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mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 267b58deb3 docs(remediation): RM-02 round-3 review dispatched at fbb61912 — anchor verified against ground truth
The derived boundary f4fd5967 equals an independently computed git merge-base HEAD
refs/remotes/origin/main. It is the same value f10-coder once set by hand: the value was never wrong,
the authority was. That is exactly why Mos insisted A6 be separated from A4 — asking only whether the
value was right would have closed this three rounds ago with the hole intact.

Empty-registry attack now fails in the precondition's own language. The both-directions bootstrap
statement is in the code with the residual bound to Builds 1-2, per D-19's third mandatory move.

Exact-head CI 2198: 10 children all success including clone and gate-verify; my machine check exits 0
bound to the head with anomalies 0, and a wrong-head negative control exits 1. exempted_steps is 0 this
run because ci-postgres succeeded, so the #1000 exemption was present but unneeded.

Review dispatched with A1 and P2 as the sharp checks: both ask whether this fix REMOVED the author's
control point or moved it again. refs/remotes/origin/main is a local ref, and the seven required gate
IDs are an anchor list. Five for five so far, every blocker on this PR came from outside the registered
set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 13:00:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e2058d4e84 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 anchor-round review — A1/P2 ask if the control point moved again
Registered at fbb61912 before any reviewer read the diff. I reproduced three things first so the review
does not re-spend on them: the derived boundary equals an independently computed git merge-base HEAD
origin/main (f4fd5967 — the same value f10-coder once set by hand, now derived rather than asserted);
emptying the registry populations fails with the precondition's own language; the both-directions
bootstrap statement is present with the Builds 1-2 residual.

A1 and P2 are the sharp ones and they ask the same question the last two rounds answered badly: did the
fix REMOVE the author's control point or MOVE it? A1 — refs/remotes/origin/main is a local ref; who
controls it where the gate runs, and can an author rewrite remote.origin.url or craft that ref in their
own clone? P2 — the seven required gate IDs are an anchor list; if the author can edit it, that is D-45
one level in. A4 asks about the natural failure mode of this fix, over-inclusion causing false reds.

P3 independently confirms the production fixture-profile bypass the author found and removed in their
own pre-commit review — self-disclosed, so it gets verified rather than credited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:43:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4430e60d84 docs(remediation): RM-02 round 3 dispatched — board de-staled, under budget
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:09:58 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4520d2f672 docs(remediation): promote two first-class principles to the charter; dispatch RM-02 round 3
Mos ruled both open questions and promoted the pattern to the charter.

PRINCIPLE 1 — the anchor must live outside the audited party's authority. You cannot fix "the author
controls X" by deriving X from something the author also controls; deriving only MOVES the control
point. Third independent arrival of one conclusion, each reached while shipping something else and each
from a different direction: the manifest certifying its own tree (D-19), the sandbox evaluating code
that enters before the boundary exists (D-25), and now the registry seam derived from a path the author
also places (D-45). Three impossibility-derivations of the same conclusion is the strongest
architectural evidence this mission has produced, and it is what forces Builds 1-2 rather than making
them a preference.

PRINCIPLE 2 — no universally-quantified check may pass over an empty set. "All registered cases ran" is
vacuously true when there are none. Non-emptiness and anchoring are preconditions asserted before the
quantified check runs, not properties hoped for after. The identical vacuity appeared twice at two
levels — seam=HEAD emptied the commit range, an emptied manifest emptied the registry population — and
the first was fixed as an instance, so it returned one level up. Corollary, same disease: a clause
written for the instance that produced it is not a clause.

Q1 ruled: the merge-base anchor IS in scope for f10-coder in this PR. It is git-computable against
main, which the author does not control, so reordering or splitting within the branch cannot move it —
an existing non-author-controlled reference, no new infrastructure. RM-60's execution boundary is a
sibling under the same principle but a different mechanism (where gate-verify runs, not what the anchor
is) and stays with Mos and Jason. Honesty required in both directions: the merge-base anchors to main,
whose integrity rests on the merge discipline this registry enforces — a bootstrap, sound against an
author who cannot rewrite main and NOT sound against an attacker who can, with that residual bound to
the Builds 1-2 dependency rather than implied.

Q2 ruled: state the empty-set principle as a general clause now, and generalize the D-38/D-40 criteria
the same way — quantify over the population instead of relabeling the originating instances.

Round 3 dispatched to f10-coder: merge-base anchor plus delayed-introduction must-fail; empty-set
precondition as a general clause with an emptied-registry must-fail; generalized clauses bound across
the gate inventory; each red-first. Number.isInteger accepting zero/negative/unsafe pipeline numbers
banked as a non-blocking follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:08:21 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 09875143c0 docs(remediation): roll D-11 capability/identity bullets to the ledger (D-43: roll out, never reword)
Third application of D-43's rule today. Those two bullets restated D-11/D-11a/D-11b, which live
authoritatively in TASKS.md, so they were a second copy waiting to go stale. Rolled verbatim; the board
keeps a pointer plus the one operational line that is not a restatement — assert the differential as
that seat, because a single endpoint can be true for anyone or 403 for an unrelated scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:05:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 08cb73fde3 docs(remediation): bank D-45/D-46/D-47 — the fix moved the author's control point instead of removing it
Second NO-GO on the keystone at 32b490a7. The pattern is the finding, not the three blockers.

D-45: round 1 the author set activationCommit as a field, so we derived it; round 2 the derivation
depends on WHEN the author introduces gates/gates.manifest.json. rev-974 committed a gate change before
adding the manifest — deriveHistoryBoundary picked that commit as activation, the prospective list held
only the later introduction, and verifyHistory returned no failures. The three registered seam controls
cannot catch it because they compare candidates against whatever introduction the author selected: they
validate the choice, not the choosing. You cannot fix "the author controls X" by deriving X from
something the author also controls. That is D-19/D-25 verbatim — the anchor must live outside the
audited party's authority — arriving a third time, now inside the keystone, and it is exactly why
Builds 1-2 are forced rather than preferred.

D-46: I reproduced it myself. Emptying criteria, gates, proseClaims and compatibilityScenarios — 17, 7,
8 and 2 entries — and pointing gateRoots at an empty directory yields EXIT 0, reporting "all registered
cases ran from this checkout" and "open behavior deltas: 0". "All registered cases ran" is vacuously
true over an empty set. The registry can be reduced to nothing and still report green.

D-45 and D-46 are the same defect at two levels: vacuity through emptiness. Empty the commit range or
empty the registry population — either way a universally-quantified check over an empty set passes.
seam=HEAD was the first instance and we fixed it AS an instance; the principle was never extracted, so
it came back one level up. Proposed general clause pending Mos: no universally-quantified registry
check may pass over an empty set — non-emptiness and anchoring are preconditions, not properties.

D-47: the new criteria are still instance-scoped. RM02-EVIDENCE-SUBJECT-BINDING covers only provider
evidence identity, not whether every registered gate binds evidence to its subject; RM02-TYPE-STRICT-
SCHEMA covers registry schema fields, not each gate's own discriminators. Do not relabel the
originating instances as the general clauses.

Dispatch PAUSED for the first time this session: the fix needs a non-author-controlled anchor, which
touches the provider/merge-base boundary and is adjacent to RM-60, which Mos and Jason own. Asked Mos
whether that anchoring is in scope for f10-coder here or crosses into RM-60, and whether the empty-set
principle becomes a general clause now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 12:04:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 24a7915633 docs(remediation): stop item 1 restating the In-flight table — it went stale 3x by duplicating it
Item 1 has now gone stale three separate times in one session, every time for the same reason: it
restated lane state that the In-flight table already owns. That is D-26's class (restatement is lossy
every time) and D-43's mechanism (a second copy is a second thing to go stale). Fixing the wording a
fourth time would just buy another few hours.

So it no longer carries lane state at all — it points at the table and keeps only the two things that
are NOT restatements: read the table, and re-derive any board claim from the provider before
load-bearing use, because the board is sole-written and has no independent verifier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:49:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e1a3806292 docs(remediation): RM-02 re-review dispatched at 32b490a7; RM-61 exemption load-bearing for the first time
All four D-44 silent-defeat paths remediated in one hardening pass. I re-ran three of the four attacks
myself and they are dead: activationCommit injection is rejected as an author-controlled field with the
boundary now derived from the registry introduction (0b4aa475); the misspelled outputPatern is rejected
as an unknown field by the recursive schema; the global cross-commit duplicate-pipeline check is
present. Three new criteria registered with bound cases.

Exact-head CI 2197 is the notable one: pipeline success with 10 children, 9 success and 1 genuine
FAILURE — ci-postgres, type service, exit_code 0, exact #1000 teardown signature. The RM-61 exemption
fired for real on a gate-ready decision for the first time. I ran the machine check myself (exit 0,
terminal-green, exempted_steps 1, correct exemption id) and a negative control on the same record with
a wrong expected head (exit 1, not-terminal-green, exempted_steps 0). Both halves of RM-61 — the
signature-scoped exemption and the subject binding — demonstrated in a single run.

The pre-registered ACs deliberately do not re-check what I reproduced; they attack the FIX, because
every round on this mission the remediation introduced the next hole. H1 asks whether the new
derivation's inputs are author-controlled, S1 whether the schema closure is a class or an enumeration,
C2 whether the new criteria are clauses or just their originating instances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:48:33 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 72b577eb85 docs(remediation): pre-register the RM-02 hardening re-review — attack the FIX, not the original bug
Registered at 32b490a7 before any reviewer read the diff. I verified three of the four attacks are dead
by re-running them myself: injecting activationCommit=HEAD now yields "author-controlled
activationCommit is forbidden; history boundary is derived from the registry introduction"; the
misspelled outputPatern is rejected as an unknown field by the recursive schema; the global
cross-commit duplicate check is present. The three criteria are registered with caseRefs 1/3/3.

So the AC set does not spend itself re-checking what I already reproduced. Every round on this mission
the remediation introduced the next hole — the commit-binding fix shipped a type confusion, the
type-strict fix was clean but the registry around it had four defeats — so the value is in whether the
NEW mechanism is defeatable.

Blocker 1's fix replaced an author-settable field with a derivation, and a derivation has inputs. H1
asks who controls them: can an author move the derived boundary by adding, renaming, deleting-and-
recreating or symlinking gates/gates.manifest.json, or by planting a second manifest earlier in
history? If so, blocker 1 is relocated rather than fixed. H2-H4 ask what first-parent traversal,
shallow clones, and path deletion do — fail closed or silently derive a wrong boundary.

S1 asks whether the schema closure is complete or merely enumerated: find a nested object the author
did not list and inject an unknown key there. C2 asks whether the new criteria express D-38 and D-40
generally or only their originating instances — a clause that covers only the instance that produced it
is not a clause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 11:32:35 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 52114dd4eb docs(remediation): bank D-44 — the anti-inert-gate registry was inert-able four distinct ways
rev-974 NO-GO at 83d2ecb2. A4/A5/A6 confirmed and three further blockers found, two of them outside my
registered set. Each is a silent-defeat path of the registry itself: the activation seam inerts the
history audit (seam=HEAD gives 0 prospective commits and no failures — and HEAD's parent and the
introduction commit also pass, so forbidding equality with HEAD does not close it); a misspelled
outputPattern silently reduces an assertion to exit-code-only because the closed schema is not
recursive; two provider records sharing pipeline number 7 certify two different commits; and the D-38
and D-40 criteria are absent, with blocker 4 a live instance of the very D-38 clause that is missing.

The headline: all four passed CI, passed the canonical gate:verify, and passed 38/38 focused tests.
Greens discharged nothing. My own AC set was incomplete too — A3 corrects the prospective range to
eight commits, not the seven I wrote; I omitted the seam commit itself.

Mos ruled ALL FOUR in this PR, no trim, and sizing does not help: a registry that ships with a known
way to be silently defeated IS the inert gate it exists to detect. There is no core registry that is
integrity-complete without these — they are not hardening on top of the deliverable, they are the
deliverable. Theme: the registry's own checks must not be silently defeatable. Each fix carries a
red-first must-fail control proving the specific defeat is now caught, and that control set IS the
D-38/D-40 coverage work rather than being additive to it.

Blocker 1's fix keeps the value and replaces the mechanism: derive the seam from non-author-controlled
history (parent of the first first-parent commit introducing gates/gates.manifest.json) rather than
asserting it in an author-editable field, plus must-fail controls for HEAD, HEAD's parent, and the
introduction commit. If the work balloons past reviewability the only acceptable split is by
integrity-complete stage, never by deferring a blocker.

Method note banked as a positive: I could not reproduce "full verifier exit 0", traced my first attempt
to my own instrumentation artifact (json.dump reformatting the manifest), and stated the divergence
rather than wielding non-reproduction as a refutation. The vacuity itself reproduced and blocker 3 was
confirmed by construction. Non-reproduction is not refutation. Open thread: why my gate:verify exits 1
on checkout-preflight with outcome 42.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:49:42 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8f70b1bc63 docs(remediation): pre-position the RM-02 activation-seam disposition so it survives a rotation
Mos ruled the disposition BEFORE the verdict, contingent on rev-974's independent A4/A5/A6. Recorded
here — not in the frozen AC file, which would be retrofitting, and not relayed to the reviewer, who
must reach A4 themselves or refute it.

The concern: activationCommit is the lower bound of the range required to carry own-tree registry
provenance, advancing it shrinks the audited set, the author advanced it to turn the author's own gate
green, and the only validation is --is-ancestor, which a commit satisfies against itself. The registry
built to detect gates that silently stopped enforcing may contain a field by which its own author can
make it stop enforcing, validated by a tautology.

A6 is the crux and stands alone from A4: even if f4fd5967 is the correct value — and it plausibly is,
since a pre-registry commit cannot carry a registry manifest — the mechanism question is independent.
If the audited party can relax its own audit behind a tautological check, the value being right today
is irrelevant and the next value need not be right.

If confirmed: BLOCKING at D-40's standard, and the fix is NOT reverting the value. It is making the
field non-author-relaxable — activationCommit independently derivable, equal to the real pre-registry
seam by construction rather than assertion — plus a must-fail negative control that a HEAD-valued or
over-advanced seam is REJECTED. The registry must be able to fail on its own seam being gamed.
If refuted: bounded, value stands, hardening tracked as a registry clause, and the refutation is itself
a finding worth having.

f10-coder commended with the distinction stated: it verified identity before committing and disclosed
the non-mechanical change unprompted, which is the only reason this is visible at all. But disclosure
is not sufficiency — an honest author flagging a self-relaxing change still made one. Honesty surfaced
it; the mechanism must catch it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:29:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 32384dab02 docs(remediation): board under budget by ROLLING OUT (D-43), not rewording; item 1 de-staled
Sequencing section rolled verbatim to BOARD-LEDGER — it was a pointer to a pointer, and MISSION.md
plus TASKS.md 5 remain canonical. Item 1 said RM-02 'needs rebase+CI+review'; rebase and CI are done
and it is in review at 83d2ecb2.

Second application of D-43's rule today: delete-and-reference, never paraphrase-to-save-bytes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:27:28 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 777a8f7f5b docs(remediation): RM-02 in review at 83d2ecb2; crux is the activation-seam question (A4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:26:11 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 995f8b6a24 docs(remediation): pre-register RM-02 keystone review ACs before the reviewer reads the diff
Registered at head 83d2ecb2 before dispatch. Prior reviews 63/65 are superseded and this head carries
no live review of any kind, so the keystone gets a full independent review.

The crux is the one non-mechanical change, which f10-coder disclosed unprompted: activationCommit
advanced f65e9ea6 -> f4fd5967 so that the newly merged pre-registry RM-61 commit is no longer treated
as prospective. activationCommit sets the lower bound of the commit range required to carry own-tree
registry provenance, so advancing it SHRINKS that set. The value is plausibly correct — a pre-registry
commit cannot carry a registry manifest — but the change was made by the author to turn the author's
own gate from red to green, which is the self-verification shape the charter warns about.

Registered as A1-A6 without a verdict from me (D-39). A4 is the sharp one: the only validation on the
field is merge-base --is-ancestor activationCommit head, and a commit is its own ancestor, so setting
activationCommit = HEAD would empty the prospective range and the per-commit provenance loop would
iterate zero times. Whether that makes the history check pass VACUOUSLY is for rev-974 to determine and
report — an author-settable field that can inert the anti-inert-gate registry's own history check would
be the disease inside the cure again. A5 asks whether a must-fail negative control exists for it, since
RM-02's own founding rule is that a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence.

B1/B2 carry Mos's scope ruling that the D-38 bind-to-subject and D-40 type-strict clauses land in THIS
PR; B3 confirms D-42's clause is deliberately absent rather than forgotten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:24:24 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0a510d28d docs(remediation): scope rulings banked; D-43 elevated onto RM-34 — the control plane has no verifier
SCOPE (Mos): D-38 (bind evidence to subject) and D-40 (type-strict discriminator inputs) land IN the
RM-02 PR — cheap registry-coverage clauses, satisfiable now, and RM-02 literally IS the registry, so
codifying what its own delivery learned about how gates fail is the coherent move.

D-42 splits, and the reason is sharper than "needs experimentation": landing its clause in-PR today
would give the registry a clause with NOTHING to satisfy it, so the registry would go red on its own
clause and couple the keystone's landing to infra work. Wrong coupling. So (a) the infra experiment
proving the pin enforces via the negative case, in Mos's D-37/D-41/D-42 cluster; (b) the registry
clause "provider-side enforcement requires an OBSERVED negative control", in a follow-up RM-02
increment once (a) gives it something to check. Named owner, not a vacuous check and not a silent
omission.

D-43 point 3 elevated to the PRIMARY requirement on RM-34, with the table that makes it plain: code has
rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan, and the control plane has NOTHING. Every
other layer earned a verifier from a live failure; the board never did, and it is the artifact every
other decision is staged from. "Validate the checkpoint" must mean re-derive the board's claims from
ground truth — not that the file parses or that a successor can read it. It belongs to the
coordinator-daemon deliverable: the control plane needs its own verifier the way every other layer got
one. Today's catch was discipline, not mechanism.

Interim rule binding on BOTH seats until that mechanism exists, and Mos adopted it against himself:
re-derive a board claim from ground truth before any load-bearing use. The orchestrator does it before
dispatch; the coordinator does it before acting on or relaying a board claim that gates a decision.

D-11b addendum: the false-NEGATIVE twin. /user returns 403 on a least-privilege seat token (no
read:user) and reads exactly like an unprovisioned seat. The real assertion is the DIFFERENTIAL —
authenticated push=true vs unauthenticated push=false proves the token caused the difference. A single
endpoint can be true for anyone or refused for an unrelated scope reason. Would have escalated a
working seat as unprovisioned and stalled the keystone on a phantom.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 10:02:19 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8cef39f924 docs(remediation): RM-61 MERGED; bank D-43 — I inverted a board fact while compressing to fit the budget
#1033 merged f4fd5967, verified by property: merged=true + merge commit, #1034 (delivery) CLOSED,
#1000 (retirement trigger) still OPEN. The exemption is on main and RM-02 is unblocked.

D-43 is mine. Compressing RM-02's board row to meet the 8KB budget, I turned "2 reviews clear" into
"2 live REQUEST_CHANGES" — an inversion. Provider truth: reviews 63 and 65 are at superseded heads and
live REQUEST_CHANGES at f9746b23 is empty. The real state is subtler than either wording: no live
blocker AND no live approval, because the head carries no review at all.

Caught only by re-deriving RM-02's state from the provider before dispatching, not by re-reading the
board. I was one message from briefing f10-coder to remediate two blocking reviews that do not exist.

The transferable part: this board carries a hard <8KB budget, it exceeded that budget four times in one
session, and each time I shaved prose to fit. Compression IS restatement, and this board's own rule is
"REFERENCE, do not restate" (D-26) because restatement is lossy every time. The budget therefore forces
the exact operation the board forbids, on its most load-bearing table. I flagged that as a risk earlier
in the session; it then materialised as an actual error.

Rule banked: meet a size budget by ROLLING content out to BOARD-LEDGER.md, never by rewording what
stays. Deleting a row and pointing at its authoritative home is safe; paraphrasing to save bytes is not.
Applied immediately — this commit rolls the Decisions-log narrative out verbatim rather than trimming
it, and the board is back under budget at 8096.

And the deeper one, onto RM-34: the orchestrator is the board's sole writer, so nothing external checks
the board against reality. Code has rev-974, gates have the merge-gate, CI has the JSON scan — the
control plane has no independent verifier. Handoff validation must include re-deriving the board's
claims from the provider, not merely confirming a successor can read the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:56:44 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f3c100f814 docs(remediation): bank D-42 — the head-pin's negative control has never been observed
merge-gate.md says it outright: a successful merge is NOT evidence the pin worked, only the negative
case is. On mosaicstack Gitea a merge against a WRONG head_commit_id has never been attempted, so every
head-pinned merge to date is equally consistent with the pin working and with the pin being ignored.

That is D-23's class — the queue guard "ran" and returned pass for every possible input; the pin
"holds" on every merge that would have succeeded anyway. By the mission's own standard (every
gate-introducing task carries a registered must-fail negative control; a gate with no proven failure
path manufactures evidence) the head-pin is unregistered in substance however it reads in the runbook.

Not blocking #1033: that head is coordinator-frozen with both the orchestrator and coder-mos1 holding,
so there is no concurrent pusher for the pin to defend against — its protection is only load-bearing on
a contested head. Raised by Mos while assigning the merge; Mos owns it and has filed it as an infra
task in the D-37/D-41 cluster, to be proven before any contested-head merge.

Requirement on RM-02: the negative-control clause must cover provider-side enforcement mechanisms, not
only in-repo checks. "The API accepted our parameter" is not evidence the API honours it — the same
true-answer-to-a-different-question shape as D-24 and D-38.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:52:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2750cc4842 docs(remediation): D-38c — PR metadata failed a THIRD time on #1033; delivery-issue gap ruled
Merge-gate NO-GO with every code and CI gate verified, including the --expect-commit machine-check it
was told to exercise (9/9 JSON, exempted_steps 0, expected_commit == commit). The blocker was the body:
only "Refs #1000", no "Closes #N", and Mosaic completion requires a linked issue closed.

Third distinct metadata failure on one PR — missing commit binding, then a stale DO-NOT-MERGE body
describing a dead head, now an incomplete link. Each time the code was fine and the metadata was
unbound, stale, or incomplete. Nothing re-binds PR metadata to the head or checks it for completeness
until a gate does, and by then it costs a round trip.

The subtlety that makes it a real ruling: #1033 must NOT Closes #1000. The teardown defect stays open,
and #1000 is the exemption's own retirement trigger — auto-closing it would delete the retirement
trigger for the workaround being merged, turning a bounded exemption into a permanent one by side
effect. Hence a delivery issue distinct from the defect issue: #1034, with Closes #1034 added and
Refs #1000 kept.

Metadata-only, head never moved: verified by read-back that head is still 57cae04f, Closes #1034
present, Refs #1000 present, Closes #1000 ABSENT, review 70 still CURRENT with zero live
REQUEST_CHANGES, #1034 open. coder-mos1 stayed parked; nobody pushed.

Process gap ruled by Mos: every remediation delivery PR needs a delivery issue to Close, created at
OPEN-TIME rather than discovered at gate-time. #1032 already Closes #1019; #1033 had none.

Both provider writes went through the tea->API fallback — the same path that silently dropped #1033's
draft property at creation — so both were read back and verified by property, not by exit code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:49:23 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 553474e4c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 GATE-READY at 57cae04f — review 70 APPROVED, CI 2194 9/9, D-40 closed
rev-974 approved at the exact head with no blocking and no non-blocking findings. Verified by me from
the provider rather than relayed: head unmoved, review 70 bound to 57cae04f, pipeline 2194 terminal
success at that commit, 9 children all success including clone (a 9-of-9 scan, not the 8-of-9 D-33 was
banked for). Queue guard run for the push gate and NOT cited — state=unknown exit 0 on branch=main,
D-23 verbatim.

The redundant-clause question I handed rev-974 without a conclusion came back answered by mutation
testing, and I re-ran both mutations myself: deleting the bool clause alone leaves the 17-case harness
green (not load-bearing), deleting the exact-type clause alone fails it (load-bearing, mutation
killed). So the exact-type clause carries the protection and the bool clause is inert-but-defensive
against a future type()->isinstance() edit, which the true/false cases would catch. Removing it alone
cannot reopen D-40. Better answer than either of us had, obtained by asking rather than telling —
D-39 paid for itself on the first review after adoption.

Disclosed to Mos rather than absorbed: JSON `-0` decodes to Python integer zero and passes. rev-974
ruled it not a type confusion because it is a valid JSON integer numerically equal to zero. I agree on
the merits, but it is a reviewer judgement inside the exemption and belongs in front of the gate.

Gate steps 1-3 are satisfied. Steps 4 and 5 — merge-gate verdict and head-pinned merge — are Mos's.
Head frozen; coder-mos1 parked idle per ruling (c) and will not push; neither will I.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:40:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0de8ccb52c docs(remediation): RM-62 — fleet management is a PREREQUISITE, and the rotation claim is corrected
Mos ruled (c): coder-mos1 stays idle/parked, not manually rotated. It holds no in-flight work, so
there is nothing to rotate FOR, and a manual in-pane restart would dress a missing mechanism as a
lifecycle operation — the D-41 overclaim itself. It stays AVAILABLE through RM-61's re-review in case
that review needs its context; the next NEW lane goes to a fresh seat, not to a seat at 67%.

RM-62 filed, because a dependency stated as prose with no owner becomes the permanent gap the charter
warns about. Bringing the execution fleet under roster/systemd management BLOCKS RM-50, RM-58 and
P-LIFECYCLE-001 — each is unsatisfiable against its real population until it lands. Banked explicitly
that both would FAIL against their real target today: RM-50 applied now quarantines the seat
implementing RM-50, and RM-58 has no mechanical reset path for any seat that needs one. RM-50 and
RM-58 now carry RM-62 as a hard depends_on edge, and RM-50 carries the requirement that acceptance be
proved against the unmanaged execution fleet rather than the roster-managed canaries.

RECORD CORRECTION, initiated by Mos and banked here: this session's opening rotation validated the
checkpoint+rehydration DESIGN losslessly — the residency attestation genuinely passed from the files —
but the MECHANISM was a manual pane respawn. "The handoff rehydrated losslessly" is earned; "rotation
worked" overclaims a mechanism that does not exist, and that overclaim is D-41. Same distinction as
D-23's inert guard: the step ran, one property was observed, the mechanism was not. Board header now
says so rather than implying a lifecycle rotation occurred.

D-37 and D-41 are one cluster — the execution fleet lacks both its shared-infrastructure and its
lifecycle management. Mos owns both, sequenced at a seam, never mid-lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:34:10 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 37402e9770 docs(remediation): bank D-41 — the whole execution fleet is UNMANAGED, so RM-50/RM-58 have no surface
Went to rotate coder-mos1 mechanically; `mosaic fleet restart` cannot reach it. Every seat executing
this mission is systemd inactive/disabled and flagged UNMANAGED — coder-mos1, rev-974, f10-coder,
merge-gate, the pm-scouts, rev-3107b, ultron-3107, and mos-remediation itself. The roster-managed
population is a different set of seats from the ones doing the work.

RM-50 applied today would quarantine the entire remediation fleet including the seat implementing it.
RM-58's mechanical out-of-band reset cannot be performed at all, so the only rotation available is what
D-4 says does not count: asking the agent, or killing a pane by hand. Requirement banked on both: their
acceptance must be demonstrated against the UNMANAGED execution population, because a criterion proved
only on roster-managed canaries is tested on the wrong population — D-17's coverage class one layer up.

Today's rotation is therefore labelled honestly as a manual pane restart with a hand-verified handoff,
not as a lifecycle operation. The step ran; the property was not observed (cf. D-23).

Did not run fleet restart against a disabled unit while the live pane held RM-61 and RM-03 state.
Disposition escalated to Mos.

Also records the handoff artifact as the positive control: typed state, and it surfaced D-12 recurring
live (PR #1033's draft property silently dropped by a wrapper fallback), an unrunnable check declared
rather than substituted, and suspicions labelled as suspicions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:31:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 01831814b6 docs(remediation): board — D-40 ruled BLOCKING, RM-61 rebuilding, TS1-TS12 pre-registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:25:54 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 86cd1a0f46 docs(remediation): D-40 RULED BLOCKING; pre-register type-strict ACs before the fix is pushed
Mos ruled BLOCKING on the exit_code type confusion. Both of us had leaned non-blocking on the
unreachability argument and neither shipped it. The two decisive grounds: the direction is
wrong-ACCEPT (false and 0.0 GRANT the exemption), which is this mission's disqualifying direction and
exactly why RR12 was tolerable; and "Woodpecker is Go with an int type" is structurally the same
incidental-correlate argument RM-61 itself forbade for the signature — you cannot certify the
discriminator against infra-shift and then defend a hole in it with an infra-stability assumption.

Generalised into an RM-02 standing clause, which is the real prize: discriminator and comparison
inputs must be TYPE-STRICT. A comparison that accepts a type it should not is a wrong-ACCEPT hole by
construction; `== 0` matching False and 0.0 is one instance of a class. D-40 is the instance, the
clause is the fix. It sits alongside the D-38 clause (does this gate bind its evidence to its subject).

D-39b banks the roles-swapped half: the author does not adjudicate its own PR's blocker status and
does not move the head to enforce it. Symmetric with D-39 — a seat with a stake in the answer does not
settle the question, and a conservative motive exempts neither direction.

ACs are registered NOW, before coder-mos1 pushes and before any reviewer reads a diff; at registration
the fix exists only as an unpushed local commit I have not read, so there is no diff to retrofit to.
They also state explicitly which cases are genuine RED-FIRST (false, 0.0 — currently wrongly exempting)
and which are only regression guards ("0", null — already blocking), because demanding an impossible
red for the latter two invites weakening something real to manufacture it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:23:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 249335e515 docs(remediation): bank D-39/D-40 — gate-ready reached, then withdrawn on a finding I disclosed
D-39: I contaminated an open independent review. RR12 was an open registered check and I sent rev-974
my CONCLUSION, not just my observation. rev-974 then downgraded an automated Codex review that had
flagged RR12 as a blocker, in line with my framing. The bias sat in my instrument, not the reviewer's
diligence — a subordinate is agreeable by construction, and the divergence instruction I attached
cannot undo having named the answer first. Mos adopted the rule fleet-wide: a dispatcher may relay
observations and reproductions into an open review, never its own verdict on an open check.
Re-adjudicated by a mechanically fresh seat with no access to my framing: NON-BLOCKING, independently,
on stronger evidence than either prior pass (accept-set matrix proving the accepted set is a strict
subset of a correct case-insensitive comparison's, so it cannot false-certify; exploit path hunted and
ruled out; all 0x110000 codepoints scanned for a fold that could smuggle non-hex onto a valid SHA).
So contamination did not change the answer, and the finding stands anyway — a correct answer reached
by a contaminated process still corrupts the process.

D-40: that same fresh seat looked outside its question and found a type confusion inside the exact
conjunction the exemption rests on. `step.get("exit_code") == 0` is True for JSON false, and
coder-mos1 added the float case. Verified by me on the real #2188 record: false and 0.0 both yield
exit 0 with exempted_steps 1 — the exemption GRANTED; "0" and null correctly block. Two of four
near-miss types satisfy a conjunction whose whole justification is that it is exactly scoped.

Consequence: I reported #1033 gate-ready at 033b2ffb (RR1-RR12 pass, review 69 APPROVED, CI #2193
success 9/9) and then had to hand Mos a finding that may disqualify what I had just certified. Better
that than defending the report. Disposition is Mos's; coder-mos1 escalated it to blocker unilaterally
and moved to push — held, because the author does not adjudicate their own PR and does not void a live
APPROVED review plus terminal-green CI by pushing. Head frozen, fix prepared and unpushed, ACKed.

Board doctrine now carries both rules: never relay a conclusion into an open review, and the author
never adjudicates their own blocker status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:20:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d9ab6026c8 docs(remediation): RM-61 tick — twelve checks pass, blocker moved to metadata, head never moved
rev-974 review 68 @ 033b2ffb: RR1-RR12 all PASS. RR7 is the strong one — all four binding predicates
proved RED against the old e7b29219 verifier, and the original attack under the old interface returned
exit 0 with exempted_steps=1, proving the PRIOR DEFECT rather than merely unsupported syntax.

The remaining blocker was metadata, not code: the live PR body still said "DO NOT MERGE" and "the
exemption will not be implemented", describing an earlier head. Verified independently — the controls
were injected in 3931b0e2/9455cd6a/25ac5971/ef9d23ab and the final delta does not touch
.woodpecker/ci.yml at all. The body was true when written and went stale as the branch evolved. That
is D-38 one layer out: the PR that binds evidence to its subject shipped a description that was not
bound to its subject, and D-36's staleness class on provider metadata rather than a repo file.

Fixed as metadata only. Head confirmed unmoved at 033b2ffb from both provider and git, body SHA-256
b0198d98 matched the author's reported digest byte-for-byte, both stale strings absent. Because the
commit never moved, the twelve results stand and no third review round is owed — only the discharge
of the finding by the reviewer who raised it.

Exact-head CI #2193: success, 9 children, 9/9 success including clone, read from -f json (D-33).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 09:10:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 50c0340add docs(remediation): bank D-37/D-38, pre-register RM-61 re-review, rebuild board for a cold read
D-38 — RM-61's terminal-green verifier certified the right RECORD for the wrong COMMIT. rev-974
mutated only #2188's commit field and the gate still exited 0. Confirmed by construction: at
e7b29219 the whole verifier had exactly one "commit" line (159), no expected-head parameter, no
comparison, no failure path. D-24 at the gate layer — a true answer to a different question.
The transferable half is the AC set, not the verifier: AC1-AC8 ALL PASSED and the PR was still
NO GO, because every registered check tested whether the signature discriminates and none tested
whether the evidence was bound to its subject (coverage-failure-mode-2, D-17 class). Mos ruled a
STANDING clause into RM-02 coverage: "does this gate bind its evidence to the subject under
review?" — every gate can fail this way and pass its own ACs.

D-37 — one shared .git/config silently re-identified EVERY worktree. extensions.worktreeConfig is
unset, so a worker's repo-local identity write rebinds all linked worktrees at once; the
orchestrator checkout and rev-974's review worktree both authored as coder-mos1. Distinct from
D-34, not an instance: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY was exported and correct and still resolved wrong.
Sharp edge is gate-16 defeated in the artifact — the reviewer would author its pre-registered ACs
as the author of the code under review. No contamination occurred. Containment (explicit -c, no
shared-config rewrites mid-flight) is the standing order; the real fix is authorised and owned by
Mos, sequenced at a quiet seam. #1024 is implicated: repo-local pinning is the colliding mechanism.

Also pre-registers the twelve RM-61 re-review checks at exact head 033b2ffb BEFORE the reviewer
reads the diff, and rebuilds the board for a cold read — RM-61 "building", "nothing implemented
yet", and DECISION-1/2/3 "must be ruled" were all stale, the D-36 class again at the same seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:59:40 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 345d152790 docs(remediation): RM-61 result — kill criterion NOT triggered, signature discriminates structurally
coder-mos1 ran two real ci-postgres failure controls; the orchestrator verified the JSON
records independently. #2189 (startup failure) exit 1 and #2191 (post-readiness crash,
log proves ready then postmaster killed) exit 137 both take the workflow and the test
step down — terminal red. #2188, the genuine artifact, carries exit_code 0 under a
SUCCESSFUL workflow.

So the discriminator is structural — a failed service step with exit 0 under a successful
workflow — not the message string and not an incidental correlate like node or timestamp,
which were explicitly forbidden because they pass today and mask a real failure the moment
infrastructure shifts.

Verifier: exit 0 with one named exemption on the artifact; exit 1 with exempted_steps 0 on
BOTH real controls. No fetch, trigger, retry or re-roll — the coin flip is removed, not
codified.

PR #1033 dispatched to rev-974 with eight acceptance checks pre-registered before the diff
was read; AC2 (both real failures must NOT be exempted) is the crux and a REJECT if it fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:44:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f11f257368 docs(remediation): bank D-36 — rotation-seam audit found three stale restatements on the board
Preparing the checkpoint for a cold read surfaced three stale sections, each a copy of
text owned elsewhere, each of which would have misled the incoming orchestrator: a
delivery-gate list still omitting the merge-gate step (D-26's own defect, still on the
board after MISSION.md was fixed); a capability rule superseded by D-13/D-15; and
DECISION-1 still marked CONTESTED hours after it was ruled.

None were wrong when written. All three drifted because they were copies — D-14 three
times in one artifact. The failure is not that someone forgot to update three lines; it
is that three lines existed to forget.

The rotation seam is what surfaced it. A familiar section is skimmed for the line you
came for; preparing state to be read cold by a stranger is a different act from
maintaining it, and catches a class ordinary use cannot.

RM-34: a handoff must VALIDATE the checkpoint, not merely write it. RM-02 registers the
general form with a must-fail on divergence. Interim: audit the board against its
sources at every rotation seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:14:04 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6c779595e1 docs(remediation): rotation checkpoint — board rebuilt for a cold read, three stale restatements removed
Orchestrator rotating at ~803k tokens (~4x threshold). A mission built on
rotation-not-compaction should not run its own coordinator past it.

Board rewritten as the rehydration artifact: in-flight state, a read-this-first block
for the incoming seat, and the live rulings it most needs. Under the 8KB cap.

AUDIT AT THE SEAM found THREE stale restatements on this board, each of which would have
misled the incoming orchestrator:
  1. the delivery-gate list still OMITTED the merge-gate verdict step (the D-26 defect
     itself, still sitting on the board after MISSION.md was corrected);
  2. capability described as 'token-file set = authoritative registry', superseded by
     D-13/D-15 (capability is per-path; assert permissions.push as that seat);
  3. Sequencing still said DECISION-1 was CONTESTED and 'do not treat it as settled'
     hours after it was RULED — an incoming seat would have re-litigated a closed decision.

All three were restatements of text owned elsewhere. Replaced with references, per the
mission's own render-not-restate principle: a second copy is a second thing to go stale,
and this board proved it three times in one night.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 08:13:12 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cc097f36c5 docs(remediation): re-run failed; RM-02 blocked on RM-61, declared bound honoured
Pipeline #2188 at the same head: ci-postgres the sole failure, everything else success
including gate-verify. f10-coder independently confirmed and applied the pre-registered
rule itself.

RM-02 blocked. No ad-hoc exemption, no third roll. Recorded why: two failures against one
earlier clean run makes 'best of five' feel reasonable, and the point of declaring the
bound in advance is that it binds when the result is inconvenient. A third roll would
have been indistinguishable from diligence, including to the person doing it.

Data for RM-61: the artifact hit twice consecutively at f9746b23 while #2184 was clean at
38f1b249, so it may cluster rather than be uniformly random — which makes a one-shot
re-roll close to worthless and strengthens the ruling that it must not become policy.

And the illustration: the anti-inert-gate registry is blocked by an artifact that makes
gate evidence unreliable. The thesis demonstrating itself on its own keystone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:34:20 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 56d8e8a3d5 docs(remediation): record the bounded re-trigger as a stopgap; mark the first end-to-end merge stack
The re-trigger guardrail, recorded so it cannot become practice: one bounded,
pre-declared attempt at the same head with the response to each outcome fixed before
triggering. Re-running until the desired answer appears is p-hacking the pipeline, and
silently nobody can tell it from diligence — including the person doing it. Per Mos: a
per-PR free re-roll would be D-21 normalisation wearing a new hat. RM-61 must make the
re-roll unnecessary, not codify it, and a clean re-run does not retire RM-61.

Milestone: RM-03/#1032 completed independent review -> CI terminal-green -> merge-gate GO
-> coordinator -> held for owner, the first time end-to-end. GO posted under the gate's
own minted identity by a seat that structurally cannot merge. Head verified unmoved after
the verdict, so the commit-bound GO stands.

The first delivery through the complete stack is also the last one gated by a check that
could not fail — RM-03 is that check's fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:22:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4589659bc1 docs(remediation): board — RM-03 GATE-READY, merge-gate assigned, held for Jason
First genuine gate-ready of the mission. Head triple equal at 78ec47cd, latest review
APPROVED at the current head, CI 9/9 by JSON scan with two-observer agreement.

Recorded the shape worth remembering: the queue guard is still inert for this merge
because RM-03 is the fix — the last merge to pass through the broken gate is the one
that fixes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 01:15:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 357a636a3a docs(remediation): promote redundant-observation to charter; bank D-35 (tool caught what attention could not)
Charter gains a fifth principle from D-33: two observers of the same evidence,
disagreeing, catch what neither catches alone — applied to evidence GATHERING, not just
judgement. A summary that resembles an enumeration is more dangerous than one that
obviously summarises; prefer the machine-readable record and state counts so divergence
is detectable.

D-35: while editing merge-gate.md to fix D-33, the coordinator recalled the mandate
string instead of reading it and the Edit tool's exact-match REJECTED it. Third instance
for that author, inside the turn fixing another instance of the same class — and the
only one that did not reach a document, because a mechanism caught it.

A rule that fails in its authors but is caught by a tool has told you where it belongs.
RM-02 should enforce verbatim citation by construction, as the Edit tool did by accident
of design.

Fix landed by annotating the source: merge-gate.md mandates 3 and 4 now require the
scan and count from the JSON record. The shared wrapper was deliberately NOT modified
mid-flight — three lanes are reading it; fix at a seam.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:53:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9e205e8201 docs(remediation): bank D-34 — a context reset silently strips a seat's credential identity
rev-974 finished its RM-02 review and could not post it: pr-review.sh failed with
'Gitea token not found'. Verified — with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY unset the token does not
resolve; with it set it resolves. The token file was correct throughout.

My own context reset wiped the seat's exported identity and my rehydration brief did not
re-establish it. git config mosaic.gitIdentity is persistent and per-worktree;
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is ephemeral and per-context. rev-974 works from ~/agent-work with no
git-config fallback, so it had no warning and the loss surfaced only when it next needed
a credential.

Intersection of two banked findings, created by acting on one: D-31 prescribes rotation,
D-11a requires identity coherence, and nothing said rotation is a credential-affecting
operation. The fix for one failure introduced another.

RM-34: rotation must re-establish AND verify seat identity before handing over work.
RM-50: prefer the durable binding (mosaic.gitIdentity in the seat's repo) so identity
survives a reset by construction. Interim: every rehydration brief re-exports identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:51:21 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 73a313301b docs(remediation): bank D-33 — the full-step-scan tool prunes a step in default output
coder-mos1 scanned pipeline #2186 with -f json and found 9/9 child steps; my scan of the
same pipeline in the wrapper's default text mode showed 8. Verified: text mode omits
clone (JSON shows the ci workflow entry, clone, and the 8 visible ones).

Every full step scan performed tonight enumerated 8 of 9 real child steps and reported
it as complete. clone succeeded throughout so no verdict changes — but the method was
incomplete and its user did not know.

The merge-gate mandate requires a FULL step scan and requires verdicts to enumerate the
step count. A verdict citing 8 where 9 exist is non-conforming evidence, and a gate using
this wrapper's default output would produce exactly that while believing it complied.

The shape is the session's thesis aimed at the detection tool: the doc says read the
artifact not the summary, and text mode IS a summary that looks like an artifact. Compare
D-24 — mergeable was a true answer to a different question; this is a true answer to a
smaller one.

Caught only because two observers' counts disagreed; neither alone would have found it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:49:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eddf718a5c docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 38f1b249 with a fully clean 9/9 scan
First run on this branch where ci-postgres passed, so no exemption question arises.
Recorded that the artifact's intermittency is evidence FOR RM-61's negative-control
requirement: intermittent means delivery is a coin flip until the signature is proven to
discriminate from a real database failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:35:51 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 c83a3cd3e2 docs(remediation): bank D-32 — the repaired gate shipped with a documented switch to skip it
rev-974 blocked RM-03: pr-merge.sh still ships --skip-queue-guard at five sites
including a worked example. It proved this rather than reading it — stubbed the guard to
exit 99, ran a real fixture merge with the flag, and observed the guard never called,
provider payload created, 'merged successfully', exit 0.

Disqualifying because RM-03 repairs a mandatory gate that has never been able to fail;
shipping that repair with a documented bypass means the gate merely requires one flag
instead of zero, and every merge-side CANNOT_ASSERT/HOLD semantic is skipped. L0 bars
equivalent skip switches, and the merge-gate role doc names this exact hazard about
force_merge — adjacent to the field you came to edit, at the moment you are most
motivated to reach for it.

Generalizable: repairing a gate is incomplete while any supported path skips it. The
failure changes from 'cannot block' to 'can be told not to' — the same outcome one
keystroke later. Removing the bypass is part of the repair.

Everything else passed independently, including the 160 KiB stdin transport where #1023
regressed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:33:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bf8c6f4a89 docs(remediation): bank D-31 — seat ran past 100% context with 28 uncommitted files
coder-mos1 hit 102.5%/372k on RM-03 with 28 modified files uncommitted and its branch
still at base — a full context window spent with nothing durable. Caught by polling seat
state, not by any system signal. Nothing warned anyone: no threshold alert, no
pre-compaction hook.

The founding failure mode of this mission — compaction destroying in-flight work —
nearly hit the mission's own delivery twice in one night. RM-01 survived because it had
committed work when checkpointed; this one had none. Commit-then-rotate works;
rotate-without-commit loses everything.

RM-34: a context threshold is not enough — rotation must force a durable checkpoint and
refuse to rotate a seat with uncommitted work. RM-50: seat context is observable state
and must be monitored; relying on an orchestrator to poll is instructions-not-enforcement
applied to lifecycle. Brief doctrine: commit early, commit WIP.

Adjacent: the diff spans 5 guides and 11 templates against a brief scoped to one script.
Queried, not assumed — but a 28-file diff from a one-script brief is a scope signal
regardless of the answer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:07:59 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 bdf8932328 docs(remediation): RM-61 terminal-green exemption ruled B, with sequencing correction
Condition 1 tested: the signature is stable — pods "wp-svc-<ULID>-ci-postgres" not
found across all five observed failures, an orchestration-layer lookup miss structurally
unlike a service-level failure.

But discrimination is UNPROVEN: every observation co-occurs with a demonstrably working
database, and we have never seen a real ci-postgres failure on this provider. If
PostgreSQL crashes and the pod is GC'd, the status query may also return pod-not-found —
the exemption would over-match and mask a real failure.

So conditions 1 and 2 are not independent: 2 is the evidence for 1. Build the negative
control first, prove a real failure produces a different signature, then adopt the
exemption. Kill criterion stated in advance: if an injected real failure also yields
pod-not-found, B is unsafe and we do A.

Filed as RM-61, unassigned — no free write-capable seat; flagged rather than stacked
onto a busy lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-01 00:04:32 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 16d11cd6cd docs(remediation): bank D-29 (syntactic criterion binding) and D-30 (false comparator, mine)
D-29: rev-974 moved two criterion bindings to an unrelated case, reformatted the
manifest, and gate:verify still exited 0. The registry verifies a criterion HAS a
binding, not that the bound case can fail for that criterion's stated reason —
RM02-REQ-03 unsatisfied. The keystone reproduced the defect it exists to eliminate, in
its own coverage check. Caught only by mutating and re-running; inspection would have
passed it.

D-30: my review brief claimed the ci-postgres FAIL appeared on #2167 — it did not
(#2167 is OK). My own banked D-21 says so explicitly; I restated from memory instead of
reading my record. D-26 recurring, in a reviewer brief, hours after promoting
render-not-restate to the charter.

The harm is not the inaccuracy but that I supplied a reviewer with fabricated supporting
evidence for my own reading. It refuted me — query-for-refutation paying for itself in
the same document that introduced it.

Requirement: briefs cite evidence from the record with identifiers, never from recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:59:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8ce77fcb0d docs(remediation): board — RM-02 frozen at 9b4d4beb, CI green, review in flight
Head triple verified independently twice (orchestrator + f10-coder): local = origin =
PR #1030 = pipeline #2182. Full step scan rather than a tests-complete inference.
Queue guard not offered as evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:41:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cdd5568adb docs(remediation): promote query-for-refutation to charter doctrine
Per Mos. A subordinate asked to confirm a hypothesis will agree — the bias is induced by
the query, not by the answerer's diligence. 'The DB flaked, please confirm' and 'confirm
or refute, with the log line that proves it' are different instruments returning
different answers to the same question.

This matters most with agent subordinates, which are agreeable by construction, so the
discipline cannot rest on the answerer being rigorous — it must be built into how the
question is asked.

Origin: the orchestrator's ci-postgres hypothesis was refuted by the implementing seat
with log evidence and then settled by reproduction. Phrased for confirmation, it would
have returned agreement and D-21 would have been re-classified on a false premise,
silently corrupting a banked finding.

Operational form: state the hypothesis as yours, ask for evidence that kills it, say
what would change your mind, and reproduce when the answer is consequential. Added to
KICKSTART's standing invariants so it survives compaction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:21:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ff4b45b025 docs(remediation): RM-03 CANNOT_ASSERT semantics ruled (option B)
Resolves an ambiguity in the orchestrator's own brief, which required CANNOT_ASSERT to
neither silently pass nor permanently block without distinguishing push from merge.
coder-mos1 stopped and asked rather than inferring authorisation; Codex security
independently flagged CWE-693.

Ruled B: merge fails CLOSED (proceeding without exact-head CI evidence is D-23's
condition in a narrower costume), push degrades AUDITED (blocking during an outage
bricks delivery — the Pi-brick class we already banked). A temporary block pending
evidence is not a permanent block, and merge is separately gated by the merge-gate and
coordinator, so nothing is stranded.

Conditions: distinct exit code or the tri-state is destroyed; the audit record asserted
by a registered case, not assumed, or 'audited' is a claim dressed as a property;
retryable and self-clearing; cases observed RED first; no silent degraded merge path —
break-glass belongs to RM-05.

Option C rejected: it bricks push during an outage and defers the degraded path, which
in this codebase means a silent bypass appears under incident pressure. Three are
already on the books.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:17:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f47cf45b0c docs(remediation): bank D-28 — a swallowed diagnostic destroyed a fail-closed check's evidence
RM-02 CI failed on four sandbox tests. Bubblewrap is installed by the gate step but not
the test step, so spawnSync returned ENOENT; replayCommit replaced the spawn diagnostic
with an empty string, so the classifier could not prove Bubblewrap provenance and
correctly refused to treat it as expected sandbox unavailability.

The refusal was right; the information loss was the bug. For a classifier, error text is
not decoration — it is the input. Widening acceptance to make the test pass would be a
finding, not a fix.

Linkages: D-16 again (local has bwrap, CI does not — local and CI disagree a third
time), and diagnostic-preservation registered as an RM-02 gate requirement with a
must-fail control proving a swallowed message is detected.

Process note: the orchestrator's hypothesis that the coincident ci-postgres FAIL caused
this was WRONG and was refuted with log evidence. D-21 stands unchanged as a teardown
artifact and is NOT upgraded — it was about to be re-classified on a false premise.
Asking the seat to confirm or refute rather than accept is what prevented that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:10:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e7c9160c7b docs(remediation): board — delivery-gate doctrine change recorded with render-vs-restate root cause
Per Mos's item 4. The gate definition was incomplete from setup because the gates were
restated from memory rather than referenced, and the omission propagated into every
worker brief since — then recurred inside the correction itself (D-26).

Board now carries the referenced sources, the gate order, freeze-after-GO, the
coordinator/orchestrator split, and the queue-guard zero-information field form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:01:07 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2d58779675 docs(remediation): bank D-27 — role file certifies the inert queue guard as enforced
rev-974 found this while loading the canonical gate sources, i.e. because we switched
from restating to reading. Verified in roles.local/merge-gate.md: mandate 3 requires
verifying 'CI queue guard clear', mandate 4 requires enumerating 'the queue-guard
outcome' in every durable verdict, the merge path annotates it 'real', and the control
table at :290 certifies it ' enforced … genuinely aborts'.

The document is correct about the WIRING and wrong about the CONTROL: set -euo pipefail
with an unguarded exit does abort, but the guard cannot produce a non-zero exit for any
input (D-23). A mechanism correctly wired to a sensor that never fires, certified as
enforced.

Compounding: the verdict format REQUIRES the queue-guard outcome as evidence, so a
conforming verdict must include a meaningless field — the role file instructs the gate
to manufacture evidence, in the mandate that exists to stop bare conclusions.

Interim: record the field labelled ZERO-INFORMATION (inert, owner RM-03) rather than
omitting it — omission makes the verdict non-conforming; silent citation is worse.

Escalated: operator-owned file, coordinator's to fix. Recommend annotation not deletion
— the requirement is correct once RM-03 lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:55:28 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 cbbe3e1ce2 docs(remediation): gate definition now REFERENCES canonical roles; bank D-26
The delivery-gate definition was incomplete from setup — the merge-gate verdict step
was missing because the gates were restated from memory rather than referenced, and the
omission propagated into every worker brief since.

Then it recurred inside the correction: the correcting message was itself a restatement
and dropped five things, including a security precondition (an unminted gate seat fails
open to the owner's admin account — the #3084 breach mechanism) and a citation to a file
that does not exist.

D-26 is the definitive case because every condition favoured success: attention maximal,
actor knew the rule best, subject was the rule itself. A rule its own enforcer cannot
follow while enforcing it is not a discipline — it is a requirement for a mechanism.

MISSION.md and KICKSTART.md now reference fleet/roles.local/merge-gate.md and
fleet/roles/validator.md and state only the gate ORDER. Every reference resolves; a
dangling pointer is worse than a restatement.

Precondition independently verified: merge-gate token is least-privilege,
pull=True push=False admin=False — structurally cannot merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:53:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 9a7ab73952 docs(remediation): charter — Builds 1-2 justified by two independent impossibility proofs; RM-60 option analysis
Per Mos. The choke-point executor and PG spine are not a design preference — they are
forced. Twice during the mission's own first deliveries, work stopped against a security
property that cannot exist at the layer needing it: D-19 (audited party controls the
manifest certifying it — artifact integrity) and D-25 (audited party controls the code
entering the sandbox — execution integrity). Both reduce to self-verification by the
audited party is not verification, and both resolve only via an authority outside its
control.

Neither proof was sought; both arrived while shipping something else, from different
directions, at different layers. An architecture forced by two independent impossibility
proofs is stronger evidence than one argued for.

RM-60 records Mos's sharper option analysis: A (unprivileged userns) does NOT fix the
vulnerability — it grants a capability and leaves the ORDERING defect untouched, so B is
required regardless; A without B is kernel exposure bought for nothing. B is the correct
primitive, generalises to RM-59 and the choke-point executor, and may not need A at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:09:38 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2b85afe4ea docs(remediation): bank D-25, accept RM02-REQ-10 revision, open RM-60
RM-02's per-commit replay needs isolation; the privileged CI step was correctly refused
because PR-controlled code executes before Bubblewrap establishes any boundary — the
untrusted party would obtain the capability meant to contain it. Ordering defect, not a
hardening problem.

D-25 is D-19 one layer down: audited party controls the manifest (artifact integrity)
became audited party controls the code entering the sandbox (execution integrity). Both
reduce to self-verification by the audited party is not verification, and both resolve
via an authority outside its control — twice now this mission has derived Builds 1-2
from a security impossibility rather than design preference.

Option C ruled independently by the orchestrator and rev-974 before either saw the
other. rev-974 added the condition I missed and it matters most: post-merge replay is
DETECTION, not PREVENTION, with a defined quarantine/revert response, and must never be
presented as equivalent to a pre-merge gate.

RM02-REQ-10 revision formally recorded and accepted under RM-02's own clause 4 —
original text, restatement, reason — discharging rev-974's review-readiness condition.
RM-60 opened for the external pre-execution trust boundary, cross-referenced with RM-59.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:05:50 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 eabe04bc5e docs(remediation): bank D-24 — mergeable:true cited as merge-readiness; D-23 corrected backward
Mos verified #1023 before relaying and corrected my framing. Verified independently:
review id-58 REQUEST_CHANGES at f6334080, the current head — the block is live, and its
findings are that #1023's own fix is defective (unknown still exits 0, payload-as-argv
hits ARG_MAX, tests do not assert exits).

mergeable:true is git-mergeability, not readiness. The charter's first principle
committed by the orchestrator inside an escalation about proxies. Fifth instance of mine.

The mechanism, named because it will recur: mergeable is not a lie, it is a true answer
to a different question. A false field would have been caught; a true-but-adjacent field
passes every sniff test — which is why the discipline must be mechanical, not attentive.

D-23 corrected backward per D-14-as-amended, original framing quoted.

RM-02: readiness cases must assert the decision-relevant property — latest review state,
CI terminal status on the exact head, required approvals — never a structural proxy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:50:46 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 36018be8d1 docs(remediation): bank D-23 — the mandatory queue guard has never worked, for any input
RM-02's registered fixtures found this before the registry was built. Worse than the
banked unknown=>exit 0: ci-queue-wait.sh:266 pipes the payload into a classifier
starting 'python3 - <<PY', so python reads its PROGRAM from stdin and json.load never
sees the JSON. Proven empirically — success, failure, pending and malformed all
classify as unknown, and unknown exits 0.

The mandatory pre-push/pre-merge guard therefore returns PASS for every possible input,
including a genuinely failing CI. The six observed meaningless greens were not an edge
case; they are the only output it can produce.

PR #1023 is exactly this fix, open and parked, and its body diagnoses it precisely.
Two aggravating details from that body: pr-ci-wait.sh:38 documented the bug and remedy
and it was never backported to the mandatory sibling (D-14 propagation with a
security-adjacent blast radius); and the fix was opened without re-verification.

Escalated for Jason's #1023 disposition. RM-02 records required-vs-actual with
DEFECT (owner: RM-03); no RM-03 lane opened, guard not edited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:44:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8c496993e4 docs(remediation): bank D-22 — the registry would have verified the wrong artifact
The gate that actually runs is the installed copy at ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/;
a repo-scoped registry would test packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/. Byte-identical
today (sha256 19cda2f7009c536e both) but nothing asserts it.

A registry that verifies the wrong artifact is worse than none — it manufactures
confidence, and the divergence would be invisible from every signal we have: registry
green, CI green, deployed gate arbitrarily different.

D-1/P-ACTIVATION applied to the enforcement mechanism itself rather than to config.

RM-02 gains: for every registered gate with a deployed counterpart, assert
repo-source == deployed-copy with a must-fail control; where none exists, record that
explicitly.

Found by design review before implementation — the only finding tonight not found by
execution, which is the design-first gate on keystone tasks paying for itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:14:13 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e85a088f85 docs(remediation): bank D-21 — a FAIL that means nothing is a green that means nothing, sign-flipped
ci-postgres reports FAIL under an overall-success pipeline on #2170 and #2175 while all
eight functional steps pass. Most likely a service-pod teardown artifact; the test
step's pg_isready fail-fast guard passed, so the database was available during the run.

Low severity, but the pattern matters: a red that is routinely present and routinely
correct to ignore trains operators and agents to discount reds, and the discounting
generalises. Six instances of a meaningless green are already banked; a meaningless
FAIL is the same erosion with the sign flipped.

Recorded rather than normalised — the first time it is waved through without a note is
when it becomes background noise.

RM-55: treat a non-terminal-success sub-step under an overall-success pipeline as a
reportable anomaly, and make the CI contract state which steps may fail without failing
the pipeline. An implicit allowance is indistinguishable from a bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 20:08:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 8a795df0ce docs(remediation): D-14 amended by D-20 — propagation is bidirectional
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Both the orchestrator and the coordinator read D-14 as forward propagation only: a
ruling reaches the documents stating the new rule. D-20 proved that insufficient —
when D-19 superseded part of D-18, the consequence went forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never backward into D-18, which kept asserting a withdrawn
claim until a reviewer disproved it by experiment.

A supersession must update BOTH the documents rendering the new rule AND the finding it
retires, with the retired wording quoted rather than deleted. Interim rule updated
accordingly.

Applying D-14's own rule to D-14, in the same commit that records the amendment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:53:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f5a0566198 docs(remediation): board — RM-01 MERGED (f58b3699); RM-02 keystone is next
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:50:36 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 1e7a0701fd docs(remediation): fix D-18 overclaim (D-20) — reviewer empirically disproved my own documentation
rev-974 blocked #1027 a second time, and the defect was in this file, not the code.

D-18's AC2 restatement omitted the accidental/independent scope D-19 made mandatory,
and D-18 asserted the tampered-manifest control turns integrity 'from a claim into a
property'. It does not and cannot — that sentence predated D-19 and was never revised
when D-19 landed. rev-974 disproved it by experiment: a same-UID consistent
manifest+marker rewrite passed preflight.

Two banked findings firing on the orchestrator at once: the integrity-claim corollary
(I wrote a claim in the voice of a property, in the document defining the rule against
it), and D-14 propagation — I carried D-19's consequence forward into the charter and
the delivery conditions but never back into the finding it superseded. Backwards
propagation is the same defect as forwards and I did not audit for it.

