morgana: row 295 r2 narrow alice grant (Dewey F1, sage-3333): aliceAccess(ref) names only the test's project, set after project.create; asserts and bindLaunch lines byte-identical; BUILD.md preservation record updated

agents/morgana/work/queue-295/BUILD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+# Row 295: FED R4 revocation (#1801)
+
+Brief: docs/plans/2026-10-23_mvp-readiness-rows.md, "Brief: FED R4, revocation".
+Design: agents/gizmoduck/work/federation/DESIGN.md at b93f098f0 (r4.11), sections 3.7 and 7.
+Base: origin/refactor 253346e3c (rows 206, 271 and 275 are in it). Branch morgana/row295.
+Round 2 base: 80793d824 (row 294 landed as d3059c2c3), branch morgana/row295-r2 (sage-3256).
+Reviewer Dewey, gate owner Sage.
+
+Row 193's viewer level landed with row 275 (3410df7c3), so it is on this base. The downgrade test and
+its mutant build here, not on a 193 candidate (Q177 not needed).
+
+## Plan
+
+### Broker (packages/bus/src/broker.mjs)
+
+1. `#revoked(business, t)`: true when `t.owner` is `user:<id>` and no grant in one read of the access
+   file covers the thread at collaborator level (`covers(g, {business, project: t.project, instance:
+   t.instance}, now, {level: 'collaborator'})`). A read that throws, a null document or no `access`
+   function covers nothing, as `#covered` does (fail closed). A thread the business human or the tester
+   owns is never revoked.
+2. `#revokeLost(business, by)`: one read of the file, then one transaction that ends, with
+   `#claimEnd(..., 'revoke', null, 'access-revoked', by)`, the held claim of every session of every
+   user-owned thread `#revoked` names. Returns the ended runs. The claim is ended, so the run's next
+   bus call refuses `not-holder` (F10) and a later `role.claim` for it refuses `run-revoked`.
+3. Triggers (design 3.7):
+   - a trusted method `accessSweep()`, not a socket verb, that runs `#revokeLost` for each business with
+     `by: 'access-timer'`. The runtime calls it on a 30 s `setInterval` (unref'd, cleared in close()),
+     only when `access` is configured.
+   - `access.reload`, human-only (`#human(s)`, so not the tester and not a reader), runs `#revokeLost`
+     for `s.business` with `by: s.human` and returns `{ ended: [runs] }`.
+   - every user request (`s.user`), any user's: `#revokeLost(by: 'access-change')` before the verb,
+     once per stamp change (sage-3139 Q1, D2). threadsState sweeps the same way (D3).
+4. `threadsState` rows gain `revoked: true|false`, from one access read per call. `#threadRows`
+   selects `t.owner, t.project` for it. `threadIdle` ignores the field.
+5. Launch check: `bindLaunch` refuses `thread-revoked` for a new run (`!old`) of a revoked thread, the
+   way `!old && !harnessOn` refuses `invalid-harness`, and `role.claim` refuses `thread-revoked` too.
+   A rebind (`old`, recover() at launcher.mjs:1174) is not refused, so recover() can still end the
+   earlier host's run. bindLaunch comes after spawn and a refusal there SIGKILLs the child
+   (launcher.mjs:608, :620), which covers a start racing the revocation; the claim check covers a run
+   bound just before it.
+
+### Runtime (packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs)
+
+6. With `access` set: `setInterval(() => broker.accessSweep(), access.intervalMs ?? 30_000)`, unref'd,
+   cleared in close() and on a failed start. A sweep that throws logs one line to stderr and the next
+   tick tries again. `access.intervalMs` follows `librarySync.intervalMs` (C2-03a): in-process only.
+
+### Launcher (packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs)
+
+7. threadPass: a `revoked` row never starts. A revoked row with a running session, not already
+   stopping, gets `stopping.add`, a `thread-revoked` record event and the idle stop's start-time-checked
+   SIGTERM at once, with no `threadIdle` call (the claim is already ended).
+8. A bindLaunch refusal `thread-revoked` is a start refusal, logged once per code as today.
+
+### CLI (packages/cli/src/access.mjs)
+
+9. grant and revoke call `access.reload` after the write (project.list stays the human proof, since
+   grant needs its rows for project names; D6 for `user remove`). A refused reload after a good write:
+   stdout still reports the write, stderr says `access.reload refused: <code>; the bus's timer
+   applies the change within 30 s`, exit 0, because the file is written and a retry would hit
+   revision-conflict (sage-3139 Q2).
+10. ACCESS_HELP keeps the provider-removal order; a test pins the sentence.
+
+## Tests (each with a mutant)
+
+Timers: `t.mock.timers` drives `setInterval` and `Date`; no test sleeps 30 s. The bus file is
+packages/bus/tests/access-revoke.test.mjs (B), the launcher file packages/cli/tests/thread-revoke.test.mjs
+(L), and the CLI tests are appended to packages/cli/tests/access.test.mjs (C).
+
+| # | Test | File | Mutant |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| M1 | timer sweep after a hand edit ends only alice's run (by access-timer, reason access-revoked); its next call refuses not-holder; bob's and the human's runs stay | B | `#revokeLost` ends every user thread (drop the `#revoked` filter) |
+| M2 | an expiry with no write and no request ends the run at the next sweep; bob's request on the same stamp doesn't | B | `accessSweep` not forced (`#revokeLost('access-timer')`) |
+| M3 | a downgrade to viewer is a loss | B | level `'viewer'` in `#revoked` |
+| M4 | bob's request after a hand edit ends alice's run, and nothing ends before it (sage-3139 Q1) | B | the per-request `#revokeLost` call removed |
+| M5 | one read per stamp change, none while unchanged | B | `#accessDoc` ignores the stamp |
+| M6 | access.reload ends at once for the human; tester, reader, agent refused human-required/read-only, user access-refused | B | drop `#human(s)` in access.reload |
+| M7 | threadsState marks `revoked: true` on the lost thread only, its pending message kept | B | threadsState never adds `revoked` |
+| M8 | bindLaunch and role.claim refuse thread-revoked; another broker's rebind is allowed | B | drop the bindLaunch check |
+| M9 | the runtime timer ends the run at 30 000 ms and not at 29 999; intervalMs is checked; close stops it | B | the timer callback never calls `accessSweep` |
+| M10 | pending message + launcher restart starts no run, logs no launch and no refused start | L | threadPass ignores `revoked` |
+| M11 | a running revoked thread's run gets SIGTERM, ends `stopped` exit 0, with no thread-idle; its last claim row is revoke/access-revoked/access-change, not a release (dewey-0871 B1) | L | the revoked branch drops the kill |
+| M12 | recover() rebinds an earlier host's run on a revoked thread and ends it host-lost (sage-3139 D1) | L | the bindLaunch check without `!old` |
+| M13 | grant and revoke call access.reload after the write; list and a refused write don't | C | drop the `reload` call |
+| M14 | a refused reload: exit 0, stdout as before, stderr names the code and the 30 s timer (sage-3139 Q2) | C | `reload` rethrows |
+| M15 | help keeps the provider-removal order with the reload sentence after it | C | drop the help sentence |
+| M16 | an expiry with no write and no sweep: threadsState ends the claim (revoke, access-revoked, by access-expiry) before it returns the row revoked with holder null; one revoke row only (dewey-0871 B1) | B | drop threadsState's `#revokeLost('access-expiry', true, doc)` call |
+
+M11 relies on the runner's poll interval (set to 600 s in L), so only the signal ends the run: without
+the kill, a run that polls would exit 22 on not-holder and hide the mutant.
+
+## Sage's rulings (sage-3139)
+
+- Q1 resolved, yes: a request from any user counts. The cost rule: a request only stats the file;
+  `#revokeLost` runs only on a stat change and reuses the read R3's check makes. Tests M4 and M5.
+- Q2 resolved, exit 0: stderr names the refusal code and the 30 s timer, stdout reports the write as
+  today. Help text next to the provider-removal order. Tests M14 and M15.
+- D1 accepted with a test (M12).
+- Base 253346e3c; rebase before the gate if broker.mjs or launcher.mjs change on refactor.
+
+## Decisions
+
+- D1: bindLaunch's revoked check skips a rebind. recover() binds the earlier host's run and then ends
+  it; a refusal there would leave the run unended in the broker (launcher.mjs:1173-1179).
+- D2, the stamp: the runtime passes `accessStamp`, an lstat key (dev, ino, size, mtimeNs, ctimeNs,
+  mode, uid; a failed stat is `unreadable:<code>`). `#accessDoc` reuses the last read while the
+  stamp is unchanged, and the sweep runs once per stamp (`#accessSwept`). The timer and
+  access.reload force a read, so an expiry with no write is caught by the timer. With no stamp
+  function (the bus tests' old fixtures), every read reads, as R3 did, so user-principal.test's
+  reads+2 pin holds: a request reads once and hands the document to both the sweep and the grants.
+- D3: threadsState also sweeps on a stamp change, so the launcher's tick sees the claim already
+  ended when it gets `revoked: true`. `revoked` is added only when true, so end-launch.test's
+  deepEqual of a threadsState row still holds.
+- D4: `#threadLost` (bindLaunch, role.claim) only reads. role.claim runs inside the verb's
+  transaction and store.transaction refuses nesting, so the claim end waits for the next sweep.
+- D5: a session in a clear is skipped in threadPass before the revoked branch (clearPass owns it).
+  Its successor's start goes through bindLaunch, which refuses thread-revoked, so no run starts.
+  A drained run of a revoked thread already had its claim ended by the sweep.
+- D6: `user remove` doesn't call access.reload: it refuses while the user holds a grant, so it
+  never removes coverage. The brief names grant and revoke.
+- D7 (Dewey's B1, dewey-0871): an expiry changes no stamp, so the stamp check skips the sweep while
+  `#revoked` with the current time already marks the row. threadsState therefore ends the lost
+  claims itself when a lost row still has a holder, forced, from the cached document (no read, so
+  sage-3139's cost rule holds), `by: 'access-expiry'`, and re-reads the rows. The launcher (2 s
+  tick) then never sees `revoked: true` with a held claim, and the run's end is never a release.
+  The request path is unchanged.
+- D8 (Dewey's N1): access.reload ends lost claims in every business, since the access file is
+  shared, and writes the calling business's human as `by` on each. It returns only the caller's
+  business's ended runs, so one business's human learns nothing of another's threads.
+
+## Review round 1 (dewey-0871, CHANGES on 527002f97)
+
+- B1 fixed: D7, test M16, M11 assertion. N1: D8. N2: packages/bus/README.md gets the access.reload
+  row, `revoked` in threadsState, a revocation paragraph (timer, accessSweep, access.intervalMs,
+  the four triggers) and the stamp-cached wording.
+- N3, at the rebase on 294 (c866a8a69): 294's accessFor passes `access` to the live boot, so the
+  timer and request sweep go live with both rows; fix 294's "reads the file on every user request"
+  comment to stamp-cached, and check its ACCESS_HELP edit against M15's ordering assertion.
+- N4: the touched whole files (user-principal, viewer, thread-shares) run whole in the bus suite;
+  a first-run red goes per mos-1272.
+
+## Rebase onto 80793d824 (sage-3256)
+
+- Row 294 landed (d3059c2c3). Of 295's manifest only packages/cli/src/access.mjs drifted; the rebase
+  applied with no conflict and keeps 294's lines (the federation.peers help and comment,
+  accessContextFor's peers). The reload sentence still sits right after "so do that second.", so
+  M15's order assertion holds; 294 changed only lines after it.
+- N3: packages/cli/src/config.mjs accessFor's comment now says the broker reads on a user request
+  that finds the stat changed and on the 30 s timer. config.mjs joins the manifest (comment only).
+- 294 put `access` on the live boot, so the timer and the request sweep run in its new tests:
+  packages/cli/tests/access-boot.test.mjs and packages/webui/tests/granted-user.test.mjs run whole at
+  the gate with the touched files. stack-release.test's copy list carries access.mjs, which adds
+  no import here.
+
+## Gate on 07802dc57 (sage-3318)
+
+- First run, merge b42c591f8 (tree 0626929e5): access-revoke.test went 4 pass, 6 fail. These were
+  first-run reds in the row's new tests, placed per mos-1272 in 9f29e1b2f (sage-3326, Dewey
+  dewey-0905). Five claim-row compares failed because store rows have a null prototype, so they're
+  now spread; thread-revoke:207 had the same compare and got the same fix. The demo business switches
+  on the pi harness, which startBroker's harnessOn needs. In thread-revoke, Alice binds at her first
+  call, because a second host's bind after the hand edit refuses access-revoked.
+- Second run, merge 38591cf96 (tree f719c0dc5): 12 whole files green. suite-bus stopped on 2
+  old-test reds in packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs. ":117 trail on a decision ..." and
+  ":165 governance pin ..." each threw thread-revoked from bindLaunch's new check. Those fixtures
+  write a `user:alice` thread with no access function, and with no document no grant covers it.
+  Mos ruled option (a) in mos-1436: old-test setup only.
+
+### Assertion-preservation record (mos-1436 conditions 7-9)
+
+- message-filter.test.mjs gains `aliceAccess(ref)`. It returns the access function, whose single
+  grant is user alice, business demo, projects `[ref.project]`, instances `['assistant']` (the
+  thread's instance), collaborator level. That's the narrowest grant (Dewey's F1, sage-3333;
+  f652dfa5b had projects `['*']`). The broker has no accessStamp here, so #accessDoc calls the
+  function again on each read.
+- `setup(t, { access } = {})` passes `access` to `new Broker`. Only the trail test (:117 at 9f29e1b2f, :126 now) passes it; every other
+  `setup(t)` gives `access: undefined`, which the constructor's default turns into null, as before.
+  setup() already returned `project`.
+- The trail test and the governance pin (:176) each add `const ref = {};` before setup or fixture, and set
+  `ref.project = project;` once the project exists. The trail test also destructures `project` from setup().
+  The governance pin passes `access: aliceAccess(ref)` to `fixture()`.
+- Nothing reads access before `ref.project` is set. The broker reads it on a user's request
+  (request()), in threadsState, in #covered, and in bindLaunch/role.claim on a thread.
+  setup() binds only the human, a reader and the tester and makes the project. fixture() binds
+  coder and reviewer runs with no thread. Neither binds or claims as alice, and neither calls
+  threadsState.
+- No other line of either test changes. The bindLaunch lines (:119, :169 at 9f29e1b2f; :130, :182 now)
+  and every assertion are byte-identical. The removed lines are only `function setup(t) {`, the
+  two setup/fixture calls and the two helper lines below.
+- spec-fixtures.mjs (11 importers) gains one optional parameter with a null default, which goes to
+  `new Broker` unchanged. No other caller changes.
+
+      -export async function fixture(t, { adapter = true, roles = {}, arbiters = { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' } } = {}) {
+      +export async function fixture(t, { adapter = true, roles = {}, arbiters = { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' }, access = null } = {}) {
+      -  const broker = new Broker({ store, businesses: { demo: business }, project: adapter ? {
+      +  const broker = new Broker({ store, businesses: { demo: business }, access, project: adapter ? {
+
+- Condition 4: M8 is the mutant. It deletes the broker.mjs:1371 thread-revoked check in bindLaunch,
+  and its kill test is access-revoke's bind/claim refusal test. The red-first run on 38591cf96
+  (both tests red), the green run and M8 run on Sage's CLEAR, followed by a full gate restart on
+  the new merge with a new manifest.
+
+### N items
+
+- N1 (morgana-0167, sage-3318): a revoked run that calls the bus after its claim ends and before the
+  launcher's SIGTERM gets not-holder and exits 22, not stopped (the same shape as #1809). 302's
+  launcher-released path doesn't cover it. Sage decides after 295 lands whether this becomes a row.

