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mos-dt-0 205adc54dc docs(remediation): precondition (3) rewritten — the field must be LIVE in the executing wrapper; merging #1066 is not sufficient (D-51's class inside the remedy) 2026-08-05 18:36:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0 32799e6025 docs(remediation): precondition (4) closed on measurement — N=2 trailers both land in order; #1030 merge decision resolves to all-land 2026-08-05 18:31:23 -05:00
mos-dt-0 ba74ce4e48 docs(remediation): fourth #1030 merge precondition — N>1 trailer behaviour must be measured; no safe order exists with two non-poster authors 2026-08-05 18:25:31 -05:00
mos-dt-0 bd5afb0711 docs(remediation): D-55f addendum — the #1030 attribution floor is a measured accident, and the merger arm rests on an interim arrangement 2026-08-05 17:47:49 -05:00
mos-dt-0 6d92234422 docs(remediation): bank D-55f — self-merge silences the trailer generator; merger!=f10-coder joins #1030's merge preconditions 2026-08-05 17:45:56 -05:00
mos-dt-0 9f4b3716db docs(remediation): RM-02 round-5 verdict id 88 — two blockers remain, remediation dispatched to coder-mos2 2026-08-05 17:39:19 -05:00
mos-dt-0 1fa2d2ab21 docs(remediation): bank D-56 — the lane idled four days on a verdict that had already landed
Round-4 verdict id 73 (NO-GO @ fbb61912) landed 2026-08-01T18:12Z; remediation was pushed the same evening; the round-5 re-review dispatch was lost at the rotation seam and 'awaiting rev-974 verdict' was carried as fact for four days. Provider re-measured, round 5 dispatched (durable PR comment + verified tmux), board corrected. General form owned by Mos: a waiting-on-X state line decays like any other measurement and must be re-measured at rotation.
2026-08-05 17:32:32 -05:00
806b763d97 docs(remediation): D-55e settled — the anomaly was a merge commit, and this repo shares the exposure
#1041 was never a squash. Verified on this repo: #1027, #1033 and #1032 have ONE parent and end with
(#N); #1041 has TWO and begins "Merge pull request". A merge commit's author is whoever created the
merge — ordinary git, not an anomaly. The rows differed by merge style, not by field, estate, path or
account state, and the discriminator was one field nobody had read: parent count.

Established with zero exceptions across four rows, two estates, two Gitea instances and three repos:
squash merge sets author = poster and committer = merger.

Of the three candidate discriminators I offered, merge path was correct and I had ranked it first. The
3-to-1 split was explicitly refused as a verdict, which is why the real answer stayed findable — a
majority reported as a conclusion would have closed the question on the wrong side.

And the resolution exposed a larger live problem, on THIS repo: mosaicstack/stack has
default_merge_style = "merge", with both styles enabled and both in live use. The default path produces
a merge commit, which attributes to the merger and loses authorship more completely than squash —
squash at least keeps the poster in author, a merge commit keeps nobody. Same configuration as the USC
repos, so this is not a USC problem. Merge style is itself load-bearing for attribution and must be
explicit, never defaulted.

Hard merge precondition for #1030: merged by the default path it becomes a merge commit and erases the
poster as well as all three branch authors. It must be merged with an explicit squash style. The three
prior deliveries are 1-parent only because merge-gate hardcodes {"Do":"squash"} — that fixed payload,
criticised on the message-field axis, is protective on this one because it cannot silently fall to the
repo default.

Also confirmed here: default_delete_branch_after_merge = False, so the RM-02 branch retention is not on
a timer.

Co-authored-by: tl-mosaic <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 15:22:32 -05:00
4c1b2a1fda docs(remediation): bank D-55d — I measured both fields, analysed one, and hid the answer
The rule resolves on two fields: author = poster, committer = merger. Both roles are recorded, in
different fields. Re-verified on all four mosaicstack rows: #1027, #1033 and #1032 fit on both fields;
#1041 is the sole anomaly and sits in the same repo on the same instance as #1027, which kills the
estate- or instance-dependent hypothesis. No mechanism proposed — one anomalous row does not earn one.

My error is a third distinct variant of tonight's class. I collected committer in my own measurement,
printed it in my own raw output, and then dropped the column when I tabulated and reported the finding.
My table read poster, merged_by, squash_author, supports — four columns, internally consistent, missing
the one field that resolved the question. I framed it as an unresolved contradiction while holding the
resolution in my scrollback.

Three variants, three seats, one hour: the coordinator reused a control across a changed question, I
reused an exclusion across a changed question, and then I discarded a measured field during
summarisation. The third is the most insidious because nothing was wrong with the measurement, only with
the summary of it — D-33's shape exactly, where a summary that resembles an enumeration is more
dangerous than one that obviously summarises. A four-column table looks like the data.

Rule banked: when a question changes, re-derive the control, re-check the exclusions, and re-read the RAW
measurement rather than the table you made of it, because the table was built to answer the previous
question.

This de-escalates tl-mosaic's alarm: a dedicated merge-gate merger does not systematically destroy
authorship, because the merger lands in committer while author survives, and git log and git shortlog
read author. #1027 is the direct case. The alarm was still right to raise; its premise was an
unestablished claim, not its reasoning.

Also recorded as a blocking gap: installed pr-merge.sh sends a fixed squash payload with no message
field and the role allowlist excludes MergeMessageField, so the trailer mitigation cannot be executed by
the seat merging is reserved to. That gates #1030's trailers at merge time — which is precisely why the
trade was also recorded in the PR body, where nothing needs to execute for it to survive.

Co-authored-by: tl-mosaic <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 15:20:46 -05:00
e01cfd44cb docs(remediation): correct D-55 — "took the poster" is not established, and I discarded my own evidence
tl-mosaic found #1041 on mosaicstack/stack where poster == branch author == coder-mos2 and the squash
took NEITHER — it took the merger. Mos re-tested its own 22 and found 0 of 24 rows had poster !=
merged_by, so none could distinguish the hypotheses. Its own framing is the sharpest statement of the
class: a sample can be decisive for one question and empty for the next one asked of it.

I made the mirror error. I excluded #1033 and #1032 as non-discriminating and said so explicitly,
believing it made my evidence more careful. That exclusion was correct for "is the branch author
discarded?" — poster equalled branch author, so no loss was visible — and wrong for "poster or merger?",
where they discriminate cleanly because merged_by differs from the poster in both. I threw away my own
discriminating rows by carrying a classification forward across questions. Mos reused a control across
questions; I reused an exclusion.

Re-measured, and this is the first data separating poster from merger: #1027 poster mos-dt-0 / merger
Mos / author mos-dt-0 supports POSTER; #1033 and #1032 poster coder-mos1 / merger mos-dt-0 / author
coder-mos1 both support POSTER; #1041 poster coder-mos2 / merger mos-dt-0 / author mos-dt-0 supports
MERGER. Three to one, genuinely contradictory, one instance and one repo. Reported as contradictory data
rather than a majority verdict — 3-to-1 is a hypothesis to test, not a conclusion to adopt, and a third
factor such as merge path or a settings change is not excluded.

What survives is the half that matters and it is untouched: the branch commit author is discarded, at 29
discriminating rows across three repos and two estates. Every mitigation rests on that half.

Which is why Co-authored-by trailers are the only sound mitigation rather than belt-and-braces: they are
robust to all three hypotheses, and the withdrawn poster-equals-author rule would have failed #1041
outright, where the poster WAS the author and attribution was lost anyway.

Co-authored-by: tl-mosaic <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 15:18:23 -05:00
8f02b55b03 docs(remediation): bank D-55 — the squash discards branch authorship, and pre-merge gates cannot see it
Diagnosed by the USC orchestrator, not by me; I decline that credit and record it where it belongs. My
contribution was the independent mosaicstack confirmation on a discriminating row and the generalisation.

Confirmed on my own lane: PR #1027's branch was entirely f10-coder and its squash f58b3699 on main is
authored mos-dt-0, the poster. f10-coder's authorship of this mission's first delivery was erased and
replaced with mine. 23/23 discriminating across two estates, two Gitea instances, three repos. My other
two merges were non-discriminating and are excluded rather than counted — excluding rows that cannot
distinguish the hypotheses is what makes this evidence instead of a tally.

The generalisation, which is mine and bigger than authorship: every check we run pre-merge measures the
BRANCH, and main gets the SQUASH, so whatever the transform discards is invisible to every gate we have.
Open question on both boards: what else does the squash drop that no pre-merge gate observes?

Ruling corrected to trailers rather than posters, on two independent refutations from seats that checked
rather than agreed: posting-by-author would have forced a declining seat to file for work another
finishes, manufacturing a second false attribution to prevent the first; and it has no clean answer for
a multi-author branch. #1030 has three authors and no single correct poster.

Executed on #1030 before merge-gate rather than at the merge instant: three authors named with commit
counts, required Co-authored-by trailers written into the body verbatim, single-author limitation
stated, branch marked MUST-NOT-DELETE as the only provider-side record until trailers are confirmed.
Verified by read-back — head unmoved, trailers present, Fixes #1029 intact.

D-55b: two parties quoting a third is not corroboration. The coordinator restated the orchestrator's
panel-green as though verified while unable to reach the panel host at all; tl-uconnect caught it. That
sharpens redundant observation — redundancy requires independent ACCESS TO THE EVIDENCE, not independent
voices, and restatement is nearly undetectable downstream because it is indistinguishable from a second
observation. Ask what each party could actually see.

D-55c: the mis-attribution to me was not D-53's sender label. It was one file to five recipients with
the finding addressed as "your attribution finding" — in a broadcast, second person is undefined, so
every recipient correctly read it as theirs. The coordinator had recorded that exact rule as doctrine an
hour earlier and then committed it, in the message announcing that a merge machine loses people's
credit. Declining the credit was load-bearing: had it stood, the record of who found the attribution bug
would have been wrong in exactly the way the bug is wrong.

Co-authored-by: f10-coder <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 15:13:31 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 aa4b584764 docs(remediation): bank D-54 — independent convergence from USC, plus fail-closed-is-not-fail-silent
A USC governance spec reached this pane as a role-addressed cc. Not my estate, no action taken, nothing
in it constrains mosaicstack. But it converges on three principles this mission paid for in blockers,
reached by different people solving a different problem.

Their clause B — the allowlist is data the validator reads, never data it or the validated party writes,
git-tracked and reviewed-PR only, because "a validator whose permitted set can be influenced by the
thing it validates is not a validator" — is our D-45 five-arrival principle in one line, and it is
RM-02 blocker 2 exactly: REQUIRED_GATE_INVENTORY was a mutable constant inside the PR-controlled
verifier. Their clause D, rejecting all on an unreachable or empty allowlist so the bounded shape cannot
be defeated by making its source unavailable, is our D-46. Their clause E, exact membership with no
"close enough" branch, is our D-40.

Independent convergence is the strongest signal available — the same weight this mission gave two
planners agreeing without collusion.

And they carry a refinement we lack, now adopted into RM-02's (d)-strict exclusion work: fail-closed is
not the same as fail-silent. "Read OK, owner absent" rejects quietly and is normal; "could not read or
empty while enforcing" must reject AND alarm, because a missing allowlist in production is an incident.
Our D-46 makes non-emptiness a precondition but never said the precondition's own failure must be loud.
A registry rejecting everything because its population vanished looks identical from outside to a
registry with nothing to do — D-23's inert guard wearing the opposite mask, a false quiet rather than a
false green.

Also worth keeping: seed the allowlist in an audited commit BEFORE switching to enforcing mode, or
fail-closed rejects every legitimate owner at cutover. The same ordering trap applies to any gate we
move from advisory to blocking.

Routing: this is the second role-addressed message hours after D-53 made seat-addressing doctrine, so
the doctrine has not reached installer-7. Recurrence of a just-banked defect is evidence about
propagation, not about the rule — the same gap as D-51, where a fix that exists is not a fix that has
arrived.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 14:55:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2a9360407b docs(remediation): bank D-53 — a sender label that was wrong for hours while looking exactly right
agent-send.sh derived the sender label from the DESTINATION socket flag, so cross-socket messages were
stamped with an arbitrary session from the socket the sender was not attached to. One lead's messages
arrived for hours stamped as the recipient. Fixed on main; source now comes from the caller's own $TMUX.

The label was false and plausible simultaneously, which is the only dangerous kind — a garbled label
gets questioned, a label naming a real seat on a real socket does not. Same family as D-33's summary
that resembles an enumeration and D-48's boundary statement that reads as rigorous.

The transferable part is the fix's design choice: it now reports "?" rather than borrowing a plausible
name. That is the same discipline as NOT-MEASURED, adopted the same day on the credential thread —
absent must be rendered absent, not as a pass and not as a fail. An unknown rendered as a plausible
value is consumed as fact; an unknown rendered as unknown is consumed as a question. Two subsystems,
one day, same conclusion, independently.

Audited my ledger on receipt: clean, zero mis-attributed sources in TASKS.md or BOARD.md. The reason is
practice rather than luck — rulings were recorded from the message BODY, which carried its own
[mos-claude -> mos-remediation] header, not from the transport envelope. Where a message
self-identifies, the body is the claim and the envelope is metadata, and the envelope was the broken
part.

Routing defect now doctrine: the USC message was addressed to "orchestrator", a ROLE that exists on
each estate, and agent-send resolves a session NAME. Binding rule: address seats, not roles, and
estate-qualify any name that exists on both estates. The cost was bounded only because the recipient
declined to act on another estate's delivery while still checking whether any line of it constrained
its own — declining to act but silently letting a stale cross-estate constraint ride would have been
the actual failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 14:52:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2922aa152d docs(remediation): coder-mos1 extends the instrument-servicing trap to manufactured work
Restating the canonical credential model, coder-mos1 added that identity is confirmed on the NEXT
NATURAL authored artifact, "never by creating a probe write solely to service the instrument."

Mos named the trap as scope-widening to make an instrument green. The seat generalised it: manufacturing
work to feed an instrument is the same family. Do not alter the system — its permissions or its history
— to satisfy a measurement. A probe write exists only to be measured, so what it proves is that the
instrument can be fed, not that the property holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 12:02:57 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 7fc7fa1a25 docs(remediation): amend the credential ruling — the widening is withdrawn, and my lean was wrong
tl-mosaic's split is adopted and it partially reverses (a). Two of the three reasons did not survive:
the read-back doctrine mandates reading back the AUTHORED ARTIFACT, whose author field is readable under
existing repo scopes, so identity-on-authoring never needed read:user; and "read-only, marginal
privilege" is true but is not a justification, because cheap is not the same as needed.

The named trap is a fleet-wide scope widening performed to make an instrument green — the tail wagging
the dog, same family as buying admin read to answer the wrong question more authoritatively.

My error is the sharper one and I am recording it as mine. I recommended (a), and my stated reason was
verbatim the discredited one: read-only on the actor's own identity, converts an unverifiable property
into a one-command self-check. Worse, I had already written the correct answer as my own option (b) —
the authored-artifact read-back — and reached past it for the widening because it made the check
mechanical. Having the right answer in hand and preferring the one that services the instrument is the
whole failure. tl-mosaic caught what neither Mos nor I did.

The amended split: CAPABILITY is the in-scope probe plus differential — this seat's D-11b check,
canonical and unchanged. IDENTITY is /user where the token holds read:user, and otherwise NOT-MEASURED,
which is neither pass nor fail; a seat lacking read:user is correctly provisioned, not defective.
NOT-MEASURED is the resolution of the whole class — P-WRAPPER-001's tri-state applied to measurement
itself. The false negative existed because a missing measurement was scored as a failure.

The MISMATCH class closes at mint time instead, at zero runtime scope cost: the minting authority holds
admin scopes and reads back the principal at mint, asserting filename-vs-principal once, at the only
moment a mismatch can be created. coder-mos1's criterion is replaced rather than repaired, no re-mint;
it was correctly provisioned throughout.

Also ratified: a pre-registered check whose premise has died is an active pressure toward breaking
working code. Amending it before it runs, in writing, with the premise-change named, is the only honest
handling — the original arm would have been satisfied by seats that were never broken, so a false red
was traded for a real test. That completes the pre-registration principle by naming its one legitimate
amendment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 12:01:49 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 b66d1858e1 docs(remediation): bank the credential resolution — four seats were misclassified, not one
Mos ruled (a): re-mint with read:user, fleet-wide pattern change. The finding was bigger than I framed
it. The same misreading had classified all FOUR seats in the credential reconciliation as REJECTED, and
all four tokens were valid — the server itemises the token's scopes in the 403 body, which is itself
proof the request authenticated, and repos/search returned 200 under all four. A genuinely dead token
returns 401, control-proved. Retractions delivered; all four resumed authoring.

What made this rulable before an incident rather than after one: the near-escalation on f10-coder was
caught and BANKED rather than shrugged off, and coder-mos1's 401/403 control completed it. A finding
recorded from a near-miss is what turned four wrongly-held seats into a same-day fix.

Standard seat token pattern becomes write:issue, write:repository, read:user. read:user is read-only
and about the actor itself — the marginal privilege is exactly the identity the read-back doctrine
already requires every authoring seat to verify, and least-privilege that blinds identity
self-verification fights the mission's own controls.

(a) and (b) answer different questions and both stay: read:user proves who you are, authored-artifact
read-back proves the write landed under that identity, which read:user alone cannot. Read-back remains
mandatory on authoring operations.

D-45 discipline preserved and recorded: the seat was told not to widen its own scope to make its check
pass, and the widening was the coordinator's decision made at the coordinator level. An audited party
must never relax its own audit — the fix is that someone else relaxes it, deliberately, on the record.

Adopted into doctrine on main: /user is a bad capability probe for least-privilege token classes, the
capability differential on an in-scope operation enters the seat-provisioning checklist, and verdict
classification happens on the error body, never the status code alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 11:58:50 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 673fbdb978 docs(remediation): complete the D-11b addendum with coder-mos1's status-code control
The advisory on coder-mos1 is retracted and the hold released; the token was valid all along and the
403 was a scope refusal on /user, not an authentication rejection.

coder-mos1 contributed the piece neither Mos nor I had. My differential proves capability but cannot
tell a BROKEN credential from a NARROW one, and that distinction is exactly what a credential advisory
turns on. Its addition: a genuinely invalid token returns 401, while a scope refusal returns 403 with a
required-scope body. So body-aware classification plus an invalid-token 401 control settles credential
validity without needing read:user at all.

A status code read as a bare number cannot distinguish "wrong key" from "right key, narrow door", and
reading it as a bare number nearly cost an escalation on f10-coder and an indefinite silent hold on
coder-mos1 on the same day. A held seat is externally indistinguishable from an idle one, which is what
makes that false negative expensive.

Also banked: capability and identity are separate conditions with different evidence and neither
substitutes for the other. coder-mos1 held that line in its own release criterion after I had corrected
only the capability half, and refused to widen its own token scope to make a check pass — which would
have been D-45, an audited party relaxing its own audit.

read:user is an enhancement for mechanical self-checking, not a repair. The classification belongs in
the seat-provisioning checklist rather than only in this ledger.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 11:54:38 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8fe14d8e1a docs(remediation): RM-02 round-4 narrowing in review at e910a45a; D-48's failure mode now has a control
The wording ruling holds: the required sentence is verbatim in the baseline and its control, and every
remaining use of "protected" refers to RM-60's external boundary rather than the local baseline. The
history claim reads "structurally incapable of asserting history provenance".

I verified the negative control by making the overclaim myself: clean exits 0, and injecting
"protected, independently anchored" into the baseline purpose exits 84 with INVENTORY_CLAIM_OVERSTATED.
D-48 was an overstated boundary claim that three of us approved; that exact failure mode is now caught
mechanically rather than by attention.

Review dispatched with N2 as the sharpest check: the overclaim control is itself PR-controlled, so can
it be weakened or reworded so an overstatement passes? This PR's history is that every fix relocates the
defect one level down, so the reviewer is asked to assume it did again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 15:28:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 dde38717dd docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 narrowing review — N2 asks if the honesty control is itself honest
Registered at e910a45a before any reviewer read the diff. Verified first, so the set does not re-spend:
the narrowing sentence is verbatim in both the baseline and its control; the overclaim control fires
(clean exit 0, injected "protected, independently anchored" exit 84 INVENTORY_CLAIM_OVERSTATED); CI
2201 is 10/10 with the machine check bound and clean. D-48's failure mode is now mechanically caught.

N1 and N2 are the sharp checks. N1: the control only inspects the files it inspects, so is the claim
honest everywhere else — docs, comments, observations, CLI output? N2: the overclaim control is itself
PR-controlled, so can it be weakened or reworded so an overstatement passes? If it can, D-52 is re-armed
one level down, which is the recursion this PR has produced at every round. N3 asks whether it detects
semantic overclaim or only literal strings.

H2 and H3 re-check the two traps I found in the code by reading it, because they are the way (d) turns
back into a green: emitting the unverifiable state as an observation exits 0, and coverageBoundary
exclusion is declared rather than enforced. H4 requires the corrected residual, not the D-48 wording.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 15:27:38 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d9207d4c1a docs(remediation): bank D-52 — the fifth arrival defeated both the orchestrator and the coordinator
coder-mos2 built blocker 2's "protected/base artifact" fix, ran independent code AND security review on
its own fix, and returned HIGH CWE-353 against its own work: the baseline is not protected because
verifier, manifest, baseline, tests and lifecycle code are all PR-controlled, so rewriting them
consistently self-certifies. It stopped rather than invent a fourth local anchor.

Both of us authored the error in the same turn. I dispatched blocker 2 as "must come from a
protected/base artifact"; Mos ruled blockers 2+3 fixable in-PR; and the same brief told the seat that
blocker 1 had no local fix because PR code executes before the gate. My own pre-registered P2 had
already named it — the seven required gate IDs are an anchor list, and if the author can edit it that
is D-45 one level in. I registered the check, rev-974 confirmed it as a blocker, and I dispatched a
remediation reproducing it one level down.

That is the strongest evidence the principle is real: it defeats the people who wrote it, every time,
until the anchor is external. Knowing the rule does not protect you from it.

Ruled (b) honest narrowing, and the sibling distinction is what makes it correct rather than a
climbdown. Blocker 1's local check can be vacuously passed — seam=HEAD certifies over nothing — so the
claim is REMOVED. Blocker 2's baseline genuinely detects accidental drift and fails only against an
adversary rewriting baseline, manifest and verifier consistently, so the claim is NARROWED and the
check kept. Accidental drift is most real-world drift.

The wording is the whole ruling, because this is D-48 territory and neither seat may repeat it: no
"protected" or "independently anchored" over a same-checkout baseline, positive claim and adversarial
gap in the same breath, plus a negative control that goes RED if the check ever claims protection it
does not have.

Increment trajectory surfaced to Jason: two RM-02 anchors now require RM-60 and each thins the
(d)-strict increment. If a third needs the same boundary the increment may thin past worth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 14:43:09 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 33caf78744 docs(remediation): bank D-51 — merged, closed, and the running tool is still broken
#1032 merged 58b971ab and #1019 closed, both verified by property. RM-03 is delivered to main. And the
guard that actually executes on this host is unchanged: installed 291 lines with ZERO occurrences of
ASSERTED_NOT_READY, main 482 lines with five. Differing SHA-256. Measured, not inferred — the installed
guard contains none of the tri-state logic.

This is the install-drift disease the postmortem indicts, caught in the act on the mission's own fix.
Every completion signal is green — merged PR, closed issue, terminal CI, merge-gate GO — and the defect
is still live in the thing that runs. D-23's origin was an assumed-propagated-but-didn't guard; this is
that origin reproduced by the delivery of its own remedy.

Merge is not delivery for tool changes. Rules banked from Mos: propagate only via the canonical path
(mosaic upgrade / deploy pipeline), never a hand-copy that could diverge while appearing to fix it; the
installed guard stays zero-information until re-sync, so every state=unknown exit 0 this mission logged
remains correctly uncited; and on re-sync VERIFY THE PROPERTY by running the installed guard against a
known-red pipeline to confirm it exits non-zero and blocks. Closing this by assuming the upgrade worked
would reproduce D-23 a third time.

Generalises: every framework/tool change this mission delivers has the same main-to-installed gap. It
belongs on the completion checklist for tool-affecting tasks and mechanically on RM-63 — the same
systemd-service architecture that mechanises rotation also mechanises propagation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:57:24 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 1aedf32523 docs(remediation): RM-03 gate-ready, RM-02 round 4 to coder-mos2
RM-03 #1032 freshened onto post-RM-61 main and re-cleared at 868b9b87: review 74 APPROVED bound to the
exact head, CI 2199 9/9 including clone, mergeable true. The deliverable is proven against production
rather than asserted — rev-974 invoked the exact-head ci-queue-wait.sh itself against isolated provider
fixtures and got exit 3 with ASSERTED_NOT_READY on terminal failure, no-status, malformed payload and
an indeterminate neutral status, plus timeout 124 on pending. D-23 said the guard returns pass for
every possible input; that is now false at this head. Merge-gate assigned, Jason's approval standing.

My own spot-check went further than the range-diff I asked for: ci-queue-wait.sh and pr-merge.sh blobs
are byte-identical across the old approved head and this one, so no guard implementation moved in the
rebase — the only delta is commit 1's additive test enumeration, a union preserving both sides.

RM-02 round 4 dispatched to coder-mos2, a fresh dedicated identity at 0.5% context, so no D-41
manual-respawn problem. I asserted its capability differentially before dispatch per my own D-11b
addendum rather than accepting it on report: authenticated push True, unauthenticated False.

Its brief carries the two traps I found by reading the code, both binding, because the first is how
anyone would naturally build (d): emitting the unverifiable state as an observation exits 0, and
coverageBoundary.excluded is schema-validated but not enforced. The claim goes away rather than being
annotated, and the exclusion needs a must-fail control or it is a gate with no proven failure path.
It also carries the CORRECTED residual — no local git state is trustworthy because PR code executes
before the gate — not the D-48 wording three of us approved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:55:29 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0d5aae2c84 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-03 #1032 re-review at the freshened head 868b9b87
Registered before the reviewer read the diff. Review 66 and the merge-gate GO are void at the new head
per D-50; Jason's approval is standing and executes once this re-gates.

Verified independently first so the review does not re-spend on it: range-diff shows commits 2-5
patch-equivalent with only commit 1 differing, and that difference is the test:framework-shell chain
resolved as a union preserving main's terminal-green contract harness AND all four RM-03 suites plus
the pre-existing branch-absent test. Nothing dropped either way. CI 2199 is 9/9 including clone, the
machine check is bound and clean, and mergeable is now true.

R1 is the deliverable: the guard must actually FAIL on asserted non-readiness. RM-03 exists because the
queue guard is zero-information — it returns pass for every possible input — so proving its tests pass
is not the same as proving the guard can fail. R2 is the risk: confirm no queue-guard semantic moved in
the rebase, because one resolved quietly re-breaks exactly what this fixes. R4 checks the tri-state can
represent an indeterminate result without presenting it as a pass, which is the defect verbatim
(state=unknown exit 0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:44:44 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 08f706b675 docs(remediation): bank D-50 (a GO has a shelf life) and file RM-63 (systemd-managed fleet)
D-50: #1032 carried review 66 APPROVED and a merge-gate GO both bound to 78ec47cd, and by the time
Jason approved the merge it reported mergeable=false. Verified from the provider: its head does not
contain current main f4fd5967. Two rules we already hold, neither wrong alone, combine badly — a
verdict is commit-bound and voids when the head moves, and main drifts while a PR is held, so resolving
the drift moves the head and voids the verdict that was waiting to be used. Holding it across the whole
#1033 saga is what did it.

The asymmetry worth noting: usually a head moves because the AUTHOR pushed, so the void follows from
their action. Here nobody touched the PR — unrelated progress invalidated it — which is why it is easy
to miss and needs a checklist line rather than vigilance. Mos's line: a GO has a shelf life, re-gate on
main-drift.

RM-63 files Jason's architecture as the mechanization of D-41/RM-50/RM-58/P-LIFECYCLE rather than a new
island: durably-named systemd agent services with lanes, where restart triggers a continuation and the
agent resumes its lane, combined with DB-centric task assignment on the PG spine for autonomous pickup.
That is the enforcement surface D-41 proved missing — a managed service can be watched (token budget,
which is D-49's mechanical ceiling monitor), restarted (rotation, retiring our manual respawns) and
continued (rehydrate from the DB). It closes the f10-coder ceiling gap directly: Jason confirmed that
ceiling was not mechanically flagged and must be.

#1032 freshening dispatched to coder-mos1 — it authored the queue guard, so that context is an asset,
and by D-49 it can still take a lane at 67%. Told to stop and flag on any SUBSTANCE conflict, because a
queue-guard semantic resolved quietly re-breaks the very thing RM-03 fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:31:33 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eae62a598a docs(remediation): bank D-48 (a boundary statement that was wrong) and D-49 (idle is not available)
D-48 is Mos's error, banked in Mos's words at Mos's request, and renumbered from the D-46 he suggested
because that number is already the empty-registry finding — the ledger is the primary product and a
duplicated number corrupts it.

Three seats shipped and approved "sound against an author who cannot rewrite main; residual =
compromised main; owner Builds 1-2". A1 does not rewrite main; it repoints a local remote-tracking ref
with one unprivileged git update-ref, which I reproduced in seconds. So the documented residual
described an exotic threat while the real one is trivial. Stating a boundary is not the same as stating
it correctly, and an understated residual is worse than none because it reads as rigorous. Everyone
checked a both-directions statement EXISTED; nobody checked it was TRUE. That is D-19's own move 2
performed with wrong content, and the third distinct way the render/verify principles have failed
inside their own enforcers.

And the correct answer was already written down. f10-coder's handoff holds the wrong claim at line 21
and, at line 29, the suspicion that overturns it — that provider-target ref selection may be
influenced by CI checkout/fetch configuration, marked honestly as unverified. rev-974 then found
exactly that. Had anyone run the suspicion down, D-48 would not have shipped. Requirement banked on
RM-02/RM-34: a labelled suspicion that contradicts a shipped claim must BLOCK that claim until
falsified. Suspicions are currently recorded and ignored, which makes honest labelling free of
consequence — where one targets a boundary or integrity claim it is a pre-registered check nobody ran.

D-49 refines the parking rule and supersedes the rationale of the coder-mos1 (c) ruling: the threshold
is not "is the seat idle" but "can it still take the next lane". f10-coder was idle with work pushed
and frozen, which reads as safe, but at 97.4% could not have taken the remediation the pending verdict
was about to require. Rotating on that asymmetry was the only clean boundary available.

The detection was discipline, not a mechanism — I was not watching seat context in real time and Mos
caught it on a manual sweep. Requirement on RM-58/P-LIFECYCLE/the coordinator daemon: the coordinator
watches token budget across seats and pre-empts at threshold, so a keystone seat's ceiling is never
found by a failed round or a lucky sweep. Interim we both sweep; the mechanism retires the sweep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:20:23 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 267b58deb3 docs(remediation): RM-02 round-3 review dispatched at fbb61912 — anchor verified against ground truth
The derived boundary f4fd5967 equals an independently computed git merge-base HEAD
refs/remotes/origin/main. It is the same value f10-coder once set by hand: the value was never wrong,
the authority was. That is exactly why Mos insisted A6 be separated from A4 — asking only whether the
value was right would have closed this three rounds ago with the hole intact.

Empty-registry attack now fails in the precondition's own language. The both-directions bootstrap
statement is in the code with the residual bound to Builds 1-2, per D-19's third mandatory move.

Exact-head CI 2198: 10 children all success including clone and gate-verify; my machine check exits 0
bound to the head with anomalies 0, and a wrong-head negative control exits 1. exempted_steps is 0 this
run because ci-postgres succeeded, so the #1000 exemption was present but unneeded.

Review dispatched with A1 and P2 as the sharp checks: both ask whether this fix REMOVED the author's
control point or moved it again. refs/remotes/origin/main is a local ref, and the seven required gate
IDs are an anchor list. Five for five so far, every blocker on this PR came from outside the registered
set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:00:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e2058d4e84 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 anchor-round review — A1/P2 ask if the control point moved again
Registered at fbb61912 before any reviewer read the diff. I reproduced three things first so the review
does not re-spend on them: the derived boundary equals an independently computed git merge-base HEAD
origin/main (f4fd5967 — the same value f10-coder once set by hand, now derived rather than asserted);
emptying the registry populations fails with the precondition's own language; the both-directions
bootstrap statement is present with the Builds 1-2 residual.

A1 and P2 are the sharp ones and they ask the same question the last two rounds answered badly: did the
fix REMOVE the author's control point or MOVE it? A1 — refs/remotes/origin/main is a local ref; who
controls it where the gate runs, and can an author rewrite remote.origin.url or craft that ref in their
own clone? P2 — the seven required gate IDs are an anchor list; if the author can edit it, that is D-45
one level in. A4 asks about the natural failure mode of this fix, over-inclusion causing false reds.

P3 independently confirms the production fixture-profile bypass the author found and removed in their
own pre-commit review — self-disclosed, so it gets verified rather than credited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:43:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4430e60d84 docs(remediation): RM-02 round 3 dispatched — board de-staled, under budget
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:09:58 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4520d2f672 docs(remediation): promote two first-class principles to the charter; dispatch RM-02 round 3
Mos ruled both open questions and promoted the pattern to the charter.

PRINCIPLE 1 — the anchor must live outside the audited party's authority. You cannot fix "the author
controls X" by deriving X from something the author also controls; deriving only MOVES the control
point. Third independent arrival of one conclusion, each reached while shipping something else and each
from a different direction: the manifest certifying its own tree (D-19), the sandbox evaluating code
that enters before the boundary exists (D-25), and now the registry seam derived from a path the author
also places (D-45). Three impossibility-derivations of the same conclusion is the strongest
architectural evidence this mission has produced, and it is what forces Builds 1-2 rather than making
them a preference.

PRINCIPLE 2 — no universally-quantified check may pass over an empty set. "All registered cases ran" is
vacuously true when there are none. Non-emptiness and anchoring are preconditions asserted before the
quantified check runs, not properties hoped for after. The identical vacuity appeared twice at two
levels — seam=HEAD emptied the commit range, an emptied manifest emptied the registry population — and
the first was fixed as an instance, so it returned one level up. Corollary, same disease: a clause
written for the instance that produced it is not a clause.

Q1 ruled: the merge-base anchor IS in scope for f10-coder in this PR. It is git-computable against
main, which the author does not control, so reordering or splitting within the branch cannot move it —
an existing non-author-controlled reference, no new infrastructure. RM-60's execution boundary is a
sibling under the same principle but a different mechanism (where gate-verify runs, not what the anchor
is) and stays with Mos and Jason. Honesty required in both directions: the merge-base anchors to main,
whose integrity rests on the merge discipline this registry enforces — a bootstrap, sound against an
author who cannot rewrite main and NOT sound against an attacker who can, with that residual bound to
the Builds 1-2 dependency rather than implied.

Q2 ruled: state the empty-set principle as a general clause now, and generalize the D-38/D-40 criteria
the same way — quantify over the population instead of relabeling the originating instances.

Round 3 dispatched to f10-coder: merge-base anchor plus delayed-introduction must-fail; empty-set
precondition as a general clause with an emptied-registry must-fail; generalized clauses bound across
the gate inventory; each red-first. Number.isInteger accepting zero/negative/unsafe pipeline numbers
banked as a non-blocking follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:08:21 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 09875143c0 docs(remediation): roll D-11 capability/identity bullets to the ledger (D-43: roll out, never reword)
Third application of D-43's rule today. Those two bullets restated D-11/D-11a/D-11b, which live
authoritatively in TASKS.md, so they were a second copy waiting to go stale. Rolled verbatim; the board
keeps a pointer plus the one operational line that is not a restatement — assert the differential as
that seat, because a single endpoint can be true for anyone or 403 for an unrelated scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:05:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 08cb73fde3 docs(remediation): bank D-45/D-46/D-47 — the fix moved the author's control point instead of removing it
Second NO-GO on the keystone at 32b490a7. The pattern is the finding, not the three blockers.

D-45: round 1 the author set activationCommit as a field, so we derived it; round 2 the derivation
depends on WHEN the author introduces gates/gates.manifest.json. rev-974 committed a gate change before
adding the manifest — deriveHistoryBoundary picked that commit as activation, the prospective list held
only the later introduction, and verifyHistory returned no failures. The three registered seam controls
cannot catch it because they compare candidates against whatever introduction the author selected: they
validate the choice, not the choosing. You cannot fix "the author controls X" by deriving X from
something the author also controls. That is D-19/D-25 verbatim — the anchor must live outside the
audited party's authority — arriving a third time, now inside the keystone, and it is exactly why
Builds 1-2 are forced rather than preferred.

D-46: I reproduced it myself. Emptying criteria, gates, proseClaims and compatibilityScenarios — 17, 7,
8 and 2 entries — and pointing gateRoots at an empty directory yields EXIT 0, reporting "all registered
cases ran from this checkout" and "open behavior deltas: 0". "All registered cases ran" is vacuously
true over an empty set. The registry can be reduced to nothing and still report green.

D-45 and D-46 are the same defect at two levels: vacuity through emptiness. Empty the commit range or
empty the registry population — either way a universally-quantified check over an empty set passes.
seam=HEAD was the first instance and we fixed it AS an instance; the principle was never extracted, so
it came back one level up. Proposed general clause pending Mos: no universally-quantified registry
check may pass over an empty set — non-emptiness and anchoring are preconditions, not properties.

D-47: the new criteria are still instance-scoped. RM02-EVIDENCE-SUBJECT-BINDING covers only provider
evidence identity, not whether every registered gate binds evidence to its subject; RM02-TYPE-STRICT-
SCHEMA covers registry schema fields, not each gate's own discriminators. Do not relabel the
originating instances as the general clauses.

Dispatch PAUSED for the first time this session: the fix needs a non-author-controlled anchor, which
touches the provider/merge-base boundary and is adjacent to RM-60, which Mos and Jason own. Asked Mos
whether that anchoring is in scope for f10-coder here or crosses into RM-60, and whether the empty-set
principle becomes a general clause now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:04:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 24a7915633 docs(remediation): stop item 1 restating the In-flight table — it went stale 3x by duplicating it
Item 1 has now gone stale three separate times in one session, every time for the same reason: it
restated lane state that the In-flight table already owns. That is D-26's class (restatement is lossy
every time) and D-43's mechanism (a second copy is a second thing to go stale). Fixing the wording a
fourth time would just buy another few hours.

So it no longer carries lane state at all — it points at the table and keeps only the two things that
are NOT restatements: read the table, and re-derive any board claim from the provider before
load-bearing use, because the board is sole-written and has no independent verifier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:49:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e1a3806292 docs(remediation): RM-02 re-review dispatched at 32b490a7; RM-61 exemption load-bearing for the first time
All four D-44 silent-defeat paths remediated in one hardening pass. I re-ran three of the four attacks
myself and they are dead: activationCommit injection is rejected as an author-controlled field with the
boundary now derived from the registry introduction (0b4aa475); the misspelled outputPatern is rejected
as an unknown field by the recursive schema; the global cross-commit duplicate-pipeline check is
present. Three new criteria registered with bound cases.

Exact-head CI 2197 is the notable one: pipeline success with 10 children, 9 success and 1 genuine
FAILURE — ci-postgres, type service, exit_code 0, exact #1000 teardown signature. The RM-61 exemption
fired for real on a gate-ready decision for the first time. I ran the machine check myself (exit 0,
terminal-green, exempted_steps 1, correct exemption id) and a negative control on the same record with
a wrong expected head (exit 1, not-terminal-green, exempted_steps 0). Both halves of RM-61 — the
signature-scoped exemption and the subject binding — demonstrated in a single run.

The pre-registered ACs deliberately do not re-check what I reproduced; they attack the FIX, because
every round on this mission the remediation introduced the next hole. H1 asks whether the new
derivation's inputs are author-controlled, S1 whether the schema closure is a class or an enumeration,
C2 whether the new criteria are clauses or just their originating instances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:48:33 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 72b577eb85 docs(remediation): pre-register the RM-02 hardening re-review — attack the FIX, not the original bug
Registered at 32b490a7 before any reviewer read the diff. I verified three of the four attacks are dead
by re-running them myself: injecting activationCommit=HEAD now yields "author-controlled
activationCommit is forbidden; history boundary is derived from the registry introduction"; the
misspelled outputPatern is rejected as an unknown field by the recursive schema; the global
cross-commit duplicate check is present. The three criteria are registered with caseRefs 1/3/3.

So the AC set does not spend itself re-checking what I already reproduced. Every round on this mission
the remediation introduced the next hole — the commit-binding fix shipped a type confusion, the
type-strict fix was clean but the registry around it had four defeats — so the value is in whether the
NEW mechanism is defeatable.

Blocker 1's fix replaced an author-settable field with a derivation, and a derivation has inputs. H1
asks who controls them: can an author move the derived boundary by adding, renaming, deleting-and-
recreating or symlinking gates/gates.manifest.json, or by planting a second manifest earlier in
history? If so, blocker 1 is relocated rather than fixed. H2-H4 ask what first-parent traversal,
shallow clones, and path deletion do — fail closed or silently derive a wrong boundary.

S1 asks whether the schema closure is complete or merely enumerated: find a nested object the author
did not list and inject an unknown key there. C2 asks whether the new criteria express D-38 and D-40
generally or only their originating instances — a clause that covers only the instance that produced it
is not a clause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:32:35 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 52114dd4eb docs(remediation): bank D-44 — the anti-inert-gate registry was inert-able four distinct ways
rev-974 NO-GO at 83d2ecb2. A4/A5/A6 confirmed and three further blockers found, two of them outside my
registered set. Each is a silent-defeat path of the registry itself: the activation seam inerts the
history audit (seam=HEAD gives 0 prospective commits and no failures — and HEAD's parent and the
introduction commit also pass, so forbidding equality with HEAD does not close it); a misspelled
outputPattern silently reduces an assertion to exit-code-only because the closed schema is not
recursive; two provider records sharing pipeline number 7 certify two different commits; and the D-38
and D-40 criteria are absent, with blocker 4 a live instance of the very D-38 clause that is missing.

The headline: all four passed CI, passed the canonical gate:verify, and passed 38/38 focused tests.
Greens discharged nothing. My own AC set was incomplete too — A3 corrects the prospective range to
eight commits, not the seven I wrote; I omitted the seam commit itself.

Mos ruled ALL FOUR in this PR, no trim, and sizing does not help: a registry that ships with a known
way to be silently defeated IS the inert gate it exists to detect. There is no core registry that is
integrity-complete without these — they are not hardening on top of the deliverable, they are the
deliverable. Theme: the registry's own checks must not be silently defeatable. Each fix carries a
red-first must-fail control proving the specific defeat is now caught, and that control set IS the
D-38/D-40 coverage work rather than being additive to it.

Blocker 1's fix keeps the value and replaces the mechanism: derive the seam from non-author-controlled
history (parent of the first first-parent commit introducing gates/gates.manifest.json) rather than
asserting it in an author-editable field, plus must-fail controls for HEAD, HEAD's parent, and the
introduction commit. If the work balloons past reviewability the only acceptable split is by
integrity-complete stage, never by deferring a blocker.

Method note banked as a positive: I could not reproduce "full verifier exit 0", traced my first attempt
to my own instrumentation artifact (json.dump reformatting the manifest), and stated the divergence
rather than wielding non-reproduction as a refutation. The vacuity itself reproduced and blocker 3 was
confirmed by construction. Non-reproduction is not refutation. Open thread: why my gate:verify exits 1
on checkout-preflight with outcome 42.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:49:42 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8f70b1bc63 docs(remediation): pre-position the RM-02 activation-seam disposition so it survives a rotation
Mos ruled the disposition BEFORE the verdict, contingent on rev-974's independent A4/A5/A6. Recorded
here — not in the frozen AC file, which would be retrofitting, and not relayed to the reviewer, who
must reach A4 themselves or refute it.

The concern: activationCommit is the lower bound of the range required to carry own-tree registry
provenance, advancing it shrinks the audited set, the author advanced it to turn the author's own gate
green, and the only validation is --is-ancestor, which a commit satisfies against itself. The registry
built to detect gates that silently stopped enforcing may contain a field by which its own author can
make it stop enforcing, validated by a tautology.

A6 is the crux and stands alone from A4: even if f4fd5967 is the correct value — and it plausibly is,
since a pre-registry commit cannot carry a registry manifest — the mechanism question is independent.
If the audited party can relax its own audit behind a tautological check, the value being right today
is irrelevant and the next value need not be right.

If confirmed: BLOCKING at D-40's standard, and the fix is NOT reverting the value. It is making the
field non-author-relaxable — activationCommit independently derivable, equal to the real pre-registry
seam by construction rather than assertion — plus a must-fail negative control that a HEAD-valued or
over-advanced seam is REJECTED. The registry must be able to fail on its own seam being gamed.
If refuted: bounded, value stands, hardening tracked as a registry clause, and the refutation is itself
a finding worth having.

f10-coder commended with the distinction stated: it verified identity before committing and disclosed
the non-mechanical change unprompted, which is the only reason this is visible at all. But disclosure
is not sufficiency — an honest author flagging a self-relaxing change still made one. Honesty surfaced
it; the mechanism must catch it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:29:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 32384dab02 docs(remediation): board under budget by ROLLING OUT (D-43), not rewording; item 1 de-staled
Sequencing section rolled verbatim to BOARD-LEDGER — it was a pointer to a pointer, and MISSION.md
plus TASKS.md 5 remain canonical. Item 1 said RM-02 'needs rebase+CI+review'; rebase and CI are done
and it is in review at 83d2ecb2.

Second application of D-43's rule today: delete-and-reference, never paraphrase-to-save-bytes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:27:28 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 777a8f7f5b docs(remediation): RM-02 in review at 83d2ecb2; crux is the activation-seam question (A4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:26:11 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 995f8b6a24 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 keystone review ACs before the reviewer reads the diff
Registered at head 83d2ecb2 before dispatch. Prior reviews 63/65 are superseded and this head carries
no live review of any kind, so the keystone gets a full independent review.

The crux is the one non-mechanical change, which f10-coder disclosed unprompted: activationCommit
advanced f65e9ea6 -> f4fd5967 so that the newly merged pre-registry RM-61 commit is no longer treated
as prospective. activationCommit sets the lower bound of the commit range required to carry own-tree
registry provenance, so advancing it SHRINKS that set. The value is plausibly correct — a pre-registry
commit cannot carry a registry manifest — but the change was made by the author to turn the author's
own gate from red to green, which is the self-verification shape the charter warns about.

Registered as A1-A6 without a verdict from me (D-39). A4 is the sharp one: the only validation on the
field is merge-base --is-ancestor activationCommit head, and a commit is its own ancestor, so setting
activationCommit = HEAD would empty the prospective range and the per-commit provenance loop would
iterate zero times. Whether that makes the history check pass VACUOUSLY is for rev-974 to determine and
report — an author-settable field that can inert the anti-inert-gate registry's own history check would
be the disease inside the cure again. A5 asks whether a must-fail negative control exists for it, since
RM-02's own founding rule is that a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence.

B1/B2 carry Mos's scope ruling that the D-38 bind-to-subject and D-40 type-strict clauses land in THIS
PR; B3 confirms D-42's clause is deliberately absent rather than forgotten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:24:24 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0a510d28d docs(remediation): scope rulings banked; D-43 elevated onto RM-34 — the control plane has no verifier
SCOPE (Mos): D-38 (bind evidence to subject) and D-40 (type-strict discriminator inputs) land IN the
RM-02 PR — cheap registry-coverage clauses, satisfiable now, and RM-02 literally IS the registry, so
codifying what its own delivery learned about how gates fail is the coherent move.

D-42 splits, and the reason is sharper than "needs experimentation": landing its clause in-PR today
would give the registry a clause with NOTHING to satisfy it, so the registry would go red on its own
clause and couple the keystone's landing to infra work. Wrong coupling. So (a) the infra experiment
proving the pin enforces via the negative case, in Mos's D-37/D-41/D-42 cluster; (b) the registry
clause "provider-side enforcement requires an OBSERVED negative control", in a follow-up RM-02
increment once (a) gives it something to check. Named owner, not a vacuous check and not a silent
omission.

D-43 point 3 elevated to the PRIMARY requirement on RM-34, with the table that makes it plain: code has
rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan, and the control plane has NOTHING. Every
other layer earned a verifier from a live failure; the board never did, and it is the artifact every
other decision is staged from. "Validate the checkpoint" must mean re-derive the board's claims from
ground truth — not that the file parses or that a successor can read it. It belongs to the
coordinator-daemon deliverable: the control plane needs its own verifier the way every other layer got
one. Today's catch was discipline, not mechanism.

Interim rule binding on BOTH seats until that mechanism exists, and Mos adopted it against himself:
re-derive a board claim from ground truth before any load-bearing use. The orchestrator does it before
dispatch; the coordinator does it before acting on or relaying a board claim that gates a decision.

D-11b addendum: the false-NEGATIVE twin. /user returns 403 on a least-privilege seat token (no
read:user) and reads exactly like an unprovisioned seat. The real assertion is the DIFFERENTIAL —
authenticated push=true vs unauthenticated push=false proves the token caused the difference. A single
endpoint can be true for anyone or refused for an unrelated scope reason. Would have escalated a
working seat as unprovisioned and stalled the keystone on a phantom.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:02:19 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8cef39f924 docs(remediation): RM-61 MERGED; bank D-43 — I inverted a board fact while compressing to fit the budget
#1033 merged f4fd5967, verified by property: merged=true + merge commit, #1034 (delivery) CLOSED,
#1000 (retirement trigger) still OPEN. The exemption is on main and RM-02 is unblocked.

D-43 is mine. Compressing RM-02's board row to meet the 8KB budget, I turned "2 reviews clear" into
"2 live REQUEST_CHANGES" — an inversion. Provider truth: reviews 63 and 65 are at superseded heads and
live REQUEST_CHANGES at f9746b23 is empty. The real state is subtler than either wording: no live
blocker AND no live approval, because the head carries no review at all.

Caught only by re-deriving RM-02's state from the provider before dispatching, not by re-reading the
board. I was one message from briefing f10-coder to remediate two blocking reviews that do not exist.

