,
+  route_to TEXT NOT NULL,
+  question TEXT NOT NULL,
+  options TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(options) AND json_array_length(options) BETWEEN 2 AND 9),
+  recommendation TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_ref TEXT CHECK (task_ref IS NULL OR (task_ref GLOB 'vikunja:[1-9]*/[1-9]*' AND NOT substr(task_ref, 9) GLOB '*[^0-9/]*' AND NOT substr(task_ref, 9) GLOB '*/*/*')), requirement_ref TEXT,
+  blocking INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (blocking IN (0,1)),
+  supersedes TEXT REFERENCES decisions(id)
+, spec_path TEXT, spec_commit TEXT) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE decision_events (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  op TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('seen','resolved','withdrawn','expired')),
+  by TEXT NOT NULL,
+  choice TEXT, note TEXT, via TEXT
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE messages (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  from_role TEXT NOT NULL, from_run TEXT NOT NULL,
+  to_role TEXT NOT NULL,
+  class TEXT NOT NULL,
+  in_reply_to TEXT REFERENCES messages(id),
+  decision TEXT REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  corrects TEXT REFERENCES messages(id),
+  body TEXT NOT NULL
+, to_name TEXT) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE deliveries (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  message TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES messages(id),
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  op TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('routed','delivered','failed','read')),
+  holder_run TEXT, transport TEXT, address TEXT, detail TEXT
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE task_snapshots (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_ref TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (task_ref GLOB 'vikunja:[1-9]*/[1-9]*' AND NOT substr(task_ref, 9) GLOB '*[^0-9/]*' AND NOT substr(task_ref, 9) GLOB '*/*/*'),
+  updated TEXT NOT NULL,
+  etag TEXT,
+  digest TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(digest) = 64 AND NOT digest GLOB '*[^0-9a-f]*'),
+  fields TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(fields)),
+  source TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (source IN ('self','poll')),
+  via TEXT CHECK (via IN ('board','cursor','task','reconcile')),
+  read_at TEXT,
+  role TEXT, run TEXT,
+  CHECK ((source = 'self') = (role IS NOT NULL AND run IS NOT NULL)),
+  CHECK ((source = 'poll') = (via IS NOT NULL AND read_at IS NOT NULL)),
+  CHECK (json_type(fields, '$.bucket') IS 'integer'
+         OR (source IS 'poll' AND via IS 'task' AND json_type(fields, '$.gone') IS 'text'))
+) STRICT;
+CREATE INDEX task_snapshots_ref ON task_snapshots (business, task_ref, seq);
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_resolve_once BEFORE INSERT ON decision_events
+  WHEN NEW.op IN ('resolved','withdrawn','expired') AND EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM decision_events WHERE decision = NEW.decision AND op IN ('resolved','withdrawn','expired'))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decision already closed'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_resolved_choice BEFORE INSERT ON decision_events
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'resolved' AND (NEW.choice IS NULL OR NOT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1 FROM decisions d, json_each(d.options) o WHERE d.id = NEW.decision AND json_extract(o.value,'$.key') = NEW.choice))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'resolution must name one of the options'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_one_holder BEFORE INSERT ON role_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'claim' AND (SELECT op FROM role_claims WHERE business = NEW.business AND role = NEW.role ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1) = 'claim'
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'role already held'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_release_by_holder BEFORE INSERT ON role_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op IN ('release','revoke') AND COALESCE((SELECT op FROM role_claims WHERE business = NEW.business AND role = NEW.role ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1),'') <> 'claim'
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'role is not held'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_release_same_run BEFORE INSERT ON role_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'release' AND (SELECT holder_run FROM role_claims WHERE business = NEW.business AND role = NEW.role ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1) <> NEW.holder_run
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'only the holder releases; others revoke'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_revoke_needs_decision BEFORE INSERT ON role_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'revoke' AND NEW.decision IS NULL AND NEW.reason IS NULL
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'revoke needs a resolved decision or a reason'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER meta_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON meta BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'meta is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER meta_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON meta BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'meta is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON events BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON events BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_claims_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON role_claims BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'role_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_claims_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON role_claims BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'role_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON decisions BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decisions is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON decisions BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decisions is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decision_events_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON decision_events BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decision_events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decision_events_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON decision_events BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decision_events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER messages_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON messages BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'messages is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER messages_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON messages BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'messages is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER deliveries_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON deliveries BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'deliveries is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER deliveries_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON deliveries BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'deliveries is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER meta_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON meta WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM meta WHERE key = NEW.key) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'meta is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON events WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM events WHERE seq = NEW.seq OR id = NEW.id) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER role_claims_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON role_claims WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM role_claims WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'role_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON decisions WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM decisions WHERE seq = NEW.seq OR id = NEW.id) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decisions is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decision_events_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON decision_events WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM decision_events WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'decision_events is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER messages_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON messages WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages WHERE seq = NEW.seq OR id = NEW.id) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'messages is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER deliveries_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON deliveries WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM deliveries WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'deliveries is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_snapshots_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON task_snapshots BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_snapshots is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_snapshots_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON task_snapshots BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_snapshots is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_snapshots_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON task_snapshots WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_snapshots WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_snapshots is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER decisions_blocking_needs_task BEFORE INSERT ON decisions
+  WHEN NEW.blocking = 1 AND NEW.task_ref IS NULL
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a blocking decision cites the task it blocks'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_launch_by_human BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind IN ('launch.revoked','launch.restored') AND (NEW.actor_role IS NOT NULL OR NEW.actor_run IS NOT NULL)
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'only the human revokes or restores launching'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_credential_body BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind GLOB 'credential.*' AND (
+    json_extract(NEW.body, '$.service') IS NULL OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.service') NOT IN ('gitea','vikunja')
+    OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.instance') IS NULL)
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'credential events name a service and a role instance'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_task_missing_body BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind = 'task.missing' AND (
+    json_extract(NEW.body, '$.reason') IS NULL OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.reason') NOT IN ('moved','not-found','no-access')
+    OR (json_extract(NEW.body, '$.reason') = 'moved' AND json_type(NEW.body, '$.project') IS NOT 'integer'))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task.missing carries a reason, and the new project when moved'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_task_subject BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind GLOB 'task.*' AND (NEW.subject IS NULL OR NOT (NEW.subject GLOB 'vikunja:[1-9]*/[1-9]*' AND NOT substr(NEW.subject, 9) GLOB '*[^0-9/]*' AND NOT substr(NEW.subject, 9) GLOB '*/*/*'))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a task event names its task in subject'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_task_created_body BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind = 'task.created' AND (
+    json_type(NEW.body, '$.request') IS NOT 'text'
+    OR NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM events WHERE id = json_extract(NEW.body, '$.request')
+                   AND kind = 'human.input' AND business = NEW.business)
+    OR json_type(NEW.body, '$.requirement') IS NOT 'text'
+    OR NOT json_extract(NEW.body, '$.requirement') GLOB 'REQ-[A-Z]*-[1-9]*'
+    OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.requirement') GLOB 'REQ-*[^A-Z0-9-]*')
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task.created cites the human.input that asked for it and a requirement id'); END;
+CREATE VIEW launch_state AS
+  SELECT business, CASE kind WHEN 'launch.revoked' THEN 'revoked' ELSE 'allowed' END AS state, at
+  FROM events e WHERE kind IN ('launch.revoked','launch.restored')
+    AND seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM events WHERE business = e.business AND kind IN ('launch.revoked','launch.restored'));
+CREATE VIEW task_external_changes AS
+  SELECT p.business, p.task_ref, p.seq, p.via, p.updated, p.digest, ls.digest AS self_digest
+  FROM task_snapshots p
+  LEFT JOIN task_snapshots ls ON ls.seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM task_snapshots
+                                           WHERE business = p.business AND task_ref = p.task_ref AND source = 'self')
+  WHERE p.source = 'poll'
+    AND p.seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM task_snapshots WHERE business = p.business AND task_ref = p.task_ref)
+    AND (ls.seq IS NULL OR (p.updated >= ls.updated AND p.read_at > ls.at AND p.digest <> ls.digest));
+CREATE VIEW task_current AS
+  SELECT s.seq, s.at, s.business, s.task_ref, s.updated, s.etag, s.digest, s.fields, s.source, s.via, s.read_at, s.role, s.run
+  FROM task_snapshots s
+  WHERE s.seq = (SELECT max(c.seq) FROM task_snapshots c
+                 WHERE c.business = s.business AND c.task_ref = s.task_ref
+                   AND (c.source = 'self'
+                        OR c.read_at > coalesce((SELECT ls.at FROM task_snapshots ls
+                                                 WHERE ls.business = c.business AND ls.task_ref = c.task_ref AND ls.source = 'self'
+                                                 ORDER BY ls.seq DESC LIMIT 1), '')));
+CREATE VIEW tasks_open AS
+  SELECT s.business, s.task_ref, json_extract(s.fields, '$.bucket') AS bucket, s.seq
+  FROM task_current s
+  WHERE json_type(s.fields, '$.gone') IS NULL
+    AND json_extract(s.fields, '$.done') = 0;
+CREATE VIEW urgent_inbox AS
+  SELECT d.id, d.business, d.task_ref, d.question, d.at
+  FROM decisions d
+  WHERE d.class = 'gated' AND d.blocking = 1
+    AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM decision_events x WHERE x.decision = d.id AND x.op IN ('resolved','withdrawn','expired'));
+CREATE TABLE task_comment_cursors (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  task_id INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (task_id > 0),
+  last_comment INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (last_comment > 0)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE INDEX task_comment_cursors_latest ON task_comment_cursors (business, task_id, seq);
+CREATE TRIGGER task_comment_cursors_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON task_comment_cursors
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_comment_cursors is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_comment_cursors_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON task_comment_cursors
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_comment_cursors is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_comment_cursors_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON task_comment_cursors
+  WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM task_comment_cursors WHERE seq = NEW.seq)
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'task_comment_cursors is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER task_comment_cursors_forward BEFORE INSERT ON task_comment_cursors
+  WHEN NEW.last_comment <= COALESCE((SELECT last_comment FROM task_comment_cursors
+    WHERE business = NEW.business AND task_id = NEW.task_id ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1), 0)
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'comment cursor must advance'); END;
+CREATE TABLE projects (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  repo TEXT,
+  created_by TEXT NOT NULL,
