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mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 777a8f7f5b docs(remediation): RM-02 in review at 83d2ecb2; crux is the activation-seam question (A4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:26:11 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 995f8b6a24 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 keystone review ACs before the reviewer reads the diff
Registered at head 83d2ecb2 before dispatch. Prior reviews 63/65 are superseded and this head carries
no live review of any kind, so the keystone gets a full independent review.

The crux is the one non-mechanical change, which f10-coder disclosed unprompted: activationCommit
advanced f65e9ea6 -> f4fd5967 so that the newly merged pre-registry RM-61 commit is no longer treated
as prospective. activationCommit sets the lower bound of the commit range required to carry own-tree
registry provenance, so advancing it SHRINKS that set. The value is plausibly correct — a pre-registry
commit cannot carry a registry manifest — but the change was made by the author to turn the author's
own gate from red to green, which is the self-verification shape the charter warns about.

Registered as A1-A6 without a verdict from me (D-39). A4 is the sharp one: the only validation on the
field is merge-base --is-ancestor activationCommit head, and a commit is its own ancestor, so setting
activationCommit = HEAD would empty the prospective range and the per-commit provenance loop would
iterate zero times. Whether that makes the history check pass VACUOUSLY is for rev-974 to determine and
report — an author-settable field that can inert the anti-inert-gate registry's own history check would
be the disease inside the cure again. A5 asks whether a must-fail negative control exists for it, since
RM-02's own founding rule is that a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence.

B1/B2 carry Mos's scope ruling that the D-38 bind-to-subject and D-40 type-strict clauses land in THIS
PR; B3 confirms D-42's clause is deliberately absent rather than forgotten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:24:24 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0a510d28d docs(remediation): scope rulings banked; D-43 elevated onto RM-34 — the control plane has no verifier
SCOPE (Mos): D-38 (bind evidence to subject) and D-40 (type-strict discriminator inputs) land IN the
RM-02 PR — cheap registry-coverage clauses, satisfiable now, and RM-02 literally IS the registry, so
codifying what its own delivery learned about how gates fail is the coherent move.

D-42 splits, and the reason is sharper than "needs experimentation": landing its clause in-PR today
would give the registry a clause with NOTHING to satisfy it, so the registry would go red on its own
clause and couple the keystone's landing to infra work. Wrong coupling. So (a) the infra experiment
proving the pin enforces via the negative case, in Mos's D-37/D-41/D-42 cluster; (b) the registry
clause "provider-side enforcement requires an OBSERVED negative control", in a follow-up RM-02
increment once (a) gives it something to check. Named owner, not a vacuous check and not a silent
omission.

D-43 point 3 elevated to the PRIMARY requirement on RM-34, with the table that makes it plain: code has
rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan, and the control plane has NOTHING. Every
other layer earned a verifier from a live failure; the board never did, and it is the artifact every
other decision is staged from. "Validate the checkpoint" must mean re-derive the board's claims from
ground truth — not that the file parses or that a successor can read it. It belongs to the
coordinator-daemon deliverable: the control plane needs its own verifier the way every other layer got
one. Today's catch was discipline, not mechanism.

Interim rule binding on BOTH seats until that mechanism exists, and Mos adopted it against himself:
re-derive a board claim from ground truth before any load-bearing use. The orchestrator does it before
dispatch; the coordinator does it before acting on or relaying a board claim that gates a decision.

D-11b addendum: the false-NEGATIVE twin. /user returns 403 on a least-privilege seat token (no
read:user) and reads exactly like an unprovisioned seat. The real assertion is the DIFFERENTIAL —
authenticated push=true vs unauthenticated push=false proves the token caused the difference. A single
endpoint can be true for anyone or refused for an unrelated scope reason. Would have escalated a
working seat as unprovisioned and stalled the keystone on a phantom.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:02:19 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8cef39f924 docs(remediation): RM-61 MERGED; bank D-43 — I inverted a board fact while compressing to fit the budget
#1033 merged f4fd5967, verified by property: merged=true + merge commit, #1034 (delivery) CLOSED,
#1000 (retirement trigger) still OPEN. The exemption is on main and RM-02 is unblocked.

D-43 is mine. Compressing RM-02's board row to meet the 8KB budget, I turned "2 reviews clear" into
"2 live REQUEST_CHANGES" — an inversion. Provider truth: reviews 63 and 65 are at superseded heads and
live REQUEST_CHANGES at f9746b23 is empty. The real state is subtler than either wording: no live
blocker AND no live approval, because the head carries no review at all.

Caught only by re-deriving RM-02's state from the provider before dispatching, not by re-reading the
board. I was one message from briefing f10-coder to remediate two blocking reviews that do not exist.

The transferable part: this board carries a hard <8KB budget, it exceeded that budget four times in one
session, and each time I shaved prose to fit. Compression IS restatement, and this board's own rule is
"REFERENCE, do not restate" (D-26) because restatement is lossy every time. The budget therefore forces
the exact operation the board forbids, on its most load-bearing table. I flagged that as a risk earlier
in the session; it then materialised as an actual error.

Rule banked: meet a size budget by ROLLING content out to BOARD-LEDGER.md, never by rewording what
stays. Deleting a row and pointing at its authoritative home is safe; paraphrasing to save bytes is not.
Applied immediately — this commit rolls the Decisions-log narrative out verbatim rather than trimming
it, and the board is back under budget at 8096.

And the deeper one, onto RM-34: the orchestrator is the board's sole writer, so nothing external checks
the board against reality. Code has rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan — the
control plane has no independent verifier. Handoff validation must include re-deriving the board's
claims from the provider, not merely confirming a successor can read the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:56:44 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f3c100f814 docs(remediation): bank D-42 — the head-pin's negative control has never been observed
merge-gate.md says it outright: a successful merge is NOT evidence the pin worked, only the negative
case is. On mosaicstack Gitea a merge against a WRONG head_commit_id has never been attempted, so every
head-pinned merge to date is equally consistent with the pin working and with the pin being ignored.

That is D-23's class — the queue guard "ran" and returned pass for every possible input; the pin
"holds" on every merge that would have succeeded anyway. By the mission's own standard (every
gate-introducing task carries a registered must-fail negative control; a gate with no proven failure
path manufactures evidence) the head-pin is unregistered in substance however it reads in the runbook.

Not blocking #1033: that head is coordinator-frozen with both the orchestrator and coder-mos1 holding,
so there is no concurrent pusher for the pin to defend against — its protection is only load-bearing on
a contested head. Raised by Mos while assigning the merge; Mos owns it and has filed it as an infra
task in the D-37/D-41 cluster, to be proven before any contested-head merge.

Requirement on RM-02: the negative-control clause must cover provider-side enforcement mechanisms, not
only in-repo checks. "The API accepted our parameter" is not evidence the API honours it — the same
true-answer-to-a-different-question shape as D-24 and D-38.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:52:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2750cc4842 docs(remediation): D-38c — PR metadata failed a THIRD time on #1033; delivery-issue gap ruled
Merge-gate NO-GO with every code and CI gate verified, including the --expect-commit machine-check it
was told to exercise (9/9 JSON, exempted_steps 0, expected_commit == commit). The blocker was the body:
only "Refs #1000", no "Closes #N", and Mosaic completion requires a linked issue closed.

Third distinct metadata failure on one PR — missing commit binding, then a stale DO-NOT-MERGE body
describing a dead head, now an incomplete link. Each time the code was fine and the metadata was
unbound, stale, or incomplete. Nothing re-binds PR metadata to the head or checks it for completeness
until a gate does, and by then it costs a round trip.

The subtlety that makes it a real ruling: #1033 must NOT Closes #1000. The teardown defect stays open,
and #1000 is the exemption's own retirement trigger — auto-closing it would delete the retirement
trigger for the workaround being merged, turning a bounded exemption into a permanent one by side
effect. Hence a delivery issue distinct from the defect issue: #1034, with Closes #1034 added and
Refs #1000 kept.

Metadata-only, head never moved: verified by read-back that head is still 57cae04f, Closes #1034
present, Refs #1000 present, Closes #1000 ABSENT, review 70 still CURRENT with zero live
REQUEST_CHANGES, #1034 open. coder-mos1 stayed parked; nobody pushed.

Process gap ruled by Mos: every remediation delivery PR needs a delivery issue to Close, created at
OPEN-TIME rather than discovered at gate-time. #1032 already Closes #1019; #1033 had none.

Both provider writes went through the tea->API fallback — the same path that silently dropped #1033's
draft property at creation — so both were read back and verified by property, not by exit code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:49:23 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 553474e4c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 GATE-READY at 57cae04f — review 70 APPROVED, CI 2194 9/9, D-40 closed
rev-974 approved at the exact head with no blocking and no non-blocking findings. Verified by me from
the provider rather than relayed: head unmoved, review 70 bound to 57cae04f, pipeline 2194 terminal
success at that commit, 9 children all success including clone (a 9-of-9 scan, not the 8-of-9 D-33 was
banked for). Queue guard run for the push gate and NOT cited — state=unknown exit 0 on branch=main,
D-23 verbatim.

The redundant-clause question I handed rev-974 without a conclusion came back answered by mutation
testing, and I re-ran both mutations myself: deleting the bool clause alone leaves the 17-case harness
green (not load-bearing), deleting the exact-type clause alone fails it (load-bearing, mutation
killed). So the exact-type clause carries the protection and the bool clause is inert-but-defensive
against a future type()->isinstance() edit, which the true/false cases would catch. Removing it alone
cannot reopen D-40. Better answer than either of us had, obtained by asking rather than telling —
D-39 paid for itself on the first review after adoption.

Disclosed to Mos rather than absorbed: JSON `-0` decodes to Python integer zero and passes. rev-974
ruled it not a type confusion because it is a valid JSON integer numerically equal to zero. I agree on
the merits, but it is a reviewer judgement inside the exemption and belongs in front of the gate.

Gate steps 1-3 are satisfied. Steps 4 and 5 — merge-gate verdict and head-pinned merge — are Mos's.
Head frozen; coder-mos1 parked idle per ruling (c) and will not push; neither will I.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:40:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0de8ccb52c docs(remediation): RM-62 — fleet management is a PREREQUISITE, and the rotation claim is corrected
Mos ruled (c): coder-mos1 stays idle/parked, not manually rotated. It holds no in-flight work, so
there is nothing to rotate FOR, and a manual in-pane restart would dress a missing mechanism as a
lifecycle operation — the D-41 overclaim itself. It stays AVAILABLE through RM-61's re-review in case
that review needs its context; the next NEW lane goes to a fresh seat, not to a seat at 67%.

RM-62 filed, because a dependency stated as prose with no owner becomes the permanent gap the charter
warns about. Bringing the execution fleet under roster/systemd management BLOCKS RM-50, RM-58 and
P-LIFECYCLE-001 — each is unsatisfiable against its real population until it lands. Banked explicitly
that both would FAIL against their real target today: RM-50 applied now quarantines the seat
implementing RM-50, and RM-58 has no mechanical reset path for any seat that needs one. RM-50 and
RM-58 now carry RM-62 as a hard depends_on edge, and RM-50 carries the requirement that acceptance be
proved against the unmanaged execution fleet rather than the roster-managed canaries.

RECORD CORRECTION, initiated by Mos and banked here: this session's opening rotation validated the
checkpoint+rehydration DESIGN losslessly — the residency attestation genuinely passed from the files —
but the MECHANISM was a manual pane respawn. "The handoff rehydrated losslessly" is earned; "rotation
worked" overclaims a mechanism that does not exist, and that overclaim is D-41. Same distinction as
D-23's inert guard: the step ran, one property was observed, the mechanism was not. Board header now
says so rather than implying a lifecycle rotation occurred.

D-37 and D-41 are one cluster — the execution fleet lacks both its shared-infrastructure and its
lifecycle management. Mos owns both, sequenced at a seam, never mid-lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:34:10 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 37402e9770 docs(remediation): bank D-41 — the whole execution fleet is UNMANAGED, so RM-50/RM-58 have no surface
Went to rotate coder-mos1 mechanically; `mosaic fleet restart` cannot reach it. Every seat executing
this mission is systemd inactive/disabled and flagged UNMANAGED — coder-mos1, rev-974, f10-coder,
merge-gate, the pm-scouts, rev-3107b, ultron-3107, and mos-remediation itself. The roster-managed
population is a different set of seats from the ones doing the work.

RM-50 applied today would quarantine the entire remediation fleet including the seat implementing it.
RM-58's mechanical out-of-band reset cannot be performed at all, so the only rotation available is what
D-4 says does not count: asking the agent, or killing a pane by hand. Requirement banked on both: their
acceptance must be demonstrated against the UNMANAGED execution population, because a criterion proved
only on roster-managed canaries is tested on the wrong population — D-17's coverage class one layer up.

Today's rotation is therefore labelled honestly as a manual pane restart with a hand-verified handoff,
not as a lifecycle operation. The step ran; the property was not observed (cf. D-23).

Did not run fleet restart against a disabled unit while the live pane held RM-61 and RM-03 state.
Disposition escalated to Mos.

Also records the handoff artifact as the positive control: typed state, and it surfaced D-12 recurring
live (PR #1033's draft property silently dropped by a wrapper fallback), an unrunnable check declared
rather than substituted, and suspicions labelled as suspicions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:31:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 01831814b6 docs(remediation): board — D-40 ruled BLOCKING, RM-61 rebuilding, TS1-TS12 pre-registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:25:54 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 86cd1a0f46 docs(remediation): D-40 RULED BLOCKING; pre-register type-strict ACs before the fix is pushed
Mos ruled BLOCKING on the exit_code type confusion. Both of us had leaned non-blocking on the
unreachability argument and neither shipped it. The two decisive grounds: the direction is
wrong-ACCEPT (false and 0.0 GRANT the exemption), which is this mission's disqualifying direction and
exactly why RR12 was tolerable; and "Woodpecker is Go with an int type" is structurally the same
incidental-correlate argument RM-61 itself forbade for the signature — you cannot certify the
discriminator against infra-shift and then defend a hole in it with an infra-stability assumption.

Generalised into an RM-02 standing clause, which is the real prize: discriminator and comparison
inputs must be TYPE-STRICT. A comparison that accepts a type it should not is a wrong-ACCEPT hole by
construction; `== 0` matching False and 0.0 is one instance of a class. D-40 is the instance, the
clause is the fix. It sits alongside the D-38 clause (does this gate bind its evidence to its subject).

D-39b banks the roles-swapped half: the author does not adjudicate its own PR's blocker status and
does not move the head to enforce it. Symmetric with D-39 — a seat with a stake in the answer does not
settle the question, and a conservative motive exempts neither direction.

ACs are registered NOW, before coder-mos1 pushes and before any reviewer reads a diff; at registration
the fix exists only as an unpushed local commit I have not read, so there is no diff to retrofit to.
They also state explicitly which cases are genuine RED-FIRST (false, 0.0 — currently wrongly exempting)
and which are only regression guards ("0", null — already blocking), because demanding an impossible
red for the latter two invites weakening something real to manufacture it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:23:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 249335e515 docs(remediation): bank D-39/D-40 — gate-ready reached, then withdrawn on a finding I disclosed
D-39: I contaminated an open independent review. RR12 was an open registered check and I sent rev-974
my CONCLUSION, not just my observation. rev-974 then downgraded an automated Codex review that had
flagged RR12 as a blocker, in line with my framing. The bias sat in my instrument, not the reviewer's
diligence — a subordinate is agreeable by construction, and the divergence instruction I attached
cannot undo having named the answer first. Mos adopted the rule fleet-wide: a dispatcher may relay
observations and reproductions into an open review, never its own verdict on an open check.
Re-adjudicated by a mechanically fresh seat with no access to my framing: NON-BLOCKING, independently,
on stronger evidence than either prior pass (accept-set matrix proving the accepted set is a strict
subset of a correct case-insensitive comparison's, so it cannot false-certify; exploit path hunted and
ruled out; all 0x110000 codepoints scanned for a fold that could smuggle non-hex onto a valid SHA).
So contamination did not change the answer, and the finding stands anyway — a correct answer reached
by a contaminated process still corrupts the process.

D-40: that same fresh seat looked outside its question and found a type confusion inside the exact
conjunction the exemption rests on. `step.get("exit_code") == 0` is True for JSON false, and
coder-mos1 added the float case. Verified by me on the real #2188 record: false and 0.0 both yield
exit 0 with exempted_steps 1 — the exemption GRANTED; "0" and null correctly block. Two of four
near-miss types satisfy a conjunction whose whole justification is that it is exactly scoped.

Consequence: I reported #1033 gate-ready at 033b2ffb (RR1-RR12 pass, review 69 APPROVED, CI #2193
success 9/9) and then had to hand Mos a finding that may disqualify what I had just certified. Better
that than defending the report. Disposition is Mos's; coder-mos1 escalated it to blocker unilaterally
and moved to push — held, because the author does not adjudicate their own PR and does not void a live
APPROVED review plus terminal-green CI by pushing. Head frozen, fix prepared and unpushed, ACKed.

Board doctrine now carries both rules: never relay a conclusion into an open review, and the author
never adjudicates their own blocker status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:20:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d9ab6026c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 tick — twelve checks pass, blocker moved to metadata, head never moved
rev-974 review 68 @ 033b2ffb: RR1-RR12 all PASS. RR7 is the strong one — all four binding predicates
proved RED against the old e7b29219 verifier, and the original attack under the old interface returned
exit 0 with exempted_steps=1, proving the PRIOR DEFECT rather than merely unsupported syntax.

The remaining blocker was metadata, not code: the live PR body still said "DO NOT MERGE" and "the
exemption will not be implemented", describing an earlier head. Verified independently — the controls
were injected in 3931b0e2/9455cd6a/25ac5971/ef9d23ab and the final delta does not touch
.woodpecker/ci.yml at all. The body was true when written and went stale as the branch evolved. That
is D-38 one layer out: the PR that binds evidence to its subject shipped a description that was not
bound to its subject, and D-36's staleness class on provider metadata rather than a repo file.

Fixed as metadata only. Head confirmed unmoved at 033b2ffb from both provider and git, body SHA-256
b0198d98 matched the author's reported digest byte-for-byte, both stale strings absent. Because the
commit never moved, the twelve results stand and no third review round is owed — only the discharge
of the finding by the reviewer who raised it.

Exact-head CI #2193: success, 9 children, 9/9 success including clone, read from -f json (D-33).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:10:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 50c0340add docs(remediation): bank D-37/D-38, pre-register RM-61 re-review, rebuild board for a cold read
D-38 — RM-61's terminal-green verifier certified the right RECORD for the wrong COMMIT. rev-974
mutated only #2188's commit field and the gate still exited 0. Confirmed by construction: at
e7b29219 the whole verifier had exactly one "commit" line (159), no expected-head parameter, no
comparison, no failure path. D-24 at the gate layer — a true answer to a different question.
The transferable half is the AC set, not the verifier: AC1-AC8 ALL PASSED and the PR was still
NO GO, because every registered check tested whether the signature discriminates and none tested
whether the evidence was bound to its subject (coverage-failure-mode-2, D-17 class). Mos ruled a
STANDING clause into RM-02 coverage: "does this gate bind its evidence to the subject under
review?" — every gate can fail this way and pass its own ACs.

D-37 — one shared .git/config silently re-identified EVERY worktree. extensions.worktreeConfig is
unset, so a worker's repo-local identity write rebinds all linked worktrees at once; the
orchestrator checkout and rev-974's review worktree both authored as coder-mos1. Distinct from
D-34, not an instance: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY was exported and correct and still resolved wrong.
Sharp edge is gate-16 defeated in the artifact — the reviewer would author its pre-registered ACs
as the author of the code under review. No contamination occurred. Containment (explicit -c, no
shared-config rewrites mid-flight) is the standing order; the real fix is authorised and owned by
Mos, sequenced at a quiet seam. #1024 is implicated: repo-local pinning is the colliding mechanism.

Also pre-registers the twelve RM-61 re-review checks at exact head 033b2ffb BEFORE the reviewer
reads the diff, and rebuilds the board for a cold read — RM-61 "building", "nothing implemented
yet", and DECISION-1/2/3 "must be ruled" were all stale, the D-36 class again at the same seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:59:40 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 345d152790 docs(remediation): RM-61 result — kill criterion NOT triggered, signature discriminates structurally
coder-mos1 ran two real ci-postgres failure controls; the orchestrator verified the JSON
records independently. #2189 (startup failure) exit 1 and #2191 (post-readiness crash,
log proves ready then postmaster killed) exit 137 both take the workflow and the test
step down — terminal red. #2188, the genuine artifact, carries exit_code 0 under a
SUCCESSFUL workflow.

So the discriminator is structural — a failed service step with exit 0 under a successful
workflow — not the message string and not an incidental correlate like node or timestamp,
which were explicitly forbidden because they pass today and mask a real failure the moment
infrastructure shifts.

Verifier: exit 0 with one named exemption on the artifact; exit 1 with exempted_steps 0 on
BOTH real controls. No fetch, trigger, retry or re-roll — the coin flip is removed, not
codified.

PR #1033 dispatched to rev-974 with eight acceptance checks pre-registered before the diff
was read; AC2 (both real failures must NOT be exempted) is the crux and a REJECT if it fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:44:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f11f257368 docs(remediation): bank D-36 — rotation-seam audit found three stale restatements on the board
Preparing the checkpoint for a cold read surfaced three stale sections, each a copy of
text owned elsewhere, each of which would have misled the incoming orchestrator: a
delivery-gate list still omitting the merge-gate step (D-26's own defect, still on the
board after MISSION.md was fixed); a capability rule superseded by D-13/D-15; and
DECISION-1 still marked CONTESTED hours after it was ruled.