Corrected in place with the original wording quoted and the disproof recorded, not
silently rewritten.

RM-02 fifth clause: documentation asserting a security or integrity property is itself
a claim requiring a negative control observed red. Prose is not exempt from the
mission's evidentiary standard, and governing prose least of all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:48:00 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 43f69bf167 docs(remediation): promote D-19 to charter; bind residual risk to RM-59 as a tracked edge
Per Mos, with his two additions.

Charter gains a fourth first-class principle: when a property cannot exist at the layer
that specified it, three honest moves are mandatory — implement what the layer can
guarantee; state the boundary in BOTH directions (what it does not defend AND what it
does, since either alone misleads); and record the real guarantee as a TRACKED
DEPENDENCY, not prose. A written-down gap is acceptable engineering; an implied-fixed
gap is the mission's core failure in a new costume.

The residual risk is now RM-59 (depends_on RM-12, RM-21, RM-25) — a real backlog task
owned by the choke-point executor and spine, which verify from outside the worktree's
authority. Mos's point: 'record where the guarantee comes from' only holds if the record
is a live dependency someone must close; a documented gap with no owner becomes a
permanent gap that reads as intentional.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:23:15 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f9435c2a03 docs(remediation): bank D-19 — an integrity property that cannot exist at its specified layer
Implementing the D-18 manifest hit CWE-345: manifest and marker share one same-UID
writable tree, so that actor can regenerate both and pass. No local construction fixes
self-authentication without a key outside its authority. The seat escalated rather than
calling it tamper-resistant — the charter corollary working on its first real test.

Ruling: Option A, scope AC2 to accidental/independent/stale mutation, retain the design.
The undefendable boundary is not the weak link (same-UID write already owns the source,
the tests, preflight.mjs and .husky); AC2 exists for the D-5 staleness class, against
which the design works; and a real anchor arrives with the choke-point executor and PG
spine, which verify outside the worktree's authority.

Acceptable only with honest labelling: threat model verbatim in code and PR, the words
tamper-proof/tamper-evident/secure barred there, scope carried in AC2's restatement,
residual risk named as backlog, all controls kept RED-first.

Generalizable: when a property cannot exist at the layer it was specified, implement
what the layer can guarantee, state the boundary precisely, and record where the real
guarantee comes from. A known gap written down is acceptable; a gap implied fixed is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:20:05 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3b191b6b34 docs(remediation): promote the three-mode taxonomy and the integrity-claim corollary to the charter
Per Mos. Two first-class principles alongside observe-the-property:

1. Pre-registration prevents RETROFITTING and nothing else. A pre-registered check set
   can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17), or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18). It confers
   neither correctness nor coverage nor consistency. All three modes were found on this
   mission's own first delivery, by the machinery applied to its own work. RM-02's four
   clauses are the enforceable form.

2. Never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property. A verification artifact
   writable by the actor whose behaviour it certifies certifies the attack. It must sit
   inside its integrity envelope, publish atomically, and carry a tamper negative
   control observed red. If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider —
   an honest 'this cannot be verified' is always available and always preferable to
   laundering foreign content as certified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:14:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 85bdbe3383 docs(remediation): bank D-18 — pre-registered criteria AC2 and AC4 were mutually unsatisfiable
Implementing D-17's fix surfaced a conflict between criteria, not within one. AC2
(reject symlinked generated state) cannot hold alongside AC4 (canonical build
succeeds): verified independently that apps/web sets output:'standalone' and the built
tree carries 42 legitimate pnpm symlinks under .next/standalone. Only building the
tree reveals it.

Completes the chain: a pre-registered check set can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17),
or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18).

Ruling: build-certified symlink manifest — .next itself still rejected; descendants
rejected unless exactly certified. Stronger than blanket rejection because it catches
retargeting. AC2 restated and RECORDED with provenance rather than absorbed, since
silently resolving a conflict between pre-registered criteria destroys the point of
registering them.

Hardening: the manifest is generated state, so a manifest writable by whoever plants a
rogue symlink certifies the attack. Must be inside the integrity envelope, published
atomically, with negative controls observed red first including manifest-tampered.

RM-02 fourth clause: the registry must detect conflicts between criteria, and retain
original text plus restatement plus reason when a criterion changes meaning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:11:52 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 ae4baf145d docs(remediation): bank D-17 — pre-registration confers neither correctness nor coverage
rev-974 blocked PR #1027: AC2 was pre-registered and explicitly required rejecting
symlinked generated state; the implementation accepts it (ln -s into .next, preflight
exits 0 instead of 43) while the acceptance suite ran 21/21 green throughout.

Confirmed independently: preflight.mjs:82-92 rejects symlinks on the SOURCE path,
:28 merely skips symlinked dirs, and the generated-state path :141-163 checks uid but
never isSymbolicLink(). The suite's only symlink cases cover the turbo binary and a
source file.

Sharpens D-8 rather than repeating it. D-8: pre-registration does not confer
CORRECTNESS. D-17: it does not confer COVERAGE — a suite can be green with every
criterion appearing satisfied while a criterion's actual requirement is untested.

RM-02 third clause: the registry must bind each criterion to the specific case that
exercises it and prove that case red before trusting its green. Mutation testing
pointed at the criterion-to-case mapping, not just the gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 19:07:58 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 4512312b9f docs(remediation): D-16 ownership — #1024 is Jason-pending; CI is the authoritative gate for #1027
Propagating Mos's ruling in the same commit that records it, per D-14's interim rule.

The hermeticity fix IS PR #1024, which sits in Jason's parked delivery stack, so its
disposition is his — marked SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON alongside #1023. D-16 strengthens
urgency without transferring ownership; we do not open a third lane on a parked PR.

Class sharpened: a pre-push gate an operator cannot run locally is a gate only CI
enforces, so pointing .husky/pre-push at it misrepresents where the gate lives.
Non-hermetic gates make every green host-dependent.

#1027 proceeds on CI-green; the local exit-97 is a host-specific guard abort and is
not a merge consideration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:43:25 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 e233f196b5 docs(remediation): bank D-16 — local and CI test gates disagree by environment
Ran down Mos's flag. Both hypotheses were wrong: CI runs exactly 'pnpm test' (same
command, path IS exercised) and is green, while this host exits 97 on an
environment-dependent BASH_LINENO guard (#973) that aborts on bash 5.2.15 and not in
CI's container. PR #1027 touches zero files under packages/mosaic, so the guard is
genuinely pre-existing — f10-coder's report was accurate in every particular, and main
is equally affected here.

Not 'merges step around a red' but something worse in one respect: the local gate and
the CI gate disagree about what passing means. No agent on this host can get a green
pnpm test on any branch. A gate only CI can run cannot be a pre-push gate.

Second defect found while establishing this: in the main checkout the same package
fails differently (exit 1) because a test scans the working tree and picks up
apps/coordinator/venv third-party site-packages. A test whose verdict depends on
untracked files is not hermetic — same contamination source that broke format:check,
one foreign tree breaking two independent gates.

Coordinate with #1007/#1024 rather than opening a third lane.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:40:53 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 3477e933df docs(remediation): bank D-15 — token scope is not repository permission
f10-coder holds gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder.token with write:repository scope and was
verified at mint by 'repo access returns 200'. It cannot push: collaborator lookup
404s and its own token reports push:false, pull:true.

Capability has three independent layers — token file (raw-API auth), tea login (tea
path), repository permission (actual write authority) — and satisfying two proves
nothing about the third. Scope bounds what a token may ATTEMPT; repository permission
decides what the user may DO.

The charter principle failing on the check meant to confirm capability: a 200 on a
READ was accepted as evidence of WRITE. written-unverified treated as verified, by
both provisioner and orchestrator, one layer above D-12.

RM-50's pre-dispatch check must assert effective permission for the intended operation
(permissions.push == true as that seat), not token existence or a read returning 200.
A capability check that cannot fail on a seat lacking write permission is itself an
inert gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:32:27 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d0ad6e942b docs(remediation): propagate DECISION-2 to charter — second un-propagated ruling, found by applying D-14
Applied D-14's own interim rule immediately instead of waiting to be bitten again, and
it caught a second instance within minutes: MISSION.md's standing directives still
stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of Mos's binding qualification that the
spine must not be a single-point hard-stop (degraded mode + rollback artifact
required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability
posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected, with the superseded 'no DB means the
fleet stops' recommendation nowhere contradicted.

Two un-propagated rulings out of two that touched charter text. Without a mechanism,
propagation failure is the default outcome, not an oversight — which is the argument
for D-14 being a requirement rather than a discipline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:12:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 7f686aaf6d docs(remediation): bank D-14 decision-propagation requirement; record D-13 reconciliation
D-14: DECISION-1 was ruled and applied to TASKS.md while MISSION.md — the charter a
cold-starting seat reads first — kept the superseded wire-in target for hours, flagged
CONTESTED on the board but never corrected in the source of truth. A resuming seat
would have read the rejected target as authoritative. Caught by hand during an
unrelated edit; nothing would have caught it otherwise.

P-MISSION-001 turned on ourselves: a decision that lives in a ruling and a board note
but not in the authoritative record has been AGREED, not MADE. Requirement: rulings
must propagate mechanically — decisions as records, documents rendering rather than
restating, and a must-fail check where duplication is unavoidable. Interim rule until
the DB cutover: the same commit that records a ruling updates every document stating it.

D-13 updated with Mos's reconciliation: 5 of 6 mosaicstack-provisioned seats have no
tea login — systemic, not a one-off. Supersedes D-11(b): the token-file set is
necessary but NOT sufficient; capability is per-path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:11:01 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 f13222b76b docs(remediation): charter reflects DECISION-1 corrected wire-in target and current status
The charter's build-1 cell still named mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task after
DECISION-1 ruled against it. Leaving the charter contradicting the ruled decision would
mislead any future reader who starts there — corrected in place with the rationale and
provenance, rather than only in TASKS.md.

Also: status PLANNING -> EXECUTING; scout TODO discharged (file is in-tree) with a note
that its findings stand but its recommended wire-in point is superseded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:07:16 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 d1e7ba19ca docs(remediation): promote observe-the-property principle to charter; bank D-13 dual credential registries
Charter gains a first-class principle per Mos: no write is done until the requested
PROPERTY is observed; a success exit code is not evidence. Success output is designed
to be believed — that is why the inert-gate class exists and why the P-WRAPPER
tri-state is not optional. Recorded with its provenance: the orchestrator committed
this exact error (D-12), and three of the session's twelve instances were its own.

D-13: diagnosing D-12 found two parallel credential registries that can disagree.
gitea-mosaicstack-mos-dt-0.token EXISTS, but tea has no mosaicstack login for that
identity — so raw-API paths work while tea-dependent wrapper paths silently degrade.
tea is not stale; the login does not exist. Capability declared authoritative by the
token-file set does not govern the tea path.

RM-04 must reconcile the registries (or assert agreement at startup, with a must-fail
control). RM-50's pre-dispatch check must verify capability for the path actually used.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:06:18 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 0ffdcf14bd docs(remediation): bank D-12 — pr-create silently dropped --draft; I trusted exit 0 over observed state
PR #1027 was created with -d because it carries partial unproven work. tea auth was
stale, the wrapper fell back to the raw API which cannot set draft, warned on stderr,
and exited 0. The PR sat open and mergeable for ~25 minutes, protected only by the
word DRAFT in its title and body. I had reported it to the coordinator as a draft.

Three failures: a fallback silently degrading a SAFETY flag (nuisance for --labels,
dangerous for --draft); a correct warning nobody consumed; and my own failure to
verify the flag took effect — I checked the PR existed, not that it had the property
I required. That is written-unverified treated as verified, by me, on exactly the
class of tool this mission exists to distrust.

Fixed via the WIP: title prefix; draft:True verified after.

RM-02 gains a must-fail control: a wrapper that cannot honour a safety-relevant
argument must exit non-zero. RM-24 gains this as its canonical tri-state example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:03:29 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 be10bdc828 docs(remediation): board tick — 2 PRs merged, RM-01 on rotated seat, dispatch doctrine
Board now carries the pre-dispatch capability check (token-file existence), the
token/authorship coherence rule, and the accreted worker-brief doctrine, so a
compacted or fresh seat inherits them mechanically rather than by recall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 18:01:55 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 2201c30284 docs(remediation): correct D-11(a) mechanism — token identity and commit authorship are separate
Per Mos. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY resolves the TOKEN; commit author comes from git config
user.name/user.email, a separate setting that fell back to the generic value. The
export could never have fixed authorship — my worker brief instructed only the export,
so the seat did what it was told and the commits were still mis-attributed. The error
was in the brief before it was in the finding.

Requirement is COHERENCE: token and authorship must agree; either half alone is drift.
Belongs in seat setup, verified by an exit-asserting test that commits and asserts the
author — not in prose a seat can follow correctly and still end up wrong.

Capability check mechanized: capability IS token-file existence. Before dispatching
seat X to provider Y, test gitea-<Y>-<X>.token exists. The token-file set is the
authoritative capability registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:59:06 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 75dfe2fa75 docs(remediation): bank D-11 — identity drift + seat capability opacity at dispatch
RM-01's seat was briefed to export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY; its commits are authored as
the generic mosaic-coder fallback, so git history cannot say which seat did the work.
P-WRAPPER-001 reproduced on our own delivery.

Separately, nothing at dispatch time revealed the seat lacked a credential for the
target provider — discovered only when it failed mid-task after ~$9 and 69% context.
get_gitea_token behaved correctly by refusing to borrow another slot's token; the
dispatch-time information simply did not exist.

RM-50 gains per-seat capability declaration + pre-dispatch check; RM-04 gains
identity-binding verified by an exit-asserting test rather than assumed from an
export in a brief.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:56:34 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 409bf23e6a docs(remediation): bank D-10 — the queue guard's failure modes are inverted
Same required gate, both directions wrong: fails OPEN on state=unknown (5 meaningless
greens this session, wrong branch too), and fails CLOSED on credential resolution,
hard-blocking a worker's completed work. The identical command succeeded from that
worker's own worktree in another shell, so the checkout was fine.

A gate that waves through unchecked work and blocks ready work has its failure modes
backwards. Availability failures must degrade to a loud, audited CANNOT_ASSERT;
correctness failures must block. Also the Pi-brick shape: a gate whose unavailability
prevents recovery from it.

RM-03 extended to a third requirement: distinguish CANNOT_ASSERT from
ASSERTED_NOT_READY, both registered with must-fail controls, neither exiting 0 silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:52:42 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 31c3191305 docs(remediation): rolling-branch resume pointer + D-9 interim comms rule
KICKSTART resume now points at origin/remediation/state for the live board, per Mos's
cadence ruling: every tick is pushed to the rolling branch immediately (durable
per-tick, no per-tick main PR); main carries periodic snapshots only. Reading the
board from main would silently yield a stale tick, so the step warns explicitly.

D-9 hardened: comms/v1 must use file/stdin transport, never argv interpolation.
Standing interim rule until then — agent-send -f for any body with special
characters, never -m. Mandatory in every worker brief alongside the D-8 clause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:50:26 -05:00
mos-dt-0andClaude Opus 5 6a067174ed docs(remediation): bank D-9 — comms path shell-interprets message bodies
agent-send.sh -m with backticks executes them as command substitution: the recipient
got a mangled body plus a shell error, and the send still reported success. Same class
as the known pr-create.sh backtick bug — two tools in the comms path treating a
message body as shell input.

The failure mode is the mission's own pattern: silent corruption with a success
receipt.

Requirement on RM-40/RM-42: comms/v1 must carry payloads verbatim with no shell
interpretation at any hop, with a byte-identical round-trip test (backticks, command
substitution, quotes, newlines) registered under RM-02 including a must-fail control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 17:48:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0andMos 01e966f36d docs(remediation): mission charter + reconciled execution backlog (#1026)
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Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:47:03 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 524146055d fix(hygiene): .prettierignore must exclude Python build/test artifacts (#1025)
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Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 22:24:49 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 06e0d40352 feat(quality): CI test-membership guard — enumeration can no longer silently under-run the disk (#1017) (#1018)
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Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 14:08:41 +00:00
Mos 166ee8c90f fix(wake): close fd 9 in the detector's sleep child so a dead detector's lock dies with it (#993)
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2026-07-31 13:48:33 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 826a8b3b26 fix(git): pr-review.sh — surface the provider's stated reason, drop the hardcoded #865 attribution (#1006)
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Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 10:52:58 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos a4280b9c98 fix(wake): #984 fatal source guard + #985 absorb re-scan — #973 follow-up batch (#1001)
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Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 10:16:22 +00:00
Mos 4fb44f6345 fix(wake): three-valued grep verdicts — has_match/count_lines across all ten suites (closes #973) (#983)
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2026-07-31 08:39:04 +00:00
Mos 089615f63b feat(git): push-guard — refuse verifications satisfied by the null case (closes #975) (#974)
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2026-07-31 03:35:24 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 76eef39a29 docs(wake): #953 dead-letter retention recorded as load-bearing at the write site (#968)
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Closes #953.

GATE RECORD: review CLEAR at this exact head (author != reviewer, pre-registered diff-blind checks) + terminal-green CI at this exact head + queue guard clear.
CI CAVEAT (#973): green on the wake suites is currently WEAKER THAN IT LOOKS, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. grep error/spawn exit codes are read as absence across 257 assertion sites in six idiom forms; 36 inverted (&&-fail) sites — including 19 credential-security canaries — fail toward GREEN under load. These greens were obtained on solo reruns after load-correlated FALSE reds (2115/2116/2118; main itself was red). This merge's safety therefore rests on the CONTENT review, not on the green. Remediation charter fa551c2d0 is authored and in flight.

Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 23:25:38 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 47f8689231 fix(wake): #952 quarantine-audit clean sweep names BOTH unprovable residual classes (#967)
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Closes #952.

GATE RECORD: review CLEAR at this exact head (author != reviewer, pre-registered diff-blind checks) + terminal-green CI at this exact head + queue guard clear.
CI CAVEAT (#973): green on the wake suites is currently WEAKER THAN IT LOOKS, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. grep error/spawn exit codes are read as absence across 257 assertion sites in six idiom forms; 36 inverted (&&-fail) sites — including 19 credential-security canaries — fail toward GREEN under load. These greens were obtained on solo reruns after load-correlated FALSE reds (2115/2116/2118; main itself was red). This merge's safety therefore rests on the CONTENT review, not on the green. Remediation charter fa551c2d0 is authored and in flight.

Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 23:25:34 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 8d1d6e5e76 feat(wake): #958 A11 preimage.sh — durable provenance for the operator-side preimage definition (#964)
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Closes #958.

The preimage definition (source-adapter.sh) is the single most consequential file in the wake pipeline — every observed_hash is a sha256 of what it emits — and it was UNVERSIONED: no git history, no backup. When it was edited at 07:27 on 2026-07-30, attribution was recoverable only because an agent transcript happened to still be on disk. A11 gives that file durable provenance (option (2) of #958: recorded content-addressed, not in-band).

DESIGN, per the pre-registration:
- Provenance is OUT-OF-BAND (never on the adapter's stdout) — an in-band record would advance observed_hash for every source at once and manufacture the re-baseline it exists to explain (B3).
- The obligation never depends on the provenance path: a missing/corrupt store cannot halt the detector or swallow a wake (#940 advisory-fields precedent; B4).
- DESC_FMT=d1 is NOT the provenance record — the tag versions the descriptor FORMAT; a behaviour change that keeps descriptor shape re-baselines every hash and leaves the tag unchanged (B6).

CREDENTIAL HARD GATE (rebuilt after the first verdict FAILED it): byte capture is now RECORD-ONLY BY DEFAULT (extras opt in via WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE), not allow-by-default-refuse-on-shape — because a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone already enumerated, and the tool's own usage text recommended adding detector.env (where HMAC material lives). Deny is evaluated on BOTH raw and resolved path forms with resolved anchors, ordered before allow — closing the realpath-before-deny ordering defect that let a renamed symlink target through.

VERIFICATION (reviewer, mos-dt, independent of the author's claims):
- Seven decoy cases by planted-marker-then-grep-whole-state-dir: known cred path / same-name symlink / RENAMED-target symlink / prefixed secret / prefixless secret / opted-in-symlink-to-DENIED-target all REFUSED; opted-in-symlink-to-ALLOWED-target CAPTURED (positive control that the harness can capture at all, and that C was not closed by breaking every symlink).
- Polarity-completeness self-test RE-RUN with the shape list stubbed always-allow AND both deny lists stubbed — case D still safe: the flip is complete, the shape list is not load-bearing. Each stub proven live first (a stub that silently fails to apply reports the dangerous state as safe).
- B11: rm-then-change fails LOUD (rc=1), refuses to re-baseline, leaves the ledger absent; absent-with-emptied-objects still first-installs cleanly (absent-is-not-corrupt not paid for by breaking first install).
- RED-first reproduced exactly P13-P16 pre-fix; each refusal corroborated three ways (loud stderr, ledger row captured:false WITH a hash so attribution survives refusal, objects/ holding only the adapter).

KNOWN RESIDUAL (filed #969, non-gating): the deny check is both-forms but the suite needles only the resolved form — a deny reduced to resolved-only survives 17/17 green and would leak a renamed-symlink case. No reachable leak at this head (shipped code correct on all seven decoys); it constrains a FUTURE edit. Doctrine: a both-forms fix needs a needle per form; a fixture that satisfies its assertion through a DIFFERENT rule is testing the rule it did not mean to test.

Authored by pepper (sb-it-1-dt); independently reviewed by mos-dt (sb-it-1-dt) under diff-blind pre-registration (7242688b1, predating first read) — NOT CLEAR on the first verdict (B2/B11 failed by decoy), CLEAR at 8aff7d8 after the polarity rebuild. Manifest version 0.7.0.

Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 21:48:06 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 6a7fce34bb fix(wake): #946 digest ack watermark clamped at quarantined seqs — disclose AND clamp (#951)
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Closes #946.

The digest omitted a quarantined entry's claim from disclosure while still advancing the ack watermark it instructed the consumer to run — converting a fail-safe HOLD into a silent DISCARD, through the documented normal path. Measured: the burial instruction was re-issued FIVE times, four fresh digests plus one system-initiated redelivery fired purely because the entry had gone unconsumed for 1826s. That redelivery is the proof of the 'indefinitely' half: the mechanism re-asserted itself with no new information.

SCOPE — this was NOT a missing check in the consume path. Measured before the fix: dead-letter occurrences were digest.sh 27, store.sh 0, ack.sh 0, detector.sh 0, reconcile.sh 0. Quarantine was owned ENTIRELY by the renderer; the store that advances the watermark had zero knowledge the ledger existed, so an entry could be quarantined by one subsystem and consumed by another with no possible interaction. The fix is therefore a deliberate cross-module decision — option (b), quarantine recorded into a store-owned file, preserving the existing direction of dependency — pre-registered by the consumer before any diff existed.

VERIFICATION
- Pipeline 2107 terminal SUCCESS at e11bc6622, read clone-inclusive from the provider API rather than through `pipeline-status.sh` (which filters `.type != "clone"` per workflow and would hide a clone failure behind an all-green table): 9/9 children success, exit 0 each, no non-success member. Its `test` step runs all nine wake harnesses via turbo -> packages/mosaic `test` -> `test:framework-shell`.
- Independent review by the consumer on the affected lane: eleven pre-registered acceptance checks, authored and delivered BEFORE the diff was read — the file list deliberately unlooked-at, because a filename alone would have disclosed which option was chosen. All eleven resolved, no blocker.
- The check that decides it: a RAW `ack.sh consumed --upto N` with no digest involved must refuse to advance past a quarantined seq — the case an agent hits when a digest is MISSED, and the one that would have sunk a disclosure-only fix. Covered at the head as a named assertion (T13 ordinary-path bypass), written independently of the reviewer's list.
- Mutation: one asserted site disabled -> TWELVE assertions die, every one BEHAVIOURAL, ZERO count assertions, including one killing across the module boundary the fix spans.
- RED control at base a6b5f6a: 34 and 10 assertions fail, matching the body exactly.
- Coordinator re-verify by a different instrument than the reviewer used: static reference counts across the base/head boundary — store.sh 0 -> 49, ack.sh 0 -> 6, `--agent` unchanged at 4 (so #949 correctly stayed out). A fix present-but-inert passes the count and fails the mutation; a fix behaviourally correct but smuggling #949 passes the mutation and fails the count. Neither result is reachable by repeating the other.

KNOWN RESIDUALS
- The `consumed-hashes` repair criterion is met only for keys that RE-EMIT. A corrupted row whose key never recurs stays false indefinitely; the sweep covers those, and the known-false row named in the acceptance criteria had already self-healed by re-emission rather than by design — safe by population, not by design.
- The audit's clean-sweep message names one unprovable class; a second exists (a surviving dead-letter row with an empty `observed_hash` cannot be convicted either). Wording, not logic. Filed separately.
- The audit's provability bound makes dead-letter RETENTION load-bearing for auditability. Nothing prunes it today, so this is latent — but any future rotation or size cap silently converts provable rows into unprovable ones with no signal at either end. This is not a defect; it is a property that BECAME load-bearing and is recorded nowhere. Filed separately.
- `test-wake-detector.sh` D4 fails at this head AND identically at base, with an empty diff over detector files — pre-existing, tracked, not introduced here.

Authored by pepper (sb-it-1-dt); reviewed independently by mos-dt (sb-it-1-dt). The mos-dt-0 commit and fork identity does not identify the author — attribution collapse tracked separately.

Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 15:41:03 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos a6b5f6a01a fix(wake): #944 path becomes a hard-locator arm — detector-shape actionable entries pass the §2.1 gate (#945)
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Closes #944.

_has_hard_locator accepted only repo+issue / 40-hex sha / file — the forge vocabulary. The detector emits path (+snapshot_sha when attested) and NEVER emits file/issue/sha, so predicate and sole producer shared ZERO keys and every class=actionable board_file entry dead-lettered. Latent since #920, whose harness pinned the detector's own emission shape as its malformed example — the suite certified the gap it was written to guard.

Fix: `path` becomes a hard-locator arm, and ONLY path. Bare path-less snapshot_sha is a deliberate NON-arm (would widen past the board_file vocabulary); Q11(d) asserts it still quarantines at 7/40/64 chars, spanning the detector's ^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$ attestation range.

VERIFICATION
- Pipeline 2105 terminal-green at fa36da8. Its `test` step reaches all nine wake harnesses via turbo -> packages/mosaic `test` -> `test:framework-shell`, which names each suite explicitly. The two-levels-down indirection matters: no search of .woodpecker/* can see it, and that is exactly why this question was got wrong earlier today and then corrected. CI therefore DOES attest the quarantine suite and the detector suite at this head.
- Independent review (mos-dt, consumer on the affected lane) PASS at fa36da8, from a detached worktree: predicate provably unmoved from fb3c3c3 (comment-stripped sha256 identical, _has_hard_locator body byte-identical), RED control at base reproduced exactly 8 failures all Q11 including "got 6".
- Third reviewer (wake-judge) ACCEPT on both judgment calls: the Q1 assertion reversal is a legitimate correction (the flip was forced, not elective — base fixtures red 19 assertions against the head predicate) and path-alone satisfies §2.1, whose operative test is "one targeted call, never a search" — two of its four named exemplars already resolve to current state. Requiring path+snapshot_sha jointly would permanently dead-letter a declared source class and conflict with #940's advisory-fields ruling.
- Judge's mutation criterion met: with the reconciled exemption disabled, the gate-level assertion ("an ORIENTATION-tier enumeration must NOT be quarantined") dies at this head and did not exist as a casualty before F1.
- D4 (detector lock re-acquisition) fails intermittently at base AND head; git diff base..head over the detector files is EMPTY, so it is out of this PR's surface on structural grounds rather than on a re-roll. Known defect, fix identified (detector.sh:516, fd 9 leaked into sleep), tracked separately.

KNOWN RESIDUALS
- ENUM-B is now the sole address-free reconciled fixture, so the exemption's gate-level guard is a population of one. Safe by population, not by design. Author follow-up: assert ENUM-B carries no hard-locator arm so the harness guards its own premise.
- The binding spec (CONVERGED-DESIGN.md §2.1, separate repo) still enumerates four forge tokens and reads narrower than the shipped gate. Tracked as #948, sequenced after the dragon-lin reseed.
- Hard-locator arms are type-loose: repo/file/path accept any non-null JSON value. Pre-existing; `sha` fails closed only by accident of test(). Tracked separately.

Authored by pepper (sb-it-1-dt); reviewed independently by mos-dt (sb-it-1-dt) and wake-judge. The mos-dt-0 commit/fork identity does not identify the author — attribution collapse tracked in #3092.

Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 14:01:48 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 539b475a92 fix(wake): #943 whole-string validation for WAKE_SNAPSHOT_TS_FUTURE_SLACK + version 0.6.13
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grep is line-oriented, so a multi-line knob value passed the per-line anchors and was still fatal in arithmetic. Replaced with a case pattern matching the whole string, so an embedded or leading newline rejects. Manifest bumped 0.6.12 -> 0.6.13: three materially different detectors had shipped under one version string, and version= is the component sole self-identity claim.

Authored-by: pepper
Reviewed-by: mos-dt (independent, at this head; transfer proven by blob-hash equality)
Merged-by: Mos
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 11:56:18 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 3e47fc076f fix(wake): #942 harden WAKE_SNAPSHOT_TS_FUTURE_SLACK — validate shape AND force base-10
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The slack knob was interpolated raw into $((...)) under set -u: a malformed value was FATAL to the poll, falsifying the poll-never-fails invariant, and a negative value inverted the guard to deny-all. Shape validation alone was insufficient — bash reads a leading zero as octal, so 08/09 passed the regex yet were fatal and 0300 silently meant 192. Now validated ^[0-9]{1,9}$ with a loud fallback to 300, then forced to base-10 via 10# so the knob means what the operator wrote.

Authored-by: pepper
Reviewed-by: mos-dt (independent, found both the original defect and the radix residual)
Merged-by: Mos
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 11:17:51 +00:00
mos-dt-0andMos 8710d0f6d7 feat(wake): #940 snapshot-datable digests — fd-3 snapshot-metadata channel (#941)
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Adapter emits snapshot sha/ts out-of-band on fd 3 so a changing value never enters the delta-gate hash. Detector validates advisorily (sha regex, epoch sanity before arithmetic, future-skew slack); malformed metadata is dropped loudly and never gates the wake. Digest renders snapshot_sha/snapshot_ts plus a git-show re-verify hint. Adapters that never write fd 3 are byte-identical.

Reviewed-by: Mos (design, independent)
Reviewed-by: mos-dt (artifact, hardening §2)
Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 10:55:18 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos b981b4ec10 fix(wake): #934 mount-free, privilege-invariant seq-integrity fault injection (T9/T11 run in non-priv CI) (#936)
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Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 16:34:58 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 9e81ffd7fc fix(wake): #932 stop reconciler re-enumerating already-CONSUMED detector state (#935)
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Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 15:48:40 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 9becaf877f fix(wake): #917 gate the final observed_seq cursor write + observed.set/cursor consistency (defense-in-depth) (#933)
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2026-07-26 15:14:38 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 17087efe15 fix(wake): #925 framework-ship canon fallback-wake (systemd timer + schema bound + A10 install/validate) — F7 out of the box (#931)
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2026-07-26 13:44:51 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 0ea41e848b fix(wake): #913 installer adoption gaps — _lib dep-check fail-loud + mosaic-wake.service systemd-search-path link+validate (#930)
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2026-07-26 12:37:29 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 347c1d57c1 fix(wake): #924 route dead-letter quarantine alarm via WAKE_ALARM_SINK_CMD with per-observed_seq dedup (G2a) (#929)
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2026-07-26 11:45:09 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 13e6ce5e5c fix(wake): #927 enqueue TOCTOU — move stale-tmp cleanup off the hot enqueue path (no concurrent in-flight-write clobber) (#928)
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2026-07-26 10:56:40 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 90265ef550 test(wake): #923 de-flake T10 concurrent-enqueue race (deterministic barrier) (#926)
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2026-07-26 10:23:07 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 937a276208 fix(wake): #920 quarantine render-refused drain entry (no head-of-line block) + reconciler enumerations render orientation-tier (reconciled:true, render-tier not class=digest) (#922)
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2026-07-26 08:45:51 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 712c770b7a fix(wake): #912 exercise the digest/HMAC trust suite in real CI (fix runner divergence + openssl + hard-require) (#921)
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2026-07-26 08:11:28 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos d967a4a926 fix(wake): #914 digest renderer — WAKE_AGENT-prefixed ack line + digest-class locator threading (#916)
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2026-07-26 07:13:07 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos c585ac3326 test(wake): #918 de-flake T7 ack-no-network-block (sub-second timing) (#919)
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2026-07-26 06:46:28 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos e2ec927b1c fix(wake): #908 unify observed_seq on a single store-side allocator (dissolve detector-private-counter seam) (#915)
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2026-07-26 06:02:02 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 2378665eaf feat(wake): W7 A10 idempotent installer + mosaic-wake.service (component-manifest, Gate-A, blank-reset retire, snapshot-guard, fail-closed install-validate) (#911)
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2026-07-26 04:19:09 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 003cdaa1a6 feat(wake): W6 — off-host dead-man beacon + pluggable alarm-sink adapter (#910)
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2026-07-26 02:30:28 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 320f5bfb6f feat(wake): W5 — synthetic-canary FN-oracle + source-parity reconciler (#909)
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2026-07-26 02:04:19 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 5df47e735e feat(wake): W4 — per-host delta-gated detector daemon (fail-loud source semantics, enqueues to W2 store) (#907)
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2026-07-26 01:04:55 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos dd1391fd76 fix(wake): digest hard-locator gate covers top-level .claim entries (Closes #905) (#906)
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2026-07-26 00:58:40 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 10d957d095 feat(wake): W3 — cumulative-state digest renderer + non-circular HMAC signer (#904)
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2026-07-26 00:32:12 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos dc45eb7c30 feat(kbn): land KBN-101 Envelope A v6 (rc.20) — declarative sink-RBAC + RLS write-source (Form A) (#902)
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2026-07-25 23:58:18 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 28f022d9c0 feat(wake): W2 — three-cursor durable store + RECEIVED/CONSUMED ack-wrapper + watch-list schema (#903)
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2026-07-25 23:58:08 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 2726fab5e0 chore(framework): wire agent-send.test.sh into CI test:framework-shell (W1 follow-up) (#901)
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2026-07-25 23:23:24 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos ab6e8e80dc fix(framework): send-message.sh fail-loud submission verdict + regression tests (Patch 6) (#895)
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2026-07-25 22:57:11 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 1933c6cb1d feat(framework): accept digest message class in agent-send.sh (W1) (#894)
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2026-07-25 22:56:46 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 48a0c86093 fix(lease-broker): recovery_runtime_unittest wait_ready() connect-probe (co-equal CI flake, cherry-pick #898) (#900)
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2026-07-25 22:26:38 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 79c8647fd9 fix(lease-broker): wait_ready() polls real connect-readiness not socket-file existence (flaky CI race) (#898)
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2026-07-25 22:10:15 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 2483dada33 fix(framework): pr-review.sh -r/--repo + -H/--host overrides + UA + repo preflight (Patches 5/5c) (#896)
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2026-07-25 22:08:08 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 4c117afe03 docs(framework): add WAKE-DOCTRINE.md guide (W0) (#893)
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2026-07-25 21:57:51 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 2698ddb7b5 feat(comms): P1 presence — minimal Synapse + fleet presence room + mosaic.presence heartbeat + liveness (#888)
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2026-07-25 21:03:18 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos fabde1c834 docs(rfc): add RFC-001 (MACP/Matrix-native comms) + RFC-002 (install/config/topology) (#886)
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2026-07-25 21:02:54 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 3c7890f17f fix(framework): detect-platform get_gitea_token fail-loud on absent per-slot token (Patch 2b) (#890)
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2026-07-25 20:51:19 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 529c177830 fix(update): mosaic update runs the install-ordering guard post-reseed (#882 --sync-only bypass) (#883)
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2026-07-23 22:18:34 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos a32ce4c8f9 feat(869-c4): activation version-coupling assertion (Part of #869)
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Part of #869

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @90eb48fa (fail-closed identity locks byte-unchanged verified), author id2 != approver id11, clean mosaic-coder author, CI green wp1992. #869 Point-1 CODE COMPLETE (C1/C3/C5/C2/C4).

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 19:07:27 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos d351caad36 feat(869-c2): install-ordering enforcement-hook guard (Part of #869)
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Part of #869

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @b6f36564 (8/8, verified vs real production settings template), author id2 != approver id11, clean mosaic-coder author, CI green wp1988.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 18:48:33 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 76b86a246e feat(869-c5): mosaic doctor activation-check (Part of #869)
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Part of #869

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @e75e3238 (8/8), author id2 != approver id11, clean mosaic-coder author, CI green wp1987.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 18:38:21 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 4422231bdb feat: per-agent Gitea identity resolution (#873)
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Closes #873

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @4b472a22 (author-blocker dissolved via (a) re-author, identical tree hash to tech-approved head), author id2 != approver id11, clean mosaic-coder commit-author, CI green wp1985. Framework train COMPLETE 6/6.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 18:09:34 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 8504216964 fix(pr-review): case-insensitive _belongs slug compare (#875)
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Closes #875

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @9d8d58ae, author id2 != approver id11, clean mosaic-coder commit-author, CI green wp1982.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 17:53:26 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 7edc9b3121 fix(gitea): direct REST comment/review with fail-closed read-back (#865)
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Closes #865

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: fresh confirmatory independent APPROVE @8ac7e70f (1241-case fuzz 0 fail-open), author id2 != approver id11, clean commit-author, CI green wp1966.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 17:25:32 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 2f50c0876b feat(869-c3): lease-broker supervisor unit (Part of #869)
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Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent APPROVE @75235ef8 (9/9, no live host mutation), author id2 != approver id11, CI green wp1971.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 17:19:48 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos db90da347e feat(869-c1): activation-capability probe (Part of #869)
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Part of #869

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent 3-round APPROVE @c5a2bcc5, author id2 != approver id11, CI green wp1973.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 17:14:57 +00:00
jason.woltjeandMos 48fd1df28a fix(ci-queue-wait): treat absent branch (404) as queue-clear (#872)
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Closes #872

Mos (id-11) Gate-16 merge: independent review APPROVE @23cbdaf8, author jason.woltje(id2) != approver Mos(id11), CI green wp1974.

Co-authored-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: jason.woltje <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 17:08:57 +00:00
jason.woltje b79336a8c1 feat(orchestrator): board-roll.sh — auto-roll LIVE board to LEDGER under byte cap (#868)
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feat(orchestrator): board-roll.sh - auto-roll LIVE board to LEDGER under byte cap

Closes #868
2026-07-22 09:20:03 +00:00
jason.woltje 4e5af23214 Merge pull request 'skills: add glpi-* family (solve, followup, sweep, list, create)' (#863) from feat/glpi-skills into main
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2026-07-21 01:09:50 +00:00
Hermes Agent 880c28b191 docs(glpi-skills): genericize operator-specific content per review
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Jason WoltjeandClaude Opus 4.8 7bc2dfb6c8 skills: add glpi-* family (solve, followup, sweep, list, create)
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GLPI helpdesk workflow skills written against the portable
tools/glpi/ tooling (session-init.sh, ticket-list.sh, ticket-create.sh),
cross-linked via [[glpi-*]]:

- glpi-solve    — close a ticket by setting status Solved (5); GLPI auto-closes
- glpi-followup — add a followup via the top-level /ITILFollowup endpoint
- glpi-sweep    — read-only hunt for done-but-open tickets needing Solve
- glpi-list     — query tickets by status/recency
- glpi-create   — open a new ticket

Core rule encoded: completing work means setting status Solved, not just
posting a resolution followup (a followup documents; only Solved auto-closes).

Note: illustrative examples in the bodies are USC-flavored (M2M / helpdesk
ticket numbers) and can be genericized in review if preferred.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GjBgrb9tHgvq414Fqj37c
2026-07-20 18:04:53 -05:00
jason.woltje b0d78d8632 fix(mosaic): de-flake mutator-class lease gate TTL-expiry test (#861)
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2026-07-20 10:32:45 +00:00
jason.woltje 344d86a635 fix(#812 follow-up): normalize detect-platform.sh host-match port comparison by scheme (#859)
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2026-07-20 10:13:29 +00:00
jason.woltje acd7d380f6 fix(framework): install deps on worktree bootstrap + legible deps-preflight at gate seam (#856) (#858)
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2026-07-20 09:38:12 +00:00
jason.woltje 3b70c66c07 fix(framework): drop unsupported --comment from tea pr approve/reject; route review body via durable comment (#835) (#857)
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2026-07-20 09:19:48 +00:00
jason.woltje 11d2818453 docs(tasks): FCM-M5-001 done — verified completion evidence (supersedes #848) (#853)
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2026-07-20 07:45:08 +00:00
jason.woltje aa999daf1b fix(framework): durable Gitea comment posting in pr-review.sh via REST + read-back verify (#812) (#852)
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jason.woltje 77c9a82614 fix(lease-broker): de-flake recovery_runtime b2 broker-socket ConnectionRefused race (#849) (#851)
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2026-07-20 06:44:37 +00:00
jason.woltje 627cf2bb38 docs(fleet): add operator configuration guide (#789)
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2026-07-20 05:22:25 +00:00
jason.woltje 0582a8912b WI-7 #834: T-C server-side branch-protection posture + R1 honesty amendment (#847)
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2026-07-20 04:20:02 +00:00
jason.woltje 2509eb7646 WI-6 (#833): constrained recovery command + mosaic-context-refresh skill wrapper (#846)
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2026-07-20 03:33:00 +00:00
jason.woltje 07553ead33 WI-5 #832: Receipt-challenge protocol (compaction-refresh, milestone 188) (#845)
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2026-07-19 23:18:56 +00:00
jason.woltje e522b22fa4 WI-4 (#831): verbatim-hashed normative fragments (B_payload/H_payload) (#844)
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2026-07-19 20:34:20 +00:00
jason.woltje e4d7d4502d WI-3 (#830): compaction observers → revoke + D4 same-PID generation auto-revoke (#842)
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2026-07-19 19:46:28 +00:00
jason.woltje 8dfcf1903e fix(#838): bound broker reply deadlines + fail-close empty-read; de-flake acceptance harness (#839)
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Bound broker reply deadlines (separate read/lock/send budgets, BROKER_BUSY-before-mutation, fresh post-handle send budget → closes drop-after-commit window); fail-close empty/truncated read → GATE_UNAVAILABLE deny. De-flakes the 1917 acceptance surface. terra CODE APPROVE (pi) + Opus SECREV APPROVED (claude) — RoR comment 18143. Promote-lease-lost-ACK residual = fail-safe two-generals observability-gap, routed to WI-3 D2-v5 as named-disclosed-bounded-residual (route i). Gate-16 3-principal author=gpt-sol.

closes #838
2026-07-18 07:15:50 +00:00
jason.woltje abd2791f59 feat(mosaic): WI-2 mutator-class guard for directive-freshness (#837)
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WI-2: mutator-class guard for the compaction directive-freshness mechanism — command-position parser (prefix x var-indirection unified) + primitive-anchored invariant backstop + all-tools-hook fail-close. Parser-complete on principle: realistic evasion matrix RED-regression-covered, residual exotic evasions proven backstop-caught (B-tests), lens-convergence reached.

closes #829
2026-07-18 05:51:58 +00:00
jason.woltje 8ec67a1126 feat(mosaic): add authenticated external lease broker (#836)
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2026-07-18 03:12:23 +00:00
jason.woltje d801d6c4c8 feat(mosaic): add secure skill registration CLI (#826)
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jason.woltje d3bf52898b fix: reject unknown installer arguments (#825)
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jason.woltje 3f77229e88 fix(#792): fleet roster ENOENT actionable exit + installer heading printf (#818)
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jason.woltje 686c881fe4 fix: fetch actual Gitea PR head for Codex reviews (#815)
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jason.woltje fe7a468c9d ci: bake jq into the prebuilt test image (#821)
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jason.woltje cabf02e7b9 ci: bake git into the prebuilt test image (#819)
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2026-07-17 18:11:16 +00:00
jason.woltje 9ddc6fbda8 feat(fleet): mosaic fleet regen — regenerate roster-derived projections (PR3 of #791) (#813)
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jason.woltje 31607a4af6 feat(mosaic): durable pre-update snapshot + verify net + restore CLI (#791 PR2) (#811)
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2026-07-17 00:43:18 +00:00
jason.woltje 32a0ffba13 feat(mosaic): manifest-owned upgrade guard so updates never wipe operator config (#791) (#802)
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2026-07-16 23:01:26 +00:00
jason.woltje 8536454257 fix(glpi): accept HTTP 206 in list wrappers (#807) (#810)
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jason.woltje 4f29cc604d fix(tmux): correct cross-socket sender identity (#808) (#809)
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2026-07-16 22:47:25 +00:00
jason.woltje 3be443c96d feat(mosaic): claudex isolated config + env-inject + yolo wiring (P2–P4 of #790) (#806)
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jason.woltje 59f5f51ffd feat(mosaic): claudex proxy preflight + lifecycle (P1 of #790) (#793)
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jason.woltje 9745bc3f29 feat(fleet): add reviewed v1-to-v2 migration preview (#788)
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jason.woltje adad486b6f fix(fleet): enforce exact comms authority (#787)
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jason.woltje c1aecfabe9 test(fleet): cover reconciler lifecycle gates (#786)
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2026-07-15 16:46:13 +00:00
jason.woltje 499090508e feat(fleet): reconcile local roster state (#785)
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2026-07-15 15:03:31 +00:00
jason.woltje c593a15ef8 docs(kbn): freeze KBN-101 database role split contract (#774)
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jason.woltje bc5e73629e feat(fleet): add generation-guarded agent CRUD (#773)
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jason.woltje 191efaefeb feat(fleet): enforce generated environment boundary (#772)
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jason.woltje e9c4aa3e8b test(fleet): validate shipped artifact dispositions (#770)
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jason.woltje a5e8e55401 feat(fleet): add shared role semantics (#768)
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jason.woltje eb4e14ae5c feat(mos): add logical identity connector fencing (#757)
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jason.woltje 2e2280070a docs(#753): clear KBN-010 threat and schema gate (#765)
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jason.woltje aa5b43bba2 feat(fleet): add roster v2 structural compiler (#764)
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jason.woltje ba13c08890 Fixes #756 (#763)
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jason.woltje c32d85a337 docs(fleet): define declarative configuration M0 (#760)
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jason.woltje 48b2bc42c9 docs(mos): format Option 2 qualification report (#762)
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jason.woltje 5e832049bb docs(mos): preserve Option 2 qualification evidence (#759)
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jason.woltje 49e8a54105 docs(#751): Publish native Kanban/SOT canon (#752)
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jason.woltje d077183554 docs(tess): remediate M5 qualification findings (#750)
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2026-07-13 19:59:38 +00:00
jason.woltje 405984af5a De-hardcode orchestrator and interaction agent names (#748)
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jason.woltje 8dd4e9d541 docs(tess): ledger sync m4 — M5-003 done, #745/#746 merged (#749)
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jason.woltje bc8016c831 docs(#744): complete Tess documentation gate (#746)
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jason.woltje e72388b2cb docs(tess): ledger sync m3 — M5-001 + M5-002 done (#745)
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jason.woltje 6345dbfcf2 feat(agent): add Matrix native runtime provider (#744)
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jason.woltje c6e3cfbd95 docs(tess): ledger sync — W-001 3-of-3 merged, M5-002 approved, M5-001 in TDD (#743)
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jason.woltje 5789711ee0 docs(tess): add migration evidence set (#742)
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jason.woltje f40e6ba388 docs(tess): sync M4 tracking to merged reality (M4 in-progress / gate-pending) (#741)
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jason.woltje b7b0f508e6 feat(gateway): register Hermes runtime provider (#740)
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jason.woltje 3378b857eb feat(memory): bind operator plugin to agent sessions (#739)
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jason.woltje e2376190e5 feat(gateway): expose Mos coordination boundary (#737)
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jason.woltje cca6aaf947 feat(agent): add Hermes transitional capability matrix (#738)
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jason.woltje 2363f155b4 feat(memory): add operator retrieval plugin (#736)
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jason.woltje 76325ca3f2 feat(tess): add Mos coordination boundary (#735)
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jason.woltje 9e5b9188ce feat(agent): add transitional Hermes runtime adapter (#734)
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jason.woltje f1c6b37b46 fix(tess): route bare Discord approvals (#733)
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jason.woltje 0b621660c8 feat(tess): wire durable interaction surfaces (#732)
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jason.woltje 84d884b932 feat(#709): add configured Discord interaction binding (#730)
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jason.woltje 8246ee0137 feat(tess): add generic interaction CLI (#731)
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jason.woltje 99a2d0fc9d feat(tess): persist durable session state (#729)
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jason.woltje e3b5113be2 feat(tess): add configurable Pi interaction service (#728)
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jason.woltje 24b07d0f83 docs(tess): sync M1 ledger to merged state; M1-V Mos-owned (#727)
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jason.woltje 86a50138a9 feat(tess): add safe runtime observability (#726)
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jason.woltje 7b9f40d3b7 fix(tess): redact chat persistence and egress (#725)
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jason.woltje 9a8a572fcf feat(tess): add roster-bound tmux fleet provider (#724)
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jason.woltje 753a360517 fix(#707): scope session GC retention (#720)
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jason.woltje e92186d768 feat: add Tess runtime provider registry (#722)
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jason.woltje 119f64e69d feat(#707): secure Discord service ingress (#716)
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jason.woltje 46ca3ce742 fix(tess): enforce command authorization approvals (#718)
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jason.woltje 227b73fcdf fix(security): enforce Tess MCP server identity (#717)
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jason.woltje a959b1d6b4 ci: restrict push-event CI to protected branches (halve feature-branch load) (#721)
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jason.woltje 62f8177806 feat(tess): define runtime provider contract (#719)
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jason.woltje 353e43c947 fix: enforce Tess session ownership scope (#715)
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jason.woltje ca9c2b5c23 restore Tess markdown formatting gate (v2, non-author) (#714)
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jason.woltje b580d37d51 Fixes #703 (#705)
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jason.woltje 59e49cfd15 docs(tess): define Pi-native interaction agent mission (#712)
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jason.woltje a99aded26d fix(tools/git): -h/--help now exits 0 across 7 wrappers (#702)
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jason.woltje 4df38f7e81 fix(tools/_lib): /etc/mosaic host-level fallback for credential resolution (#700)
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jason.woltje 4e9e053800 fix(tools/tmux): unique per-invocation paste buffer; track auto-submit-drafts.sh (#697)
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jason.woltje 851c67c27b docs(bootstrap): add python-is-python3 to agent-host prerequisites (#694)
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jason.woltje 86e106fcc9 feat(#462): add federation list verb (#682)
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2026-06-25 02:15:17 +00:00
jason.woltje 67135d3822 fix(fleet): guard mosaic fleet restart against tight-loop re-entry race (#680)
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jason.woltje adb153428b feat(installer): --dev flag builds CLI + gateway from source (#681)
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jason.woltje c739256a2c feat(#462): add federation scope enforcement service (#672)
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jason.woltje fc2970916f style(federation): re-run prettier on TASKS.md (unblock format:check) (#679)
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jason.woltje 79eae2ffce fix(fleet): raise fleet-personas.spec timeout to 30s (mirror #665) (#677)
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jason.woltje 7035cd23bf docs(federation): record M3-07/09 merges + fix M3-11 dependency DAG (#678)
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jason.woltje 3eeed04e17 docs(federation): sync M3 backlog to origin/main reality (#671)
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jason.woltje e0e7be70f5 chore(release): @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.48 (#670)
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jason.woltje d7eaa19380 feat(fleet): provision roster from system-type profile (H3) (#665)
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jason.woltje 248193cd3b fix(fleet): export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS into the agent pane so personas inject (#669)
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jason.woltje a9857c5043 fix(release): republish @mosaicstack/db 0.0.4 with BacklogService; mosaic 0.0.47 (#668)
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jason.woltje e4ede69144 chore(release): mosaic 0.0.46 (persona contracts live) (#666)
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jason.woltje a8008138c8 docs(fleet): record per-agent model switch in north star (#667)
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jason.woltje 0d17a29ebe feat(fleet): export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS into agent env (A3a) (#663)
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jason.woltje 28cfecda94 feat(fleet): inject persona contract at launch (A3b) (#664)
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jason.woltje 6c84ccd0b1 feat(fleet): dedicated orchestrator persona, split from planner (#662)
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jason.woltje 84d2757817 feat(fleet): update-surviving persona customization (H4) (#661)
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jason.woltje a738ac1410 feat(fleet): system-type profiles (H2) (#660)
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jason.woltje 538f0556d5 feat(fleet): cross-domain baseline persona library (H1) (#659)
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jason.woltje 61b1bdac2a feat(fleet): add machine-readable NORTH_STAR.yaml + Markdown projection (#656)
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jason.woltje 937077f6be fix(fleet): report idle agents as available, reserve stuck for genuine blocks (#653)
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jason.woltje 70661e3fab fix(fleet): derive pane idle from window activity fallback (#651)
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jason.woltje e3adc6a1bc chore(release): mosaic CLI 0.0.42 (#648)
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jason.woltje aa27c42129 fix(fleet): pre-trust claude agent workdir to clear the folder-trust gate (#644) (#645)
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jason.woltje 16ae809442 fix(update): re-seed framework on version drift, not just in-command updates (#642) (#646)
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jason.woltje 6980e40e51 fix(db): stop pglite migration tests flaking CI (timeout + WASM OOM) (#647)
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jason.woltje e6b53ea103 fix(tools): default AGENT_WORK_ROOT to $HOME/mosaic/agent-work (#641)
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2026-06-23 13:40:13 +00:00
jason.woltje 4da87640e8 feat(tmux): agent-send.sh --class triage tag for the comms daemon (#552)
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2026-06-23 03:25:16 +00:00
jason.woltje a38a491403 chore(release): mosaic CLI 0.0.41 (#640)
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jason.woltje 78d67c6261 chore(ci): bump ci-base image node 22 → 24-alpine (#639)
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2026-06-23 00:59:39 +00:00
jason.woltje 94e5cd7a81 ci: eliminate cold pnpm install via pre-baked CI base image (Phase 1) (#635)
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2026-06-22 22:50:21 +00:00
jason.woltje 4e84f8e850 feat(fleet): comms-block emitter + FLEET-LAUNCH runbook (#633) (#638)
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jason.woltje cf8ceb3095 CI: add pre-baked ci-base image (producer) [Phase 1a] (#637)
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jason.woltje bf2a6745c8 fix(install): preserve user fleet data on re-seed + refresh active units (CRITICAL) (#632)
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2026-06-22 21:38:09 +00:00
jason.woltje d539d61e0e refactor(fleet): rename tmux socket mosaic-factory → mosaic-fleet (#630)
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jason.woltje 3f69d45334 docs(fleet): consolidate north-star doctrine (budget + control plane + identity) (#629)
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jason.woltje e2336bb0ca chore(release): mosaic CLI 0.0.40 (#624)
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jason.woltje 7342415a32 fix(fleet): consume model_hint + fix socket-default trap (stand-up fixes) (#627)
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2026-06-22 19:18:01 +00:00
jason.woltje 095e19443b feat(fleet): onboarding-injection — comms cheat-sheet + peer roster per agent (#621)
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2026-06-22 17:54:54 +00:00
jason.woltje fabc413407 feat(fleet): F4 Phase 2a — Matrix CS-API connector client + factory (#618)
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2026-06-22 16:48:17 +00:00
jason.woltje 858d90329d feat(fleet): F4 Phase 1 — chat connector abstraction + Matrix design (#617)
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2026-06-22 16:14:32 +00:00
jason.woltje 2bf66136e4 feat(fleet): enhancer role + two-agent floor (orchestrator + enhancer) (#615)
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2026-06-22 13:15:59 +00:00
jason.woltje 4434c3c481 docs(fleet): orchestrator+enhancer two-agent floor + role library + Discord plugin north-star (#613)
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jason.woltje dd0a0d38c6 ci(publish): gate kaniko image builds + publish on changed paths (CI throughput) (#619)
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2026-06-22 13:14:31 +00:00
jason.woltje d46ac40890 fix(fleet): boot-survival symmetry — disable-on-remove + add-enable + init-R5 (#612)
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2026-06-22 08:12:58 +00:00
jason.woltje 8ddd48c843 feat(mosaic): mosaic update re-seeds framework + relaunches agents (R13) (#610)
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2026-06-22 03:34:05 +00:00
jason.woltje 528700ceea feat(framework): P6 — docs + compliance matrix + resident-budget CI (#607)
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2026-06-22 02:20:35 +00:00
jason.woltje 32f4215461 chore(release): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.38 -> 0.0.39 (#608)
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jason.woltje 23343bb7f0 feat(mosaic): P5 — overlay composer (compose-contract + *.local overlays) (#605)
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jason.woltje c8b2dab0ca chore(release): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.37 -> 0.0.38 (#603)
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2026-06-22 01:48:27 +00:00
jason.woltje 6dbe452a9f fix(fleet): watch viewer-session leak + workdir test settle-race (#601)
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2026-06-22 01:43:21 +00:00
jason.woltje 59c755067e feat(fleet): F3-m2 — native Pi heartbeat + model surface + mosaic_mission_status tool (#602)
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2026-06-22 01:43:18 +00:00
jason.woltje 6ffb27787e fix(fleet): complete HB reader/writer consistency + sidecar hardening (#599)
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2026-06-22 01:22:35 +00:00
jason.woltje 130837365f chore(release): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.36 -> 0.0.37 (#597)
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2026-06-21 23:27:14 +00:00
jason.woltje 67df06f1c4 feat(fleet): orchestrator-mutable fleet — fleet add/remove (F5/R9) (#596)
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2026-06-21 23:26:21 +00:00
jason.woltje 60a309d5a4 fix(fleet): heartbeat consistency — MOSAIC_HOME path + configurable interval (#595)
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2026-06-21 23:25:53 +00:00
jason.woltje 2dc0f24828 docs(fleet): Fleet Suite PRD (init/configure/operate + Mos-on-Discord) (#588)
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2026-06-21 23:17:10 +00:00
jason.woltje 31e7a4d25e docs(framework): P4.1 — fix stale install.sh comments + cmp-equal early-exit (#593)
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2026-06-21 23:12:31 +00:00
jason.woltje ca19d57bba feat(fleet): config-type presets + AI-free init wizard (F1) (#591)
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2026-06-21 23:07:41 +00:00
jason.woltje bb7d549080 feat(framework): P4 — upgrade-safe Constitution migration (both installers) (#590)
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2026-06-21 23:03:48 +00:00
jason.woltje 5bef2c35eb feat(fleet): fleet ps surfaces unmanaged socket sessions (#586)
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2026-06-21 22:37:34 +00:00
jason.woltje 2849a8f9db chore(release): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.35 -> 0.0.36 (#585)
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jason.woltje 7ced5588c9 feat(fleet): launcher heartbeat sidecar — HB for all runtimes (pi/claude/codex) (#584)
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jason.woltje afcbbb302f feat(fleet): auto-enable units on install + drift recognizes wrapped runtimes (#583)
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jason.woltje c2c0b5fe8d chore(release): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.34 -> 0.0.35 (#582)
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2026-06-21 18:59:39 +00:00
jason.woltje c9cfe36204 docs(framework): P3.1 fast-follow — governance wording + gate scope + bare-launch note (#577)
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2026-06-21 18:56:50 +00:00
jason.woltje fc90c89913 fix(fleet): durable runtime PATH for detached agent launch (#581)
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jason.woltje af2eede7a9 feat(fleet): Phase-2 observability — fleet ps + watch + send verify (#579)
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2026-06-21 04:23:51 +00:00
jason.woltje 5118be74cb feat(framework): P3 — extract Constitution (L0) + gut AGENTS dispatcher (#575)
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2026-06-21 03:20:32 +00:00
jason.woltje bf24066a49 feat(framework): P1+P2 — public sanitization + blocking CI gate (#572)
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2026-06-21 02:40:11 +00:00
jason.woltje 92316ab41e feat(framework): P0 — MIT license + executable-leak sanitization (#570)
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2026-06-21 01:43:49 +00:00
jason.woltje b354bc8fae docs(framework): add agency & persistence patterns to config + guides (#543)
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2026-06-21 01:43:36 +00:00
jason.woltje e834bbb83c fix(fleet): install executable tmux helpers (#568)
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2026-06-20 22:27:46 +00:00
jason.woltje 7498fcb20d fix(fleet): preserve agent env overrides on install (#567)
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2026-06-20 21:50:46 +00:00
jason.woltje 42d081613f chore(release): bump mosaic cli to 0.0.32 (#566)
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2026-06-20 21:15:25 +00:00
jason.woltje b5c1381e45 fix(fleet): harden operator sends for release (#565)
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2026-06-20 20:41:11 +00:00
jason.woltje 6dfd78f643 feat(fleet): add local canary CLI (#563)
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2026-06-20 17:49:01 +00:00
jason.woltje 45e2c2aad8 docs: plan durable tmux fleet install (#557)
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2026-06-20 16:19:19 +00:00
jason.woltje 57919c38d8 fix(framework/tools): wrapper hardening — TLS validation, cred-path fallback, no-CI fast-exit (#551)
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2026-06-20 10:16:38 +00:00
jason.woltje 87f561c1f8 fix(launch): include Pi native skill roots in 'all' mode; dedup 'discover' force-loads (#556)
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2026-06-19 19:58:09 +00:00
jason.woltje 8c45857859 feat(launch): force-load fleet-critical Pi skills + reconcile skill docs (#555)
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2026-06-19 18:31:02 +00:00
jason.woltje 605221d42f docs(framework/tools): lead TOOLS.md with high-salience fleet-tools cheatsheet (#554)
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jason.woltje ee584ab48c fix(framework/tools): prettier-format woodpecker README — restore main format gate (#553)
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2026-06-18 22:39:35 +00:00
jason.woltje ab4e138003 feat(framework/tools): orchestration helpers — lane-brief.sh + ci-wait.sh (#547)
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2026-06-18 22:08:40 +00:00
jason.woltje 719c6ac3db fix(framework/tools): eval injection, broken JSON, tmpfile leak (#549)
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2026-06-18 21:35:32 +00:00
jason.woltje b8807e60df feat(agent-reflection): durable kernel — reflection.v1 capture + risk-floor + Phase-0 (#545)
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2026-06-16 21:35:40 +00:00
jason.woltje c461380a4a feat(mosaic-as): agent registration + scoped/revocable tokens (US-007) (#541)
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2026-06-16 01:10:44 +00:00
jason.woltje 98a771c8f8 Fix Gitea wrapper login resolution (#538)
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2026-06-12 02:34:18 +00:00
jason.woltje bd9527c033 docs(framework): canonize merge-authority policy (hard gate 13 + E2E gate note) (#537)
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jason.woltje aa221bf92e release(mosaic): bump @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.30 -> 0.0.31 (#534)
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jason.woltje 799df40f4e feat(appservice): room provisioning (M4c) (#535)
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jason.woltje b79e9f32c6 chore(framework): canonize Vault-as-SSOT + ESO-default secrets policy (#519)
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2026-06-11 19:07:00 +00:00
jason.woltje 89d69eb23b docs: add mission control and coordination resilience docs (#511)
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jason.woltje 59b611ba8a refactor(framework): thin-core prompt diet — cut injected contract ~53% (#529)
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2026-06-11 18:10:42 +00:00
jason.woltje dfa0be42f6 feat(framework/tools): inter-agent tmux comms — agent-send.sh + addressing standard (#533)
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2026-06-11 18:01:44 +00:00
jason.woltje bb96a3f23e ci: publish mosaic-as appservice image (#532)
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2026-06-10 23:00:38 +00:00
jason.woltje 48b2f28e45 feat(appservice): mosaic-as daemon host + container (M4a) (#531)
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2026-06-10 22:16:28 +00:00
jason.woltje 8f09c910a9 feat(appservice): Matrix Application Service core library (M4a) (#530)
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2026-06-10 21:23:25 +00:00
jason.woltje dde95a59b3 fix(pi): reduce startup skill-token overhead (#527)
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2026-06-05 18:36:42 +00:00
jason.woltje 821e19dcbb fix(mosaic-tools): roll up Gitea and Woodpecker wrapper fixes (#524)
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2026-05-26 20:56:09 +00:00
jason.woltje 755df9079e Merge pull request 'fix(db): bootstrap migrations on local-tier gateway startup' (#510) from fix/db-bootstrap-migrations into main 2026-05-04 22:13:14 +00:00
jason.woltjeandClaude Opus 4.7 ac5650d9f9 fix(db): bootstrap migrations on local-tier gateway startup
Fresh `mosaic gateway install` (npm) left the gateway DB schema empty —
sign-in 500'd with `relation "users" does not exist`, and every entry
point (auth, bootstrap setup) failed because they all query the users
table first. Five stacked bugs on the local (PGlite) tier:

1. `packages/db/package.json` `files: ["dist"]` excluded the `drizzle/`
   SQL migrations from the published tarball.
2. `runMigrations()` only supports postgres-js — unusable for embedded
   PGlite.
3. `apps/gateway/src/database/database.module.ts` never invoked
   migrations at startup.
4. `createPgliteDb` didn't load pgvector, so migration 0001's
   `CREATE EXTENSION vector` failed.
5. Drizzle's PG migrator wraps every migration in one outer
   transaction, which trips Postgres' `check_safe_enum_use` on
   migration 0009 (`ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE 'pending'` → `SET DEFAULT
   'pending'` in the same tx).