+  UNIQUE (business, name)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE threads (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  id TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  project TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES projects(id),
+  instance TEXT NOT NULL,
+  owner TEXT NOT NULL,
+  name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  UNIQUE (project, name)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE thread_claims (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  thread TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES threads(id),
+  op TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('claim','release','revoke')),
+  holder_run TEXT NOT NULL,
+  harness TEXT NOT NULL, address TEXT,
+  by TEXT NOT NULL, reason TEXT,
+  decision TEXT
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE message_threads (
+  message TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES messages(id),
+  thread TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES threads(id)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE thread_opens (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  thread TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES threads(id),
+  by TEXT NOT NULL
+) STRICT;
+CREATE INDEX thread_claims_thread ON thread_claims (thread, seq);
+CREATE INDEX message_threads_thread ON message_threads (thread);
+CREATE TRIGGER threads_project_business BEFORE INSERT ON threads
+  WHEN (SELECT business FROM projects WHERE id = NEW.project) IS NOT NEW.business
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a thread belongs to its project''s business'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_one_holder BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'claim' AND (SELECT op FROM thread_claims WHERE thread = NEW.thread ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1) = 'claim'
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread already held'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_one_per_run BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'claim' AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM thread_claims c WHERE c.holder_run = NEW.holder_run AND c.business = NEW.business
+    AND c.seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM thread_claims WHERE thread = c.thread) AND c.op = 'claim')
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'run already holds a thread'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_release_by_holder BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op IN ('release','revoke') AND COALESCE((SELECT op FROM thread_claims WHERE thread = NEW.thread ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1),'') <> 'claim'
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread is not held'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_release_same_run BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'release' AND (SELECT holder_run FROM thread_claims WHERE thread = NEW.thread ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1) <> NEW.holder_run
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'only the holder releases; others revoke'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_revoke_needs_decision BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN NEW.op = 'revoke' AND NEW.decision IS NULL AND NEW.reason IS NULL
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'revoke needs a resolved decision or a reason'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_claims_business BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims
+  WHEN (SELECT business FROM threads WHERE id = NEW.thread) IS NOT NEW.business
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a thread claim names the thread''s business'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER message_threads_match BEFORE INSERT ON message_threads
+  WHEN NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m JOIN threads t ON t.id = NEW.thread
+    WHERE m.id = NEW.message AND m.business = t.business AND t.instance IN (m.to_role, m.from_role))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a threaded message is to or from the thread''s instance'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER delivery_same_thread BEFORE INSERT ON deliveries
+  WHEN NEW.op IN ('routed','delivered') AND (NEW.op = 'delivered' OR NEW.holder_run IS NOT NULL)
+    AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM message_threads mt JOIN messages m ON m.id = mt.message JOIN threads t ON t.id = mt.thread
+      WHERE mt.message = NEW.message AND m.to_role = t.instance
+        AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM thread_claims c WHERE c.seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM thread_claims WHERE thread = t.id)
+          AND c.op = 'claim' AND c.holder_run IS NEW.holder_run))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'a threaded message goes only to its thread''s holder'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER projects_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON projects BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'projects is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER projects_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON projects BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'projects is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER projects_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON projects WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM projects WHERE seq = NEW.seq OR id = NEW.id) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'projects is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER threads_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON threads BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER threads_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON threads BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER threads_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON threads WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM threads WHERE seq = NEW.seq OR id = NEW.id) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_claims_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON thread_claims BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_claims_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON thread_claims BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_claims_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON thread_claims WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM thread_claims WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_claims is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER message_threads_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON message_threads BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'message_threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER message_threads_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON message_threads BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'message_threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER message_threads_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON message_threads WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM message_threads WHERE message = NEW.message) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'message_threads is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_opens_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON thread_opens BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_opens is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_opens_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON thread_opens BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_opens is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER thread_opens_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON thread_opens WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM thread_opens WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'thread_opens is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TABLE instance_names (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  instance TEXT NOT NULL,
+  name TEXT NOT NULL,
+  by TEXT NOT NULL
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TRIGGER instance_names_unique BEFORE INSERT ON instance_names
+  WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM instance_names n WHERE n.business = NEW.business AND n.name = NEW.name
+    AND n.instance <> NEW.instance
+    AND n.seq = (SELECT max(seq) FROM instance_names WHERE business = n.business AND instance = n.instance))
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'an instance name is unique in its business'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER instance_names_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON instance_names BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'instance_names is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER instance_names_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON instance_names BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'instance_names is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER instance_names_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON instance_names WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM instance_names WHERE seq = NEW.seq) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'instance_names is append-only'); END;
+-- Row 124 (#1618): immutable source snapshots and turn outcomes, never transcript text.
+CREATE TABLE usage_records (
+  seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+  at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  run TEXT NOT NULL,
+  instance TEXT NOT NULL,
+  provider TEXT,
+  model TEXT,
+  account TEXT,
+  turn TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source TEXT NOT NULL,
+  phase TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (phase IN ('begin','end')),
+  status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('known','unknown')),
+  code TEXT,
+  cursor TEXT CHECK (cursor IS NULL OR json_valid(cursor)),
+  input INTEGER,
+  output INTEGER,
+  cache_write INTEGER,
+  cache_read INTEGER,
+  UNIQUE (business,run,turn,source,phase),
+  CHECK ((status='unknown' AND input IS NULL AND output IS NULL AND cache_write IS NULL AND cache_read IS NULL)
+    OR (status='known' AND input >= 0 AND output >= 0 AND cache_write >= 0 AND cache_read >= 0
+      AND input IS NOT NULL AND output IS NOT NULL AND cache_write IS NOT NULL AND cache_read IS NOT NULL))
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TRIGGER usage_records_no_update BEFORE UPDATE ON usage_records BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'usage_records is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER usage_records_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON usage_records BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'usage_records is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TRIGGER usage_records_no_replace BEFORE INSERT ON usage_records WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM usage_records WHERE seq=NEW.seq OR (business=NEW.business AND run=NEW.run AND turn=NEW.turn AND source=NEW.source AND phase=NEW.phase)) BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'usage_records is append-only'); END;
+CREATE TABLE hosts (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  host TEXT NOT NULL,
+  address TEXT NOT NULL,
+  port INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (port BETWEEN 1 AND 65535),
+  user TEXT NOT NULL,
+  sudo INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (sudo IN (0,1)),
+  host_keys TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(host_keys) AND json_type(host_keys) = 'array' AND json_array_length(host_keys) > 0),
+  installer_fingerprint TEXT,
+  state TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (state IN ('pending-install','ready')),
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  checked_at TEXT,
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, host),
+  CHECK (state = 'pending-install' OR (installer_fingerprint IS NOT NULL AND checked_at IS NOT NULL))
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TABLE host_grants (
+  business TEXT NOT NULL,
+  agent TEXT NOT NULL,
+  host TEXT NOT NULL,
+  commands TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (json_valid(commands) AND json_type(commands) = 'array' AND json_array_length(commands) > 0),
+  rotate_by TEXT NOT NULL,
+  tag TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (length(tag) = 39 AND tag GLOB 'mosaic-*' AND NOT substr(tag, 8) GLOB '*[^0-9a-f]*'),
+  decision TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES decisions(id),
+  PRIMARY KEY (business, agent, host),
+  FOREIGN KEY (business, host) REFERENCES hosts(business, host)
+) STRICT;
+CREATE TRIGGER events_grant_actor BEFORE INSERT ON events
+  WHEN NEW.kind = 'action.allowed'
+    AND (json_extract(NEW.body, '$.action') GLOB 'grant.*' OR json_extract(NEW.body, '$.operation') GLOB 'grant.*')
+    AND NOT (NEW.actor_role IS NULL AND NEW.actor_run IS 'grant')
+  BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'only the grant writer records grant events'); END;
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// Row 236 (#1742, #436b r5 section 9, X-G3): the grant path end to end on a scratch gitea/gitea:1.27.1, as
+// section 1's facts were found: a throwaway container on 127.0.0.1 over TLS with row 199's scratch CA, its
+// data inside the container, removed after. The test never pulls an image; without Docker or the image it
+// skips. The admin and seat tokens are scratch tokens this container made; none is printed, and no test
+// here reaches git.mosaicstack.dev or any provider.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { request } from 'node:https';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { Broker, GRANT_EVIDENCE } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { Credentials } from '../src/credentials.mjs';
+import { SEAT_SCOPES, giteaGrant, giteaKeys } from '../src/gitea-grant.mjs';
+import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
+import { scratchCa } from '../../seat/tests/fake-gitea.mjs';
+
+const IMAGE = 'gitea/gitea:1.27.1';
+const USER = 'demo-coder';
+const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
+const dayFrom = (n) => new Date(Date.now() + n * 86400000).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
+const none = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } };
+const docker = (...args) => spawnSync('docker', args, { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 120000 });
+const skip = docker('image', 'inspect', IMAGE).status === 0 ? false : `no Docker or no local ${IMAGE}; this test never pulls`;
+
+const freePort = () =>
+  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const s = createServer();
+    s.once('error', reject);
+    s.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const { port } = s.address();
+      s.close(() => resolve(port));
+    });
+  });
+
+// One HTTPS call to the scratch container, trusting only the scratch CA.
+function call(url, ca, method, path, { auth = null, body = null } = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const data = body ? JSON.stringify(body) : null;
+    const headers = { accept: 'application/json', ...(data ? { 'content-type': 'application/json' } : {}), ...(auth ? { authorization: auth } : {}) };
+    const req = request(url + path, { method, ca, headers, timeout: 10000 }, (res) => {
+      let text = '';
+      res.on('data', (c) => (text += c));
+      res.on('end', () => {
+        let json = null;
+        try {
+          json = text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
+        } catch {}
+        resolve({ status: res.statusCode, json });
+      });
+    });
+    req.on('timeout', () => req.destroy());
+    req.on('error', () => resolve({ status: 0, json: null }));
+    req.end(data ?? undefined);
+  });
+}
+
+test('X-G3: on scratch 1.27.1, a grant makes the user, mints, forks, checks reach, writes the file, and revoke deletes the token', { skip, timeout: 300000 }, async (t) => {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'g236-docker-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const tlsDir = join(dir, 'tls');
+  const tls = scratchCa(tlsDir);
+  // The container's git user reads the scratch key; it is a throwaway key for this run only.