The transferable part: this board carries a hard <8KB budget, it exceeded that budget four times in one
session, and each time I shaved prose to fit. Compression IS restatement, and this board's own rule is
"REFERENCE, do not restate" (D-26) because restatement is lossy every time. The budget therefore forces
the exact operation the board forbids, on its most load-bearing table. I flagged that as a risk earlier
in the session; it then materialised as an actual error.

Rule banked: meet a size budget by ROLLING content out to BOARD-LEDGER.md, never by rewording what
stays. Deleting a row and pointing at its authoritative home is safe; paraphrasing to save bytes is not.
Applied immediately — this commit rolls the Decisions-log narrative out verbatim rather than trimming
it, and the board is back under budget at 8096.

And the deeper one, onto RM-34: the orchestrator is the board's sole writer, so nothing external checks
the board against reality. Code has rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan — the
control plane has no independent verifier. Handoff validation must include re-deriving the board's
claims from the provider, not merely confirming a successor can read the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:56:44 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f3c100f814 docs(remediation): bank D-42 — the head-pin's negative control has never been observed
merge-gate.md says it outright: a successful merge is NOT evidence the pin worked, only the negative
case is. On mosaicstack Gitea a merge against a WRONG head_commit_id has never been attempted, so every
head-pinned merge to date is equally consistent with the pin working and with the pin being ignored.

That is D-23's class — the queue guard "ran" and returned pass for every possible input; the pin
"holds" on every merge that would have succeeded anyway. By the mission's own standard (every
gate-introducing task carries a registered must-fail negative control; a gate with no proven failure
path manufactures evidence) the head-pin is unregistered in substance however it reads in the runbook.

Not blocking #1033: that head is coordinator-frozen with both the orchestrator and coder-mos1 holding,
so there is no concurrent pusher for the pin to defend against — its protection is only load-bearing on
a contested head. Raised by Mos while assigning the merge; Mos owns it and has filed it as an infra
task in the D-37/D-41 cluster, to be proven before any contested-head merge.

Requirement on RM-02: the negative-control clause must cover provider-side enforcement mechanisms, not
only in-repo checks. "The API accepted our parameter" is not evidence the API honours it — the same
true-answer-to-a-different-question shape as D-24 and D-38.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:52:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2750cc4842 docs(remediation): D-38c — PR metadata failed a THIRD time on #1033; delivery-issue gap ruled
Merge-gate NO-GO with every code and CI gate verified, including the --expect-commit machine-check it
was told to exercise (9/9 JSON, exempted_steps 0, expected_commit == commit). The blocker was the body:
only "Refs #1000", no "Closes #N", and Mosaic completion requires a linked issue closed.

Third distinct metadata failure on one PR — missing commit binding, then a stale DO-NOT-MERGE body
describing a dead head, now an incomplete link. Each time the code was fine and the metadata was
unbound, stale, or incomplete. Nothing re-binds PR metadata to the head or checks it for completeness
until a gate does, and by then it costs a round trip.

The subtlety that makes it a real ruling: #1033 must NOT Closes #1000. The teardown defect stays open,
and #1000 is the exemption's own retirement trigger — auto-closing it would delete the retirement
trigger for the workaround being merged, turning a bounded exemption into a permanent one by side
effect. Hence a delivery issue distinct from the defect issue: #1034, with Closes #1034 added and
Refs #1000 kept.

Metadata-only, head never moved: verified by read-back that head is still 57cae04f, Closes #1034
present, Refs #1000 present, Closes #1000 ABSENT, review 70 still CURRENT with zero live
REQUEST_CHANGES, #1034 open. coder-mos1 stayed parked; nobody pushed.

Process gap ruled by Mos: every remediation delivery PR needs a delivery issue to Close, created at
OPEN-TIME rather than discovered at gate-time. #1032 already Closes #1019; #1033 had none.

Both provider writes went through the tea->API fallback — the same path that silently dropped #1033's
draft property at creation — so both were read back and verified by property, not by exit code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:49:23 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 553474e4c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 GATE-READY at 57cae04f — review 70 APPROVED, CI 2194 9/9, D-40 closed
rev-974 approved at the exact head with no blocking and no non-blocking findings. Verified by me from
the provider rather than relayed: head unmoved, review 70 bound to 57cae04f, pipeline 2194 terminal
success at that commit, 9 children all success including clone (a 9-of-9 scan, not the 8-of-9 D-33 was
banked for). Queue guard run for the push gate and NOT cited — state=unknown exit 0 on branch=main,
D-23 verbatim.

The redundant-clause question I handed rev-974 without a conclusion came back answered by mutation
testing, and I re-ran both mutations myself: deleting the bool clause alone leaves the 17-case harness
green (not load-bearing), deleting the exact-type clause alone fails it (load-bearing, mutation
killed). So the exact-type clause carries the protection and the bool clause is inert-but-defensive
against a future type()->isinstance() edit, which the true/false cases would catch. Removing it alone
cannot reopen D-40. Better answer than either of us had, obtained by asking rather than telling —
D-39 paid for itself on the first review after adoption.

Disclosed to Mos rather than absorbed: JSON `-0` decodes to Python integer zero and passes. rev-974
ruled it not a type confusion because it is a valid JSON integer numerically equal to zero. I agree on
the merits, but it is a reviewer judgement inside the exemption and belongs in front of the gate.

Gate steps 1-3 are satisfied. Steps 4 and 5 — merge-gate verdict and head-pinned merge — are Mos's.
Head frozen; coder-mos1 parked idle per ruling (c) and will not push; neither will I.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:40:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0de8ccb52c docs(remediation): RM-62 — fleet management is a PREREQUISITE, and the rotation claim is corrected
Mos ruled (c): coder-mos1 stays idle/parked, not manually rotated. It holds no in-flight work, so
there is nothing to rotate FOR, and a manual in-pane restart would dress a missing mechanism as a
lifecycle operation — the D-41 overclaim itself. It stays AVAILABLE through RM-61's re-review in case
that review needs its context; the next NEW lane goes to a fresh seat, not to a seat at 67%.

RM-62 filed, because a dependency stated as prose with no owner becomes the permanent gap the charter
warns about. Bringing the execution fleet under roster/systemd management BLOCKS RM-50, RM-58 and
P-LIFECYCLE-001 — each is unsatisfiable against its real population until it lands. Banked explicitly
that both would FAIL against their real target today: RM-50 applied now quarantines the seat
implementing RM-50, and RM-58 has no mechanical reset path for any seat that needs one. RM-50 and
RM-58 now carry RM-62 as a hard depends_on edge, and RM-50 carries the requirement that acceptance be
proved against the unmanaged execution fleet rather than the roster-managed canaries.

RECORD CORRECTION, initiated by Mos and banked here: this session's opening rotation validated the
checkpoint+rehydration DESIGN losslessly — the residency attestation genuinely passed from the files —
but the MECHANISM was a manual pane respawn. "The handoff rehydrated losslessly" is earned; "rotation
worked" overclaims a mechanism that does not exist, and that overclaim is D-41. Same distinction as
D-23's inert guard: the step ran, one property was observed, the mechanism was not. Board header now
says so rather than implying a lifecycle rotation occurred.

D-37 and D-41 are one cluster — the execution fleet lacks both its shared-infrastructure and its
lifecycle management. Mos owns both, sequenced at a seam, never mid-lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:34:10 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 37402e9770 docs(remediation): bank D-41 — the whole execution fleet is UNMANAGED, so RM-50/RM-58 have no surface
Went to rotate coder-mos1 mechanically; `mosaic fleet restart` cannot reach it. Every seat executing
this mission is systemd inactive/disabled and flagged UNMANAGED — coder-mos1, rev-974, f10-coder,
merge-gate, the pm-scouts, rev-3107b, ultron-3107, and mos-remediation itself. The roster-managed
population is a different set of seats from the ones doing the work.

RM-50 applied today would quarantine the entire remediation fleet including the seat implementing it.
RM-58's mechanical out-of-band reset cannot be performed at all, so the only rotation available is what
D-4 says does not count: asking the agent, or killing a pane by hand. Requirement banked on both: their
acceptance must be demonstrated against the UNMANAGED execution population, because a criterion proved
only on roster-managed canaries is tested on the wrong population — D-17's coverage class one layer up.

Today's rotation is therefore labelled honestly as a manual pane restart with a hand-verified handoff,
not as a lifecycle operation. The step ran; the property was not observed (cf. D-23).

Did not run fleet restart against a disabled unit while the live pane held RM-61 and RM-03 state.
Disposition escalated to Mos.

Also records the handoff artifact as the positive control: typed state, and it surfaced D-12 recurring
live (PR #1033's draft property silently dropped by a wrapper fallback), an unrunnable check declared
rather than substituted, and suspicions labelled as suspicions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:31:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 01831814b6 docs(remediation): board — D-40 ruled BLOCKING, RM-61 rebuilding, TS1-TS12 pre-registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:25:54 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 86cd1a0f46 docs(remediation): D-40 RULED BLOCKING; pre-register type-strict ACs before the fix is pushed
Mos ruled BLOCKING on the exit_code type confusion. Both of us had leaned non-blocking on the
unreachability argument and neither shipped it. The two decisive grounds: the direction is
wrong-ACCEPT (false and 0.0 GRANT the exemption), which is this mission's disqualifying direction and
exactly why RR12 was tolerable; and "Woodpecker is Go with an int type" is structurally the same
incidental-correlate argument RM-61 itself forbade for the signature — you cannot certify the
discriminator against infra-shift and then defend a hole in it with an infra-stability assumption.

Generalised into an RM-02 standing clause, which is the real prize: discriminator and comparison
inputs must be TYPE-STRICT. A comparison that accepts a type it should not is a wrong-ACCEPT hole by
construction; `== 0` matching False and 0.0 is one instance of a class. D-40 is the instance, the
clause is the fix. It sits alongside the D-38 clause (does this gate bind its evidence to its subject).

D-39b banks the roles-swapped half: the author does not adjudicate its own PR's blocker status and
does not move the head to enforce it. Symmetric with D-39 — a seat with a stake in the answer does not
settle the question, and a conservative motive exempts neither direction.

ACs are registered NOW, before coder-mos1 pushes and before any reviewer reads a diff; at registration
the fix exists only as an unpushed local commit I have not read, so there is no diff to retrofit to.
They also state explicitly which cases are genuine RED-FIRST (false, 0.0 — currently wrongly exempting)
and which are only regression guards ("0", null — already blocking), because demanding an impossible
red for the latter two invites weakening something real to manufacture it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:23:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 249335e515 docs(remediation): bank D-39/D-40 — gate-ready reached, then withdrawn on a finding I disclosed
D-39: I contaminated an open independent review. RR12 was an open registered check and I sent rev-974
my CONCLUSION, not just my observation. rev-974 then downgraded an automated Codex review that had
flagged RR12 as a blocker, in line with my framing. The bias sat in my instrument, not the reviewer's
diligence — a subordinate is agreeable by construction, and the divergence instruction I attached
cannot undo having named the answer first. Mos adopted the rule fleet-wide: a dispatcher may relay
observations and reproductions into an open review, never its own verdict on an open check.
Re-adjudicated by a mechanically fresh seat with no access to my framing: NON-BLOCKING, independently,
on stronger evidence than either prior pass (accept-set matrix proving the accepted set is a strict
subset of a correct case-insensitive comparison's, so it cannot false-certify; exploit path hunted and
ruled out; all 0x110000 codepoints scanned for a fold that could smuggle non-hex onto a valid SHA).
So contamination did not change the answer, and the finding stands anyway — a correct answer reached
by a contaminated process still corrupts the process.

D-40: that same fresh seat looked outside its question and found a type confusion inside the exact
conjunction the exemption rests on. `step.get("exit_code") == 0` is True for JSON false, and
coder-mos1 added the float case. Verified by me on the real #2188 record: false and 0.0 both yield
exit 0 with exempted_steps 1 — the exemption GRANTED; "0" and null correctly block. Two of four
near-miss types satisfy a conjunction whose whole justification is that it is exactly scoped.

Consequence: I reported #1033 gate-ready at 033b2ffb (RR1-RR12 pass, review 69 APPROVED, CI #2193
success 9/9) and then had to hand Mos a finding that may disqualify what I had just certified. Better
that than defending the report. Disposition is Mos's; coder-mos1 escalated it to blocker unilaterally
and moved to push — held, because the author does not adjudicate their own PR and does not void a live
APPROVED review plus terminal-green CI by pushing. Head frozen, fix prepared and unpushed, ACKed.

Board doctrine now carries both rules: never relay a conclusion into an open review, and the author
never adjudicates their own blocker status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:20:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d9ab6026c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 tick — twelve checks pass, blocker moved to metadata, head never moved
rev-974 review 68 @ 033b2ffb: RR1-RR12 all PASS. RR7 is the strong one — all four binding predicates
proved RED against the old e7b29219 verifier, and the original attack under the old interface returned
exit 0 with exempted_steps=1, proving the PRIOR DEFECT rather than merely unsupported syntax.

The remaining blocker was metadata, not code: the live PR body still said "DO NOT MERGE" and "the
exemption will not be implemented", describing an earlier head. Verified independently — the controls
were injected in 3931b0e2/9455cd6a/25ac5971/ef9d23ab and the final delta does not touch
.woodpecker/ci.yml at all. The body was true when written and went stale as the branch evolved. That
is D-38 one layer out: the PR that binds evidence to its subject shipped a description that was not
bound to its subject, and D-36's staleness class on provider metadata rather than a repo file.

Fixed as metadata only. Head confirmed unmoved at 033b2ffb from both provider and git, body SHA-256
b0198d98 matched the author's reported digest byte-for-byte, both stale strings absent. Because the
commit never moved, the twelve results stand and no third review round is owed — only the discharge
of the finding by the reviewer who raised it.

Exact-head CI #2193: success, 9 children, 9/9 success including clone, read from -f json (D-33).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:10:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 50c0340add docs(remediation): bank D-37/D-38, pre-register RM-61 re-review, rebuild board for a cold read
D-38 — RM-61's terminal-green verifier certified the right RECORD for the wrong COMMIT. rev-974
mutated only #2188's commit field and the gate still exited 0. Confirmed by construction: at
e7b29219 the whole verifier had exactly one "commit" line (159), no expected-head parameter, no
comparison, no failure path. D-24 at the gate layer — a true answer to a different question.
The transferable half is the AC set, not the verifier: AC1-AC8 ALL PASSED and the PR was still
NO GO, because every registered check tested whether the signature discriminates and none tested
whether the evidence was bound to its subject (coverage-failure-mode-2, D-17 class). Mos ruled a
STANDING clause into RM-02 coverage: "does this gate bind its evidence to the subject under
review?" — every gate can fail this way and pass its own ACs.

D-37 — one shared .git/config silently re-identified EVERY worktree. extensions.worktreeConfig is
unset, so a worker's repo-local identity write rebinds all linked worktrees at once; the
orchestrator checkout and rev-974's review worktree both authored as coder-mos1. Distinct from
D-34, not an instance: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY was exported and correct and still resolved wrong.
Sharp edge is gate-16 defeated in the artifact — the reviewer would author its pre-registered ACs
as the author of the code under review. No contamination occurred. Containment (explicit -c, no
shared-config rewrites mid-flight) is the standing order; the real fix is authorised and owned by
Mos, sequenced at a quiet seam. #1024 is implicated: repo-local pinning is the colliding mechanism.

Also pre-registers the twelve RM-61 re-review checks at exact head 033b2ffb BEFORE the reviewer
reads the diff, and rebuilds the board for a cold read — RM-61 "building", "nothing implemented
yet", and DECISION-1/2/3 "must be ruled" were all stale, the D-36 class again at the same seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:59:40 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 345d152790 docs(remediation): RM-61 result — kill criterion NOT triggered, signature discriminates structurally
coder-mos1 ran two real ci-postgres failure controls; the orchestrator verified the JSON
records independently. #2189 (startup failure) exit 1 and #2191 (post-readiness crash,
log proves ready then postmaster killed) exit 137 both take the workflow and the test
step down — terminal red. #2188, the genuine artifact, carries exit_code 0 under a
SUCCESSFUL workflow.

So the discriminator is structural — a failed service step with exit 0 under a successful
workflow — not the message string and not an incidental correlate like node or timestamp,
which were explicitly forbidden because they pass today and mask a real failure the moment
infrastructure shifts.

Verifier: exit 0 with one named exemption on the artifact; exit 1 with exempted_steps 0 on
BOTH real controls. No fetch, trigger, retry or re-roll — the coin flip is removed, not
codified.

PR #1033 dispatched to rev-974 with eight acceptance checks pre-registered before the diff
was read; AC2 (both real failures must NOT be exempted) is the crux and a REJECT if it fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:44:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f11f257368 docs(remediation): bank D-36 — rotation-seam audit found three stale restatements on the board
Preparing the checkpoint for a cold read surfaced three stale sections, each a copy of
text owned elsewhere, each of which would have misled the incoming orchestrator: a
delivery-gate list still omitting the merge-gate step (D-26's own defect, still on the
board after MISSION.md was fixed); a capability rule superseded by D-13/D-15; and
DECISION-1 still marked CONTESTED hours after it was ruled.

None were wrong when written. All three drifted because they were copies — D-14 three
times in one artifact. The failure is not that someone forgot to update three lines; it
is that three lines existed to forget.

The rotation seam is what surfaced it. A familiar section is skimmed for the line you
came for; preparing state to be read cold by a stranger is a different act from
maintaining it, and catches a class ordinary use cannot.

RM-34: a handoff must VALIDATE the checkpoint, not merely write it. RM-02 registers the
general form with a must-fail on divergence. Interim: audit the board against its
sources at every rotation seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:14:04 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6c779595e1 docs(remediation): rotation checkpoint — board rebuilt for a cold read, three stale restatements removed
Orchestrator rotating at ~803k tokens (~4x threshold). A mission built on
rotation-not-compaction should not run its own coordinator past it.

Board rewritten as the rehydration artifact: in-flight state, a read-this-first block
for the incoming seat, and the live rulings it most needs. Under the 8KB cap.

AUDIT AT THE SEAM found THREE stale restatements on this board, each of which would have
misled the incoming orchestrator:
  1. the delivery-gate list still OMITTED the merge-gate verdict step (the D-26 defect
     itself, still sitting on the board after MISSION.md was corrected);
  2. capability described as 'token-file set = authoritative registry', superseded by
     D-13/D-15 (capability is per-path; assert permissions.push as that seat);
  3. Sequencing still said DECISION-1 was CONTESTED and 'do not treat it as settled'
     hours after it was RULED — an incoming seat would have re-litigated a closed decision.

All three were restatements of text owned elsewhere. Replaced with references, per the
mission's own render-not-restate principle: a second copy is a second thing to go stale,
and this board proved it three times in one night.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:13:12 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cc097f36c5 docs(remediation): re-run failed; RM-02 blocked on RM-61, declared bound honoured
Pipeline #2188 at the same head: ci-postgres the sole failure, everything else success
including gate-verify. f10-coder independently confirmed and applied the pre-registered
rule itself.

RM-02 blocked. No ad-hoc exemption, no third roll. Recorded why: two failures against one
earlier clean run makes 'best of five' feel reasonable, and the point of declaring the
bound in advance is that it binds when the result is inconvenient. A third roll would
have been indistinguishable from diligence, including to the person doing it.

Data for RM-61: the artifact hit twice consecutively at f9746b23 while #2184 was clean at
38f1b249, so it may cluster rather than be uniformly random — which makes a one-shot
re-roll close to worthless and strengthens the ruling that it must not become policy.

And the illustration: the anti-inert-gate registry is blocked by an artifact that makes
gate evidence unreliable. The thesis demonstrating itself on its own keystone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:34:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 56d8e8a3d5 docs(remediation): record the bounded re-trigger as a stopgap; mark the first end-to-end merge stack
The re-trigger guardrail, recorded so it cannot become practice: one bounded,
pre-declared attempt at the same head with the response to each outcome fixed before
triggering. Re-running until the desired answer appears is p-hacking the pipeline, and
silently nobody can tell it from diligence — including the person doing it. Per Mos: a
per-PR free re-roll would be D-21 normalisation wearing a new hat. RM-61 must make the
re-roll unnecessary, not codify it, and a clean re-run does not retire RM-61.

Milestone: RM-03/#1032 completed independent review -> CI terminal-green -> merge-gate GO
-> coordinator -> held for owner, the first time end-to-end. GO posted under the gate's
own minted identity by a seat that structurally cannot merge. Head verified unmoved after
the verdict, so the commit-bound GO stands.

The first delivery through the complete stack is also the last one gated by a check that
could not fail — RM-03 is that check's fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:22:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4589659bc1 docs(remediation): board — RM-03 GATE-READY, merge-gate assigned, held for Jason
First genuine gate-ready of the mission. Head triple equal at 78ec47cd, latest review
APPROVED at the current head, CI 9/9 by JSON scan with two-observer agreement.

Recorded the shape worth remembering: the queue guard is still inert for this merge
because RM-03 is the fix — the last merge to pass through the broken gate is the one
that fixes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:15:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 357a636a3a docs(remediation): promote redundant-observation to charter; bank D-35 (tool caught what attention could not)
Charter gains a fifth principle from D-33: two observers of the same evidence,
disagreeing, catch what neither catches alone — applied to evidence GATHERING, not just
judgement. A summary that resembles an enumeration is more dangerous than one that
obviously summarises; prefer the machine-readable record and state counts so divergence
is detectable.

D-35: while editing merge-gate.md to fix D-33, the coordinator recalled the mandate
string instead of reading it and the Edit tool's exact-match REJECTED it. Third instance
for that author, inside the turn fixing another instance of the same class — and the
only one that did not reach a document, because a mechanism caught it.

A rule that fails in its authors but is caught by a tool has told you where it belongs.
RM-02 should enforce verbatim citation by construction, as the Edit tool did by accident
of design.

Fix landed by annotating the source: merge-gate.md mandates 3 and 4 now require the
scan and count from the JSON record. The shared wrapper was deliberately NOT modified
mid-flight — three lanes are reading it; fix at a seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:53:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9e205e8201 docs(remediation): bank D-34 — a context reset silently strips a seat's credential identity
rev-974 finished its RM-02 review and could not post it: pr-review.sh failed with
'Gitea token not found'. Verified — with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY unset the token does not
resolve; with it set it resolves. The token file was correct throughout.

My own context reset wiped the seat's exported identity and my rehydration brief did not
re-establish it. git config mosaic.gitIdentity is persistent and per-worktree;
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is ephemeral and per-context. rev-974 works from ~/agent-work with no
git-config fallback, so it had no warning and the loss surfaced only when it next needed
a credential.

Intersection of two banked findings, created by acting on one: D-31 prescribes rotation,
D-11a requires identity coherence, and nothing said rotation is a credential-affecting
operation. The fix for one failure introduced another.

RM-34: rotation must re-establish AND verify seat identity before handing over work.
RM-50: prefer the durable binding (mosaic.gitIdentity in the seat's repo) so identity
survives a reset by construction. Interim: every rehydration brief re-exports identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:51:21 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 73a313301b docs(remediation): bank D-33 — the full-step-scan tool prunes a step in default output
coder-mos1 scanned pipeline #2186 with -f json and found 9/9 child steps; my scan of the
same pipeline in the wrapper's default text mode showed 8. Verified: text mode omits
clone (JSON shows the ci workflow entry, clone, and the 8 visible ones).

Every full step scan performed tonight enumerated 8 of 9 real child steps and reported
it as complete. clone succeeded throughout so no verdict changes — but the method was
incomplete and its user did not know.

The merge-gate mandate requires a FULL step scan and requires verdicts to enumerate the
step count. A verdict citing 8 where 9 exist is non-conforming evidence, and a gate using
this wrapper's default output would produce exactly that while believing it complied.

The shape is the session's thesis aimed at the detection tool: the doc says read the
artifact not the summary, and text mode IS a summary that looks like an artifact. Compare
D-24 — mergeable was a true answer to a different question; this is a true answer to a
smaller one.

Caught only because two observers' counts disagreed; neither alone would have found it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:49:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eddf718a5c docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 38f1b249 with a fully clean 9/9 scan
First run on this branch where ci-postgres passed, so no exemption question arises.
Recorded that the artifact's intermittency is evidence FOR RM-61's negative-control
requirement: intermittent means delivery is a coin flip until the signature is proven to
discriminate from a real database failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:35:51 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 c83a3cd3e2 docs(remediation): bank D-32 — the repaired gate shipped with a documented switch to skip it
rev-974 blocked RM-03: pr-merge.sh still ships --skip-queue-guard at five sites
including a worked example. It proved this rather than reading it — stubbed the guard to
exit 99, ran a real fixture merge with the flag, and observed the guard never called,
provider payload created, 'merged successfully', exit 0.

Disqualifying because RM-03 repairs a mandatory gate that has never been able to fail;
shipping that repair with a documented bypass means the gate merely requires one flag
instead of zero, and every merge-side CANNOT_ASSERT/HOLD semantic is skipped. L0 bars
equivalent skip switches, and the merge-gate role doc names this exact hazard about
force_merge — adjacent to the field you came to edit, at the moment you are most
motivated to reach for it.

Generalizable: repairing a gate is incomplete while any supported path skips it. The
failure changes from 'cannot block' to 'can be told not to' — the same outcome one
keystroke later. Removing the bypass is part of the repair.

Everything else passed independently, including the 160 KiB stdin transport where #1023
regressed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:33:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bf8c6f4a89 docs(remediation): bank D-31 — seat ran past 100% context with 28 uncommitted files
coder-mos1 hit 102.5%/372k on RM-03 with 28 modified files uncommitted and its branch
still at base — a full context window spent with nothing durable. Caught by polling seat
state, not by any system signal. Nothing warned anyone: no threshold alert, no
pre-compaction hook.

The founding failure mode of this mission — compaction destroying in-flight work —
nearly hit the mission's own delivery twice in one night. RM-01 survived because it had
committed work when checkpointed; this one had none. Commit-then-rotate works;
rotate-without-commit loses everything.

RM-34: a context threshold is not enough — rotation must force a durable checkpoint and
refuse to rotate a seat with uncommitted work. RM-50: seat context is observable state
and must be monitored; relying on an orchestrator to poll is instructions-not-enforcement
applied to lifecycle. Brief doctrine: commit early, commit WIP.

Adjacent: the diff spans 5 guides and 11 templates against a brief scoped to one script.
Queried, not assumed — but a 28-file diff from a one-script brief is a scope signal
regardless of the answer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:07:59 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bdf8932328 docs(remediation): RM-61 terminal-green exemption ruled B, with sequencing correction
Condition 1 tested: the signature is stable — pods "wp-svc-<ULID>-ci-postgres" not
found across all five observed failures, an orchestration-layer lookup miss structurally
unlike a service-level failure.

But discrimination is UNPROVEN: every observation co-occurs with a demonstrably working
database, and we have never seen a real ci-postgres failure on this provider. If
PostgreSQL crashes and the pod is GC'd, the status query may also return pod-not-found —
the exemption would over-match and mask a real failure.

So conditions 1 and 2 are not independent: 2 is the evidence for 1. Build the negative
control first, prove a real failure produces a different signature, then adopt the
exemption. Kill criterion stated in advance: if an injected real failure also yields
pod-not-found, B is unsafe and we do A.

Filed as RM-61, unassigned — no free write-capable seat; flagged rather than stacked
onto a busy lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:04:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 16d11cd6cd docs(remediation): bank D-29 (syntactic criterion binding) and D-30 (false comparator, mine)
D-29: rev-974 moved two criterion bindings to an unrelated case, reformatted the
manifest, and gate:verify still exited 0. The registry verifies a criterion HAS a
binding, not that the bound case can fail for that criterion's stated reason —
RM02-REQ-03 unsatisfied. The keystone reproduced the defect it exists to eliminate, in
its own coverage check. Caught only by mutating and re-running; inspection would have
passed it.

D-30: my review brief claimed the ci-postgres FAIL appeared on #2167 — it did not
(#2167 is OK). My own banked D-21 says so explicitly; I restated from memory instead of
reading my record. D-26 recurring, in a reviewer brief, hours after promoting
render-not-restate to the charter.

The harm is not the inaccuracy but that I supplied a reviewer with fabricated supporting
evidence for my own reading. It refuted me — query-for-refutation paying for itself in
the same document that introduced it.

Requirement: briefs cite evidence from the record with identifiers, never from recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:59:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8ce77fcb0d docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 9b4d4beb, CI green, review in flight
Head triple verified independently twice (orchestrator + f10-coder): local = origin =
PR #1030 = pipeline #2182. Full step scan rather than a tests-complete inference.
Queue guard not offered as evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:41:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cdd5568adb docs(remediation): promote query-for-refutation to charter doctrine
Per Mos. A subordinate asked to confirm a hypothesis will agree — the bias is induced by
the query, not by the answerer's diligence. 'The DB flaked, please confirm' and 'confirm
or refute, with the log line that proves it' are different instruments returning
different answers to the same question.

This matters most with agent subordinates, which are agreeable by construction, so the
discipline cannot rest on the answerer being rigorous — it must be built into how the
question is asked.

Origin: the orchestrator's ci-postgres hypothesis was refuted by the implementing seat
with log evidence and then settled by reproduction. Phrased for confirmation, it would
have returned agreement and D-21 would have been re-classified on a false premise,
silently corrupting a banked finding.

Operational form: state the hypothesis as yours, ask for evidence that kills it, say
what would change your mind, and reproduce when the answer is consequential. Added to
KICKSTART's standing invariants so it survives compaction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:21:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ff4b45b025 docs(remediation): RM-03 CANNOT_ASSERT semantics ruled (option B)
Resolves an ambiguity in the orchestrator's own brief, which required CANNOT_ASSERT to
neither silently pass nor permanently block without distinguishing push from merge.
coder-mos1 stopped and asked rather than inferring authorisation; Codex security
independently flagged CWE-693.

Ruled B: merge fails CLOSED (proceeding without exact-head CI evidence is D-23's
condition in a narrower costume), push degrades AUDITED (blocking during an outage
bricks delivery — the Pi-brick class we already banked). A temporary block pending
evidence is not a permanent block, and merge is separately gated by the merge-gate and
coordinator, so nothing is stranded.

Conditions: distinct exit code or the tri-state is destroyed; the audit record asserted
by a registered case, not assumed, or 'audited' is a claim dressed as a property;
retryable and self-clearing; cases observed RED first; no silent degraded merge path —
break-glass belongs to RM-05.

Option C rejected: it bricks push during an outage and defers the degraded path, which
in this codebase means a silent bypass appears under incident pressure. Three are
already on the books.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:17:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f47cf45b0c docs(remediation): bank D-28 — a swallowed diagnostic destroyed a fail-closed check's evidence
RM-02 CI failed on four sandbox tests. Bubblewrap is installed by the gate step but not
the test step, so spawnSync returned ENOENT; replayCommit replaced the spawn diagnostic
with an empty string, so the classifier could not prove Bubblewrap provenance and
correctly refused to treat it as expected sandbox unavailability.

The refusal was right; the information loss was the bug. For a classifier, error text is
not decoration — it is the input. Widening acceptance to make the test pass would be a
finding, not a fix.

Linkages: D-16 again (local has bwrap, CI does not — local and CI disagree a third
time), and diagnostic-preservation registered as an RM-02 gate requirement with a
must-fail control proving a swallowed message is detected.

Process note: the orchestrator's hypothesis that the coincident ci-postgres FAIL caused
this was WRONG and was refuted with log evidence. D-21 stands unchanged as a teardown
artifact and is NOT upgraded — it was about to be re-classified on a false premise.
Asking the seat to confirm or refute rather than accept is what prevented that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:10:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e7c9160c7b docs(remediation): board — delivery-gate doctrine change recorded with render-vs-restate root cause
Per Mos's item 4. The gate definition was incomplete from setup because the gates were
restated from memory rather than referenced, and the omission propagated into every
worker brief since — then recurred inside the correction itself (D-26).

Board now carries the referenced sources, the gate order, freeze-after-GO, the
coordinator/orchestrator split, and the queue-guard zero-information field form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:01:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2d58779675 docs(remediation): bank D-27 — role file certifies the inert queue guard as enforced
rev-974 found this while loading the canonical gate sources, i.e. because we switched
from restating to reading. Verified in roles.local/merge-gate.md: mandate 3 requires
verifying 'CI queue guard clear', mandate 4 requires enumerating 'the queue-guard
outcome' in every durable verdict, the merge path annotates it 'real', and the control
table at :290 certifies it ' enforced … genuinely aborts'.

The document is correct about the WIRING and wrong about the CONTROL: set -euo pipefail
with an unguarded exit does abort, but the guard cannot produce a non-zero exit for any
input (D-23). A mechanism correctly wired to a sensor that never fires, certified as
enforced.

Compounding: the verdict format REQUIRES the queue-guard outcome as evidence, so a
conforming verdict must include a meaningless field — the role file instructs the gate
to manufacture evidence, in the mandate that exists to stop bare conclusions.

Interim: record the field labelled ZERO-INFORMATION (inert, owner RM-03) rather than
omitting it — omission makes the verdict non-conforming; silent citation is worse.

Escalated: operator-owned file, coordinator's to fix. Recommend annotation not deletion
— the requirement is correct once RM-03 lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:55:28 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cbbe3e1ce2 docs(remediation): gate definition now REFERENCES canonical roles; bank D-26
The delivery-gate definition was incomplete from setup — the merge-gate verdict step
was missing because the gates were restated from memory rather than referenced, and the
omission propagated into every worker brief since.

Then it recurred inside the correction: the correcting message was itself a restatement
and dropped five things, including a security precondition (an unminted gate seat fails
open to the owner's admin account — the #3084 breach mechanism) and a citation to a file
that does not exist.

D-26 is the definitive case because every condition favoured success: attention maximal,
actor knew the rule best, subject was the rule itself. A rule its own enforcer cannot
follow while enforcing it is not a discipline — it is a requirement for a mechanism.

MISSION.md and KICKSTART.md now reference fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md and
fleet/roles/validator.md and state only the gate ORDER. Every reference resolves; a
dangling pointer is worse than a restatement.

Precondition independently verified: merge-gate token is least-privilege,
pull=True push=False admin=False — structurally cannot merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:53:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9a7ab73952 docs(remediation): charter — Builds 1-2 justified by two independent impossibility proofs; RM-60 option analysis
Per Mos. The choke-point executor and PG spine are not a design preference — they are
forced. Twice during the mission's own first deliveries, work stopped against a security
property that cannot exist at the layer needing it: D-19 (audited party controls the
manifest certifying it — artifact integrity) and D-25 (audited party controls the code
entering the sandbox — execution integrity). Both reduce to self-verification by the
audited party is not verification, and both resolve only via an authority outside its
control.

Neither proof was sought; both arrived while shipping something else, from different
directions, at different layers. An architecture forced by two independent impossibility
proofs is stronger evidence than one argued for.

RM-60 records Mos's sharper option analysis: A (unprivileged userns) does NOT fix the
vulnerability — it grants a capability and leaves the ORDERING defect untouched, so B is
required regardless; A without B is kernel exposure bought for nothing. B is the correct
primitive, generalises to RM-59 and the choke-point executor, and may not need A at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:09:38 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2b85afe4ea docs(remediation): bank D-25, accept RM02-REQ-10 revision, open RM-60
RM-02's per-commit replay needs isolation; the privileged CI step was correctly refused
because PR-controlled code executes before Bubblewrap establishes any boundary — the
untrusted party would obtain the capability meant to contain it. Ordering defect, not a
hardening problem.

D-25 is D-19 one layer down: audited party controls the manifest (artifact integrity)
became audited party controls the code entering the sandbox (execution integrity). Both
reduce to self-verification by the audited party is not verification, and both resolve
via an authority outside its control — twice now this mission has derived Builds 1-2
from a security impossibility rather than design preference.

Option C ruled independently by the orchestrator and rev-974 before either saw the
other. rev-974 added the condition I missed and it matters most: post-merge replay is
DETECTION, not PREVENTION, with a defined quarantine/revert response, and must never be
presented as equivalent to a pre-merge gate.

RM02-REQ-10 revision formally recorded and accepted under RM-02's own clause 4 —
original text, restatement, reason — discharging rev-974's review-readiness condition.
RM-60 opened for the external pre-execution trust boundary, cross-referenced with RM-59.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:05:50 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eabe04bc5e docs(remediation): bank D-24 — mergeable:true cited as merge-readiness; D-23 corrected backward
Mos verified #1023 before relaying and corrected my framing. Verified independently:
review id-58 REQUEST_CHANGES at f6334080, the current head — the block is live, and its
findings are that #1023's own fix is defective (unknown still exits 0, payload-as-argv
hits ARG_MAX, tests do not assert exits).

mergeable:true is git-mergeability, not readiness. The charter's first principle
committed by the orchestrator inside an escalation about proxies. Fifth instance of mine.

The mechanism, named because it will recur: mergeable is not a lie, it is a true answer
to a different question. A false field would have been caught; a true-but-adjacent field
passes every sniff test — which is why the discipline must be mechanical, not attentive.

D-23 corrected backward per D-14-as-amended, original framing quoted.

RM-02: readiness cases must assert the decision-relevant property — latest review state,
CI terminal status on the exact head, required approvals — never a structural proxy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:50:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 36018be8d1 docs(remediation): bank D-23 — the mandatory queue guard has never worked, for any input
RM-02's registered fixtures found this before the registry was built. Worse than the
banked unknown=>exit 0: ci-queue-wait.sh:266 pipes the payload into a classifier
starting 'python3 - <<PY', so python reads its PROGRAM from stdin and json.load never
sees the JSON. Proven empirically — success, failure, pending and malformed all
classify as unknown, and unknown exits 0.

The mandatory pre-push/pre-merge guard therefore returns PASS for every possible input,
including a genuinely failing CI. The six observed meaningless greens were not an edge
case; they are the only output it can produce.

PR #1023 is exactly this fix, open and parked, and its body diagnoses it precisely.
Two aggravating details from that body: pr-ci-wait.sh:38 documented the bug and remedy
and it was never backported to the mandatory sibling (D-14 propagation with a
security-adjacent blast radius); and the fix was opened without re-verification.

Escalated for Jason's #1023 disposition. RM-02 records required-vs-actual with
DEFECT (owner: RM-03); no RM-03 lane opened, guard not edited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:44:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8c496993e4 docs(remediation): bank D-22 — the registry would have verified the wrong artifact
The gate that actually runs is the installed copy at ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/;
a repo-scoped registry would test packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/. Byte-identical
today (sha256 19cda2f7009c536e both) but nothing asserts it.

A registry that verifies the wrong artifact is worse than none — it manufactures
confidence, and the divergence would be invisible from every signal we have: registry
green, CI green, deployed gate arbitrarily different.

D-1/P-ACTIVATION applied to the enforcement mechanism itself rather than to config.

RM-02 gains: for every registered gate with a deployed counterpart, assert
repo-source == deployed-copy with a must-fail control; where none exists, record that
explicitly.

Found by design review before implementation — the only finding tonight not found by
execution, which is the design-first gate on keystone tasks paying for itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:14:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e85a088f85 docs(remediation): bank D-21 — a FAIL that means nothing is a green that means nothing, sign-flipped
ci-postgres reports FAIL under an overall-success pipeline on #2170 and #2175 while all
eight functional steps pass. Most likely a service-pod teardown artifact; the test
step's pg_isready fail-fast guard passed, so the database was available during the run.

Low severity, but the pattern matters: a red that is routinely present and routinely
correct to ignore trains operators and agents to discount reds, and the discounting
generalises. Six instances of a meaningless green are already banked; a meaningless
FAIL is the same erosion with the sign flipped.

Recorded rather than normalised — the first time it is waved through without a note is
when it becomes background noise.

RM-55: treat a non-terminal-success sub-step under an overall-success pipeline as a
reportable anomaly, and make the CI contract state which steps may fail without failing
the pipeline. An implicit allowance is indistinguishable from a bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:08:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8a795df0ce docs(remediation): D-14 amended by D-20 — propagation is bidirectional
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Both the orchestrator and the coordinator read D-14 as forward propagation only: a
ruling reaches the documents stating the new rule. D-20 proved that insufficient —
when D-19 superseded part of D-18, the consequence went forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never backward into D-18, which kept asserting a withdrawn
claim until a reviewer disproved it by experiment.

A supersession must update BOTH the documents rendering the new rule AND the finding it
retires, with the retired wording quoted rather than deleted. Interim rule updated
accordingly.

Applying D-14's own rule to D-14, in the same commit that records the amendment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:53:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f5a0566198 docs(remediation): board — RM-01 MERGED (f58b3699); RM-02 keystone is next
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:50:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 1e7a0701fd docs(remediation): fix D-18 overclaim (D-20) — reviewer empirically disproved my own documentation
rev-974 blocked #1027 a second time, and the defect was in this file, not the code.

D-18's AC2 restatement omitted the accidental/independent scope D-19 made mandatory,
and D-18 asserted the tampered-manifest control turns integrity 'from a claim into a
property'. It does not and cannot — that sentence predated D-19 and was never revised
when D-19 landed. rev-974 disproved it by experiment: a same-UID consistent
manifest+marker rewrite passed preflight.

Two banked findings firing on the orchestrator at once: the integrity-claim corollary
(I wrote a claim in the voice of a property, in the document defining the rule against
it), and D-14 propagation — I carried D-19's consequence forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never back into the finding it superseded. Backwards
propagation is the same defect as forwards and I did not audit for it.

Corrected in place with the original wording quoted and the disproof recorded, not
silently rewritten.

RM-02 fifth clause: documentation asserting a security or integrity property is itself
a claim requiring a negative control observed red. Prose is not exempt from the
mission's evidentiary standard, and governing prose least of all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:48:00 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 43f69bf167 docs(remediation): promote D-19 to charter; bind residual risk to RM-59 as a tracked edge
Per Mos, with his two additions.

Charter gains a fourth first-class principle: when a property cannot exist at the layer
that specified it, three honest moves are mandatory — implement what the layer can
guarantee; state the boundary in BOTH directions (what it does not defend AND what it
does, since either alone misleads); and record the real guarantee as a TRACKED
DEPENDENCY, not prose. A written-down gap is acceptable engineering; an implied-fixed
gap is the mission's core failure in a new costume.

The residual risk is now RM-59 (depends_on RM-12, RM-21, RM-25) — a real backlog task
owned by the choke-point executor and spine, which verify from outside the worktree's
authority. Mos's point: 'record where the guarantee comes from' only holds if the record
is a live dependency someone must close; a documented gap with no owner becomes a
permanent gap that reads as intentional.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:23:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f9435c2a03 docs(remediation): bank D-19 — an integrity property that cannot exist at its specified layer
Implementing the D-18 manifest hit CWE-345: manifest and marker share one same-UID
writable tree, so that actor can regenerate both and pass. No local construction fixes
self-authentication without a key outside its authority. The seat escalated rather than
calling it tamper-resistant — the charter corollary working on its first real test.

Ruling: Option A, scope AC2 to accidental/independent/stale mutation, retain the design.
The undefendable boundary is not the weak link (same-UID write already owns the source,
the tests, preflight.mjs and .husky); AC2 exists for the D-5 staleness class, against
which the design works; and a real anchor arrives with the choke-point executor and PG
spine, which verify outside the worktree's authority.

Acceptable only with honest labelling: threat model verbatim in code and PR, the words
tamper-proof/tamper-evident/secure barred there, scope carried in AC2's restatement,
residual risk named as backlog, all controls kept RED-first.

Generalizable: when a property cannot exist at the layer it was specified, implement
what the layer can guarantee, state the boundary precisely, and record where the real
guarantee comes from. A known gap written down is acceptable; a gap implied fixed is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:20:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3b191b6b34 docs(remediation): promote the three-mode taxonomy and the integrity-claim corollary to the charter
Per Mos. Two first-class principles alongside observe-the-property:

1. Pre-registration prevents RETROFITTING and nothing else. A pre-registered check set
   can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17), or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18). It confers
   neither correctness nor coverage nor consistency. All three modes were found on this
   mission's own first delivery, by the machinery applied to its own work. RM-02's four
   clauses are the enforceable form.

2. Never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property. A verification artifact
   writable by the actor whose behaviour it certifies certifies the attack. It must sit
   inside its integrity envelope, publish atomically, and carry a tamper negative
   control observed red. If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider —
   an honest 'this cannot be verified' is always available and always preferable to
   laundering foreign content as certified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:14:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 85bdbe3383 docs(remediation): bank D-18 — pre-registered criteria AC2 and AC4 were mutually unsatisfiable
Implementing D-17's fix surfaced a conflict between criteria, not within one. AC2
(reject symlinked generated state) cannot hold alongside AC4 (canonical build
succeeds): verified independently that apps/web sets output:'standalone' and the built
tree carries 42 legitimate pnpm symlinks under .next/standalone. Only building the
tree reveals it.

Completes the chain: a pre-registered check set can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17),
or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18).

Ruling: build-certified symlink manifest — .next itself still rejected; descendants
rejected unless exactly certified. Stronger than blanket rejection because it catches
retargeting. AC2 restated and RECORDED with provenance rather than absorbed, since
silently resolving a conflict between pre-registered criteria destroys the point of
registering them.

Hardening: the manifest is generated state, so a manifest writable by whoever plants a
rogue symlink certifies the attack. Must be inside the integrity envelope, published
atomically, with negative controls observed red first including manifest-tampered.

RM-02 fourth clause: the registry must detect conflicts between criteria, and retain
original text plus restatement plus reason when a criterion changes meaning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:11:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ae4baf145d docs(remediation): bank D-17 — pre-registration confers neither correctness nor coverage
rev-974 blocked PR #1027: AC2 was pre-registered and explicitly required rejecting
symlinked generated state; the implementation accepts it (ln -s into .next, preflight
exits 0 instead of 43) while the acceptance suite ran 21/21 green throughout.

Confirmed independently: preflight.mjs:82-92 rejects symlinks on the SOURCE path,
:28 merely skips symlinked dirs, and the generated-state path :141-163 checks uid but
never isSymbolicLink(). The suite's only symlink cases cover the turbo binary and a
source file.

Sharpens D-8 rather than repeating it. D-8: pre-registration does not confer
CORRECTNESS. D-17: it does not confer COVERAGE — a suite can be green with every
criterion appearing satisfied while a criterion's actual requirement is untested.

RM-02 third clause: the registry must bind each criterion to the specific case that
exercises it and prove that case red before trusting its green. Mutation testing
pointed at the criterion-to-case mapping, not just the gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:07:58 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4512312b9f docs(remediation): D-16 ownership — #1024 is Jason-pending; CI is the authoritative gate for #1027
Propagating Mos's ruling in the same commit that records it, per D-14's interim rule.

The hermeticity fix IS PR #1024, which sits in Jason's parked delivery stack, so its
disposition is his — marked SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON alongside #1023. D-16 strengthens
urgency without transferring ownership; we do not open a third lane on a parked PR.

Class sharpened: a pre-push gate an operator cannot run locally is a gate only CI
enforces, so pointing .husky/pre-push at it misrepresents where the gate lives.
Non-hermetic gates make every green host-dependent.

#1027 proceeds on CI-green; the local exit-97 is a host-specific guard abort and is
not a merge consideration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:43:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e233f196b5 docs(remediation): bank D-16 — local and CI test gates disagree by environment
Ran down Mos's flag. Both hypotheses were wrong: CI runs exactly 'pnpm test' (same
command, path IS exercised) and is green, while this host exits 97 on an
environment-dependent BASH_LINENO guard (#973) that aborts on bash 5.2.15 and not in
CI's container. PR #1027 touches zero files under packages/mosaic, so the guard is
genuinely pre-existing — f10-coder's report was accurate in every particular, and main
is equally affected here.

Not 'merges step around a red' but something worse in one respect: the local gate and
the CI gate disagree about what passing means. No agent on this host can get a green
pnpm test on any branch. A gate only CI can run cannot be a pre-push gate.

Second defect found while establishing this: in the main checkout the same package
fails differently (exit 1) because a test scans the working tree and picks up
apps/coordinator/venv third-party site-packages. A test whose verdict depends on
untracked files is not hermetic — same contamination source that broke format:check,
one foreign tree breaking two independent gates.

Coordinate with #1007/#1024 rather than opening a third lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:40:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3477e933df docs(remediation): bank D-15 — token scope is not repository permission
f10-coder holds gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder.token with write:repository scope and was
verified at mint by 'repo access returns 200'. It cannot push: collaborator lookup
404s and its own token reports push:false, pull:true.

Capability has three independent layers — token file (raw-API auth), tea login (tea
path), repository permission (actual write authority) — and satisfying two proves
nothing about the third. Scope bounds what a token may ATTEMPT; repository permission
decides what the user may DO.

The charter principle failing on the check meant to confirm capability: a 200 on a
READ was accepted as evidence of WRITE. written-unverified treated as verified, by
both provisioner and orchestrator, one layer above D-12.

RM-50's pre-dispatch check must assert effective permission for the intended operation
(permissions.push == true as that seat), not token existence or a read returning 200.
A capability check that cannot fail on a seat lacking write permission is itself an
inert gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:32:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0ad6e942b docs(remediation): propagate DECISION-2 to charter — second un-propagated ruling, found by applying D-14
Applied D-14's own interim rule immediately instead of waiting to be bitten again, and
it caught a second instance within minutes: MISSION.md's standing directives still
stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of Mos's binding qualification that the
spine must not be a single-point hard-stop (degraded mode + rollback artifact
required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability
posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected, with the superseded 'no DB means the
fleet stops' recommendation nowhere contradicted.

Two un-propagated rulings out of two that touched charter text. Without a mechanism,
propagation failure is the default outcome, not an oversight — which is the argument
for D-14 being a requirement rather than a discipline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:12:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 7f686aaf6d docs(remediation): bank D-14 decision-propagation requirement; record D-13 reconciliation
D-14: DECISION-1 was ruled and applied to TASKS.md while MISSION.md — the charter a
cold-starting seat reads first — kept the superseded wire-in target for hours, flagged
CONTESTED on the board but never corrected in the source of truth. A resuming seat
would have read the rejected target as authoritative. Caught by hand during an
unrelated edit; nothing would have caught it otherwise.

P-MISSION-001 turned on ourselves: a decision that lives in a ruling and a board note
but not in the authoritative record has been AGREED, not MADE. Requirement: rulings
must propagate mechanically — decisions as records, documents rendering rather than
restating, and a must-fail check where duplication is unavoidable. Interim rule until
the DB cutover: the same commit that records a ruling updates every document stating it.