None were wrong when written. All three drifted because they were copies — D-14 three
times in one artifact. The failure is not that someone forgot to update three lines; it
is that three lines existed to forget.

The rotation seam is what surfaced it. A familiar section is skimmed for the line you
came for; preparing state to be read cold by a stranger is a different act from
maintaining it, and catches a class ordinary use cannot.

RM-34: a handoff must VALIDATE the checkpoint, not merely write it. RM-02 registers the
general form with a must-fail on divergence. Interim: audit the board against its
sources at every rotation seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:14:04 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6c779595e1 docs(remediation): rotation checkpoint — board rebuilt for a cold read, three stale restatements removed
Orchestrator rotating at ~803k tokens (~4x threshold). A mission built on
rotation-not-compaction should not run its own coordinator past it.

Board rewritten as the rehydration artifact: in-flight state, a read-this-first block
for the incoming seat, and the live rulings it most needs. Under the 8KB cap.

AUDIT AT THE SEAM found THREE stale restatements on this board, each of which would have
misled the incoming orchestrator:
  1. the delivery-gate list still OMITTED the merge-gate verdict step (the D-26 defect
     itself, still sitting on the board after MISSION.md was corrected);
  2. capability described as 'token-file set = authoritative registry', superseded by
     D-13/D-15 (capability is per-path; assert permissions.push as that seat);
  3. Sequencing still said DECISION-1 was CONTESTED and 'do not treat it as settled'
     hours after it was RULED — an incoming seat would have re-litigated a closed decision.

All three were restatements of text owned elsewhere. Replaced with references, per the
mission's own render-not-restate principle: a second copy is a second thing to go stale,
and this board proved it three times in one night.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:13:12 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cc097f36c5 docs(remediation): re-run failed; RM-02 blocked on RM-61, declared bound honoured
Pipeline #2188 at the same head: ci-postgres the sole failure, everything else success
including gate-verify. f10-coder independently confirmed and applied the pre-registered
rule itself.

RM-02 blocked. No ad-hoc exemption, no third roll. Recorded why: two failures against one
earlier clean run makes 'best of five' feel reasonable, and the point of declaring the
bound in advance is that it binds when the result is inconvenient. A third roll would
have been indistinguishable from diligence, including to the person doing it.

Data for RM-61: the artifact hit twice consecutively at f9746b23 while #2184 was clean at
38f1b249, so it may cluster rather than be uniformly random — which makes a one-shot
re-roll close to worthless and strengthens the ruling that it must not become policy.

And the illustration: the anti-inert-gate registry is blocked by an artifact that makes
gate evidence unreliable. The thesis demonstrating itself on its own keystone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:34:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 56d8e8a3d5 docs(remediation): record the bounded re-trigger as a stopgap; mark the first end-to-end merge stack
The re-trigger guardrail, recorded so it cannot become practice: one bounded,
pre-declared attempt at the same head with the response to each outcome fixed before
triggering. Re-running until the desired answer appears is p-hacking the pipeline, and
silently nobody can tell it from diligence — including the person doing it. Per Mos: a
per-PR free re-roll would be D-21 normalisation wearing a new hat. RM-61 must make the
re-roll unnecessary, not codify it, and a clean re-run does not retire RM-61.

Milestone: RM-03/#1032 completed independent review -> CI terminal-green -> merge-gate GO
-> coordinator -> held for owner, the first time end-to-end. GO posted under the gate's
own minted identity by a seat that structurally cannot merge. Head verified unmoved after
the verdict, so the commit-bound GO stands.

The first delivery through the complete stack is also the last one gated by a check that
could not fail — RM-03 is that check's fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:22:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4589659bc1 docs(remediation): board — RM-03 GATE-READY, merge-gate assigned, held for Jason
First genuine gate-ready of the mission. Head triple equal at 78ec47cd, latest review
APPROVED at the current head, CI 9/9 by JSON scan with two-observer agreement.

Recorded the shape worth remembering: the queue guard is still inert for this merge
because RM-03 is the fix — the last merge to pass through the broken gate is the one
that fixes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:15:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 357a636a3a docs(remediation): promote redundant-observation to charter; bank D-35 (tool caught what attention could not)
Charter gains a fifth principle from D-33: two observers of the same evidence,
disagreeing, catch what neither catches alone — applied to evidence GATHERING, not just
judgement. A summary that resembles an enumeration is more dangerous than one that
obviously summarises; prefer the machine-readable record and state counts so divergence
is detectable.

D-35: while editing merge-gate.md to fix D-33, the coordinator recalled the mandate
string instead of reading it and the Edit tool's exact-match REJECTED it. Third instance
for that author, inside the turn fixing another instance of the same class — and the
only one that did not reach a document, because a mechanism caught it.

A rule that fails in its authors but is caught by a tool has told you where it belongs.
RM-02 should enforce verbatim citation by construction, as the Edit tool did by accident
of design.

Fix landed by annotating the source: merge-gate.md mandates 3 and 4 now require the
scan and count from the JSON record. The shared wrapper was deliberately NOT modified
mid-flight — three lanes are reading it; fix at a seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:53:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9e205e8201 docs(remediation): bank D-34 — a context reset silently strips a seat's credential identity
rev-974 finished its RM-02 review and could not post it: pr-review.sh failed with
'Gitea token not found'. Verified — with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY unset the token does not
resolve; with it set it resolves. The token file was correct throughout.

My own context reset wiped the seat's exported identity and my rehydration brief did not
re-establish it. git config mosaic.gitIdentity is persistent and per-worktree;
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is ephemeral and per-context. rev-974 works from ~/agent-work with no
git-config fallback, so it had no warning and the loss surfaced only when it next needed
a credential.

Intersection of two banked findings, created by acting on one: D-31 prescribes rotation,
D-11a requires identity coherence, and nothing said rotation is a credential-affecting
operation. The fix for one failure introduced another.

RM-34: rotation must re-establish AND verify seat identity before handing over work.
RM-50: prefer the durable binding (mosaic.gitIdentity in the seat's repo) so identity
survives a reset by construction. Interim: every rehydration brief re-exports identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:51:21 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 73a313301b docs(remediation): bank D-33 — the full-step-scan tool prunes a step in default output
coder-mos1 scanned pipeline #2186 with -f json and found 9/9 child steps; my scan of the
same pipeline in the wrapper's default text mode showed 8. Verified: text mode omits
clone (JSON shows the ci workflow entry, clone, and the 8 visible ones).

Every full step scan performed tonight enumerated 8 of 9 real child steps and reported
it as complete. clone succeeded throughout so no verdict changes — but the method was
incomplete and its user did not know.

The merge-gate mandate requires a FULL step scan and requires verdicts to enumerate the
step count. A verdict citing 8 where 9 exist is non-conforming evidence, and a gate using
this wrapper's default output would produce exactly that while believing it complied.

The shape is the session's thesis aimed at the detection tool: the doc says read the
artifact not the summary, and text mode IS a summary that looks like an artifact. Compare
D-24 — mergeable was a true answer to a different question; this is a true answer to a
smaller one.

Caught only because two observers' counts disagreed; neither alone would have found it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:49:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eddf718a5c docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 38f1b249 with a fully clean 9/9 scan
First run on this branch where ci-postgres passed, so no exemption question arises.
Recorded that the artifact's intermittency is evidence FOR RM-61's negative-control
requirement: intermittent means delivery is a coin flip until the signature is proven to
discriminate from a real database failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:35:51 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 c83a3cd3e2 docs(remediation): bank D-32 — the repaired gate shipped with a documented switch to skip it
rev-974 blocked RM-03: pr-merge.sh still ships --skip-queue-guard at five sites
including a worked example. It proved this rather than reading it — stubbed the guard to
exit 99, ran a real fixture merge with the flag, and observed the guard never called,
provider payload created, 'merged successfully', exit 0.

Disqualifying because RM-03 repairs a mandatory gate that has never been able to fail;
shipping that repair with a documented bypass means the gate merely requires one flag
instead of zero, and every merge-side CANNOT_ASSERT/HOLD semantic is skipped. L0 bars
equivalent skip switches, and the merge-gate role doc names this exact hazard about
force_merge — adjacent to the field you came to edit, at the moment you are most
motivated to reach for it.

Generalizable: repairing a gate is incomplete while any supported path skips it. The
failure changes from 'cannot block' to 'can be told not to' — the same outcome one
keystroke later. Removing the bypass is part of the repair.

Everything else passed independently, including the 160 KiB stdin transport where #1023
regressed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:33:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bf8c6f4a89 docs(remediation): bank D-31 — seat ran past 100% context with 28 uncommitted files
coder-mos1 hit 102.5%/372k on RM-03 with 28 modified files uncommitted and its branch
still at base — a full context window spent with nothing durable. Caught by polling seat
state, not by any system signal. Nothing warned anyone: no threshold alert, no
pre-compaction hook.

The founding failure mode of this mission — compaction destroying in-flight work —
nearly hit the mission's own delivery twice in one night. RM-01 survived because it had
committed work when checkpointed; this one had none. Commit-then-rotate works;
rotate-without-commit loses everything.

RM-34: a context threshold is not enough — rotation must force a durable checkpoint and
refuse to rotate a seat with uncommitted work. RM-50: seat context is observable state
and must be monitored; relying on an orchestrator to poll is instructions-not-enforcement
applied to lifecycle. Brief doctrine: commit early, commit WIP.

Adjacent: the diff spans 5 guides and 11 templates against a brief scoped to one script.
Queried, not assumed — but a 28-file diff from a one-script brief is a scope signal
regardless of the answer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:07:59 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bdf8932328 docs(remediation): RM-61 terminal-green exemption ruled B, with sequencing correction
Condition 1 tested: the signature is stable — pods "wp-svc-<ULID>-ci-postgres" not
found across all five observed failures, an orchestration-layer lookup miss structurally
unlike a service-level failure.

But discrimination is UNPROVEN: every observation co-occurs with a demonstrably working
database, and we have never seen a real ci-postgres failure on this provider. If
PostgreSQL crashes and the pod is GC'd, the status query may also return pod-not-found —
the exemption would over-match and mask a real failure.

So conditions 1 and 2 are not independent: 2 is the evidence for 1. Build the negative
control first, prove a real failure produces a different signature, then adopt the
exemption. Kill criterion stated in advance: if an injected real failure also yields
pod-not-found, B is unsafe and we do A.

Filed as RM-61, unassigned — no free write-capable seat; flagged rather than stacked
onto a busy lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:04:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 16d11cd6cd docs(remediation): bank D-29 (syntactic criterion binding) and D-30 (false comparator, mine)
D-29: rev-974 moved two criterion bindings to an unrelated case, reformatted the
manifest, and gate:verify still exited 0. The registry verifies a criterion HAS a
binding, not that the bound case can fail for that criterion's stated reason —
RM02-REQ-03 unsatisfied. The keystone reproduced the defect it exists to eliminate, in
its own coverage check. Caught only by mutating and re-running; inspection would have
passed it.

D-30: my review brief claimed the ci-postgres FAIL appeared on #2167 — it did not
(#2167 is OK). My own banked D-21 says so explicitly; I restated from memory instead of
reading my record. D-26 recurring, in a reviewer brief, hours after promoting
render-not-restate to the charter.

The harm is not the inaccuracy but that I supplied a reviewer with fabricated supporting
evidence for my own reading. It refuted me — query-for-refutation paying for itself in
the same document that introduced it.

Requirement: briefs cite evidence from the record with identifiers, never from recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:59:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8ce77fcb0d docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 9b4d4beb, CI green, review in flight
Head triple verified independently twice (orchestrator + f10-coder): local = origin =
PR #1030 = pipeline #2182. Full step scan rather than a tests-complete inference.
Queue guard not offered as evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:41:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cdd5568adb docs(remediation): promote query-for-refutation to charter doctrine
Per Mos. A subordinate asked to confirm a hypothesis will agree — the bias is induced by
the query, not by the answerer's diligence. 'The DB flaked, please confirm' and 'confirm
or refute, with the log line that proves it' are different instruments returning
different answers to the same question.

This matters most with agent subordinates, which are agreeable by construction, so the
discipline cannot rest on the answerer being rigorous — it must be built into how the
question is asked.

Origin: the orchestrator's ci-postgres hypothesis was refuted by the implementing seat
with log evidence and then settled by reproduction. Phrased for confirmation, it would
have returned agreement and D-21 would have been re-classified on a false premise,
silently corrupting a banked finding.

Operational form: state the hypothesis as yours, ask for evidence that kills it, say
what would change your mind, and reproduce when the answer is consequential. Added to
KICKSTART's standing invariants so it survives compaction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:21:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ff4b45b025 docs(remediation): RM-03 CANNOT_ASSERT semantics ruled (option B)
Resolves an ambiguity in the orchestrator's own brief, which required CANNOT_ASSERT to
neither silently pass nor permanently block without distinguishing push from merge.
coder-mos1 stopped and asked rather than inferring authorisation; Codex security
independently flagged CWE-693.

Ruled B: merge fails CLOSED (proceeding without exact-head CI evidence is D-23's
condition in a narrower costume), push degrades AUDITED (blocking during an outage
bricks delivery — the Pi-brick class we already banked). A temporary block pending
evidence is not a permanent block, and merge is separately gated by the merge-gate and
coordinator, so nothing is stranded.

Conditions: distinct exit code or the tri-state is destroyed; the audit record asserted
by a registered case, not assumed, or 'audited' is a claim dressed as a property;
retryable and self-clearing; cases observed RED first; no silent degraded merge path —
break-glass belongs to RM-05.

Option C rejected: it bricks push during an outage and defers the degraded path, which
in this codebase means a silent bypass appears under incident pressure. Three are
already on the books.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:17:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f47cf45b0c docs(remediation): bank D-28 — a swallowed diagnostic destroyed a fail-closed check's evidence
RM-02 CI failed on four sandbox tests. Bubblewrap is installed by the gate step but not
the test step, so spawnSync returned ENOENT; replayCommit replaced the spawn diagnostic
with an empty string, so the classifier could not prove Bubblewrap provenance and
correctly refused to treat it as expected sandbox unavailability.

The refusal was right; the information loss was the bug. For a classifier, error text is
not decoration — it is the input. Widening acceptance to make the test pass would be a
finding, not a fix.

Linkages: D-16 again (local has bwrap, CI does not — local and CI disagree a third
time), and diagnostic-preservation registered as an RM-02 gate requirement with a
must-fail control proving a swallowed message is detected.

Process note: the orchestrator's hypothesis that the coincident ci-postgres FAIL caused
this was WRONG and was refuted with log evidence. D-21 stands unchanged as a teardown
artifact and is NOT upgraded — it was about to be re-classified on a false premise.
Asking the seat to confirm or refute rather than accept is what prevented that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:10:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e7c9160c7b docs(remediation): board — delivery-gate doctrine change recorded with render-vs-restate root cause
Per Mos's item 4. The gate definition was incomplete from setup because the gates were
restated from memory rather than referenced, and the omission propagated into every
worker brief since — then recurred inside the correction itself (D-26).

Board now carries the referenced sources, the gate order, freeze-after-GO, the
coordinator/orchestrator split, and the queue-guard zero-information field form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:01:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2d58779675 docs(remediation): bank D-27 — role file certifies the inert queue guard as enforced
rev-974 found this while loading the canonical gate sources, i.e. because we switched
from restating to reading. Verified in roles.local/merge-gate.md: mandate 3 requires
verifying 'CI queue guard clear', mandate 4 requires enumerating 'the queue-guard
outcome' in every durable verdict, the merge path annotates it 'real', and the control
table at :290 certifies it ' enforced … genuinely aborts'.

The document is correct about the WIRING and wrong about the CONTROL: set -euo pipefail
with an unguarded exit does abort, but the guard cannot produce a non-zero exit for any
input (D-23). A mechanism correctly wired to a sensor that never fires, certified as
enforced.

Compounding: the verdict format REQUIRES the queue-guard outcome as evidence, so a
conforming verdict must include a meaningless field — the role file instructs the gate
to manufacture evidence, in the mandate that exists to stop bare conclusions.

Interim: record the field labelled ZERO-INFORMATION (inert, owner RM-03) rather than
omitting it — omission makes the verdict non-conforming; silent citation is worse.

Escalated: operator-owned file, coordinator's to fix. Recommend annotation not deletion
— the requirement is correct once RM-03 lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:55:28 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cbbe3e1ce2 docs(remediation): gate definition now REFERENCES canonical roles; bank D-26
The delivery-gate definition was incomplete from setup — the merge-gate verdict step
was missing because the gates were restated from memory rather than referenced, and the
omission propagated into every worker brief since.

Then it recurred inside the correction: the correcting message was itself a restatement
and dropped five things, including a security precondition (an unminted gate seat fails
open to the owner's admin account — the #3084 breach mechanism) and a citation to a file
that does not exist.

D-26 is the definitive case because every condition favoured success: attention maximal,
actor knew the rule best, subject was the rule itself. A rule its own enforcer cannot
follow while enforcing it is not a discipline — it is a requirement for a mechanism.

MISSION.md and KICKSTART.md now reference fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md and
fleet/roles/validator.md and state only the gate ORDER. Every reference resolves; a
dangling pointer is worse than a restatement.

Precondition independently verified: merge-gate token is least-privilege,
pull=True push=False admin=False — structurally cannot merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:53:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9a7ab73952 docs(remediation): charter — Builds 1-2 justified by two independent impossibility proofs; RM-60 option analysis
Per Mos. The choke-point executor and PG spine are not a design preference — they are
forced. Twice during the mission's own first deliveries, work stopped against a security
property that cannot exist at the layer needing it: D-19 (audited party controls the
manifest certifying it — artifact integrity) and D-25 (audited party controls the code
entering the sandbox — execution integrity). Both reduce to self-verification by the
audited party is not verification, and both resolve only via an authority outside its
control.

Neither proof was sought; both arrived while shipping something else, from different
directions, at different layers. An architecture forced by two independent impossibility
proofs is stronger evidence than one argued for.

RM-60 records Mos's sharper option analysis: A (unprivileged userns) does NOT fix the
vulnerability — it grants a capability and leaves the ORDERING defect untouched, so B is
required regardless; A without B is kernel exposure bought for nothing. B is the correct
primitive, generalises to RM-59 and the choke-point executor, and may not need A at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:09:38 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2b85afe4ea docs(remediation): bank D-25, accept RM02-REQ-10 revision, open RM-60
RM-02's per-commit replay needs isolation; the privileged CI step was correctly refused
because PR-controlled code executes before Bubblewrap establishes any boundary — the
untrusted party would obtain the capability meant to contain it. Ordering defect, not a
hardening problem.

D-25 is D-19 one layer down: audited party controls the manifest (artifact integrity)
became audited party controls the code entering the sandbox (execution integrity). Both
reduce to self-verification by the audited party is not verification, and both resolve
via an authority outside its control — twice now this mission has derived Builds 1-2
from a security impossibility rather than design preference.

Option C ruled independently by the orchestrator and rev-974 before either saw the
other. rev-974 added the condition I missed and it matters most: post-merge replay is
DETECTION, not PREVENTION, with a defined quarantine/revert response, and must never be
presented as equivalent to a pre-merge gate.

RM02-REQ-10 revision formally recorded and accepted under RM-02's own clause 4 —
original text, restatement, reason — discharging rev-974's review-readiness condition.
RM-60 opened for the external pre-execution trust boundary, cross-referenced with RM-59.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:05:50 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eabe04bc5e docs(remediation): bank D-24 — mergeable:true cited as merge-readiness; D-23 corrected backward
Mos verified #1023 before relaying and corrected my framing. Verified independently:
review id-58 REQUEST_CHANGES at f6334080, the current head — the block is live, and its
findings are that #1023's own fix is defective (unknown still exits 0, payload-as-argv
hits ARG_MAX, tests do not assert exits).

mergeable:true is git-mergeability, not readiness. The charter's first principle
committed by the orchestrator inside an escalation about proxies. Fifth instance of mine.

The mechanism, named because it will recur: mergeable is not a lie, it is a true answer
to a different question. A false field would have been caught; a true-but-adjacent field
passes every sniff test — which is why the discipline must be mechanical, not attentive.

D-23 corrected backward per D-14-as-amended, original framing quoted.

RM-02: readiness cases must assert the decision-relevant property — latest review state,
CI terminal status on the exact head, required approvals — never a structural proxy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:50:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 36018be8d1 docs(remediation): bank D-23 — the mandatory queue guard has never worked, for any input
RM-02's registered fixtures found this before the registry was built. Worse than the
banked unknown=>exit 0: ci-queue-wait.sh:266 pipes the payload into a classifier
starting 'python3 - <<PY', so python reads its PROGRAM from stdin and json.load never
sees the JSON. Proven empirically — success, failure, pending and malformed all
classify as unknown, and unknown exits 0.

The mandatory pre-push/pre-merge guard therefore returns PASS for every possible input,
including a genuinely failing CI. The six observed meaningless greens were not an edge
case; they are the only output it can produce.

PR #1023 is exactly this fix, open and parked, and its body diagnoses it precisely.
Two aggravating details from that body: pr-ci-wait.sh:38 documented the bug and remedy
and it was never backported to the mandatory sibling (D-14 propagation with a
security-adjacent blast radius); and the fix was opened without re-verification.

Escalated for Jason's #1023 disposition. RM-02 records required-vs-actual with
DEFECT (owner: RM-03); no RM-03 lane opened, guard not edited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:44:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8c496993e4 docs(remediation): bank D-22 — the registry would have verified the wrong artifact
The gate that actually runs is the installed copy at ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/;
a repo-scoped registry would test packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/. Byte-identical
today (sha256 19cda2f7009c536e both) but nothing asserts it.

A registry that verifies the wrong artifact is worse than none — it manufactures
confidence, and the divergence would be invisible from every signal we have: registry
green, CI green, deployed gate arbitrarily different.