+  chmodSync(tlsDir, 0o755);
+  chmodSync(join(tlsDir, 'server.key'), 0o644);
+  const ca = readFileSync(tls.ca, 'utf8');
+  const port = await freePort();
+  const url = `https://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  const name = 'g236-' + randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
+  t.after(() => docker('rm', '-f', name));
+  const started = docker('run', '-d', '--rm', '--name', name, '-p', `127.0.0.1:${port}:3000`, '-v', `${tlsDir}:/certs:ro`,
+    '-e', 'GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true',
+    '-e', 'GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3',
+    '-e', 'GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true',
+    '-e', 'GITEA__server__PROTOCOL=https',
+    '-e', 'GITEA__server__CERT_FILE=/certs/server.pem',
+    '-e', 'GITEA__server__KEY_FILE=/certs/server.key',
+    '-e', `GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=${url}/`,
+    IMAGE);
+  assert.equal(started.status, 0, started.stderr);
+  const end = Date.now() + 120000;
+  while ((await call(url, ca, 'GET', '/api/v1/version')).status !== 200) {
+    if (Date.now() > end) assert.fail('the scratch Gitea did not answer in 120 s: ' + docker('logs', '--tail', '20', name).stdout);
+    await sleep(500);
+  }
+  const gitea = (...args) => docker('exec', '-u', 'git', name, 'gitea', ...args);
+  const password = () => randomBytes(18).toString('base64url');
+  for (const [user, admin] of [['mosaic-grant', true], ['acme', false]]) {
+    const r = gitea('admin', 'user', 'create', '--username', user, '--email', `${user}@example.test`, '--password', password(), '--must-change-password=false', ...(admin ? ['--admin'] : []));
+    assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
+  }
+  const minted = gitea('admin', 'user', 'generate-access-token', '--username', 'mosaic-grant', '--token-name', 'mosaic-grant-bootstrap',
+    '--scopes', 'write:admin,write:repository,write:user', '--raw');
+  assert.equal(minted.status, 0, 'generate-access-token failed');
+  const adminToken = minted.stdout.trim();
+  assert.match(adminToken, /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/, 'the admin token has the shape of a Gitea token');
+  const basic = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`mosaic-grant:${adminToken}`).toString('base64');
+  for (const repo of ['app', 'lib']) {
+    const r = await call(url, ca, 'POST', '/api/v1/admin/users/acme/repos', { auth: 'token ' + adminToken, body: { name: repo, auto_init: true } });
+    assert.equal(r.status, 201);
+  }
+
+  const configDir = join(dir, 'cfg');
+  mkdirSync(configDir, { mode: 0o700 });
+  mkdirSync(join(dir, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  const storeRoot = join(configDir, 'secrets', 'agents');
+  const store = new Store(join(dir, 'data'));
+  const credentials = new Credentials({ references: {}, storeRoot, dataRoot: join(dir, 'data') });
+  t.after(() => {
+    credentials.close();
+    store.close();
+  });
+  const business = {
+    id: 'demo',
+    human: 'jason',
+    arbiters: { technical: 'pm', delivery: 'pm' },
+    roles: {
+      chief: { definition: 'chief-of-staff', ...none },
+      pm: { definition: 'pm', ...none },
+      coder: { definition: 'coder', ...none, identity: { name: 'Coder', email: '[email protected]', gitea: { url, user: USER } }, publish: ['app', 'lib'] },
+    },
+    definitions: {
+      'chief-of-staff': { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [] },
+      pm: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [] },
+      coder: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [{ service: 'gitea' }] },
+    },
+    projects: { app: { remote: `${url}/acme/app` }, lib: { remote: `${url}/acme/lib` } },
+    vars: {},
+  };
+  const broker = new Broker({
+    store,
+    businesses: { demo: business },
+    secretCheck: (value) => credentials.assertClean(value),
+    giteaGrant: giteaGrant({ configDir, ca, timeoutMs: 20000 }),
+    giteaKeys: giteaKeys({ credentials, storeRoot }),
+  });
+  const chief = broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'chief', run: 'chief-run', harness: 'pi', address: 'chief' });
+  broker.request(chief, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  const human = broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+
+  // C1 to C4 on the real server, then the slot is written.
+  await broker.request(human, { verb: 'grants.admin.set', args: { service: 'gitea', url, account: 'mosaic-grant', rotateBy: dayFrom(60), token: adminToken + '\n' } });
+  const d = await broker.request(chief, {
+    verb: 'decision.raise',
+    args: {
+      action: 'credential.mint', question: 'Grant coder Gitea?', options: [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }], recommendation: 'yes', blocking: false,
+      grant: { method: 'gitea', agent: 'coder', target: { projects: ['app'] }, rotateBy: dayFrom(30) },
+    },
+  });
+  broker.request(human, { verb: 'decision.resolve', args: { id: d.id, choice: 'yes' } });
+  const events = () => store.all(`SELECT body FROM events WHERE business='demo' AND ${GRANT_EVIDENCE} ORDER BY seq`).map((e) => JSON.parse(e.body));
+  const ended = () => events().find((e) => e.grantDecision === d.id && ['grant.applied', 'grant.failed'].includes(e.action));
+  const until = Date.now() + 120000;
+  while (!ended() && Date.now() < until) await sleep(100);
+  await broker.giteaIdle();
+  const applied = ended();
+  assert.equal(applied?.action, 'grant.applied', JSON.stringify(applied));
+
+  // The user, made with the nonce, and its id recorded.
+  const nonce = events().find((e) => e.grantDecision === d.id && e.step === 'user').nonce;
+  const u = await call(url, ca, 'GET', `/api/v1/users/${USER}`, { auth: 'token ' + adminToken });
+  assert.equal(u.status, 200);
+  assert.equal(u.json.full_name, `Coder [mosaic ${nonce}]`);
+  assert.equal(u.json.is_admin, false);
+  const row = store.get("SELECT id, nonce FROM gitea_users WHERE business='demo' AND agent='coder'");
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...row }, { id: u.json.id, nonce });
+  // One token, with the two scopes, at the id the record names.
+  const list = await call(url, ca, 'GET', `/api/v1/users/${USER}/tokens`, { auth: basic });
+  assert.equal(list.status, 200);
+  assert.equal(list.json.length, 1);
+  assert.deepEqual([...list.json[0].scopes].sort(), [...SEAT_SCOPES]);
+  const grant = store.get("SELECT token_id FROM gitea_grants WHERE business='demo' AND agent='coder'");
+  assert.equal(list.json[0].id, grant.token_id);
+  // The fork, with its parent.
+  const fork = await call(url, ca, 'GET', `/api/v1/repos/${USER}/app`, { auth: 'token ' + adminToken });
+  assert.equal(fork.status, 200);
+  assert.equal(fork.json.parent?.full_name, 'acme/app');
+  // The 0600 file, whose token Gitea knows as the recorded id; the value is compared, never printed.
+  const file = join(storeRoot, 'demo', 'coder', 'gitea');
+  assert.equal(statSync(file).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
+  const who = await call(url, ca, 'GET', '/api/v1/token', { auth: 'token ' + readFileSync(file, 'utf8').trim() });
+  assert.equal(who.status, 200);
+  assert.equal(who.json.id, grant.token_id);
+
+  // Revoke deletes the token at Gitea: gone from the list, the file and the record gone.
+  const out = await broker.request(human, { verb: 'grants.revoke', args: { service: 'gitea', agent: 'coder', reason: 'X-G3' } });
+  assert.deepEqual(out.serviceLeft, []);
+  await broker.giteaIdle();
+  const after = await call(url, ca, 'GET', `/api/v1/users/${USER}/tokens`, { auth: basic });
+  assert.equal(after.status, 200);
+  assert.deepEqual(after.json, []);
+  assert.equal(existsSync(file), false);
+  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT count(*) AS n FROM gitea_grants WHERE business='demo'").n, 0);
+  // No scratch token reached the store.
+  const text = store.all("SELECT body FROM events WHERE business='demo'").map((r) => r.body).join('\n');
+  assert.ok(!text.includes(adminToken), 'the admin token reached the store');
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { chmodSync, copyFileSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite';
+import { Store, schemaDigest } from '../src/store.mjs';
+// Row 236 (#1742, #436b r5 section 7): the 3j→3k step adds the gitea_users and gitea_grants tables and
+// nothing else. It runs on a 3j store built here from the pinned 3j schema (02da6a2ae's schema.sql) and
+// fixture rows. No live store is read or copied.
+const AT = '2026-10-21T00:00:00.000Z';
+const ddl3j = readFileSync(new URL('./fixtures/schema-3j.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+const here = (p) => new URL(p, import.meta.url);
+const NEW = ['gitea_users', 'gitea_grants', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_users_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_grants_1'];
+function source3j(t) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'gitea-migrate-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'bus'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  const path = join(root, 'bus/bus.sqlite'), db = new DatabaseSync(path);
+  assert.equal(createHash('sha256').update(ddl3j).digest('hex'), '0a7b633ce7eec9d0bb37c3255f4244d97bd0c8eac38db91a11b4ef6cc982ec8c');
+  db.exec(ddl3j);
+  const run = (sql, ...args) => db.prepare(sql).run(...args);
+  run('INSERT INTO meta VALUES (?,?)', 'schema_version', '3j');
+  run('INSERT INTO meta VALUES (?,?)', 'schema_digest', schemaDigest(db));
+  run('INSERT INTO meta VALUES (?,?)', 'comment_cursor_epoch', AT);
+  run(`INSERT INTO decisions(id,at,business,raised_by_role,raised_by_run,class,action,route_to,question,options,recommendation,blocking)
+    VALUES('d1',?,'demo','chief','run1','gated','credential.mint','human','q','["yes","no"]','yes',0)`, AT);
+  run('INSERT INTO events(id,at,business,kind,actor_role,actor_run,body) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)', 'e1', AT, 'demo', 'action.allowed', null, 'grant', '{"operation":"grant.host-enroll","decision":"d1"}');
+  run('INSERT INTO events(id,at,business,kind,body) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)', 'e2', AT, 'demo', 'action.allowed', '{}');
+  db.close(); chmodSync(path, 0o600);
+  return { root, path };
+}
+function rows(path) {
+  const db = new DatabaseSync(path, { readOnly: true });
+  try {
+    return Object.fromEntries(db.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name NOT IN ('gitea_users','gitea_grants')").all()
+      .map(({ name }) => [name, db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM ${name} ORDER BY rowid`).all()
+        .filter(r => name !== 'meta' || !['schema_version', 'schema_digest'].includes(r.key)).map(r => ({ ...r }))]));
+  } finally { db.close(); }
+}
+function master(path) {
+  const db = new DatabaseSync(path, { readOnly: true });
+  try {
+    return db.prepare('SELECT type,name,tbl_name,sql FROM sqlite_master ORDER BY type,name').all().map(r => ({ ...r }));
+  } finally { db.close(); }
+}
+const version = (path) => {
+  const db = new DatabaseSync(path, { readOnly: true });
+  try { return db.prepare("SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key='schema_version'").get().value; } finally { db.close(); }
+};
+// A copy of the bus module whose store.mjs, schema.sql and 3j→3k step the caller edits.