packages/bus/README.md

@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ an operator inspect content and delivery evidence after an uncertain result.
 | `review.verdict` | `{task_ref,request,verdict,body,decision?}`; action `review.verdict`. `verdict` is `approve` or `changes`. `request` must be a `review.requested` event on the task addressed to the caller's role (`request-not-found`), with no verdict yet (`verdict-exists`). Writes a `review.verdict` event `{task_ref,request,commit,verdict,message}` and sends the requesting role a REVIEW-RESULT in reply to the request's message. Returns `{verdict,message,commit}`. |
 | `event.emit` | `{kind:'action.allowed',body:{action:'routine',target?},subject?}`; routine observations only. |
 | `launch.revoke`, `launch.restore` | No args; outside-agent human CLI only. |
+| `access.reload` | No args; the outside-agent human CLI only (row 295, #1801, FED R4): the tester and an agent get `human-required`, a reader `read-only`, a user `access-refused`. Reads the access file whatever its stamp and ends the lost claims of every business, since the file is shared, with `by` the human. Returns `{ended:[{thread,session,run}]}` for the caller's business only. `mosaic access grant` and `revoke` call it after the write. |
 | `inbox` | No args; plain JSON projection scoped to capability's business. |
 | `tasks` | Optional args, scoped to capability's business (row 89, #1583). None: every row of the tasks projection (below). `{task_ref}` alone: that one row, or `task-not-found`. Any of `{done,assignee,label,requirement,limit,after}`: `{tasks,total,next}`, the short form (below). An unknown arg or bad value refuses `invalid-request`. |
 | `agents` | No args; each held role's latest claim row in the capability's business. Human and reader sessions also get `state`, `working`, `inputNeeded` and `stranded` (Agent state, below); a role session gets the claim rows only. |
@@ -305,8 +306,9 @@ Only a human principal matches a share: the business human, a reader session as
 a user. An agent session matches none, `*` included, even when it is bound to the thread.
 A reader session reads as the business human. A sharee can't call `session.list` on the
 thread; it stays owner-only until row 193's share wiring. The check runs on every request against the
-access document the broker reads then, so a removed, expired or unreadable grant or an
-unshare ends reads on the next request. Only `thread.messages` admits a sharee; `thread.open`,
+access document as of that request: the broker stats the file each time and reads it again only
+when the stat changed (row 295), so a removed, expired or unreadable grant or an unshare ends
+reads on the next request. Only `thread.messages` admits a sharee; `thread.open`,
 `thread.send` and the share verbs refuse it `thread-not-owned`. `trail` and `replies` show a
 user's thread messages to the owner and readers while the check holds. The tester can't call
 the share verbs (`tester-refused`), and a viewer is refused them `access-refused`; a viewer
@@ -316,7 +318,22 @@ reads a thread shared with it. Tests: `tests/thread-shares.test.mjs`.
 Per thread it returns `{thread,instance,pending,unread,lastMessage,lastOpen,lastClaim,holder}`:
 messages to the instance not yet delivered, messages delivered to the current holder and
 not yet read, the latest message, open and claim times, and the holding run or `null`. The
-launcher reads it to start and stop thread sessions (`packages/cli/README.md`).
+launcher reads it to start and stop thread sessions (`packages/cli/README.md`). A row adds
+`revoked: true` when its thread's user owner has lost the grant (below); the launcher never
+starts such a thread and sends a running one SIGTERM.
+
+Revocation (row 295, #1801, FED R4, federation design 3.7). A user thread is lost when no grant
+in the access file covers it at collaborator level, so a downgrade to viewer is a loss. One
+transaction ends the held claim of every session of every lost thread, op `revoke`, reason
+`access-revoked`; the run's next bus call refuses `not-holder`, and a new run of the thread
+refuses `thread-revoked` at `bindLaunch` and at `role.claim`. A rebind of an earlier host's run is
+allowed, so the launcher's recovery can end it. Four triggers end the claims, each with its `by`:
+the runtime's timer, every 30 s (`access.intervalMs` sets it in process, as `librarySync.intervalMs`
+does), which reads the file whatever its stamp (`access-timer`); a user's request or a
+`threadsState` call after the file's stat changed (`access-change`); a `threadsState` row that is
+lost with its claim still held, as when a grant expired with no write, from the same read
+(`access-expiry`); and `access.reload` (the human). The timer calls `accessSweep()`, a trusted
+broker method, not a verb. Tests: `tests/access-revoke.test.mjs`.
 