D-1/P-ACTIVATION applied to the enforcement mechanism itself rather than to config.

RM-02 gains: for every registered gate with a deployed counterpart, assert
repo-source == deployed-copy with a must-fail control; where none exists, record that
explicitly.

Found by design review before implementation — the only finding tonight not found by
execution, which is the design-first gate on keystone tasks paying for itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:14:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e85a088f85 docs(remediation): bank D-21 — a FAIL that means nothing is a green that means nothing, sign-flipped
ci-postgres reports FAIL under an overall-success pipeline on #2170 and #2175 while all
eight functional steps pass. Most likely a service-pod teardown artifact; the test
step's pg_isready fail-fast guard passed, so the database was available during the run.

Low severity, but the pattern matters: a red that is routinely present and routinely
correct to ignore trains operators and agents to discount reds, and the discounting
generalises. Six instances of a meaningless green are already banked; a meaningless
FAIL is the same erosion with the sign flipped.

Recorded rather than normalised — the first time it is waved through without a note is
when it becomes background noise.

RM-55: treat a non-terminal-success sub-step under an overall-success pipeline as a
reportable anomaly, and make the CI contract state which steps may fail without failing
the pipeline. An implicit allowance is indistinguishable from a bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:08:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8a795df0ce docs(remediation): D-14 amended by D-20 — propagation is bidirectional
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Both the orchestrator and the coordinator read D-14 as forward propagation only: a
ruling reaches the documents stating the new rule. D-20 proved that insufficient —
when D-19 superseded part of D-18, the consequence went forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never backward into D-18, which kept asserting a withdrawn
claim until a reviewer disproved it by experiment.

A supersession must update BOTH the documents rendering the new rule AND the finding it
retires, with the retired wording quoted rather than deleted. Interim rule updated
accordingly.

Applying D-14's own rule to D-14, in the same commit that records the amendment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:53:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f5a0566198 docs(remediation): board — RM-01 MERGED (f58b3699); RM-02 keystone is next
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:50:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 1e7a0701fd docs(remediation): fix D-18 overclaim (D-20) — reviewer empirically disproved my own documentation
rev-974 blocked #1027 a second time, and the defect was in this file, not the code.

D-18's AC2 restatement omitted the accidental/independent scope D-19 made mandatory,
and D-18 asserted the tampered-manifest control turns integrity 'from a claim into a
property'. It does not and cannot — that sentence predated D-19 and was never revised
when D-19 landed. rev-974 disproved it by experiment: a same-UID consistent
manifest+marker rewrite passed preflight.

Two banked findings firing on the orchestrator at once: the integrity-claim corollary
(I wrote a claim in the voice of a property, in the document defining the rule against
it), and D-14 propagation — I carried D-19's consequence forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never back into the finding it superseded. Backwards
propagation is the same defect as forwards and I did not audit for it.

Corrected in place with the original wording quoted and the disproof recorded, not
silently rewritten.

RM-02 fifth clause: documentation asserting a security or integrity property is itself
a claim requiring a negative control observed red. Prose is not exempt from the
mission's evidentiary standard, and governing prose least of all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:48:00 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 43f69bf167 docs(remediation): promote D-19 to charter; bind residual risk to RM-59 as a tracked edge
Per Mos, with his two additions.

Charter gains a fourth first-class principle: when a property cannot exist at the layer
that specified it, three honest moves are mandatory — implement what the layer can
guarantee; state the boundary in BOTH directions (what it does not defend AND what it
does, since either alone misleads); and record the real guarantee as a TRACKED
DEPENDENCY, not prose. A written-down gap is acceptable engineering; an implied-fixed
gap is the mission's core failure in a new costume.

The residual risk is now RM-59 (depends_on RM-12, RM-21, RM-25) — a real backlog task
owned by the choke-point executor and spine, which verify from outside the worktree's
authority. Mos's point: 'record where the guarantee comes from' only holds if the record
is a live dependency someone must close; a documented gap with no owner becomes a
permanent gap that reads as intentional.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:23:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f9435c2a03 docs(remediation): bank D-19 — an integrity property that cannot exist at its specified layer
Implementing the D-18 manifest hit CWE-345: manifest and marker share one same-UID
writable tree, so that actor can regenerate both and pass. No local construction fixes
self-authentication without a key outside its authority. The seat escalated rather than
calling it tamper-resistant — the charter corollary working on its first real test.

Ruling: Option A, scope AC2 to accidental/independent/stale mutation, retain the design.
The undefendable boundary is not the weak link (same-UID write already owns the source,
the tests, preflight.mjs and .husky); AC2 exists for the D-5 staleness class, against
which the design works; and a real anchor arrives with the choke-point executor and PG
spine, which verify outside the worktree's authority.

Acceptable only with honest labelling: threat model verbatim in code and PR, the words
tamper-proof/tamper-evident/secure barred there, scope carried in AC2's restatement,
residual risk named as backlog, all controls kept RED-first.

Generalizable: when a property cannot exist at the layer it was specified, implement
what the layer can guarantee, state the boundary precisely, and record where the real
guarantee comes from. A known gap written down is acceptable; a gap implied fixed is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:20:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3b191b6b34 docs(remediation): promote the three-mode taxonomy and the integrity-claim corollary to the charter
Per Mos. Two first-class principles alongside observe-the-property:

1. Pre-registration prevents RETROFITTING and nothing else. A pre-registered check set
   can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17), or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18). It confers
   neither correctness nor coverage nor consistency. All three modes were found on this
   mission's own first delivery, by the machinery applied to its own work. RM-02's four
   clauses are the enforceable form.

2. Never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property. A verification artifact
   writable by the actor whose behaviour it certifies certifies the attack. It must sit
   inside its integrity envelope, publish atomically, and carry a tamper negative
   control observed red. If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider —
   an honest 'this cannot be verified' is always available and always preferable to
   laundering foreign content as certified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:14:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 85bdbe3383 docs(remediation): bank D-18 — pre-registered criteria AC2 and AC4 were mutually unsatisfiable
Implementing D-17's fix surfaced a conflict between criteria, not within one. AC2
(reject symlinked generated state) cannot hold alongside AC4 (canonical build
succeeds): verified independently that apps/web sets output:'standalone' and the built
tree carries 42 legitimate pnpm symlinks under .next/standalone. Only building the
tree reveals it.

Completes the chain: a pre-registered check set can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17),
or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18).

Ruling: build-certified symlink manifest — .next itself still rejected; descendants
rejected unless exactly certified. Stronger than blanket rejection because it catches
retargeting. AC2 restated and RECORDED with provenance rather than absorbed, since
silently resolving a conflict between pre-registered criteria destroys the point of
registering them.

Hardening: the manifest is generated state, so a manifest writable by whoever plants a
rogue symlink certifies the attack. Must be inside the integrity envelope, published
atomically, with negative controls observed red first including manifest-tampered.

RM-02 fourth clause: the registry must detect conflicts between criteria, and retain
original text plus restatement plus reason when a criterion changes meaning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:11:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ae4baf145d docs(remediation): bank D-17 — pre-registration confers neither correctness nor coverage
rev-974 blocked PR #1027: AC2 was pre-registered and explicitly required rejecting
symlinked generated state; the implementation accepts it (ln -s into .next, preflight
exits 0 instead of 43) while the acceptance suite ran 21/21 green throughout.

Confirmed independently: preflight.mjs:82-92 rejects symlinks on the SOURCE path,
:28 merely skips symlinked dirs, and the generated-state path :141-163 checks uid but
never isSymbolicLink(). The suite's only symlink cases cover the turbo binary and a
source file.

Sharpens D-8 rather than repeating it. D-8: pre-registration does not confer
CORRECTNESS. D-17: it does not confer COVERAGE — a suite can be green with every
criterion appearing satisfied while a criterion's actual requirement is untested.

RM-02 third clause: the registry must bind each criterion to the specific case that
exercises it and prove that case red before trusting its green. Mutation testing
pointed at the criterion-to-case mapping, not just the gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:07:58 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4512312b9f docs(remediation): D-16 ownership — #1024 is Jason-pending; CI is the authoritative gate for #1027
Propagating Mos's ruling in the same commit that records it, per D-14's interim rule.

The hermeticity fix IS PR #1024, which sits in Jason's parked delivery stack, so its
disposition is his — marked SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON alongside #1023. D-16 strengthens
urgency without transferring ownership; we do not open a third lane on a parked PR.

Class sharpened: a pre-push gate an operator cannot run locally is a gate only CI
enforces, so pointing .husky/pre-push at it misrepresents where the gate lives.
Non-hermetic gates make every green host-dependent.

#1027 proceeds on CI-green; the local exit-97 is a host-specific guard abort and is
not a merge consideration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:43:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e233f196b5 docs(remediation): bank D-16 — local and CI test gates disagree by environment
Ran down Mos's flag. Both hypotheses were wrong: CI runs exactly 'pnpm test' (same
command, path IS exercised) and is green, while this host exits 97 on an
environment-dependent BASH_LINENO guard (#973) that aborts on bash 5.2.15 and not in
CI's container. PR #1027 touches zero files under packages/mosaic, so the guard is
genuinely pre-existing — f10-coder's report was accurate in every particular, and main
is equally affected here.

Not 'merges step around a red' but something worse in one respect: the local gate and
the CI gate disagree about what passing means. No agent on this host can get a green
pnpm test on any branch. A gate only CI can run cannot be a pre-push gate.

Second defect found while establishing this: in the main checkout the same package
fails differently (exit 1) because a test scans the working tree and picks up
apps/coordinator/venv third-party site-packages. A test whose verdict depends on
untracked files is not hermetic — same contamination source that broke format:check,
one foreign tree breaking two independent gates.

Coordinate with #1007/#1024 rather than opening a third lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:40:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3477e933df docs(remediation): bank D-15 — token scope is not repository permission
f10-coder holds gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder.token with write:repository scope and was
verified at mint by 'repo access returns 200'. It cannot push: collaborator lookup
404s and its own token reports push:false, pull:true.

Capability has three independent layers — token file (raw-API auth), tea login (tea
path), repository permission (actual write authority) — and satisfying two proves
nothing about the third. Scope bounds what a token may ATTEMPT; repository permission
decides what the user may DO.

The charter principle failing on the check meant to confirm capability: a 200 on a
READ was accepted as evidence of WRITE. written-unverified treated as verified, by
both provisioner and orchestrator, one layer above D-12.

RM-50's pre-dispatch check must assert effective permission for the intended operation
(permissions.push == true as that seat), not token existence or a read returning 200.
A capability check that cannot fail on a seat lacking write permission is itself an
inert gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:32:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0ad6e942b docs(remediation): propagate DECISION-2 to charter — second un-propagated ruling, found by applying D-14
Applied D-14's own interim rule immediately instead of waiting to be bitten again, and
it caught a second instance within minutes: MISSION.md's standing directives still
stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of Mos's binding qualification that the
spine must not be a single-point hard-stop (degraded mode + rollback artifact
required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability
posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected, with the superseded 'no DB means the
fleet stops' recommendation nowhere contradicted.

Two un-propagated rulings out of two that touched charter text. Without a mechanism,
propagation failure is the default outcome, not an oversight — which is the argument
for D-14 being a requirement rather than a discipline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:12:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 7f686aaf6d docs(remediation): bank D-14 decision-propagation requirement; record D-13 reconciliation
D-14: DECISION-1 was ruled and applied to TASKS.md while MISSION.md — the charter a
cold-starting seat reads first — kept the superseded wire-in target for hours, flagged
CONTESTED on the board but never corrected in the source of truth. A resuming seat
would have read the rejected target as authoritative. Caught by hand during an
unrelated edit; nothing would have caught it otherwise.

P-MISSION-001 turned on ourselves: a decision that lives in a ruling and a board note
but not in the authoritative record has been AGREED, not MADE. Requirement: rulings
must propagate mechanically — decisions as records, documents rendering rather than
restating, and a must-fail check where duplication is unavoidable. Interim rule until
the DB cutover: the same commit that records a ruling updates every document stating it.

D-13 updated with Mos's reconciliation: 5 of 6 mosaicstack-provisioned seats have no
tea login — systemic, not a one-off. Supersedes D-11(b): the token-file set is
necessary but NOT sufficient; capability is per-path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:11:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f13222b76b docs(remediation): charter reflects DECISION-1 corrected wire-in target and current status
The charter's build-1 cell still named mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task after
DECISION-1 ruled against it. Leaving the charter contradicting the ruled decision would
mislead any future reader who starts there — corrected in place with the rationale and
provenance, rather than only in TASKS.md.

Also: status PLANNING -> EXECUTING; scout TODO discharged (file is in-tree) with a note
that its findings stand but its recommended wire-in point is superseded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:07:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d1e7ba19ca docs(remediation): promote observe-the-property principle to charter; bank D-13 dual credential registries
Charter gains a first-class principle per Mos: no write is done until the requested
PROPERTY is observed; a success exit code is not evidence. Success output is designed
to be believed — that is why the inert-gate class exists and why the P-WRAPPER
tri-state is not optional. Recorded with its provenance: the orchestrator committed
this exact error (D-12), and three of the session's twelve instances were its own.

D-13: diagnosing D-12 found two parallel credential registries that can disagree.
gitea-mosaicstack-mos-dt-0.token EXISTS, but tea has no mosaicstack login for that
identity — so raw-API paths work while tea-dependent wrapper paths silently degrade.
tea is not stale; the login does not exist. Capability declared authoritative by the
token-file set does not govern the tea path.

RM-04 must reconcile the registries (or assert agreement at startup, with a must-fail
control). RM-50's pre-dispatch check must verify capability for the path actually used.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:06:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0ffdcf14bd docs(remediation): bank D-12 — pr-create silently dropped --draft; I trusted exit 0 over observed state
PR #1027 was created with -d because it carries partial unproven work. tea auth was
stale, the wrapper fell back to the raw API which cannot set draft, warned on stderr,
and exited 0. The PR sat open and mergeable for ~25 minutes, protected only by the
word DRAFT in its title and body. I had reported it to the coordinator as a draft.

Three failures: a fallback silently degrading a SAFETY flag (nuisance for --labels,
dangerous for --draft); a correct warning nobody consumed; and my own failure to
verify the flag took effect — I checked the PR existed, not that it had the property
I required. That is written-unverified treated as verified, by me, on exactly the
class of tool this mission exists to distrust.

Fixed via the WIP: title prefix; draft:True verified after.

RM-02 gains a must-fail control: a wrapper that cannot honour a safety-relevant
argument must exit non-zero. RM-24 gains this as its canonical tri-state example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:03:29 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 be10bdc828 docs(remediation): board tick — 2 PRs merged, RM-01 on rotated seat, dispatch doctrine
Board now carries the pre-dispatch capability check (token-file existence), the
token/authorship coherence rule, and the accreted worker-brief doctrine, so a
compacted or fresh seat inherits them mechanically rather than by recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:01:55 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2201c30284 docs(remediation): correct D-11(a) mechanism — token identity and commit authorship are separate
Per Mos. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY resolves the TOKEN; commit author comes from git config
user.name/user.email, a separate setting that fell back to the generic value. The
export could never have fixed authorship — my worker brief instructed only the export,
so the seat did what it was told and the commits were still mis-attributed. The error
was in the brief before it was in the finding.

Requirement is COHERENCE: token and authorship must agree; either half alone is drift.
Belongs in seat setup, verified by an exit-asserting test that commits and asserts the
author — not in prose a seat can follow correctly and still end up wrong.

Capability check mechanized: capability IS token-file existence. Before dispatching
seat X to provider Y, test gitea-<Y>-<X>.token exists. The token-file set is the
authoritative capability registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:59:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 75dfe2fa75 docs(remediation): bank D-11 — identity drift + seat capability opacity at dispatch
RM-01's seat was briefed to export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY; its commits are authored as
the generic mosaic-coder fallback, so git history cannot say which seat did the work.
P-WRAPPER-001 reproduced on our own delivery.

Separately, nothing at dispatch time revealed the seat lacked a credential for the
target provider — discovered only when it failed mid-task after ~$9 and 69% context.
get_gitea_token behaved correctly by refusing to borrow another slot's token; the
dispatch-time information simply did not exist.

RM-50 gains per-seat capability declaration + pre-dispatch check; RM-04 gains
identity-binding verified by an exit-asserting test rather than assumed from an
export in a brief.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:56:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 409bf23e6a docs(remediation): bank D-10 — the queue guard's failure modes are inverted
Same required gate, both directions wrong: fails OPEN on state=unknown (5 meaningless
greens this session, wrong branch too), and fails CLOSED on credential resolution,
hard-blocking a worker's completed work. The identical command succeeded from that
worker's own worktree in another shell, so the checkout was fine.

A gate that waves through unchecked work and blocks ready work has its failure modes
backwards. Availability failures must degrade to a loud, audited CANNOT_ASSERT;
correctness failures must block. Also the Pi-brick shape: a gate whose unavailability
prevents recovery from it.

RM-03 extended to a third requirement: distinguish CANNOT_ASSERT from
ASSERTED_NOT_READY, both registered with must-fail controls, neither exiting 0 silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:52:42 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 31c3191305 docs(remediation): rolling-branch resume pointer + D-9 interim comms rule
KICKSTART resume now points at origin/remediation/state for the live board, per Mos's
cadence ruling: every tick is pushed to the rolling branch immediately (durable
per-tick, no per-tick main PR); main carries periodic snapshots only. Reading the
board from main would silently yield a stale tick, so the step warns explicitly.

D-9 hardened: comms/v1 must use file/stdin transport, never argv interpolation.
Standing interim rule until then — agent-send -f for any body with special
characters, never -m. Mandatory in every worker brief alongside the D-8 clause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:50:26 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6a067174ed docs(remediation): bank D-9 — comms path shell-interprets message bodies
agent-send.sh -m with backticks executes them as command substitution: the recipient
got a mangled body plus a shell error, and the send still reported success. Same class
as the known pr-create.sh backtick bug — two tools in the comms path treating a
message body as shell input.

The failure mode is the mission's own pattern: silent corruption with a success
receipt.