+async function engine(root, name, { store, schema, step = (s) => s }) {
+  const moduleRoot = join(root, name);
+  mkdirSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations'), { recursive: true });
+  const source = readFileSync(here('../src/store.mjs'), 'utf8'), edited = store ? store(source) : source;
+  if (store) assert.notEqual(edited, source);
+  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs'), edited);
+  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'schema.sql'), schema ?? readFileSync(here('../schema.sql'), 'utf8'));
+  for (const file of ['3b.sql', '3b-3c.sql', '3c-3d.sql', '3d-3e.sql', '3e-3f.sql', '3f-3g.sql', '3g-3h.sql', '3h-3i.sql', '3i-3j.sql'])
+    copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/' + file), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations', file));
+  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'), step(readFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'), 'utf8')));
+  return (await import(pathToFileURL(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs')))).Store;
+}
+function fresh(t) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'gitea-store-'));
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  t.after(() => { store.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+  store.run(`INSERT INTO decisions(id,at,business,raised_by_role,raised_by_run,class,action,route_to,question,options,recommendation,blocking)
+    VALUES('d1',?,'demo','chief','run1','gated','credential.mint','human','q','["yes","no"]','yes',0)`, AT);
+  return store;
+}
+const user = (store, values = {}) => store.run(
+  'INSERT INTO gitea_users(business,agent,user,id,nonce,decision) VALUES(:business,:agent,:user,:id,:nonce,:decision)',
+  { business: 'demo', agent: 'coder', user: 'demo-coder', id: 7, nonce: '0123456789abcdef', decision: 'd1', ...values });
+const grant = (store, values = {}) => store.run(
+  'INSERT INTO gitea_grants(business,agent,user,token_id,token_name,projects,rotate_by,decision) VALUES(:business,:agent,:user,:token,:name,:projects,:rotate,:decision)',
+  { business: 'demo', agent: 'coder', user: 'demo-coder', token: 9, name: 'mosaic-demo-coder-gitea-d1', projects: '["app"]', rotate: '2026-12-01', decision: 'd1', ...values });
+
+test('3j copy migrates to 3k: every row kept, and sqlite_master gains only the two tables and their keys', t => {
+  const { root, path } = source3j(t), before = rows(path), was = master(path);
+  assert.throws(() => new Store(root), /schema-mismatch/);
+  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
+  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), before);
+  const now = master(path);
+  assert.deepEqual(now.filter(r => !NEW.includes(r.name)), was);
+  assert.deepEqual(now.filter(r => NEW.includes(r.name)).map(r => r.name).sort(), [...NEW].sort());
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  try {
+    assert.equal(store.get('PRAGMA quick_check').quick_check, 'ok');
+    assert.deepEqual(store.all('PRAGMA foreign_key_check'), []);
+    assert.equal(store.get('SELECT count(*) AS n FROM gitea_users').n, 0);
+    assert.equal(store.get('SELECT count(*) AS n FROM gitea_grants').n, 0);
+    user(store);
+    grant(store);
+  } finally { store.close(); }
+});
+
+test('a 3j→3k step that fails partway leaves the store at 3j with every row and the schema intact', async t => {
+  const { root, path } = source3j(t), before = rows(path), was = master(path);
+  // The real step plus a statement that fails only when events has a row, so the empty replay at
+  // import passes and the store's run fails after both tables exist.
+  const Failing = await engine(root, 'engine-failing', { step: (sql) => sql + 'INSERT INTO events SELECT * FROM events LIMIT 1;\n' });
+  assert.throws(() => new Failing(root, { migrateSchema: true }), /events is append-only/);
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.deepEqual(master(path), was);
+  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), before);
+  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
+});
+
+test('the 3j engine refuses a 3k store, migrating or not, and leaves it at 3k', async t => {
+  const { root, path } = source3j(t);
+  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
+  const after = rows(path), was = master(path);
+  const Store3j = await engine(root, 'engine-3j', {
+    schema: ddl3j,
+    store: (source) => source
+      .replace(/export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '[a-f0-9]+';/, `export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '${createHash('sha256').update(ddl3j).digest('hex')}';`)
+      .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';")
+      .replace(/\}, \{\n {2}\/\/ Row 236 \(#1742[\s\S]*?\}\];\nconst timedTables/, '}];\nconst timedTables'),
+  });
+  const pinned = readFileSync(join(root, 'engine-3j/src/store.mjs'), 'utf8');
+  assert.ok(pinned.includes("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';") && !pinned.includes('3j-3k'), 'the 3j engine has no 3j→3k step');
+  assert.throws(() => new Store3j(root), /schema-mismatch/);
+  assert.throws(() => new Store3j(root, { migrateSchema: true }), /schema-mismatch/);
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
+  assert.deepEqual(master(path), was);
+  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), after);
+});
+
+test('gitea_users: one user per business and agent, an id above 0, a 16-hex nonce and a real decision', t => {
+  const store = fresh(t);
+  user(store);
+  assert.throws(() => user(store, { user: 'other' }), /UNIQUE constraint failed: gitea_users\.business, gitea_users\.agent/);
+  user(store, { business: 'other' });
+  for (const nonce of ['0123456789abcde', '0123456789abcdef0', '0123456789ABCDEF', '0123456789abcdeg'])
+    assert.throws(() => user(store, { agent: 'x', nonce }), /CHECK constraint failed/, nonce);
+  assert.throws(() => user(store, { agent: 'x', id: 0 }), /CHECK constraint failed/);
+  assert.throws(() => user(store, { agent: 'x', id: 'seven' }), /cannot store TEXT value in INTEGER column/);
+  assert.throws(() => user(store, { agent: 'x', decision: 'nope' }), /FOREIGN KEY constraint failed/);
+});
+
+test('gitea_grants: one grant per agent, a projects array, a token id above 0, and only for a recorded user', t => {
+  const store = fresh(t);
+  assert.throws(() => grant(store), /FOREIGN KEY constraint failed/);
+  user(store);
+  for (const projects of ['[]', '{}', '"app"', 'not json'])
+    assert.throws(() => grant(store, { projects }), /CHECK constraint failed/, projects);
+  assert.throws(() => grant(store, { token: 0 }), /CHECK constraint failed/);
+  assert.throws(() => grant(store, { decision: 'nope' }), /FOREIGN KEY constraint failed/);
+  grant(store);
+  assert.throws(() => grant(store, { token: 10 }), /UNIQUE constraint failed/);
+  assert.throws(() => store.run("DELETE FROM gitea_users WHERE business='demo' AND agent='coder'"), /FOREIGN KEY constraint failed/);
+  store.run("DELETE FROM gitea_grants WHERE business='demo' AND agent='coder'");
+  store.run("DELETE FROM gitea_users WHERE business='demo' AND agent='coder'");
+});
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
 // reaches another host.
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
-import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
-import { connect } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
 import { appendFileSync, chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostExecutor, runHost } from '../src/host-run.mjs';
 import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
 import { grantDecision, hostRecord } from './host-fixtures.mjs';

+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
 const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
 const USER = userInfo().username;
 const AT = '2026-10-21T00:00:00.000Z';
@@ -35,12 +37,7 @@ const DEFINITIONS = {
  pm: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [] },
  ops: { roleVersion: 2, credentials: [{ service: 'host' }] },
 };
-const listening = (port) =>
-  new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
-    s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
-    s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
-  });
+
 async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
  const end = Date.now() + ms;
  while (!fn()) {
@@ -54,12 +51,13 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 10000) {
 // Both also stop when the test dir is gone, since a held stub on the sshd side outlives its test (#1750).
 // wrap.sh logs every request. The sudo stub logs its arguments to sudo.log and runs the command as the
 // test's user.
-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
  if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
  keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
  keygen(join(dir, 'installer'));
  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'installer.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
  mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+  installSleepStub(dir);
  const stub = (name, body) => writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', name), `#!/bin/sh\nD='${dir}'\n${body}\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
  stub('list', '[ -e "$D/fail-list" ] && exit 1\n[ -e "$D/granted" ] && grep " mosaic-[0-9a-f]*$" "$D/granted"\nexit 0');
  stub(
@@ -76,26 +74,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
    `#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" >> '${dir}/requests.log'\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`,
    { mode: 0o755 },
  );
-  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
-    const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
-    writeFileSync(
-      join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
-      [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`,
-        `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
-        `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
-    );
-    const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
-    t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
-    const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
-    while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
-      if (await listening(port)) return port;
-      await sleep(30);
-    }
-    daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
-  }
-  throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+  return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+    'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+    `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys ${dir}/granted`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+    'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+    `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+  ], options);
 }

+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+  });
+  t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+  const occupied = server.address().port;
+  const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+  assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+  assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+  assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+    readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+  for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+    const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+    assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+    assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+  }
+});
+
 async function setup(t, opts = {}) {
  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'g235x-'));
  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ test('G1, R4: the grant takes exactly method, agent, host, commands and rotateBy
  for (const bad of [
    noRotate,
    { ...g, extra: 1 },
-    { ...g, method: 'gitea' },
+    // Row 236 (#1742) makes gitea a known method with its own path, so the unknown method is another name.
+    { ...g, method: 'ftp' },
    { ...g, method: 'Host' },
    { ...g, agent: 'Ops' },
    { ...g, agent: '' },
@@ -101,6 +102,15 @@ test('G1, R4: the grant takes exactly method, agent, host, commands and rotateBy
  assert.ok(rotateBy);
 });

+test('row 236 (#1742): a gitea grant on a broker with no Gitea path refuses gitea-not-configured, and nothing is stored', async (t) => {
+  const f = setup(t);
+  const before = f.decisions();
+  const refused = f.refusals().length;
+  await refusesWith(f.raise({ method: 'gitea' }), 'gitea-not-configured');
+  assert.equal(f.decisions(), before);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.refusals().slice(refused), ['gitea-not-configured']);
+});
+
 test('G2: an agent whose definition lacks host refuses host-not-declared, and an unknown agent unknown-role', async (t) => {
  const f = setup(t);
  const before = f.decisions();
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ const TAG = 'mosaic-' + 'a'.repeat(32);
 const ddl3i = readFileSync(new URL('./fixtures/schema-3i.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
 const here = (p) => new URL(p, import.meta.url);
 const NEW = ['hosts', 'host_grants', 'events_grant_actor', 'sqlite_autoindex_hosts_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_host_grants_1'];
+// Row 236 (#1742): 3j→3k's objects, after this step. Their test is gitea-migration.test.mjs.