D-13 updated with Mos's reconciliation: 5 of 6 mosaicstack-provisioned seats have no
tea login — systemic, not a one-off. Supersedes D-11(b): the token-file set is
necessary but NOT sufficient; capability is per-path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:11:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f13222b76b docs(remediation): charter reflects DECISION-1 corrected wire-in target and current status
The charter's build-1 cell still named mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task after
DECISION-1 ruled against it. Leaving the charter contradicting the ruled decision would
mislead any future reader who starts there — corrected in place with the rationale and
provenance, rather than only in TASKS.md.

Also: status PLANNING -> EXECUTING; scout TODO discharged (file is in-tree) with a note
that its findings stand but its recommended wire-in point is superseded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:07:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d1e7ba19ca docs(remediation): promote observe-the-property principle to charter; bank D-13 dual credential registries
Charter gains a first-class principle per Mos: no write is done until the requested
PROPERTY is observed; a success exit code is not evidence. Success output is designed
to be believed — that is why the inert-gate class exists and why the P-WRAPPER
tri-state is not optional. Recorded with its provenance: the orchestrator committed
this exact error (D-12), and three of the session's twelve instances were its own.

D-13: diagnosing D-12 found two parallel credential registries that can disagree.
gitea-mosaicstack-mos-dt-0.token EXISTS, but tea has no mosaicstack login for that
identity — so raw-API paths work while tea-dependent wrapper paths silently degrade.
tea is not stale; the login does not exist. Capability declared authoritative by the
token-file set does not govern the tea path.

RM-04 must reconcile the registries (or assert agreement at startup, with a must-fail
control). RM-50's pre-dispatch check must verify capability for the path actually used.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:06:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0ffdcf14bd docs(remediation): bank D-12 — pr-create silently dropped --draft; I trusted exit 0 over observed state
PR #1027 was created with -d because it carries partial unproven work. tea auth was
stale, the wrapper fell back to the raw API which cannot set draft, warned on stderr,
and exited 0. The PR sat open and mergeable for ~25 minutes, protected only by the
word DRAFT in its title and body. I had reported it to the coordinator as a draft.

Three failures: a fallback silently degrading a SAFETY flag (nuisance for --labels,
dangerous for --draft); a correct warning nobody consumed; and my own failure to
verify the flag took effect — I checked the PR existed, not that it had the property
I required. That is written-unverified treated as verified, by me, on exactly the
class of tool this mission exists to distrust.

Fixed via the WIP: title prefix; draft:True verified after.

RM-02 gains a must-fail control: a wrapper that cannot honour a safety-relevant
argument must exit non-zero. RM-24 gains this as its canonical tri-state example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:03:29 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 be10bdc828 docs(remediation): board tick — 2 PRs merged, RM-01 on rotated seat, dispatch doctrine
Board now carries the pre-dispatch capability check (token-file existence), the
token/authorship coherence rule, and the accreted worker-brief doctrine, so a
compacted or fresh seat inherits them mechanically rather than by recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:01:55 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2201c30284 docs(remediation): correct D-11(a) mechanism — token identity and commit authorship are separate
Per Mos. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY resolves the TOKEN; commit author comes from git config
user.name/user.email, a separate setting that fell back to the generic value. The
export could never have fixed authorship — my worker brief instructed only the export,
so the seat did what it was told and the commits were still mis-attributed. The error
was in the brief before it was in the finding.

Requirement is COHERENCE: token and authorship must agree; either half alone is drift.
Belongs in seat setup, verified by an exit-asserting test that commits and asserts the
author — not in prose a seat can follow correctly and still end up wrong.

Capability check mechanized: capability IS token-file existence. Before dispatching
seat X to provider Y, test gitea-<Y>-<X>.token exists. The token-file set is the
authoritative capability registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:59:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 75dfe2fa75 docs(remediation): bank D-11 — identity drift + seat capability opacity at dispatch
RM-01's seat was briefed to export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY; its commits are authored as
the generic mosaic-coder fallback, so git history cannot say which seat did the work.
P-WRAPPER-001 reproduced on our own delivery.

Separately, nothing at dispatch time revealed the seat lacked a credential for the
target provider — discovered only when it failed mid-task after ~$9 and 69% context.
get_gitea_token behaved correctly by refusing to borrow another slot's token; the
dispatch-time information simply did not exist.

RM-50 gains per-seat capability declaration + pre-dispatch check; RM-04 gains
identity-binding verified by an exit-asserting test rather than assumed from an
export in a brief.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:56:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 409bf23e6a docs(remediation): bank D-10 — the queue guard's failure modes are inverted
Same required gate, both directions wrong: fails OPEN on state=unknown (5 meaningless
greens this session, wrong branch too), and fails CLOSED on credential resolution,
hard-blocking a worker's completed work. The identical command succeeded from that
worker's own worktree in another shell, so the checkout was fine.

A gate that waves through unchecked work and blocks ready work has its failure modes
backwards. Availability failures must degrade to a loud, audited CANNOT_ASSERT;
correctness failures must block. Also the Pi-brick shape: a gate whose unavailability
prevents recovery from it.

RM-03 extended to a third requirement: distinguish CANNOT_ASSERT from
ASSERTED_NOT_READY, both registered with must-fail controls, neither exiting 0 silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:52:42 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 31c3191305 docs(remediation): rolling-branch resume pointer + D-9 interim comms rule
KICKSTART resume now points at origin/remediation/state for the live board, per Mos's
cadence ruling: every tick is pushed to the rolling branch immediately (durable
per-tick, no per-tick main PR); main carries periodic snapshots only. Reading the
board from main would silently yield a stale tick, so the step warns explicitly.

D-9 hardened: comms/v1 must use file/stdin transport, never argv interpolation.
Standing interim rule until then — agent-send -f for any body with special
characters, never -m. Mandatory in every worker brief alongside the D-8 clause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:50:26 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6a067174ed docs(remediation): bank D-9 — comms path shell-interprets message bodies
agent-send.sh -m with backticks executes them as command substitution: the recipient
got a mangled body plus a shell error, and the send still reported success. Same class
as the known pr-create.sh backtick bug — two tools in the comms path treating a
message body as shell input.

The failure mode is the mission's own pattern: silent corruption with a success
receipt.