 `threadIdle({business,thread,run})` is the launcher's idle stop, also trusted and not a
 verb. It rechecks the thread and releases the run's claim in one call, and returns

packages/bus/src/broker.mjs

@@ -396,6 +396,12 @@ export class Broker {
   // FED R3: () => the checked access document (R1's loadAccess), read once per user request. Null,
   // a throw or no document leaves every user with no grant (design 3.5, fail closed).
   #access;
+  // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7): () => a key that changes when the access file does (dev, inode,
+  // size, mtime, ctime), or null. With it a request only stats the file; without it every read reads.
+  #accessStamp;
+  // The last read, { stamp, doc }, and the stamp whose losses #revokeLost has already ended.
+  #accessSeen = null;
+  #accessSwept;
   #compactions;
   // r6 X3: interrupted host grants whose remote undo waits for reconcileHosts, each with its claim.
   #hostUndo = [];
@@ -422,13 +428,14 @@ export class Broker {
   #clock = 0;
   #processing;
   // credentialStatus is the runtime's metadata-only Credentials.status(); the broker never gets use().
-  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, library = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null, hostGrant = null, hostKeys = null, processing = null, testerOn = null, roleFile = null, giteaGrant = null, giteaKeys = null, access = null, compactions = null }) {
+  constructor({ store, businesses, secretCheck = () => {}, credentialStatus = () => [], organization = null, project = null, library = null, usage = null, limits = null, harnessOn = null, credentialVerbs = null, hostGrant = null, hostKeys = null, processing = null, testerOn = null, roleFile = null, giteaGrant = null, giteaKeys = null, access = null, accessStamp = null, compactions = null }) {
     if (!object(businesses) || !Object.keys(businesses).length) fail('invalid-business');
     // Row 194 b15 (sage-2501): the function-argument checks come before anything reads the store.
     if (harnessOn !== null && typeof harnessOn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('harnessOn must be a function');
     if (testerOn !== null && typeof testerOn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('testerOn must be a function');
     if (roleFile !== null && typeof roleFile !== 'function') throw new TypeError('roleFile must be a function');
     if (access !== null && typeof access !== 'function') throw new TypeError('access must be a function');
+    if (accessStamp !== null && typeof accessStamp !== 'function') throw new TypeError('accessStamp must be a function');
     if (compactions !== null && typeof compactions !== 'function') throw new TypeError('compactions must be a function');
     this.#businesses = structuredClone(businesses);
     this.#store = store;
@@ -449,6 +456,7 @@ export class Broker {
     this.#giteaGrant = giteaGrant;
     this.#giteaKeys = giteaKeys;
     this.#access = access;
+    this.#accessStamp = accessStamp;
     this.#compactions = compactions;
     this.#project = project;
     this.#library = library;
@@ -903,13 +911,7 @@ export class Broker {
   // FED R3 (design 3.5): the user's live grants in the session's business, from one read of the
   // access file. Any failure to read leaves none. Row 275: a grant at any level counts here; each
   // verb's own check asks the level it needs (#granted).
-  #userGrants(s) {
-    let doc = null;
-    try {
-      doc = this.#access?.() ?? null;
-    } catch {
-      doc = null;
-    }
+  #userGrants(s, doc = this.#accessDoc()) {
     const now = new Date();
     return (doc?.grants ?? []).filter((g) => g.user === s.user && g.business === s.business &&
       covers(g, { business: s.business, project: g.projects[0], instance: g.instances[0] }, now, { level: 'viewer' }));
@@ -965,15 +967,72 @@ export class Broker {
   // Does a live grant of any level cover thread `t` for `user`? One read of the access file, as
   // #userGrants does; any failure to read covers nothing (design 5.6, H3).
   #covered(user, business, t) {
+    const doc = this.#accessDoc();
+    const now = new Date();
+    return (doc?.grants ?? []).some((g) => g.user === user &&
+      covers(g, { business, project: t.project, instance: t.instance }, now, { level: 'viewer' }));
+  }
+  // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7): the access document, from one read per change of the file. A stamp
+  // equal to the last read's reuses that read; `force` (the timer, access.reload) reads regardless.
+  // A read that throws, or no access function, is no document: every user loses every grant.
+  #accessDoc(force = false) {
+    let stamp = null;
+    try {
+      stamp = this.#accessStamp?.() ?? null;
+    } catch {
+      stamp = null;
+    }
+    if (!force && stamp !== null && this.#accessSeen?.stamp === stamp) return this.#accessSeen.doc;
     let doc = null;
     try {
       doc = this.#access?.() ?? null;
     } catch {
       doc = null;
     }
+    this.#accessSeen = { stamp, doc };
+    return doc;
+  }
+  // Is thread `t` owned by a user whom no grant in `doc` covers at collaborator level any more? A
+  // downgrade to viewer is a loss (design 3.7, morgana-0005). The human's and the tester's never are.
+  #revoked(t, doc, now) {
+    if (!t.owner.startsWith('user:')) return false;
+    const user = t.owner.slice(5);
+    return !(doc?.grants ?? []).some((g) => g.user === user &&
+      covers(g, { business: t.business, project: t.project, instance: t.instance }, now, { level: 'collaborator' }));
+  }
+  // Design 3.7: on a loss, one transaction ends the held claim of every session of every user thread
+  // the access file no longer covers, in every business. The run's next bus call refuses not-holder
+  // (F10), and a later claim refuses thread-revoked. Runs only when the read is new: a forced read,
+  // a stamp it hasn't swept, or no stamp at all. `doc` is a read the caller just made, so a request
+  // reads once. Returns the ended claims.
+  #revokeLost(by, force = false, doc = this.#accessDoc(force)) {
+    const stamp = this.#accessSeen.stamp;
+    if (!force && stamp !== null && stamp === this.#accessSwept) return [];
     const now = new Date();
-    return (doc?.grants ?? []).some((g) => g.user === user &&
-      covers(g, { business, project: t.project, instance: t.instance }, now, { level: 'viewer' }));
+    const lost = this.#store.all("SELECT * FROM threads WHERE substr(owner,1,5)='user:' ORDER BY seq").filter((t) => this.#revoked(t, doc, now));
+    const ended = [];
+    if (lost.length) this.#store.transaction(() => {
+      for (const t of lost)
+        for (const h of this.#threadHolders(t.business, t.instance, t.owner))
+          if (h.thread === t.id) {
+            this.#claimEnd({ business: t.business }, h, 'revoke', null, 'access-revoked', by);
+            ended.push(h);
+          }
+    });
+    this.#accessSwept = stamp;
+    return ended;
+  }
+  // Is thread `id` of `business` revoked, from the file as of now? Only reads: role.claim runs it
+  // inside the verb's transaction, so the claim end is left to the next sweep.
+  #threadLost(business, id) {
+    const t = this.#store.get('SELECT * FROM threads WHERE id=? AND business=?', id, business);
+    // Only a user's thread reads the file, so a human's or tester's run never does.
+    return Boolean(t?.owner.startsWith('user:')) && this.#revoked(t, this.#accessDoc(), new Date());
+  }
+  // Trusted host API, not a socket verb: the runtime's 30 s timer (design 3.7 trigger 2). It reads
+  // the file whatever its stamp, so an expiry with no write and no request ends its runs too.
+  accessSweep() {
+    return this.#revokeLost('access-timer', true).map((h) => ({ business: h.business, thread: h.thread, session: h.session, run: h.holder_run }));
   }
   // The threads another principal owns that the session may read, oldest first.
   #readableThreads(s, project) {
@@ -1033,9 +1092,23 @@ export class Broker {
   // (a turn in progress), and the latest message, open and claim times. A message delivered
   // to an earlier run and never read (it crashed mid-turn) isn't the holder's turn, so it
   // doesn't keep the holder from idling out.
+  // FED R4 (design 3.7): a row adds revoked: true for a thread the access file no longer covers, as
+  // of this call, so a launcher restart never starts one. A changed file also ends its lost runs here.
+  // A grant that expired with no change to the file (Dewey's B1 in dewey-0871) leaves a revoked row
+  // whose claim the stamp check didn't end: that row ends the lost claims from the same read, by
+  // access-expiry, before the launcher sees it, so the run's end is never a release.
   threadsState(business) {
     this.#business(identifier(business));
-    return this.#threadRows('t.business=?', business);
+    this.#revokeLost('access-change');
+    const doc = this.#accessSeen?.doc ?? null;
+    const now = new Date();
+    const lost = (r, owner, project) => this.#revoked({ business, owner, project, instance: r.instance }, doc, now);
+    let rows = this.#threadRows('t.business=?', business);
+    if (rows.some(({ owner, project, ...r }) => r.holder !== null && lost(r, owner, project))) {
+      this.#revokeLost('access-expiry', true, doc);
+      rows = this.#threadRows('t.business=?', business);
+    }
+    return rows.map(({ owner, project, ...r }) => (lost(r, owner, project) ? { ...r, revoked: true } : r));
   }
   // Row 121 round 2 (#1615, Dewey's F3 in 28591): the launcher's idle stop. The tick decides
   // from a threadsState snapshot, and a message the run took after it would be delivered to a
@@ -1203,7 +1276,7 @@ export class Broker {
   #threadRows(where, ...params) {
     return this.#store
       .all(
-        `SELECT t.id, t.instance, se.id AS session, se.op AS session_op,
+        `SELECT t.id, t.instance, t.owner, t.project, se.id AS session, se.op AS session_op,
           (SELECT count(*) FROM messages m JOIN message_threads mt ON mt.message=m.id WHERE mt.session=se.id AND m.to_role=t.instance
             AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM deliveries d WHERE d.message=m.id AND d.op IN ('delivered','read'))
             AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM message_cancels x WHERE x.message=m.id)) AS pending,
@@ -1221,6 +1294,8 @@ export class Broker {
       .map((r) => ({
         thread: r.id,
         instance: r.instance,
+        owner: r.owner,
+        project: r.project,
         pending: r.pending,
         unread: r.unread,
         lastMessage: r.last_message,
@@ -1285,6 +1360,9 @@ export class Broker {
     // harness was switched off, so it can be ended.
     if (!old) this.#processingWork();
     if (!old && !this.#harnessOn(record.business, record.harness)) fail('invalid-harness');
+    // FED R4 (design 3.7, D1): a new run of a revoked thread refuses, which covers a start racing the
+    // revocation. recover()'s rebind of an earlier run isn't refused, so it can still end that run.
+    if (!old && record.thread !== undefined && this.#threadLost(record.business, record.thread)) fail('thread-revoked');
     if (old) {
       if (old.actor_role !== record.role || old.body !== JSON.stringify(body)) fail('launch-record-mismatch');
       // An ended run stays ended across broker restarts.
@@ -4450,8 +4528,12 @@ export class Broker {
       // request reads the access file again, so a removed or expired grant refuses the next one.
       let grants = null;
       if (s.user) {
+        // FED R4 (sage-3139): any user's request that finds the file changed ends the lost runs. One
+        // read serves the sweep and the grants, and none at all while the file's stamp is unchanged.
+        const doc = this.#accessDoc();
+        this.#revokeLost('access-change', false, doc);
         if (!USER_VERBS.includes(request.verb)) fail('access-refused');
-        grants = this.#userGrants(s);
+        grants = this.#userGrants(s, doc);
         if (!grants.length) fail('access-revoked');
       }
       const args = request.args ?? {};
@@ -4463,6 +4545,14 @@ export class Broker {
         keys(args, []);
         return this.#processingState();
       }
+      // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7 trigger 3): the human's re-read of the access file, which R5's grant
+      // and revoke call after the write. Human-only, so not a tester, a reader, an agent or a user.
+      if (request.verb === 'access.reload') {
+        this.#human(s);
+        keys(args, []);
+        const ended = this.#revokeLost(s.human, true).filter((h) => h.business === s.business);
+        return { ended: ended.map((h) => ({ thread: h.thread, session: h.session, run: h.holder_run })) };
+      }
       this.#processingGate(s, request.verb);
       // Row 213 (C2-08, Case 2 design 5.1 M6): a creative role has no free-text decision channel. It
       // runs before the spec-cited branch below, so a cited raise refuses too.
@@ -5154,6 +5244,8 @@ export class Broker {
         if (s.thread) {
           if (this.#store.get("SELECT 1 FROM thread_claims WHERE session=? AND holder_run=? AND op='revoke' LIMIT 1", s.session, s.run))
             fail('run-revoked');
+          // FED R4 (design 3.7): no run takes a thread the access file no longer covers.
+          if (this.#threadLost(s.business, s.thread)) fail('thread-revoked');
           // Row 271 (264d, B2): no run takes a session being cleared, or a retired one.
           this.#sessionFence(s.session);
           if (this.#sessionHolder(s.session)?.op === 'claim') fail('thread-already-held');