+const LATER = ['gitea_users', 'gitea_grants', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_users_1', 'sqlite_autoindex_gitea_grants_1'];
 function source3i(t) {
  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'grant-migrate-'));
  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ function source3i(t) {
 function rows(path) {
  const db = new DatabaseSync(path, { readOnly: true });
  try {
-    return Object.fromEntries(db.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name NOT IN ('hosts','host_grants')").all()
+    return Object.fromEntries(db.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name NOT IN ('hosts','host_grants','gitea_users','gitea_grants')").all()
      .map(({ name }) => [name, db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM ${name} ORDER BY rowid`).all()
        .filter(r => name !== 'meta' || !['schema_version', 'schema_digest'].includes(r.key)).map(r => ({ ...r }))]));
  } finally { db.close(); }
@@ -61,6 +63,7 @@ async function engine(root, name, { store, schema, step = (s) => s }) {
  for (const file of ['3b.sql', '3b-3c.sql', '3c-3d.sql', '3d-3e.sql', '3e-3f.sql', '3f-3g.sql', '3g-3h.sql', '3h-3i.sql'])
    copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/' + file), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations', file));
  writeFileSync(join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3i-3j.sql'), step(readFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3i-3j.sql'), 'utf8')));
+  copyFileSync(here('../src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'), join(moduleRoot, 'src/migrations/3j-3k.sql'));
  return (await import(pathToFileURL(join(moduleRoot, 'src/store.mjs')))).Store;
 }
 function fresh(t) {
@@ -84,9 +87,9 @@ test('3i copy migrates to 3j: every row kept, and sqlite_master gains only the t
  const { root, path } = source3i(t), before = rows(path), was = master(path);
  assert.throws(() => new Store(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), before);
-  const now = master(path);
+  const now = master(path).filter(r => !LATER.includes(r.name));
  assert.deepEqual(now.filter(r => !NEW.includes(r.name)), was);
  assert.deepEqual(now.filter(r => NEW.includes(r.name)).map(r => r.name).sort(), [...NEW].sort());
  const store = new Store(root);
@@ -109,7 +112,7 @@ test('a 3i→3j step that fails partway leaves the store at 3i with every row an
  assert.deepEqual(master(path), was);
  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), before);
  new Store(root, { migrateSchema: true }).close();
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
 });

 test('the 3i engine refuses a 3j store, migrating or not, and leaves it at 3j', async t => {
@@ -120,14 +123,14 @@ test('the 3i engine refuses a 3j store, migrating or not, and leaves it at 3j',
    schema: ddl3i,
    store: (source) => source
      .replace(/export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '[a-f0-9]+';/, `export const SCHEMA_SHA256 = '${createHash('sha256').update(ddl3i).digest('hex')}';`)
-      .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3j';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3i';")
+      .replace("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3k';", "export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3i';")
      .replace(/\}, \{\n {2}\/\/ Row 234 \(#1740\)[\s\S]*?\}\];\nconst timedTables/, '}];\nconst timedTables'),
  });
  const pinned = readFileSync(join(root, 'engine-3i/src/store.mjs'), 'utf8');
  assert.ok(pinned.includes("export const SCHEMA_VERSION = '3i';") && !pinned.includes('3i-3j'), 'the 3i engine has no 3i→3j step');
  assert.throws(() => new Store3i(root), /schema-mismatch/);
  assert.throws(() => new Store3i(root, { migrateSchema: true }), /schema-mismatch/);
-  assert.equal(version(path), '3j');
+  assert.equal(version(path), '3k');
  assert.deepEqual(master(path), was);
  assert.deepEqual(rows(path), after);
 });
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
-import { connect, createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
 import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import { hostGrant } from '../src/host-grant.mjs';
 import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
 import { businessDoc, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';

+import { ephemeralRange, installSleepStub, pickPort, startScratchSshd } from './scratch-sshd.mjs';
+
 const SSHD = '/usr/bin/sshd';
 const REPO = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url));
 const USER = userInfo().username;
@@ -50,22 +52,18 @@ async function until(fn, ms = 5000) {
  }
  return true;
 }
-const listening = (port) =>
-  new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const s = connect(port, '127.0.0.1');
-    s.on('connect', () => (s.destroy(), resolve(true)));
-    s.on('error', () => resolve(false));
-  });
+

 // A scratch sshd. ForceCommand puts the fake sudo first on PATH and hands the command to /bin/sh, so
 // the remote side parses the command line the way a real host's POSIX shell does.
-async function sshd(t, dir) {
+async function sshd(t, dir, options) {
  if (!existsSync(SSHD)) throw new Error(`${SSHD} is missing: the executor tests need it and fail, never skip`);
  keygen(join(dir, 'hostkey'));
  keygen(join(dir, 'otherhost'));
  keygen(join(dir, 'user'));
  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'authorized_keys'), readFileSync(join(dir, 'user.pub')), { mode: 0o600 });
  mkdirSync(join(dir, 'fake'));
+  installSleepStub(dir);
  writeFileSync(
    join(dir, 'fake', 'sudo'),
    `#!/bin/sh\n'${process.execPath}' -e 'require("fs").appendFileSync(process.argv[1], JSON.stringify(process.argv.slice(2)) + "\\n")' '${dir}/argv.json' "$@"\nshift 2\nexec "$@"\n`,
@@ -75,26 +73,42 @@ async function sshd(t, dir) {
  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'fake', 'fail255'), '#!/bin/sh\necho "Host key verification failed." >&2\nexit 255\n', { mode: 0o755 });
  writeFileSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), `#!/bin/sh\nPATH=${dir}/fake:/usr/bin:/bin; export PATH\nexec /bin/sh -c "$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"\n`);
  chmodSync(join(dir, 'wrap.sh'), 0o755);
-  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt++) {
-    const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
-    writeFileSync(
-      join(dir, 'sshd_config'),
-      [`Port ${port}`, 'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`, `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`,
-        `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`, 'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
-        `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`, ''].join('\n'),
-    );
-    const daemon = spawn(SSHD, ['-D', '-f', join(dir, 'sshd_config'), '-E', join(dir, 'sshd.log')], { stdio: 'ignore' });
-    t.after(() => daemon.kill('SIGKILL'));
-    const deadline = Date.now() + 3000;
-    while (Date.now() < deadline && daemon.exitCode === null) {
-      if (await listening(port)) return port;
-      await sleep(30);
-    }
-    daemon.kill('SIGKILL');
-  }
-  throw new Error('scratch sshd did not start');
+  return startScratchSshd(t, dir, [
+    'ListenAddress 127.0.0.1', `HostKey ${dir}/hostkey`,
+    `AuthorizedKeysFile ${dir}/authorized_keys`, `PidFile ${dir}/sshd.pid`,
+    'UsePAM no', 'StrictModes no', 'PasswordAuthentication no', 'KbdInteractiveAuthentication no',
+    `ForceCommand ${dir}/wrap.sh`,
+  ], options);
 }

+
+test('row 280: an occupied TCP port is attempted, refused, and retried with our sshd', async t => {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'sshd280-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const server = createServer(socket => socket.end());
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve);
+  });
+  t.after(() => new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)));
+  const occupied = server.address().port;
+  const port = await sshd(t, dir, { firstPort: occupied });
+  assert.match(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.conf'), 'utf8'), new RegExp(`^Port ${occupied}\\n`));
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(dir, 'sshd-0.log'), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${occupied}.`), false);
+  assert.notEqual(port, occupied);
+  assert.ok([1, 2, 3, 4].some(n => existsSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`)) &&
+    readFileSync(join(dir, `sshd-${n}.log`), 'utf8').includes(`Server listening on 127.0.0.1 port ${port}.`)));
+});
+
+test('row 280: every injected picker sample is unprivileged and outside the ephemeral range', () => {
+  const [lo, hi] = ephemeralRange();
+  for (const sample of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.6384, 0.75, 0.999999]) {
+    const port = pickPort(() => sample);
+    assert.ok(port >= 1024 && port <= 65535);
+    assert.ok(port < lo || port > hi, `sample ${sample}: ${port} inside ${lo}-${hi}`);
+  }
+});
+
 const GRANT = [['true'], ['false'], ['echo'], ['sleep'], ['head'], ['cat'], ['systemctl', 'status']];
 async function hostFixture(t, { commands = GRANT, reviewerHosts, wrongHostKey = false, coderWeb2 = false } = {}) {
  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'h210-'));
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
-import { Broker, ORGANIZATION_KEYS } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { Broker, LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS, ORGANIZATION_KEYS, TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS } from '../src/broker.mjs';

 const chiefAuthority = JSON.parse(readFileSync(fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../roles/chief-of-staff.json', import.meta.url)), 'utf8')).authority;
 const none = { authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } };
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ test('row 165 runtime: an add and a change reach the organization file with the
  assert.equal(view.definitions['merge-gate'].accepted, true);
  const added = bus.broker.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { ...ADD, revision: view.revision } });
  assert.equal(added.instances['sec-1'].launched, true);
+  // Row 194 (D3 item 3): this boot copy's coder has no credential references and the file's has, so
+  // the bus doesn't reload and asks for a restart. reload.test.mjs boots from the file.
  assert.equal(added.restart, true);
  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, 'utf8')).roles['sec-1'], { definition: 'security-reviewer' });
  const first = log().at(-1);
@@ -84,7 +86,8 @@ test('row 165 runtime: an add and a change reach the organization file with the
  const before = readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
  const entries = log().length;
  const code = (args) => { try { bus.broker.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { revision: changed.revision, ...args } }); } catch (e) { return e.code; } return null; };
-  assert.equal(code({ instance: 'reviewer-2', op: 'add', definition: 'reviewer' }), 'organization-credentials-out-of-scope');
+  // Row 194 (brief item 7, sage-1610 a): an add of a vikunja definition needs its bot.