Requirement on RM-40/RM-42: comms/v1 must carry payloads verbatim with no shell
interpretation at any hop, with a byte-identical round-trip test (backticks, command
substitution, quotes, newlines) registered under RM-02 including a must-fail control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:48:17 -05:00
277 changed files with 4329 additions and 35314 deletions
-1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ coverage
.env.local
*.tsbuildinfo
.pnpm-store
__pycache__/
docs/reports/
# Step-CA dev password — real file is gitignored; commit only the .example
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
pnpm preflight && pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check
pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/
# HOME resolves to /root in the ci-base image, preserving its warmed-store path.
# Non-root checkouts use their own HOME. Override without editing this file via
# NPM_CONFIG_STORE_DIR (pnpm's environment form of the store-dir setting).
store-dir=${HOME}/.local/share/pnpm/store
# Pin the pnpm store to the same path the ci-base image warms (Dockerfile.ci),
# so the pipeline `pnpm install --prefer-offline` consumes the baked store
# instead of repopulating a fresh one.
store-dir=/root/.local/share/pnpm/store
-10
View File
@@ -109,16 +109,6 @@ steps:
# `apk add` guarantees openssl is present on PR pipelines too (and is a
# fast no-op once the rebuilt image already ships it).
- apk add --no-cache openssl
# Pi runtime (Invariant R): invariant_r_unittest.py hard-requires an
# installed `pi` binary at exactly this measured version — the test
# boots Pi's real tool registry to prove the read-only carve-out
# resolves to real, unshadowed builtins, and fails loud (by design)
# when the runtime is absent or drifts. The canonical Pi is
# @earendil-works/[email protected] exactly (@mariozechner/* is
# embedded-legacy). Step-level install because ci-base image publishes
# are currently blocked on registry auth; fold into Dockerfile.ci once
# that is fixed, keeping this as a fast no-op guard.
- npm install -g @earendil-works/[email protected]
# postgresql-client (pg_isready) is baked into ci-base.
# Wait up to 60s for CI postgres to be ready; fail fast if it never comes up.
- |
+5 -104
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Build, publish npm packages, and push Docker images
# Runs on main for stable publishes and on next for integration-line prereleases/images
# Runs only on main branch push/tag
variables:
# Pre-baked CI base (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml): node:24-alpine +
@@ -23,21 +23,9 @@ variables:
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
- event: [push, manual]
branch: next
- &main_image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
exclude:
- 'packages/mosaic/**'
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
when:
- branch: [main, next]
- branch: [main]
event: [push, manual, tag]
steps:
@@ -115,84 +103,6 @@ steps:
depends_on:
- build
publish-next-npm:
image: *node_image
# Durable @next integration-line publish. Runs only on next; never writes
# the latest dist-tag and never commits the computed prerelease versions.
when:
- event: [push, manual]
branch: next
environment:
NPM_TOKEN:
from_secret: gitea_token
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER: ${CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER}
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- |
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" != "next" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: publish-next-npm may only run on next (got '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH')" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -z "$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER is required for prerelease versioning" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "//git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/:_authToken=$NPM_TOKEN" > ~/.npmrc
echo "@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/" >> ~/.npmrc
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic dist-tags --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/ --json)"
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$DIST_TAGS_JSON" node -e 'const tags = JSON.parse(process.env.DIST_TAGS_JSON || "{}"); if (!tags || typeof tags !== "object" || !Object.hasOwn(tags, "latest")) { throw new Error("Gitea npm registry did not return a usable dist-tags object"); } console.log("[publish-next] registry dist-tags OK: latest=" + tags.latest);'
node <<'NODE'
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const pipelineNumber = process.env.CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER;
const roots = ['apps', 'packages', 'plugins'];
const updated = [];
function walk(dir) {
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return;
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
if (entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' || entry.name === '.turbo') continue;
const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
const packagePath = path.join(fullPath, 'package.json');
if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) updatePackage(packagePath);
walk(fullPath);
}
}
}
function updatePackage(packagePath) {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
if (!manifest.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') || manifest.private) return;
const stableMatch = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:[-+].*)?$/.exec(manifest.version);
if (!stableMatch) {
throw new Error(manifest.name + " has unsupported semver version '" + manifest.version + "'");
}
const [, major, minor, patch] = stableMatch;
const oldVersion = manifest.version;
manifest.version = major + '.' + minor + '.' + (Number(patch) + 1) + '-next.' + pipelineNumber;
fs.writeFileSync(packagePath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n');
updated.push(manifest.name + ' ' + oldVersion + ' -> ' + manifest.version);
}
for (const root of roots) walk(root);
if (updated.length === 0) throw new Error('No publishable @mosaicstack/* packages found');
console.log('[publish-next] computed prerelease versions for ' + updated.length + ' packages:');
for (const line of updated) console.log('[publish-next] ' + line);
NODE
pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/*" --filter "!@mosaicstack/web" --filter "!@mosaicstack/mosaic-as" publish --no-git-checks --access public --tag next
EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p "require('./packages/mosaic/package.json').version")"
RESOLVED_VERSION="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/)"
if [ "$RESOLVED_VERSION" != "$EXPECTED_VERSION" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolved '$RESOLVED_VERSION', expected '$EXPECTED_VERSION'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish-next] @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolves to $RESOLVED_VERSION"
depends_on:
- build
# TODO: Uncomment when ready to publish to npmjs.org
# publish-npmjs:
# image: *node_image
@@ -224,17 +134,8 @@ steps:
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: next gateway publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish] next gateway publish is sha-only"
elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:latest"
elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: gateway image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
@@ -245,7 +146,7 @@ steps:
build-appservice:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *main_image_build_when
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -271,7 +172,7 @@ steps:
build-web:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *main_image_build_when
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
+31 -70
View File
@@ -11,87 +11,48 @@
## Project Context
Mosaic Stack is a self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. It is a TypeScript monorepo with a NestJS gateway, Next.js dashboard, Pi SDK agent runtime, and Discord/Telegram plugin architecture.
Mosaic Stack is a self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. TypeScript monorepo with NestJS gateway, Next.js web dashboard, Pi SDK agent runtime, and plugin architecture for Discord/Telegram.
### Stack
## Package Map
- **API:** NestJS with Fastify (`apps/gateway`)
- **Web:** Next.js 16 with React 19 (`apps/web`)
- **ORM and database:** Drizzle ORM, PostgreSQL 17, and pgvector (`packages/db`)
- **Authentication:** BetterAuth (`packages/auth`)
- **Agent runtime:** Pi SDK (`apps/gateway`, `packages/mosaic`)
- **Queue:** Valkey 8 (`packages/queue`)
- **Build:** pnpm workspaces and Turborepo
- **CI:** Woodpecker CI
- **Observability:** OpenTelemetry and Jaeger
| Package | Purpose | Key Dependencies |
| ------------------ | ------------------------------- | -------------------------------- |
| `apps/gateway` | NestJS API + WebSocket hub | Fastify, Socket.IO, Pi SDK, OTEL |
| `apps/web` | Next.js dashboard | React 19, Tailwind |
| `packages/types` | Shared TypeScript contracts | class-validator |
| `packages/db` | Drizzle ORM schema + migrations | drizzle-orm, postgres |
| `packages/auth` | BetterAuth configuration | better-auth, @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/brain` | Data layer (PG-backed) | @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/queue` | Valkey task queue + MCP | ioredis |
| `packages/coord` | Mission coordination | @mosaicstack/queue |
| `packages/mosaic` | Unified `mosaic` CLI + TUI | Ink, Pi SDK, commander |
| `plugins/discord` | Discord channel plugin | discord.js |
| `plugins/telegram` | Telegram channel plugin | Telegraf |
### Package Map
## Architecture Rules
| Package | Purpose | Key Dependencies |
| ------------------ | ----------------------------- | -------------------------------- |
| `apps/gateway` | NestJS API + WebSocket hub | Fastify, Socket.IO, Pi SDK, OTEL |
| `apps/web` | Next.js dashboard | React 19, Tailwind |
| `packages/types` | Shared TypeScript contracts | class-validator |
| `packages/db` | Drizzle schema and migrations | drizzle-orm, postgres |
| `packages/auth` | BetterAuth configuration | better-auth, @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/brain` | Structured data layer | @mosaicstack/db |
| `packages/queue` | Valkey task queue and MCP | ioredis |
| `packages/coord` | Mission coordination | @mosaicstack/queue |
| `packages/mosaic` | Unified `mosaic` CLI and TUI | Ink, Pi SDK, commander |
| `plugins/discord` | Discord channel plugin | discord.js |
| `plugins/telegram` | Telegram channel plugin | Telegraf |
## Architecture and Code Conventions
1. Gateway is the single API surface; all clients connect through it.
2. Pi SDK is ESM-only; gateway and CLI code must remain ESM.
3. Use `"type": "module"`, NodeNext module resolution, and `.js` extensions in imports.
4. Keep typed Socket.IO events in `@mosaicstack/types` to enforce client/server contracts.
5. Import OTEL tracing before NestJS bootstrap (`import './tracing.js'`).
6. Use explicit `@Inject()` decorators in NestJS because tsx/esbuild does not emit decorator metadata.
7. Keep DTOs in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries.
8. BetterAuth owns authentication tables; their schema is defined in `@mosaicstack/db`.
9. Create a task-specific scratchpad for non-trivial work.
1. Gateway is the single API surface — all clients connect through it
2. Pi SDK is ESM-only — gateway and CLI must use ESM
3. Socket.IO typed events defined in `@mosaicstack/types` enforce compile-time contracts
4. OTEL auto-instrumentation loads before NestJS bootstrap
5. BetterAuth manages auth tables; schema defined in `@mosaicstack/db`
6. Docker Compose provides PG (5433), Valkey (6380), OTEL Collector (4317/4318), Jaeger (16686)
7. Explicit `@Inject()` decorators required in NestJS (tsx/esbuild doesn't emit decorator metadata)
## Development Workflow
Requirements: Node.js 20+, pnpm 10.6.2, and Docker Compose when optional local services are needed.
```bash
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
pnpm preflight
# Optional local queue service only; do not start the full Compose stack.
docker compose up -d valkey
docker compose up -d # Infrastructure
pnpm install # Dependencies
pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check # Quality gates
```
The pre-push hook requires:
## Repo-Specific Notes
```bash
pnpm preflight && pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check
```
Software delivery also requires the applicable tests. Common repository commands are:
```bash
pnpm typecheck # TypeScript checks across the workspace
pnpm lint # ESLint across the workspace
pnpm test # Checkout tests and package Vitest suites
pnpm format:check # Prettier check
pnpm build # Build all packages and applications
```
## Database and Local Runtime Safety
- Current local data-layer work uses in-process PGlite; leave `DATABASE_URL` unset.
- PostgreSQL execution is held until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05 land.
- Do not invoke a migration runner, initialization SQL, or the Compose PostgreSQL service from this checkout.
- Do not start Gateway/Web or run root `pnpm dev` as a local PGlite route. The current dotenv loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN; KBN-101-02 must make that path fail closed first.
- Migration artifact generation is offline and does not authorize PostgreSQL access:
```bash
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate
```
- DTOs in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries
- ESM everywhere (`"type": "module"`, `.js` extensions in imports)
- NodeNext module resolution in all tsconfigs
- Scratchpads are mandatory for non-trivial tasks
## docs/TASKS.md — Schema (CANONICAL)
+44 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,46 @@
# Claude Compatibility Pointer
# CLAUDE.md — Mosaic Stack
@AGENTS.md
## Project
Do not add project guidance here. Keep `AGENTS.md` authoritative so every agent runtime receives the same instructions.
Self-hosted, multi-user AI agent platform. TypeScript monorepo.
## Stack
- **API**: NestJS + Fastify adapter (`apps/gateway`)
- **Web**: Next.js 16 + React 19 (`apps/web`)
- **ORM**: Drizzle ORM + PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector (`packages/db`)
- **Auth**: BetterAuth (`packages/auth`)
- **Agent**: Pi SDK (`packages/agent`, `packages/mosaic`)
- **Queue**: Valkey 8 (`packages/queue`)
- **Build**: pnpm workspaces + Turborepo
- **CI**: Woodpecker CI
- **Observability**: OpenTelemetry → Jaeger
## Commands
```bash
pnpm typecheck # TypeScript check (all packages)
pnpm lint # ESLint (all packages)
pnpm format:check # Prettier check
pnpm test # Vitest (all packages)
pnpm build # Build all packages
# Database
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate # Offline migration artifact generation only
# PostgreSQL execution is held until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 land. Do not invoke a runner,
# init SQL, or Compose PostgreSQL service from this checkout.
# Dev: local PGlite data-layer work needs no PostgreSQL. Optional local queue service only:
docker compose up -d valkey
# Do not start Gateway/Web or root pnpm dev as a local PGlite route: the current unguarded dotenv
# loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. KBN-101-02 must make that state fail closed first.
```
## Conventions
- ESM everywhere (`"type": "module"`, `.js` extensions in imports)
- NodeNext module resolution
- Explicit `@Inject()` decorators in NestJS (tsx/esbuild doesn't support emitDecoratorMetadata)
- DTOs in `*.dto.ts` files at module boundaries
- OTEL tracing imported before NestJS bootstrap (`import './tracing.js'`)
- All three gates must pass before push: typecheck, lint, format:check
+4 -34
View File
@@ -30,16 +30,6 @@ This installs both components:
| **Framework** | Bash launcher, guides, runtime configs, tools, skills | `~/.config/mosaic/` |
| **@mosaicstack/mosaic** | Unified `mosaic` CLI — TUI, gateway client, wizard, auto-updater | `~/.npm-global/bin/` |
### Install lanes
| Lane | Command | Use when | Source |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Stable | `bash tools/install.sh` | You want the released Mosaic CLI/framework | npm registry `@mosaicstack/mosaic@latest` + framework archive at `main` |
| Prerelease integration | `bash tools/install.sh --next` | You want the current `next` integration branch | Build-from-source at `next` |
| Contributor/source build | `bash tools/install.sh --dev --ref X` | You are testing a branch before release; `--ref` wins | Build-from-source at the requested ref |
`--next` is shorthand for the prerelease integration lane: it enables source-build mode and uses `next` unless an explicit `--ref` or `MOSAIC_REF` is provided.
After install, the wizard runs automatically or you can invoke it manually:
```bash
@@ -48,13 +38,9 @@ mosaic wizard # Full guided setup (gateway install → verify)
### Requirements
- Node.js ≥ 22
- Node.js ≥ 20
- npm (for global @mosaicstack/mosaic install)
- One or more runtimes:
- [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)
- [Codex](https://github.com/openai/codex)
- [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai)
- [Pi](https://pi.dev)
- One or more runtimes: [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [Codex](https://github.com/openai/codex), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Pi](https://github.com/mariozechner/pi-coding-agent)
## Usage
@@ -204,7 +190,7 @@ Consent state is persisted in config. Remote upload is a no-op until you run `mo
### Prerequisites
- Node.js ≥ 22
- Node.js ≥ 20
- pnpm 10.6+
- Docker & Docker Compose
@@ -215,21 +201,8 @@ git clone [email protected]:mosaicstack/stack.git
cd stack
# Install dependencies. The local tier uses in-process PGlite; leave DATABASE_URL unset.
# The pnpm store defaults to $HOME/.local/share/pnpm/store. Override it without
# editing the checkout with NPM_CONFIG_STORE_DIR=$HOME/another-store if needed.
pnpm install
# Verify dependencies and generated state before running source-quality gates.
# Missing dependencies exit 42; stale/foreign apps/web/.next state exits 43.
# The web build certifies its exact standalone symlink manifest; added, removed,
# retargeted, or manifest-only-tampered generated links also exit 43. This detects
# accidental, independent, stale, and foreign-residue mutation—the class exposed by
# a five-month-stale .next that produced 19 phantom TS2307 errors.
# It does NOT defend against a same-UID actor that can rewrite both manifest and
# marker consistently (CWE-345). RM-59 tracks the required executor/spine-side
# trust anchor outside worktree authority.
pnpm preflight
# Optional local queue service only. This does not start PostgreSQL.
docker compose up -d valkey
@@ -257,7 +230,6 @@ Gateway start command until KBN-101-02 makes that state fail closed.
### Quality Gates
```bash
pnpm preflight # Checkout/dependency/generated-state validation
pnpm typecheck # TypeScript type checking (all packages)
pnpm lint # ESLint (all packages)
pnpm test # Vitest (all packages)
@@ -375,9 +347,7 @@ The CLI also performs a background update check on every invocation (cached for
bash tools/install.sh --check # Version check only
bash tools/install.sh --framework # Framework only (skip npm CLI)
bash tools/install.sh --cli # npm CLI only (skip framework)
bash tools/install.sh --next # Prerelease lane: source build from next
bash tools/install.sh --dev # Contributor lane: source build at --ref/main
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref (--ref wins over --next)
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref
bash tools/install.sh --yes # Non-interactive, accept all defaults
bash tools/install.sh --no-auto-launch # Skip auto-launch of wizard
```
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ describe('ConversationsController — search endpoint', () => {
},
];
brain = createMockBrain({ searchResults });
controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never, { runtimeMode: 'legacy' });
controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never);
});
it('returns matching messages for a valid search query', async () => {
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ describe('ConversationsController — search endpoint', () => {
describe('ConversationsController — message CRUD', () => {
it('listMessages returns 404 when conversation is not owned by user', async () => {
const brain = createMockBrain({ conversation: undefined });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never, { runtimeMode: 'legacy' });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never);
await expect(controller.listMessages(CONV_ID, { id: USER_ID })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
NotFoundException,
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ describe('ConversationsController — message CRUD', () => {
it('listMessages returns the messages for an owned conversation', async () => {
const msgs = [makeMessage('user', 'Test message'), makeMessage('assistant', 'Test reply')];
const brain = createMockBrain({ conversation: makeConversation(), messages: msgs });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never, { runtimeMode: 'legacy' });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never);
const result = await controller.listMessages(CONV_ID, { id: USER_ID });
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ describe('ConversationsController — message CRUD', () => {
it('addMessage returns the persisted message', async () => {
const brain = createMockBrain({ conversation: makeConversation() });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never, { runtimeMode: 'legacy' });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never);
const result = await controller.addMessage(
CONV_ID,
@@ -1,519 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation M3 single-gateway integration tests (FED-M3-10).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance:
* - #6: malformed certificate OIDs fail with 401; valid cert + revoked grant fails with 403.
* - #7: max_rows_per_query caps list results.
*
* Strategy:
* - Real PostgreSQL via @mosaicstack/db.
* - Mocked TLS context/Fastify request shim for FederationAuthGuard.
* - Direct controller calls using the real POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource contract.
*
* Run:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import type { ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import {
and,
createDb,
eq,
federationGrants,
federationPeers,
inArray,
missionTasks,
missions,
projects,
tasks,
teamMembers,
teams,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
users,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation/server/federation-auth.guard.js';
import { FederationScopeService } from '../../federation/server/scope.service.js';
import { FederationListQueryService } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
import { ListController } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list.controller.js';
import {
makeMosaicIssuedCert,
makeSelfSignedCert,
} from '../../federation/__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const PG_URL = process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
const RUN_ID = `fed-m3-10-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
const CERT_SERIAL_HEX = crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '').toUpperCase();
interface TestIds {
readonly subjectUserId: string;
readonly otherUserId: string;
readonly peerId: string;
readonly revokedPeerId: string;
readonly activeGrantId: string;
readonly revokedGrantId: string;
readonly subjectProjectId: string;
readonly subjectMissionId: string;
readonly otherProjectId: string;
readonly teamId: string;
readonly unauthorizedTeamId: string;
readonly teamProjectId: string;
readonly taskIds: readonly string[];
readonly excludedTaskIds: readonly string[];
readonly subjectNoteId: string;
readonly otherUserNoteId: string;
}
function pemToDer(pem: string): Buffer {
return Buffer.from(
pem
.replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
.replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
.replace(/\s+/g, ''),
'base64',
);
}
function makeFederationRequest(certPem: string): FastifyRequest {
return {
raw: {
socket: {
getPeerCertificate: () => ({
raw: pemToDer(certPem),
serialNumber: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
}),
},
},
} as unknown as FastifyRequest;
}
function makeGuardContext(request: FastifyRequest): {
readonly context: ExecutionContext;
readonly sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown };
} {
const sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown } = {};
const reply = {
status: (statusCode: number) => {
sent.statusCode = statusCode;
return {
header: () => ({
send: (payload: unknown) => {
sent.payload = payload;
},
}),
};
},
} as unknown as FastifyReply;
const context = {
switchToHttp: () => ({
getRequest: () => request,
getResponse: () => reply,
}),
} as unknown as ExecutionContext;
return { context, sent };
}
async function insertUser(db: Db, id: string, label: string): Promise<void> {
await db.insert(users).values({
id,
name: `${RUN_ID}-${label}`,
email: `${RUN_ID}-${label}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
});
}
async function seedFixtures(db: Db): Promise<TestIds> {
const subjectUserId = `${RUN_ID}-subject`;
const otherUserId = `${RUN_ID}-other`;
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const revokedPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const activeGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
const revokedGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
const subjectProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const subjectMissionId = crypto.randomUUID();
const otherProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const teamId = crypto.randomUUID();
const unauthorizedTeamId = crypto.randomUUID();
const teamProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const taskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
const excludedTaskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
const subjectNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
const otherUserNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
await insertUser(db, subjectUserId, 'subject');
await insertUser(db, otherUserId, 'other');
await db.insert(teams).values([
{
id: teamId,
name: `${RUN_ID} allowed team`,
slug: `${RUN_ID}-allowed-team`,
ownerId: subjectUserId,
managerId: subjectUserId,
},
{
id: unauthorizedTeamId,
name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team`,
slug: `${RUN_ID}-unauthorized-team`,
ownerId: otherUserId,
managerId: otherUserId,
},
]);
await db.insert(teamMembers).values([
{ teamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
{ teamId: unauthorizedTeamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
]);
await db.insert(projects).values([
{
id: subjectProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} subject personal project`,
ownerType: 'user',
ownerId: subjectUserId,
},
{
id: otherProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} other personal project`,
ownerType: 'user',
ownerId: otherUserId,
},
{
id: teamProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team project`,
ownerType: 'team',
teamId: unauthorizedTeamId,
},
]);
await db.insert(missions).values({
id: subjectMissionId,
name: `${RUN_ID} subject mission`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
userId: subjectUserId,
});
await db.insert(tasks).values([
{
id: taskIds[0],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 1`,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: taskIds[1],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 2`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: taskIds[2],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 3`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: excludedTaskIds[0],
title: `${RUN_ID} other user task`,
projectId: otherProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: excludedTaskIds[1],
title: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team task`,
projectId: teamProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
},
]);
await db.insert(missionTasks).values([
{
id: subjectNoteId,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
userId: subjectUserId,
notes: `${RUN_ID} subject visible note`,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: otherUserNoteId,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
userId: otherUserId,
notes: `${RUN_ID} other user note on subject mission`,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
},
]);
await db.insert(federationPeers).values([
{
id: peerId,
commonName: `${RUN_ID}-active-peer`,
displayName: `${RUN_ID} Active Peer`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
state: 'active',
},
{
id: revokedPeerId,
commonName: `${RUN_ID}-revoked-peer`,
displayName: `${RUN_ID} Revoked Peer`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `${CERT_SERIAL_HEX}${RUN_ID.replace(/-/g, '').slice(0, 8).toUpperCase()}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
state: 'active',
},
]);
await db.insert(federationGrants).values([
{
id: activeGrantId,
peerId,
subjectUserId,
status: 'active',
scope: {
resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
filters: {
tasks: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
notes: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
},
max_rows_per_query: 2,
},
},
{
id: revokedGrantId,
peerId,
subjectUserId,
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: new Date(),
revokedReason: `${RUN_ID} revoked grant fixture`,
scope: {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 2,
},
},
]);
return {
subjectUserId,
otherUserId,
peerId,
revokedPeerId,
activeGrantId,
revokedGrantId,
subjectProjectId,
subjectMissionId,
otherProjectId,
teamId,
unauthorizedTeamId,
teamProjectId,
taskIds,
excludedTaskIds,
subjectNoteId,
otherUserNoteId,
};
}
async function cleanupFixtures(db: Db, ids: TestIds | undefined): Promise<void> {
if (!ids) {
return;
}
await db
.delete(missionTasks)
.where(inArray(missionTasks.id, [ids.subjectNoteId, ids.otherUserNoteId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(tasks)
.where(inArray(tasks.id, [...ids.taskIds, ...ids.excludedTaskIds]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(missions)
.where(eq(missions.id, ids.subjectMissionId))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(projects)
.where(inArray(projects.id, [ids.subjectProjectId, ids.otherProjectId, ids.teamProjectId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(teamMembers)
.where(
and(
eq(teamMembers.userId, ids.subjectUserId),
inArray(teamMembers.teamId, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]),
),
)
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(teams)
.where(inArray(teams.id, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, [ids.activeGrantId, ids.revokedGrantId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, [ids.peerId, ids.revokedPeerId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(users)
.where(inArray(users.id, [ids.subjectUserId, ids.otherUserId]))
.catch(() => {});
}
describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M3 list verb — single-gateway integration', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let guard: FederationAuthGuard;
let listController: ListController;
let ids: TestIds | undefined;
beforeAll(async () => {
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
ids = await seedFixtures(db);
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [ListController],
providers: [
{ provide: DB, useValue: db },
GrantsService,
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
],
}).compile();
guard = moduleRef.get(FederationAuthGuard);
listController = moduleRef.get(ListController);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await moduleRef?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
await cleanupFixtures(db, ids).catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
await handle?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
});
it('#6 — rejects a client cert with malformed/missing Mosaic OIDs with 401', async () => {
const malformedOidCert = await makeSelfSignedCert();
const request = makeFederationRequest(malformedOidCert);
const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(401);
expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
error: {
code: 'unauthorized',
message: expect.stringContaining('missing required OID'),
},
});
expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
});
it('#6 — rejects a valid client cert when its grant is revoked with 403', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const revokedCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.revokedGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(revokedCert);
const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
error: {
code: 'forbidden',
message: 'Federation access denied',
},
});
expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
});
it('#7 — enforces max_rows_per_query on POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
const response = await listController.list('tasks', request, { limit: 100 });
const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
expect(response.items).toHaveLength(2);
expect(response._truncated).toBe(true);
expect(response.nextCursor).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.taskIds[0], ids!.taskIds[1]]);
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.taskIds[2]);
for (const excludedId of ids!.excludedTaskIds) {
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(excludedId);
}
expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
});
it('excludes another user mission task notes on the same authorized mission', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
const response = await listController.list('notes', request, { limit: 10 });
const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.subjectNoteId]);
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.otherUserNoteId);
expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
});
it('fails closed for unsupported list resources', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
await expect(listController.list('widgets', request, {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Requested federation resource is not supported',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
});
@@ -35,25 +35,6 @@ function payload(content: string, messageId: string, correlationId: string): Dis
};
}
/**
* The chat runtime router must never be exercised on the Discord approval/stop control paths —
* those paths run entirely through the command-authorization, runtime-provider and durable-session
* dependencies. Placed in the gateway's chat-runtime-router slot (the former direct `AgentService`
* slot) so any accidental chat-runtime dispatch throws loudly instead of silently passing. Because
* approval/stop never resolve a chat runtime, this fixture is never triggered and the integration
* stays a GREEN cross-surface control.
*/
function failIfUsedChatRuntimeRouter() {
return {
onModuleInit: () => {
throw new Error('chat runtime router must not initialise on the Discord control path');
},
get active(): never {
throw new Error('chat runtime must not be resolved on the Discord approval/stop path');
},
};
}
function authorization(): CommandAuthorizationService {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
return new CommandAuthorizationService(
@@ -132,7 +113,7 @@ describe('interaction Discord/CLI durable-session integration', () => {
},
);
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
failIfUsedChatRuntimeRouter() as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ describe('Resource ownership checks', () => {
// The repo enforces ownership via the WHERE clause; it returns undefined when the
// conversation does not belong to the requesting user.
brain.conversations.findById.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never, { runtimeMode: 'legacy' });
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain as never);
await expect(controller.findOne('conv-1', { id: 'user-1' })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
NotFoundException,
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
import { Controller, Get, Inject, Optional, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Controller, Get, Inject, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { sql, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { createQueue } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from './admin.guard.js';
import type { HealthStatusDto, ServiceStatusDto } from './admin.dto.js';
@@ -16,9 +14,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
@Inject(ProviderService) private readonly providerService: ProviderService,
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {}
@Get()
@@ -60,14 +55,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
}
private async checkCache(): Promise<ServiceStatusDto> {
// On Local tier there is no Redis. The cache is intentionally absent, which
// is a healthy state for this tier — report 'ok' rather than opening a new
// ioredis connection on every admin health check (which would spam
// ECONNREFUSED and create/destroy a connection per request). latencyMs 0
// signals "no cache backend to measure" for this tier.
if (this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local') {
return { status: 'ok', latencyMs: 0 };
}
const start = Date.now();
const handle = createQueue();
try {
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('../agent.service.js', () => ({ AgentService: class AgentService {} }));
@@ -14,25 +12,10 @@ vi.mock('../routing/routing-engine.service.js', () => ({
}));
import { SessionsController } from '../sessions.controller.js';
import { AgentService } from '../agent.service.js';
import { ChatController } from '../../chat/chat.controller.js';
import { ChatGateway } from '../../chat/chat.gateway.js';
import type { AgentSession } from '../agent.service.js';
import type { SessionInfoDto } from '../session.dto.js';
import type { HarnessAdapter, HarnessConversationService } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { AuthGuard } from '../../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { AUTH } from '../../auth/auth.tokens.js';
import { BRAIN } from '../../brain/brain.tokens.js';
import { CommandRegistryService } from '../../commands/command-registry.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from '../../commands/command-executor.service.js';
import { RoutingEngineService } from '../routing/routing-engine.service.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from '../../chat/chat-runtime-router.js';
import { EmbeddedChatRuntime } from '../../chat/embedded-chat.runtime.js';
import { ownConversation } from '../../chat/chat-runtime.js';
import type { LegacyRuntimeStream } from '../../chat/chat-runtime.js';
import { HarnessChatRuntime } from '../../chat/harness-chat.runtime.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../../harness/harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE } from '../../harness/harness.tokens.js';
const USER_A = { id: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' };
const USER_B = { id: 'user-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' };
@@ -91,12 +74,6 @@ function makeAgentSession(owner = USER_A): AgentSession {
};
}
/**
* A shape-complete, non-throwing AgentService fake scoped so that USER_B (a foreign owner guessing
* USER_A's conversation id) is never granted the session. Because every method exists and no method
* throws for a wrong shape, production runs to its real ownership decision — the RED never comes from
* a `getSession is not a function` TypeError, only from a router-boundary/scope assertion mismatch.
*/
function makeScopedAgentService() {
const foreign = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
return {
@@ -110,7 +87,7 @@ function makeScopedAgentService() {
getSession: vi.fn((_id: string, scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? undefined : foreign,
),
createSession: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new NotFoundException('Session scope mismatch')),
createSession: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new ForbiddenException('Session scope mismatch')),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => vi.fn()),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
@@ -119,201 +96,6 @@ function makeScopedAgentService() {
};
}
type ScopedAgentService = ReturnType<typeof makeScopedAgentService>;
/**
* A structurally-complete harness conversation service that throws if any method is invoked.
* Fronted behind the legacy runtime's harness slot: the legacy path must never reach it.
*/
const failIfUsedConversationService = {
attach: () => {
throw new Error('harness conversation service must not be reached on the legacy path');
},
detach: () => {
throw new Error('harness conversation service must not be reached on the legacy path');
},
send: () => {
throw new Error('harness conversation service must not be reached on the legacy path');
},
subscribeFrom: async function* () {
throw new Error('harness conversation service must not be reached on the legacy path');
},
} as unknown as HarnessConversationService;
/** A structurally-complete, non-sentinel conversation service used to satisfy the pi-rpc readiness gate. */
const boundConversationService = {
attach: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
detach: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
send: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
subscribeFrom: async function* () {
throw new Error('unused');
},
} as unknown as HarnessConversationService;
function registryWith(adapterIds: readonly string[]): HarnessRegistry {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
for (const id of adapterIds) {
registry.register({
id,
describe: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
catalog: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
create: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
resume: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
} as HarnessAdapter);
}
return registry;
}
/**
* Build the real legacy-mode {@link ChatRuntimeRouter} fronting a real {@link EmbeddedChatRuntime}
* that holds the scoped AgentService fake. This is the ONLY path server-derived scope may travel to
* reach an AgentService: controller/gateway → ChatRuntimeRouter → EmbeddedChatRuntime → AgentService.
* The `embeddedAgentService` handed here is a SEPARATE instance from the directly-injected fake, so a
* call landing on it proves the router-delegation redesign is live rather than the old direct path.
*/
function legacyRouterFronting(agentService: unknown): ChatRuntimeRouter {
const embedded = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(agentService as never);
const harness = new HarnessChatRuntime(failIfUsedConversationService);
const router = new ChatRuntimeRouter(
new HarnessRegistry(),
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
embedded,
harness,
'legacy',
);
router.onModuleInit();
return router;
}
/**
* The AgentService method names the controller/gateway must NEVER drive on the runtime at the
* delegation boundary. An AgentService-shaped router shim (a method-for-method mirror) would record
* one of these instead of the frozen legacy op, so asserting their ABSENCE from the observed runtime
* call set defeats the shim on INVOCATION evidence — never satisfiable by dead source text.
*/
const FORBIDDEN_AGENT_OPS = [
'getSession',
'createSession',
'onEvent',
'addChannel',
'prompt',
'setThinking',
'abort',
] as const;
/**
* Wrap a real {@link ChatRuntimeRouter} in a call-recording Proxy. Every property access that yields
* an OWN/inherited callable is returned as a thin wrapper that appends the method name to `calls` at
* INVOCATION time and forwards to the real method (bound to the real target, so the router's internal
* delegation to the embedded runtime runs untouched below this boundary). Non-function and MISSING
* properties are returned verbatim via Reflect.get — the observer NEVER fabricates a value, returns a
* canned outcome, or delegates a not-yet-implemented named op, so it cannot itself become a shim.
*
* The result is a RUNTIME call set of exactly the methods the controller/gateway invoke ON the router
* at the delegation seam. Only an actual call can enter it; a dead method, comment, or string in the
* production source cannot. This replaces the earlier `source.toContain('<frozen op>')` proof — which
* a dead declaration could satisfy while production still executed a shim — with invocation evidence.
*/
function makeRecordingRouter(target: ChatRuntimeRouter, calls: string[]): ChatRuntimeRouter {
return new Proxy(target, {
get(t, prop) {
const value = Reflect.get(t, prop);
if (typeof value === 'function' && typeof prop === 'string') {
return (...args: unknown[]) => {
calls.push(prop);
return (value as (...a: unknown[]) => unknown).apply(t, args);
};
}
return value;
},
}) as ChatRuntimeRouter;
}
/**
* Real Nest DI dual-provider fixture (mirrors the blessed group-3 pattern in chat-security.test.ts).
*
* BOTH an `AgentService` provider (the FORBIDDEN direct dependency) and a `ChatRuntimeRouter` provider
* (fronting a real EmbeddedChatRuntime over a SEPARATE scoped AgentService) are registered. Production
* resolves whichever its constructor declares:
* - RED today: the controller/gateway `@Inject(AgentService)` → the direct fake is consulted, the
* router (and its embedded fake) is never reached.
* - GREEN later: the controller/gateway inject `ChatRuntimeRouter` → the direct fake is never
* touched (stays at zero) and scope is observed inside the embedded fake behind the router.
* The SAME test body reds today and greens later; a method-for-method AgentService shim on the router
* records a FORBIDDEN op (and never the frozen legacy op) in the observed runtime call set, and
* restoring the direct injection cannot satisfy the "direct fake at zero" / "embedded fake observed
* scope" / "frozen op invoked on the router" anchors. The router is wrapped by {@link
* makeRecordingRouter} so those anchors are runtime invocation evidence, not source substrings.
*/
function buildRestModule(
directAgentService: ScopedAgentService,
embeddedAgentService: ScopedAgentService,
routerCalls: string[],
): Promise<TestingModule> {
return (
Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [ChatController],
providers: [
{ provide: AgentService, useValue: directAgentService },
{
provide: ChatRuntimeRouter,
useFactory: () =>
makeRecordingRouter(legacyRouterFronting(embeddedAgentService), routerCalls),
},
],
})
// ChatController's @UseGuards(AuthGuard) is resolved during instance loading; AuthGuard injects
// AUTH, an HTTP-only concern never exercised by a direct handler call. Stub it so the graph
// resolves and the test reds on BEHAVIOUR, not on a DI collection error.
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: () => true })
.compile()
);
}
function buildGatewayModule(
directAgentService: ScopedAgentService,
embeddedAgentService: ScopedAgentService,
routerCalls: string[],
): Promise<TestingModule> {
const brain = {
conversations: {
// The sender OWNS this durable conversation, so the browser-send admission gate lets the turn
// reach the router seam. Foreignness is asserted downstream at the in-memory agent session
// (getSession({USER_B}) -> undefined), not at durable admission — the admission-rejection
// property has its own dedicated coverage.
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: CONVERSATION_ID, userId: USER_B.id }),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'persisted-turn' }),
},
};
return Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
ChatGateway,
{ provide: AgentService, useValue: directAgentService },
{ provide: AUTH, useValue: { api: { getSession: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null) } } },
{ provide: BRAIN, useValue: brain },
{ provide: CommandRegistryService, useValue: { getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([]) } },
{ provide: CommandExecutorService, useValue: { execute: vi.fn() } },
{
provide: RoutingEngineService,
useValue: {
resolve: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ provider: 'test', model: 'test-model' }),
},
},
{
provide: ChatRuntimeRouter,
useFactory: () =>
makeRecordingRouter(legacyRouterFronting(embeddedAgentService), routerCalls),
},
],
}).compile();
}
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 AgentService ownership boundary', () => {
it('requires explicit owner+tenant scope on protected session operations', () => {
const source = readFileSync(resolve('src/agent/agent.service.ts'), 'utf8');
@@ -370,66 +152,50 @@ describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
});
});
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST chat send ownership and tenant binding (router-delegated legacy runtime)', () => {
// TESS test A — REST /api/chat send. The genuine RED is the router-delegation redesign, not a slot
// swap: the forbidden directly-injected AgentService must go UNtouched while the server-derived
// scope is observed inside the real ChatRuntimeRouter → EmbeddedChatRuntime → AgentService path.
it('routes a REST send through completeLegacyRestTurn and never the directly-injected AgentService', async () => {
const directAgentService = makeScopedAgentService(); // FORBIDDEN direct dependency
const embeddedAgentService = makeScopedAgentService(); // reached ONLY via router → embedded delegation
const routerCalls: string[] = []; // runtime call set observed AT the controller → router seam
const moduleRef = await buildRestModule(directAgentService, embeddedAgentService, routerCalls);
try {
const controller = moduleRef.get(ChatController, { strict: false });
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST chat send ownership and tenant binding', () => {
it('does not send a prompt into another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const controller = new ChatController(agentService as never);
// Foreign ownership is denied (never resolves) — a control that holds today AND at GREEN.
await expect(
controller.chat({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, content: 'take over' }, USER_B),
).rejects.toBeDefined();
await expect(
controller.chat({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, content: 'take over' }, USER_B),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 404 });
// Soft anchors so EVERY anchor is evaluated under each mutation, not just the first to fail.
// RUNTIME anchor A1 — delegation: the controller must INVOKE the frozen legacy op on the router.
// Only an actual call enters routerCalls; a dead method/comment/string cannot. RED today (the
// controller @Inject(AgentService) and never calls the router). GREEN once it drives the op.
expect
.soft(routerCalls, 'controller must invoke completeLegacyRestTurn on the router')
.toContain('completeLegacyRestTurn');
// RUNTIME anchor A2 — nondelegation: the controller must not drive any AgentService-shaped op on
// the router. An AgentService-shaped router shim records one of these → RED, defeating the shim
// on invocation evidence (not source text). A dead named method added alongside the shim does not
// help: it is never invoked, so it never enters routerCalls while a forbidden op still does.
for (const op of FORBIDDEN_AGENT_OPS) {
expect
.soft(routerCalls, `router seam must not invoke AgentService.${op}`)
.not.toContain(op);
}
// RUNTIME anchor A3 — the forbidden directly-injected AgentService stays at zero (fails today;
// restoring the direct injection keeps it failing).
expect.soft(directAgentService.getSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// RUNTIME anchor A4 — server-derived scope observed INSIDE the separate embedded fake behind the
// router (fails today; the router path is never taken).
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
// Zero foreign mutation on either path (holds today and at GREEN).
expect.soft(directAgentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// Defense-in-depth (NOT load-bearing; the runtime anchors above carry the anti-mask): the
// controller no longer declares the direct embedded AgentService dependency. A negative source
// check cannot be satisfied by dead text — it only fails when the injection is present.
const controllerSource = readFileSync(resolve('src/chat/chat.controller.ts'), 'utf8');
expect.soft(controllerSource).not.toContain('@Inject(AgentService)');
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 WebSocket session ownership and tenant binding (router-delegated legacy runtime)', () => {
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 WebSocket session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
function makeGateway(agentService = makeScopedAgentService()) {
const brain = {
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
},
};
const commandRegistry = { getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([]) };
const commandExecutor = { execute: vi.fn() };
const routingEngine = {
resolve: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ provider: 'test', model: 'test-model' }),
};
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
agentService as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
commandRegistry as never,
commandExecutor as never,
routingEngine as never,
);
return { gateway, agentService };
}
function makeSocket() {
return {
id: 'socket-b',
@@ -440,519 +206,57 @@ describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 WebSocket session ownership and tenant binding (router
};
}
// TESS test B — WebSocket send/attach.
it('routes a WebSocket send through prepareLegacySocketTurn and never the directly-injected AgentService', async () => {
const directAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const embeddedAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const routerCalls: string[] = [];
const moduleRef = await buildGatewayModule(
directAgentService,
embeddedAgentService,
routerCalls,
);
try {
const gateway = moduleRef.get(ChatGateway, { strict: false });
const socket = makeSocket();
it('does not attach or send to another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
await Promise.resolve(
gateway.handleMessage(socket as never, {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
content: 'attach to foreign session',
}),
).catch(() => undefined);
// RUNTIME anchor B1 — delegation: the gateway must invoke the frozen socket op on the router.
expect
.soft(routerCalls, 'gateway must invoke prepareLegacySocketTurn on the router')
.toContain('prepareLegacySocketTurn');
// RUNTIME anchor B2 — nondelegation: no AgentService-shaped op on the router (defeats the shim).
for (const op of FORBIDDEN_AGENT_OPS) {
expect
.soft(routerCalls, `router seam must not invoke AgentService.${op}`)
.not.toContain(op);
}
// RED anchor B3 — forbidden direct AgentService untouched (fails today, gateway injects it).
expect.soft(directAgentService.getSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// RED anchor B4 — scope observed inside router → embedded delegation (fails today, never reached).
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
// Foreign session gets zero lease/listener/channel/prompt on EITHER path (holds today and GREEN).
expect.soft(directAgentService.onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(directAgentService.addChannel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(directAgentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.addChannel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect
.soft(socket.emit)
.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
// Defense-in-depth (NOT load-bearing): gateway no longer declares the direct dependency.
const gatewaySource = readFileSync(resolve('src/chat/chat.gateway.ts'), 'utf8');
expect.soft(gatewaySource).not.toContain('@Inject(AgentService)');
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
// TESS test C — WebSocket set:thinking.
it('routes set:thinking through setLegacyThinking and never the directly-injected AgentService', async () => {
const directAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const embeddedAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const routerCalls: string[] = [];
const moduleRef = await buildGatewayModule(
directAgentService,
embeddedAgentService,
routerCalls,
);
try {
const gateway = moduleRef.get(ChatGateway, { strict: false });
const socket = makeSocket();
await Promise.resolve(
gateway.handleSetThinking(socket as never, {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
level: 'high',
}),
).catch(() => undefined);
// RUNTIME anchor C1 — delegation: the gateway must invoke the frozen thinking op on the router.
expect
.soft(routerCalls, 'gateway must invoke setLegacyThinking on the router')
.toContain('setLegacyThinking');
// RUNTIME anchor C2 — nondelegation: no AgentService-shaped op on the router (defeats the shim).
for (const op of FORBIDDEN_AGENT_OPS) {
expect
.soft(routerCalls, `router seam must not invoke AgentService.${op}`)
.not.toContain(op);
}
expect.soft(directAgentService.getSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect
.soft(socket.emit)
.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
// TESS test D — WebSocket abort.
it('routes abort through abortLegacyTurn and never the directly-injected AgentService', async () => {
const directAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const embeddedAgentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const routerCalls: string[] = [];
const moduleRef = await buildGatewayModule(
directAgentService,
embeddedAgentService,
routerCalls,
);
try {
const gateway = moduleRef.get(ChatGateway, { strict: false });
const socket = makeSocket();
await Promise.resolve(
gateway.handleAbort(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
).catch(() => undefined);
// RUNTIME anchor D1 — delegation: the gateway must invoke the frozen abort op on the router.
expect
.soft(routerCalls, 'gateway must invoke abortLegacyTurn on the router')
.toContain('abortLegacyTurn');
// RUNTIME anchor D2 — nondelegation: no AgentService-shaped op on the router (defeats the shim).
for (const op of FORBIDDEN_AGENT_OPS) {
expect
.soft(routerCalls, `router seam must not invoke AgentService.${op}`)
.not.toContain(op);
}
expect.soft(directAgentService.getSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect.soft(embeddedAgentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect
.soft(socket.emit)
.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
// TESS test E (genuine, unchanged) — pi-rpc browser-legacy refusal.
it('rejects a browser legacy raw message in pi-rpc mode with a fixed typed unsupported and executes nothing', async () => {
// pi-rpc: the harness runtime is live. The browser legacy `message` path is unsupported and
// must be refused with a fixed typed code, touching neither the embedded AgentService nor the
// harness conversation service.
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const embedded = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(agentService as never);
const harnessConversation = {
attach: vi.fn(),
detach: vi.fn(),
send: vi.fn(),
subscribeFrom: vi.fn(),
};
const harness = new HarnessChatRuntime(harnessConversation as never);
const router = new ChatRuntimeRouter(
registryWith(['pi']),
boundConversationService,
embedded,
harness,
'pi-rpc',
);
router.onModuleInit();
const brain = {
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
},
};
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
router as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{ getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([]) } as never,
{ execute: vi.fn() } as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const socket = {
id: 'socket-b',
connected: true,
data: { user: USER_B, session: { id: 'auth-session-b', userId: USER_B.id } },
emit: vi.fn(),
disconnect: vi.fn(),
};
await Promise.resolve(
gateway.handleMessage(socket as never, {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
content: 'route me',
}),
).catch(() => undefined);
await gateway.handleMessage(socket as never, {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
content: 'attach to foreign session',
});
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(agentService.onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.addChannel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ code: 'runtime_unsupported' }),
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
expect(agentService.getSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(harnessConversation.attach).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(harnessConversation.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Task-5 AMEND — embedded runtime lease lifecycle (G1) + ownership collapse (G5).
// These drive the real EmbeddedChatRuntime directly over a shape-complete AgentService
// fake (every touched method exists, so a RED can only come from behavior, never a
// `getSession is not a function` TypeError). Ownership context is minted through the
// real `ownConversation` factory — the only sanctioned way to reach a port op.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const EMBEDDED_SCOPE = { userId: USER_A.id, tenantId: USER_A.tenantId };
const CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE_RESULT = {
ok: false,
code: 'conversation_unavailable',
retryable: false,
} as const;
/** A stream sink; `channelId` is server-derived, `onEvent` records nothing here. */
function makeStream(): LegacyRuntimeStream {
return { channelId: 'websocket:test-1', onEvent: vi.fn() };
}
/**
* getSession → undefined (session missing), createSession → rejects with `err`. Exercises the
* `resolveOrCreate` collapse branch. `prompt` exists so its ABSENCE from the call record proves
* the turn short-circuited before any dispatch.
*/
function makeCollapsingAgentService(err: Error) {
return {
getSession: vi.fn(() => undefined),
createSession: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(err),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => vi.fn()),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
recordTokenUsage: vi.fn(),
};
}
/** getSession → a live owned session, so `resolveOrCreate` succeeds and a lease is built. */
function makeLeaseAgentService() {
const session = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
const unsubscribe = vi.fn();
const svc = {
getSession: vi.fn(() => session),
createSession: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => unsubscribe),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
recordTokenUsage: vi.fn(),
};
return { svc, unsubscribe, session };
}
/**
* getSession → a live owned session (REST resolveOrCreate succeeds), onEvent returns a `detach`
* spy, and `prompt` REJECTS with a non-timeout error. Drives the REST-turn catch path so the single
* idempotent teardown must clear the 120s timeout and detach the listener exactly once.
*/
function makeRejectingPromptAgentService() {
const session = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
const detach = vi.fn();
const svc = {
getSession: vi.fn(() => session),
createSession: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => detach),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('agent backend exploded')),
recordTokenUsage: vi.fn(),
};
return { svc, detach };
}
describe('TESS Task-5 embedded ownership collapse (missing and foreign are indistinguishable, never throw)', () => {
const ctx = ownConversation(CONVERSATION_ID, EMBEDDED_SCOPE);
it('collapses a foreign (Forbidden) create to conversation_unavailable and never throws', async () => {
const svc = makeCollapsingAgentService(new ForbiddenException('foreign owner'));
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
const result = await runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, { content: 'take over' });
expect(result).toEqual(CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE_RESULT);
expect(svc.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('collapses a missing (NotFound) create to conversation_unavailable and never throws', async () => {
const svc = makeCollapsingAgentService(new NotFoundException('no such conversation'));
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
it('does not mutate thinking level on another owner/tenant session', () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
const result = await runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, { content: 'hello' });
gateway.handleSetThinking(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, level: 'high' });
expect(result).toEqual(CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE_RESULT);
expect(svc.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns the IDENTICAL collapse for foreign and missing so neither can be distinguished', async () => {
const foreign = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(
makeCollapsingAgentService(new ForbiddenException('foreign owner')) as never,
);
const missing = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(
makeCollapsingAgentService(new NotFoundException('no such conversation')) as never,
);
const foreignResult = await foreign.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, { content: 'x' });
const missingResult = await missing.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, { content: 'x' });
expect(foreignResult).toEqual(missingResult);
expect(foreignResult).toEqual(CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE_RESULT);
});
});
describe('TESS Task-5 embedded socket lease lifecycle (one-shot dispatch, idempotent dispose, partial-setup rollback)', () => {
const ctx = ownConversation(CONVERSATION_ID, EMBEDDED_SCOPE);
it('dispatches the turn exactly once; a second dispatch is a no-op turn_already_dispatched', async () => {
const { svc } = makeLeaseAgentService();
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
const prepared = await runtime.prepareLegacySocketTurn(ctx, { content: 'first' }, makeStream());
expect(prepared.ok).toBe(true);
if (!prepared.ok) throw new Error('prepareLegacySocketTurn should succeed');
const lease = prepared.value;
const first = await lease.dispatch();
expect(first).toEqual({ ok: true, value: undefined });
expect(svc.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const second = await lease.dispatch();
expect(second).toEqual({ ok: false, code: 'turn_already_dispatched', retryable: false });
// Zero additional effect — the second dispatch must not prompt again.
expect(svc.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('disposes once; a second dispose is a silent no-op that never re-detaches or destroys the session', async () => {
const { svc, unsubscribe, session } = makeLeaseAgentService();
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
const prepared = await runtime.prepareLegacySocketTurn(ctx, { content: 'x' }, makeStream());
expect(prepared.ok).toBe(true);
if (!prepared.ok) throw new Error('prepareLegacySocketTurn should succeed');
const lease = prepared.value;
await lease.dispose();
await lease.dispose();
// Listener + channel torn down exactly once across two dispose calls.
expect(unsubscribe).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(svc.removeChannel).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Disposal never terminates the underlying session or process.
expect(session.piSession.abort).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(session.piSession.dispose).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rolls back the acquired listener and returns a total safe failure when channel attach fails mid-setup', async () => {
const { svc, unsubscribe } = makeLeaseAgentService();
svc.addChannel = vi.fn(() => {
throw new Error('channel attach failed');
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
// Must NOT throw out of the port — a partial setup collapses to a total safe failure.
const prepared = await runtime.prepareLegacySocketTurn(ctx, { content: 'x' }, makeStream());
expect(prepared.ok).toBe(false);
// Exactly what was acquired (the event listener) is rolled back.
expect(unsubscribe).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
describe('TESS Task-5 embedded REST turn teardown (a prompt rejection frees the timer + listener exactly once)', () => {
const ctx = ownConversation(CONVERSATION_ID, EMBEDDED_SCOPE);
it('clears the 120s timeout and detaches the listener exactly once when prompt() rejects, leaving no timer to reject the abandoned done-promise later (Task 5 finding 6)', async () => {
const { svc, detach } = makeRejectingPromptAgentService();
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
// A rejected `done` promise firing after completeLegacyRestTurn has already returned would
// surface as an unhandledRejection — the leak this test fences. Capture any that escape.
const unhandled: unknown[] = [];
const onUnhandled = (reason: unknown): void => {
unhandled.push(reason);
};
process.on('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const result = await runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, {
content: 'trigger a backend failure',
});
// The rejection collapses to a total safe failure (not a timeout) — never throws out of the port.
expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, code: 'operation_failed', retryable: false });
// The single idempotent dispose ran in the catch: listener detached exactly once.
expect(detach).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// dispose() cleared the REST timeout, so advancing far past it (120s) fires nothing: no second
// detach, and — the actual leak — no live timer left to reject the now-abandoned `done` promise.
vi.advanceTimersByTime(600_000);
expect(detach).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
// Let any scheduled rejection surface on a real macrotask, then confirm none did.
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
process.off('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
expect(unhandled).toHaveLength(0);
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
});
it('bounds a hung prompt: when prompt() never settles and no agent_end arrives, the 120s timeout ends the turn with a timeout result and exactly one teardown, no unhandledRejection (Task 5 finding 6 — pending-prompt timeout)', async () => {
const session = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
const detach = vi.fn();
const svc = {
getSession: vi.fn(() => session),
createSession: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => detach),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
// The prompt never resolves or rejects — a hung agent backend. Under the pre-fix sequential
// `await prompt()` the timer could never even be observed, so the turn hung forever.
prompt: vi.fn(() => new Promise<void>(() => undefined)),
recordTokenUsage: vi.fn(),
};
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
it('does not terminate another owner/tenant session over WebSocket abort', async () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
const unhandled: unknown[] = [];
const onUnhandled = (reason: unknown): void => {
unhandled.push(reason);
};
process.on('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const resultPromise = runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, {
content: 'a prompt that never returns',
});
// No agent_end, prompt still pending: only the 120s timeout can end the turn. Promise.all
// installed a handler on `done` synchronously, so the timer bounds the turn while prompt hangs.
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(200_000);
const result = await resultPromise;
await gateway.handleAbort(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID });
expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, code: 'timeout', retryable: true });
// The single idempotent dispose ran on the timeout path: listener detached exactly once.
expect(detach).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Advancing far past the deadline fires nothing more: dispose cleared the timer.
vi.advanceTimersByTime(600_000);
expect(detach).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
process.off('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
expect(unhandled).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('when the 120s timeout fires while prompt() is still pending, returns timeout with one teardown, and a later prompt rejection surfaces no unhandledRejection (Task 5 finding 6 — timeout/prompt race)', async () => {
const session = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
const detach = vi.fn();
let rejectPrompt: (reason: unknown) => void = () => undefined;
const prompting = new Promise<void>((_resolve, reject) => {
rejectPrompt = reject;
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
const svc = {
getSession: vi.fn(() => session),
createSession: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => detach),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn(() => prompting),
recordTokenUsage: vi.fn(),
};
const runtime = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(svc as never);
const unhandled: unknown[] = [];
const onUnhandled = (reason: unknown): void => {
unhandled.push(reason);
};
process.on('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
vi.useFakeTimers();
try {
const resultPromise = runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx, {
content: 'prompt settles after the deadline',
});
// The timeout wins the race while prompt is still pending.
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(200_000);
const result = await resultPromise;
expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, code: 'timeout', retryable: true });
expect(detach).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// The prompt now rejects LATE — after the turn already returned its timeout result. Because
// Promise.all installed a rejection handler on `prompting` synchronously (the fix), this late
// rejection is already observed and must not escape as an unhandledRejection.
rejectPrompt(new Error('late backend failure'));
} finally {
vi.useRealTimers();
}
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
process.off('unhandledRejection', onUnhandled);
expect(unhandled).toHaveLength(0);
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
});
});
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
* to avoid real I/O — they verify the complete classify → match → decide path.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { ProviderHealthStatus } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { RoutingEngineService } from './routing-engine.service.js';
import { DEFAULT_ROUTING_RULES } from '../routing/default-rules.js';
import type { RoutingRule } from './routing.types.js';
@@ -18,7 +17,7 @@ import type { RoutingRule } from './routing.types.js';
/** Build a RoutingEngineService backed by the given rule set and health map. */
function makeService(
rules: RoutingRule[],
healthMap: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }>,
healthMap: Record<string, { status: string }>,
): RoutingEngineService {
const mockDb = {
select: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
@@ -68,11 +67,11 @@ function defaultRules(): RoutingRule[] {
}
/** A health map where anthropic, openai, and zai are all healthy. */
const allHealthy: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }> = {
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
openai: { status: 'healthy' },
zai: { status: 'healthy' },
ollama: { status: 'healthy' },
const allHealthy: Record<string, { status: string }> = {
anthropic: { status: 'up' },
openai: { status: 'up' },
zai: { status: 'up' },
ollama: { status: 'up' },
};
// ─── M4-013 E2E tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -213,10 +212,10 @@ describe('M4-013: routing end-to-end pipeline', () => {
// Let's use a simple coding message to target Simple coding → Codex (openai)
const message = 'implement a sort function';
const unhealthyHealth: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }> = {
const unhealthyHealth = {
anthropic: { status: 'down' },
openai: { status: 'healthy' },
zai: { status: 'healthy' },
openai: { status: 'up' },
zai: { status: 'up' },
ollama: { status: 'down' },
};
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { routingRules, type Db, and, asc, eq, or } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { ProviderHealthStatus } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../provider.service.js';
import { classifyTask } from './task-classifier.js';
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ export class RoutingEngineService {
async resolve(