packages/bus/src/runtime.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { lstatSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { Store } from './store.mjs';
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ import { createContainerStopper } from '../../processing-control/src/containers.
 
 // Row 194 (D3): the verbs the instance writer commits, whose answers carry restart.
 const INSTANCE_VERBS = new Set(['instances.set', 'veto.set', 'instance.hire', 'instance.fire']);
+// FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7): the revocation timer's period.
+export const ACCESS_SWEEP_MS = 30_000;
 // Trusted host API. S1 supplies resolved definitions, S6 supplies launch records and ends them.
 // Human limits writes use the shared organization writer behind the verified transport.
 // `tasks` is S3's adapter factory: ({broker, credentials, businesses}) => {handle, timeout, close}.
@@ -101,16 +103,18 @@ export async function startBroker({
   // a librarySync without one is refused.
   librarySync = null,
   // FED R3 (#414): the access file and its loader context, { file, context } (R1's loadAccess).
-  // Without it no user binds. R6 and R8 pass it; the live boot config doesn't yet.
+  // Without it no user binds. R6 and R8 pass it; the live boot config doesn't yet. FED R4 (#1801):
+  // intervalMs, the revocation timer's period (design 3.7, 30 s), in-process only like librarySync's.
   access = null,
 }) {
-  if (access !== null && (typeof access?.file !== 'string' || access.context === null || typeof access.context !== 'object'))
+  if (access !== null && (typeof access?.file !== 'string' || access.context === null || typeof access.context !== 'object'
+      || (Object.hasOwn(access, 'intervalMs') && !(Number.isSafeInteger(access.intervalMs) && access.intervalMs > 0))))
     throw new BusError('invalid-host-request');
   if (librarySync !== null && (typeof librarySync?.command !== 'function'
       || (Object.hasOwn(librarySync, 'intervalMs') && !(Number.isSafeInteger(librarySync.intervalMs) && librarySync.intervalMs > 0))
       || (Object.hasOwn(librarySync, 'configDir') && typeof librarySync.configDir !== 'string')))
     throw new BusError('invalid-host-request');
-  let store, credentials, server, adapter, processing, syncTimer = null, syncPass = null;
+  let store, credentials, server, adapter, processing, syncTimer = null, syncPass = null, accessTimer = null;
   try {
     const references = {};
     for (const [business, b] of Object.entries(businesses)) {
@@ -262,6 +266,16 @@ export async function startBroker({
     broker = new Broker({
       // FED R3: the access file is read per user request; a refusal leaves the user no grant.
       access: access ? () => loadAccess(access.file, access.context) : null,
+      // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7 trigger 1): a request stats the file and reads it only when this
+      // changes. A failed stat is a stamp of its own, so a removed file reads (and refuses) once.
+      accessStamp: access ? () => {
+        try {
+          const st = lstatSync(access.file, { bigint: true });
+          return `${st.dev}:${st.ino}:${st.size}:${st.mtimeNs}:${st.ctimeNs}:${st.mode}:${st.uid}`;
+        } catch (e) {
+          return `unreadable:${e.code ?? 'error'}`;
+        }
+      } : null,
       // Row 270 (264c): session.list's compaction count, read from the session store's ledger.
       compactions: ({ business, thread, session, legacy }) => {
         const dir = storeDir(dataRoot, business, thread, session, { legacy });
@@ -558,6 +572,18 @@ export async function startBroker({
       syncTimer.unref();
     }
     const stopSync = async () => { clearInterval(syncTimer); syncTimer = null; await syncPass; };
+    // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7 trigger 2): every 30 s the broker re-reads the access file, so a hand
+    // edit or an expiry with no request ends the lost runs within one period.
+    if (access) {
+      accessTimer = setInterval(() => {
+        try {
+          broker.accessSweep();
+        } catch (e) {
+          process.stderr.write(`access: ${JSON.stringify({ event: 'access-sweep-failed', code: e.code ?? 'error' })}\n`);
+        }
+      }, access.intervalMs ?? ACCESS_SWEEP_MS);
+      accessTimer.unref();
+    }
     return {
       broker,
       credentials,
@@ -605,6 +631,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
       launches: bound,
       readers: readCaps,
       async close() {
+        clearInterval(accessTimer);
         await stopSync();
         await server.close();
         await adapter?.close?.();
@@ -614,6 +641,7 @@ export async function startBroker({
       },
     };
   } catch (e) {
+    clearInterval(accessTimer);
     await server?.close();
     await adapter?.close?.();
     await processing?.close();