Changes:
- Ship `drizzle/` in the published tarball.
- `createPgliteDb` loads `@electric-sql/pglite/vector`.
- New `runPgliteMigrations(handle)` walks the Drizzle journal and
  runs each statement-breakpoint chunk through PGlite's `client.exec()`
  (autocommit per statement). Records into `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`
  for interop with the postgres-js path. Per-statement try/catch
  surfaces which statement of which migration failed.
- `DatabaseModule` runs migrations in `OnModuleInit` before
  `app.listen()`. Local tier: explicit `runPgliteMigrations` then
  `storageAdapter.migrate()`. Postgres tier: just `storageAdapter.migrate()`,
  which already calls `runMigrations(url)` internally — no double-call.
- Removed `packages/storage/src/test-utils/pglite-with-vector.ts`. The
  "intentionally not exported" rationale is moot now that migration
  0001 forces pgvector load anyway. The integration test uses
  `createPgliteDb` + `runPgliteMigrations` from `@mosaicstack/db`.

Tests: BetterAuth tables exist after migrate; idempotent (re-runs 0009);
partial-failure surfaces statement-level context and leaves no ledger row.

QA on a fresh PGlite install:
- `Applying PGlite schema migrations...` then `Initializing storage
  adapter (pglite)...` in startup log.
- `GET /api/bootstrap/status` → `{"needsSetup":true}` HTTP 200 (was 500).
- `POST /api/bootstrap/setup` reaches Zod validator (was 500).

Scope: this PR fixes the local (PGlite) tier. Postgres-tier first
install still has the outer-transaction problem and a journal ordering
bug (0009's `when` < 0008's). Documented inline as TODO and in the
scratchpad — needs a separate change with real-Postgres validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-05-04 17:06:50 -05:00
jason.woltje bd83f86740 Merge pull request 'feat(federation): mTLS AuthGuard with OID-based grant resolution (FED-M3-03)' (#509) from feat/federation-m3-auth-guard into main
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2026-04-25 13:27:20 +00:00
jarvisandClaude Sonnet 4.6 0af3e218a1 fix(federation/auth-guard): remediate CRIT-1/CRIT-2 + HIGH-1..4 review findings
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- CRIT-1: Validate cert subjectUserId against grant.subjectUserId from DB;
  use authoritative DB value in FederationContext
- CRIT-2: Add @Inject(GrantsService) decorator (tsx/esbuild requirement)
- HIGH-1: Validate UTF8String TLV tag, length, and bounds in OID parser
- HIGH-2: Collapse all 403 wire messages to a generic string to prevent
  grant enumeration; keep internal logger detail
- HIGH-3: Assert federation wire envelope shape in all guard tests
- HIGH-4: Regression test for subjectUserId cert/DB mismatch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-25 06:33:37 -05:00
jarvisandClaude Sonnet 4.6 b01c9b3bb0 feat(federation): mTLS AuthGuard with OID-based grant resolution (FED-M3-03)
Adds FederationAuthGuard that validates inbound mTLS client certs on
federation API routes. Extracts custom OIDs (grantId, subjectUserId),
loads the grant+peer from DB in one query, asserts active status, and
validates cert serial as defense-in-depth. Attaches FederationContext
to requests on success and uses federation wire-format error envelopes
(not raw NestJS exceptions) for 401/403 responses.

New files:
- apps/gateway/src/federation/oid.util.ts — shared OID extraction (no dupe ASN.1 logic)
- apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts — guard impl
- apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-context.ts — FederationContext type + module augment
- apps/gateway/src/federation/server/index.ts — barrel export
- apps/gateway/src/federation/server/__tests__/federation-auth.guard.spec.ts — 11 unit tests

Modified:
- apps/gateway/src/federation/grants.service.ts — adds getGrantWithPeer() with join
- apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.module.ts — registers FederationAuthGuard as provider

Closes #462

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-25 06:33:37 -05:00
jason.woltje b67f2c9f08 Merge pull request 'feat(federation): outbound mTLS FederationClient (FED-M3-08)' (#508) from feat/federation-m3-client into main
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2026-04-24 04:30:29 +00:00
jarvisandClaude Sonnet 4.6 37675ae3f2 fix(federation/client): serialize cache fills, destroy evicted Agent, cover env-var guard
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- HIGH-A: resolveEntry now uses promise-cache pattern so concurrent
  callers serialize on a single in-flight build, eliminating duplicate
  key material in heap and duplicate DB round-trips
- HIGH-B: flushPeer destroys the evicted undici Agent so stale TLS
  connections close on cert rotation
- MED-C: add regression test for PEER_MISCONFIGURED when
  STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is unset

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-23 22:56:57 -05:00
jarvisandClaude Opus 4.7 a4a6769a6d fix(federation/client): pin Step-CA root, fix lockfile, harden cache test
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CRIT-1: regenerate pnpm-lock.yaml so apps/gateway resolves [email protected].6
(prior PR pushed package.json without lockfile update; CI failed with
ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE). Incidentally cleans 57 lines of stale
peer-dep entries.

CRIT-2: cache-hit test no longer swallows resolveEntry errors. Calls the
private method directly twice and asserts identity equality plus a
single DB select, removing the silent-failure path the prior assertion
allowed.

HIGH-1: mTLS Agent now pins Step-CA root via STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH.
Without the env var resolveEntry throws PEER_MISCONFIGURED, refusing to
dial peers against the public trust store. PEM is read once and cached
on the service instance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
2026-04-23 22:30:09 -05:00
jarvisandClaude Sonnet 4.6 21650fb194 feat(federation): outbound mTLS FederationClient (FED-M3-08)
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Implements FederationClientService — a NestJS injectable that dials peer
gateways over mTLS (undici Agent with cert+sealed-key from federation_peers),
invokes list/get/capabilities verbs, validates responses via Zod, and surfaces
all failure modes as typed FederationClientError with a coherent error code
taxonomy (PEER_NOT_FOUND, PEER_INACTIVE, PEER_MISCONFIGURED, NETWORK,
FORBIDDEN, HTTP_{status}, INVALID_RESPONSE).

Per-peer Agent instances are cached in a Map for the service lifetime;
flushPeer(peerId) invalidates the cache for M5/M6 cert rotation and
revocation events.

Wired into FederationModule providers + exports so QuerySourceService
(M3-09) can inject it.

13 unit tests covering all required scenarios via undici MockAgent +
real sealClientKey/unsealClientKey round-trip.

Closes #462

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-23 22:16:52 -05:00
jason.woltje 89c733e0b9 feat(federation): two-gateway test harness scaffold (FED-M3-02) (#505)
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2026-04-24 03:01:25 +00:00
jason.woltje ee3f2defd9 feat(types): federation v1 DTOs (FED-M3-01) (#506)
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2026-04-24 02:54:40 +00:00
jason.woltje 7342c1290d fix(federation): use real PEM certs in enrollment + ca service tests (#507)
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2026-04-24 02:43:42 +00:00
jason.woltje e64ddd2c1c docs(federation): M3 mission planning — 14-task decomposition (#504)
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2026-04-24 01:13:40 +00:00
jason.woltje 4ece6dc643 chore(federation): M2 milestone close (FED-M2-13) (#503)
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2026-04-22 06:09:54 +00:00
jason.woltje 194c3b603e docs(federation): M2 Step-CA setup guide + admin CLI reference (FED-M2-12) (#502)
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2026-04-22 06:06:45 +00:00
jason.woltje fc1600b738 fix(federation): security hardening — OID verification, atomic activation, audit on failure (#501)
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2026-04-22 06:02:52 +00:00
jason.woltje 0ee5b14c68 test(federation): M2 E2E peer-add enrollment flow (FED-M2-10) (#500)
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2026-04-22 05:37:06 +00:00
jason.woltje 3eee176cc3 test(federation): M2 integration tests (FED-M2-09) (#499)
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2026-04-22 05:08:24 +00:00
jason.woltje 74fe60d8d6 feat(federation): admin controller + CLI federation commands (FED-M2-08) (#498)
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2026-04-22 04:39:46 +00:00
jason.woltje 0bfaa56e9e feat(federation): enrollment controller + single-use token flow (FED-M2-07) (#497)
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2026-04-22 04:23:19 +00:00
jason.woltje 01dd6b9fa1 feat(federation): grants service CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06) (#496)
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2026-04-22 03:57:12 +00:00
jason.woltje 1038ae76e1 feat(federation): Step-CA client service for grant certs (FED-M2-04) (#494)
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2026-04-22 03:34:37 +00:00
jason.woltje bf082d95a0 feat(federation): seal federation peer client keys at rest (FED-M2-05) (#495)
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2026-04-22 03:10:20 +00:00
jason.woltje bb24292cf7 fix(federation): healthcheck + restart policy for federated-test stacks (#492)
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2026-04-22 02:56:40 +00:00
jason.woltje f2cda52e1a fix(deploy): bump gateway image digest to sha-9f1a081 [DEPLOY-IMG-FIX] (#491)
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2026-04-22 02:35:19 +00:00
jason.woltje 7d7cf012f0 feat(federation): scope schema validator [FED-M2-03] (#489)
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2026-04-22 02:31:13 +00:00
jason.woltje c56dda74aa feat(federation): Step-CA sidecar in federated compose [FED-M2-02] (#490)
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2026-04-22 02:21:49 +00:00
jason.woltje 9f1a08185e docs(federation): S21 tracking — DEPLOY-01/02 done, IMG-FIX in flight, M2-01 in remediation (#487)
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2026-04-22 02:02:36 +00:00
jason.woltje d2e408656b fix(docker): pnpm deploy for self-contained gateway runtime image (#488)
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2026-04-22 02:02:29 +00:00
jason.woltje 54c278b871 feat(db): federation schema — grants/peers/audit_log [FED-M2-01] (#486)
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2026-04-22 02:02:21 +00:00
jason.woltje 4dbd429203 feat(deploy): portainer stack template for federation test instances [DEPLOY-02] (#485)
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2026-04-22 01:34:44 +00:00
jason.woltje b985d7bfe2 docs(federation): M2 mission planning — TASKS decomposition + manifest update (#483)
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2026-04-22 01:24:00 +00:00
jason.woltje 45e8f02c91 feat(mosaic-portainer): PORTAINER_INSECURE flag for self-signed TLS (#484)
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2026-04-22 01:21:54 +00:00
jason.woltje 54c422ab06 Merge pull request 'docs(federation): close FED-M1 milestone' (#481) from feat/federation-m1-close into main
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2026-04-20 02:20:43 +00:00
jarvis b9fb8aab57 docs(federation): close FED-M1 milestone
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- TASKS.md: mark FED-M1-12 done with PR/issue/tag references
- MISSION-MANIFEST.md: phase=M1 complete, progress 1/7, M1 row done with PR range #470-#481, session log appended
- scratchpad: Session 19 entry covering M1-09 → M1-12 with PR ledger and M1 retrospective learnings

Refs #460
2026-04-19 21:12:52 -05:00
jason.woltje 78841f228a docs(federation): operator setup + migration guides (FED-M1-11) (#480)
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2026-04-20 02:07:15 +00:00
jason.woltje dc4afee848 fix(storage): redact credentials in driver errors + advisory lock (FED-M1-10) (#479)
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2026-04-20 02:02:57 +00:00
jason.woltje 1e2b8ac8de test(federation): standalone regression canary — no breakage from M1 (FED-M1-09) (#478)
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2026-04-20 01:46:35 +00:00
jason.woltje 15d849c166 test(storage): integration test for migrate-tier (FED-M1-08) + camelCase column fix (#477)
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2026-04-20 01:40:02 +00:00
jason.woltje 78251d4af8 test(federation): integration tests for federated tier gateway boot (FED-M1-07) (#476)
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2026-04-20 01:13:10 +00:00
jason.woltje 1a4b1ebbf1 feat(gateway,storage): mosaic gateway doctor with tier health JSON (FED-M1-06) (#475)
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2026-04-20 01:00:39 +00:00
jason.woltje ccad30dd27 feat(storage): mosaic storage migrate-tier with dry-run + idempotency (FED-M1-05) (#474)
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2026-04-20 00:35:08 +00:00
jason.woltje 4c2b177eab feat(gateway): tier-detector with fail-fast PG/Valkey/pgvector probes (FED-M1-04) (#473)
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2026-04-20 00:07:07 +00:00
jason.woltje 58169f9979 feat(storage): pgvector adapter support gated on tier=federated (FED-M1-03) (#472)
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2026-04-19 23:42:18 +00:00
jason.woltje 51402bdb6d feat(infra): docker-compose.federated.yml overlay (FED-M1-02) (#471)
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2026-04-19 23:21:31 +00:00
jason.woltje 9c89c32684 feat(config): add federated tier + rename team→standalone (FED-M1-01) (#470)
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2026-04-19 23:11:11 +00:00
jason.woltje 8aabb8c5b2 docs(mission): author MVP rollup manifest, archive install-ux-v2 (#469)
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2026-04-19 22:51:11 +00:00
jason.woltje 66512550df docs(federation): PRD, milestones, mission manifest, and M1 task breakdown (#468)
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2026-04-19 22:27:09 +00:00
jason.woltje 46dd799548 docs(federation): PRD, milestones, mission manifest, and M1 task breakdown (#467)
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2026-04-19 22:09:20 +00:00
jason.woltje 5f03c05523 chore(release): @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.30 (#459)
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Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
2026-04-12 02:18:17 +00:00
jason.woltje c3f810bbd1 fix(mosaic): seed TOOLS.md from defaults on install (#458)
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Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
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2026-04-12 02:02:21 +00:00
jason.woltje b2cbf898d7 docs(scratchpad): finalize yolo runtime hotfix evidence (#456)
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Follow-up to mosaicstack/stack#455.

Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
2026-04-11 17:14:00 +00:00
jason.woltje b2cec8c6ba fix(mosaic): stop yolo runtime from leaking runtime name as first user message (#455)
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Fixes mosaicstack/stack#454

Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <[email protected]>
2026-04-11 16:57:43 +00:00
jason.woltje 81c1775a03 chore(release): @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.29 (#453)
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2026-04-08 00:42:54 +00:00
jason.woltje f64ec12f39 fix(installer): preserve credentials dir and seed STANDARDS.md (#452)
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2026-04-08 00:40:49 +00:00
jason.woltje 026382325c feat(framework): superpowers enforcement, typecheck hook, file-ownership rules (#451)
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2026-04-07 00:44:22 +00:00
jason.woltje 1bfd8570d6 chore(release): @mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.28 (#450) 2026-04-06 00:46:31 +00:00
jason.woltje 312acd8bad chore: sweep mosaicstack/mosaic-stack → mosaicstack/stack + add short install URL (#448) 2026-04-06 00:39:56 +00:00
jason.woltje d08b969918 fix(mosaic): mask password input in TUI login prompt (#449) 2026-04-06 00:33:54 +00:00
jason.woltje 051de0d8a9 docs: update README for mosaicstack/stack repo rename (#447) 2026-04-06 00:22:20 +00:00
jason.woltje bd76df1a50 feat(mosaic): drill-down main menu + provider-first flow + quick start (#446) 2026-04-06 00:15:23 +00:00
jason.woltje 62b2ce2da1 docs: orchestrator close-out IUV-M02 (#445)
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2026-04-05 23:50:55 +00:00
jason.woltje 172bacb30f feat(mosaic): IUV-M02 — CORS/FQDN UX polish + skill installer rework (#444)
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2026-04-05 23:44:07 +00:00
jason.woltje 43667d7349 docs: orchestrator close-out IUV-M01 — mark tasks done, append session 2 (#443)
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2026-04-05 22:40:08 +00:00
jason.woltje 783884376c docs: mark IUV-M01 complete — mosaic-v0.0.26 released (#436) (#442)
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2026-04-05 22:31:37 +00:00
jason.woltje c08aa6fa46 fix: add vitest.config.ts to eslint allowDefaultProject (#440 build fix) (#441)
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2026-04-05 22:01:57 +00:00
jason.woltje 0ae932ab34 fix: bootstrap hotfix — DTO erasure, wizard failure, port prefill, Pi SDK copy (mosaic-v0.0.26) (#440)
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2026-04-05 21:43:30 +00:00
jason.woltje a8cd52e88c docs: scaffold install-ux-v2 mission (#439)
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2026-04-05 21:27:19 +00:00
993 changed files with 190859 additions and 2749 deletions
+13
View File
@@ -9,3 +9,16 @@ coverage
*.tsbuildinfo
.pnpm-store
docs/reports/
# Step-CA dev password — real file is gitignored; commit only the .example
infra/step-ca/dev-password
# Scratch dirs created by the framework git-wrapper shell test harnesses
.mosaic-test-work/
# Transient config files vite/vitest/esbuild write next to a *.config.ts while
# loading it, then unlink. They are untracked but were not ignored, so turbo's
# package traversal hashed them and intermittently failed CI with "Package
# traversal error: ... .timestamp-*.mjs: No such file or directory" when the
# file vanished mid-scan. Ignoring them removes the race.
*.timestamp-*.mjs
+4
View File
@@ -1 +1,5 @@
@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/
# Pin the pnpm store to the same path the ci-base image warms (Dockerfile.ci),
# so the pipeline `pnpm install --prefer-offline` consumes the baked store
# instead of repopulating a fresh one.
store-dir=/root/.local/share/pnpm/store
+11
View File
@@ -4,4 +4,15 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
**/node_modules
**/drizzle
**/.next
# Python build/test artifacts — same category as node_modules/dist/.next above.
# Prettier must never scan generated trees; without these a local venv poisons
# `pnpm format:check` with thousands of third-party files.
**/venv
**/__pycache__
**/.mypy_cache
**/.pytest_cache
**/htmlcov
.claude/
docs/tess/TASKS.md
docs/scratchpads/
packages/mosaic/src/fleet/testdata/documentation-publication-v1/inline-migration-v1.json
+40
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
# Build & push the pre-baked CI base image (Dockerfile.ci) to the Gitea
# registry CI already publishes to. Reuses the exact kaniko + auth pattern
# from publish.yml (REGISTRY_USER/REGISTRY_PASS from_secret, /kaniko/.docker
# config.json). Other pipelines (ci.yml, publish.yml) pull `ci-base:latest`
# for their install step.
#
# Rebuild ONLY when the dependency set or the image recipe changes — a normal
# code push must not trigger a 25-min image build. `path` applies to push/PR
# events; `event: tag` (releases) rebuilds unconditionally so a tagged release
# always ships a fresh base.
when:
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
include:
- 'pnpm-lock.yaml'
- 'Dockerfile.ci'
steps:
build-ci-base:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
# Lockfile-hash tag: an immutable identity for the exact dep set baked
# into this image. `:latest` is the mutable pointer pipelines consume.
LOCK_HASH=$(sha256sum pnpm-lock.yaml | cut -c1-12)
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest"
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:lock-$LOCK_HASH"
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile Dockerfile.ci $DESTINATIONS
+79 -12
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,20 @@
# &node_image is the pre-baked CI base built by .woodpecker/ci-image.yml:
# node:24-alpine + python3/make/g++/postgresql-client + pnpm + a warm pnpm
# store. The install step resolves from the baked store (--prefer-offline)
# instead of paying a ~731s cold fetch + native compile every run.
variables:
- &node_image 'node:22-alpine'
- &node_image 'git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest'
- &enable_pnpm 'corepack enable'
when:
- event: [push, pull_request, manual]
# PR + manual CI run on any branch — the pull_request pipeline is the merge gate.
# push CI is restricted to protected branches (main) so a feature-branch push no
# longer fires a redundant SECOND pipeline alongside its PR pipeline. This ~halves
# CI load on the storage-constrained runner with zero loss of gating (branch
# protection requires no push/ci status context; main still gets full push CI).
- event: [pull_request, manual]
- event: push
branch: main
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
# repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).
@@ -15,8 +26,47 @@ steps:
image: *node_image
commands:
- corepack enable
- apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
# python3/make/g++ are baked into ci-base; --prefer-offline resolves from
# the baked pnpm store.
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline
# Blocking gate: public framework package must contain no operator-specific
# personal data or private $HOME defaults. Runs early (no node_modules needed).
sanitization:
image: *node_image
commands:
- apk add --no-cache bash
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh
# Resident line-count ceiling over framework-owned resident files
# (Constitution + dispatcher + each RUNTIME.md slice). See DESIGN §7 / R9.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-resident-budget.sh
# Test-membership guard (#1017): also first link of test:framework-shell.
# Invoked from BOTH surfaces it audits (F2, PR #1018) — the guard is link
# [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
# with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
# survives a keep-mode reseed byte-identical (with rsync present AND absent —
# keep mode is a single cp-based path that must not depend on rsync), and that a
# corrupt/empty/missing manifest aborts fail-closed leaving operator files
# untouched (B2/B3). The rollback gate proves a mid-sync failure is rolled back
# from the pre-update snapshot (B1). The durable-snapshot gate (#791 PR2) proves
# the retained, operator-scoped pre-update backup is taken before any mutation
# (0700/0600, secret never logged, retention-pruned) and that the post-sync
# verify net restores any operator file a manifest bug lets the sync touch. The
# migration matrix pins the v2→v3 contract-file semantics. Pure bash, no
# node_modules — runs early alongside sanitization.
upgrade-guard:
image: *node_image
commands:
- apk add --no-cache bash rsync
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-manifest-guard.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-install-migration.sh
typecheck:
image: *node_image
@@ -25,6 +75,8 @@ steps:
- pnpm typecheck
depends_on:
- install
- sanitization
- upgrade-guard
# lint, format, and test are independent — run in parallel after typecheck
lint:
@@ -46,18 +98,33 @@ steps:
test:
image: *node_image
environment:
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@postgres:5432/mosaic
# Avoid the namespace-level Woodpecker DB service named "postgres".
# The Kubernetes backend exposes service containers by step name.
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@ci-postgres:5432/mosaic
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
# Install postgresql-client for pg_isready
- apk add --no-cache postgresql-client
# Wait up to 30s for postgres to be ready
# openssl (#912) is the wake HMAC signer: the digest H1/H2, beacon B12,
# and install I8 legs hard-require it in CI. It is baked into ci-base via
# Dockerfile.ci, but ci-base only rebuilds on push-to-main/tag — this
# `apk add` guarantees openssl is present on PR pipelines too (and is a
# fast no-op once the rebuilt image already ships it).
- apk add --no-cache openssl
# postgresql-client (pg_isready) is baked into ci-base.
# Wait up to 60s for CI postgres to be ready; fail fast if it never comes up.
- |
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
pg_isready -h postgres -p 5432 -U mosaic && break
echo "Waiting for postgres ($i/30)..."
ready=0
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
if pg_isready -h ci-postgres -p 5432 -U mosaic; then
ready=1
break
fi
echo "Waiting for ci-postgres ($i/60)..."
sleep 1
done
if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "ci-postgres did not become ready" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Run migrations (DATABASE_URL is set in environment above)
- pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate
# Run all tests
@@ -66,7 +133,7 @@ steps:
- typecheck
services:
postgres:
ci-postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: mosaic
+66 -9
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,27 @@
# Runs only on main branch push/tag
variables:
- &node_image 'node:22-alpine'
# Pre-baked CI base (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml): node:24-alpine +
# toolchain + warm pnpm store. Kills the second cold install publish pays.
- &node_image 'git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest'
- &enable_pnpm 'corepack enable'
# Heavy kaniko image builds (~25 min) — gate them so a merge that only touches
# the npm-only CLI (@mosaicstack/mosaic) or docs does NOT rebuild the platform
# images (gateway/appservice/web do not depend on @mosaicstack/mosaic). Releases
# (tags) always build everything. Exclude-list keeps the default SAFE: any
# non-excluded change still builds, so no transitive dep can silently go stale.
# (Woodpecker: `when` entries are OR'd; `path` applies to push/PR only — hence
# the separate `event: tag` entry.)
- &image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
exclude:
- 'packages/mosaic/**'
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
when:
- branch: [main]
@@ -14,7 +33,8 @@ steps:
image: *node_image
commands:
- corepack enable
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
# Resolve from the baked pnpm store instead of a cold network fetch.
- pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline
build:
image: *node_image
@@ -26,6 +46,15 @@ steps:
publish-npm:
image: *node_image
# Publish only when a publishable package changed (or on a release tag); a
# pure-docs merge runs no publish. Cheap step, but gated for cleanliness.
when:
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
include:
- 'packages/**'
environment:
NPM_TOKEN:
from_secret: gitea_token
@@ -91,6 +120,7 @@ steps:
build-gateway:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -103,19 +133,20 @@ steps:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/gateway:latest"
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/gateway.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
build-web:
build-appservice:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -128,12 +159,38 @@ steps:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/web:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/web:latest"
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/web:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/appservice.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
build-web:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: gitea_password
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/web.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
+8 -8
View File
@@ -58,14 +58,14 @@ pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm format:check # Quality gates
The `agent` column specifies the required model for each task. **This is set at task creation by the orchestrator and must not be changed by workers.**
| Value | When to use | Budget |
| -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `codex` | All coding tasks (default for implementation) | OpenAI credits — preferred |
| `glm-5` | Cost-sensitive coding where Codex is unavailable | Z.ai credits |
| `haiku` | Review gates, verify tasks, status checks, docs-only | Cheapest Claude tier |
| `sonnet` | Complex planning, multi-file reasoning, architecture review | Claude quota |
| `opus` | Major cross-cutting architecture decisions ONLY | Most expensive — minimize |
| `—` | No preference / auto-select cheapest capable | Pipeline decides |
| Value | When to use | Budget |
| --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `codex` | All coding tasks (default for implementation) | OpenAI credits — preferred |
| `glm-5.1` | Cost-sensitive coding where Codex is unavailable | Z.ai credits |
| `haiku` | Review gates, verify tasks, status checks, docs-only | Cheapest Claude tier |
| `sonnet` | Complex planning, multi-file reasoning, architecture review | Claude quota |
| `opus` | Major cross-cutting architecture decisions ONLY | Most expensive — minimize |
| `—` | No preference / auto-select cheapest capable | Pipeline decides |
Pipeline crons read this column and spawn accordingly. Workers never modify `docs/TASKS.md` — only the orchestrator writes it.
+7 -6
View File
@@ -26,13 +26,14 @@ pnpm test # Vitest (all packages)
pnpm build # Build all packages
# Database
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push # Push schema to PG (dev)
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate # Generate migrations
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate # Run migrations
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate # Offline migration artifact generation only
# PostgreSQL execution is held until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 land. Do not invoke a runner,
# init SQL, or Compose PostgreSQL service from this checkout.
# Dev
docker compose up -d # Start PG, Valkey, OTEL, Jaeger
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec tsx src/main.ts # Start gateway
# Dev: local PGlite data-layer work needs no PostgreSQL. Optional local queue service only:
docker compose up -d valkey
# Do not start Gateway/Web or root pnpm dev as a local PGlite route: the current unguarded dotenv
# loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. KBN-101-02 must make that state fail closed first.
```
## Conventions
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# Pre-baked CI base image for Woodpecker pipelines.
#
# Purpose: eliminate the cold `pnpm install` that dominates every pipeline
# (~731s median). This image ships the native toolchain (no per-run `apk add`)
# AND a warm, content-addressable pnpm store with the dependency-tree tarballs
# already fetched at build time. `pnpm fetch` only populates the store from the
# lockfile — it does NOT run the native node-gyp builds (better-sqlite3,
# node-pty, sqlite3, canvas, sharp); those still compile at `pnpm install`,
# which is exactly why the musl toolchain stays baked into this image. A
# pipeline `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline` then resolves
# tarballs from local hard-links (no network) and compiles natives against the
# already-present toolchain, in tens of seconds instead of ~731s.
#
# Rebuilt only when `pnpm-lock.yaml` or this Dockerfile change
# (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml).
#
# Node version is pinned to 24 (Active LTS). This is the follow-up bump from
# node:22 — sequenced AFTER the CI cache work landed so the runtime change
# carries zero cache variables. node:26 stays held until it reaches LTS
# (Oct 2026); the Current line risks native-module (node-gyp) breakage on a
# runner that compiles better-sqlite3 / canvas / sharp / node-pty from source.
FROM node:24-alpine
# Native toolchain required to compile node-gyp deps on musl, plus the
# postgresql-client used by the test step's pg_isready readiness probe. `bash`,
# `git`, and `jq` are baked here too — framework shell tests and the shipped
# Codex review wrappers require them without per-run installation in ci.yml.
# `openssl` (#912) is the non-circular HMAC signer for the wake trust layer:
# the digest H1/H2, beacon B12, and install I8 legs hard-require it in CI so the
# §4 G6 evidence comes from an actually-run HMAC leg, not a skipped one.
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ postgresql-client bash git jq openssl
# Pin pnpm to the repo's packageManager version via corepack.
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare [email protected] --activate
WORKDIR /app
# Pin the store location so the pipeline can point `store-dir` at the same path.
ENV PNPM_HOME=/root/.local/share/pnpm
RUN pnpm config set store-dir /root/.local/share/pnpm/store
# Warm the store. `pnpm fetch` populates the content-addressable store with the
# dependency tarballs directly from the lockfile (no package.json / workspace
# needed), so a baked store stays valid until the lockfile changes. Note:
# `fetch` does NOT compile native modules — that happens later at `pnpm install`
# in the pipeline, against the toolchain baked above.
COPY pnpm-lock.yaml ./
RUN pnpm fetch --frozen-lockfile
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2026 Mosaic Stack
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
+53 -24
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ Mosaic gives you a unified launcher for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi —
## Quick Install
```bash
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
curl -fsSL https://mosaicstack.dev/install.sh | bash
```
Or use the direct URL:
```bash
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
```
The installer auto-launches the setup wizard, which walks you through gateway install and verification. Flags for non-interactive use:
@@ -52,6 +58,8 @@ mosaic yolo pi # Pi in yolo mode
The launcher verifies your config, checks for `SOUL.md`, injects your `AGENTS.md` standards into the runtime, and forwards all arguments.
Pi launches default to a token-lean skill posture: `mosaic pi` passes `--no-skills` so Pi does not preload every global skill description into the system prompt. Use `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=all mosaic pi` for the legacy all-skills catalog, or `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=discover mosaic pi` to let Pi use its native settings/project skill discovery.
### TUI & Gateway
```bash
@@ -74,6 +82,8 @@ If you already have a gateway account but no token, use `mosaic gateway config r
### Configuration
Mosaic supports three storage tiers: `local` (PGlite, single-host), `standalone` (PostgreSQL, single-host), and `federated` (PostgreSQL + pgvector + Valkey, multi-host). See [Federated Tier Setup](docs/federation/SETUP.md) for multi-user and production deployments, or [Migrating to Federated](docs/guides/migrate-tier.md) to upgrade from existing tiers.
```bash
mosaic config show # Print full config as JSON
mosaic config get <key> # Read a specific key
@@ -87,7 +97,10 @@ mosaic config path # Print config file path
```bash
mosaic doctor # Health audit — detect drift and missing files
mosaic sync # Sync skills from canonical source
mosaic update # Check for and install CLI updates
mosaic skill list # Audit Claude skill registrations and conflicts
mosaic skill register <name> # Register one canonical skill with Claude Code
mosaic skill unregister <name> # Remove one Mosaic-owned Claude link
mosaic update # Update CLI/framework and auto-register canonical skills
mosaic wizard # Full guided setup wizard
mosaic bootstrap <path> # Bootstrap a repo with Mosaic standards
mosaic coord init # Initialize a new orchestration mission
@@ -147,7 +160,12 @@ mosaic storage status
mosaic storage tier
mosaic storage export
mosaic storage import
mosaic storage migrate
# Schema migration is unavailable in this release. The current storage wrapper shells
# directly to `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate`; it is legacy N-1,
# uncertified, and MUST NOT be invoked pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation.
# Future schema migration is non-operative: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner
# --run → runner --verify → readiness. Tier copy uses only the separately held secure
# migrate-tier route.
```
### Telemetry
@@ -179,32 +197,35 @@ Consent state is persisted in config. Remote upload is a no-op until you run `mo
### Setup
```bash
git clone [email protected]:mosaicstack/mosaic-stack.git
cd mosaic-stack
git clone [email protected]:mosaicstack/stack.git
cd stack
# Start infrastructure (Postgres, Valkey, Jaeger)
docker compose up -d
# Install dependencies
# Install dependencies. The local tier uses in-process PGlite; leave DATABASE_URL unset.
pnpm install
# Run migrations
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate
# Optional local queue service only. This does not start PostgreSQL.
docker compose up -d valkey
# Start all services in dev mode
pnpm dev
# The current Gateway/Web local process is held; see docs/guides/dev-guide.md.
# Do not start it until KBN-101-02 makes inherited dotenv/DSN state fail closed.
```
### Infrastructure
### Held future procedure
Docker Compose provides:
The checked-in Compose PostgreSQL service mounts legacy initialization SQL and is **not** a
current PostgreSQL, standalone, or federated developer route. Do not start it with Compose,
invoke initialization SQL, or treat the planned migrator as currently executable.
| Service | Port | Purpose |
| --------------------- | --------- | ---------------------- |
| PostgreSQL (pgvector) | 5433 | Primary database |
| Valkey | 6380 | Task queue + caching |
| Jaeger | 16686 | Distributed tracing UI |
| OTEL Collector | 4317/4318 | Telemetry ingestion |
**Held future activation procedure — non-operative and no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05
land:** external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run`
`mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. The future deployment artifacts—not
this README—will provide the reviewed commands and secret-consumer interface.
For local data-layer work, PGlite needs no PostgreSQL service. The optional Compose command above
starts only Valkey; OTEL Collector and Jaeger may likewise be started individually if needed,
without starting PostgreSQL. A Gateway/Web local process is not currently a safe PGlite route:
its unguarded dotenv loader may inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. Do not use root `pnpm dev` or a
Gateway start command until KBN-101-02 makes that state fail closed.
### Quality Gates
@@ -221,7 +242,7 @@ pnpm format # Prettier auto-fix
Woodpecker CI runs on every push:
- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
- Database migration against a fresh Postgres
- **Legacy N-1 CI status only — active, uncertified, and non-authorizing as an operator route:** the checked-in job currently invokes `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate` with `DATABASE_URL` against an isolated disposable PostgreSQL CI database. It performs direct DDL in that CI database, is not approved ordinary behavior or an operator route, and remains a known exception pending KBN-101-06 removal/replacement by the certified runner-backed CI path.
- `pnpm test` (Turbo-orchestrated across all packages)
npm packages are published to the Gitea package registry on main merges.
@@ -229,7 +250,7 @@ npm packages are published to the Gitea package registry on main merges.
## Architecture
```
mosaic-stack/
stack/
├── apps/
│ ├── gateway/ NestJS API + WebSocket hub (Fastify, Socket.IO, OTEL)
│ └── web/ Next.js dashboard (React 19, Tailwind)
@@ -302,7 +323,13 @@ Each stage has a dispatch mode (`exec` for research/review, `yolo` for coding),
Run the installer again — it handles upgrades automatically:
```bash
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
curl -fsSL https://mosaicstack.dev/install.sh | bash
```
Or use the direct URL:
```bash
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
```
Or use the CLI:
@@ -325,6 +352,8 @@ bash tools/install.sh --yes # Non-interactive, accept all defaults
bash tools/install.sh --no-auto-launch # Skip auto-launch of wizard
```
The installer rejects unrecognized flags or positional arguments before making changes and prints the supported-option usage.
## Contributing
```bash
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
{
"name": "@mosaicstack/mosaic-as",
"version": "0.0.1",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"repository": {
"type": "git",
"url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",
"directory": "apps/appservice"
},
"main": "dist/main.js",
"bin": {
"mosaic-as": "dist/main.js",
"mosaic-as-registration": "dist/registration-main.js"
},
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc",
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
"dev": "tsx watch src/main.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mosaicstack/appservice": "workspace:*"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"tsx": "^4.19.0",
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
},
"files": [
"dist"
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AppserviceDaemon } from '../server.js';
import type { DaemonConfig, DaemonRequest } from '../server.js';
const AGENTS_TYPE = 'org.uscllc.mosaic_as.agents';
const cfg: DaemonConfig = {
homeserverUrl: 'https://hs.example',
domain: 'hs.example',
asToken: 'as-secret',
hsToken: 'hs-secret',
bridgeTokens: ['bridge-secret'],
};
const jsonResponse = (status: number, body: unknown): Response =>
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
const request = (overrides: Partial<DaemonRequest>): DaemonRequest => ({
method: 'GET',
path: '/',
searchParams: new URLSearchParams(),
body: undefined,
...overrides,
});
const makeDaemon = () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (_input: URL | string) => jsonResponse(200, { event_id: '$sent' }));
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch, () => {});
return { daemon, fetchMock };
};
describe('AppserviceDaemon routing', () => {
it('serves health unauthenticated', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
expect((await daemon.handle(request({ path: '/health' }))).status).toBe(200);
});
it('404s unknown paths', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
expect((await daemon.handle(request({ path: '/nope' }))).status).toBe(404);
});
it('transactions require the hs_token', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
const bad = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'PUT',
path: '/_matrix/app/v1/transactions/t1',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer wrong',
body: { events: [] },
}),
);
expect(bad.status).toBe(403);
const ok = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'PUT',
path: '/_matrix/app/v1/transactions/t1',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret',
body: { events: [{ type: 'm.room.message', event_id: '$e' }] },
}),
);
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
});
it('bridge requires a bridge token (hs/as tokens do not work)', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
for (const token of [undefined, 'Bearer hs-secret', 'Bearer as-secret', 'Bearer nope']) {
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: token,
body: {},
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
}
});
it('bridge message sends as the agent and returns the event id', async () => {
const { daemon, fetchMock } = makeDaemon();
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', body: 'hi', thread_root: '$req' },
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.event_id).toBe('$sent');
const sendCall = fetchMock.mock.calls
.map((c) => new URL(String(c[0])))
.find((u) => u.pathname.includes('/send/m.room.message/'));
expect(sendCall).toBeDefined();
expect(sendCall!.searchParams.get('user_id')).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
});
it('bridge rejects invalid payloads with 400', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { room_id: 'bad', agent: 'pi0', body: 'x' },
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('bridge typing endpoint works', async () => {
const { daemon, fetchMock } = makeDaemon();
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/typing',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', typing: true },
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const typingCall = fetchMock.mock.calls
.map((c) => new URL(String(c[0])))
.find((u) => u.pathname.includes('/typing/'));
expect(typingCall).toBeDefined();
});
it('authenticated unknown bridge sub-paths return 405, never fall through', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'GET',
path: '/bridge/v1/unknown',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(405);
});
it('provisions a room as the AS sender with space linking', async () => {
const calls: Array<{ url: URL; body: unknown }> = [];
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string, init?: RequestInit) => {
const url = new URL(String(input));
calls.push({ url, body: init?.body ? JSON.parse(String(init.body)) : undefined });
if (url.pathname.endsWith('/createRoom'))
return jsonResponse(200, { room_id: '!new:hs.example' });
return jsonResponse(200, {});
});
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch, () => {});
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: {
name: 'proj-x',
alias: 'mosaic-proj-x',
invite: ['@jason.woltje:hs.example'],
space_id: '!space:hs.example',
},
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.room_id).toBe('!new:hs.example');
expect(res.body.space_linked).toBe(true);
const create = calls.find((c) => c.url.pathname.endsWith('/createRoom'));
expect(create!.url.searchParams.get('user_id')).toBe('@mosaic-as:hs.example');
const body = create!.body as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body.room_alias_name).toBe('mosaic-proj-x');
expect((body.power_level_content_override as Record<string, unknown>).users).toEqual({
'@mosaic-as:hs.example': 100,
});
expect(calls.some((c) => c.url.pathname.includes('/state/m.space.child/'))).toBe(true);
expect(calls.some((c) => c.url.pathname.includes('/state/m.space.parent/'))).toBe(true);
});
it('space-link failure still returns the room id (no orphan)', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string) => {
const url = new URL(String(input));
if (url.pathname.endsWith('/createRoom'))
return jsonResponse(200, { room_id: '!new:hs.example' });
if (url.pathname.includes('/state/m.space.child/'))
return jsonResponse(403, { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'no PL in space' });
return jsonResponse(200, {});
});
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch, () => {});
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { name: 'proj-x', space_id: '!space:hs.example' },
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.room_id).toBe('!new:hs.example');
expect(res.body.space_linked).toBe(false);
expect(String(res.body.space_error)).toContain('403');
});
it('invite list cap enforced', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { name: 'x', invite: Array.from({ length: 51 }, (_, i) => `@u${i}:hs`) },
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('provision rejects bad payloads and requires auth', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
const noAuth = await daemon.handle(
request({ method: 'POST', path: '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms', body: { name: 'x' } }),
);
expect(noAuth.status).toBe(403);
const bad = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { name: '', alias: 'BAD ALIAS' },
}),
);
expect(bad.status).toBe(400);
});
// A daemon whose fetch mock backs account_data with a mutable in-test object,
// so register/verify/revoke round-trip through the (faked) homeserver.
const makeAgentDaemon = () => {
const accountData: { value: Record<string, unknown> | null } = { value: null };
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string, init?: RequestInit) => {
const url = new URL(String(input));
const path = url.pathname;
if (path.includes(`/account_data/${AGENTS_TYPE}`)) {
if (init?.method === 'PUT') {
accountData.value = JSON.parse(String(init.body)) as Record<string, unknown>;
return jsonResponse(200, {});
}
if (accountData.value === null) {
return jsonResponse(404, { errcode: 'M_NOT_FOUND', error: 'not found' });
}
return jsonResponse(200, accountData.value);
}
if (path.endsWith('/register')) return jsonResponse(200, { user_id: 'whatever' });
if (path.includes('/send/m.room.message/')) return jsonResponse(200, { event_id: '$sent' });
return jsonResponse(200, {});
});
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch, () => {});
return { daemon, fetchMock };
};
const registerAgent = async (
daemon: AppserviceDaemon,
body: Record<string, unknown> = { alias: 'pi0', host: 'web1' },
) =>
daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/agents',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body,
}),
);
it('host token registers an agent and returns agent_user_id + bridge_token', async () => {
const { daemon, fetchMock } = makeAgentDaemon();
const res = await registerAgent(daemon, { alias: 'pi0', host: 'web1' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.agent_user_id).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
expect(String(res.body.bridge_token).startsWith('magt_')).toBe(true);
const registerCall = fetchMock.mock.calls
.map((c) => new URL(String(c[0])))
.find((u) => u.pathname.endsWith('/register'));
expect(registerCall).toBeDefined();
});
it('register requires a HOST token (agent token and no token are 403)', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeAgentDaemon();
const minted = await registerAgent(daemon);
const agentToken = String(minted.body.bridge_token);
const asAgent = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/agents',
authorizationHeader: `Bearer ${agentToken}`,
body: { alias: 'pi1', host: 'web2' },
}),
);
expect(asAgent.status).toBe(403);
const noAuth = await daemon.handle(
request({ method: 'POST', path: '/bridge/v1/agents', body: { alias: 'pi1', host: 'web2' } }),
);
expect(noAuth.status).toBe(403);
});
it('agent-scoped token may send as itself but not as another agent', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeAgentDaemon();
const minted = await registerAgent(daemon, { alias: 'pi0', host: 'web1' });
const agentToken = String(minted.body.bridge_token);
const self = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: `Bearer ${agentToken}`,
body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', body: 'hi' },
}),
);
expect(self.status).toBe(200);
const other = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: `Bearer ${agentToken}`,
body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi9-web9', body: 'hi' },
}),
);
expect(other.status).toBe(403);
expect(other.body.error).toBe('token not scoped to this agent');
});
it('revoked agent token is rejected on messages', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeAgentDaemon();
const minted = await registerAgent(daemon, { alias: 'pi0', host: 'web1' });
const agentToken = String(minted.body.bridge_token);
const revoke = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/agents/revoke',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: { agent_user_id: '@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example' },
}),
);
expect(revoke.status).toBe(200);
expect(revoke.body.revoked).toBe(1);
const afterRevoke = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
authorizationHeader: `Bearer ${agentToken}`,
body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', body: 'hi' },
}),
);
expect(afterRevoke.status).toBe(403);
});
it('GET /bridge/v1/agents lists registered agents (host only)', async () => {
const { daemon } = makeAgentDaemon();
await registerAgent(daemon, { alias: 'pi0', host: 'web1', display_name: 'Pi Zero' });
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'GET',
path: '/bridge/v1/agents',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const agents = res.body.agents as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
expect(agents).toHaveLength(1);
expect(agents[0]?.agent_user_id).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
expect(agents[0]?.display_name).toBe('Pi Zero');
});
it('empty bridge token list denies everything', async () => {
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon({ ...cfg, bridgeTokens: [] }, undefined, () => {});
const res = await daemon.handle(
request({
method: 'POST',
path: '/bridge/v1/typing',
authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
body: {},
}),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
});
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
import type { DaemonConfig } from './server.js';
const required = (name: string): string => {
const value = process.env[name];
if (!value) throw new Error(`missing required env var ${name}`);
return value;
};
export function configFromEnv(): DaemonConfig & { port: number } {
return {
homeserverUrl: required('MOSAIC_AS_HOMESERVER_URL'),
domain: required('MOSAIC_AS_DOMAIN'),
asToken: required('MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN'),
hsToken: required('MOSAIC_HS_TOKEN'),
userPrefix: process.env.MOSAIC_AS_USER_PREFIX ?? 'agent-',
senderLocalpart: process.env.MOSAIC_AS_SENDER_LOCALPART ?? 'mosaic-as',
bridgeTokens: (process.env.MOSAIC_AS_BRIDGE_TOKENS ?? '')
.split(',')
.map((t) => t.trim())
.filter(Boolean),
port: Number(process.env.MOSAIC_AS_PORT ?? 8008),
};
}
+67
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
import http from 'node:http';
import { configFromEnv } from './config.js';
import { AppserviceDaemon } from './server.js';
const cfg = configFromEnv();
const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg);
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
let received = 0;
let rejected = false;
req.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
received += chunk.length;
if (received > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
rejected = true;
res.writeHead(413, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ errcode: 'M_TOO_LARGE', error: 'request body too large' }));
req.destroy();
return;
}
chunks.push(chunk);
});
req.on('end', () => {
if (rejected) return;
void (async () => {
const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://localhost');
let body: unknown;
try {
const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
body = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined;
} catch {
res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ errcode: 'M_NOT_JSON', error: 'invalid json' }));
return;
}
const result = await daemon.handle({
method: req.method ?? 'GET',
path: url.pathname,
searchParams: url.searchParams,
authorizationHeader: req.headers.authorization,
body,
});
res.writeHead(result.status, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify(result.body));
})().catch((error: unknown) => {
console.error('request failed:', error);
if (res.headersSent) {
res.destroy();
return;
}
res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'internal error' }));
});
});
});
server.listen(cfg.port, () => {
console.log(
`mosaic-as listening on :${cfg.port} (homeserver ${cfg.homeserverUrl}, domain ${cfg.domain})`,
);
if (cfg.bridgeTokens.length === 0) {
console.warn('WARNING: MOSAIC_AS_BRIDGE_TOKENS is empty — bridge API will deny all requests');
}
});
+10
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
import { buildRegistration, registrationToYaml } from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
import { configFromEnv } from './config.js';
// Prints the Synapse registration YAML (mosaic-as.yaml) for the current env.
// Usage: MOSAIC_AS_URL=http://mosaic-as:8008 mosaic-as-registration > mosaic-as.yaml
const cfg = configFromEnv();
const url = process.env.MOSAIC_AS_URL;
if (!url) throw new Error('missing required env var MOSAIC_AS_URL');
process.stdout.write(registrationToYaml(buildRegistration(cfg, { url })));
+225
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import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import {
AgentTokenStore,
AppserviceIntent,
TransactionHandler,
validateBridgeMessage,
validateBridgeTyping,
validateProvisionRoom,
validateRegisterAgent,
validateRevokeAgent,
} from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
import type { AppserviceConfig, MatrixEvent } from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
export interface DaemonConfig extends AppserviceConfig {
/** Bearer tokens accepted on /bridge/v1/* (one per agent-comms host daemon). */
bridgeTokens: string[];
}
export interface DaemonRequest {
method: string;
/** URL path without query string. */
path: string;
searchParams: URLSearchParams;
authorizationHeader?: string;
body: unknown;
}
export interface DaemonResponse {
status: number;
body: Record<string, unknown>;
}
// Compare equal-length HMAC digests so neither content nor LENGTH of the
// stored secret is observable through timing.
const HMAC_KEY = randomBytes(32);
const digest = (value: string): Buffer => createHmac('sha256', HMAC_KEY).update(value).digest();
const safeEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => timingSafeEqual(digest(a), digest(b));
const TXN_PATH = /^\/_matrix\/app\/v1\/transactions\/([^/]+)$/;
/**
* Resolved identity for an authenticated /bridge/v1/* caller. Host principals
* (the agent-comms host daemons) are unrestricted; agent principals are scoped
* to a single virtual user and may only act as themselves.
*/
export type BridgePrincipal = { kind: 'host' } | { kind: 'agent'; agentUserId: string } | null;
/**
* HTTP-framework-agnostic request router for the mosaic-as daemon: the
* Application Service transactions endpoint (Synapse-facing) plus the
* internal bridge API v1 (agent-comms daemon-facing). main.ts binds this to
* node:http; tests drive it directly.
*/
export class AppserviceDaemon {
readonly intent: AppserviceIntent;
private readonly transactions: TransactionHandler;
private readonly agents: AgentTokenStore;
constructor(
private readonly cfg: DaemonConfig,
fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
private readonly log: (line: string) => void = (line) => console.log(line),
) {
this.intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, fetchImpl);
this.agents = new AgentTokenStore(this.intent);
this.transactions = new TransactionHandler({
hsToken: cfg.hsToken,
onEvent: (event) => this.onEvent(event),
onError: (error, txnId) => this.log(`txn ${txnId} handler error: ${String(error)}`),
});
}
/** v1: the daemon only observes; room logic lives in the agent-comms daemons. */
private onEvent(event: MatrixEvent): void {
if (event.type === 'm.room.message') {
this.log(
`event ${event.event_id ?? '?'} in ${event.room_id ?? '?'} from ${event.sender ?? '?'}`,
);
}
}
/** Resolve the calling principal, or null when unauthorized. Fail-closed:
* host tokens win (timing-safe compare); otherwise a magt_* bearer is looked
* up in the agent token store; anything else is rejected. */
private async bridgeAuthorized(
authorizationHeader: string | undefined,
): Promise<BridgePrincipal> {
if (!authorizationHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null;
const presented = authorizationHeader.slice('Bearer '.length);
if (this.cfg.bridgeTokens.some((token) => safeEqual(presented, token))) {
return { kind: 'host' };
}
const agentUserId = await this.agents.verifyToken(presented);
if (agentUserId) return { kind: 'agent', agentUserId };
return null;
}
async handle(req: DaemonRequest): Promise<DaemonResponse> {
if (req.method === 'GET' && req.path === '/health') {
return { status: 200, body: { ok: true } };
}
const txnMatch = req.method === 'PUT' ? TXN_PATH.exec(req.path) : null;
if (txnMatch?.[1] !== undefined) {
return this.transactions.handle(txnMatch[1], req.body, {
authorizationHeader: req.authorizationHeader,
accessTokenParam: req.searchParams.get('access_token') ?? undefined,
});
}
if (req.path.startsWith('/bridge/v1/')) {
const principal = await this.bridgeAuthorized(req.authorizationHeader);
if (!principal) {
return { status: 403, body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'bad bridge token' } };
}
try {
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/agents') {
if (principal.kind !== 'host') {
return {
status: 403,
body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'agents cannot register agents' },
};
}
validateRegisterAgent(req.body);
const { agentUserId, token } = await this.agents.register({
alias: req.body.alias,
host: req.body.host,
displayName: req.body.display_name,
});
this.log(`registered agent ${agentUserId}`);
return { status: 200, body: { agent_user_id: agentUserId, bridge_token: token } };
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/agents/revoke') {
if (principal.kind !== 'host') {
return {
status: 403,
body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'agents cannot revoke agents' },
};
}
validateRevokeAgent(req.body);
const revoked = await this.agents.revoke(req.body.agent_user_id);
this.log(`revoked ${revoked} token(s) for ${req.body.agent_user_id}`);
return { status: 200, body: { revoked } };
}
if (req.method === 'GET' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/agents') {
if (principal.kind !== 'host') {
return {
status: 403,
body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'agents cannot list agents' },
};
}
const agents = await this.agents.list();
return { status: 200, body: { agents } };
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/messages') {
validateBridgeMessage(req.body);
if (
principal.kind === 'agent' &&
this.intent.agentUserId(req.body.agent) !== principal.agentUserId
) {
return {
status: 403,
body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'token not scoped to this agent' },
};
}
const eventId = await this.intent.sendAsAgent({
roomId: req.body.room_id,
agent: req.body.agent,
body: req.body.body,
threadRoot: req.body.thread_root,
msgtype: req.body.msgtype,
extraContent: req.body.extra_content,
});
return { status: 200, body: { event_id: eventId ?? null } };
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/typing') {
validateBridgeTyping(req.body);
if (
principal.kind === 'agent' &&
this.intent.agentUserId(req.body.agent) !== principal.agentUserId
) {
return {
status: 403,
body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'token not scoped to this agent' },
};
}
await this.intent.setTyping(req.body.room_id, req.body.agent, req.body.typing);
return { status: 200, body: {} };
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/provision/rooms') {
validateProvisionRoom(req.body);
const result = await this.intent.createRoom({
name: req.body.name,
alias: req.body.alias,
topic: req.body.topic,
invite: req.body.invite,
spaceId: req.body.space_id,
});
this.log(
`provisioned room ${result.roomId} (${req.body.name}) space_linked=${result.spaceLinked}`,
);
return {
status: 200,
body: {
room_id: result.roomId,
space_linked: result.spaceLinked,
...(result.spaceError ? { space_error: result.spaceError } : {}),
},
};
}
} catch (error) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
this.log(`bridge error ${req.method} ${req.path}: ${message}`);
return { status: 400, body: { error: message } };
}
// Explicit: never fall out of the authenticated bridge block, so future
// sub-paths cannot accidentally route around the auth guard above.
return { status: 405, body: { error: 'unsupported bridge method/path' } };
}
return { status: 404, body: { error: 'not found' } };
}
}
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
"compilerOptions": {
"outDir": "dist",
"rootDir": "src"
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
"version": "0.0.6",
"repository": {
"type": "git",
"url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/mosaic-stack.git",
"url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",
"directory": "apps/gateway"
},
"type": "module",
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
"@mariozechner/pi-ai": "^0.65.0",
"@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent": "^0.65.0",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.27.1",
"@mosaicstack/agent": "workspace:^",
"@mosaicstack/auth": "workspace:^",
"@mosaicstack/brain": "workspace:^",
"@mosaicstack/config": "workspace:^",
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@
"@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics": "^2.6.0",
"@opentelemetry/sdk-node": "^0.213.0",
"@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions": "^1.40.0",
"@peculiar/x509": "^2.0.0",
"@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48",
"better-auth": "^1.5.5",
"bullmq": "^5.71.0",
@@ -63,20 +65,30 @@
"class-validator": "^0.15.1",
"dotenv": "^17.3.1",
"fastify": "^5.0.0",
"ioredis": "^5.10.0",
"jose": "^6.2.2",
"node-cron": "^4.2.1",
"openai": "^6.32.0",
"postgres": "^3.4.8",
"reflect-metadata": "^0.2.0",
"rxjs": "^7.8.0",
"socket.io": "^4.8.0",
"uuid": "^11.0.0",
"undici": "^7.24.6",
"zod": "^4.3.6"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@nestjs/testing": "^11.1.18",
"@swc/core": "^1.15.24",
"@swc/helpers": "^0.5.21",
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"@types/node-cron": "^3.0.11",
"@types/supertest": "^7.2.0",
"@types/uuid": "^10.0.0",
"supertest": "^7.2.2",
"tsx": "^4.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
"unplugin-swc": "^1.5.9",
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
/**
* Test B — Gateway boot refuses (fail-fast) when PG is unreachable.
*
* Prereq: docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
* (Valkey must be running; only PG is intentionally misconfigured.)
* Run: FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test src/__tests__/integration/federated-boot.pg-unreachable.integration.test.ts
*
* Skipped when FEDERATED_INTEGRATION !== '1'.
*/
import net from 'node:net';
import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { TierDetectionError, detectAndAssertTier } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const VALKEY_URL = 'redis://localhost:6380';
/**
* Reserves a guaranteed-closed port at runtime by binding to an ephemeral OS
* port (port 0) and immediately releasing it. The OS will not reassign the
* port during the TIME_WAIT window, so it remains closed for the duration of
* this test.
*/
async function reserveClosedPort(): Promise<number> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const server = net.createServer();
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const addr = server.address();
if (typeof addr !== 'object' || !addr) return reject(new Error('no addr'));
const port = addr.port;
server.close(() => resolve(port));
});
server.on('error', reject);
});
}
describe.skipIf(!run)('federated boot — PG unreachable', () => {
let badPgUrl: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
const closedPort = await reserveClosedPort();
badPgUrl = `postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:${closedPort}/mosaic`;
});
it('detectAndAssertTier throws TierDetectionError with service: postgres when PG is down', async () => {
const brokenConfig = {
tier: 'federated' as const,
storage: {
type: 'postgres' as const,
url: badPgUrl,
enableVector: true,
},
queue: {
type: 'bullmq',
url: VALKEY_URL,
},
};
await expect(detectAndAssertTier(brokenConfig)).rejects.toSatisfy(
(err: unknown) => err instanceof TierDetectionError && err.service === 'postgres',
);
}, 10_000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/**
* Test A — Gateway boot succeeds when federated services are up.
*
* Prereq: docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
* Run: FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test src/__tests__/integration/federated-boot.success.integration.test.ts
*
* Skipped when FEDERATED_INTEGRATION !== '1'.
*/
import postgres from 'postgres';
import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { detectAndAssertTier } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
const VALKEY_URL = 'redis://localhost:6380';
const federatedConfig = {
tier: 'federated' as const,
storage: {
type: 'postgres' as const,
url: PG_URL,
enableVector: true,
},
queue: {
type: 'bullmq',
url: VALKEY_URL,
},
};
describe.skipIf(!run)('federated boot — success path', () => {
let sql: ReturnType<typeof postgres> | undefined;
afterAll(async () => {
if (sql) {
await sql.end({ timeout: 2 }).catch(() => {});
}
});
it('detectAndAssertTier resolves without throwing when federated services are up', async () => {
await expect(detectAndAssertTier(federatedConfig)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
}, 10_000);
it('pgvector extension is registered (pg_extension row exists)', async () => {
sql = postgres(PG_URL, { max: 1, connect_timeout: 5, idle_timeout: 5 });
const rows = await sql`SELECT * FROM pg_extension WHERE extname = 'vector'`;
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
}, 10_000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
/**
* Test C — pgvector extension is functional end-to-end.
*
* Creates a temp table with a vector(3) column, inserts a row, and queries it
* back — confirming the extension is not just registered but operational.
*
* Prereq: docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
* Run: FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test src/__tests__/integration/federated-pgvector.integration.test.ts
*
* Skipped when FEDERATED_INTEGRATION !== '1'.
*/
import postgres from 'postgres';
import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
let sql: ReturnType<typeof postgres> | undefined;
afterAll(async () => {
if (sql) {
await sql.end({ timeout: 2 }).catch(() => {});
}
});
describe.skipIf(!run)('federated pgvector — functional end-to-end', () => {
it('vector ops round-trip: INSERT [1,2,3] and SELECT returns [1,2,3]', async () => {
sql = postgres(PG_URL, { max: 1, connect_timeout: 5, idle_timeout: 5 });
await sql`CREATE TEMP TABLE t (id int, embedding vector(3))`;
await sql`INSERT INTO t VALUES (1, '[1,2,3]')`;
const rows = await sql`SELECT embedding FROM t`;
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
// The postgres driver returns vector columns as strings like '[1,2,3]'.
// Normalise by parsing the string representation.
const raw = rows[0]?.['embedding'] as string;
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as number[];
expect(parsed).toEqual([1, 2, 3]);
}, 10_000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
/**
* Federation M2 E2E test — peer-add enrollment flow (FED-M2-10).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance test #6:
* "`peer add <url>` on Server A yields an `active` peer record with a valid cert + key"
*
* This test simulates two gateways using a single bootstrapped NestJS app:
* - "Server A": the admin API that generates a keypair and stores the cert
* - "Server B": the enrollment endpoint that signs the CSR
* Both share the same DB + Step-CA in the test environment.
*
* Prerequisites:
* docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
*
* Run:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
* STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
* pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2-e2e.integration.test.ts
*
* Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
* # Extract provisioner key from running container:
* # docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
* # Copy root cert from container:
* # docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
* # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
*
* Skipped unless both FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 and STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 are set.
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import supertest from 'supertest';
import {
createDb,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
federationPeers,
federationGrants,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
inArray,
eq,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from '../../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { FederationModule } from '../../federation/federation.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const stepCaRun =
run &&
process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1' &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 E2E — peer add enrollment flow', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let app: NestFastifyApplication;
let agent: ReturnType<typeof supertest>;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
const createdTokenGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-e2e-sealing-key';
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [FederationModule],
providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }],
})
.overrideGuard(AdminGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: () => true })
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, transform: true }));
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
agent = supertest(app.getHttpServer());
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db && createdTokenGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdTokenGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (app)
await app.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #6 — peer add: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#6 — peer add flow: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record', async () => {
// Create a subject user to satisfy FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
await db
.insert(schema.users)
.values({
id: userId,
name: `e2e-user-${RUN_ID}`,
email: `e2e-${RUN_ID}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
createdUserIds.push(userId);
// ── Step A: "Server B" setup ─────────────────────────────────────────
// Server B admin creates a grant and generates an enrollment token to
// share out-of-band with Server A's operator.
// Insert a placeholder peer on "Server B" to satisfy the grant FK
const serverBPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
await db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
id: serverBPeerId,
commonName: `server-b-peer-${RUN_ID}`,
displayName: 'Server B Placeholder',
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `serial-b-${serverBPeerId}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
createdPeerIds.push(serverBPeerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
peerId: serverBPeerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
createdTokenGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId: serverBPeerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
// ── Step B: "Server A" generates keypair ─────────────────────────────
const keypairRes = await agent
.post('/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair')
.send({
commonName: `e2e-peer-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`,
displayName: 'E2E Test Peer',
endpointUrl: 'https://test.invalid',
})
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(keypairRes.status).toBe(201);
const { peerId, csrPem } = keypairRes.body as { peerId: string; csrPem: string };
expect(typeof peerId).toBe('string');
expect(csrPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----');
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
// ── Step C: Enrollment (simulates Server A sending CSR to Server B) ──
const enrollRes = await agent
.post(`/api/federation/enrollment/${token}`)
.send({ csrPem })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(enrollRes.status).toBe(200);
const { certPem, certChainPem } = enrollRes.body as {
certPem: string;
certChainPem: string;
};
expect(certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// ── Step D: "Server A" stores the cert ───────────────────────────────
const storeRes = await agent
.patch(`/api/admin/federation/peers/${peerId}/cert`)
.send({ certPem })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(storeRes.status).toBe(200);
// ── Step E: Verify peer record in DB ─────────────────────────────────
const [peer] = await db
.select()
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
.limit(1);
expect(peer).toBeDefined();
expect(peer?.state).toBe('active');
expect(peer?.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(typeof peer?.certSerial).toBe('string');
expect((peer?.certSerial ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// clientKeyPem is a sealed ciphertext — must not be a raw PEM
expect(peer?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
// certNotAfter must be in the future
expect(peer?.certNotAfter?.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
}, 60_000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
/**
* Federation M2 integration tests (FED-M2-09).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8.
*
* Prerequisites:
* docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
*
* Run DB-only tests (no Step-CA):
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=test-secret pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
*
* Run all tests including Step-CA-dependent ones:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
* STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
* pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
*
* Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
* # Extract provisioner key from running container:
* # docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
* # Copy root cert from container:
* # docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
* # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { GoneException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator, X509Certificate as PeculiarX509 } from '@peculiar/x509';
import {
createDb,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
federationPeers,
federationGrants,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
inArray,
eq,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { seal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
import { CaService } from '../../federation/ca.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from '../../federation/scope-schema.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const stepCaRun = run && process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1';
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers for test data isolation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Unique run prefix to identify rows created by this test run. */
const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
/** Insert a minimal user row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id. */
async function insertTestUser(db: Db, id: string): Promise<void> {
await db
.insert(schema.users)
.values({
id,
name: `test-user-${id}`,
email: `test-${id}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
}
/** Insert a minimal peer row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.peer_id. */
async function insertTestPeer(db: Db, id: string, suffix: string = ''): Promise<void> {
await db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
id,
commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-${suffix}`,
displayName: `Test Peer ${suffix}`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `test-serial-${id}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DB-only test module (CaService mocked so env vars not required)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function buildDbModule(db: Db) {
return Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
{ provide: DB, useValue: db },
GrantsService,
{
provide: CaService,
useValue: {
issueCert: async () => {
throw new Error('CaService.issueCert should not be called in DB-only tests');
},
},
},
EnrollmentService,
],
}).compile();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test suite — DB-only (no Step-CA)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M2 — DB-only tests', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
/** IDs created during this run — cleaned up in afterAll. */
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-integration-sealing-key-not-for-prod';
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
const moduleRef = await buildDbModule(db);
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
});
afterAll(async () => {
// Clean up in FK-safe order: tokens → grants → peers → users
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #1 — grant create writes a pending row
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#1 — createGrant writes a pending row to DB', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test1');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
// Verify the row exists in DB with correct shape
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(federationGrants)
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, grant.id))
.limit(1);
expect(row).toBeDefined();
expect(row?.status).toBe('pending');
expect(row?.peerId).toBe(peerId);
expect(row?.subjectUserId).toBe(userId);
const storedScope = row?.scope as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(storedScope['resources']).toEqual(['tasks']);
expect(storedScope['max_rows_per_query']).toBe(100);
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #7 — scope with unknown resource type rejected
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#7 — createGrant rejects scope with unknown resource type', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const invalidScope = {
resources: ['totally_unknown_resource'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test7');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
await expect(
grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: invalidScope,
peerId,
}),
).rejects.toThrow(FederationScopeError);
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 50,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test8');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
// Create two pending grants via GrantsService
const grantA = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
const grantB = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 50 },
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grantA.id, grantB.id);
// Insert a third grant directly in 'revoked' state to test status variety
const [grantC] = await db
.insert(federationGrants)
.values({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
subjectUserId: userId,
peerId,
scope: validScope,
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: new Date(),
})
.returning();
createdGrantIds.push(grantC!.id);
// List all grants for this peer
const allForPeer = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId });
const ourGrantIds = new Set([grantA.id, grantB.id, grantC!.id]);
const ourGrants = allForPeer.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
expect(ourGrants).toHaveLength(3);
const pendingGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'pending');
const revokedGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'revoked');
expect(pendingGrants).toHaveLength(2);
expect(revokedGrants).toHaveLength(1);
// Status-filtered query
const pendingOnly = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId, status: 'pending' });
const ourPending = pendingOnly.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
expect(ourPending.every((g) => g.status === 'pending')).toBe(true);
// Verify peer list from DB also shows the peer rows with correct state
const peers = await db.select().from(federationPeers).where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId));
expect(peers).toHaveLength(1);
expect(peers[0]?.state).toBe('pending');
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #5 — client_key_pem encrypted at rest
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#5 — clientKeyPem stored in DB is a sealed ciphertext (not a valid PEM)', async () => {
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const rawPem = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMOCK\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n';
const sealed = seal(rawPem);
await db.insert(federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-sealed`,
displayName: 'Sealed Key Test Peer',
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `test-serial-sealed-${peerId}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
clientKeyPem: sealed,
});
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
.limit(1);
expect(row).toBeDefined();
// The stored value must NOT be a valid PEM — it's a sealed ciphertext blob
expect(row?.clientKeyPem).toBeDefined();
expect(row?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
// The sealed value should be non-trivial (at least 20 chars)
expect((row?.clientKeyPem ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
}, 15_000);
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test suite — Step-CA gated
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 — Step-CA tests', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
// Use real CaService — env vars (STEP_CA_URL, STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON,
// STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH) must be set when STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }, CaService, GrantsService, EnrollmentService],
}).compile();
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
});
/** Generate a P-256 key pair and PKCS#10 CSR, returning the CSR as PEM. */
async function generateCsrPem(cn: string): Promise<string> {
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' };
const keyPair = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, true, ['sign', 'verify']);
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: `CN=${cn}`,
keys: keyPair,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
});
return csr.toString('pem');
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #2 — enrollment signs CSR and returns cert
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#2 — redeem returns a certPem containing a valid PEM certificate', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test2');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// Verify the issued cert parses cleanly
const cert = new PeculiarX509(result.certPem);
expect(cert.serialNumber).toBeTruthy();
}, 30_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #3 — token single-use; second attempt returns GoneException
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#3 — second redeem of the same token throws GoneException', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 50,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test3');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-replay-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
// First redeem must succeed
const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// Second redeem with the same token must be rejected
await expect(enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem)).rejects.toThrow(GoneException);
}, 30_000);
});
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { InMemoryDurableSessionStore } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import {
createDiscordIngressEnvelope,
DiscordPlugin,
type DiscordIngressPayload,
} from '@mosaicstack/discord-plugin';
import { InteractionController } from '../../agent/interaction.controller.js';
import { RuntimeProviderService } from '../../agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import { DurableSessionService } from '../../agent/durable-session.service.js';
import { ChatGateway } from '../../chat/chat.gateway.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from '../../commands/command-authorization.service.js';
const SERVICE_TOKEN = 'test-discord-service-token';
const envKeys = [
'DISCORD_SERVICE_TOKEN',
'DISCORD_SERVICE_TENANT_ID',
'DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS',
'DISCORD_ALLOWED_GUILD_IDS',
'DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS',
'DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME',
] as const;
const priorEnv = new Map<string, string | undefined>();
function payload(content: string, messageId: string, correlationId: string): DiscordIngressPayload {
return {
content,
messageId,
correlationId,
guildId: 'guild-1',
channelId: 'channel-1',
userId: 'discord-admin-1',
conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-1',
};
}
function authorization(): CommandAuthorizationService {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
return new CommandAuthorizationService(
{
select: () => ({
from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role: 'admin' }] }) }),
}),
} as never,
{
get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
set: async (key: string, value: string) => entries.set(key, value),
del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
},
);
}
describe('interaction Discord/CLI durable-session integration', () => {
afterEach(() => {
for (const key of envKeys) {
const value = priorEnv.get(key);
if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
else process.env[key] = value;
}
priorEnv.clear();
});
it('enrolls through the CLI surface then resolves the same durable session from Discord', async () => {
for (const key of envKeys) priorEnv.set(key, process.env[key]);
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_TOKEN'] = SERVICE_TOKEN;
process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_TENANT_ID'] = 'tenant-1';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_GUILD_IDS'] = 'guild-1';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-1';
process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS'] = 'discord-admin-1';
process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-1',
channelId: 'channel-1',
pairedUsers: {
'discord-admin-1': { role: 'admin', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-admin-1' },
},
},
]);
const durable = new DurableSessionService(
new InMemoryDurableSessionStore() as never,
{} as never,
);
const enrollmentRuntime = {
listSessions: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([{ id: 'runtime-1' }]),
};
const controller = new InteractionController(enrollmentRuntime as never, durable);
await controller.enroll(
'Nova',
'Nova:discord:channel-1',
{ providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
{ id: 'mosaic-admin-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
'cli-enrollment-correlation',
);
const authz = authorization();
const terminated = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const runtime = new RuntimeProviderService(
{
require: () => ({
capabilities: async () => ({ supported: ['session.terminate'] }),
terminate: terminated,
}),
} as never,
{ record: async () => undefined } as never,
{
consume: (approvalId, action) =>
authz.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approvalId, action),
},
);
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
authz,
runtime,
durable,
);
const client = { data: { discordService: true }, emit: vi.fn() };
const plugin = new DiscordPlugin({
token: 'unused',
gatewayUrl: 'http://unused',
serviceToken: SERVICE_TOKEN,
allowedGuildIds: ['guild-1'],
allowedChannelIds: ['channel-1'],
allowedUserIds: ['discord-admin-1'],
interactionBindings: [
{
instanceId: 'Nova',
agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
guildId: 'guild-1',
channelId: 'channel-1',
pairedUsers: {
'discord-admin-1': { role: 'admin', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-admin-1' },
},
},
],
});
const pluginInternals = plugin as unknown as {
client: { user: { id: string } };
socket: { connected: boolean; emit: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> };
handleDiscordMessage(message: unknown): void;
};
const pluginSocket = { connected: true, emit: vi.fn() };
pluginInternals.client = { user: { id: 'bot-1' } };
pluginInternals.socket = pluginSocket;
pluginInternals.handleDiscordMessage({
id: 'approve-1',
guildId: 'guild-1',
channelId: 'channel-1',
author: { id: 'discord-admin-1', bot: false },
mentions: { has: () => true },
content: '<@bot-1> /approve',
channel: { parentId: null },
attachments: new Map(),
});
expect(pluginSocket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('discord:approve', expect.any(Object));
const approvalEnvelope = pluginSocket.emit.mock.calls[0]?.[1];
await gateway.handleDiscordApproval(client as never, approvalEnvelope);
const approval = client.emit.mock.calls.find(
([event]) => event === 'discord:approval',
)?.[1] as {
approvalId: string;
success: boolean;
};
expect(approval.success).toBe(true);
await gateway.handleDiscordStop(
client as never,
createDiscordIngressEnvelope(
payload(`/stop ${approval.approvalId}`, 'stop-1', 'discord-stop-correlation'),
SERVICE_TOKEN,
),
);
expect(terminated).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'runtime-1',
approval.approvalId,
expect.objectContaining({ actorId: 'mosaic-admin-1' }),
);
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('discord:stop', {
correlationId: 'discord-stop-correlation',
success: true,
});
});
});
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
async check(): Promise<HealthStatusDto> {
const [database, cache] = await Promise.all([this.checkDatabase(), this.checkCache()]);
const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions();
const sessions = this.agentService.listAllSessionsForSystem();
const providers = this.providerService.listProviders();
const allOk = database.status === 'ok' && cache.status === 'ok';
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import type { Auth } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import { v4 as uuid } from 'uuid';
import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import type { BootstrapSetupDto, BootstrapStatusDto, BootstrapResultDto } from './bootstrap.dto.js';
import { BootstrapSetupDto } from './bootstrap.dto.js';
import type { BootstrapStatusDto, BootstrapResultDto } from './bootstrap.dto.js';
@Controller('api/bootstrap')
export class BootstrapController {
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
/**
* E2E integration test — POST /api/bootstrap/setup
*
* Regression guard for the `import type { BootstrapSetupDto }` class-erasure
* bug (IUV-M01, issue #436).
*
* When `BootstrapSetupDto` is imported with `import type`, TypeScript erases
* the class at compile time. NestJS then sees `Object` as the `@Body()`
* metatype, and ValidationPipe with `whitelist:true + forbidNonWhitelisted:true`
* treats every property as non-whitelisted, returning:
*
* 400 { message: ["property email should not exist", "property password should not exist"] }
*
* The fix is a plain value import (`import { BootstrapSetupDto }`), which
* preserves the class reference so Nest can read the class-validator decorators.
*
* This test MUST fail if `import type` is re-introduced on `BootstrapSetupDto`.
* A controller unit test that constructs ValidationPipe manually won't catch
* this — only the real DI binding path exercises the metatype lookup.
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, afterAll, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { ValidationPipe, type INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import request from 'supertest';
import { BootstrapController } from './bootstrap.controller.js';
import type { BootstrapResultDto } from './bootstrap.dto.js';
// ─── Minimal mock dependencies ───────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* We use explicit `@Inject(AUTH)` / `@Inject(DB)` in the controller so we
* can provide mock values by token without spinning up the real DB or Auth.
*/
import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
const MOCK_USER_ID = 'mock-user-id-001';
const mockAuth = {
api: {
createUser: () =>
Promise.resolve({
user: {
id: MOCK_USER_ID,
name: 'Admin',
email: '[email protected]',
},
}),
},
};
// Override db.select() so the second query (verify user exists) returns a user.
// The bootstrap controller calls select().from() twice:
// 1. count() to check zero users → returns [{total: 0}]
// 2. select().where().limit() → returns [the created user]
let selectCallCount = 0;
const mockDbWithUser = {
select: () => {
selectCallCount++;
return {
from: () => {
if (selectCallCount === 1) {
// First call: count — zero users
return Promise.resolve([{ total: 0 }]);
}
// Subsequent calls: return a mock user row
return {
where: () => ({
limit: () =>
Promise.resolve([
{
id: MOCK_USER_ID,
name: 'Admin',
email: '[email protected]',
role: 'admin',
},
]),
}),
};
},
};
},
update: () => ({
set: () => ({
where: () => Promise.resolve([]),
}),
}),
insert: () => ({
values: () => ({
returning: () =>
Promise.resolve([
{
id: 'token-id-001',
label: 'Initial setup token',
},
]),
}),
}),
};
// ─── Test suite ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('POST /api/bootstrap/setup — ValidationPipe DTO binding', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
selectCallCount = 0;
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [BootstrapController],
providers: [
{ provide: AUTH, useValue: mockAuth },
{ provide: DB, useValue: mockDbWithUser },
],
}).compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
// Mirror main.ts configuration exactly — this is what reproduced the 400.
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({
whitelist: true,
forbidNonWhitelisted: true,
transform: true,
}),
);
await app.init();
// Fastify requires waiting for the adapter to be ready
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it('returns 201 (not 400) when a valid {name, email, password} body is sent', async () => {
const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/bootstrap/setup')
.send({ name: 'Admin', email: '[email protected]', password: 'password123' })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
// Before the fix (import type), Nest ValidationPipe returned 400 with
// "property email should not exist" / "property password should not exist"
// because the DTO class was erased and every field looked non-whitelisted.
expect(res.status).not.toBe(400);
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
const body = res.body as BootstrapResultDto;
expect(body.user).toBeDefined();
expect(body.user.email).toBe('[email protected]');
expect(body.token).toBeDefined();
expect(body.token.plaintext).toBeDefined();
});
it('returns 400 when extra forbidden properties are sent', async () => {
// This proves ValidationPipe IS active and working (forbidNonWhitelisted).
const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/bootstrap/setup')
.send({
name: 'Admin',
email: '[email protected]',
password: 'password123',
extraField: 'should-be-rejected',
})
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('returns 400 when email is invalid', async () => {
const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/bootstrap/setup')
.send({ name: 'Admin', email: 'not-an-email', password: 'password123' })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it('returns 400 when password is too short', async () => {
const res = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/bootstrap/setup')
.send({ name: 'Admin', email: '[email protected]', password: 'short' })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
import { ForbiddenException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent.service.js';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../../auth/session-scope.js';
const CONVERSATION_ID = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222';
const OWNER_SCOPE: ActorTenantScope = { userId: 'owner-user', tenantId: 'owner-tenant' };
const FOREIGN_SCOPE: ActorTenantScope = { userId: 'foreign-user', tenantId: 'foreign-tenant' };
type AgentServiceInternals = {
sessions: Map<string, AgentSession>;
creating: Map<string, Promise<AgentSession>>;
};
function makeService(operatorMemory: unknown = null): AgentService {
return new AgentService(
{
getDefaultModel: vi.fn(() => null),
getRegistry: vi.fn(() => ({})),
findModel: vi.fn(),
listAvailableModels: vi.fn(() => []),
} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ available: false } as never,
{} as never,
{ getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
{ loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
null,
null,
{ collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
operatorMemory as never,
);
}
function internals(service: AgentService): AgentServiceInternals {
return service as unknown as AgentServiceInternals;
}
function makeSession(scope: ActorTenantScope = OWNER_SCOPE): AgentSession {
return {
id: CONVERSATION_ID,
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'off',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(['off', 'low', 'high']),
setThinkingLevel: vi.fn(),
abort: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
dispose: vi.fn(),
getSessionStats: vi.fn(),
getContextUsage: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as AgentSession['piSession'],
listeners: new Set(),
unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
createdAt: Date.now(),
promptCount: 0,
channels: new Set(),
skillPromptAdditions: [],
sandboxDir: '/tmp/tess-session-ownership-test',
allowedTools: null,
userId: scope.userId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
metrics: {
tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
modelSwitches: 0,
messageCount: 0,
lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
},
};
}
describe('AgentService owner/tenant scope enforcement', () => {
it('allows owner-scoped operations and rejects foreign scopes for seeded sessions', async () => {
const service = makeService();
const session = makeSession();
internals(service).sessions.set(CONVERSATION_ID, session);
expect(service.getSession(CONVERSATION_ID, OWNER_SCOPE)).toBe(session);
expect(service.getSession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toBeUndefined();
expect(service.getSessionInfo(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toBeUndefined();
expect(service.listSessions(OWNER_SCOPE)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(service.listSessions(FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toEqual([]);
service.addChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:owner', OWNER_SCOPE);
expect(session.channels.has('websocket:owner')).toBe(true);
expect(() => service.addChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:foreign', FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
ForbiddenException,
);
expect(() => service.removeChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:owner', FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
ForbiddenException,
);
expect(() =>
service.updateSessionModel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'foreign-model', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
service.updateSessionModel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'owner-model', OWNER_SCOPE);
expect(session.modelId).toBe('owner-model');
expect(() =>
service.applyAgentConfig(CONVERSATION_ID, 'agent-foreign', 'Foreign Agent', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
service.applyAgentConfig(CONVERSATION_ID, 'agent-owner', 'Owner Agent', OWNER_SCOPE);
expect(session.agentConfigId).toBe('agent-owner');
expect(() => service.onEvent(CONVERSATION_ID, vi.fn(), FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
ForbiddenException,
);
const cleanup = service.onEvent(CONVERSATION_ID, vi.fn(), OWNER_SCOPE);
cleanup();
await expect(
service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, 'foreign prompt', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
await service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, 'owner prompt', OWNER_SCOPE);
expect(session.piSession.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('owner prompt');
await service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, '', OWNER_SCOPE, [
{
id: 'attachment-001',
name: 'diagram.png',
url: 'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png',
mimeType: 'image/png',
},
]);
expect(session.piSession.prompt).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
'\n\n[Untrusted channel attachments]\n' +
'{"id":"attachment-001","name":"diagram.png","mimeType":"image/png","url":"https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png"}',
);
await expect(service.destroySession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
ForbiddenException,
);
expect(internals(service).sessions.has(CONVERSATION_ID)).toBe(true);
await service.destroySession(CONVERSATION_ID, OWNER_SCOPE);
expect(session.piSession.dispose).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(internals(service).sessions.has(CONVERSATION_ID)).toBe(false);
});
it('derives the operator-memory scope on the createSession production path', async () => {
const plugin = { capture: vi.fn(), search: vi.fn() };
const service = makeService(plugin);
const buildTools = vi.spyOn(service as never, 'buildToolsForSandbox').mockReturnValue([]);
// Session construction reaches the real scope derivation before the intentionally incomplete
// Pi test double rejects later in createAgentSession.
await service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, OWNER_SCOPE).catch(() => undefined);
expect(buildTools).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(String), OWNER_SCOPE.userId, {
tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
ownerId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
sessionId: CONVERSATION_ID,
});
});
it('denies a foreign actor before it can obtain another session operator-memory scope', async () => {
const plugin = { capture: vi.fn(), search: vi.fn() };
const service = makeService(plugin);
internals(service).sessions.set(CONVERSATION_ID, makeSession());
const buildTools = vi.spyOn(service as never, 'buildToolsForSandbox');
await expect(service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
ForbiddenException,
);
expect(buildTools).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(plugin.capture).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(plugin.search).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('checks owner/tenant scope before returning an in-flight session creation', async () => {
const service = makeService();
const session = makeSession();
internals(service).creating.set(CONVERSATION_ID, Promise.resolve(session));
await expect(
service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: FOREIGN_SCOPE.userId,
tenantId: FOREIGN_SCOPE.tenantId,
}),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
await expect(
service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
}),
).resolves.toBe(session);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type {
AgentRuntimeProvider,
RuntimeAttachHandle,
RuntimeAttachMode,
RuntimeCapability,
RuntimeCapabilitySet,
RuntimeHealth,
RuntimeMessage,
RuntimeScope,
RuntimeSession,
RuntimeSessionTree,
RuntimeStreamEvent,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../../auth/session-scope.js';
import {
RuntimeProviderAuditService,
RuntimeProviderService,
type RuntimeAuditEvent,
type RuntimeAuditSink,
type RuntimeApprovalVerifier,