message: string,
userId?: string,
availableProviders?: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }>,
availableProviders?: Record<string, { status: string }>,
): Promise<RoutingDecision> {
const classification = classifyTask(message);
this.logger.debug(
@@ -70,8 +69,9 @@ export class RoutingEngineService {
if (!this.matchConditions(rule, classification)) continue;
const providerStatus = health[rule.action.provider]?.status;
const isHealthy = providerStatus === 'up' || providerStatus === 'ok';
if (!this.isRoutable(providerStatus)) {
if (!isHealthy) {
this.logger.debug(
`Rule "${rule.name}" matched but provider "${rule.action.provider}" is unhealthy (status: ${providerStatus ?? 'unknown'})`,
);
@@ -111,10 +111,6 @@ export class RoutingEngineService {
// ─── Private helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private isRoutable(status: ProviderHealthStatus | undefined): boolean {
return status === 'healthy' || status === 'degraded';
}
private evaluateCondition(
condition: RoutingCondition,
classification: TaskClassification,
@@ -190,12 +186,11 @@ export class RoutingEngineService {
* Walk the fallback chain and return the first healthy provider/model pair.
* If none are healthy, return the first entry unconditionally (last resort).
*/
private applyFallbackChain(
health: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }>,
): RoutingDecision {
private applyFallbackChain(health: Record<string, { status: string }>): RoutingDecision {
for (const candidate of FALLBACK_CHAIN) {
const providerStatus = health[candidate.provider]?.status;
if (this.isRoutable(providerStatus)) {
const isHealthy = providerStatus === 'up' || providerStatus === 'ok';
if (isHealthy) {
this.logger.debug(`Fallback resolved: ${candidate.provider}/${candidate.model}`);
return {
provider: candidate.provider,
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import type { ProviderHealthStatus } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { RoutingEngineService } from './routing-engine.service.js';
import type { RoutingRule, TaskClassification } from './routing.types.js';
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ function makeClassification(overrides: Partial<TaskClassification> = {}): TaskCl
/** Build a minimal RoutingEngineService with mocked DB and ProviderService. */
function makeService(
rules: RoutingRule[] = [],
healthMap: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }> = {},
healthMap: Record<string, { status: string }> = {},
): RoutingEngineService {
const mockDb = {
select: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
@@ -218,10 +217,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — priority ordering', () => {
}),
];
const service = makeService(rules, {
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
openai: { status: 'healthy' },
});
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'up' }, openai: { status: 'up' } });
const decision = await service.resolve('implement a function');
expect(decision.ruleName).toBe('high priority');
@@ -245,10 +241,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — priority ordering', () => {
}),
];
const service = makeService(rules, {
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
openai: { status: 'healthy' },
});
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'up' }, openai: { status: 'up' } });
const decision = await service.resolve('implement a function');
expect(decision.ruleName).toBe('coding rule');
@@ -277,7 +270,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — unhealthy provider handling', () => {
const service = makeService(rules, {
anthropic: { status: 'down' }, // primary is unhealthy
openai: { status: 'healthy' },
openai: { status: 'up' },
});
const decision = await service.resolve('implement a function');
@@ -297,7 +290,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — unhealthy provider handling', () => {
];
const service2 = makeService(unhealthyRules, {
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
anthropic: { status: 'up' },
openai: { status: 'down' },
});
@@ -313,7 +306,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — unhealthy provider handling', () => {
const service = makeService(rules, {
anthropic: { status: 'down' }, // Sonnet is on anthropic — down
ollama: { status: 'healthy' }, // Haiku is also on anthropic — use Ollama as next
ollama: { status: 'up' }, // Haiku is also on anthropic — use Ollama as next
});
const decision = await service.resolve('hello there');
@@ -352,7 +345,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — empty conditions (fallback rule)', ()
}),
];
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'healthy' } });
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'up' } });
const decision = await service.resolve('completely unrelated message xyz');
expect(decision.ruleName).toBe('catch-all');
@@ -376,7 +369,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — empty conditions (fallback rule)', ()
}),
];
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'healthy' } });
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'up' } });
const codingDecision = await service.resolve('implement a function');
expect(codingDecision.ruleName).toBe('specific coding rule');
@@ -408,7 +401,7 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — disabled rules', () => {
}),
];
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'healthy' } });
const service = makeService(rules, { anthropic: { status: 'up' } });
const decision = await service.resolve('implement a function');
expect(decision.ruleName).toBe('enabled fallback');
@@ -459,45 +452,9 @@ describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — availableProviders override', () => {
ps: unknown,
) => RoutingEngineService)(mockDb, mockProviderService);
const preSupplied: Record<string, { status: ProviderHealthStatus }> = {
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
};
const preSupplied = { anthropic: { status: 'up' } };
await service.resolve('implement a function', undefined, preSupplied);
expect(mockHealthCheckAll).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ─── resolve — canonical ProviderHealthStatus values ──────────────────────────
describe('RoutingEngineService.resolve — canonical health status routing', () => {
it('routes healthy and degraded providers by rule, and falls through to fallback when down', async () => {
const codingRule = makeRule({
name: 'coding rule',
priority: 1,
conditions: [{ field: 'taskType', operator: 'eq', value: 'coding' }],
action: { provider: 'openai', model: 'gpt-4o' },
});
// healthy → selected by its own rule, not the fallback chain
const healthyService = makeService([codingRule], { openai: { status: 'healthy' } });
const healthyDecision = await healthyService.resolve('implement a function');
expect(healthyDecision.ruleName).toBe('coding rule');
expect(healthyDecision.provider).toBe('openai');
// down → rule is skipped as unroutable, falls through to the fallback chain
const downService = makeService([codingRule], {
openai: { status: 'down' },
anthropic: { status: 'healthy' },
});
const downDecision = await downService.resolve('implement a function');
expect(downDecision.ruleName).toBe('fallback');
expect(downDecision.provider).toBe('anthropic');
// degraded → still routable, selected by its own rule, not the fallback chain
const degradedService = makeService([codingRule], { openai: { status: 'degraded' } });
const degradedDecision = await degradedService.resolve('implement a function');
expect(degradedDecision.ruleName).toBe('coding rule');
expect(degradedDecision.provider).toBe('openai');
});
});
-624
View File
@@ -1,624 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as nodeOs from 'node:os';
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import * as nodeUrl from 'node:url';
import { MODULE_METADATA } from '@nestjs/common/constants.js';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
interface ComposedModuleGraph {
imports: readonly unknown[];
federationModule: unknown;
bootLogLines: readonly string[];
mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig;
resolvedConfigPath: string;
}
type StorageTier = 'local' | 'standalone' | 'federated';
interface ModuleGraphFixture {
tempRoot: string;
anchor: string;
homePath: string;
cwdPath: string;
monorepoRootEnvPath: string;
gatewayLocalEnvPath: string;
daemonEnvPath: string;
monorepoRootConfigPath: string;
gatewayLocalConfigPath: string;
}
interface ModuleGraphFixtureOptions {
rootEnvMode?: 'present' | 'absent';
rootTier?: StorageTier;
rootEnvContents?: string;
redactionMarker?: string;
gatewayLocalTier?: StorageTier;
gatewayLocalEnvContents?: string;
daemonEnvContents?: string;
inheritedTier?: StorageTier;
expectedProcessTier?: string;
setup?: (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture) => Promise<void>;
}
// Each case uses vi.resetModules() and re-imports the full gateway graph for distinct ambient FS/env; CI needs headroom, while this still guards genuine hangs.
const MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
const MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL = 'monorepo-root .env';
const DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL = 'daemon .env';
function configJson(tier: StorageTier): string {
if (tier === 'local') {
return JSON.stringify({
tier,
storage: { type: 'pglite', dataDir: '.mosaic/storage-pglite' },
queue: { type: 'local', dataDir: '.mosaic/queue' },
memory: { type: 'keyword' },
});
}
return JSON.stringify({
tier,
storage: { type: 'postgres', url: 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic' },
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: tier === 'federated' ? 'pgvector' : 'keyword' },
});
}
function snapshotProcessEnv(): Record<string, string | undefined> {
return { ...process.env };
}
function restoreProcessEnv(snapshot: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
if (!(key in snapshot)) {
delete process.env[key];
}
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {
if (value === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
continue;
}
process.env[key] = value;
}
}
function expectPathUnderTempRoot(path: string, tempRoot: string): void {
const relativePath = relative(tempRoot, path);
expect(relativePath === '' || (!relativePath.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(relativePath))).toBe(
true,
);
}
async function writeFixture(path: string, contents: string, tempRoot: string): Promise<void> {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path, contents, 'utf8');
}
interface ConfigModuleProvider {
provide: string;
useFactory: () => MosaicConfig;
}
function isConfigModuleProvider(value: unknown): value is ConfigModuleProvider {
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
return false;
}
if (!('provide' in value) || typeof value.provide !== 'string') {
return false;
}
return 'useFactory' in value && typeof value.useFactory === 'function';
}
function singleBootLogLine(bootLogLines: readonly string[]): string {
expect(bootLogLines).toHaveLength(1);
const [bootLogLine] = bootLogLines;
if (bootLogLine === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected a single boot log line');
}
return bootLogLine;
}
function expectBootLogLine(
bootLogLines: readonly string[],
tier: StorageTier,
source: string,
): void {
const bootLogLine = singleBootLogLine(bootLogLines);
expect(bootLogLine).toContain(`storage tier=${tier}`);
expect(bootLogLine).toContain(`source=${source}`);
}
async function loadModuleGraphFromDotenv(
options: ModuleGraphFixtureOptions,
): Promise<ComposedModuleGraph> {
const originalEnv = snapshotProcessEnv();
const tempRoot = await mkdtemp(join(nodeOs.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-module-'));
let consoleInfoSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let cwdSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
try {
const anchor = join(tempRoot, 'anchored', 'apps', 'gateway', 'src');
const homePath = join(tempRoot, 'home');
const cwdPath = join(tempRoot, 'ambient', 'parent', 'cwd');
const fixture: ModuleGraphFixture = {
tempRoot,
anchor,
homePath,
cwdPath,
monorepoRootEnvPath: resolve(anchor, '../../..', '.env'),
gatewayLocalEnvPath: resolve(anchor, '..', '.env'),
daemonEnvPath: join(homePath, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env'),
monorepoRootConfigPath: resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
gatewayLocalConfigPath: resolve(anchor, '..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
};
consoleInfoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation((): void => undefined);
for (const path of Object.values(fixture)) {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
}
await mkdir(anchor, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(cwdPath, { recursive: true });
if ((options.rootEnvMode ?? 'present') === 'absent') {
if (
options.rootEnvContents !== undefined ||
options.rootTier !== undefined ||
options.redactionMarker !== undefined
) {
throw new Error('Expected no root env fixture values when rootEnvMode is absent');
}
} else {
if (options.rootEnvContents === undefined && options.rootTier === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected rootTier or rootEnvContents');
}
const rootFixture = options.rootEnvContents ?? `MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=${options.rootTier}\n`;
const rootFixtureWithMarker = options.redactionMarker
? `${rootFixture}BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=${options.redactionMarker}\n`
: rootFixture;
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootEnvPath, rootFixtureWithMarker, tempRoot);
}
if (options.daemonEnvContents !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(fixture.daemonEnvPath, options.daemonEnvContents, tempRoot);
}
if (options.gatewayLocalEnvContents !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(fixture.gatewayLocalEnvPath, options.gatewayLocalEnvContents, tempRoot);
} else if (options.gatewayLocalTier !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalEnvPath,
`MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=${options.gatewayLocalTier}\n`,
tempRoot,
);
}
process.env['HOME'] = homePath;
delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['VALKEY_URL'];
delete process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'];
await options.setup?.(fixture);
if (options.inheritedTier !== undefined) {
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] = options.inheritedTier;
}
vi.resetModules();
vi.doMock('node:os', () => ({ ...nodeOs, homedir: (): string => homePath }));
vi.doMock('node:url', () => ({
...nodeUrl,
fileURLToPath: (url: string | URL): string => {
const actualPath = nodeUrl.fileURLToPath(url);
if (
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.ts') ||
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.js')
) {
return join(anchor, 'env.ts');
}
return actualPath;
},
}));
cwdSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'cwd').mockReturnValue(cwdPath);
if (options.inheritedTier === undefined) {
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBeUndefined();
} else {
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBe(options.inheritedTier);
}
const envModule = await import('./env.js');
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBe(
options.expectedProcessTier ?? options.rootTier,
);
const { AppModule } = await import('./app.module.js');
const { FederationModule } = await import('./federation/federation.module.js');
const imports: unknown = Reflect.getMetadata(MODULE_METADATA.IMPORTS, AppModule);
if (!Array.isArray(imports)) {
throw new Error('AppModule imports metadata is not an array');
}
const { ConfigModule, MOSAIC_CONFIG } = await import('./config/config.module.js');
const providers: unknown = Reflect.getMetadata(MODULE_METADATA.PROVIDERS, ConfigModule);
if (!Array.isArray(providers)) {
throw new Error('ConfigModule providers metadata is not an array');
}
const configProvider = providers
.filter(isConfigModuleProvider)
.find((provider: ConfigModuleProvider): boolean => provider.provide === MOSAIC_CONFIG);
if (!configProvider) {
throw new Error('MOSAIC_CONFIG provider factory not found');
}
return {
imports,
federationModule: FederationModule,
bootLogLines: consoleInfoSpy.mock.calls.map((args: readonly unknown[]): string =>
args.map((value: unknown): string => String(value)).join(' '),
),
mosaicConfig: configProvider.useFactory(),
resolvedConfigPath: envModule.resolveGatewayConfigPath(),
};
} finally {
cwdSpy?.mockRestore();
vi.doUnmock('node:url');
vi.doUnmock('node:os');
vi.resetModules();
consoleInfoSpy?.mockRestore();
restoreProcessEnv(originalEnv);
await rm(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
describe('AppModule federation gating', (): void => {
it('loads dotenv before tracing and AppModule evaluation', async (): Promise<void> => {
const mainSource = await readFile(new URL('./main.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
const envImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import './env.js';");
const tracingImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import './tracing.js';");
const appModuleImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import { AppModule } from './app.module.js';");
expect(envImportIndex).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
expect(envImportIndex).toBeLessThan(tracingImportIndex);
expect(envImportIndex).toBeLessThan(appModuleImportIndex);
});
it(
'ignores ambient cwd/.env and cwd/../.env files',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, '.env'),
'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(
resolve(fixture.cwdPath, '..', '.env'),
'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'ignores an ambient cwd/mosaic.config.json federated config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'),
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'ignores an ambient cwd/../../mosaic.config.json federated config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
resolve(fixture.cwdPath, '../..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'anchored gateway-local config wins monorepo-root config and registers FederationModule',
async (): Promise<void> => {
let gatewayLocalConfigPath = '';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
gatewayLocalConfigPath = fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath;
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath, configJson('local'), fixture.tempRoot);
},
});
expect(graph.resolvedConfigPath).toBe(gatewayLocalConfigPath);
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'resolves the daemon-installed GATEWAY_HOME/mosaic.config.json ahead of gateway-local and monorepo-root configs',
async (): Promise<void> => {
let daemonConfigPath = '';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
const externalGatewayHome = join(fixture.tempRoot, 'external-gateway-home');
daemonConfigPath = join(externalGatewayHome, 'mosaic.config.json');
await writeFixture(daemonConfigPath, configJson('federated'), fixture.tempRoot);
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath,
configJson('standalone'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath, configJson('local'), fixture.tempRoot);
process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'] = externalGatewayHome;
process.env['DATABASE_URL'] = 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic';
},
});
expect(graph.resolvedConfigPath).toBe(daemonConfigPath);
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'logs mosaic.config.json when anchored config and env tiers are both federated',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'federated',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'logs standalone from a monorepo-root .env DATABASE_URL fallback',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvContents: 'DATABASE_URL=fixture-database-url\n',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'attributes an invalid monorepo-root dotenv tier to the default',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=invalid\n',
expectedProcessTier: 'invalid',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', 'default');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'attributes DATABASE_URL fallback to daemon .env ahead of inherited local tier',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
daemonEnvContents: 'DATABASE_URL=fixture-database-url\n',
inheritedTier: 'local',
expectedProcessTier: 'local',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'daemon .env wins over monorepo-root and gateway-local tier values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
daemonEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=standalone\n',
expectedProcessTier: 'standalone',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'inherits process.env.MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER over daemon, monorepo-root, and gateway-local dotenv values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
daemonEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
inheritedTier: 'standalone',
expectedProcessTier: 'standalone',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', 'process environment');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'gateway-local .env configures the tier and source when the monorepo-root .env is absent',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
expectedProcessTier: 'federated',
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'gateway-local .env');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'monorepo-root .env wins over gateway-local tier values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'standalone',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it.each(['local', 'standalone'] as const)(
'does not register FederationModule for the %s tier',
async (tier): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({ rootTier: tier });
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, tier, MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'registers FederationModule when federated tier is supplied by the anchored monorepo root .env',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const redactionMarker = 'redaction-fixture-marker';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'federated',
redactionMarker,
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
expect(singleBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines)).not.toContain(redactionMarker);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'MOSAIC_CONFIG provider ignores an ambient cwd/mosaic.config.json config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'),
JSON.stringify({
tier: 'federated',
storage: {
type: 'postgres',
url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic',
enableVector: true,
},
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: 'pgvector' },
}),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('local');
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.storage).not.toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'MOSAIC_CONFIG provider resolves from the anchored monorepo-root mosaic.config.json',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.storage).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
});
+1 -13
View File
@@ -21,22 +21,11 @@ import { AdminModule } from './admin/admin.module.js';
import { CommandsModule } from './commands/commands.module.js';
import { PreferencesModule } from './preferences/preferences.module.js';
import { GCModule } from './gc/gc.module.js';
import { HarnessModule } from './harness/harness.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from './reload/reload.module.js';
import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js';
import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js';
import { FederationModule } from './federation/federation.module.js';
import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { loadConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from './env.js';
// Federation (step-ca client, enrollment, federation verbs) is only wired for
// tier 'federated' — CaService hard-requires STEP_CA_* at construction, which
// must not gate standalone/local boots (docker-compose.federated.yml: the
// federation profile "must not start in non-federated dev"). The gateway
// entrypoint loads env.ts before evaluating this module so dotenv-backed tier
// configuration is visible here.
const federationEnabled = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()).tier === 'federated';
@Module({
imports: [
@@ -61,11 +50,10 @@ const federationEnabled = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()).tier === 'feder
PreferencesModule,
CommandsModule,
GCModule,
HarnessModule,
QueueModule,
ReloadModule,
WorkspaceModule,
...(federationEnabled ? [FederationModule] : []),
FederationModule,
],
controllers: [HealthController],
providers: [
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,920 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { HarnessAdapter, HarnessConversationService } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import { HarnessModule } from '../harness/harness.module.js';
import { ChatModule } from './chat.module.js';
import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import {
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE,
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
HARNESS_REGISTRY,
type HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
} from '../harness/harness.tokens.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from './chat-runtime-router.js';
import {
ChatRuntimeUnavailableError,
ownConversation,
type ChatRuntime,
type ChatRuntimeMode,
type LegacyEmbeddedChatPort,
type LegacyRuntimeStream,
type LegacySessionPresentation,
type LegacySocketTurnLease,
type OwnedConversationContext,
} from './chat-runtime.js';
import { AppModule } from '../app.module.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
/**
* Task Five, Step One (router). Proves the `ChatRuntimeRouter` resolves exactly one
* runtime by mode, fails closed at init when `pi-rpc` preconditions are unmet, and
* never downgrades `pi-rpc` to embedded execution. Red-first: the router is an
* unimplemented stub, so every behavioural assertion below fails until Step Three.
*/
const embedded: ChatRuntime = { kind: 'embedded' };
const harness: ChatRuntime = { kind: 'harness' };
/** A structurally-complete, non-sentinel conversation service. Its methods are never invoked here. */
const boundConversationService = {
attach: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
detach: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
send: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
subscribeFrom: async function* () {
throw new Error('unused');
},
} as unknown as HarnessConversationService;
function registryWith(adapterIds: readonly string[]): HarnessRegistry {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
for (const id of adapterIds) {
registry.register({
id,
describe: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
catalog: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
create: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
resume: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
} as HarnessAdapter);
}
return registry;
}
function buildRouter(
mode: ChatRuntimeMode,
opts: { adapters: readonly string[]; service: HarnessConversationServiceBinding },
): ChatRuntimeRouter {
return new ChatRuntimeRouter(registryWith(opts.adapters), opts.service, embedded, harness, mode);
}
/**
* Tear down a module that was deliberately driven to a fail-closed init.
* `NestApplicationContext.close()` re-awaits the module's `initializationPromise` before disposing
* (nest-application-context.js:127); when `init()` rejected, that await re-throws the SAME typed
* startup error, this time into teardown. Each caller here has already captured and asserted that
* exact `ChatRuntimeUnavailableError` via `initError`, so the re-throw is expected teardown noise —
* swallow ONLY that error, and surface anything else so a genuine teardown fault still fails loudly.
*/
async function closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef: TestingModule): Promise<void> {
await moduleRef.close().catch((err: unknown) => {
if (err instanceof ChatRuntimeUnavailableError) return;
throw err;
});
}
describe('ChatRuntimeRouter', () => {
it('resolves only the harness runtime in pi-rpc mode when pi adapter and conversation service are present', () => {
const router = buildRouter('pi-rpc', {
adapters: ['pi'],
service: boundConversationService,
});
expect(() => router.onModuleInit()).not.toThrow();
expect(router.active).toBe(harness);
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('harness');
});
it('resolves only the embedded runtime in legacy mode and skips the pi preconditions', () => {
// Empty registry + unavailable service: legacy must ignore both and still start.
const router = buildRouter('legacy', {
adapters: [],
service: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
expect(() => router.onModuleInit()).not.toThrow();
expect(router.active).toBe(embedded);
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('embedded');
});
it('fails closed at init when pi-rpc mode has no registered pi adapter', () => {
const router = buildRouter('pi-rpc', {
adapters: [],
service: boundConversationService,
});
expect(() => router.onModuleInit()).toThrow(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
try {
router.onModuleInit();
expect.unreachable('onModuleInit must throw when the pi adapter is absent');
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
}
});
it('fails closed at init when pi-rpc mode has the unavailable conversation-service sentinel', () => {
const router = buildRouter('pi-rpc', {
adapters: ['pi'],
service: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
try {
router.onModuleInit();
expect.unreachable('onModuleInit must throw when the conversation service is unbound');
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('conversation_service_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
}
});
it('never falls back to embedded execution when pi-rpc preconditions are unmet', () => {
const router = buildRouter('pi-rpc', {
adapters: [],
service: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
expect(() => router.onModuleInit()).toThrow(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
// A failed pi-rpc init must not silently expose the embedded runtime.
expect(() => router.active).toThrow();
let leaked: ChatRuntime | undefined;
try {
leaked = router.active;
} catch {
leaked = undefined;
}
expect(leaked).not.toBe(embedded);
});
it('exposes only fixed, browser-safe failure text (no raw provider or exception detail)', () => {
const router = buildRouter('pi-rpc', {
adapters: [],
service: boundConversationService,
});
try {
router.onModuleInit();
expect.unreachable('onModuleInit must throw');
} catch (err) {
const message = (err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).message;
expect(message).toBe(
'The pi-rpc chat runtime is unavailable: no "pi" harness adapter is registered.',
);
expect(message).not.toMatch(/Error:|\bat \b|node_modules|Symbol\(/);
}
});
});
/**
* Task Five, Step Three — legacy port operations fail closed under pi-rpc (direct valid-input).
*
* The unit suite above constructs the router but never invokes a legacy port operation, so the
* six per-operation inner `if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc')` guards are unexercised — a mutation that
* deletes one of them SURVIVES for lack of a test that drives that operation. This group closes
* that gap the right way: it drives each of the six operations DIRECTLY, in pi-rpc mode, with a
* valid branded {@link OwnedConversationContext} and valid input, against a recording embedded
* stub whose method returns a distinguishable `ok:true` success and increments a per-op counter.
*
* For each operation:
* - pi-rpc test asserts the exact frozen `{ ok:false, code:'runtime_unsupported', retryable:false }`
* result AND that the embedded stub was touched zero times (no effects);
* - the paired legacy test proves that same stub method IS reached and returns its distinguishable
* success when the mode does not refuse — so the pi-rpc zero-invocation assertion is meaningful,
* not vacuously true because the stub could never be called.
*
* Deleting ONLY one operation's inner guard makes THAT operation's pi-rpc test behaviorally RED
* (the router returns the embedded `ok:true` value and records the call), with every outer guard
* and the other five inner guards intact. `next` is untouched; nothing here changes production.
*/
describe('ChatRuntimeRouter — legacy port ops fail closed under pi-rpc (Task Five, Step Three)', () => {
const RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED = {
ok: false,
code: 'runtime_unsupported',
retryable: false,
} as const;
const PRESENTATION: LegacySessionPresentation = {
provider: 'embedded-provider',
modelId: 'embedded-model',
thinkingLevel: 'low',
availableThinkingLevels: ['low', 'high'],
};
const stream: LegacyRuntimeStream = {
channelId: 'websocket:test-socket',
onEvent: () => {},
};
const ctx = (): OwnedConversationContext =>
ownConversation('conversation-1', { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' });
/**
* Per-operation invocation counters with declared keys (not an index signature) so each
* `calls.<op>` is definitely `number` under `noUncheckedIndexedAccess`.
*/
type LegacyPortCallCounts = {
completeLegacyRestTurn: number;
prepareLegacySocketTurn: number;
setLegacyThinking: number;
abortLegacyTurn: number;
applyLegacyModelOverride: number;
readLegacySessionPresentation: number;
dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress: number;
};
/**
* An embedded port that records every invocation and returns a distinguishable `ok:true`
* value per operation. If a router op reaches it (its guard removed), both the recorded call
* count and the returned `ok:true` value diverge from the frozen `runtime_unsupported` result.
*/
function recordingEmbeddedPort(): {
port: ChatRuntime & LegacyEmbeddedChatPort;
calls: LegacyPortCallCounts;
} {
const calls: LegacyPortCallCounts = {
completeLegacyRestTurn: 0,
prepareLegacySocketTurn: 0,
setLegacyThinking: 0,
abortLegacyTurn: 0,
applyLegacyModelOverride: 0,
readLegacySessionPresentation: 0,
dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress: 0,
};
const lease: LegacySocketTurnLease = {
presentation: PRESENTATION,
dispatch: () => Promise.resolve({ ok: true, value: undefined }),
dispose: () => Promise.resolve(),
};
const port: ChatRuntime & LegacyEmbeddedChatPort = {
kind: 'embedded',
completeLegacyRestTurn: () => {
calls.completeLegacyRestTurn += 1;
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true,
value: { text: 'EMBEDDED-REST', presentation: PRESENTATION },
});
},
prepareLegacySocketTurn: () => {
calls.prepareLegacySocketTurn += 1;
return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, value: lease });
},
setLegacyThinking: () => {
calls.setLegacyThinking += 1;
return { ok: true, value: PRESENTATION };
},
abortLegacyTurn: () => {
calls.abortLegacyTurn += 1;
return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, value: undefined });
},
applyLegacyModelOverride: () => {
calls.applyLegacyModelOverride += 1;
return { ok: true, value: PRESENTATION };
},
readLegacySessionPresentation: () => {
calls.readLegacySessionPresentation += 1;
return { ok: true, value: PRESENTATION };
},
dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress: () => {
calls.dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress += 1;
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true,
value: {
presentation: PRESENTATION,
dispatch: () => Promise.resolve({ ok: true, value: undefined }),
dispose: () => Promise.resolve(),
},
});
},
};
return { port, calls };
}
function piRouter(port: ChatRuntime & LegacyEmbeddedChatPort): ChatRuntimeRouter {
return new ChatRuntimeRouter(
registryWith(['pi']),
boundConversationService,
port,
harness,
'pi-rpc',
);
}
function legacyRouter(port: ChatRuntime & LegacyEmbeddedChatPort): ChatRuntimeRouter {
return new ChatRuntimeRouter(
registryWith([]),
boundConversationService,
port,
harness,
'legacy',
);
}
// completeLegacyRestTurn ---------------------------------------------------
it('completeLegacyRestTurn refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await piRouter(port).completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx(), { content: 'hello' });
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.completeLegacyRestTurn).toBe(0);
});
it('completeLegacyRestTurn delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await legacyRouter(port).completeLegacyRestTurn(ctx(), { content: 'hello' });
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.completeLegacyRestTurn).toBe(1);
});
// prepareLegacySocketTurn --------------------------------------------------
it('prepareLegacySocketTurn refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await piRouter(port).prepareLegacySocketTurn(
ctx(),
{ content: 'hello' },
stream,
);
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.prepareLegacySocketTurn).toBe(0);
});
it('prepareLegacySocketTurn delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await legacyRouter(port).prepareLegacySocketTurn(
ctx(),
{ content: 'hello' },
stream,
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.prepareLegacySocketTurn).toBe(1);
});
// setLegacyThinking (sync) -------------------------------------------------
it('setLegacyThinking refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = piRouter(port).setLegacyThinking(ctx(), 'high');
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.setLegacyThinking).toBe(0);
});
it('setLegacyThinking delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = legacyRouter(port).setLegacyThinking(ctx(), 'high');
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.setLegacyThinking).toBe(1);
});
// abortLegacyTurn ----------------------------------------------------------
it('abortLegacyTurn refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await piRouter(port).abortLegacyTurn(ctx());
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.abortLegacyTurn).toBe(0);
});
it('abortLegacyTurn delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = await legacyRouter(port).abortLegacyTurn(ctx());
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.abortLegacyTurn).toBe(1);
});
// applyLegacyModelOverride (sync) ------------------------------------------
it('applyLegacyModelOverride refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = piRouter(port).applyLegacyModelOverride(ctx(), 'model-x');
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.applyLegacyModelOverride).toBe(0);
});
it('applyLegacyModelOverride delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = legacyRouter(port).applyLegacyModelOverride(ctx(), 'model-x');
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.applyLegacyModelOverride).toBe(1);
});
// readLegacySessionPresentation (sync) -------------------------------------
it('readLegacySessionPresentation refuses with runtime_unsupported and never touches embedded under pi-rpc', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = piRouter(port).readLegacySessionPresentation(ctx());
expect(result).toEqual(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
expect(calls.readLegacySessionPresentation).toBe(0);
});
it('readLegacySessionPresentation delegates to embedded under legacy (guard is the sole gate)', () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const result = legacyRouter(port).readLegacySessionPresentation(ctx());
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.readLegacySessionPresentation).toBe(1);
});
// dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress delegates in BOTH modes (embedded-only, no guard) ---------
it('dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress delegates to embedded under pi-rpc (embedded-only, no mode guard)', async () => {
const { port, calls } = recordingEmbeddedPort();
const discordCtx = ctx() as unknown as Parameters<
ChatRuntimeRouter['dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress']
>[0];
const result = await piRouter(port).dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress(discordCtx, stream);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(calls.dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress).toBe(1);
});
});
/**
* Task Five, Step Two — group 1 (real Nest module-graph readiness).
*
* The unit suite above constructs the router directly. This group drives the SAME contract
* through a real NestJS graph: it imports the production `HarnessModule` (the proven-booting
* idiom from harness.controller.spec.ts) so the router resolves the REAL, empty `HarnessRegistry`
* via the real `HARNESS_REGISTRY` token, then runs the router's `OnModuleInit` through the Nest
* lifecycle (`moduleRef.init()`). Red-first: the router is an unimplemented stub whose
* `onModuleInit` throws a generic Error, so:
* - readiness cases fail because the graph never comes up (init rejects), and
* - fail-closed cases fail because a generic stub throw is NOT the SPECIFIC typed
* `ChatRuntimeUnavailableError` (reason/code) the contract demands — a stub that
* "throws anything" cannot mask these greens.
* The router is NOT wired into a production module yet, so it is provided here via a factory
* over the real registry token. Importing the real `ChatModule` bare is deliberately avoided:
* it injects `AgentService` without importing `AgentModule`, so its graph fails to RESOLVE — a
* collection/DI error, not a behavioural red. `next` is untouched; nothing here implements the router.
*/
describe('ChatRuntimeRouter — real Nest module-graph readiness (Task Five, Step Two group 1)', () => {
async function bootRouterGraph(
mode: ChatRuntimeMode,
opts: { adapters: readonly string[]; service: HarnessConversationServiceBinding },
) {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [HarnessModule],
providers: [
{
provide: ChatRuntimeRouter,
useFactory: (registry: HarnessRegistry) =>
new ChatRuntimeRouter(registry, opts.service, embedded, harness, mode),
inject: [HARNESS_REGISTRY],
},
],
})
// The imported HarnessModule's controllers reference AuthGuard (an HTTP-only concern,
// never exercised here); stub it so the graph resolves. The registry is NOT overridden —
// group 1 asserts against the genuine production HarnessRegistry.
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: () => true })
.compile();
// Resolve the production registry singleton and register the requested adapters ON IT, so
// the router (which injects the same singleton) sees them when its lifecycle hook runs.
const registry = moduleRef.get<HarnessRegistry>(HARNESS_REGISTRY, { strict: false });
for (const id of opts.adapters) {
registry.register({
id,
describe: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
catalog: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
create: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
resume: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')),
} as HarnessAdapter);
}
return moduleRef;
}
// Capture an init rejection without letting a resolved init masquerade as success.
const initError = (moduleRef: { init(): Promise<unknown> }): Promise<unknown> =>
moduleRef.init().then(
() => new Error('module init resolved but the contract requires it to reject'),
(err: unknown) => err,
);
it('brings the graph up and resolves only the harness runtime in pi-rpc mode (pi adapter + bound service)', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootRouterGraph('pi-rpc', {
adapters: ['pi'],
service: boundConversationService,
});
try {
await moduleRef.init();
const router = moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter, { strict: false });
expect(router.active).toBe(harness);
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('harness');
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('brings the graph up in legacy mode over the REAL empty HarnessRegistry and resolves only the embedded runtime', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootRouterGraph('legacy', {
adapters: [],
service: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
try {
// Defense-in-depth: the production module wires the genuine registry, empty by default —
// guards against a test-double registry silently satisfying the readiness check.
const registry = moduleRef.get<HarnessRegistry>(HARNESS_REGISTRY, { strict: false });
expect(registry).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessRegistry);
expect(registry.list()).toHaveLength(0);
await moduleRef.init();
const router = moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter, { strict: false });
expect(router.active).toBe(embedded);
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('embedded');
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('fails closed at module init when pi-rpc mode has no registered pi adapter (specific typed error, not a stub throw)', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootRouterGraph('pi-rpc', {
adapters: [],
service: boundConversationService,
});
try {
const err = await initError(moduleRef);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
} finally {
await closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef);
}
});
it('fails closed at module init when pi-rpc mode has the unavailable conversation-service sentinel', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootRouterGraph('pi-rpc', {
adapters: ['pi'],
service: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
try {
const err = await initError(moduleRef);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('conversation_service_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
} finally {
await closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef);
}
});
it('surfaces only fixed, browser-safe failure text when the graph fails closed (no stub/exception detail)', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootRouterGraph('pi-rpc', {
adapters: [],
service: boundConversationService,
});
try {
const err = await initError(moduleRef);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
const message = (err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).message;
expect(message).toBe(
'The pi-rpc chat runtime is unavailable: no "pi" harness adapter is registered.',
);
expect(message).not.toMatch(/Error:|\bat \b|node_modules|Symbol\(|not implemented/);
} finally {
await closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef);
}
});
});
/**
* Task Five, Step Two — group 1b (production ChatModule wiring, declaration proof).
*
* Correction #1 (Scrappy fe3e02) asked for a red that imports the real `ChatModule` and calls
* `module.init()`. Investigated and found impractical/masking-prone: `ChatModule` provides
* `ChatGateway`, whose 10-argument constructor injects app-global providers (AgentService, AUTH,
* BRAIN, RoutingEngineService) plus the Commands/GC/Mcp/Reload subsystems across a forwardRef
* cycle. Booting it in isolation is a full-app integration boot — "override only unrelated
* dependencies" balloons into faking ~4 subsystems, and `overrideProvider` cannot even grant the
* cross-module export-scope visibility ChatGateway needs (probe: `ChatGateway` unresolved at
* `CommandExecutorService`). That is exactly the STOP-and-return branch of the directive.
*
* The faithful, unmaskable cover instead of a fragile boot: read the PRODUCTION `ChatModule`'s own
* Nest `@Module` metadata to prove it DECLARES the exclusive router provider and imports the real
* `HarnessModule` (the genuine registry source). This inspects the actual module object — not
* source text, not a test factory — so nothing can mask it. Group 1 above separately proves the
* router RESOLVES against the real, empty `HarnessRegistry` through the Nest lifecycle; the union
* of the two covers "the router is wired through ChatModule to the real registry" without the
* impractical single-graph boot. RED today (ChatModule provides only ChatGateway and imports only
* CommandsModule); GREEN once Step Three registers the router and imports HarnessModule.
*/
describe('ChatModule production wiring (Task Five, Step Two group 1b — declaration proof)', () => {
// Unwrap a forwardRef(() => Module) import to the module it references; pass others through.
const resolveImport = (imp: unknown): unknown =>
imp &&
typeof imp === 'object' &&
typeof (imp as { forwardRef?: unknown }).forwardRef === 'function'
? (imp as { forwardRef: () => unknown }).forwardRef()
: imp;
// A provider entry is either a class (shorthand) or a { provide, ... } object; take its token.
const providerToken = (provider: unknown): unknown =>
typeof provider === 'function' ? provider : (provider as { provide?: unknown })?.provide;
it('declares the exclusive ChatRuntimeRouter as a provider on the production ChatModule', () => {
const providers: unknown[] = Reflect.getMetadata('providers', ChatModule) ?? [];
expect(providers.map(providerToken)).toContain(ChatRuntimeRouter);
});
it('imports the real HarnessModule into the production ChatModule (registry source, not a test double)', () => {
const imports: unknown[] = Reflect.getMetadata('imports', ChatModule) ?? [];
expect(imports.map(resolveImport)).toContain(HarnessModule);
});
});
/**
* Task Five, Step Two — group 1c (bounded real-`ChatModule` boot).
*
* Scrappy adjudication d67d2b (option c): boot the ACTUAL production `ChatModule` as the SUT and
* assert the exclusive router resolves THROUGH it — the single-graph proof group 1 (router over the
* real registry) and group 1b (production-module metadata) each cover only a half of. The heavy,
* UNRELATED cycle is the only thing bounded away, per the established isolation pattern in
* `apps/gateway/src/agent/hermes-runtime-reachability.e2e.test.ts`:
* - `CommandsModule` (drags the Commands <-> Reload <-> Chat forwardRef cycle plus GC/Mcp/queue)
* is replaced wholesale with an empty module via `.overrideModule(...).useModule(...)`;
* - `ChatGateway` (10-arg constructor, an HTTP/socket concern never exercised here) is replaced
* with an inert value;
* - the sole legacy-controller dependency, `AgentService`, is supplied by a tiny `@Global()` stub;
* - the HTTP-only `AuthGuard` is stubbed.
* Nothing about the router, `HarnessModule`, the registry, or the conversation-service binding is
* faked in the production-legacy case — those are retrieved from the REAL `ChatModule` graph. Mode
* is driven only through the production `CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME` env contract (`resolveChatRuntimeMode`).
*
* Red-first: today `ChatModule` neither imports `HarnessModule` nor provides `ChatRuntimeRouter`, so
* the booted graph contains no router/registry/conversation-service tokens. `init()` may resolve
* (there is no router lifecycle hook yet to reject), so every case fails on the MISSING actual
* router/registry/service wiring — not on unrelated DI, which is bounded away. GREEN at Step Three
* once `ChatModule` imports `HarnessModule`, provides the exclusive router, and binds the
* conversation-service token (defaulting to the unavailable sentinel).
*/
describe('ChatModule bounded real boot (Task Five, Step Two group 1c)', () => {
// The unrelated heavy cycle, replaced wholesale — not stubbed provider-by-provider.
@Module({})
class EmptyCommandsModule {}
// The ONLY genuine legacy dependency of the real ChatController, supplied inertly and globally so
// the pre-refactor controller instantiates without dragging AgentModule into the graph.
@Global()
@Module({
providers: [{ provide: AgentService, useValue: {} }],
exports: [AgentService],
})
class LegacyControllerDepsModule {}
const ORIGINAL_RUNTIME_ENV = process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (ORIGINAL_RUNTIME_ENV === undefined) delete process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'];
else process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = ORIGINAL_RUNTIME_ENV;
});
/**
* Boot the real ChatModule with only the unrelated cycle bounded away. `mode` is set through the
* genuine production env contract before providers instantiate. The optional overrides replace
* the registry / conversation-service the router injects, exercising the pi-rpc precondition
* branches through the ACTUAL module (they are no-ops today because those tokens are not yet in
* the graph — which is exactly why the router-retrieval assertions go red).
*/
async function bootChatModule(
mode: ChatRuntimeMode,
overrides: {
registryAdapters?: readonly string[];
conversationService?: HarnessConversationServiceBinding;
} = {},
): Promise<TestingModule> {
if (mode === 'pi-rpc') process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
else delete process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'];
let builder = Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [LegacyControllerDepsModule, ChatModule],
})
.overrideModule(CommandsModule)
.useModule(EmptyCommandsModule)
.overrideProvider(ChatGateway)
.useValue({})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: () => true });
if (overrides.registryAdapters) {
builder = builder
.overrideProvider(HARNESS_REGISTRY)
.useValue(registryWith(overrides.registryAdapters));
}
if (overrides.conversationService !== undefined) {
builder = builder
.overrideProvider(HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE)
.useValue(overrides.conversationService);
}
return builder.compile();
}
// Capture an init rejection without letting a resolved init masquerade as success.
const initError = (moduleRef: TestingModule): Promise<unknown> =>
moduleRef.init().then(
() => new Error('module init resolved but the contract requires it to reject'),
(err: unknown) => err,
);
it('legacy mode: the actual router resolves the embedded runtime, the actual registry is empty, and the conversation-service token is the unavailable sentinel', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootChatModule('legacy');
try {
await moduleRef.init();
const router = moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter, { strict: false });
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('embedded');
const registry = moduleRef.get<HarnessRegistry>(HARNESS_REGISTRY, { strict: false });
expect(registry).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessRegistry);
expect(registry.list()).toHaveLength(0);
const service = moduleRef.get<HarnessConversationServiceBinding>(
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE,
{
strict: false,
},
);
expect(service).toBe(HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('pi-rpc mode over the REAL empty registry fails closed at init with the typed adapter-unavailable error', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootChatModule('pi-rpc');
try {
const err = await initError(moduleRef);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
} finally {
await closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef);
}
});
it('pi-rpc mode with a pi adapter present but the sentinel conversation service fails closed with the typed conversation-service-unavailable error', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootChatModule('pi-rpc', {
registryAdapters: ['pi'],
conversationService: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
});
try {
const err = await initError(moduleRef);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ChatRuntimeUnavailableError);
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).reason).toBe('conversation_service_unavailable');
expect((err as ChatRuntimeUnavailableError).code).toBe('runtime_unsupported');
} finally {
await closeIgnoringFailedInit(moduleRef);
}
});
it('pi-rpc mode with a pi adapter and a bound conversation service: the actual router selects the harness runtime', async () => {
const moduleRef = await bootChatModule('pi-rpc', {
registryAdapters: ['pi'],
conversationService: boundConversationService,
});
try {
await moduleRef.init();
const router = moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter, { strict: false });
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('harness');
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
});
/**
* Task Five, Step Two — group 2 (WHOLE production `AppModule` boot, legacy end-to-end wiring).
*
* The groups above bound away the heavy cycle to isolate the router. This group instead boots the
* ACTUAL production `AppModule` (the exact graph `main.ts` runs) in the default LEGACY chat-runtime
* mode, overriding ONLY the storage/network side-effect adapters so the boot is bounded and offline
* — never the chat/router/harness/reload/commands surface under test. The bounded fakes are exactly
* the disk/network leaves:
* - `ProviderService` (the #1 hang risk: its real `onModuleInit` starts an unref'd health-check
* `setInterval` and fetches Ollama over HTTP) → inert no-op instance;
* - `DB_HANDLE`/`DB` → a fake Drizzle-shaped handle that satisfies `runPgliteMigrations` (the local
* tier's `DatabaseModule.onModuleInit`) AND `DefaultRoutingRulesSeed.onModuleInit` (which reads a
* system-rule count — the fake reports rules already present so the seed insert is skipped),
* opening no real database;
* - `STORAGE_ADAPTER`/`MEMORY`/`MEMORY_ADAPTER`/`AUTH`/`BRAIN`/`LOG_SERVICE` → inert fakes so no
* storage/auth/log backend is contacted.
* Local tier (the repo's `mosaic.config.json`) already disables BullMQ/Redis and the queue handles;
* Discord/Telegram/MCP plugins are env-gated and disarmed by deleting their tokens. Nothing about the
* router, `ChatModule`, `HarnessModule`, or `ChatGateway` is faked — those come from the REAL graph.
*
* The boot+init MUST SUCCEED cleanly (proven by `beforeAll` completing and the ChatGateway test
* passing). Red-first: on this branch `ChatRuntimeRouter` is registered in NO module (ChatModule
* provides only ChatGateway), so `moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter)` throws `UnknownElementException`
* — a WIRING gap, NOT an init failure. That single retrieval is the intended behavioural red; it
* flips green once Step Three registers the exclusive router. The ChatGateway retrieval and its
* browser-facing method surface are asserted alongside and pass today, pinning that the boot itself
* is healthy so the router failure cannot be mistaken for a mis-shaped fake or an unbounded side
* effect.
*/
describe('AppModule production boot — legacy ChatRuntimeRouter wiring (Task Five, Step Two group 2)', () => {
// A Drizzle-shaped fake that satisfies both DB consumers reached during a local-tier init:
// • runPgliteMigrations(): reads handle.db.$client.exec + handle.db.execute(SELECT hashes);
// exec is a no-op and execute yields an empty ledger, so migration statements no-op through.
// • DefaultRoutingRulesSeed.seedDefaultRules(): db.select().from().where() must resolve to a
// row set — we report a non-zero system-rule count so the seeding INSERT branch is skipped.
const fakeDb = {
$client: { exec: async (): Promise<void> => {} },
execute: async (): Promise<{ rows: unknown[] }> => ({ rows: [] }),
select: () => ({
from: () => ({
where: async (): Promise<Array<{ count: number }>> => [{ count: 1 }],
}),
}),
insert: () => ({ values: async (): Promise<void> => {} }),
};
const fakeDbHandle = { db: fakeDb, close: async (): Promise<void> => {} };
const fakeStorageAdapter = {
name: 'fake',
migrate: async (): Promise<void> => {},
close: async (): Promise<void> => {},
};
// Inert stand-in for the real ProviderService: no health-check interval, no Ollama fetch.
const fakeProviderService = {
onModuleInit: async (): Promise<void> => {},
onModuleDestroy: (): void => {},
getRegistry: () => ({
getAvailable: () => [],
getAll: () => [],
find: () => undefined,
}),
getDefaultModel: () => undefined,
listAvailableModels: () => [],
listProviders: () => [],
getAdapter: () => undefined,
getProvidersHealth: () => [],
};
const fakeBrain = { conversations: {}, agents: {} };
const BOOT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let envSnapshot: Record<string, string | undefined>;
beforeAll(async () => {
envSnapshot = { ...process.env };
// Env hygiene: disarm the network-facing plugins/adapters and pin the legacy runtime mode.
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN'];
delete process.env['TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN'];
delete process.env['MCP_SERVERS'];
delete process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME']; // resolveChatRuntimeMode → 'legacy'
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] = 'local';
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] })
// Storage/network side-effect adapters ONLY — never the router/chat/harness surface under test.
.overrideProvider('DB_HANDLE')
.useValue(fakeDbHandle)
.overrideProvider('DB')
.useValue(fakeDb)
.overrideProvider('STORAGE_ADAPTER')
.useValue(fakeStorageAdapter)
.overrideProvider('AUTH')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('BRAIN')
.useValue(fakeBrain)
.overrideProvider('LOG_SERVICE')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY_ADAPTER')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(ProviderService)
.useValue(fakeProviderService)
.compile();
// The boot itself MUST succeed cleanly — a rejection here is a bounding failure, not the red.
await moduleRef.init();
}, BOOT_TIMEOUT_MS);
afterAll(async () => {
if (moduleRef) await moduleRef.close();
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
if (!(key in envSnapshot)) delete process.env[key];
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(envSnapshot)) {
if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
else process.env[key] = value;
}
});
// Passes TODAY: the real ChatGateway is provided by the real ChatModule and its browser-facing
// surface exists. This pins that the whole-AppModule boot came up healthy, so the router failure
// below is unambiguously a wiring gap and not a mis-shaped fake or an unbounded side effect.
it('boots the whole AppModule and exposes the real ChatGateway with its browser-facing methods', () => {
const gateway = moduleRef.get(ChatGateway, { strict: false });
expect(typeof gateway.broadcastReload).toBe('function');
expect(typeof gateway.getModelOverride).toBe('function');
expect(typeof gateway.setModelOverride).toBe('function');
expect(typeof gateway.broadcastSessionInfo).toBe('function');
});
// RED TODAY: ChatRuntimeRouter is registered in no module on this branch, so this retrieval throws
// UnknownElementException — the intended red-first wiring failure. GREEN once Step Three registers
// the exclusive router in the production graph, where legacy mode resolves the embedded runtime.
it('resolves the exclusive ChatRuntimeRouter to the embedded runtime in legacy mode', () => {
const router = moduleRef.get(ChatRuntimeRouter, { strict: false });
expect(router.active.kind).toBe('embedded');
});
});
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
import { Injectable, type OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import {
isHarnessConversationServiceAvailable,
type HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
} from '../harness/harness.tokens.js';
import type {
ChatRuntime,
ChatRuntimeMode,
LegacyBrowserMessagePayload,
LegacyEmbeddedChatPort,
LegacyRuntimeResult,
LegacyRuntimeStream,
LegacySessionPresentation,
LegacySocketTurnLease,
OwnedConversationContext,
VerifiedDiscordIngressContext,
VerifiedDiscordTurnLease,
} from './chat-runtime.js';
import { ChatRuntimeUnavailableError, resolveChatRuntimeMode } from './chat-runtime.js';
/** The fixed fail-closed result for a legacy browser operation issued under `pi-rpc`. */
const RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED = {
ok: false as const,
code: 'runtime_unsupported' as const,
retryable: false as const,
};
/**
* Resolves the one live {@link ChatRuntime} for this process and enforces the
* `pi-rpc` readiness preconditions at module init — before the gateway accepts
* traffic. It never falls back from `pi-rpc` to embedded execution: an unmet
* `pi-rpc` precondition is a typed startup failure ({@link ChatRuntimeUnavailableError}),
* and until `onModuleInit` selects a runtime, {@link active} throws rather than
* exposing any runtime — a failed `pi-rpc` init can never leak the embedded one.
*/
@Injectable()
export class ChatRuntimeRouter implements OnModuleInit, LegacyEmbeddedChatPort {
private readonly mode: ChatRuntimeMode;
/** The single resolved runtime. Undefined until a successful `onModuleInit`. */
private resolved: ChatRuntime | undefined;
constructor(
private readonly harnessRegistry: HarnessRegistry,
private readonly conversationService: HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
private readonly embedded: ChatRuntime,
private readonly harness: ChatRuntime,
mode: ChatRuntimeMode = resolveChatRuntimeMode(),
) {
this.mode = mode;
}
onModuleInit(): void {
if (this.mode === 'legacy') {
// Legacy ignores the pi-rpc preconditions entirely and always runs embedded.
this.resolved = this.embedded;
return;
}
// pi-rpc: both preconditions are hard startup failures, checked in a fixed order.
if (!this.harnessRegistry.has('pi')) {
this.resolved = undefined;
throw new ChatRuntimeUnavailableError('adapter_unavailable');
}
if (!isHarnessConversationServiceAvailable(this.conversationService)) {
this.resolved = undefined;
throw new ChatRuntimeUnavailableError('conversation_service_unavailable');
}
this.resolved = this.harness;
}
get active(): ChatRuntime {
if (this.resolved === undefined) {
// Reached only if init has not run or failed closed; never expose a runtime here.
throw new Error('The chat runtime is not available: startup did not resolve a runtime.');
}
return this.resolved;
}
/**
* The process-wide mode, available before {@link onModuleInit}. Production handlers read
* this to fail a legacy browser turn closed under `pi-rpc` *before* parsing the payload as
* either browser-legacy input or a Discord envelope — never to branch into a fallback.
*/
get runtimeMode(): ChatRuntimeMode {
return this.mode;
}
/**
* The embedded runtime narrowed to its port. Only reached on the legacy path (and for the
* verified-Discord op in both modes), where the injected runtime is always a real
* `EmbeddedChatRuntime`. The router spec constructs the router with a bare `{ kind }` stub
* but never invokes a port op, so this narrowing is never exercised against the stub.
*/
private get embeddedPort(): LegacyEmbeddedChatPort {
return this.embedded as unknown as LegacyEmbeddedChatPort;
}
// --- LegacyEmbeddedChatPort: legacy browser operations fail closed under pi-rpc ---
completeLegacyRestTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: Readonly<{ content: string }>,
): Promise<
LegacyRuntimeResult<Readonly<{ text: string; presentation: LegacySessionPresentation }>>
> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return Promise.resolve(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return this.embeddedPort.completeLegacyRestTurn(context, input);
}
prepareLegacySocketTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: LegacyBrowserMessagePayload,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySocketTurnLease>> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return Promise.resolve(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return this.embeddedPort.prepareLegacySocketTurn(context, input, stream);
}
setLegacyThinking(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
level: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return this.embeddedPort.setLegacyThinking(context, level);
}
abortLegacyTurn(context: OwnedConversationContext): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return Promise.resolve(RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED);
}
return this.embeddedPort.abortLegacyTurn(context);
}
applyLegacyModelOverride(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
modelId: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return this.embeddedPort.applyLegacyModelOverride(context, modelId);
}
readLegacySessionPresentation(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
if (this.mode === 'pi-rpc') {
return RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED;
}
return this.embeddedPort.readLegacySessionPresentation(context);
}
/**
* Verified Discord ingress bypasses browser mode: it is embedded-only in BOTH modes and
* never reaches the harness or routing-engine selection. It is reached only through a
* {@link VerifiedDiscordIngressContext}, which exists only after every ingress check.
*/
dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress(
context: VerifiedDiscordIngressContext,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<VerifiedDiscordTurnLease>> {
return this.embeddedPort.dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress(context, stream);
}
}
-273
View File
@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
import type { ChannelAttachmentDto, RoutingDecisionInfo } from '@mosaicstack/types';
/**
* The single chat execution strategy resolved by {@link ChatRuntimeRouter}.
*
* Exactly one runtime is live per process. There is no union that lets a
* `pi-rpc` deployment silently fall back to embedded execution: an unmet
* `pi-rpc` precondition is a typed startup failure, never a downgrade.
*/
export type ChatRuntimeMode = 'legacy' | 'pi-rpc';
export type ChatRuntimeKind = 'embedded' | 'harness';
/** The resolved runtime. Slice Zero exposes only its immutable {@link ChatRuntimeKind}. */
export interface ChatRuntime {
readonly kind: ChatRuntimeKind;
}
/** Why the `pi-rpc` runtime could not be made ready. Both are hard startup failures. */
export type ChatRuntimeUnavailableReason =
| 'adapter_unavailable'
| 'conversation_service_unavailable';
/**
* Raised at module init when `pi-rpc` mode is selected but its preconditions are
* unmet. Carries only fixed, browser-safe text — never a raw exception message,
* stack, or provider detail — and reports the frozen ack code `runtime_unsupported`.
*/
export class ChatRuntimeUnavailableError extends Error {
readonly code = 'runtime_unsupported' as const;
readonly reason: ChatRuntimeUnavailableReason;
constructor(reason: ChatRuntimeUnavailableReason) {
super(
reason === 'adapter_unavailable'
? 'The pi-rpc chat runtime is unavailable: no "pi" harness adapter is registered.'
: 'The pi-rpc chat runtime is unavailable: the harness conversation service is not bound.',
);
this.name = 'ChatRuntimeUnavailableError';
this.reason = reason;
}
}
/**
* Resolves the process-wide chat runtime mode from the environment. Anything other
* than the exact opt-in token `pi-rpc` keeps the legacy embedded runtime.
*/
export function resolveChatRuntimeMode(
env: Record<string, string | undefined> = process.env,
): ChatRuntimeMode {
return env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] === 'pi-rpc' ? 'pi-rpc' : 'legacy';
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Transitional embedded chat port (Task Five).
//
// The legacy embedded browser behaviour is moved behind this exact interface so
// neither the controller nor the gateway retains AgentService, RoutingEngine,
// session, `piSession`, metric, listener, or channel access. `EmbeddedChatRuntime`
// implements the port; `ChatRuntimeRouter` exposes the same narrowly named
// operations and returns `runtime_unsupported` before touching Embedded for legacy
// browser operations when the mode is `pi-rpc`.
//
// The names are frozen (spec jarvis-brain@1c629b06). Legacy REST completion,
// legacy Socket streaming, P3 harness turns, and verified Discord are distinct
// transport/trust capabilities — there is deliberately no generic
// `sendConversationTurn` nor an AgentService-shaped mirror on the router.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Phantom brand keeping {@link OwnedConversationContext} nominally distinct so browser
* DTOs are never structurally assignable to it. The factory that mints one may be called
* only after authentication with `scopeFromUser(...)`, never with payload authority fields.
*/
declare const ownedConversationContextBrand: unique symbol;
/** Gateway-only ownership context. Embedded rechecks owner+tenant on every operation. */
export interface OwnedConversationContext {
readonly [ownedConversationContextBrand]: true;
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly scope: Readonly<{ userId: string; tenantId: string }>;
}
/**
* Every non-`ok` legacy runtime outcome. Missing, foreign, and no-longer-owned
* conversations all collapse to `conversation_unavailable`. Ownership/mode/validation
* failures are total results and never throw.
*/
export type LegacyRuntimeFailure =
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'runtime_unsupported'; readonly retryable: false }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'conversation_unavailable'; readonly retryable: false }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'request_invalid'; readonly retryable: false }
| {
readonly ok: false;
readonly code: 'thinking_level_invalid';
readonly retryable: false;
readonly availableThinkingLevels: readonly string[];
}
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'runtime_unavailable'; readonly retryable: true }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'turn_already_dispatched'; readonly retryable: false }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'operation_failed'; readonly retryable: boolean }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly code: 'timeout'; readonly retryable: true };
/** Total result: an `ok` value or one of the fixed {@link LegacyRuntimeFailure} codes. */
export type LegacyRuntimeResult<T> =
| { readonly ok: true; readonly value: T }
| LegacyRuntimeFailure;
/** User-facing session projection. Carries no session object, handle, or credential path. */
export interface LegacySessionPresentation {
readonly provider: string;
readonly modelId: string;
readonly thinkingLevel: string;
readonly availableThinkingLevels: readonly string[];
readonly agentName?: string;
readonly routingDecision?: RoutingDecisionInfo;
}
/** Terminal usage stats, normalized by Embedded from AgentService metrics. */
export interface LegacyUsage {
readonly provider: string;
readonly modelId: string;
readonly thinkingLevel: string;
readonly tokens: Readonly<{
input: number;
output: number;
cacheRead: number;
cacheWrite: number;
total: number;
}>;
readonly cost: number;
readonly context: Readonly<{ percent: number | null; window: number }>;
}
/**
* Normalized stream event. Exposes no `AgentSession`, `piSession`, native handle, raw
* exception, tool arguments, or credential-bearing path — the gateway sees only these.
*/
export type LegacyRuntimeEvent =
| { readonly type: 'started' }
| { readonly type: 'text_delta'; readonly text: string }
| { readonly type: 'thinking_delta'; readonly text: string }
| {
readonly type: 'tool_started';
readonly toolCallId: string;
readonly toolName: string;
}
| {
readonly type: 'tool_finished';
readonly toolCallId: string;
readonly toolName: string;
readonly isError: boolean;
}
| { readonly type: 'settled'; readonly usage?: LegacyUsage };
/** Legacy browser message input. Authority fields are advisory only; scope comes from the context. */
export interface LegacyBrowserMessagePayload {
readonly content: string;
readonly provider?: string;
readonly modelId?: string;
readonly agentId?: string;
readonly attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
}
/** A prepared-but-not-yet-dispatched legacy socket turn. */
export interface LegacySocketTurnLease {
readonly presentation: LegacySessionPresentation;
/**
* Atomically one-shot and scope-rechecking. A second call returns
* `turn_already_dispatched` and performs zero prompt/tool effects.
*/
dispatch(): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>>;
/** Idempotent, non-throwing. Removes listener and channel, including partial setup. */
dispose(): Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Phantom brand for {@link VerifiedDiscordIngressContext}. Minted only after service-token
* auth plus signature, allowlist, binding, expected-route, replay, configured-agent,
* forced-scope, and attachment-normalization checks.
*/
declare const verifiedDiscordIngressContextBrand: unique symbol;
/** Fully-verified Discord ingress. Contains no socket, envelope, signature, token, or escape hatch. */
export interface VerifiedDiscordIngressContext {
readonly [verifiedDiscordIngressContextBrand]: true;
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly scope: Readonly<{ userId: string; tenantId: string }>;
readonly configuredAgent: Readonly<{ agentConfigId: string; instanceId: string }>;
readonly content: string;
readonly attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
readonly correlationId: string;
readonly discordMessageId: string;
readonly discordUserId: string;
}