packages/bus/tests/access-revoke.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+// FED R4 (#1801, federation design 3.7 and the R4 row of section 7): revocation. A loss of a user's
+// grant ends the claim of every run on that user's threads, from one of three triggers: the timer's
+// accessSweep, the human's access.reload, and the next request of any user once the file changed.
+// The access document and its stamp come in as functions, as the runtime passes loadAccess and an
+// lstat key; `edit` changes the document and the stamp together, as a hand edit does. BUILD.md
+// (agents/morgana/work/queue-295) names the mutant each test kills.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { Store } from '../src/store.mjs';
+import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
+import { ACCESS_SWEEP_MS, startBroker } from '../src/runtime.mjs';
+
+const shipped = (name) =>
+  JSON.parse(readFileSync(fileURLToPath(new URL(`../../../roles/${name}.json`, import.meta.url)), 'utf8'));
+const grant = (over = {}) => ({
+  id: `g-${over.user ?? 'alice'}`, user: 'alice', business: 'demo', projects: ['*'], instances: ['assistant'], level: 'collaborator', ...over,
+});
+const BUSINESSES = {
+  demo: {
+    id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'chief', delivery: 'chief' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true }, plugins: { harness: ['pi'] },
+    roles: {
+      chief: { definition: 'chief-of-staff', authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } },
+      assistant: { definition: 'assistant', authority: { withinRole: ['message.send'], crossRole: [] } },
+    },
+    definitions: { 'chief-of-staff': {}, assistant: { messaging: shipped('assistant').messaging } },
+  },
+};
+
+// Alice and Bob each hold a collaborator grant and own a thread; the human owns thread H. With
+// `runs`, each thread has a claimed run: a-run on A, b-run on B, h-run on H.
+function setup(t, { runs = true, grants = [grant(), grant({ user: 'bob' })] } = {}) {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-access-revoke-'));
+  const store = new Store(root);
+  t.after(() => {
+    store.close();
+    rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  // `reads` counts loader calls; `rev` is the stamp, which a hand edit changes.
+  const access = { doc: { accessVersion: 1, revision: 1, users: [], grants }, reads: 0, rev: 1 };
+  const broker = () => new Broker({
+    store,
+    businesses: BUSINESSES,
+    access: () => {
+      access.reads++;
+      return access.doc;
+    },
+    accessStamp: () => String(access.rev),
+  });
+  const b = broker();
+  const caps = {
+    human: b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true }),
+    tester: b.bindTester({ business: 'demo' }),
+    reader: b.bindReader({ business: 'demo' }),
+  };
+  const call = (who, verb, args = {}) => b.request(caps[who], { verb, args });
+  const code = (who, verb, args = {}) => {
+    try {
+      call(who, verb, args);
+    } catch (e) {
+      return e.code;
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  const edit = (fn) => {
+    access.doc = { ...access.doc, revision: access.doc.revision + 1, grants: fn(access.doc.grants) };
+    access.rev++;
+  };
+  const record = (name, thread) => ({ business: 'demo', role: 'assistant', run: `${name}-run`, harness: 'pi', thread });
+  const launch = (name, thread) => {
+    caps[name] = b.bindLaunch(record(name, thread));
+    return call(name, 'role.claim');
+  };
+  // The latest claim row of a run: its op, reason and by, spread off the store's null prototype.
+  const claim = (run) => ({ ...store.get('SELECT op, reason, by FROM thread_claims WHERE holder_run=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1', run) });
+  const P = call('human', 'project.create', { name: 'shared' }).id;
+  caps.alice = b.bindUser({ business: 'demo', user: 'alice' });
+  caps.bob = b.bindUser({ business: 'demo', user: 'bob' });
+  const A = call('alice', 'thread.create', { project: P, name: 'alice work' }).id;
+  const B = call('bob', 'thread.create', { project: P, name: 'bob work' }).id;
+  const H = call('human', 'thread.create', { project: P, name: 'owner work' }).id;
+  if (runs) {
+    launch('a', A);
+    launch('b', B);
+    launch('h', H);
+  }
+  return { b, store, access, caps, call, code, edit, record, launch, claim, broker, P, A, B, H };
+}
+
+const withoutAlice = (gs) => gs.filter((g) => g.user !== 'alice');
+
+test('R4: the timer sweep after a hand edit ends only the lost user\'s run; its next call refuses not-holder', (t) => {
+  const { b, code, edit, claim, A } = setup(t);
+  edit(withoutAlice);
+  const ended = b.accessSweep();
+  assert.equal(ended.length, 1);
+  assert.deepEqual({ ...ended[0], session: undefined }, { business: 'demo', thread: A, session: undefined, run: 'a-run' });
+  assert.equal(typeof ended[0].session, 'string');
+  assert.deepEqual(claim('a-run'), { op: 'revoke', reason: 'access-revoked', by: 'access-timer' });
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), 'not-holder', 'the ended run');
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'message.receive'), null, 'another user\'s run stays');
+  assert.equal(code('h', 'message.receive'), null, 'the human\'s run stays');
+  assert.deepEqual([claim('b-run').op, claim('h-run').op], ['claim', 'claim']);
+  // Ended once: a second sweep finds nothing to end.
+  assert.deepEqual(b.accessSweep(), []);
+});
+
+test('R4: an expiry with no write and no request ends the run at the next timer sweep', (t) => {
+  t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.parse('2026-10-23T00:00:00Z') });
+  const { b, code, claim } = setup(t, { grants: [grant({ expires: '2026-10-23T00:01:00Z' }), grant({ user: 'bob' })] });
+  assert.deepEqual(b.accessSweep(), [], 'live');
+  t.mock.timers.tick(60_001);
+  // Bob's request sees the same stamp, so it doesn't sweep: the timer is what catches an expiry.
+  assert.equal(code('bob', 'thread.list'), null);
+  assert.equal(claim('a-run').op, 'claim');
+  assert.deepEqual(b.accessSweep().map((h) => h.run), ['a-run']);
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), 'not-holder');
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'message.receive'), null);
+});
+
+test('R4: a downgrade to viewer is a loss', (t) => {
+  const { b, code, edit, claim } = setup(t);
+  edit((gs) => gs.map((g) => (g.user === 'alice' ? { ...g, level: 'viewer' } : g)));
+  assert.deepEqual(b.accessSweep().map((h) => h.run), ['a-run']);
+  assert.deepEqual(claim('a-run'), { op: 'revoke', reason: 'access-revoked', by: 'access-timer' });
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'message.receive'), null);
+});
+
+// sage-3139 Q1: no timer runs here, so only the request trigger can end alice's run.
+test('R4: another user\'s request after a hand edit ends the lost user\'s run, and its own run stays', (t) => {
+  const { code, edit, claim } = setup(t);
+  edit(withoutAlice);
+  assert.equal(claim('a-run').op, 'claim', 'nothing ends before a request');
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), null, 'an agent request is not a trigger');
+  assert.equal(code('bob', 'thread.list'), null);
+  assert.deepEqual(claim('a-run'), { op: 'revoke', reason: 'access-revoked', by: 'access-change' });
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), 'not-holder');
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'message.receive'), null);
+  assert.equal(code('h', 'message.receive'), null);
+});
+
+// sage-3139 Q1, the cost rule: a request only stats the file, and reads it once per change.
+test('R4: a request reads the access file only when its stamp changed, once per change', (t) => {
+  const { access, code, edit } = setup(t);
+  const reads = access.reads;
+  assert.equal(code('bob', 'thread.list'), null);
+  assert.equal(code('alice', 'project.list'), null);
+  assert.equal(access.reads, reads, 'unchanged: no read');
+  edit((gs) => gs);
+  assert.equal(code('bob', 'thread.list'), null);
+  assert.equal(code('alice', 'thread.list'), null);
+  assert.equal(access.reads, reads + 1, 'changed: one read for both requests');
+});
+
+test('R4: access.reload ends the lost runs at once for the human; the tester, a reader, an agent and a user are refused', (t) => {
+  const { b, code, call, edit, claim, A } = setup(t);
+  assert.equal(code('tester', 'access.reload'), 'human-required', 'tester');
+  assert.equal(code('reader', 'access.reload'), 'read-only', 'reader');
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'access.reload'), 'human-required', 'agent');
+  assert.equal(code('bob', 'access.reload'), 'access-refused', 'user');
+  assert.deepEqual(call('human', 'access.reload'), { ended: [] }, 'nothing lost');
+  assert.equal(code('human', 'access.reload', { force: true }), 'invalid-request');
+  edit(withoutAlice);
+  const { ended } = call('human', 'access.reload');
+  assert.deepEqual(ended.map((h) => [h.thread, h.run]), [[A, 'a-run']]);
+  assert.equal(typeof ended[0].session, 'string');
+  assert.deepEqual(claim('a-run'), { op: 'revoke', reason: 'access-revoked', by: 'jason' });
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), 'not-holder');
+  assert.equal(code('b', 'message.receive'), null);
+  assert.deepEqual(b.accessSweep(), []);
+});
+
+test('R4: threadsState marks revoked: true on the lost user\'s thread only, a pending message included', (t) => {
+  const { b, call, edit, A, B, H } = setup(t, { runs: false });
+  call('alice', 'thread.send', { thread: A, body: 'for A' });
+  call('bob', 'thread.send', { thread: B, body: 'for B' });
+  const row = (id) => b.threadsState('demo').find((x) => x.thread === id);
+  assert.equal(row(A).revoked, undefined, 'covered');
+  edit(withoutAlice);
+  assert.equal(row(A).revoked, true);
+  assert.equal(row(A).pending, 1, 'its message is still pending');
+  assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(row(B), 'revoked'), false);
+  assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(row(H), 'revoked'), false);
+  assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(row(A), 'owner'), false, 'the row keeps its old fields');
+});
+
+// Dewey's B1 (dewey-0871): the launcher ticks faster than the timer, so a grant that expires with no
+// write must not reach it as revoked: true with the claim still held.
+test('R4: threadsState after an expiry with no write and no sweep ends the claim before it marks the row revoked', (t) => {
+  t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['Date'], now: Date.parse('2026-10-23T00:00:00Z') });
+  const { b, code, claim, store, A, B } = setup(t, { grants: [grant({ expires: '2026-10-23T00:01:00Z' }), grant({ user: 'bob' })] });
+  const row = (id) => b.threadsState('demo').find((x) => x.thread === id);
+  assert.equal(row(A).revoked, undefined, 'live');
+  t.mock.timers.tick(60_001);
+  const a = row(A);
+  assert.deepEqual([a.revoked, a.holder], [true, null]);
+  assert.deepEqual(claim('a-run'), { op: 'revoke', reason: 'access-revoked', by: 'access-expiry' });
+  assert.equal(code('a', 'message.receive'), 'not-holder');
+  assert.deepEqual([row(B).holder, claim('b-run').op], ['b-run', 'claim']);
+  // Ended once: the next call writes no second revoke.
+  row(A);
+  assert.equal(store.get("SELECT count(*) AS n FROM thread_claims WHERE holder_run='a-run' AND op='revoke'").n, 1);
+});
+
+test('R4: a new run of a revoked thread refuses thread-revoked at bind and at claim; a rebind is allowed', (t) => {
+  const { b, call, edit, record, broker, A, B } = setup(t, { runs: false });
+  const late = b.bindLaunch(record('late', A));
+  edit(withoutAlice);
+  assert.throws(() => b.request(late, { verb: 'role.claim' }), { code: 'thread-revoked' }, 'bound before, claimed after');
+  assert.throws(() => b.bindLaunch(record('new', A)), { code: 'thread-revoked' }, 'bound after');
+  assert.ok(b.bindLaunch(record('other', B)), 'bob\'s thread binds');
+  call('bob', 'thread.list');
+  // D1: a later broker over the same store rebinds the run an earlier one bound (recover()), so the
+  // host can end it.
+  const again = broker();
+  assert.ok(again.bindLaunch(record('late', A)));
+  assert.equal(again.endLaunch({ business: 'demo', run: 'late-run', reason: 'recovered' }).released, false);
+});
+
+// The runtime's timer (design 3.7 trigger 2) on a real 0600 access file read by loadAccess. The mocked
+// setInterval stands in for 30 s; the run is watched through its own calls, since threadsState and a
+// user request would sweep by themselves.
+test('R4 runtime: a hand edit ends the run at the first timer period, intervalMs is checked, and close stops the timer', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.timers.enable({ apis: ['setInterval'] });
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-access-timer-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  const dataRoot = join(root, 'data');
+  mkdirSync(dataRoot, { mode: 0o700 });
+  const file = join(root, 'access.json');
+  const write = (grants) => writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({
+    accessVersion: 1, revision: 1, users: [{ id: 'alice', home: 'local', subjects: [{ provider: 'authentik', sub: 'alice-sub' }] }], grants,
+  }), { mode: 0o600 });
+  write([grant()]);
+  const context = { providers: ['authentik'], peers: [], businesses: { demo: { human: 'jason', instances: ['chief', 'assistant'] } }, ssoSubjects: [] };
+  for (const intervalMs of [0, -1, 1.5, '30000'])
+    await assert.rejects(startBroker({ dataRoot, businesses: BUSINESSES, access: { file, context, intervalMs } }), { code: 'invalid-host-request' }, String(intervalMs));
+  const runtime = await startBroker({ dataRoot, businesses: BUSINESSES, access: { file, context } });
+  let closed = false;
+  t.after(() => closed || runtime.close());
+  const b = runtime.broker;
+  const human = b.bindHuman({ business: 'demo', human: 'jason', via: 'cli', outsideAgent: true });
+  const alice = b.bindUser({ business: 'demo', user: 'alice' });
+  const P = b.request(human, { verb: 'project.create', args: { name: 'shared' } }).id;
+  const A = b.request(alice, { verb: 'thread.create', args: { project: P, name: 'alice work' } }).id;
+  const run = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'assistant', run: 'a-run', harness: 'pi', thread: A });
+  b.request(run, { verb: 'role.claim' });
+  const receive = () => {
+    try {
+      b.request(run, { verb: 'message.receive' });
+    } catch (e) {
+      return e.code;
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  write([]);
+  t.mock.timers.tick(ACCESS_SWEEP_MS - 1);
+  assert.equal(receive(), null, 'before the first period');
+  t.mock.timers.tick(1);
+  assert.equal(receive(), 'not-holder', 'at the first period');
+  // After close the timer is gone: the sweep is never called again.
+  let sweeps = 0;
+  b.accessSweep = () => void sweeps++;
+  t.mock.timers.tick(ACCESS_SWEEP_MS);
+  assert.equal(sweeps, 1, 'one more period, one sweep');
+  closed = true;
+  await runtime.close();
+  t.mock.timers.tick(ACCESS_SWEEP_MS * 3);
+  assert.equal(sweeps, 1, 'closed');
+});