} from '../runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] ??= 'test-runtime-agent';
const OWNER_SCOPE: ActorTenantScope = { userId: 'owner-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' };
const CONTEXT = {
actorScope: OWNER_SCOPE,
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-1',
};
class RecordingRuntimeProvider implements AgentRuntimeProvider {
readonly id = 'fleet';
readonly receivedScopes: RuntimeScope[] = [];
readonly sentMessages: RuntimeMessage[] = [];
terminateCalls = 0;
throwAfterSend = false;
throwAuthorization = false;
constructor(private readonly supported: RuntimeCapability[]) {}
async capabilities(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeCapabilitySet> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return { supported: this.supported };
}
async health(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeHealth> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return { status: 'healthy', checkedAt: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z' };
}
async listSessions(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSession[]> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return [];
}
async getSessionTree(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSessionTree[]> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return [];
}
async *streamSession(
_sessionId: string,
_cursor: string | undefined,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return;
}
async sendMessage(
_sessionId: string,
message: RuntimeMessage,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): Promise<void> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
this.sentMessages.push(message);
if (this.throwAuthorization) {
throw Object.assign(new Error('provider authorization denied'), { code: 'forbidden' });
}
if (this.throwAfterSend) {
throw new Error('provider acknowledgement failed');
}
}
async attach(
sessionId: string,
mode: RuntimeAttachMode,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): Promise<RuntimeAttachHandle> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
return {
attachmentId: 'attachment-1',
sessionId,
mode,
expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z',
};
}
async detach(_attachmentId: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
}
async terminate(_sessionId: string, _approvalRef: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> {
this.receivedScopes.push(scope);
this.terminateCalls += 1;
}
}
class RecordingAuditSink implements RuntimeAuditSink {
readonly events: RuntimeAuditEvent[] = [];
async record(event: RuntimeAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
this.events.push(event);
}
}
class DenyingApprovalVerifier implements RuntimeApprovalVerifier {
async consume(): Promise<boolean> {
return false;
}
}
class AcceptingApprovalVerifier implements RuntimeApprovalVerifier {
consumedAction: Parameters<RuntimeApprovalVerifier['consume']>[1] | undefined;
async consume(
_approvalRef: string,
action: Parameters<RuntimeApprovalVerifier['consume']>[1],
): Promise<boolean> {
this.consumedAction = action;
return true;
}
}
function makeService(
provider: RecordingRuntimeProvider,
audit: RuntimeAuditSink = new RecordingAuditSink(),
approval: RuntimeApprovalVerifier = new DenyingApprovalVerifier(),
): RuntimeProviderService {
const registry = new AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry();
registry.register(provider);
return new RuntimeProviderService(registry, audit, approval);
}
describe('RuntimeProviderService security boundary', (): void => {
it('derives and freezes only the authenticated actor scope while preserving correlation metadata', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
const audit = new RecordingAuditSink();
const service = makeService(provider, audit);
await service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
);
const providerScope = provider.receivedScopes[0];
expect(providerScope).toEqual({
actorId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
channelId: CONTEXT.channelId,
correlationId: CONTEXT.correlationId,
});
expect(Object.isFrozen(providerScope)).toBe(true);
expect(audit.events).toContainEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
providerId: 'fleet',
operation: 'session.send',
outcome: 'succeeded',
actorId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
channelId: CONTEXT.channelId,
correlationId: CONTEXT.correlationId,
resourceId: 'session-1',
durationMs: expect.any(Number),
}),
);
expect(JSON.stringify(audit.events)).not.toContain('hello');
expect(JSON.stringify(audit.events)).not.toContain('key-1');
});
it('does not block a provider operation when an unsafe resource ID is redacted in durable audit', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
let persisted: unknown;
const durableAudit = new RuntimeProviderAuditService({
logs: {
ingest: async (entry: unknown): Promise<unknown> => {
persisted = entry;
return entry;
},
},
} as never);
const service = makeService(provider, durableAudit);
await service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session/credential-canary=secret-value',
{ content: 'safe message', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
);
expect(provider.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(JSON.stringify(persisted)).not.toContain('secret-value');
});
it('fails closed before a provider side effect when a capability is missing', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider([]);
const service = makeService(provider);
await expect(
service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
),
).rejects.toThrow(/capability denied/);
expect(provider.sentMessages).toEqual([]);
});
it('requires a consumed exact-action approval before termination', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.terminate']);
const approval = new DenyingApprovalVerifier();
const audit = new RecordingAuditSink();
const service = makeService(provider, audit, approval);
await expect(
service.terminate('fleet', 'session-1', 'forged-approval', CONTEXT),
).rejects.toThrow(/approval denied/);
expect(provider.terminateCalls).toBe(0);
expect(audit.events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ outcome: 'denied', errorCode: 'policy_denied' });
});
it('binds an accepted termination approval to provider, session, immutable scope, and correlation', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.terminate']);
const approval = new AcceptingApprovalVerifier();
const service = makeService(provider, new RecordingAuditSink(), approval);
await service.terminate('fleet', 'session-1', 'approval-1', CONTEXT);
expect(approval.consumedAction).toEqual({
providerId: 'fleet',
sessionId: 'session-1',
actorId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
channelId: CONTEXT.channelId,
correlationId: CONTEXT.correlationId,
agentName: process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'],
});
expect(provider.terminateCalls).toBe(1);
});
it('fails closed before invoking a provider when audit persistence rejects the request', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
const unavailableAudit: RuntimeAuditSink = {
async record(): Promise<void> {
throw new Error('audit unavailable');
},
};
const service = makeService(provider, unavailableAudit);
await expect(
service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
),
).rejects.toThrow(/audit unavailable/);
expect(provider.sentMessages).toEqual([]);
});
it('records a provider error after invocation as failed rather than denied', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
provider.throwAfterSend = true;
const audit = new RecordingAuditSink();
const service = makeService(provider, audit);
await expect(
service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
),
).rejects.toThrow(/provider acknowledgement failed/);
expect(provider.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(audit.events.map((event: RuntimeAuditEvent): string => event.outcome)).toEqual([
'requested',
'failed',
]);
expect(audit.events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({
errorCode: 'provider_error',
durationMs: expect.any(Number),
});
});
it('records a provider authorization rejection as denied rather than provider failure', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
provider.throwAuthorization = true;
const audit = new RecordingAuditSink();
const service = makeService(provider, audit);
await expect(
service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
),
).rejects.toThrow(/provider authorization denied/);
expect(audit.events.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ outcome: 'denied', errorCode: 'policy_denied' });
});
it('persists only metadata-only runtime audit fields', async (): Promise<void> => {
let persisted: unknown;
const ingest = async (entry: unknown): Promise<unknown> => {
persisted = entry;
return entry;
};
const service = new RuntimeProviderAuditService({ logs: { ingest } } as never);
await service.record({
providerId: 'fleet',
operation: 'session.send',
outcome: 'succeeded',
actorId: 'owner-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-1',
resourceId: 'session-1',
durationMs: 12,
});
expect(persisted).toMatchObject({
content: 'runtime.provider.audit',
metadata: expect.objectContaining({ correlationId: 'correlation-1', durationMs: 12 }),
});
expect(JSON.stringify(persisted)).not.toContain('approval');
});
it('does not misreport a completed provider side effect when completion auditing fails', async (): Promise<void> => {
const provider = new RecordingRuntimeProvider(['session.send']);
let auditCalls = 0;
const audit: RuntimeAuditSink = {
async record(): Promise<void> {
auditCalls += 1;
if (auditCalls === 2) {
throw new Error('completion audit unavailable');
}
},
};
const service = makeService(provider, audit);
await expect(
service.sendMessage(
'fleet',
'session-1',
{ content: 'hello', idempotencyKey: 'key-1' },
CONTEXT,
),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(provider.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(auditCalls).toBe(2);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('../agent.service.js', () => ({ AgentService: class AgentService {} }));
vi.mock('../../commands/command-executor.service.js', () => ({
CommandExecutorService: class CommandExecutorService {},
}));
vi.mock('../routing/routing-engine.service.js', () => ({
RoutingEngineService: class RoutingEngineService {},
}));
import { SessionsController } from '../sessions.controller.js';
import { ChatController } from '../../chat/chat.controller.js';
import { ChatGateway } from '../../chat/chat.gateway.js';
import type { AgentSession } from '../agent.service.js';
import type { SessionInfoDto } from '../session.dto.js';
const USER_A = { id: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' };
const USER_B = { id: 'user-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' };
const CONVERSATION_ID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111';
function makeSessionInfo(overrides?: Partial<SessionInfoDto>): SessionInfoDto {
return {
id: CONVERSATION_ID,
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
createdAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
promptCount: 0,
channels: [],
durationMs: 0,
metrics: {
tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
modelSwitches: 0,
messageCount: 0,
lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
},
...overrides,
};
}
function makeAgentSession(owner = USER_A): AgentSession {
return {
id: CONVERSATION_ID,
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
piSession: {
thinkingLevel: 'off',
getAvailableThinkingLevels: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(['off', 'low', 'high']),
setThinkingLevel: vi.fn(),
abort: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
dispose: vi.fn(),
getSessionStats: vi.fn(),
getContextUsage: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as AgentSession['piSession'],
listeners: new Set(),
unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
createdAt: Date.now(),
promptCount: 0,
channels: new Set(),
skillPromptAdditions: [],
sandboxDir: '/tmp',
allowedTools: null,
userId: owner.id,
tenantId: owner.tenantId,
metrics: {
tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
modelSwitches: 0,
messageCount: 0,
lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
},
};
}
function makeScopedAgentService() {
const foreign = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
return {
listSessions: vi.fn((scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? [] : [makeSessionInfo({ id: foreign.id })],
),
getSessionInfo: vi.fn((_id: string, scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? undefined : makeSessionInfo({ id: foreign.id }),
),
destroySession: vi.fn(),
getSession: vi.fn((_id: string, scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? undefined : foreign,
),
createSession: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new ForbiddenException('Session scope mismatch')),
onEvent: vi.fn(() => vi.fn()),
addChannel: vi.fn(),
removeChannel: vi.fn(),
recordMessage: vi.fn(),
prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
}
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 AgentService ownership boundary', () => {
it('requires explicit owner+tenant scope on protected session operations', () => {
const source = readFileSync(resolve('src/agent/agent.service.ts'), 'utf8');
expect(source).toContain('getSession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
expect(source).toContain('listSessions(scope: ActorTenantScope)');
expect(source).toContain('getSessionInfo(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
expect(source).toContain(
'addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
);
expect(source).toContain(
'removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
);
expect(source).toContain(
'async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
);
expect(source).toContain('scope: ActorTenantScope,');
expect(source).toContain('async destroySession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
expect(source).not.toContain('scope?: ActorTenantScope');
});
});
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
it('lists only sessions owned by the authenticated owner+tenant scope', () => {
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
expect(controller.list(USER_B)).toEqual({ sessions: [], total: 0 });
expect(agentService.listSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
});
it('does not reveal another owner/tenant session by guessed id', () => {
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
expect(() => controller.findOne(CONVERSATION_ID, USER_B)).toThrow(NotFoundException);
expect(agentService.getSessionInfo).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
});
it('does not terminate another owner/tenant session by guessed id', async () => {
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
await expect(controller.destroy(CONVERSATION_ID, USER_B)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
NotFoundException,
);
expect(agentService.destroySession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST chat send ownership and tenant binding', () => {
it('does not send a prompt into another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
const controller = new ChatController(agentService as never);
await expect(
controller.chat({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, content: 'take over' }, USER_B),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 404 });
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 WebSocket session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
function makeGateway(agentService = makeScopedAgentService()) {
const brain = {
conversations: {
findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
},
};
const commandRegistry = { getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([]) };
const commandExecutor = { execute: vi.fn() };
const routingEngine = {
resolve: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ provider: 'test', model: 'test-model' }),
};
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
agentService as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
commandRegistry as never,
commandExecutor as never,
routingEngine as never,
);
return { gateway, agentService };
}
function makeSocket() {
return {
id: 'socket-b',
connected: true,
data: { user: USER_B, session: { id: 'auth-session-b', userId: USER_B.id } },
emit: vi.fn(),
disconnect: vi.fn(),
};
}
it('does not attach or send to another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
await gateway.handleMessage(socket as never, {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
content: 'attach to foreign session',
});
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(agentService.onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.addChannel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
});
it('does not mutate thinking level on another owner/tenant session', () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
gateway.handleSetThinking(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, level: 'high' });
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
});
it('does not terminate another owner/tenant session over WebSocket abort', async () => {
const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
const socket = makeSocket();
await gateway.handleAbort(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID });
expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
userId: USER_B.id,
tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
});
expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'error',
expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
);
});
});
+62 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry, HermesRuntimeProvider } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { AgentService } from './agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from './provider.service.js';
import { ProviderCredentialsService } from './provider-credentials.service.js';
@@ -8,24 +9,79 @@ import { SkillLoaderService } from './skill-loader.service.js';
import { ProvidersController } from './providers.controller.js';
import { SessionsController } from './sessions.controller.js';
import { AgentConfigsController } from './agent-configs.controller.js';
import { InteractionController } from './interaction.controller.js';
import { RoutingController } from './routing/routing.controller.js';
import { DurableSessionRepository } from './durable-session.repository.js';
import { DurableSessionService } from './durable-session.service.js';
import { CoordModule } from '../coord/coord.module.js';
import { McpClientModule } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.module.js';
import { SkillsModule } from '../skills/skills.module.js';
import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
import { LogModule } from '../log/log.module.js';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from '../commands/runtime-approval-verifier.js';
import { GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport } from './hermes-runtime.transport.js';
import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
import {
CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
ConnectorLeaseService,
DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
} from './connector-lease.service.js';
import {
AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER,
RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK,
RuntimeProviderAuditService,
RuntimeProviderService,
} from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
export function createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry(): AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry {
const registry = new AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry();
registry.register(new HermesRuntimeProvider(new GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport()));
return registry;
}
@Global()
@Module({
imports: [CoordModule, McpClientModule, SkillsModule, GCModule],
imports: [CoordModule, McpClientModule, SkillsModule, GCModule, LogModule, CommandsModule],
providers: [
ProviderService,
ProviderCredentialsService,
RoutingService,
RoutingEngineService,
SkillLoaderService,
DurableSessionRepository,
DurableSessionService,
ConnectorLeaseRepository,
DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
{
provide: CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
useExisting: DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
},
ConnectorLeaseService,
{
provide: AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
useFactory: createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry,
},
RuntimeProviderAuditService,
{
provide: RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK,
useExisting: RuntimeProviderAuditService,
},
{
provide: RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER,
useExisting: CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
},
RuntimeProviderService,
AgentService,
],
controllers: [ProvidersController, SessionsController, AgentConfigsController, RoutingController],
controllers: [
ProvidersController,
SessionsController,
AgentConfigsController,
InteractionController,
RoutingController,
],
exports: [
AgentService,
ProviderService,
@@ -33,6 +89,10 @@ import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
RoutingService,
RoutingEngineService,
SkillLoaderService,
DurableSessionService,
RuntimeProviderService,
ConnectorLeaseService,
AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
],
})
export class AgentModule {}
+170 -50
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, Optional, type OnModuleDestroy } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
ForbiddenException,
Inject,
Injectable,
Logger,
Optional,
type OnModuleDestroy,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import {
createAgentSession,
DefaultResourceLoader,
@@ -8,9 +15,11 @@ import {
type ToolDefinition,
} from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
import type { Memory } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
import type { ChannelAttachmentDto } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { Memory, OperatorMemoryPlugin } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
import { MEMORY } from '../memory/memory.tokens.js';
import { OPERATOR_MEMORY_PLUGIN } from '../memory/memory.module.js';
import { EmbeddingService } from '../memory/embedding.service.js';
import { CoordService } from '../coord/coord.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from './provider.service.js';
@@ -28,12 +37,15 @@ import type { SessionInfoDto, SessionMetrics } from './session.dto.js';
import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
import { PreferencesService } from '../preferences/preferences.service.js';
import { SessionGCService } from '../gc/session-gc.service.js';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
/** A single message from DB conversation history, used for context injection. */
export interface ConversationHistoryMessage {
role: 'user' | 'assistant' | 'system';
content: string;
createdAt: Date;
/** Validated, URI-referenced channel attachments preserved on session resume. */
attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
}
export interface AgentSessionOptions {
@@ -68,6 +80,8 @@ export interface AgentSessionOptions {
agentConfigId?: string;
/** ID of the user who owns this session. Used for preferences and system override lookups. */
userId?: string;
/** Server-derived tenant scope that owns this session. Falls back to userId for solo users. */
tenantId?: string;
/**
* Prior conversation messages to inject as context when resuming a session.
* These messages are formatted and prepended to the system prompt so the
@@ -94,6 +108,8 @@ export interface AgentSession {
allowedTools: string[] | null;
/** User ID that owns this session, used for preference lookups. */
userId?: string;
/** Server-derived tenant scope that owns this session. Falls back to userId for solo users. */
tenantId?: string;
/** Agent config ID applied to this session, if any (M5-001). */
agentConfigId?: string;
/** Human-readable agent name applied to this session, if any (M5-001). */
@@ -123,6 +139,9 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
@Inject(PreferencesService)
private readonly preferencesService: PreferencesService | null,
@Inject(SessionGCService) private readonly gc: SessionGCService,
@Optional()
@Inject(OPERATOR_MEMORY_PLUGIN)
private readonly operatorMemory: OperatorMemoryPlugin | null = null,
) {}
/**
@@ -134,6 +153,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
private buildToolsForSandbox(
sandboxDir: string,
sessionUserId: string | undefined,
sessionScope?: { tenantId: string; ownerId: string; sessionId: string },
): ToolDefinition[] {
return [
...createBrainTools(this.brain),
@@ -142,6 +162,9 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
this.memory,
this.embeddingService.available ? this.embeddingService : null,
sessionUserId,
this.operatorMemory && sessionScope
? { plugin: this.operatorMemory, scope: sessionScope }
: undefined,
),
...createFileTools(sandboxDir),
...createGitTools(sandboxDir),
@@ -174,12 +197,20 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
.filter((t) => t.length > 0);
}
async createSession(sessionId: string, options?: AgentSessionOptions): Promise<AgentSession> {
async createSession(sessionId: string, options: AgentSessionOptions): Promise<AgentSession> {
const scope = this.scopeFromOptions(options);
const existing = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (existing) return existing;
if (existing) {
this.assertSessionScope(existing, scope);
return existing;
}
const inflight = this.creating.get(sessionId);
if (inflight) return inflight;
if (inflight) {
const session = await inflight;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
return session;
}
const promise = this.doCreateSession(sessionId, options).finally(() => {
this.creating.delete(sessionId);
@@ -208,6 +239,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
isAdmin: options.isAdmin,
agentConfigId: options.agentConfigId,
userId: options.userId,
tenantId: options.tenantId,
conversationHistory: options.conversationHistory,
};
this.logger.log(
@@ -247,7 +279,15 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
}
// Build per-session tools scoped to the sandbox directory and authenticated user
const sandboxTools = this.buildToolsForSandbox(sandboxDir, mergedOptions?.userId);
const sessionUserId = mergedOptions?.userId;
const sessionTenantId = this.tenantIdFor(sessionUserId, mergedOptions?.tenantId);
const sandboxTools = this.buildToolsForSandbox(
sandboxDir,
sessionUserId,
sessionUserId && sessionTenantId
? { tenantId: sessionTenantId, ownerId: sessionUserId, sessionId }
: undefined,
);
// Combine static tools with dynamically discovered MCP client tools and skill tools
const mcpTools = this.mcpClientService.getToolDefinitions();
@@ -342,6 +382,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
sandboxDir,
allowedTools,
userId: mergedOptions?.userId,
tenantId: sessionTenantId,
agentConfigId: mergedOptions?.agentConfigId,
agentName: resolvedAgentName,
metrics: {
@@ -390,7 +431,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
const formatMessage = (msg: ConversationHistoryMessage): string => {
const roleLabel =
msg.role === 'user' ? 'User' : msg.role === 'assistant' ? 'Assistant' : 'System';
return `**${roleLabel}:** ${msg.content}`;
return `**${roleLabel}:** ${msg.content}${this.attachmentContext(msg.attachments ?? [])}`;
};
const formatted = history.map((msg) => formatMessage(msg));
@@ -449,6 +490,21 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
return result;
}
private attachmentContext(attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[]): string {
if (attachments.length === 0) return '';
return `\n\n[Untrusted channel attachments]\n${attachments
.map((attachment: ChannelAttachmentDto): string =>
JSON.stringify({
id: attachment.id,
name: attachment.name,
mimeType: attachment.mimeType,
url: attachment.url,
...(attachment.sizeBytes !== undefined ? { sizeBytes: attachment.sizeBytes } : {}),
}),
)
.join('\n')}`;
}
private resolveModel(options?: AgentSessionOptions) {
if (!options?.provider && !options?.modelId) {
return this.providerService.getDefaultModel() ?? null;
@@ -473,38 +529,70 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
return this.providerService.getDefaultModel() ?? null;
}
getSession(sessionId: string): AgentSession | undefined {
return this.sessions.get(sessionId);
getSession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): AgentSession | undefined {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session || !this.sessionMatchesScope(session, scope)) return undefined;
return session;
}
listSessions(): SessionInfoDto[] {
listSessions(scope: ActorTenantScope): SessionInfoDto[] {
const now = Date.now();
return Array.from(this.sessions.values()).map((s) => ({
id: s.id,
provider: s.provider,
modelId: s.modelId,
...(s.agentName ? { agentName: s.agentName } : {}),
createdAt: new Date(s.createdAt).toISOString(),
promptCount: s.promptCount,
channels: Array.from(s.channels),
durationMs: now - s.createdAt,
metrics: { ...s.metrics },
}));
return Array.from(this.sessions.values())
.filter((s) => this.sessionMatchesScope(s, scope))
.map((s) => this.toSessionInfo(s, now));
}
getSessionInfo(sessionId: string): SessionInfoDto | undefined {
listAllSessionsForSystem(): SessionInfoDto[] {
const now = Date.now();
return Array.from(this.sessions.values()).map((s) => this.toSessionInfo(s, now));
}
getSessionInfo(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): SessionInfoDto | undefined {
const s = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!s) return undefined;
if (!s || !this.sessionMatchesScope(s, scope)) return undefined;
return this.toSessionInfo(s);
}
private scopeFromOptions(options: AgentSessionOptions): ActorTenantScope {
if (!options.userId) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Session owner scope is required');
}
return {
id: s.id,
provider: s.provider,
modelId: s.modelId,
...(s.agentName ? { agentName: s.agentName } : {}),
createdAt: new Date(s.createdAt).toISOString(),
promptCount: s.promptCount,
channels: Array.from(s.channels),
durationMs: Date.now() - s.createdAt,
metrics: { ...s.metrics },
userId: options.userId,
tenantId: this.tenantIdFor(options.userId, options.tenantId) ?? options.userId,
};
}
private tenantIdFor(
userId: string | undefined,
tenantId: string | undefined,
): string | undefined {
return tenantId ?? userId;
}
private sessionMatchesScope(session: AgentSession, scope: ActorTenantScope): boolean {
return (
session.userId === scope.userId && (session.tenantId ?? session.userId) === scope.tenantId
);
}
private assertSessionScope(session: AgentSession, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
if (!this.sessionMatchesScope(session, scope)) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Session does not belong to the current owner/tenant scope');
}
}
private toSessionInfo(session: AgentSession, now = Date.now()): SessionInfoDto {
return {
id: session.id,
provider: session.provider,
modelId: session.modelId,
...(session.agentName ? { agentName: session.agentName } : {}),
createdAt: new Date(session.createdAt).toISOString(),
promptCount: session.promptCount,
channels: Array.from(session.channels),
durationMs: now - session.createdAt,
metrics: { ...session.metrics },
};
}
@@ -553,9 +641,10 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
* not reconstructed — the model is used on the next createSession call for
* the same conversationId when the session is torn down or a new one is created.
*/
updateSessionModel(sessionId: string, modelId: string): void {
updateSessionModel(sessionId: string, modelId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) return;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
const prev = session.modelId;
session.modelId = modelId;
this.recordModelSwitch(sessionId);
@@ -572,48 +661,67 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
sessionId: string,
agentConfigId: string,
agentName: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
modelId?: string,
): void {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) return;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.agentConfigId = agentConfigId;
session.agentName = agentName;
if (modelId) {
this.updateSessionModel(sessionId, modelId);
this.updateSessionModel(sessionId, modelId, scope);
}
this.logger.log(
`Session ${sessionId}: agent switched to "${agentName}" (${agentConfigId}) (M5-003)`,
);
}
addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string): void {
addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (session) {
session.channels.add(channel);
}
if (!session) return;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.channels.add(channel);
}
removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string): void {
removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (session) {
session.channels.delete(channel);
}
if (!session) return;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.channels.delete(channel);
}
async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string): Promise<void> {
async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void>;
async prompt(
sessionId: string,
message: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[] | undefined,
): Promise<void>;
async prompt(
sessionId: string,
message: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[] = [],
): Promise<void> {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) {
throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
}
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.promptCount += 1;
// Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact,
// authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority.
const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments);
// Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn)
let effectiveMessage = message;
let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`;
if (this.systemOverride) {
const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId);
const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
if (override) {
effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${message}`;
await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId);
effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
}
}
@@ -629,16 +737,28 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
}
}
onEvent(sessionId: string, listener: (event: AgentSessionEvent) => void): () => void {
onEvent(
sessionId: string,
listener: (event: AgentSessionEvent) => void,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): () => void {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) {
throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
}
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.listeners.add(listener);
return () => session.listeners.delete(listener);
}
async destroySession(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
async destroySession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) return;
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
await this.destroySessionForSystem(sessionId);
}
private async destroySessionForSystem(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) return;
this.logger.log(`Destroying agent session ${sessionId}`);
@@ -667,7 +787,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
this.logger.log('Shutting down all agent sessions');
const stops = Array.from(this.sessions.keys()).map((id) => this.destroySession(id));
const stops = Array.from(this.sessions.keys()).map((id) => this.destroySessionForSystem(id));
const results = await Promise.allSettled(stops);
for (const result of results) {
if (result.status === 'rejected') {
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import {
connectorLeaseAuditLog,
createPgliteDb,
eq,
runPgliteMigrations,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { ConnectorExecutionContext, FencedConnectorAdapter } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
import {
CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
ConnectorLeaseService,
type ConnectorLeasePolicy,
type ConnectorLeasePolicySubject,
} from './connector-lease.service.js';
const authorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
const policy: ConnectorLeasePolicy = { authorize };
const context = {
actorScope: { userId: 'operator-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
correlationId: 'correlation-acquire',
};
describe('gateway connector lease fencing integration', (): void => {
let dataDir: string;
let handle: DbHandle;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let service: ConnectorLeaseService;
let repository: ConnectorLeaseRepository;
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z'));
dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-connector-lease-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
ConnectorLeaseRepository,
ConnectorLeaseService,
{ provide: DB, useValue: handle.db },
{ provide: CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY, useValue: policy },
],
}).compile();
service = moduleRef.get(ConnectorLeaseService);
repository = moduleRef.get(ConnectorLeaseRepository);
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
vi.useRealTimers();
await moduleRef.close();
await handle.close();
await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('derives tenant authority at the gateway and validates a grant before side effects', async (): Promise<void> => {
const lease = await service.acquire(
{
logicalAgentId: 'Mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
},
context,
);
const grant = await service.issueGrant(
{ lease, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-grant' },
);
const execute = vi.fn(async (_message: string, leaseContext: ConnectorExecutionContext) => {
return leaseContext.leaseEpoch;
});
const adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<string, string> = { execute };
await expect(service.executeGrant(grant, 'runtime.send', 'hello', adapter)).resolves.toBe('1');
expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
action: 'grant.issue',
requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
requestedTtlMs: 30_000,
}),
);
expect(execute.mock.calls[0]?.[1]).toMatchObject({
identity: { tenantId: 'tenant-a', logicalAgentId: 'mos' },
bindingId: 'operator-chat',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
});
});
it('normalizes lease-derived policy subjects before authorization', async (): Promise<void> => {
const lease = await service.acquire(
{
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
},
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-policy-setup' },
);
const aliasedLease = {
...lease,
identity: { ...lease.identity, logicalAgentId: ' MOS ' },
bindingId: ' Operator-Chat-Policy ',
connectorId: ' PI-Worker-A ',
scopes: [' Runtime.Send '],
leaseEpoch: `00${lease.leaseEpoch}`,
};
await service.heartbeat(aliasedLease, 30_000, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-policy-heartbeat',
});
expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
action: 'lease.heartbeat',
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
}),
);
await service.issueGrant(
{ lease: aliasedLease, scopes: [' Runtime.Send '], ttlMs: 1_000 },
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-policy-grant' },
);
expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
action: 'grant.issue',
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
}),
);
await service.release(aliasedLease, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-policy-release',
});
expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
action: 'lease.release',
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
}),
);
});
it('denies stale, forged, expired, cross-tenant, and cross-binding grants before effects', async (): Promise<void> => {
const bindingId = 'operator-chat-denials';
const current = await service.acquire(
{
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId,
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
},
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-denial-setup' },
);
const stale = await service.issueGrant(
{ lease: current, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-stale' },
);
await service.takeover(
{
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId,
connectorId: 'pi-worker-b',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
expectedEpoch: current.leaseEpoch,
},
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-takeover' },
);
const adapter = { execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
await expect(service.executeGrant(stale, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter)).rejects.toThrow();
const active = await service.current('mos', bindingId, context);
if (!active) throw new Error('active lease fixture is unavailable');
const grant = await service.issueGrant(
{ lease: active, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 1_000 },
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-active' },
);
await expect(
service.executeGrant({ ...grant }, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter),
).rejects.toThrow();
await expect(
service.executeGrant(
{ ...grant, bindingId: 'other-binding' },
'runtime.send',
undefined,
adapter,
),
).rejects.toThrow();
await expect(
service.issueGrant(
{ lease: active, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
{
actorScope: { userId: 'operator-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
correlationId: 'correlation-cross-tenant',
},
),
).rejects.toThrow();
const crossTenantAudit = await handle.db
.select()
.from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
.where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-cross-tenant'));
expect(crossTenantAudit).toHaveLength(1);
expect(crossTenantAudit[0]).toMatchObject({
tenantId: 'tenant-b',
logicalAgentId: 'untrusted',
bindingId: 'untrusted',
connectorId: 'untrusted',
reason: 'policy_denied',
});
vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:02.000Z'));
await expect(service.executeGrant(grant, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter)).rejects.toThrow();
expect(adapter.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects submitted lifecycle scopes that differ from durable authority before policy or mutation', async (): Promise<void> => {
authorize.mockResolvedValue(true);
const heartbeatLease = await service.acquire(
{
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-heartbeat-scope',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
},
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-setup' },
);
const releaseLease = await service.acquire(
{
logicalAgentId: 'mos',
bindingId: 'operator-chat-release-scope',
connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
},
{ ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-setup' },
);
const forgedHeartbeat = { ...heartbeatLease, scopes: ['tool.execute'] };
const forgedRelease = { ...releaseLease, scopes: ['tool.execute'] };
authorize.mockImplementation(async (subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject) => {
return subject.requestedScopes.length === 1 && subject.requestedScopes[0] === 'tool.execute';
});
authorize.mockClear();
await expect(
service.heartbeat(forgedHeartbeat, 30_000, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-forgery',
}),
).rejects.toThrow('Connector authority policy denied');
await expect(
service.release(forgedRelease, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-forgery',
}),
).rejects.toThrow('Connector authority policy denied');
expect(authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const currentHeartbeat = await repository.findCurrent({
identity: heartbeatLease.identity,
bindingId: heartbeatLease.bindingId,
});
const currentRelease = await repository.findCurrent({
identity: releaseLease.identity,
bindingId: releaseLease.bindingId,
});
expect(currentHeartbeat).toMatchObject({
leaseId: heartbeatLease.leaseId,
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
heartbeatAt: heartbeatLease.heartbeatAt,
expiresAt: heartbeatLease.expiresAt,
});
expect(currentRelease).toMatchObject({
leaseId: releaseLease.leaseId,
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
});
expect(currentRelease?.releasedAt).toBeUndefined();
const forgedAudits = await handle.db
.select()
.from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
.where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-forgery'));
expect(forgedAudits).toHaveLength(1);
expect(forgedAudits[0]).toMatchObject({
bindingId: heartbeatLease.bindingId,
connectorId: heartbeatLease.connectorId,
event: 'reject',
outcome: 'denied',
reason: 'policy_denied',
});
const forgedReleaseAudits = await handle.db
.select()
.from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
.where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-release-scope-forgery'));
expect(forgedReleaseAudits).toHaveLength(1);
expect(forgedReleaseAudits[0]).toMatchObject({
bindingId: releaseLease.bindingId,
connectorId: releaseLease.connectorId,
event: 'reject',
outcome: 'denied',
reason: 'policy_denied',
});
authorize.mockImplementation(async (subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject) => {
return subject.requestedScopes.length === 1 && subject.requestedScopes[0] === 'runtime.send';
});
await expect(
service.heartbeat(heartbeatLease, 30_000, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-canonical',
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({ scopes: ['runtime.send'] });
await expect(
service.release(releaseLease, {
...context,
correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-canonical',
}),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import {
connectorLeaseAuditLog,
createDb,
eq,
logicalAgentConnectorLeases,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
const hasPostgres = Boolean(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
const tenantId = `lease-test-${randomUUID()}`;
const identity = { tenantId, logicalAgentId: 'mos' } as const;
describe.skipIf(!hasPostgres)('ConnectorLeaseRepository real PostgreSQL integration', (): void => {
let handle: DbHandle;
beforeAll((): void => {
handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
if (!handle) return;
await handle.db
.delete(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
.where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.tenantId, tenantId));
await handle.db
.delete(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.where(eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.tenantId, tenantId));
await handle.close();
});
it('preserves the exclusive CAS fence across a real pool close/reopen', async (): Promise<void> => {
const command = {
identity,
bindingId: 'operator-chat',
scopes: ['runtime.send'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
} as const;
const firstCoordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db));
const contenders = await Promise.allSettled([
firstCoordinator.acquire({
...command,
connectorId: 'connector-a',
correlationId: 'postgres-acquire-a',
}),
firstCoordinator.acquire({
...command,
connectorId: 'connector-b',
correlationId: 'postgres-acquire-b',
}),
]);
const acquired = contenders.find((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled');
if (!acquired || acquired.status !== 'fulfilled') throw new Error('no lease contender won');
expect(contenders.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
await handle.close();
handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
const reopened = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db));
const persisted = await reopened.current({ identity, bindingId: 'operator-chat' });
expect(persisted).toMatchObject({
leaseId: acquired.value.leaseId,
leaseEpoch: '1',
});
const takeover = await reopened.takeover({
...command,
connectorId: 'connector-c',
correlationId: 'postgres-takeover',
expectedEpoch: acquired.value.leaseEpoch,
});
expect(takeover).toMatchObject({ connectorId: 'connector-c', leaseEpoch: '2' });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import {
connectorLeaseAuditLog,
createPgliteDb,
eq,
runPgliteMigrations,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator, ConnectorLeaseError } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
const identity = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', logicalAgentId: 'mos' } as const;
function acquireCommand(connectorId: string, correlationId: string) {
return {
identity,
bindingId: 'operator-chat',
connectorId,
scopes: ['runtime.send', 'tool.execute'],
ttlMs: 60_000,
correlationId,
};
}
describe('ConnectorLeaseRepository PostgreSQL semantics', (): void => {
let dataDir: string;
let handle: DbHandle;
let now: Date;
let coordinator: ConnectorLeaseCoordinator;
beforeEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-connector-lease-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z');
coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db), {
now: (): Date => now,
});
});
afterEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
await handle.close();
await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('allows only one concurrent contender to acquire a binding', async (): Promise<void> => {
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled([
coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a')),
coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-b')),
]);
expect(outcomes.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
const rejected = outcomes.find((result) => result.status === 'rejected');
expect(rejected).toMatchObject({
reason: { code: 'lease_held' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>,
});
});
it('uses compare-and-swap takeover and increments the fencing epoch monotonically', async (): Promise<void> => {
const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
const results = await Promise.allSettled([
coordinator.takeover({
...acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-b'),
expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
}),
coordinator.takeover({
...acquireCommand('connector-c', 'correlation-c'),
expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
}),
]);
const winner = results.find((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled');
expect(results.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
expect(winner?.status === 'fulfilled' ? winner.value.leaseEpoch : null).toBe('2');
expect(results.find((result) => result.status === 'rejected')).toMatchObject({
reason: { code: 'cas_mismatch' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>,
});
});
it('heartbeats and releases only the current connector epoch', async (): Promise<void> => {
const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:30.000Z');
const renewed = await coordinator.heartbeat({
lease: acquired,
ttlMs: 120_000,
correlationId: 'correlation-renew',
});
expect(renewed.expiresAt).toBe('2026-07-14T17:02:30.000Z');
await coordinator.release({ lease: renewed, correlationId: 'correlation-release' });
await expect(
coordinator.heartbeat({
lease: renewed,
ttlMs: 120_000,
correlationId: 'correlation-stale',
}),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'lease_released' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
});
it('survives close/reopen and requires CAS takeover to recover an expired lease', async (): Promise<void> => {
const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
await handle.close();
now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:02:00.000Z');
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db), {
now: (): Date => now,
});
await expect(
coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-plain-acquire')),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'takeover_required' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
const recovered = await coordinator.takeover({
...acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-takeover'),
expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
});
expect(recovered).toMatchObject({ connectorId: 'connector-b', leaseEpoch: '2' });
});
it('writes credential-safe lifecycle and rejection audit records', async (): Promise<void> => {
const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
await coordinator.heartbeat({
lease: acquired,
ttlMs: 60_000,
correlationId: 'correlation-renew',
});
await expect(
coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-reject')),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConnectorLeaseError);
const rows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
.where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.tenantId, identity.tenantId));
expect(rows.map((row) => row.event)).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining(['acquire', 'renew', 'reject']),
);
const serialized = JSON.stringify(rows, (_key: string, value: unknown): unknown =>
typeof value === 'bigint' ? value.toString(10) : value,
);
expect(serialized).not.toContain('tool.execute');
expect(serialized).not.toContain('runtime.send');
expect(serialized).not.toMatch(/token|secret|credential/i);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
and,
connectorLeaseAuditLog,
eq,
gt,
isNull,
logicalAgentConnectorLeases,
sql,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { ConnectorLeaseError } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import type {
ConnectorLease,
ConnectorLeaseAcquireMutation,
ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
ConnectorLeaseHeartbeatMutation,
ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
ConnectorLeaseReleaseMutation,
ConnectorLeaseStore,
ConnectorLeaseTakeoverMutation,
LogicalAgentBinding,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
interface SuccessfulMutation {
readonly ok: true;
readonly lease: ConnectorLease;
}
interface FailedMutation {
readonly ok: false;
readonly reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason;
}
type MutationResult = SuccessfulMutation | FailedMutation;
@Injectable()
export class ConnectorLeaseRepository implements ConnectorLeaseStore {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
async acquire(input: ConnectorLeaseAcquireMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
const inserted = await tx
.insert(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.values({
leaseId: input.leaseId,
tenantId: input.identity.tenantId,
logicalAgentId: input.identity.logicalAgentId,
bindingId: input.bindingId,
connectorId: input.connectorId,
scopes: [...input.scopes],
leaseEpoch: 1n,
acquiredAt: new Date(input.now),
heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
const row = inserted[0];
if (row) {
const lease = toLease(row);
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'acquire'));
return { ok: true, lease };
}
const current = await findRow(tx, input);
if (current && current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now) && !current.releasedAt) {
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
}
const reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason =
current && (current.releasedAt || current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now))
? 'takeover_required'
: 'lease_held';
await insertAudit(tx, rejectionAudit(input, current ? toLease(current) : null, reason));
return { ok: false, reason };
},
);
return unwrap(result);
}
async takeover(input: ConnectorLeaseTakeoverMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
const current = await findRow(tx, input);
if (!current || current.leaseEpoch.toString(10) !== input.expectedEpoch) {
await insertAudit(
tx,
rejectionAudit(input, current ? toLease(current) : null, 'cas_mismatch'),
);
return { ok: false, reason: 'cas_mismatch' };
}
if (current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now) && !current.releasedAt) {
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
}
const updated = await tx
.update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.set({
leaseId: input.leaseId,
connectorId: input.connectorId,
scopes: [...input.scopes],
leaseEpoch: sql`${logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch} + 1`,
acquiredAt: new Date(input.now),
heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
releasedAt: null,
updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
})
.where(
and(
bindingPredicate(input),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, current.leaseId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.expectedEpoch)),
),
)
.returning();
const row = updated[0];
if (!row) {
await insertAudit(tx, rejectionAudit(input, toLease(current), 'cas_mismatch'));
return { ok: false, reason: 'cas_mismatch' };
}
const lease = toLease(row);
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'takeover'));
return { ok: true, lease };
},
);
return unwrap(result);
}
async heartbeat(input: ConnectorLeaseHeartbeatMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
const updated = await tx
.update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.set({
heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
})
.where(
and(
bindingPredicate(input.lease),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, input.lease.leaseId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.connectorId, input.lease.connectorId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.lease.leaseEpoch)),
isNull(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.releasedAt),
gt(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.expiresAt, new Date(input.now)),
),
)
.returning();
const row = updated[0];
if (row) {
const lease = toLease(row);
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'renew'));
return { ok: true, lease };
}
const current = await findRow(tx, input.lease);
const reason = classifyAuthorityFailure(
current ? toLease(current) : null,
input.lease,
input.now,
);
if (reason === 'lease_expired' && current) {
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
}
await insertAudit(
tx,
rejectionAudit(
{ ...input.lease, correlationId: input.correlationId, now: input.now },
current ? toLease(current) : null,
reason,
),
);
return { ok: false, reason };
},
);
return unwrap(result);
}
async release(input: ConnectorLeaseReleaseMutation): Promise<void> {
const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
const updated = await tx
.update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.set({
releasedAt: new Date(input.now),
expiresAt: new Date(input.now),
updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
})
.where(
and(
bindingPredicate(input.lease),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, input.lease.leaseId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.connectorId, input.lease.connectorId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.lease.leaseEpoch)),
isNull(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.releasedAt),
gt(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.expiresAt, new Date(input.now)),
),
)
.returning();
const row = updated[0];
if (row) {
const lease = toLease(row);
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'release'));
return { ok: true, lease };
}
const current = await findRow(tx, input.lease);
const reason = classifyAuthorityFailure(
current ? toLease(current) : null,
input.lease,
input.now,
);
if (reason === 'lease_expired' && current) {
await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
}
await insertAudit(
tx,
rejectionAudit(
{ ...input.lease, correlationId: input.correlationId, now: input.now },
current ? toLease(current) : null,
reason,
),
);
return { ok: false, reason };
},
);
unwrap(result);
}
async findCurrent(binding: LogicalAgentBinding): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
const row = await findRow(this.db, binding);
return row ? toLease(row) : null;
}
async recordAudit(event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
await insertAudit(this.db, event);
}
}
function unwrap(result: MutationResult): ConnectorLease {
if (!result.ok) throw new ConnectorLeaseError(result.reason, safeErrorMessage(result.reason));
return result.lease;
}
function safeErrorMessage(reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason): string {
return `Connector lease mutation denied: ${reason}`;
}
function bindingPredicate(binding: LogicalAgentBinding) {
return and(
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.tenantId, binding.identity.tenantId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.logicalAgentId, binding.identity.logicalAgentId),
eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.bindingId, binding.bindingId),
);
}
async function findRow(
db: Pick<Db, 'select'>,
binding: LogicalAgentBinding,
): Promise<typeof logicalAgentConnectorLeases.$inferSelect | null> {
const rows = await db
.select()
.from(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
.where(bindingPredicate(binding))
.limit(1);
return rows[0] ?? null;
}
function toLease(row: typeof logicalAgentConnectorLeases.$inferSelect): ConnectorLease {
return Object.freeze({
identity: Object.freeze({ tenantId: row.tenantId, logicalAgentId: row.logicalAgentId }),
bindingId: row.bindingId,
leaseId: row.leaseId,
connectorId: row.connectorId,
scopes: Object.freeze([...row.scopes]),
leaseEpoch: row.leaseEpoch.toString(10),
acquiredAt: row.acquiredAt.toISOString(),
heartbeatAt: row.heartbeatAt.toISOString(),
expiresAt: row.expiresAt.toISOString(),
...(row.releasedAt ? { releasedAt: row.releasedAt.toISOString() } : {}),
});
}
function classifyAuthorityFailure(
current: ConnectorLease | null,
claimed: ConnectorLease,
now: string,
): ConnectorLeaseRejectReason {
if (!current) return 'lease_missing';
if (current.releasedAt) return 'lease_released';
if (new Date(current.expiresAt) <= new Date(now)) return 'lease_expired';
if (current.leaseEpoch !== claimed.leaseEpoch) return 'stale_epoch';
return 'connector_mismatch';
}
function lifecycleAudit(
input: { readonly correlationId: string; readonly now: string },
lease: ConnectorLease,
event: Exclude<ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent['event'], 'reject'>,
): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
return {
identity: lease.identity,
bindingId: lease.bindingId,
connectorId: lease.connectorId,
leaseId: lease.leaseId,
leaseEpoch: lease.leaseEpoch,
event,
outcome: 'succeeded',
correlationId: input.correlationId,
occurredAt: input.now,
};
}
function rejectionAudit(
input: {
readonly identity: ConnectorLease['identity'];
readonly bindingId: string;
readonly connectorId: string;
readonly correlationId: string;
readonly now: string;
},
current: ConnectorLease | null,
reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
return {
identity: input.identity,
bindingId: input.bindingId,
connectorId: input.connectorId,
event: 'reject',
outcome: 'denied',
correlationId: input.correlationId,
occurredAt: input.now,
...(current ? { leaseId: current.leaseId, leaseEpoch: current.leaseEpoch } : {}),
reason,
};
}
async function insertAudit(db: Pick<Db, 'insert'>, event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
await db.insert(connectorLeaseAuditLog).values({
tenantId: event.identity.tenantId,
logicalAgentId: event.identity.logicalAgentId,
bindingId: event.bindingId,
connectorId: event.connectorId,
...(event.leaseId ? { leaseId: event.leaseId } : {}),
...(event.leaseEpoch ? { leaseEpoch: BigInt(event.leaseEpoch) } : {}),
event: event.event,
outcome: event.outcome,
...(event.reason ? { reason: event.reason } : {}),
correlationId: event.correlationId,
occurredAt: new Date(event.occurredAt),
});
}
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
import { ForbiddenException, Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator, normalizeConnectorLease } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import {
normalizeConnectorId,
normalizeConnectorScopes,
normalizeCorrelationId,
normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity,
normalizeLogicalBindingId,
type AcquireConnectorLeaseInput,
type ConnectorExecutionGrant,
type ConnectorLease,
type ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
type FencedConnectorAdapter,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
export const CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY = Symbol('CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY');
export type ConnectorLeasePolicyAction =
| 'lease.acquire'
| 'lease.takeover'
| 'lease.heartbeat'
| 'lease.release'
| 'lease.read'
| 'grant.issue';
export interface ConnectorLeaseRequestContext {
readonly actorScope: ActorTenantScope;
readonly correlationId: string;
}
export interface GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest {
readonly logicalAgentId: string;
readonly bindingId: string;
readonly connectorId: string;
readonly scopes: readonly string[];
readonly ttlMs: number;
}
export interface GatewayConnectorLeaseTakeoverRequest extends GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest {
readonly expectedEpoch: string;
}
export interface GatewayConnectorGrantRequest {
readonly lease: ConnectorLease;
readonly scopes: readonly string[];
readonly ttlMs: number;
}
export interface ConnectorLeasePolicySubject {
readonly action: ConnectorLeasePolicyAction;
readonly actorId: string;
readonly tenantId: string;
readonly logicalAgentId: string;
readonly bindingId: string;
readonly connectorId: string;
readonly requestedScopes: readonly string[];
readonly requestedTtlMs: number | null;
}
export interface ConnectorLeasePolicy {
authorize(subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject): Promise<boolean>;
}
/** M1 has no concrete cutover policy: unconfigured production use fails closed. */
@Injectable()
export class DenyConnectorLeasePolicy implements ConnectorLeasePolicy {
async authorize(_subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject): Promise<boolean> {
return false;
}
}
/** Gateway-owned policy surface for durable connector authority and fenced effects. */
@Injectable()
export class ConnectorLeaseService {
private readonly coordinator: ConnectorLeaseCoordinator;
constructor(
@Inject(ConnectorLeaseRepository) private readonly repository: ConnectorLeaseRepository,
@Inject(CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY) private readonly policy: ConnectorLeasePolicy,
) {
this.coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(repository);
}
async acquire(
request: GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const command = this.command(request, context);
await this.assertPolicy('lease.acquire', command, context, command.scopes, command.ttlMs);
return this.coordinator.acquire({ ...command, correlationId: this.correlation(context) });
}
async takeover(
request: GatewayConnectorLeaseTakeoverRequest,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const command = this.command(request, context);
await this.assertPolicy('lease.takeover', command, context, command.scopes, command.ttlMs);
return this.coordinator.takeover({
...command,
expectedEpoch: request.expectedEpoch,
correlationId: this.correlation(context),
});
}
async heartbeat(
lease: ConnectorLease,
ttlMs: number,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
const normalizedLease = normalizeConnectorLease(lease);
const durableLease = await this.durableLifecycleLease(normalizedLease, context);
await this.assertPolicy('lease.heartbeat', durableLease, context, durableLease.scopes, ttlMs);
return this.coordinator.heartbeat({
lease: durableLease,
ttlMs,
correlationId: this.correlation(context),
});
}
async release(lease: ConnectorLease, context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext): Promise<void> {
const normalizedLease = normalizeConnectorLease(lease);
const durableLease = await this.durableLifecycleLease(normalizedLease, context);
await this.assertPolicy('lease.release', durableLease, context, durableLease.scopes, null);
await this.coordinator.release({
lease: durableLease,
correlationId: this.correlation(context),
});
}
async current(
logicalAgentId: string,
bindingId: string,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
const binding = {
identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity({
tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
logicalAgentId,
}),
bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(bindingId),
connectorId: 'gateway',
};
await this.assertPolicy('lease.read', binding, context, [], null);
return this.coordinator.current(binding);
}
async issueGrant(
request: GatewayConnectorGrantRequest,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorExecutionGrant> {
const lease = normalizeConnectorLease(request.lease);
await this.assertTenant(lease, context);
const scopes = normalizeConnectorScopes(request.scopes);
await this.assertPolicy('grant.issue', lease, context, scopes, request.ttlMs);
return this.coordinator.issueGrant({
lease,
scopes,
ttlMs: request.ttlMs,
correlationId: this.correlation(context),
});
}
async executeGrant<TInput, TOutput>(
grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant,
requiredScope: string,
input: TInput,
adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<TInput, TOutput>,
): Promise<TOutput> {
return this.coordinator.executeGrant(grant, requiredScope, input, adapter);
}
private command(
request: GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Omit<AcquireConnectorLeaseInput, 'correlationId'> {
return {
identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity({
tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
logicalAgentId: request.logicalAgentId,
}),
bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(request.bindingId),
connectorId: normalizeConnectorId(request.connectorId),
scopes: normalizeConnectorScopes(request.scopes),
ttlMs: request.ttlMs,
};
}
private async assertTenant(
lease: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
if (lease.identity.tenantId !== context.actorScope.tenantId) {
await this.recordPolicyDenial(
{
identity: {
tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
logicalAgentId: 'untrusted',
},
bindingId: 'untrusted',
connectorId: 'untrusted',
},
context,
);
throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority tenant scope denied');
}
}
private async durableLifecycleLease(
submittedLease: ConnectorLease,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
await this.assertTenant(submittedLease, context);
const durableLease = await this.coordinator.current(submittedLease);
if (!durableLease || !hasSameLifecycleAuthority(submittedLease, durableLease)) {
await this.recordPolicyDenial(durableLease ?? submittedLease, context);
throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority policy denied');
}
return durableLease;
}
private async assertPolicy(
action: ConnectorLeasePolicyAction,
subject: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
requestedScopes: readonly string[],
requestedTtlMs: number | null,
): Promise<void> {
const allowed = await this.policy.authorize({
action,
actorId: context.actorScope.userId,
tenantId: subject.identity.tenantId,
logicalAgentId: subject.identity.logicalAgentId,
bindingId: subject.bindingId,
connectorId: subject.connectorId,
requestedScopes: Object.freeze([...requestedScopes]),
requestedTtlMs,
});
if (!allowed) {
await this.recordPolicyDenial(subject, context);
throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority policy denied');
}
}
private async recordPolicyDenial(
subject: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
const event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent = {
identity: subject.identity,
bindingId: subject.bindingId,
connectorId: subject.connectorId,
event: 'reject',
outcome: 'denied',
reason: 'policy_denied',
correlationId: this.correlation(context),
occurredAt: new Date().toISOString(),
};
await this.repository.recordAudit(event);
}
private correlation(context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext): string {
return normalizeCorrelationId(context.correlationId);
}
}
function hasSameLifecycleAuthority(
submittedLease: ConnectorLease,
durableLease: ConnectorLease,
): boolean {
return (
submittedLease.identity.tenantId === durableLease.identity.tenantId &&
submittedLease.identity.logicalAgentId === durableLease.identity.logicalAgentId &&
submittedLease.bindingId === durableLease.bindingId &&
submittedLease.leaseId === durableLease.leaseId &&
submittedLease.connectorId === durableLease.connectorId &&
submittedLease.leaseEpoch === durableLease.leaseEpoch &&
submittedLease.scopes.length === durableLease.scopes.length &&
submittedLease.scopes.every((scope: string, index: number): boolean => {
return scope === durableLease.scopes[index];
})
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
import type { RuntimeProviderRequestContext } from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
/** Server-side request for a replay-safe provider message. */
export interface ProviderOutboxDto {
sessionId: string;
idempotencyKey: string;
correlationId: string;
content: string;
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { eq, sql, interactionCheckpoints, interactionInbox } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DurableSessionCoordinator, type DurableSessionIdentity } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { createPgliteDb, runPgliteMigrations, type DbHandle } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DurableSessionRepository } from './durable-session.repository.js';
import { DurableSessionService } from './durable-session.service.js';
const IDENTITY: DurableSessionIdentity = {
agentName: 'Nova',
sessionId: 'tess-pglite-session',
tenantId: 'tenant-pglite',
ownerId: 'tess-owner',
providerId: 'fleet',
runtimeSessionId: 'nova',
};
describe('DurableSessionRepository', () => {
let dataDir: string | undefined;
let handle: DbHandle;
let previousAuthSecret: string | undefined;
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
previousAuthSecret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = 'tess-durable-state-test-sealing-key';
dataDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'tess-durable-state-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
await seedOwner(handle);
}, 30_000);
beforeEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
await handle.db.execute(sql`DELETE FROM interaction_handoffs`);
await handle.db.execute(sql`DELETE FROM interaction_checkpoints`);
await handle.db.execute(sql`DELETE FROM interaction_inbox`);
await handle.db.execute(sql`DELETE FROM interaction_outbox`);
await handle.db.execute(sql`DELETE FROM interaction_sessions`);
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
await handle.close();
if (dataDir) rmSync(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
if (previousAuthSecret === undefined) delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
else process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = previousAuthSecret;
});
it('survives a full PGlite close/reopen mid-session without duplicate inbox or outbox side effects', async () => {
const beforeRestart = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await beforeRestart.create(IDENTITY);
await beforeRestart.receive({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'inbox-before-kill',
correlationId: 'correlation-before-kill',
content: 'resume after a kill',
});
await beforeRestart.enqueueOutbox({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'outbox-before-kill',
correlationId: 'correlation-before-kill',
channelId: 'cli',
kind: 'provider.send',
content: 'one response only',
});
await beforeRestart.checkpoint({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-before-kill',
cursor: 'cursor-before-kill',
summary: 'restart-safe state',
compactionEpoch: 1,
});
await beforeRestart.handoff({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
handoffId: 'handoff-before-kill',
destination: 'mos',
correlationId: 'correlation-before-kill',
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-before-kill',
status: 'pending',
});
await beforeRestart.checkpoint({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-after-handoff',
cursor: 'cursor-after-handoff',
summary: 'newer state cannot strand the portable handoff',
compactionEpoch: 2,
});
await handle.close();
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir!);
const afterRestart = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
const recovered = await afterRestart.recover(IDENTITY.sessionId);
const resumedHandoff = await afterRestart.resumeHandoff('handoff-before-kill');
const handled: string[] = [];
const effects: string[] = [];
await afterRestart.drainInbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, async (entry): Promise<void> => {
handled.push(entry.idempotencyKey);
});
await afterRestart.dispatchOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, async (entry): Promise<void> => {
effects.push(entry.idempotencyKey);
});
await afterRestart.drainInbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, async (entry): Promise<void> => {
handled.push(entry.idempotencyKey);
});
await afterRestart.dispatchOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, async (entry): Promise<void> => {
effects.push(entry.idempotencyKey);
});
expect(recovered.identity).toEqual(IDENTITY);
expect(recovered.checkpoint).toMatchObject({ checkpointId: 'checkpoint-after-handoff' });
expect(recovered.handoffs).toMatchObject([{ handoffId: 'handoff-before-kill' }]);
expect(resumedHandoff.checkpoint).toMatchObject({ checkpointId: 'checkpoint-before-kill' });
expect(handled).toEqual(['inbox-before-kill']);
expect(effects).toEqual(['outbox-before-kill']);
}, 30_000);
it('redacts sensitive durable payloads before persistence', async () => {
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
await coordinator.receive({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'redacted-inbox',
correlationId: 'correlation-redaction',
content: 'api_key=super-secret-canary',
});
await coordinator.enqueueOutbox({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'redacted-outbox',
correlationId: 'correlation-redaction',
channelId: 'cli',
kind: 'provider.send',
content: 'email [email protected] api_key=super-secret-canary',
});
await coordinator.checkpoint({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
checkpointId: 'redacted-checkpoint',
cursor: 'bearer super-secret-canary',
summary: 'email [email protected]',
compactionEpoch: 0,
});
const snapshot = await coordinator.snapshot(IDENTITY.sessionId);
const [persisted] = await handle.db
.select({ content: interactionInbox.content })
.from(interactionInbox)
.where(eq(interactionInbox.idempotencyKey, 'redacted-inbox'));
expect(JSON.stringify(snapshot)).not.toContain('super-secret-canary');
expect(JSON.stringify(snapshot)).not.toContain('[email protected]');
expect(persisted?.content).not.toContain('super-secret-canary');
expect(persisted?.content).not.toContain('[REDACTED]');
}, 30_000);
it('fails closed when the configured idempotency secret is unavailable', async () => {
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
try {
await expect(
coordinator.receive({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'requires-idempotency-secret',
correlationId: 'correlation-secret',
content: 'sensitive payload',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/required for durable idempotency digests/);
} finally {
if (secret === undefined) delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
else process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = secret;
}
}, 30_000);
it('uses keyed pre-redaction digests to reject distinct sensitive checkpoint payloads', async () => {
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
const input = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-secret-conflict',
cursor: 'api_key=secret-one',
summary: 'bearer secret-one',
compactionEpoch: 1,
};
await coordinator.checkpoint(input);
await expect(
coordinator.checkpoint({
...input,
cursor: 'api_key=secret-two',
summary: 'bearer secret-two',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/checkpoint identity conflict/);
const [persisted] = await handle.db
.select({
digest: interactionCheckpoints.contentDigest,
cursor: interactionCheckpoints.cursor,
})
.from(interactionCheckpoints)
.where(eq(interactionCheckpoints.checkpointId, input.checkpointId));
expect(persisted?.cursor).not.toContain('secret-one');
expect(persisted?.digest).not.toBe(
createHash('sha256')
.update(JSON.stringify([input.cursor, input.summary]))
.digest('hex'),
);
await coordinator.checkpoint({
...input,
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-delimiter-conflict',
cursor: 'a\u0000b',
summary: 'c',
});
await expect(
coordinator.checkpoint({
...input,
checkpointId: 'checkpoint-delimiter-conflict',
cursor: 'a',
summary: 'b\u0000c',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/checkpoint identity conflict/);
}, 30_000);
it('rejects distinct sensitive inbox and outbox payloads under reused idempotency keys', async () => {
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
const inbox = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'inbox-secret-conflict',
correlationId: 'correlation-inbox-secret',
content: 'api_key=secret-one',
};
const outbox = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'outbox-secret-conflict',
correlationId: 'correlation-outbox-secret',
channelId: 'cli',
kind: 'provider.send',
content: 'api_key=secret-one',
};
await coordinator.receive(inbox);
await coordinator.enqueueOutbox(outbox);
await expect(coordinator.receive({ ...inbox, content: 'api_key=secret-two' })).rejects.toThrow(
/idempotency conflict/,
);
await expect(
coordinator.enqueueOutbox({ ...outbox, content: 'api_key=secret-two' }),
).rejects.toThrow(/idempotency conflict/);
}, 30_000);
it('rejects database inbox and outbox idempotency-key conflicts', async () => {
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db));
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
await coordinator.receive({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'inbox-conflict',
correlationId: 'correlation-inbox',
content: 'original inbox',
});
await coordinator.enqueueOutbox({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'outbox-conflict',
correlationId: 'correlation-outbox',
channelId: 'cli',
kind: 'provider.send',
content: 'original outbox',
});
await expect(
coordinator.receive({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'inbox-conflict',
correlationId: 'forged-correlation',
content: 'original inbox',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/idempotency conflict/);
await expect(
coordinator.enqueueOutbox({
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'outbox-conflict',
correlationId: 'correlation-outbox',
channelId: 'forged-channel',
kind: 'provider.send',
content: 'original outbox',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/idempotency conflict/);
}, 30_000);
it('does not requeue a live outbox claim during a normal scoped dispatch', async () => {
const repository = new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db);
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(repository);
const runtimeProviders = { sendMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const service = new DurableSessionService(repository, runtimeProviders as never);
const input = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'live-effect',
correlationId: 'correlation-live',
content: 'must not duplicate',
context: {
actorScope: { userId: IDENTITY.ownerId, tenantId: IDENTITY.tenantId },
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-live',
},
};
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
await service.queueProviderSend(input);
expect(await repository.claimOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId)).toMatchObject({
status: 'processing',
});
await service.dispatchProviderOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, input);
await expect(
service.recoverProviderSession(IDENTITY.sessionId, {
...input,
context: {
...input.context,
actorScope: { userId: 'intruder', tenantId: 'tenant-pglite' },
},
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/scope or correlation mismatch/);
expect(runtimeProviders.sendMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(await coordinator.snapshot(IDENTITY.sessionId)).toMatchObject({
outbox: [{ idempotencyKey: 'live-effect', status: 'processing' }],
});
}, 30_000);
it('rejects an outbox correlation mismatch before claiming the pending effect', async () => {
const repository = new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db);
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(repository);
const runtimeProviders = { sendMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const service = new DurableSessionService(repository, runtimeProviders as never);
const input = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'mismatch-effect',
correlationId: 'correlation-expected',
content: 'must remain pending',
context: {
actorScope: { userId: IDENTITY.ownerId, tenantId: IDENTITY.tenantId },
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-expected',
},
};
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
await service.queueProviderSend(input);
await expect(
service.dispatchProviderOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, {
...input,
correlationId: 'correlation-forged',
context: { ...input.context, correlationId: 'correlation-forged' },
}),
).rejects.toThrow(/scope or correlation mismatch/);
expect(runtimeProviders.sendMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(await coordinator.snapshot(IDENTITY.sessionId)).toMatchObject({
outbox: [{ idempotencyKey: 'mismatch-effect', status: 'pending' }],
});
}, 30_000);
it('dispatches only the outbox record bound to the supplied correlation and channel', async () => {
const repository = new DurableSessionRepository(handle.db);
const coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(repository);
const runtimeProviders = { sendMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const service = new DurableSessionService(repository, runtimeProviders as never);
const first = {
sessionId: IDENTITY.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: 'scoped-effect-one',
correlationId: 'correlation-one',
content: 'first result',
context: {
actorScope: { userId: IDENTITY.ownerId, tenantId: IDENTITY.tenantId },
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-one',
},
};
const second = {
...first,
idempotencyKey: 'scoped-effect-two',
correlationId: 'correlation-two',
content: 'second result',
context: { ...first.context, correlationId: 'correlation-two' },
};
await coordinator.create(IDENTITY);
await service.queueProviderSend(first);
await service.queueProviderSend(second);
await service.dispatchProviderOutbox(IDENTITY.sessionId, first);
expect(runtimeProviders.sendMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(runtimeProviders.sendMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
IDENTITY.providerId,
IDENTITY.runtimeSessionId,
{ content: 'first result', idempotencyKey: 'scoped-effect-one' },
first.context,
);
expect(await coordinator.snapshot(IDENTITY.sessionId)).toMatchObject({
outbox: [
{ idempotencyKey: 'scoped-effect-one', status: 'delivered' },
{ idempotencyKey: 'scoped-effect-two', status: 'pending' },
],
});
}, 30_000);
});
async function seedOwner(handle: DbHandle): Promise<void> {
await handle.db.execute(sql`
INSERT INTO users (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ('tess-owner', 'Tess Owner', '[email protected]', false, now(), now())
`);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
import { createHash, createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
and,
asc,
desc,
eq,
interactionCheckpoints,
interactionHandoffs,
interactionInbox,
interactionOutbox,
interactionSessions,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import { redactSensitiveContent } from '@mosaicstack/log';
import type {
DurableCheckpoint,
DurableCheckpointInput,
DurableEnqueueResult,
DurableHandoff,
DurableHandoffInput,
DurableInboxEntry,
DurableInboxInput,
DurableInboxStatus,
DurableOutboxEntry,
DurableOutboxInput,
DurableOutboxStatus,
DurableSessionIdentity,
DurableSessionSnapshot,
DurableSessionStore,
} from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
@Injectable()
export class DurableSessionRepository implements DurableSessionStore {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
async create(identity: DurableSessionIdentity): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.insert(interactionSessions)
.values({
id: identity.sessionId,
agentName: identity.agentName,
tenantId: identity.tenantId,
ownerId: identity.ownerId,
providerId: identity.providerId,
runtimeSessionId: identity.runtimeSessionId,
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
const existing = await this.session(identity.sessionId);
if (!existing || !sameEnrollmentScope(existing, identity)) {
throw new Error(`Durable session identity conflict: ${identity.sessionId}`);
}
// A recovered/re-enrolled runtime can receive a new provider session ID;
// the conversation handle and owner scope remain immutable.
if (
existing.providerId !== identity.providerId ||
existing.runtimeSessionId !== identity.runtimeSessionId
) {
await this.db
.update(interactionSessions)
.set({ providerId: identity.providerId, runtimeSessionId: identity.runtimeSessionId })
.where(eq(interactionSessions.id, identity.sessionId));
}
}
async snapshot(sessionId: string): Promise<DurableSessionSnapshot | null> {
const identity = await this.session(sessionId);
if (!identity) return null;
const [inbox, outbox, checkpoints, handoffs] = await Promise.all([
this.db
.select()
.from(interactionInbox)
.where(eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, sessionId))
.orderBy(asc(interactionInbox.createdAt)),
this.db
.select()
.from(interactionOutbox)
.where(eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, sessionId))
.orderBy(asc(interactionOutbox.createdAt)),
this.db
.select()
.from(interactionCheckpoints)
.where(eq(interactionCheckpoints.sessionId, sessionId))
.orderBy(
desc(interactionCheckpoints.compactionEpoch),
desc(interactionCheckpoints.createdAt),
)
.limit(1),
this.db
.select()
.from(interactionHandoffs)
.where(eq(interactionHandoffs.sessionId, sessionId))
.orderBy(asc(interactionHandoffs.createdAt)),
]);
const checkpoint = checkpoints[0];
return {
identity,
inbox: inbox.map(toInbox),
outbox: outbox.map(toOutbox),
...(checkpoint ? { checkpoint: toCheckpoint(checkpoint) } : {}),
handoffs: handoffs.map(toHandoff),
};
}
async enqueueInbox(input: DurableInboxInput): Promise<DurableEnqueueResult<DurableInboxStatus>> {
const digest = contentDigest(input.content);
const record: DurableInboxInput = {
...input,
content: redactSensitiveContent(input.content).content,
};
const inserted = await this.db
.insert(interactionInbox)
.values({
...record,
content: seal(record.content),
contentDigest: digest,
status: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ status: interactionInbox.status });
if (inserted[0]) return { accepted: true, status: inserted[0].status };
const existing = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionInbox)
.where(
and(
eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, input.sessionId),
eq(interactionInbox.idempotencyKey, input.idempotencyKey),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (!existing[0]) throw new Error(`Durable inbox enqueue failed: ${input.idempotencyKey}`);
const entry = toInbox(existing[0]);
if (
!sameInbox(entry, record) ||
!matchesContentDigest(existing[0].contentDigest, input.content)
) {
throw new Error(`Durable inbox idempotency conflict: ${input.idempotencyKey}`);
}
return { accepted: false, status: entry.status };
}
async claimInbox(sessionId: string): Promise<DurableInboxEntry | null> {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
const candidate = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionInbox)
.where(
and(eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, sessionId), eq(interactionInbox.status, 'pending')),
)
.orderBy(asc(interactionInbox.createdAt))
.limit(1);
const entry = candidate[0];
if (!entry) return null;
const claimed = await this.db
.update(interactionInbox)
.set({ status: 'processing', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(and(eq(interactionInbox.id, entry.id), eq(interactionInbox.status, 'pending')))
.returning();
if (claimed[0]) return toInbox(claimed[0]);
}
return null;