+  assert.equal(code({ instance: 'reviewer-2', op: 'add', definition: 'reviewer' }), 'organization-tracker-required');
  assert.equal(code({ instance: 'sec-1', op: 'change', definition: 'coder' }), 'organization-credentials-out-of-scope');
  assert.equal(code({ instance: 'sec-1', op: 'add', definition: 'merge-gate' }), 'organization-instance-exists');
  assert.equal(code({ instance: 'ghost', op: 'change', vars: {} }), 'organization-unknown-instance');
@@ -94,3 +97,42 @@ test('row 165 runtime: an add and a change reach the organization file with the
  assert.equal(readFileSync(file, 'utf8'), before);
  assert.equal(log().length, entries, 'a refused write logs nothing');
 });
+
+// Row 194 (#1692, D4, D4.1): the human lifecycle verbs so far, veto.set and instances.set's three ops.
+test('row 194 T12: agent and reader sessions refuse veto.set; the tester gets add and change but not delete or veto.set; the human passes the hook for each listed verb', (t) => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'instances-verb-'));
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  t.after(() => { store.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+  const calls = [];
+  const b = new Broker({ store, businesses: biz(), organization: (id, verb, args, actor) => (calls.push([verb, args.op, actor]), verb === 'instances.check' ? { revision: ADD.revision } : { ok: true }) });
+  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const tester = b.bindTester({ business: 'demo' });
+  const caps = { reader: b.bindReader({ business: 'demo' }) };
+  for (const role of ['chief', 'pm']) caps[role] = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role, run: `${role}-run`, harness: 'pi' });
+  const VETO = { revision: ADD.revision, op: 'keep', name: 'pm' };
+  for (const [who, cap] of Object.entries(caps)) {
+    assert.throws(() => b.request(cap, { verb: 'veto.set', args: VETO }), /human-required/, who);
+    assert.throws(() => b.request(cap, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { ...ADD, op: 'delete' } }), /human-required/, who);
+  }
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'veto.set', args: VETO }), /tester-refused/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(tester, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { revision: ADD.revision, instance: 'pm', op: 'delete' } }), /tester-refused/);
+  assert.equal(TESTER_ORGANIZATION_VERBS.includes('veto.set'), false);
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
+  // veto.set takes exactly its three keys, and instances.set only its three ops.
+  for (const args of [{ ...VETO, actor: 'forged' }, { revision: VETO.revision, op: 'keep' }, { ...VETO, holder: 'mos' }])
+    assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'veto.set', args }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { ...ADD, op: 'remove' } }), /invalid-request/);
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0);
+  // The hook refuses a verb missing from LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS, so each call below passing shows the
+  // hook got that exact entry.
+  assert.deepEqual([...LIFECYCLE_HUMAN_VERBS].sort(), ['instance.end', 'instance.launch', 'instance.regenerate', 'instances.set add', 'instances.set change', 'instances.set delete', 'veto.set']);
+  b.request(human, { verb: 'veto.set', args: VETO });
+  b.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: ADD });
+  b.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { revision: ADD.revision, instance: 'pm', op: 'change', vars: {} } });
+  // S2c: the delete is a request after the writer's check, and writes nothing yet.
+  assert.ok(b.request(human, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { revision: ADD.revision, instance: 'pm', op: 'delete' } }).request);
+  b.request(tester, { verb: 'instances.set', args: ADD });
+  b.request(tester, { verb: 'instances.set', args: { revision: ADD.revision, instance: 'pm', op: 'change', vars: {} } });
+  assert.deepEqual(calls, [['veto.set', 'keep', 'jason'], ['instances.set', 'add', 'jason'], ['instances.set', 'change', 'jason'],
+    ['instances.check', undefined, 'jason'], ['instances.set', 'add', 'tester'], ['instances.set', 'change', 'tester']]);
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+// Row 194 (#1692, brief item 8, row 199 D13, T20): fire and delete revoke the agent's credentials
+// after the writer's checks and before the write. Fire revokes each service and keeps the store
+// directory. Delete calls remove (sage-1593). A failed revoke stops the verb with
+// credential-revoke-failed and the business file's bytes unchanged. Fake tokens in a scratch root.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { busBusiness } from '../src/business.mjs';
+import { startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
+import { loadBusiness } from '../../business/src/business.mjs';
+import { resolveInstance } from '../../business/src/resolve.mjs';
+import { businessDoc, FAR_DATE, rolesCopy, systemFor, writeJson } from '../../business/tests/helpers.mjs';
+
+const TOKEN = 'fake_issued_token_0123456789';
+const store = (agent, service) => ({ store: true, [service === 'gitea' ? 'rotateBy' : 'expires']: FAR_DATE });
+
+// coder: gitea in the store, vikunja a file reference. rev-2 and rev-3: both in the store, with a
+// tracker bot. `drop` names instances whose credentials the boot copy leaves out, as a restart that
+// dropped the entry would: the running bus then has no entry for a file on disk (sage-1592).
+async function setup(t, { drop = [] } = {}) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-lifecycle-revoke-'));
+  const rolesDir = rolesCopy(root);
+  const doc = { ...businessDoc(root, 'demo'), plugins: { harness: ['pi'] } };
+  doc.roles.coder.credentials.gitea = store('coder', 'gitea');
+  for (const [name, botId] of [['rev-2', 40], ['rev-3', 41]]) {
+    doc.roles[name] = { definition: 'reviewer', tracker: { bot: `bot-demo-${name}`, botId }, credentials: { gitea: store(name, 'gitea'), vikunja: store(name, 'vikunja') } };
+  }
+  doc.launch.instances.push('rev-2', 'rev-3');
+  const file = writeJson(join(root, 'businesses/demo.json'), doc);
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'data'), { mode: 0o700 });
+  mkdirSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const b = loadBusiness('demo', { dir: root, rolesDir });
+  const resolved = {};
+  for (const i of Object.keys(b.roles)) resolved[i] = resolveInstance({ system: systemFor(root), business: b, instance: i });
+  const boot = busBusiness(b, resolved);
+  for (const name of drop) delete boot.roles[name].credentials;
+  const bus = await startBroker({ dataRoot: join(root, 'data'), businesses: { demo: boot }, organization: { dir: root, rolesDir, system: systemFor(root) } });
+  t.after(async () => {
+    await bus.close();
+    chmodSync(join(root, 'secrets', 'agents'), 0o700);
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  const human = bus.broker.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const chief = bus.broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'chief', run: 'chief-run', harness: 'pi' });
+  bus.broker.request(chief, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  const ask = (verb, args) => bus.broker.request(human, { verb, args });
+  const fire = (name) => bus.broker.request(chief, { verb: 'instance.fire', args: { name, reason: 'the work is done' } });
+  const agentDir = (agent) => join(root, 'secrets', 'agents', 'demo', agent);
+  const plant = (agent, service) => {
+    mkdirSync(agentDir(agent), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    writeFileSync(join(agentDir(agent), service), TOKEN + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  };
+  // A delete runs as the launcher's pass would: the verb's request, the take, then lifecycleDelete.
+  // A refused delete closes the request with its code, as the launcher does.
+  const remove = (instance) => {
+    const { request } = ask('instances.set', { revision: ask('instances').revision, instance, op: 'delete' });
+    assert.equal(bus.lifecycleTake({ business: 'demo', request }).go, true);
+    try {
+      return { request, ...bus.lifecycleDelete({ business: 'demo', request }) };
+    } catch (e) {
+      bus.lifecycleDone({ business: 'demo', request, refusal: e.code });
+      throw e;
+    }
+  };
+  const bytes = () => readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
+  const code = (fn) => { try { fn(); } catch (e) { return e.code; } return null; };
+  const status = (agent) => Object.fromEntries(bus.credentialStatus('demo', agent).map((e) => [e.service, e.state]));
+  return { root, bus, ask, fire, remove, agentDir, plant, bytes, code, status, file };
+}
+
+test('T20 fire: a revoke that fails stops the fire with the file unchanged; one that succeeds revokes, keeps the directory and names the services outside the store', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t);
+  f.ask('credentials.issue', { agent: 'coder', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: '2099-01-01' });
+  assert.ok(existsSync(join(f.agentDir('coder'), 'gitea')));
+  // The revoke can't unlink the token, so it fails before the write: the file still lists coder.
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  chmodSync(f.agentDir('coder'), 0o500);
+  assert.equal(f.code(() => f.fire('coder')), 'credential-revoke-failed');
+  chmodSync(f.agentDir('coder'), 0o700);
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  assert.ok(JSON.parse(before).launch.instances.includes('coder'));
+
+  const fired = f.fire('coder');
+  assert.equal(fired.delisted, true);
+  assert.deepEqual(fired.credentials, { revoked: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], outsideStore: ['vikunja'] });
+  assert.ok(!JSON.parse(f.bytes()).launch.instances.includes('coder'));
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('coder'), { gitea: 'revoked', vikunja: 'revoked' });
+  // The directory stays, empty, so the status reads revoked and the human removes the remote token.
+  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(f.agentDir('coder')), []);
+});
+
+// webby-0094 N1: a fire of an instance already delisted (here a hand edit) still revokes its tokens,
+// with no write, and the instance is no longer firing.
+test('T20 fire: an instance already delisted still has its tokens revoked and the file is left alone', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t);
+  f.ask('credentials.issue', { agent: 'rev-2', service: 'gitea', token: TOKEN, date: '2099-01-01' });
+  assert.ok(existsSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'gitea')));
+  const doc = JSON.parse(f.bytes());
+  doc.launch.instances = doc.launch.instances.filter((name) => name !== 'rev-2');
+  writeFileSync(f.file, JSON.stringify(doc, null, 2) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  const fired = f.fire('rev-2');
+  assert.equal(fired.delisted, false);
+  assert.equal(fired.transaction, null);
+  assert.deepEqual(fired.credentials, { revoked: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], outsideStore: [] });
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(f.agentDir('rev-2')), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('rev-2'), { gitea: 'revoked', vikunja: 'revoked' });
+});
+
+test('T20 fire: with no entry in the running bus, a token on disk refuses and an empty store goes on', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t, { drop: ['rev-2'] });
+  f.plant('rev-2', 'gitea');
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  assert.equal(f.code(() => f.fire('rev-2')), 'credential-revoke-failed');
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  rmSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'gitea'));
+  const fired = f.fire('rev-2');
+  assert.equal(fired.delisted, true);
+  assert.deepEqual(fired.credentials, { revoked: ['gitea', 'vikunja'], outsideStore: [] });
+});
+
+test('T20 delete: a revoke that fails keeps the file; one that succeeds clears the store, deletes, and names the tracker bot', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t);
+  f.ask('credentials.issue', { agent: 'rev-2', service: 'vikunja', token: TOKEN, date: '2099-01-01' });
+  // remove refuses a name it doesn't own (credential-file), so the delete stops with the file unchanged.