packages/bus/tests/message-filter.test.mjs

@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ import { fixture } from './spec-fixtures.mjs';
 const AT = '2026-10-21T00:00:00.000Z';
 const within = (grants) => ({ authority: { withinRole: grants, crossRole: [] } });
 const options = [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }];
+// FED R4 (row 295, mos-1436): a new run on a user's thread binds only while a grant covers it, so the
+// two tests that launch on alice's thread pass this access function; no other test's broker has one.
+// The grant names only the test's project, which the test sets in `ref` once it exists; the broker
+// has no stamp here, so it calls the function again on each read.
+const aliceAccess = (ref) => () => ({
+  accessVersion: 1, revision: 1, users: [],
+  grants: [{ id: 'g-alice', user: 'alice', business: 'demo', projects: [ref.project], instances: ['assistant'], level: 'collaborator' }],
+});
 // Row 264a (#1769): a thread made by hand gets the default session the 3k-3l migration gives a
 // legacy thread, with the thread's id.
 const DEFAULT_SESSION = [
@@ -55,7 +63,7 @@ const fromAlice = (store, thread, body, extra = {}) =>
 const toAlice = (store, thread, body, extra = {}) =>
   put(store, { thread, from_role: 'assistant', from_run: 'assistant-run', to_role: 'user', body, ...extra });
 
-function setup(t) {
+function setup(t, { access } = {}) {
   const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-message-filter-'));
   const store = new Store(root);
   t.after(() => {
@@ -64,6 +72,7 @@ function setup(t) {
   });
   const b = new Broker({
     store,
+    access,
     businesses: {
       demo: {
         id: 'demo', human: 'jason', arbiters: { technical: 'chief', delivery: 'chief' }, vars: { 'bus.tester': true },
@@ -115,7 +124,9 @@ test('replies on a hidden message id answers exactly as on an unknown id, for th
 });
 
 test('trail on a decision keeps the decision and drops the user thread messages, their deliveries and their events', (t) => {
-  const { b, store, call, U } = setup(t);
+  const ref = {};
+  const { b, store, call, project, U } = setup(t, { access: aliceAccess(ref) });
+  ref.project = project;
   const run = b.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'assistant', run: 'assistant-run', harness: 'pi', thread: U });
   b.request(run, { verb: 'role.claim' });
   const d = b.request(run, {
@@ -163,8 +174,10 @@ test('messages in the business human and tester threads are not hidden (row 177
 // Row 193's user sentence, one assertion per item: "The business owner sees your thread's agent's
 // decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not your messages."
 test('governance pin: the owner sees decisions, inbox entries, claims, tasks and project files, but not the user messages', async (t) => {
-  const f = await fixture(t, { roles: { assistant: { definition: 'assistant', ...within(['message.send', 'record.write']) } } });
+  const ref = {};
+  const f = await fixture(t, { roles: { assistant: { definition: 'assistant', ...within(['message.send', 'record.write']) } }, access: aliceAccess(ref) });
   const project = (await f.call(f.human, 'project.create', { name: 'alice work' })).id;
+  ref.project = project;
   const U = threadOf(f.store, project, 'user:alice', 'alice');
   const run = f.broker.bindLaunch({ business: 'demo', role: 'assistant', run: 'assistant-run', harness: 'pi', thread: U });
   await f.call(run, 'role.claim');

packages/bus/tests/spec-fixtures.mjs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { Broker } from '../src/broker.mjs';
 import { initProject, readSpec, writeRecord, listProjectFiles, readProjectFile, writeHumanFile, ProjectError } from '../../project/src/index.mjs';
 export const git = (repo, ...args) => execFileSync('git', ['-c', 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null', '-C', repo, ...args], { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();
 const options = [{ key: 'yes', text: 'Yes' }, { key: 'no', text: 'No' }];
-export async function fixture(t, { adapter = true, roles = {}, arbiters = { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' } } = {}) {
+export async function fixture(t, { adapter = true, roles = {}, arbiters = { technical: 'reviewer', delivery: 'reviewer' }, access = null } = {}) {
   const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'bus-spec-'));
   const store = new Store(root);
   t.after(() => { store.close(); rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export async function fixture(t, { adapter = true, roles = {}, arbiters = { tech
       ...roles,
     } };
   const { repo, commit } = await initProject({ business, project: 'stack', dataRoot: root });
-  const broker = new Broker({ store, businesses: { demo: business }, project: adapter ? {
+  const broker = new Broker({ store, businesses: { demo: business }, access, project: adapter ? {
     readSpec: context => readSpec({ ...context, dataRoot: root }),
     writeRecord: context => writeRecord({ ...context, dataRoot: root }),
     listFiles: context => listProjectFiles({ ...context, dataRoot: root }),

packages/cli/src/access.mjs

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ list is the real limit: a collaborator's message drives a granted instance with
 the owner's role.
 To cut a user off, revoke them here first. It acts at once. Removing a provider
 from console.sso takes effect only after a Console restart, so do that second.
+grant and revoke ask the bus to re-read the file after the write. If the bus
+refuses, the write still stands (exit 0), stderr names the refusal, and the bus's
+timer applies the change within 30 s.
 user remove refuses while the user has a grant at any business: revoke those first.
 A user's home is local or a peer id from federation.peers in the system config;
 any other home refuses. A grant that names a sign-in subject needs console.sso
@@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ export function withLock(file, fn, fs = realFs) {
 
 // The one human-proof call: project.list, which the bus gates with #human
 // (broker.mjs:2319, and #human at :377). It also returns the rows that resolve
-// project names. Row R4 swaps this call for access.reload.
+// project names. R4 (#1801) keeps it, since grant needs those rows, and calls access.reload after the write.
 async function proveHuman(transport, business) {
   return transport(business)("project.list", {});
 }
@@ -283,6 +286,18 @@ async function accessVerb(args, io, deps) {
     grants: result.touched,
   });
   io.stdout.write(`access ${sub}: ${result.touched.join(", ")} at ${business}, revision ${result.checked.revision}\n`);
+  await reload(deps.transport, business, io);
+}
+
+// FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7 trigger 3): after a grant or revoke, the bus re-reads the file and ends
+// the runs a loss leaves uncovered, at once. The write already stands, so a refusal here is exit 0
+// (sage-3139): a nonzero exit invites a retry that would hit revision-conflict.
+async function reload(transport, business, io) {
+  try {
+    await transport(business)("access.reload", {});
+  } catch (error) {
+    io.stderr.write(`access.reload refused: ${error.code ?? error.message}; the bus's timer applies the change within 30 s\n`);
+  }
 }
 