}
async completeInbox(sessionId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.update(interactionInbox)
.set({ status: 'processed', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(
eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionInbox.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
eq(interactionInbox.status, 'processing'),
),
);
}
async releaseInbox(sessionId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.update(interactionInbox)
.set({ status: 'pending', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(
eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionInbox.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
eq(interactionInbox.status, 'processing'),
),
);
}
async enqueueOutbox(
input: DurableOutboxInput,
): Promise<DurableEnqueueResult<DurableOutboxStatus>> {
const digest = contentDigest(input.content);
const record: DurableOutboxInput = {
...input,
content: redactSensitiveContent(input.content).content,
};
const inserted = await this.db
.insert(interactionOutbox)
.values({
...record,
content: seal(record.content),
contentDigest: digest,
status: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ status: interactionOutbox.status });
if (inserted[0]) return { accepted: true, status: inserted[0].status };
const existing = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionOutbox)
.where(
and(
eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, input.sessionId),
eq(interactionOutbox.idempotencyKey, input.idempotencyKey),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (!existing[0]) throw new Error(`Durable outbox enqueue failed: ${input.idempotencyKey}`);
const entry = toOutbox(existing[0]);
if (
!sameOutbox(entry, record) ||
!matchesContentDigest(existing[0].contentDigest, input.content)
) {
throw new Error(`Durable outbox idempotency conflict: ${input.idempotencyKey}`);
}
return { accepted: false, status: entry.status };
}
async claimOutbox(sessionId: string): Promise<DurableOutboxEntry | null> {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
const candidate = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionOutbox)
.where(
and(eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, sessionId), eq(interactionOutbox.status, 'pending')),
)
.orderBy(asc(interactionOutbox.createdAt))
.limit(1);
const entry = candidate[0];
if (!entry) return null;
const claimed = await this.db
.update(interactionOutbox)
.set({ status: 'processing', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(and(eq(interactionOutbox.id, entry.id), eq(interactionOutbox.status, 'pending')))
.returning();
if (claimed[0]) return toOutbox(claimed[0]);
}
return null;
}
async claimOutboxByKey(
sessionId: string,
idempotencyKey: string,
): Promise<DurableOutboxEntry | null> {
const claimed = await this.db
.update(interactionOutbox)
.set({ status: 'processing', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(
eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionOutbox.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
eq(interactionOutbox.status, 'pending'),
),
)
.returning();
return claimed[0] ? toOutbox(claimed[0]) : null;
}
async completeOutbox(sessionId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.update(interactionOutbox)
.set({ status: 'delivered', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(
eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionOutbox.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
eq(interactionOutbox.status, 'processing'),
),
);
}
async releaseOutbox(sessionId: string, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<void> {
await this.db
.update(interactionOutbox)
.set({ status: 'pending', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(
eq(interactionOutbox.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionOutbox.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
eq(interactionOutbox.status, 'processing'),
),
);
}
async checkpoint(input: DurableCheckpointInput): Promise<void> {
// Compute identity before redaction. The persisted digest is keyed so a database
// reader cannot use it as an offline oracle for sensitive cursor/summary values.
const digest = contentDigest(JSON.stringify([input.cursor, input.summary]));
const checkpoint: DurableCheckpointInput = {
...input,
cursor: redactSensitiveContent(input.cursor).content,
summary: redactSensitiveContent(input.summary).content,
};
const inserted = await this.db
.insert(interactionCheckpoints)
.values({
...checkpoint,
contentDigest: digest,
cursor: seal(checkpoint.cursor),
summary: seal(checkpoint.summary),
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ checkpointId: interactionCheckpoints.checkpointId });
if (inserted[0]) return;
const existing = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionCheckpoints)
.where(
and(
eq(interactionCheckpoints.sessionId, input.sessionId),
eq(interactionCheckpoints.checkpointId, input.checkpointId),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (
!existing[0] ||
!sameCheckpoint(toCheckpoint(existing[0]), checkpoint) ||
!matchesCheckpointDigest(existing[0].contentDigest, digest)
) {
throw new Error(`Durable checkpoint identity conflict: ${input.checkpointId}`);
}
}
async findCheckpoint(sessionId: string, checkpointId: string): Promise<DurableCheckpoint | null> {
const checkpoints = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionCheckpoints)
.where(
and(
eq(interactionCheckpoints.sessionId, sessionId),
eq(interactionCheckpoints.checkpointId, checkpointId),
),
)
.limit(1);
const checkpoint = checkpoints[0];
return checkpoint ? toCheckpoint(checkpoint) : null;
}
async handoff(input: DurableHandoffInput): Promise<void> {
const checkpoint = await this.findCheckpoint(input.sessionId, input.checkpointId);
if (!checkpoint) {
throw new Error(`Durable handoff checkpoint is unavailable: ${input.checkpointId}`);
}
const inserted = await this.db
.insert(interactionHandoffs)
.values({ ...input })
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ handoffId: interactionHandoffs.handoffId });
if (inserted[0]) return;
const existing = await this.findHandoff(input.handoffId);
if (!existing || !sameHandoff(existing, input)) {
throw new Error(`Durable handoff identity conflict: ${input.handoffId}`);
}
}
async findHandoff(handoffId: string): Promise<DurableHandoff | null> {
const handoffs = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionHandoffs)
.where(eq(interactionHandoffs.handoffId, handoffId))
.limit(1);
const handoff = handoffs[0];
return handoff ? toHandoff(handoff) : null;
}
async requeueInFlight(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
// Inbox handlers are process-local work. A provider outbox claim may have
// reached an external target before a crash, so it is deliberately not
// replayed by generic recovery.
await this.db
.update(interactionInbox)
.set({ status: 'pending', updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(
and(eq(interactionInbox.sessionId, sessionId), eq(interactionInbox.status, 'processing')),
);
}
private async session(sessionId: string): Promise<DurableSessionIdentity | null> {
const sessions = await this.db
.select()
.from(interactionSessions)
.where(eq(interactionSessions.id, sessionId))
.limit(1);
const session = sessions[0];
return session
? {
agentName: session.agentName,
sessionId: session.id,
tenantId: session.tenantId,
ownerId: session.ownerId,
providerId: session.providerId,
runtimeSessionId: session.runtimeSessionId,
}
: null;
}
}
function contentDigest(content: string): string {
const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
if (!secret) {
throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is required for durable idempotency digests');
}
return `hmac:v1:${createHmac('sha256', secret).update(content).digest('hex')}`;
}
function matchesContentDigest(stored: string, content: string): boolean {
return (
stored === contentDigest(content) ||
stored === createHash('sha256').update(content).digest('hex')
);
}
function matchesCheckpointDigest(stored: string, digest: string): boolean {
// Legacy rows predate any pre-redaction identity and cannot safely prove equality.
// Reject rather than let redaction collapse distinct sensitive checkpoint payloads.
return stored === digest;
}
function sameEnrollmentScope(left: DurableSessionIdentity, right: DurableSessionIdentity): boolean {
return (
left.agentName === right.agentName &&
left.sessionId === right.sessionId &&
left.tenantId === right.tenantId &&
left.ownerId === right.ownerId
);
}
function sameInbox(left: DurableInboxEntry, right: DurableInboxInput): boolean {
return (
left.sessionId === right.sessionId &&
left.idempotencyKey === right.idempotencyKey &&
left.correlationId === right.correlationId &&
left.content === right.content
);
}
function sameOutbox(left: DurableOutboxEntry, right: DurableOutboxInput): boolean {
return (
left.sessionId === right.sessionId &&
left.idempotencyKey === right.idempotencyKey &&
left.correlationId === right.correlationId &&
left.channelId === right.channelId &&
left.kind === right.kind &&
left.content === right.content
);
}
function sameCheckpoint(left: DurableCheckpoint, right: DurableCheckpointInput): boolean {
return (
left.sessionId === right.sessionId &&
left.checkpointId === right.checkpointId &&
left.compactionEpoch === right.compactionEpoch
);
}
function sameHandoff(left: DurableHandoff, right: DurableHandoffInput): boolean {
return (
left.sessionId === right.sessionId &&
left.handoffId === right.handoffId &&
left.destination === right.destination &&
left.correlationId === right.correlationId &&
left.checkpointId === right.checkpointId &&
left.status === right.status
);
}
function toInbox(row: typeof interactionInbox.$inferSelect): DurableInboxEntry {
return {
sessionId: row.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: row.idempotencyKey,
correlationId: row.correlationId,
content: unseal(row.content),
status: row.status,
};
}
function toOutbox(row: typeof interactionOutbox.$inferSelect): DurableOutboxEntry {
return {
sessionId: row.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: row.idempotencyKey,
correlationId: row.correlationId,
channelId: row.channelId,
kind: row.kind,
content: unseal(row.content),
status: row.status,
};
}
function toCheckpoint(row: typeof interactionCheckpoints.$inferSelect): DurableCheckpoint {
return {
sessionId: row.sessionId,
checkpointId: row.checkpointId,
cursor: unseal(row.cursor),
summary: unseal(row.summary),
compactionEpoch: row.compactionEpoch,
};
}
function toHandoff(row: typeof interactionHandoffs.$inferSelect): DurableHandoff {
return {
sessionId: row.sessionId,
handoffId: row.handoffId,
destination: row.destination,
correlationId: row.correlationId,
checkpointId: row.checkpointId,
status: row.status,
};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
import { ForbiddenException, Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { DurableSessionCoordinator, type DurableSessionIdentity } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import type { ProviderOutboxDto } from './durable-session.dto.js';
import { DurableSessionRepository } from './durable-session.repository.js';
import {
RuntimeProviderService,
type RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
} from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
/**
* Scoped gateway boundary for the canonical durable session state machine. It deliberately
* uses composition: raw state methods cannot be injected into channel, CLI, or
* MCP adapters without a server-derived actor/tenant/correlation context.
*/
@Injectable()
export class DurableSessionService {
private readonly coordinator: DurableSessionCoordinator;
constructor(
@Inject(DurableSessionRepository) repository: DurableSessionRepository,
@Inject(RuntimeProviderService) private readonly runtimeProviders: RuntimeProviderService,
) {
this.coordinator = new DurableSessionCoordinator(repository);
}
/** Enroll a verified runtime session under the stable cross-surface conversation handle. */
async enroll(
identity: DurableSessionIdentity,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
if (
identity.ownerId !== context.actorScope.userId ||
identity.tenantId !== context.actorScope.tenantId
) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Durable session enrollment scope mismatch');
}
await this.coordinator.create(identity);
}
async queueProviderSend(input: ProviderOutboxDto): Promise<void> {
const snapshot = await this.coordinator.snapshot(input.sessionId);
this.assertScope(snapshot.identity.ownerId, snapshot.identity.tenantId, input);
await this.coordinator.enqueueOutbox({
sessionId: input.sessionId,
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
channelId: input.context.channelId,
kind: 'provider.send',
content: input.content,
});
}
async dispatchProviderOutbox(sessionId: string, input: ProviderOutboxDto): Promise<void> {
if (sessionId !== input.sessionId) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Durable outbox session mismatch');
}
const snapshot = await this.coordinator.snapshot(sessionId);
this.assertScope(snapshot.identity.ownerId, snapshot.identity.tenantId, input);
const pendingEntry = snapshot.outbox.find(
(entry): boolean => entry.idempotencyKey === input.idempotencyKey,
);
if (!pendingEntry) return;
// Validate immutable routing before claiming. A caller with a mismatched
// correlation/channel must not strand a pending external side effect.
this.assertOutboxScope(pendingEntry, input);
await this.coordinator.dispatchOutboxEntry(
sessionId,
input.idempotencyKey,
async (entry): Promise<void> => {
this.assertOutboxScope(entry, input);
await this.runtimeProviders.sendMessage(
snapshot.identity.providerId,
snapshot.identity.runtimeSessionId,
{ content: entry.content, idempotencyKey: entry.idempotencyKey },
input.context,
);
},
);
}
/** Read durable identity/state only after deriving and checking the server-side actor scope. */
async getSnapshot(sessionId: string, context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext) {
const snapshot = await this.coordinator.snapshot(sessionId);
this.assertScope(snapshot.identity.ownerId, snapshot.identity.tenantId, {
sessionId,
content: '',
idempotencyKey: 'read-only',
correlationId: context.correlationId,
context,
});
return snapshot;
}
/** Startup/recovery-only path; normal queue/dispatch methods never requeue live work. */
async recoverProviderSession(sessionId: string, input: ProviderOutboxDto): Promise<void> {
const snapshot = await this.coordinator.snapshot(sessionId);
this.assertScope(snapshot.identity.ownerId, snapshot.identity.tenantId, input);
await this.coordinator.recover(sessionId);
}
private assertOutboxScope(
entry: { kind: string; correlationId: string; channelId: string },
input: ProviderOutboxDto,
): void {
if (
entry.kind !== 'provider.send' ||
entry.correlationId !== input.correlationId ||
entry.channelId !== input.context.channelId
) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Durable outbox scope or correlation mismatch');
}
}
private assertScope(ownerId: string, tenantId: string, input: ProviderOutboxDto): void {
if (
input.context.actorScope.userId !== ownerId ||
input.context.actorScope.tenantId !== tenantId ||
input.context.correlationId !== input.correlationId
) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Durable session scope or correlation mismatch');
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { HermesRuntimeProvider } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import { AgentModule } from './agent.module.js';
import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { CoordModule } from '../coord/coord.module.js';
import { McpClientModule } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.module.js';
import { SkillsModule } from '../skills/skills.module.js';
import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
import { LogModule } from '../log/log.module.js';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import {
AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER,
RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK,
RuntimeProviderAuditService,
} from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import { DurableSessionService } from './durable-session.service.js';
import { DurableSessionRepository } from './durable-session.repository.js';
import { AgentService } from './agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from './provider.service.js';
import { ProviderCredentialsService } from './provider-credentials.service.js';
import { RoutingService } from './routing.service.js';
import { RoutingEngineService } from './routing/routing-engine.service.js';
import { SkillLoaderService } from './skill-loader.service.js';
const authenticatedUser = { id: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' };
@Module({})
class EmptyAgentDependencyModule {}
@Global()
@Module({
providers: [
{
provide: AUTH,
useValue: {
api: {
getSession: vi.fn(async ({ headers }: { headers: Headers }) =>
headers.get('cookie') === 'session=trusted'
? { user: authenticatedUser, session: { id: 'session-1' } }
: null,
),
},
},
},
AuthGuard,
{ provide: BRAIN, useValue: {} },
{ provide: DB, useValue: {} },
],
exports: [AUTH, AuthGuard, BRAIN, DB],
})
class AuthenticatedRequestModule {}
/**
* This is deliberately an HTTP test rather than a controller unit test: it
* exercises AgentModule's actual provider factory, Nest DI, and AuthGuard.
*/
describe('Hermes runtime provider reachability', (): void => {
let app: NestFastifyApplication | undefined;
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [AuthenticatedRequestModule, AgentModule],
})
.overrideModule(CoordModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideModule(McpClientModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideModule(SkillsModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideModule(GCModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideModule(LogModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideModule(CommandsModule)
.useModule(EmptyAgentDependencyModule)
.overrideProvider(RuntimeProviderAuditService)
.useValue({ record: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) })
.overrideProvider(RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK)
.useValue({ record: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) })
.overrideProvider(RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER)
.useValue({ consume: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) })
.overrideProvider(DurableSessionService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(DurableSessionRepository)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(AgentService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(ProviderService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(ProviderCredentialsService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(RoutingService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(RoutingEngineService)
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(SkillLoaderService)
.useValue({})
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
await app?.close();
});
it('returns gateway denial responses from the actual guarded interaction routes', async (): Promise<void> => {
if (!app) throw new Error('Nest application did not initialize');
const attachDenied = await app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/attach',
headers: { 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
payload: { mode: 'read' },
});
expect(attachDenied.statusCode).toBe(401);
const sendDenied = await app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/send',
headers: { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
payload: {},
});
expect(sendDenied.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(sendDenied.json()).toMatchObject({
message: 'Content and idempotency key are required',
});
const stopDenied = await app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/stop',
headers: { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
payload: {},
});
expect(stopDenied.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(stopDenied.json()).toMatchObject({ message: 'Exact-action approval is required' });
});
it('requires authentication and reaches the Hermes provider registered by AgentModule', async (): Promise<void> => {
if (!app) throw new Error('Nest application did not initialize');
const registry = app.get(AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY);
expect(registry.get('runtime.hermes')).toBeInstanceOf(HermesRuntimeProvider);
const denied = await app.inject({
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/interaction/Nova/transitional-capabilities?provider=runtime.hermes',
headers: { 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
});
expect(denied.statusCode).toBe(401);
const response = await app.inject({
method: 'GET',
url: '/api/interaction/Nova/transitional-capabilities?provider=runtime.hermes',
headers: { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
});
expect(response.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(response.json()).toEqual([
{ capability: 'kanban', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'skills', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'memory', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'tools', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'cron', status: 'unsupported' },
]);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport } from './hermes-runtime.transport.js';
const scope = {
actorId: 'owner-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'correlation-1',
};
describe('GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport', () => {
it('preserves a configured path prefix and authenticates the concrete runtime request', async () => {
const fetchFn = vi
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue(new Response(JSON.stringify(['session.list']), { status: 200 }));
const transport = new GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport(
'https://runtime.example.test/hermes',
'test-service-token',
fetchFn,
);
await expect(transport.capabilities(scope)).resolves.toEqual(['session.list']);
expect(fetchFn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
new URL('https://runtime.example.test/hermes/capabilities'),
expect.objectContaining({
headers: expect.objectContaining({
authorization: 'Bearer test-service-token',
'x-mosaic-channel-id': 'cli',
}),
}),
);
});
it('rejects non-loopback HTTP runtime endpoints before sending identity headers', async () => {
const fetchFn = vi.fn();
const transport = new GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport(
'http://runtime.example.test/hermes',
'test-service-token',
fetchFn,
);
await expect(transport.capabilities(scope)).rejects.toThrow('requires HTTPS');
expect(fetchFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
import type { HermesLegacySession, HermesRuntimeTransport } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import type {
RuntimeAttachHandle,
RuntimeAttachMode,
RuntimeMessage,
RuntimeScope,
RuntimeStreamEvent,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
/** Concrete HTTP transport for a configured legacy Hermes runtime endpoint. */
export class GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport implements HermesRuntimeTransport {
constructor(
private readonly baseUrl = process.env['MOSAIC_HERMES_RUNTIME_URL']?.trim(),
private readonly serviceToken = process.env['MOSAIC_HERMES_RUNTIME_TOKEN']?.trim(),
private readonly fetchFn: typeof fetch = fetch,
) {}
async capabilities(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<string[]> {
return this.request<string[]>('/capabilities', scope);
}
async health(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<{ status: string; detail?: string }> {
return this.request<{ status: string; detail?: string }>('/health', scope);
}
async sessions(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<HermesLegacySession[]> {
return this.request<HermesLegacySession[]>('/sessions', scope);
}
async *stream(
sessionId: string,
cursor: string | undefined,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent> {
const params = new URLSearchParams(cursor ? { cursor } : {});
const events = await this.request<RuntimeStreamEvent[]>(
`/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}/stream?${params.toString()}`,
scope,
);
yield* events;
}
async send(sessionId: string, message: RuntimeMessage, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}/messages`, scope, {
method: 'POST',
body: message,
});
}
async attach(
sessionId: string,
mode: RuntimeAttachMode,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): Promise<RuntimeAttachHandle> {
return this.request<RuntimeAttachHandle>(
`/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}/attach`,
scope,
{
method: 'POST',
body: { mode },
},
);
}
async detach(attachmentId: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/attachments/${encodeURIComponent(attachmentId)}`, scope, {
method: 'DELETE',
});
}
async terminate(sessionId: string, approvalRef: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}/terminate`, scope, {
method: 'POST',
body: { approvalRef },
});
}
private async request<T>(
path: string,
scope: RuntimeScope,
init: { method?: string; body?: unknown } = {},
): Promise<T> {
if (!this.baseUrl || !this.serviceToken) {
throw new Error(
'MOSAIC_HERMES_RUNTIME_URL and MOSAIC_HERMES_RUNTIME_TOKEN must configure Hermes transport',
);
}
const endpoint = new URL(this.baseUrl);
if (endpoint.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHttp(endpoint)) {
throw new Error('Hermes runtime transport requires HTTPS outside loopback');
}
const response = await this.fetchFn(
new URL(path.replace(/^\//, ''), `${endpoint.toString().replace(/\/$/, '')}/`),
{
method: init.method ?? 'GET',
headers: {
accept: 'application/json',
authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
'x-mosaic-actor-id': scope.actorId,
'x-mosaic-tenant-id': scope.tenantId,
'x-mosaic-channel-id': scope.channelId,
'x-correlation-id': scope.correlationId,
...(init.body ? { 'content-type': 'application/json' } : {}),
},
...(init.body ? { body: JSON.stringify(init.body) } : {}),
},
);
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Hermes runtime request failed: ${response.status}`);
if (response.status === 204) return undefined as T;
return (await response.json()) as T;
}
}
function isLoopbackHttp(endpoint: URL): boolean {
return (
endpoint.protocol === 'http:' &&
(endpoint.hostname === 'localhost' ||
endpoint.hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
endpoint.hostname === '::1')
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
import { createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry } from './agent.module.js';
import { firstValueFrom } from 'rxjs';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
RuntimeApprovalDeniedError,
RuntimeProviderService,
} from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import { RuntimeApprovalDeniedFilter } from './runtime-approval-denied.filter.js';
import { InteractionController } from './interaction.controller.js';
describe('InteractionController', (): void => {
afterEach(() => vi.restoreAllMocks());
it('maps a denied runtime approval to Fastify HTTP 403', () => {
const send = vi.fn();
const status = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ send });
const response = { status };
const host = { switchToHttp: () => ({ getResponse: () => response }) };
new RuntimeApprovalDeniedFilter().catch(new RuntimeApprovalDeniedError(), host as never);
expect(status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
statusCode: 403,
message: 'Runtime termination approval denied',
});
});
it('honors a differently named configured instance without a code change', async () => {
const prior = process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'];
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtime = { listSessions: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) };
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, {} as never);
await expect(
controller.sessions('Nova', 'fleet', { id: 'owner', tenantId: 'team' }, 'corr-1'),
).resolves.toEqual([]);
await expect(
controller.sessions('Other', 'fleet', { id: 'owner', tenantId: 'team' }, 'corr-1'),
).rejects.toThrow('Interaction agent is not configured');
if (prior === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = prior;
});
it('reaches the registered Hermes provider through the authenticated transitional matrix route', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const registry = createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry();
const runtime = new RuntimeProviderService(
registry,
{ record: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) },
{ consume: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false) },
);
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime, {} as never);
await expect(
controller.transitionalCapabilities(
'Nova',
'runtime.hermes',
{ id: 'owner', tenantId: 'team' },
'corr-1',
),
).resolves.toEqual([
{ capability: 'kanban', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'skills', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'memory', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'tools', status: 'unsupported' },
{ capability: 'cron', status: 'unsupported' },
]);
});
it('rejects a request without the non-simple correlation header', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const controller = new InteractionController({ listSessions: vi.fn() } as never, {} as never);
await expect(controller.sessions('Nova', 'fleet', { id: 'owner' })).rejects.toThrow(
'X-Correlation-Id is required',
);
});
it('enrolls a visible runtime session under the cross-surface conversation handle', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtime = {
listSessions: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([{ id: 'runtime-1' }]),
};
const durable = { enroll: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
await expect(
controller.enroll(
'Nova',
'conversation-1',
{ providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
{ id: 'owner', tenantId: 'team' },
'corr-1',
),
).resolves.toEqual({ status: 'enrolled', sessionId: 'conversation-1' });
expect(durable.enroll).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{
agentName: 'Nova',
sessionId: 'conversation-1',
tenantId: 'team',
ownerId: 'owner',
providerId: 'fleet',
runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1',
},
expect.objectContaining({ correlationId: 'corr-1' }),
);
});
it('rejects an invalid attach mode before invoking a provider', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const controller = new InteractionController({ attach: vi.fn() } as never, {} as never);
await expect(
controller.attach('Nova', 'durable-1', { mode: 'write' as never }, { id: 'owner' }, 'corr-1'),
).rejects.toThrow('Interaction attach mode is invalid');
});
it('resumes a durable session by attaching and streaming its runtime events', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtimeEvent = {
type: 'message.delta' as const,
sessionId: 'runtime-1',
cursor: 'cursor-1',
occurredAt: '2026-07-13T00:00:00.000Z',
content: 'resumed',
};
const runtime = {
attach: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ attachmentId: 'attach-1', sessionId: 'runtime-1' }),
streamSession: vi.fn(async function* () {
yield runtimeEvent;
}),
};
const durable = {
getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
identity: { agentName: 'Nova', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
}),
};
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
await controller.attach('Nova', 'conversation-1', { mode: 'read' }, { id: 'owner' }, 'corr-1');
await expect(
firstValueFrom(
controller.stream('Nova', 'conversation-1', undefined, { id: 'owner' }, 'corr-1'),
),
).resolves.toEqual({ data: runtimeEvent });
expect(runtime.attach).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'fleet',
'runtime-1',
'read',
expect.objectContaining({ correlationId: 'corr-1' }),
);
expect(runtime.streamSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'fleet',
'runtime-1',
undefined,
expect.objectContaining({ correlationId: 'corr-1' }),
);
});
it('does not create a runtime stream after the SSE subscriber disconnects during snapshot lookup', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
let resolveSnapshot!: (value: { identity: Record<string, string> }) => void;
const snapshot = new Promise<{ identity: Record<string, string> }>((resolve) => {
resolveSnapshot = resolve;
});
const runtime = { streamSession: vi.fn() };
const durable = { getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(snapshot) };
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
const subscription = controller
.stream('Nova', 'conversation-1', undefined, { id: 'owner' }, 'corr-1')
.subscribe();
subscription.unsubscribe();
resolveSnapshot({
identity: { agentName: 'Nova', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
});
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
expect(runtime.streamSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['wrong actor', { getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('scope mismatch')) }],
[
'session-agent mismatch',
{
getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
identity: { agentName: 'Other', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
}),
},
],
])('denies a CLI stop for %s', async (_reason, durable) => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtime = { terminate: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
await expect(
controller.stop(
'Nova',
'durable-1',
{ approvalRef: 'approval-1' },
{ id: 'owner' },
'corr-1',
),
).rejects.toBeDefined();
expect(runtime.terminate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('surfaces a denied runtime approval to the CLI interaction surface', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtime = {
terminate: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('Runtime termination approval denied')),
};
const durable = {
getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
identity: { agentName: 'Nova', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
}),
};
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
await expect(
controller.stop(
'Nova',
'durable-1',
{ approvalRef: 'approval-1' },
{ id: 'owner' },
'corr-1',
),
).rejects.toThrow('Runtime termination approval denied');
});
it('uses the durable session identity and runtime registry for an approved stop', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
const runtime = { terminate: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
const durable = {
getSnapshot: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
identity: { agentName: 'Nova', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
}),
};
const controller = new InteractionController(runtime as never, durable as never);
await controller.stop(
'Nova',
'durable-1',
{ approvalRef: 'approval-1' },
{ id: 'owner' },
'corr-1',
);
expect(runtime.terminate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'fleet',
'runtime-1',
'approval-1',
expect.objectContaining({
correlationId: 'corr-1',
actorScope: { userId: 'owner', tenantId: 'owner' },
}),
);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
Get,
Headers,
Sse,
Inject,
Param,
Post,
Query,
UseGuards,
UseFilters,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import type { RuntimeAttachMode, RuntimeStreamEvent } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { Observable } from 'rxjs';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { DurableSessionService } from './durable-session.service.js';
import { RuntimeApprovalDeniedFilter } from './runtime-approval-denied.filter.js';
import {
RuntimeProviderService,
type RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
} from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
/**
* Authenticated HTTP boundary for operator interaction clients. Identity is
* selected from deployment configuration, never a client-side command name.
*/
@Controller('api/interaction/:agentName')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
@UseFilters(RuntimeApprovalDeniedFilter)
export class InteractionController {
constructor(
@Inject(RuntimeProviderService) private readonly runtime: RuntimeProviderService,
@Inject(DurableSessionService) private readonly durable: DurableSessionService,
) {}
@Get('sessions')
async sessions(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Query('provider') providerId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
return this.runtime.listSessions(
this.requiredProvider(providerId),
this.context(user, correlationId),
);
}
@Get('transitional-capabilities')
async transitionalCapabilities(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Query('provider') providerId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
return this.runtime.transitionalCapabilityMatrix(
this.requiredProvider(providerId),
this.context(user, correlationId),
);
}
@Get('tree')
async tree(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Query('provider') providerId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
return this.runtime.getSessionTree(
this.requiredProvider(providerId),
this.context(user, correlationId),
);
}
/**
* Bind an existing, authorized runtime session to the stable conversation ID.
* This is the lifecycle boundary where both runtime identifiers are known.
*/
@Post('sessions/:sessionId/enroll')
async enroll(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@Body() body: { providerId?: string; runtimeSessionId?: string } = {},
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
const providerId = this.requiredProvider(body.providerId ?? '');
const runtimeSessionId = body.runtimeSessionId?.trim();
if (!runtimeSessionId) throw new ForbiddenException('Runtime session identity is required');
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
const sessions = await this.runtime.listSessions(providerId, context);
if (!sessions.some((session): boolean => session.id === runtimeSessionId)) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Runtime session is not visible to this actor');
}
await this.durable.enroll(
{
agentName,
sessionId,
tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
ownerId: context.actorScope.userId,
providerId,
runtimeSessionId,
},
context,
);
return { status: 'enrolled', sessionId };
}
@Post('sessions/:sessionId/attach')
async attach(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@Body() body: { mode?: RuntimeAttachMode } = {},
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
const mode = body.mode ?? 'read';
if (mode !== 'read' && mode !== 'control') {
throw new ForbiddenException('Interaction attach mode is invalid');
}
const snapshot = await this.durable.getSnapshot(sessionId, context);
this.assertSessionAgent(snapshot.identity.agentName, agentName);
return this.runtime.attach(
snapshot.identity.providerId,
snapshot.identity.runtimeSessionId,
mode,
context,
);
}
@Sse('sessions/:sessionId/stream')
stream(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@Query('cursor') cursor: string | undefined,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
): Observable<{ data: RuntimeStreamEvent }> {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
return new Observable((subscriber) => {
let iterator: AsyncIterator<RuntimeStreamEvent> | undefined;
let cancelled = false;
void (async (): Promise<void> => {
try {
const snapshot = await this.durable.getSnapshot(sessionId, context);
if (cancelled || subscriber.closed) return;
this.assertSessionAgent(snapshot.identity.agentName, agentName);
iterator = this.runtime
.streamSession(
snapshot.identity.providerId,
snapshot.identity.runtimeSessionId,
cursor?.trim() || undefined,
context,
)
[Symbol.asyncIterator]();
if (cancelled || subscriber.closed) {
await iterator.return?.();
return;
}
while (!cancelled && !subscriber.closed) {
const next = await iterator.next();
if (next.done || cancelled || subscriber.closed) break;
subscriber.next({ data: next.value });
}
if (!subscriber.closed) subscriber.complete();
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (!subscriber.closed) subscriber.error(error);
}
})();
return (): void => {
cancelled = true;
void iterator?.return?.();
};
});
}
@Post('sessions/:sessionId/send')
async send(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@Body() body: { content?: string; idempotencyKey?: string } = {},
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
if (!body.content?.trim() || !body.idempotencyKey?.trim()) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Content and idempotency key are required');
}
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
const snapshot = await this.durable.getSnapshot(sessionId, context);
this.assertSessionAgent(snapshot.identity.agentName, agentName);
const input = {
sessionId,
content: body.content,
idempotencyKey: body.idempotencyKey,
correlationId: context.correlationId,
context,
};
await this.durable.queueProviderSend(input);
await this.durable.dispatchProviderOutbox(sessionId, input);
return { status: 'queued', sessionId };
}
@Post('sessions/:sessionId/stop')
async stop(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@Body() body: { approvalRef?: string } = {},
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
if (!body.approvalRef?.trim())
throw new ForbiddenException('Exact-action approval is required');
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
const snapshot = await this.durable.getSnapshot(sessionId, context);
this.assertSessionAgent(snapshot.identity.agentName, agentName);
await this.runtime.terminate(
snapshot.identity.providerId,
snapshot.identity.runtimeSessionId,
body.approvalRef,
context,
);
return { status: 'stopped', sessionId };
}
@Post('sessions/:sessionId/recover')
async recover(
@Param('agentName') agentName: string,
@Param('sessionId') sessionId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
) {
this.assertConfiguredAgent(agentName);
const context = this.context(user, correlationId);
const snapshot = await this.durable.getSnapshot(sessionId, context);
this.assertSessionAgent(snapshot.identity.agentName, agentName);
await this.durable.recoverProviderSession(sessionId, {
sessionId,
content: '',
idempotencyKey: `recovery:${context.correlationId}`,
correlationId: context.correlationId,
context,
});
return { status: 'recovered', sessionId };
}
private context(
user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
correlationId?: string,
): RuntimeProviderRequestContext {
const requestCorrelationId = correlationId?.trim();
// This non-simple request header is mandatory for mutations. Browser
// cross-origin requests cannot set it without a CORS preflight, and the
// gateway's allowlist rejects untrusted origins before the handler runs.
if (!requestCorrelationId) {
throw new ForbiddenException('X-Correlation-Id is required');
}
return {
actorScope: scopeFromUser(user),
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: requestCorrelationId,
};
}
private assertConfiguredAgent(agentName: string): void {
const configured = process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME']?.trim();
if (!configured || configured !== agentName) {
throw new ForbiddenException('Interaction agent is not configured for this request');
}
}
private assertSessionAgent(sessionAgentName: string, agentName: string): void {
if (sessionAgentName !== agentName)
throw new ForbiddenException('Interaction session identity mismatch');
}
private requiredProvider(providerId: string): string {
if (!providerId?.trim()) throw new ForbiddenException('Runtime provider is required');
return providerId;
}
}
@@ -1,62 +1,10 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { providerCredentials, eq, and } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import type { ProviderCredentialSummaryDto } from './provider-credentials.dto.js';
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const IV_LENGTH = 12; // 96-bit IV for GCM
const TAG_LENGTH = 16; // 128-bit auth tag
/**
* Derive a 32-byte AES-256 key from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET using SHA-256.
* The secret is assumed to be set in the environment.
*/
function deriveEncryptionKey(): Buffer {
const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
if (!secret) {
throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot derive encryption key');
}
return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
}
/**
* Encrypt a plain-text value using AES-256-GCM.
* Output format: base64(iv + authTag + ciphertext)
*/
function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
// Combine iv (12) + authTag (16) + ciphertext and base64-encode
const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, authTag, encrypted]);
return combined.toString('base64');
}
/**
* Decrypt a value encrypted by `encrypt()`.
* Throws on authentication failure (tampered data).
*/
function decrypt(encoded: string): string {
const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
const combined = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
const iv = combined.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
const authTag = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const ciphertext = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return decrypted.toString('utf8');
}
@Injectable()
export class ProviderCredentialsService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ProviderCredentialsService.name);
@@ -74,7 +22,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
value: string,
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<void> {
const encryptedValue = encrypt(value);
const encryptedValue = seal(value);
await this.db
.insert(providerCredentials)
@@ -122,7 +70,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
}
try {
return decrypt(row.encryptedValue);
return unseal(row.encryptedValue);
} catch (err) {
this.logger.error(
`Failed to decrypt credential for user=${userId} provider=${provider}`,
+23 -2
View File
@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ export class ProviderService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Interval is configurable via PROVIDER_HEALTH_INTERVAL env (seconds, default 60).
*/
private startHealthCheckScheduler(): void {
const intervalSecs =
parseInt(process.env['PROVIDER_HEALTH_INTERVAL'] ?? '', 10) || DEFAULT_HEALTH_INTERVAL_SECS;
const intervalSecs = this.effectiveHealthCheckIntervalSecs();
const intervalMs = intervalSecs * 1000;
// Run an initial check immediately (non-blocking)
@@ -176,6 +175,28 @@ export class ProviderService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
});
}
/**
* Returns the effective provider operational policy without credentials,
* endpoints, request content, or provider error details.
*/
getEffectivePolicyStatus(): {
healthCheckIntervalSecs: number;
configuredProviders: string[];
availableModelCount: number;
} {
return {
healthCheckIntervalSecs: this.effectiveHealthCheckIntervalSecs(),
configuredProviders: this.adapters.map((adapter) => adapter.name),
availableModelCount: this.registry?.getAvailable().length ?? 0,
};
}
private effectiveHealthCheckIntervalSecs(): number {
return (
parseInt(process.env['PROVIDER_HEALTH_INTERVAL'] ?? '', 10) || DEFAULT_HEALTH_INTERVAL_SECS
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Adapter-pattern API
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { ProvidersController } from './providers.controller.js';
describe('ProvidersController operational status', (): void => {
it('reports provider latency and effective policy without exposing provider error details', (): void => {
const providerService = {
getProvidersHealth: vi.fn(() => [
{
name: 'fleet',
status: 'down',
latencyMs: 42,
lastChecked: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z',
modelCount: 0,
error: 'credential-canary=secret-value',
},
]),
getEffectivePolicyStatus: vi.fn(() => ({
healthCheckIntervalSecs: 60,
configuredProviders: ['fleet'],
availableModelCount: 0,
})),
};
const controller = new ProvidersController(providerService as never, {} as never, {} as never);
const status = controller.status();
expect(status).toEqual({
providers: [
{
name: 'fleet',
status: 'down',
latencyMs: 42,
lastChecked: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z',
modelCount: 0,
errorCode: 'provider_unavailable',
},
],
effectivePolicy: {
healthCheckIntervalSecs: 60,
configuredProviders: ['fleet'],
availableModelCount: 0,
},
});
expect(JSON.stringify(status)).not.toContain('secret-value');
});
});
+21 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,20 @@ export class ProvidersController {
@Get('health')
health() {
return { providers: this.providerService.getProvidersHealth() };
return { providers: this.safeProviderHealth() };
}
/**
* Safe operational status for troubleshooting and readiness checks. Provider
* errors are reduced to a stable code so credentials and remote responses
* cannot leak through this endpoint.
*/
@Get('status')
status() {
return {
providers: this.safeProviderHealth(),
effectivePolicy: this.providerService.getEffectivePolicyStatus(),
};
}
@Post('test')
@@ -51,6 +64,13 @@ export class ProvidersController {
return this.routingService.rank(criteria);
}
private safeProviderHealth() {
return this.providerService.getProvidersHealth().map(({ error, ...provider }) => ({
...provider,
...(error ? { errorCode: 'provider_unavailable' } : {}),
}));
}
// ── Credential CRUD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
import { Catch, type ArgumentsHost, type ExceptionFilter } from '@nestjs/common';
import { RuntimeApprovalDeniedError } from './runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
/** Maps a consumed/missing runtime approval to a stable HTTP authorization response. */
@Catch(RuntimeApprovalDeniedError)
export class RuntimeApprovalDeniedFilter implements ExceptionFilter {
catch(_exception: RuntimeApprovalDeniedError, host: ArgumentsHost): void {
const response = host.switchToHttp().getResponse<{
status(code: number): { send(body: { statusCode: number; message: string }): void };
}>();
response.status(403).send({ statusCode: 403, message: 'Runtime termination approval denied' });
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
import { ForbiddenException, Inject, Injectable, Logger, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
import {
createRuntimeAuditLogEntry,
type LogService,
type RuntimeAuditErrorCode,
} from '@mosaicstack/log';
import type {
AgentRuntimeProvider,
RuntimeAttachHandle,
RuntimeAttachMode,
RuntimeCapability,
RuntimeCapabilitySet,
RuntimeHealth,
RuntimeMessage,
RuntimeScope,
RuntimeSession,
RuntimeSessionTree,
RuntimeStreamEvent,
TransitionalCapabilityInventoryEntry,
TransitionalCapabilityInventoryProvider,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
export const AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY = Symbol('AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY');
export const RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK = Symbol('RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK');
export const RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER = Symbol('RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER');
export type RuntimeProviderOperation =
| RuntimeCapability
| 'runtime.capabilities'
| 'runtime.health'
| 'runtime.transitional-capabilities';
export type RuntimeProviderAuditOutcome = 'requested' | 'succeeded' | 'denied' | 'failed';
/** Trusted server-side context only; it intentionally excludes client-provided identity fields. */
export interface RuntimeProviderRequestContext {
actorScope: ActorTenantScope;
channelId: string;
correlationId: string;
}
/** Metadata-only audit record. Message bodies, idempotency keys, and approval refs are excluded. */
export interface RuntimeAuditEvent {
providerId: string;
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation;
outcome: RuntimeProviderAuditOutcome;
actorId: string;
tenantId: string;
channelId: string;
correlationId: string;
resourceId?: string;
durationMs?: number;
errorCode?: RuntimeAuditErrorCode;
}
export interface RuntimeAuditSink {
record(event: RuntimeAuditEvent): Promise<void>;
}
/** Exact action shape that a durable approval implementation must consume once. */
export interface RuntimeTerminationAction {
providerId: string;
sessionId: string;
actorId: string;
tenantId: string;
channelId: string;
correlationId: string;
agentName: string;
}
export interface RuntimeApprovalVerifier {
consume(approvalRef: string, action: RuntimeTerminationAction): Promise<boolean>;
}
function isTransitionalInventoryProvider(
provider: AgentRuntimeProvider,
): provider is AgentRuntimeProvider & TransitionalCapabilityInventoryProvider {
return (
typeof (provider as Partial<TransitionalCapabilityInventoryProvider>)
.transitionalCapabilityMatrix === 'function'
);
}
function configuredAgentName(): string {
const agentName = process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME']?.trim();
if (!agentName) throw new RuntimeApprovalDeniedError();
return agentName;
}
export class RuntimeApprovalDeniedError extends Error {
constructor() {
super('Runtime termination approval denied');
}
}
/**
* The default denies all runtime termination until a durable, exact-action
* approval implementation is configured. This is safer than a permissive stub.
*/
@Injectable()
export class DenyRuntimeApprovalVerifier implements RuntimeApprovalVerifier {
async consume(_approvalRef: string, _action: RuntimeTerminationAction): Promise<boolean> {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Temporary metadata-only audit sink. M1 observability can replace this token
* with a durable audit writer without changing provider call sites.
*/
@Injectable()
export class RuntimeProviderAuditService implements RuntimeAuditSink {
private readonly logger = new Logger(RuntimeProviderAuditService.name);
constructor(@Inject(LOG_SERVICE) private readonly logService: LogService) {}
async record(event: RuntimeAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
const entry = createRuntimeAuditLogEntry(event);
await this.logService.logs.ingest(entry);
this.logger.log(JSON.stringify({ event: entry.content, metadata: entry.metadata }));
}
}
@Injectable()
export class RuntimeProviderService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(RuntimeProviderService.name);
constructor(
@Inject(AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY)
private readonly registry: AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry,
@Inject(RUNTIME_PROVIDER_AUDIT_SINK)
private readonly audit: RuntimeAuditSink,
@Inject(RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER)
private readonly approvals: RuntimeApprovalVerifier,
) {}
async capabilities(
providerId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<RuntimeCapabilitySet> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'runtime.capabilities',
undefined,
undefined,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeCapabilitySet> =>
provider.capabilities(scope),
);
}
async health(providerId: string, context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext): Promise<RuntimeHealth> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'runtime.health',
undefined,
undefined,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeHealth> =>
provider.health(scope),
);
}
async transitionalCapabilityMatrix(
providerId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<TransitionalCapabilityInventoryEntry[]> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'runtime.transitional-capabilities',
undefined,
undefined,
context,
async (provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope) => {
if (!isTransitionalInventoryProvider(provider)) {
throw new NotFoundException('Runtime provider has no transitional capability inventory');
}
return provider.transitionalCapabilityMatrix(scope);
},
);
}
async listSessions(
providerId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<RuntimeSession[]> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'session.list',
'session.list',
undefined,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSession[]> =>
provider.listSessions(scope),
);
}
async getSessionTree(
providerId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<RuntimeSessionTree[]> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'session.tree',
'session.tree',
undefined,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSessionTree[]> =>
provider.getSessionTree(scope),
);
}
streamSession(
providerId: string,
sessionId: string,
cursor: string | undefined,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent> {
return this.stream(
providerId,
'session.stream',
'session.stream',
sessionId,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent> =>
provider.streamSession(sessionId, cursor, scope),
);
}
async sendMessage(
providerId: string,
sessionId: string,
message: RuntimeMessage,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
await this.execute(
providerId,
'session.send',
'session.send',
sessionId,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> =>
provider.sendMessage(sessionId, message, scope),
);
}
async attach(
providerId: string,
sessionId: string,
mode: RuntimeAttachMode,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<RuntimeAttachHandle> {
return this.execute(
providerId,
'session.attach',
'session.attach',
sessionId,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeAttachHandle> =>
provider.attach(sessionId, mode, scope),
);
}
async detach(
providerId: string,
attachmentId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
await this.execute(
providerId,
'session.attach',
'session.attach',
attachmentId,
context,
(provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> =>
provider.detach(attachmentId, scope),
);
}
async terminate(
providerId: string,
sessionId: string,
approvalRef: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<void> {
await this.execute(
providerId,
'session.terminate',
'session.terminate',
sessionId,
context,
async (provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void> => {
const approved = await this.approvals.consume(approvalRef, {
providerId,
sessionId,
actorId: scope.actorId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
channelId: scope.channelId,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
agentName: configuredAgentName(),
});
if (!approved) {
throw new RuntimeApprovalDeniedError();
}
await provider.terminate(sessionId, approvalRef, scope);
},
);
}
private async execute<T>(
providerId: string,
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation,
requiredCapability: RuntimeCapability | undefined,
resourceId: string | undefined,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
invoke: (provider: AgentRuntimeProvider, scope: RuntimeScope) => Promise<T>,
): Promise<T> {
const scope = this.deriveScope(context);
const startedAt = Date.now();
await this.record(providerId, operation, 'requested', scope, resourceId);
let invocationStarted = false;
try {
const provider = this.provider(providerId);
if (requiredCapability) {
await this.assertCapability(provider, requiredCapability, scope);
}
invocationStarted = true;
const result = await invoke(provider, scope);
await this.recordCompletion(providerId, operation, scope, resourceId, Date.now() - startedAt);
return result;
} catch (error: unknown) {
const durationMs = Date.now() - startedAt;
if (invocationStarted && !this.isAuthorizationDenied(error)) {
await this.recordFailure(providerId, operation, scope, resourceId, durationMs);
} else {
await this.record(
providerId,
operation,
'denied',
scope,
resourceId,
durationMs,
'policy_denied',
);
}
throw error;
}
}
private async *stream(
providerId: string,
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation,
requiredCapability: RuntimeCapability,
resourceId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
invoke: (
provider: AgentRuntimeProvider,
scope: RuntimeScope,
) => AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent>,
): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent> {
const scope = this.deriveScope(context);
const startedAt = Date.now();
await this.record(providerId, operation, 'requested', scope, resourceId);
let invocationStarted = false;
try {
const provider = this.provider(providerId);
await this.assertCapability(provider, requiredCapability, scope);
invocationStarted = true;
for await (const event of invoke(provider, scope)) {
yield event;
}
await this.recordCompletion(providerId, operation, scope, resourceId, Date.now() - startedAt);
} catch (error: unknown) {
const durationMs = Date.now() - startedAt;
if (invocationStarted) {
await this.recordFailure(providerId, operation, scope, resourceId, durationMs);
} else {
await this.record(
providerId,
operation,
'denied',
scope,
resourceId,
durationMs,
'policy_denied',
);
}
throw error;
}
}
private isAuthorizationDenied(error: unknown): boolean {
return (
error instanceof RuntimeApprovalDeniedError ||
error instanceof ForbiddenException ||
(typeof error === 'object' &&
error !== null &&
'code' in error &&
(error as { code?: unknown }).code === 'forbidden')
);
}
private provider(providerId: string): AgentRuntimeProvider {
try {
return this.registry.require(providerId);
} catch (error: unknown) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Runtime provider is not registered';
throw new NotFoundException(message);
}
}
private async assertCapability(
provider: AgentRuntimeProvider,
requiredCapability: RuntimeCapability,
scope: RuntimeScope,
): Promise<void> {
const capabilities = await provider.capabilities(scope);
if (!capabilities.supported.includes(requiredCapability)) {
throw new ForbiddenException(`Runtime provider capability denied: ${requiredCapability}`);
}
}
private deriveScope(context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext): RuntimeScope {
const actorId = context.actorScope.userId.trim();
const tenantId = context.actorScope.tenantId.trim();
const channelId = context.channelId.trim();
const correlationId = context.correlationId.trim();
if (!actorId || !tenantId || !channelId || !correlationId) {
throw new ForbiddenException(
'Authenticated runtime actor scope and correlation are required',
);
}
return Object.freeze({ actorId, tenantId, channelId, correlationId });
}
private async recordFailure(
providerId: string,
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation,
scope: RuntimeScope,
resourceId: string | undefined,
durationMs: number,
): Promise<void> {
try {
await this.record(
providerId,
operation,
'failed',
scope,
resourceId,
durationMs,
'provider_error',
);
} catch {
this.logger.error(
`Runtime provider failure audit failed provider=${providerId} operation=${operation} correlation=${scope.correlationId}`,
);
}
}
private async recordCompletion(
providerId: string,
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation,
scope: RuntimeScope,
resourceId: string | undefined,
durationMs: number,
): Promise<void> {
try {
await this.record(providerId, operation, 'succeeded', scope, resourceId, durationMs);
} catch {
this.logger.error(
`Runtime provider completion audit failed provider=${providerId} operation=${operation} correlation=${scope.correlationId}`,
);
}
}
private async record(
providerId: string,
operation: RuntimeProviderOperation,
outcome: RuntimeProviderAuditOutcome,
scope: RuntimeScope,
resourceId: string | undefined,
durationMs?: number,
errorCode?: RuntimeAuditErrorCode,
): Promise<void> {
await this.audit.record({
providerId,
operation,
outcome,
actorId: scope.actorId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
channelId: scope.channelId,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
...(resourceId ? { resourceId } : {}),
...(durationMs !== undefined ? { durationMs } : {}),
...(errorCode ? { errorCode } : {}),
});
}
}
+10 -7
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import {
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { AgentService } from './agent.service.js';
@Controller('api/sessions')
@@ -18,23 +20,24 @@ export class SessionsController {
constructor(@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService) {}
@Get()
list() {
const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions();
list(@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions(scopeFromUser(user));
return { sessions, total: sessions.length };
}
@Get(':id')
findOne(@Param('id') id: string) {
const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id);
findOne(@Param('id') id: string, @CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id, scopeFromUser(user));
if (!info) throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
return info;
}
@Delete(':id')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT)
async destroy(@Param('id') id: string) {
const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id);
async destroy(@Param('id') id: string, @CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
const scope = scopeFromUser(user);
const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id, scope);
if (!info) throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
await this.agentService.destroySession(id);
await this.agentService.destroySession(id, scope);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { createMemoryTools } from './memory-tools.js';
describe('createMemoryTools operator retrieval binding', () => {
const memory = {
insights: { searchByEmbedding: vi.fn(), create: vi.fn() },
preferences: { findByUserAndCategory: vi.fn(), findByUser: vi.fn(), upsert: vi.fn() },
};
const scope = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', ownerId: 'owner-a', sessionId: 'session-a' };
it('uses the configured plugin with the server-derived scope for retrieval and capture', async () => {
const plugin = {
search: vi.fn(async () => []),
capture: vi.fn(async () => ({ id: 'insight-1' })),
};
const tools = createMemoryTools(memory as never, null, 'owner-a', {
plugin: plugin as never,
scope,
});
await tools
.find((tool) => tool.name === 'memory_search')!
.execute('call-1', { query: 'plans' }, undefined, undefined, {} as never);
await tools
.find((tool) => tool.name === 'memory_save_insight')!
.execute(
'call-2',
{ content: 'secret', category: 'decision' },
undefined,
undefined,
{} as never,
);
expect(plugin.search).toHaveBeenCalledWith(scope, 'plans', 5);
expect(plugin.capture).toHaveBeenCalledWith(scope, {
content: 'secret',
source: 'agent',
category: 'decision',
});
});
});
+29 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
import { Type } from '@sinclair/typebox';
import type { ToolDefinition } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
import type { Memory } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
import type { EmbeddingProvider } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
import type {
EmbeddingProvider,
Memory,
OperatorMemoryPlugin,
OperatorMemoryScope,
} from '@mosaicstack/memory';
/**
* Create memory tools bound to the session's authenticated userId.
@@ -13,8 +17,10 @@ import type { EmbeddingProvider } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
export function createMemoryTools(
memory: Memory,
embeddingProvider: EmbeddingProvider | null,
/** Authenticated user ID from the session. All memory operations are scoped to this user. */
/** Authenticated user ID from the session. All preference operations are scoped to this user. */
sessionUserId: string | undefined,
/** Optional configured retrieval plugin, bound to a server-derived session scope. */
operatorMemory?: { plugin: OperatorMemoryPlugin; scope: OperatorMemoryScope },
): ToolDefinition[] {
/** Return an error result when no session user is bound. */
function noUserError() {
@@ -46,6 +52,14 @@ export function createMemoryTools(
limit?: number;
};
if (operatorMemory) {
const results = await operatorMemory.plugin.search(operatorMemory.scope, query, limit ?? 5);
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(results, null, 2) }],
details: undefined,
};
}
if (!embeddingProvider) {
return {
content: [
@@ -158,6 +172,18 @@ export function createMemoryTools(
};
type Cat = 'decision' | 'learning' | 'preference' | 'fact' | 'pattern' | 'general';
if (operatorMemory) {
const insight = await operatorMemory.plugin.capture(operatorMemory.scope, {
content,
source: 'agent',
category: category ?? 'learning',
});
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(insight, null, 2) }],
details: undefined,
};
}
let embedding: number[] | null = null;
if (embeddingProvider) {
embedding = await embeddingProvider.embed(content);
+2
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { GCModule } from './gc/gc.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from './reload/reload.module.js';
import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js';
import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js';
import { FederationModule } from './federation/federation.module.js';
import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
@Module({
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
QueueModule,
ReloadModule,
WorkspaceModule,
FederationModule,
],
controllers: [HealthController],
providers: [
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
export interface AuthenticatedUserLike {
id: string;
tenantId?: string | null;
teamId?: string | null;
organizationId?: string | null;
orgId?: string | null;
}
export interface ActorTenantScope {
userId: string;
tenantId: string;
}
/**
* Build the immutable server-derived scope used for Tess session operations.
* Current Mosaic auth is user-scoped; future org/team claims can populate one
* of the tenant fields without allowing clients to choose another tenant.
*/
export function scopeFromUser(user: AuthenticatedUserLike): ActorTenantScope {
return {
userId: user.id,
tenantId: user.tenantId ?? user.teamId ?? user.organizationId ?? user.orgId ?? user.id,
};
}
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ describe('Chat controller source hardening', () => {
const source = readFileSync(resolve('src/chat/chat.controller.ts'), 'utf8');
expect(source).toContain('@UseGuards(AuthGuard)');
expect(source).toContain('@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }');
expect(source).toContain('@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike');
expect(source).toContain('const scope = scopeFromUser(user);');
});
});
+31 -14
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@ import {
Post,
Body,
Logger,
ForbiddenException,
HttpException,
HttpStatus,
NotFoundException,
Inject,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
@@ -13,6 +15,7 @@ import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { v4 as uuid } from 'uuid';
import { ChatRequestDto } from './chat.dto.js';
@@ -32,16 +35,23 @@ export class ChatController {
@Throttle({ default: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
async chat(
@Body() body: ChatRequestDto,
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
): Promise<ChatResponse> {
const conversationId = body.conversationId ?? uuid();
const scope = scopeFromUser(user);
try {
let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
if (!agentSession) {
agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId);
agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId, {
userId: scope.userId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
});
}
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof ForbiddenException) {
throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
}
this.logger.error(
`Session creation failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
@@ -60,20 +70,27 @@ export class ChatController {
reject(new Error('Agent response timed out'));
}, 120_000);
const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(conversationId, (event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
if (event.type === 'message_update' && event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta') {
responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
}
if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
clearTimeout(timer);
cleanup();
resolve();
}
});
const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(
conversationId,
(event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
if (
event.type === 'message_update' &&
event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta'
) {
responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
}
if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
clearTimeout(timer);
cleanup();
resolve();
}
},
scope,
);
});
try {
await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, body.content);
await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, body.content, scope);
await done;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof HttpException) throw err;
+4
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import type { ChannelAttachmentDto } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, MaxLength } from 'class-validator';
export class ChatRequestDto {
@@ -32,4 +33,7 @@ export class ChatSocketMessageDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsUUID()
agentId?: string;
/** Validated channel attachment references; binary content is not embedded. */
attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
}
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http';
import { fromNodeHeaders } from 'better-auth/node';
@@ -12,6 +13,19 @@ export interface SessionAuth {
};
}
export function validateDiscordServiceToken(
candidate: unknown,
expected: string | undefined,
): boolean {
if (typeof candidate !== 'string' || !expected) return false;
const candidateBuffer = Buffer.from(candidate);
const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected);
return (
candidateBuffer.length === expectedBuffer.length &&
timingSafeEqual(candidateBuffer, expectedBuffer)
);
}
export async function validateSocketSession(
headers: IncomingHttpHeaders,
auth: SessionAuth,
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'gc',
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
approvalId: 'approval-1',
};
function buildGateway(commandExecutor: {
execute: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
createApproval: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
}): ChatGateway {
return new ChatGateway(
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
commandExecutor as never,
{} as never,
);
}
describe('ChatGateway command approval ingress', () => {
it('passes the client approval ID through to command execution while deriving the actor server-side', async (): Promise<void> => {
const commandExecutor = {
execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ...payload, success: true }),
createApproval: vi.fn(),
};
const gateway = buildGateway(commandExecutor);
const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
await gateway.handleCommandExecute(client as never, payload);
expect(commandExecutor.execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(payload, {
userId: 'admin-1',
tenantId: 'admin-1',
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'command:result',
expect.objectContaining({ success: true }),
);
});
it('issues a durable approval only for the authenticated actor', async (): Promise<void> => {
const commandExecutor = {
execute: vi.fn(),
createApproval: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
approvalId: 'approval-1',
expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:05:00.000Z',
}),
};
const gateway = buildGateway(commandExecutor);
const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
await gateway.handleCommandApproval(client as never, {
command: 'gc',
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
});
expect(commandExecutor.createApproval).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' },
{ userId: 'admin-1', tenantId: 'admin-1' },
);
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('command:approval', {
command: 'gc',
conversationId: 'conversation-1',
success: true,
approvalId: 'approval-1',
expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:05:00.000Z',
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
const CONVERSATION_ID = 'conversation-1';
const CANARY = 'sk_canary12345678';
function clientConversationKey(clientId: string, conversationId: string): string {
return `${clientId}\u0000${conversationId}`;
}
type GatewayInternals = {
clientSessions: Map<string, unknown>;
relayEvent(client: unknown, conversationId: string, event: unknown): void;
};
function buildGateway() {
const brain = {
conversations: {
addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
},
};
const agentService = {
getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
};
const gateway = new ChatGateway(
agentService as never,
{} as never,
brain as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
);
return { gateway: gateway as unknown as GatewayInternals, brain };
}
describe('ChatGateway redaction boundary', (): void => {
it('redacts a secret split across assistant deltas before egress and persistence', (): void => {
const { gateway } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'client-1',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const session = {
clientId: client.id,
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
cleanup: vi.fn(),
assistantText: '',
toolCalls: [],
pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
scope: { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
};
gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, CONVERSATION_ID), session);
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'sk_canary' },
});
expect(JSON.stringify(client.emit.mock.calls)).not.toContain('sk_canary');
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: '12345678 ' },
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
text: '[REDACTED_SECRET] ',
});
expect(session.assistantText).toBe(`${CANARY} `);
expect(JSON.stringify(client.emit.mock.calls)).not.toContain(CANARY);
});
it('retains a split secret label until its value can be redacted', (): void => {
const { gateway } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'client-1',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'token ' },
});
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: '=canaryvalue123 ' },
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
text: '[REDACTED_SECRET] ',
});
expect(JSON.stringify(client.emit.mock.calls)).not.toContain('canaryvalue123');
});
it('holds a streamed private key until it can be redacted', (): void => {
const { gateway } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'client-1',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\ncanary' },
});
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: '\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----' },
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
text: '[REDACTED_SECRET]',
});
expect(JSON.stringify(client.emit.mock.calls)).not.toContain('canary');
});
it('drops an oversized unterminated stream fragment rather than retaining it', (): void => {
const { gateway } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'client-1',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'x'.repeat(8_193) },
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
text: '[REDACTED_STREAM_OVERFLOW]',
});
});
it('isolates concurrent conversation streams sharing one Discord socket', (): void => {
const { gateway } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'discord-client',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
const firstConversation = 'Nova:discord:thread-1';
const secondConversation = 'Nova:discord:thread-2';
const createSession = (conversationId: string) => ({
clientId: client.id,
conversationId,
cleanup: vi.fn(),
assistantText: '',
toolCalls: [],
pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
scope: { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
});
const firstSession = createSession(firstConversation);
const secondSession = createSession(secondConversation);
gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, firstConversation), firstSession);
gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, secondConversation), secondSession);
gateway.relayEvent(client, firstConversation, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'first response ' },
});
gateway.relayEvent(client, secondConversation, {
type: 'message_update',
assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'second response ' },
});
expect(firstSession.assistantText).toBe('first response ');
expect(secondSession.assistantText).toBe('second response ');
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: firstConversation,
text: 'first response ',
});
expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
conversationId: secondConversation,
text: 'second response ',
});
});
it('persists only redacted assistant content with classifications', (): void => {
const { gateway, brain } = buildGateway();
const client = {
connected: true,
id: 'client-1',
data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
emit: vi.fn(),
};
gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, CONVERSATION_ID), {
clientId: client.id,
conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
cleanup: vi.fn(),
assistantText: CANARY,
toolCalls: [],
pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
scope: { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
});
gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, { type: 'agent_end' });
expect(brain.conversations.addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
content: '[REDACTED_SECRET]',
metadata: expect.objectContaining({ classifications: ['secret'] }),
}),
'user-1',
);
expect(JSON.stringify(brain.conversations.addMessage.mock.calls)).not.toContain(CANARY);
});
});
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
const adminCommand: CommandDef = {
name: 'gc',
description: 'GC',
aliases: [],
scope: 'admin',
execution: 'socket',
available: true,
};
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
function createService(
role: string,
entries: Map<string, string> = new Map<string, string>(),
): CommandAuthorizationService {
const db = {
select: () => ({ from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role }] }) }) }),
};
const redis = {
get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
set: async (key: string, value: string) => {
entries.set(key, value);
},
del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
};
return new CommandAuthorizationService(db as never, redis);
}
describe('CommandAuthorizationService', () => {
it('consumes one exact actor-bound approval once', async (): Promise<void> => {
const service = createService('admin');
const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1');
expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
expect(
(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
).toBe(true);
expect(
(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects an approval when the structured action is mutated', async (): Promise<void> => {
const service = createService('admin');
const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1');
const mutated = { ...payload, conversationId: 'other-conversation' };
expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
expect(
(await service.authorize(adminCommand, mutated, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it('denies an admin command to a member before approval is considered', async (): Promise<void> => {
const service = createService('member');
const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'member-1');
expect(approval).toBeNull();
expect(
(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'member-1', 'forged-approval-id')).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it('denies a malformed durable approval expiry instead of treating it as unexpired', async (): Promise<void> => {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
const action = {
providerId: 'fleet',
sessionId: 'nova',
actorId: 'admin-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
channelId: 'discord:operator',
correlationId: 'correlation-malformed-expiry',
agentName: 'Nova',
};
const service = createService('admin', entries);
const approval = await service.createRuntimeTerminationApproval(action);
expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
const key = `agent:Nova:command-approval:${approval!.approvalId}`;
const stored = entries.get(key);
expect(stored).toBeDefined();
entries.set(key, JSON.stringify({ ...JSON.parse(stored!), expiresAt: 'not-a-date' }));
expect(await service.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approval!.approvalId, action)).toBe(
false,
);
});
it('persists and consumes one exact runtime termination approval across a service restart', async (): Promise<void> => {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
const action = {
providerId: 'fleet',
sessionId: 'nova',
actorId: 'admin-1',
tenantId: 'tenant-1',
channelId: 'discord:operator',
correlationId: 'correlation-1',
agentName: 'Nova',
};
const beforeRestart = createService('admin', entries);
const approval = await beforeRestart.createRuntimeTerminationApproval(action);
const afterRestart = createService('admin', entries);
expect(
await afterRestart.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approval!.approvalId, {
...action,
sessionId: 'forged-session',
}),
).toBe(false);
expect(await afterRestart.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approval!.approvalId, action)).toBe(
true,
);
expect(await afterRestart.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approval!.approvalId, action)).toBe(
false,
);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { eq, users as usersTable, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
export type CommandRole = 'admin' | 'member' | 'viewer';
export interface CommandApproval {
approvalId: string;
actionDigest: string;
actorId: string;
command: string;
expiresAt: string;
}
/** Exact immutable binding for a privileged runtime termination. */
export interface RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction {
providerId: string;
sessionId: string;
actorId: string;
tenantId: string;
channelId: string;
correlationId: string;
/** Provisioned roster identity; isolates approvals between interaction agents. */
agentName: string;
}
export interface RuntimeTerminationApproval extends RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction {
approvalId: string;
actionDigest: string;
expiresAt: string;
}
export interface CommandAuthorizationResult {
allowed: boolean;
reason?: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class CommandAuthorizationService {
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
private readonly redis: {
get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
set(key: string, value: string, ...args: string[]): Promise<unknown>;
del(key: string): Promise<number>;
},
) {}
async authorize(
command: CommandDef,
payload: SlashCommandPayload,
actorId: string,
approvalId?: string,
): Promise<CommandAuthorizationResult> {
const role = await this.resolveRole(actorId);
if (!role || !this.hasScope(role, command.scope)) {
return { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' };
}
if (command.scope !== 'admin') return { allowed: true };
if (!approvalId) return { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' };
const actionDigest = this.actionDigest(command.name, payload);
const approved = await this.consumeApproval(approvalId, actorId, actionDigest);
return approved
? { allowed: true }
: {
allowed: false,
reason: 'approval is invalid, expired, replayed, or does not match this action',
};
}
async createApproval(
command: CommandDef,
payload: SlashCommandPayload,
actorId: string,
): Promise<CommandApproval | null> {
const role = await this.resolveRole(actorId);
if (!role || command.scope !== 'admin' || !this.hasScope(role, command.scope)) return null;
const approvalId = randomUUID();
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 5 * 60_000).toISOString();
const approval: CommandApproval = {
approvalId,
actionDigest: this.actionDigest(command.name, payload),
actorId,
command: command.name,
expiresAt,
};
await this.redis.set(this.key(approvalId), JSON.stringify(approval), 'EX', '300');
return approval;
}
/**
* Uses the same `interaction:command-approval:*` store and one-time deletion rule as
* command approvals. This deliberately avoids a parallel approval database.
*/
async createRuntimeTerminationApproval(
action: RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction,
): Promise<RuntimeTerminationApproval | null> {
if (!this.hasRuntimeTerminationAction(action)) return null;
const role = await this.resolveRole(action.actorId);
if (role !== 'admin') return null;
const approval: RuntimeTerminationApproval = {
approvalId: randomUUID(),
actionDigest: this.runtimeActionDigest(action),
...action,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 5 * 60_000).toISOString(),
};
await this.redis.set(
this.runtimeKey(action.agentName, approval.approvalId),
JSON.stringify(approval),
'EX',
'300',
);
return approval;
}
async consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(
approvalId: string,
action: RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction,
): Promise<boolean> {
const encoded = await this.redis.get(this.runtimeKey(action.agentName, approvalId));
if (!encoded) return false;
let approval: unknown;
try {
approval = JSON.parse(encoded);
} catch {
return false;
}
if (
!this.isRuntimeTerminationApproval(approval) ||
approval.actionDigest !== this.runtimeActionDigest(action) ||
approval.actorId !== action.actorId ||
approval.tenantId !== action.tenantId ||
!this.isUnexpired(approval.expiresAt)
) {
return false;
}
if ((await this.resolveRole(approval.actorId)) !== 'admin') return false;
return (await this.redis.del(this.runtimeKey(action.agentName, approvalId))) === 1;
}
private async resolveRole(actorId: string): Promise<CommandRole | null> {
const [user] = await this.db
.select({ role: usersTable.role })
.from(usersTable)
.where(eq(usersTable.id, actorId))
.limit(1);
const role = user?.role;
return role === 'admin' || role === 'member' || role === 'viewer' ? role : null;
}
private hasScope(role: CommandRole, scope: CommandDef['scope']): boolean {
if (role === 'admin') return true;
return role === 'member' && (scope === 'core' || scope === 'agent');
}
private async consumeApproval(
approvalId: string,
actorId: string,
actionDigest: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
const key = this.key(approvalId);
const encoded = await this.redis.get(key);
if (!encoded) return false;
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(encoded);
} catch {
return false;
}
if (
!this.isCommandApproval(parsed) ||
parsed.actorId !== actorId ||
parsed.actionDigest !== actionDigest ||
!this.isUnexpired(parsed.expiresAt)
)
return false;
return (await this.redis.del(key)) === 1;
}
private actionDigest(command: string, payload: SlashCommandPayload): string {
return createHash('sha256')
.update(
JSON.stringify({
command,
args: payload.args?.trim() ?? '',
conversationId: payload.conversationId,
}),
)
.digest('hex');
}
private hasRuntimeTerminationAction(action: RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction): boolean {
return [
action.providerId,
action.sessionId,
action.actorId,
action.tenantId,
action.channelId,
action.correlationId,
action.agentName,
].every((value: string): boolean => value.trim().length > 0);
}
private runtimeActionDigest(action: RuntimeTerminationApprovalAction): string {
return createHash('sha256')
.update(
JSON.stringify({
providerId: action.providerId,
sessionId: action.sessionId,
actorId: action.actorId,
tenantId: action.tenantId,
channelId: action.channelId,
correlationId: action.correlationId,
agentName: action.agentName,
}),
)
.digest('hex');
}
private isUnexpired(expiresAt: unknown): expiresAt is string {
if (typeof expiresAt !== 'string') return false;
const expiresAtMs = Date.parse(expiresAt);
return Number.isFinite(expiresAtMs) && expiresAtMs > Date.now();
}
private isCommandApproval(value: unknown): value is CommandApproval {
return (
typeof value === 'object' &&
value !== null &&
'approvalId' in value &&
'actionDigest' in value &&
'actorId' in value &&
'expiresAt' in value &&
'command' in value
);
}
private isRuntimeTerminationApproval(value: unknown): value is RuntimeTerminationApproval {
return (
typeof value === 'object' &&
value !== null &&
'approvalId' in value &&