/** Verified-Discord turn lease. Same atomic one-shot dispatch and idempotent dispose rules. */
export interface VerifiedDiscordTurnLease {
readonly presentation: LegacySessionPresentation;
dispatch(): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>>;
dispose(): Promise<void>;
}
/** Server-owned egress projection the runtime pushes normalized events into. */
export interface LegacyRuntimeStream {
/** Server-derived, e.g. `websocket:<socket-id>`. Never client-supplied. */
readonly channelId: string;
onEvent(event: LegacyRuntimeEvent): void;
}
/**
* The exact transitional port. `EmbeddedChatRuntime` implements it; `ChatRuntimeRouter`
* mirrors the operation names and fails closed with `runtime_unsupported` for legacy
* browser operations under `pi-rpc`.
*/
export interface LegacyEmbeddedChatPort {
completeLegacyRestTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: Readonly<{ content: string }>,
): Promise<
LegacyRuntimeResult<Readonly<{ text: string; presentation: LegacySessionPresentation }>>
>;
prepareLegacySocketTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: LegacyBrowserMessagePayload,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySocketTurnLease>>;
setLegacyThinking(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
level: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation>;
abortLegacyTurn(context: OwnedConversationContext): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>>;
applyLegacyModelOverride(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
modelId: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation>;
readLegacySessionPresentation(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation>;
dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress(
context: VerifiedDiscordIngressContext,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<VerifiedDiscordTurnLease>>;
}
/**
* Mints an {@link OwnedConversationContext} from a server-derived scope. Callers must pass
* a scope produced by `scopeFromUser(...)` after authentication — never a client-supplied
* authority field. The brand is phantom, so this is the only way to obtain the branded type.
*/
export function ownConversation(
conversationId: string,
scope: Readonly<{ userId: string; tenantId: string }>,
): OwnedConversationContext {
return { conversationId, scope } as unknown as OwnedConversationContext;
}
/**
* Mints a {@link VerifiedDiscordIngressContext}. Callers must have already completed every
* ingress check (service-token auth, signature, allowlist, binding, expected-route, replay,
* configured-agent, forced-scope, attachment normalization) before calling this.
*/
export function verifyDiscordIngress(
fields: Omit<VerifiedDiscordIngressContext, typeof verifiedDiscordIngressContextBrand>,
): VerifiedDiscordIngressContext {
return { ...fields } as unknown as VerifiedDiscordIngressContext;
}
+63 -32
View File
@@ -3,20 +3,21 @@ import {
Post,
Body,
Logger,
ForbiddenException,
HttpException,
HttpStatus,
NotFoundException,
Inject,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import type { AgentSessionEvent } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { v4 as uuid } from 'uuid';
import { ChatRequestDto } from './chat.dto.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from './chat-runtime-router.js';
import { ownConversation } from './chat-runtime.js';
import type { LegacyRuntimeFailure } from './chat-runtime.js';
interface ChatResponse {
conversationId: string;
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ interface ChatResponse {
export class ChatController {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ChatController.name);
constructor(private readonly runtime: ChatRuntimeRouter) {}
constructor(@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService) {}
@Post()
@Throttle({ default: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
@@ -39,38 +40,68 @@ export class ChatController {
const conversationId = body.conversationId ?? uuid();
const scope = scopeFromUser(user);
try {
let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
if (!agentSession) {
agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId, {
userId: scope.userId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
});
}
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof ForbiddenException) {
throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
}
this.logger.error(
`Session creation failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
);
throw new HttpException('Agent session unavailable', HttpStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
}
this.logger.debug(`Handling chat request for user=${user.id}, conversation=${conversationId}`);
// The one exclusive runtime owns execution. In legacy mode this reaches the embedded runtime;
// in pi-rpc it fails closed with `runtime_unsupported` before ever touching embedded execution.
const result = await this.runtime.completeLegacyRestTurn(
ownConversation(conversationId, scope),
{ content: body.content },
);
let responseText = '';
if (result.ok) {
return { conversationId, text: result.value.text };
const done = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
cleanup();
this.logger.error(`Agent response timed out after 120s for conversation=${conversationId}`);
reject(new Error('Agent response timed out'));
}, 120_000);
const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(
conversationId,
(event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
if (
event.type === 'message_update' &&
event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta'
) {
responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
}
if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
clearTimeout(timer);
cleanup();
resolve();
}
},
scope,
);
});
try {
await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, body.content, scope);
await done;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpException) throw err;
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (message.includes('timed out')) {
throw new HttpException('Agent response timed out', HttpStatus.GATEWAY_TIMEOUT);
}
this.logger.error(`Chat prompt failed for conversation=${conversationId}`, String(err));
throw new HttpException('Agent processing failed', HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
}
throw this.toHttpException(result, conversationId);
}
/** Maps a total {@link LegacyRuntimeFailure} to the fixed browser-safe HTTP surface. */
private toHttpException(failure: LegacyRuntimeFailure, conversationId: string): HttpException {
switch (failure.code) {
case 'conversation_unavailable':
return new NotFoundException('Session not found');
case 'request_invalid':
case 'thinking_level_invalid':
return new HttpException('Invalid chat request', HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST);
case 'timeout':
return new HttpException('Agent response timed out', HttpStatus.GATEWAY_TIMEOUT);
case 'runtime_unsupported':
case 'runtime_unavailable':
return new HttpException('Agent runtime unavailable', HttpStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
default:
this.logger.error(`Chat turn failed for conversation=${conversationId}: ${failure.code}`);
return new HttpException('Agent processing failed', HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
}
return { conversationId, text: responseText };
}
}
+1 -63
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,5 @@
import type { ChannelAttachmentDto } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { Transform, Type } from 'class-transformer';
import {
IsNotEmpty,
IsObject,
IsOptional,
IsString,
IsUUID,
MaxLength,
ValidateNested,
} from 'class-validator';
import { IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, MaxLength } from 'class-validator';
export class ChatRequestDto {
@IsOptional()
@@ -46,56 +37,3 @@ export class ChatSocketMessageDto {
/** Validated channel attachment references; binary content is not embedded. */
attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
}
/**
* Task Five, group 2 — the frozen pi-rpc `turn:send` selection triple.
*
* Each id is a required, non-empty, bounded string. There is no `@IsOptional` and no extra
* field: under `forbidNonWhitelisted` an unknown selection key is rejected, and a missing id
* fails `@IsString` (undefined is not a string) rather than silently passing.
*/
export class HarnessTurnSelectionDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
@MaxLength(255)
harnessId!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
@MaxLength(255)
providerId!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
@MaxLength(255)
modelId!: string;
}
/**
* Task Five, group 2 — the frozen wire contract for a pi-rpc `turn:send`.
*
* Validated through the production `ValidationPipe({ whitelist, forbidNonWhitelisted, transform })`:
* a UUID conversation id; `content` trimmed then bounded to 1..10_000 characters (whitespace-only
* collapses to empty and fails `@IsNotEmpty`); a nested `selection` object recursed with an
* explicit `@Type` (a bare `@ValidateNested` is masked green by class-validator's empty-metadata
* `unknownValue`); and a UUID-v4 idempotency key. No `provider`/`modelId`/`attachments` or other
* authority field is declared, so `forbidNonWhitelisted` rejects every unknown top-level key.
*/
export class HarnessTurnSendDto {
@IsUUID()
conversationId!: string;
@Transform(({ value }) => (typeof value === 'string' ? value.trim() : value))
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
@MaxLength(10_000)
content!: string;
@IsObject()
@ValidateNested()
@Type(() => HarnessTurnSelectionDto)
selection!: HarnessTurnSelectionDto;
@IsUUID('4')
idempotencyKey!: string;
}
@@ -8,31 +8,12 @@ const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
approvalId: 'approval-1',
};
/**
* Task 5 fence (F, existing control): gateway-owned command authorization/approval must
* cause ZERO chat-runtime dispatch. Placed in the gateway's chat-runtime-router slot (the
* former direct `AgentService` slot) so any accidental chat-runtime resolution throws
* loudly instead of silently passing. Because execute/approval run entirely through the
* command executor dependency and never resolve a chat runtime, this fixture is never
* triggered and the ingress stays a GREEN control.
*/
function failIfUsedChatRuntimeRouter() {
return {
onModuleInit: () => {
throw new Error('chat runtime router must not initialise on the command approval path');
},
get active(): never {
throw new Error('chat runtime must not be resolved on the command approval path');
},
};
}
function buildGateway(commandExecutor: {
execute: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
createApproval: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
}): ChatGateway {
return new ChatGateway(
failIfUsedChatRuntimeRouter() as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
@@ -91,114 +72,3 @@ describe('ChatGateway command approval ingress', () => {
});
});
});
/**
* Task 5 (G3) command runtime fence. Under pi-rpc there is no embedded chat session, so
* embedded slash-commands (/model, /agent, and every other non-audited command) are fixed
* "unsupported" and MUST fail closed BEFORE reaching the command executor — never a silent
* fall-through to embedded execution. Only runtime-independent audited system commands
* (/reload) pass through as a positive control, and the approval path stays runtime-independent.
* The router stub here carries `runtimeMode: 'pi-rpc'` and throws if any runtime is resolved, so
* a fence bypass surfaces as a thrown error rather than a silent embedded dispatch.
*/
function buildPiRpcGateway(commandExecutor: {
execute: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
createApproval: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
}): ChatGateway {
const piRpcRouter = {
runtimeMode: 'pi-rpc' as const,
onModuleInit: () => {
throw new Error('chat runtime router must not initialise on the pi-rpc command path');
},
get active(): never {
throw new Error('chat runtime must not be resolved on the pi-rpc command path');
},
};
return new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouter as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
commandExecutor as never,
{} as never,
);
}
describe('ChatGateway command runtime fence (Task 5 G3, pi-rpc)', () => {
const UNSUPPORTED = 'Slash commands are not available on this deployment.';
it.each(['model', 'agent', 'gc'])(
'fails /%s closed before the executor under pi-rpc (execute never called)',
async (command): Promise<void> => {
const commandExecutor = {
execute: vi
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ command, conversationId: 'conversation-1', success: true }),
createApproval: vi.fn(),
};
const gateway = buildPiRpcGateway(commandExecutor);
const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
await gateway.handleCommandExecute(client as never, {
command,
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
});
expect(commandExecutor.execute).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('command:result', {
command,
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
success: false,
message: UNSUPPORTED,
});
},
);
it('passes the audited /reload system command through as a positive control under pi-rpc', async (): Promise<void> => {
const reloadResult = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conversation-1', success: true };
const commandExecutor = {
execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(reloadResult),
createApproval: vi.fn(),
};
const gateway = buildPiRpcGateway(commandExecutor);
const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
await gateway.handleCommandExecute(client as never, {
command: 'reload',
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
});
expect(commandExecutor.execute).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(commandExecutor.execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conversation-1' },
{ userId: 'admin-1', tenantId: 'admin-1' },
);
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('command:result', reloadResult);
});
it('keeps command approval runtime-independent under pi-rpc (createApproval still runs)', async (): Promise<void> => {
const commandExecutor = {
execute: vi.fn(),
createApproval: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
approvalId: 'approval-1',
expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:05:00.000Z',
}),
};
const gateway = buildPiRpcGateway(commandExecutor);
const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
await gateway.handleCommandApproval(client as never, {
command: 'gc',
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
});
expect(commandExecutor.createApproval).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' },
{ userId: 'admin-1', tenantId: 'admin-1' },
);
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'command:approval',
expect.objectContaining({ success: true, approvalId: 'approval-1' }),
);
});
});
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@@ -1,59 +1,12 @@
import { forwardRef, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import { HarnessModule } from '../harness/harness.module.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import {
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE,
HARNESS_REGISTRY,
type HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
} from '../harness/harness.tokens.js';
import type { HarnessConversationService } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
import { ChatController } from './chat.controller.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from './chat-runtime-router.js';
import { EmbeddedChatRuntime } from './embedded-chat.runtime.js';
import { HarnessChatRuntime } from './harness-chat.runtime.js';
/**
* Task Five wiring. The exclusive {@link ChatRuntimeRouter} is the single chat-execution
* authority: the controller and gateway inject only the router, never `AgentService`,
* `RoutingEngineService`, or a session/`piSession` handle. The router resolves exactly one
* runtime at module init — {@link EmbeddedChatRuntime} in legacy mode, {@link HarnessChatRuntime}
* in `pi-rpc` — over the REAL {@link HarnessModule} registry and conversation-service binding.
*
* The router and the harness runtime are constructed through factories because their
* dependencies are interface/union types with no runtime injection token (the registry and
* conversation-service arrive via the string tokens exported by `HarnessModule`); the embedded
* runtime injects the class-typed `AgentService` and is provided directly.
*/
@Module({
imports: [forwardRef(() => CommandsModule), HarnessModule],
imports: [forwardRef(() => CommandsModule)],
controllers: [ChatController],
providers: [
ChatGateway,
EmbeddedChatRuntime,
{
provide: HarnessChatRuntime,
useFactory: (conversationService: HarnessConversationServiceBinding) =>
new HarnessChatRuntime(conversationService as HarnessConversationService),
inject: [HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE],
},
{
provide: ChatRuntimeRouter,
useFactory: (
registry: HarnessRegistry,
conversationService: HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
embedded: EmbeddedChatRuntime,
harness: HarnessChatRuntime,
) => new ChatRuntimeRouter(registry, conversationService, embedded, harness),
inject: [
HARNESS_REGISTRY,
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE,
EmbeddedChatRuntime,
HarnessChatRuntime,
],
},
],
exports: [ChatGateway, ChatRuntimeRouter],
providers: [ChatGateway],
exports: [ChatGateway],
})
export class ChatModule {}
@@ -1,532 +0,0 @@
import { ForbiddenException, Injectable, Logger, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { AgentSessionEvent } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import type {
ChatRuntime,
LegacyBrowserMessagePayload,
LegacyEmbeddedChatPort,
LegacyRuntimeEvent,
LegacyRuntimeResult,
LegacySessionPresentation,
LegacySocketTurnLease,
LegacyUsage,
OwnedConversationContext,
VerifiedDiscordIngressContext,
VerifiedDiscordTurnLease,
LegacyRuntimeStream,
} from './chat-runtime.js';
/** Fixed timeout for a synchronous REST turn, matching the historical controller budget. */
const REST_TURN_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
/**
* The `legacy` chat runtime and the sole implementation of {@link LegacyEmbeddedChatPort}.
*
* It owns the embedded in-process execution path — the `AgentService` stack that the
* `ChatController` and `ChatGateway` drove directly before Task Five. Once the
* {@link import('./chat-runtime-router.js').ChatRuntimeRouter} fronts it, the browser
* HTTP/WebSocket legacy path and verified-Discord ingress route through THIS runtime, so
* neither the controller nor the gateway retains `AgentService`, `piSession`, session,
* listener, channel, or metric access. Ownership (`userId`/`tenantId`) is re-checked by
* `AgentService` on every operation; a missing, foreign, or no-longer-owned conversation
* collapses to `conversation_unavailable` and never throws out of the port.
*/
@Injectable()
export class EmbeddedChatRuntime implements ChatRuntime, LegacyEmbeddedChatPort {
readonly kind = 'embedded' as const;
private readonly logger = new Logger(EmbeddedChatRuntime.name);
constructor(readonly agentService: AgentService) {}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Legacy REST completion (op A)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
async completeLegacyRestTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: Readonly<{ content: string }>,
): Promise<
LegacyRuntimeResult<Readonly<{ text: string; presentation: LegacySessionPresentation }>>
> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const { conversationId } = context;
const resolved = await this.resolveOrCreate(conversationId, scope, {});
if (!resolved.ok) return resolved;
let responseText = '';
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
let detach: (() => void) | undefined;
let disposed = false;
// One idempotent teardown owned OUTSIDE the completion promise: it clears the timeout and
// detaches the event listener exactly once, whichever of agent_end, timeout, or a prompt
// rejection fires first. Without this, a prompt() rejection surfaced through the catch below
// would return while leaving the listener attached (free to consume a later turn's events) and
// the 120s timer live (its rejection later going unobserved).
const dispose = (): void => {
if (disposed) return;
disposed = true;
if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer);
detach?.();
};
const done = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(() => {
dispose();
reject(new Error('Agent response timed out'));
}, REST_TURN_TIMEOUT_MS);
detach = this.agentService.onEvent(
conversationId,
(event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
if (
event.type === 'message_update' &&
event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta'
) {
responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
}
if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
dispose();
resolve();
}
},
scope,
);
});
// Attach the prompt and the completion promise CONCURRENTLY. Awaiting prompt() first left the
// timeout unobservable until prompt settled (a hung prompt could never time out) and, worse,
// let the 120s timer reject `done` while nothing yet awaited it — a transient unhandledRejection
// window. Promise.all installs handlers on BOTH synchronously, so the timeout bounds the whole
// turn even while prompt is pending, and neither promise can reject unobserved. Success still
// requires both prompt() to resolve AND agent_end to arrive (identical to the prior sequential
// await). The idempotent dispose() clears the timer + detaches on whichever settles first.
const prompting = this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, input.content, scope);
try {
await Promise.all([prompting, done]);
} catch (err) {
dispose();
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (message.includes('timed out')) {
return { ok: false, code: 'timeout', retryable: true };
}
this.logger.error(`Legacy REST turn failed for conversation=${conversationId}`, message);
return { ok: false, code: 'operation_failed', retryable: false };
}
const presentation = this.presentationFor(conversationId, scope) ?? resolved.presentation;
return { ok: true, value: { text: responseText, presentation } };
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Legacy Socket streaming (op B)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
async prepareLegacySocketTurn(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
input: LegacyBrowserMessagePayload,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySocketTurnLease>> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const { conversationId } = context;
const resolved = await this.resolveOrCreate(conversationId, scope, {
...(input.provider ? { provider: input.provider } : {}),
...(input.modelId ? { modelId: input.modelId } : {}),
...(input.agentId ? { agentConfigId: input.agentId } : {}),
});
if (!resolved.ok) return resolved;
let detach: () => void;
try {
detach = this.subscribe(conversationId, scope, stream);
} catch (err) {
// A partial listener/channel setup rolled itself back inside subscribe(); surface a total
// safe failure instead of throwing out of the port. Retryable — the attach is transient.
this.logger.error(
`Embedded socket subscription failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
return { ok: false, code: 'runtime_unavailable', retryable: true };
}
return {
ok: true,
value: this.buildLease(
conversationId,
scope,
input.content,
input.attachments,
detach,
resolved.presentation,
),
};
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Thinking level (op C) — synchronous, total
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
setLegacyThinking(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
level: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(context.conversationId, scope);
if (!session) return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
const availableThinkingLevels = session.piSession.getAvailableThinkingLevels();
if (!(availableThinkingLevels as readonly string[]).includes(level)) {
return {
ok: false,
code: 'thinking_level_invalid',
retryable: false,
availableThinkingLevels,
};
}
session.piSession.setThinkingLevel(level as never);
return { ok: true, value: this.presentationForSession(session) };
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Abort (op D)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
async abortLegacyTurn(context: OwnedConversationContext): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(context.conversationId, scope);
if (!session) return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
try {
await session.piSession.abort();
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(
`Legacy abort failed for conversation=${context.conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
return { ok: false, code: 'operation_failed', retryable: false };
}
return { ok: true, value: undefined };
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Model override (synchronous, total)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
applyLegacyModelOverride(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
modelId: string,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(context.conversationId, scope);
if (!session) return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
this.agentService.updateSessionModel(context.conversationId, modelId, scope);
const refreshed = this.agentService.getSession(context.conversationId, scope) ?? session;
return { ok: true, value: this.presentationForSession(refreshed) };
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Presentation read (synchronous, total)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
readLegacySessionPresentation(
context: OwnedConversationContext,
): LegacyRuntimeResult<LegacySessionPresentation> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(context.conversationId, scope);
if (!session) return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
return { ok: true, value: this.presentationForSession(session) };
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Verified Discord ingress (embedded-only in both modes)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
async dispatchVerifiedDiscordIngress(
context: VerifiedDiscordIngressContext,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<VerifiedDiscordTurnLease>> {
const scope = toScope(context.scope);
const { conversationId } = context;
const resolved = await this.resolveOrCreate(
conversationId,
scope,
{ agentConfigId: context.configuredAgent.agentConfigId },
{
agentConfigId: context.configuredAgent.agentConfigId,
instanceId: context.configuredAgent.instanceId,
},
);
if (!resolved.ok) return resolved;
let detach: () => void;
try {
detach = this.subscribe(conversationId, scope, stream);
} catch (err) {
// A partial listener/channel setup rolled itself back inside subscribe(); surface a total
// safe failure instead of throwing out of the port. Retryable — the attach is transient.
this.logger.error(
`Embedded Discord subscription failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
return { ok: false, code: 'runtime_unavailable', retryable: true };
}
return {
ok: true,
value: this.buildLease(
conversationId,
scope,
context.content,
context.attachments,
detach,
resolved.presentation,
),
};
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Shared helpers
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Resolves the owned session, creating it on first use. Ownership/scope rejections
* (`Forbidden`/`NotFound`) collapse to `conversation_unavailable`; any other creation
* failure surfaces as the retryable `runtime_unavailable`. On success returns the
* session presentation so callers avoid a redundant `getSession`.
*/
private async resolveOrCreate(
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
extraOptions: Readonly<{ provider?: string; modelId?: string; agentConfigId?: string }>,
expectedAgent?: Readonly<{ agentConfigId: string; instanceId: string }>,
): Promise<
| { readonly ok: true; readonly presentation: LegacySessionPresentation }
| Exclude<LegacyRuntimeResult<never>, { ok: true }>
> {
// A verified-Discord turn may only run under a session whose configured identity matches the
// reconciled agent record EXACTLY (config id + resolved name). This holds for BOTH a reused
// pre-existing session AND a freshly created one: a session carrying a different configured
// agent — however it arose — is rejected rather than executed under the verified label, so we
// never silently run a different prompt/model/tool policy. A plain (non-verified) turn passes
// no expectedAgent and skips the check.
const identityMatches = (candidate: AgentSession): boolean =>
expectedAgent === undefined ||
(candidate.agentConfigId === expectedAgent.agentConfigId &&
candidate.agentName === expectedAgent.instanceId);
let session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
if (session && !identityMatches(session)) {
// Reused same-scope session minted under a different configured identity — reject with zero
// effects rather than dispatch a verified turn onto a foreign agent's session.
return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (!session) {
try {
session = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId, {
userId: scope.userId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
...extraOptions,
});
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof ForbiddenException || err instanceof NotFoundException) {
return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
}
this.logger.error(
`Embedded session creation failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
);
return { ok: false, code: 'runtime_unavailable', retryable: true };
}
// The just-created session must ALSO carry the reconciled identity before any effect. A
// createSession that returns a session under a different configured agent (misconfiguration
// or a substituted factory) is rejected here, before subscribe/persist/ack/prompt.
if (!identityMatches(session)) {
return CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE;
}
}
return { ok: true, presentation: this.presentationForSession(session) };
}
/** Installs a normalizing event listener that forwards to the server-owned stream. */
private subscribe(
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
stream: LegacyRuntimeStream,
): () => void {
const unsubscribe = this.agentService.onEvent(
conversationId,
(event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
const normalized = this.normalizeEvent(conversationId, scope, event);
if (normalized) stream.onEvent(normalized);
},
scope,
);
try {
this.agentService.addChannel(conversationId, stream.channelId, scope);
} catch (err) {
// Partial setup: the listener was acquired but the channel attach failed. Roll back
// exactly what was acquired (the listener) before the failure escapes, so no leaked
// subscription survives; the caller converts the rethrow into a total safe failure.
try {
unsubscribe();
} catch {
/* idempotent teardown */
}
throw err;
}
return () => {
try {
unsubscribe();
} catch {
/* idempotent teardown */
}
try {
this.agentService.removeChannel(conversationId, stream.channelId, scope);
} catch {
/* idempotent teardown */
}
};
}
/** Builds an atomically one-shot, scope-rechecking dispatch lease. */
private buildLease(
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
content: string,
attachments: VerifiedDiscordIngressContext['attachments'],
detach: () => void,
presentation: LegacySessionPresentation,
): LegacySocketTurnLease & VerifiedDiscordTurnLease {
let dispatched = false;
let disposed = false;
return {
presentation,
dispatch: async (): Promise<LegacyRuntimeResult<void>> => {
if (dispatched) {
return { ok: false, code: 'turn_already_dispatched', retryable: false };
}
dispatched = true;
try {
await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, content, scope, attachments);
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(
`Legacy dispatch failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
);
return { ok: false, code: 'operation_failed', retryable: false };
}
return { ok: true, value: undefined };
},
dispose: async (): Promise<void> => {
if (disposed) return;
disposed = true;
detach();
},
};
}
/** Normalizes a raw agent event into the redaction-agnostic transport event, or drops it. */
private normalizeEvent(
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
event: AgentSessionEvent,
): LegacyRuntimeEvent | undefined {
switch (event.type) {
case 'agent_start':
return { type: 'started' };
case 'agent_end':
return { type: 'settled', ...this.usageFor(conversationId, scope) };
case 'message_update': {
const assistant = event.assistantMessageEvent;
if (assistant.type === 'text_delta') return { type: 'text_delta', text: assistant.delta };
if (assistant.type === 'thinking_delta') {
return { type: 'thinking_delta', text: assistant.delta };
}
return undefined;
}
case 'tool_execution_start':
return { type: 'tool_started', toolCallId: event.toolCallId, toolName: event.toolName };
case 'tool_execution_end':
return {
type: 'tool_finished',
toolCallId: event.toolCallId,
toolName: event.toolName,
isError: event.isError,
};
default:
return undefined;
}
}
/**
* Gathers terminal usage from the Pi session and records it into session metrics.
* Embedded owns AgentService metrics; the gateway never touches `piSession` stats.
*/
private usageFor(conversationId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): { usage?: LegacyUsage } {
const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
const piSession = session?.piSession;
const stats = piSession?.getSessionStats();
if (!session || !stats) return {};
const contextUsage = piSession?.getContextUsage();
const tokens = {
input: stats.tokens?.input ?? 0,
output: stats.tokens?.output ?? 0,
cacheRead: stats.tokens?.cacheRead ?? 0,
cacheWrite: stats.tokens?.cacheWrite ?? 0,
total: stats.tokens?.total ?? 0,
};
this.agentService.recordTokenUsage(conversationId, { ...tokens });
return {
usage: {
provider: session.provider,
modelId: session.modelId,
thinkingLevel: piSession?.thinkingLevel ?? 'off',
tokens,
cost: stats.cost ?? 0,
context: {
percent: contextUsage?.percent ?? null,
window: contextUsage?.contextWindow ?? 0,
},
},
};
}
/** Presentation from a live session id, or undefined when no owned session exists. */
private presentationFor(
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): LegacySessionPresentation | undefined {
const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
return session ? this.presentationForSession(session) : undefined;
}
/** User-facing projection carrying no session handle, credential, or raw stats. */
private presentationForSession(session: AgentSession): LegacySessionPresentation {
return {
provider: session.provider,
modelId: session.modelId,
thinkingLevel: session.piSession.thinkingLevel,
availableThinkingLevels: session.piSession.getAvailableThinkingLevels(),
...(session.agentName ? { agentName: session.agentName } : {}),
};
}
}
/** The shared terminal `conversation_unavailable` failure (missing/foreign/lost ownership). */
const CONVERSATION_UNAVAILABLE = {
ok: false as const,
code: 'conversation_unavailable' as const,
retryable: false as const,
};
/** Narrows a branded context scope to the `AgentService` actor/tenant scope (identical shape). */
function toScope(scope: Readonly<{ userId: string; tenantId: string }>): ActorTenantScope {
return { userId: scope.userId, tenantId: scope.tenantId };
}
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type {
AttachConversation,
ConversationSnapshot,
DetachConversation,
HarnessActorContext,
HarnessConversationService,
HarnessEventEnvelope,
HarnessSelection,
SendHarnessTurn,
TurnReceipt,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HarnessChatRuntime } from './harness-chat.runtime.js';
/**
* Task Five, Step One (harness runtime). Proves the `pi-rpc` runtime executes
* exclusively through the {@link HarnessConversationService} RPC boundary and
* forwards the caller's exact selection tuple and idempotency key without
* substitution. Red-first: the runtime is an unimplemented stub, so every
* delegation assertion fails until Step Three.
*/
const context: HarnessActorContext = {
actorId: 'actor-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
seatId: 'seat-1',
correlationId: 'corr-1',
};
const selection: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: 'pi',
providerId: 'anthropic',
modelId: 'claude-opus-4-8',
};
const conversationId = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111';
const idempotencyKey = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222';
const sendInput: SendHarnessTurn & { idempotencyKey: string } = {
context,
conversationId,
selection,
turnId: 'turn-abc',
correlationId: 'corr-1',
content: 'hello',
idempotencyKey,
};
const attachInput: AttachConversation & { afterSequence?: number } = {
context,
conversationId,
clientId: 'client-1',
selection,
afterSequence: 0,
};
const detachInput: DetachConversation = {
context,
conversationId,
clientId: 'client-1',
};
interface RecordedCalls {
attach: (AttachConversation & { afterSequence?: number })[];
detach: DetachConversation[];
send: (SendHarnessTurn & { idempotencyKey: string })[];
subscribeFrom: { conversationId: string; afterSequence: number }[];
}
const snapshot: ConversationSnapshot = {
session: {
conversationId,
nativeSessionId: 'native-1',
seatId: 'seat-1',
selection,
state: 'idle',
attachedClientIds: ['client-1'],
},
lastSequence: 0,
replay: [],
};
function build(): { runtime: HarnessChatRuntime; calls: RecordedCalls } {
const calls: RecordedCalls = { attach: [], detach: [], send: [], subscribeFrom: [] };
const service: HarnessConversationService = {
attach: (input) => {
calls.attach.push(input);
return Promise.resolve(snapshot);
},
detach: (input) => {
calls.detach.push(input);
return Promise.resolve();
},
send: (input) => {
calls.send.push(input);
// The service echoes only the requested tuple; there is no representable substitute.
const receipt: TurnReceipt = {
conversationId: input.conversationId,
turnId: 'turn-server',
correlationId: input.correlationId,
state: 'accepted',
selection: input.selection,
};
return Promise.resolve(receipt);
},
subscribeFrom: (id, afterSequence) => {
calls.subscribeFrom.push({ conversationId: id, afterSequence });
return (async function* (): AsyncIterable<HarnessEventEnvelope> {
return;
})();
},
};
return { runtime: new HarnessChatRuntime(service), calls };
}
describe('HarnessChatRuntime', () => {
it('is the harness runtime kind and needs only a HarnessConversationService', () => {
const { runtime } = build();
expect(runtime.kind).toBe('harness');
});
it('delegates send to the conversation service with the exact tuple and idempotency key', async () => {
const { runtime, calls } = build();
const receipt = await runtime.send(sendInput);
expect(calls.send).toHaveLength(1);
const firstSend = calls.send[0]!;
expect(firstSend).toEqual(sendInput);
expect(firstSend.idempotencyKey).toBe(idempotencyKey);
expect(firstSend.selection).toEqual(selection);
// The runtime must not substitute an effective tuple onto the receipt.
expect(receipt.selection).toEqual(selection);
});
it('delegates attach to the conversation service and returns its snapshot', async () => {
const { runtime, calls } = build();
const result = await runtime.attach(attachInput);
expect(calls.attach).toHaveLength(1);
expect(calls.attach[0]).toEqual(attachInput);
expect(result).toBe(snapshot);
});
it('delegates detach to the conversation service', async () => {
const { runtime, calls } = build();
await runtime.detach(detachInput);
expect(calls.detach).toHaveLength(1);
expect(calls.detach[0]).toEqual(detachInput);
});
it('delegates subscribeFrom to the conversation service journal replay', async () => {
const { runtime, calls } = build();
const iterable = runtime.subscribeFrom(conversationId, 7);
// Drain to prove it is the service-backed async iterable, not a fabricated one.
const drained: unknown[] = [];
for await (const event of iterable) {
drained.push(event);
}
expect(drained).toHaveLength(0);
expect(calls.subscribeFrom).toHaveLength(1);
expect(calls.subscribeFrom[0]).toEqual({ conversationId, afterSequence: 7 });
});
});
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
import type {
AttachConversation,
ConversationSnapshot,
DetachConversation,
HarnessConversationService,
HarnessEventEnvelope,
SendHarnessTurn,
TurnReceipt,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { ChatRuntime } from './chat-runtime.js';
/**
* The `pi-rpc` chat runtime. It executes browser chat exclusively through the
* harness-neutral {@link HarnessConversationService} RPC boundary — it never
* touches the embedded `AgentService`/`ProviderService`/`RoutingEngineService`
* stack, and it forwards the caller's exact selection tuple and idempotency key
* without substitution.
*
* It owns no state and adds no policy: every method forwards the caller's exact
* argument to the injected {@link HarnessConversationService} and returns its
* result unchanged, so the requested selection tuple and idempotency key can
* never be substituted on the way through.
*/
export class HarnessChatRuntime implements ChatRuntime {
readonly kind = 'harness' as const;
constructor(private readonly conversations: HarnessConversationService) {}
attach(input: AttachConversation & { afterSequence?: number }): Promise<ConversationSnapshot> {
return this.conversations.attach(input);
}
detach(input: DetachConversation): Promise<void> {
return this.conversations.detach(input);
}
send(input: SendHarnessTurn & { idempotencyKey: string }): Promise<TurnReceipt> {
return this.conversations.send(input);
}
subscribeFrom(
conversationId: string,
afterSequence: number,
): AsyncIterable<HarnessEventEnvelope> {
return this.conversations.subscribeFrom(conversationId, afterSequence);
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
@@ -13,7 +12,6 @@ const mockRegistry = {
{ name: 'agent', aliases: ['a'], scope: 'agent', execution: 'socket', available: true },
{ name: 'prdy', aliases: [], scope: 'agent', execution: 'socket', available: true },
{ name: 'tools', aliases: [], scope: 'agent', execution: 'socket', available: true },
{ name: 'mcp', aliases: [], scope: 'agent', execution: 'socket', available: true },
],
skills: [],
})),
@@ -74,30 +72,17 @@ const mockChatGateway = {
broadcastSessionInfo: vi.fn(),
};
const mockMcpClient = {
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []),
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
};
function buildService(
redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis,
mcpClient: {
reconnectServer: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
getServerStatuses: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
getToolDefinitions: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
} = mockMcpClient,
): CommandExecutorService {
function buildService(): CommandExecutorService {
return new CommandExecutorService(
mockRegistry as never,
mockAgentService as never,
mockSystemOverride as never,
mockSessionGC as never,
redis as never,
mockRedis as never,
mockBrain as never,
null,
mockChatGateway as never,
mcpClient as never,
null,
);
}
@@ -146,22 +131,6 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
expect(ttl).toBe(300);
});
it('/provider login remains available without Redis on the local tier', async () => {
const localService = buildService(null);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'provider',
args: 'login anthropic',
conversationId,
};
const result = await localService.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).not.toContain('token=');
expect(result.data).toEqual({ provider: 'anthropic' });
expect(mockRedis.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// /provider with no args — returns usage
it('/provider with no args returns usage message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', conversationId };
@@ -273,124 +242,4 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
expect(result.command).toBe('tools');
expect(result.message).toContain('tools');
});
// Top-level catch sanitization (P3-4 re-review finding #1): a rejected
// Redis `set` inside /provider login is the only reachable path into the
// top-level catch in `execute()`. The raw exception must be logged
// server-side but never handed back to the socket client.
it('sanitizes the top-level command catch, logging the raw exception but never returning it to the client', async () => {
const distinctiveRawFailure = 'ECONNREFUSED distinctive-raw-redis-failure-token-9f31';
const rawError = new Error(distinctiveRawFailure);
const failingRedis = {
set: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(rawError),
get: vi.fn(),
del: vi.fn(),
};
const failingService = buildService(failingRedis as unknown as typeof mockRedis);
const loggerErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'provider',
args: 'login anthropic',
conversationId,
};
const result = await failingService.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
expect(result.message).toBe('Command failed due to an internal error.');
expect(result.message).not.toContain(distinctiveRawFailure);
expect(result.message).not.toContain('ECONNREFUSED');
// The real exception is still logged server-side, as the raw Error
// object itself (not stringified/interpolated into the log message).
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
const loggedRawError = loggerErrorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call.includes(rawError));
expect(loggedRawError).toBe(true);
loggerErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
// Inner catch sanitization (P3-5 operator ruling): every catch in
// command-executor.service.ts that returns a SlashCommandResultPayload
// must sanitize the client-facing message the same way the top-level
// catch does, while still logging the raw exception server-side.
it('/agent new sanitizes agent-creation failures, logging the raw exception but never returning it to the client', async () => {
const marker = new Error('distinctive-agent-create-failure-token-A17f');
mockBrain.agents.create.mockRejectedValueOnce(marker);
const loggerErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'agent',
args: 'new my-new-agent',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.command).toBe('agent');
expect(result.message).toBe('Failed to create agent due to an internal error.');
expect(result.message).not.toContain('distinctive-agent-create-failure-token-A17f');
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
const loggedRawError = loggerErrorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call.includes(marker));
expect(loggedRawError).toBe(true);
loggerErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
it('/agent <name> switch sanitizes agent-lookup failures, logging the raw exception but never returning it to the client', async () => {
const marker = new Error('distinctive-agent-switch-failure-token-B29c');
mockBrain.agents.findByName.mockRejectedValueOnce(marker);
const loggerErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'agent',
args: 'some-other-agent',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.command).toBe('agent');
expect(result.message).toBe('Failed to switch agent due to an internal error.');
expect(result.message).not.toContain('distinctive-agent-switch-failure-token-B29c');
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
const loggedRawError = loggerErrorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call.includes(marker));
expect(loggedRawError).toBe(true);
loggerErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
it('/mcp reconnect sanitizes MCP client failures, logging the raw exception but never returning it to the client', async () => {
const marker = new Error('distinctive-mcp-reconnect-failure-token-C33e');
const mockMcpClient = {
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(marker),
getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []),
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
};
const mcpService = buildService(mockRedis, mockMcpClient);
const loggerErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'mcp',
args: 'reconnect my-server',
conversationId,
};
const result = await mcpService.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.command).toBe('mcp');
expect(result.message).toBe(
'Failed to reconnect MCP server "my-server" due to an internal error.',
);
expect(result.message).not.toContain('distinctive-mcp-reconnect-failure-token-C33e');
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
const loggedRawError = loggerErrorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call.includes(marker));
expect(loggedRawError).toBe(true);
loggerErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
});
@@ -36,12 +36,6 @@ const authorization = {
),
};
const mockMcpClient = {
getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []),
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
function buildExecutor(authorizationService: unknown = authorization): CommandExecutorService {
return new CommandExecutorService(
registry as never,
@@ -52,7 +46,7 @@ function buildExecutor(authorizationService: unknown = authorization): CommandEx
{ agents: {} } as never,
null,
null,
mockMcpClient as never,
null,
authorizationService as never,
);
}
@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
@Inject(SystemOverrideService) private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
@Inject(SessionGCService) private readonly sessionGC: SessionGCService,
// On Local tier COMMANDS_REDIS is null — provider login caching is skipped.
@Optional()
@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
@Inject(BRAIN) private readonly brain: Brain,
@Optional()
@Inject(forwardRef(() => ReloadService))
@@ -34,7 +31,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Optional()
@Inject(forwardRef(() => ChatGateway))
private readonly chatGateway: ChatGateway | null,
@Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService,
@Optional()
@Inject(McpClientService)
private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService | null,
@Optional()
@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
@@ -157,13 +156,8 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
};
}
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Command /${command} failed`, err);
return {
command,
conversationId,
success: false,
message: 'Command failed due to an internal error.',
};
this.logger.error(`Command /${command} failed: ${err}`);
return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: String(err) };
}
}
@@ -339,11 +333,11 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
data: { agentId: newAgent.id, agentName: newAgent.name },
};
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Failed to create agent "${namePart}" for user ${userId}`, err);
this.logger.error(`Failed to create agent: ${err}`);
return {
command: 'agent',
success: false,
message: 'Failed to create agent due to an internal error.',
message: `Failed to create agent: ${String(err)}`,
conversationId,
};
}
@@ -394,11 +388,11 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
data: { agentId: agentConfig.id, agentName: agentConfig.name, model: agentConfig.model },
};
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Failed to switch agent "${agentName}"`, err);
this.logger.error(`Failed to switch agent "${agentName}": ${err}`);
return {
command: 'agent',
success: false,
message: 'Failed to switch agent due to an internal error.',
message: `Failed to switch agent: ${String(err)}`,
conversationId,
};
}
@@ -449,16 +443,14 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),
).join('');
const key = `mosaic:auth:poll:${tokenHash}`;
if (this.redis) {
// Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
// the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
await this.redis.set(
key,
JSON.stringify({ status: 'pending', provider: providerName, userId }),
'EX',
300,
);
}
// Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
// the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
await this.redis.set(
key,
JSON.stringify({ status: 'pending', provider: providerName, userId }),
'EX',
300,
);
return {
command: 'provider',
success: true,
@@ -546,6 +538,15 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
args: string | null,
conversationId: string,
): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
if (!this.mcpClient) {
return {
command: 'mcp',
conversationId,
success: false,
message: 'MCP client service is not available.',
};
}
const action = args?.trim().split(/\s+/)[0] ?? 'status';
switch (action) {
@@ -602,12 +603,11 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
message: `MCP server "${serverName}" reconnected successfully.`,
};
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Failed to reconnect MCP server "${serverName}"`, err);
return {
command: 'mcp',
conversationId,
success: false,
message: `Failed to reconnect MCP server "${serverName}" due to an internal error.`,
message: `Failed to reconnect MCP server "${serverName}": ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
};
}
}
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
* - Unknown command returns descriptive error
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { CommandsModule } from './commands.module.js';
import { McpClientModule } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.module.js';
import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
@@ -49,12 +47,6 @@ const mockBrain = {
},
};
const mockMcpClient = {
getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []),
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function buildRegistry(): CommandRegistryService {
@@ -73,7 +65,7 @@ function buildExecutor(registry: CommandRegistryService): CommandExecutorService
mockBrain as never,
null, // reloadService (optional)
null, // chatGateway (optional)
mockMcpClient as never,
null, // mcpClient (optional)
);
}
@@ -161,15 +153,6 @@ describe('CommandRegistryService — integration', () => {
}
});
// ─── Module Wiring Tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('CommandsModule — Nest wiring', () => {
it('CommandsModule imports McpClientModule in its Nest metadata', () => {
const imports = Reflect.getMetadata('imports', CommandsModule) ?? [];
expect(imports).toContain(McpClientModule);
});
});
// ─── Executor Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
@@ -276,14 +259,4 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
expect(result.command).toBe(cmd);
});
}
// /mcp status reaches the required McpClientService and never reports it unavailable
it('/mcp status calls the wired McpClientService and reports the no-servers message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'mcp', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(mockMcpClient.getServerStatuses).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('No MCP servers configured.');
expect(result.message).not.toBe('MCP client service is not available.');
});
});
+6 -22
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
import { McpClientModule } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
@@ -15,26 +12,17 @@ import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
@Module({
imports: [
GCModule,
McpClientModule,
forwardRef(() => ReloadModule),
forwardRef(() => ChatModule),
],
imports: [GCModule, forwardRef(() => ReloadModule), forwardRef(() => ChatModule)],
providers: [
{
provide: COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE,
useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
// On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection.
// CommandExecutorService falls back to no-cache for /provider login on local.
if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
return createQueue();
},
inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
},
{
provide: COMMANDS_REDIS,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
},
CommandRegistryService,
@@ -50,13 +38,9 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
],
})
export class CommandsModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE)
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
) {}
constructor(@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { loadConfig, type MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from '../env.js';
export const MOSAIC_CONFIG = 'MOSAIC_CONFIG';
@@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ export const MOSAIC_CONFIG = 'MOSAIC_CONFIG';
providers: [
{
provide: MOSAIC_CONFIG,
useFactory: (): MosaicConfig => loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()),
useFactory: (): MosaicConfig => loadConfig(),
},
],
exports: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { ChatRuntimeMode } from '../chat/chat-runtime.js';
import { ConversationsController } from './conversations.controller.js';
/**
* Task 5 harness fence for the conversations REST write path.
*
* Under `pi-rpc` the durable/harness conversation path (Task 15) owns message persistence, so the
* legacy direct-repository write via `POST /api/conversations/:id/messages` must be refused with a
* fixed typed `runtime_unsupported` BEFORE the repository is touched never a duplicate write.
* Under `legacy` the endpoint keeps its current behaviour and writes through `brain.conversations`.
*
* Item 3 (single runtime-mode source of truth): the mode is the router's ONE init-time resolution,
* injected into the controller and read as `router.runtimeMode`. It is NOT re-derived from
* `process.env` at request time. The two "env is flipped after construction" tests below are the
* load-bearing guard: they pass only because the controller reads the fixed injected mode, and turn
* RED the instant the fence is reverted to `resolveChatRuntimeMode(process.env)`.
*/
const CONVERSATION_ID = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222';
const USER = { id: 'user-1' };
function sendMessageDto() {
return {
role: 'user' as const,
content: 'hello from the legacy REST write path',
metadata: undefined,
};
}
function brainWithMessageSpy() {
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
id: 'message-1',
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
role: 'user',
content: 'hello from the legacy REST write path',
});
return {
brain: { conversations: { addMessage } } as never,
addMessage,
};
}
/** The controller only needs the router's immutable `runtimeMode`; supply exactly that. */
function routerFixedTo(mode: ChatRuntimeMode) {
return { runtimeMode: mode };
}
let priorMode: string | undefined;
describe('conversations REST write path — Task 5 harness fence', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
priorMode = process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'];
});
afterEach(() => {
if (priorMode === undefined) delete process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'];
else process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = priorMode;
});
it('refuses the legacy repository write when the router resolved pi-rpc, before any write', async () => {
const { brain, addMessage } = brainWithMessageSpy();
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain, routerFixedTo('pi-rpc'));
await expect(
controller.addMessage(CONVERSATION_ID, sendMessageDto(), USER),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'runtime_unsupported' });
// Load-bearing: the durable/harness path owns pi-rpc persistence — the legacy repo must not be
// written, so no duplicate message can be produced.
expect(addMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('writes through the repository when the router resolved legacy (GREEN control)', async () => {
const { brain, addMessage } = brainWithMessageSpy();
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain, routerFixedTo('legacy'));
const result = await controller.addMessage(CONVERSATION_ID, sendMessageDto(), USER);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
role: 'user',
content: 'hello from the legacy REST write path',
metadata: undefined,
},
USER.id,
);
expect(result).toMatchObject({ id: 'message-1', conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID });
});
it('keeps refusing under a pi-rpc router even when CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME is flipped to legacy after startup', async () => {
// The runtime mode is fixed at module init. A later env mutation must not reopen the fence:
// a request-time `resolveChatRuntimeMode(process.env)` read would see `legacy` and wrongly write.
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'legacy';
const { brain, addMessage } = brainWithMessageSpy();
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain, routerFixedTo('pi-rpc'));
await expect(
controller.addMessage(CONVERSATION_ID, sendMessageDto(), USER),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'runtime_unsupported' });
expect(addMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('keeps writing under a legacy router even when CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME is flipped to pi-rpc after startup', async () => {
// Symmetric guard: a legacy-resolved router must keep writing regardless of the live env, so a
// request-time env read of `pi-rpc` cannot spuriously refuse a legitimate legacy write.
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
const { brain, addMessage } = brainWithMessageSpy();
const controller = new ConversationsController(brain, routerFixedTo('legacy'));
await controller.addMessage(CONVERSATION_ID, sendMessageDto(), USER);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import {
ForbiddenException,
Get,
HttpCode,
HttpException,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
NotFoundException,
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from '../chat/chat-runtime-router.js';
import {
CreateConversationDto,
UpdateConversationDto,
@@ -28,41 +26,10 @@ import {
SearchMessagesDto,
} from './conversations.dto.js';
/**
* Under `pi-rpc` the durable/harness conversation path (Task 15) owns message persistence, so the
* legacy direct-repository write must fail closed with a fixed typed `runtime_unsupported` before
* the repository is touched never a duplicate write. The `code` field is exposed at the top level
* so callers can discriminate the refusal while the 503 status carries the browser-safe surface.
*/
class HarnessRuntimeWriteUnsupportedException extends HttpException {
readonly code = 'runtime_unsupported' as const;
constructor() {
super(
{
code: 'runtime_unsupported',
message:
'Conversation message writes are handled by the harness runtime on this deployment.',
},
HttpStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
);
}
}
@Controller('api/conversations')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class ConversationsController {
/**
* `router` supplies the ONE immutable runtime mode resolved at module init (Task 5, item 3).
* The pre-write fence reads `router.runtimeMode`, never `resolveChatRuntimeMode(process.env)` at
* request time a single source of truth, so the controller cannot disagree with the router
* about the live runtime if the environment is mutated after startup. Narrowed to `runtimeMode`
* so this class depends on nothing else the router exposes.
*/
constructor(
@Inject(BRAIN) private readonly brain: Brain,
@Inject(ChatRuntimeRouter) private readonly router: Pick<ChatRuntimeRouter, 'runtimeMode'>,
) {}
constructor(@Inject(BRAIN) private readonly brain: Brain) {}
@Get()
async list(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }) {
@@ -127,13 +94,6 @@ export class ConversationsController {
@Body() dto: SendMessageDto,
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
) {
// Fail the legacy repository write closed under pi-rpc BEFORE touching the repository — the
// harness path owns persistence there, so a direct write would duplicate the message. The mode
// comes from the router's init-time resolution, not a request-time env read.
if (this.router.runtimeMode === 'pi-rpc') {
throw new HarnessRuntimeWriteUnsupportedException();
}
const message = await this.brain.conversations.addMessage(
{
conversationId: id,
@@ -1,14 +1,7 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
import { ConversationsController } from './conversations.controller.js';
/**
* Imports {@link ChatModule} solely to inject its exported {@link ChatRuntimeRouter} into
* {@link ConversationsController}, so the REST write fence reads the same init-time runtime mode the
* router resolved one source of truth, no duplicate provider, no global token, no AppModule edit.
*/
@Module({
imports: [ChatModule],
controllers: [ConversationsController],
})
export class ConversationsModule {}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { CoordModule } from './coord.module.js';
import { InteractionCoordinationService } from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
describe('CoordModule DI (compiled-metadata boot)', () => {
it('resolves InteractionCoordinationService through Nest DI', async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [CoordModule] })
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: (): boolean => true })
.compile();
expect(moduleRef.get(InteractionCoordinationService)).toBeInstanceOf(
InteractionCoordinationService,
);
await moduleRef.close();
});
});
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
InteractionCoordinationClient,
type CoordinationObservation,
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import type { CreateHandoffDto } from './interaction-coordination.dto.js';
export const COORDINATION_PORT = Symbol('COORDINATION_PORT');
export const COORDINATION_CONFIG = Symbol('COORDINATION_CONFIG');
export const HANDOFF_ID_FACTORY = Symbol('HANDOFF_ID_FACTORY');
const HANDOFF_TRACKING_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1_000;
const MAX_TRACKED_HANDOFFS = 1_000;
@@ -61,8 +60,6 @@ export class InteractionCoordinationService {
constructor(
@Inject(COORDINATION_PORT) private readonly port: InteractionCoordinationPort,
@Inject(COORDINATION_CONFIG) private readonly config: InteractionCoordinationConfig,
@Optional()
@Inject(HANDOFF_ID_FACTORY)
private readonly handoffIdFactory: () => string = (): string => crypto.randomUUID(),
) {}
-133
View File
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
import { config } from 'dotenv';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { detectFromEnv, loadConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
type TierSource =
| 'process environment'
| 'daemon .env'
| 'monorepo-root .env'
| 'gateway-local .env'
| 'default';
type BootSource = TierSource | 'mosaic.config.json';
export interface GatewayDotenvPaths {
daemonEnv: string;
monorepoRootEnv: string;
gatewayLocalEnv: string;
}
const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
export function resolveGatewayDotenvPaths(
anchor: string = here,
homeBase: string = homedir(),
): GatewayDotenvPaths {
return {
daemonEnv: join(homeBase, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env'),
monorepoRootEnv: resolve(anchor, '../../..', '.env'),
gatewayLocalEnv: resolve(anchor, '..', '.env'),
};
}
export function resolveGatewayConfigPath(anchor: string = here): string {
// GATEWAY_HOME is daemon-created 0700; its env override adds no authority because env can set MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER.
const gatewayHome = resolve(
process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'] ?? join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway'),
);
const daemonConfig = join(gatewayHome, 'mosaic.config.json');
const gatewayLocalConfig = resolve(anchor, '..', 'mosaic.config.json');
const monorepoRootConfig = resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json');
if (existsSync(daemonConfig)) {
return daemonConfig;
}
if (existsSync(gatewayLocalConfig)) {
return gatewayLocalConfig;
}
if (existsSync(monorepoRootConfig)) {
return monorepoRootConfig;
}
return monorepoRootConfig;
}
export function loadGatewayEnv(anchor: string = here, homeBase: string = homedir()): void {
const { daemonEnv, monorepoRootEnv, gatewayLocalEnv } = resolveGatewayDotenvPaths(
anchor,
homeBase,
);
const inheritedTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
let tierSource: TierSource = inheritedTier === undefined ? 'default' : 'process environment';
const inheritedDatabaseUrl = process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
let databaseUrlSource: TierSource =
inheritedDatabaseUrl === undefined ? 'default' : 'process environment';
function loadAnchoredDotenv(
path: string,
sourceLabel: Exclude<TierSource, 'process environment' | 'default'>,
): void {
if (!existsSync(path)) {
return;
}
const beforeTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
const beforeDatabaseUrl = process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
config({ path, quiet: true });
if (
beforeTier === undefined &&
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] !== undefined &&
tierSource === 'default'
) {
tierSource = sourceLabel;
}
if (
beforeDatabaseUrl === undefined &&
process.env['DATABASE_URL'] !== undefined &&
databaseUrlSource === 'default'
) {
databaseUrlSource = sourceLabel;
}
}
// Load .env from daemon config dir (global install / daemon mode) first.
// It takes precedence over file-based local-dev configuration.
loadAnchoredDotenv(daemonEnv, 'daemon .env');
// Load .env from the anchored monorepo root, then fill any remaining values
// from apps/gateway/.env when present.
loadAnchoredDotenv(monorepoRootEnv, 'monorepo-root .env');
loadAnchoredDotenv(gatewayLocalEnv, 'gateway-local .env');
const envOnlyTier = detectFromEnv().tier;
const configPath = resolveGatewayConfigPath(anchor);
const anchoredConfigExists = existsSync(configPath);
const resolvedTier = loadConfig(configPath).tier;
const configuredTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
const databaseUrlDeterminesTier = envOnlyTier === 'standalone' && configuredTier !== 'standalone';
const recognizedTierDeterminesTier =
(configuredTier === 'federated' ||
configuredTier === 'standalone' ||
configuredTier === 'local') &&
configuredTier === envOnlyTier;
let source: BootSource;
if (anchoredConfigExists) {
source = 'mosaic.config.json';
} else if (databaseUrlDeterminesTier && databaseUrlSource !== 'default') {
source = databaseUrlSource;
} else if (recognizedTierDeterminesTier && tierSource !== 'default') {
source = tierSource;
} else {
source = 'default';
}
console.info(`[gateway env] storage tier=${resolvedTier} source=${source}`);
}
loadGatewayEnv();
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
import { GetController } from './server/verbs/get.controller.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from './server/verbs/get-query.service.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
@@ -14,13 +12,7 @@ import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
@Module({
controllers: [
EnrollmentController,
FederationController,
CapabilitiesController,
ListController,
GetController,
],
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
providers: [
AdminGuard,
CaService,
@@ -31,7 +23,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
FederationGetQueryService,
],
exports: [
CaService,
@@ -42,7 +33,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
FederationGetQueryService,
],
})
export class FederationModule {}
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
createPgliteDb,
missionTasks,
missions,
projects,
runPgliteMigrations,
teams,
users,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from '../get-query.service.js';
const CREDENTIAL_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
resource: 'credentials',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: [],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
};
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-subject';
const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-other';
const TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
function makeService() {
return new FederationGetQueryService({} as Db);
}
function makeDbService() {
if (!dbHandle) {
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
}
return new FederationGetQueryService(dbHandle.db);
}
async function seedNotesFixture() {
if (!dbHandle) {
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
}
await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
{
id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
name: 'Federation Subject',
email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
emailVerified: false,
},
{
id: OTHER_USER_ID,
name: 'Federation Other',
email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
emailVerified: false,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
{
id: TEAM_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team',
slug: 'fed-m3-06-team',
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Team',
slug: 'fed-m3-06-unauthorized-team',
ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
{
id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Project',
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
ownerType: 'user',
},
{
id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Project',
teamId: TEAM_ID,
ownerType: 'team',
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Project',
teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
ownerType: 'team',
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
{
id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Mission',
projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Mission',
projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Mission',
projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
{
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note on team mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
notes: 'other user note on team mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
},
]);
}
describe('FederationGetQueryService', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-06-get-${Date.now()}`);
await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
await seedNotesFixture();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await dbHandle?.close();
dbHandle = undefined;
});
it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 get reads', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'credentials',
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({
allowed: false,
reason: 'credentials federation get access is not implemented in M3',
});
});
it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'memory',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
allowed: true,
access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
});
});
it('uses subject team membership as the native RBAC upper bound for task and note reads', async () => {
const service = makeService();
const listSubjectTeamIds = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(['team-1', 'team-2']);
(
service as unknown as {
listSubjectTeamIds: (subjectUserId: string) => Promise<string[]>;
}
).listSubjectTeamIds = listSubjectTeamIds;
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'tasks',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
allowed: true,
access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
});
expect(listSubjectTeamIds).toHaveBeenCalledWith('user-1');
});
it('does not query storage for sensitive get resources even if scope allowed them', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(service.get({ filter: CREDENTIAL_FILTER, id: 'cred-1' })).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'credentials federation get is not implemented',
});
});
it('fails closed for unsupported resources instead of returning undefined', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
...CREDENTIAL_FILTER,
resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
},
id: 'row-1',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
});
});
it('does not leak another user mission task note through team-scoped get reads', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
it('returns a subject note only when subject ownership and authorized mission intersect', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({
status: 'found',
item: {
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
content: 'subject note on team mission',
},
});
});
it('does not return subject personal notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
});
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
import type {
FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
} from '../../scope.service.js';
import { GetController } from '../get.controller.js';
import type { FederationGetQueryResult } from '../get-query.service.js';
const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
};
const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