 // `user add ID` and `user remove ID` (row 193c): the same lock, revision check, file checks,

packages/cli/src/config.mjs

@@ -85,9 +85,10 @@ function trackerFor(system, b, warn) {
 }
 
 // FED R6 (#1800, sage-3142): the runtime's `access`, { file, context }. The broker reads the file
-// with R1's loadAccess on every user request, so a bad file leaves every user with no grant and
-// the owner's bus still boots (sage-3153). The context is the cli's accessContextFor, peers included. No file,
-// or a context that can't be built, means no `access`: no user binds, as before R6.
+// with R1's loadAccess on a user request that finds the file's stat changed, and on its 30 s timer
+// (FED R4, #1801), so a bad file leaves every user with no grant and the owner's bus still boots
+// (sage-3153). The context is the cli's accessContextFor, peers included. No file, or a context
+// that can't be built, means no `access`: no user binds, as before R6.
 function accessFor(system, env, warn) {
   const file = accessFilePath(configDir(env));
   try {

packages/cli/src/launcher.mjs

@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@
 //     after the snapshot gets a turn from the same run or waits for the
 //     next one, instead of going to the stopping run. An idle thread holds
 //     no session and counts against no limit.
+//   - FED R4 (#1801): never starts a thread the broker marks revoked, and
+//     SIGTERMs its running session at once (the broker already ended the
+//     claim). bindLaunch refuses a new run of one with thread-revoked.
 //
 // A thread run's sessionDir is the thread's store (session.mjs
 // threadStore()), so the next run for the thread resumes the harness
@@ -698,6 +701,20 @@ export function createLauncher({
       const key = `${t.thread}/${t.session}`;
       if (clearing.has(t.session)) continue;
       const s = registry.running(b.id, t.instance, t.thread, t.session);
+      // FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7): the broker marks a thread whose user owner lost the grant, and has
+      // ended its claim before it returns the row, whether the file changed or a grant expired. A
+      // revoked thread never starts, and a running one gets the idle stop's start-time-checked
+      // SIGTERM at once, with no threadIdle: there is no claim left to release.
+      if (t.revoked) {
+        if (s && !stopping.has(s.run)) {
+          stopping.add(s.run);
+          record({ event: "thread-revoked", instance: t.instance, thread: t.thread, session: t.session, run: s.run });
+          try {
+            if (startTimeOf(s.runnerPid) === s.runnerStartTime) process.kill(s.runnerPid, "SIGTERM");
+          } catch {}
+        }
+        continue;
+      }
       if (s) {
         const last = Math.max(ms(s.startedAt), ms(t.lastMessage), ms(t.lastOpen));
         if (!stopping.has(s.run) && now - last >= b.launch.threadIdleSeconds * 1000) {

packages/cli/tests/access.test.mjs

@@ -449,3 +449,62 @@ test("T9 a bus that refuses the human proof blocks both user verbs", async (t) =
   assert.equal(readFileSync(s.file, "utf8"), before);
   assert.equal(s.receipts(), "");
 });
+
+// FED R4 (#1801, design 3.7 trigger 3): grant and revoke ask the bus to re-read the file after the
+// write. This stand-in CLI logs every call, one line each, and with FAKE_MODE "refuse-reload"
+// refuses access.reload alone, as a bus would refuse a call it can't take. BUILD.md
+// (agents/morgana/work/queue-295) names the mutant each test kills.
+const RELOAD_BODY = `
+import { appendFileSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+const input = JSON.parse(readFileSync(0, "utf8"));
+appendFileSync(process.env.FAKE_LOG, JSON.stringify(input) + "\\n");
+if (input.verb === "access.reload") {
+  if (process.env.FAKE_MODE === "refuse-reload") { process.stderr.write("human-required\\n"); process.exit(3); }
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ended: [] }));
+} else process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(${JSON.stringify(ROWS)}));
+`;
+
+function reloading(t, mode = "ok") {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  mkdirSync(join(s.root, "reload"));
+  const cli = fakeCli(join(s.root, "reload"), RELOAD_BODY);
+  const env = humanEnv({ FAKE_LOG: s.log, FAKE_MODE: mode });
+  s.deps.transport = (business) => humanTransport({ socket: join(s.root, "bus.sock"), business, env, cli, timeoutMs: 5000 });
+  const calls = () => readFileSync(s.log, "utf8").trim().split("\n").map((l) => JSON.parse(l));
+  return { ...s, calls };
+}
+
+test("R4 grant and revoke call access.reload after the write, and nothing else does", async (t) => {
+  const s = reloading(t);
+  await run([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], s.deps);
+  assert.deepEqual(s.calls().map((c) => [c.verb, c.business, c.args]), [["project.list", "acme", {}], ["access.reload", "acme", {}]]);
+  await run(["revoke", "--business", "acme", "--user", "alice", "--revision", "2"], s.deps);
+  await run(["list", "--business", "acme"], s.deps);
+  assert.deepEqual(s.calls().map((c) => c.verb), ["project.list", "access.reload", "project.list", "access.reload", "project.list"]);
+  // A refused write never asks.
+  await refusal(run([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], s.deps), /revision-conflict/);
+  assert.equal(s.calls().at(-1).verb, "project.list");
+  assert.equal(s.calls().filter((c) => c.verb === "access.reload").length, 2);
+});
+
+// sage-3139 Q2: the write stands, so a refused reload is exit 0. stdout reports the write as before,
+// and stderr names the refusal and the timer.
+test("R4 a refused access.reload after a good write exits 0, stdout reports the write, stderr names the code and the 30 s timer", async (t) => {
+  const s = reloading(t, "refuse-reload");
+  const i = io(humanEnv());
+  assert.equal(await accessCommand([...GRANT, "--revision", "1"], i, s.deps), undefined, "no error: exit 0");
+  assert.match(i.out.text, /^access grant: g-[0-9a-f]{8} at acme, revision 2\n$/);
+  assert.equal(i.err.text, "access.reload refused: human-required; the bus's timer applies the change within 30 s\n");
+  assert.equal(s.read().revision, 2, "the write stands");
+  assert.equal(s.receipts().trim().split("\n").length, 1);
+});
+
+test("R4 the help keeps the provider-removal order and says what a refused reload means", async (t) => {
+  const s = setup(t);
+  const err = await refusal(run(["help"], s.deps), /revoke them here first/);
+  assert.equal(err.exitCode, 4);
+  const text = err.message.replace(/\n/g, " ");
+  assert.match(text, /To cut a user off, revoke them here first\. It acts at once\. Removing a provider from console\.sso takes effect only after a Console restart, so do that second\./);
+  assert.match(text, /grant and revoke ask the bus to re-read the file after the write\. If the bus refuses, the write still stands \(exit 0\), stderr names the refusal, and the bus's timer applies the change within 30 s\./);
+  assert.ok(text.indexOf("so do that second") < text.indexOf("re-read the file"), "next to the provider-removal order");
+});