'actionDigest' in value &&
'actorId' in value &&
'tenantId' in value &&
'providerId' in value &&
'sessionId' in value &&
'channelId' in value &&
'correlationId' in value &&
'agentName' in value &&
'expiresAt' in value
);
}
private key(approvalId: string): string {
return `interaction:command-approval:${approvalId}`;
}
private runtimeKey(agentName: string, approvalId: string): string {
return `agent:${encodeURIComponent(agentName)}:command-approval:${approvalId}`;
}
}
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ function buildService(): CommandExecutorService {
describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
let service: CommandExecutorService;
const userId = 'user-123';
const userScope = { userId, tenantId: userId };
const conversationId = 'conv-456';
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -99,31 +100,26 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /provider login — missing provider name
it('/provider login with no provider name returns usage error', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'login', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider login');
expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
});
// /provider login anthropic — success with URL containing poll token
it('/provider login <name> returns success with URL and poll token', async () => {
// /provider login anthropic — no bearer token or auth URL reaches chat output
it('/provider login <name> keeps its one-time token out of chat output', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'provider',
args: 'login anthropic',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
expect(result.message).toContain('anthropic');
expect(result.message).toContain('http');
// data should contain loginUrl and pollToken
expect(result.data).toBeDefined();
const data = result.data as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(typeof data['loginUrl']).toBe('string');
expect(typeof data['pollToken']).toBe('string');
expect(data['loginUrl'] as string).toContain('anthropic');
expect(data['loginUrl'] as string).toContain(data['pollToken'] as string);
expect(result.message).not.toContain('http');
expect(result.message).not.toContain('token=');
expect(result.data).toEqual({ provider: 'anthropic' });
// Verify Valkey was called
expect(mockRedis.set).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const [key, value, , ttl] = mockRedis.set.mock.calls[0] as [string, string, string, number];
@@ -138,7 +134,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /provider with no args — returns usage
it('/provider with no args returns usage message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider');
});
@@ -146,7 +142,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /provider list
it('/provider list returns success', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'list', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
});
@@ -154,7 +150,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /provider logout with no name — usage error
it('/provider logout with no name returns error', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'logout', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider logout');
});
@@ -166,7 +162,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
args: 'unknown',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('Unknown subcommand');
});
@@ -174,7 +170,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /mission status
it('/mission status returns stub message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'mission', args: 'status', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('mission');
expect(result.message).toContain('Mission status');
@@ -183,7 +179,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /mission with no args
it('/mission with no args returns status stub', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'mission', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('Mission status');
});
@@ -195,7 +191,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
args: 'set my-mission-123',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('my-mission-123');
});
@@ -203,7 +199,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /agent list
it('/agent list returns stub message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'agent', args: 'list', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('agent');
expect(result.message).toContain('agent');
@@ -212,7 +208,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /agent with no args
it('/agent with no args returns usage', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'agent', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /agent');
});
@@ -224,7 +220,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
args: 'my-agent-id',
conversationId,
};
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('my-agent-id');
});
@@ -232,7 +228,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /prdy
it('/prdy returns PRD wizard message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'prdy', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('prdy');
expect(result.message).toContain('mosaic prdy');
@@ -241,7 +237,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
// /tools
it('/tools returns tools stub message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'tools', conversationId };
const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('tools');
expect(result.message).toContain('tools');
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
const registry = {
getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
version: 1,
commands: [
{
name: 'gc',
description: 'System-wide garbage collection',
aliases: [],
scope: 'admin' as const,
execution: 'socket' as const,
available: true,
},
],
skills: [],
})),
};
const sessionGc = {
sweepOrphans: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ orphanedSessions: 1, totalCleaned: [], duration: 1 }),
};
const scope = (userId: string) => ({ userId, tenantId: 'tenant-1' });
const authorization = {
authorize: vi.fn((_command: unknown, _payload: unknown, actorId: string) =>
Promise.resolve(
actorId === 'member-1'
? { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' }
: { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' },
),
),
};
function buildExecutor(authorizationService: unknown = authorization): CommandExecutorService {
return new CommandExecutorService(
registry as never,
{ getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
{ clear: vi.fn(), set: vi.fn() } as never,
sessionGc as never,
{ set: vi.fn() } as never,
{ agents: {} } as never,
null,
null,
null,
authorizationService as never,
);
}
function createDurableAuthorization(): CommandAuthorizationService {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
const db = {
select: () => ({ from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role: 'admin' }] }) }) }),
};
const redis = {
get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
set: async (key: string, value: string) => {
entries.set(key, value);
},
del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
};
return new CommandAuthorizationService(db as never, redis);
}
describe('TESS-M1-SEC-001 command authorization abuse cases', () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
beforeEach((): void => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('denies a forged admin identity and does not execute a system-wide command', async (): Promise<void> => {
const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, scope('admin-forged-by-client'));
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('not authorized');
expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('denies a privileged command without a server-bound durable approval', async (): Promise<void> => {
const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, scope('member-1'));
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('approval');
expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('executes an admin command only after a valid durable approval is issued and supplied', async (): Promise<void> => {
const executor = buildExecutor(createDurableAuthorization());
const adminScope = scope('admin-1');
const denied = await executor.execute(payload, adminScope);
const approval = await executor.createApproval(payload, adminScope);
const approved = await executor.execute(
{ ...payload, approvalId: approval?.approvalId },
adminScope,
);
expect(denied.success).toBe(false);
expect(denied.message).toContain('approval');
expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
// A valid durable approval is consumed, but cannot authorize an unimplemented
// global retention operation. Session-scoped cleanup remains lifecycle-only.
expect(approved.success).toBe(false);
expect(approved.message).toContain('Global GC is disabled');
expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
import type { SlashCommandPayload, SlashCommandResultPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { ChatGateway } from '../chat/chat.gateway.js';
import { SessionGCService } from '../gc/session-gc.service.js';
import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import { ReloadService } from '../reload/reload.service.js';
import { McpClientService } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.service.js';
import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
@Injectable()
@@ -32,10 +34,17 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Optional()
@Inject(McpClientService)
private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService | null,
@Optional()
@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
) {}
async execute(payload: SlashCommandPayload, userId: string): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
async execute(
payload: SlashCommandPayload,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
const { command, args, conversationId } = payload;
const userId = scope.userId;
const def = this.registry.getManifest().commands.find((c) => c.name === command);
if (!def) {
@@ -47,14 +56,24 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
};
}
const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize(
def,
payload,
userId,
payload.approvalId,
);
if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) {
return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
}
try {
switch (command) {
case 'model':
return await this.handleModel(args ?? null, conversationId);
return await this.handleModel(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
case 'thinking':
return await this.handleThinking(args ?? null, conversationId);
case 'system':
return await this.handleSystem(args ?? null, conversationId);
return await this.handleSystem(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
case 'new':
return {
command,
@@ -83,18 +102,17 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
success: true,
message: 'Retry last message requested.',
};
case 'gc': {
// Admin-only: system-wide GC sweep across all sessions
const result = await this.sessionGC.sweepOrphans();
case 'gc':
// Global retention requires a separate, authorized and audited job.
// Session cleanup is performed only through the session lifecycle.
return {
command: 'gc',
success: true,
message: `GC sweep complete: ${result.orphanedSessions} orphaned sessions cleaned in ${result.duration}ms.`,
success: false,
message: 'Global GC is disabled pending an authorized retention job.',
conversationId,
};
}
case 'agent':
return await this.handleAgent(args ?? null, conversationId, userId);
return await this.handleAgent(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
case 'provider':
return await this.handleProvider(args ?? null, userId, conversationId);
case 'mission':
@@ -143,13 +161,22 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
}
}
async createApproval(payload: SlashCommandPayload, scope: ActorTenantScope) {
const def = this.registry
.getManifest()
.commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command);
if (!def || !this.authorization) return null;
return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId);
}
private async handleModel(
args: string | null,
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
if (!args || args.trim().length === 0) {
// Show current override or usage hint
const currentOverride = this.chatGateway?.getModelOverride(conversationId);
const currentOverride = this.chatGateway?.getModelOverride(conversationId, scope);
if (currentOverride) {
return {
command: 'model',
@@ -171,7 +198,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
// /model clear removes the override and re-enables automatic routing
if (modelName === 'clear') {
this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, null);
this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, null, scope);
return {
command: 'model',
conversationId,
@@ -181,9 +208,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
}
// Set the sticky per-session override (M4-007)
this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, modelName);
this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, modelName, scope);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
if (!session) {
return {
command: 'model',
@@ -224,10 +251,11 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
private async handleSystem(
args: string | null,
conversationId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
if (!args || args.trim().length === 0) {
// Clear the override when called with no args
await this.systemOverride.clear(conversationId);
await this.systemOverride.clear(conversationId, scope);
return {
command: 'system',
conversationId,
@@ -236,7 +264,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
};
}
await this.systemOverride.set(conversationId, args.trim());
await this.systemOverride.set(conversationId, args.trim(), scope);
return {
command: 'system',
conversationId,
@@ -248,8 +276,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
private async handleAgent(
args: string | null,
conversationId: string,
userId: string,
scope: ActorTenantScope,
): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
const userId = scope.userId;
if (!args) {
return {
command: 'agent',
@@ -338,11 +367,14 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
conversationId,
agentConfig.id,
agentConfig.name,
scope,
agentConfig.model ?? undefined,
);
// Broadcast updated session:info so TUI TopBar reflects new agent/model
this.chatGateway?.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId, { agentName: agentConfig.name });
this.chatGateway?.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId, scope, {
agentName: agentConfig.name,
});
this.logger.log(
`Agent switched to "${agentConfig.name}" (${agentConfig.id}) for conversation ${conversationId} (M5-003)`,
@@ -403,22 +435,28 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
};
}
const pollToken = crypto.randomUUID();
const key = `mosaic:auth:poll:${pollToken}`;
// Store pending state in Valkey (TTL 5 minutes)
const tokenDigest = await crypto.subtle.digest(
'SHA-256',
new TextEncoder().encode(pollToken),
);
const tokenHash = Array.from(new Uint8Array(tokenDigest), (byte: number): string =>
byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),
).join('');
const key = `mosaic:auth:poll:${tokenHash}`;
// Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
// the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
await this.redis.set(
key,
JSON.stringify({ status: 'pending', provider: providerName, userId }),
'EX',
300,
);
// In production this would construct an OAuth URL
const loginUrl = `${process.env['MOSAIC_BASE_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:3000'}/auth/provider/${providerName}?token=${pollToken}`;
return {
command: 'provider',
success: true,
message: `Open this URL to authenticate with ${providerName}:\n${loginUrl}`,
message: `Provider login for ${providerName} is ready. Continue in the authenticated dashboard.`,
conversationId,
data: { loginUrl, pollToken, provider: providerName },
data: { provider: providerName },
};
}
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
let registry: CommandRegistryService;
let executor: CommandExecutorService;
const userId = 'user-integ-001';
const userScope = { userId, tenantId: userId };
const conversationId = 'conv-integ-001';
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -170,28 +171,26 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// Unknown command returns error
it('unknown command returns success:false with descriptive message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'nonexistent', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('nonexistent');
expect(result.command).toBe('nonexistent');
});
// /gc handler calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans (admin-only, no userId arg)
it('/gc calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans without arguments', async () => {
it('/gc refuses an unaudited global sweep', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
expect(mockSessionGC.sweepOrphans).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('GC sweep complete');
expect(result.message).toContain('3 orphaned sessions');
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(mockSessionGC.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('disabled pending an authorized retention job');
});
// /system with args calls SystemOverrideService.set
it('/system with text calls SystemOverrideService.set', async () => {
const override = 'You are a helpful assistant.';
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'system', args: override, conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
expect(mockSystemOverride.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, override);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(mockSystemOverride.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, override, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('override set');
});
@@ -199,8 +198,8 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// /system with no args clears the override
it('/system with no args calls SystemOverrideService.clear', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'system', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
expect(mockSystemOverride.clear).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(mockSystemOverride.clear).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('cleared');
});
@@ -212,7 +211,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
args: 'claude-3-opus',
conversationId,
};
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('model');
expect(result.message).toContain('claude-3-opus');
@@ -221,7 +220,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// /thinking with valid level returns success
it('/thinking with valid level returns success', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'thinking', args: 'high', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('high');
});
@@ -229,7 +228,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// /thinking with invalid level returns usage message
it('/thinking with invalid level returns usage message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'thinking', args: 'invalid', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).toContain('Usage:');
});
@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// /new command returns success
it('/new returns success', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'new', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe('new');
});
@@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
// /reload without reloadService returns failure
it('/reload without ReloadService returns failure', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.message).toContain('ReloadService');
});
@@ -255,7 +254,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
for (const cmd of stubCommands) {
it(`/${cmd} returns success (stub)`, async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: cmd, conversationId };
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.command).toBe(cmd);
});
+10 -1
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@ import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from './runtime-approval-verifier.js';
import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
@@ -24,9 +26,16 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
},
CommandRegistryService,
CommandAuthorizationService,
CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
CommandExecutorService,
],
exports: [
CommandRegistryService,
CommandAuthorizationService,
CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
CommandExecutorService,
],
exports: [CommandRegistryService, CommandExecutorService],
})
export class CommandsModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
constructor(@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type {
RuntimeApprovalVerifier,
RuntimeTerminationAction,
} from '../agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
/**
* Adapter from the provider registry's exact termination action to the shared,
* Redis-backed `interaction:command-approval:*` store. It has no separate approval
* persistence or replay semantics.
*/
@Injectable()
export class CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier implements RuntimeApprovalVerifier {
constructor(
@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService,
) {}
async consume(approvalRef: string, action: RuntimeTerminationAction): Promise<boolean> {
return this.authorization.consumeRuntimeTerminationApproval(approvalRef, action);
}
}
+25 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,32 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort } from '@mosaicstack/coord';
import { CoordService } from './coord.service.js';
import { CoordController } from './coord.controller.js';
import { InteractionCoordinationController } from './interaction-coordination.controller.js';
import {
COORDINATION_CONFIG,
COORDINATION_PORT,
InteractionCoordinationService,
} from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
@Module({
providers: [CoordService],
controllers: [CoordController],
exports: [CoordService],
providers: [
CoordService,
{
provide: COORDINATION_PORT,
useFactory: (): InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort =>
new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort(),
},
{
provide: COORDINATION_CONFIG,
useFactory: () => ({
interactionAgentId: process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'],
orchestrationAgentId: process.env['MOSAIC_ORCHESTRATOR_AGENT_NAME'],
}),
},
InteractionCoordinationService,
],
controllers: [CoordController, InteractionCoordinationController],
exports: [CoordService, InteractionCoordinationService],
})
export class CoordModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
const PATH_METADATA = 'path';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { InteractionCoordinationController } from './interaction-coordination.controller.js';
const user = { id: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-a' };
describe('InteractionCoordinationController', () => {
it('exposes the neutral canonical route and Mos compatibility alias over identical handlers', () => {
expect(Reflect.getMetadata(PATH_METADATA, InteractionCoordinationController)).toEqual([
'api/coord/interaction',
'api/coord/mos',
]);
expect(InteractionCoordinationController.prototype.handoff).toBeTypeOf('function');
expect(InteractionCoordinationController.prototype.observe).toBeTypeOf('function');
expect(InteractionCoordinationController.prototype.result).toBeTypeOf('function');
});
it('derives actor and tenant from the authenticated user rather than handoff input', async () => {
const coordination = {
handoff: vi.fn(async () => ({ handoffId: 'handoff-1' })),
observe: vi.fn(),
result: vi.fn(),
};
const controller = new InteractionCoordinationController(coordination as never);
await controller.handoff({ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement' }, user, 'corr-1');
expect(coordination.handoff).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement' },
expect.objectContaining({
actorScope: { userId: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'corr-1',
}),
);
});
it('requires a correlation header before invoking the coordination service', async () => {
const coordination = { handoff: vi.fn(), observe: vi.fn(), result: vi.fn() };
const controller = new InteractionCoordinationController(coordination as never);
await expect(
controller.handoff({ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement' }, user, undefined),
).rejects.toThrow('X-Correlation-Id is required');
expect(coordination.handoff).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
Get,
Headers,
Inject,
Param,
Post,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import type { RuntimeProviderRequestContext } from '../agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import type {
InteractionCoordinationObservationDto,
InteractionCoordinationResponseDto,
InteractionCoordinationResultDto,
CreateHandoffDto,
} from './interaction-coordination.dto.js';
import { InteractionCoordinationService } from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
/** Authenticated interaction-plane boundary for the handoff/observe/result-only interaction coordination contract. */
/** `api/coord/interaction` is canonical; the Mos path remains a compatibility alias. */
@Controller(['api/coord/interaction', 'api/coord/mos'])
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class InteractionCoordinationController {
constructor(
@Inject(InteractionCoordinationService)
private readonly coordination: InteractionCoordinationService,
) {}
@Post('handoff')
async handoff(
@Body() request: CreateHandoffDto,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
): Promise<InteractionCoordinationResponseDto> {
return { receipt: await this.coordination.handoff(request, this.context(user, correlationId)) };
}
@Get(':handoffId/observe')
async observe(
@Param('handoffId') handoffId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
): Promise<InteractionCoordinationObservationDto> {
return {
observation: await this.coordination.observe(handoffId, this.context(user, correlationId)),
};
}
@Get(':handoffId/result')
async result(
@Param('handoffId') handoffId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
@Headers('x-correlation-id') correlationId?: string,
): Promise<InteractionCoordinationResultDto> {
return { result: await this.coordination.result(handoffId, this.context(user, correlationId)) };
}
private context(
user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
correlationId?: string,
): RuntimeProviderRequestContext {
const requestCorrelationId = correlationId?.trim();
if (!requestCorrelationId) throw new ForbiddenException('X-Correlation-Id is required');
return {
actorScope: scopeFromUser(user),
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: requestCorrelationId,
};
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
import type {
CoordinationObservation,
CoordinationResult,
HandoffReceipt,
} from '@mosaicstack/coord';
/** Input accepted at the gateway coordination boundary. Agent identity is not caller-controlled. */
export interface CreateHandoffDto {
idempotencyKey: string;
summary: string;
context?: string;
missionId?: string;
}
export interface InteractionCoordinationResponseDto {
receipt: HandoffReceipt;
}
export interface InteractionCoordinationObservationDto {
observation: CoordinationObservation;
}
export interface InteractionCoordinationResultDto {
result: CoordinationResult;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { InteractionCoordinationController } from './interaction-coordination.controller.js';
import { InteractionCoordinationService } from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
@Global()
@Module({
providers: [
{
provide: AUTH,
useValue: {
api: {
getSession: vi.fn(async ({ headers }: { headers: Headers }) =>
headers.get('cookie') === 'session=trusted'
? { user: { id: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' }, session: { id: 'session-1' } }
: null,
),
},
},
},
AuthGuard,
],
exports: [AUTH, AuthGuard],
})
class AuthenticatedRequestModule {}
describe('InteractionCoordinationController route aliases', (): void => {
let app: NestFastifyApplication | undefined;
const coordination = {
handoff: vi.fn(async () => ({ handoffId: 'handoff-1' })),
observe: vi.fn(async () => ({ status: 'running' })),
result: vi.fn(async () => ({ status: 'completed' })),
};
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [AuthenticatedRequestModule],
controllers: [InteractionCoordinationController],
providers: [{ provide: InteractionCoordinationService, useValue: coordination }],
}).compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => app?.close());
it('routes handoff, observe, and result through the same AuthGuard-protected service for both prefixes', async (): Promise<void> => {
if (!app) throw new Error('test app was not initialized');
for (const prefix of ['/api/coord/interaction', '/api/coord/mos']) {
const headers = { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': `corr-${prefix}` };
expect(
(
await app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `${prefix}/handoff`,
headers,
payload: { idempotencyKey: `key-${prefix}`, summary: 'handoff' },
})
).statusCode,
).toBe(201);
expect(
(await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: `${prefix}/handoff-1/observe`, headers }))
.statusCode,
).toBe(200);
expect(
(await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: `${prefix}/handoff-1/result`, headers }))
.statusCode,
).toBe(200);
}
expect(coordination.handoff).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(coordination.observe).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(coordination.result).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(
(
await app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: '/api/coord/interaction/handoff',
payload: { idempotencyKey: 'denied', summary: 'x' },
})
).statusCode,
).toBe(401);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort,
type InteractionCoordinationPort,
type Handoff,
} from '@mosaicstack/coord';
import type { RuntimeProviderRequestContext } from '../agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import {
InteractionCoordinationService,
type InteractionCoordinationConfig,
type InteractionCoordinationGatewayError,
} from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
const context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext = {
actorScope: { userId: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
channelId: 'cli',
correlationId: 'corr-1',
};
const config: InteractionCoordinationConfig = {
interactionAgentId: 'Nova',
orchestrationAgentId: 'Conductor',
};
function service(
port: InteractionCoordinationPort = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort(),
options: {
config?: InteractionCoordinationConfig;
handoffIdFactory?: () => string;
} = {},
): InteractionCoordinationService {
return new InteractionCoordinationService(
port,
options.config ?? config,
options.handoffIdFactory ?? (() => 'handoff-1'),
);
}
describe('InteractionCoordinationService authority boundary', (): void => {
it('derives identity and actor/tenant scope server-side, then round-trips the native adapter', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort();
const coordination = service(adapter);
await expect(
coordination.handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
),
).resolves.toEqual({
handoffId: 'handoff-1',
targetAgentId: 'Conductor',
status: 'queued',
correlationId: 'corr-1',
});
adapter.recordActivity('handoff-1', 'running', 'Orchestrator accepted the request');
adapter.recordResult('handoff-1', 'completed', 'Merged by orchestrator');
const followUpContext = { ...context, correlationId: 'corr-2' };
await expect(coordination.observe('handoff-1', followUpContext)).resolves.toMatchObject({
targetAgentId: 'Conductor',
status: 'completed',
});
await expect(coordination.result('handoff-1', followUpContext)).resolves.toMatchObject({
targetAgentId: 'Conductor',
status: 'completed',
summary: 'Merged by orchestrator',
});
});
it('fails closed without calling a port when the interaction requester is unconfigured', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort();
const handoff = vi.spyOn(adapter, 'handoff');
const coordination = service(adapter, {
config: { interactionAgentId: '', orchestrationAgentId: 'Conductor' },
});
await expect(
coordination.handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'unconfigured_requester',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
expect(handoff).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects self-delegation configuration before delivering work', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort();
const handoff = vi.spyOn(adapter, 'handoff');
const coordination = service(adapter, {
config: { interactionAgentId: 'Nova', orchestrationAgentId: 'Nova' },
});
await expect(
coordination.handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
),
).rejects.toThrow('Interaction and orchestration identities must differ');
expect(handoff).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('denies cross-tenant observe and result before calling the adapter', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort();
const observe = vi.spyOn(adapter, 'observe');
const result = vi.spyOn(adapter, 'result');
const coordination = service(adapter);
await coordination.handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
);
const otherTenant = {
...context,
actorScope: { ...context.actorScope, tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
};
await expect(coordination.observe('handoff-1', otherTenant)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'cross_tenant_forbidden',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
await expect(coordination.result('handoff-1', otherTenant)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'cross_tenant_forbidden',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
expect(observe).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(result).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('scopes idempotency by actor and joins concurrent retries without duplicate delivery', async (): Promise<void> => {
let handoffSequence = 0;
let release: (() => void) | undefined;
const delivered = new Promise<void>((resolve: () => void): void => {
release = resolve;
});
const adapter: InteractionCoordinationPort = {
handoff: vi.fn(async (handoff: Handoff) => {
await delivered;
return {
handoffId: handoff.handoffId,
targetAgentId: handoff.targetAgentId,
status: 'queued' as const,
correlationId: handoff.scope.correlationId,
};
}),
observe: vi.fn(),
result: vi.fn(),
};
const coordination = service(adapter, {
handoffIdFactory: (): string => `handoff-${++handoffSequence}`,
});
const request = { idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' };
const first = coordination.handoff(request, context);
const retry = coordination.handoff(request, context);
expect(adapter.handoff).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
release?.();
await expect(Promise.all([first, retry])).resolves.toEqual([
expect.objectContaining({ handoffId: 'handoff-1' }),
expect.objectContaining({ handoffId: 'handoff-1' }),
]);
await expect(
coordination.handoff(request, {
...context,
actorScope: { ...context.actorScope, userId: 'operator-2' },
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({ handoffId: 'handoff-2' });
expect(adapter.handoff).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
it('rejects idempotency-key payload drift and malformed handoff input before delivery', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter = new InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort();
const handoff = vi.spyOn(adapter, 'handoff');
const coordination = service(adapter);
await coordination.handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
);
await expect(
coordination.handoff({ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Different work' }, context),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'handoff_conflict',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
await expect(
coordination.handoff({ idempotencyKey: 'request-2', summary: '' }, context),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_request',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
await expect(
coordination.handoff({ idempotencyKey: 'request-3', summary: 'x'.repeat(2_049) }, context),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'invalid_request',
} satisfies Partial<InteractionCoordinationGatewayError>);
expect(handoff).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('fails closed when the port reports a target that drifts from configuration', async (): Promise<void> => {
const adapter: InteractionCoordinationPort = {
handoff: vi.fn(async (handoff: Handoff) => ({
handoffId: handoff.handoffId,
targetAgentId: 'Unexpected',
status: 'accepted' as const,
correlationId: handoff.scope.correlationId,
})),
observe: vi.fn(),
result: vi.fn(),
};
await expect(
service(adapter).handoff(
{ idempotencyKey: 'request-1', summary: 'Implement the requested feature' },
context,
),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'target_drift' });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
InteractionCoordinationClient,
type CoordinationObservation,
type CoordinationResult,
type CoordinationScope,
type InteractionCoordinationIdentity,
type InteractionCoordinationPort,
type HandoffReceipt,
} from '@mosaicstack/coord';
import type { RuntimeProviderRequestContext } from '../agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.js';
import type { CreateHandoffDto } from './interaction-coordination.dto.js';
export const COORDINATION_PORT = Symbol('COORDINATION_PORT');
export const COORDINATION_CONFIG = Symbol('COORDINATION_CONFIG');
const HANDOFF_TRACKING_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1_000;
const MAX_TRACKED_HANDOFFS = 1_000;
const MAX_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_LENGTH = 128;
const MAX_SUMMARY_LENGTH = 2_048;
const MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH = 8_192;
const MAX_MISSION_ID_LENGTH = 128;
export interface InteractionCoordinationConfig {
interactionAgentId?: string;
orchestrationAgentId?: string;
}
interface HandoffOwner {
actorId: string;
tenantId: string;
requesterAgentId: string;
correlationId: string;
expiresAt: number;
}
interface NormalizedHandoffRequest {
idempotencyKey: string;
summary: string;
context?: string;
missionId?: string;
}
interface TrackedHandoff {
request: NormalizedHandoffRequest;
receipt: Promise<HandoffReceipt>;
expiresAt: number;
}
/**
* Gateway authority boundary for the interaction agent. It derives requester,
* actor, and tenant from trusted server configuration and authentication; no
* channel request can name a target or gain orchestrator-owned orchestration verbs.
*/
@Injectable()
export class InteractionCoordinationService {
private readonly owners = new Map<string, HandoffOwner>();
private readonly handoffsByIdempotencyKey = new Map<string, TrackedHandoff>();
constructor(
@Inject(COORDINATION_PORT) private readonly port: InteractionCoordinationPort,
@Inject(COORDINATION_CONFIG) private readonly config: InteractionCoordinationConfig,
private readonly handoffIdFactory: () => string = (): string => crypto.randomUUID(),
) {}
async handoff(
request: CreateHandoffDto,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<HandoffReceipt> {
this.pruneExpiredTracking();
const normalized = this.normalizeRequest(request);
const scope = this.scope(context);
const idempotencyKey = this.idempotencyKey(normalized.idempotencyKey, scope);
const existing = this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey.get(idempotencyKey);
if (existing !== undefined) {
if (!sameRequest(existing.request, normalized)) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'handoff_conflict',
'Handoff idempotency key is already bound to different immutable input',
);
}
return existing.receipt;
}
const pending = this.deliverHandoff(this.handoffIdFactory(), normalized, scope);
const tracked: TrackedHandoff = {
request: normalized,
receipt: pending,
expiresAt: this.expiresAt(),
};
this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey.set(idempotencyKey, tracked);
this.enforceTrackingLimit(this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey);
try {
return await pending;
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey.get(idempotencyKey) === tracked) {
this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey.delete(idempotencyKey);
}
throw error;
}
}
async observe(
handoffId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<CoordinationObservation> {
this.pruneExpiredTracking();
const scope = this.scope(context);
const owner = this.ownerFor(handoffId, scope);
return this.client().observe(handoffId, { ...scope, correlationId: owner.correlationId });
}
async result(
handoffId: string,
context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext,
): Promise<CoordinationResult> {
this.pruneExpiredTracking();
const scope = this.scope(context);
const owner = this.ownerFor(handoffId, scope);
return this.client().result(handoffId, { ...scope, correlationId: owner.correlationId });
}
private async deliverHandoff(
handoffId: string,
request: NormalizedHandoffRequest,
scope: CoordinationScope,
): Promise<HandoffReceipt> {
const receipt = await this.client((): string => handoffId).handoff(request, scope);
const owner: HandoffOwner = {
actorId: scope.actorId,
tenantId: scope.tenantId,
requesterAgentId: scope.requesterAgentId,
correlationId: scope.correlationId,
expiresAt: this.expiresAt(),
};
const existing = this.owners.get(receipt.handoffId);
if (existing !== undefined && !sameOwner(existing, owner)) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'handoff_conflict',
'Handoff ID is already bound to a different authenticated scope',
);
}
this.owners.set(receipt.handoffId, owner);
this.enforceTrackingLimit(this.owners);
return receipt;
}
private client(handoffIdFactory?: () => string): InteractionCoordinationClient {
return new InteractionCoordinationClient(this.identity(), this.port, handoffIdFactory);
}
private identity(): InteractionCoordinationIdentity {
const interactionAgentId = this.config.interactionAgentId?.trim();
const orchestrationAgentId = this.config.orchestrationAgentId?.trim();
if (!interactionAgentId) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'unconfigured_requester',
'Interaction agent identity is not configured',
);
}
if (!orchestrationAgentId) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'unconfigured_target',
'Orchestration agent identity is not configured',
);
}
return { interactionAgentId, orchestrationAgentId };
}
private scope(context: RuntimeProviderRequestContext): CoordinationScope {
const identity = this.identity();
return Object.freeze({
actorId: context.actorScope.userId,
tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
correlationId: context.correlationId,
requesterAgentId: identity.interactionAgentId,
});
}
private normalizeRequest(request: CreateHandoffDto): NormalizedHandoffRequest {
if (typeof request !== 'object' || request === null) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'invalid_request',
'Handoff request is invalid',
);
}
const idempotencyKey = this.requiredString(
request.idempotencyKey,
'idempotency key',
MAX_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_LENGTH,
);
const summary = this.requiredString(request.summary, 'summary', MAX_SUMMARY_LENGTH);
const context = this.optionalString(request.context, 'context', MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH);
const missionId = this.optionalString(request.missionId, 'mission ID', MAX_MISSION_ID_LENGTH);
return Object.freeze({
idempotencyKey,
summary,
...(context === undefined ? {} : { context }),
...(missionId === undefined ? {} : { missionId }),
});
}
private idempotencyKey(requestKey: string, scope: CoordinationScope): string {
return `${scope.tenantId}\u0000${scope.actorId}\u0000${scope.requesterAgentId}\u0000${requestKey}`;
}
private requiredString(value: unknown, field: string, maximumLength: number): string {
if (typeof value !== 'string') {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'invalid_request',
`Handoff ${field} must be a string`,
);
}
const normalized = value.trim();
if (normalized.length === 0 || normalized.length > maximumLength) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'invalid_request',
`Handoff ${field} is invalid`,
);
}
return normalized;
}
private optionalString(value: unknown, field: string, maximumLength: number): string | undefined {
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
return this.requiredString(value, field, maximumLength);
}
private expiresAt(): number {
return Date.now() + HANDOFF_TRACKING_TTL_MS;
}
private pruneExpiredTracking(): void {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [key, tracked] of this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey) {
if (tracked.expiresAt <= now) this.handoffsByIdempotencyKey.delete(key);
}
for (const [key, owner] of this.owners) {
if (owner.expiresAt <= now) this.owners.delete(key);
}
}
private enforceTrackingLimit<T>(entries: Map<string, T>): void {
while (entries.size > MAX_TRACKED_HANDOFFS) {
const oldest = entries.keys().next().value;
if (typeof oldest !== 'string') return;
entries.delete(oldest);
}
}
private ownerFor(handoffId: string, scope: CoordinationScope): HandoffOwner {
const owner = this.owners.get(handoffId);
if (owner === undefined) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError('not_found', 'Handoff was not found');
}
if (
owner.tenantId !== scope.tenantId ||
owner.actorId !== scope.actorId ||
owner.requesterAgentId !== scope.requesterAgentId
) {
throw new InteractionCoordinationGatewayError(
'cross_tenant_forbidden',
'Handoff is outside the authenticated scope',
);
}
return owner;
}
}
export type InteractionCoordinationGatewayErrorCode =
| 'cross_tenant_forbidden'
| 'handoff_conflict'
| 'invalid_request'
| 'not_found'
| 'unconfigured_requester'
| 'unconfigured_target';
function sameOwner(left: HandoffOwner, right: HandoffOwner): boolean {
return (
left.actorId === right.actorId &&
left.tenantId === right.tenantId &&
left.requesterAgentId === right.requesterAgentId
);
}
function sameRequest(left: NormalizedHandoffRequest, right: NormalizedHandoffRequest): boolean {
return (
left.idempotencyKey === right.idempotencyKey &&
left.summary === right.summary &&
left.context === right.context &&
left.missionId === right.missionId
);
}
export class InteractionCoordinationGatewayError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly code: InteractionCoordinationGatewayErrorCode,
message: string,
) {
super(message);
this.name = InteractionCoordinationGatewayError.name;
}
}
+41 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { Global, Inject, Module, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createDb, createPgliteDb, type Db, type DbHandle } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import {
Global,
Inject,
Logger,
Module,
type OnApplicationShutdown,
type OnModuleInit,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import {
createDb,
createPgliteDb,
runPgliteMigrations,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { createStorageAdapter, type StorageAdapter } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
@@ -39,12 +52,37 @@ export const STORAGE_ADAPTER = 'STORAGE_ADAPTER';
],
exports: [DB, STORAGE_ADAPTER],
})
export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown, OnModuleInit {
private readonly logger = new Logger(DatabaseModule.name);
constructor(
@Inject(DB_HANDLE) private readonly handle: DbHandle,
@Inject(STORAGE_ADAPTER) private readonly storageAdapter: StorageAdapter,
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG) private readonly config: MosaicConfig,
) {}
// Migrations must complete before any module that injects DB starts serving
// requests. NestJS awaits onModuleInit before app.listen(), and modules that
// inject DB are initialized after this one — so all DB-dependent code sees a
// populated schema before the first HTTP request lands.
//
// Local (PGlite) tier: we run gateway-DB migrations explicitly here. The
// storage adapter writes to a separate PGlite directory and only manages its
// own KV tables, so we still call its migrate() afterwards.
//
// Postgres tier: PostgresAdapter.migrate() already calls runMigrations() on
// the same DATABASE_URL, so a single call covers both the gateway DB and
// the storage tables. We deliberately do NOT call runMigrations() here to
// avoid opening a second short-lived connection and doubling startup cost.
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
if (this.config.tier === 'local') {
this.logger.log('Applying PGlite schema migrations...');
await runPgliteMigrations(this.handle);
}
this.logger.log(`Initializing storage adapter (${this.storageAdapter.name})...`);
await this.storageAdapter.migrate();
}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await Promise.all([this.handle.close(), this.storageAdapter.close()]);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
/**
* Unit tests for EnrollmentService — federation enrollment token flow (FED-M2-07).
*
* Coverage:
* createToken:
* - inserts token row with correct grantId, peerId, and future expiresAt
* - returns { token, expiresAt } with a 64-char hex token
* - clamps ttlSeconds to 900
*
* redeem — error paths:
* - NotFoundException when token row not found
* - GoneException when token already used (usedAt set)
* - GoneException when token expired (expiresAt < now)
* - GoneException when grant status is not pending
*
* redeem — success path:
* - atomically claims token BEFORE cert issuance (claim → issueCert → tx)
* - calls CaService.issueCert with correct args
* - activates grant + updates peer + writes audit log inside a transaction
* - returns { certPem, certChainPem }
*
* redeem — replay protection:
* - GoneException when claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent request won)
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
import { GoneException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
import { makeSelfSignedCert } from './helpers/test-cert.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test constants
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64-char hex
// Real self-signed EC P-256 cert — populated once in beforeAll.
// Required because EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter calls new X509Certificate(certPem)
// with strict parsing (PR #501 HIGH-2: no silent fallback).
let REAL_CERT_PEM: string;
const MOCK_CHAIN_PEM = () => REAL_CERT_PEM + REAL_CERT_PEM;
const MOCK_SERIAL = 'ABCD1234';
beforeAll(async () => {
REAL_CERT_PEM = await makeSelfSignedCert();
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Factory helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeTokenRow(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
token: TOKEN,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000), // 1 min from now
usedAt: null,
createdAt: new Date(),
...overrides,
};
}
function makeGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
status: 'pending',
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date(),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
...overrides,
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock DB builder
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeDb({
tokenRows = [makeTokenRow()],
// claimedRows is returned by the .returning() on the token-claim UPDATE.
// Empty array = concurrent request won the race (GoneException).
claimedRows = [{ token: TOKEN }],
}: {
tokenRows?: unknown[];
claimedRows?: unknown[];
} = {}) {
// insert().values() — for createToken (outer db, not tx)
const insertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: insertValues });
// select().from().where().limit() — for fetching the token row
const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(tokenRows);
const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereSelect });
const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
// update().set().where().returning() — for the atomic token claim (outer db)
const returningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(claimedRows);
const whereClaimUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningMock });
const setClaimMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereClaimUpdate });
const claimUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setClaimMock });
// transaction(cb) — cb receives txMock; txMock has update + insert
//
// The tx mock must support two tx.update() call patterns (CRIT-2, PR #501):
// 1. Grant activation: .update().set().where().returning() → resolves to [{ id }]
// 2. Peer update: .update().set().where() → resolves to undefined
//
// We achieve this by making txWhereUpdate return an object with BOTH a thenable
// interface (so `await tx.update().set().where()` works) AND a .returning() method.
const txGrantActivatedRow = { id: GRANT_ID };
const txReturningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([txGrantActivatedRow]);
const txWhereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
// .returning() for grant activation (first tx.update call)
returning: txReturningMock,
// thenables so `await tx.update().set().where()` also works for peer update
then: (resolve: (v: undefined) => void) => resolve(undefined),
catch: () => undefined,
finally: () => undefined,
});
const txSetMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: txWhereUpdate });
const txUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: txSetMock });
const txInsertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const txInsertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: txInsertValues });
const txMock = { update: txUpdateMock, insert: txInsertMock };
const transactionMock = vi
.fn()
.mockImplementation(async (cb: (tx: typeof txMock) => Promise<void>) => cb(txMock));
return {
insert: insertMock,
select: selectMock,
update: claimUpdateMock,
transaction: transactionMock,
_mocks: {
insertValues,
insertMock,
limitSelect,
whereSelect,
fromSelect,
selectMock,
returningMock,
whereClaimUpdate,
setClaimMock,
claimUpdateMock,
txInsertValues,
txInsertMock,
txWhereUpdate,
txReturningMock,
txSetMock,
txUpdateMock,
txMock,
transactionMock,
},
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock CaService
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeCaService() {
return {
// REAL_CERT_PEM is populated by beforeAll — safe to reference via closure here
// because makeCaService() is only called after the suite's beforeAll runs.
issueCert: vi.fn().mockImplementation(async () => ({
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL,
})),
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock GrantsService
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeGrantsService(grantOverrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant(grantOverrides)),
activateGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant({ status: 'active' })),
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helper: build service under test
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function buildService({
db = makeDb(),
caService = makeCaService(),
grantsService = makeGrantsService(),
}: {
db?: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
caService?: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
grantsService?: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
} = {}) {
return new EnrollmentService(db as unknown as Db, caService as never, grantsService as never);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: createToken
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.createToken', () => {
it('inserts a token row and returns { token, expiresAt }', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const service = buildService({ db });
const result = await service.createToken({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
expect(result.token).toHaveLength(64); // 32 bytes hex
expect(result.expiresAt).toBeDefined();
expect(new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
expect(db._mocks.insertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ grantId: GRANT_ID, peerId: PEER_ID }),
);
});
it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const service = buildService({ db });
const before = Date.now();
const result = await service.createToken({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 9999,
});
const after = Date.now();
const expiresMs = new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime();
// Should be at most 900s from now
expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThanOrEqual(900_000 + 100);
expect(expiresMs - after).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: redeem — error paths
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — error paths', () => {
it('throws NotFoundException when token row not found', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
it('throws GoneException when usedAt is set (already redeemed)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ usedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when token has expired', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when grant status is not pending', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const grantsService = makeGrantsService({ status: 'active' });
const service = buildService({ db, grantsService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when token claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent replay)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
const caService = makeCaService();
const grantsService = makeGrantsService();
const service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('does NOT call issueCert when token claim fails (no double minting)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
const caService = makeCaService();
const service = buildService({ db, caService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
expect(caService.issueCert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: redeem — success path
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
let caService: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
let grantsService: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
let service: EnrollmentService;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDb();
caService = makeCaService();
grantsService = makeGrantsService();
service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
});
it('claims token BEFORE calling issueCert (prevents double minting)', async () => {
const callOrder: string[] = [];
db._mocks.returningMock.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('claim');
return [{ token: TOKEN }];
});
caService.issueCert.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('issueCert');
return { certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM, certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(), serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL };
});
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['claim', 'issueCert']);
});
it('calls CaService.issueCert with grantId, subjectUserId, csrPem, ttlSeconds=300', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(caService.issueCert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
csrPem: '---CSR---',
ttlSeconds: 300,
}),
);
});
it('runs activate grant + peer update + audit inside a transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.transactionMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
// tx.update called twice: activate grant + update peer
expect(db._mocks.txUpdateMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
// tx.insert called once: audit log
expect(db._mocks.txInsertMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it('activates grant (sets status=active) inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ status: 'active' }));
});
it('updates the federationPeers row with certPem, certSerial, state=active inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certSerial: MOCK_SERIAL,
state: 'active',
}),
);
});
it('inserts an audit log row inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txInsertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
peerId: PEER_ID,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
verb: 'enrollment',
}),
);
});
it('returns { certPem, certChainPem } from CaService', async () => {
const result = await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(result).toEqual({
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
/**
* Unit tests for FederationController (FED-M2-08).
*
* Coverage:
* - listGrants: delegates to GrantsService with query params
* - createGrant: delegates to GrantsService, validates body
* - generateToken: returns enrollmentUrl containing the token
* - listPeers: returns DB rows
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { FederationController } from '../federation.controller.js';
import type { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
import type { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Constants
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
const MOCK_GRANT = {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
status: 'pending' as const,
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
};
const MOCK_PEER = {
id: PEER_ID,
commonName: 'test-peer',
displayName: 'Test Peer',
certPem: '',
certSerial: 'pending',
certNotAfter: new Date(0),
clientKeyPem: null,
state: 'pending' as const,
endpointUrl: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DB mock builder
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeDbMock(rows: unknown[] = []) {
const orderBy = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(rows);
const where = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ orderBy });
const from = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where, orderBy });
const select = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from });
return {
select,
from,
where,
orderBy,
insert: vi.fn(),
update: vi.fn(),
delete: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as Db;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('FederationController', () => {
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
let controller: FederationController;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDbMock([MOCK_PEER]);
grantsService = {
createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
listGrants: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([MOCK_GRANT]),
revokeGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ...MOCK_GRANT, status: 'revoked' }),
activateGrant: vi.fn(),
expireGrant: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as GrantsService;
enrollmentService = {
createToken: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
token: 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12',
expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
}),
redeem: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as EnrollmentService;
controller = new FederationController(db, grantsService, enrollmentService);
});
// ─── Grant management ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listGrants', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with provided query params', async () => {
const query = { peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' as const };
const result = await controller.listGrants(query);
expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith(query);
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
});
it('delegates to GrantsService with empty filters', async () => {
const result = await controller.listGrants({});
expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith({});
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
});
});
describe('createGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService and returns created grant', async () => {
const body = {
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
};
const result = await controller.createGrant(body);
expect(grantsService.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(body);
expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
});
});
describe('getGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with provided ID', async () => {
const result = await controller.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(grantsService.getGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID);
expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
});
});
describe('revokeGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with id and reason', async () => {
const result = await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, { reason: 'test reason' });
expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'revoked' });
});
it('delegates without reason when omitted', async () => {
await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, {});
expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, undefined);
});
});
describe('generateToken', () => {
it('returns enrollmentUrl containing the token', async () => {
const token = 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12';
vi.mocked(enrollmentService.createToken).mockResolvedValueOnce({
token,
expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
});
const result = await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 });
expect(result.token).toBe(token);
expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain(token);
expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain('/api/federation/enrollment/');
});
it('creates token via EnrollmentService with correct grantId and peerId', async () => {
await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 300 });
expect(enrollmentService.createToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 300,
});
});
it('throws NotFoundException when grant does not exist', async () => {
vi.mocked(grantsService.getGrant).mockRejectedValueOnce(
new NotFoundException(`Grant ${GRANT_ID} not found`),
);
await expect(controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 })).rejects.toThrow(
NotFoundException,
);
});
});
// ─── Peer management ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listPeers', () => {
it('returns DB rows ordered by commonName', async () => {
const result = await controller.listPeers();
expect(db.select).toHaveBeenCalled();
// The DB mock resolves with [MOCK_PEER]
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_PEER]);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
/**
* Unit tests for GrantsService — federation grants CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06).
*
* Coverage:
* - createGrant: validates scope via parseFederationScope
* - createGrant: inserts with status 'pending'
* - getGrant: returns grant when found
* - getGrant: throws NotFoundException when not found
* - listGrants: no filters returns all grants
* - listGrants: filters by peerId
* - listGrants: filters by subjectUserId
* - listGrants: filters by status
* - listGrants: multiple filters combined
* - activateGrant: pending → active works
* - activateGrant: non-pending throws ConflictException
* - revokeGrant: active → revoked works, sets revokedAt
* - revokeGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
* - expireGrant: active → expired works
* - expireGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { ConflictException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from '../scope-schema.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Minimal valid federation scope for testing
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const VALID_SCOPE = {
resources: ['tasks'] as const,
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
const PEER_ID = 'a1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const USER_ID = 'u2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const GRANT_ID = 'g3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Build a mock DB that mimics chained Drizzle query builder calls
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeMockGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
status: 'pending',
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeDb(
overrides: {
insertReturning?: unknown[];
selectRows?: unknown[];
updateReturning?: unknown[];
} = {},
) {
const insertReturning = overrides.insertReturning ?? [makeMockGrant()];
const selectRows = overrides.selectRows ?? [makeMockGrant()];
const updateReturning = overrides.updateReturning ?? [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })];
// Drizzle returns a chainable builder; we need to mock the full chain.
const returningInsert = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(insertReturning);
const valuesInsert = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningInsert });
const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: valuesInsert });
// select().from().where().limit()
const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectRows);
const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
// from returns something that is both thenable (for full-table select) and has .where()
const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
where: whereSelect,
limit: limitSelect,
// Make it thenable for listGrants with no filters (await db.select().from(federationGrants))
then: (resolve: (v: unknown) => unknown) => resolve(selectRows),
});
const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
const returningUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(updateReturning);
const whereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningUpdate });
const setMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereUpdate });
const updateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setMock });
return {
insert: insertMock,
select: selectMock,
update: updateMock,
// Expose internals for assertions
_mocks: {
insertReturning,
valuesInsert,
insertMock,
limitSelect,
whereSelect,
fromSelect,
selectMock,
returningUpdate,
whereUpdate,
setMock,
updateMock,
},
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('GrantsService', () => {
let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
let service: GrantsService;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDb();
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
});
// ─── createGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('createGrant', () => {
it('calls parseFederationScope — rejects an invalid scope', async () => {
const invalidScope = { resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 0 };
await expect(
service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: invalidScope }),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(FederationScopeError);
});
it('inserts a grant with status pending and returns it', async () => {
const result = await service.createGrant({
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
});
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ status: 'pending', peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID }),
);
expect(result.status).toBe('pending');
});
it('passes expiresAt as a Date when provided', async () => {
await service.createGrant({
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
expiresAt: '2027-01-01T00:00:00Z',
});
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: expect.any(Date) }),
);
});
it('sets expiresAt to null when not provided', async () => {
await service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: VALID_SCOPE });
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: null }),
);
});
});
// ─── getGrant ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('getGrant', () => {
it('returns the grant when found', async () => {
const result = await service.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(result.id).toBe(GRANT_ID);
});
it('throws NotFoundException when no rows returned', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.getGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
});
// ─── listGrants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listGrants', () => {
it('queries without where clause when no filters provided', async () => {
const result = await service.listGrants({});
expect(Array.isArray(result)).toBe(true);
});
it('applies peerId filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies subjectUserId filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ subjectUserId: USER_ID });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies status filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ status: 'active' });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies multiple filters combined', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ─── activateGrant ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('activateGrant', () => {
it('transitions pending → active and returns updated grant', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'active' });
expect(result.status).toBe('active');
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already active', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
// ─── revokeGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('revokeGrant', () => {
it('transitions active → revoked and sets revokedAt', async () => {
const revokedAt = new Date();
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: expect.any(Date),
revokedReason: 'test reason',
}),
);
expect(result.status).toBe('revoked');
});
it('sets revokedReason to null when not provided', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt: new Date() })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ revokedReason: null }),
);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
// ─── expireGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('expireGrant', () => {
it('transitions active → expired and returns updated grant', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'expired' });
expect(result.status).toBe('expired');
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
/**
* Test helpers for generating real X.509 PEM certificates in unit tests.
*
* PR #501 (FED-M2-11) introduced strict `new X509Certificate(certPem)` parsing
* in both EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter and CaService.issueCert — dummy
* cert strings now throw `error:0680007B:asn1 encoding routines::header too long`.
*
* These helpers produce minimal but cryptographically valid self-signed EC P-256
* certificates via @peculiar/x509 + Node.js webcrypto, suitable for test mocks.
*
* Two variants:
* - makeSelfSignedCert() Plain cert — satisfies node:crypto X509Certificate parse.
* - makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts) Cert with custom Mosaic OID extensions — satisfies the
* CRIT-1 OID presence + value checks in CaService.issueCert.
*/
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
import {
X509CertificateGenerator,
Extension,
KeyUsagesExtension,
KeyUsageFlags,
BasicConstraintsExtension,
cryptoProvider,
} from '@peculiar/x509';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Encode a string as an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV:
* 0x0C (tag) + 1-byte length (for strings ≤ 127 bytes) + UTF-8 bytes.
*
* CaService.issueCert reads the extension value as:
* decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2))
* i.e. it skips the tag + length byte and decodes the remainder as UTF-8.
* So we must produce exactly this encoding as the OCTET STRING content.
*/
function encodeUtf8String(value: string): Uint8Array {
const utf8 = new TextEncoder().encode(value);
if (utf8.length > 127) {
throw new Error('encodeUtf8String: value too long for single-byte length encoding');
}
const buf = new Uint8Array(2 + utf8.length);
buf[0] = 0x0c; // ASN.1 UTF8String tag
buf[1] = utf8.length;
buf.set(utf8, 2);
return buf;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mosaic OID constants (must match production CaService)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1';
const OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public API
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Generate a minimal self-signed EC P-256 certificate valid for 1 day.
* CN=harness-test, no custom extensions.
*
* Suitable for:
* - EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter (just needs parseable PEM)
* - Any mock that returns certPem / certChainPem without OID checks
*/
export async function makeSelfSignedCert(): Promise<string> {
// Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto (available as globalThis.crypto in Node 19+,
// but we set it explicitly here to be safe on all Node 18+ versions).
cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
const now = new Date();
const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
serialNumber: '01',
name: 'CN=harness-test',
notBefore: now,
notAfter: tomorrow,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
keys,
extensions: [
new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
],
});
return cert.toString('pem');
}
/**
* Generate a self-signed EC P-256 certificate that contains the two custom
* Mosaic OID extensions required by CaService.issueCert's CRIT-1 check:
* OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 → mosaic_grant_id (value = grantId)
* OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 → mosaic_subject_user_id (value = subjectUserId)
*
* The extension value encoding matches the production parser's `.slice(2)` assumption:
* each extension value is an OCTET STRING wrapping an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV.
*/
export async function makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts: {
grantId: string;
subjectUserId: string;
}): Promise<string> {
// Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto.
cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
const now = new Date();
const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
serialNumber: '01',
name: 'CN=mosaic-issued-test',
notBefore: now,
notAfter: tomorrow,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
keys,
extensions: [
new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
// mosaic_grant_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1
new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.grantId)),
// mosaic_subject_user_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2
new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.subjectUserId)),
],
});
return cert.toString('pem');
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { sealClientKey, unsealClientKey } from '../peer-key.util.js';
const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-for-peer-key-unit-tests-only';
const TEST_PEM = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo
pCOW8QqstpxEBpnFo37JxLYEJbpE3gUlJajsHv9UWRQ7m5B7n+MBXwTCQqMEY8Wl
kHv9tGgz1YGwzBjNKxPJXE6pPTXQ1Oa0VB9l3qHdqF5HtZoJzE0c6dO8HJ5YUVL
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;
let savedSecret: string | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
savedSecret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
});
afterEach(() => {
if (savedSecret === undefined) {
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
} else {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = savedSecret;
}
});
describe('peer-key seal/unseal', () => {
it('round-trip: unsealClientKey(sealClientKey(pem)) returns original pem', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const roundTripped = unsealClientKey(sealed);
expect(roundTripped).toBe(TEST_PEM);
});
it('non-determinism: sealClientKey produces different ciphertext each call', () => {
const sealed1 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const sealed2 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
expect(sealed1).not.toBe(sealed2);
});
it('at-rest: sealed output does not contain plaintext PEM content', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
expect(sealed).not.toContain('PRIVATE KEY');
expect(sealed).not.toContain(
'MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo',
);
});
it('tamper: flipping a byte in the sealed payload causes unseal to throw', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const buf = Buffer.from(sealed, 'base64');
// Flip a byte in the middle of the buffer (past IV and authTag)
const midpoint = Math.floor(buf.length / 2);
buf[midpoint] = buf[midpoint]! ^ 0xff;
const tampered = buf.toString('base64');
expect(() => unsealClientKey(tampered)).toThrow();
});
it('missing secret: unsealClientKey throws when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is unset', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
expect(() => unsealClientKey(sealed)).toThrow('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set');
});
});
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
/**
* DTOs for the Step-CA client service (FED-M2-04).
*
* IssueCertRequestDto — input to CaService.issueCert()
* IssuedCertDto — output from CaService.issueCert()
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class IssueCertRequestDto {
/**
* PEM-encoded PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request.
* The CSR must already include the desired SANs.
*/
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
csrPem!: string;
/**
* UUID of the federation_grants row this certificate is being issued for.
* Embedded as the `mosaic_grant_id` custom OID extension.
*/
@IsUUID()
grantId!: string;
/**
* UUID of the local user on whose behalf the cert is being issued.
* Embedded as the `mosaic_subject_user_id` custom OID extension.
*/
@IsUUID()
subjectUserId!: string;
/**
* Requested certificate validity in seconds.
* Hard cap: 900 s (15 minutes). Default: 300 s (5 minutes).
* The service will always clamp to 900 s regardless of this value.
*/
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(15 * 60)
ttlSeconds: number = 300;
}
export class IssuedCertDto {
/** PEM-encoded leaf certificate returned by step-ca. */
certPem!: string;
/**
* PEM-encoded full certificate chain (leaf + intermediates + root).
* Falls back to `certPem` when step-ca returns no `certChain` field.
*/
certChainPem!: string;
/** Decimal serial number string of the issued certificate. */
serialNumber!: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,592 @@
/**
* Unit tests for CaService — Step-CA client (FED-M2-04).
*
* Coverage:
* - Happy path: returns IssuedCertDto with certPem, certChainPem, serialNumber
* - certChainPem fallback: falls back to certPem when certChain absent
* - certChainPem from ca field: uses crt+ca when certChain absent but ca present
* - HTTP 401: throws CaServiceError with cause + remediation
* - HTTP non-401 error: throws CaServiceError
* - Malformed CSR: throws before HTTP call (INVALID_CSR)
* - Non-JSON response: throws CaServiceError
* - HTTPS connection error: throws CaServiceError
* - JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id present in OTT payload
* verified with jose.jwtVerify (real signature check)
* - CaServiceError: has cause + remediation properties
* - Missing crt in response: throws CaServiceError
* - Real CSR validation: valid P-256 CSR passes; malformed CSR fails with INVALID_CSR
* - provisionerPassword never appears in CaServiceError messages
* - HTTPS-only enforcement: http:// URL throws in constructor
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll, type Mock } from 'vitest';
import { jwtVerify, exportJWK, generateKeyPair } from 'jose';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
import { makeMosaicIssuedCert } from './__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock node:https BEFORE importing CaService so the mock is in place when
// the module is loaded. Vitest/ESM require vi.mock at the top level.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi.mock('node:https', () => {
const mockRequest = vi.fn();
const mockAgent = vi.fn().mockImplementation(() => ({}));
return {
default: { request: mockRequest, Agent: mockAgent },
request: mockRequest,
Agent: mockAgent,
};
});
vi.mock('node:fs', () => {
const mockReadFileSync = vi
.fn()
.mockReturnValue('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nFAKEROOT\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n');
return {
default: { readFileSync: mockReadFileSync },
readFileSync: mockReadFileSync,
};
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real self-signed EC P-256 certificate generated with openssl for testing.
// openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -nodes -keyout /dev/null \
// -out /dev/stdout -subj "/CN=test" -days 1
const FAKE_CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBdDCCARmgAwIBAgIUM+iUJSayN+PwXkyVN6qwSY7sr6gwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
DzENMAsGA1UEAwwEdGVzdDAeFw0yNjA0MjIwMzE5MTlaFw0yNjA0MjMwMzE5MTla
MA8xDTALBgNVBAMMBHRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR21kHL
n1GmFQ4TEBw3EA53pD+2McIBf5WcoHE+x0eMz5DpRKJe0ksHwOVN5Yev5d57kb+4
MvG1LhbHCB/uQo8So1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLsw
HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLswDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB
/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAypJqyC6S77aQ3eEXokM6sgAsD7Oa3tJbCbVm
zG3uJb0CIQC1w+GE+Ad0OTR5Quja46R1RjOo8ydpzZ7Fh4rouAiwEw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
`;
// Use a second copy of the same cert for the CA field in tests.
const FAKE_CA_PEM = FAKE_CERT_PEM;
const GRANT_ID = 'a0eebc99-9c0b-4ef8-bb6d-6bb9bd380a11';
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'b1ffcd00-0d1c-5f09-cc7e-7cc0ce491b22';
// Real self-signed cert containing both Mosaic OID extensions — populated in beforeAll.
// Required because CaService.issueCert performs CRIT-1 OID presence/value checks on the
// response cert (PR #501 — strict parsing, no silent fallback).
let realIssuedCertPem: string;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Generate a real EC P-256 key pair and CSR for integration-style tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// We generate this once at module level so it's available to all tests.
// The key pair and CSR PEM are populated asynchronously in the test that needs them.
let realCsrPem: string;
async function generateRealCsr(): Promise<string> {
const { privateKey, publicKey } = await generateKeyPair('ES256');
// Export public key JWK for potential verification (not used here but confirms key is exportable)
await exportJWK(publicKey);
// Use @peculiar/x509 to build a proper CSR
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: 'CN=test.federation.local',
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
keys: { privateKey, publicKey },
});
return csr.toString('pem');
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Setup env before importing service
// We use an EC P-256 key pair here so the JWK-based signing works.
// The key pair is generated once and stored in module-level vars.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real EC P-256 test JWK (test-only, never used in production).
// Generated with node webcrypto for use in unit tests.
const TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK = {
key_ops: ['sign'],
ext: true,
kty: 'EC',
x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
crv: 'P-256',
d: 'TM6N79w1HE-PiML5Td4mbXfJaLHEaZrVyVrrwlJv7q8',
kid: 'test-ec-kid',
};
const TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK = {
key_ops: ['verify'],
ext: true,
kty: 'EC',
x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
crv: 'P-256',
kid: 'test-ec-kid',
};
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'https://step-ca:9000';
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] = JSON.stringify(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK);
process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'] = '/fake/root.pem';
// Import AFTER env is set and mocks are registered
import * as httpsModule from 'node:https';
import { CaService, CaServiceError } from './ca.service.js';
import type { IssueCertRequestDto } from './ca.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helper to build a mock https.request that simulates step-ca
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeHttpsMock(statusCode: number, body: unknown, errorMsg?: string): void {
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn(),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
if (body !== undefined) {
cb(Buffer.from(typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)));
}
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
if (errorMsg) {
// Simulate a connection error via the req.on('error') handler
mockReq.on.mockImplementation((event: string, cb: (err: Error) => void) => {
if (event === 'error') {
setImmediate(() => cb(new Error(errorMsg)));
}
});
} else {
// Normal flow: call the response callback
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
}
return mockReq;
},
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('CaService', () => {
let service: CaService;
beforeAll(async () => {
// Generate a cert with the two Mosaic OIDs so that CaService.issueCert's
// CRIT-1 OID checks pass when mock step-ca returns it as `crt`.
realIssuedCertPem = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
});
});
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
service = new CaService();
});
function makeReq(overrides: Partial<IssueCertRequestDto> = {}): IssueCertRequestDto {
// Use a real CSR if available; fall back to a minimal placeholder
const defaultCsr = realCsrPem ?? makeFakeCsr();
return {
csrPem: defaultCsr,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 300,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeFakeCsr(): string {
// A structurally valid-looking CSR header/footer (body will fail crypto verify)
return `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0000000000000000AAAA\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n`;
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real CSR generation — runs once and populates realCsrPem
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('generates a real P-256 CSR that passes validateCsr', async () => {
realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
expect(realCsrPem).toMatch(/BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST/);
// Now test that the service's validateCsr accepts it.
// We call it indirectly via issueCert with a successful mock.
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem, certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM] });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
});
it('throws INVALID_CSR for a malformed PEM-shaped CSR', async () => {
const malformedCsr =
'-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nTm90QVJlYWxDU1I=\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n';
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: malformedCsr }))).rejects.toSatisfy(
(err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.code).toBe('INVALID_CSR');
return true;
},
);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Happy path
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('returns IssuedCertDto on success (certChain present)', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: realIssuedCertPem,
certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM],
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
expect(typeof result.serialNumber).toBe('string');
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// certChainPem fallback — certChain absent, ca field present
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('builds certChainPem from crt+ca when certChain is absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: realIssuedCertPem,
ca: FAKE_CA_PEM,
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// certChainPem fallback — no certChain, no ca field
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('falls back to certPem alone when certChain and ca are absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTP 401
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 401', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/401/);
expect(err.remediation).toBeTruthy();