Requirement on RM-40/RM-42: comms/v1 must carry payloads verbatim with no shell
interpretation at any hop, with a byte-identical round-trip test (backticks, command
substitution, quotes, newlines) registered under RM-02 including a must-fail control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:48:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andMos 01e966f36d docs(remediation): mission charter + reconciled execution backlog (#1026)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:47:03 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 524146055d fix(hygiene): .prettierignore must exclude Python build/test artifacts (#1025)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:24:49 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 06e0d40352 feat(quality): CI test-membership guard — enumeration can no longer silently under-run the disk (#1017) (#1018)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 14:08:41 +00:00
Mos 166ee8c90f fix(wake): close fd 9 in the detector's sleep child so a dead detector's lock dies with it (#993)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-07-31 13:48:33 +00:00
22 changed files with 4779 additions and 149 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
**/node_modules
**/drizzle
**/.next
# Python build/test artifacts — same category as node_modules/dist/.next above.
# Prettier must never scan generated trees; without these a local venv poisons
# `pnpm format:check` with thousands of third-party files.
**/venv
**/__pycache__
**/.mypy_cache
**/.pytest_cache
**/htmlcov
.claude/
docs/tess/TASKS.md
docs/scratchpads/
+5
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@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ steps:
# (Constitution + dispatcher + each RUNTIME.md slice). See DESIGN §7 / R9.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh
# Test-membership guard (#1017): also first link of test:framework-shell.
# Invoked from BOTH surfaces it audits (F2, PR #1018) — the guard is link
# [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
# with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
+71
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# RM-02 / PR #1030 — PRE-REGISTERED ACCEPTANCE CHECKS (post-rebase, keystone)
**Subject head (exact):** `83d2ecb2243f1b0987ef2bc14de47f444285a684`
**Rebased onto:** `main` @ `f4fd5967fc5d4cbc72d680b199d88224aa855131` (post-RM-61)
**Registered by:** `mos-remediation` **BEFORE the reviewer read the diff.** **Reviewer:** `rev-974`
(author ≠ reviewer; branch commits are `f10-coder`'s and `coder-mos1`'s).
**Prior reviews 63 / 65 are SUPERSEDED; this head carries NO live review of any kind.**
RM-02 is the **keystone**: it is the anti-inert-gate registry every downstream gate is measured against.
A defect that survives here propagates into every gate this mission ships.
## ★ CRUX — the one non-mechanical change, made by the author, that turned a red green
The rebase was clean. One further commit was **not** purely mechanical and the author disclosed it
unprompted (`83d2ecb2` — advance registry activation seam):
gates/gates.manifest.json
- "activationCommit": "f65e9ea656ec466e12640bf6ab5d46fe07ff160c"
+ "activationCommit": "f4fd5967fc5d4cbc72d680b199d88224aa855131"
Stated rationale: after the rebase, `pnpm gate:verify` correctly failed because the newly-merged
pre-registry RM-61 commit was treated as _prospective_ and required a manifest that could not exist.
`activationCommit` sets the lower bound of `activationCommit..HEAD` — **the set of commits required to
carry own-tree registry provenance** (`gate-history.mjs:314``listProspectiveCommits`). Advancing it
**shrinks that set**.
**Determine, do not assume — and I have deliberately formed and stated no verdict (D-39):**
| id | check |
| ------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **A1** | **Is the advance JUSTIFIED?** Can a pre-registry commit on `main` (e.g. `f4fd5967`) satisfy the provenance requirement at all, or is requiring it impossible-by-construction? If impossible, is advancing the seam the _correct_ remedy, or does a correct remedy exist that does not move an author-controlled field? |
| **A2** | **Is the advance MINIMAL?** Was it advanced exactly to the new parent baseline, or beyond it? Does any commit that _should_ remain covered fall outside the new range? |
| **A3** | **Are all 7 branch commits still PROSPECTIVE under the new seam?** Enumerate them and show each is still required to carry provenance. The author claims "own-tree provenance over every registry-era branch commit" — verify the claim, do not accept it. |
| **A4** | ★★ **IS THE SEAM ITSELF CONSTRAINED?** The only validation found is `merge-base --is-ancestor activationCommit head` (`gate-history.mjs:288`). **A commit is its own ancestor.** Determine what `activationCommit = HEAD` does: is the prospective range empty, does the per-commit loop iterate zero times, and does the history check therefore PASS VACUOUSLY? If so, the anti-inert-gate registry contains an author-settable field that can inert its own history check. **Run it. Report the observed exit and whether any failure is raised.** |
| **A5** | **If A4 shows vacuity is reachable, is there a registered MUST-FAIL negative control for it?** RM-02's own founding rule is that a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence. Does the registry hold a case that goes RED when the seam is over-advanced? If not, that is a hole in the registry's coverage of itself. |
| **A6** | **Self-verification shape (charter / D-19 / D-39b):** the field was advanced by the change's own author to make the author's gate pass. Independent of whether the value is correct, determine whether the _mechanism_ permits an audited party to relax its own audit, and whether that needs a constraint, an owner, or an escalation. |
## Registry substance — the clauses this PR must now carry
| id | check |
| ------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **B1** | **D-38 clause present and enforced:** the registry asks of every gate _"does this gate BIND its evidence to the subject under review?"_ Ruled in-scope for THIS PR by Mos. Verify it exists as a checked clause, not prose. |
| **B2** | **D-40 clause present and enforced:** _"discriminator and comparison inputs must be TYPE-STRICT."_ Also ruled in-scope for THIS PR. `== 0` matching `False`/`0.0` is the banked instance; the clause is the general form. |
| **B3** | **D-42's clause is CORRECTLY ABSENT** — provider-side negative control tracks separately (Mos: landing it now would give the registry a clause with nothing to satisfy it, going red on its own clause). Confirm its absence is deliberate and recorded, not forgotten. |
| **B4** | **The four founding clauses still hold** (`MISSION.md`): every check proven **right** (red for its own stated reason), the set **covers**, no two criteria **conflict**, and criterion evolution **retains original text + restatement + reason**. |
| **B5** | **Nothing was weakened, skipped, or deleted by the rebase.** Diff `f9746b23``83d2ecb2` and confirm no registered case, test, or assertion was removed or relaxed to make the rebase land. |
| **B6** | **`coverageBoundary.excluded[]` is honest in BOTH directions** (charter principle 4): what it does NOT cover is stated beside what it DOES, and the gap is tracked (`trackedBy: RM-54`) rather than implied-fixed. |
| **B7** | **The RM-02 execution boundary** (`gate-history.mjs`, DOES / DOES NOT, owner RM-60, xref RM-59) states its limits in both directions and names a tracked owner — not a documented gap with no owner. |
## Head + CI (re-run these; do not carry them forward from the author's report)
| id | check |
| ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **C1** | Head `83d2ecb2…` on **both** git and provider; `Closes #1029` present in the body (delivery-issue rule, D-38c). |
| **C2** | Exact-head CI terminal-green by **full `-f json` scan**, counts stated **including `clone`**. Note the count changed 9 → **10** (this PR adds `gate-verify`) — confirm the new step is real, not a miscount. |
| **C3** | **Machine-check it, do not assert it:** `verify-terminal-green.py --expect-commit 83d2ecb2243f1b0987ef2bc14de47f444285a684`. Report exit, `exempted_steps`, `commit == expected_commit`. |
| **C4** | `exempted_steps=0` is expected here — `ci-postgres` succeeded, so the #1000 exemption was **not needed**. Confirm the exemption is present-but-unused rather than silently inapplicable. |
## Reviewer instruction
Verdict bound to `83d2ecb2243f1b0987ef2bc14de47f444285a684`, evidence enumerated per check, posted
durably under your own identity. If a check is unrunnable, **say so** — never substitute a variant that
passes. Scan CI from `-f json`, never default text (D-33); state your counts.
**A4 is the check I most want an answer to and the one I have least confidence about.** Attack outside
this set as well: every blocker found on this mission so far came from mutating something nobody had
registered a check for.
**No one dispatching this review may state a conclusion on an open check (D-39).** Observations may be
relayed to you; verdicts may not. The ruling is yours.
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# RM-61 / PR #1033 — PRE-REGISTERED RE-REVIEW ACCEPTANCE CHECKS
**Subject head (exact):** `033b2ffb46674b2c0bcc5197273c109b461f62d9`
**Supersedes:** review 67 / comment 20403 @ `e7b29219` (NO GO). That verdict is VOID — the head moved.
**Registered by:** `mos-remediation` (orchestrator). **Reviewer:** `rev-974` (author ≠ reviewer).
**Registered BEFORE the reviewer read the diff.** Any head move after this file is committed voids the
re-review and requires re-registration.
## Scope discipline
The prior review passed AC1AC8 and still found a blocker, because the registered set tested whether the
signature DISCRIMINATES and never tested whether the evidence was BOUND TO ITS SUBJECT (Finding 3 /
coverage-failure-mode-2, D-17 class). This set therefore carries the binding property as a first-class
check, and **RR7 explicitly invites the reviewer to attack outside the set** — a registered set is
protection against retrofitting only, never a ceiling on scrutiny.
## Checks
| id | check | verdict form |
| -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **RR1** | The full 12-case contract harness passes at the exact head: `bash test-terminal-green-contract.sh` | ⇒0, and states 12 cases |
| **RR2** | ★CRUX — the ORIGINAL ATTACK IS DEAD. Take the real `#2188` record, mutate ONLY `commit` to an unrelated 40-hex value, verify against the true expected head | ⇒1, `exempted_steps == 0`, anomaly naming expected vs actual |
| **RR3** | Missing `--expect-commit` cannot be defaulted, inferred, or skipped | ⇒2 (not 0, not 1) |
| **RR4** | Malformed expected commit (short SHA, non-hex, empty) is rejected — no silent normalisation into a pass | ⇒2 |
| **RR5** | A record with the `commit` key ABSENT (not merely different) is rejected — fail-closed on missing, not just on mismatch | ⇒1, `exempted_steps == 0` |
| **RR6** | The genuine artifact still passes when correctly bound: real `#2188` + its true head | ⇒0, `exempted_steps == 1`, exactly one `WP-K8S-1000-CI-POSTGRES-TEARDOWN` |
| **RR7** | ★RED-FIRST, PROVED RETROACTIVELY. The four new cases must FAIL against the OLD verifier at `e7b29219` — otherwise they do not test what they claim (D-8 class). Run the new cases against the previous implementation | new cases ⇒≠0 under `e7b29219` |
| **RR8** | AC2 OF THE PRIOR SET DID NOT REGRESS: both REAL controls stay terminal red — `#2189` (`ci-postgres` exit 1) and `#2191` (exit 137, `test` exit 61) | both ⇒1, `exempted_steps == 0` |
| **RR9** | Still NO fetch / trigger / retry / re-roll / sleep / network of any kind in the verifier or harness. The coin flip must remain removed, not codified (D-21) | grep ⇒ no such call sites |
| **RR10** | The doc/baseline changes REQUIRE the current provider PR head to be passed — they must not merely mention it. Check `merge-gate.md`, `CI-CD-PIPELINES.md`, `woodpecker/README.md` state it as a requirement a gate operator cannot satisfy by omission | reviewer judgement, quote the lines |
| **RR11** | Exemption remains bound to #1000 and retires with it; signature conjunction unchanged and not widened by this fix | diff-scoped, ⇒ no widening |
| **RR12** | Case-sensitivity: an uppercase-hex record commit against a lowercase expected head must NOT silently pass by accident of comparison. State which way it resolves and whether it fails closed | state the observed behaviour |
## Reviewer instruction
Report the verdict **bound to `033b2ffb46674b2c0bcc5197273c109b461f62d9`** and state each check's
observed result, including counts read from `pipeline-status.sh -f json` (never default text — it omits
`clone`, D-33). If any check is unrunnable, **say so** — never substitute a passing variant. Attack
outside this set and report anything it finds; RR7 and RR12 exist because the last blocker was found
exactly that way.
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# RM-61 / PR #1033 — PRE-REGISTERED ACCEPTANCE CHECKS: `exit_code` TYPE-STRICTNESS (D-40)
**Registered by:** `mos-remediation` (orchestrator) — **BEFORE the fix was pushed and before any
reviewer read a diff.** At registration time the fix existed only as an unpushed local commit
(`6e7a336d`) on coder-mos1's machine which **I have not read**. There is therefore no diff for these
checks to have been retrofitted to.
**Subject head:** TBD — binds to the NEW head once coder-mos1 pushes. The prior head
`033b2ffb46674b2c0bcc5197273c109b461f62d9` and its review 69 / pipeline #2193 go VOID on that push;
that cost was accepted deliberately by Mos's BLOCKING ruling on D-40.
**Ruling being enforced (Mos, 2026-08-01):** `exit_code` must be accepted ONLY as a real integer.
`false`, `0.0`, `"0"`, and `null` must all fail to satisfy the exemption. Wrong-ACCEPT is the
disqualifying direction; this hole sits inside the load-bearing discriminator.
## ⚠ Read this before writing the tests — RED-FIRST HERE IS NOT UNIFORM
Two of the four near-miss values **already block** at `033b2ffb`. Demanding "all four observed RED
first" would be demanding an impossible red for two of them, and the predictable response to an
impossible demand is a fudge — weakening something real to manufacture the red. So state it precisely:
| value | behaviour at `033b2ffb` (pre-fix) | what the new case is |
| ------- | --------------------------------- | ------------------------- |
| `false` | **WRONGLY EXEMPTS** (exit 0) | **genuine RED-FIRST** |
| `0.0` | **WRONGLY EXEMPTS** (exit 0) | **genuine RED-FIRST** |
| `"0"` | correctly blocks (exit 1) | **regression guard** only |
| `null` | correctly blocks (exit 1) | **regression guard** only |
Claiming red-first for `"0"` or `null` would be a false claim about your own evidence. Say which is
which. **Do not weaken anything to make a green case go red** (D-8).
## Checks
| id | check | verdict form |
| -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **TS1** | ★RED-FIRST. `exit_code: false` on the real #2188 record is **observed wrongly exempting at `033b2ffb`** (exit 0, `exempted_steps 1`), then blocks after the fix | pre-fix ⇒0/exempt 1 · post-fix ⇒1/exempt 0 |
| **TS2** | ★RED-FIRST. Same for `exit_code: 0.0` | pre-fix ⇒0/exempt 1 · post-fix ⇒1/exempt 0 |
| **TS3** | REGRESSION GUARD. `exit_code: "0"` blocked before AND after — state honestly that it was already green | both ⇒1, `exempted_steps 0` |
| **TS4** | REGRESSION GUARD. `exit_code: null` blocked before AND after | both ⇒1, `exempted_steps 0` |
| **TS5** | ★NOT OVER-TIGHTENED. The genuine artifact — real #2188, real integer `exit_code: 0`, correctly bound head — still passes | ⇒0, `exempted_steps 1`, exactly one `WP-K8S-1000-CI-POSTGRES-TEARDOWN` |
| **TS6** | The strictness sits on the value the EXEMPTION rests on, not on a cosmetic sibling. Show the guarded comparison is the one feeding `exemption_applies` | reviewer quotes the line |
| **TS7** | `bool` is excluded EXPLICITLY, not incidentally. A bare `isinstance(x, int)` still admits `True`/`False` — verify the `not isinstance(x, bool)` clause exists | ⇒ clause present; `true` also blocks |
| **TS8** | Negative control unaffected: a genuine failed step with a real integer non-zero exit still blocks | ⇒1, `exempted_steps 0` |
| **TS9** | NO REGRESSION ON THE PRIOR ROUND'S BINDING WORK: mutated record commit ⇒1; `--expect-commit` omitted ⇒2; record `commit` absent ⇒1 | ⇒1 / ⇒2 / ⇒1 |
| **TS10** | Signature conjunction NOT widened elsewhere by this fix — `POD_NOT_FOUND` / name / type / state untouched | diff-scoped ⇒ no widening |
| **TS11** | Still no fetch / trigger / retry / re-roll / sleep / network | grep ⇒ no call sites |
| **TS12** | Full harness passes at the new head; **state the case count** (12 previously, expected 16 — confirm the actual number rather than the expected one) | ⇒0, count stated |
## Reviewer instruction
Verdict bound to the NEW head, evidence enumerated per check, CI counts from `pipeline-status.sh -f json`
(never default text — it omits `clone`, D-33). If a check is unrunnable, **say so**; never substitute a
passing variant.
**Attack outside this set and report what you find.** Both blockers on this PR so far — the missing
commit binding, and this type confusion — were found outside the registered set, by mutating a field
nobody had registered a check for. That is now the expectation, not a bonus.
**Nobody dispatching this review may state a conclusion on an open check here (D-39).** If you are sent
an observation, it is an observation; the ruling is yours.
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<!-- board-roll: 1 entry rolled from BOARD.md -->
### **D-1 / P-ACTIVATION + hygiene — committed `.npmrc` hard-pins `store-dir=/root/.local/share/pnpm/store`.**
Correct for the CI container (runs as root), fatal for EVERY non-root local checkout: `EACCES` on `/root/.local/share/pnpm/store/v10/server/server.json`. A committed config that only works on one runtime is exactly the activation-skew class. Fix candidate: make store-dir env-overridable, not hardcoded.
<!-- board-roll: 2 entries rolled from BOARD.md -->
### **D-3 / P-FLEET-001 — the seats running this mission are UNMANAGED.** `mos-remediation`, `rev-974`,
`planner-opus`, `planner-sol` appear in NO roster (`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roster.yaml`, `agents/`). Planners run on socket `default`; the roster declares `mosaic-fleet`. This is the exact "one roster-owned socket/host + quarantine unmanaged + stale GC" failure P-FLEET-001 indicts — observed on the remediation mission's own fleet. Prerequisite for INBOX identity-addressing.
### **D-2 / hygiene — husky `prepare` fails `EPERM` copying into root-owned `.husky/_/`.** Repo working
tree has root-owned dirs (`.husky/`, repo root) under a non-root agent. Worked around with the intended `HUSKY=0` escape hatch (does NOT disable the existing pre-commit/pre-push hooks).
<!-- board-roll: 2 entries rolled from BOARD.md -->
### **D-5 / P-QUEUE-001 + P-CONFORMANCE-001 — KEYSTONE: an inert gate that erased its own evidence.**
Merged PR #868 (`b79336a8`) shipped a file that FAILS `pnpm format:check` ⇒ the CI format gate did not block. An unrelated later PR (#872) then reformatted that file via its own `lint-staged`, so `main` went green again and nobody learned the gate had failed to fire. Verified blob-level under the repo's own config. **Detection must be per-merge-commit against that commit's own tree** — a "is main green today" check reports all-clear on this exact defect. Binding on RM-02/RM-55. Full chain in `TASKS.md` §1a. NOT quiet-patched, by Mos's ruling: patching the symptom destroys the signal.
### **D-4 / P-LIFECYCLE + hygiene — a dispatched agent silently IGNORED an in-message context reset.**
planner-sol was at 64.3%/372k; the brief asked it to reset first; it began work on dirty context anyway. Only an out-of-band `/new` driven by the orchestrator guaranteed clean state. Confirms the postmortem thesis: **instructions are not enforcement.** Reset must be a mechanical pre-dispatch step, not a request.
<!-- board-roll: 2 entries rolled from BOARD.md -->
### **D-7 / P-FLEET-001 — stale-GC-on-disk: shared 30G /tmp hit 100% ENOSPC, degrading two seats.**
~5.2G was session scratch dead 8-9 days (this session's own footprint: 88K). Same missing capability as orphaned-tmux-session GC, applied to disk — not a quota or discipline problem. Resolved manually by Mos (lead coordinator) after independent verification; `/tmp` now 79%. **The gap IS the finding:** the authority to reap exists, the deterministic reaper does not. Folded into RM-50 with explicit requirements (mechanical liveness, age threshold, dry-run, audit event per reap — never a heuristic sweep). Refusing to unilaterally delete another session's scratch was correct doctrine; the fix is a reaper, not braver agents.
### **D-6 / P-QUEUE-001 — the mandated queue guard returned PASS on an UNKNOWN state, live, today.**
Running the required `ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push` before pushing produced `state=unknown ... exit 0` — the exact defect at `ci-queue-wait.sh:282-288` that PR #1023 is parked on. It also evaluated `branch=main` rather than the branch being pushed. The mission's own required pre-push gate passed me on an indeterminate result. Third independent live instance of the class.
<!-- board-roll: 1 entry rolled from BOARD.md -->
### **D-8 / P-CONFORMANCE-001 — a PRE-REGISTERED acceptance check that was not runnable as written.**
PR #1025 AC2's fixture `mkdir -p apps/*/venv/lib` creates a literal `apps/*/venv/lib` dir when the glob is unmatched — it did not test what it claimed. rev-974 ran it exactly as written, caught it, re-ran the intended assertion at an explicit path, and **disclosed** rather than silently substituting a working fixture and reporting PASS. **Pre-registration protects a check from being retrofitted to the implementation; it does not make the check correct.** An unverified gate appeared inside the mechanism built to catch unverified gates. Hard requirement on RM-02: the registry must self-verify that every registered case runs AND can fail — presence is not evidence.
<!-- board-roll: Decisions-log narrative rolled from BOARD.md 2026-08-01 (D-43: meet the
byte budget by ROLLING OUT, never by rewording what stays) -->
### Decisions log — full record in [`TASKS.md`](./TASKS.md)
All 44 findings (D-1…D-6 in `BOARD-LEDGER.md`, D-7…D-43 + D-38c in `TASKS.md`) and every ruling with its
rationale live there. **Not duplicated here** — a second copy is a second thing to go stale, which this
board had done three times in one night (gate list, capability registry, DECISION-1 status), and three
more times by the next rotation seam (RM-61 "building", "nothing implemented yet", DECISION-1/2/3
"must be ruled"). The rulings a fresh seat needs are items 47 above; they are **not** repeated here,
because that repetition is what went stale.
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# mos-remediation — LIVE BOARD (keep < 8 KB)
**Phase:** EXECUTING — RM-03 at owner-merge; RM-61 **MERGED**; **RM-02 keystone is the front**.
**Updated:** 2026-08-01 — seam crossed; successor seat resumed, attested from the files, and is driving.
⚠ That was a **MANUAL pane respawn** (prior seat ~803k tokens): it validates the checkpoint+rehydration
**design**, NOT a lifecycle **mechanism** — P-LIFECYCLE rotation does not exist yet (**D-41 / RM-62**).
## Head
- Charter + 15 decisions + 4-build plan: `MISSION.md`. Backlog + all findings: `TASKS.md`.
- Planning DONE (58 tasks, P0P5). **DECISION-1/2/3 all RULED by Mos 2026-07-31** (`TASKS.md` §5) —
nothing is waiting on a decision. D-2's availability _target_ is Jason-pending and non-blocking.
- **Executing, not planning.** RM-01 is MERGED; three lanes are live (see In-flight).
- Orchestrator seat `mos-remediation` LIVE, owns the mission, resumed across the rotation seam
2026-08-01 and re-attested to Mos from the files. Residency attestation: PASS.
## In-flight
| Task | Owner | State |
| ------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| RM-01 checkout | — | **MERGED** `f58b3699` (#1027) |
| RM-03 queue guard | **Jason** | **GO** @ `78ec47cd` (cmt 20392) — HELD FOR OWNER MERGE. Head unmoved; GO commit-bound, VOID if it moves — **do not push #1032** |
| RM-02 registry ★key | rev-974 | ★ **IN REVIEW @ `83d2ecb2`** — rebased onto `f4fd5967`; CI #2196 **10/10** incl `clone`; verifier exit 0 bound to head. ACs pre-registered @ `995f8b6a`. **Crux A4: is the activation seam vacuity-capable?** |
| RM-61 CI exemption | — | ✅ **MERGED** `f4fd5967` (#1033). #1034 closed; **#1000 stays OPEN** (retirement trigger). Exemption is on `main` |
| RM-59 / RM-60 | Jason (infra) | tracked deps; RM-60 option **B** |
| #1023 queue attempt | Jason | SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON — live REQUEST_CHANGES, do **not** merge |
### For the incoming orchestrator — read this before acting
1. **RM-02 is the front.** RM-03 waits on Jason; RM-61 MERGED; RM-02 needs rebase+CI+review on
post-#1033 main. ⚠ Re-derive board claims from the provider before acting (**D-43**).