packages/cli/tests/thread-revoke.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// FED R4 (#1801, federation design 3.7): the launcher half of revocation. A thread whose user owner
+// lost the grant never starts, even with a message waiting across a restart; a running one gets
+// SIGTERM at once; and recover() still rebinds and ends an earlier host's run on such a thread
+// (sage-3139, D1). Real runners in the bwrap sandbox, with thread-adapter.mjs as the turn.
+// The bus half is packages/bus/tests/access-revoke.test.mjs; BUILD.md
+// (agents/morgana/work/queue-295) names the mutant each test kills.
+//
+// The host is thread-launch.test.mjs's, with an access file passed to startBroker, which the live
+// boot config doesn't pass yet.
+
+import { test } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { launchDoc } from "../../business/tests/helpers.mjs";
+import { BusError } from "../../bus/src/broker.mjs";
+import { startBroker } from "../../bus/src/runtime.mjs";
+import { Store } from "../../bus/src/store.mjs";
+import { gitEnv } from "../../seat/src/checkout.mjs";
+import { sandboxProblem } from "../../seat/src/sandbox.mjs";
+import { launchLogFile, readSessions, Registry, SESSION_CREDENTIALS } from "../../seat/src/session.mjs";
+import { bootConfig, loadSystem } from "../src/config.mjs";
+import { createLauncher } from "../src/launcher.mjs";
+import { fakeHarnesses, fixture, tmp } from "./helpers.mjs";
+
+const ADAPTER = fileURLToPath(new URL("./fixtures/thread-adapter.mjs", import.meta.url));
+const skip = sandboxProblem() ?? false;
+
+// A mutant's kill is an assertion failure, not a timeout (sage-2707): the wait returns what it last
+// saw and the assertions after it decide.
+async function settle(fn, ms = 20000) {
+  const end = Date.now() + ms;
+  let v;
+  while (Date.now() < end) {
+    v = await fn();
+    if (v) return v;
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 50));
+  }
+  return v;
+}
+
+function gitIn(cwd, ...args) {
+  const r = spawnSync("git", ["-c", "user.name=test", "-c", "[email protected]", "-C", cwd, ...args], { env: gitEnv(), encoding: "utf8" });
+  assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
+}
+
+// The assistant is the thread instance. Alice holds a collaborator grant on it in the access file;
+// `grant(false)` is the hand edit that removes it.
+function prepare(t) {
+  const root = tmp(t, "mosaic-revoke-");
+  const f = fixture(root, "acme", (doc) => {
+    doc.roles.chief.vars = { harness: "pi", model: "claude-opus-5-5", thinking: "high" };
+    doc.roles.assistant = { definition: "assistant", vars: { harness: "pi", model: "claude-sonnet-5-5", thinking: "high" } };
+    doc.launch = launchDoc("chief", ["coder", "assistant"], { opus: 1, sonnet: 2 });
+    doc.launch.threadIdleSeconds = 3600;
+    return doc;
+  });
+  for (const k of SESSION_CREDENTIALS.flat()) delete f.env[k];
+  const project = f.doc.projects.stack.root;
+  gitIn(project, "init", "-q", "-b", "main");
+  writeFileSync(join(project, "file.txt"), "one\n");
+  gitIn(project, "add", "file.txt");
+  gitIn(project, "commit", "-q", "-m", "one");
+  const adapter = join(root, "adapter.sh");
+  writeFileSync(adapter, `exec '${process.execPath}' '${ADAPTER}'\n`, { mode: 0o644 });
+  const file = join(root, "access.json");
+  let revision = 0;
+  const grant = (on) =>
+    writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({
+      accessVersion: 1,
+      revision: ++revision,
+      users: [{ id: "alice", home: "local", subjects: [{ provider: "authentik", sub: "alice-sub" }] }],
+      grants: on ? [{ id: "g-alice", user: "alice", business: "acme", projects: ["*"], instances: ["assistant"], level: "collaborator" }] : [],
+    }), { mode: 0o600 });
+  grant(true);
+  const context = { providers: ["authentik"], peers: [], businesses: { acme: { human: f.doc.human, instances: Object.keys(f.doc.roles) } }, ssoSubjects: [] };
+  return { root, f, adapter, access: { file, context }, grant };
+}
+
+// A host and its launcher, ticking only when the test calls tick(). pollInterval is long, so a run
+// with nothing to do sleeps rather than ask the bus, and only a signal ends it.
+async function start(t, { f, adapter, access }) {
+  const system = loadSystem({ env: f.env });
+  const { trackers, ...boot } = bootConfig({ system, businessId: "acme", env: f.env });
+  assert.equal(trackers, undefined);
+  const runtime = await startBroker({ ...boot, access });
+  const ops = {
+    identity: (m) => runtime.identity(m.cap),
+    authorizeLaunch: (m) => runtime.authorizeLaunch(m.cap, m.instance),
+    refuse: (m) => runtime.refuse(m.cap, m.code, m.subject),
+    endLaunch: (m) => runtime.endLaunch(m.record),
+    credentialStatus: (m) => runtime.credentialStatus(m.business, m.role),
+    threadsState: (m) => runtime.threadsState(m.business),
+    threadIdle: (m) => runtime.threadIdle(m.record),
+    mayLaunch: (m) => runtime.mayLaunch(m),
+    landHeld: (m) => runtime.landHeld(m.record),
+    landHolders: (m) => runtime.landHolders(m.business),
+    landRelease: (m) => runtime.landRelease(m.record),
+    sessionClears: (m) => runtime.sessionClears(m.business),
+  };
+  const refusing = (what, fn) => async (m) => {
+    try {
+      return fn(m);
+    } catch (e) {
+      const code = e instanceof BusError ? e.code : `${what}-refused`;
+      throw Object.assign(new Error(`${what} refused: ${code}`), { code });
+    }
+  };
+  const hooks = [];
+  let closing = null;
+  const host = {
+    business: "acme",
+    path: runtime.path,
+    dataRoot: f.dataRoot,
+    op: refusing("launch-op", (m) => {
+      if (!Object.hasOwn(ops, m.op)) throw new BusError("invalid-host-request");
+      return ops[m.op](m);
+    }),
+    bindLaunch: refusing("launch bind", (r) => runtime.bindLaunch(r)),
+    beforeClose: (fn) => void hooks.push(fn),
+  };
+  const logs = [];
+  const launcher = createLauncher({
+    host,
+    system,
+    env: f.env,
+    makeLoader: await fakeHarnesses(t, { pi: adapter, "claude-code": adapter }),
+    sessionDefaults: { pollInterval: 600000 },
+    harnessVersion: "0.85.1",
+    readOnly: [ADAPTER],
+    threadTickMs: 3600000,
+    log: (l) => logs.push(l),
+  });
+  const close = () =>
+    (closing ??= (async () => {
+      for (const fn of hooks) await fn(0);
+      await runtime.close();
+    })());
+  t.after(close);
+  await launcher.listen();
+  const human = runtime.broker.bindHuman({ business: "acme", human: f.doc.human, via: "cli", outsideAgent: true });
+  // Alice binds at her first call: after the hand edit her bind refuses access-revoked.
+  let alice = null;
+  const call = (verb, args = {}) => runtime.broker.request(human, { verb, args });
+  const as = (verb, args = {}) => runtime.broker.request((alice ??= runtime.broker.bindUser({ business: "acme", user: "alice" })), { verb, args });
+  return { runtime, launcher, call, as, logs, close };
+}
+
+const launchLog = (f) =>
+  existsSync(launchLogFile(f.dataRoot, "acme"))
+    ? readFileSync(launchLogFile(f.dataRoot, "acme"), "utf8").trim().split("\n").map((l) => JSON.parse(l))
+    : [];
+const events = (f, event) => launchLog(f).filter((e) => e.event === event);
+
+// Alice's thread A in the stack project.
+function thread(host) {
+  const project = host.call("project.create", { name: "stack work", repo: "stack" }).id;
+  return host.as("thread.create", { project, name: "alice work" }).id;
+}
+
+test("REQ-LAUNCH-1 R4: a pending message on a revoked thread starts no run after a launcher restart", { skip, timeout: 60000 }, async (t) => {
+  const prepared = prepare(t);
+  const { f } = prepared;
+  const one = await start(t, prepared);
+  const A = thread(one);
+  one.as("thread.send", { thread: A, body: "for A" });
+  await one.close();
+  // The hand edit, while no host runs.
+  prepared.grant(false);
+  const two = await start(t, prepared);
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) await two.launcher.tick();
+  const row = two.runtime.threadsState("acme").find((x) => x.thread === A);
+  assert.deepEqual([row.revoked, row.pending, row.holder], [true, 1, null]);
+  assert.deepEqual(launchLog(f), [], "no launch and no refused start");
+  assert.deepEqual(readSessions(f.dataRoot), []);
+});
+
+test("REQ-LAUNCH-1 R4: a running thread's run gets SIGTERM at the first tick after the hand edit, with no idle check", { skip, timeout: 60000 }, async (t) => {
+  const prepared = prepare(t);
+  const { f } = prepared;
+  const host = await start(t, prepared);
+  const A = thread(host);
+  const sent = host.as("thread.send", { thread: A, body: "hello" });
+  await host.launcher.tick();
+  const reply = await settle(() => host.as("thread.messages", { thread: A }).find((m) => m.in_reply_to === sent.id && m.class === "RESULT"));
+  assert.ok(reply, JSON.stringify(launchLog(f)));
+  const [launch] = events(f, "launch");
+  assert.equal(launch.thread, A);
+  prepared.grant(false);
+  await host.launcher.tick();
+  assert.deepEqual(events(f, "thread-revoked").map((e) => [e.thread, e.run]), [[A, launch.run]]);
+  // The runner sleeps for its poll interval, so only the signal ends it, and it exits 0, stopped.
+  const end = await settle(() => events(f, "end").find((e) => e.run === launch.run));
+  assert.deepEqual([end?.reason, end?.exitCode, end?.signal], ["stopped", 0, null], JSON.stringify(launchLog(f)));
+  assert.deepEqual(events(f, "thread-idle"), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(readSessions(f.dataRoot), []);
+  const row = host.runtime.threadsState("acme").find((x) => x.thread === A);
+  assert.deepEqual([row.revoked, row.holder], [true, null]);
+  // More ticks start nothing.
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) await host.launcher.tick();
+  assert.equal(events(f, "launch").length, 1);
+  // Dewey's B1: the broker ended the claim before the launcher's kill, so the run's end didn't release it.
+  await host.close();
+  const store = new Store(f.dataRoot);
+  t.after(() => store.close());
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    { ...store.get("SELECT op, reason, by FROM thread_claims WHERE holder_run=? ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1", launch.run) },
+    { op: "revoke", reason: "access-revoked", by: "access-change" },
+  );
+});
+
+// sage-3139, D1: the bind refusal skips a rebind, so recover() ends the earlier host's run.
+test("REQ-LAUNCH-1 R4 D1: recover() rebinds an earlier host's run on a revoked thread and ends it, which ends its claim", { skip, timeout: 60000 }, async (t) => {
+  const prepared = prepare(t);
+  const { f } = prepared;
+  const one = await start(t, prepared);
+  const A = thread(one);
+  const D = one.runtime.threadsState("acme").find((x) => x.thread === A).session;
+  // A stand-in for the earlier host's run, with pids that aren't running.
+  const record = { business: "acme", role: "assistant", run: "run-left", harness: "pi", pid: 2 ** 22 + 7, startTime: "1", thread: A, session: D };
+  const left = one.runtime.bindLaunch(record);
+  one.runtime.broker.request(left.cap, { verb: "role.claim" });
+  await one.close();
+  prepared.grant(false);
+  new Registry(f.dataRoot).add({ business: "acme", instance: "assistant", thread: A, session: D, run: "run-left", harness: "pi", pid: record.pid, startTime: "1", runnerPid: 2 ** 22 + 9, runnerStartTime: "1" });
+  const two = await start(t, prepared);
+  assert.ok(two.logs.includes("run run-left (assistant) from an earlier host ended: host-lost"), two.logs.join("\n"));
+  assert.deepEqual(events(f, "end").map((e) => [e.run, e.reason]), [["run-left", "host-lost"]]);
+  const row = two.runtime.threadsState("acme").find((x) => x.thread === A);
+  assert.deepEqual([row.revoked, row.holder], [true, null]);
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) await two.launcher.tick();
+  assert.deepEqual(events(f, "launch"), []);
+});