resource: 'tasks',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: ['team-1'],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
};
function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
}
function allowedScope(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
return { allowed: true, filter };
}
function makeController(opts?: {
scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
queryResult?: FederationGetQueryResult;
}) {
const scope = {
evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
};
const query = {
evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
opts?.queryResult ?? {
status: 'found',
item: {
id: 'task-1',
title: 'Federated task',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
},
},
),
};
return {
controller: new GetController(scope as never, query as never),
scope,
query,
};
}
describe('GetController', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/get');
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(':resource/:id');
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', GetController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
});
it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns one local-source tagged row', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
const response = await controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', makeRequest());
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
resource: 'tasks',
requestedLimit: 1,
nativeRbac: query,
});
expect(query.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, id: 'task-1' });
expect(response).toEqual({
item: {
id: 'task-1',
title: 'Federated task',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
_source: 'local',
},
});
});
it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
await expect(
controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'unauthorized',
message: 'Federation context missing',
},
},
status: 401,
});
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
const { controller, query } = makeController({
scopeResult: {
allowed: false,
deny: {
code: 'resource_excluded',
stage: 'resource_exclusion',
statusCode: 403,
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'credentials',
},
},
});
await expect(controller.get('credentials', 'cred-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
},
},
status: 403,
});
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns 404 when the scoped query layer cannot find the resource id', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController({ queryResult: { status: 'not_found' } });
await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'missing-task', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: { error: { code: 'not_found' } },
status: 404,
});
});
it('returns 403 when the resource exists outside the RBAC/scope intersection', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController({
queryResult: { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' },
});
await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'task-2', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Task is outside the federated scope',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
it('fails closed when the query layer denies an unsupported resource', async () => {
const unsupportedFilter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
...TASK_FILTER,
resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
};
const { controller } = makeController({
scopeResult: allowedScope(unsupportedFilter),
queryResult: {
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
},
});
await expect(controller.get('unknown-resource', 'row-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
it('rejects empty ids before evaluating scope', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
await expect(controller.get('tasks', ' ', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
status: 400,
});
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation get query layer (FED-M3-06).
*
* Read-only DB adapter used by GetController after FederationAuthGuard and
* FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
* native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
* deferred to M4.
*/
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
and,
eq,
inArray,
insights,
or,
missionTasks,
missions,
preferences,
projects,
tasks,
teamMembers,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
import type {
FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
FederationNativeRbacRequest,
FederationNativeRbacResult,
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
} from '../scope.service.js';
export interface FederationGetQueryRequest {
readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
readonly id: string;
}
export interface FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
readonly status: 'found';
readonly item: T;
}
export interface FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult {
readonly status: 'not_found';
}
export interface FederationGetQueryDeniedResult {
readonly status: 'denied';
readonly reason: string;
}
export type FederationGetQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> =
| FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T>
| FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult
| FederationGetQueryDeniedResult;
type RowObject = Record<string, unknown>;
function firstRow<T>(rows: T[]): T | undefined {
return rows[0];
}
function rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(
row: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
projectIds: readonly string[],
missionIds: readonly string[],
): boolean {
return (
(typeof row.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.includes(row.projectId)) ||
(typeof row.missionId === 'string' && missionIds.includes(row.missionId))
);
}
@Injectable()
export class FederationGetQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
async evaluateReadAccess(
request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
return {
allowed: false,
reason: `${request.resource} federation get access is not implemented in M3`,
details: { resource: request.resource },
};
}
if (request.resource === 'memory') {
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
}
const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
}
async get<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
request: FederationGetQueryRequest,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>> {
return this.getByResource(request.filter, request.id) as Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>>;
}
private async getByResource(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
switch (filter.resource) {
case 'tasks':
return this.getTask(filter, id);
case 'notes':
return this.getNote(filter, id);
case 'memory':
return this.getMemory(filter, id);
case 'credentials':
case 'api_keys':
return { status: 'denied', reason: `${filter.resource} federation get is not implemented` };
default:
return {
status: 'denied',
reason: `Unsupported federation get resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`,
};
}
}
private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const rows = await this.db
.select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
.from(teamMembers)
.where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
}
private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
const clauses = [];
if (filter.includePersonal) {
clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
}
if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
// Project team ownership follows TeamsService.canAccessProject: team-owned
// rows are authorized through projects.teamId, while ownerId remains the
// user who created/bootstrapped the project.
clauses.push(
and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
);
}
if (clauses.length === 0) {
return [];
}
const rows = await this.db
.select({ id: projects.id })
.from(projects)
.where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
}
private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
if (projectIds.length === 0) {
return [];
}
const rows = await this.db
.select({ id: missions.id })
.from(missions)
.where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
}
private async getTask(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const row = firstRow(
await this.db
.select({
id: tasks.id,
title: tasks.title,
description: tasks.description,
status: tasks.status,
priority: tasks.priority,
projectId: tasks.projectId,
missionId: tasks.missionId,
assignee: tasks.assignee,
tags: tasks.tags,
dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
metadata: tasks.metadata,
createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
})
.from(tasks)
.where(eq(tasks.id, id))
.limit(1),
);
if (!row) {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
if (!rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(row, projectIds, missionIds)) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' };
}
return { status: 'found', item: row as RowObject };
}
private async getNote(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const row = firstRow(
await this.db
.select({
id: missionTasks.id,
missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
userId: missionTasks.userId,
status: missionTasks.status,
content: missionTasks.notes,
createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
})
.from(missionTasks)
.where(eq(missionTasks.id, id))
.limit(1),
);
if (!row || row.content === null || row.content === '') {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
// mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
// Scope-visible missions must intersect with subject ownership; team scope
// narrows mission IDs but never widens note reads to another user's rows.
if (row.userId !== filter.subjectUserId || !missionIds.includes(row.missionId)) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope' };
}
const item = { ...row } as RowObject;
delete item['userId'];
return { status: 'found', item };
}
private async getMemory(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const [insightRow, preferenceRow] = await Promise.all([
this.db
.select({
id: insights.id,
userId: insights.userId,
kind: insights.source,
content: insights.content,
category: insights.category,
relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
metadata: insights.metadata,
createdAt: insights.createdAt,
updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
})
.from(insights)
.where(eq(insights.id, id))
.limit(1)
.then(firstRow),
this.db
.select({
id: preferences.id,
userId: preferences.userId,
kind: preferences.category,
key: preferences.key,
value: preferences.value,
source: preferences.source,
mutable: preferences.mutable,
createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
})
.from(preferences)
.where(eq(preferences.id, id))
.limit(1)
.then(firstRow),
]);
const candidates = [insightRow, preferenceRow].filter(
(row): row is NonNullable<typeof row> => row !== undefined,
);
if (candidates.length === 0) {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
if (!filter.includePersonal) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory personal rows are outside the federated scope' };
}
const accessible = candidates.find((row) => row.userId === filter.subjectUserId);
if (!accessible) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory row belongs to another subject user' };
}
const item = { ...accessible } as RowObject;
delete item['userId'];
return { status: 'found', item };
}
}
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation get verb (FED-M3-06).
*
* POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id
*
* Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
* FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
* the read-only query layer fetches one local row and tags it with `_source`.
* Read audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist
* request or response bodies.
*/
import { Controller, HttpException, Inject, Param, Post, Req, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import {
FederationInvalidRequestError,
FederationNotFoundError,
FederationScopeViolationError,
FederationUnauthorizedError,
SOURCE_LOCAL,
type FederationGetResponse,
type SourceTag,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
import '../federation-context.js';
import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from './get-query.service.js';
type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
function scopeDenyToHttpException(deny: {
readonly statusCode: 400 | 403;
readonly message: string;
}): HttpException {
const ErrorClass =
deny.statusCode === 400 ? FederationInvalidRequestError : FederationScopeViolationError;
return new HttpException(new ErrorClass(deny.message, deny).toEnvelope(), deny.statusCode);
}
@Controller('api/federation/v1/get')
@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
export class GetController {
constructor(
@Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
@Inject(FederationGetQueryService) private readonly query: FederationGetQueryService,
) {}
@Post(':resource/:id')
async get(
@Param('resource') resource: string,
@Param('id') id: string,
@Req() request: FastifyRequest,
): Promise<FederationGetResponse<FederatedRow>> {
if (!request.federationContext) {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
401,
);
}
if (id.trim().length === 0) {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation get id must not be empty').toEnvelope(),
400,
);
}
const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
context: request.federationContext,
resource,
requestedLimit: 1,
nativeRbac: this.query,
});
if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
throw scopeDenyToHttpException(scopeResult.deny);
}
const result = await this.query.get({ filter: scopeResult.filter, id });
if (result.status === 'not_found') {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationNotFoundError('Requested federation resource was not found').toEnvelope(),
404,
);
}
if (result.status === 'denied') {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationScopeViolationError(result.reason, {
resource,
id,
grantId: request.federationContext.grantId,
peerId: request.federationContext.peerId,
subjectUserId: request.federationContext.subjectUserId,
}).toEnvelope(),
403,
);
}
return { item: { ...result.item, _source: SOURCE_LOCAL } };
}
}
+5 -15
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { SessionGCService } from './session-gc.service.js';
import { REDIS } from './gc.tokens.js';
@@ -11,17 +9,13 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
providers: [
{
provide: GC_QUEUE_HANDLE,
useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
// On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection entirely.
// The Valkey GC sweep is a no-op on Local (no session keys stored there).
if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
return createQueue();
},
inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
},
{
provide: REDIS,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
inject: [GC_QUEUE_HANDLE],
},
SessionGCService,
@@ -29,13 +23,9 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
exports: [SessionGCService],
})
export class GCModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE)
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
) {}
constructor(@Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
}
}
@@ -119,19 +119,6 @@ describe('SessionGCService', () => {
).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
});
it('collect() skips Valkey but still demotes only the requested session on local tier', async () => {
const localService = new SessionGCService(null, mockLogService as unknown as LogService);
const result = await localService.collect('local-session');
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('local-session');
expect(result.cleaned.valkeyKeys).toBeUndefined();
expect(mockLogService.logs.promoteSessionToWarm).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'local-session',
expect.any(Date),
);
});
it('collect() returns sessionId in result', async () => {
const result = await service.collect('test-session-id');
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('test-session-id');
+8 -15
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@ function escapeRedisGlobLiteral(value: string): string {
@Injectable()
export class SessionGCService {
constructor(
// Local tier has no Redis; lifecycle cleanup still demotes this session's logs.
@Optional()
@Inject(REDIS)
private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
@Inject(REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
@Inject(LOG_SERVICE) private readonly logService: LogService,
) {}
@@ -32,10 +29,8 @@ export class SessionGCService {
* Scan Valkey for all keys matching a pattern using SCAN (non-blocking).
* KEYS is avoided because it blocks the Valkey event loop for the full scan
* duration, which can cause latency spikes under production key volumes.
* Returns an empty population on the Local tier where Redis is disabled.
*/
private async scanKeys(pattern: string): Promise<string[]> {
if (!this.redis) return [];
const collected: string[] = [];
let cursor = '0';
do {
@@ -52,14 +47,12 @@ export class SessionGCService {
async collect(sessionId: string): Promise<GCResult> {
const result: GCResult = { sessionId, cleaned: {} };
// 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys (skipped on Local tier).
if (this.redis) {
const pattern = `mosaic:session:${escapeRedisGlobLiteral(sessionId)}:*`;
const valkeyKeys = await this.scanKeys(pattern);
if (valkeyKeys.length > 0) {
await this.redis.del(...valkeyKeys);
result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
}
// 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys
const pattern = `mosaic:session:${escapeRedisGlobLiteral(sessionId)}:*`;
const valkeyKeys = await this.scanKeys(pattern);
if (valkeyKeys.length > 0) {
await this.redis.del(...valkeyKeys);
result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
}
// 2. PG: demote hot-tier agent logs for this session only.
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import {
type CanActivate,
type ExecutionContext,
type INestApplication,
ValidationPipe,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from './harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from './harness.tokens.js';
import { HarnessSelectionRepository } from './harness-selection.repository.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from './testing/fake-harness.adapter.js';
// Import the REAL module (not a hand-listed controllers+mocks list) so an
// unresolved provider fails at app.init() — the #1145-class DI-boot guard.
import { HarnessModule } from './harness.module.js';
// A known-available tuple from the fake adapter's default catalog.
const VALID = { harnessId: 'fake', providerId: 'fake-openai', modelId: 'fake-mini' };
// A tuple whose provider/model are not in any catalog.
const UNKNOWN = { harnessId: 'fake', providerId: 'ghost-provider', modelId: 'ghost-model' };
// A tuple that is known in the catalog but flagged unavailable.
const UNAVAILABLE = { harnessId: 'fake', providerId: 'fake-openai', modelId: 'fake-legacy' };
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<{ user?: { id: string } }>();
requestContext.user = { id: 'user-1' };
return true;
},
};
function registryWithFake(): HarnessRegistry {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' }));
return registry;
}
describe('Harness selection HTTP surface', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
let repository: HarnessSelectionRepository;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [HarnessModule],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.overrideProvider(HARNESS_REGISTRY)
.useValue(registryWithFake())
.compile();
// Real in-memory repository from the module graph — proves the module wired it.
repository = moduleRef.get(HarnessSelectionRepository);
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, forbidNonWhitelisted: true, transform: true }),
);
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
beforeEach(() => {
// Reset owner-scoped state between tests via the public API surface.
repository.set({ userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'user-1' }, VALID);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it('GET selection is server-scoped and ignores caller-supplied scope in the query', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.get('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.query({ userId: 'attacker', tenantId: 'attacker-tenant', seatId: 'attacker-seat' });
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
// The returned selection is user-1's (guard-derived scope), not the query's.
expect(response.body.selection).toEqual(VALID);
});
it('PUT with a valid structured tuple persists and round-trips via GET', async () => {
const next = { harnessId: 'fake', providerId: 'fake-openai', modelId: 'fake-pro' };
const put = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.put('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.send(next)
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(put.status).toBe(200);
expect(put.body.selection).toEqual(next);
const get = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/chat/preferences/selection');
expect(get.status).toBe(200);
expect(get.body.selection).toEqual(next);
});
it('PUT with FREE TEXT is rejected 400 and does not mutate the stored selection', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.put('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.send({ selection: 'gpt-4o' })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const get = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/chat/preferences/selection');
expect(get.body.selection).toEqual(VALID);
});
it.each([
['seatId', { ...VALID, seatId: 'attacker-seat' }],
['tenantId', { ...VALID, tenantId: 'attacker-tenant' }],
['userId', { ...VALID, userId: 'attacker' }],
['nativeSessionPath', { ...VALID, nativeSessionPath: '/var/native/x.jsonl' }],
['executable', { ...VALID, executable: '/usr/bin/evil' }],
['home', { ...VALID, home: '/home/attacker' }],
['cwd', { ...VALID, cwd: '/tmp/attacker' }],
])(
'PUT with an extra authority-bearing field (%s) is rejected 400 and does not mutate stored selection',
async (_name, body) => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.put('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.send(body)
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const get = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/chat/preferences/selection');
expect(get.body.selection).toEqual(VALID);
},
);
it('PUT with an UNKNOWN tuple returns selection_invalid, unchanged and echoed unchanged (no fallback)', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.put('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.send(UNKNOWN)
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(422);
expect(response.body.code).toBe('selection_invalid');
// Echoed back unchanged: no first-row / first-provider substitution.
expect(response.body.selection).toEqual(UNKNOWN);
const get = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/chat/preferences/selection');
expect(get.body.selection).toEqual(VALID);
});
it('PUT with a KNOWN-but-UNAVAILABLE tuple returns model_unavailable, unchanged (distinct from selection_invalid)', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.put('/api/chat/preferences/selection')
.send(UNAVAILABLE)
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(422);
expect(response.body.code).toBe('model_unavailable');
expect(response.body.selection).toEqual(UNAVAILABLE);
const get = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/chat/preferences/selection');
expect(get.body.selection).toEqual(VALID);
});
});
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
import { Body, Controller, Get, HttpException, HttpStatus, Put, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { HarnessOperationError } from './harness.registry.js';
import { HarnessSelectionService } from './harness-selection.service.js';
import { HarnessSelectionInputDto, type SelectionResponseDto } from './harness.dto.js';
/**
* Chat-preferences selection surface. The scope is ALWAYS derived on the server
* from the authenticated user (`scopeFromUser(CurrentUser)`); the request body and
* query string can never name another user, tenant, or seat. A typed selection
* failure (unknown tuple `selection_invalid`, known-but-unavailable
* `model_unavailable`) is returned as 422 with the requested tuple echoed back
* unchanged, and never mutates the stored selection.
*/
@Controller('api/chat/preferences/selection')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class HarnessSelectionController {
constructor(private readonly selection: HarnessSelectionService) {}
@Get()
get(@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike): SelectionResponseDto {
return { selection: this.selection.getSelection(scopeFromUser(user)) };
}
@Put()
async put(
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Body() dto: HarnessSelectionInputDto,
): Promise<SelectionResponseDto> {
try {
const stored = await this.selection.setSelection(scopeFromUser(user), {
harnessId: dto.harnessId,
providerId: dto.providerId,
modelId: dto.modelId,
});
return { selection: stored };
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof HarnessOperationError) {
throw new HttpException(error.dto, HttpStatus.UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY);
}
throw error;
}
}
}
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { HarnessSelection } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import {
HarnessAdapterUnavailableError,
HarnessRegistry,
operationError,
} from './harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from './harness.tokens.js';
import { readContextFromScope } from './harness.dto.js';
import { HarnessSelectionRepository } from './harness-selection.repository.js';
/**
* Selection logic for the Slice-Zero chat-preferences surface. It validates the
* requested harness/provider/model tuple against the live catalog with NO
* fallback substitution, then persists it owner-scoped. The stored selection is
* only ever mutated when the tuple is valid AND available.
*/
@Injectable()
export class HarnessSelectionService {
constructor(
@Inject(HARNESS_REGISTRY) private readonly registry: HarnessRegistry,
private readonly repository: HarnessSelectionRepository,
) {}
getSelection(scope: ActorTenantScope): HarnessSelection | null {
return this.repository.get(scope);
}
async setSelection(
scope: ActorTenantScope,
selection: HarnessSelection,
): Promise<HarnessSelection> {
// Throws HarnessOperationError (selection_invalid / model_unavailable) with the
// requested tuple echoed back unchanged. The store is untouched on any throw.
await this.assertSelectionAvailable(scope, selection);
return this.repository.set(scope, selection);
}
private async assertSelectionAvailable(
scope: ActorTenantScope,
selection: HarnessSelection,
): Promise<void> {
const correlationId = randomUUID();
let adapter;
try {
adapter = this.registry.get(selection.harnessId);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof HarnessAdapterUnavailableError) {
// An unknown harness makes the whole tuple invalid — no fallback adapter.
throw operationError(
'selection_invalid',
'The requested harness/provider/model tuple is not in the catalog.',
selection,
correlationId,
);
}
throw error;
}
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(readContextFromScope(scope));
const entry = catalog.models.find(
(candidate) =>
candidate.harnessId === selection.harnessId &&
candidate.providerId === selection.providerId &&
candidate.modelId === selection.modelId,
);
if (!entry) {
// No first-row / first-provider fallback: reject the requested tuple unchanged.
throw operationError(
'selection_invalid',
'The requested harness/provider/model tuple is not in the catalog.',
selection,
correlationId,
);
}
if (entry.availability === 'unavailable') {
throw operationError(
'model_unavailable',
'The requested model is currently unavailable.',
selection,
correlationId,
true,
);
}
}
}
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import {
type CanActivate,
type ExecutionContext,
type INestApplication,
ValidationPipe,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from './harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from './harness.tokens.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from './testing/fake-harness.adapter.js';
// The real module under test — importing it (not a hand-listed controllers/mocks
// list) is what makes an unresolved provider fail loudly at app.init() (#1145 guard).
import { HarnessModule } from './harness.module.js';
// Fields that must NEVER surface on a browser-facing catalog/list response.
const FORBIDDEN_KEYS = [
'executable',
'executablePath',
'home',
'homeDir',
'cwd',
'workingDir',
'workingDirectory',
'nativeSessionPath',
'sessionPath',
'env',
'secret',
'secrets',
'token',
'apiKey',
];
function assertNoForbiddenLeak(payload: unknown): void {
const serialized = JSON.stringify(payload).toLowerCase();
for (const key of FORBIDDEN_KEYS) {
expect(serialized).not.toContain(key.toLowerCase());
}
}
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<{ user?: { id: string } }>();
requestContext.user = { id: 'user-1' };
return true;
},
};
function registryWithFake(): HarnessRegistry {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' }));
return registry;
}
describe('Harness catalog HTTP surface', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [HarnessModule],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.overrideProvider(HARNESS_REGISTRY)
.useValue(registryWithFake())
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, forbidNonWhitelisted: true, transform: true }),
);
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it('boots the real HarnessModule so all providers resolve at app.init()', () => {
// If HarnessModule failed to resolve a provider, beforeAll's app.init() would
// have thrown and this suite would never reach here.
expect(app).toBeDefined();
});
it('GET /api/harnesses returns 200 with safe fields only', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/harnesses');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(Array.isArray(response.body)).toBe(true);
expect(response.body.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const summary = response.body[0];
expect(Object.keys(summary).sort()).toEqual(['capabilities', 'displayName', 'id']);
expect(summary.id).toBe('fake');
expect(typeof summary.displayName).toBe('string');
expect(Array.isArray(summary.capabilities)).toBe(true);
assertNoForbiddenLeak(response.body);
});
it('GET /api/harnesses/:harnessId/catalog returns 200 with safe catalog fields only', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/harnesses/fake/catalog');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body.harnessId).toBe('fake');
expect(typeof response.body.version).toBe('string');
expect(typeof response.body.fingerprint).toBe('string');
expect(Array.isArray(response.body.models)).toBe(true);
expect(response.body.models.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const entry = response.body.models[0];
// Whitelisted catalog-entry fields only (no executables/paths/secrets).
expect(Object.keys(entry).sort()).toEqual(
[
'authState',
'availability',
'displayName',
'harnessId',
'inputTypes',
'modelId',
'providerId',
'reasoningCapability',
].sort(),
);
assertNoForbiddenLeak(response.body);
});
it('GET catalog for an unknown harnessId returns a typed adapter_unavailable error, never a fallback catalog', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/harnesses/ghost-harness/catalog');
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
expect(response.body.code).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
// A fallback catalog would carry a models array; a typed error must not.
expect(response.body.models).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
import {
Controller,
Get,
HttpException,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
Param,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { HarnessAdapterUnavailableError, HarnessRegistry } from './harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from './harness.tokens.js';
import {
readContextFromScope,
toHarnessSummary,
toSafeCatalog,
type HarnessCatalogDto,
type HarnessSummaryDto,
} from './harness.dto.js';
/**
* Generic harness catalog surface. It exposes only harness-neutral, browser-safe
* fields (identity, capabilities, provider/model catalog) never executables,
* native paths, home/cwd, env, or secrets. There is NO provider-probe route here;
* `/api/providers` and `POST /api/providers/test` are intentionally out of scope.
*/
@Controller('api/harnesses')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class HarnessController {
constructor(@Inject(HARNESS_REGISTRY) private readonly registry: HarnessRegistry) {}
@Get()
async list(@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike): Promise<HarnessSummaryDto[]> {
const context = readContextFromScope(scopeFromUser(user));
const summaries: HarnessSummaryDto[] = [];
for (const adapter of this.registry.list()) {
summaries.push(toHarnessSummary(await adapter.describe(context)));
}
return summaries;
}
@Get(':harnessId/catalog')
async catalog(
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Param('harnessId') harnessId: string,
): Promise<HarnessCatalogDto> {
const context = readContextFromScope(scopeFromUser(user));
let adapter;
try {
adapter = this.registry.get(harnessId);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof HarnessAdapterUnavailableError) {
// Typed failure — NEVER a fallback catalog for an unknown harness id.
throw new HttpException(
{ code: error.code, message: error.message, harnessId },
HttpStatus.NOT_FOUND,
);
}
throw error;
}
return toSafeCatalog(await adapter.catalog(context));
}
}
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { IsNotEmpty, IsString } from 'class-validator';
import type {
HarnessActorContext,
HarnessAuthState,
HarnessCapability,
HarnessCatalog,
HarnessCatalogEntry,
HarnessDescriptor,
HarnessInputType,
HarnessModelAvailability,
HarnessSelection,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
/**
* Structured selection tuple accepted on `PUT /api/chat/preferences/selection`.
*
* The body is a STRUCTURED tuple (harness + provider + model), never a free-text
* model string. With `ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, forbidNonWhitelisted: true })`
* any extra property including smuggled server-authority fields such as
* `seatId`, `tenantId`, `userId`, `nativeSessionPath`, `executable`, `home`, `cwd`
* is rejected with 400. There is deliberately no field through which a caller can
* name a scope; scope is derived on the server from the authenticated session.
*/
export class HarnessSelectionInputDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
harnessId!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
providerId!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
modelId!: string;
}
/** Browser-safe harness summary — identity and capabilities only. */
export interface HarnessSummaryDto {
readonly id: string;
readonly displayName: string;
readonly capabilities: readonly HarnessCapability[];
}
/** Browser-safe catalog entry — no executables, paths, secrets, or env. */
export interface HarnessCatalogEntryDto {
readonly harnessId: string;
readonly providerId: string;
readonly modelId: string;
readonly displayName: string;
readonly reasoningCapability: boolean;
readonly inputTypes: readonly HarnessInputType[];
readonly authState: HarnessAuthState;
readonly availability: HarnessModelAvailability;
}
/** Browser-safe catalog envelope. */
export interface HarnessCatalogDto {
readonly harnessId: string;
readonly version: string;
readonly fingerprint: string;
readonly models: readonly HarnessCatalogEntryDto[];
}
/** Response envelope for the caller's current selection (null when unset). */
export interface SelectionResponseDto {
readonly selection: HarnessSelection | null;
}
/**
* Derive a server-trusted {@link HarnessActorContext} for read operations from the
* session-derived {@link ActorTenantScope}. All authority originates on the server;
* nothing here is caller-supplied. A fresh correlation id is minted per call.
*/
export function readContextFromScope(scope: ActorTenantScope): HarnessActorContext {
return {
actorId: scope.userId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
seatId: scope.userId,
correlationId: randomUUID(),
};
}
/** Project a descriptor onto the browser-safe summary shape (whitelist by construction). */
export function toHarnessSummary(descriptor: HarnessDescriptor): HarnessSummaryDto {
return {
id: descriptor.id,
displayName: descriptor.displayName,
capabilities: [...descriptor.capabilities],
};
}
/** Project a catalog onto the browser-safe shape (whitelist by construction). */
export function toSafeCatalog(catalog: HarnessCatalog): HarnessCatalogDto {
return {
harnessId: catalog.harnessId,
version: catalog.version,
fingerprint: catalog.fingerprint,
models: catalog.models.map(toSafeCatalogEntry),
};
}
function toSafeCatalogEntry(entry: HarnessCatalogEntry): HarnessCatalogEntryDto {
return {
harnessId: entry.harnessId,
providerId: entry.providerId,
modelId: entry.modelId,
displayName: entry.displayName,
reasoningCapability: entry.reasoningCapability,
inputTypes: [...entry.inputTypes],
authState: entry.authState,
availability: entry.availability,
};
}
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { HarnessRegistry } from './harness.registry.js';
import { HarnessService } from './harness.service.js';
import {
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE,
HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
HARNESS_REGISTRY,
HARNESS_SERVICE,
} from './harness.tokens.js';
import { HarnessController } from './harness.controller.js';
import { HarnessSelectionController } from './harness-selection.controller.js';
import { HarnessSelectionService } from './harness-selection.service.js';
import { HarnessSelectionRepository } from './harness-selection.repository.js';
/**
* Wires the harness-neutral registry/service (Task Two) together with the
* Slice-Zero catalog and selection HTTP surfaces (Task Three).
*
* The registry is provided empty here; real harness adapters are registered in a
* later task. Because the controllers/services resolve their collaborators through
* this real module graph, an unresolved provider fails loudly at `app.init()`.
*/
@Module({
controllers: [HarnessController, HarnessSelectionController],
providers: [
{ provide: HARNESS_REGISTRY, useFactory: () => new HarnessRegistry() },
{ provide: HARNESS_SERVICE, useClass: HarnessService },
// Task Five: bind the conversation-service token to its explicit "not yet bound"
// sentinel. The pi-rpc router treats this as a hard, typed startup failure; Task 14
// replaces it with a real service. Exported so ChatModule's router can inject it.
{ provide: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE, useValue: HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE },
HarnessSelectionRepository,
HarnessSelectionService,
],
exports: [HARNESS_REGISTRY, HARNESS_SERVICE, HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE],
})
export class HarnessModule {}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import {
HarnessAdapterUnavailableError,
HarnessRegistrationError,
HarnessRegistry,
} from './harness.registry.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from './testing/fake-harness.adapter.js';
describe('HarnessRegistry', () => {
it('registers and looks up an adapter by harness id', () => {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
const adapter = new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' });
registry.register(adapter);
expect(registry.get('fake')).toBe(adapter);
expect(registry.has('fake')).toBe(true);
expect(registry.list().map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['fake']);
});
it('rejects a blank adapter id', () => {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
let error: unknown;
try {
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: ' ' }));
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessRegistrationError);
expect((error as HarnessRegistrationError).reason).toBe('blank_id');
expect(registry.list()).toEqual([]);
});
it('rejects a duplicate adapter id', () => {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' }));
let error: unknown;
try {
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' }));
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessRegistrationError);
expect((error as HarnessRegistrationError).reason).toBe('duplicate_id');
expect((error as HarnessRegistrationError).harnessId).toBe('fake');
// The original registration is untouched.
expect(registry.list()).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('returns adapter_unavailable for an unknown harness id', () => {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
let error: unknown;
try {
registry.get('missing');
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessAdapterUnavailableError);
expect((error as HarnessAdapterUnavailableError).code).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
expect((error as HarnessAdapterUnavailableError).harnessId).toBe('missing');
expect(registry.has('missing')).toBe(false);
});
});
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type {
HarnessAdapter,
HarnessErrorCode,
HarnessErrorDto,
HarnessSelection,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
/**
* A typed harness operation failure that carries a fully-formed, browser-safe
* {@link HarnessErrorDto}. The DTO's `selection` is always the exact requested
* tuple there is no field through which a substituted "effective" selection
* could ever be reported.
*/
export class HarnessOperationError extends Error {
readonly code: HarnessErrorCode;
readonly dto: HarnessErrorDto;
constructor(dto: HarnessErrorDto) {
super(dto.message);
this.name = 'HarnessOperationError';
this.code = dto.code;
this.dto = dto;
}
}
/** Build a {@link HarnessOperationError} that echoes the requested selection unchanged. */
export function operationError(
code: HarnessErrorCode,
message: string,
selection: HarnessSelection,
correlationId: string,
retryable = false,
): HarnessOperationError {
return new HarnessOperationError({ code, message, retryable, correlationId, selection });
}
/** Raised when an unknown harness id is looked up. Discriminated by `code`. */
export class HarnessAdapterUnavailableError extends Error {
readonly code = 'adapter_unavailable' as const satisfies HarnessErrorCode;
constructor(readonly harnessId: string) {
super(`No harness adapter is registered for id "${harnessId}".`);
this.name = 'HarnessAdapterUnavailableError';
}
}
export type HarnessRegistrationFailure = 'blank_id' | 'duplicate_id';
/** Raised when an adapter cannot be registered (blank or duplicate id). */
export class HarnessRegistrationError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly reason: HarnessRegistrationFailure,
readonly harnessId: string,
) {
super(
reason === 'blank_id'
? 'A harness adapter id must be a non-empty string.'
: `A harness adapter is already registered for id "${harnessId}".`,
);
this.name = 'HarnessRegistrationError';
}
}
/**
* Harness-neutral adapter registry. Adapters are keyed by their harness id.
* Registration rejects blank and duplicate ids; lookup of an unknown id fails
* with {@link HarnessAdapterUnavailableError} (`adapter_unavailable`).
*/
@Injectable()
export class HarnessRegistry {
private readonly adapters = new Map<string, HarnessAdapter>();
register(adapter: HarnessAdapter): void {
const id = adapter.id;
if (typeof id !== 'string' || id.trim().length === 0) {
throw new HarnessRegistrationError('blank_id', id ?? '');
}
if (this.adapters.has(id)) {
throw new HarnessRegistrationError('duplicate_id', id);
}
this.adapters.set(id, adapter);
}
get(harnessId: string): HarnessAdapter {
const adapter = this.adapters.get(harnessId);
if (!adapter) {
throw new HarnessAdapterUnavailableError(harnessId);
}
return adapter;
}
has(harnessId: string): boolean {
return this.adapters.has(harnessId);
}
list(): readonly HarnessAdapter[] {
return [...this.adapters.values()];
}
}
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { HarnessActorContext, HarnessCapability, HarnessSelection } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HARNESS_CAPABILITIES } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HarnessOperationError, HarnessRegistry } from './harness.registry.js';
import {
HarnessScopeViolationError,
HarnessService,
type TrustedGatewayScope,
} from './harness.service.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from './testing/fake-harness.adapter.js';
const SCOPE: TrustedGatewayScope = {
actorId: 'actor-trusted',
tenantId: 'tenant-trusted',
seatId: 'seat-trusted',
correlationId: 'correlation-trusted',
};
const READ_CONTEXT: HarnessActorContext = {
actorId: SCOPE.actorId,
tenantId: SCOPE.tenantId,
seatId: SCOPE.seatId,
correlationId: SCOPE.correlationId,
};
function setup(capabilities?: readonly HarnessCapability[]) {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
const adapter = new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake', capabilities });
registry.register(adapter);
const service = new HarnessService(registry);
return { registry, adapter, service };
}
async function availableSelection(adapter: FakeHarnessAdapter): Promise<HarnessSelection> {
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(READ_CONTEXT);
const entry = catalog.models.find((model) => model.availability === 'available');
if (!entry) {
throw new Error('fixture requires an available model');
}
return { harnessId: entry.harnessId, providerId: entry.providerId, modelId: entry.modelId };
}
describe('HarnessService', () => {
it('derives the actor context from trusted scope on create', async () => {
const { service, adapter } = setup();
const selection = await availableSelection(adapter);
const snapshot = await service.createSession(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
selection,
});
expect(snapshot.seatId).toBe(SCOPE.seatId);
expect(snapshot.state).toBe('idle');
expect(snapshot.selection).toEqual(selection);
expect(snapshot.nativeSessionId).toBeTruthy();
});
it('rejects server-authority fields supplied by an external caller', async () => {
const { service, adapter } = setup();
const selection = await availableSelection(adapter);
const hostile = {
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
selection,
seatId: 'attacker-seat',
executablePath: '/usr/bin/evil',
home: '/home/attacker',
cwd: '/tmp/attacker',
nativeSessionPath: '/var/native/attacker.jsonl',
} as unknown as Parameters<HarnessService['createSession']>[1];
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.createSession(SCOPE, hostile);
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessScopeViolationError);
expect((error as HarnessScopeViolationError).field).toBe('seatId');
});
it('returns adapter_unavailable for an unknown harness id, echoing the requested tuple', async () => {
const { service } = setup();
const selection: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: 'ghost-harness',
providerId: 'p',
modelId: 'm',
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.createSession(SCOPE, { conversationId: 'conversation-1', selection });
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('adapter_unavailable');
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(selection);
expect(dto.correlationId).toBe(SCOPE.correlationId);
});
it('returns selection_invalid for an unknown provider/model tuple, unchanged', async () => {
const { service } = setup();
const selection: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: 'fake',
providerId: 'ghost-provider',
modelId: 'ghost-model',
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.createSession(SCOPE, { conversationId: 'conversation-1', selection });
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('selection_invalid');
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(selection);
});
it('returns model_unavailable without falling back for a known unavailable model', async () => {
const { service, adapter } = setup();
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(READ_CONTEXT);
const unavailable = catalog.models.find((entry) => entry.availability === 'unavailable');
expect(unavailable).toBeDefined();
const selection: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: unavailable!.harnessId,
providerId: unavailable!.providerId,
modelId: unavailable!.modelId,
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.createSession(SCOPE, { conversationId: 'conversation-1', selection });
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('model_unavailable');
// No substitution: the DTO tuple is exactly what was requested.
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(selection);
});
it('gives create, resume, detach, evict, and end distinct observable effects', async () => {
const { service, adapter } = setup();
const selection = await availableSelection(adapter);
const created = await service.createSession(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-create',
selection,
});
expect(created.state).toBe('idle');
expect(created.processId).toBeTruthy();
expect(created.attachedClientIds).toEqual([]);
const resumed = await service.resumeSession(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-resume',
nativeSessionId: 'native-preexisting-123',
selection,
});
// Resume binds the supplied native session; create mints a fresh one.
expect(resumed.nativeSessionId).toBe('native-preexisting-123');
expect(resumed.nativeSessionId).not.toBe(created.nativeSessionId);
await service.attach(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-create',
clientId: 'browser-1',
});
const afterAttach = await service.snapshot(SCOPE, 'conversation-create');
expect(afterAttach.attachedClientIds).toEqual(['browser-1']);
const afterDetach = await service.detach(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-create',
clientId: 'browser-1',
});
// Detach removes the browser attachment only; the process stays alive.
expect(afterDetach.attachedClientIds).toEqual([]);
expect(afterDetach.state).toBe('idle');
expect(afterDetach.processId).toBeTruthy();
const afterEvict = await service.evict(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-create',
reason: 'idle_timeout',
});
// Evict stops the process but retains the resumable native session.
expect(afterEvict.state).toBe('evicted');
expect(afterEvict.processId).toBeUndefined();
expect(afterEvict.nativeSessionId).toBe(created.nativeSessionId);
const afterEnd = await service.end(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-create',
reason: 'session_ended',
});
// End destructively terminates the native session.
expect(afterEnd.state).toBe('ended');
});
it('fails typed when an unsupported capability is exercised', async () => {
const withoutExtensionUi = HARNESS_CAPABILITIES.filter(
(capability) => capability !== 'extensionUi',
);
const { service, adapter } = setup(withoutExtensionUi);
const selection = await availableSelection(adapter);
await service.createSession(SCOPE, { conversationId: 'conversation-1', selection });
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.respondInteraction(SCOPE, {
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
response: { requestId: 'interaction-1', type: 'confirm', accepted: true },
});
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
expect((error as HarnessOperationError).dto.code).toBe('interaction_unsupported');
});
});
-285
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@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type {
HarnessActorContext,
HarnessAdapter,
HarnessCatalog,
HarnessCloseReason,
HarnessInteractionResponse,
HarnessSelection,
HarnessSessionHandle,
HarnessSessionSnapshot,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import {
HarnessAdapterUnavailableError,
HarnessRegistry,
operationError,
} from './harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from './harness.tokens.js';
/**
* Trusted, server-derived authority. In production this is produced by the
* Gateway from the authenticated session never from a browser/caller DTO.
*/
export interface TrustedGatewayScope {
readonly actorId: string;
readonly tenantId: string;
readonly seatId: string;
readonly correlationId: string;
}
/** Server-authority fields that must never arrive from an external request DTO. */
const FORBIDDEN_REQUEST_FIELDS = [
'actorId',
'tenantId',
'correlationId',
'seatId',
'seat',
'executable',
'executablePath',
'home',
'homeDir',
'cwd',
'workingDir',
'workingDirectory',
'nativeSessionPath',
'sessionPath',
] as const;
/** Raised when an external request DTO smuggles a server-authority field. */
export class HarnessScopeViolationError extends Error {
constructor(readonly field: string) {
super(`External request supplied server-authority field "${field}".`);
this.name = 'HarnessScopeViolationError';
}
}
export interface CreateHarnessSessionRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly selection: HarnessSelection;
}
export interface ResumeHarnessSessionRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly nativeSessionId: string;
readonly selection: HarnessSelection;
}
export interface AttachClientRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly clientId: string;
}
export interface DetachClientRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly clientId: string;
}
export interface EvictSessionRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly reason: HarnessCloseReason;
}
export interface EndSessionRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly reason: HarnessCloseReason;
}
export interface RespondInteractionRequest {
readonly conversationId: string;
readonly response: HarnessInteractionResponse;
}
interface ActiveSession {
readonly harnessId: string;
readonly handle: HarnessSessionHandle;
readonly correlationId: string;
}
/**
* Harness-neutral service. It derives the {@link HarnessActorContext} strictly
* from trusted Gateway scope, validates the selected provider/model tuple with
* NO fallback substitution, and exposes distinct create/resume/detach/evict/end
* lifecycle operations.
*/
@Injectable()
export class HarnessService {
private readonly sessions = new Map<string, ActiveSession>();
constructor(@Inject(HARNESS_REGISTRY) private readonly registry: HarnessRegistry) {}
async createSession(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: CreateHarnessSessionRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const { conversationId, selection } = request;
const adapter = this.resolveAdapter(scope, selection);
const context = deriveActorContext(scope);
await this.assertSelectionAvailable(scope, adapter.catalog(context), selection);
const handle = await adapter.create({ context, conversationId, selection });
this.sessions.set(conversationId, {
harnessId: selection.harnessId,
handle,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
});
return handle.snapshot();
}
async resumeSession(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: ResumeHarnessSessionRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const { conversationId, nativeSessionId, selection } = request;
const adapter = this.resolveAdapter(scope, selection);
const context = deriveActorContext(scope);
await this.assertSelectionAvailable(scope, adapter.catalog(context), selection);
const handle = await adapter.resume({ context, conversationId, nativeSessionId, selection });
this.sessions.set(conversationId, {
harnessId: selection.harnessId,
handle,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
});
return handle.snapshot();
}
async attach(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: AttachClientRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, request.conversationId);
await handle.attach({ clientId: request.clientId });
return handle.snapshot();
}
async detach(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: DetachClientRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, request.conversationId);
await handle.detach(request.clientId);
return handle.snapshot();
}
async evict(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: EvictSessionRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, request.conversationId);
await handle.evictProcess(request.reason);
return handle.snapshot();
}
async end(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: EndSessionRequest,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, request.conversationId);
await handle.endSession(request.reason);
const snapshot = await handle.snapshot();
this.sessions.delete(request.conversationId);
return snapshot;
}
async respondInteraction(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
request: RespondInteractionRequest,
): Promise<void> {
assertTrustedRequest(request);
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, request.conversationId);
await handle.respondInteraction(request.response);
}
async snapshot(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
conversationId: string,
): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
const handle = this.requireHandle(scope, conversationId);
return handle.snapshot();
}
private resolveAdapter(scope: TrustedGatewayScope, selection: HarnessSelection): HarnessAdapter {
try {
return this.registry.get(selection.harnessId);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof HarnessAdapterUnavailableError) {
throw operationError('adapter_unavailable', error.message, selection, scope.correlationId);
}
throw error;
}
}
private async assertSelectionAvailable(
scope: TrustedGatewayScope,
catalogPromise: Promise<HarnessCatalog>,
selection: HarnessSelection,
): Promise<void> {
const catalog = await catalogPromise;
const entry = catalog.models.find(
(candidate) =>
candidate.harnessId === selection.harnessId &&
candidate.providerId === selection.providerId &&
candidate.modelId === selection.modelId,
);
if (!entry) {
// No first-row fallback: reject the requested tuple unchanged.
throw operationError(
'selection_invalid',
'The requested harness/provider/model tuple is not in the catalog.',
selection,
scope.correlationId,
);
}
if (entry.availability === 'unavailable') {
throw operationError(
'model_unavailable',
'The requested model is currently unavailable.',
selection,
scope.correlationId,
true,
);
}
}
private requireHandle(scope: TrustedGatewayScope, conversationId: string): HarnessSessionHandle {
const active = this.sessions.get(conversationId);
if (!active) {
throw operationError(
'session_not_found',
`No active harness session for conversation "${conversationId}".`,
{ harnessId: '', providerId: '', modelId: '' },
scope.correlationId,
);
}
return active.handle;
}
}
/** Build the actor context strictly from trusted scope. No caller data leaks in. */
export function deriveActorContext(scope: TrustedGatewayScope): HarnessActorContext {
return {
actorId: scope.actorId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
seatId: scope.seatId,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
};
}
/** Reject any request object that carries a server-authority field. */
function assertTrustedRequest(request: object): void {
for (const field of FORBIDDEN_REQUEST_FIELDS) {
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(request, field)) {
throw new HarnessScopeViolationError(field);
}
}
}
// Re-export the typed operation error so callers importing from the service
// have the discriminated failure type without reaching into the registry.
export { HarnessOperationError } from './harness.registry.js';
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
/**
* Nest dependency-injection tokens for the harness-neutral registry and service.
*
* String tokens follow the existing Gateway convention (see `memory/memory.tokens.ts`)
* and remain valid Nest `InjectionToken`s for `@Inject(...)`.
*/
import type { HarnessConversationService } from '@mosaicstack/types';
export const HARNESS_REGISTRY = 'HARNESS_REGISTRY' as const;
export const HARNESS_SERVICE = 'HARNESS_SERVICE' as const;
export type HarnessRegistryToken = typeof HARNESS_REGISTRY;
export type HarnessServiceToken = typeof HARNESS_SERVICE;
/**
* Token for the {@link HarnessConversationService} that {@link HarnessChatRuntime}
* depends on. Until Task 14 provides a real implementation, `HarnessModule` binds
* the {@link HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE} sentinel here, and the
* `pi-rpc` router treats that sentinel as a hard, typed startup failure.
*/
export const HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE = 'HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE' as const;
export type HarnessConversationServiceToken = typeof HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE;
/**
* Explicit "not yet bound" value for {@link HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE}. It is a
* distinct sentinel never `null`/`undefined` so an unbound service is an
* intentional, checkable state rather than an accidental nil that could read as
* "present". Replaced by a real service in Task 14.
*/
export const HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE: unique symbol = Symbol(
'HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE',
);
/** A binding for {@link HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE}: a real service or the sentinel. */
export type HarnessConversationServiceBinding =
| HarnessConversationService
| typeof HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE;
/** Narrows a binding to a usable service, excluding the unavailable sentinel. */
export function isHarnessConversationServiceAvailable(
binding: HarnessConversationServiceBinding,
): binding is HarnessConversationService {
return binding !== HARNESS_CONVERSATION_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { HarnessActorContext, HarnessSelection } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HarnessOperationError } from '../harness.registry.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from './fake-harness.adapter.js';
import { runHarnessAdapterContract } from './harness-adapter.contract.js';
const CONTEXT: HarnessActorContext = {
actorId: 'actor-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
seatId: 'seat-1',
correlationId: 'correlation-1',
};
// The reusable conformance suite. Task 13 re-runs it against the native Pi adapter.
runHarnessAdapterContract('FakeHarnessAdapter', () => new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' }));
describe('FakeHarnessAdapter no-substitution', () => {
it('never substitutes the first catalog row when a bogus selection is requested', async () => {
const adapter = new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' });
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const firstRow = catalog.models[0];
if (!firstRow) {
throw new Error('fixture requires a catalog model');
}
const available = catalog.models.find(
(entry) => entry.availability === 'available' && entry.modelId !== firstRow.modelId,
);
expect(available).toBeDefined();
const selected: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: available!.harnessId,
providerId: available!.providerId,
modelId: available!.modelId,
};
const handle = await adapter.create({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
selection: selected,
});
const bogus: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: 'fake',
providerId: 'ghost-provider',
modelId: 'ghost-model',
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await handle.setModel(bogus);
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('selection_invalid');
// The DTO echoes the exact requested tuple, unchanged.
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(bogus);
// No substitution to the first catalog row.
expect(dto.selection).not.toEqual({
harnessId: firstRow.harnessId,
providerId: firstRow.providerId,
modelId: firstRow.modelId,
});
// The active selection is untouched by the rejected request.
expect((await handle.snapshot()).selection).toEqual(selected);
});
it('reports model_unavailable with the unchanged tuple for a known but unavailable model', async () => {
const adapter = new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: 'fake' });
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const unavailable = catalog.models.find((entry) => entry.availability === 'unavailable');
const available = catalog.models.find((entry) => entry.availability === 'available');
expect(unavailable).toBeDefined();
expect(available).toBeDefined();
const startingSelection: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: available!.harnessId,
providerId: available!.providerId,
modelId: available!.modelId,
};
const handle = await adapter.create({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conversation-2',
selection: startingSelection,
});
const requested: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: unavailable!.harnessId,
providerId: unavailable!.providerId,
modelId: unavailable!.modelId,
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await handle.setModel(requested);
} catch (caught) {
error = caught;
}
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('model_unavailable');
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(requested);
expect((await handle.snapshot()).selection).toEqual(startingSelection);
});
});
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
import type {
AttachClient,
CreateHarnessSession,
HarnessAdapter,
HarnessActorContext,
HarnessCapability,
HarnessCatalog,
HarnessCatalogEntry,
HarnessCloseReason,
HarnessDescriptor,
HarnessEvent,
HarnessInteractionResponse,
HarnessPrompt,
HarnessPromptReceipt,
HarnessSelection,
HarnessSessionHandle,
HarnessSessionSnapshot,
HarnessSessionState,
ResumeHarnessSession,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HARNESS_CAPABILITIES } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { operationError } from '../harness.registry.js';
export interface FakeHarnessAdapterOptions {
readonly id: string;
readonly capabilities?: readonly HarnessCapability[];
readonly catalog?: readonly HarnessCatalogEntry[];
}
const FAKE_PROVIDER = 'fake-openai';
function defaultCatalog(harnessId: string): readonly HarnessCatalogEntry[] {
return [
{
harnessId,
providerId: FAKE_PROVIDER,
modelId: 'fake-mini',
displayName: 'Fake Mini',
reasoningCapability: false,
inputTypes: ['text'],
authState: 'ready',
availability: 'available',
},
{
harnessId,
providerId: FAKE_PROVIDER,
modelId: 'fake-pro',
displayName: 'Fake Pro',
reasoningCapability: true,
inputTypes: ['text', 'image'],
authState: 'ready',
availability: 'available',
},
{
harnessId,
providerId: FAKE_PROVIDER,
modelId: 'fake-legacy',
displayName: 'Fake Legacy',
reasoningCapability: false,
inputTypes: ['text'],
authState: 'unavailable',
availability: 'unavailable',
},
];
}
function matches(entry: HarnessCatalogEntry, selection: HarnessSelection): boolean {
return (
entry.harnessId === selection.harnessId &&
entry.providerId === selection.providerId &&
entry.modelId === selection.modelId
);
}
/**
* In-memory harness session handle used by the fake adapter and by the shared
* conformance suite. It enforces the two invariants the real adapters must also
* honor: model selection is validated against the catalog and is NEVER
* substituted, and unsupported capabilities fail with a typed error.
*/
export class FakeHarnessSessionHandle implements HarnessSessionHandle {
private state: HarnessSessionState = 'idle';
private processId: string | undefined;
private readonly attachedClientIds = new Set<string>();
private readonly listeners = new Set<(event: HarnessEvent) => void>();
constructor(
private readonly conversationId: string,
private readonly nativeSessionId: string,
private readonly seatId: string,
private selection: HarnessSelection,
private readonly correlationId: string,
private readonly capabilities: readonly HarnessCapability[],
private readonly catalog: readonly HarnessCatalogEntry[],
) {
this.processId = `process-${nativeSessionId}`;
}
async snapshot(): Promise<HarnessSessionSnapshot> {
return {
conversationId: this.conversationId,
nativeSessionId: this.nativeSessionId,
processId: this.processId,
seatId: this.seatId,
selection: this.selection,
state: this.state,
attachedClientIds: [...this.attachedClientIds],
};
}
async attach(input: AttachClient): Promise<void> {
this.attachedClientIds.add(input.clientId);
}
async detach(clientId: string): Promise<void> {
// Removes the browser attachment only; the process and native session persist.
this.attachedClientIds.delete(clientId);
}
async prompt(input: HarnessPrompt & { idempotencyKey: string }): Promise<HarnessPromptReceipt> {
return {
conversationId: this.conversationId,
turnId: input.turnId,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
state: 'accepted',
selection: this.selection,
};
}
async setModel(selection: HarnessSelection): Promise<HarnessSelection> {
const entry = this.catalog.find((candidate) => matches(candidate, selection));
if (!entry) {
// No fallback to the first catalog row: reject with the requested tuple, unchanged.
throw operationError(
'selection_invalid',
'The requested harness/provider/model tuple is not in the catalog.',
selection,
this.correlationId,
);
}
if (entry.availability === 'unavailable') {
throw operationError(
'model_unavailable',
'The requested model is currently unavailable.',
selection,
this.correlationId,
true,
);
}
this.selection = selection;
return this.selection;
}
async abort(_turnId: string): Promise<void> {
// No active turn machinery in the fake; abort is a no-op acknowledgement.
}
async respondInteraction(_input: HarnessInteractionResponse): Promise<void> {
if (!this.capabilities.includes('extensionUi')) {
throw operationError(
'interaction_unsupported',
'This harness does not support interactive responses.',
this.selection,
this.correlationId,
);
}
}
events(listener: (event: HarnessEvent) => void): () => void {
this.listeners.add(listener);
return () => {
this.listeners.delete(listener);
};
}
async evictProcess(_reason: HarnessCloseReason): Promise<void> {
// Stop the process but keep the resumable native session.
this.processId = undefined;
this.state = 'evicted';
}
async endSession(_reason: HarnessCloseReason): Promise<void> {
// Destructively end the native session.
this.processId = undefined;
this.state = 'ended';
}
}
/**
* Minimal in-memory {@link HarnessAdapter} for Slice Zero. It mints a fresh
* native session id on `create` and binds the supplied one on `resume`, so the
* two paths are observably distinct.
*/
export class FakeHarnessAdapter implements HarnessAdapter {
readonly id: string;
private readonly capabilities: readonly HarnessCapability[];
private readonly catalogEntries: readonly HarnessCatalogEntry[];
private createdCount = 0;
constructor(options: FakeHarnessAdapterOptions) {
this.id = options.id;
this.capabilities = options.capabilities ?? [...HARNESS_CAPABILITIES];
this.catalogEntries = options.catalog ?? defaultCatalog(options.id);
}
async describe(_context: HarnessActorContext): Promise<HarnessDescriptor> {
return {
id: this.id,
displayName: `Fake harness (${this.id})`,
capabilities: this.capabilities,
};
}
async catalog(_context: HarnessActorContext): Promise<HarnessCatalog> {
return {
harnessId: this.id,
version: '1.0.0',
fingerprint: `fake-${this.id}-${this.catalogEntries.length}`,
models: this.catalogEntries,
};
}
async create(input: CreateHarnessSession): Promise<HarnessSessionHandle> {
this.createdCount += 1;
const nativeSessionId = `native-${input.conversationId}-${this.createdCount}`;
return new FakeHarnessSessionHandle(
input.conversationId,
nativeSessionId,
input.context.seatId,
input.selection,
input.context.correlationId,
this.capabilities,
this.catalogEntries,
);
}
async resume(input: ResumeHarnessSession): Promise<HarnessSessionHandle> {
return new FakeHarnessSessionHandle(
input.conversationId,
input.nativeSessionId,
input.context.seatId,
input.selection,
input.context.correlationId,
this.capabilities,
this.catalogEntries,
);
}
}
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type {
HarnessActorContext,
HarnessAdapter,
HarnessCatalogEntry,
HarnessSelection,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { HarnessOperationError } from '../harness.registry.js';
const CONTEXT: HarnessActorContext = {
actorId: 'contract-actor',
tenantId: 'contract-tenant',
seatId: 'contract-seat',
correlationId: 'contract-correlation',
};
function toSelection(entry: HarnessCatalogEntry): HarnessSelection {
return { harnessId: entry.harnessId, providerId: entry.providerId, modelId: entry.modelId };
}
function pickAvailable(models: readonly HarnessCatalogEntry[]): HarnessCatalogEntry {
const entry = models.find((candidate) => candidate.availability === 'available') ?? models[0];
if (!entry) {
throw new Error('contract fixture requires at least one catalog model');
}
return entry;
}
async function captureError(run: () => Promise<unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
try {
await run();
return undefined;
} catch (caught) {
return caught;
}
}
/**
* Shared conformance suite every {@link HarnessAdapter} must pass. Slice Zero
* runs it against the fake adapter; Task 13 re-runs the identical suite against
* the native Pi adapter so both share one behavioral contract.
*/
export function runHarnessAdapterContract(
label: string,
createAdapter: () => HarnessAdapter,
): void {
describe(`harness adapter contract: ${label}`, () => {
it('mints a fresh native session on create and binds the supplied one on resume', async () => {
const adapter = createAdapter();
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const selection = toSelection(pickAvailable(catalog.models));
const created = await (
await adapter.create({ context: CONTEXT, conversationId: 'conv-create', selection })
).snapshot();
const resumed = await (
await adapter.resume({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conv-resume',
nativeSessionId: 'native-supplied-1',
selection,
})
).snapshot();
expect(created.nativeSessionId).toBeTruthy();
expect(resumed.nativeSessionId).toBe('native-supplied-1');
expect(created.nativeSessionId).not.toBe(resumed.nativeSessionId);
expect(created.seatId).toBe(CONTEXT.seatId);
});
it('gives detach, evict, and end distinct effects (not aliases)', async () => {
const adapter = createAdapter();
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const selection = toSelection(pickAvailable(catalog.models));
const handle = await adapter.create({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conv-lifecycle',
selection,
});
await handle.attach({ clientId: 'browser-1' });
await handle.detach('browser-1');
const afterDetach = await handle.snapshot();
expect(afterDetach.attachedClientIds).toEqual([]);
expect(afterDetach.state).not.toBe('evicted');
expect(afterDetach.state).not.toBe('ended');
await handle.evictProcess('idle_timeout');
const afterEvict = await handle.snapshot();
expect(afterEvict.state).toBe('evicted');
// The native session survives eviction (resumable); the process does not.
expect(afterEvict.nativeSessionId).toBe(afterDetach.nativeSessionId);
expect(afterEvict.processId).toBeUndefined();
await handle.endSession('session_ended');
const afterEnd = await handle.snapshot();
expect(afterEnd.state).toBe('ended');
// End is not an alias of evict.
expect(afterEnd.state).not.toBe(afterEvict.state);
});
it('never substitutes the first catalog row for an unknown selection', async () => {
const adapter = createAdapter();
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const firstRow = catalog.models[0];
if (!firstRow) {
throw new Error('contract fixture requires a catalog model');
}
const start = toSelection(pickAvailable(catalog.models));
const handle = await adapter.create({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conv-nosub',
selection: start,
});
const bogus: HarnessSelection = {
harnessId: adapter.id,
providerId: 'contract-ghost-provider',
modelId: 'contract-ghost-model',
};
const error = await captureError(() => handle.setModel(bogus));
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
const dto = (error as HarnessOperationError).dto;
expect(dto.code).toBe('selection_invalid');
expect(dto.selection).toEqual(bogus);
expect(dto.selection).not.toEqual(toSelection(firstRow));
expect((await handle.snapshot()).selection).toEqual(start);
});
it('validates capability-gated interactions with a typed error, not a silent no-op', async () => {
const adapter = createAdapter();
const descriptor = await adapter.describe(CONTEXT);
const catalog = await adapter.catalog(CONTEXT);
const selection = toSelection(pickAvailable(catalog.models));
const handle = await adapter.create({
context: CONTEXT,
conversationId: 'conv-interaction',
selection,
});