2. **`docs/remediation/TASKS.md` is authoritative**, not the newest voice in a chat. It holds 44 findings
(D-1…D-6 in `BOARD-LEDGER.md`, D-7…D-43 + D-38c in TASKS.md), every ruling with its rationale, and the
requirements each finding placed on RM-02/RM-34/RM-50/RM-55.
3. **`MISSION.md` carries five first-class principles**, all earned by live failures — observe the
property not the proxy · pre-registration prevents retrofitting and nothing else · never ship an
integrity claim dressed as a property · when a property cannot exist at its layer, bound it and track
the real guarantee · query for refutation, never for confirmation · redundant observation on
evidence-bearing steps.
4. **Seat identity:** `export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<seat>` is stripped by a context reset (**D-34**) —
every dispatch/rehydration brief must re-export it, or the seat cannot use its credentials.
5. **Scan CI from `-f json`, never default text** — text mode omits `clone` (**D-33**). State counts.
6. **The queue guard is zero-information until RM-03 merges** (**D-23**) — never cite its green.
7. **The bounded CI re-roll used on RM-02 was a one-time stopgap, NOT policy.** A per-PR free re-roll is
D-21 normalisation. Do not repeat it; RM-61 is the fix.
## Delivery gates — REFERENCE, do not restate
Canonical: `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md` (verdict authority) +
`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles/validator.md`. Order and the freeze/zero-information rules: `MISSION.md`
and `KICKSTART.md`. **Read them there** — restating the gate from memory is how the merge-gate step
went missing from mission setup twice, once inside the correction for it (**D-26**).
## Fleet seats
- mos-remediation — project orchestrator (Claude, /src/mosaic-stack, socket `mosaic-fleet`) — ACTIVE
- planner-opus — adversarial planner (robustness), Opus 5, socket `default` — DELIVERED, idle
- planner-sol — adversarial planner (pragmatic), gpt-5.6-sol, socket `default` — DELIVERED, idle
- rev-974 — mosaicstack reviewer identity (id 16, write:repository) — idle, on call
- Mos (mos-claude) — lead coordinator, socket `default` — relay path to Jason
## Gate status
- Freeze: LIFTED for this workstream only.
- Git identity: orchestrator runs `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=mos-dt-0` INTERIM. Mos ruled gate-16 HOLDS (author≠reviewer is what
gate-16 protects; rev-974 reviews, mos-dt-0 never self-reviews). Dedicated identity TRACKED, Mos provisions.
- Capability is **per-path** (D-11b → **superseded in part by D-13/D-15**): a token file is **necessary,
not sufficient**. Three layers — token file (raw-API), `tea` login (tea paths), **repository permission**
(writes). Before dispatch, assert `permissions.push == true` **as that seat**, not token existence and
not a 200 on a read. Mos owns provisioning; escalate missing pairs.
- Seat identity (D-11a): token identity AND `git config user.name`/`user.email` must BOTH be set and
agree. Exporting `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` alone does NOT fix commit authorship.
-**LIVE HAZARD (D-37) — one shared `.git/config` re-identifies EVERY worktree at once.** Every seat,
including `rev-974`'s review worktree, currently authors as **`coder-mos1`**; `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`
does **not** override it. **STANDING ORDER: commit with explicit
`git -c user.name=<seat> -c user.email=<seat>@…`, and NOBODY rewrites the shared config mid-flight.**
Real fix authorised, Mos owns it, sequenced at a quiet seam. **#1024 implicated.** Detail: D-37.
- Standing worker-brief doctrine (mandatory in EVERY brief): re-export `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` (**D-34**);
commit early/WIP (**D-31**); don't weaken a RED test to pass; if a check is unrunnable SAY SO, never
substitute; `agent-send -f` never `-m`; artifacts off shared `/tmp`; scan CI from `-f json` (**D-33**);
**relay observations into an open review, NEVER your own conclusion on an open check (D-39)**; the
**author never adjudicates their own PR's blocker status** — surface evidence, prepare the fix, hold.
- Remote control: native `/remote-control` NOT wired in this runtime. Path is **Mos-relay**
(Jason ↔ mos-claude via Discord ↔ mos-remediation via agent-send). Not a blocker.
## Sequencing — see [`MISSION.md`](./MISSION.md)
Builds 1-5, the cross-cutting retirements, and DECISION-1's corrected wire-in target are stated once in
the charter and `TASKS.md` §5. **Not repeated here** — the previous copy of DECISION-1's status on this
board is one of the six stale restatements below.
## Decisions log — full record in [`TASKS.md`](./TASKS.md)
All 44 findings (D-1…D-6 in `BOARD-LEDGER.md`, D-7…D-43 + D-38c in `TASKS.md`) and every ruling with
its rationale live there. **Not duplicated here.** The history of _why_ this board must not restate —
six stale copies across two seams — is rolled verbatim into [`BOARD-LEDGER.md`](./BOARD-LEDGER.md).
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# Adversarial Decomposition — Pragmatic / Shortest-Path Side
**Planner:** `planner-sol`
**Bias:** make one real fleet task pass through one enforced path as early as possible; reuse before building.
**Scope source:** `MISSION.md`, `MACP-WIRING-SCOUT.md`, `BOARD.md`, existing `@mosaicstack/macp`, `packages/coord`, PG/Valkey, Tess durable inbox/outbox, and the Mission Control PRD.
## Executive position
The first useful milestone is **not** “complete Builds 1 and 2.” It is this narrow vertical slice:
> A DB-backed mission task is atomically claimed by `packages/coord`, executed by one Node `@mosaicstack/macp` TaskExecutor, gated, and terminally recorded with identity-bound events and a tri-state mutation result. No `docs/TASKS.md`, `mission.json`, `tasks.json`, Python gate loop, or NDJSON ledger participates.
That slice is **SOL-03 → SOL-04 → SOL-05 → SOL-06 → SOL-07 → SOL-08**, estimated at **72K tokens**, mostly Codex. PG polling is acceptable for this first proof. Redis acceleration follows only after correctness is observable. This is the shortest path that is both dogfoodable and not throwaway work.
### Cost posture
- **25 PR tasks, ~294K tokens total:** ~164K Codex, ~130K Sonnet, **0K Opus**.
- First live choke-point dogfood: ~72K on the hard path; SOL-01 and SOL-02 can run beside it.
- Opus is not justified for planned implementation. Escalate only if an independent security review finds an unresolved architecture-level authority flaw.
- Every row is one PR. Estimates include implementation, focused tests, docs affected by that PR, and one remediation pass—not orchestration/reviewer overhead.
## Gates and critical path
| gate | opens when | proof required before downstream work |
| ------------------------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **G0 — trustworthy launch gates** | SOL-01, SOL-02 | non-root checkout works; queue status cannot become false-green |
| **G1 — first dogfood / minimum viable cut** | SOL-08 | one live fleet task completes DB → MACP executor → gates → DB with no flat-file state |
| **G2 — Builds 1+2 closed** | SOL-09..SOL-12 | all producers use the executor; duplicate islands retired; Redis loss is recoverable from PG |
| **G3 — rotation real** | SOL-13..SOL-16 | stale generation cannot mutate; fresh session resumes typed state; Pi-brick recovery works without broker |
| **G4 — sole-path comms real** | SOL-17..SOL-22 | roster identity is stable; bounced/stale messages converge through PG/Redis and adapters |
| **G5 — mission proof** | SOL-23..SOL-25 | workflow sweep cannot capture unknown files; fault bank passes, including 100 rotations |
**Critical path:** `03 → 04 → 05 → 06 → 08 → 10 → 12 → 13 → 14 → 15 → 16 → 17 → 18 → 19 → 20 → 21 → 22 → 24 → 25`.
## Ordered task list
### SOL-01 — Repair activation coherence and non-root checkout hygiene
- **build:** 5 (hygiene; pulled forward)
- **depends_on:** —
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. A clean non-root checkout can run dependency/bootstrap preparation without accessing `/root`.
2. A root CI checkout still uses an isolated writable pnpm store.
3. Activation installs CLI, hooks, broker/runtime assets, and version manifest transactionally: induced failure leaves the prior complete generation active.
4. Launch with a deliberately skewed component version is rejected with the exact repair command; diagnostics remain usable.
5. No test uses `--no-verify` or suppresses hooks.
- **dogfood seed:** BOARD D-1 root-pinned `.npmrc` and D-2 root-owned Husky path.
- **est. tokens:** 6K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-02 — Make queue guard fail-safe with exit-asserting tests
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** —
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Fixture responses `pending`, `success`, `failure`, no-status, malformed JSON, provider error, and unknown status produce explicitly asserted process exits.
2. Only terminal success/no-active-queue returns 0; unknown, malformed, and transport failure return non-zero with actionable output.
3. A payload larger than 150 KiB is consumed without argv expansion or truncation.
4. At least one mutant changes unknown→success and is killed by the test suite.
- **dogfood seed:** inert gate-6 and recursive #1019 failure (unknown→exit 0; ARG_MAX).
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-03 — Complete the canonical MACP contract, not another protocol
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** —
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. `@mosaicstack/macp` validates typed Task, TaskResult, lifecycle Event, state Claim, and `verified | written-unverified | failed` mutation outcome records.
2. Claims require source, confidence, issued-at, TTL/expiry, refresh instruction, and HMAC integrity; tamper/expiry returns a typed refusal, never partial data.
3. Lifecycle events include launch, mission generation, checkpoint, rotation, recovery, inbox receipt, and terminal disposition while preserving existing task events.
4. `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` is required for mutating execution and appears in credential/actor binding; missing identity fails closed.
5. Target metadata requires repository identity, task/record ID, and head or generation where applicable.
- **dogfood seed:** rev-974 identity drift plus the three observed write outcomes.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-04 — Add the narrow PG orchestration spine schema
- **build:** 2
- **depends_on:** SOL-03
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Migration up creates mission, task, dependency, task-claim, MACP event, typed state-claim, session-generation, and dispatch-outbox records with tenant/mission keys and uniqueness constraints.
2. The database rejects a task without a mission, a dependency outside its mission, duplicate idempotency keys, and terminal→running regression.
3. Event and claim records reference canonical mission/task/generation identities; claims store integrity metadata.
4. Migration rollback on an empty test DB succeeds; rerunning migration is safe.
5. No comms-specific “universal message” schema is invented here; Build 4 reuses/extends existing interaction inbox/outbox tables.
- **dogfood seed:** mission convention existed but a lane could act with no mechanically valid mission/task.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-05 — Implement atomic PG task claims, transitions, ledger, and outbox
- **build:** 2
- **depends_on:** SOL-04
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Two concurrent claimers for one runnable task yield exactly one lease owner.
2. Dependencies are evaluated transactionally; an unmet dependency can never be claimed.
3. Claim, state transition, MACP event, and dispatch-outbox append commit atomically or all roll back.
4. Expired leases are reclaimable with a higher fencing generation; stale owners cannot complete or mutate.
5. Querying mission status is derived solely from PG and returns the next runnable task deterministically.
- **dogfood seed:** model-maintained live board and stale claims surviving session changes.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-06 — Build the one production Node MACP TaskExecutor
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** SOL-03, SOL-05
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. A public Node executor accepts only a claimed canonical MACP Task, resolves credentials/identity, runs the worker, runs structured gates, and persists terminal result/events through SOL-05.
2. Worker exit 0 plus a failed gate cannot produce `completed`; worker failure cannot skip terminal ledger emission.
3. Claude, Codex, and Pi fixture backends emit the same runtime-neutral lifecycle sequence.
4. Every mutation returns one mandatory tri-state outcome; callers cannot compile while discarding it.
5. Crash after worker success but before terminal commit leaves a recoverable fenced claim and no false completion.
- **dogfood seed:** stranded MACP, gate-6 inert completion, and `written-unverified` being treated as success.
- **est. tokens:** 16K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-07 — Provide one-shot flat-file import and cutover readiness audit
- **build:** 2
- **depends_on:** SOL-05
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. A dry-run parses existing mission/TASKS artifacts, reports unsupported/ambiguous rows, and performs zero writes.
2. Apply is idempotent and records source digests; repeated apply creates no duplicates.
3. Unknown status, dangling dependency, duplicate task ID, and malformed table block import with row-level diagnostics.
4. Readiness reports “cutover-ready” only when imported PG projections exactly match source counts/dependencies/statuses.
5. This command is migration-only; it exposes no dual-write or ongoing sync mode.
- **dogfood seed:** current remediation board/TASKS state needs a clean DB landing without silently losing tasks.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-08 — Hard-cut `packages/coord` to PG and dogfood one live task
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** SOL-06, SOL-07
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. `mosaic coord run/status/continue` reads and mutates PG only; absent/unmigrated DB state fails with the SOL-07 repair path.
2. No fallback reads/writes `docs/TASKS.md`, mission JSON, task JSON, state JSON, results JSON, or events NDJSON.
3. A live canary task assigned to a fleet seat travels PG claim → TaskExecutor → worker → gate → terminal PG result/event and closes only after gate success.
4. Killing the coordinator after claim and restarting it neither duplicates execution nor allows the stale lease to close the task.
5. Evidence query shows actor seat, mission/task, target metadata, gate results, and tri-state outcome.
- **dogfood seed:** this remediation mission itself; reproduce a gate-6-style non-null task and identity-bound write.
- **est. tokens:** 16K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
> **G1 FIRST-DOGFOOD:** stop and validate here before broadening. If SOL-08 cannot carry a real task, do not build Redis, rotation, comms, or UI.
### SOL-09 — Route Forge and OpenClaw/MACP producers through TaskExecutor
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** SOL-08
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Forge and the OpenClaw MACP runtime submit the canonical Task type to SOL-06; neither executes a worker or gate itself.
2. Their success callbacks are derived from canonical terminal results, not local/stub completion.
3. A failed canonical gate is observed identically from Coord, Forge, and OpenClaw fixtures.
4. Repository search plus an executable import boundary test finds no production-local redefinition of Task/TaskResult/GateResult on these paths.
- **dogfood seed:** Forges immediate empty-gate completion and the plugins redefined MACP-shaped result.
- **est. tokens:** 10K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-10 — Retire flat-file orchestration and the disabled duplicate rail
- **build:** 1
- **depends_on:** SOL-09
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. The Python controller execution/gate/event path, `tasks_md_sync`, plugin-local protocol types, orphaned context loader, and production flat-file orchestration writers/readers are absent from shipped assets.
2. Framework guides/templates/startup context point to DB mission commands, not `docs/TASKS.md` as orchestration SoR.
3. A regression scan fails CI if production code reintroduces `events.ndjson`, `tasks.json`, `mission.json`, or `docs/TASKS.md` orchestration mutation.
4. jarvis-brain PDA flat files and unrelated project docs remain untouched.
5. Upgrade removes/quarantines obsolete generated rail files without deleting user source/docs.
- **dogfood seed:** three parallel islands and stale `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json` 0/0 residue.
- **est. tokens:** 14K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-11 — Add Redis hot dispatch as a derived outbox consumer
- **build:** 2
- **depends_on:** SOL-08
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Task creation commits mission/task/outbox in PG before any Redis enqueue.
2. Induced Redis failure leaves the task durable and pending; a sweeper later enqueues it exactly once logically.
3. Deleting the Redis queue and rebuilding from PG restores all non-terminal dispatches without reviving terminal tasks.
4. Duplicate delivery is neutralized by PG claim fencing/idempotency.
5. Existing `packages/queue` adapter/config is reused; no second broker API is introduced.
- **dogfood seed:** inert/unknown queue transport and broker outage during task dispatch.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-12 — Lock Builds 1+2 with black-box failure cases
- **build:** 2
- **depends_on:** SOL-02, SOL-10, SOL-11
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. A black-box suite proves: unknown queue status blocks; malformed task blocks; gate failure blocks completion; dropped identity blocks mutation; HMAC corruption forces refresh; Redis loss recovers from PG; stale lease cannot close.
2. The suite invokes shipped CLI/service boundaries, not internal mocks.
3. Every asserted failure checks process/result status and durable terminal/non-terminal state.
4. The same canary task succeeds under Claude, Codex, and Pi adapters or a documented unavailable-runtime fixture fails explicitly.
- **dogfood seed:** gate-6/#1019, identity drift, and built-but-unwired MACP.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-13 — Bind session authority to contract hash and generation
- **build:** 3
- **depends_on:** SOL-12
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Launch computes a stable hash over the effective Constitution/AGENTS/runtime/skills set and stores it with session generation.
2. Policy change or compaction detection marks the generation stale before any subsequent mutation.
3. A stale/mismatched generation can read diagnostics but cannot claim, write task state, acknowledge comms, merge, or close.
4. Re-attestation creates a new generation; old credentials/leases remain fenced.
5. Hash input order/path normalization is deterministic across two clean launches.
- **dogfood seed:** compacted orchestrator losing directives and D-4 ignoring an in-message reset.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-14 — Persist compact typed rotation checkpoints using Coord primitives
- **build:** 3
- **depends_on:** SOL-13
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Checkpoint contains mission/task, completed/blocked state, next three actions, constraints, claims, contract hash/generation, and cursors—never transcript text.
2. Checkpoint is HMAC-verified before rehydration; corrupt/expired/missing required claims refuse resume and request deterministic refresh.
3. Writing checkpoint and rotation-intent event is atomic in PG.
4. Existing Coord continuation capsule semantics are reused; no competing handoff schema/file is created.
- **dogfood seed:** manual MOS-ORCHESTRATION-BOARD checkpoint and incomplete-rehydration risk.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-15 — Finish the deterministic coordinator rotation daemon
- **build:** 3
- **depends_on:** SOL-14
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Configured token threshold triggers checkpoint → revoke old authority → terminate → launch fresh → verify rehydration in that order.
2. Compaction-detected is a backstop that forces the same rotation path; it never requests recursive compaction.
3. A launch failure leaves the mission recoverable and visibly paused, not assigned to two active generations.
4. Ephemeral seats die/respawn without mission checkpoint; persistent/orchestrator seats rotate.
5. The implementation extends `packages/coord`; untracked `apps/coordinator` residue is not revived.
- **dogfood seed:** planner-sol dirty-context dispatch and the old coordinators log-only `_check_context()` behavior.
- **est. tokens:** 16K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-16 — Add broker-independent recovery and remove silent MOSAIC BYPASS
- **build:** 3
- **depends_on:** SOL-15
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. With Redis/broker unavailable, a diagnostic/bootstrap command can inspect PG mission state, repair broker configuration, and resume without traversing the broker gate.
2. Normal recovery remains broker-gated and is labeled as such.
3. Break-glass requires explicit scope and expiry, emits a durable event, displays a loud banner, and auto-expires; permanent/silent bypass text or behavior is absent.
4. The Pi-brick fixture recovers the broker, then returns to normal gated operation without editing source/config by hand.
5. Orchestrator guidance removes “/compact and continue” only after the rotation command is available; ephemeral guidance remains explicit.
- **dogfood seed:** Pi brick and silent `MOSAIC BYPASS 2026-07-22`.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-17 — Converge each host on one roster-owned lifecycle domain
- **build:** 5 (hygiene; hard prerequisite for addressed comms)
- **depends_on:** SOL-16
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Reconcile establishes exactly one roster-declared tmux socket/lifecycle domain per host.
2. Unknown sessions are reported and quarantined; they are never killed without positive unmanaged classification.
3. Max-age/max-context stale sessions invoke SOL-15 rotation for persistent seats or reap for ephemerals.
4. Seat identity survives respawn and equals the roster/MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME binding.
5. A fixture matching the current four unmanaged remediation seats converges them or produces explicit quarantine actions.
- **dogfood seed:** scout-bounce and BOARD D-3 seats split between default and `mosaic-fleet` sockets.
- **est. tokens:** 14K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-18 — Publish authenticated `comms/v1` envelope and compatibility rules
- **build:** 4
- **depends_on:** SOL-13, SOL-17
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Envelope validates protocol version, message/idempotency ID, sender/recipient seat identity, class, ordering/coalesce key, creation/expiry, correlation, payload digest, and authentication.
2. Current and immediately previous supported protocol versions are accepted; unsupported versions are rejected loudly with supported range.
3. Framework/runtime version is diagnostic metadata and never the compatibility key.
4. Forged sender, changed recipient/payload, expired envelope, and replay with conflicting content fail closed.
- **dogfood seed:** wrong-socket bare tmux message with no authoritative sender/recipient receipt.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-19 — Build the logical PG-first comms service with tmux adapter
- **build:** 4
- **depends_on:** SOL-18
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Sending commits envelope/payload and PENDING state in PG before adapter delivery.
2. State machine enforces PENDING → RECEIVED → CONSUMED or DEAD-LETTER; illegal regressions are rejected.
3. Recipient-filtered claims and append/coalesce policy are deterministic by message class.
4. tmux is a dumb adapter: delivery failure changes no PG authority state and is retryable.
5. Existing Tess durable repository/state-machine patterns are extended or generalized; no new deployable microservice or second inbox framework appears.
- **dogfood seed:** MACP scout bounce that was discovered only by manual liveness check.
- **est. tokens:** 16K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-20 — Make `agent-send` use the sole path and prove stale-message handling
- **build:** 4
- **depends_on:** SOL-19
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Normal `agent-send` creates a comms/v1 record and observes RECEIVED/CONSUMED; it cannot directly invoke tmux.
2. A wrong/missing socket leaves PENDING with retry diagnostics, then reaches RECEIVED after roster repair without resending.
3. A stale coalescible message arriving after a newer terminal message is marked superseded/consumed and is not surfaced as live work.