+  writeFileSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'notes'), 'x');
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  assert.equal(f.code(() => f.remove('rev-2')), 'credential-revoke-failed');
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  // remove revokes the services it knows before it reads the directory (row 199), so the token is
+  // already gone: a failed delete leaves the agent listed with nothing it can use.
+  assert.equal(existsSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'vikunja')), false);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('rev-2'), { gitea: 'revoked', vikunja: 'revoked' });
+  rmSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'notes'));
+
+  const out = f.remove('rev-2');
+  assert.equal(out.bot, 'bot-demo-rev-2');
+  assert.equal(existsSync(f.agentDir('rev-2')), false);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('rev-2'), { gitea: 'revoked', vikunja: 'revoked' });
+  const after = JSON.parse(f.bytes());
+  assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(after.roles, 'rev-2'), false);
+  assert.ok(after.retired.includes('rev-2'));
+  // The launcher's close carries the bot, so the CLI and the Console name it.
+  const done = f.bus.lifecycleDone({ business: 'demo', request: out.request, transaction: out.transaction, bot: out.bot });
+  assert.equal(done.done.bot, 'bot-demo-rev-2');
+});
+
+test('T20 delete: with no entry in the running bus, a token file is cleared and the delete goes on; a file reference refuses', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t, { drop: ['rev-3'] });
+  f.plant('rev-3', 'gitea');
+  const out = f.remove('rev-3');
+  assert.equal(out.bot, 'bot-demo-rev-3');
+  assert.equal(existsSync(f.agentDir('rev-3')), false);
+  assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(JSON.parse(f.bytes()).roles, 'rev-3'), false);
+  // coder's vikunja is a file reference: deleting it stays a hand edit, refused at the request.
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  assert.equal(f.code(() => f.remove('coder')), 'organization-credentials-out-of-scope');
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('coder'), { gitea: 'not-issued', vikunja: 'valid' });
+});
+
+test('T21 delete: a write between the raise and the take makes the delete refuse revision-conflict before it revokes anything', async (t) => {
+  const f = await setup(t);
+  f.ask('credentials.issue', { agent: 'rev-2', service: 'vikunja', token: TOKEN, date: '2099-01-01' });
+  const { request } = f.ask('instances.set', { revision: f.ask('instances').revision, instance: 'rev-2', op: 'delete' });
+  assert.equal(f.bus.lifecycleTake({ business: 'demo', request }).go, true);
+  // A write after the raise: the request's revision is now stale.
+  const raised = f.bytes();
+  f.ask('credentials.issue', { agent: 'rev-3', service: 'gitea', token: 'fake_other_token_9876543210', date: '2099-02-01' });
+  assert.ok(f.bytes() !== raised, 'the issue wrote the business file');
+  const before = f.bytes();
+  const entry = structuredClone(JSON.parse(before).roles['rev-2'].credentials);
+  assert.equal(f.code(() => f.bus.lifecycleDelete({ business: 'demo', request })), 'revision-conflict');
+  // Nothing revoked: the token stays issued, Credentials is unchanged and no store file is removed.
+  assert.equal(f.bytes(), before);
+  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(f.bytes()).roles['rev-2'].credentials, entry);
+  assert.equal(readFileSync(join(f.agentDir('rev-2'), 'vikunja'), 'utf8'), TOKEN + '\n');
+  assert.deepEqual(readdirSync(f.agentDir('rev-2')), ['vikunja']);
+  assert.deepEqual(f.status('rev-2'), { gitea: 'not-issued', vikunja: 'valid' });
+});
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jason.woltje	97535587b2	row 281 design d6: the job's step C without the chief's claim, fire.failed for a step B or C failure, boot closes interrupted jobs, Q1 lines in the set (dewey-0825, #1786 )	2026-10-22 05:10:15 -05:00
jason.woltje	59142e9fbb	row 281 design d5: two requests per granted delete with its five conditions, a job id on every answer, event and message (sage-2575, #1786 )	2026-10-22 05:06:39 -05:00
jason.woltje	41983e2659	row 281 design d4: step G detached from the verbs, open decisions and a fired-agent raise check, one step G per agent (dewey-0823, #1786 )	2026-10-22 05:04:49 -05:00
jason.woltje	36c2d98b81	row 281 design d3: a grant decision approved before a fire and executed after it, tests T6/T6b/T6c (sage-2574, #1786 )	2026-10-22 04:58:09 -05:00
jason.woltje	c746ce378c	row 281 design d2: Q1/Q2 rulings (sage-2573), the finding in the Why, T3b/T4b and M8/M9 (#1786 )	2026-10-22 04:56:39 -05:00
jason.woltje	dfebd16cc1	row 281 design d1: a fire or a delete revokes the instance's host and Gitea grants (sage-2568, #1786 )	2026-10-22 04:54:22 -05:00
jason.woltje	47a35bf436	queue: revs 3163-3172, row 256 claim (Honker 3163), row 236 in-review (Megavolt 3164/3165), review request 3166/3167, Dewey approve 3168, landing note and done 3169/3170, row 281 add and briefed 3171/3172 (Sage)	2026-10-22 04:47:17 -05:00
jason.woltje	6b32424adb	docs: row 236 landing log lines, and row 281 (#1786 ): a fire or a delete revokes the instance's grants (mos-1271) Brief docs/plans/2026-10-22_fire-revokes-grants.md, owner Megavolt, reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage. DEFERRED entry points at row 281. BUILD-LOG and SESSIONS carry Honker's row 194 lines, Dewey's two row 236 lines and Sage's row 236 landing lines.	2026-10-22 04:43:49 -05:00
jason.woltje	bd5f11dedd	bus: row 236, a gitea grant raise on a broker with no Gitea path refuses gitea-not-configured (sage-2559, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:59:40 -05:00
jason.woltje	e40b74bebc	bus: row 236, two out-of-manifest pins: gitea is a known grant method, and the broker imports giteaName and parseGiteaUrl (gate run sage-2554, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:57:48 -05:00
jason.woltje	ce74477e14	bus: row 236, grants.status is a read under the kill switch, as hosts.status is (sage-2453, #1742 ) Row 191's #processingGate refuses agent verbs off its read list while processing is halted. grants.status joins hosts.status on that list, per the kill-switch plan (2026-10-20_kill-switch.md:16): reads still work. An agent's grants.revoke stays refused while halted, as hosts.revoke is.	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	4d9d62ae89	bus: row 236 r3, one N5 test per settle branch; README notes for a left admin token and a running executor (sage-2388, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	5e5ba94b19	bus: row 236 r3, a revoke during a settle whoami ends revoked in the 401 and token-unknown branches (Dewey N5, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	97bbe7fd30	bus: row 236 r2, a revoke during step 7 or a settle ends revoked; sweep fire retry checks the user id (Dewey B1, B2, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	91f7029923	bus: row 236 gap test takes any HTTP status in a grant.result (debug run 2, #1742 )	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	be11a1f7e6	bus: row 236 tests for the static mutant gaps M8, M9, M16, M28, M29, M37 (#1742 )	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	d87483d683	bus, cli: #436b Gitea grant path, schema 3j-3k (row 236, #1742 ) Gitea grant executor (steps 0-8, settle, restart, revoke and fire, sweep, status), the grants.* verbs and mosaic grants, the 3j-3k migration with gitea_users and gitea_grants, and the section 9 tests with a fake Gitea and a scratch gitea/gitea:1.27.1 X-G3 test. Build notes in agents/megavolt/work/queue-236/BUILD.md.	2026-10-22 03:42:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	be2b008cc0	queue: revs 3156-3162: row 194 Honker in-review and failed request (3156/3157), Sage review request (3158/3159), Webby verdict (3160), Sage landing note and done (3161/3162)	2026-10-22 03:39:38 -05:00
jason.woltje	ab7377bcf1	docs: row 194 landing BUILD-LOG and SESSIONS lines (Sage)	2026-10-22 03:38:16 -05:00
jason.woltje	fd6dd327c3	honker: row 194 b15 (b') (sage-2507): T15 drops the exited reviewer stand-in's registry entry by hand, the N6 convention, so the post-resume coder launch isn't refused on an entry with no provider/model; BUILD.md notes for (a) and (b')	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	5fd178e44d	honker: row 194 b15 (a) (sage-2501): the Broker constructor's harnessOn, testerOn and roleFile type checks move ahead of the store reads, so a null store gets the argument error first (chief-of-staff T8b); 191's lines unchanged	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	345f3ace67	honker: row 194 b8 r3 docs: correct N4, only session.ended clears the alive flag today	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	54ec93d06f	honker: row 194 b8 r3 docs (webby-0100, sage-2290): N1 corrects the N6 clock caveat (the bus clock runs ahead, so the error is over-signal); N2 DEFERRED the 64-stop done cap; N3 and N4 follow-ups; no product change	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	4f68485272	honker: row 194 b8 r2 (sage-2289): a fire stop stopRun can't confirm (unknown) reads as lifecycle.end.alive with reason unknown, never killed, and the Console flags it; cli T9a no-runtime-record test, bus T9a reason checks, M56; notes	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	c48239ec3d	honker: row 194 b8 notes: base `eb3abba12` (row 191), the commit 1, b4 and b6 conflict resolutions file by file, S6 design notes, the unknown-outcome question, mutants and run list	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	5d2c274420	honker: row 194 b8 S6 (sage-2241, sage-2246, sage-2261): fire's kill end goes through row 191's stopRun with the fire's request as owner, killed and alive come back as lifecycle.end.killed and lifecycle.end.alive and the Console flags a run still alive; terminate stays SIGTERM-only (V3); halted, the pass closes launches and regenerates processing-halted and a halt joins a fire's stop; terminate's pass narrows to runs spawned by the end's time (N6); T9a, T9b, T15, N6	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	9e5ad7c599	honker: row 194 b7 notes: rebase onto `dcd8d4dda` (row 254), channel-proof pin, N3 as a behaviour change, routes.set keep and M-next, mutant (a) kill file corrected, N6 ruling for S6	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	939356a1c2	honker: row 194 b7 (webby-0095 N1, sage-2248): routes.set refuses a kept instance's route to anyone but the human, as the limits writer does	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	3521c23c3e	honker: row 194 b6 (webby-0094, sage-2241, sage-2245): every instance-writer verb answers restart (B1) and the CLI and Console show it for veto; fire runs the writer's checks against the file before step A, so an unloaded keep can't strand an instance firing; a fire of a delisted name revokes (N1); a host service