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTP non-401 error (e.g. 422)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 422', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(422, { message: 'Unprocessable Entity' });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(CaServiceError);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Malformed CSR — throws before HTTP call
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError for malformed CSR without making HTTP call', async () => {
const requestSpy = vi.spyOn(httpsModule, 'request');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: 'not-a-valid-csr' }))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
CaServiceError,
);
expect(requestSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Non-JSON response
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError when step-ca returns non-JSON', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, 'this is not json');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/non-JSON/);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTPS connection error
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTPS connection error', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(0, undefined, 'connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:9000');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/HTTPS connection/);
expect(err.cause).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id
// Verified with jose.jwtVerify for real signature verification (M6)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('OTT contains mosaic_grant_id, mosaic_subject_user_id, and jti; signature verifies with jose', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
}),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
return mockReq;
},
);
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
const ott = capturedBody!['ott'] as string;
expect(typeof ott).toBe('string');
// Verify JWT structure
const parts = ott.split('.');
expect(parts).toHaveLength(3);
// Decode payload without signature check first
const payloadJson = Buffer.from(parts[1]!, 'base64url').toString('utf8');
const payload = JSON.parse(payloadJson) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
expect(payload['mosaic_subject_user_id']).toBe(SUBJECT_USER_ID);
expect(typeof payload['jti']).toBe('string'); // M2: jti present
expect(payload['jti']).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/); // UUID format
// M3: top-level sha should NOT be present; step.sha should be present
expect(payload['sha']).toBeUndefined();
const step = payload['step'] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
expect(step?.['sha']).toBeDefined();
// M6: Verify signature with jose.jwtVerify using the public key
const { importJWK: importJose } = await import('jose');
const publicKey = await importJose(TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK, 'ES256');
const verified = await jwtVerify(ott, publicKey);
expect(verified.payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// CaServiceError has cause + remediation
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('CaServiceError carries cause and remediation', () => {
const cause = new Error('original error');
const err = new CaServiceError('something went wrong', 'fix it like this', cause);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(CaServiceError);
expect(err.message).toBe('something went wrong');
expect(err.remediation).toBe('fix it like this');
expect(err.cause).toBe(cause);
expect(err.name).toBe('CaServiceError');
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Missing crt in response
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError when response is missing the crt field', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, { ca: FAKE_CA_PEM });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/missing the "crt" field/);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// M6: provisionerPassword must never appear in CaServiceError messages
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('provisionerPassword does not appear in any CaServiceError message', async () => {
// Temporarily set a recognizable password to test against
const originalPassword = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'];
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = 'super-secret-password-12345';
// Generate a bad CSR to trigger an error path
const caughtErrors: CaServiceError[] = [];
try {
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: 'not-a-csr' }));
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
caughtErrors.push(err);
}
}
// Also try HTTP 401 path
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
try {
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
caughtErrors.push(err);
}
}
for (const err of caughtErrors) {
expect(err.message).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
if (err.remediation) {
expect(err.remediation).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
}
}
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = originalPassword;
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// M7: HTTPS-only enforcement in constructor
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws in constructor if STEP_CA_URL uses http://', () => {
const originalUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'http://step-ca:9000';
expect(() => new CaService()).toThrow(CaServiceError);
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = originalUrl;
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TTL clamp: ttlSeconds is clamped to 900 s (15 min) maximum
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900 s regardless of input', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
}),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
return mockReq;
},
);
// Request 86400 s — should be clamped to 900
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ ttlSeconds: 86400 }));
expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
const validity = capturedBody!['validity'] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(validity['duration']).toBe('900s');
});
});
+680
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
/**
* CaService — Step-CA client for federation grant certificate issuance.
*
* Responsibilities:
* 1. Build a JWK-provisioner One-Time Token (OTT) signed with the provisioner
* private key (ES256/ES384/RS256 per JWK kty/crv) carrying Mosaic-specific
* claims (`mosaic_grant_id`, `mosaic_subject_user_id`, `step.sha`) per the
* step-ca JWK provisioner protocol.
* 2. POST the CSR + OTT to the step-ca `/1.0/sign` endpoint over HTTPS,
* pinning the trust to the CA root cert supplied via env.
* 3. Return an IssuedCertDto containing the leaf cert, full chain, and
* serial number.
*
* Environment variables (all required at runtime — validated in constructor):
* STEP_CA_URL https://step-ca:9000
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON JWK provisioner private key (JSON)
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH Absolute path to the CA root PEM
*
* Optional (only used for JWK PBES2 decrypt at startup if key is encrypted):
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD JWK provisioner password (raw string)
*
* Custom OID registry (PRD §6, docs/federation/SETUP.md):
* 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 — mosaic_grant_id
* 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 — mosaic_subject_user_id
*
* Fail-loud contract:
* Every error path throws CaServiceError with a human-readable `remediation`
* field. Silent OID-stripping is NEVER allowed — if the sign response does
* not include the cert, we throw rather than return a cert that may be
* missing the custom extensions.
*/
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import * as https from 'node:https';
import { SignJWT, importJWK } from 'jose';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequest, X509Certificate } from '@peculiar/x509';
import type { IssueCertRequestDto } from './ca.dto.js';
import { IssuedCertDto } from './ca.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Custom error class
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export class CaServiceError extends Error {
readonly cause: unknown;
readonly remediation: string;
readonly code?: string;
constructor(message: string, remediation: string, cause?: unknown, code?: string) {
super(message);
this.name = 'CaServiceError';
this.cause = cause;
this.remediation = remediation;
this.code = code;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interface StepSignResponse {
crt: string;
ca?: string;
certChain?: string[];
}
interface JwkKey {
kty: string;
kid?: string;
use?: string;
alg?: string;
k?: string; // symmetric
n?: string; // RSA
e?: string;
d?: string;
x?: string; // EC
y?: string;
crv?: string;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** UUID regex for validation */
const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
/**
* Derive the JWT algorithm string from a JWK's kty/crv fields.
* EC P-256 → ES256, EC P-384 → ES384, RSA → RS256.
*/
function algFromJwk(jwk: JwkKey): string {
if (jwk.alg) return jwk.alg;
if (jwk.kty === 'EC') {
if (jwk.crv === 'P-384') return 'ES384';
return 'ES256'; // default for P-256 and Ed25519-style EC keys
}
if (jwk.kty === 'RSA') return 'RS256';
throw new CaServiceError(
`Unsupported JWK kty: ${jwk.kty}`,
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON must be an EC (P-256/P-384) or RSA JWK private key.',
);
}
/**
* Compute SHA-256 fingerprint of the DER-encoded CSR body.
* step-ca uses this as the `step.sha` claim to bind the OTT to a specific CSR.
*/
function csrFingerprint(csrPem: string): string {
// Strip PEM headers and decode base64 body
const b64 = csrPem
.replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----/, '')
.replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----/, '')
.replace(/\s+/g, '');
let derBuf: Buffer;
try {
derBuf = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to base64-decode the CSR PEM body',
'Verify that csrPem is a valid PKCS#10 PEM-encoded certificate request.',
err,
);
}
if (derBuf.length === 0) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR PEM decoded to empty buffer — malformed input',
'Provide a valid non-empty PKCS#10 PEM-encoded certificate request.',
);
}
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(derBuf).digest('hex');
}
/**
* Send a JSON POST to the step-ca sign endpoint.
* Returns the parsed response body or throws CaServiceError.
*/
function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<StepSignResponse> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const bodyStr = JSON.stringify(body);
const parsed = new URL(url);
const options: https.RequestOptions = {
hostname: parsed.hostname,
port: parsed.port ? parseInt(parsed.port, 10) : 443,
path: parsed.pathname,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(bodyStr),
},
agent,
timeout: 5000,
};
const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
res.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk));
res.on('end', () => {
const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
if (res.statusCode === 401) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`step-ca returned HTTP 401 — invalid or expired OTT`,
'Check STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON. Ensure the mosaic-fed provisioner is configured in the CA.',
),
);
return;
}
if (res.statusCode && res.statusCode >= 400) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`step-ca returned HTTP ${res.statusCode}: ${raw.slice(0, 256)}`,
`Review the step-ca logs. Status ${res.statusCode} may indicate a CSR policy violation or misconfigured provisioner.`,
),
);
return;
}
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown;
} catch (err) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
'step-ca returned a non-JSON response',
'Verify STEP_CA_URL points to a running step-ca instance and that TLS is properly configured.',
err,
),
);
return;
}
resolve(parsed as StepSignResponse);
});
});
req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
req.destroy(new Error('Request timed out after 5000ms'));
});
req.on('error', (err: Error) => {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`HTTPS connection to step-ca failed: ${err.message}`,
'Ensure STEP_CA_URL is reachable and STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH points to the correct CA root certificate.',
err,
),
);
});
req.write(bodyStr);
req.end();
});
}
/**
* Extract a decimal serial number from a PEM certificate.
* Throws CaServiceError on failure — never silently returns 'unknown'.
*/
function extractSerial(certPem: string): string {
let cert: crypto.X509Certificate;
try {
cert = new crypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to parse the issued certificate PEM',
'The certificate returned by step-ca could not be parsed. Check that step-ca is returning a valid PEM certificate.',
err,
'CERT_PARSE',
);
}
return cert.serialNumber;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Service
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Injectable()
export class CaService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(CaService.name);
private readonly caUrl: string;
private readonly rootCertPath: string;
private readonly httpsAgent: https.Agent;
private readonly jwk: JwkKey;
private cachedPrivateKey: crypto.KeyObject | null = null;
private readonly jwtAlg: string;
private readonly kid: string;
constructor() {
const caUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
const provisionerKeyJson = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'];
const rootCertPath = process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
if (!caUrl) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_URL is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_URL to the base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
);
}
// Enforce HTTPS-only URL
let parsedUrl: URL;
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(caUrl);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`STEP_CA_URL is not a valid URL: ${caUrl}`,
'Set STEP_CA_URL to a valid HTTPS URL, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
err,
);
}
if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:') {
throw new CaServiceError(
`STEP_CA_URL must use HTTPS — got: ${parsedUrl.protocol}`,
'Set STEP_CA_URL to an https:// URL. Unencrypted connections to the CA are not permitted.',
);
}
if (!provisionerKeyJson) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-encoded JWK for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
);
}
if (!rootCertPath) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH to the absolute path of the step-ca root CA certificate PEM file.',
);
}
// Parse JWK once — do NOT store the raw JSON string as a class field
let jwk: JwkKey;
try {
jwk = JSON.parse(provisionerKeyJson) as JwkKey;
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not valid JSON',
'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-serialised JWK object for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
err,
);
}
// Derive algorithm from JWK metadata
const jwtAlg = algFromJwk(jwk);
const kid = jwk.kid ?? 'mosaic-fed';
// Import the JWK into a native KeyObject — fail loudly if it cannot be loaded.
// We do this synchronously here by calling the async importJWK via a blocking workaround.
// Actually importJWK is async, so we store it for use during token building.
// We keep the raw jwk object for later async import inside buildOtt.
// NOTE: We do NOT store provisionerKeyJson string as a class field.
this.jwk = jwk;
this.jwtAlg = jwtAlg;
this.kid = kid;
this.caUrl = caUrl;
this.rootCertPath = rootCertPath;
// Read the root cert and pin it for all HTTPS connections.
let rootCert: string;
try {
rootCert = fs.readFileSync(this.rootCertPath, 'utf8');
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Cannot read STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH: ${rootCertPath}`,
'Ensure the file exists and is readable by the gateway process.',
err,
);
}
this.httpsAgent = new https.Agent({
ca: rootCert,
rejectUnauthorized: true,
});
this.logger.log(`CaService initialised — CA URL: ${this.caUrl}`);
}
/**
* Lazily import the private key from JWK on first use.
* The key is cached in cachedPrivateKey after first import.
*/
private async getPrivateKey(): Promise<crypto.KeyObject> {
if (this.cachedPrivateKey !== null) return this.cachedPrivateKey;
try {
const key = await importJWK(this.jwk, this.jwtAlg);
// importJWK returns KeyLike (crypto.KeyObject | Uint8Array) — in Node.js it's KeyObject
this.cachedPrivateKey = key as unknown as crypto.KeyObject;
return this.cachedPrivateKey;
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to import STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON as a cryptographic key',
'Ensure STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON contains a valid JWK private key (EC P-256/P-384 or RSA).',
err,
);
}
}
/**
* Build the JWK-provisioner OTT signed with the provisioner private key.
* Algorithm is derived from the JWK kty/crv fields.
*/
private async buildOtt(params: {
csrPem: string;
grantId: string;
subjectUserId: string;
ttlSeconds: number;
csrCn: string;
}): Promise<string> {
const { csrPem, grantId, subjectUserId, ttlSeconds, csrCn } = params;
// Validate UUID shape for grant id and subject user id
if (!UUID_RE.test(grantId)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`grantId is not a valid UUID: ${grantId}`,
'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for grantId.',
undefined,
'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
);
}
if (!UUID_RE.test(subjectUserId)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`subjectUserId is not a valid UUID: ${subjectUserId}`,
'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for subjectUserId.',
undefined,
'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
);
}
const sha = csrFingerprint(csrPem);
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const privateKey = await this.getPrivateKey();
const ott = await new SignJWT({
iss: this.kid,
sub: csrCn, // M1: set sub to identity from CSR CN
aud: [`${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`],
iat: now,
nbf: now - 30, // 30 s clock-skew tolerance
exp: now + Math.min(ttlSeconds, 3600), // OTT validity ≤ 1 h
jti: crypto.randomUUID(), // M2: unique token ID
// step.sha is the canonical field name used in the template — M3: keep only step.sha
step: { sha },
// Mosaic custom claims consumed by federation.tpl
mosaic_grant_id: grantId,
mosaic_subject_user_id: subjectUserId,
})
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: this.jwtAlg, typ: 'JWT', kid: this.kid })
.sign(privateKey);
return ott;
}
/**
* Validate a PEM-encoded CSR using @peculiar/x509.
* Verifies the self-signature, key type/size, and signature algorithm.
* Optionally verifies that the CSR's SANs match the expected set.
*
* Throws CaServiceError with code 'INVALID_CSR' on failure.
*/
private async validateCsr(pem: string, expectedSans?: string[]): Promise<string> {
let csr: Pkcs10CertificateRequest;
try {
csr = new Pkcs10CertificateRequest(pem);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to parse CSR PEM as a valid PKCS#10 certificate request',
'Provide a valid PEM-encoded PKCS#10 CSR.',
err,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Verify self-signature
let valid: boolean;
try {
valid = await csr.verify();
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR signature verification threw an error',
'The CSR self-signature could not be verified. Ensure the CSR is properly formed.',
err,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
if (!valid) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR self-signature is invalid',
'The CSR must be self-signed with the corresponding private key.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Validate signature algorithm — reject MD5 and SHA-1
// signatureAlgorithm is HashedAlgorithm which extends Algorithm.
// Cast through unknown to access .name and .hash.name without DOM lib globals.
const sigAlgAny = csr.signatureAlgorithm as unknown as {
name?: string;
hash?: { name?: string };
};
const sigAlgName = (sigAlgAny.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
const hashName = (sigAlgAny.hash?.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
if (
sigAlgName.includes('md5') ||
sigAlgName.includes('sha1') ||
hashName === 'sha-1' ||
hashName === 'sha1'
) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR uses a forbidden signature algorithm: ${sigAlgAny.name ?? 'unknown'}`,
'Use SHA-256 or stronger. MD5 and SHA-1 are not permitted.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Validate public key algorithm and strength via the algorithm descriptor on the key.
// csr.publicKey.algorithm is type Algorithm (WebCrypto) — use name-based checks.
// We cast to an extended interface to access curve/modulus info without DOM globals.
const pubKeyAlgo = csr.publicKey.algorithm as {
name: string;
namedCurve?: string;
modulusLength?: number;
};
const keyAlgoName = pubKeyAlgo.name;
if (keyAlgoName === 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' || keyAlgoName === 'RSA-PSS') {
const modulusLength = pubKeyAlgo.modulusLength ?? 0;
if (modulusLength < 2048) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR RSA key is too short: ${modulusLength} bits (minimum 2048)`,
'Use an RSA key of at least 2048 bits.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
} else if (keyAlgoName === 'ECDSA') {
const namedCurve = pubKeyAlgo.namedCurve ?? '';
const allowedCurves = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384']);
if (!allowedCurves.has(namedCurve)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR EC key uses disallowed curve: ${namedCurve}`,
'Use EC P-256 or P-384. Other curves are not permitted.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
} else if (keyAlgoName === 'Ed25519') {
// Ed25519 is explicitly allowed
} else {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR uses unsupported key algorithm: ${keyAlgoName}`,
'Use EC (P-256/P-384), Ed25519, or RSA (≥2048 bit) keys.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Extract SANs if expectedSans provided
if (expectedSans && expectedSans.length > 0) {
// Get SANs from CSR extensions
const sanExtension = csr.extensions?.find(
(ext) => ext.type === '2.5.29.17', // Subject Alternative Name OID
);
const csrSans: string[] = [];
if (sanExtension) {
// Parse the raw SAN extension — store as stringified for comparison
// @peculiar/x509 exposes SANs through the parsed extension
const sanExt = sanExtension as { names?: Array<{ type: string; value: string }> };
if (sanExt.names) {
for (const name of sanExt.names) {
csrSans.push(name.value);
}
}
}
const csrSanSet = new Set(csrSans);
const expectedSanSet = new Set(expectedSans);
const missing = expectedSans.filter((s) => !csrSanSet.has(s));
const extra = csrSans.filter((s) => !expectedSanSet.has(s));
if (missing.length > 0 || extra.length > 0) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR SANs do not match expected set. Missing: [${missing.join(', ')}], Extra: [${extra.join(', ')}]`,
'The CSR must include exactly the SANs specified in the issuance request.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
}
// Return the CN from the CSR subject for use as JWT sub
const cn = csr.subjectName.getField('CN')?.[0] ?? '';
return cn;
}
/**
* Submit a CSR to step-ca and return the issued certificate.
*
* Throws `CaServiceError` on any failure (network, auth, malformed input).
* Never silently swallows errors — fail-loud is a hard contract per M2-02 review.
*/
async issueCert(req: IssueCertRequestDto): Promise<IssuedCertDto> {
// Clamp TTL to 15-minute maximum (H2)
const ttl = Math.min(req.ttlSeconds ?? 300, 900);
this.logger.debug(
`issueCert — grantId=${req.grantId} subjectUserId=${req.subjectUserId} ttl=${ttl}s`,
);
// Validate CSR — real cryptographic validation (H3)
const csrCn = await this.validateCsr(req.csrPem);
const ott = await this.buildOtt({
csrPem: req.csrPem,
grantId: req.grantId,
subjectUserId: req.subjectUserId,
ttlSeconds: ttl,
csrCn,
});
const signUrl = `${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`;
const requestBody = {
csr: req.csrPem,
ott,
validity: {
duration: `${ttl}s`,
},
};
this.logger.debug(`Posting CSR to ${signUrl}`);
const response = await httpsPost(signUrl, requestBody, this.httpsAgent);
if (!response.crt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'step-ca sign response missing the "crt" field',
'This is unexpected — the step-ca instance may be misconfigured or running an incompatible version.',
);
}
// Build certChainPem: prefer certChain array, fall back to ca field, fall back to crt alone.
let certChainPem: string;
if (response.certChain && response.certChain.length > 0) {
certChainPem = response.certChain.join('\n');
} else if (response.ca) {
certChainPem = response.crt + '\n' + response.ca;
} else {
certChainPem = response.crt;
}
const serialNumber = extractSerial(response.crt);
// CRIT-1: Verify the issued certificate contains both Mosaic OID extensions
// with the correct values. Step-CA's federation.tpl encodes each as an ASN.1
// UTF8String TLV: tag 0x0C + 1-byte length + UUID bytes. We skip 2 bytes
// (tag + length) to extract the raw UUID string.
const issuedCert = new X509Certificate(response.crt);
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
const grantIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1');
if (!grantIdExt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_grant_id',
'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
undefined,
'OID_MISSING',
);
}
const grantIdInCert = decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2));
if (grantIdInCert !== req.grantId) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Issued certificate mosaic_grant_id mismatch: expected ${req.grantId}, got ${grantIdInCert}`,
'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different grant ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
undefined,
'OID_MISMATCH',
);
}
const subjectUserIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2');
if (!subjectUserIdExt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_subject_user_id',
'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
undefined,
'OID_MISSING',
);
}
const subjectUserIdInCert = decoder.decode(subjectUserIdExt.value.slice(2));
if (subjectUserIdInCert !== req.subjectUserId) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Issued certificate mosaic_subject_user_id mismatch: expected ${req.subjectUserId}, got ${subjectUserIdInCert}`,
'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different subject user ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
undefined,
'OID_MISMATCH',
);
}
this.logger.log(`Certificate issued — serial=${serialNumber} grantId=${req.grantId}`);
const result = new IssuedCertDto();
result.certPem = response.crt;
result.certChainPem = certChainPem;
result.serialNumber = serialNumber;
return result;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
/**
* Unit tests for FederationClientService (FED-M3-08).
*
* HTTP mocking strategy:
* undici MockAgent is used to intercept outbound HTTP requests. The service
* uses `undici.fetch` with a `dispatcher` option, so MockAgent is set as the
* global dispatcher and all requests flow through it.
*
* Because the service builds one `undici.Agent` per peer and passes it as
* the dispatcher on every fetch call, we cannot intercept at the Agent level
* in unit tests without significant refactoring. Instead, we set the global
* dispatcher to a MockAgent and override the service's `doRequest` indirection
* by spying on the internal fetch call.
*
* For the cert/key wiring, we use the real `sealClientKey` function from
* peer-key.util.ts with a test secret — no stubs.
*
* Sealed-key setup:
* Each test (or beforeAll) calls `sealClientKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM)` with
* BETTER_AUTH_SECRET set to a deterministic test value so that
* `unsealClientKey` in the service recovers the original PEM.
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import { MockAgent, setGlobalDispatcher, getGlobalDispatcher } from 'undici';
import type { Dispatcher } from 'undici';
import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { FederationClientService, FederationClientError } from '../federation-client.service.js';
import { sealClientKey } from '../../peer-key.util.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test constants
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-for-federation-client-spec-only';
const PEER_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa';
const ENDPOINT = 'https://peer.example.com';
// Minimal valid RSA/EC private key PEM — does NOT need to be a real key for
// unit tests because we only verify it round-trips through seal/unseal, not
// that it actually negotiates TLS (MockAgent handles that).
const TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDummyKeyForTests
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;
// Minimal self-signed cert PEM (dummy — only used for mTLS Agent construction)
const TEST_CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBdummyCertForFederationClientTests==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----`;
const TEST_CERT_SERIAL = 'ABCDEF1234567890';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Sealed key (computed once in beforeAll)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let SEALED_KEY: string;
// Path to a stub Step-CA root cert file written in beforeAll. The cert is never
// actually used to negotiate TLS in unit tests (MockAgent + spy on resolveEntry
// short-circuit the network), but loadStepCaRoot() requires the file to exist.
const STUB_CA_PEM_PATH = join(tmpdir(), 'federation-client-spec-ca.pem');
const STUB_CA_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBdummyCAforFederationClientSpecOnly==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
`;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Peer row factory
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makePeerRow(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
id: PEER_ID,
commonName: 'peer-example-com',
displayName: 'Test Peer',
certPem: TEST_CERT_PEM,
certSerial: TEST_CERT_SERIAL,
certNotAfter: new Date('2030-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
clientKeyPem: SEALED_KEY,
state: 'active' as const,
endpointUrl: ENDPOINT,
lastSeenAt: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
revokedAt: null,
...overrides,
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock DB builder
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeDb(selectRows: unknown[] = [makePeerRow()]): Db {
const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectRows);
const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereSelect });
const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
return {
select: selectMock,
insert: vi.fn(),
update: vi.fn(),
delete: vi.fn(),
transaction: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as Db;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers for MockAgent HTTP interception
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Create a MockAgent + MockPool for the peer endpoint, set it as the global
* dispatcher, and return both for per-test configuration.
*/
function makeMockAgent() {
const mockAgent = new MockAgent({ connections: 1 });
mockAgent.disableNetConnect();
setGlobalDispatcher(mockAgent);
const pool = mockAgent.get(ENDPOINT);
return { mockAgent, pool };
}
/**
* Build a FederationClientService with a mock DB and a spy on the internal
* fetch so we can intercept at the HTTP layer via MockAgent.
*
* The service calls `fetch(url, { dispatcher: agent })` where `agent` is the
* mTLS undici.Agent built from the peer's cert+key. To make MockAgent work,
* we need the fetch dispatcher to be the MockAgent, not the per-peer Agent.
*
* Strategy: we replace the private `resolveEntry` result's `agent` field with
* the MockAgent's pool, so fetch uses our interceptor. We do this by spying
* on `resolveEntry` and returning a controlled entry.
*/
function makeService(db: Db, mockPool: Dispatcher): FederationClientService {
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
// Override resolveEntry to inject MockAgent pool as the dispatcher
vi.spyOn(
svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> },
'resolveEntry',
).mockImplementation(async (_peerId: string) => {
// Still call DB (via the real logic) to exercise peer validation,
// but return mock pool as the agent.
// For simplicity in unit tests, directly return a controlled entry.
return {
agent: mockPool,
endpointUrl: ENDPOINT,
certPem: TEST_CERT_PEM,
certSerial: TEST_CERT_SERIAL,
};
});
return svc;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test setup
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let originalDispatcher: Dispatcher;
beforeAll(() => {
// Seal the test key once — requires BETTER_AUTH_SECRET
const saved = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
try {
SEALED_KEY = sealClientKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM);
} finally {
if (saved === undefined) {
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
} else {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = saved;
}
}
writeFileSync(STUB_CA_PEM_PATH, STUB_CA_PEM, 'utf8');
});
afterAll(() => {
try {
unlinkSync(STUB_CA_PEM_PATH);
} catch {
// best-effort cleanup
}
});
beforeEach(() => {
originalDispatcher = getGlobalDispatcher();
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'] = STUB_CA_PEM_PATH;
});
afterEach(() => {
setGlobalDispatcher(originalDispatcher);
vi.restoreAllMocks();
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
delete process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Successful list response body */
const LIST_BODY = {
items: [{ id: '1', title: 'Task One' }],
nextCursor: undefined,
_partial: false,
};
/** Successful get response body */
const GET_BODY = {
item: { id: '1', title: 'Task One' },
_partial: false,
};
/** Successful capabilities response body */
const CAP_BODY = {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
supported_verbs: ['list', 'get', 'capabilities'] as const,
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('FederationClientService', () => {
// ─── Successful verb calls ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('list()', () => {
it('returns parsed typed response on success', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool
.intercept({
path: '/api/federation/v1/list/tasks',
method: 'POST',
})
.reply(200, LIST_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
const result = await svc.list(PEER_ID, 'tasks', {});
expect(result.items).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.items[0]).toMatchObject({ id: '1', title: 'Task One' });
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
describe('get()', () => {
it('returns parsed typed response on success', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool
.intercept({
path: '/api/federation/v1/get/tasks/1',
method: 'POST',
})
.reply(200, GET_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
const result = await svc.get(PEER_ID, 'tasks', '1', {});
expect(result.item).toMatchObject({ id: '1', title: 'Task One' });
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
describe('capabilities()', () => {
it('returns parsed capabilities response on success', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool
.intercept({
path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities',
method: 'GET',
})
.reply(200, CAP_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
const result = await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
expect(result.resources).toContain('tasks');
expect(result.max_rows_per_query).toBe(100);
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
// ─── HTTP error surfaces ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('non-2xx responses', () => {
it('surfaces 403 as FederationClientError({ status: 403, code: "FORBIDDEN" })', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/list/tasks', method: 'POST' }).reply(
403,
{ error: { code: 'forbidden', message: 'Access denied' } },
{
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
},
);
await expect(svc.list(PEER_ID, 'tasks', {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 403,
code: 'FORBIDDEN',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
await mockAgent.close();
});
it('surfaces 404 as FederationClientError({ status: 404, code: "HTTP_404" })', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/get/tasks/999', method: 'POST' }).reply(
404,
{ error: { code: 'not_found', message: 'Not found' } },
{
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
},
);
await expect(svc.get(PEER_ID, 'tasks', '999', {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 404,
code: 'HTTP_404',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
// ─── Network error ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('network errors', () => {
it('surfaces network error as FederationClientError({ code: "NETWORK" })', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool
.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
.replyWithError(new Error('ECONNREFUSED'));
await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'NETWORK',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
// ─── Invalid response body ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('invalid response body', () => {
it('surfaces as FederationClientError({ code: "INVALID_RESPONSE" }) when body shape is wrong', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
// capabilities returns wrong shape (missing required fields)
pool
.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
.reply(200, { totally: 'wrong' }, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
// ─── Peer DB validation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('peer validation (without resolveEntry spy)', () => {
/**
* These tests exercise the real `resolveEntry` path — no spy on resolveEntry.
*/
it('throws PEER_NOT_FOUND when peer is not in DB', async () => {
// DB returns empty array (peer not found)
const db = makeDb([]);
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
});
it('throws PEER_INACTIVE when peer state is not "active"', async () => {
const db = makeDb([makePeerRow({ state: 'suspended' })]);
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'PEER_INACTIVE',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
});
});
// ─── Cache behaviour ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('cache behaviour', () => {
it('hits cache on second call — only one DB lookup happens', async () => {
// Verify cache by calling the private resolveEntry directly twice and
// asserting the DB was queried only once. This avoids the HTTP layer,
// which would require either a real network or per-peer Agent rewiring
// that the cache invariant doesn't depend on.
const db = makeDb();
const selectSpy = vi.spyOn(db, 'select');
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
const resolveEntry = (
svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> }
).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
const first = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
const second = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
expect(first).toBe(second);
expect(selectSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('serializes concurrent resolveEntry calls — only one DB lookup', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const selectSpy = vi.spyOn(db, 'select');
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
const resolveEntry = (
svc as unknown as {
resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
}
).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
const [a, b] = await Promise.all([resolveEntry(PEER_ID), resolveEntry(PEER_ID)]);
expect(a).toBe(b);
expect(selectSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('flushPeer destroys the evicted Agent so old TLS connections close', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
const resolveEntry = (
svc as unknown as {
resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<{ agent: { destroy: () => Promise<void> } }>;
}
).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
const entry = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
const destroySpy = vi.spyOn(entry.agent, 'destroy').mockResolvedValue();
svc.flushPeer(PEER_ID);
expect(destroySpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('flushPeer() invalidates cache — next call re-reads DB', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
const svc = makeService(db, pool);
pool
.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
.reply(200, CAP_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } })
.times(2);
// First call — populates cache (via mock resolveEntry)
await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
// Flush the cache
svc.flushPeer(PEER_ID);
// The spy on resolveEntry is still active — check it's called again after flush
const resolveEntrySpy = vi.spyOn(
svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> },
'resolveEntry',
);
// Second call after flush — should call resolveEntry again
await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
// resolveEntry should have been called once after we started spying (post-flush)
expect(resolveEntrySpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
await mockAgent.close();
});
});
// ─── loadStepCaRoot env-var guard ─────────────────────────────────────────
describe('loadStepCaRoot() env-var guard', () => {
it('throws PEER_MISCONFIGURED when STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set', async () => {
delete process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
const db = makeDb();
const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
const resolveEntry = (
svc as unknown as {
resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
}
).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
await expect(resolveEntry(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
});
});
});
// ─── FederationClientError class ──────────────────────────────────────────
describe('FederationClientError', () => {
it('is instanceof Error and FederationClientError', () => {
const err = new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
message: 'test',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(FederationClientError);
expect(err.name).toBe('FederationClientError');
});
it('carries status, code, and peerId', () => {
const err = new FederationClientError({
status: 403,
code: 'FORBIDDEN',
message: 'forbidden',
peerId: PEER_ID,
});
expect(err.status).toBe(403);
expect(err.code).toBe('FORBIDDEN');
expect(err.peerId).toBe(PEER_ID);
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { FederationListResponse } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import {
FederationClientError,
type FederationClientService,
} from '../federation-client.service.js';
import { type QuerySourceError, QuerySourceService } from '../query-source.service.js';
interface TestRow {
id: string;
title: string;
}
interface PeerRow {
id: string;
commonName: string;
endpointUrl: string | null;
clientKeyPem: string | null;
state: 'active' | 'pending' | 'suspended' | 'revoked';
}
const LOCAL_ROWS: TestRow[] = [
{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' },
{ id: 'local-2', title: 'Local Two' },
];
const PEER_A: PeerRow = {
id: 'aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa',
commonName: 'peer-a',
endpointUrl: 'https://peer-a.example.com',
clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-a',
state: 'active',
};
const PEER_B: PeerRow = {
id: 'bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb',
commonName: 'peer-b',
endpointUrl: 'https://peer-b.example.com',
clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-b',
state: 'active',
};
const PEER_LOCALHOST: PeerRow = {
id: 'cccccccc-cccc-cccc-cccc-cccccccccccc',
commonName: 'peer-localhost',
endpointUrl: 'https://localhost:3001',
clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-c',
state: 'active',
};
function makeDb(activePeers: PeerRow[]): Db {
const orderBy = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(activePeers);
const where = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ orderBy });
const from = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where });
const select = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from });
return {
select,
insert: vi.fn(),
update: vi.fn(),
delete: vi.fn(),
transaction: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as Db;
}
function makeFederationClient(
list: (
peerId: string,
resource: string,
request: Record<string, unknown>,
) => Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>>,
): FederationClientService {
return {
list: list as unknown as FederationClientService['list'],
} as FederationClientService;
}
function makeLocalResponse(rows: TestRow[] = LOCAL_ROWS): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> {
return Promise.resolve({ items: rows });
}
describe('QuerySourceService', () => {
it('routes source="local" to the local executor and tags rows as local', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({ items: [] }));
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'local',
resource: 'tasks',
request: { cursor: 'ignored-for-local-test' },
local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
{ id: 'local-2', title: 'Local Two', _source: 'local' },
],
});
expect(list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('routes source="federated:<host>" to the matching active peer and tags rows with peer commonName', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(
async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
items: [{ id: 'remote-1', title: 'Remote One' }],
}),
);
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'federated:peer-b.example.com',
resource: 'tasks',
request: { status: 'open' },
local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [{ id: 'remote-1', title: 'Remote One', _source: 'peer-b' }],
});
expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PEER_B.id, 'tasks', { status: 'open' });
});
it('matches federated hosts by endpoint host including non-default port', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(
async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
items: [{ id: 'remote-port', title: 'Remote Port' }],
}),
);
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_LOCALHOST]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'federated:localhost:3001',
resource: 'tasks',
request: {},
local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [{ id: 'remote-port', title: 'Remote Port', _source: 'peer-localhost' }],
});
expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PEER_LOCALHOST.id, 'tasks', {});
});
it('fans out source="all" to local plus every active outbound peer in parallel and merges tagged rows', async () => {
const callOrder: string[] = [];
const list = vi.fn(async (peerId: string): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => {
callOrder.push(`remote-start:${peerId}`);
await Promise.resolve();
return {
items: [{ id: `remote-${peerId.slice(0, 1)}`, title: `Remote ${peerId.slice(0, 1)}` }],
};
});
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'all',
resource: 'tasks',
request: { limit: 25 },
local: async () => {
callOrder.push('local-start');
await Promise.resolve();
return { items: [{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }] };
},
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote a', _source: 'peer-a' },
{ id: 'remote-b', title: 'Remote b', _source: 'peer-b' },
],
});
expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(callOrder).toEqual([
'local-start',
`remote-start:${PEER_A.id}`,
`remote-start:${PEER_B.id}`,
]);
});
it('marks source="all" as partial and truncated when any subquery returns a cursor', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(
async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
items: [{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A' }],
nextCursor: 'remote-next',
}),
);
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'all',
resource: 'tasks',
request: {},
local: () => makeLocalResponse([{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }]),
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A', _source: 'peer-a' },
],
_partial: true,
_truncated: true,
});
});
it('returns _partial=true for source="all" when one peer fails without dropping successful sources', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(async (peerId: string): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => {
if (peerId === PEER_B.id) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'NETWORK',
message: 'peer unavailable',
peerId,
});
}
return { items: [{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A' }] };
});
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'all',
resource: 'tasks',
request: {},
local: () => makeLocalResponse([{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }]),
});
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A', _source: 'peer-a' },
],
_partial: true,
});
});
it('throws QuerySourceError when a federated host does not match an active outbound peer', async () => {
const list = vi.fn(async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({ items: [] }));
const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
await expect(
service.list<TestRow>({
source: 'federated:missing.example.com',
resource: 'tasks',
request: {},
local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
}),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
name: 'QuerySourceError',
code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
} satisfies Partial<QuerySourceError>);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
/**
* FederationClientService — outbound mTLS client for federation requests (FED-M3-08).
*
* Dials peer gateways over mTLS using the cert+sealed-key stored in `federation_peers`,
* invokes federation verbs (list / get / capabilities), and surfaces all failure modes
* as typed `FederationClientError` instances.
*
* ## Error code taxonomy
*
* | Code | When |
* | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
* | PEER_NOT_FOUND | No row in federation_peers for the given peerId |
* | PEER_INACTIVE | Peer row exists but state !== 'active' |
* | PEER_MISCONFIGURED | Peer row is active but missing endpointUrl or clientKeyPem |
* | NETWORK | undici threw a connection / TLS / timeout error |
* | HTTP_{status} | Peer returned a non-2xx response (e.g. HTTP_403, HTTP_404) |
* | FORBIDDEN | Peer returned 403 (convenience alias alongside HTTP_403) |
* | INVALID_RESPONSE | Response body failed Zod schema validation |
*
* ## Cache strategy
*
* Per-peer `undici.Agent` instances are cached in a `Map<peerId, AgentCacheEntry>` for
* the lifetime of the service instance. The cache is keyed on peerId (UUID).
*
* Cache invalidation:
* - `flushPeer(peerId)` — removes the entry immediately. M5/M6 MUST call this on
* cert rotation or peer revocation events so the next request re-reads the DB and
* builds a fresh TLS Agent with the new cert material.
* - On cache miss: re-reads the DB, checks state === 'active', rebuilds Agent.
*
* Cache does NOT auto-expire. The service is expected to be a singleton scoped to the
* NestJS application lifecycle; flushing on revocation/rotation is the only invalidation
* path by design (avoids redundant DB round-trips on the hot path).
*/
import { Injectable, Inject, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { Agent, fetch as undiciFetch } from 'undici';
import type { Dispatcher } from 'undici';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { type Db, eq, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import {
FederationListResponseSchema,
FederationGetResponseSchema,
FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema,
FederationErrorEnvelopeSchema,
type FederationListResponse,
type FederationGetResponse,
type FederationCapabilitiesResponse,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { unsealClientKey } from '../peer-key.util.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Error taxonomy
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Client-side error code set. Distinct from the server-side `FederationErrorCode`
* (which lives in `@mosaicstack/types`) because the client has additional failure
* modes (PEER_NOT_FOUND, PEER_INACTIVE, PEER_MISCONFIGURED, NETWORK) that the
* server never emits.
*/
export type FederationClientErrorCode =
| 'PEER_NOT_FOUND'
| 'PEER_INACTIVE'
| 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED'
| 'NETWORK'
| 'FORBIDDEN'
| 'INVALID_RESPONSE'
| `HTTP_${number}`;
export interface FederationClientErrorOptions {
status?: number;
code: FederationClientErrorCode;
message: string;
peerId: string;
cause?: unknown;
}
/**
* Thrown by FederationClientService on every failure path.
* Callers can dispatch on `error.code` for programmatic handling.
*/
export class FederationClientError extends Error {
readonly status?: number;
readonly code: FederationClientErrorCode;
readonly peerId: string;
readonly cause?: unknown;
constructor(opts: FederationClientErrorOptions) {
super(opts.message);
this.name = 'FederationClientError';
this.status = opts.status;
this.code = opts.code;
this.peerId = opts.peerId;
this.cause = opts.cause;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal cache types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interface AgentCacheEntry {
agent: Agent;
endpointUrl: string;
certPem: string;
certSerial: string;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Service
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Injectable()
export class FederationClientService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(FederationClientService.name);
/**
* Per-peer undici Agent cache.
* Key = peerId (UUID string).
*
* Values are either a resolved `AgentCacheEntry` or an in-flight
* `Promise<AgentCacheEntry>` (promise-cache pattern). Storing the promise
* prevents duplicate DB lookups and duplicate key-unseal operations when two
* requests for the same peer arrive before the first build completes.
*
* Flush via `flushPeer(peerId)` on cert rotation / peer revocation (M5/M6).
*/
private readonly cache = new Map<string, AgentCacheEntry | Promise<AgentCacheEntry>>();
/**
* Step-CA root cert PEM, loaded once from `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
* Used as the trust anchor for peer server certificates so federation TLS is
* pinned to our PKI, not the public trust store. Lazily loaded on first use
* so unit tests that don't exercise the agent path can run without the env var.
*/
private cachedCaPem: string | null = null;
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public verb API
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Invoke the `list` verb on a remote peer.
*
* @param peerId UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
* @param resource Resource path, e.g. "tasks".
* @param request Free-form body sent as JSON in the POST body.
* @returns Parsed `FederationListResponse<T>`.
*/
async list<T>(
peerId: string,
resource: string,
request: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<FederationListResponse<T>> {
const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/list/${encodeURIComponent(resource)}`;
const body = await this.doPost(peerId, url, agent, request);
return this.parseWith<FederationListResponse<T>>(
peerId,
body,
FederationListResponseSchema(z.unknown()),
);
}
/**
* Invoke the `get` verb on a remote peer.
*
* @param peerId UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
* @param resource Resource path, e.g. "tasks".
* @param id Resource identifier.
* @param request Free-form body sent as JSON in the POST body.
* @returns Parsed `FederationGetResponse<T>`.
*/
async get<T>(
peerId: string,
resource: string,
id: string,
request: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<FederationGetResponse<T>> {
const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/get/${encodeURIComponent(resource)}/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`;
const body = await this.doPost(peerId, url, agent, request);
return this.parseWith<FederationGetResponse<T>>(
peerId,
body,
FederationGetResponseSchema(z.unknown()),
);
}
/**
* Invoke the `capabilities` verb on a remote peer.
*
* @param peerId UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
* @returns Parsed `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`.
*/
async capabilities(peerId: string): Promise<FederationCapabilitiesResponse> {
const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/capabilities`;
const body = await this.doGet(peerId, url, agent);
return this.parseWith<FederationCapabilitiesResponse>(
peerId,
body,
FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema,
);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cache management
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Flush the cached Agent for a specific peer.
*
* M5/M6 MUST call this on:
* - cert rotation events (so new cert material is picked up)
* - peer revocation events (so future requests fail at PEER_INACTIVE)
*
* After flushing, the next call to `list`, `get`, or `capabilities` for
* this peer will re-read the DB and rebuild the Agent.
*/
flushPeer(peerId: string): void {
const entry = this.cache.get(peerId);
if (entry === undefined) {
return;
}
this.cache.delete(peerId);
if (!(entry instanceof Promise)) {
// best-effort destroy; promise-cached entries skip destroy because
// the in-flight build owns its own Agent which will be GC'd when the
// owning request handles the rejection from the cache miss
entry.agent.destroy().catch(() => {
// intentionally ignored — destroy errors are not actionable
});
}
this.logger.log(`Cache flushed for peer ${peerId}`);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal helpers
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Load and cache the Step-CA root cert PEM from `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
* Throws `FederationClientError` if the env var is unset or the file cannot
* be read — mTLS to a peer without a pinned trust anchor would silently
* fall back to the public trust store.
*/
private loadStepCaRoot(): string {
if (this.cachedCaPem !== null) {
return this.cachedCaPem;
}
const path = process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
if (!path) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
message: 'STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set; refusing to dial peer without pinned CA trust',
peerId: '',
});
}
try {
const pem = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
this.cachedCaPem = pem;
return pem;
} catch (err) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
message: `Failed to read STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH (${path})`,
peerId: '',
cause: err,
});
}
}
/**
* Resolve the cache entry for a peer, reading DB on miss.
*
* Uses a promise-cache pattern: concurrent callers for the same uncached
* `peerId` all `await` the same in-flight `Promise<AgentCacheEntry>` so
* only one DB lookup and one key-unseal ever runs per peer per cache miss.
* The promise is replaced with the concrete entry on success, or deleted on
* rejection so a transient error does not poison the cache permanently.
*
* Throws `FederationClientError` with appropriate code if the peer is not
* found, is inactive, or is missing required fields.
*/
private async resolveEntry(peerId: string): Promise<AgentCacheEntry> {
const cached = this.cache.get(peerId);
if (cached) {
return cached; // Promise or concrete entry — both are awaitable
}
const inflight = this.buildEntry(peerId).then(
(entry) => {
this.cache.set(peerId, entry); // replace promise with concrete value
return entry;
},
(err: unknown) => {
this.cache.delete(peerId); // don't poison the cache with a rejected promise
throw err;
},
);
this.cache.set(peerId, inflight);
return inflight;
}
/**
* Build the `AgentCacheEntry` for a peer by reading the DB, validating the
* peer's state, unsealing the private key, and constructing the mTLS Agent.
*
* Throws `FederationClientError` with appropriate code if the peer is not
* found, is inactive, or is missing required fields.
*/
private async buildEntry(peerId: string): Promise<AgentCacheEntry> {
// DB lookup
const [peer] = await this.db
.select()
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
.limit(1);
if (!peer) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
message: `Federation peer ${peerId} not found`,
peerId,
});
}
if (peer.state !== 'active') {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_INACTIVE',
message: `Federation peer ${peerId} is not active (state: ${peer.state})`,
peerId,
});
}
if (!peer.endpointUrl || !peer.clientKeyPem) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
message: `Federation peer ${peerId} is missing endpointUrl or clientKeyPem`,
peerId,
});
}
// Unseal the private key
let privateKeyPem: string;
try {
privateKeyPem = unsealClientKey(peer.clientKeyPem);
} catch (err) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
message: `Failed to unseal client key for peer ${peerId}`,
peerId,
cause: err,
});
}
// Build mTLS agent — pin trust to Step-CA root so we never accept
// a peer cert signed by a public CA (defense against MITM with a
// publicly-trusted DV cert for the peer's hostname).
const agent = new Agent({
connect: {
cert: peer.certPem,
key: privateKeyPem,
ca: this.loadStepCaRoot(),
// rejectUnauthorized: true is the undici default for HTTPS
},
});
const entry: AgentCacheEntry = {
agent,
endpointUrl: peer.endpointUrl,
certPem: peer.certPem,
certSerial: peer.certSerial,
};
this.logger.log(`Agent cached for peer ${peerId} (serial: ${peer.certSerial})`);
return entry;
}
/**
* Execute a POST request with a JSON body.
* Returns the parsed response body as an unknown value.
* Throws `FederationClientError` on network errors and non-2xx responses.
*/
private async doPost(
peerId: string,
url: string,
agent: Dispatcher,
body: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<unknown> {
return this.doRequest(peerId, url, agent, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
}
/**
* Execute a GET request.
* Returns the parsed response body as an unknown value.
* Throws `FederationClientError` on network errors and non-2xx responses.
*/
private async doGet(peerId: string, url: string, agent: Dispatcher): Promise<unknown> {
return this.doRequest(peerId, url, agent, { method: 'GET' });
}
private async doRequest(
peerId: string,
url: string,
agent: Dispatcher,
init: { method: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; body?: string },
): Promise<unknown> {
let response: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof undiciFetch>>;
try {
response = await undiciFetch(url, {
...init,
dispatcher: agent,
});
} catch (err) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'NETWORK',
message: `Network error calling peer ${peerId} at ${url}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
peerId,
cause: err,
});
}
const rawBody = await response.text().catch(() => '');
if (!response.ok) {
const status = response.status;
// Attempt to parse as federation error envelope
let serverMessage = `HTTP ${status}`;
try {
const json: unknown = JSON.parse(rawBody);
const result = FederationErrorEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(json);
if (result.success) {
serverMessage = result.data.error.message;
}
} catch {
// Not valid JSON or not a federation envelope — use generic message
}
// Specific code for 403 (most actionable for callers); generic HTTP_{n} for others
const code: FederationClientErrorCode = status === 403 ? 'FORBIDDEN' : `HTTP_${status}`;
throw new FederationClientError({
status,
code,
message: `Peer ${peerId} returned ${status}: ${serverMessage}`,
peerId,
});
}
try {
return JSON.parse(rawBody) as unknown;
} catch (err) {
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
message: `Peer ${peerId} returned non-JSON body`,
peerId,
cause: err,
});
}
}
/**
* Parse and validate a response body against a Zod schema.
*
* For list/get, callers pass the result of `FederationListResponseSchema(z.unknown())`
* so that the envelope structure is validated without requiring a concrete item schema
* at the client level. The generic `T` provides compile-time typing.
*
* Throws `FederationClientError({ code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE' })` on parse failure.
*/
private parseWith<T>(peerId: string, body: unknown, schema: z.ZodTypeAny): T {
const result = schema.safeParse(body);
if (!result.success) {
const issues = result.error.issues
.map((e: z.ZodIssue) => `[${e.path.join('.') || 'root'}] ${e.message}`)
.join('; ');
throw new FederationClientError({
code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
message: `Peer ${peerId} returned invalid response shape: ${issues}`,
peerId,
});
}
return result.data as T;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
/**
* Federation client barrel — re-exports for FederationModule consumers.
*
* M3-09 (QuerySourceService) and future milestones should import from here,
* not directly from the implementation file.
*/
export {
FederationClientService,
FederationClientError,
type FederationClientErrorCode,
type FederationClientErrorOptions,
} from './federation-client.service.js';
export {
QuerySourceService,
QuerySourceError,
type QuerySource,
type QuerySourceErrorCode,
type QuerySourceErrorOptions,
type QuerySourceListOptions,
type QuerySourceListResponse,
type LocalListExecutor,
} from './query-source.service.js';
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
/**
* QuerySourceService — gateway query source router (FED-M3-09).
*
* Accepts the federation query-layer `source` selector and routes list-style
* reads to local storage, one federated peer, or all active outbound peers.
*
* `source: "all"` is intentionally tolerant of per-peer failures: local data
* and successful peer responses are returned, and the envelope is marked
* `_partial: true`. Local failures still reject because there is no safe local
* fallback and the gateway's own storage is expected to be authoritative.
*/
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { and, eq, federationPeers, isNotNull, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import {
SOURCE_LOCAL,
tagWithSource,
type FederationListResponse,
type SourceTag,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { FederationClientService } from './federation-client.service.js';
export type QuerySource = 'local' | 'all' | `federated:${string}`;
export type QuerySourceErrorCode = 'INVALID_SOURCE' | 'PEER_NOT_FOUND';
export interface QuerySourceErrorOptions {
code: QuerySourceErrorCode;
message: string;
source: string;
}
export class QuerySourceError extends Error {
readonly code: QuerySourceErrorCode;
readonly source: string;
constructor(opts: QuerySourceErrorOptions) {
super(opts.message);
this.name = 'QuerySourceError';
this.code = opts.code;
this.source = opts.source;
}
}
export type LocalListExecutor<T extends object> = () => Promise<FederationListResponse<T> | T[]>;
export interface QuerySourceListOptions<T extends object> {
source: QuerySource;
resource: string;
request?: Record<string, unknown>;
local: LocalListExecutor<T>;
}
export type QuerySourceListResponse<T extends object> = FederationListResponse<T & SourceTag>;
interface OutboundPeer {
id: string;
commonName: string;
endpointUrl: string;
}
interface TaggedList<T extends object> {
items: Array<T & SourceTag>;
partial: boolean;
truncated: boolean;
nextCursor?: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class QuerySourceService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(QuerySourceService.name);
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(FederationClientService) private readonly federationClient: FederationClientService,
) {}
async list<T extends object>(
options: QuerySourceListOptions<T>,
): Promise<QuerySourceListResponse<T>> {
const request = options.request ?? {};
if (options.source === 'local') {
const local = await this.runLocal(options.local);
return this.toResponse(this.tagList(local, SOURCE_LOCAL));
}
if (options.source === 'all') {
return this.listAll(options.resource, request, options.local);
}
if (options.source.startsWith('federated:')) {
const host = options.source.slice('federated:'.length).trim();
if (!host) {
throw new QuerySourceError({
code: 'INVALID_SOURCE',
message: 'Federated source must include a host after federated:',
source: options.source,
});
}
const peer = await this.findPeerByHost(host, options.source);
const remote = await this.federationClient.list<T>(peer.id, options.resource, request);
return this.toResponse(this.tagList(remote, peer.commonName));
}
throw new QuerySourceError({
code: 'INVALID_SOURCE',
message: `Unsupported query source: ${options.source}`,
source: options.source,
});
}
private async listAll<T extends object>(
resource: string,
request: Record<string, unknown>,
local: LocalListExecutor<T>,
): Promise<QuerySourceListResponse<T>> {
const peers = await this.listActiveOutboundPeers();
const localPromise = this.runLocal(local).then((response) =>
this.tagList(response, SOURCE_LOCAL),
);
const remotePromises = peers.map(async (peer: OutboundPeer): Promise<TaggedList<T> | null> => {
try {
const response = await this.federationClient.list<T>(peer.id, resource, request);
return this.tagList(response, peer.commonName);
} catch (error: unknown) {
this.logger.warn(
`Federated query to peer ${peer.commonName} (${peer.id}) failed; returning partial all-source response: ${
error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
}`,
);
return null;
}
});
const [localResult, ...remoteResults] = await Promise.all([localPromise, ...remotePromises]);
const successfulRemoteResults = remoteResults.filter(
(result: TaggedList<T> | null): result is TaggedList<T> => result !== null,
);
const allResults = [localResult, ...successfulRemoteResults];
const peerFailure = successfulRemoteResults.length !== peers.length;
return this.mergeTaggedLists(allResults, peerFailure);
}
private async runLocal<T extends object>(
local: LocalListExecutor<T>,
): Promise<FederationListResponse<T>> {
const response = await local();
if (Array.isArray(response)) {
return { items: response };
}
return response;
}
private tagList<T extends object>(
response: FederationListResponse<T>,
source: string,
): TaggedList<T> {
return {
items: tagWithSource(response.items, source),
partial: response._partial === true,
truncated: response._truncated === true || response.nextCursor !== undefined,
nextCursor: response.nextCursor,
};
}
private mergeTaggedLists<T extends object>(
lists: Array<TaggedList<T>>,
peerFailure: boolean,
): QuerySourceListResponse<T> {
const items = lists.flatMap((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.items);
const partial =
peerFailure ||
lists.some((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.partial || list.nextCursor !== undefined);
const truncated = lists.some((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.truncated);
const response: QuerySourceListResponse<T> = { items };
if (partial) {
response._partial = true;
}
if (truncated) {
response._truncated = true;
}
return response;
}
private toResponse<T extends object>(tagged: TaggedList<T>): QuerySourceListResponse<T> {
const response: QuerySourceListResponse<T> = {
items: tagged.items,
};
if (tagged.nextCursor !== undefined) {
response.nextCursor = tagged.nextCursor;
}
if (tagged.partial) {
response._partial = true;
}
if (tagged.truncated) {
response._truncated = true;
}
return response;
}
private async findPeerByHost(sourceHost: string, source: string): Promise<OutboundPeer> {
const host = normalizeHost(sourceHost);
const peers = await this.listActiveOutboundPeers();
const peer = peers.find((candidate: OutboundPeer) => {
const commonName = normalizeHost(candidate.commonName);
const endpointHosts = endpointHostKeys(candidate.endpointUrl).map((endpointHost: string) =>
normalizeHost(endpointHost),
);
return commonName === host || endpointHosts.includes(host);
});
if (!peer) {
throw new QuerySourceError({
code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
message: `No active outbound federation peer matches source ${source}`,
source,
});
}
return peer;
}
private async listActiveOutboundPeers(): Promise<OutboundPeer[]> {
const rows = await this.db
.select({
id: federationPeers.id,
commonName: federationPeers.commonName,
endpointUrl: federationPeers.endpointUrl,
})
.from(federationPeers)
.where(
and(
eq(federationPeers.state, 'active'),
isNotNull(federationPeers.endpointUrl),
isNotNull(federationPeers.clientKeyPem),
),
)
.orderBy(federationPeers.commonName);
return rows.filter((row): row is OutboundPeer => typeof row.endpointUrl === 'string');
}
}
function normalizeHost(host: string): string {
return host.trim().toLowerCase();
}
function endpointHostKeys(endpointUrl: string): string[] {
try {
const url = new URL(endpointUrl);
return Array.from(new Set([url.host, url.hostname].filter((host: string) => host.length > 0)));
} catch {
return [];
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
/**
* EnrollmentController — federation enrollment HTTP layer (FED-M2-07).
*
* Routes:
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens — admin creates a single-use token
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token — unauthenticated; token IS the auth
*/
import {
Body,
Controller,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
Param,
Post,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto, RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
@Controller('api/federation/enrollment')
export class EnrollmentController {
constructor(@Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService) {}
/**
* Admin-only: generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
* The token should be distributed out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
*
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens
*/
@Post('tokens')
@UseGuards(AdminGuard)
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createToken(@Body() dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
return this.enrollmentService.createToken(dto);
}
/**
* Unauthenticated: remote peer redeems a token by submitting its CSR.
* The token itself is the credential — no session or bearer token required.
*
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token
*
* Returns the signed leaf cert and full chain PEM on success.
* Returns 410 Gone if the token was already used or has expired.
*/
@Post(':token')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
async redeem(@Param('token') token: string, @Body() dto: RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto) {
return this.enrollmentService.redeem(token, dto.csrPem);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* DTOs for the federation enrollment flow (FED-M2-07).
*
* CreateEnrollmentTokenDto — admin generates a single-use enrollment token
* RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto — remote peer submits CSR to redeem the token
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class CreateEnrollmentTokenDto {
/** UUID of the federation grant this token will activate on redemption. */
@IsUUID()
grantId!: string;
/** UUID of the peer record that will receive the issued cert on redemption. */
@IsUUID()
peerId!: string;
/**
* Token lifetime in seconds. Default 900 (15 min). Min 60. Max 900.
* After this time the token is rejected even if unused.
*/
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(900)
ttlSeconds: number = 900;
}
export class RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto {
/** PEM-encoded PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request from the remote peer. */
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
csrPem!: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
/**
* EnrollmentService — single-use enrollment token lifecycle (FED-M2-07).
*
* Responsibilities:
* 1. Generate time-limited single-use enrollment tokens (admin action).
* 2. Redeem a token: validate → atomically claim token → issue cert via
* CaService → transactionally activate grant + update peer + write audit.
*
* Replay protection: the token is claimed (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL) BEFORE
* cert issuance. This prevents double cert minting on concurrent requests.
* If cert issuance fails after claim, the token is consumed and the grant
* stays pending — admin must create a new grant.
*/
import {
BadRequestException,
ConflictException,
GoneException,
Inject,
Injectable,
Logger,
NotFoundException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
// X509Certificate is available as a named export in Node.js ≥ 15.6
const { X509Certificate } = crypto;
import {
type Db,
and,
eq,
isNull,
sql,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
federationGrants,
federationPeers,
federationAuditLog,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from './scope-schema.js';
import type { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
export interface EnrollmentTokenResult {
token: string;
expiresAt: string;
}
export interface RedeemResult {
certPem: string;
certChainPem: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class EnrollmentService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(EnrollmentService.name);
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
private readonly caService: CaService,
private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
) {}
/**
* Generate a single-use enrollment token for an admin to distribute
* out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
*/
async createToken(dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto): Promise<EnrollmentTokenResult> {
const ttl = Math.min(dto.ttlSeconds, 900);
// MED-3: Verify the grantId ↔ peerId binding — prevents attacker from
// cross-wiring grants to attacker-controlled peers.
const [grant] = await this.db
.select({ peerId: federationGrants.peerId })
.from(federationGrants)
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, dto.grantId))
.limit(1);
if (!grant) {
throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${dto.grantId} not found`);
}
if (grant.peerId !== dto.peerId) {
throw new BadRequestException(`peerId does not match the grant's registered peer`);
}
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ttl * 1000);
await this.db.insert(federationEnrollmentTokens).values({
token,
grantId: dto.grantId,
peerId: dto.peerId,
expiresAt,
});
this.logger.log(
`Enrollment token created — grantId=${dto.grantId} peerId=${dto.peerId} expiresAt=${expiresAt.toISOString()}`,
);
return { token, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString() };
}
/**
* Redeem an enrollment token.
*
* Full flow:
* 1. Fetch token row — NotFoundException if not found
* 2. usedAt set → GoneException (already used)
* 3. expiresAt < now → GoneException (expired)
* 4. Load grant — verify status is 'pending'
* 5. Atomically claim token (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL RETURNING token)
* — if no rows returned, concurrent request won → GoneException
* 6. Issue cert via CaService (network call, outside transaction)
* — if this fails, token is consumed; grant stays pending; admin must recreate
* 7. Transaction: activate grant + update peer record + write audit log
* 8. Return { certPem, certChainPem }
*/
async redeem(token: string, csrPem: string): Promise<RedeemResult> {
// HIGH-5: Track outcome so we can write a failure audit row on any error.
let outcome: 'allowed' | 'denied' = 'denied';
// row may be undefined if the token is not found — used defensively in catch.
let row: typeof federationEnrollmentTokens.$inferSelect | undefined;
try {
// 1. Fetch token row
const [fetchedRow] = await this.db
.select()
.from(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token))
.limit(1);
if (!fetchedRow) {
throw new NotFoundException('Enrollment token not found');
}
row = fetchedRow;
// 2. Already used?
if (row.usedAt !== null) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used');
}
// 3. Expired?
if (row.expiresAt < new Date()) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has expired');
}
// 4. Load grant and verify it is still pending
let grant;
try {
grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(row.grantId);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
throw new BadRequestException(err.message);
}
throw err;
}
if (grant.status !== 'pending') {
throw new GoneException(
`Grant ${row.grantId} is no longer pending (status: ${grant.status})`,
);
}
// 5. Atomically claim the token BEFORE cert issuance to prevent double-minting.
// WHERE used_at IS NULL ensures only one concurrent request wins.
// Using .returning() works on both node-postgres and PGlite without rowCount inspection.
const claimed = await this.db
.update(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.set({ usedAt: sql`NOW()` })
.where(
and(
eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token),
isNull(federationEnrollmentTokens.usedAt),
),
)
.returning({ token: federationEnrollmentTokens.token });
if (claimed.length === 0) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used (concurrent request)');
}
// 6. Issue certificate via CaService (network call — outside any transaction).
// If this throws, the token is already consumed. The grant stays pending.
// Admin must revoke the grant and create a new one.
let issued;
try {
issued = await this.caService.issueCert({
csrPem,
grantId: row.grantId,
subjectUserId: grant.subjectUserId,
ttlSeconds: 300,
});
} catch (err) {
// HIGH-4: Log only the first 8 hex chars of the token for correlation — never log the full token.
this.logger.error(
`issueCert failed after token ${token.slice(0, 8)}... was claimed — grant ${row.grantId} is stranded pending`,
err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
);
if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
throw new BadRequestException((err as Error).message);
}
throw err;
}
// 7. Atomically activate grant, update peer record, and write audit log.
const certNotAfter = this.extractCertNotAfter(issued.certPem);
await this.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
// CRIT-2: Guard activation with WHERE status='pending' to prevent double-activation.
const [activated] = await tx
.update(federationGrants)
.set({ status: 'active' })
.where(and(eq(federationGrants.id, row!.grantId), eq(federationGrants.status, 'pending')))
.returning({ id: federationGrants.id });
if (!activated) {
throw new ConflictException(
`Grant ${row!.grantId} is no longer pending — cannot activate`,
);
}
// CRIT-2: Guard peer update with WHERE state='pending'.
await tx
.update(federationPeers)
.set({
certPem: issued.certPem,
certSerial: issued.serialNumber,
certNotAfter,
state: 'active',
})
.where(and(eq(federationPeers.id, row!.peerId), eq(federationPeers.state, 'pending')));
await tx.insert(federationAuditLog).values({
requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
peerId: row!.peerId,
grantId: row!.grantId,
verb: 'enrollment',
resource: 'federation_grant',
statusCode: 200,
outcome: 'allowed',
});
});
this.logger.log(
`Enrollment complete — peerId=${row.peerId} grantId=${row.grantId} serial=${issued.serialNumber}`,
);
outcome = 'allowed';
// 8. Return cert material
return {
certPem: issued.certPem,
certChainPem: issued.certChainPem,
};
} catch (err) {
// HIGH-5: Best-effort audit write on failure — do not let this throw.
if (outcome === 'denied') {
await this.db
.insert(federationAuditLog)
.values({
requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
peerId: row?.peerId ?? null,
grantId: row?.grantId ?? null,
verb: 'enrollment',
resource: 'federation_grant',
statusCode:
err instanceof GoneException ? 410 : err instanceof NotFoundException ? 404 : 500,
outcome: 'denied',
})
.catch(() => {});
}
throw err;
}
}
/**
* Extract the notAfter date from a PEM certificate.
* HIGH-2: No silent fallback — a cert that cannot be parsed should fail loud.
*/
private extractCertNotAfter(certPem: string): Date {
const cert = new X509Certificate(certPem);
return new Date(cert.validTo);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
/**
* DTOs for the federation admin controller (FED-M2-08).
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUrl, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class CreatePeerKeypairDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
commonName!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
displayName!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsUrl()
endpointUrl?: string;
}
export class StorePeerCertDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
certPem!: string;
}
export class GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(900)
ttlSeconds: number = 900;
}
export class RevokeGrantBodyDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
reason?: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
/**
* FederationController — admin REST API for federation management (FED-M2-08).
*
* Routes (all under /api/admin/federation, all require AdminGuard):
*
* Grant management:
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
*
* Peer management:
* GET /api/admin/federation/peers
* POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
*
* NOTE: The enrollment REDEMPTION endpoint (POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token)
* is handled by EnrollmentController — not duplicated here.
*/
import {
Body,
Controller,
Get,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
NotFoundException,
Param,
Patch,
Post,
Query,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
import { X509Certificate } from 'node:crypto';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
import { type Db, eq, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { sealClientKey } from './peer-key.util.js';
import { CreateGrantDto, ListGrantsDto } from './grants.dto.js';
import {
CreatePeerKeypairDto,
GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto,
RevokeGrantBodyDto,
StorePeerCertDto,
} from './federation-admin.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Convert an ArrayBuffer to a Base64 string (for PEM encoding).
*/
function arrayBufferToBase64(buf: ArrayBuffer): string {
const bytes = new Uint8Array(buf);
let binary = '';
for (const b of bytes) {
binary += String.fromCharCode(b);
}
return Buffer.from(binary, 'binary').toString('base64');
}
/**
* Wrap a Base64 string in PEM armour.
*/
function toPem(label: string, b64: string): string {
const lines = b64.match(/.{1,64}/g) ?? [];
return `-----BEGIN ${label}-----\n${lines.join('\n')}\n-----END ${label}-----\n`;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Controller
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Controller('api/admin/federation')
@UseGuards(AdminGuard)
export class FederationController {
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(GrantsService) private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
@Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService,
) {}
// ─── Grant management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants
* Create a new grant in pending state.
*/
@Post('grants')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createGrant(@Body() body: CreateGrantDto) {
return this.grantsService.createGrant(body);
}
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants
* List grants with optional filters.
*/
@Get('grants')
async listGrants(@Query() query: ListGrantsDto) {
return this.grantsService.listGrants(query);
}
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
* Get a single grant by ID.
*/
@Get('grants/:id')
async getGrant(@Param('id') id: string) {
return this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
}
/**
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
* Revoke an active grant.
*/
@Patch('grants/:id/revoke')
async revokeGrant(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: RevokeGrantBodyDto) {
return this.grantsService.revokeGrant(id, body.reason);
}
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
* Generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
* Returns the token plus an enrollmentUrl the operator shares out-of-band.
*/
@Post('grants/:id/tokens')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async generateToken(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
const grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
const result = await this.enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: id,
peerId: grant.peerId,
ttlSeconds: body.ttlSeconds ?? 900,
});
const baseUrl = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
const enrollmentUrl = `${baseUrl}/api/federation/enrollment/${result.token}`;
return {
token: result.token,
expiresAt: result.expiresAt,
enrollmentUrl,
};
}
// ─── Peer management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/peers
* List all federation peer rows.
*/
@Get('peers')
async listPeers() {
return this.db.select().from(federationPeers).orderBy(federationPeers.commonName);
}
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* Generate a new peer entry with EC P-256 key pair and a PKCS#10 CSR.
*
* Flow:
* 1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via webcrypto
* 2. Generate a self-signed CSR via @peculiar/x509
* 3. Export private key as PEM
* 4. sealClientKey(privatePem) → sealed blob
* 5. Insert pending peer row
* 6. Return { peerId, csrPem }
*/
@Post('peers/keypair')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createPeerKeypair(@Body() body: CreatePeerKeypairDto) {
// 1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via Web Crypto
const keyPair = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
true, // extractable
['sign', 'verify'],
);
// 2. Generate PKCS#10 CSR
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: `CN=${body.commonName}`,
keys: keyPair,
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
});
const csrPem = csr.toString('pem');
// 3. Export private key as PKCS#8 PEM
const pkcs8Der = await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('pkcs8', keyPair.privateKey);
const privatePem = toPem('PRIVATE KEY', arrayBufferToBase64(pkcs8Der));
// 4. Seal the private key
const sealed = sealClientKey(privatePem);
// 5. Insert pending peer row
const [peer] = await this.db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
commonName: body.commonName,
displayName: body.displayName,
certPem: '',
certSerial: 'pending',
certNotAfter: new Date(0),
clientKeyPem: sealed,
state: 'pending',
endpointUrl: body.endpointUrl,
})
.returning();
return {
peerId: peer!.id,
csrPem,
};
}
/**
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
* Store a signed certificate after enrollment completes.
*
* Flow:
* 1. Parse the cert to extract serial and notAfter
* 2. Update the peer row with cert data + state='active'
* 3. Return the updated peer row
*/
@Patch('peers/:id/cert')
async storePeerCert(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: StorePeerCertDto) {
// Ensure peer exists
const [existing] = await this.db
.select({ id: federationPeers.id })
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
.limit(1);
if (!existing) {
throw new NotFoundException(`Peer ${id} not found`);
}
// 1. Parse cert
const x509 = new X509Certificate(body.certPem);
const certSerial = x509.serialNumber;
const certNotAfter = new Date(x509.validTo);
// 2. Update peer
const [updated] = await this.db
.update(federationPeers)
.set({
certPem: body.certPem,
certSerial,
certNotAfter,
state: 'active',
})
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
.returning();
return updated;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
@Module({
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
providers: [
AdminGuard,
CaService,
EnrollmentService,
GrantsService,
FederationClientService,
QuerySourceService,
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
],
exports: [
CaService,
EnrollmentService,
GrantsService,
FederationClientService,
QuerySourceService,
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
],
})
export class FederationModule {}

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