4. Duplicate identical send is idempotent; same ID with changed content is rejected.
5. Inbox receipt/terminal disposition emits canonical MACP lifecycle events.
- **dogfood seed:** scout-bounce and #1018 stale-consumed message arriving after merge.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-21 — Add Redis Streams hot delivery and PG reconciliation
- **build:** 4
- **depends_on:** SOL-11, SOL-20
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. PG commit precedes XADD; induced XADD failure is repaired by sweeper.
2. Consumer uses a PEL; ack sequence is PG CONSUMED commit before XACK.
3. Redis flush/restart rebuilds pending delivery from PG without duplicating consumed messages.
4. Pending, abandoned, and dead-letter transitions are observable with bounded retry/backoff.
5. Existing Redis/queue connection/configuration is reused.
- **dogfood seed:** delivery bounce plus broker loss between durable write and hot enqueue.
- **est. tokens:** 12K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-22 — Prove adapter pluggability with the existing Matrix connector
- **build:** 4
- **depends_on:** SOL-21
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Existing Matrix connector consumes/produces comms/v1 through SOL-19 without owning authority state.
2. The same envelope can fail tmux and later deliver through Matrix while producing one logical message lifecycle.
3. Matrix retry/reconnect cannot regress PG state or duplicate CONSUMED work.
4. Removing Matrix availability leaves PG/Redis/tmux behavior intact.
- **dogfood seed:** cross-socket scout notification bounce; alternate reach must not become alternate authority.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-23 — Constrain auto-sync and agent writes by allowlist and lease
- **build:** 5
- **depends_on:** SOL-10
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Auto-sync stages only an explicit allowlist; an unknown modified/untracked docs/source file remains unstaged and is reported.
2. Agent source/docs writes require the correct worktree/lease; two seats cannot acquire the same mutable target concurrently.
3. Generated files are positively identified, not inferred by denylist.
4. The measured annotation/index mid-write fixture cannot be swept into an unrelated commit.
5. DB orchestration state is absent from repository staging concerns.
- **dogfood seed:** auto-sync sweep commit `517bd5c26` capturing agent-authored docs mid-write.
- **est. tokens:** 8K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
### SOL-24 — Build the real-artifact lifecycle conformance harness
- **build:** 5
- **depends_on:** SOL-16, SOL-17, SOL-22, SOL-23
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Harness launches shipped CLI/runtime artifacts and fault-injects compaction, broker outage, delivery bounce, identity drop, stale contract hash, queue unknown/malformed, Redis loss, and auto-sync collision.
2. One deterministic test executes 100 sequential rotations with no lost/duplicated task, claim, receipt, or terminal disposition.
3. Tests assert DB state/event order and process exits, not log substrings alone.
4. Harness runs against isolated PG/Redis namespaces and cleans only resources it created.
5. Every banked dogfood seed has a named case and evidence output suitable for CI/release attachment.
- **dogfood seed:** the complete failure bank: Pi brick, scout-bounce, gate-6/#1019, identity drift, auto-sync, #1018 stale-consumed, D-4 dirty context.
- **est. tokens:** 18K
- **suggested runtime tier:** sonnet
### SOL-25 — Complete operator cutover docs and activation proof
- **build:** 5
- **depends_on:** SOL-01, SOL-02, SOL-10, SOL-16, SOL-22, SOL-24
- **acceptance criteria (diff-blind testable):**
1. Operator docs give exact DB import/cutover, rollback-before-cutover, recovery, break-glass expiry, rotation, comms, quarantine, and conformance commands.
2. Link/command checks find no orchestrator instruction to mutate flat-file mission/tasks, use silent bypass, direct-tmux normal comms, or “compact and continue” a persistent seat.
3. A clean non-root install activates one coherent version and runs the conformance smoke subset.
4. Release evidence maps all 15 decisions and every live seed to a passing check or an explicit deferred item below.
- **dogfood seed:** activation skew plus the tendency to leave built fixes unwired or undocumented.
- **est. tokens:** 6K
- **suggested runtime tier:** codex
## Explicit DEFER list (10)
These are not rejected; they are **past first dogfood** and should not delay G1/G2. Each is gold-plating unless a live failure makes it necessary.
1. **DEFER — Mission dashboard/TUI views.** CLI/DB queries are enough to operate and prove the spine.
2. **DEFER — PRD-to-board automatic decomposition.** This is LLM/judgment-heavy and unrelated to enforcing already-decided tasks.
3. **DEFER — General heuristic churn scoring.** Implement token threshold + compaction sensor first; repeated-tool-loop inference can follow measured need.
4. **DEFER — Discord comms adapter.** Existing plugin reach remains; migrate only after tmux+Matrix prove the service contract.
5. **DEFER — Slack comms adapter.** No current dogfood dependency.
6. **DEFER — Telegram comms adapter.** No current dogfood dependency.
7. **DEFER — Public MCP comms surface.** `agent-send` and service API are sufficient for the mission proof.
8. **DEFER — Protocol-v2 features/general negotiation framework.** Ship v1 with a bounded current/previous acceptance window; do not predict v2.
9. **DEFER — Multi-region/HA PG or Redis.** Existing in-stack PG+Redis and rebuildability satisfy current failure classes.
10. **DEFER — Event analytics/search UI and long-term warehouse.** Indexed PG evidence plus CLI queries is enough for audit/conformance.
## Suspect abstractions register
| proposed thing | verdict |
| ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Canonical Node `TaskExecutor` | **JUSTIFIED:** explicitly required single choke point; wraps existing MACP functions rather than replacing them. |
| PG repository methods | **JUSTIFIED but narrow:** ordinary adapters around existing Drizzle/DB patterns, not a new “state platform.” |
| Rotation daemon | **JUSTIFIED:** finishes `packages/coord`; do not revive `apps/coordinator` or create another service. |
| Comms service | **JUSTIFIED only as a logical in-process boundary:** reuse Tess durable inbox/outbox and existing connectors; no new deployable microservice this cycle. |
| Universal queue/broker abstraction | **SUSPECT / DO NOT BUILD:** reuse `packages/queue`, PG outbox, and Redis Streams/BullMQ configuration already present. |
| Universal envelope/state framework | **SUSPECT / DO NOT BUILD:** MACP Task/Claim/Event and comms/v1 have different bounded purposes. |
| Generic compatibility-negotiation engine | **SUSPECT / DEFER:** a small supported-version check meets v1 needs. |
## Dissent (7)
1. **Do not wire new production behavior into `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task`.** The scout correctly identified the duplicated block, but BOARDs later ruling says the disabled Python rail is residue and must be retired. Building a Node bridge only to delete it is throwaway. Put the Node TaskExecutor in `@mosaicstack/macp`, route the live Coord path to it at SOL-08, migrate remaining producers at SOL-09, then delete the Python block at SOL-10.
2. **Redis is not on the first-dogfood critical path.** PG claim/polling is sufficient for one real task and exposes correctness earlier. Add Redis only after G1; otherwise queue debugging obscures whether the choke point works.
3. **“One choke-point service” does not justify a new deployable service.** An exported executor plus Coord daemon is enough. A new Nest app, RPC protocol, deployment, auth layer, and health plane would be greenfield.
4. **The Mission Control PRDs file-first and board-regeneration assumptions are superseded.** Keep its mission/rotation semantics, but obey the accepted hard DB cutover; do not implement its file-first milestones or PRD-to-board generator now.
5. **Do not gate every interactive runtime launch as if it were a mission task.** Enforce every tracked task/data mutation at the executor/DB authority boundary. Ephemeral interactive shells may launch, but receive no task mutation authority unless attached to a valid claim.
6. **Do not implement broad “churn intelligence.”** Token threshold and compaction-detected are deterministic sensors. Repeated-loop semantic detection is expensive, noisy, and premature until telemetry demonstrates a gap.
7. **The 100-rotation test is a final conformance bar, not an early unit-test tax.** First prove one rotation, then fault cases, then 100 repetitions in SOL-24. Requiring 100 before G3 would delay feedback without changing the design.
## Orchestrator reconciliation notes
- Pre-register each tasks acceptance checks from this document before showing implementation diffs to its reviewer. Author and reviewer remain different seats.
- SOL-07 permits a one-time import, **not** an interim store: no shadow writes, dual reads, or sync daemon.
- G1 is the budget escape hatch. If the 72K hard-path slice does not work, stop and remediate instead of spending the remaining ~222K.
- Docs belong in each behavior-changing PR where required; SOL-25 is cross-link/cutover validation, not permission to postpone essential docs.
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# mos-remediation — Orchestrator Kickstart / Compaction-Survival Resume
**You are `mos-remediation`, the project orchestrator for the Mosaic Stack remediation, launched in `/src/mosaic-stack`.**
This file is your fail-closed resume procedure. Read it on EVERY fresh/cleared session and on the FIRST turn
after any compaction. This mission's whole point is that manual compaction-survival is fragile — so follow this
mechanically until Build 3 (rotation) makes it automatic.
## On resume (do in order, before any orchestration action)
1. `cd /src/mosaic-stack`, then **`git fetch origin remediation/state`**.
**The live board is on the rolling branch `remediation/state`, NOT on `main`.** `main` carries only
periodic snapshots, so reading the board from `main` will silently give you a STALE tick. Read the
live files at `origin/remediation/state` (e.g. `git show origin/remediation/state:docs/remediation/BOARD.md`),
or check that branch out. Every tick is pushed there immediately, so its HEAD is always the newest state.
2. Read `docs/remediation/MISSION.md` — the charter (goal, 4 builds, 15 decisions, sequencing, directives).
3. Read `docs/remediation/BOARD.md` **at `origin/remediation/state`** — the LIVE state: current phase,
in-flight tasks, fleet seat assignments, gate status. Single source of in-flight truth (kept < 8 KB;
older entries roll to `BOARD-LEDGER.md` via `board-roll.sh`).
4. Read the discussion checkpoint for full rationale if needed:
`../jarvis-brain/docs/scratchpads/postmortem/REMEDIATION-DISCUSSION-STATE.md` (or the jarvis-brain repo path).
5. **Residency attestation (fail-closed):** restate from the reloaded files — (a) the goal in one line, (b) the
current build/phase, (c) the BOARD head (in-flight tasks + who owns them). If you cannot, HALT and re-read.
Do NOT act on memory alone; a compaction may have dropped context silently.
## Standing invariants (never violate)
- **North star:** deterministic-right-answer → code/gate; LLM only for judgment.
- **Delivery gates — REFERENCE the canonical files, never restate them:**
`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md` (verdict authority) and
`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles/validator.md` (validator role). Order:
independent review (author ≠ reviewer, `rev-974`; pre-registered diff-blind checks committed before the
diff is read) → remediation → **CI terminal-green at the exact head by full step scan**
**merge-gate verdict `GO`/`NO-GO`/`HOLD`**, commit-bound and **void the instant the head moves**, posted
durably with enumerated evidence under its own minted identity → **coordinator head-pinned merge**.
The queue guard runs but is **zero-information until RM-03 lands** (D-23) and must not be cited as evidence.
**After a `GO`, freeze pushes** — even a doc tweak voids the verdict. The coordinator assigns the gate seat.
- **Query for refutation, never for confirmation.** A subordinate asked to confirm a hypothesis will
agree — the bias is in the question, not the answerer, and agent seats are agreeable by construction.
State the hypothesis as yours, ask for the evidence that KILLS it, and reproduce when it matters.
- **Dogfooding:** every fix validated against its live seed case (MISSION.md lists them).
- **Tracking → DB** (hard cutover); do NOT re-invest in flat-file tracking. jarvis-brain PDA is off-limits.
- **Git identity:** export `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<your-seat>` so wrappers author correctly and survive respawn.
## After every significant event
Overwrite stale lines in `BOARD.md`, keep it < 8 KB, commit + push. The board IS your checkpoint until the
DB-backed rotation daemon (Build 3) exists. Persist typed state (phase, tasks, owners, gates) — never the transcript.
## Fleet
- Adversarial planners: `planner-opus` (robustness), `planner-sol` (pragmatic) — dispatch for task decomposition; reconcile their oppositional decomps.
- Coders/reviewers: dispatch per roster + delivery gates. Comms: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/tmux/agent-send.sh`
(`-L <socket> -s <dst> -S <yourhost>:<yourseat> --class <class>`); always pass `-S`.
- Lead coordinator: Mos (`mos-claude`). Escalate only on the Constitution's escalation triggers.
## Remote control
On first startup, activate remote control for this session (`/remote-control`) so Jason can reach/drive you while
away. If the command is unavailable in this runtime, report it to Mos and continue — it is not a blocker.
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# MACP wiring investigation
**Scope:** `/src/mosaic-stack` inspected at HEAD `b79336a8c11e2a4646a47ff8d295a226e0c71404`; read-only. Existing dirty/untracked state was not touched.
## Verdict
**(c) STRANDED.** `packages/macp` is exported, unit-tested, and registered as a CLI command group, but no production dispatch/execution code invokes its credential resolver, gate runner, or event emitter.
A separate MACP-named OpenClaw/orchestrator rail exists, but it redefines task/result types and gate/event logic instead of importing `@mosaicstack/macp`; direct `mosaic yolo|claude|codex|opencode|pi` also bypasses it.
## 1. Production call sites vs tests
### Production references to `@mosaicstack/macp`
| Surface | Evidence | Actual use |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Unified CLI | `packages/mosaic/src/cli.ts:8,385` | Imports and registers `registerMacpCommand`; no task/gate/event execution. |
| Forge | `packages/forge/src/types.ts:1,17,68,79` | **Type-only** imports of `GateEntry` and `TaskResult`. Pipeline calls an injected abstract executor at `packages/forge/src/pipeline-runner.ts:189-190,299-300`, not MACP. |
| Mosaic package metadata | `packages/mosaic/package.json:36`; `packages/mosaic/src/runtime/update-checker.ts:172` | Dependency/update inventory only. |
| Agent | No match under production `packages/agent/src/**` | No MACP import/call. |
| Coord | No match under production `packages/coord/src/**`; dependency list is only `@mosaicstack/types` at `packages/coord/package.json:25-27` | No MACP import/call. |
| Plugins | No `@mosaicstack/macp` import under `plugins/**` | No package use; the MACP-named plugin is an independent implementation (below). |
**Repository-wide production call-site search result:** excluding `packages/macp/**`, tests, worktrees, and build output, there are **zero** calls to `runGate`, `runGates`, `emitEvent`, `appendEvent`, or `resolveCredentials`.
### `packages/macp` implementation is internally connected only
- Public exports: `packages/macp/src/index.ts:1-48` exports Task/GateEntry/MACPEvent/TaskResult, credential resolution, `runGate(s)`, risk-floor, and event emission.
- Gate runner calls its own event emitter: `packages/macp/src/gate-runner.ts:187-236`.
- Event persistence implementation appends NDJSON to a caller-supplied path: `packages/macp/src/event-emitter.ts:11-27`.
- There is **no exported programmatic `submit` implementation** in `packages/macp/src/index.ts:1-48`; only the CLI placeholder named `submit`.
### Test-only invocations
- Gate runner: `packages/macp/__tests__/gate-runner.test.ts:96-242` invokes `runGate/runGates`.
- Event ledger: `packages/macp/__tests__/event-emitter.test.ts:46-133` invokes `appendEvent/emitEvent` against temporary `events.ndjson` files.
- Credential resolver: `packages/macp/__tests__/credential-resolver.test.ts` exercises resolver behavior.
- CLI tests only verify command registration: `packages/macp/src/cli.spec.ts:37-73`; `packages/mosaic/src/cli-smoke.spec.ts:8` imports registration.
## 2. Gate on the live dispatch path
### Direct Mosaic runtime launch bypasses MACP
- Runtime commands dispatch directly to harness launch: `packages/mosaic/src/commands/launch.ts:730-801`.
- Claude/Pi go through the lease broker, then spawn the runtime: `packages/mosaic/src/commands/launch.ts:817-843`.
- Commander wiring sends `mosaic yolo <runtime>` and direct runtime commands to `launchRuntime`: `packages/mosaic/src/commands/launch.ts:1102-1157,1165-1167`.
- None of those ranges imports/calls `@mosaicstack/macp`, `runGates`, or `emitEvent`.
**Result:** a direct `mosaic yolo`, `mosaic claude/codex/opencode/pi`, or underlying exec does not create a typed MACP Task, run the package gate-runner, or append a package MACPEvent.
### Coord bypasses MACP
- Coord reads/updates `docs/TASKS.md`: `packages/coord/src/runner.ts:6,306-386`; parser/writer is `packages/coord/src/tasks-file.ts:326-377`.
- Coord launches a child process directly: `packages/coord/src/runner.ts:397-427`.
- Mission state is its own `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json`/`next-task.json`: `packages/coord/src/mission.ts:8-12`; `packages/coord/src/runner.ts:15-16,355-384`.
**Result:** Coord task execution has no MACP Task validation, package gate runner, or event append.
### Forge bypasses MACP execution
- Forge defines its own `ForgeTask` and abstract `TaskExecutor`: `packages/forge/src/types.ts:48-80`.
- The production CLI injects a **stub executor** that immediately reports completion with empty gates: `packages/forge/src/cli.ts:13-31,167,185`.
**Result:** even `mosaic forge run` does not execute MACP gates or persist MACP events.
### Separate MACP-named rail is not `packages/macp`
- OpenClaw plugin registers an ACP backend named `macp`: `plugins/macp/src/index.ts:1-18,72-102`.
- It locally redefines `OrchestratorTask`, `TaskResult`, and gate-result shapes instead of importing package types: `plugins/macp/src/macp-runtime.ts:43-77`.
- It appends directly to `.mosaic/orchestrator/tasks.json`, triggers an external controller, and polls `results/<task>.json`: `plugins/macp/src/macp-runtime.ts:290-329,437-483`.
- The controller independently implements `append_event`, `emit_event`, shell execution, gate execution, and results: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator-matrix/controller/mosaic_orchestrator.py:29-91,126-276`.
- Its gate loop runs raw string gates after worker success: `mosaic_orchestrator.py:213-235`; it does not support the package's structured `GateEntry`/AI-review behavior.
- Current checkout disables this controller: `.mosaic/orchestrator/config.json:2` (`"enabled": false`).
- Plugin references `tools/macp/dispatcher/pi_runner.ts` at `plugins/macp/src/macp-runtime.ts:85-91`, but `tools/macp/` does not exist in this checkout.
**Result:** there is a parallel, optionally enabled MACP-shaped rail, not package integration. It cannot make `packages/macp` the enforced path.
## 3. Event ledger status
- Package persistence exists only as a library primitive: `packages/macp/src/event-emitter.ts:11-27` appends JSON lines to an arbitrary `eventsPath`.
- Package event emission is reached only from package `runGates`: `packages/macp/src/gate-runner.ts:204-236`.
- No production caller invokes package `runGates/emitEvent/appendEvent`; therefore no runtime destination path is configured for the package ledger.
- Test-only ledgers use temp paths: `packages/macp/__tests__/event-emitter.test.ts:35-133`; gate tests use temp `events.ndjson`: `packages/macp/__tests__/gate-runner.test.ts:171-242`.
- The separate Python controller writes `.mosaic/orchestrator/events.ndjson`: `mosaic_orchestrator.py:129-133,159-161,219-235`; the Mosaic Framework plugin only **reads** that file for context at `plugins/mosaic-framework/src/index.ts:279-316,430-438`.
- In this checkout, `.mosaic/orchestrator/events.ndjson` is absent and the controller is disabled (`.mosaic/orchestrator/config.json:2`).
**Conclusion:** `MACPEvent` from `packages/macp` is defined/tested but not emitted or persisted by live production call sites. The similarly shaped Python ledger is a duplicate island.
## 4. Coord link
- `packages/coord` has no `@mosaicstack/macp` dependency/import: `packages/coord/package.json:25-27`; no matches in `packages/coord/src/**`.
- Coord's task model is Markdown `docs/TASKS.md` plus mission/session JSON: `packages/coord/src/tasks-file.ts:1-10,257-377`; `packages/coord/src/mission.ts:8-12`; `packages/coord/src/runner.ts:306-427`.
- It does not consume `.mosaic/orchestrator/events.ndjson`, MACP Task, MACPEvent, GateEntry, or TaskResult.
**Conclusion:** Coord and `packages/macp` are disconnected islands.
## Shortest wiring gap
**Single integration point:** replace the duplicated execution/gate/event block in `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task` (`:126-276`) with one production Node `TaskExecutor` backed by `@mosaicstack/macp` (typed Task validation + `resolveCredentials` + `runGates` + `emitEvent`), and make Coord/Forge/OpenClaw submit through that executor. This queue/controller choke point is where `yolo|acp|exec` worker outcomes can be gated and journaled before completion is recorded.
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# Mosaic Stack Remediation — Mission Charter
**Owner:** project orchestrator `mos-remediation` (Claude, launched in `/src/mosaic-stack`).
**Origin:** 2026-07-16..31 fleet lifecycle postmortem. **Status:** EXECUTING (planning complete; RM-01 in flight).
**HOLD lifted** for this workstream by Jason, 2026-07-31 — "begin full mosaic fleet operation on this."
## Goal
Convert the 15 accepted postmortem remediation proposals into a working, **dogfooded** implementation.
**North star:** anything with a deterministic right answer moves OUT of the LLM into a deterministic
gate/program; the LLM handles only genuine judgment.
### First-class principle — observe the property, not the exit code
> **No write is done until the requested PROPERTY is observed. A success exit code is not evidence.**
>
> **Success output is designed to be believed.** That is the whole reason the inert-gate class exists
> and why P-WRAPPER-001's tri-state (`verified` / `written-unverified` / `failed`) is not optional. The
> failure is not carelessness — a green is _engineered_ to be trusted, so trusting it is the default
> behaviour of a competent operator, not a lapse.
>
> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31) after the orchestrator committed this exact error: a
> `--draft` flag was silently dropped by a wrapper fallback that still exited 0, and the PR was reported
> as a draft on the strength of the exit code rather than an observed `draft: true` (D-12). Twelve
> failure instances were banked in that session; **three of them were the orchestrator's own.** That
> ratio is the point — the mechanism must catch the mechanic too, or it is not a mechanism.
>
> Operationally: after any write, read back the property you required. Applies to gates, wrappers, PR
> flags, commit authorship, file installs, and message delivery alike.
### First-class principle — pre-registration prevents retrofitting, and nothing else
> **A pre-registered check set can fail in three distinct ways:**
>
> | mode | the set is… | found as |
> | --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------- |
> | **WRONG** | a check does not test what it claims | D-8 |
> | **INCOMPLETE** | green while a criterion's requirement is untested | D-17 |
> | **INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT** | two criteria cannot both hold | D-18 |
>
> **Pre-registration protects against exactly one thing: retrofitting a check to fit the implementation
> it is supposed to judge.** It confers neither correctness, nor coverage, nor consistency. "We
> pre-registered the checks" has been treated as though it settled the question — it settles one of
> three.
>
> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31). All three modes were found on this mission's own **first
> delivery**, by the machinery applied to its own work — not by inspection, and not by looking for them.
>
> **Enforceable form — RM-02's four clauses.** The registry must establish that: (1) each check is
> **right** — proven red for its own stated reason before its green counts; (2) the set **covers** —