makes no token reference (N2); only the human re-points a kept instance's model (N3); DEFERRED a human escape for a stuck fire (N4); S6 waits on row 191's stopRun contract	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	2311a50e1c	honker: row 194 b4 (sage-2164, sage-2166, sage-2217): a hire and the role's hireable list refuse a creative definition; a library mapping change isn't reloaded (T14); the listing's endProtected hides a Delete the server refuses; DEFERRED creative delete; C1 testerNoSignIn closed; row 213's writer-restart pin follows D3 and T16 uses row 196's tester socket	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	29daebf548	honker: row 194 b3 sage-1634: commit() checks the revision before the revoke, so a stale delete or fire refuses revision-conflict with nothing revoked (N1); bus T21; option 2 a follow-up	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	2f08fd8f23	honker: row 194 b3 sage-1630: BUILD.md follow-up N1, a revoke that succeeds before a refused write (a stale-revision delete does it every time)	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	b8c3d00362	honker: row 194 b3 sage-1620: credential-revoke-failed says the business file is unchanged and a retry is safe (CLI and Console), W2 checks the log per case	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	14124d96d4	honker: row 194 b3 (sage-1605, sage-1610): fire and delete revoke before the write (T20), a human add takes a tracker bot, a store-only delete names the bot; the tester keeps the credential refusal (row 175 W2); channel-proof and project-runtime pins	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	e7fb59f225	honker: row 194 on row 199's landing `cb5fdb064` (sage-1601): honker/row194-b2 `85edab7c7` squashed, five conflicts kept both sides (broker imports, constructor, dispatch, the credential and lifecycle verbs; runtime imports; organization write takes detail and context; cli credentials and veto dispatch; vocabulary comment as row 199 wrote it)	2026-10-22 03:06:41 -05:00
jason.woltje	e122aad8e2	queue: revs 3148-3155: row 280 Rocko start, in-review and failed review request (3148-3150), Sage review request (3151/3152), Duckworth verdict (3153), Sage landing note and done (3154/3155)	2026-10-22 03:03:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	4c4b8559cf	docs: row 280 landing BUILD-LOG and SESSIONS lines (Sage); Rocko's row 280 BUILD-LOG and SESSIONS lines	2026-10-22 03:00:14 -05:00
rocko	b0fd28b6f3	docs: keep a slim row 280 packet with full evidence reference	2026-10-22 02:56:40 -05:00
rocko	b765f5cb81	test(bus): prove scratch sshd listener ownership before use	2026-10-22 02:28:09 -05:00
jason.woltje	da5d3651d7	queue: revs 3138-3147: row 279 Rocko start and in-review (3138-3140), Sage review request (3141/3142), Dewey verdict (3143), Sage landing note and done (3144/3145); row 280 #1785 bus sshd port race added and briefed (Sage 3146/3147, mos-1270)	2026-10-22 02:14:46 -05:00
jason.woltje	82c8281166	sage: brief for the bus sshd port race row (mos-1270, #1785 ); 279 landing and 194 b16 third-red BUILD-LOG lines; SESSIONS lines (Sage, Rocko 279, Dewey 279 r1 and carry)	2026-10-22 02:12:09 -05:00
rockoandjason.woltje	ceadad993c	docs: record row 279 regression and mutant evidence	2026-10-22 01:03:26 -05:00
rockoandjason.woltje	f5611c937e	fix(processing): observe run status after stop deadline overshoot	2026-10-22 01:03:26 -05:00
jason.woltje	343b6dd766	queue: revs 3134-3137: row 277 brief re-pin (Sage 3134), Morgana 277 claim (3135); row 279 #1784 stopRun deadline added and briefed (Sage 3136/3137, mos-1269)	2026-10-22 00:54:47 -05:00
jason.woltje	f40f2e770e	sage: brief for the stopRun deadline row (mos-1269), the 191 follow-up row 194 b15's gate found	2026-10-22 00:51:17 -05:00
jason.woltje	23c3d62183	queue: revs 3130-3133 (Sage): row 277 #1782 owner thread claims added and briefed; row 278 #1783 Console thread claims added and briefed	2026-10-22 00:17:54 -05:00
jason.woltje	70e289ba73	sage: #1782 design D1 ruling (sage-2487) and the Console thread-claims follow-up brief	2026-10-22 00:14:35 -05:00
jason.woltje	ab50de9fe3	queue: revs 3114-3129: rows 191, 205, 268 landed and done (Sage 3116/3117, 3119/3120, 3123/3124, 3126-3129); Rocko 191 in-review 3114/3115; Dewey 191 verdict 3118; Morgana 205 in-review 3121/3122; Duckworth 205 verdict 3125	2026-10-22 00:12:00 -05:00
jason.woltje	b3665f5ab1	sage: docs for landings 191, 205, 268; #1782 owner thread-claims brief (mos-1262); re-pin `86f95bb27` plan; phase 2 window draft 3; seat SESSIONS and BUILD-LOG lines	2026-10-22 00:10:08 -05:00
jason.woltje	c27207f6e6	row 268 (C2-01c, #1773 , Vikunja 464): playgrounds at three levels; classify checks prefixes first checkMapping takes kind absent, hybrid or draft. A draft has a name and one or more prefixes and no books, and comes back with books []. A prefix inside or holding another entry's book refuses library-playground-other-universe, which replaces library-playground-outside-book. A prefix equal to a book or holding its own refuses library-mapping-invalid, as does a draft source. classify returns a playground file's entry and the book holding its prefix, or null at universe level and in a draft.	2026-10-22 00:04:42 -05:00
jason.woltje	ce6a96ad61	morgana: row 205 r2 (sage-2430): put() events carry their decision so the decision trail reaches them; pin checks the thread claim via threadsState, owner read is a follow-up row	2026-10-21 23:49:34 -05:00
jason.woltje	59f708ca21	morgana: row 205a build (sage-2288): trail and replies hide other users' thread messages from owner, reader and tester; hidden answers as unknown; #readable owner-only; design d2 rulings	2026-10-21 23:49:34 -05:00
jason.woltje	f751505ada	morgana: row 205 design d1 (sage-2280): FED R3 unfiled, so split 205a message filter now and 205b viewer verbs after R3; mutant 3 to 193b2; hidden trail subject returns []	2026-10-21 23:49:34 -05:00
rocko	0fa7bf421f	fix: place processing controls within the Console navigation box	2026-10-21 22:42:13 -05:00
rocko	93d211c295	fix: allocate Console viewport space to processing controls	2026-10-21 22:42:13 -05:00
rocko	08c896e3c5	docs: record processing gate failures and timer fixture correction	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	03ed2bccce	test: attribute processing timer to its owning script	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	ad6020754d	fix: stop processing controls on Console sign-out and preserve layout	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	5c8f983dde	test: initialize processing control in Discord CLI fixtures	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	f1267e49af	fix: account for processing controls in image inputs and launch fixtures	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	d2be97c5fc	test: use private tester socket for processing controls	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	c13c68c813	test: strengthen processing cancellation and refusal guards Bound the halt-abort expectation, check Discord refusal before malformed journal reads, and isolate HTTP origin and valid oversized-body guards. These test changes are committed for the row 191 gate; execution awaits the coordinated slot.	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
rocko	4bdc7e0e86	processing: inspectable per-run stop seam for lifecycle fire Unify halt and fire cancellation by verified run identity with durable first-owner receipts and shared deadlines. Integrate the instance control with the current host, library and tester-socket paths. Focused nine-file evidence is 62 passing tests; broad suites, mutants and review remain pending.	2026-10-21 22:42:12 -05:00
jason.woltje	86f95bb27f	queue: revs 3109-3113 (darkwing: row 273 in-review round 1 and review request; filbert: row 273 APPROVE recorded (c30308); sage: row 273 landing note and done after `0bbf0f6d1` (#1778 ))	2026-10-21 22:41:05 -05:00
jason.woltje	5365adaef6	docs: row 273 TOOLS.md activate usage and F39 rules (Filbert N1), BUILD-LOG for rows 202 and 273 TOOLS.md: activate takes --no-sso and --send; three lines state the F39 rules. BUILD-LOG: the row 202 landing line held since 02:01Z and the row 273 landing line.	2026-10-21 22:37:16 -05:00
jason.woltje	0bbf0f6d18	row 273: T53 test 6 pins the usage line with --no-sso The usage line gained --no-sso in the proof and sso bracket. T53 test 6 still matched the old bracket and failed the whole run on `978143bf4`.	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	95f4bd8fdc	row 273 notes: name the changed T57 item 3 assertion for review (sage-2321)	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	d8034c51bc	stack-release: a rollback that drops --sso drops --send; the --no-sso walk refuses an ok line with no activation (row 273, sage-2315) B1: row 200's rollback to a Console without --sso kept the pointer's --send, which F39 b forbids once --send can sit beside --sso. send_for_target drops it whenever the run drops the pointer's --sso, and the plan and steps say so. N1: an ok line with no activation refuses sso-off-flags instead of being skipped.	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	b28baf7ee8	stack-release tests: T58 adds sage-2305 cases a and b (row 273) (a) --sso on, then two re-pins that carry it, then --no-sso gives back the arrival's ExecStart byte for byte. (b) every set in the log holds --sso, so --no-sso refuses sso-off-flags before any unit stops.	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	3673463182	stack-release: --no-sso drops --send in one place, send_for_target (row 273)	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
jason.woltje	7991662dc0	stack-release: activate --send and --no-sso (row 273, #1778 ) activate --send turns send on only when the run's Console flags hold --sso, given or carried (F39 b), and puts it after --sso and before the tester flags. activate --no-sso turns --sso off with the Console flags from the set of the activation that turned it on, drops --send (F39 a) and keeps the pointer's tester. Both are usage errors under --units external. T58 covers the brief's T1-T4; the external test covers T5. Design and the set-walk choice: agents/darkwing/work/queue-273/BUILD.md.	2026-10-21 22:15:36 -05:00
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`{"id":"M1","file":"packages/processing-control/src/runtimes.mjs","old":" for (;;) {\n try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","new":" while (now() <= deadline) {\n try { record = runtime(root, record.id); }","test":"packages/processing-control/tests/stop-run.test.mjs","pattern":"a sleep past the stop deadline still observes an alive run after both signals","required":"named assertion kill, never syntax or timeout"}`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`None. All four TAP records report skipped 0.`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`None. All 60 repeat files and both complete CLI load cycles report skipped 0.`