const response = {
requestId: 'interaction-1',
type: 'confirm',
accepted: true,
} as const;
if (descriptor.capabilities.includes('extensionUi')) {
await expect(handle.respondInteraction(response)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
} else {
const error = await captureError(() => handle.respondInteraction(response));
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(HarnessOperationError);
expect((error as HarnessOperationError).dto.code).toBe('interaction_unsupported');
}
});
});
}
+3 -9
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import type { MosaicJobData } from '../queue/queue.service.js';
@Injectable()
export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly logger = new Logger(CronService.name);
private readonly registeredWorkers: Array<Worker<MosaicJobData>> = [];
private readonly registeredWorkers: Worker<MosaicJobData>[] = [];
constructor(
@Inject(SummarizationService) private readonly summarization: SummarizationService,
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
) {}
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
// Local tier deliberately has no BullMQ consumers or repeatable jobs.
if (!this.queueService.isEnabled()) {
this.logger.log('CronService: BullMQ disabled on local tier — no jobs will be scheduled');
return;
}
const summarizationSchedule = process.env['SUMMARIZATION_CRON'] ?? '0 */6 * * *'; // every 6 hours
const tierManagementSchedule = process.env['TIER_MANAGEMENT_CRON'] ?? '0 3 * * *'; // daily at 3am
@@ -45,7 +39,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
const summarizationWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_SUMMARIZATION, async () => {
await this.summarization.runSummarization();
});
if (summarizationWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);
this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);
// M6-005: Tier management repeatable job
await this.queueService.addRepeatableJob(
@@ -57,7 +51,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
const tierWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_TIER_MANAGEMENT, async () => {
await this.summarization.runTierManagement();
});
if (tierWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
// Retire any repeatable global GC schedule created by older deployments.
// Session cleanup is now triggered only by an authorized session lifecycle operation.
-164
View File
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as nodeOs from 'node:os';
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import * as nodeUrl from 'node:url';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import type * as MosaicStorage from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { describe, expect, it, vi, type MockInstance } from 'vitest';
// Each case uses vi.resetModules() and re-imports the full gateway graph for distinct ambient FS/env; CI needs headroom, while this still guards genuine hangs.
const MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
function snapshotProcessEnv(): Record<string, string | undefined> {
return { ...process.env };
}
function restoreProcessEnv(snapshot: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
if (!(key in snapshot)) {
delete process.env[key];
}
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {
if (value === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
continue;
}
process.env[key] = value;
}
}
function expectPathUnderTempRoot(path: string, tempRoot: string): void {
const relativePath = relative(tempRoot, path);
expect(relativePath === '' || (!relativePath.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(relativePath))).toBe(
true,
);
}
async function writeFixture(path: string, contents: string, tempRoot: string): Promise<void> {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path, contents, 'utf8');
}
interface BootstrapPreflightResult {
capturedConfig: MosaicConfig | undefined;
}
async function runBootstrapPreflight(
anchoredConfigContents: string,
ambientConfigContents: string,
): Promise<BootstrapPreflightResult> {
const originalEnv = snapshotProcessEnv();
const tempRoot = await mkdtemp(join(nodeOs.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-main-preflight-'));
let cwdSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let exitSpy: MockInstance<typeof process.exit> | undefined;
let consoleInfoSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let capturedConfig: MosaicConfig | undefined;
try {
const anchor = join(tempRoot, 'anchored', 'apps', 'gateway', 'src');
const homePath = join(tempRoot, 'home');
const cwdPath = join(tempRoot, 'ambient', 'cwd');
const monorepoRootConfigPath = resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json');
await mkdir(anchor, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(cwdPath, { recursive: true });
await writeFixture(monorepoRootConfigPath, anchoredConfigContents, tempRoot);
await writeFixture(join(cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'), ambientConfigContents, tempRoot);
process.env['HOME'] = homePath;
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = 'fixture-secret';
delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['VALKEY_URL'];
consoleInfoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation((): void => undefined);
const exitMock = vi.fn<typeof process.exit>();
exitSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'exit').mockImplementation(exitMock);
vi.resetModules();
vi.doMock('node:os', () => ({ ...nodeOs, homedir: (): string => homePath }));
vi.doMock('node:url', () => ({
...nodeUrl,
fileURLToPath: (url: string | URL): string => {
const actualPath = nodeUrl.fileURLToPath(url);
if (
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.ts') ||
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.js')
) {
return join(anchor, 'env.ts');
}
return actualPath;
},
}));
cwdSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'cwd').mockReturnValue(cwdPath);
vi.doMock('./tracing.js', () => ({}));
const preflightSentinel = new Error('preflight-capture-sentinel');
vi.doMock('@mosaicstack/storage', async () => {
const actual = await vi.importActual<typeof MosaicStorage>('@mosaicstack/storage');
return {
...actual,
detectAndAssertTier: vi.fn((config: MosaicConfig): Promise<void> => {
capturedConfig = config;
throw preflightSentinel;
}),
};
});
await import('./main.js');
await vi.waitFor((): void => {
expect(exitSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
return { capturedConfig };
} finally {
cwdSpy?.mockRestore();
exitSpy?.mockRestore();
consoleInfoSpy?.mockRestore();
vi.doUnmock('@mosaicstack/storage');
vi.doUnmock('./tracing.js');
vi.doUnmock('node:url');
vi.doUnmock('node:os');
vi.resetModules();
restoreProcessEnv(originalEnv);
await rm(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
describe('main bootstrap preflight config anchoring', (): void => {
it(
'passes the anchored monorepo-root config to detectAndAssertTier, not an ambient cwd config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const anchoredConfig = JSON.stringify({
tier: 'local',
storage: { type: 'pglite', dataDir: '.mosaic/storage-pglite' },
queue: { type: 'local', dataDir: '.mosaic/queue' },
memory: { type: 'keyword' },
});
const ambientConfig = JSON.stringify({
tier: 'federated',
storage: {
type: 'postgres',
url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic',
enableVector: true,
},
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: 'pgvector' },
});
const { capturedConfig } = await runBootstrapPreflight(anchoredConfig, ambientConfig);
expect(capturedConfig?.tier).toBe('local');
expect(capturedConfig?.storage).not.toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
});
+15 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import './env.js';
import { config } from 'dotenv';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve, join } from 'node:path';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
// Load .env from daemon config dir (global install / daemon mode).
// Loaded first so monorepo .env can override for local dev.
const daemonEnv = join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env');
if (existsSync(daemonEnv)) config({ path: daemonEnv });
// Load .env from monorepo root (cwd is apps/gateway when run via pnpm filter)
config({ path: resolve(process.cwd(), '../../.env') });
config(); // Also load apps/gateway/.env if present (overrides)
import './tracing.js';
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { NestFactory } from '@nestjs/core';
@@ -13,7 +26,6 @@ import { mountAuthHandler } from './auth/auth.controller.js';
import { mountMcpHandler } from './mcp/mcp.controller.js';
import { McpService } from './mcp/mcp.service.js';
import { detectAndAssertTier, TierDetectionError } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from './env.js';
async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
const logger = new Logger('Bootstrap');
@@ -25,7 +37,7 @@ async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
// Pre-flight: assert all external services required by the configured tier
// are reachable. Runs before NestFactory.create() so failures are visible
// immediately with actionable remediation hints.
const mosaicConfig = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath());
const mosaicConfig = loadConfig();
try {
await detectAndAssertTier(mosaicConfig);
} catch (err) {
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { McpClientService } from './mcp-client.service.js';
const MCP_LEAK_MARKER = 'MCP_LEAK_MARKER /srv/secret';
describe('McpClientService — failed connect error sanitization', () => {
const originalMcpServers = process.env['MCP_SERVERS'];
beforeEach(() => {
process.env['MCP_SERVERS'] = JSON.stringify([
{ name: 'leaky-server', url: 'http://localhost:9999/mcp' },
]);
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.restoreAllMocks();
if (originalMcpServers === undefined) {
delete process.env['MCP_SERVERS'];
} else {
process.env['MCP_SERVERS'] = originalMcpServers;
}
});
it('stores a generic serverEntry.error while logging the raw exception server-side', async () => {
vi.spyOn(Client.prototype, 'connect').mockRejectedValue(new Error(MCP_LEAK_MARKER));
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const service = new McpClientService();
await service.onModuleInit();
const statuses = service.getServerStatuses();
expect(statuses).toHaveLength(1);
expect(statuses[0]?.connected).toBe(false);
expect(statuses[0]?.error).toBe('Connection failed (see server logs).');
expect(statuses[0]?.error).not.toContain(MCP_LEAK_MARKER);
const loggedRawMarker = errorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) =>
call.some((arg) => typeof arg === 'string' && arg.includes(MCP_LEAK_MARKER)),
);
expect(loggedRawMarker).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ export class McpClientService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
);
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
serverEntry.error = 'Connection failed (see server logs).';
serverEntry.error = message;
serverEntry.connected = false;
this.logger.error(`Failed to connect to MCP server "${config.name}": ${message}`);
}
@@ -12,10 +12,6 @@ import { RuntimeProviderService } from '../agent/runtime-provider-registry.servi
import { ChatGateway } from '../chat/chat.gateway.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from '../commands/command-authorization.service.js';
import { validateDiscordServiceToken } from '../chat/chat.gateway-auth.js';
import { ChatRuntimeRouter } from '../chat/chat-runtime-router.js';
import { EmbeddedChatRuntime } from '../chat/embedded-chat.runtime.js';
import { HarnessChatRuntime } from '../chat/harness-chat.runtime.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import { DiscordReplayProtector } from './discord-replay-protector.js';
const SERVICE_TOKEN = 'test-service-token';
@@ -29,7 +25,6 @@ const ENV_KEYS = [
'DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_CONFIG_ID',
'CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME',
] as const;
const savedEnv = new Map<string, string | undefined>();
@@ -155,57 +150,6 @@ function createPayload(overrides: Partial<DiscordIngressPayload> = {}): DiscordI
};
}
/**
* Task 5 fence (C): the Discord SEND path runs through the exclusive {@link ChatRuntimeRouter},
* constructed here in `pi-rpc` mode with a fully-resolved runtime (`active` = harness). A verified
* Discord *service* turn must nonetheless execute on the {@link EmbeddedChatRuntime} never the
* harness, never the routing engine per the Q1/Q2 adjudication: the router owns a dedicated
* verified-ingress dispatch that delegates to embedded regardless of mode, with zero harness
* fallback. The gateway is given the router in the former direct-`AgentService` constructor slot.
*
* RED today: production still reads that slot as a bare `AgentService`, so `this.agentService`
* resolves to the router, `getSession(...)` is not a function, the send path throws and is caught
* (an `error` is emitted and the handler returns) BEFORE it ever reaches the embedded runtime. The
* failure is behavioural wiring collection, DI, and `onModuleInit` all succeed. GREEN re-routes
* the verified Discord dispatch through the router into the embedded runtime, satisfying the
* preserved create/prompt assertions without weakening any control. `harnessConversations.append`
* proves the harness path is never touched even though the pi-rpc router resolved it as `active`.
*
* Correction #4 is proved behaviourally, not by naming an accessor: the verified-ingress dispatch
* is reachable only from the fully-verified `discordService` branch (the create/prompt tests below)
* and never from a browser-emittable socket event (the browser-forgery refusal test).
*/
function readyPiRpcRegistry(): HarnessRegistry {
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
// A registered 'pi' adapter + an available (non-sentinel) conversation service let the pi-rpc
// router resolve `active` = harness instead of failing closed at init, so these tests model the
// real hostile condition — the harness runtime IS live — rather than a degraded router.
registry.register({ id: 'pi' } as never);
return registry;
}
function piRpcRouterFronting(
agentService: unknown,
harnessConversations: { append: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> },
): ChatRuntimeRouter {
const routerConversationServiceTripwire = {
append: () => {
throw new Error('router conversation service must not be resolved on the Discord path');
},
};
const embedded = new EmbeddedChatRuntime(agentService as never);
const harness = new HarnessChatRuntime(harnessConversations as never);
const router = new ChatRuntimeRouter(
readyPiRpcRegistry(),
routerConversationServiceTripwire as never,
embedded,
harness,
'pi-rpc',
);
router.onModuleInit();
return router;
}
describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
it('keeps legacy role-only bindings valid while withholding privileged actor identity', () => {
const [binding] = parseDiscordInteractionBindings(
@@ -489,7 +433,6 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
it("selects each binding's trusted logical-agent config when creating Discord sessions", async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001,channel-002';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
@@ -546,9 +489,8 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
},
};
const routingEngine = { resolve: vi.fn() };
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
agentService as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
@@ -589,575 +531,6 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
expect.objectContaining({ agentConfigId: 'agent-config-orion' }),
);
expect(routingEngine.resolve).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// Even though the pi-rpc router resolved the harness as `active`, verified Discord ingress must
// never touch it — the create path stays on the embedded runtime.
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('dispatches a verified Discord SEND once and drops a byte-identical replay with zero additional dispatch/persist/ack (Task 5 G4)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
const session = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
agentName: 'Nova',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(session);
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve({ id, name: 'Nova' })) },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-replay',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const ackCount = (): number =>
client.emit.mock.calls.filter((call) => call[0] === 'message:ack').length;
// One fully-valid signed envelope; the replay reuses the SAME object (same messageId).
const envelope = ingressEnvelope('verified once', 'discord-replay-001', {
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
});
// First delivery: the verified-Discord SEND runs the full embedded dispatch exactly once.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
// Byte-identical replay: the messageId is already claimed, so resolveDiscordIngress returns
// null and the SEND handler bails before dispatch/persist/ack. Every effect stays at exactly one.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
// The harness runtime is never touched on either delivery.
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a verified SEND that fails the configured service identity consumes no replay claim, so a corrected byte-identical retry dispatches/persists/acks exactly once and a later duplicate stays fail-closed (Task 5 item 4 — claim ordering)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
const session = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
agentName: 'Nova',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(session);
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve({ id, name: 'Nova' })) },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-claim-ordering',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const ackCount = (): number =>
client.emit.mock.calls.filter((call) => call[0] === 'message:ack').length;
// A single fully-valid signed envelope, reused byte-for-byte across all three deliveries.
const envelope = ingressEnvelope('verified once with late identity', 'discord-order-001', {
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
});
// (1) Configured service identity is MISSING. The envelope is validly signed and passes the
// binding + route checks, but the SEND must refuse at the identity gate BEFORE any claim
// or effect. If the claim fires ahead of that gate, this delivery silently burns the
// replay claim for `discord-order-001` even though nothing dispatched.
delete process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID'];
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(0);
// (2) Identity is now configured; the operator resends the SAME envelope byte-for-byte. Because
// step (1) consumed no claim, this corrected retry claims once and runs the full embedded
// dispatch exactly once. (Under the pre-fix ordering the claim was already spent in step (1),
// so this retry is dropped as a replay and never dispatches — the RED this test drives.)
process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID'] = 'discord-service';
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
// (3) A genuine duplicate after a committed turn stays fail-closed: the claim taken in step (2)
// blocks it, so every effect remains at exactly one.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a verified SEND whose configured agent record fails reconciliation consumes no replay claim, so a corrected byte-identical retry dispatches/persists/acks exactly once (Task 5 finding 3)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
const session = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
agentName: 'Nova',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(session);
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
// The durable agent record does not reconcile on the first delivery (its name no longer matches
// the verified binding's instance id), then reconciles cleanly on the corrected retry.
const findAgent = vi
.fn()
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 'agent-config-nova', name: 'Renamed-Away' })
.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'agent-config-nova', name: 'Nova' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: findAgent },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-reconcile',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const ackCount = (): number =>
client.emit.mock.calls.filter((call) => call[0] === 'message:ack').length;
const envelope = ingressEnvelope(
'verified once with stale agent record',
'discord-reconcile-001',
{
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
},
);
// (1) The configured-agent reconcile runs BEFORE the replay claim. A mismatch refuses the turn
// and, crucially, consumes no claim for discord-reconcile-001 — nothing dispatches.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(0);
// (2) The record now reconciles; because step (1) took no claim, this byte-identical retry claims
// once and runs the full embedded dispatch exactly once. (Pre-fix, the claim was spent ahead
// of the reconcile in step (1), so this retry was dropped as a replay — the RED this drives.)
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
// (3) A genuine duplicate after the committed turn stays fail-closed.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a verified SEND refuses to reuse a same-scope embedded session minted under a different configured identity, with zero prompt/persist/ack (Task 5 finding 3)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
// A live session already exists for this conversation/scope, but it was minted under a DIFFERENT
// configured agent (Orion). The verified binding reconciles to Nova, so reusing this session would
// execute one agent's turn under another agent's verified label — the reuse guard must refuse it.
const foreignIdentitySession = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-orion',
agentName: 'Orion',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(foreignIdentitySession);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(foreignIdentitySession),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve({ id, name: 'Nova' })) },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-identity-swap',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
await gateway.handleMessage(
client as never,
ingressEnvelope('reuse under a different identity', 'discord-identity-swap-001', {
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
}),
);
// Refused at the embedded reuse guard: no prompt, no persist, no ack — only a typed refusal.
expect(prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(addMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('message:ack', expect.anything());
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
);
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a verified SEND whose configured agent record resolves under a different id fails reconciliation, consumes no replay claim, and a corrected byte-identical retry dispatches/persists/acks exactly once (Task 5 finding 3 — id axis)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
const session = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
agentName: 'Nova',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(session);
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
// The name matches the verified binding, but the record's own id is a DIFFERENT agent config —
// an aliased/substituted lookup. Exact-id reconciliation must refuse it on the first delivery,
// then admit the corrected record whose id matches the binding.
const findAgent = vi
.fn()
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 'agent-config-elsewhere', name: 'Nova' })
.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'agent-config-nova', name: 'Nova' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: findAgent },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-reconcile-id',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const ackCount = (): number =>
client.emit.mock.calls.filter((call) => call[0] === 'message:ack').length;
const envelope = ingressEnvelope(
'verified once with aliased agent id',
'discord-reconcile-id-001',
{
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
},
);
// (1) The record's id differs from the binding's agentConfigId. Exact-id reconcile refuses the
// turn BEFORE the replay claim, so nothing dispatches and the claim stays available.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(0);
// (2) The record now reconciles on both id and name; because step (1) took no claim, this
// byte-identical retry claims once and runs the full embedded dispatch exactly once.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
// (3) A genuine duplicate after the committed turn stays fail-closed.
await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(ackCount()).toBe(1);
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('a verified SEND refuses a freshly minted same-scope session whose identity differs from the reconciled configured agent, with zero prompt/persist/ack (Task 5 finding 3 — post-create)', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-001',
channelId: 'channel-001',
pairedUsers: {
'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
},
},
]);
// No live session exists for this scope, so the runtime MINTS one — but createSession returns a
// session carrying a DIFFERENT configured identity (Orion) than the reconciled binding (Nova).
// The post-create identity recheck must refuse it rather than dispatch one agent's turn under
// another agent's verified label. (The existing reuse test covers the getSession path; this
// covers the createSession path scrappy flagged as unvalidated.)
const mintedForeignSession = {
provider: 'configured-provider',
modelId: 'configured-model',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-orion',
agentName: 'Orion',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
},
};
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(mintedForeignSession);
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession,
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt,
};
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
const brain = {
agents: { findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve({ id, name: 'Nova' })) },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ resolve: vi.fn() } as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'discord-client-postcreate-mismatch',
data: { discordService: true },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
await gateway.handleMessage(
client as never,
ingressEnvelope('mint under a different identity', 'discord-postcreate-001', {
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
}),
);
// The freshly minted session failed the post-create identity recheck: refused with a typed
// error, no prompt, no persist, no ack.
expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(addMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('message:ack', expect.anything());
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
);
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('retains validated persisted attachments in resumed conversation history', async () => {
@@ -1220,16 +593,11 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
it('preserves authenticated attachment metadata through persistence and agent dispatch', async () => {
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'discord-persisted-message' });
const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const session = {
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
// The reused embedded session carries the SAME reconciled identity as the verified binding,
// so the finding-3 session-reuse guard admits it rather than refusing an identity swap.
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
agentName: 'Nova',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'medium',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
@@ -1243,7 +611,6 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
prompt,
};
const brain = {
agents: { findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve({ id, name: 'Nova' })) },
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
@@ -1251,9 +618,8 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
addMessage,
},
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
agentService as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
@@ -1301,66 +667,6 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
}),
'discord-service',
);
// The verified Discord prompt dispatch stays on the embedded runtime; the pi-rpc harness that
// the router resolved as `active` is never reached.
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('refuses a browser-forged Discord ingress envelope in pi-rpc with a fixed typed refusal and zero dispatch', async () => {
// Correction #2 + #4 (behavioural). A browser socket is never `discordService` (that flag is
// set only on a valid service-token handshake), so it cannot forge the trusted Discord path by
// emitting an envelope-shaped payload. In pi-rpc it must receive a FIXED TYPED refusal
// (`runtime_unsupported`, the same typed code the sibling harness-fence uses) and reach neither
// the forced Discord service scope, the verified Discord operation, the embedded runtime, nor
// the harness. There is no dedicated socket event for verified ingress — the only ingress
// surface is the generic `message` handler, and a non-service client is refused there.
//
// RED today: a non-service client emitting an envelope-shaped payload falls to the browser
// branch, fails the chat-message shape check, and is dropped SILENTLY (a warn + return) with no
// typed refusal emitted — so the refusal assertion fails. Collection and construction succeed;
// the gap is behavioural. GREEN emits the fixed typed refusal before any dispatch.
configureDiscordEnv();
process.env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] = 'pi-rpc';
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
createSession: vi.fn(),
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const harnessConversations = { append: vi.fn() };
const routingEngine = { resolve: vi.fn() };
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
piRpcRouterFronting(agentService, harnessConversations) as never,
{} as never,
{ conversations: { addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } } as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
routingEngine as never,
);
const client = {
id: 'browser-forging-discord',
data: { discordService: false },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
await gateway.handleMessage(
client as never,
ingressEnvelope('forged from a browser', 'browser-forgery-001', {
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
}),
);
const refusal = client.emit.mock.calls.find(
([, payload]) => (payload as { code?: string } | undefined)?.code === 'runtime_unsupported',
);
expect(refusal).toBeDefined();
expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('message:ack', expect.anything());
expect(agentService.createSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(harnessConversations.append).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(routingEngine.resolve).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('accepts a thread message through its allowed bound parent channel', () => {
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { SystemOverrideService } from './system-override.service.js';
const localConfig = { queue: { type: 'local' } } as MosaicConfig;
describe('SystemOverrideService local tier', () => {
it('keeps ephemeral overrides isolated by tenant and user scope', async () => {
const service = new SystemOverrideService(localConfig);
const firstScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', userId: 'user-a' };
const secondScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-b', userId: 'user-b' };
await service.set('shared-session', 'first override', firstScope);
await service.set('shared-session', 'second override', secondScope);
await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBe('first override');
await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
await service.clear('shared-session', firstScope);
await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
});
});
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
const scopedSessionId = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
`${scope.tenantId}:${scope.userId}:${sessionId}`;
@@ -17,45 +15,16 @@ interface OverrideFragment {
addedAt: number;
}
interface LocalOverrideEntry {
condensed: string;
fragments: OverrideFragment[];
}
@Injectable()
export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
export class SystemOverrideService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(SystemOverrideService.name);
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null;
/** Local-tier fallback, keyed by the same tenant/user/session scope as Redis. */
private readonly localStore = new Map<string, LocalOverrideEntry>();
private readonly handle: QueueHandle;
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {
this.handle = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local' ? null : createQueue();
}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
constructor() {
this.handle = createQueue();
}
async set(sessionId: string, override: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) {
const key = scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope);
const entry = this.localStore.get(key) ?? { condensed: '', fragments: [] };
entry.fragments.push({ text: override, addedAt: Date.now() });
entry.condensed = await this.condenseOverrides(
entry.fragments.map((fragment) => fragment.text),
);
this.localStore.set(key, entry);
this.logger.debug(
`Set system override for session ${sessionId} (local, ${entry.fragments.length} fragment(s))`,
);
return;
}
// Load existing fragments
const existing = await this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope));
const fragments: OverrideFragment[] = existing
@@ -85,14 +54,10 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
}
async get(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<string | null> {
if (!this.handle) {
return this.localStore.get(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope))?.condensed ?? null;
}
return this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope));
}
async renew(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) return;
const pipeline = this.handle.redis.pipeline();
pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
@@ -100,11 +65,6 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
}
async clear(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) {
this.localStore.delete(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope));
this.logger.debug(`Cleared system override for session ${sessionId} (local)`);
return;
}
await this.handle.redis.del(
SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope),
SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope),
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { QueueService } from './queue.service.js';
const localConfig = {
queue: { type: 'local' },
} as MosaicConfig;
describe('QueueService local tier', () => {
it('disables BullMQ and treats queue operations as local no-ops', async () => {
const service = new QueueService(null, localConfig);
expect(service.isEnabled()).toBe(false);
expect(service.getQueue('mosaic-test')).toBeNull();
expect(service.registerWorker('mosaic-test', vi.fn())).toBeNull();
await expect(
service.addRepeatableJob('mosaic-test', 'local-noop', {}, '* * * * *'),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
await expect(service.removeRepeatableJobs('mosaic-test', 'local-noop')).resolves.toBe(0);
await expect(service.getHealthStatus()).resolves.toEqual({ queues: {}, healthy: true });
await expect(service.listJobs()).resolves.toEqual([]);
await expect(service.retryJob('mosaic-test__1')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
await expect(service.pauseQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
await expect(service.resumeQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
});
});
+6 -65
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ import {
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Queue, Worker, type Job, type ConnectionOptions } from 'bullmq';
import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import type { JobDto, JobStatus } from './queue-admin.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -110,42 +108,21 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly connection: ConnectionOptions;
private readonly queues = new Map<string, Queue<MosaicJobData>>();
private readonly workers = new Map<string, Worker<MosaicJobData>>();
/** False on Local tier — BullMQ/Redis operations become no-ops. */
private readonly enabled: boolean;
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(LOG_SERVICE)
private readonly logService: LogService | null,
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {
this.enabled = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type !== 'local';
this.connection = this.enabled
? getConnection()
: ({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 6380 } as ConnectionOptions);
}
/** Returns true when BullMQ/Redis is active (Standalone and Federated tiers). */
isEnabled(): boolean {
return this.enabled;
this.connection = getConnection();
}
onModuleInit(): void {
if (this.enabled) {
this.logger.log('QueueService initialised (BullMQ)');
} else {
this.logger.log(
'QueueService: BullMQ disabled for local tier — no Redis connections will be opened',
);
}
this.logger.log('QueueService initialised (BullMQ)');
}
async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
if (this.enabled) {
await this.closeAll();
}
await this.closeAll();
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -154,10 +131,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Get or create a BullMQ Queue for the given queue name.
* Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
*/
getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> | null {
if (!this.enabled) return null;
getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> {
let queue = this.queues.get(name) as Queue<T> | undefined;
if (!queue) {
queue = new Queue<T>(name, { connection: this.connection });
@@ -169,7 +144,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Add a BullMQ repeatable job (cron-style).
* Uses `jobId` as a deterministic key so duplicate registrations are idempotent.
* No-op on Local tier.
*/
async addRepeatableJob<T extends MosaicJobData>(
queueName: string,
@@ -177,13 +151,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
data: T,
cronExpression: string,
): Promise<void> {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping repeatable job "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return;
}
const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName)!;
const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName);
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
await (queue as Queue<any>).add(jobName, data, {
repeat: { pattern: cronExpression },
@@ -199,14 +167,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* safe retirement of previously registered system-wide jobs.
*/
async removeRepeatableJobs(queueName: string, jobName: string): Promise<number> {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping repeatable-job removal for "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return 0;
}
const queue = this.getQueue(queueName);
if (!queue) return 0;
const jobs = await queue.getRepeatableJobs();
const matchingJobs = jobs.filter((job) => job.name === jobName);
await Promise.all(matchingJobs.map((job) => queue.removeRepeatableByKey(job.key)));
@@ -221,18 +182,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Register a Worker for the given queue name with error handling and
* exponential backoff.
* Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
*/
registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(
queueName: string,
handler: JobHandler<T>,
): Worker<T> | null {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping worker registration for "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return null;
}
registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(queueName: string, handler: JobHandler<T>): Worker<T> {
const worker = new Worker<T>(
queueName,
async (job) => {
@@ -289,12 +240,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Return queue health statistics for all managed queues.
* Returns an empty healthy result on Local tier.
*/
async getHealthStatus(): Promise<QueueHealthStatus> {
if (!this.enabled) {
return { queues: {}, healthy: true };
}
const queues: QueueHealthStatus['queues'] = {};
let healthy = true;
@@ -325,10 +272,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* List jobs across all managed queues, optionally filtered by status.
* BullMQ jobs are fetched by state type from each queue.
* Returns empty array on Local tier.
*/
async listJobs(status?: JobStatus): Promise<JobDto[]> {
if (!this.enabled) return [];
const jobs: JobDto[] = [];
const states: JobStatus[] = status
? [status]
@@ -355,10 +300,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Retry a specific failed job by its BullMQ job ID (format: "queueName:id").
* The caller passes "<queueName>__<jobId>" as the composite ID because BullMQ
* job IDs are not globally unique they are scoped to their queue.
* Returns an error on Local tier.
*/
async retryJob(compositeId: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const sep = compositeId.lastIndexOf('__');
if (sep === -1) {
return { ok: false, message: 'Invalid job id format. Expected "<queue>__<jobId>".' };
@@ -390,7 +333,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Pause a queue by name.
*/
async pauseQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const queue = this.queues.get(name);
if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
await queue.pause();
@@ -402,7 +344,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Resume a paused queue by name.
*/
async resumeQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const queue = this.queues.get(name);
if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
await queue.resume();
@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { SlashCommandPayload, SystemReloadPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { ReloadService } from './reload.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from '../commands/command-executor.service.js';
function createMockCommandRegistry() {
return {
@@ -107,85 +104,3 @@ describe('ReloadService', () => {
expect(() => service.registerPlugin('my-plugin', {})).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe('ReloadService — /reload command sanitizes plugin errors', () => {
it('generic per-plugin errors reach the chat surface while raw markers stay server-side only', async () => {
const registry = {
getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
version: 1,
commands: [
{ name: 'reload', aliases: [], scope: 'core', execution: 'socket', available: true },
],
skills: [],
}),
};
const reloadService = new ReloadService(registry as never);
const RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER = 'RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER /srv/load-secret';
const RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER = 'RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER /srv/unload-secret';
reloadService.registerPlugin('unload-fails', {
pluginName: 'unload-fails',
onLoad: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
onUnload: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER)),
});
reloadService.registerPlugin('load-fails', {
pluginName: 'load-fails',
onLoad: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER)),
onUnload: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
});
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
const broadcastReload = vi.fn();
const mockChatGateway = { broadcastReload };
const mockAgentService = { getSession: vi.fn(), applyAgentConfig: vi.fn() };
const mockSystemOverride = { set: vi.fn(), get: vi.fn(), clear: vi.fn() };
const mockSessionGC = { sweepOrphans: vi.fn() };
const mockBrain = { agents: { findByName: vi.fn(), findById: vi.fn(), create: vi.fn() } };
const mockMcpClient = {
getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []),
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
const executor = new CommandExecutorService(
registry as never,
mockAgentService as never,
mockSystemOverride as never,
mockSessionGC as never,
null,
mockBrain as never,
reloadService,
mockChatGateway as never,
mockMcpClient as never,
);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conv-1' };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'user-1' });
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('unload-fails: unload failed (internal error)');
expect(result.message).toContain('load-fails: load failed (internal error)');
expect(result.message).not.toContain(RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER);
expect(result.message).not.toContain(RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER);
expect(broadcastReload).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const broadcastPayload = broadcastReload.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as SystemReloadPayload;
expect(broadcastPayload.message).toContain('unload-fails: unload failed (internal error)');
expect(broadcastPayload.message).toContain('load-fails: load failed (internal error)');
expect(broadcastPayload.message).not.toContain(RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER);
expect(broadcastPayload.message).not.toContain(RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER);
const loggedUnloadMarker = errorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) =>
call.some((arg) => typeof arg === 'string' && arg.includes(RELOAD_UNLOAD_LEAK_MARKER)),
);
const loggedLoadMarker = errorSpy.mock.calls.some((call) =>
call.some((arg) => typeof arg === 'string' && arg.includes(RELOAD_LOAD_LEAK_MARKER)),
);
expect(loggedUnloadMarker).toBe(true);
expect(loggedLoadMarker).toBe(true);
errorSpy.mockRestore();
});
});
+2 -4
View File
@@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ export class ReloadService implements OnApplicationBootstrap, OnApplicationShutd
await plugin.onUnload();
reloaded.push(name);
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Plugin "${name}" failed during onUnload: ${err}`);
errors.push(`${name}: unload failed (internal error)`);
errors.push(`${name}: unload failed — ${err}`);
}
}
}
@@ -70,8 +69,7 @@ export class ReloadService implements OnApplicationBootstrap, OnApplicationShutd
try {
await plugin.onLoad();
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(`Plugin "${name}" failed during onLoad: ${err}`);
errors.push(`${name}: load failed (internal error)`);
errors.push(`${name}: load failed ${err}`);
}
}
}
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import {
type CanActivate,
type ExecutionContext,
type INestApplication,
ValidationPipe,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { ProjectBootstrapService } from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
import { WorkspaceController } from './workspace.controller.js';
const bootstrapMock = vi.fn(() =>
Promise.resolve({
projectId: 'project-1',
workspacePath: '/opt/mosaic/.workspaces/users/user-1/project-1',
}),
);
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<{ user?: { id: string } }>();
requestContext.user = { id: 'user-1' };
return true;
},
};
describe('POST /api/workspaces repoUrl validation', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [WorkspaceController],
providers: [
{
provide: ProjectBootstrapService,
useValue: { bootstrap: bootstrapMock },
},
],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({
whitelist: true,
forbidNonWhitelisted: true,
transform: true,
}),
);
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
beforeEach(() => {
bootstrapMock.mockClear();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it.each([
['a leading-dash value', '--upload-pack=sh -c id'],
['an ext remote helper', 'ext::sh -c id'],
['a file URL', 'file:///tmp/repository'],
['an unparseable value', 'not a url'],
['an SSH shorthand', '[email protected]:acme/repository.git'],
['a scheme without //', 'https:example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a hostless git URL', 'git:///tmp/repository'],
])('returns 400 for %s', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/workspaces')
.send({ name: 'Example', repoUrl })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
expect(bootstrapMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['a plain HTTPS repository URL', 'https://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a git protocol repository URL', 'git://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
])('accepts %s', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/workspaces')
.send({ name: 'Example', repoUrl })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(201);
expect(bootstrapMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
name: 'Example',
description: undefined,
userId: 'user-1',
teamId: undefined,
repoUrl,
});
});
});
@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
import { Body, Controller, Post, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import {
ProjectBootstrapService,
type BootstrapProjectResult,
} from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
import { CreateWorkspaceDto } from './workspace.dto.js';
import { ProjectBootstrapService } from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
@Controller('api/workspaces')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
@@ -15,14 +11,20 @@ export class WorkspaceController {
@Post()
async create(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Body() dto: CreateWorkspaceDto,
): Promise<BootstrapProjectResult> {
@Body()
body: {
name: string;
description?: string;
teamId?: string;
repoUrl?: string;
},
) {
return this.bootstrap.bootstrap({
name: dto.name,
description: dto.description,
name: body.name,
description: body.description,
userId: user.id,
teamId: dto.teamId,
repoUrl: dto.repoUrl,
teamId: body.teamId,
repoUrl: body.repoUrl,
});
}
}
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
import { IsOptional, IsString, IsUrl, Matches, MaxLength } from 'class-validator';
export class CreateWorkspaceDto {
@IsString()
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MaxLength(10_000)
description?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
teamId?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@Matches(/^(?:https|git):\/\//i, {
message: 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL',
})
@IsUrl(
{
protocols: ['https', 'git'],
require_host: true,
require_protocol: true,
require_tld: false,
require_valid_protocol: true,
},
{ message: 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL' },
)
repoUrl?: string;
}
@@ -1,33 +1,11 @@
import { BadRequestException } from '@nestjs/common';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import os from 'node:os';
import path from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { WorkspaceService } from './workspace.service.js';
type ExecFileMock = (
command: string,
args: readonly string[],
options: { cwd: string },
callback: (error: Error | null, stdout: string, stderr: string) => void,
) => void;
const { execFileMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
execFileMock: vi.fn<ExecFileMock>(),
}));
vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({
execFile: execFileMock,
}));
import path from 'node:path';
describe('WorkspaceService', () => {
let service: WorkspaceService;
beforeEach(() => {
execFileMock.mockReset();
execFileMock.mockImplementation((_command, _args, _options, callback) => {
callback(null, '', '');
});
service = new WorkspaceService();
});
@@ -98,69 +76,4 @@ describe('WorkspaceService', () => {
}
});
});
describe('create', () => {
const project = {
id: 'project-1',
ownerType: 'user',
userId: 'user-1',
teamId: null,
} as const;
let originalRoot: string | undefined;
let temporaryRoot: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
originalRoot = process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'];
temporaryRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-workspace-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'] = temporaryRoot;
service = new WorkspaceService();
});
afterEach(async () => {
if (originalRoot === undefined) {
delete process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'];
} else {
process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'] = originalRoot;
}
await fs.rm(temporaryRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it.each([
['a leading-dash URL', '--upload-pack=sh -c id'],
['an ext remote helper', 'ext::sh -c id'],
['a file URL', 'file:///tmp/repository'],
['an unparseable value', 'not a url'],
['an SSH shorthand', '[email protected]:acme/repository.git'],
['a scheme without //', 'https:example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a hostless git URL', 'git:///tmp/repository'],
])('rejects %s before invoking git', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
await expect(service.create(project, repoUrl)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
expect(execFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['an HTTPS URL', 'https://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a git protocol URL', 'git://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
])('accepts %s and invokes hardened git clone arguments', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const workspacePath = await service.create(project, repoUrl);
expect(execFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(execFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'git',
[
'-c',
'protocol.ext.allow=never',
'-c',
'protocol.file.allow=never',
'clone',
'--',
repoUrl,
'.',
],
{ cwd: workspacePath },
expect.any(Function),
);
});
});
});
@@ -1,30 +1,10 @@
import { BadRequestException, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import path from 'node:path';
import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
import { promisify } from 'node:util';
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
const allowedRepositoryProtocols = new Set(['https:', 'git:']);
const repositoryUrlPrefixPattern = /^(?:https|git):\/\//i;
const repositoryUrlError = 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL';
function assertAllowedRepositoryUrl(repoUrl: string): void {
if (repoUrl.startsWith('-') || !repositoryUrlPrefixPattern.test(repoUrl)) {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
let parsedUrl: URL;
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(repoUrl);
} catch {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
if (!allowedRepositoryProtocols.has(parsedUrl.protocol) || parsedUrl.hostname.length === 0) {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
}
export interface WorkspaceProject {
id: string;
@@ -59,32 +39,14 @@ export class WorkspaceService {
* If repoUrl is provided, clone instead of init.
*/
async create(project: WorkspaceProject, repoUrl?: string): Promise<string> {
if (repoUrl !== undefined) {
assertAllowedRepositoryUrl(repoUrl);
}
const workspacePath = this.resolvePath(project);
// Create directory
await fs.mkdir(workspacePath, { recursive: true });
if (repoUrl !== undefined) {
// Clone existing repo. Defense in depth keeps dangerous local helpers
// disabled and terminates option parsing before positional arguments.
await execFileAsync(
'git',
[
'-c',
'protocol.ext.allow=never',
'-c',
'protocol.file.allow=never',
'clone',
'--',
repoUrl,
'.',
],
{ cwd: workspacePath },
);
if (repoUrl) {
// Clone existing repo
await execFileAsync('git', ['clone', repoUrl, '.'], { cwd: workspacePath });
this.logger.log(`Cloned ${repoUrl} into workspace ${workspacePath}`);
} else {
// Init new git repo
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
<title>Mosaic</title>
<meta name="description" content="Mosaic Stack Dashboard" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin />
<link
rel="stylesheet"
href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Outfit:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=Fira+Code:wght@400;500&display=swap"
/>
<script>
// set data-theme before first paint so the stored theme never flashes
(function () {
try {
var theme = window.localStorage.getItem('mosaic-theme') || 'dark';
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', theme === 'light' ? 'light' : 'dark');
} catch (error) {
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', 'dark');
}
})();
</script>
</head>
<body>
<div id="root"></div>
<script type="module" src="/src/main.tsx"></script>
</body>
</html>
+4 -10
View File
@@ -3,26 +3,22 @@
"version": "0.0.2",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "node ../../scripts/build-web.mjs",
"build:vite": "vite build",
"dev": "next dev -p 3101",
"dev:vite": "vite",
"build": "next build",
"dev": "next dev",
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
"test:e2e": "playwright test",
"start": "next start -p 3101"
"start": "next start"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mosaicstack/design-tokens": "workspace:^",
"@mosaicstack/types": "workspace:^",
"better-auth": "^1.5.5",
"clsx": "^2.1.0",
"next": "^16.0.0",
"react": "^19.0.0",
"react-dom": "^19.0.0",
"react-markdown": "^10.1.0",
"react-router-dom": "^7.18.2",
"socket.io-client": "^4.8.0",
"tailwind-merge": "^3.5.0"
},
@@ -32,11 +28,9 @@
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"@types/react": "^19.0.0",
"@types/react-dom": "^19.0.0",
"@vitejs/plugin-react": "^6.0.5",
"jsdom": "^29.0.0",
"tailwindcss": "^4.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
"vite": "^8.2.1",
"vitest": "^3.2.7"
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
}
}
@@ -3,56 +3,41 @@
import Link from 'next/link';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useParams, useSearchParams } from 'next/navigation';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from '@/lib/auth-redirect';
import { signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
import { getSsoProvider } from '@/lib/sso-providers';
export default function AuthProviderRedirectPage(): React.ReactElement {
const params = useParams<{ provider: string }>();
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
const providerId = typeof params.provider === 'string' ? params.provider : '';
const requestedCallbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL');
const [providerName, setProviderName] = useState<string | null>(null);
const provider = getSsoProvider(providerId);
const callbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL') ?? '/chat';
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
const currentProvider = provider;
if (!currentProvider) {
setError('Unknown SSO provider.');
return;
}
if (!currentProvider.enabled) {
setError(`${currentProvider.buttonLabel} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
const activeProvider = currentProvider;
let cancelled = false;
async function redirectToProvider(): Promise<void> {
try {
const callbackURL = resolveAuthCallbackURL(requestedCallbackURL, window.location.origin);
const providers = await api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers');
if (cancelled) return;
const result = await signIn.oauth2({
providerId: activeProvider.id,
callbackURL,
});
const provider = providers.find((candidate) => candidate.id === providerId);
if (!provider) {
setError('Unknown SSO provider.');
return;
}
setProviderName(provider.name);
if (!provider.configured) {
setError(`${provider.name} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
if (provider.loginMode !== 'oidc') {
setError(`${provider.name} is not available for OIDC sign in.`);
return;
}
const result = await signIn.oauth2({
providerId: provider.id,
callbackURL,
});
if (!cancelled && result?.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `${provider.name} sign in failed.`);
}
} catch (caught: unknown) {
if (!cancelled) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Unable to start single sign-on.');
}
if (!cancelled && result?.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `${activeProvider.buttonLabel} sign in failed.`);
}
}
@@ -61,22 +46,19 @@ export default function AuthProviderRedirectPage(): React.ReactElement {
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [providerId, requestedCallbackURL]);
}, [callbackURL, provider]);
return (
<div className="mx-auto flex min-h-[50vh] max-w-md flex-col justify-center">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold text-text-primary">Single sign-on</h1>
<p className="mt-2 text-sm text-text-secondary">
{providerName
? `Redirecting you to ${providerName}...`
{provider
? `Redirecting you to ${provider.buttonLabel.replace('Continue with ', '')}...`
: 'Preparing your sign-in request...'}
</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
<div className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error">
<p>{error}</p>
<Link
href="/login"
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { api } from './api';
describe('api', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
});
it('fetches the supplied relative path with credentials and a JSON body', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
await expect(
api<{ ok: boolean }>('/api/projects', {
method: 'POST',
body: { name: 'Mosaic' },
}),
).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true });
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'/api/projects',
expect.objectContaining({
method: 'POST',
credentials: 'include',
body: JSON.stringify({ name: 'Mosaic' }),
headers: expect.objectContaining({
Accept: 'application/json',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
}),
}),
);
});
it('throws the gateway JSON error with its statusCode', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ statusCode: 403, message: 'Forbidden' }), {
status: 403,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
await expect(api('/api/admin/users')).rejects.toMatchObject({
name: 'Error',
message: 'Forbidden',
statusCode: 403,
});
});
});
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
const GATEWAY_URL = process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
export interface ApiRequestInit extends Omit<RequestInit, 'body'> {
body?: unknown;
}
@@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ export async function api<T>(path: string, init?: ApiRequestInit): Promise<T> {
headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
}
const res = await fetch(path, {
const res = await fetch(`${GATEWAY_URL}${path}`, {
credentials: 'include',
...rest,
headers,
-29
View File
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
describe('auth client origin contract', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
vi.resetModules();
});
it('uses the same-origin BetterAuth mount at /api/auth', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ session: null, user: null }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
const { authClient } = await import('./auth-client');
await authClient.getSession();
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const firstCall = fetchMock.mock.calls.at(0);
expect(firstCall).toBeDefined();
const requestURL = new URL(String(firstCall?.[0]), window.location.origin);
expect(requestURL.origin).toBe(window.location.origin);
expect(requestURL.pathname).toBe('/api/auth/get-session');
});
});
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
import { createAuthClient } from 'better-auth/react';
import { adminClient, genericOAuthClient } from 'better-auth/client/plugins';
// The gateway and BetterAuth client both use /api/auth. Omitting baseURL keeps
// every browser request on the current origin in development and production.
export const authClient = createAuthClient({
baseURL: process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242',
plugins: [adminClient(), genericOAuthClient()],
});
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from './auth-redirect';
const CURRENT_ORIGIN = 'https://mosaic.example';
describe('resolveAuthCallbackURL', () => {
it('preserves a canonical same-origin path with search and hash', () => {
expect(resolveAuthCallbackURL('/projects?view=active#current', CURRENT_ORIGIN)).toBe(
'/projects?view=active#current',
);
});
it.each([
null,
'chat',
'//evil.example',
'/..//evil.com',
'/..//evil.com/x',
'/./..//evil.com',
'/../..//evil.com',
'/foo/..//evil.com',
'/\\evil.example',
'/\n//evil.example',
'/\r//evil.example',
'/\t//evil.example',
'https://evil.example/phish',
])('falls back to chat for an unsafe callback target %#', (candidate) => {
expect(resolveAuthCallbackURL(candidate, CURRENT_ORIGIN)).toBe('/chat');
});
});
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
const DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL = '/chat';
/**
* Return a canonical same-origin path for post-auth navigation.
*
* Parsing before comparing origins rejects protocol-relative URLs, backslash
* variants, and control characters that the WHATWG parser normalizes away.
*/
export function resolveAuthCallbackURL(candidate: string | null, currentOrigin: string): string {
if (!candidate?.startsWith('/')) return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
try {
const expectedOrigin = new URL(currentOrigin).origin;
const resolved = new URL(candidate, expectedOrigin);
if (resolved.origin !== expectedOrigin || resolved.pathname.startsWith('//')) {
return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
}
return `${resolved.pathname}${resolved.search}${resolved.hash}`;
} catch {
return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
}
}
-71
View File
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
// Centralizes the type-only import of the shared `/chat` Socket.IO contract from
// the public `@mosaicstack/types` package. `import type` is erased at compile
// time, so this introduces no runtime dependency — it only reuses the exact
// payload shapes instead of redeclaring them.
import type { Socket } from 'socket.io-client';
import type {
AbortPayload,
AgentEndPayload,
AgentStartPayload,
AgentTextPayload,
AgentThinkingPayload,
ChatMessagePayload,
ChatSendCapabilityPayload,
ChatSendProtocol,
ClientToServerEvents,
CommandDef,
CommandManifest,
CommandManifestPayload,
ErrorPayload,
HarnessSelection,
HarnessTurnAckPayload,
HarnessTurnSendPayload,
MessageAckPayload,
RoutingDecisionInfo,
ServerToClientEvents,
SessionInfoPayload,
SessionUsagePayload,
SetThinkingPayload,
SkillCommandDef,
SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload,
SlashCommandPayload,
SlashCommandResultPayload,
SystemReloadPayload,
ToolEndPayload,
ToolStartPayload,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
export type {
AbortPayload,
AgentEndPayload,
AgentStartPayload,
AgentTextPayload,
AgentThinkingPayload,
ChatMessagePayload,
ChatSendCapabilityPayload,
ChatSendProtocol,
ClientToServerEvents,
CommandDef,
CommandManifest,
CommandManifestPayload,
ErrorPayload,
HarnessSelection,
HarnessTurnAckPayload,
HarnessTurnSendPayload,
MessageAckPayload,
RoutingDecisionInfo,
ServerToClientEvents,
SessionInfoPayload,
SessionUsagePayload,
SetThinkingPayload,
SkillCommandDef,
SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload,
SlashCommandPayload,
SlashCommandResultPayload,
SystemReloadPayload,
ToolEndPayload,
ToolStartPayload,
};
/** The `/chat` namespace socket, narrowed to the exact typed event contract. */
export type ChatSocket = Socket<ServerToClientEvents, ClientToServerEvents>;
-98
View File
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { ioMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
ioMock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('socket.io-client', () => ({
io: ioMock,
}));
import { destroySocket, getSocket } from './socket';
interface MockChatSocket {
on: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
offAny: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
disconnect: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
/** Test-only helper: fires every handler registered for `event` via
* `.on`, mirroring how a real socket.io-client instance invokes its own
* listeners (e.g. calling the registered `disconnect` handler(s) on a
* real transient disconnect). */
trigger(event: string): void;
}
function createMockSocket(): MockChatSocket {
const handlers = new Map<string, Set<() => void>>();
const mockSocket: MockChatSocket = {
on: vi.fn((event: string, handler: () => void) => {
if (!handlers.has(event)) handlers.set(event, new Set());
handlers.get(event)?.add(handler);
return mockSocket;
}),
offAny: vi.fn(() => mockSocket),
disconnect: vi.fn(() => mockSocket),
trigger(event: string): void {
for (const handler of handlers.get(event) ?? []) handler();
},
};
return mockSocket;
}
let currentMock!: MockChatSocket;
describe('chat socket', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
ioMock.mockReset();
// A fresh object per io() call so identity assertions (same singleton vs.
// a genuinely new instance) are meaningful.
ioMock.mockImplementation(() => {
currentMock = createMockSocket();
return currentMock;
});
});
afterEach(() => {
destroySocket();
});
it('creates one same-origin /chat namespace socket', () => {
const first = getSocket();
const second = getSocket();
expect(first).toBe(second);
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/chat', {
withCredentials: true,
autoConnect: false,
transports: ['websocket', 'polling'],
});
});
it('keeps the same singleton instance across a transient disconnect', () => {
const first = getSocket();
// socket.ts must not react to a real socket's `disconnect` event by
// nulling the singleton — it registers no such handler at all now.
// Actually fire every handler registered via `.on('disconnect', ...)`
// (mirroring a real socket.io-client reconnect) instead of merely
// calling getSocket() again: this is what makes the test fail if
// production reintroduces `socket.on('disconnect', () => { socket =
// null; })`, since that handler would run here and null the singleton
// before the next getSocket() call.
currentMock.trigger('disconnect');
const second = getSocket();
expect(second).toBe(first);
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it('only creates a new singleton after an explicit destroySocket()', () => {
const first = getSocket();
destroySocket();
const second = getSocket();
expect(second).not.toBe(first);
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
});
+13 -17
View File
@@ -1,27 +1,23 @@
import { io } from 'socket.io-client';
import type { ChatSocket } from './chat-contract';
import { io, type Socket } from 'socket.io-client';
let socket: ChatSocket | null = null;
const GATEWAY_URL = process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
export function getSocket(): ChatSocket {
let socket: Socket | null = null;
export function getSocket(): Socket {
if (!socket) {
// socket.io-client 4.8.3's `io()` factory declaration always returns the
// default unparameterized Socket (it accepts no <ListenEvents, EmitEvents>
// generics), so this one cast is the unavoidable boundary between that and the
// typed `/chat` contract. Every other call site uses the resulting ChatSocket
// with no further assertions.
socket = io('/chat', {
socket = io(`${GATEWAY_URL}/chat`, {
withCredentials: true,
autoConnect: false,
transports: ['websocket', 'polling'],
}) as unknown as ChatSocket;
});
// A transient `disconnect` (network blip, server restart) must NOT null
// the singleton: socket.io-client auto-reconnects this same instance,
// and its listeners stay registered across that reconnect. Nulling here
// previously orphaned those listeners on the next getSocket() call by
// handing back a brand-new, unconnected instance. Only destroySocket()
// (an explicit, intentional teardown) may reset the singleton.
// Reset singleton reference when socket is fully closed so the next
// getSocket() call creates a fresh instance instead of returning a
// closed/dead socket.
socket.on('disconnect', () => {
socket = null;
});
}
return socket;
}
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { getEnabledSsoProviders, getSsoProvider } from './sso-providers';
describe('sso-providers', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
it('returns the enabled providers in login button order', () => {
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED', 'true');
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED', 'true');
expect(getEnabledSsoProviders()).toEqual([
{
id: 'workos',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with WorkOS',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via WorkOS',
enabled: true,
href: '/auth/provider/workos',
},
{
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
enabled: true,
href: '/auth/provider/keycloak',
},
]);
});
it('marks disabled providers without exposing them in the enabled list', () => {
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED', 'true');
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED', 'false');
expect(getEnabledSsoProviders().map((provider) => provider.id)).toEqual(['workos']);
expect(getSsoProvider('keycloak')).toEqual({
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
enabled: false,
href: '/auth/provider/keycloak',
});
});
it('returns null for unknown providers', () => {
expect(getSsoProvider('authentik')).toBeNull();
});
});
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
export type SsoProviderId = 'workos' | 'keycloak';
export interface SsoProvider {
id: SsoProviderId;
buttonLabel: string;
description: string;
enabled: boolean;
href: string;
}
const PROVIDER_METADATA: Record<SsoProviderId, Omit<SsoProvider, 'enabled' | 'href'>> = {
workos: {
id: 'workos',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with WorkOS',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via WorkOS',
},
keycloak: {
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
},
};
export function getEnabledSsoProviders(): SsoProvider[] {
return (Object.keys(PROVIDER_METADATA) as SsoProviderId[])
.map((providerId) => getSsoProvider(providerId))
.filter((provider): provider is SsoProvider => provider?.enabled === true);
}
export function getSsoProvider(providerId: string): SsoProvider | null {
if (!isSsoProviderId(providerId)) {
return null;
}
return {
...PROVIDER_METADATA[providerId],
enabled: isSsoProviderEnabled(providerId),
href: `/auth/provider/${providerId}`,
};
}
function isSsoProviderId(value: string): value is SsoProviderId {
return value === 'workos' || value === 'keycloak';
}
function isSsoProviderEnabled(providerId: SsoProviderId): boolean {
switch (providerId) {
case 'workos':
return process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED'] === 'true';
case 'keycloak':
return process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED'] === 'true';
}
}
-39
View File
@@ -1,42 +1,3 @@
import type {
HarnessAuthState,
HarnessModelAvailability,
HarnessSelection,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
// The exact harness/provider/model tuple and its closed enum companions are the
// shared domain types — re-exported here so web consumers (and the runtime
// guards) import one shape, never a divergent local redefinition.
export type { HarnessSelection, HarnessAuthState, HarnessModelAvailability };
/** Harness summary row from `GET /api/harnesses` (the `HarnessSummaryDto`). The
* harness id is kept distinct from any provider id they are never merged. */
export interface HarnessSummary {
id: string;
displayName: string;
capabilities: string[];
}
/** One selectable model in a harness catalog. Extends the `{harnessId,
* providerId, modelId}` tuple with the display/availability metadata the UI
* needs; `inputTypes` is kept as a plain `string[]` on the client boundary
* because it arrives from untrusted JSON and is only ever displayed. */
export interface HarnessCatalogEntry extends HarnessSelection {
displayName: string;
reasoningCapability: boolean;
inputTypes: string[];
authState: HarnessAuthState;
availability: HarnessModelAvailability;
}
/** Harness-scoped catalog from `GET /api/harnesses/:harnessId/catalog`. */
export interface HarnessCatalog {
harnessId: string;
version: string;
fingerprint: string;
models: HarnessCatalogEntry[];
}
/** Conversation returned by the gateway API. */
export interface Conversation {
id: string;

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