> every criterion bound to a case that actually exercises it; (3) no two criteria **conflict** —
> mutual unsatisfiability is a registry defect discoverable by construction; (4) when a criterion's
> meaning changes, the registry **retains original text, restatement, and reason**, so evolution stays
> auditable. A criterion with no case that can fail for its own reason is unregistered in substance,
> however it reads in the manifest.
### Corollary — never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property
> A verification artifact that can be forged by whoever it is meant to catch verifies nothing. If a
> manifest, marker, ledger, or receipt is writable by the same actor whose behaviour it certifies, it
> **certifies the attack.** Such an artifact must sit inside the integrity envelope it belongs to,
> publish atomically, and carry a **tamper negative-control observed red** — otherwise its integrity is
> a _claim_, not a _property_.
>
> **If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider the approach.** Laundering foreign
> content as certified is the only unacceptable outcome; an honest "this cannot be verified" is always
> available and always preferable.
### First-class principle — when a property cannot exist at the layer it was specified
> Some required properties are **impossible at the layer that asked for them** — not hard, impossible.
> A local check cannot defend against an actor who can rewrite the check itself. When that happens,
> there are exactly three honest moves, and all three are mandatory:
>
> 1. **Implement what the layer _can_ guarantee.** Partial protection against the class it was actually
> born from is worth having.
> 2. **State the boundary precisely, in BOTH directions.** What it does _not_ defend, **and** beside it
> what it _does_. A reader who sees only the negative dismisses the check as worthless; one who sees
> only the positive over-trusts it. **Both together is the honest artifact** — either alone misleads.
> 3. **Record where the real guarantee will come from — as a TRACKED DEPENDENCY, not prose.** It must
> name a task that someone must close. _A documented gap with no owner becomes a permanent gap that
> reads as intentional._
>
> **A written-down gap is acceptable engineering. An implied-fixed gap is this mission's core failure in
> a new costume** — a verification artifact that verifies nothing, with a green to prove it.
>
> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31) from D-19. Origin: the RM-01 symlink manifest could not be
> made tamper-evident against a same-UID actor (CWE-345), because the manifest and its marker share one
> writable tree. The implementing seat **escalated rather than relabelling self-authentication as
> tamper-resistance** — the corollary above firing on its first real adversarial test, on the cheapest
> seat in the loop. Residual risk bound to **RM-59** (`depends_on: RM-12, RM-21, RM-25`), where the
> choke-point executor and spine verify from _outside_ the worktree's authority.
### First-class principle — query for refutation, never for confirmation
> **A subordinate asked to confirm a hypothesis will agree. Ask it to refute, with evidence.**
>
> The bias is induced by the **query**, not by the answerer's diligence. _"The DB flaked — please
> confirm"_ and _"confirm or refute this, with the log line that proves it"_ are different instruments,
> and they return different answers to the same question. The first harvests agreement; only the second
> can return **"you are wrong, and here is why."**
>
> This matters most with agent subordinates, which are **agreeable by construction**: fluent, eager to
> be useful, and structurally disinclined to tell the dispatcher their premise is false. A confirmation
> query aimed at one is close to a guaranteed yes — so the discipline cannot rest on the answerer being
> rigorous. **It has to be built into how the question is asked.**
>
> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-08-01). Origin: the orchestrator hypothesised that a coincident
> `ci-postgres` failure caused a CI test failure and asked the implementing seat to **confirm or refute**
> it. The seat **refuted it** with the log (`ci-postgres:5432 - accepting connections`, migrations
> completed) and identified the real cause. Reproduction on an identical head then settled it. Had the
> query been phrased for confirmation, the agreement would have been returned, **D-21 would have been
> re-classified on a false premise**, and a banked finding would have been silently corrupted.
>
> **Operationally:** state your hypothesis explicitly, mark it as yours, ask for _evidence that kills
> it_, and say what evidence would change your mind. A hypothesis you cannot describe how to falsify is
> not yet a hypothesis. Where the answer is consequential, **reproduce** rather than accept — two
> independent runs beat one confident report.
### First-class principle — redundant observation on evidence-bearing steps
> **Two observers of the same evidence, disagreeing, catch what neither catches alone.** Apply redundancy
> not only to judgement calls but to **evidence gathering itself** — the step everyone assumes is
> mechanical and therefore skips.
>
> Promoted by Mos (2026-08-01) from **D-33**. A seat scanned a pipeline with `-f json` and reported 9
> steps; the orchestrator scanned the same pipeline in the wrapper's default text mode and reported 8.
> **The default output omits `clone`.** Every "full step scan" that night had been 8-of-9 and was stated
> as complete in good faith. No verdict changed — but the _method_ was wrong, invisibly, and **only the
> disagreement between two counts surfaced it.**
>
> The reason it survived: **a summary that resembles an enumeration is more dangerous than one that
> obviously summarises.** A labelled list of named steps with states _looks_ like the artifact, so nobody
> checks it against the record. Compare D-24 — `mergeable` was a _true answer to a different question_;
> this was a _true answer to a smaller one_. Neither is a lie; both pass every sniff test.
>
> **Operationally:** where a step _produces evidence a decision rests on_, have it produced twice by
> different means, and treat **any divergence as a finding rather than as noise to reconcile**. Prefer the
> machine-readable record over the human-readable rendering — _read the artifact, not the summary_ — and
> state the counts observed so a divergence is detectable at all.
## Decision record (authoritative, immutable)
- **15/15 proposals decided: 13 accept, 2 modify (P-AUTHORITY-001, P-INBOX-001), 0 reject.**
- Site + `annotations.json`: `jarvis-brain/docs/postmortem-spec/site/` (committed, origin/main).
- Discussion checkpoint (rich rationale per proposal): `jarvis-brain/docs/scratchpads/postmortem/REMEDIATION-DISCUSSION-STATE.md`.
- Postmortem report: mosaicstack/stack PR #107 (merged 88f4ee04).
- MACP wiring scout (verdict c=STRANDED): [`MACP-WIRING-SCOUT.md`](./MACP-WIRING-SCOUT.md) (copied into this dir; TODO discharged). Its findings are sound; its _recommended wire-in point_ is superseded by DECISION-1.
## The plan — 15 proposals collapse to 4 builds + hygiene
| Build | Absorbs | What it is |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **1. One choke-point service** (mechanical enforcer) | MISSION, STATE, AUDIT, WRAPPER, QUEUE | Deterministic program every task/data mutation flows through. **Wire the stranded `@mosaicstack/macp`** — typed tasks, gate-runner, event ledger, credential binding, tri-state write outcomes. ⚠ **Target CORRECTED 2026-07-31 (DECISION-1, Mos):** a new production Node `TaskExecutor` on the **live** dispatch path (`packages/mosaic` launch + `packages/coord`), which Coord/Forge/live-dispatch submit through. **NOT** `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task` — that controller is `"enabled": false` and references a dispatcher absent from this checkout; wiring it would strand the executor, reproducing this mission's own disease. The Python rail is **deleted**, not ported. Both planners reached this independently. |
| **2. One durable spine + hot path** | (storage under everything) | **PG system-of-record + Redis hot queue** (transactional-outbox). Mission/tasks/state-claims/audit-ledger/comms-inbox all land here. |
| **3. Rotation lifecycle** (finish the Mission Control Plane) | LIFECYCLE, CONTRACT, GUIDE, RECOVERY | Coordinator daemon: contract-hash binding, compaction-detected → rotate-not-compact, checkpoint→fresh-session→rehydrate, broker-independent recovery. Deterministic, not an LLM. Reuse `packages/coord`; existing PRD at `docs/mission-control/`. |
| **4. Comms service** | AUTHORITY, INBOX (+ versioning roadmap) | Envelope (comms/v1) → sole-path service → PG/Redis → pluggable adapters (tmux→Matrix/Discord/Slack/Telegram). Version the protocol, not participants. |
| **+ Hygiene & proof** | FLEET, WORKFLOW, CONFORMANCE | One roster-owned socket/host + stale GC; allowlist auto-sync; the conformance harness that fault-injects the failure classes and proves builds 14 hold. |
## Why Builds 12 are necessary — two independent impossibility proofs
**The choke-point executor and PG spine are not a design preference. They are forced.** Twice during
the mission's own first deliveries, work stopped against a security property that **cannot exist** at
the layer that needed it — and both times the only resolution was an authority _outside_ the audited
party's control, which is precisely what Builds 12 provide.
| | the audited party controls… | so what fails | found as |
| ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | -------- |
| **Artifact integrity** | the manifest that certifies its own generated tree (same-UID write ⇒ regenerate manifest _and_ marker consistently, CWE-345) | tamper-evidence | **D-19** |
| **Execution integrity** | the code that enters the sandbox (PR-controlled config executes _before_ the boundary exists) | isolation | **D-25** |
Both reduce to one sentence:
> **Self-verification by the audited party is not verification.**
And to one consequence: **the anchor must live outside the audited party's authority.** A local check
cannot defend against an actor who can rewrite the check; a repo cannot grant a capability to
PR-controlled config and simultaneously prevent that config from using it.
**An architecture forced by two independent impossibility proofs is stronger evidence than one argued
for.** Neither proof was sought — both arrived while trying to ship something else, from different
directions (a symlink manifest; a CI sandbox), at different layers. RM-59 and RM-60 are the two tracked
dependencies this creates, and they are the same dependency in different clothes.
## The finding that sets the cost
**Built-but-unwired disease.** `@mosaicstack/macp` is stranded (nothing calls it); `packages/coord` primitives
exist; the Mission Control PRD exists; PG + Redis already run in-stack. Three duplicate MACP islands, an
orphaned context loader, a fail-open bypass. **Work = wire + consolidate + retire, NOT greenfield. "Finish, don't re-spec."**
## Sequencing (skeleton — adversarial decomposition refines this)
1. **Spine + choke-point service** (builds 1+2) — foundation; unlocks MISSION/STATE/AUDIT/WRAPPER/QUEUE at one integration point.
(Per DECISION-1, a P0 phase of provable-gate + activation work precedes this; see `TASKS.md` §3.)
2. **Rotation daemon** (build 3) on that spine — the drift fix proper.
3. **Comms service** (build 4) — envelope → service → PG/Redis → adapters; retire direct-tmux.
4. **Hygiene + conformance** (build 5) — fleet convergence, allowlist sync, dogfood harness.
- **Cross-cutting retirements:** flat-file orchestration tracking (hard cutover to DB), the 3 duplicate MACP islands, the silent `MOSAIC BYPASS`.
## Standing directives (Jason, 2026-07-31)
- **Dogfooding:** validate EACH fix against the live fleet failure that motivated it. Seed acceptance tests:
Pi brick (RECOVERY), scout-bounce (INBOX/FLEET), gate-6 inert + #1019 recursion (QUEUE), identity drift
(WRAPPER), auto-sync sweep (WORKFLOW), #1018 stale-consumed (INBOX). The fleet is its own test bed.
- **Orchestration tracking → DB**, hard cutover ("rip off the bandaid"), NO flat-file interim. jarvis-brain
PDA flat-files untouched. Current flat-file tracking runs as-is/unhardened until DB tracking is real, then one clean replace.
-**QUALIFIED 2026-07-31 (DECISION-2, Mos):** the DB spine **must NOT be a single-point hard-stop.**
A broker-independent / degraded mode **and** a rehearsed rollback artifact are **design requirements**
(P-RECOVERY-001), binding now on RM-12, RM-13, RM-23, RM-36 and RM-53. This **supersedes** the earlier
orchestrator recommendation to pre-commit "no DB ⇒ the fleet stops" — that answer is _not_ on record.
Only the specific availability _target_ remains open, queued for Jason; it does **not** block current work.
## The 15 decisions (one-line; full rationale in the checkpoint)
1. **P-ACTIVATION-001** accept — transactional CLI+hooks+broker+version release; block launch on skew, fail-SAFE.
2. **P-AUTHORITY-001** MODIFY — structured authenticated inbox; envelope carries comms-PROTOCOL version; version the protocol not participants; N-version window.
3. **P-LIFECYCLE-001** accept — rotation not recursive compaction; pre-empt at token threshold; enforcer = deterministic coordinator; = finish Mission Control Plane.
4. **P-MISSION-001** accept — bind lanes to mission+task ledger; convention exists, ENFORCEMENT is the gap; mission+tasks → DB spine (hard cutover).
5. **P-QUEUE-001** accept — repair queue transport + exit-asserting non-null-case tests (gate-6 was INERT fleet-wide; #1019 fix recursed the same bug).
6. **P-STATE-001** accept — typed claims (source/confidence/TTL) not prose blob; MACP typed record; integrity fail-closed HMAC; don't fork a 4th island.
7. **P-AUDIT-001** accept — MACPEvent lifecycle ledger; EXTEND enum to lifecycle events; runtime-neutral (executor-emitted); retire duplicate Python ledger.
8. **P-WRAPPER-001** accept — identity derives from seat name + survives respawn; tri-state write outcomes MANDATORY; name safe target metadata.
9. **P-CONTRACT-001** accept — bind session to contract hash; re-anchor on policy-change OR compaction-detected; stale generation loses authority MECHANICALLY.
10. **P-INBOX-001** MODIFY — sole-path comms SERVICE; PG durable SoR + Redis hot queue (outbox, reconciliation sweeper); pluggable adapters; protocol-first, PG-first-then-Redis.
11. **P-RECOVERY-001** accept — broker-independent bootstrap recovery; honest capability labeling; break-glass LOUD+AUDITED+TEMPORARY not silent permanent bypass.
12. **P-GUIDE-001** accept — delete `/compact and continue` from orchestrator path (keep for ephemeral); removal = substitution (wire rotation trigger).
13. **P-FLEET-001** accept — one roster-owned socket/host; quarantine unmanaged; stale-session GC; prerequisite for INBOX identity-addressing.
14. **P-WORKFLOW-001** accept — auto-sync ALLOWLIST not denylist; worktree/lease isolation for agent docs/source; DB-tracking obviates the flat-file-sweep criterion.
15. **P-CONFORMANCE-001** accept — fleet lifecycle harness on REAL runtime artifacts + fault injection; the 100-rotations-lossless bar is a test; target the DB substrate.
## Fleet operating model
- **Project orchestrator** `mos-remediation` (this seat) owns the mission; coordinates under Mos (lead).
- **Adversarial task decomposition:** `planner-opus` (robustness) + `planner-sol` (pragmatic) each decompose
the plan independently; orchestrator reconciles into `TASKS.md`/DB tasks. Oppositional by design.
- **Delivery gates — REFERENCE, do not restate.** The authoritative definitions live at
[`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md`](file:///home/hermes/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md)
(verdict authority) and
[`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles/validator.md`](file:///home/hermes/.config/mosaic/fleet/roles/validator.md)
(validator/certificate role). **Read them; do not paraphrase them.** Restating an authoritative source
is lossy every time — see D-26, where a subset restated from memory dropped a security precondition.
**Gate order** (the sequence only; the definitions are in the files above):
1. Independent review, **author ≠ reviewer** (`rev-974` on mosaicstack), with PRE-REGISTERED diff-blind
acceptance checks committed before the diff is read
2. Remediation of findings
3. **CI terminal-green** at the exact full-40 head, by **full step scan**
4. **Merge-gate verdict — `GO` / `NO-GO` / `HOLD`** (class `merge-gate`; "Ultron" is an _instance name_,
display data, never an authority source). **Bound to a commit and VOID the instant the head moves.**
`HOLD` persists until replaced; a `NO-GO` answered by an empty commit must be re-issued as `NO-GO`.
Posted durably on the PR under the gate's own minted identity, **enumerating** its evidence — a bare
"GO — gates verified" is non-conforming.
5. **Coordinator merge**, head-pinned. The gate never merges; it holds `push=False` by design.
**The CI queue guard runs but is ZERO-INFORMATION until RM-03 lands** (D-23: it returns pass for every
possible input). It must not be cited as evidence by any gate, including the coordinator's own merge path.
**Assignment:** the coordinator assigns the merge-gate seat; the orchestrator does not. The orchestrator
owns getting a PR _gate-ready_.
- **Compaction survival:** see `KICKSTART.md` in this dir — the resume procedure. Persist typed state, not transcript.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -254,32 +254,15 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
#
# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
# provider's own correct answer about a write that landed — a deterministic
# false negative on every comment posted against such a deployment. The
# scheme is also not what this check defends: the forgeries it exists to
# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/number) all
# vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
#
# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
if scheme in ("http", "https"):
scheme_class = "web"
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
else:
scheme_class = scheme
port = parsed.port
return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
@@ -243,35 +243,15 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
#
# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
# provider's own correct answer about a comment that landed — a deterministic
# false negative on EVERY review comment posted against such a deployment.
# That matters more here than anywhere else: on a host where no seat can
# create a review OBJECT, the comment-form review record this path produces
# is the only gate-16 evidence available, and this check refuses all of it.
# The scheme is also not what the check defends: the forgeries it exists to
# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number)
# all vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
#
# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
if scheme in ("http", "https"):
scheme_class = "web"
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
else:
scheme_class = scheme
port = parsed.port
return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
@@ -41,13 +41,7 @@
# that other host's credential cross-host;
# 10. leaves NO temp files behind (POST/GET bodies + metadata) on either the
# success or the failure path — nested function-scoped RETURN traps do not
# clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths;
# 11. (#991) ACCEPTS a record whose provider-returned URL differs from the repo
# remote ONLY in http-vs-https — the standing state on a deployment whose
# Gitea ROOT_URL is misconfigured — while still REJECTING a different
# explicit port and a non-web scheme. Every prior fixture here was https://
# and every negative varied only host or path, so the one axis that fails
# in production had zero coverage: the fixtures encoded the assumption.
# clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths.
set -euo pipefail
@@ -67,29 +61,15 @@ STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
# #1007: a sandboxed HOME. detect-platform.sh's step-0 per-agent identity lookup
# reads ~/.config/mosaic/gitea-tokens/<identity>, which is OUTSIDE both
# XDG_CONFIG_HOME and MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE — so on any seat that has a real
# per-agent token the suite resolves a PRODUCTION credential and dies at the
# authenticated-identity read (HTTP 401) before reaching case 1. Pointing HOME
# at the work dir keeps that lookup inside the sandbox.
HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH" "$HOME_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
# #1007: shadow any GLOBAL `mosaic.gitIdentity` with an empty REPO-LOCAL value.
# A repo-local key shadows the global and reads back empty at rc=0, which is the
# only way to make step 0 fall through inside a sandbox. Note the env-var route
# (MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="") does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads it with
# `${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}`, and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to
# unset, so setting it empty is silently the same as not setting it at all.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
ISSUE_NUMBER=7
REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
@@ -286,19 +266,6 @@ elif mode == "url-wrong-repo":
elif mode == "url-suffix-injection":
# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/issues/7") test would ACCEPT this.
issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/deceptive/{repo}/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-scheme-downgrade":
# #991, and the ONLY one of these modes that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo cloned over
# https://. Same host, same path, correct record — the provider is telling
# the truth about a write that landed.
issue_url = f"http://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-wrong-port":
# An EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same host and
# must stay distinguishing — collapsing the scheme must not collapse this.
issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev:8443/{repo}/issues/7"
elif mode == "url-non-web-scheme":
# Only http/https collapse. Any other scheme stays distinguishing.
issue_url = f"ftp://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
record = {
"id": new_id,
"body": body,
@@ -398,7 +365,6 @@ run_comment() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
@@ -579,17 +545,13 @@ if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
fi
assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host"
# Cases 7-12 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url does not belong to this issue on
# this provider/repo. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host +
# explicit non-default port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix + exact
# owner/repo + kind + number), so each must FAIL CLOSED. A bare endswith/suffix
# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
# url-wrong-port and url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from
# the other side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port
# or a different scheme family.
for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection \
url-wrong-port url-non-web-scheme; do
# Cases 7-10 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url is forged. Verification pins the
# URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix
# + exact owner/repo + kind + number), so each forgery must FAIL CLOSED. A bare
# endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and
# prefix-injection variants.
for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection; do
if run_comment "$bad_mode"; then
echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
@@ -606,19 +568,4 @@ done
# issue_url (already exercised by Case 1's fresh-success), so the tightened check
# is not rejecting genuine writes.
# Case 13 (#991): the deployment's ROOT_URL is http:// while the repo remote is
# https://, so the provider returns an http:// issue_url for a record that is
# otherwise entirely correct. This is not a forgery — it is the provider's own
# truthful answer about a write that landed — and a scheme-strict comparison
# rejects it deterministically, on EVERY comment, converting a successful write
# into a reported failure. It must be ACCEPTED. Host, path, owner, repo, kind
# and number all remain strict; only the http/https distinction is relaxed.
run_comment url-scheme-downgrade
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 1)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
# The write really happened and was read back by exact id — this case passes
# through the same POST/GET chain as case 1, not around it.
grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments$" "$CURL_LOG"
grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/1$" "$CURL_LOG"
assert_no_temp_leak "url-scheme-downgrade"
echo "issue-comment.sh REST create + exact-id read-back regression passed"
@@ -436,19 +436,6 @@ elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-repo":
elif mode == "comment-url-suffix-injection":
# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/pulls/123") test would ACCEPT it.
pr_url = f"{_origin}/deceptive{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-port":
# #991 bound: an EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same
# host. Relaxing http-vs-https must NOT relax this.
pr_url = f"{_p.scheme}://{_p.hostname}:8443{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-non-web-scheme":
# #991 bound: ONLY http/https collapse; any other scheme stays distinguishing.
pr_url = f"ftp://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-scheme-downgrade":
# #991, and the only URL mode here that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo reached over
# https://. Same host, same path, correct record — a truthful provider
# answer about a comment that landed, not a forgery.
pr_url = f"http://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-mixed-case-slug":
# #875: EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG is taken verbatim from GITEA_API_BASE and can be
# mixed-case (e.g. "USC/uconnect"), but Gitea canonicalizes the returned
@@ -903,16 +890,11 @@ fi
assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-reuse"
# Cases 12-15 (#865 Blocker 3): a PR comment whose id/author/body are all correct
# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url does not belong to this PR must
# FAIL CLOSED. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host + explicit
# non-default port) and FULL path (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind +
# number); a bare endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host
# and prefix-injection variants. comment-url-wrong-port and
# comment-url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from the other
# side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port or a
# different scheme family.
for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo \
comment-url-suffix-injection comment-url-wrong-port comment-url-non-web-scheme; do
# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url is forged must FAIL CLOSED.
# Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and FULL path
# (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind + number); a bare endswith/suffix
# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo comment-url-suffix-injection; do
if run_review "$bad_mode" comment durable-body; then
echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
@@ -938,19 +920,6 @@ run_review comment-mixed-case-slug comment durable-body https://git.mosaicstack.
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
assert_no_temp_leak "comment-mixed-case-slug"
# Case 15c (#991): the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL is http:// while every client
# reaches it over https://, so the provider returns an http:// pull_request_url
# for a comment that is otherwise entirely correct. Same class as 15b — a
# legitimate provider response, not a spoof — and a scheme-strict compare
# rejects it on EVERY comment, deterministically. That is not a cosmetic false
# negative here: on a host where no seat can create a review OBJECT, this
# comment-form record is the only gate-16 evidence obtainable, and the wrapper
# refuses all of it while the comment sits durably on the PR. Host, path, owner,
# repo, kind and number stay strict; only http-vs-https is relaxed.
run_review comment-url-scheme-downgrade comment durable-body
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
assert_no_temp_leak "comment-url-scheme-downgrade"
# Case 16 (#865 ITEM 1, current-head TOCTOU): the PR head advances between the
# pre-submit head read (which pins the review) and the post-verify re-read. The
# review is genuinely created and verified as pinned to the OLD head, but the
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check-test-enumeration.sh — CI test-membership guard (#1017).
#
# CI reaches shell suites through two hand-enumerated surfaces:
# S1 packages/mosaic/package.json scripts."test:framework-shell"
# S2 .woodpecker/ci.yml direct `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/...` commands
#
# A hand-enumerated allowlist re-arms its own gap: a new suite never auto-joins,
# so the list silently under-runs the disk (17 of 39 suites were invisible when
# #1017 was filed). This guard makes that under-run impossible to do silently:
#
# FAIL when a suite-shaped file exists on disk and is neither enumerated on
# the UNION of both surfaces nor listed in the exclusions file.
# ("Enumerated", deliberately — F1/F2 on PR #1018 proved this guard sees
# NAMING, not reachability, and its words must not claim otherwise.)
# FAIL when either surface names a path that does not exist on disk
# (a rename manufactures a stale entry silently — checked BOTH directions).
# FAIL when an exclusion entry has no reason, names a path that is gone,
# names a path that is also enumerated (contradiction), or names a path
# outside the population (dead weight that looks like coverage).
#
# POPULATION PATTERN — a deliberate decision, stated per #1017's record:
# basename matches *test*.sh (contains "test", ends ".sh"). Deliberately BROAD:
# the strict `test-*.sh` prefix cannot even name three real boundary files
# (tmux/agent-send.test.sh — CI-run; orchestrator/smoke-test.sh;
# wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh), and three independent censuses
# handled that last file three different ways with no trace of the judgement.
# The broad pattern makes such files MEMBERS, so their disposition must be a
# signed exclusion, not an accident of the glob. The SAME pattern is applied to
# both sides of the comparison (disk and enumeration) — a comparison globbed two
# ways runs on two different populations. Scripts outside the pattern on both
# sides symmetrically (e.g. check-resident-budget.sh, verify-sanitized.sh) are
# check-scripts, not suites; their existence is still verified via the
# both-directions rule because every surface-named path must exist on disk.
#
# The surfaces are PARSED, never line-ranged: three seats independently
# mis-scoped hand-written line ranges against these files (#1017 thread). S1 is
# read via JSON + command-chain tokenization; S2 by extracting every
# packages/mosaic/framework/tools/ token wherever it appears in the file.
#
# Exclusions file format (framework/tools/quality/test-enumeration-exclusions.txt):
# <repo-relative-path> | <non-empty reason>
# Lines starting with # and blank lines are ignored. An exclusion is a recorded
# decision someone signed, not an omission nobody made.
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../../../../.." && pwd)"
while (( $# )); do
case "$1" in
--root) ROOT="$(cd "$2" && pwd)"; shift 2 ;;
*) echo "usage: check-test-enumeration.sh [--root <repo-root>]" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
PKG_JSON="$ROOT/packages/mosaic/package.json"
CI_YML="$ROOT/.woodpecker/ci.yml"
TOOLS_DIR="$ROOT/packages/mosaic/framework/tools"
EXCLUSIONS="$TOOLS_DIR/quality/test-enumeration-exclusions.txt"
for f in "$PKG_JSON" "$CI_YML"; do
[[ -f "$f" ]] || { echo "FAIL: required surface file missing: $f" >&2; exit 2; }
done
[[ -d "$TOOLS_DIR" ]] || { echo "FAIL: tools dir missing: $TOOLS_DIR" >&2; exit 2; }
fail_count=0
fail() { printf 'FAIL %s\n' "$1"; fail_count=$(( fail_count + 1 )); }
# in_population <repo-relative path> — the single pattern, used for BOTH sides.
in_population() {
local base; base="$(basename "$1")"
[[ "$base" == *test*.sh ]]
}
# --- Surface 1: package.json test:framework-shell, parsed, repo-relative -----
# Tokens are script paths iff they contain "/" and end .sh/.py; interpreter
# names and flags are skipped. Paths are relative to packages/mosaic/.
mapfile -t S1 < <(python3 - "$PKG_JSON" <<'PY'
import json, shlex, sys
cmd = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["scripts"].get("test:framework-shell", "")
seen = []
for seg in cmd.split("&&"):
for tok in shlex.split(seg):
if "/" in tok and (tok.endswith(".sh") or tok.endswith(".py")):
path = "packages/mosaic/" + tok
if path not in seen:
seen.append(path)
print("\n".join(seen))
PY
)
# --- Surface 2: ci.yml, every framework/tools token wherever it appears ------
# Comment lines (first non-whitespace char is #) are skipped BEFORE matching:
# commenting an invocation out is the most common way a suite actually gets
# disabled, and a raw-text regex would keep calling it enumerated (F1, 20155 on
# PR #1018 — demonstrated, not argued). Known residual limit: a path named only
# in a TRAILING comment on a live line still matches; no such line exists today
# and full fidelity would need a YAML parser the CI image does not ship.
mapfile -t S2 < <(grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#' "$CI_YML" \
| grep -oE 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+\.(sh|py)' | sort -u)
# --- Union, and its population-restricted view -------------------------------
declare -A ENUM=() ENUM_POP=()
for p in "${S1[@]:-}" "${S2[@]:-}"; do
[[ -n "$p" ]] || continue
ENUM["$p"]=1
in_population "$p" && ENUM_POP["$p"]=1
done
# --- Direction B: every surface-named path must exist on disk ----------------
for p in "${!ENUM[@]}"; do
[[ -f "$ROOT/$p" ]] || fail "STALE ENUMERATION: surfaces name '$p' but it does not exist on disk"
done
# --- Exclusions: parsed with the same rigor the enumeration gets -------------
declare -A EXCLUDED=()
if [[ -f "$EXCLUSIONS" ]]; then
lineno=0
while IFS= read -r line; do
lineno=$(( lineno + 1 ))
[[ "$line" =~ ^[[:space:]]*(#|$) ]] && continue
path="${line%%|*}"; reason="${line#*|}"
path="$(echo "$path" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//')"
reason="$(echo "$reason" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//')"
if [[ "$line" != *"|"* || -z "$reason" ]]; then
fail "EXCLUSION MISSING REASON: line $lineno ('$path') — an exclusion is a recorded decision someone signed"
continue
fi
if [[ ! -f "$ROOT/$path" ]]; then
fail "STALE EXCLUSION: line $lineno excludes '$path' which does not exist on disk"
continue
fi
if ! in_population "$path"; then
fail "EXCLUSION OUTSIDE POPULATION: line $lineno excludes '$path' which the population pattern does not name — dead weight that reads as coverage"
continue
fi
if [[ -n "${ENUM[$path]:-}" ]]; then
fail "CONTRADICTORY EXCLUSION: line $lineno excludes '$path' which the surfaces already enumerate"
continue
fi
EXCLUDED["$path"]=1
done < "$EXCLUSIONS"
fi
# --- Direction A: disk population must be enumerated or signed-excluded ------
disk_total=0
unlisted=0
while IFS= read -r f; do
rel="${f#"$ROOT"/}"
in_population "$rel" || continue
disk_total=$(( disk_total + 1 ))
if [[ -z "${ENUM_POP[$rel]:-}" && -z "${EXCLUDED[$rel]:-}" ]]; then
fail "UNENUMERATED: '$rel' exists on disk but is neither enumerated on any CI surface nor signed in the exclusions file"
unlisted=$(( unlisted + 1 ))
fi
done < <(find "$TOOLS_DIR" -type f -name '*.sh' | sort)
if (( fail_count > 0 )); then
printf 'enumeration guard: %d failure(s) — population %d, enumerated (in-population) %d, excluded %d\n' \
"$fail_count" "$disk_total" "${#ENUM_POP[@]}" "${#EXCLUDED[@]}"
exit 1
fi
printf 'enumeration guard: OK — population %d, enumerated (in-population) %d, excluded (signed) %d, surfaces name %d path(s), all present on disk\n' \
"$disk_total" "${#ENUM_POP[@]}" "${#EXCLUDED[@]}" "${#ENUM[@]}"
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# test-check-test-enumeration.sh — needles for the enumeration guard (#1017).
#
# Every failure mode the guard promises gets BOTH polarities:
# NEEDLE a fixture that MUST trip the guard, asserted on the guard's OWN
# words (--out) — exit 1 alone cannot distinguish "caught the rogue
# file" from "choked on the fixture".
# CONTROL a fixture that MUST pass. A guard that failed unconditionally
# would satisfy every needle here — the null-case defect the guard's
# own subject matter (#1017) exists to make impossible.
#
# The needles encode the specific errors that produced #1017's thread:
# n6 is the 20124 boundary file (a suite the strict prefix cannot name);
# n2b proves surface 2 is PARSED, not line-ranged (three seats mis-scoped
# hand-written ranges against ci.yml);
# n5/n7 keep the exclusions file honest so it cannot become the next silent cap;
# n8/c4 are F1 (20155): a commented-out ci.yml line is NOT enumeration —
# commenting-out is the most common way a suite actually gets disabled,
# and it must fail loud in one direction without false-staling the other.
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
GUARD="$HERE/check-test-enumeration.sh"
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
PASS=0; FAIL=0
# fixture <name> — a minimal repo root the guard accepts via --root:
# one suite enumerated on S1 (plus a naming-outlier suite, so the S1 parser's
# handling of non-prefix names is always exercised), one on S2, one check-script
# named on S2 that is outside the population, and an empty exclusions file.
fixture() {
local r="$TMP/$1"
mkdir -p "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git" \
"$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux" \
"$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts" \
"$r/.woodpecker"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-a.sh"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/outlier.test.sh"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-ci.sh"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify-thing.sh"
cat > "$r/packages/mosaic/package.json" <<'JSON'
{"scripts": {"test:framework-shell": "bash framework/tools/git/test-a.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/outlier.test.sh"}}
JSON
cat > "$r/.woodpecker/ci.yml" <<'YML'
steps:
sanitize:
commands:
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify-thing.sh
guard:
commands:
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-ci.sh
YML
: > "$r/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/test-enumeration-exclusions.txt"
printf '%s' "$r"
}
# expect <kind> <want-exit> <desc> [--out <substring>] -- <root>
expect() {
local kind="$1" want="$2" desc="$3"; shift 3
local need_out=""
while (( $# )); do
case "$1" in
--out) need_out="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--) shift; break ;;
esac
done
local root="$1" got=0 out
out="$(bash "$GUARD" --root "$root" 2>&1)" || got=$?
local why=""
[[ "$got" == "$want" ]] || why="wanted exit $want, got $got"
if [[ -z "$why" && -n "$need_out" && "$out" != *"$need_out"* ]]; then
why="exit $got as expected, but output never said: $need_out"
fi
if [[ -z "$why" ]]; then
printf ' PASS [%-7s] %s (exit %s)\n' "$kind" "$desc" "$got"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
else
printf ' FAIL [%-7s] %s — %s\n' "$kind" "$desc" "$why"
printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed 's/^/ | /'
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
fi
}
excl() { printf '%s\n' "$2" >> "$1/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/test-enumeration-exclusions.txt"; }
echo "=== c1: a fully consistent fixture passes ==="
R="$(fixture c1)"
expect CONTROL 0 "consistent tree: both surfaces enumerated, nothing unlisted" \
--out "enumeration guard: OK" -- "$R"
echo "=== n1: an on-disk suite reachable from no surface must fail ==="
R="$(fixture n1)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh"
expect NEEDLE 1 "unlisted suite is named in the failure" \
--out "UNENUMERATED: 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh'" -- "$R"
echo "=== n6: the 20124 boundary file — a suite the strict prefix cannot name ==="
R="$(fixture n6)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/rogue.test.sh"
expect NEEDLE 1 "naming-outlier suite (*.test.sh) is a population member, not invisible" \
--out "UNENUMERATED: 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/rogue.test.sh'" -- "$R"
echo "=== c3: a non-suite script outside the pattern is outside it on BOTH sides ==="
R="$(fixture c3)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/check-unrelated.sh"
expect CONTROL 0 "check-script on disk, unlisted, outside population: not the guard's business" \
--out "enumeration guard: OK" -- "$R"
echo "=== n2/n2b: a surface naming a path absent from disk must fail — both surfaces ==="
R="$(fixture n2)"
rm "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-a.sh"
expect NEEDLE 1 "S1 (package.json) stale entry" \
--out "STALE ENUMERATION: surfaces name 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-a.sh'" -- "$R"
R="$(fixture n2b)"
rm "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-ci.sh"
expect NEEDLE 1 "S2 (ci.yml) stale entry — proves ci.yml is parsed, not line-ranged" \
--out "STALE ENUMERATION: surfaces name 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-ci.sh'" -- "$R"
echo "=== c2: a rogue suite with a SIGNED exclusion passes, and is counted ==="
R="$(fixture c2)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh | non-hermetic pending fixture work (needle-suite specimen)"
expect CONTROL 0 "signed exclusion is honoured and visible in the summary" \
--out "excluded (signed) 1" -- "$R"
echo "=== n3: an exclusion with no reason is not a decision ==="
R="$(fixture n3)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh | "
expect NEEDLE 1 "empty reason rejected" --out "EXCLUSION MISSING REASON" -- "$R"
R="$(fixture n3b)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-rogue.sh"
expect NEEDLE 1 "missing separator rejected (the path alone is not a signature)" \
--out "EXCLUSION MISSING REASON" -- "$R"
echo "=== n4: an exclusion whose path is gone is stale, not satisfied ==="
R="$(fixture n4)"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-vanished.sh | was excluded once, then deleted"
expect NEEDLE 1 "stale exclusion rejected" --out "STALE EXCLUSION" -- "$R"
echo "=== n5: excluding an enumerated suite is a contradiction, not belt-and-braces ==="
R="$(fixture n5)"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-a.sh | already in CI but excluded anyway"
expect NEEDLE 1 "contradictory exclusion rejected" --out "CONTRADICTORY EXCLUSION" -- "$R"
echo "=== n8/c4: a commented-out ci.yml line is not enumeration (F1, 20155) ==="
R="$(fixture n8)"
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$R/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-disabled.sh"
printf ' # - bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-disabled.sh\n' >> "$R/.woodpecker/ci.yml"
expect NEEDLE 1 "suite named only in a commented-out invocation is UNENUMERATED" \
--out "UNENUMERATED: 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-disabled.sh'" -- "$R"
R="$(fixture c4)"
printf ' # - bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-vanished.sh\n' >> "$R/.woodpecker/ci.yml"
expect CONTROL 0 "comment naming an absent path raises no false stale-enumeration" \
--out "enumeration guard: OK" -- "$R"
echo "=== n7: excluding a file outside the population is dead weight, not coverage ==="
R="$(fixture n7)"
excl "$R" "packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify-thing.sh | not a suite but signing it anyway"
expect NEEDLE 1 "out-of-population exclusion rejected" --out "EXCLUSION OUTSIDE POPULATION" -- "$R"
echo
printf 'enumeration-guard needles: %d passed, %d failed\n' "$PASS" "$FAIL"
(( FAIL == 0 ))
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# test-enumeration-exclusions.txt — signed exclusions for check-test-enumeration.sh (#1017).
#
# Every entry is a recorded decision: a suite-shaped file that exists on disk,
# is NOT reachable from any CI surface, and carries the reason someone signed
# for that. The guard FAILS on an entry with no reason, a stale path, or a path
# the surfaces already enumerate. Burning an entry down = making it CI-reachable
# (package.json test:framework-shell or a ci.yml step) and deleting its line.
#
# Format: <repo-relative path> | <reason>
# All entries below were signed at #1017's filing base (main 826a8b3b, 2026-07-31)
# by pepper (sb-it-1-dt); measurements cited are one-run assertions from that seat.
# --- tools/git: the #1007 five — non-hermetic, resolve real credentials ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh | resolves real credentials (#1007 census); joins CI after the wrapper-half hermeticity fix (git -C scoping)
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh | resolves real credentials (#1007 census); joins CI after the wrapper-half hermeticity fix
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh | resolves real credentials (#1007 census); joins CI after the wrapper-half hermeticity fix
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh | resolves real credentials (#1007 census, fourth entry via family-grep); joins CI after the wrapper-half hermeticity fix
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh | resolves real credentials (#1007 census, fifth entry); joins CI after the wrapper-half hermeticity fix
# --- tools/git: push guards — measured green locally, CI-image fitness unverified ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-push-guard.sh | measured green at 826a8b3b (46 passed / 0 failed, one run, 2026-07-31); CI-image fitness unverified; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-mutate-push-guard.sh | measured green at 826a8b3b (8/0, 13 mutants killed 0 survived, one run, 2026-07-31); requires setsid (util-linux), absent from the alpine base image; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh | hermeticity unaudited — the unprotected suite in #1007's protected/unprotected split; audit before CI; #1017 burndown
# --- tools/git: unmeasured ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-verify-clean-clone.sh | unmeasured in CI image; asserts git file-mode (100644/755) semantics that need verification on the CI filesystem first; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh | unmeasured in CI image; stub-based (#701 regression harness), likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh | unmeasured in CI image; fixture-based (#546/#547 regression harness), likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
# --- tools/tmux: require a live tmux server ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh | requires a real tmux server on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (needs tmux in image or a signed permanent exclusion)
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its sibling)
# --- single-suite directories: unmeasured in CI ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh | unmeasured in CI image; stubs tmux via a fake bin dir, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/glpi/test-list-http-status.sh | unmeasured in CI image; stub-based (#807 regression harness), likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh | unmeasured in CI image; file-fixture based, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/woodpecker/test-ci-wait-exit-matrix.sh | unmeasured in CI image; drives ci-wait.sh against a stub pipeline-status.sh, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
# --- naming-boundary files the strict test-*.sh prefix cannot even name ---
# (#1017: three independent censuses handled the microtest file three different
# ways — editorial drop, structural exclusion, accidental inclusion — with no
# recorded judgement. These lines ARE that judgement, signed.)
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/smoke-test.sh | behavior smoke checks for coord continue/run workflows, run manually by orchestrator seats; unmeasured in CI; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh | #973 instrument self-test, run as a precondition of the validate-973 evidence procedure rather than as a standing CI suite; #1017 burndown candidate
@@ -529,7 +529,19 @@ cmd_run() {
echo "detector.sh: WARN — off-host liveness beacon emit failed (see beacon.sh); the off-host absence check remains the authoritative dead-man." >&2
fi
[ "$once" -eq 1 ] && break
sleep "$interval"
# Close the detector lock fd in the sleep child; otherwise an orphaned sleep
# keeps the single-instance flock (fd 9, taken at exec 9> above) alive after
# the detector parent dies. The lock is non-blocking (`flock -n`, above), so
# for as long as that sleep survives a replacement instance is REFUSED and
# exits rather than queueing. This particular hold is BOUNDED by one poll
# interval (WAKE_DETECTOR_INTERVAL, default 30s): when the orphaned sleep
# exits its copy of fd 9 closes, ending this bounded sleep-child hold. It
# does NOT follow that the next start succeeds — other inheritors of fd 9
# (the M1 adapter, M2 sink grandchildren) are outside this patch's scope and
# can keep holding the flock. The cost this removes is a restart window in
# which every supervisor retry fails on the sleep child's account.
# `9>&-` closes ONLY the child's copy — the parent's lock is unaffected.
sleep "$interval" 9>&-
done
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests && pnpm run test:framework-shell",
"test:framework-shell": "python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
"test:framework-shell": "bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh && bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-check-test-enumeration.sh && python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mosaicstack/brain": "workspace:*",